1 MARTIN D.

SINGER (SBN 78166)

mdsinger@lavelysinger.com
2 MICHAEL E. WEINSTEN (SBN 155680)
mweinsten@lavelysinger.com
3 MELISSA Y. LERNER (SBN 285216)
mlerner@lavelysinger.com
4 LAVELY & SINGER P.C.
2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400
5 Los Angeles, California 90067-2906
Telephone: (310) 556-3501; Fax: (310) 556-3615
6
Attorneys for Defendants
7 MELISSA JEFFERSON pka LIZZO and
BIG GRRRL BIG TOURING, INC.
8
THERESA J. MACELLARO (SBN 147866)
9 tmacellaro@macellaroLaw.com
THE MACELLARO FIRM, P.C.
10 1748 Preuss Road
Los Angeles, CA 90035
11 Telephone: (310) 399-8585; Fax: (310) 399-8686

12 Attorneys for Defendant SHIRLENE QUIGLEY

13 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

14 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

15 ARIANNA DAVIS, as an Individual; Case No. 23SMCV03553

CRYSTAL WILLIAMS, as an Individual; and
16 NOELLE RODRIGUEZ, as an Individual; [Hon. Mark H. Epstein,
Santa Monica Courthouse, Dept. I]
17 Plaintiffs,
DEFENDANTS’ NOTICE OF MOTION AND
18 vs. SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS’
COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO CAL. CIV. PROC.
19 BIG GRRRL BIG TOURING, INC., a CODE § 425.16; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
Delaware Corporation; MELISSA JEFFERSON AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT THEREOF
20 (pka “LIZZO”), as an Individual; SHIRLENE
QUIGLEY, as an Individual; and DOES 1 [Declarations of Melissa Jefferson pka Lizzo, Shirlene
21 through 10, inclusive, Quigley, Zuri Appleby, Asia Banks, Michel’le
Baptiste, RaVaughn Brown, Molly Gordon, Doshiniq
22 Defendants. Green, Dallas Greene, Carlina Gugliotta, Ashley Joshi,
Melissa Locke, Kiara Mooring, Tanisha Scott, Jayla
23 Sullivan, Chawnta Van, Alaini Walker, Alishia
Williams, Ashley Williams, Lynette Williams and
24 Melissa Y. Lerner; [Proposed] Order filed concurrently
herewith]
25
DATE: November 22, 2023
26 TIME: 9:00 a.m.
DEPT.: I
27
Reservation ID: 254547090713
28
Complaint Filed: August 1, 2023
7488-2
1
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

2 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on November 22, 2023 at 9:00 a.m., or as soon thereafter as this

3 matter may be heard in Department I of the above-entitled Court, located at 1725 Main Street, Santa

4 Monica, CA 90401, Defendants Melissa Jefferson pka Lizzo (“Lizzo”), Big Grrrl Big Touring, Inc.

5 (“BGBT”) and Shirlene Quigley (“Quigley”) (collectively, “Defendants”) will and hereby do move to

6 strike the Complaint filed by Plaintiffs Arianna Davis, Crystal Williams, and Noelle Rodriguez

7 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and each cause of action alleged therein pursuant to California Civil

8 Procedure Code Section 425.16, also known as the anti-SLAPP statute (the “Motion”). In the alternative,

9 Defendants will and hereby do move to strike certain allegations in the Complaint pursuant to the anti-

10 SLAPP statute:

11 1. Paragraphs 12, 16-19, 21-25, 35-39, 45-46, 48-51, 53, 55-57, 59, 64-65, 83, 92, 111-112, and
135 in their entirety.
12

13 2. Page 10, paragraph 34, lines 27-28 through page 11, lines 1-2, reading, “As it turns out,
LIZZO had planned a night out in Amsterdam’s notorious Red-Light District, known for its
14 abundance of sex theaters, sex shops, and clubs and bars where nudity is on full display. The
main event of the night was a club called Bananenbar, where patrons are allowed to interact
15 with completely nude performers.”
16 3. Page 15, paragraph 47, lines 7-9, reading, "Ms. DAVIS was required to finish the rehearsal,
17 dancing in front of male crew members who were known to sexualize the dances under less
revealing scenarios, while wearing completely transparent shorts and no undergarments."
18
4. Page 22, paragraph 73, lines 18-20 and lines 21-23, reading, “BGBT management was fully
19 aware and in fact in attendance at Bananenbar. Furthermore, Ms. QUIGLEY’s sexually
explicit comments were inescapable. . . . Ms. DAVIS made it known to BGBT management
20 and security that she was incredibly uncomfortable with being pressured into touching the
nude breasts of a performer at Bananenbar. Nothing was done.”
21

22 5. Page 24, paragraph 81, lines 15-17, reading, “Plaintiffs were subjected to a hostile work
environment due to, including but not limited to, Ms. QUIGLEY’s unceasing mission to
23 force Plaintiffs to conform to Ms. QUIGLEY’s religious beliefs.”

24 6. Page 25, paragraph 84, lines 4-9, reading, “Ms. QUIGLEY also attempted to strong arm Ms.
RODRIGUEZ into conforming to Ms. QUIGLEY’s dogmatic beliefs. Despite Ms.
25 RODRIGUEZ continually making it clear that she did not want to share Ms. QUIGLEY’s
beliefs or appreciate Ms. QUIGLEY’s proselytizing, Ms. QUIGLEY became irate. Ms.
26
QUIGLEY proclaimed to other members of the dance cast that it was Ms. QUIGLEY’s
27 personal mission to minster to Ms. RODRIGUEZ and make her a believer.”

28 7. Page 27, paragraph 93, lines 2-7, reading, “Ms. QUIGLEY also attempted to strong arm Ms.
RODRIGUEZ into conforming to Ms. QUIGLEY’s dogmatic beliefs. Despite Ms.
7488-2
2
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 RODRIGUEZ continually making it clear that she did not want to share Ms. QUIGLEY’s
1 beliefs or appreciate Ms. QUIGLEY’s proselytizing, Ms. QUIGLEY became irate. Ms.
2 QUIGLEY proclaimed to other members of the dance cast that it was Ms. QUIGLEY’s
personal mission to minster to Ms. RODRIGUEZ and make her a believer.”
3
8. Page 31, paragraph 110, lines 4-7, reading, "Furthermore, after Ms. DAVIS was made so
4 anxious during her re-audition that she believed she was not allowed to leave the stage,
leading to her losing control of her bladder, it should have been wildly apparent that Ms.
5 DAVIS was grappling with some stressor in her life."
6
9. Page 34, paragraph 126, lines 3-10, reading, “During the meeting in which Ms. DAVIS was
7 fired, LIZZO became increasingly more irate. When Ms. RODRIGUEZ explained that she
did not appreciate how LIZZO handled Ms. DAVIS’s termination and was therefore
8 resigning, LIZZO approached Ms. RODRIGUEZ aggressively, yelling profanities, cracking
her knuckles, and balling her fists apparently preparing herself attack Ms. RODRIGUEZ.
9 LIZZO exclaimed, “You’re lucky. You’re so fucking lucky!” Ms. RODRIGUEZ feared
LIZZO intended to hit her and would have done so if one of the other dancers had not
10
intervened. LIZZO was restrained and pulled away before she could contact Ms.
11 RODRIGUEZ.”

12 The Motion is made on the following grounds:

13 1. The allegations and requested relief in Plaintiffs’ Complaint constitute an attempt to
14 suppress and chill Defendants’ conduct in furtherance of their constitutional rights of petition and/or
15 free speech (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 425.16(a), (b)(1)); and
16 2. Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of establishing, through competent and admissible
17 evidence, a “probability” that they will prevail on their claims alleged in the Complaint (Cal. Civ. Proc.
18 Code § 425.16(b)(1)).
19 Defendants can satisfy the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute because each of Plaintiffs’ nine
20 asserted causes of action arise from statements and “other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of . . .
21 the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
22 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4). Specifically, the Complaint arises from conduct helping to
23 advance or assisting in Defendants’ exercise of their constitutional right of free speech with respect to
24 protected expressive works: the creation, development and production of the reality competition series
25 “Watch Out For The Big Grrrls” (“WOFTBG”) and the development, production, operation and
26 performance of Lizzo’s international stadium tour, “The Special Tour.” This conduct concerns issues
27 of public interest including, without limitation Lizzo’s popularity and celebrity as a musician, dancer,
28 actress, tastemaker and social justice advocate; the commercial and critical acclaim of her music and

7488-2
3
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 WOFTBG; her contributions to the public debate regarding concepts of body and sex positivity,

2 diversity and inclusion; and Lizzo’s public rejection of traditional notions of femininity, beauty and

3 athleticism in the music industry and pop culture more generally.

4 The Motion is timely filed within sixty (60) days of service of Plaintiffs’ Complaint on

5 Defendants. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(f). Should Defendants be deemed the prevailing party on

6 this Motion, Defendants will also seek an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred,

7 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, Section 425.16(c), upon the granting of this Motion.

8 This Motion is made and based upon this Notice of Motion and Motion, the accompanying

9 Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Declarations of Melissa Jefferson pka Lizzo, Shirlene

10 Quigley, Zuri Appleby, Asia Banks, Michel’le Baptiste, RaVaughn Brown, Molly Gordon, Doshiniq

11 Green, Dallas Greene, Carlina Gugliotta, Ashley Joshi, Melissa Locke, Kiara Mooring, Tanisha Scott,

12 Jayla Sullivan, Chawnta Van, Alaini Walker, Alishia Williams, Ashley Williams, Lynette Williams and

13 Melissa Y. Lerner, and all exhibits and attachments thereto; the pleadings and documents on file in this

14 action; any matters upon which the Court may take judicial notice; and upon any further oral or written

15 argument in evidence the Court may receive prior to or at the time of the hearing of the Motion.

16
Dated: October 27, 2023 LAVELY & SINGER PC
17 MARTIN D. SINGER
MICHAEL E. WEINSTEN
18 MELISSA Y. LERNER

19
By: ___s/ Martin D. Singer_________________
20 MARTIN D. SINGER
Attorneys for Defendants MELISSA JEFFERSON
21 pka LIZZO and BIG GRRRL BIG TOURING,
INC.
22
Dated: October 27, 2023 THE MACELLARO FIRM, P.C.
23 THERESA J. MACELLARO

24
By: ___s/ Theresa J. Macellaro_____________
25 THERESA J. MACELLARO
Attorneys for Defendant SHIRLENE QUIGLEY
26

27

28

7488-2
4
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

3 I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

4 II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS .......................................................................................... 2

5 A. Plaintiffs’ Sexual Harassment Allegations Lack Merit ...................................................... 2

6 B. Plaintiffs’ Racial Discrimination Claims Are Unavailing .................................................. 4

C. Plaintiffs’ Religious Harassment Claims Are Meritless ..................................................... 4
7
D. There Is No Evidence of Disability Discrimination or Body Shaming .............................. 4
8
III. LEGAL STANDARD ..................................................................................................................... 6
9
IV. PLAINTIFFS’ CAUSES OF ACTION ARISE FROM PROTECTED CONDUCT ..................... 6
10
A. The Alleged Activity Forming the Basis of Plaintiffs’ Complaint ..................................... 6
11
B. In Furtherance of the Exercise of Free Speech Rights ........................................................ 8
12
C. In Connection With An Issue of Public Interest ............................................................... 11
13
V. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT DEMONSTRATE A PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING ON THE
14
MERITS .................................................................................................................................................... 12
15
A. FEHA Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment .................................................... 12
16 B. FEHA Failure to Prevent/Remedy Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment ........ 12
17 C. FEHA Religious Harassment ............................................................................................ 13
18 D. FEHA Failure to Prevent/Remedy Religious Harassment ................................................ 13
19 E. FEHA Racial Harassment ................................................................................................. 14
20 F. FEHA Disability Discrimination ...................................................................................... 14
21 G. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage...................................... 15

22 H. Assault............................................................................................................................... 15

23 I. False Imprisonment ........................................................................................................... 16

24 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 16

25

26

27

28

7488-2
i
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
1
Page(s)
2
Cases
3

4 Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc.,

21 Cal. 4th 121 (1999) ......................................................................................................................14
5
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
6 535 U.S. 234 (2002) ..........................................................................................................................10
7 Baral v. Schnitt,
1 Cal. 5th 376 (2016) ..........................................................................................................................6
8
Brodeur v. Atlas Ent., Inc.,
9
248 Cal. App. 4th 665 (2016) ...........................................................................................................10
10
Cross v. Cooper,
11 197 Cal. App. 4th 357 (2011) ...........................................................................................................11

12 Daniel v. Wayans,
8 Cal. App. 5th 367 (2017) ...........................................................................................................8, 10
13
De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC,
14
21 Cal. App. 5th 845 (2018) ...............................................................................................................8
15
Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,
16 11 Cal. 4th 376 (2004) ......................................................................................................................15

17 Doe v. Gangland Prods.,

730 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2013) ..............................................................................................................9
18
Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp.,
19 80 Cal. App. 4th 485 (2000) .............................................................................................................16
20
Fermino v. Fedco, Inc.,
21 7 Cal. 4th 701 (1994) (en banc) ........................................................................................................16

22 Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp.,

214 Cal. App. 3d 590 (1989) ............................................................................................................12
23
Hunter v. CBS Broad. Inc.,
24 221 Cal. App. 4th 1510 (2013) ...........................................................................................................9
25 Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., Inc.,
26 129 Cal. App. 4th 1050 (2005) .........................................................................................................10

27 Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC,

704 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013) ..........................................................................................................15
28

7488-2
ii
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc.,
1 110 Cal. App. 4th 156 (2003) .............................................................................................................9
2
Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods.,
3 38 Cal. 4th 264 (2006) (Chin, J., concurring) .............................................................................10, 12

4 McCollum v. CBS, Inc.,

202 Cal. App. 3d 989 (1988) ..............................................................................................................8
5
Navellier v. Sletten,
6 29 Cal. 4th 82 (2002) ..........................................................................................................................6
7
Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula,
8 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027 (2008) .........................................................................................................11

9 Ojjeh v. Brown,
43 Cal. App. 5th 1027 (2019) .............................................................................................................9
10
Plotnik v. Meihaus,
11 208 Cal. App. 4th 1590 (2012) .........................................................................................................15
12 Robles v. Agreserves, Inc.,
13 158 F. Supp. 3d 952 (E.D. Cal. 2016)...............................................................................................13

14 Roby v. McKesson Corp.,

47 Cal. 4th 686 (2009) ......................................................................................................................14
15
Rosenaur v. Scherer,
16 88 Cal. App. 4th 260 (2001) ...............................................................................................................6
17 Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. Am. Asphalt S., Inc.,
2 Cal. 5th 505 (2017) ........................................................................................................................15
18

19 Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp.,

97 Cal. App. 4th 798 (2002) .............................................................................................................11
20
Shulman v. Grp. W. Prods., Inc.,
21 18 Cal. 4th 200 (1998) ......................................................................................................................10
22 Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Gore,
49 Cal. 4th 12 (2010) ..........................................................................................................................6
23

24 Symmonds v. Mahoney,
31 Cal. App. 5th 1096 (2019) .......................................................................................................9, 11
25
Tamkin v. CBS Broad., Inc.,
26 193 Cal. App. 4th 133 (2011) .............................................................................................8, 9, 10, 11

27 Thompson v. City of Monrovia,

186 Cal. App. 4th 860 (2010) ...........................................................................................................14
28

7488-2
iii
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 Trujillo v. N. Cnty. Transit Dist.,
1 63 Cal. App. 4th 280 (1998), as modified (May 12, 1998) ...............................................................14
2
Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
3 491 U.S. 781 (1989) ............................................................................................................................8

4 Wilder v. CBS Corp.,

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190059 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2013).................................................................9
5
Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester,
6 28 Cal. 4th 811 (2002) ........................................................................................................................6
7
Statutes
8
Cal. Civ. Code § 3515 .............................................................................................................................16
9
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1), (e)(4) ..............................................................................................6
10
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(3) .........................................................................................................6
11
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4) .........................................................................................................8
12
Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k) .....................................................................................................................13
13
Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(q)....................................................................................................................13
14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7488-2
iv
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

2 I. INTRODUCTION

3 Plaintiffs Arianna Davis (“Davis”), Crystal Williams (“Williams”) and Noelle Rodriguez

4 (“Rodriguez”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this salacious and specious lawsuit against Defendants

5 Melissa Jefferson pka Lizzo (“Lizzo”), Big Grrrl Big Touring, Inc. (“BGBT”) and Shirlene Quigley

6 (“Quigley”) (collectively, “Defendants”) because they have an axe to grind. Williams and Davis were

7 terminated from their employment as Big Grrrls following a pattern of gross misconduct and failure to

8 perform their job up to par. Plaintiffs missed flights, arrived late and hungover to rehearsals and drunk to

9 performances, entered into consensual sexual relationships with male crew members on tour, exhibited a

10 rapid decline in the quality of their dancing and professionalism and ultimately conspired to make and

11 disseminate an unauthorized recording of a creative meeting with Lizzo and the dance cast. Gordon

12 Decl. ¶¶ 15-16, 19, 22; Gugliotta Decl. ¶ 9; Banks Decl. ¶ 8. When Plaintiffs’ wrongful conduct was

13 uncovered, Rodriguez preemptively resigned (to avoid termination) and proceeded to insult and interrupt

14 Lizzo in front of the other dancers. On her way out, Rodriguez had some choice words for dance captain

15 Quigley: “Fuck you and your Jesus shit!” Quigley Decl. ¶ 37; Gordon Decl. ¶ 19. A few months later,

16 Plaintiffs embarked on a press tour, vilifying Defendants and pushing their fabricated sob story in the

17 courts and in the media. That ends today.

18 Eighteen members of Lizzo’s touring company have signed declarations under penalty of

19 perjury that directly refute Plaintiffs’ false narrative about their experiences on the set of Lizzo’s

20 reality competition series “Watch Out For The Big Grrrls” (“WOFTBG”) and as dancers on “The

21 Special Tour.” The sworn testimony of these non-party witnesses and of Defendants Lizzo and Quigley,

22 backed by incontrovertible documentary evidence – including photographs and videos of Plaintiffs and

23 contemporaneous records of their words, intentions and conduct – confirm that Plaintiffs are not victims

24 of harassment, discrimination, a hostile work environment or any of the other tortious acts they have

25 alleged in the Complaint. Far from it. They are opportunists.

26 Before they were held to account for underperforming and violating the terms of their

27 employment, Plaintiffs were Defendants’ biggest fans. In mid-April 2023 (after many of the events

28 alleged in the Complaint), Davis applied to work with Lizzo again on the second season of WOFTBG.

1
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 In her audition video, she heaped praise on “the Queen Lizzo herself,” described working with her as “so

2 amazing and such a beautiful journey” and declared, “I look up to her so much and I just want to follow

3 in her footsteps.” Lizzo Decl. ¶ 33, Ex. D. Hours after she was let go, Williams changed her return flight

4 so she could spend more time with the dance cast and asked tour manager Molly Gordon (“Gordon”) if

5 she could attend Lizzo’s show. Gordon Decl. ¶ 15, Ex. F. In a similar vein, after Williams’ termination,

6 her agent sent an email to tour management stating: “I know she appreciates all of team Lizzo for the

7 opportunity and is grateful to have been part of the team.” Joshi Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. D. Significantly, after

8 Plaintiffs returned home in late March 2023 from the European leg of “The Special Tour,” which is

9 portrayed in the Complaint as a hellish ordeal, Plaintiffs had the choice whether or not to continue

10 dancing with Lizzo. All three did return for the third leg of the tour. Joshi Decl. ¶¶ 8-9, Exs. B, C. If

11 they had been subjected to the appalling harassment and discrimination alleged in their lawsuit, why

12 would Plaintiffs have chosen to return?

13 Plaintiffs auditioned and competed to be one of Lizzo’s Big Grrrls because they admired her as

14 an artist, performer, sex symbol and advocate for sex-positivity, body-positivity, diversity and inclusion.

15 Lizzo Decl. ¶¶ 12, 17-18, Exs. A, B. Plaintiffs’ stars rose along with Lizzo’s as part of her mission to

16 show the world that people who look like her can dance and perform at the highest level. Id. ¶ 16. They

17 received a leg up and an incredible opportunity to take their careers to the next level precisely because

18 Lizzo herself had worked tirelessly to break the stereotypes society imposes on outspoken, sexy and

19 confident plus-sized women of color. Plaintiffs had it all and they blew it. Instead of taking any

20 accountability for their own actions, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against Defendants out of spite and in

21 pursuit of media attention, public sympathy and a quick payday with minimal effort.

22 Defendants respectfully submit that this Motion should be granted because Plaintiffs’ Complaint

23 as a whole – and each cause of action alleged therein – arises from speech and conduct in furtherance of

24 the exercise of Defendants’ constitutional right of free speech in connection with issues of public

25 interest and because Plaintiffs lack any competent, admissible evidence to support their claims, let alone

26 demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits.

27 II. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

28 A. Plaintiffs’ Sexual Harassment Allegations Lack Merit

2
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 Plaintiffs allege that they were subjected to a hostile work environment because they were forced

2 to go Bananenbar, a club in Amsterdam’s Red Light District, against their will. Compl. ¶¶ 32-38. Every

3 witness has confirmed that attendance at Bananenbar (and all events Lizzo organized or invited cast

4 members to) was voluntary and that there were no adverse consequences to those who did not attend.

5 Locke Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Gordon Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Gugliotta Decl. ¶ 7; Banks Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; Van Decl. ¶¶ 14-15;

6 Green Decl. ¶ 4; Mooring Decl. ¶¶ 10-11; Appleby Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Baptiste Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Brown Decl. ¶¶

7 4-6, 11; Greene Decl. ¶ 7; Ash. Williams Decl. ¶ 6; L. Williams Decl. ¶¶ 4, 8. Contrary to her claims,

8 Davis was not forced to do anything against her will at Bananenbar. Brown Decl. ¶¶ 7-10; Gordon Decl.

9 ¶¶ 6-7; Gugliotta Decl. ¶ 7; Van Decl. ¶ 16; L. Williams Decl. ¶ 5. The next day, Davis and Rodriguez

10 described their wild night, including when they went out to other sex clubs in the Red Light District

11 after leaving Bananenbar. L. Williams Decl. ¶ 6; Locke Decl. ¶ 5; Lizzo Decl. ¶ 31. Davis happily

12 described that she touched a performer’s breast and that “the girl smelled really good.” Banks Decl. ¶ 6.

13 Plaintiffs also allege they were pressured to attend a show at world-famous Crazy Horse in Paris,

14 France. Compl. ¶ 39. All evidence flatly contradicts this claim. Davis sent a text message to Gordon

15 enthusiastically accepting the invitation to Crazy Horse: “I would really like to go!” Gordon Decl. ¶¶ 8-

16 9, Exs. A, B; Van Decl. ¶ 17. Photos and video of the three Plaintiffs show them carousing and

17 cavorting backstage with the Crazy Horse dancers, with Williams raising her glass as if toasting the

18 event. Lizzo Decl. ¶ 33, Ex. F; Green Decl. ¶ 5; L. Williams Decl. ¶ 7.

19 Plaintiffs’ allegations that they were pressured into posing naked for a “nude” photoshoot as part

20 of WOFTBG are likewise demonstrably false. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19, 64. Other contestants confirm that

21 nobody was pressured to pose nude and that the experience was, as intended, about self-love and

22 empowerment. Many of the dancers (including Davis) wore undergarments and used props to cover up

23 during the shoot and were ultimately chosen to be Big Grrrls. Banks Decl. ¶ 4; Mooring Decl. ¶¶ 3-5;

24 Sullivan Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; Ash. Williams Decl. ¶ 4; see also Lizzo Decl. ¶¶ 19-21. After the shoot, Davis

25 told the cameras she felt liberated and confident. Id. ¶ 21, Ex. C; see also Lerner Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 3.

26 Another fiction is Plaintiffs’ allegation that Quigley made constant, unprompted comments about

27 graphic sexual topics, including Davis’ virginity. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 21-22, 64, 73. Multiple witnesses attest

28 that Quigley did not initiate sexual conversations or spontaneously simulate sex acts. Mooring Decl. ¶¶

3
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 6-7; Van Decl. ¶¶ 9-10; Walker Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Banks Decl. ¶ 15; Greene Decl. ¶ 8. To the contrary, it was

2 Davis who spoke about her masturbatory habits and freely discussed her virginity while cameras rolled

3 on the set of WOFTBG. Van Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Quigley Decl. ¶ 45; Lizzo Decl. ¶ 22.

4 B. Plaintiffs’ Racial Discrimination Claims Are Unavailing

5 Plaintiffs contend they were discriminated against on the basis of race because tour management

6 purportedly called members of the dance cast lazy, unprofessional and “snarky” and accused them of

7 having bad attitudes. Compl. ¶¶ 41, 44, 101. In fact, Plaintiffs were criticized because they were not

8 dancing at the level expected of them (although they had previously) and were often late and

9 unprepared. Gordon Decl. ¶¶ 22-23; Gugliotta Decl. ¶¶ 8-9; Lizzo Decl. ¶¶ 34-36; Van Decl. ¶ 6; Banks

10 Decl. ¶ 13. Not a single witness observed or experienced racial discrimination on tour. Van Decl. ¶ 7;

11 Lizzo Decl. ¶ 60; Walker Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Green Decl. ¶ 8; Ali. Williams Decl. ¶ 11; Locke Decl. ¶ 10.

12 C. Plaintiffs’ Religious Harassment Claims Are Meritless

13 Plaintiffs allege that they were victims of religious harassment because they were forced against

14 their will to pray before rehearsals and shows. Compl. ¶ 25. Every member of the touring party attests

15 that no one was pressured to pray or faced punishment if they did not participate in prayer circles.

16 Appleby Decl. ¶ 8; Green Decl. ¶ 7; Locke Decl. ¶ 9; Van Decl. ¶ 20; Walker Decl. ¶ 10; Mooring Decl.

17 ¶ 12; Ash. Williams Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs also falsely claim that Quigley created a hostile work

18 environment because she proselytized aggressively to other dancers against their will and exhibited

19 hostility toward those who disagreed with her religious values. Compl. ¶¶ 24-25; 83-84; 92-93.

20 Numerous witnesses testify that they did not observe Quigley harassing people about religion or treating

21 dancers differently based on their religious beliefs. Greene Decl. ¶ 8; Locke Decl. ¶ 8; Walker Decl. ¶ 8;

22 Mooring Decl. ¶¶ 12, 14; Van Decl. ¶ 11; Gordon Decl. ¶ 21. To the contrary, Quigley treated everyone

23 with love and respect as dance captain regardless of their religious beliefs. Greene Decl. ¶ 8; Ali.

24 Williams Decl. ¶ 10; Scott Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. Plaintiffs’ own religiously-oriented messages to Quigley are

25 inconsistent with their harassment claims. Quigley Decl. ¶¶ 15, 17, 18, 22-27, 30, 33-34, 41, Exs. A-K.

26 D. There Is No Evidence of Disability Discrimination or Body Shaming

27 Every other dancer on tour adamantly refutes Plaintiffs’ outlandish allegations of purported “fat

28 shaming” and “body shaming” by Lizzo and her camp. Indeed, each witness confirms that Lizzo and her

4
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 camp promoted a culture of self-love and kindness. Greene Decl. ¶¶ 3, 5; Walker Decl. ¶ 5; Banks Decl.

2 ¶¶ 9, 11, 14, 16; Locke Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13; Sullivan Decl. ¶¶ 7-8; Ali. Williams Decl. ¶ 5; Ash. Williams

3 Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. Davis also alleges that she was subjected to discrimination based on a “disability” because

4 she was made so anxious during a rehearsal that she urinated onstage instead of using the restroom.

5 Compl. ¶¶ 45-47, 110. Every performer’s testimony completely contradicts Davis’ absurd claim that she

6 had no choice but to urinate on herself during a production run-through. Others left stage during

7 rehearsal for various reasons, and were never penalized, scolded or otherwise adversely impacted, even

8 if they missed a cue, mark or number. Banks Decl. ¶ 7; Moore Decl. ¶ 15; Locke Decl. ¶ 6; Greene Decl.

9 ¶ 6; Green Decl. ¶ 6; Scott Decl. ¶ 11; Van Decl. ¶ 12; Ali. Williams Decl. ¶ 7; Lizzo Decl. ¶¶ 36-37;

10 Appleby Decl. ¶ 6; Baptiste Decl. ¶ 7; Brown Decl. ¶¶ 16-17; Ash. Williams Decl. ¶ 5; Gordon Decl. ¶¶

11 11-14, Exs. C-E.

12 Plaintiffs claim Davis was the victim of disability discrimination because she was interrogated,

13 insulted and body shamed by Lizzo and Scott during a private meeting on April 21, 2023. Compl. ¶¶ 49-

14 51, 111-12. Testimony of everyone else present at the meeting refutes this characterization. Rather than

15 an interrogation, Lizzo and Scott initiated a caring and supportive conversation, proposing

16 accommodations to protect Davis’ mental and physical health and wellbeing. Lizzo Decl. ¶¶ 38-45;

17 Scott Decl. ¶¶ 13-15; Green Decl. ¶ 6. Other members of the touring party also felt genuine concern for

18 Davis because she seemed unwell, both in terms of her lax hygiene and health and her mental instability;

19 many observed that Davis’ own insecurities led her to twist Lizzo’s offer of support into something

20 nefarious. Appleby Decl. ¶ 7; Banks Decl. ¶¶ 10-12; Locke Decl. ¶ 12; Mooring Decl. ¶ 16; L. Williams

21 Decl. ¶¶ 10-11. Lizzo’s camp was committed to the health and safety of the dancers and other

22 performers. Scott Decl. ¶¶ 5, 16; Walker Decl. ¶ 6; Brown Decl. ¶¶ 14-15; Locke Decl. ¶ 7.

23 Plaintiffs claim they were subjected to harassment, but they repeatedly failed to avail themselves

24 of the grievance procedure put in place for them. Van Decl. ¶ 21; Ali. Williams Decl. ¶ 12. On the one

25 occasion when they did (regarding an alleged inappropriate statement a tour bus driver made to

26 Williams), the issue was swiftly and appropriately addressed. Gordon Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Van Decl. ¶ 19; L.

27 Williams Decl. ¶ 9. Yet, Plaintiffs ridiculously gripe that Defendants failed to prevent or remedy issues

28

5
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 that no one else on tour observed or experienced, and which Plaintiffs never reported to tour

2 management. Gordon Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; Van Decl. ¶ 18; Lizzo Decl. ¶ 55; Quigley Decl. ¶ 48.

3 III. LEGAL STANDARD

4 The anti-SLAPP statute creates a two-step process. Defendants bear the initial burden to make a

5 prima facie showing that the challenged causes of action arise from acts in furtherance of the right of

6 free speech in connection with a public issue or issue of public interest. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

7 § 425.16(b)(1), (e)(4); Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal. 4th 82, 88 (2002); Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Gore,

8 49 Cal. 4th 12, 21 (2010). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to Plaintiffs to demonstrate –

9 through competent and admissible evidence – a probability that they will prevail on each cause of

10 action. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(3); Rosenaur v. Scherer, 88 Cal. App. 4th 260, 274 (2001);

11 Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 821 (2002). Where the relief requested is “based

12 on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded” on the

13 first prong analysis, and the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “demonstrate that each challenged

14 claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.” Baral v. Schnitt, 1

15 Cal. 5th 376, 396 (2016). In that regard, “the Legislature’s choice of the term ‘motion to strike’ reflects

16 the understanding that an anti-SLAPP motion, like a conventional motion to strike, may be used to

17 attack parts of a count as pleaded.” Id. at 393. Critically, the manner in which a cause of action is styled

18 is irrelevant to the analysis of whether a cause of action – or any individual claim therein – is subject to

19 the anti-SLAPP statute; if a claim arises from conduct in furtherance of free speech, it falls within the

20 scope of the statute regardless of its label. Navellier, 29 Cal. 4th at 91.

21 IV. PLAINTIFFS’ CAUSES OF ACTION ARISE FROM PROTECTED CONDUCT

22 A. The Alleged Activity Forming the Basis of Plaintiffs’ Complaint

23 Plaintiffs’ claims stem from Defendants’ alleged speech and conduct in the creation and

24 production of Lizzo’s television show (WOFTBG) and her global stadium concert tour (“The Special

25 Tour”). The Complaint alleges nine causes of action arising from almost every stage of the creation,

26 planning and execution of these two forms of creative expression, including: the development of plot

27 lines for and filming of an episode of WOFTBG, the production of on-camera interviews for the series,

28 pre-show rituals and cast outings to encourage bonding and provide creative inspiration, evaluations of

6
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 dancers’ performance and professionalism, an investigation of employee misconduct, the running of

2 rehearsals and production run-throughs and communications regarding operational aspects of the tour,

3 budgetary restrictions and compensation for performers:

4  First Cause of Action (FEHA Hostile Work Environment – Sexual Harassment), and Second

5 Cause of Action (FEHA Failure to Prevent Hostile Work Environment – Sexual

6 Harassment): Allegedly forcing Davis to participate in a nude photoshoot for an episode of

7 WOFTBG (Compl. ¶¶ 18-19, 64); allegedly subjecting Plaintiffs to nudity against their will

8 (including, e.g., by purportedly forcing them to participate in cast outings to Bananenbar in

9 Amsterdam and Crazy Horse in Paris) (id. ¶¶ 32-39, 62, 65); alleged statements by Quigley regarding

10 Davis’ virginity in production of WOFTBG (id. ¶ 17); alleged sexually explicit statements and

11 gestures by dance captain Quigley on tour, including in rehearsal and backstage (id. ¶¶ 17, 21-22, 64,

12 73); alleged sexual harassment by a tour bus driver while traveling between tour stops and by male

13 crew members (id. ¶¶ 27, 47).

14  Third Cause of Action (FEHA Religious Harassment), and Fourth Cause of Action (FEHA

15 Failure to Prevent and/or Remedy Religious Harassment): Quigley’s alleged statements regarding

16 religion and sexuality (Compl. ¶¶ 16-17, 21-24, 81, 83-84, 92-93, 96); allegedly forcing Plaintiffs to

17 participate against their will in group prayers held before rehearsals and performances (id. ¶ 25).

18  Fifth Cause of Action (FEHA Racial Harassment): Alleged statements describing members of the

19 dance cast as lazy, unprofessional, “snarky” and having bad attitudes (Compl. ¶¶ 41, 44, 101); an

20 alleged statement to Rodriguez that tour management did not know of any complaints about her job

21 performance (id. ¶ 52).

22  Sixth Cause of Action (FEHA Disability Discrimination): Alleged statements by Lizzo in a private

23 personnel meeting with Davis and choreographer Tanisha Scott (“Scott”) about accommodations to

24 protect Davis’ physical and mental health (Compl. ¶¶ 49-51, 111-12); Davis allegedly being made to

25 feel so anxious during a production run-through that she believed she could not leave stage and

26 urinated on herself (id. ¶¶ 45-47, 110); alleged statements by Lizzo that weight gain could result in

27 termination as a dance cast member (id. ¶¶ 49-50).

28

7
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1  Seventh Cause of Action (Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations):

2 Alleged statements by tour management and BGBT accountants to Plaintiffs and/or their agents to not

3 take other jobs during potential tour dates or remain on a “soft hold” when negotiating employment

4 terms and scheduling performances (Compl. ¶¶ 14, 28-29, 40, 43, 122-123).

5  Eighth Cause of Action (Assault): Alleged statements and conduct by Lizzo at a dance cast meeting

6 during “The Special Tour” regarding personnel issues (Compl. ¶¶ 45, 48, 53, 55-57, 126).

7  Ninth Cause of Action (False Imprisonment): Alleged unconsented confinement of Davis by tour

8 management and security during investigation of employee wrongdoing immediately following a

9 dance cast meeting (Compl. ¶¶ 59-60, 135).

10 Because each of Plaintiffs’ claims involve statements made and actions taken during the

11 development, creation, production, display and/or performance of expressive works by a world famous

12 celebrity, the Complaint is based on “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of . . . the constitutional

13 right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest” that is protected by

14 California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(e)(4).

15 B. In Furtherance of the Exercise of Free Speech Rights

16 “First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and expression extend to all artistic and

17 literary expression, whether in music, concerts, plays, pictures or books,” and “‘live entertainment, such

18 as musical . . . works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee.’” McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal.

19 App. 3d 989, 999 (1988) (quoting Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)); see also Ward v.

20 Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). Likewise, television shows, “[m]ovies and films are

21 protected ‘expressive works’ subject to First Amendment protections.” Daniel v. Wayans, 8 Cal. App.

22 5th 367, 383 (2017); De Havilland v. FX Networks, LLC, 21 Cal. App. 5th 845, 860-61 (2018).

23 The anti-SLAPP statute protects more than the exercise of constitutional free speech rights (i.e.,

24 expressive works) and extends to acts that in furtherance of those rights (i.e., those acts that “help[ ] to

25 advance that right or assists in the exercise of that right.” Tamkin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 193 Cal. App. 4th

26 133, 143 (2011) (citing Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc., 110 Cal. App. 4th 156, 166 (2003)

27 (“Furtherance means helping to advance, assisting. [Citation.]”) (alteration in original)). It is thus a

28 well-settled legal precept that the creation, production and distribution of expressive works are protected

8
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 activities under the anti-SLAPP statute. See, e.g., Tamkin, 193 Cal. App. 4th at 143 (“The creation of a

2 television show is an exercise of free speech. . . . Here, defendants’ acts helped to advance or assist in

3 the creation, casting, and broadcasting of an episode of a popular television show.”); Doe v. Gangland

4 Prods., 730 F.3d 946, 954-55 (9th Cir. 2013) (creation and broadcast of television program constitutes

5 protected activity); Lieberman v, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 166 (newsgathering for broadcast news program is

6 protected activity); Wilder v. CBS Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190059, at *32-33 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13,

7 2013) (production and distribution of a television talk show is protected activity); Hunter v. CBS Broad.

8 Inc., 221 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1521 (2013) (“CBS’s selections of its . . . weather anchors, which were

9 essentially casting decisions regarding who was to report the news on a local television newscast,

10 ‘helped advance or assist’ both forms of First Amendment expression [reporting the news and creating a

11 television show]. The conduct therefore qualifies as a form of protected activity.”); Ojjeh v. Brown, 43

12 Cal. App. 5th 1027, 1039-40 (2019) (hiring and use of cinematographer to obtain footage for

13 documentary and “Defendants’ solicitation of investment funding [are] also reasonably viewed as

14 conduct in furtherance of the documentary’s production”).

15 Courts have confirmed and extended the ambit of conduct “in furtherance” of First Amendment

16 rights. In Symmonds v. Mahoney, 31 Cal. App. 5th 1096, 1106 (2019), the Second District Court of

17 Appeal held that “[a] singer’s selection of the musicians that play with him both advances and assists the

18 performance of the music, and therefore is an act in furtherance of his exercise of the right of free

19 speech.” There, plaintiff’s FEHA claim for disability and age discrimination arose from his termination

20 as a drummer in a popular singer’s band. Id. at 1101. The court reasoned that the “selection of a

21 drummer is analogous to a ‘casting decision[ ]’ regarding who is to perform music during a concert or

22 studio performance, and thus is ‘an act in furtherance of the exercise of free speech’” for purposes of

23 California’s anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at 1106 (internal citations omitted). Here, personnel management;

24 negotiation of the terms of employment; providing feedback and criticism regarding performances and

25 professionalism; termination of employees; and conducting personnel meetings are all activities

26 fundamental to preserving the creative integrity of “The Special Tour” and constitute protected conduct.

27 Nor are acts in furtherance of the exercise of free speech limited to those that occur on set (or on

28 stage) while cameras are rolling. Such an interpretation of the anti-SLAPP statute would “rest[ ] on an

9
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 unreasonably narrow or constrained view of the creative process generally.” Daniel, 8 Cal. App. 5th at

2 383; see id. at 375, 384-85 (where actors and a producer/co-writer of a comedy film testified that the

3 creative process for a film “was highly improvisational in nature and occurred when the camera was

4 rolling and when it was not,” lead actor’s racial jokes and use of a racial epithet off-camera constituted

5 protected activity). Here, multiple witnesses testify that dance cast meetings, pre-show prayers circles

6 and cast outings were integral to the iterative creative process involved in the creation of WOFTBG and

7 production of “The Special Tour.” Lizzo Decl. ¶¶ 26-27, 32, 57; Van Decl. ¶ 17; Green Decl. ¶ 7.

8 Courts have “decline[d] to dissect the creative process” or to characterize isolated occurrences as

9 related or unrelated to the overall development of creative works. See, e.g., Brodeur v. Atlas Ent., Inc.,

10 248 Cal. App. 4th 665, 677-78 (2016). As California courts have recognized:

11 ‘[T]he creative process must be unfettered, especially because it can often take strange
turns, as many bizarre and potentially offensive ideas are suggested, tried, and, in the end,
12 either discarded or used . . . . [¶] . . . We must not permit juries to dissect the creative
process in order to determine what was necessary to achieve the final product and what
13 was not, and to impose liability . . . for that portion deemed unnecessary. Creativity is, by
its nature, creative. It is unpredictable. Much that is not obvious can be necessary to the
14 creative process.’
Tamkin, 193 Cal. App. 4th at 144-45 (quoting Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264,
15
298 (2006) (Chin, J., concurring)). Likewise, in evaluating whether challenged speech is protected,
16
courts ought not consider whether challenged speech is necessary for its intended purpose, i.e., as part of
17
the creative process. See cf. Shulman v. Grp. W. Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 229 (1998) (“The courts
18
do not, and constitutionally could not, sit as superior editors of the press.”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech
19
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) (“[S]peech may not be prohibited because it concerns subjects
20
offending our sensibilities.”); Lyle, 38 Cal. 4th at 300 (“[T]hose who choose to join a creative team
21
should not be allowed to complain that some of the creativity was offensive or that behavior not directed
22
at them was unnecessary to the creative process.”)
23
The Complaint – and Plaintiffs’ carefully choreographed media blitz surrounding its filing – is a
24
brazen attempt to silence Defendants’ creative voices and weaponize their creative expression against
25
them. Because the “actual objective of the suit” filed by Plaintiffs “is to interfere with and burden”
26
Defendants’ exercise of free speech rights in connection with a creative work, the claims fall within the
27
ambit of “protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute. Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., Inc.,
28
129 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1064 (2005) (alteration in original).
10
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 C. In Connection With An Issue of Public Interest

2 The “public interest” requirement, “like all of section 425.16, is to be construed broadly.” Seelig

3 v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 97 Cal. App. 4th 798, 808 (2002). An issue of public interest has been broadly

4 defined as “any issue in which the public is interested,” and “need not be ‘significant’ to be protected by

5 the anti-SLAPP statute.” Nygard, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1042 (2008); Cross v.

6 Cooper, 197 Cal. App. 4th 357, 372-373 (2011) (same).

7 This broad standard is easily met here. As widely disseminated expressive works, television

8 shows themselves are matters of public interest. See, e.g., Tamkin, 193 Cal. App. 4th at 143 (popularity

9 of television program showed public was “demonstrably interested in the creation and broadcasting of

10 that episode”); Seelig, 97 Cal. App. 4th at 807-08 (popularity of television program demonstrated it was

11 of “significant interest”); Symmonds, 31 Cal. App. 5th at 1109 (singer’s declaration regarding sale of

12 millions of records and hundreds of thousands of social media followers was sufficient to make a prima

13 facie showing that his “music and concerts were of interest to the public”). WOFTBG has achieved

14 popularity with audiences (as confirmed by its renewal for a second season) and critical acclaim (having

15 won multiple awards). Lizzo Decl. ¶ 16; Lerner Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, 5, Exs. 1-2, 5. In addition, Lizzo’s global

16 concert tours and other live performances are issues of public interest. Lizzo has sold over 6 million

17 albums worldwide and has over 10 billion global streams to date. Lizzo Decl. ¶ 15. She has performed

18 over 300 shows around the world, headlined over 16 festivals and completed five headlining tours,

19 including “The Special Tour.” Ibid. Lizzo has won numerous awards for her music, performances and

20 philanthropic contributions. Id. ¶¶ 11, 14. Moreover, the topics addressed in WOFTBG and Lizzo’s

21 concerts involve social and cultural issues of interest to the public, including inclusivity and

22 empowerment of underrepresented minorities (particularly plus-size women of color). Id. ¶¶ 4, 16.

23 Lizzo’s level of celebrity has transformed the most mundane aspects of her daily life into issues of

24 public interest. She has been featured in numerous magazines, was profiled in an HBO Max

25 documentary and has over 12.6 million followers on Instagram. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15.

26 Because the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute is clearly satisfied, Plaintiffs bear the burden of

27 demonstrating a probability of prevailing on their claims. Plaintiffs cannot satisfy that burden.

28

11
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 V. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT DEMONSTRATE A PROBABILITY OF PREVAILING ON

2 THE MERITS

3 A. FEHA Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment

4 Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their first cause of action because they cannot establish that they

5 were subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; that the harassment was based on sex; or that “the

6 harassment complained of was sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and

7 create an abusive working environment.” Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590,

8 609 (1989). Where, as here, Plaintiffs have not alleged – and cannot allege – a tangible job detriment as

9 part of their sexual harassment claim, “the absence of such detriment requires a commensurately higher

10 showing that the sexually harassing conduct was pervasive and destructive of the working environment.”

11 Id. at 610. Under FEHA, “it is the disparate treatment of an employee on the basis of sex—not the mere

12 discussion of sex or use of vulgar language—that is the essence of a sexual harassment claim.” Lyle, 38

13 Cal. 4th at 280 (emphasis added). Here, Plaintiffs have no evidence that they were treated differently

14 because of their sex. To the contrary, they allege that sexually explicit language and conduct was

15 addressed to women and men alike. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 38, 65 (alleging that Lizzo pressured a male

16 member of her security team to get onstage at Bananenbar and hit him with whips). Multiple witnesses

17 confirm that Plaintiffs enjoyed the conduct they now allege offended them (e.g., Bananenbar and Crazy

18 Horse). L. Williams Decl. ¶ 6; Locke Decl. ¶ 5; Banks Decl. ¶ 6; Lizzo Decl. ¶ 33, Ex. F. Given that

19 Plaintiffs voluntarily sought out employment on artistic works featuring sexual and adult themes and

20 language (and Davis sought it again after the tour when she auditioned for a second season of

21 WOFTBG), exposure to this kind of language and conduct was inherent to the creative workplace they

22 joined. Lizzo Decl. ¶¶ 18, 24, Exs. B, D. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs cannot establish that they

23 suffered harassment on the basis of sex or that any arguable harassment was sufficiently pervasive. See

24 Lyle, 38 Cal. 4th at 286-89, 291-94 (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on FEHA claim

25 based on alleged sexual language and vulgar conduct in the writers’ room for the sitcom Friends).

26 B. FEHA Failure to Prevent/Remedy Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment

27 BGBT is potentially liable under FEHA only if Plaintiffs can establish that the employer

28 “fail[ed] to take all reasonable steps necessary to prevent discrimination and harassment from

12
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 occurring.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k). The evidence shows that Plaintiffs were aware of the

2 procedures for reporting alleged sexual harassment and that the one time they did make a complaint, the

3 matter was taken seriously, then swiftly and appropriately dealt with. Gordon Decl. ¶ 4; Van Decl. ¶ 19;

4 Quigley Decl. ¶ 47. Plaintiffs did not complain about the laundry list of other purported sexual

5 harassment to tour management, Quigley and Van. Defendants cannot be held responsible for allegedly

6 failing to prevent something about which they did not know. Lizzo Decl. ¶ 55; Gordon Decl. ¶ 4.

7 C. FEHA Religious Harassment

8 To prevail on their claim for FEHA religious harassment, Plaintiffs must establish that (1) they

9 are members of a protected class, (2) they were subjected to harassment because they belonged to that

10 group, and (3) the alleged harassment was so severe or pervasive that it created a hostile work

11 environment. Robles v. Agreserves, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 952, 983 (E.D. Cal. 2016). Plaintiffs cannot

12 establish that they are members of a protected class based on their religious belief, observance or

13 practice. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(q) (defining “religious creed”). At best, they allege that they did

14 not share Quigley’s religious beliefs or wish to pray. Compl. ¶¶ 92-93. Even if Plaintiffs did allege that

15 they were subjected to harassment because of their membership in a protected religious group, they

16 cannot prevail unless the conduct “would have interfered with a reasonable employee’s work

17 performance and would have seriously affected the psychological well-being of a reasonable employee

18 and that [she] was actually offended.” Robles, 158 F. Supp. 3d at 983. Multiple witnesses confirmed that

19 there was no pressure or requirement to participate in pre-rehearsal or pre-show prayer circles; that

20 Quigley did not treat anyone differently because of their religious beliefs and, in fact, explicitly told

21 Rodriguez that she did not need to participate in any prayer if she did not wish to; and that no one was

22 attacked or harassed on the basis of religion or subject to adverse employment consequences based on

23 their faith. The evidence also demonstrates that Plaintiffs were not actually offended by the purported

24 “harassment” they experienced. Williams and Davis went to church with Quigley and regularly texted

25 her about their shared religious beliefs and faith-based topics. Quigley Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. D.

26 D. FEHA Failure to Prevent/Remedy Religious Harassment

27 In order to potentially prevail on this claim, Plaintiffs must establish that BGBT did not take all

28 reasonable steps to prevent religious harassment from occurring. Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(k). Where an

13
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 alleged harasser is a nonsupervisory employee, “employer liability turns on a showing of negligence

2 (that is, the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate

3 corrective action).” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 707 (2009), as modified (Feb. 10, 2010).

4 Quigley was a representative for the dance cast members and helped with rehearsals on the road, but did

5 not actually direct or supervise the dancers or have any hiring, firing or casting influence or authority.

6 Scott Decl. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs do not allege that they ever reported Quigley’s alleged religious harassment to

7 tour management, BGBT or Lizzo. Without knowledge of the alleged harassment, Defendants cannot be

8 held liable. Nor can Defendants be held liable for failure to prevent or remedy harassment that did not

9 occur. Trujillo v. N. Cnty. Transit Dist., 63 Cal. App. 4th 280, 285 (1998), as modified (May 12, 1998).

10 E. FEHA Racial Harassment

11 Williams and Davis cannot prevail on their racial harassment claim because, among other things,

12 they cannot demonstrate that “[they were] subjected to unwelcome racial harassment; [that] the

13 harassment was based on race; [or that] the harassment unreasonably interfered with [their] work

14 performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” Thompson v. City of

15 Monrovia, 186 Cal. App. 4th 860, 876 (2010). Williams and Davis “must prove that [BGBT]’s conduct

16 would have interfered with a reasonable employee’s work performance and would have seriously

17 affected the psychological well-being of a reasonable employee.” Id. at 877 (internal quotations and

18 citations omitted). In that regard, “[h]arassment cannot be occasional, isolated, sporadic, or trivial[;]

19 rather the plaintiff[s] must show a concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a generalized

20 nature.” Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 121, 31 (1999) (internal quotations and

21 citations omitted). Davis and Williams cannot and have not demonstrated that isolated statements about

22 the dancers’ behavior were racially motivated. None of the other performers experienced or witnessed

23 racial discrimination. Van Decl. ¶ 7; Walker Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. To the contrary, criticism of Davis’ and

24 Williams’ performance of their job responsibilities was warranted because they were not performing up

25 to standards and were not acting professionally, having nothing to do with their race. Gordon Decl. ¶ 22.

26 F. FEHA Disability Discrimination

27 “To show a prima facie case of disability discrimination under FEHA, a plaintiff must show that:

28 (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing competently in the position she held;

14
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination; and (4) some other circumstances

2 that suggest a discriminatory motive.” Lawler v. Montblanc N. Am., LLC, 704 F.3d 1235, 1242 (9th Cir.

3 2013) (internal citations omitted). Davis cannot establish that she was performing competently in or

4 about late April and early May 2023. Multiple witnesses attest that Davis seemed emotionally unstable,

5 did not have energy in rehearsal or performances, danced sloppily, was observed throwing up backstage

6 between numbers during shows, and publicly urinated on herself. L. Williams Decl. ¶ 10; Appleby Decl.

7 ¶ 17. Defendants actually offered accommodations to protect Davis’ mental and physical health. Scott

8 Decl. ¶ 15; Lizzo Decl. ¶¶ 39-44. Other performers, including dancers and musicians, found Defendants

9 to be accommodating and understanding when they faced health issues or left stage during rehearsals

10 and production run-throughs. Walker Decl. ¶ 6; Locke Decl. ¶ 7. Davis cannot bring a claim for

11 discrimination because she chose to decline the accommodations offered by BGBT.

12 G. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage

13 Plaintiffs have no evidence to establish the elements of this tort, including Defendants’

14 knowledge of any economic relationships between them and third parties “that contain[ ] the probability

15 of future economic benefit” or actual disruption of that relationship by Defendants’ independently

16 wrongful conduct. Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. Am. Asphalt S., Inc., 2 Cal. 5th 505, 512 (2017); Della

17 Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 376, 393 (2004) (alleged interference must be

18 “independently wrongful” beyond the fact of the interference itself). In accordance with industry

19 standards, a performer being paid a retainer is expected not to take any jobs that may interfere with

20 performance obligations to the artist paying them. Plaintiffs were informed of potential performance

21 dates as soon as possible, with the caveat that things could change (hence the use of the phrase “soft

22 hold” after Plaintiffs were placed on retainer). Joshi Decl. ¶ 10; Van Decl. ¶ 13.

23 H. Assault

24 A claim for assault requires proof of (1) an act committed by defendant with the intent to cause

25 plaintiff’s apprehension of immediate injury and (2) reasonable apprehension of immediate touching.

26 Plotnik v. Meihaus, 208 Cal. App. 4th 1590, 1604 (2012). In addition, “mere words, however

27 threatening, will not amount to an assault.” Ibid. Rodriguez cannot establish either element. Lizzo did

28 not act with the intent to intimidate Rodriguez. Lizzo Decl. ¶ 54. Multiple witnesses confirm that they

15
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT
 1 did not believe that any physical altercation between them was imminent and that Lizzo did not

2 physically intimidate or approach Rodriguez. Mooring Decl. ¶ 17; Quigley Decl. ¶ 37. Rodriguez’s

3 purported apprehension of an immediate touching was unreasonable.

4 I. False Imprisonment

5 The elements of a claim for false imprisonment are: “(1) the nonconsensual, intentional

6 confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of time, however

7 brief.” Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (2000). However, detention “carried out

8 for a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner” by an owner of property or employer investigating

9 wrongdoing (such as theft) is privileged. Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 716-18 (1994) (en

10 banc). Consent is also a complete defense. Cal. Civ. Code § 3515. Here, Davis has no evidence that she

11 was restrained against her will. She was free to leave through the door to the conference room and was

12 not physically restrained or threatened by Defendants. Gordon Decl. ¶ 19. Davis by her conduct

13 consented when she remained voluntarily, with her phone in hand, scrolling through her video and audio

14 recordings to confirm for tour management that she had deleted all copies of the unauthorized recording,

15 and then parted with them amicably. Ibid.

16 VI. CONCLUSION

17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike and

18 strike the Complaint in its entirety or, in the alternative, strike all allegations of protected activity.

19 Dated: October 27, 2023 LAVELY & SINGER PC

MARTIN D. SINGER
20 MICHAEL E. WEINSTEN
MELISSA Y. LERNER
21

22 By: ___s/ Martin D. Singer_________________

MARTIN D. SINGER
23 Attorneys for Defendants MELISSA JEFFERSON
pka LIZZO and BIG GRRRL BIG TOURING,
24 INC.

25 Dated: October 27, 2023 THE MACELLARO FIRM, P.C.

THERESA J. MACELLARO
26

27 By: ___s/ Theresa J. Macellaro_____________

THERESA J. MACELLARO
28 Attorneys for Defendant SHIRLENE QUIGLEY

16
DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT