Motivations Behind The Suez Crisis

W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects
1993
Motivations Behind the Suez Crisis

Benjamin Joel Goldberg
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences
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Recommended Citation
Goldberg, Benjamin Joel, "Motivations Behind the Suez Crisis" (1993). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters
Projects. William & Mary. Paper 1539625839.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-jyqz-0q85
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M O T I V A T I O N S
B E H I N D
T H E S U E Z C R I S I S
A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
by
Benjamin J. Goldberg
1993
APPROVAL SHEET
This Thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degre of
Masters of Arts
^ Benjamiff J. Goldberg
Approved, May 1993
Edward P j] Crapol
Richard B. Sherman
Philip J. Funlgiello
11
D E D I C A T I O N
This work is for my Grandfather, Julian Schultz.

He always insisted that his grandchildren obtain
as much education as they could. Here I am.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements.............. v
Abstract................................................... vi
Chapter One: Introduction to a Crisis......................1
Chapter Two: Leading up to the Crisis.....................11
Chapter Three: The Crisis and Its Players................. 43
Chapter Four: Standing Against the Allies................ 79
Chapter Five: Suez Concluded..............................123
Bibliography.............................................. 134
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S
I tak e th is opportunity to th a n k my thesis advisor, Professor Ed

Crapol. His criticism an d advice are m uch appreciated. I extend my
gratitude for his assistance. I am also grateful to professors S herm an
and Funiegello for agreeing to be readers of my thesis.
In addition, I take this opportunity to th a n k my m other, Betty S.

Goldberg, for h er willingness, even eagerness, to read thro u g h two
sep arate drafts of my thesis. Her encouragem ent is always uplifting.
Finally, I m u st th a n k Amy, my wife. Perhaps, she deserves more

credit th a n everyone else, for she is th e one who h a s endured my long
h o u rs of work. Although th ere was more coercion involved in convincing
h er to act as an editor, I appreciate h er efforts. T hank you, my love.
V
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this stu d y is to exam ine th e respective reactions of

th e leading governm ents involved in the Suez Crisis. The th esis seeks to
discover w h at m otivated th e Eisenhow er adm inistration to react against
its allies, w hen they attacked Egypt. The im petus behind th e aggression
of England, France, an d Israel is explored as well. Finally, G am al
N asser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal an d su b se q u en t actions are
also d iscussed an d analyzed.
The stu d y suggests th a t P resident Eisenhow er believed he h ad no

choice b u t to condem n th e aggression com m itted by England, France,
and Israel. He felt he w as forced to su p p o rt th e Egyptian cau se b ecause
th e allies’ attack w as unjustified. N asser h ad nationalized th e Suez
Canal, b u t h ad in no way inhibited passage th ro u g h th e canal.
Eisenhow er believed th a t England, France, an d Israel h ad injured the
cause of the w estern world by invading Egypt; he therefore so u g h t to end
th e a s s a u lt as quickly as possible.
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction To A Crisis
Dwight D. Eisenhow er w as President of, the United S tates during a
critical period in American foreign relations. Between 1953 an d 1961,
th e Eisenhow er adm inistration dealt with the perceived Soviet th reat,
using th e Cold War ideology of th e United S tates to determ ine policy.
The ideology defined American in terests as antithetical to Soviet
interests. It set E ast ag ain st West, Democracy ag ain st Com m unism , and
Am erican ag ain st R ussian. D uring th is period the P resident th reaten ed
to u se n u clear force a t least twice an d repeatedly authorized aerial
espionage in his efforts to contain expansion of Soviet influence.
In m any ways these years formed the core of Cold W ar doctrine.
C ontainm ent and the Domino Theory found th eir place in each foreign
policy decision. A regular feature of Eisenhow er’s foreign policy w as the
vying for superiority th a t cam e to characterize A m erican/R ussian
relations during the following three decades. In m ilitary power,
technological advancem ents, and international influence th e United
S tates worked to gain the u p p er h an d . An obsession with Soviet

INTRODUCTION. - 2 -
advances, real and imagined, was the hallm ark of th e adm inistration.
W herever R u ssian in tru sio n was perceived, America w as su re to react.
As w ith an y obsession, this ideology pitting US in terests ag ain st th o se of
th e USSR often w ent so far as to ignore principal factors. U nnoticed
w ent th e desires of sm aller countries th a t becam e entangled in R u ssian
an d Am erican foreign policies. The countries in w hich Soviet advances
were detected by the Eisenhow er adm inistration cam e to be viewed and
treated as paw ns on a Cold War chessboard to be moved by either the
U nited S tates or the Soviet Union. They were not empowered to act as
individual states, only as representatives of one or the other superpow er.
B ecause of the obsession with counteracting Soviet advances, the
Eisenhow er adm inistration h ad m ore th a n its sh a re of foreign crises.
The m ajority of th ese critical situ atio n s took on a m ilitary n atu re. After
all, th e superpow ers vied for control of the world an d th e m ost basic
m eans of control was th e th re a t an d actual u se of b ru te force. D uring
crises, w hen extrem es becam e the norm , negotiations were reduced to
th re a ts of force an d counter-force.
Princeton Professor Fred I. G reenstein explained in The Hidden
H and Presidency, Eisenhow er as Leader th a t because of Eisenhow er’s
m ilitary experience aro u n d the world, th e P resident m aintained a keen
in terest in foreign policy. G reenstein noted th a t S ecretary of S tate Jo h n
F oster Dulles "was th e publicly visible actor" in foreign affairs while,

INTRODUCTION - 3 -
behind th e scenes, Eisenhow er actually h ad control over all policy
decisions. From w ithin the adm inistration, th e P resid en t’s participation
during th ese crises w as evident, b u t frequently it w as n o t seen from the
outside. In day to day diplomacy it was Dulles who appeared to direct
m ost American foreign policy. Eisenhow er carefully concealed his own
involvem ent to avoid being th e target of any criticism resulting from
u n p o p u lar policies. Yet, given G reenstein’s proof, and th e large am ount
of su b stan tia tin g evidence th a t h as been declassified since his book was
published, there is no do u b t th a t Eisenhow er m anaged American foreign
policy during his adm inistration. Dulles frequently m ay have acted as
his collaborator, b u t it w as th e P resident who was prim arily responsible
for th e final decisions.1
As Eisenhow er entered office in 1953, he helped force an arm istice
betw een North an d S o u th Korea, putting an end to th e three year w ar
there. Both 1954 an d 1958 saw C om m unist Chinese attack s on the
N ationalist held islands of Quemoy and M atsu. The P resident dealt with
these incursions by th reaten in g n u clear repercussions if Mao Tse Tung
continued his aggression. The Peoples Republic of C hina halted its
attack s. In the m inds of American officials all of th ese events were
Soviet instigated.
To avoid su rp rise attack s an d help anticipate any moves m ade by
th e C om m unists, it was requisite to keep an eye on R ussia. In 1955

INTRODUCTION - 4 -
Eisenhow er approved U-2 flights over the Soviet Union and other
E astern bloc countries to protect against su rp rise attack. The la u n ch of
S p u tn ik on October 4, 1957 prom pted the Eisenhow er adm inistration to
begin w ork on a satellite with photographic capabilities. Aerial
reconnaissance cam e into its own during Eisenhow er’s second term .
D uring th is period th e President also m ade less m alignant
attem p ts a t gaining influence a n d /o r control in th e far reaches of the
globe - to protect the world from the Soviet Union. By m eans of foreign
aid an d alliance the S tate D epartm ent sought to improve relations,
protect ag ain st enem y in tru sio n s, and increase US influence aro u n d the
world. In p a rts of the Middle E ast, S outh E ast Asia, and th e Pacific,
America’s claim w as staked.
The situ atio n in the Middle E ast w as particularly precarious.
Between protection of Israel and an in terest in good relations w ith the
A rabs, Eisenhow er h ad to m aintain a careful balancing act. Israel
represen ted America’s m ost definite ally in th e Middle E ast. It w as a
bastio n of Democracy and a foe of Com m unism . The Arab countries
were appealing because of the vast source of potential energy u n d e r their
territoiy. The problem w as th e m u tu al hostility between Israel an d the
Arabs. Eisenhow er tried to walk a fine line an d rem ain friendly with
both areas.
A lthough m ost of the Arab states h ad an anti-w estern bent, the

INTRODUCTION - 5 -
Eisenhow er adm inistration m ade all attem p ts to keep on am iable term s
w ith th e oil rich Arabs. Eisenhow er n eith er w ished to displease those
controlling th e oil nor w anted to see su ch an energy source drift into
C om m unist h an d s. Sim ultaneously, he tried to su p p o rt an d protect
Israel from Arab aggressions.
Keeping th e peace becam e a top priority for th e adm inistration.
By avoiding hostilities the problem of allying w ith Israel ag ain st th e
Arabs or vice versa vanished. Also, peaceful relations lessened th e
opportunity for th e Soviet Union to infiltrate th e area an d gain influence.
Soviet cam paigns to discredit the United S tates included offering th e
USSR as a more benevolent and less controlling option th a n America. If,
however, th ere w as no dissatisfaction with the United S tates from either
of th e d isp u tan ts - Arabs or Israelis - the USSR h ad little chance of
u su rp in g America’s position.
N otw ithstanding Eisenhow er’s efforts to please all th e people all
the tim e, som e were always disappointed. To the Arabs, Israel w as an
abhorred neighbor th a t w as unquestionably allied to th e United S tates.
No doubt Arab resen tm en t an d d istru st of th e US formed aro u n d this
point. By spouting sta n d ard anti-A m erican propaganda, th e Soviet
Union appeared to sym pathize with the Arabs and th u s gained a foot
hold in the Middle E ast.
To protect ag ain st the spread of fu rth er Soviet influence,

INTRODUCTION - 6 -
Eisenhow er’s adm inistration worked to align Middle E astern states with
America. The B aghdad Pact represented one su c h effort, b u t only some
of th e Arab countries h ad signed th a t treaty. Clear of any arrangem ent
w as Egypt, perh ap s th e m ost powerful non-aligned sta te in the area and
a country led by one of th e preem inent tw entieth cen tu ry Arab leaders,
Colonel Gam al Abd’ul Nasser.
N asser stood at th e forefront of a nationalistic wave th a t began
following World W ar Two. 1946 h ad seen a rising degree of national
fervor directly opposed to the superpow ers’ tendency tow ard
m anipulation of third world countries for first world purp o ses. After the
Second World W ar n u m ero u s colonies fought for an d won th eir
independence, reassertin g th eir own cultures an d custom s. O ther
people aro u n d the world experienced a renew ed sen se of sh ared
ancestry, ignored prior to the war. O ut of this atm osphere was born
N asser’s vision.
The Egyptian leader w ished to unite Middle E astern Arabs by
invoking th eir com mon traditions an d beliefs. Coming to power during
th e early 1950s, N asser defied Cold War conventions an d sought the
attentio n s of both th e Soviet Union and the U nited S tates. A ttem pting to
m anipulate the m anipulators, he negotiated w ith both superpow ers, to
the displeasure of each. As America and R ussia vied for increased
influence in Egypt, N asser retained his independence by rem aining non-

INTRODUCTION - 7 -
com m ittal. For his efforts he gained acclaim in the Arab world and
am ong oth er nationalistically inclined third world countries, b u t little
approval from th e superpow ers.
By playing on th e U S/U SSR rivalry, N asser m anaged to obtain
several objectives he sought. With help from either America or th e Soviet
Union he w as able to rid Egypt of foreign occupational forces, obtain
loans and grants, buy w eapons, and sell w heat. From an American
perspective, th e assistan ce provided w as a m eans of inviting Egypt to
become an ally of th e West. The Soviet Union h ad approxim ately the
sam e objective.
N asser’s tactic worked for only as long as both superpow ers were
willing to tolerate it. By 1956, th e patience of Eisenhow er an d his
advisors was w earing thin. N asser could not continue to sit on the
fence. He w as getting the b est of both worlds free of charge an d the
U nited S tates was not benefiting from it. Officials were clear th a t
som ething would have to change. N asser’s all expense paid trip was
ab o u t to end.
In Ju ly 1956, Eisenhow er sen t P resident N asser th e m essage th a t
his riding th e fence would no longer be allowed by cancelling an aid
package to help build the m assive Aswan dam on th e Nile river. In
retaliation N asser nationalized the Suez Canal, a w aterw ay depended

s
up o n by m uch of the free world as a passage for oil an d other precious
INTRODUCTION - 8 -
goods. N asser’s action m arked the beginning of th e Suez C anal Crisis.
Instead of pitting E ast against West, th e Suez conflict brought the
W est to face itself. The Eisenhow er adm inistration and its World War
Two allies took diam etrically opposed positions. The P resident rejected
all efforts to forcefully secure the canal from Egyptian control, while
G reat B ritain an d France saw no choice b u t to reclaim th e Suez using
any m eans.
The U nited Kingdom an d France were prim ary am ong the nations
affected by N asser’s seizure. Both h ad h ad a m ajor h a n d in ru n n in g the
canal before its nationalization. Both stood to lose large investm ents.
And, loss of control over the canal would negate B ritish and French
influence in th e Suez ju s t as N asser desired. Considering these
prospects, E ngland an d France saw no option b u t to reso rt to an
aggressive attack on Egypt - negotiation would n o t sway N asser. Joining
th e Anglo-French forces were Israeli troops, w hose leaders h ad defensive
reason s of th eir own for attacking.
P resident Eisenhow er did not allow for violence as an option. He
repudiated th e m ilitary action of his W estern allies. In doing so, America
appeared to side w ith th e Soviet Union. Here w as th e only tim e in the
E isenhow er presidency w hen the United S tates was a t odds w ith its
allies an d in seem ing accord with its enemies. The allies’ confidence th a t
su c h an illusion would never be accepted by American officials coaxed

INTRODUCTION - 9
B ritain an d France into believing Eisenhow er would su p p o rt th eir
aggression despite his contrary statem ents. S u ch w as n o t th e case.
N um erous volum es have discussed varying aspects of th e Suez
Crisis. The basic events of th e conflict can be found in any good
encyclopedia. They are n o t obscure. The influences acting u p o n and
m otivations behind decisions m ade by the principal players have not
been m ade as lucid. Through exam ination of th e words of Eisenhower,
Dulles, an d m any of the other officials caught u p in th e crisis of 1 9 5 6 ,1
will retell the history of the Suez Crisis in an effort to reveal th e motives
behind th e actions of those involved. From private conversations,
governm ent com m unications, public statem ents, m em oirs, an d diaries
th eir th o u g h ts and rationale can be derived an d exam ined. The vital
considerations th a t guided Eisenhow er in his anti-aggression stan ce
m u st be explained in order to tru ly u n d ersta n d w hat happ en ed in the
second h alf of 1956. Likewise it is necessary to investigate those
influences th a t resulted in Egyptian nationalization of th e Suez and
B ritish, French, an d Israeli insistence upon the u se of force.

INTRODUCTION - 10 -
ENDNOTES
1. Fred I. G reenstein, The Hidden H and Presidency, E isenhow er as

L eader, (New York: Basic Books, 1982): 87-92.
CHAPTER TWO
Leading Up To The Crisis
D uring th e final days of Ju ly 1956, Gam al N asser, P resident of
Egypt, an n o u n ced to th e world his intention to nationalize th e Suez
Canal. The action startled an d infuriated Britain, France, an d Israel, all
of whom depended on passage through the canal for vital com modities,
especially oil. These countries shortly devised an d executed a plan of
m ilitary attack to reverse N asser’s decision. Ultimately, largely because
Eisenhow er refused to sanction m ilitary seizure of the Suez an d in stead
directed the m atter to th e U nited Nations, a less violent solution w as
reached through UN negotiation. In November Soviet th re a ts of sending
volunteers to defend Egypt against the invaders appeared to bring
p ressu re for peaceful solution, b u t h ad the President n o t in sisted on
U nited Nations participation from the beginning of hostilities it was
im probable th a t a cease fire would have been achieved w ithout m uch
higher ca su alties.1 U.N. involvement m ean t world opinion and
diplom atic p ressu re could be brought to bear on the belligerent forces.
N asser’s nationalization move w as justified as a reaction to

LEADING UP TO THE C R I S I S - 12 -
America’s w ithdraw al on Ju ly 19 of an offer to aid in the co nstruction of
th e High Aswan D am on th e Nile River.2 W ashington’s original
w illingness to a s sist in the project w as a reaction to an anticipated
th re a t of Soviet influence in Egypt. The th re a t h ad arisen solely through
America’s refusal to sell w eaponry to Egypt, a strategy intended to
m aintain an arm s balance in the Middle E ast. T hat balance w as
betw een th e Arab countries an d Israel, w hich was clearly pro-American.
The decisions th a t resulted in these actions were based on perceptions of
Soviet involvement, dom estic pressure, rationalizations, an d em otional
reactions. To u n d e rsta n d how the Suez Crisis developed one m u st
investigate th e events th a t led to N asser’s seizure of th e canal.
The events leading tow ard the Suez Crisis h ad begun in F ebruary
1955. At th is tim e Gam al N asser requested m ilitary aid from th e United
S tates. N asser asked th a t America sell 27 million dollars w orth of arm s
to Egypt. In response the United S tates agreed, b u t added the
stipulation th a t N asser m ake full paym ent upon delivery. Aware N asser
could n o t do so, th e Eisenhow er adm inistration h ad agreed to th e deal
expecting N asser to reject th eir term s. Since N asser dropped th e subject
after th e American requirem ents were presented, th e A merican guess
w as correct.3
The effective rejection of N asser’s proposal by America h ad its
consequences. N asser’s failure to obtain arm s from th e U nited S tates

w as probably his prim e m otivation behind approaching America’s rival.
In Septem ber of 1955 it w as revealed by Egyptian officials th a t a
w eapons deal h ad been m ade between R ussia an d Egypt.4 The w eapons
were to be tran sp o rted thro u g h Czechoslovakia. E stim ates th a t Egypt
would receive between 90 an d 200 million dollars in arm s from the
Soviets alarm ed American policy m akers. B ecause th is am o u n t
drastically exceeded th e previously considered 27 million dollars in arm s
from th e United S tates, the Eisenhow er adm inistration felt it h ad to
respond in order to co u n teract possible C om m unist influence.5
In his S tate of the Union Address in th e first week of Ja n u a ry
1956, Eisenhow er m ade reference to the arm s deal, noting th a t "In the
Middle E a st recent Soviet moves are hardly com patible w ith the
reductions of in tern atio n al tension."6 The com m ent hinted a t the
ad m in istratio n ’s concern with the D ecem ber contact between N asser and
the Soviet Union. It was a quiet w arning to the Soviets th a t selling arm s
to N asser was bound to provoke American retaliation.
In his memoir. Waging Peace, Eisenhow er com m ented th a t "The
first evidence of serious C om m unist penetration occurred in th e fall of
1955...in w h at h as since been called the notorious N asser ’arm s deal.’"7
Eisenhow er continued, noting th a t "when the Soviet Union th reaten ed to
become actively involved [in the Middle East], th e United S tates could no
longer rem ain a silent partner. We h ad to step in to co unter th e weight

of Soviet power."8 To prevent Soviet intrusion, America h ad to act.
Eisenhow er’s S ecretaiy of S tate discussed th e direction Middle
E astern foreign policy would take in a com m encem ent address.
Speaking before th e 1956 g raduating class of Iowa S tate, Dulles
explained America’s next move to neutralize R ussian advances. Dulles
reported th a t continued foreign aid w as the solution. "The im portance of
th[e] economic p a rt of our peace in su ran ce policy is em phasized by the
fact th a t th e Soviet Union is now p u sh in g its own in terests by m eans of
credit extended to other countries."9 The R u ssian s were giving aid, so
America h ad to do likewise to ensure W estern - not C om m unist - powers
influenced and dom inated th e Middle E ast. The financial aid for the
construction of th e Aswan Dam would prom ote A merican interests.
Leonard Mosley, biographer of the Dulles family, noted th a t Dulles
"m aintained th a t a loan for su ch a project [as th e dam] would
dem onstrate to the Egyptian people and the world th a t while the
R ussian s were in Egypt as m erch an ts of death [dealing in weapons],
America w as offering th e m eans for growth and life."10 The dam aid
would en su re America’s position in Egypt.
America needed a tangible response to co u n ter th e Soviet in trusion
into Egypt. Thus, in Decem ber of 1955 N asser was offered economic
assistan ce for th e construction of the High Aswan Dam. The United
S tates, G reat Britain, an d th e International B ank for R econstruction and

D evelopm ent (IBRD) would com bine to aid Egypt in financing th e dam ,
Terence Robertson com m ented in his book, Crisis: The Inside Story of
th e Suez Conspiracy th at, "the project depended logically on N asser’s
w illingness to stay away from com m itm ents with th e E a st an d become,
in a general sense, som eone Dulles and [British Prime M inister] Eden
could p u t down on the credit side of their political ledger."11 The aid was
designed to m ake N asser more am enable to W estern interests, b u t would
only la st if N asser curtailed his association with the E ast.
Besides a tactic to gain N asser’s affections an d cooperation, the
proposal reflected the Eisenhow er adm inistration’s belief in American
superiority over C om m unist R ussia. American exceptionalism , n o t a
recen t innovation, w as especially prevalent following World W ar Two and
th ro u g h o u t th e Eisenhow er adm inistration. It followed th a t anything
obtained from th e United S tates would retain a sem blance of th a t
perfection an d be desirable to the receiving country. N asser w as su re to
accept a loan from th e US, no m atter how unappealing th e term s. The
adm inistration apparently h ad not anticipated th a t N asser m ight desire
a m ore beneficial arrangem ent th a n the one offered by W ashington and
th e IBRD. Nor h ad th e S tate D epartm ent expected th a t N asser m ight
u se any negotiating tactic he could to try to obtain a b etter deal. D ulles’
stipulatio n s for funding did not rep resen t a p leasan t prospect to Nasser,
so th e Egyptian refused to accept them outright.

Before the S ecretaiy of S tate would endorse th e loan for Aswan aid
he required N asser to agree to various conditions. The m ost insulting of
them for N asser m u st have been th e one calling for th e governm ent of
Egypt to plan its fiscal year aro u n d repaying th e debts to its creditors,
th e U nited S tates, G reat Britain, an d the IBRD. In addition Dulles
m aintained th a t American officials would oversee th is process - to

r )
en su re m oney was not directed tow ard alternate p u rch ases by Egyptian
officials. Regular installm ents would be paid in place of w eapons
p u rch ases from th e Soviets. Since construction of th e Aswan D am was
expected to la st ten years, America would have virtual control over the
Egyptian economy for a decade. This agreem ent w as far from beneficial
to N asser. In fact, it would have limited N asser’s in d ep en d en t actions
entirely.12
AAfhile N asser rejected D ulles’ proposition, th e proposal found no
su b sta n tia l criticism in the United S tates. The P resident rem arked th a t
"The arm s deal w ent through an d o u r attitu d e tow ard Soviet penetration
n atu rally hardened. B ut we did n o t cease our efforts to m ake N asser see
th e benefits of his strengthening ties with the w est."13 E isenhow er’s
sta tem en t portrayed Egypt as only a paw n in th e gam e betw een Soviet
a n d Am erican dom ination. Like Woodrow Wilson’s attem p t to teach the
M exicans good governm ent, Eisenhow er planned to show th e Egyptians
th e benefits of being a friend to th e West. Aswan aid was one possible

benefit.
N asser preferred to m aintain his own sovereignty, or a t m inim um ,
retain enough power to avoid succum bing to th e American governm ent’s
agenda for his country. His acceptance of E astern bloc arm s h ad
displayed th is an d American officials could n o t be com fortable w ith
N asser’s unw illingness to stay in line with American w ishes. D irector for
th e C enter of Political R esearch and S tudies a t Cairo University,
Professor Ali E. Hillal D essouki com m ented th a t from his ascen d an ce to
power, N asser "became increasingly convinced th a t Afro-Asian countries
m u st avoid alignm ent with great powers. He th o u g h t th e m ost
significant fact of the world situation was th e Cold War betw een th e two
blocs. So th e b est course of action for sm all n atio n s and Afro-Asian
countries was to avoid involvement in Cold W ar politics because it would
inevitably spell foreign influence."14 At all costs N asser would n o t allow
foreign influences in his country.
N asser, in practice, did not completely follow his own philosophy.
Instead of rem aining a p a rt from the superpow ers, he w as involved w ith
both th e Soviet Union and America. N asser attem pted to m ain tain a
balance w hereby he would not be dependent or beholden to either
nation, b u t obtained supplies and funds from both. In th is gam e he
could n o t succeed because as soon as N asser h ad contact w ith either th e
U nited S tates or R ussia, he becam e a piece in th e Cold W ar chess

m atch. W hether he considered him self a gam e piece or not, he was
treated as su ch by th e Eisenhow er adm inistration. Egypt w as viewed in
th e light of American v ersus Soviet interests, not w ith regard to Egyptian
goals. N asser could not escape it.
In Eisenhow er’s m ind, it was an Am erican’s duty, to self an d the
free world, to keep Egypt from falling u n d er Soviet influence - to enforce
containm ent. The ad m in istratio n ’s ideology also required im m ediate
suspicion of Egypt’s m otivations once a relationship w ith R ussia h ad
been revealed. T hus, th e United S tates attem pted to increase its
popularity w ith the Egyptians thro u g h boons like th e dam , while it
sim ultaneously rem ained on the look out for negative influences injected
by th e C om m unists.
As early as M arch of th e following year th e B ritish revealed their
own suspicions. Along w ith the United S tates, G reat B ritain h ad agreed
to help finance the Aswan Dam. By the third week in M arch th eir desire
to help h ad decreased. The B ritish believed th a t N asser w as held in the
clutches of Soviet power. The 1955 arm s deal h ad significantly tied
Egypt to th e Soviets. Egypt w as now, according to B ritish analysts,
beholden to th e Soviets because they h ad received w eapons. As a resu lt
B ritain began to consider th e option of "withdraw!ing] o u r offer of
financial assistan ce over th e Aswan D am ."15 Officials w ithin the
D epartm ent of S tate concurred th a t Soviet influence w as p resen t in

Egypt.
An in ter-d ep artm en tal memo on M arch 21, from th e D eputy
Secretary of S tate for Political Affairs to th e U nder S ecretary of S tate,
stated th a t "Nasser h ad opened the African door to Soviet penetration...."
an d com plained th a t "The USSR is sending n u clear scientists to Cairo by
agreem ent with th e Egyptian G overnm ent to set u p a research reactor
laboratory."16 The concern ab o u t Soviet connections in Egypt w as clear.
It w as n o t long before America took steps th a t hinted a t th eir agreem ent
w ith th e B ritish conclusion to cancel Aswan aid.
On M arch 28 a United S tates policy plan called for actions to limit
Egypt’s influence in the su rro u n d in g Middle E astern countries of S u dan,
Libya, Jo rd an , Yemen, "and other A rabian principalities."17 It was
believed by policy m akers th a t once tain ted by C om m unist influence, in

i
th e form of w eapons, Egypt could not be perm itted to influence its peers.
T hat would fu rth er spread the C om m unist disease.
In addition, the United S tates began to consider either jam m ing
Egyptian radio airways or increasing Iraqi radio capacities in order to
h alt anti-A m erican b roadcasts em anating from Egypt.18 While N asser’s
decision to allow anti-A m erican propaganda was ill-advised an d provided
a reason for th e United S tates to d istru st Egypt, it is clear th a t the
Eisenhow er adm inistration already held strong misgivings ab o u t th eir
Aswan D am involvement. N asser had n eith er curtailed his anti-

American propaganda, nor term inated his contact w ith th e Soviets.
C onsequently, Eisenhower, Dulles, an d several other adm inistration
advisors concluded th a t the "US will continue to delay cu rren t
negotiations on th e High Aswan D am ."19
Once th e dam project w as delayed it w as never again seriously
considered. N asser, refusing to bow to W estern desires continued
actions th a t clearly displeased the West. On May 16, N asser recognized
th e C om m unist governm ent of C hina.20 W hat could not help b u t be
interpreted as a move against the United S tates, an d a move tow ard the
Soviet direction, h ad international as well as dom estic ram ifications for
A merican policy.
Internationally, Egypt h ad acted in direct opposition to
Eisenhow er’s foreign policy. To associate w ith a co u n tiy th a t overtly
defied America’s objective would not show the U nited S tates in a good
fight. How could Eisenhow er’s governm ent court N asser w hen the
Egyptian leader h ad recognized the People’s Republic of C hina? Egypt,
from an American perspective, was flaunting its independence. By doing
so, America appeared ineffective.
Domestically, Egypt’s recognition of PRC, fu rth er reduced
American Congressional su p p o rt for aid.21 S u p p o rt for Aswan Dam
funding was precarious before N asser’s recognition of C om m unist China.
After, it m erely reinforced the Congressional inclination not to

appropriate the n ecessary m oney for the Dam.
A com m entator in Foreign Policy Bulletin noted th a t one reason for
dislike of th e Aswan project "was th e outspoken opposition of th e
C ongressm en from so u th ern cotton growing sta tes who feared th a t the
dam would increase Egypt’s cotton-producing area, thereby creating new
com petition for th e United States."22 Generally, in fact, C ongressm en
from n u m ero u s geographic areas were against appropriating funds for
th e Aswan Dam. This factor surely encouraged the Eisenhow er
adm inistration to continue in the direction of revoking its offer of aid.
Slightly over a m onth after N asser recognized China, Eugene
Black, p resid en t of the IBRD, retu rn ed from negotiations with N asser
concerning financing the dam . Eisenhow er rem arked th a t w hen Dulles
inform ed him of the counterproposals N asser h ad p u t forth in response
to W estern offers, they concluded th a t N asser h ad no intention of
w orking w ith the West. The President wrote in Waging Peace: "When
F oster described the extraordinary counterproposals th a t N asser h ad
given to Eugene Black, th e two of u s concluded th a t N asser w as n o t
really interested in serious negotiation of the project." He continued by
statin g th a t they "considered th e m atter dead for all practical
purposes."23 Eisenhow er an d Dulles interpreted N asser’s plans as
sim ply an effort to blackm ail the U nited S tates into an arran g em en t
w hich would benefit Egypt more. Perhaps one th a t would allow N asser
to m ain tain greater control over Egypt’s financial affairs and allow for a
less dem anding repaym ent schedule.
They interpreted N asser’s in terest in th e Soviet proposals as
blackm ail also. Not only did th e fact th a t the Egyptian P resident h ad
explored Soviet proposals for building the dam w eaken Congressional
in terest in the project because Americans would n o t to associate with
the C om m unists, b u t it also m u st have m ade th e Secretary of S tate and
the P resident view th e less powerful Egypt - com pared w ith America - as
som ew hat insolent.24 N asser’s flirtations w ith both America an d R u ssia
created an u n certain ty ab o u t his intentions th a t increased th e suspicion
in th e Eisenhow er adm inistration to the point w here officials completely
d istru sted Nasser.
The debate ab o u t w hether N asser planned to w ork with America or
R u ssia w as held behind the doors of the D epartm ent of S tate. On J u n e
25, 1956, it rem ained u n clear w hat N asser would do. Eugene Black
com m ented th a t he believed "if the w est did not proceed w ith the project,
the Soviets would m ake a deal...." He was not positive th a t the
C om m unists could succeed in the enterprise, b u t at m inim um they
would m ake an effort. Black continued with a w arning th a t the Egyptian
presid en t was now politically tied to the project. He added th a t N asser
w as receiving more inviting offers of assistan ce from th e Soviets, yet he
still believed th a t N asser preferred to do b u sin ess w ith America.25

Three days later, it was ap p aren t th a t few high governm ent
officials, particularly the Secretary of State, adhered to Black’s argum ent
for financing th e dam . At a N ational Security Council m eeting/Secretaiy
of S tate Dulles com m ented th a t constructing the dam would lead to
difficulties for th e United S tates in th e h o st country. W hichever nation
constru cted th e Aswan D am undoubtedly would be held in contem pt by
th e p aren t country because of the inevitable h ard sh ip s th e dam ’s cost
would place on th e Egyptian people them selves. The agreem ent reached
in regard to paying for th e dam left the Egyptians responsible for
900,000,000 dollars of th e slightly over one billion dollar price tag.26
This gigantic am o u n t w as g u aranteed to stretch th e Egyptian economy to
th e limit. Also, it was believed Egypt would req u est fu rth er financial aid
once th e project h ad begun.27
D ulles’ reasoning w as logical. It also conveniently solved the
problem of w hether or n o t to finance th e dam . Clearly, if it would not be
beneficial to th e United S tates - the Egyptian m asses would come to hate
w hat N asser referred to as im perialist America - there w as no reason to
p u rsu e the dam . America’s aim a t offering financial aid w as to move
closer to th e Egyptians, not alienate itself from them .
A contem poraiy com m entator p u t forth the idea th a t "stories
suggest th a t W ashington, having discovered Moscow would not help
Egypt with the dam , h ad decided it was safe to risk N asser’s

LEADING UP TO THE C R I S I S 24
displeasure..." and to cancel th e offer to finance th e dam .28 A lthough this
theory w as possibly correct, it cannot be su b stan tia te d . C harles Bohlen,
A merican A m bassador in th e USSR, did not report to W ashington th a t
th e Soviets were unwilling to u n d ertak e the project u n til Ju ly 22, after
Dulles h ad w ithdraw n th e American offer.29
Aid from the United S tates for the High Aswan D am w as
w ithdraw n on Ju ly 19. At least two days before th at, Dulles an d the
S tate d ep artm en t h ad decided th a t the project no longer show ed enough
prom ise to w arra n t th e involvement of the United S tates. N asser h ad
been playing Soviet against American, a game w hich th e Eisenhow er
-adm inistration did not approve of; th e Egyptian presid en t h ad to ally
w ith one nation or the other, dealing with .bjq th J h e J J S a n d the USSR _
I broke Cold War rules, a t least as far as the American policv m akers were
L concerned.
------------------------------
On th e seventeenth of Ju ly the A ssistant Secretary of S tate for
Near E astern, S o u th Asian, and African Affairs wrote a m em orandum to
Dulles outlining Aswan Dam policy. The A ssistant Secretary, George
Allen, com m ented th a t "Nasser is p u rsu in g policies in th e N ear E a st
opposed to reasonable U.S. objectives and supporting Soviet objectives.
N asser is not guided appreciably by ’cold w ar’ considerations b u t by his
own vision of ’Egypt’s destiny.’"30 U ndoubtedly galled by th e fact th a t
N asser would not toe th e line, Allen’s memo continued by recom m ending
th a t th e U nited S tates, "clearly w ithdraw th e D ecem ber offer on th e
Aswan Dam." It speculated th ^ t the Egyptian reaction to this action
would be to accept th e R ussian offer and th e Soviets would require
Egyptian economic subservience as a price for building th e dam .31 T hat
resu lt w as preferable to concurrently supporting Egypt w ith th e
C om m unists.
In essence, the United S tates saw itself as abandoning N asser to
C om m unist claws. The memo stated th a t w ithdraw al of th e Aswan D am
offer would be looked upon favorably by som e of th e other Middle
E astern countries. It referred to Lebanon, Syria, S u d an , Turkey, Iran,
an d Iraq as all stan d in g to gain som ething from cancellation of the
project. This would help the US position in th a t area of the world.32
Of course, diplomatically, the United S tates w ished to ap p ear
concerned w ith h u m an itarian ism and therefore would n o t cancel all
assistan ce. Dulles would offer the Egyptian A m bassador, Ahmad
H ussein, economic aid for other projects. And, dam aid m ight come a t a
later date, w hen N asser becam e more congenial tow ard the United
S ta te s.33 Although th e proposition was m ade, th e S tate D epartm ent did
no t believe N asser would agree to it. It was u nacceptable for Egypt,
since N asser was com m itted to the Aswan Dam.
On Ju ly 19 th e final decision w as made. Dulles approached his
P resident for approval in th e morning. Dulles listed the reasons for

w ithdraw al one by one an d gained Eisenhow er’s san ctio n to cancel the
project. It was recorded th a t "The P resident concurred with the
Secretary’s view th a t we should w ithdraw the US offer upon th e occasion
of the A m bassador’s visit."34
A m bassador H ussein arrived th a t afternoon an d was inform ed th a t
the offer of financial aid for th e High Aswan D am h ad been w ithdraw n.
The difficulty th a t arose, th e crucial factor th a t Dulles h ad n o t fully
analyzed, was th a t H ussein "was returning to W ashington w ith the
publicly an n o u n ced intention of accepting th e US-UK-IBRD offer of
financing."35 By expressly rejecting N asser’s acceptance of th e proposal’,
Dulles com m itted a diplom atic faux pas. He gave N asser no viable
m eans of saving face. N asser w as left holding his h a n d s out, only to
have them slapped down, an em barrassing position for th e Arab.
The A m bassador insisted th a t N asser preferred to accept the
A m erican proposal over th e Soviet one. But, he w arned, N asser was
determ ined to co n stru ct th e Aswan D am and therefore would accept the
Soviet offer if the W est w ithdrew its financial aid. He also stated th a t
N asser w as now willing to accept the original term s for aid offered in
D ecem ber 1955,36 His pleas were of no avail. Following th eir meeting,
th e S tate D epartm ent an nounced, "the U.S. G overnm ent h as concluded
th a t it is not feasible in p resen t circum stances to participate in the
[Aswan] project."37 T hat single sentence m ade w ithdraw al of Aswan

funding official.
Following th e anno u n cem en t of w ithdraw al Eisenhow er w ondered
w heth er it h ad been too ab ru p t. He com m ented in Waging P eace, "I w as
concern ed ...th at we m ight have been undiplom atic in th e way th e
cancellation w as handled." Although m any would agree with this
assessm en t, Dulles denied it. In a letter to Eisenhower, he rem arked
th a t th e E gyptians should have anticipated America’s actions. The
U nited S tates h ad pointedly neglected to respond to an Egyptian
m em orandum dealing with th e dam . Additionally, several h in ts h ad
been dropped th a t the United S tates offer was no longer valid an d it was
clear th a t Congressional su p p o rt had entirely disappeared. Thus, as far
as th e Egyptians were concerned cancellation could not have been
considered unexpected or a b ru p t.38 R ather, it was im pending.
Dulles correctly assu m ed th a t the Egyptians were n o t su rp rised by
America’s w ithdraw al of the offer. W hat he did not anticipate was
N asser’s ability to capitalize on th a t action. D ulles’ w ithdraw al, although
it m ight n o t have been ab ru p t for the Egyptian governm ent, could easily
be portrayed as su c h to Egypt’s citizens an d neighbors. In overlooking
the option opened to N asser by cancelling th e project w hen Egypt was
ready to accept it, Dulles severely m iscalculated. In diplom acy
perception is nearly all th a t m atters.
In addition, H arvard Professor E m eritus an d A ssistant S ecretary of

S tate for Policy Planning in 1956, Robert Bowie m aintained th at, "Nasser
h ad intentionally posed the issu e [of accepting aid for th e dam] in a form
virtually excluding an am biguous reply."39 N asser did n o t provide Dulles
th e option of m aking the w ithdraw al ap p ear less ab ru p t, h ad Dulles felt
it appropriate. / This m ay point to the idea th a t N asser intended to have

' " -HHMMM ......................... — — I'll- 1
- - ——■— *
Dulles w ithdraw the dam aid in su ch a way as to in su re th a t he could
capitalize on the Egyptian a n tirAmerican response. | E m phasizing D ulles’
perceived su d d en withdraw al, N asser now h ad an outrage to w hich he
could react.
On Ju ly 25 President N asser annou n ced he would respond
decisively to th e w ithdraw al of the Aswan D am proposal th e following
day in A lexandria.40 At 11 p.m ., on th e tw enty-sixth,
a som ew hat frantic telegram arrived a t the D epartm ent of S tate. S en t
from th e em bassy in Cairo, its text inform ed th e American governm ent
th a t N asser h ad nationalized the Suez Canal. In his speech N asser
outlined his plan to u se the profits from the canal to fund construction
of th e Aswan Dam. The American A m bassador com m ented th a t "Nasser
w as clearly em otional and excited" ab o u t his action.41 P erhaps, this was
due to th e fact th a t N asser potentially h ad b eaten both su p e r powers at
th eir own game. He h ad expelled both "Communist" and "Democratic"
ideologies. N either country now had th e opportunity to require
subjugation of Egyptian goals to the desires of its nation in re tu rn for

financial aid to co n stru ct the Aswan Dam.
H istorian H erbert Parm et stated in Eisenhow er an d th e American
C ru sa d es, th a t th e canal’s seizure h ad completely su rp rised the
Eisenhow er adm inistration. He contended th a t no advisor h ad foreseen
N asser’s move.42 If they had, why would Dulles have provided th e
Egyptian P resident w ith an excuse to nationalize th e canal? The aid
w ithdraw al could have been executed more delicately h ad Dulles
expected N asser to u se it as an excuse to grab th e Suez. Also, as Parm et
pointed out, th ere is no ap p aren t evidence th a t contradicts his theory.
A uthor Terence Robertson, however, claim ed in Crisis, The Inside
Story of the Suez C onspiracy, th a t Dulles and B ritish Prime M inister
A nthony Eden h ad discussed the topic. R obertson reported Dulles
believed th a t if N asser seized the Suez, he "would n o t be u n d u ly
concerned. No m atter w hat difficulties arose, he w as confident th a t
A merican know how and ingenuity would over come them ."43 If Dulles
an d E den considered th e possibility of N asser nationalizing the canal, it
seem s im probable th a t a record of the conversation would not be
recorded. Dulles seem ed to report nearly all of his discussion in
m em orandum s, yet this one is has not been found.
Robertson m aintained his report was accurate, b u t failed to
su p p o rt his statem en t in any way. He held th a t because of
confidentiality, his sources h ad to rem ain unidentified. W ithout

footnotes there is no way to su b stan tia te his theoiy. Conversely,
P arm et’s belief th a t th e S tate D epartm ent and Eisenhow er were caught
off guard b etter fits the American reaction and the docum ents available.
It therefore is more probable th a t th e United S tates w as su rp rised .
On A ugust 12 N asser com m ented, in a p ress conference, th a t he
h ad been considering nationalization of the Suez C anal for th e previous
two y ears.44 The Aswan aid w ithdraw al convinced him to tak e th e step.
It is m ore probable th a t he intentionally capitalized on D ulles’ ab ru p t
diplom atic decision to w ithdraw funding an d adroitly u sed it as an
excuse to seize the canal.
In addition, it was not un til shortly before th e w ithdraw al of aid
th a t N asser could have realized his goal of nationalizing th e Suez. In
1954 G reat B ritain h ad am assed 80,000 troops in th e canal zone, m uch
to th e dism ay of Egyptian n ationalists. The Egyptian governm ent
responded w ith a req u est th a t B ritain remove all of its troops from
Egyptian territory. In an effort, once again, to improve relations between
th e U nited S tates an d Egypt, S ecretaiy of S tate Dulles arranged for an
agreem ent w hereby all B ritish soldiers would evacuate th eir Suez bases.
A two year tim e table was established for th e troop w ithdraw al. It was
clearly not a coincidence th a t N asser nationalized the canal one m onth
after th e final B ritish troops h ad left th e Suez C anal.45 Removal of
B ritain’s soldiers gave th e Egyptian President a free h an d to tak e control

of the zone.
Dulles w as then, an d h as been since, criticized for instigating th e
w ithdraw al of B ritish troops. In the m idst of th e Suez C anal Crisis US
News an d World Report printed an article im plicating Dulles in th e troop
rem oval.46 H erbert P arm et rem arked th a t "D ulles...had p ressu red th e
B ritish to evacuate th eir eighty th o u sa n d troops from the Suez Canal."47
The statem en ts were accurate, b u t the criticism ignored A merican policy
in 1954. Any p ressu re Secretary of S tate Dulles exerted for troop
rem oval h ad been a p a rt of Eisenhow er’s schem e to develop alliances.
The P resident noted in a letter to W inston Churchill w ritten on
Ju ly 22, 1954 th a t the W est had to cater to sm aller nations. He wrote
"We know th a t there is abroad in the world a fierce an d growing spirit of
nationalism . Should we try to dam it u p completely, it would, like a
m ighty river, b u rst through the barriers and could create havoc." He
told C hurchill th a t America an d G reat B ritain h ad to follow "a program
jointly to u n d ertak e to help these nations achieve...progress. [They
m ust] seek to p u t this whole m atter in su c h a light as to gain u s friends
- to be positive ra th e r th a n negative."48 In 1954 Egypt appeared to be
the kind of nationalistically inclined nation Eisenhow er believed th e US
and UK h ad to help. Troop w ithdraw al represented a m eans "to be
positive ra th e r th a n negative." By 1956, w hen it becam e increasingly
clear N asser would not conform to W estern desires, th e idea of B ritish

troop w ithdraw al appeared less inviting. W hat h as rem ained unknow n
u n til recently is th a t th e S tate D epartm ent actually advised G reat B ritain
to disregard its rem oval agreem ent if a plausible excuse could be
devised. The p ressu re to w ithdraw troops th a t P arm et m entioned m ay
have been applied in 1954, b u t by 1956 it w as reversed.
In M arch 1956 th e S tate D epartm ent’s D irector of Near E astern,
S o u th Asian, African Affairs F raser Wilkins, wrote a m em orandum
concerning Egypt’s confrontational stance. Among th e various
recom m endations for action in response to N asser’s policies was th a t
"The United S tates would suggest to the B ritish th a t they im m ediately
slow down the w ithdraw al of B ritish troops from Suez."49 By th is time,
over seventy-five p ercent of the B ritish soldiers already h ad left Egypt.
On M arch 28, th e final draft of W ilkins’ policy sta tem en t w as issued. It
repeated th e suggestion of two weeks before, verbatim , w ith the added
qualifier: "It is realized th a t this suggestion m ight be im practicable."50
W ilkins’ proposal w as not his opinion alone. Dulles also su p p o rted the
idea. His lack of reaction to the Wilkins report can be interpreted as his
acceptance of its relevance, for he did see the m em o.51 Had he disagreed
with W ilkins’ position, Dulles doubtless would have repudiated the
m em orandum ’s content.
Thus, u p p er level S tate D epartm ent officials now were nervous
ab o u t leaving the Suez C anal unprotected from the country th ro u g h

w hich it ran . They developed the belated hope th a t th e B ritish troop
evacuation treaty Dulles h ad arranged could be overlooked. In 1954
Eisenhow er - an d probably Dulles - m u st have been confident th a t
B ritish troop removal would earn N asser’s undying allegiance. The
P resident an d Secretary of S tate expected N asser to respond to th is
gesture by moving into th e W estern cam p. B ut N asser failed to react as
th e A m ericans h ad anticipated. He accepted th e gift w ithout providing
friendship in retu rn . In retrospect American leaders ap p ear blind to this
unfavorable outcome, b u t at the tim e governm ent officials probably did
no t view N asser as a m ajor th re a t to US dom inance. American
overconfidence m ight well have been the factor w hich cau sed Eisenhow er
officials to ignore the tactical error they h ad m ade by coaxing th e B ritish
to ab an d o n th eir Suez fortifications.
By M arch, 1956 th e A dm inistration realized troop w ithdraw al had
n o t borne th e fruits originally expected. The W est’s show of good faith
w as n o t reciprocated. W ilkins’ planning statem en t hinted th a t American
foreign policy m akers h ad gained an inkling of the opportunity they had
given N asser and now were attem pting to block th a t hole. D espite the
desire to stop B ritish troops w ithdraw al, however, th e efforts proved
unsuccessful.
Since all B ritish troops evacuated th eir positions on time, one can
assu m e th e plan ran into difficulty som ew here along the line. The
LEADING UP TO THE C R I S I S • - 34 -
British, w hether u n ab le to invent a reasonable excuse to h alt troop
extraction, or sim ply unwilling to delay troop evacuation, pulled out their
final soldiers on J u n e 18. The former possibility ap p ears m ore probable
th a n th e latter, b u t th ere also exists a th ird explanation. T hat is th a t
B ritish officials never were inform ed of the S tate D epartm ent’s
suggestion. In any case, N asser, expecting D ulles’ w ithdraw al of aid,
u sed th e perceived in su lt to his u tm o st advantage and seized the canal
w ithout opposition. P resident Eisenhower, who h ad rem ained prim arily
an overseer, began to take a more active role as th e potential for an
allied response increased. The Suez Crisis h ad begun.
In th e m iddle of M arch, 1956, w hen th e Eisenhow er
adm inistration was reevaluating its offer of economic aid for th e Aswan
Dam, th e S tate D epartm ent m em orandum drafted by Wilkins expressed
w h at America sought in th e countries it supported. The United S tates
searched for "Stable, viable, friendly governm ents..., capable of
w ithstanding com m unist-inspired subversion from w ithin, and willing to
resist com m unist aggression."52 Dulles and the D epartm ent of S tate h ad
attem pted to tu rn Egypt into this type of country thro u g h an act of good
faith - they h ad arranged for th e removal of 80,000 foreign soldiers.
N asser would n o t allow it. He m aintained his independence of action.
In doing so he raised American suspicions to th e point w here th e S tate
D epartm ent considered Egypt a blackm ailing, C om m unist influenced

country. The overarching belief th a t "if you are not for u s, you are
ag ain st us" w as an im portant factor. This led to two conclusions.
On one level America’s analysts believed th a t Egypt’s only goal was
to milk th e United S tates an d th e Soviet Union for w hatever profit it
could gain. At the sam e time,however, they concluded th a t w ithout
American protection Egypt w as destined to fall u n d er th e control of the
Soviet Union - regardless of N asser’s desire to rid Egypt of all foreign
Influences. N asser’s goal of com plete independence w as ignored because
American officials did not believe it was attainable. The C om m unists
would gain power, eventually, if Egypt rejected US influence.
American career diplom at, Alfred A thertan, w as Second
A m bassador in Syria during th e Suez Crisis. He rem arked in his 1990
article "The United S tates and the Suez Crisis: The Uses an d Limits of
Diplomacy" th a t the United S tates becam e involved in the Middle E ast
"With its eyes fixed on the Cold War...." A thertan continued by statin g
th a t "the American A dm inistration failed to appreciate th e stren g th and
irreconcilability of the forces gathering stren g th in th e Middle E ast."53
He referred, here, to all of America’s involvement in Middle E astern
affairs. Yet, A thertan’s statem en t directly applied to the difficulties of an
Egypt headed by N asser, the su rro u n d in g A rabian countries, an d their
bitter conflict w ith Israel.
T hat A thertan referred to th e Eisenhow er adm inistration, and

implicitly Dulles in particular, as viewing th e Middle E ast in regard to
th e Cold War, says th a t the Middle E ast w as seen in term s of th e Soviet
U nion’s possible expansion into th a t area. Instead of seeing th e in tern al
conflicts, Dulles interpreted only bi-polar considerations: America’s
in terests and th e Soviet Union’s q u est for world dom ination, n o t N asser’s
desire for an Arab consortium . Had Dulles appreciated N asser’s
perspective th e S ecretary m ight have planned the w ithdraw of funding
m ore carefully.
By looking from th is perspective alone, Dulles could never have
realized N asser’s goals or the reasons behind his actions. Dulles did not
conceive of the fact th a t Egypt m ight wish to rem ain truly independent,
neither influenced nor indoctrinated by th e United S tates or R ussia.
N asser, on th e other h and, was determ ined to form a th ird ideology.
N asser’s ideology called for a confederation of th e A rabian sta tes, in
w hich N asser could coordinate all Arab actions ag ain st Israel an d in any
other contexts th a t were appropriate.
It w as not u ntil after the crisis began th a t Dulles adm itted N asser
h ad acted as an independent player. At th e end of A ugust Dulles stated
th a t N asser’s nationalization of the Suez h ad been only a m a tte r of time.
N asser would have seized the canal at some point to "forward his policy
o f ’g ran d eu r’" w hether th e Aswmi^Dam-aiGkwas-withdrawn5,Qrnot.
D ulles’ sen tim en t implied th a t N asser held his own goals for power,
aside from Cold W ar politics. The flaw in this sta tem en t w as th a t if the
U nited S tates h ad gone through with the Aswan aid - on its original
term s, w hich on Ju ly 19 A m bassador H ussein sta ted N asser would
accept - America’s presence in the area m ight have convinced N asser not
to nationalize th e canal un til th e dam was com pleted in an estim ated ten
years, 1966. Since the can al’s ow nership was due to revert to Egypt in
1968 anyway, N asser would have been wise to w ait th e two years
rem aining after th e scheduled completion date of th e dam an d obtain the
Suez w ithout a fight. Seizing th e Suez before the Aswan D am was
finished would have resulted in w ithdraw al of American aid in the m idst
of construction.
Prior to actu al m ilitaiy action, the diplom acy su rro u n d in g Aswan
aid an d Egypt in general h ad received little atten tio n from th e media.
N either Dulles nor Eisenhow er addressed' th e topic of th e Aswan Dam or
th e m ounting doubts ab o ut the reliability of Egypt as a conveyer of
American interests, during the m onths before th e offer’s actu al
w ithdraw al. In fact, even N asser’s nationalization of th e Suez, could no t
com pete with th e more interesting dram as of closer to hom e news.
Although an article discussing the seizure of the Suez appeared on
th e front page of the Ju ly 27 edition of the New York Tim es, it was
overshadowed by th e coverage of a d isaster a t sea. Nearly three q u arters
of the front page w as tak en u p with a headline reporting th e collision of

two ships off th e coast of N antucket - three rows of one inch letters
across th e length of th e page, three accom panying photos, an d several
related articles. N asser’s move w as noted halfway down th e page in
ab o u t h alf a colum n, continued on page th ree.56 The public did not yet
conceive of th e great dangers in h eren t in N asser’s nationalization of the
Suez Canal. The real m edia blitz did not begin u n til unhap p y , angiy
allies voiced th eir disapproval of N asser’s action and th en physically
attack ed Egypt.
As a m ilitary response by America’s allies increased in probability,
P resident Eisenhow er took control of foreign policy. T hroughout his
presidency, Eisenhow er’s direction becam e more definite each tim e a
m ilitary situ atio n arose. Some believed th a t this crisis especially
dem anded his attention. As his cam paign for reelection approached, an
intern atio n al crisis w as brewing. How he reacted could decide w hether
or n o t Americans voted for him. Eisenhow er’s reaction, vehem ent and
em otional, halted the violence th a t followed N asser’s nationalization.

ENDNOTES
1. Terence Robertson, Crisis The Inside Story of th e Suez C onspiracy,

(New York New York: A theneum , 1965.): 294.
2 . Foreign Relations of th e United S tates [FRUS], 1955-1957. "Arab-

Israeli D ispute J a n u a ry 1-July 26" Vol. XV, (W ashington D.C.: United
S tates Printing Office, 1989.): 865.
3 . Dwight D. Eisenhow er, The White H ouse Years, Waging Peace,

(G arden City, New York: D oubleday an d Com pany Inc., 1965.): 25.
4 . V.M. Dean, "Aswan an d Suez," Foreign Policy B ulletin, (36,

S eptem ber 15, 1956): 6-7.
5 . Eisenhower: 25.
6. American Foreign Policy C u rren t D ocum ents. 1956 [AFPD],

(W ashington D.C.: United S tates Printing Office, 1959): 2.
7 . Eisenhower: 24.
8. Ibid.: 25.
9 . AFPD. 1956: 37.
10. Leonard Mosley, Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, an d Jo h n

Foster Dulles an d th eir Family Network, (New York, New York: The Dial
Press, 1978.): 396.
11. Robertson: 16.
12 . Mosley: 397.
13 . Eisenhow er: 26.
14 . Ali E. Hillal D essouki, "Nasser and his struggle for Independence,"

in Suez 1956 The Crisis an d Its C onsequences, edited by William Robert
Louis an d Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarence Press, 1989.): 37.
15 . FRUS XV: 384-386.
16 . Ibid.: 388.
LEADING UP TO THE C R I S I S
17 . Ibid.: 414-415.
18 . Ibid.: 414.
19 . Ibid.: 413.
2 0 . Dean: 7.
2 1 . Eisenhower: 31.
2 2 . Dean: 7.
2 4 . Ibid.: 31.
2 5 . FRUS XV: 749.
2 7 . FRUS XV: 755.
2 8 . Dean: 7.
2 9 . FRUS XV: 879-880.
3 0 . Ibid.: 849.
3 1 . Ibid.: 853.
3 2 . Ibid.: 852.
3 3 . Ibid.: 851.
3 4 . Ibid.: 862.
3 5 . Ibid.: 862.
3 6 . Ibid.: 865-869.
3 7 . AFPD: 851-852.
LEADING UP TO THE C R I S I S 41
3 9 . Robert R. Bowie, "Eisenhower, Dulles, an d th e Suez Crisis," in Suez

1956 The Crisis and Its C onsequences, edited by William Robert Louis
an d Roger Owen (Oxford: Clarence Press, 1989.): 196.
4 0 . FRUS XV: 897.
4 1 . Ibid.: 906-908.
4 2 . H erbert S. Parm et, Eisenhow er an d th e American C ru sa d es, (New

York, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972.): 483.
4 3 . Robertson: 67-8.
4 4 . Ibid.: 483.
4 5 . FRUS XV: 414.
4 6 . "Did U.S. P u sh B ritain O ut of Suez," US News an d World R eport.

(41 A ugust 31, 1956): 59-61.
4 7 . Parm et: 475.
4 8 . Peter G. Boyle (ed.), The C hurchill-Eisenhow er Correspondence.

1953-1955. (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North
C arolina Press, 1990): 202.
4 9 . FRUS XV: 356.
50 . Ibid.: 414.
51 . Ibid.: 409.
5 2 . Ibid.: 355.
53. Alfred A thertan: "The United S tates and the Suez Crisis: The Uses
and Limits of D iplomacy," in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956 Retrospective
and R eap p raisal, edited by Selwyn Ilan Troen an d Moshe S hem esh (New
York, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1990.): 268.
55 . Parm et: 483.

LEADING UP TO THE C R I S I S
New York Tim es, 27 July, 1956: 1:1.

CHAPTER THREE
T he C r is is And Its P l a y e r s
From M arch 1956 forward, the Eisenhow er adm inistration w as
progressively disinclined to deal with the Egyptian President, G am al
Abd’ul N asser. Dulles and Eisenhow er’s dissatisfaction w ith Egypt’s
political behavior and diplom atic attitu d e culm inated on Ju ly 19, 1956
w hen Dulles w ithdrew the American offer of financial aid for th e building
of th e High Aswan Dam. G reat B ritain an d th e IBRD followed suit.
In retaliation, on 26 July, the Egyptian leader an n o u n ced th e
nationalization of th e Suez Canal. N asser m aintained th a t by u sing tolls
collected from th e u se rs of the appropriated canal, Egypt would be able
to build th e dam . Some of the u sers although little concerned w ith
N asser’s rationale for nationalization, were distu rb ed greatly by th e act
itself. G reat Britain, France an d Israel, though for different reasons,
clearly fell into th a t category.
With a sim ple decree Egypt h ad claimed control over th e canal.
Law n u m b er 285 of 1956 - included in th e Egyptian White P aper On the
N ationalization of th e Suez M aritime C anal C om pany, w hich served as a

THE C R I S I S AND I T S PLAYERS - 44 -
defense for th e Egyptian seizure - stated th a t "The Suez C anal M aritime

\
Com pany, S.A.E., is nationalized. All money, rights an d obligations of
th e com pany are transferred to the State. All organizations and
com m ittees are dissolved."1 Until N asser’s declaration th e canal h ad
been m anaged by th e Suez C anal Company, an in stitu tio n prim arily
controlled by th e B ritish and th e French. In dissolving th is com pany,
Law 285 prom ised com pensation for stock held by com pany investors.
But, th ere w as no doubt th a t the canal was now a sta te institution.
G reat B ritain an d F rance could not condone nationalization. They
m aintained N asser’s action w as in direct violation of th e Convention of
O ctober 29, 1888, guaranteeing th at, "The Suez M aritim e C anal shall
always be free an d open, in tim e of w ar as in tim e of peace, to every
vessels of com merce or war, w ithout distinction of flag."2 According to
B ritain an d France, N asser’s nationalization h ad abridged th is right.
The B ritish perspective on the situation w as frankly stated in a
speech by Prime M inister A nthony Eden. On Septem ber 22, 1956 he
m aintained th e international ch aracter of th e Suez C anal was
indisputable. Eden concluded th a t "the operation of th e canal by the
Suez C anal Com pany was p a rt of a com prehensive system , designed by
the agreem ent of 1888 to assu re free use of th e canal for all th e powers
concerned, and by purporting to nationalize th e com pany Colonel N asser
h ad distu rb ed th e balance of this system and removed one of its

THE CRISIS AND ITS PLAYERS - 45 -
essential guarantees."3 E ngland w anted to restore th e original system .
From the B ritish viewpoint, N asser’s seizure of th e C anal could not
go unansw ered. On 30 July, in th e H ouse of Com mons, E den plainly
stated th e United Kingdom’s position. The Prime M inister told m em bers
of th e House, "No arran g em en t for th e future of th is great w aterw ay
could be acceptable to Her M ajesty’s G overnm ent w hich would leave it in
the unfettered control of a single power w hich could, as recen t events
have show n, exploit it purely for purposes of national policy."4 B ritish
in terests m u st be protected said Eden. "Failure to keep th e canal
in ternatio n al would inevitably lead to the loss one by one of all our
in terests an d assets in th e Middle E ast, and even if Her M ajesty’s
G overnm ent h ad to act alone they could n o t stop sh o rt of u sin g force to
protect th eir position."5 From the earliest stages, G reat B ritain h ad
bound itself to re-internationalizing th e canal. Eden succinctly h ad
expressed th e rationale for th e B ritish governm ent’s reaction to N asser’s
nationalization schem e, losing the canal could be losing control of the
entire region.
E den’s statem en t th a t G reat B ritain would "lose one by one all of
our interests" w as telling for its economic aspect an d for its
u n d e rc u rre n t them e. Robert Rhodes Jam es, A ssistant Clerk at the
H ouse of Commons during th e Suez Crisis and em inent biographer of
Eden, noted th a t for th e B ritish th is w aterw ay was of th e u tm o st

im portance because tw o-thirds of W estern E urope’s oil sailed th ro u gh
th e Suez.6 Since B ritish officials did n o t believe th a t N asser w ould ru n
th e canal effectively and w ithout discrim ination ag ain st other nations,
th e Suez h ad to be reclaim ed from N asser’s grip to en su re th e flow of
oil.7
More im portantly, perhaps, th e B ritish viewed N asser as a nem esis
sim ilar to th e likes of Hitler. Diplom ats w hen faced w ith a crisis often
look to an historical precedent for a solution. Eden did the sam e an d
found h is precedent in th e late 1930s. Before World W ar Two, E urope
h ad app eased Hitler by allowing his territorial aggrandizem ent to go
unchecked. N asser, a natio n alist leader w ith territorial am bitions, w as
claim ing m ore land. Eden stated in his Memoir Full Circle, "The canal
w as n o t a problem th a t could be isolated from the m any other
m anifestations of Arab nationalism an d Egyptian am bitions."8 This w as
H itlerism an d th e appeasem en t at M unich again, b u t now B ritain would
no t allow it. Eden declared "Some say th a t N asser is no H itler or
M ussolini. Allowing for a difference in scale, I am not so sure. He h as
followed H itler’s pattern...."9 England, a t least would n o t allow N asser as
m uch leeway as Hitler gained. Egypt’s seizure of the Suez C anal would
n o t be an o th er M unich.
The French held a sim ilar view of N asser an d his nationalization of
th e Suez Canal. Time m agazine reported in A ugust 1956 th a t F rance

w as even m ore displeased w ith N asser’s action th a n E ngland. "The
F rench were, if anything, angrier th a n th e B ritish. The Suez, after all,
w as French-built, an d its expropriated com pany was one of F ran ce’s
b lu est chips."10 F rench b u sin essm en were unlikely to appreciate th e loss
of profits, N asser h ad caused them to suffer. Even if com pensated for
th e w orth of th eir stock, F renchm en h ad lost untold fu tu re earnings.
Herve Alphand, first th e P erm anent R epresentative to th e United
Nations from F rance and later the A m bassador to the United S tates,
stated th e F rench governm ent’s position in term s sim ilar to those of
Eden. A lphand placed N asser in th e context of Hitler. He rem arked
"Suddenly we were faced with a unilateral act an d th e tearing u p of a
co n tract w ithout any justification. The F rench people rem em bered other
u n ilateral acts of th e sam e n atu re w hich between th e two world w ars,
were left unansw ered by th e dem ocracies an d w hich gradually becom ing
m ore an d m ore intolerable led u s to the second world war." As clearly as
Eden, A lphand saw sim ilarities between N asser an d Hitler. Hitler
caused World W ar Two. Could N asser instigate a third world w ar?
From th e F rench perspective, this m ight have been a possibility.
They viewed N asser’s power base as more th reaten in g th a n H itler’s h ad
been. A lphand m aintained th a t "Nasser is an agent of a big power m uch
stronger th a n H itlerian Germany, even more dangerous for th e w estern
world - th e Soviet U nion."11 If World War Three was to be fought, it

would be betw een th e W est an d the Soviet Union. N asser’s alleged
connection to th e R ussians created even m ore desire to end his control
of th e Suez.
A lphand’s belief th a t N asser w as supported by th e USSR w as
related, no doubt, to th e situ atio n in Algeria. At th e tim e France w as
battling against th e Algerians, trying to su p p ress th eir fight for national
liberation. They believed N asser supplied Algerian rebels w ith arm s he
h ad obtained from th e Soviet Union. Time com m ented F rance was "deep
in a costly an d fru stratin g struggle in Algeria, chief aider an d ab etter of
th e rebels is D ictator N asser."12 As far as the French were concerned,
N asser w as blocking th eir efforts to restore control in Algeria an d
Moscow w as providing th e Egyptian leader with th e m eans to do so.
Likewise, th e French believed the USSR was involved in N asser’s seizure
of th e Suez. If N asser’s nationalization could be reversed it would
rep resen t one less m anifestation of R ussian covert aggression. It would
also be a m eans of regaining control over the canal zone from a
dictatorial ruler.
Donald Neff, a m agazine an d new spaper reporter an d a u th o r of
W arriors a t S u ez, explained th a t in reality Algeria received only a sm all
n u m b er of arm s from N asser. But, to m aintain a solid Arab front,
Algerians did not contradict the illusion of N asser providing volum es of
w eapons for their cause. Neff noted th a t the idea of N asser as "m aster
plotter" an d supplier of arm s for the Algerian revolt w as far m ore
appealing to th e French th a n adm itting th a t the rebellion w as instigated
an d su p p o rted by Algerians. In fact, Neff m aintained, th e m istak en
belief of N asser’s complicity in Algeria was a m ajor factor in deciding to
attac k Egypt.13
From th e B ritish an d French perspectives, N asser w as an o th er
H itler attem pting to seize territory illegally. The French h ad th e added
com plaint th a t N asser was helping Algeria. For both countries th e Suez
Crisis w as serious enough to advocate a m ilitary solution if N asser did
not rescind his nationalization order. From the first news of N asser’s
seizure, F rench and B ritish officials began th eir p reparations for su c h an
attack.
Israel’s concern ab o u t N asser arose not from his seizure of th e
canal, b u t from his hostility tow ard th e existence of th e S tate of Israel.
Egypt, along w ith other Arab countries, deeply resented th e creation of
Israel in 1948 an d sought its destruction. In 1956, N asser w as sending
terro rist groups, Fidaiyyun, into Israel th a t m ade m u rd ero u s attac k s on
the Israeli citizens. Israel’s com plaint against th e Egyptian P resident
also stem m ed from the fact th a t th eir ships h ad been denied passage
thro u g h th e S traig h ts of Tiran, th e en trance from th e Red Sea to one of
Israel’s m ain ports, E la t.14
N asser’s action also created potentially calam itous ram ifications

for the Jew ish S tate. On A ugust 10 Israeli Prime M inister David Ben-
G urion recorded th e Israeli G overnm ent’s perspective of th e Suez Crisis.
He believed G reat B ritain w as not prepared to u se force ag ain st N asser.
B ecause of this, Ben-G urion feared N asser’s im pending success would
increase his desire to destroy Israel.15 The very act of nationalizing the
canal, if unansw ered, could spell th e doom of Israel.
Ben-G urion did not yet realize Anglo-French intentions to use
force, b u t w ithin several weeks he would be well aw are of them . Before
long, th e B ritish an d F rench h ad h atched a plan designed to regain th e
canal and o u st N asser. It was a proposal in w hich Israeli participation
w as requisite.
Obviously, N asser did not view the Suez situ atio n in th e sam e light
as Israel or G reat B ritain an d France. The Egyptian governm ent used
th e Convention of 1888 to contend th a t Egyptian control of th e C anal in
no way contradicted the agreem ent. A governm ent report cited various
articles from th e 1888 Conventions th a t noted Egypt’s right of action
concerning the canal. The Egyptian White Paper On the Nationalization
of th e Suez M aritime C anal Com pany noted th a t Article Ten of the
Convention of 1888 stated th a t it would not interfere w ith actions Egypt
"might find n ecessary to take for th e defence of Egypt and the
m aintenance of public order." In addition, Article T hirteen protected the
sovereign rights of E gypt.16 Since the Convention said nothing

specifically ag ain st nationalization of the canal, an d did protect Egyptian
sovereignty, N asser reasoned his actions did nothing in opposition to the
Convention.
Although in certain ways N asser attem pted to d isarm Anglo-
F rench objections an d reduce conflict with Israel, he w as n o t successful
in placating officials in any of these countries. The m em oirs of one of
N asser’s top m ilitary officials, Abd al-Latif al-B ughdadi, revealed the
Egyptian governm ent’s attem p t to avoid provoking its enem ies.
B ughdadi sta ted th a t to ease A rab-Israeli tensions, N asser h ad removed
troops from th e Gaza strip and stopped "sabotage" in Israel. According
to th e Egyptian general, "We w ished to evade clashes an d w anted to let
these sh ip s through th e C anal so th a t preventing th em would n o t serve
as a pretext ag ain st u s or justification in world opinion to attack u s."17
In spite of th ese efforts an d p erh ap s to m aintain his popularity w ith
Egyptians an d Arabs, N asser’s public statem en ts confirmed for the
B ritish an d French the allegations they h ad leveled ag ain st him.
N asser’s com m ents also reflected his own reasoning for taking the
canal. His first professed reason for claim ing control over th e Suez
)
C anal w as to gain the profits from tolls paid by ships sailing thro u g h the
canal. As N asser stated in his speech announcing th e nationalization,
th is action would provide funds for building the Aswan D am project. In
w ithdraw ing th eir financial su p p o rt th e W estern n atio n s h ad tak en away

a project th a t w as touted as a step tow ard an improved sta n d a rd of
living in Egypt. N asser told the Egyptian people th a t th e W estern Powers
"are determ ined to fru strate Egyptian attem pts at progress an d
industrialization."18 Now, because th e W est refused to help Egypt
develop, Egypt w as helping itself. This anti-W estern stan ce undoubtedly
added to N asser’s dom estic popularity.
Although to som e extent th is factor probably w as an issu e for
N asser, it w as likely th a t his seizure of the canal w as designed m ore to
reduce foreign influence in Egypt th a n to b etter th e lives of his people.
Above all else, N asser w anted to lead a confederation of Arab sta tes
unbeholden to any outside nation. The nationalization increased his
prestige w ithin the Middle E ast, reducing outside influences an d
bringing N asser closer to his leadership goals. Coincidentally, th e action
also improved the living sta n d ard s of his own people an d solidified
N asser’s su p p o rt in Egypt.
In his speeches N asser attacked the Anglo-French position and
sim ultaneously reinforced his own. The Egyptian President an n o u n ced
E den "also said Egypt shall not be allowed to succeed b ecau se th a t
would spell success for Arab nationalism an d would be ag ain st th eir
policy, w hich aim s a t protection of Israel." N asser’s statem en t stru c k two
key topics - th e survival of Israel an d the su ppression of Arabism . To
B ritain an d France, N asser’s rem arks contained th e sam e national

appeal found in Naziism. Added to th a t w as an implied th re a t ag ain st
Israel.
N either concept reassu red the W estern powers. Not com fortable
w ith th ird world independence, B ritain and France interpreted N asser’s
speech in hostile term s. The Egyptian sought an A rabian em pire th a t
su p p lan ted all other powers in the Middle E ast. N asser also strove to
annihilate Israel, th e only ally in the Middle E ast opposing his goal an d a
stalw art anti-C om m unist country.
As if N asser’s preaching did not u p se t th e West enough, he also
confirmed th e French charge th a t Egypt w as supplying Algerians w ith
arm s. N asser inform ed his audience "of 8,000,000 Algerians, 10,000 are
fighting h alf a million French soldiers. We have arm s sufficient to equip
those who can fight aggressors."19 This could only aggravate th e French.
N asser adm itted he was helping the Algerians to fight ag ain st F rance
and th a t he would continue to do so. Besides this, th e specter of
R ussian involvement was raised again. The su rp lu s arm s N asser’s
sta tem en t implied indicated th a t Egypt h ad received large am o u n ts of
arm s from th e Soviet Union. In th e allied cam p C om m unist influence in
Egypt becam e a foregone conclusion, to be feared and reversed.
The Egyptian leader’s words were designed to appeal to A rabian
nationalism by discrediting Western nations. He told his countrym en,
"He who attack s Egypt attack s the whole Arab world. They say in th eir
papers th e whole thing will be over in forty-eight hours. They do n o t
know how strong we really are."20 He portrayed a front n o t ju s t of
Egyptians, b u t of all Arabs. Indeed N asser’s goal w as to unify th e Arab
world aro u n d himself. Nationalization of th e canal w as a m eans tow ard
this end.
In his 1990 article "Egypt, From Military Defeat to Political Victory"
Israeli Professor M oshe Shem esh agreed th a t N asser’s nationalization of
Suez w as intended to increase his power an d prestige, reduce foreign
influence in th e A rabian area, and if possible destroy Israel. S hem esh
stated "The nationalization of the Suez Canal Com pany on 26 Ju ly 1956
symbolized for the Egyptians and the Arab world th e independence of
Egyptian decision-m aking and the liberation of Egypt from foreign
political an d economic influence." S hem esh added th a t b ecause N asser’s
su p p o rt an d prestige from Egyptians an d th e Arab world rested on his
seizure of th e canal, he could not retreat w ithout losing credibility, even
if faced w ith a w ar.21
This th e n w as how th e British, French, and Israelis interpreted
N asser’s nationalization an d in w hat light N asser him self perceived his
actions. D uring th e ensuing crisis th e United S tates repeatedly
attem pted to preclude the use of force by its allies. As events unfolded
th ree efforts a t negotiation failed to bring ab o u t a solution satisfactory to
any of th e factions, Egyptian, Anglo-French, or Israeli. Before th e crisis
w as over b attles were fought an d blood w as spilled. All of these
happenings occurred between Ju ly 27 an d the first week of November.
From th e s ta rt G reat B ritain an d France were determ ined to w rest
control Of th e Suez M aritime C anal from N asser an d re tu rn it to the
West.
B ritish Prime M inister Eden had been quick to respond to the
Egyptian P resident’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. The day after
N asser’s declaration, Eden cabled President Eisenhow er an d said it was
im perative th a t N asser be halted. He proposed economic an d political
p ressu res be applied ag ain st N asser imm ediately. Eden noted "My
colleagues an d I are convinced th a t we m u st be ready, as a la st resort, to
u se force to bring N asser to his senses." Finally, E den suggested a
tripartite conference tak e place, so th a t Britain, France, and th e United
S tates could "align o u r policies an d concert together how we can b est
bring m axim um p ressu re to b ear on the Egyptian Government." In
response to E den’s proposal Eisenhow er dispatched U nder S ecretary of
S tate for Political Affairs Robert M urphy to London to d iscu ss the
situatio n with B ritish an d French officials.22
From Ju ly 29 to A ugust 2 American officials - M urphy was
replaced by S ecretary of S tate Dulles on th e first of A ugust - m et with

th eir F rench an d B ritish co u n terp arts, French Foreign M inister C hristian
Pineau an d B ritish Secretary of S tate for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd.23
In th ese m eetings, dubbed the Tripartite Conferences, Lloyd p u t forth the
B ritish position concerning N asser. He held th a t N asser’s
nationalization h ad to be reversed. Also he m aintained th a t a m ilitary
response should be prepared as a la st resort possibility, since "political
an d economic p ressu res [are] unlikely [to] have [the] desired effect unless
N asser knows m ilitary sanctions are in [the] background."24 Pineau
entirely agreed with this position.
An attem p t a t negotiation, however, h ad to be m ade before m ilitary
action could be taken. The th ree powers agreed to send a com m unique
to N asser w hich called for the internationalization of th e canal,
preferably u n d e r United Nations aegis, with Egypt receiving fair
economic com pensation in retu rn . From the Tripartite Conferences also
cam e an invitation to governm ents th a t u sed the canal to tak e p a rt in a
London Conference beginning A ugust 16, 1956.25
In th e tim e between th e Tripartite Conference an d th e London
Conference G reat B ritain an d F rance were not idle. The day after the
Tripartite m eetings closed David Ben-G urion received a report th a t the
two countries h ad a plan of m ilitary attack for regaining th e canal. It
w ould be executed in approxim ately th ree weeks an d Israel would n ot be
involved because th a t would only raise Arab-Israeli ten sio n s.26 Ben-
G urion accepted this assessm en t w riting in an A ugust diaiy entry, "A
solitary ’operation’ on our p a rt m ay well tu rn out to be calam itous...."
b ecause Israel would be condem ned for its aggression.27
U niversity of Sorbonne Professor Jean -P au l Cointet pointed out
su c h a n attack m ight have resu lted in the dism em berm ent of Israel by
su rro u n d in g Arab countries.28 The risk of an Arab' co u n terattack
existed, although a concerted a s sa u lt was im probable because A rabian
u n ity rem ained questionable. Even so, a possible m ass attack by
su rro u n d in g countries rem ained a fear for the Israeli governm ent.
The Anglo-French attack did not occur as quickly as th is original
estim ate called for, b u t its planning was p u rsu ed actively. On Monday,
A ugust 13, three days before th e London Conference w as scheduled to
begin, Ben-G urion noted th a t French A m bassador to Israel, Pierre-
E ugene Gilbert, "is pessim istic regarding the internationalization of the
Canal. In his opinion, his governm ent will be b itter following th e failure
of th e [London] Conference - they will w ant to take action - will [sic] to
tu rn to Israel...."29 The rem ark showed the French A m bassador’s
conclusion, before-the-fact, th a t th e conference would n o t achieve the
resu lts desired by France. G ilbert’s position also first expressed th e
possibility of Israel joining with England and France in an attac k against
Egypt. It is im probable th a t Gilbert - who no doubt m ade reports to his
superiors regularly - was the sole F renchm an to believe th e conference

would fail, particularly given th a t events followed Gilbert’s prophesy. In
fact, it is m ore logical to conclude th a t Gilbert was less as prophet, th a n
an a stu te diplom at who knew th e m inds of his superiors.
Of th e tw enty-four invitations distributed for th e A ugust 16

t
London Conference, twenty-two countries accepted. Only Egypt an d
Greece declined, th e latter in reaction to previous allied intervention on
C yprus.30 Near the sta rt of the London Conference Dulles talked with
Pineau, Eden, Lloyd, an d the Prime M inister of A ustralia, Robert
Menzies, to "discuss general tactics." From th is session cam e th e idea -
apparen tly raised by Menzies - to propose the creation of an
in ternatio n al board to oversee th e ru n n in g of the Suez C anal.31 By the
end of th e Conference eighteen of th e countries attending h ad agreed to
this idea. Prime M inister Menzies w as appointed head of a five m em ber
m ission charged to approach N asser with the proposal.32 Although the
com m ittee w as cordially received in Cairo, N asser would n o t accept th e
plan. He a ssu re d th e em issary group of Egypt’s intention to ru n the
canal efficiently and effectively, b u t categorically rejected in tern atio n al
control of th e Suez.33 v
Dulles an d Eisenhow er determ ined th e next negotiating direction ^
on th e night of Septem ber 8. It w as th e n th a t the idea of a U sers’
A ssociation first was discussed by th e P resident an d th e S ecretary of
S tate. According to existing records, Dulles telephoned Eisenhow er at

6:30 p.m . on th e eighth an d spoke of the idea. Dulles proposed "the use
by th e u s e rs’ organization of th eir own pilots an d th eir collection of the
fees w ith allocation to Egypt on a cost basis; th e p u ttin g into effect or
annou n cin g of alternatives to th e u se of th e C anal so far as oil was
concerned, an d the continuance of some economic m easu res tak en
against Egypt.1,34 In short, the organization w as designed to circum vent
Egyptian control of th e canal and thereby leave N asser controlling the
Suez in nam e alone. By hiring pilots independent of th e nationalized
canal to sail ships thro u g h th e canal, Dulles so u g h t to evade all
Egyptian interference. He proposed "alternatives to th e u se of the Canal"
for oil, w hich tran slate d into sailing aro u n d th e Cape of Good Hope and
avoiding th e Suez all together. Also, continued economic p ressu re would
a ssist in forcing th e Egyptians to give th eir consent to the
internationalization of the Suez.
To fu rth e r th e Cooperative Association of Suez C anal U sers -
CASU, th e official nam e of the U sers’ Association - a second London
Conference w as proposed by the United S tates. It began on S eptem ber
19 and continued through the next two days. The eighteen n atio n s th a t
h ad agreed to D ulles’ first plan now retu rn ed to d iscu ss th e U sers’
Association and other options, including taking th e m atter before the
U nited Nations S ecurity Council.35 Although at least five countries
favored bringing the Suez Crisis to the United Nations, a m ajority held
th a t CASU should be adopted prior to U.N. action.36
At th e m eeting Dulles m aintained th a t th e U sers’ Association was
required because N asser h ad rejected the Eighteen Powers Proposal
"which gave Egypt th e m axim um participation w hich they [the Eighteen
Powers] deem ed com patible w ith th eir own rights u n d e r th e 1888
Convention." Thus, "it becam e both appropriate an d n ecessary th a t the
governm ents of th e u sers should organize as am ong them selves for the
m ost effective possible enjoym ent of th e rights of p assage given by the
1888 Convention."37 Basically, the plan required Egypt’s acquiescence to
w ork w ith CASU to en su re th e canal rem ained open an d ra n smoothly.
Egypt would be reim bursed "for any expenses reasonably incurred by it
in connection w ith th e perform ance by Egypt of th e m easu re to w hich
Egypt is obligated, by the Convention of 1888, to a ssu re th e free and
open u se of th e Canal." But, N asser would n o t retain control of th e
C anal.38
In h is book The Failure of the Eden G overnm ent, B ritish
research er Richard Lamb reported th a t Eden su p p o rted th e Suez Canal
U sers’ Association because he believed if N asser accepted, his prestige in
Egypt an d th e Arab world would be reduced severely. The F rench saw
th e m easu re as an o th er way of postponing a m ilitary solution. Lamb
com m ented "The French, preoccupied with the ru n n in g sore of the
Algerian rebellion, were desperately anxious to lau n ch an im m ediate

invasion of Egypt...."39 They believed a successful attack would stop th e
flow of w eapons to Algeria an d avoid an o th er M unich. Yet, th e French
were willing to accept D ulles’ proposal in nam e, since it did n o t h in d er
th eir covert p reparations for attack.
W hen asked to capitulate to th e U sers’ Association, N asser once
again refused to cooperate with th e West. The Egyptian P resident
m aintained, "Today they are speaking of a new association w hose m ain
objective would be to rob Egypt of th e canal an d deprive h er of rightful
canal dues." He concluded "it is im possible to have two bodies organizing
navigation in th e canal [i.e. CASU an d N asser’s government]. It is
equally im possible for the proposed organization to rem ain abroad and
continue to collect dues. If th is were perm issible we for o u r p a rt would
form an organization for u se rs of th e port of London...."40 Here was
strong recrim ination of the U sers’ Association. N asser’s point w as clear.
He would as soon accept foreign control of the can al zone, as London
would in its port.
While th e Egyptian leader rem ained resolute in his decision to
keep th e Suez, G reat B ritain and F rance continued th eir p rep aratio ns for
m ilitary action ag ain st th e N asser regime.41 As th e political negotiations
repeatedly failed, E den’s statem en t m ade during the Tripartite
Conference concerning th e necessity of m ilitary prep aratio n rem ained
the Anglo-French standby. T hroughout S eptem ber Anglo-French

m ilitary plans proceeded. The next step tow ard a m ilitary solution was
to reverse th eir decision th a t Israel have no p a rt in the attack.
On S eptem ber 25 Israel’s Director G eneral of th e Defense M inistry
retu rn ed from F rance w ith news ab o u t Anglo-French displeasure w ith
th e U sers’ Association. Ben-G urion wrote in his diary: "Shimon Peres
retu rn ed from Paris saying both France an d E ngland could n o t agree to
Suez C anal U sers’ Association, so would act by force - would like
complicity of Israel, provided Israel does n o t attack Jordan." The French
w anted an attack by th e middle of O ctober.42 Again th e battle did not
begin as soon as th e French wished. There rem ained one final attem p t
a t a peaceful solution.
The la st effort to avoid a w ar over the Suez C anal h ad as little
success as th e previous attem pts. This effort was m ade, surprisingly, by
th e B ritish an d French who p u t the crisis before the United Nations
S ecurity Council. S tephen Ambrose pointed o u t in his biography of
Eisenhow er, th a t th e adm inistration could n o t know w hether this
represented an attem p t by the W estern Allies to obtain a peaceful
solution or to conceal bellicose intentions.43 As it tu rn ed out, the
resolution th a t cam e out of the Security Council m eetings prim arily
restated and com bined th e proposals already offered a t th e two London
Conferences.
Between O ctober 5 and 13 the U.N. Security Council m et alm ost

every day to d iscu ss an item p u t forth by England an d France. The item
dealt w ith th e "Situation created by th e un ilateral action of th e Egyptian
G overnm ent in bringing to an end the system of in tern atio n al operation
of th e Suez Canal, w hich w as confirmed an d com pleted by th e
Convention of 1888." In response to th eir own item, G reat B ritain and
F rance p u t forth a resolution declaring the right to freedom of navigation
in th e canal, th e protection of said right, a m an d ate th a t Egypt accept
th e Eighteen Powers Proposal, an d in the m eantim e, th a t Egypt work
w ith th e U sers’ A ssociation.44
On the second to last day of debate, Secretary-G eneral of th e U.N.
D am H am m aerskjold expressed six principles on w hich negotiation with
N asser could be based. The ten ets were basic ground rules, alm ost de
facto from the perspective of the B ritish and French. The first principle
resta ted th e opening article of th e 1888 Convention calling for free and
open tra n sit of th e canal w ithout discrim ination tow ard an y country.
The rem ainder called for respect of Egyptian sovereignty an d dem anded
th a t no single country politically dom inate the canal. It m aintained tolls
be se t by m u tu a l agreem ent am ong th e canal u sers and required funds
be allotted for fu tu re developm ent of the Suez. Finally, th e sixth ten et
proposed disputes be settled by arb itratio n .45 Although n o t specifically
calling for th e m easures accepted in the Eighteen Powers Plan an d the
U sers’ Association, these principles supported the content of both

THE C R I S I S AND IT S PLAYERS - 64 -
proposals.
Additionally on O ctober 13, the final day of debate in th e S ecurity
Council, G reat B ritain and France proposed an am endm ent to th e six
principles en um erated the previous day. This am endm ent recom m ended
th a t th e Eighteen Powers Proposal be th e term s for negotiation an d the
Cooperative A ssociation of Suez C anal U sers be invoked specifically.
Soviet an d Yugoslavian dissen t on th e vote blocked th e adoption of this
proposed addition, b u t the six ten ets were p assed unanim ously.46
From O ctober 15 to end of the m onth, com m unications between
the U nited S tates an d G reat B ritain an d France ceased. D uring this
tim e A merican radio signal interceptors recorded a huge volume of coded
radio traffic betw een France an d Britain. The US w as u n su ccessfu l in
decoding th e m essages, b u t guessed th a t som ething w as in preparation
because of th e increased q u antity of transm issions. By this tim e
American intelligence h ad already discovered th a t Israel w as mobilizing.
It w as believed, however, th a t Israel w as preparing for an attack ag ainst
Jo rd an , n o t Egypt.47 The assessm en t w as incorrect.
G reat Britain, France, an d Israel h ad continued discussing plans
for th eir m ilitary attack during the Security Council debates. F our days
after th e U.N. talks closed the three cohorts agreed upon a schem e.
David Ben-G urion reported th a t having rejected direct E nglish-French
and F rench-Israeli attack s, the B ritish suggested th a t Israel s ta rt th e

attack. Then B ritain and France could "protest an d w hen we [Israel]
reach th e C anal - they will come in as if to sep arate an d th e n they’ll
destroy N asser...."48 The plot w as set. All th a t rem ained now w as to
initiate th e attack.
On O ctober 29, 1956 Israel launched an attack across th e Sinai
D esert ag ain st Egyptian forces. The Israeli Army m ade su p e rb progress,
driving down from northw estern Egypt. American officials estim ated
th a t Israel would reach th e Suez C anal in three days. Israel’s success
w as partially due to the fact th a t Egyptian m ilitary strateg ists h ad
assu m ed th a t only G reat B ritain would attack, and th a t it would be from
the direction of A lexandria an d R ashaid, in th e northw est. Even w hen
N asser received a report th a t Israel, in cooperation w ith France, intended
to attack, he discounted it. He believed the rum or w as designed to m ake
Egyptian troops concentrate in th e wrong area, facing Israel.49
Secretary Dulles, guessing th a t the B ritish an d F rench were
planning m ilitary action, reasoned th a t they "may in fact have concerted
th eir action with the Israelis," since if the Suez was th reaten ed by
Egyptian-Israeli fighting, Anglo-French forces would have th e excuse
they w anted to intervene there. Dulles also reasoned th a t th e W estern
allies m ight believe th a t th e United S tates would be forced to su p p o rt
Anglo-French actions because a disavowal of them would m ean siding
w ith th e Soviets.50 More th a n three decades later Je an -P a u l Cointet

agreed w ith D ulles’ assessm en t, w hen he com m ented th a t F rench
G overnm ent officials did n o t envisage America would join w ith the
Soviet’s in a condem nation of th e actions of Britain, France, an d Israel.51
The French an d B ritish h ad m iscalculated Eisenhow er’s response.
By th e m iddle of th e day following Israel’s attack, the P resident w as
insisting th e problem be tak en directly to th e United N ations, a step
w hich surely did not display American su p p o rt for the attac k on Egypt.
The U nited S tates p u t forth a resolution in th e Security Council calling
for a cease fire in the Middle E ast an d for all U.N. m em bers to refrain
from u sin g force in said area. Both G reat B ritain an d F rance vetoed th e
m easu re.52 If th ere h ad been any d o u b t of Anglo-French collusion w ith
th e Israelis before, th is veto probably p u t it to an end.
Later th a t afternoon France an d G reat B ritain fu rth e r confirm ed
D ulles’ suspicion of the previous day. At 2:17 p.m. the two powers
issued a jo in t ultim atum , with a twelve h o u r tim e limit. The u ltim atu m
declared th a t in the in terest of protecting th e canal, Israel an d Egypt
should move ten miles away from it an d allow F rench an d B ritish forces
to occupy th a t area. If th e belligerents did n o t comply, Anglo-French
troops would take the canal zone by force. As would be expected, Israel
agreed to th e plan and Egypt rejected it. The allies’ hope w as th a t
reclaim ing th e canal would instigate th e overthrow of N asser, place
control of th e Suez in B ritish and F rench h an d s, an d leave Israel in

power in th e S inai.53 The schem e did not tu rn o u t as well as G reat
B ritain and France h ad hoped.
Eisenhow er’s A dm inistration continued its efforts in th e United
Nations. American representative to the U.N. H eniy C abot Lodge, Jr.
introduced a resolution to the G eneral Assembly w hich called for the
evacuation of Israeli troops to th eir original border, a cease fire between
Egypt and Israel, all U.N. m em bers refrain from th e u se of force, an d an
em bargo ag ain st Israel. The resolution was acclaim ed by a great
n u m b er of th e United Nations m em bers, especially delegates from
sm aller countries who were su rp rised th a t America w as supporting
E g y p t a third world nation, over its W estern allies.54
Officials in th e Egyptian G overnm ent convened on O ctober 30 to
discuss th e Anglo-French ultim atum . According to Abd al-Latif al-
Bughdadi, N asser did n o t take the declaration seriously. "He was of the
opinion th a t its aim w as to cau se m ost of our forces n o t to move tow ards
th e battlefield in Sinai, thereby giving Israel a chance to gain a victory as
a re su lt of th e w eakness and limited forces fighting them ."55 Believing
th is to be true, N asser rejected the ultim atum . To th e Egyptian
P resident’s chagrin, he discovered th a t G reat B ritain an d France indeed
h ad been serious.
Ignoring the resolutions proposed in the U.N., G reat B ritain and
France began th eir attack on Egypt. On O ctober 31, after the

u ltim atu m ’s twelve h o u r tim e limit h ad expired, th e B ritish Royal Air
Force bom bed Cairo an d Port Said, one of Egypt’s m ain ports. In
retaliation P resident N asser scu ttled ships in the Suez Canal, m aking
passag e through th e canal im possible.56 Soon after th e bom bings,
English an d F rench paratroopers landed aro u n d th e Suez an d Port Said.
This w as followed by an am phibious a ssa u lt.57
Seven days after the Anglo-French attack h ad begun, Prime
M inister A nthony Eden w as prepared to p u t a h a lt to it. On November 6,
election day in th e United S tates, Eden informed P resident Eisenhow er
th a t he was willing to accept a cease fire and U.N. peace keeping force.
Ambrose pointed out th a t by th a t tim e G reat B ritain an d F rance
controlled the canal zone, b u t a t least for England, the m onetary cost
h ad been outrageous. The B ritish already h ad sp e n t 500 million dollars
on th e operation.58
More im portantly, Eisenhow er h ad not allowed an y loans to be
granted to the B ritish Treasury, once the fighting began. W hen th e w ar
sta rte d a ru n on the Pound occurred, th u s the P resident’s b an on loans
to E ngland deflated the B ritish Pound trem endously. Besides this,
Eisenhow er called for an oil em bargo against Britain. The U nited
Kingdom could ill afford continued aggression.59 F rance could not
su p p o rt th e operation w ithout B ritish participation, an d w as also
p ressu red to desist. By th e end of November a U.N. peace keeping force

w as in place an d m ost of B ritish an d French troop h ad been evacuated.60
The crisis w as over an d N asser h ad retained his canal.
G reat B ritain and France, the two countries who resolutely
m aintain ed th e necessity of force in ousting N asser from th e Suez, and
indeed th a t N asser’s nationalization h ad to be resisted a t all, found
them selves w ith th e sh o rtest straw a t th e end of th e Suez C anal Crisis.
Their rationale for action and desires for resu lts h ad failed to be proven
correct, by the fact th a t none of the Anglo-French goals h ad been
achieved. G am al N asser, on th e other hand, h ad gained im m easurable
prestige an d power in th e Arab world.
Moshe Shem esh noted th a t although Egypt h ad suffered a m ilitary
defeat, N asser emerged from th e crisis with a political victory. It w as a
victory th a t w as clear to th e entire Arab world. A quick review of the
score card revealed N asser h ad racked u p all the points, while G reat
B ritain, France, and Israel appeared to be scoreless. Both B ritish and
F rench forces were evacuated from th e Suez area and Israel h ad
w ithdraw n its troops from the S inai.61 In S hem esh’s words, "for Nasser,
th e crisis w as a te st of the legitimacy of his leadership and his decision
to nationalize th e Canal. He em erged from the crisis as th e charism atic
leader of Egypt and the Arab world. His concept of Arab nationalism , in
all its aspects, becam e the cornerstone of Arab politics."62 N asser h ad
won.
Jo se p h Frankel, a B ritish Professor a t th e U niversity of
S outham pton, stated th a t for th e B ritish "the Suez action...can be largely
explained in term s of the psychological predispositions...." He concluded
th a t behind th e rationale for m ilitary action given by Eden an d Lloyd lay
psychological p ressu res from w ithin B ritish society. Frankel explained
th a t "the graceful w ithdraw al from th e [British] Em pire an d the
shrinking world role h ad built up resen tm en ts am ong th e B ritish who
were required a spot of adventure before settling to a less sp ectacu lar
foreign policy."63 T hat "spot of adventure" was found in th e form of th e
Suez Canal. Like a too strong cup of tea, it left a bitter ta ste in the
m outh of England.
The actions tak en by E ngland do ap p ear to have been less th a n
reasonable an d th u s the resu lt of som e em otional response to N asser’s
seizure. Frankel pointed out th a t h ad violence been avoided G reat
B ritain would have lost little thro u g h nationalization. The pecuniary loss
of giving u p th e canal could have been recouped by seizing Egyptian
assets in London. It was also im probable B ritish ships would have been
denied passage through the canal, given th a t Middle E astern oil
producers were as interested in selling their p ro d u ct as E ngland w as in
buying it.64 It also seem ed clear N asser’s political success would have
been m inimized h ad he not been given the p ropaganda opportunity to
consolidate his position in the Arab world, by opposing the W estern

world. Had B ritish officials considered these factors fully they would
have realized a m ilitary attack was the least beneficial reaction a t th eir
disposal.
Sim ilar to th e B ritish, Cointet m aintained th a t th e F rench
rationale for a m ilitary solution w as a resu lt of behind th e scenes
motivation. The F rench Government, said th e au th o r, attem pted to
show W estern E urope’s independence of action. In spite of America’s
lack of su p p o rt for the F rench position, w hich h ad been hoped for,
F rance carried out its m ilitary plans with the help of E ngland.65 Cointet
saw th e F rench G overnm ent as using the situ atio n as a m eans of
displaying its own ability to act w ithout th e consent or assistan ce of the
U nited S tates. F rance did succeed in acting, b u t th e resu lts obtained
were n o t those desired.
Frankel an d Cointet’s theories are intriguing, b u t can n o t be
su b stan tia te d by th e inform ation available. W hat is definite is th a t the
m ilitary actions tak en by B ritain and France did n o t achieve th e resu lts
th e aggressors sought. N asser’s grasp on the Suez C anal was not
lessened for a m om ent. And, of all th e powers vying for influence or
control in Egypt, only N asser’s bid w as successful.
Laid bare to th e world was th e fall of the B ritish Em pire an d its
reliance on the good graces of the United S tates. Although Eisenhow er’s
p ressu re on the B ritish Pound was not common knowledge, the

intern atio n al public was aw are of the US em bargo on oil. In any case,
the crippling effect of crossing America’s aim s w as clear. A gainst
A merican sanctions, the United Kingdom could not survive.
F rance m ay have displayed its independence of action, as Cointet
stated, b u t it gained nothing for its trouble. Its actions were regarded as
im m oral an d were denounced by th e United Nations. A country
supposedly against R ussia’s strong arm tactics w as guilty itself of the
sam e approach. A m bassador A lphand’s anger a t N asser’s susp ected
interference in Algeria was unfounded. Algerian independence w as
inevitable regardless of N asser’s assistan ce or lack there of, since the
rebels did n o t actually rely upon Egyptian arm s or funds. France,
em b arrassed by its quick defeat a t the beginning of World W ar Two a t
the h a n d s of Hitler, received an o th er em barrassing black eye w hen it
w ent u p ag ain st N asser and Egypt. The form er sham e w as of a m ilitary
n atu re , th e latter one was m ostly political. Both were u n p leasan tly
received an d mortifying to French pride.
Unlike its p artn ers, Israel fared b etter th a n B ritain or France in
achieving satisfactory results. In 1990 Shim on Peres, D irector G eneral
of th e M inistry of Defense during th e crisis, wrote an article entitled "The
Road to Serves". In the article Peres com m ented on the goals Israel
hoped to obtain by going to w ar w ith Egypt. According to th e au th o r,

Israel w as n o t concerned w ith the canal p er say, b u t ra th e r w ith gaining
un h in d ered passage to Port E lat - thro u g h the S traights of Tiran -and
ending the te rro rist attack s in Israel. Peres noted th a t both of these
goals were achieved.66 Israel’s im pressive advances across th e Sinai
provided Prime M inister Ben-G urion with a bargaining chip w hen the
cease-fire w as enacted. This enabled him to obtain N asser’s g u aran tee
th a t th e S traig h ts would rem ain open and th e Fidaiyyun attack s would
end, in exchange for retu rn in g the S inai.67
Peres’ optim ist conclusion th a t Israel obtained all it w as after in
the Suez cam paign is not entirely realistic. Certainly, for example,
Israeli officials would have preferred to have G reat B ritain an d F rance in
charge of th e Suez C anal ra th e r th a n Egypt. E asy canal travel would be
ensu red then. F u rth er, had E den been successful in his efforts, N asser’s
rule would have ended w hen nationalization did. Given th a t Ben-G urion
feared N asser’s increased prestige would m ake him m ore inclined to
lau n ch an a ssa u lt on Israel, it is probable N asser’s ousting was desired
by th e Israeli governm ent, at some level. N asser’s success h ad greatly
bolstered his image am ong Arabs. Therefore, one concludes th a t
although Israel cam e o u t of the foray far less scath ed th a n either of its
allies, it nonetheless h ad received a defeat in the face of Egypt’s victory.
W hat of th e Soviet m enace, th e W estern w orld’s rival, R ussia. The
French A m bassador to the United S tates believed N asser was controlled

by th e USSR. Yet, th ro u g h o u t the conflict, R ussian objectives w ent
unfulfilled. N asser, like Cointet theorized ab o u t the French, desired
m ost of all to m aintain his independence of action - to avoid th e
influences of either su p er power. He achieved his goal. Com m unism
w as n o t a m otivating factor for N asser, nationalism served th a t purpose.
The fear of Soviet influence in Egypt was not uniq u e to th e French.
In th e U nited S tates th e USSR was always the prim aiy concern. From
America’s perspective the Soviet Union was th e Cold War - remove it and
th e problem s ended, su b d u e C om m unist influence an d th e free world
w as safe. One can be positive th en th a t th e Cold War, in som e way,
influenced Eisenhow er in his reaction to the Suez C anal Crisis. Up to
th is point, however, America’s involvement in th e crisis only h as been
touched upon. The United S tates was against the Anglo-French m ilitary
initiative an d h arsh ly criticized th e actions of France, E ngland, an d
Israel. But, to discover w h at m otivated and guided Eisenhow er an d his
S ecretary of S tate Jo h n Foster Dulles one m u st exam ine th eir actions
m ore closely.
ENDNOTES
1. W hite Paper On th e Nationalization of the Suez M aritime C anal

C om pany. (Cairo, Egypt: G overnm ent Press, 1956): 3.
2. Ibid.: 51.
3 . A nthony Eden, "Suez Canal, Address Septem ber 12, 1956." Vital
S p eech es, (22 O ctober 1, 1956): 744.
4 . A nthony Eden, The Memoirs of A nthony Eden Full Circle. (Cambridge

MA: H oughton Mifflin Company, 1960): 483.
5 . Ibid.: 475.
6. Robert Rhodes Jam es, "Eden," in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956

Retrospective an d R eappraisal, edited by Selwyn Ilan Troen an d M oshe
Shemesh^(New York, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1990): 106.
7. Eden, Full Circle: 477.
8. Ibid.: 518.
9. Ibid.: 481.
10 . "Angry Challenge an d Response," Time, (68 A ugust 13, 1956): 17.
11 . H. A lphand, "French View: No C ountry Could Exclude Force," US

News an d World R eport, (41, Decem ber 7, 1956): 53.
12 . "Angry Challenge an d Response,": 16-17.
13 . D onald Neff, W arriors At S u ez. (New York, NY: The Linden

P ress/S im o n an d S ch u ster, 1981): 162.
14 . Shim on Peres, "The Road to Serves: Franco-Israeli Strategic

C ooperation," in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956 Retrospective and
R eapp raisal, edited by Selwyn Ilan Troen an d Moshe S hem esh (New
York, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1990): 146.
15 . Selwyn Ilan Troen (ed.), "Ben-Gurion’s Diary: th e Suez- Sinai

C am paign," in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956 Retrospective an d
R eapp raisal, edited by Selwyn Ilan Troen an d Moshe S hem esh (New
York, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1990): 294.
THE C R I S I S AND I T S PLAYERS - 76 -
16 . White P ap er: 56-57.
17 . M oshe S hem esh (ed.), "Abd al-Latif al-B ughdadi’s Memoirs," in The
Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956 Retrospective and R eappraisal, edited by
Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe S hem esh (New York, New York: Colum bia
University Press, 1990): 336-337.
18 . Gamel A. N asser, "Suez Canal, A ddress Septem ber 15, 1956," Vital
S peeches, Vol. 22 O ctober 1, 1956: 742.
19 . Ibid.: 742-3.
20. Ibid.: 743.
2 1 . M oshe Shem esh, "Egypt: From Military Defeat to Political Victory,"

in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956 Retrospective and R eappraisal, edited
by Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shem esh (New York, New York:
Colum bia U niversity Press, 1990): 150.
2 2 . Foreign Relations of the United S ta te s , 1955-1957 [FRUS1, Vol. XVI,

"Suez Crisis Ju ly 26-D ecem ber 31, 1956" (W ashington D.C.: United
S tates Printing Office, 1990): 9-11.
23 . Ibid.: 34.
24 . Ibid.: 39-40.
25 . Ibid.: 45.
2 6 . Troen, "Ben-Gurion Diary": 292.
2 7 . Ibid.: 295.
2 8 . Jean -P au l Cointet, "Guy Mollet, The F rench G overnm ent an d SFIO,"

in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956 Retrospective an d R eappraisal, edited
by Selwyn Ilan Troen and M oshe S hem esh (New York, New York:
C olum bia U niversity Press, 1990): 136.
3 0 . FRUS XVI: 212.
3 1 . Ibid.: 216-17.
THE C R I S I S AND I T S PLAYERS - 77
3 2 . Ambrose: 334.
3 3 . Ibid.: 338.
3 4 . FRUS XVI: 434.
3 5 . Ibid.: 516.
3 6 . Ibid.: 528-530.
37. Ibid.: 452.
38. Ibid.: 454.
3 9 . R ichard Lamb, The Failure of th e Eden G overnm ent, (London:

Sidgwick an d Jack so n , 1987): 220.
4 0 . N asser, Vital S peeches: 742.
4 1 . Ambrose: 350.
4 3 . Ambrose: 351.
4 4 . FRUS XVI: 638.
4 5 . Ibid.: 712.
4 6 . Ibid.: 719.
4 7 . Ambrose: 353.
4 9 . S hem esh, "Abd al-Latif al-B ughdadi’s Memoirs": 336.
5 0 . FRUS XVI: 835 and Ambrose: 357.
5 1 . Cointet: 135.
5 2 . Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White H ouse Years, Waging Peace,

(Garden City, New York: D oubleday and Com pany Inc., 1965): 77 and
Ambrose: 359.
5 3 . Ambrose: 360.
54 . Ibid.: 361.
5 5 . S hem esh, "Abd al-Latif al-B ughdadi’s Memoirs": 338. It occurs to

m e th a t N asser’s reasoning here was more sim ilar to th e paranoiac
responses of Jo sep h Stalin th a n th e reactions of Hitler. B u t p erh ap s one
dictator w as as good as another.
5 6 . Ambrose: 362.
5 7 . Ibid.: 367.
58 . Ibid.: 369.
5 9 . B lanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhow er A Divided

Legacy. (Garden City, New York: Double Day & Com pany, Inc., 1981):
190.
60 . Ambrose: 373.
6 1 . This is n o t quite true. Israel was able to obtain a pledge from Egypt
th a t its shipping would no longer be denied access to th e S traig h ts of
Tiran. This h ad been one of B en-G urion’s prim ary w ar aim s. Peres:
145.
6 2 . S hem esh, "Egypt: From Military Defeat to Political Victory": 159.
6 3 . Jo se p h Frankel, B ritish Foreign Policy, 1945-1973, (New York:

Oxford University Press, 1975): 133-134.
6 4 . Frankel: 134.
6 5 . Cointet: 135.
6 6 . Peres: 149.
6 7 . Ibid.: 145.
CHAPTER FOUR
Standing Against The Allies
To th e su rp rise of the world an d p erh ap s m ost of all to th e B ritish
an d th e F rench the Eisenhow er A dm inistration reacted caustically to
Israel’s O ctober 29 a s sa u lt against Egypt an d th e following Anglo-French
ultim atum . Bringing th e m atter before th e United N ations Security
Council and, failing in th a t attem pt, th e G eneral Assembly, th e U nited
S tates succeeded in passing a resolution dem anding an im m ediate
cease-fire of all forces in the Middle E ast. Had Eisenhow er betrayed his*
NATO allies? D uring th e three m onths prior to the B ritish-French-Israeli
attac k th e P resident continuously w arned th a t th e U nited S tates
governm ent would n o t su p p o rt a m ilitary solution to th e Suez Crisis.
The President w as tru e to his word. As N asser h ad lashed o u t w hen
denied his objective, so too Eisenhow er now u sed all his resources to
obtain a cease-fire, even against the w ishes of G reat B ritain an d France.
P resident Eisenhow er’s reaction to th e nationalization of th e Suez
C anal w as nearly in stan tan eo u s. From Ju ly 27 and th ro u g h th e entire
crisis, Eisenhow er insisted th a t m ilitary force could be justified only after

STANDING AGAINST THE ALLIES - 80 -
all other options h ad been attem pted w ithout success. As negotiations
failed, th e P resident’s desire for a peaceful solution becam e m ore
adam an t. Perhaps he was obsessed with avoiding war. Perhaps he
realized th a t each failed negotiation bro u g h t w ar closer to th e Middle
E ast. W hatever th e case, w hen the crisis culm inated in violence,
E isenhow er’s w rath w as unleashed. Although varying explanations for
his reaction have been offered, it appears th a t th e P resident was
m otivated prim arily by a pair of factors - th e Cold W ar and rem aining
tru e to th e principles he h ad lived by th ro u g h o u t his m ilitary and
political careers.
In th e p ast, Am ericans have claimed th a t responsibility for th e US
stan ce lay w ith Secretary of S tate, Jo h n F oster Dulles. There have also
been charges m ade th a t Eisenhow er and Dulles reacted h arsh ly because
of th e crisis’ close proximity to the 1956 election or th a t th e p air w as
angiy because they h ad not been consulted or inform ed of th e Anglo-
French plan. W hen the events and facts are exam ined, however, one can
see th a t none of th ese theories provide an accu rate rep resen tatio n or
explanation of the Suez Crisis.
A m isconception held before the historical reconstruction of
Dwight D. Eisenhow er in th e early 1980s w as th a t Jo h n F oster Dulles
m ade foreign policy decisions an d the President sim ply ru b b er stam ped
D ulles’ ideas. As Eisenhow er’s intricacies have been revealed and

evaluated th is interpretation of events largely h as been dism issed. Prior
to th e reconstruction of Eisenhow er’s image, m any people attrib u ted
America’s peaceful stan ce during the Suez situ atio n to th e S ecretary of
S tate. In fact, it was Eisenhower, with D ulles’ agreem ent, who insisted
on peaceful negotiations. And it was Eisenhow er who exploded w hen
th is course w as abandoned by the allies.
The allies-turned-adversaries of the Suez Crisis have never
contested th a t it w as th e P resident who was responsible for America’s
reaction to hostilities and th a t his reaction was one of fury. Michael
G uhin, au th o r of Jo h n Foster Dulles A S tatesm an an d his Tim es,
included convincing evidence taken from crisis p articip an ts th a t
discounts the belief th a t Dulles was behind America’s reaction and
affirms th e idea th a t Eisenhow er was incredibly an g ry .1 He noted th a t
th e B ritish S ecretary of S tate for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd "and Abba
Eben, Israel’s A m bassador to W ashington, viewed Dulles as a possible
’agent for som e salvage operation,’ while Eisenhow er ’w as in a mood of
som eone betrayed.’" There was a great difference in th e Eben-Lloyd
descriptions of th ese two statesm en. Dulles w as trying to rescue the
situation, ease tensions between the allies, find a solution th a t would
no t resu lt in W estern E urope’s hum iliation. Eisenhow er on th e other
h an d , w as som eone betrayed, an d more inclined to seek vengeance and
retribution th a n a resolution favorable to th e aggressors.

STANDING AGAINST THE A L LIES - 82 -
In addition, G uhin rem inded his readers th a t S ecretary Dulles
checked into a hospital the day after he addressed th e U nited Nations
G eneral Assembly.2 Dulles entered W alter Reed hospital on November 3
w ith th e first signs of the stom ach cancer destined to take his life in
1959. Secretary Dulles was out of th e direct decision m aking process
before America forced acceptance of th e cease-fire. He could n o t have
been its source.
The above discussion is not m ean t to imply th a t Eisenhow er did
no t co n su lt w ith Dulles or agree with m uch of the advice Dulles offered
him . The two m en were frequently of the sam e m ind. In the goal of
finding a peaceful solution, Dulles an d the President w orked as one,
u n til D ulles’ illness p u t him o u t of com mission. But, w h eth er or n o t
Dulles w as present, Eisenhow er would have been in charge.
From th e beginning, th e US governm ent w as aw are of th e Anglo-
F rench in terest in a m ilitary solution. On Ju ly 27, Prime M inister Eden
se n t a telegram to Eisenhow er in w hich he insisted m ilitary force rem ain
an option.3 The sam e day White H ouse officials received a sim ilar report
ab o u t th e French stan ce from the American A m bassador in Paris,
D ouglas Dillon.4 Neither the P resident nor the S ecretary of S tate
condoned a n aggressive response.
Given th eir agreem ent, Dulles and Eisenhow er w orked tow ard the
m u tu a l goal of keeping th e peace on both sides. A Special N ational

Intelligence Estimate prepared in September concluded that the UK and
France would tiy to keep th eir m ilitary options open, b u t probably would
no t tak e th a t course u n less N asser provided a "violent provocation" - an
attac k on natio n als or property. A uthors of th e intelligence estim ate
believed N asser w as cognizant of this and reasoned he would avoid all
possible provocations.5 Hence, Dulles and Eisenhow er were n o t
concerned w ith th e Egyptians, b u t with th eir allies.
As if in m ocking clairvoyance, th e estim ate added th a t conceivably
"other situ atio n s of friction in the area m ight develop in su ch a w ay as to
fu rn ish an occasion for the UK-French m ilitary intervention ag ain st
N asser."6 This guess proved correct. Yet, those w riting th e estim ate h ad
n o t foreseen th a t th e situation guessed at would be a co n stru ct of Anglo-
French conspirators designed to provide the excuse for an attack.
The concern ab o u t B ritain an d F rance w as well-founded. On
A ugust second, Dulles reported th a t G reat B ritain and F rance’s
determ ination to u se force h ad not abated. Dulles stated th a t he w as
attem pting to convince them to lobby in favor of international control of
th e C anal - th e U sers’ Association - in stead of attacking Egypt to gain
Anglo-French control.7 World opinion m ight su p p o rt th e former, b u t
surely would reject the latter.
D uring an evening conversation with Dulles on S eptem ber 8,
Eisenhow er expressed doubts as to w hether th e U sers’ A ssociation could

succeed. As the exchange continued, it demonstrated both Eisenhower’s
and D ulles’ in terest in keeping th e peace. Honestly, D ulles responded to
th e C om m ander in C hiefs insecurity: "I was n o t su re either but...I felt we
h ad to keep th e initiative an d keep probing along lines, particularly since
there w as no chance of getting the B ritish and th e F rench n o t to u se
force u n less they h ad som e alternatives th a t seem ed to have in them
some stren g th of purpose an d some initiative." To this, according to
Dulles, "The P resident expressed again his deep concern th a t m ilitary
m easures should n o t be taken."8 Their objectives were clearly th e same:
negotiation an d peace.
One m onth later at an NSC meeting, Eisenhow er com m ented he
an d Dulles agreed in essence "that if the United S tates could ju s t keep
th e lid on a little longer, som e kind of com prom ise plan could be worked
out for a settlem ent of th e Suez problem."9 The U ser’s A ssociation h ad
been one m eans of keeping the lid on. By this time, however,
Eisenhow er recognized th a t he could not be certain of w h eth er or n o t the
US would have the tim e to work out a com promise. If an attack
occurred, th e efforts m ade by Dulles and th e p lan s m ade by Eisenhow er
would go to w aste.
U nbeknow nst to th e President, his tim e h ad already expired.
W ithin th ree days the B ritish an d French began th eir inform ation
blackout, during w hich they planned, with Israel, to reclaim th e Suez

Canal. D espite Eisenhow er’s b est efforts, E ngland an d F rance were b en t
on force.
It is obvious th a t Eisenhow er an d Dulles supported a peaceful
conclusion for th e Suez conflict as the b est solution. Publicly both
Dulles an d Eisenhow er an n ounced th a t America would n o t accept a
m ilitary attack u n less it was th e absolute la st resort. On Septem ber 5,
Eisenhow er stated in a news conference th a t he sought a negotiated
resolution - "one th a t will in su re to all n atio n s th e free u se of th e canal
for th e shipping of th e world, w hether in peace or in war, as
contem plated by th e 1888 convention."10
Two weeks later Dulles declared: "We shall be unrem ittin g in our
efforts to seek by peaceful m eans a ju s t solution giving due recognition
to th e rights of all concerned, including Egypt."11 These were n o t isolated
statem en ts for either official. W hat is not m ade clear by them , however,
is w hy th is p air w as against m ilitary action. W hat compelled President
Eisenhow er - hero general of World W ar Two - to in sist th a t G reat
B ritain an d F rance avoid hostilities an d th a t Israel d esist in its
aggression? The answ er is prim arily twofold - w h at m ight be term ed
m oral an d ethical indignation an d Cold W ar considerations. The form er
m otivation behind Eisenhow er’s reaction h as several incarnations:
Egyptian sovereignty, stan d in g by one’s principles, an d world opinion.
The second refers to Eisenhow er’s continuing quest to stem an d reverse

th e spreading Soviet influence th ro u g h o u t the world. Together these
factors com bined to sh ap e America’s response to th e B ritish-French-
Israeli attack on Egypt during the Suez Crisis.
On O ctober 11, P resident Eisenhow er held a news conference
during w hich he reviewed several guiding principles for dealing w ith the
Suez C anal affair. The list began with "respect... Egyptian sovereignty;"
a n d w as followed by "insistence]...upon ...efficient operation of the
C anal;"12 In Eisenhow er’s m ind these two concerns ran k ed high.
Sovereignty w as a philosophical concept, while efficiency dealt with the
practical side of th e situation.
Respect for Egyptian sovereignty was im p o rtan t b ecause of
America’s heritage. The sanctity of a country’s territory h ad been
ingrained in United S tates history. It h ad been won w hen the US fought
for its freedom in American Revolution. And, America still claim ed to

*
defend freedom th ro u g h o u t th e world. All independent n atio n s h ad
certain rights because they were free. As m uch as a country’s freedom
h ad to be protected, so did its rights, for w ithout those th e country’s
liberty would be abridged. Thus, Egypt h ad certain g u aran teed rights
because it w as free.
Clearly one of those w as protection against u n w arran ted invasion.
Any attac k on Egypt w ithout good cause - Eisenhow er did n o t deem
nationalization of th e canal a rationale in itself - co n stitu ted a disregard

of N asser’s dom inion an d an im m oral act. In addition, E isenhow er wrote
"The in h eren t right of any sovereign nation to exercise th e power of
em inent dom ain w ithin its own territory could scarcely be doubted...."13
N asser’s nationalization was legitim ate in th e P resident’s eyes, therefore,
he did n o t find any grounds for th e allies’ attack.
Time m agazine reported on A ugust 13 th a t th e Secretary of S tate
h ad voiced th is concept publicly. "Dulles took the position th a t Egypt as
a sovereign nation h ad a legal right to nationalize th e C anal Com pany -
an Egyptian entity w hich he likened to a public utility w ith a governm ent
ch a rter - so long as Egypt paid due com pensation."14 Since N asser
prom ised to com pensate stock holders, his position becam e m ore
tenable, in light of D ulles’ announcem ent. Although th e Secretary of
S tate also rem arked th a t taking control of the canal represented a
violation of the 1888 Convention, this was in reference to lim iting access
to th e canal. If N asser allowed all parties open access to th e canal,
nationalization could n o t be contested.
Herein lay the second ten et of Eisenhow er’s guiding list: efficiency.
For nearly 70 years, while th e B ritish and French controlled th e Suez,
canal traffic h ad sailed along smoothly, w ithout long term delays or
problem s. Now N asser w as in charge. Eisenhow er believed th a t if
N asser could m aintain th e sam e level of productivity, there existed no
rationale to reclaim the canal. He com m ented on A ugust 1 th a t th e m ost

STANDING AGAINST THE A LLIES - 88 -
important concern "is to make certain of the continued efficiency of this
great w aterw ay...."15 As long as ships could sail th ro u g h freely an d
quickly, N asser’s action did not o b stru ct commerce. The g u aran tee of
passage for all ships, found in th e 1888 Convention w as satisfied. An
efficiently ru n canal disputed allied claim s th a t Egyptians were too
incom petent to m aintain the Suez. Their excuse for aggression
disintegrated.
Pondering th is idea as A ugust opened, Eisenhow er suggested th a t
allowing N asser to m aintain th e canal w as the b est way to en su re he
would n o t retain it. The P resident told Dulles th a t "If we are right th a t
th a t fellow can ’t ru n the Canal, th ere is bound to be a breakdow n in th e
C anal or he (Nasser) will com m it aggression." Then th e allies would have
an excuse to reassert control over th e Canal. If G reat B ritain an d h er
com rades could not w ait for su c h a pretext, b u t insisted up o n outright
aggression, Eisenhow er "was convinced th a t not only would they
consolidate Arab force...[they also] would w eaken and probably destroy
th e UN."16
It w as no w onder the Eisenhow er adm inistration objected to a
m ilitary solution. The anticipated consequences were a n a th em a to
A merica’s global objectives. Attack would stren g th en N asser’s position
as a leader in th e Middle E ast by increasing his prestige an d respect
am ong Arabs. In addition, if th e W estern nations were to disregard a UN

mandate, the door was opened to any other nation to do the same. The
global clout of the United Nations would be stripped away.
By November 1 th e President’s confidence in N asser’s ability to ru n
th e C anal h ad increased. D uring an NSC m eeting on th a t day he
rem inded his advisor Governor S tassen th a t "transit thro u g h th e C anal
h a s increased ra th e r th a n decreased since the Egyptian take-over."17
N asser m et and, to th e chagrin of the B ritish an d th e French, actually
su rp assed th e efficiency criteria set by the United S tates. In his
biography of Eisenhower, S tephen Ambrose noted th a t after Septem ber
15, w hen th e B ritish pilots abandoned th eir posts, Egyptian an d Greek
captains piloted a record 254 ships through th e canal in one w eek.18
Egypt’s accom plishm ent could not easily be ignored. And, in
Eisenhow er’s eyes, th e basis on w hich one could question nationalization
w as fu rth er reduced. N asser’s position was becom ing increasingly solid.
Egyptian sovereignty and N asser’s ability to keep th e Suez C anal
ru n n in g sm oothly were two of the factors w hich led Eisenhow er to
conclude th a t hostile action was not justified. These two factors,
however, were n o t th e only guides followed by th e President. Eisenhow er
revealed an o th er w hen he recited the third an d "central principle" of
those m entioned during his October news conference. It w as probably
w ith m any countries in m ind th a t the President announced th e principle
th a t "the C anal could not be operated for the political purposes of any
single country ." 19 Eisenhower’s statement harkened back to the Security
Council resolution p assed ju s t before E ngland an d F rance began their
inform ation blackout. Its origin m ost likely cam e from th e Convention of
1888.
Article 12 of th e Convention declared th a t th e signatories applied
"to th e principle of equality as regards the free u se of th e canal....[and]
agree th a t none of them shall endeavour to obtain w ith resp ect to the
canal territorial or com m ercial advantage or privilege in any
internatio n al arrangem ents...."20 Although only com m ercial an d
territorial advantage specifically were prohibited, w hen either is gained,
th e resu lt is invariably political power.
Eisenhow er’s statem en t could apply to m ost of the countries
involved in the Suez Crisis. In one interpretation E isenhow er’s central
principle could refer to Egypt. N asser’s nationalization of th e canal
potentially increased his ability to u se the Suez C anal for his own
advantage, commercially, territorially, an d politically. Denying his
enem ies, prim arily Israel, passage through the canal an d increasing toll
charges enlarged both N asser’s profits and prestige in the Arab world.
S u ch actions, if tak en solely for N asser’s own political power, violated the
rules laid o u t in 1888. Eisenhow er’s statem en t implied th a t th e United
S tates would n o t allow N asser to u se the canal purely for his own
purposes.
The President’s declaration of the third principle also bore directly
on th e B ritish an d French. W hen G reat B ritain an d F rance attem pted to
regain control of the Suez, an im m ediate alarm ab o u t colonialism w ent
off in th e highest levels of governm ent. Officials worried th a t th e Anglo-
F rench invasion w as a 1956 version of colonialism .21
On November 1, 1956 Dulles analyzed the problem. D uring a
m orning NSC m eeting Dulles presented th e case th a t "basically we h ad
alm ost reached the point of deciding today w hether we th in k th e future
lies w ith a policy of reassertin g by force colonial control over th e less
developed nations, or w hether we will oppose su ch a course of action by
every appropriate m eans."22 O pposition was the direction p u rsu e d by
th e adm inistration.
A lthough som e h istorians su p p o rt the idea th a t concern for
colonialism w as a prim ary factor in th e American governm ent’s decision
to resist a forceful solution, this is im probable. There exists in
governm ent records only sc an t m ention of the fear of colonial
aspirations, suggesting colonialism w as not actually a m ajor influence on
Eisenhow er. Still it is likely th a t the contem plation of colonialism h ad
som e place in th e adm inistration’s position th a t the canal rem ain free
from one country’s political purposes.
If colonial rule was reasserted over the Suez no one could
g u aran tee th a t th e British a n d /o r French would not u se th a t position for

political gain. In practice a colonial ruler subjugates its su b o rd in ate’s
desires to its own. Had th e canal been dom inated again by th e B ritish -
w hich was probable if N asser h ad been defeated - a single power could
control th e Suez for its own political purposes.
P erhaps least ap p aren t in Eisenhow er’s statem en t w as the way in
w hich it could apply to th e Soviet Union. Pre-em inent am ong
Eisenhow er’s concerns in th e Middle E ast was Soviet influence an d
control in th e area. D uring th e fighting in Egypt th e unknow n intentions
of R ussia constantly troubled top adm inistration officials. The P resident
an d h is advisors believed th a t if R ussia m anaged to improve its standing
w ith N asser, Egypt would become a satellite of Com m unism . That, from
th e adm in istratio n ’s perspective, m ight m ake th e Suez susceptible to the
control of th e single power of C om m unist R ussia. This w as not only
against Eisenhow er’s Cold W ar beliefs, it also ra n co u n ter to the
convictions of m ost Americans.
The guiding precepts th a t Eisenhow er publicly announced
paralleled American beliefs an d traditions. Sovereignty, efficiency, and
an open door to the Suez all were practical US values tran slate d into
in ternatio n al term s. The philosophical background from w hence these
ideas were born was as old as th e country itself. Also coming from the
sam e origins as th ese sta n d ard American traditions was a belief in the
im portance of stan d in g by one’s principles. This concept played an
im p o rtan t role in Eisenhow er’s reaction to th e crisis.
S trong in th e P resident’s anti-aggression stan ce was his
consideration of principles, particularly rem aining tru e to one’s prom ise.
In 1950 America h ad signed the Tripartite D eclaration, an agreem ent
th a t forbid m ilitary aggression in the Middle E ast. Eisenhow er felt duty
b o und to uphold the agreem ent. He was concerned w ith keeping the
w ord of th e US in order to m aintain American credibility aro u n d the
globe. A governm ent’s credibility is dependent largely upon respecting
internationally accepted m orals and not breaking w ritten agreem ents. At
stak e for th e United S tates w as m aintaining its rep u tatio n by rem aining
faithful to th e declaration.
In regard to this, th e P resident was concerned w ith in tern atio nal
an d dom estic opinion of America’s reactions to u n w arran ted w ar in th e
Middle E ast. He knew th a t an attack on Egypt w as im m oral because
th ere w as no justification for it. To su p p o rt an attack w as to ignore right
an d w rong in th e eyes of the whole world, as well as to disregard th e
U nited S ta te s’ proclaim ed position. Nationally and globally, people did
n o t accept force as a solution. N asser h ad legal claim s to th e canal,
th ere were no equivalent claims for a m ilitary solution.
As im p o rtan t was a second factor: rem aining loyal to his own
personal beliefs. Eisenhow er accepted w ar as a solution only w hen he

could find absolutely no alternative. World W ar Two seem ed to have left
th e ex-general with a indelible loathing of battle. C onsistently during
Eisenhow er’s two term s, the President avoided violent exchanges in favor
of negotiated com prom ise. The only conflicts w ar ended were those
belonging to soldiers killed on the field. International dilem m as were
rarely resolved by fighting. W hen the prospect of hostilities arose
Eisenhow er insisted th a t every alternative to battle be exhausted before
he accepted its necessity. T hat m ight m ean anything from conferences
to th e th re a t of attack, b u t it did not imply actu al hostilities. The
P resident could find m any alternatives sh o rt of war. In fact, during
Eisenhow er’s eight years as president, he se n t no American soldier into
com bat. Suez w as no different. It was therefore because of both global
an d personal principles th a t Eisenhow er sought to uphold th e Tripartite
D eclaration.
On May 25, 1950 th e United S tates, G reat Britain, an d France had
signed th e Tripartite D eclaration pledging all th ree n ations to work to
avoid an arm s race in the Middle E ast. More im portantly, from the
P resident’s perspective, the proclam ation took "this opportunity of
declaring...deep in terest and...desire to prom ote th e estab lish m en t and
m ainten an ce of peace and stability in the area an d u n alterab le
opposition to th e u se of force or th re a t of force between any of th e states
in th a t area." In addition the docum ent stated th a t if th e signatory

governm ents discovered one country w as preparing to attac k an o th er
they would take actions "within an d outside th e United N ations, to
prevent su c h violations."23 It w as due to this proclam ation, an d
statem en ts m ade during th e Eisenhow er’s ten u re rededicating America
to peace in th e Middle E ast, th a t th e adm inistration railed ag ain st the
aggressive attack s against Egypt.
From one view point th e B ritish and French appeared to be
upholding th e doctrine by entering th e foray w hen Israel attack ed Egypt.
Hostilities h ad broken out in th e Middle E ast an d they were taking
actions "outside the United Nations to prevent su ch violations." Yet,
w ithin th e UN, th e French and B ritish purposefully o b stru cted S ecurity
Council efforts to end the fighting. Besides this, th e Eisenhow er
adm inistration already su spected th e deception being played o u t by its
allies. B ritain and France adhered to th e precepts of th e T ripartite
D eclaration in form, b u t not in su b stan ce. The United S tates could not
be p arty to th a t aggression.
Knowing th a t th e US could n o t participate in an attack on Nasser,
th e P resident asked the next logical question of his advisors. D uring an
O ctober 29 conference in the S tate D epartm ent, he reviewed th e
situ atio n and th en w ondered how th e United S tates could ju stify it
su p p o rt of N asser.24 The C hairm an of the Jo in t Chiefs of Staff, Admiral
A rthur Radford voiced th e answ er Eisenhow er already h ad decided upon.

Radford pointed out during the meeting "the matter m ust be
handled on th e b asis of principle...." Eisenhow er added "he did n o t
fancy helping Egypt in th e p resen t circum stances b u t he felt o u r word
m u st be m ade good."25 Action was required an d su c h efforts could no t
su p p o rt E ngland or France. Only by fulfilling th e pledge m ade in the
Tripartite D eclaration could th e United S tates retain its credibility
around th e world, an d Eisenhow er m aintain his own peace-of-m ind.26
As th e S tate D epartm ent m eeting continued Eisenhow er an d his
staff discussed th eir options. Although no final course w as decided
upon, one step would be taken. Using w hat am ounted to a divide and
conquer tactic, Eisenhow er suggested a note be se n t to B ritain indicating
America’s intention to su p p o rt Egypt. England could join th e United
S tates in condem ning hostilities ag ain st Egypt - th u s leaving F rance as
the sole su p p o rter of Israeli aggression and creating even greater political
p ressu re to end th e violence - or face the consequences. If the B ritish
backed Israel and France "they m ay open a deep rift betw een us...."27
The im plications of th a t split were left to the B ritish im agination for the
time. Eisenhow er’s blackm ailing m ay have been subtle, b u t its in ten t
w as undoubtedly serious.
Although concerned ab o u t a "rift" forming between th e U nited
S tates and G reat B ritain caused by the B ritish inclination to u se force,

Si
th e P resident could n o t forgo his ideals. Only days after N asser
nationalized the Suez Canal, the Secretary of Treasury, George M.
H um phrey, inquired ab o u t th e resu lts of su ch discord. Eisenhow er
adm itted su ch disagreem ent would be serious, "but," he added, "not as
serious as letting a w ar s ta rt an d n o t trying to stop it."28 A w ar th a t was
avoidable w as an inexcusable one.
On October 31, as Britain, France, and Israel attack ed Egypt,
Eisenhow er delivered a speech condem ning th eir aggression. Rem aining
faithful to his own principles of peaceful negotiation in lieu of violent
altercation the P resident told America "In all the recen t troubles in the
Middle E ast, there have indeed been injuries suffered by all nations
involved. B ut I do not believe th a t an o th er in stru m e n t of injustice -
w ar - is th e rem edy for th ese wrongs."29 There is no do u b t Eisenhow er
w as sincere in this sentim ent, publicly and behind closed doors.
Aggression solved no problem s for the B ritish an d French, b u t
served only to stren g th en N asser an d his cause. Eisenhow er com plained
th a t "If the B ritish would agree to negotiate a settlem ent, th e n the
opinion of th e whole world would be against Egypt."30 In th a t way,
B ritain an d France could show th a t N asser was unwilling to
com promise. Only th en m ight the allies have justification for action
ag ain st him . As it stood, N asser was the victim an d W estern E urope the
villain. Eisenhow er w anted his allies to consider the situ atio n long
enough to settle on a m eans of reversing those roles. B rute force did not
serve th a t purpose.
W hat also becam e clear to the P resident w as th a t the W estern
aggression in th e Middle E ast h ad provided R u ssia w ith a prim e
opportunity to increase its influence in th a t area. Besides th e fear th e
Soviet Union would gain control over th e Suez Canal, in evidence were
th e Cold W ar insecurities ab o u t C om m unist world dom ination. The
allies’ attac k gave th e Soviet Union th e chance to denounce dem ocracy
an d th e West. It m ade for excellent m aterial in th e ongoing a n ti
dem ocracy propaganda cam paign. R ussia actively sought ways to
su p p o rt th e Arabs, while keeping the W estern image tarn ish ed .
Considering th is inform ation, there is no question th a t Eisenhow er’s
concern ab o u t th e Soviet advance influenced his vehem ent rejection of
unjustified aggression.
At th e November first NSC conference already touched upon,
Secretary Dulles raised the topic of th e Soviet Union an d the Middle
E ast. He w arned th a t if th e United S tates did not tak e the initiative
soon, th e Soviet Union would seek an end to hostilities, an d gain
dom inance in th e Middle E ast.31 Dulles continued by recom m ending
th a t the U nited S tates be su re to propose a resolution in th e UN before
th e Soviet Union did so. Any other scenario gave R u ssia th e propaganda
advantage as well as m ade America a follower, in stead of a leader. Also,
a Soviet resolution was bound to label B ritain an d France as

aggressors.32 A lthough Eisenhow er and Dulles m ight feel th a t way
privately, publicly su ch tags gave the W est a poor image. An American
resolution would avoid th e stigm a of titles by calling for a universal
cease-fire an d UN peace-keeping forces.
To allow th e R ussians any say in the Middle E ast was to give them
influence in th a t area. The US h ad to p ass its resolution before their
rivals could act. American UN representative H eniy Cabot Lodge Jr., did
so, an d received rousing acclaim from countries aro u n d the world, for
his effort.
On November 5 the situation in regards to th e Soviet Union
becam e even m ore com plicated. T hat evening P resident Eisenhow er
received a note from Soviet Head of G overnm ent Nikolai A. Bulganin.
B ulganin proposed a Russo-A m erican m ilitary venture to bring the
Middle E astern com batants into line. The R ussian official stated th a t
the USSR w as prepared to lend air su p p o rt an d naval power to the
Egyptian cause, if th e W estern n ations did n o t h alt th eir on slau g h t.33
To th is p artn ersh ip Eisenhow er answ ered a definite no. G reat
B ritain an d F rance h ad circum vented American attem p ts at peace, yet
despite th is they rem ained the prim ary allies of th e U nited S tates.
America would n o t join w ith its chief rival in m ilitary operations against
either country.
The R u ssian s followed their offer to th e US w ith th reaten in g notes

se n t to London an d Paris. These com m unications carried an om inous
Soviet w arning. The R ussians th reaten ed to lau n ch ballistic m issiles a t
B ritain an d France if th e two belligerents did n o t desist.34
In th e U nited S tates governm ent, these w arnings, although awful if
fulfilled, were m et generally with disbelief. Eisenhower, in his m emoirs,
recalled C hairm an of th e JC S Radford’s reaction to th e Soviet w arning.
The Admiral rem arked, "’It is very h ard to figure o u t th e R ussian
thinking in connection w ith their proposal. For them to attem p t any
operation in th e Middle E ast would be extremely difficult, militarily. The
only reasonable form of intervention would be long-range air strikes with
n u clear w eapons - w hich seem s unlikely.’"35 The Soviet’s would not
begin World W ar Three ju s t for propaganda. In top governm ent circles
th e th re a ts were interpreted as bluffs.
Soviet intervention was largely discounted, since it was nearly
im possible to accom plish. As a precaution and an American counter-
w arning to show th e Soviets th a t the United S tates would n o t tolerate
any aggression from them , Eisenhow er mobilized US forces aro u n d the
world. This action was a product of Eisenhow er’s cautious n atu re, not of
fear th a t th e USSR would actually follow th ro u g h on its th re a ts.36 The
P resident always kept open as m any of his options as possible. World
W ar Three w as not likely to begin, b u t Eisenhow er w anted to be
prepared on th e off chance som ething w ent horribly wrong. And, he was
prepared.
C harles Bohlen, A m bassador to the Soviet Union, inform ed the
Eisenhow er adm inistration th a t th e R ussians h ad n o t intended th e US to
accept th eir offer, b u t h ad proposed the plan as a diversionary tactic.
They w ished to avoid draw ing unw anted attention to events in th e Soviet
satellite country of H ungary.37 As it tu rn ed out, because of th e situation
in the Middle E ast, the United S tates was for th e m ost p a rt preoccupied
anyway. Although concerned with the situation in H ungary, America
h ad few options open to it an d m ustered no more th a n w eak public
denunciations of Soviet actions.
On October 22 the people of H ungary revolted ag ain st th eir
S talinist rulers. For two weeks the situation appeared prom ising.
P resident Eisenhow er began his October 31 televised speech with
com m ents ab o u t the country. He was optim istic th a t a new, free
H ungary w as coming of age. The Soviet Union h ad "declared its
readiness to consider the w ithdraw al of Soviet ’advisors....’"38 For a
m om ent th e th re a t of world C om m unist dom ination seem ed to subside.
The hope survived only an o th er four days.
Soviet m ilitary forces attacked H ungary on November 4 crushing
th e rebellion and providing a horrific example for all other E astern
E uropean freedom fighters.39 The following day D eputy U nder S ecretary
of S tate for Political Affairs, Robert D. M urphy, reiterated A m bassador

Bohlen’s conclusion. He expressed the opinion that Soviet calls for a
jo in t action by US an d USSR in Egypt were designed to draw atten tio n
away from events in H ungary.40 Bohlen’s interpretation becam e th e
sta n d a rd one.
The greatest difficulty resulting from the Soviet invasion of
H ungary w as n o t due to R ussian actions, b u t to th e previous attack s
m ade by England, France, and Israel. Their joint efforts to regain control
of the Suez Canal represented unjustifiable aggression. R u ssia’s
m ovem ents against H ungary fell into the sam e category. Both E a st and
W est were ignoring world opinion in order to obtain th eir objectives.
How then , could th e W estern world condem n Soviet forces in H ungary
an d n o t ap p ear hypocritical? M embers of the W estern com m unity were
com m itting im m oral acts th a t appeared sim ilar to R ussia’s atrocities.
Moreover B ritain and France had begun th eir aggression before th e
USSR had.
There w as little th e United S tates could do in H ungary. A
propagan d a bonanza was im possible given the circum stances since US
resources already were diverted by the Suez Crisis an d su c h a severe
blitz would m ake America ap p ear hypocritical, h ad one ju s t as
uncom prom ising n o t been directed tow ard the allies. Eisenhow er also
adm itted th a t US intervention was an im possibility b ecause troops could
not reach H ungary w ithout crossing n eu tral territory.41 All th e P resident

could do w as send America’s forlorn hope: "The h e a rt of America goes
o u t to th e people of H ungary...." - a nice sentim ent, b u t ineffective.42
C ircum stances in Egypt did serve to divert atten tio n away from
H ungary. This gave the Soviets free reign in th a t area, w ithout an
American recourse. Instead of facing a trem endous prop ag an d a
cam paign brought on by th eir attack, the Soviet Union received little
criticism . W hat official rebuke th a t was offered cam e in th e form of a
U nited Nations resolution condem ning th eir aggression, b u t offering no
way to h alt th e destruction in H ungary.
In addition, th e attack on Egypt by E ngland an d F rance m ocked
W estern n atio n s’ traditional stdnce against taking su c h a course to settle
disputes. The free world m ight expect R ussia to b ru tally c ru sh its
opposition, b u t G reat B ritain and France were supposed to be "civilized."
It w as possible to conclude th a t Anglo-French aggression gave the
Soviets an excuse to u se force. All R ussia needed to do w as look across
th e continent a t w hat its neighbors were doing. If E ngland an d F rance
could com m it im m oral attack s, why not th e USSR?
The R ussian attack on H ungary fueled Eisenhow er’s desire to
guaran tee th a t Soviet influence rem ain a t a m inim um in th e Middle
E ast. On November 6, the sam e day Eden inform ed th e P resident th a t
G reat B ritain would abide by th e cease-fire, Eisenhow er se n t a note to
Eden. The American leader proposed three factors be included in the

U nited Nations cease-fire. First, th ere could be no conditions se t on the
UN cease-fire "so as to n o t give Egypt with Soviet backing an opportunity
to quibble or s ta rt negotiations...[those] can be h andled later." Second,
th e P resident stated th a t th e peace-keeping force introduced into the
Suez area should exclude troops from any of the big five n atio n s - US,
UK, USSR, France, and Peoples Republic of China. In th is way "no
excuse [would] be given for Soviet participation in UN force...." Third, the
UN plan should be im plem ented as soon as possible to avoid fu rth er
confusion an d developm ents.43 The P resident w anted to draw the crisis
to a close and en su re R ussia did not slip in before th e gate w as locked.
Eisenhow er’s effort to keep Soviet influence o u t of th e Middle E ast
w as a m ain consideration in deciding w hat course to chose during the
Suez C anal Crisis. Along with this motivation was his desire to honor
th e sovereignty of Egypt, m aintain th e efficiency of the canal, an d rem ain
tru e to all th e principles involved. There have been, besides the
explanations outlined here, several others offered for why Eisenhow er
reacted as he did. These theories propose less h u m a n ita ria n - an d less
probable - m otivations for America’s ad am an t anti-aggression stance
against England and France.
H erbert Parm et, au th o r of Eisenhow er and th e Am erican C rusades
an d B lanche Wiesen Cook, who wrote The Declassified E isenhow er,
m aintained th a t it was not principle, b u t election tim e worries th a t

caused Eisenhow er to react with su ch anger. On the eve of th e national
vote England an d France h ad launched an im m oral attack. Not only did
it reflect poorly on the image of the West, it also increased p ressu res an d
responsibilities for Eisenhower, who already was dealing w ith a hectic
cam paigning schedule. Parm et and Cook concluded Eisenhow er took
th e attack as a personal in su lt an d responded vindictively.44
B lanche Cook added th e questionable theoiy th a t Eisenhow er
sided with N asser because "reliable sources" deem ed the Egyptian leader
"an agreeable b u sin ess partner...."45 Given N asser’s previous b u sin ess
dealings w ith th e United S tates - the Aswan D am and requested arm s -
even h ad b u sin essm en inform ed Eisenhow er of their sentim ent, it seem s
im probable th a t Eisenhow er or th e S tate D epartm ent would agree w ith
it. By all evidence collected, N asser appeared to be a m anipulative
b u sin ess associate, not a tru stw o rth y one.
The m ost convincing of the argum ents connecting th e P resident’s
reaction an d the national election cam e from Michael G uhin. G uhin p u t
a n intriguing tw ist on the theory th a t Eisenhow er’s reaction w as related
to the election. The au th o r noted th a t given the close proxim ity of the
upcom ing election and the Middle E ast War, the President would be
inclined to react in some way. "No comment" would have appeared as
either acceptance of th e Anglo-French position or as indecision. Neither
gave th e American people a good im pression of Eisenhow er.46 G uhin

concluded th a t the P resident’s response to the conflict w as co n sisten t
w ith his in terest in staying in office. The explanation avoided th e image
of Eisenhow er as vengeful archetype. He w as portrayed as a careful
strateg ist in th is model.
Although the above argum ent h as a logical, persuasive line of
reasoning to it - an d is certainly well considered - th e theory’s validity,
as w ith Cook’s an d P arm et’s, is im probable. Eisenhow er neith er
responded to th e Suez Crisis out of spite because his cam paign was
interrupted, nor as a tactic to m aintain a healthy image as th e election
approached. As accurately as can be determ ined, Eisenhow er rem ained
unconcerned w ith his reelection from the beginning of th e crisis.
In fact, Eisenhow er h ad revealed th e lack of im portance he placed
on th e election to him self an d his advisors long before hostilities broke
o u t in th e Middle E ast. Writing in his diaiy on O ctober 15, 1956
E isenhow er reviewed the situation as it stood then. He sum m arized the
American belief th a t Israel had begun a m ilitaiy mobilization.
Considering th a t th e Prime M inister of Israel, David Ben-G urion, m ight
believe Eisenhow er would not sta n d against Israeli aggression because of
th e Jew ish vote in th e United S tates, Eisenhow er wrote the warning:
"Ben G urion should not m ake any grave m istakes based upon his belief
th a t w inning a dom estic election [the presidency] is as im portant to us
as preserving and protecting the in terests of the United Nations and

other n atio n s of th e free world in th a t region."47 If need be, Eisenhow er
h ad decided he would sacrifice him self to keep th e peace.
Eisenhow er’s devotion to a cease-fire a t th e possible cost of his job
w as m ade ap p aren t to some of his close advisors during a m eeting in the
White H ouse on O ctober 29. While contem plating th e Israeli attac k on
Egypt and possible Anglo-French collusion w ith th e Jew ish S tate,
Eisenhow er’s com m ents ab o u t w hatever action the US took an d his
prospects for a second term were recorded. "The P resident said, in this
m atter, he does not care in the slightest w hether he is re-elected or not.
He feels we m u st m ake good on our word. He added th a t he does not
really th in k th e American people would throw him o u t in th e m idst of a
situ atio n like this, b u t if they did, so be it."48 Eisenhow er did n o t bother
w ith the topic of elections, it was far outweighed by th e im portance of
the Suez Crisis. And, in the end, he was retu rn ed to his office by a wide
m argin.
Finally, w hen A nthony Eden called Eisenhow er on election day to
an nou n ce th a t the U nited Kingdom would accept a UN cease-fire, Eden
politely asked how the presidential election was going. Eisenhow er’s
response was simply, "I don’t give a darn ab o u t the election."49 He was
no t concerned with the resu lts of th a t political gam bit. The P resident’s
th o u g h ts rem ained focused on attaining peace in th e Middle E ast.
A nother explanation for Eisenhow er’s reaction to th e British-

French-Israeli operation concerns the Anglo-French news blackout
beginning in th e second week of October. From O ctober 15 - w hen an
A merican reconnaissance aircraft recorded th e existence of 60 M ystere
planes in Israel, instead of th e twelve officially there -Eisenhow er wrote
"we h ad th e u n easy feeling th a t we were cu t off from our allies."50 The
P resident’s assessm en t w as correct. The question th a t som e ask is
w hether or n o t this intentional effort to keep inform ation from th e United
S tates resulted in a deep resen tm en t in American q u arte rs.51
A com m ent m ade by Secretary of S tate Dulles during a N ational
Security m eeting discredits this theoiy. Speaking to th e NSC m em bers
D ulles noted th a t G reat B ritain and F rance h ad acted contrary to US
advice an d also h ad ignored w h at was in th eir b est in terests. In spite of
th ese facts, he added, "Of course, we should not let ourselves be swayed
by resen tm en t a t th e treatm en t the B ritish and French have given us, or
do anything except w hat we decide is the right thing to do."52 Here is a
straig h t forward statem ent. W hether or not the US w as angry w ith the
Anglo-French actions, America should not react out of malice.
The final proof th a t Eisenhow er’s reaction represented w hat he
believed m orality called for, ra th e r th a n spite, is found in his response to
the im plem entation of th e cease-fire. After Eisenhow er received word on
November 6 th a t Eden would accept the cease-fire, the P resident called
his co u n ter-p art to say "I can ’t tell you how pleased we are th a t you
found it possible to accept the cease-fire...."53 It w as a som ew hat ironic
statem en t since th e US h ad forced B ritain’s acquiescence.54
Eisenhow er probably did n o t register the irony in his own
statem ent. Most likely, he was genuinely pleased th a t th e fighting was
a t an end. His actions after November 6 displayed no residual
resen tm en t ab o u t th e events of Suez and he moved to erase all discord
as quickly as possible.
A round q u arter to nine th e following m orning Eisenhow er received
a phone call from A nthony Eden. D uring th e course of th e conversation
E den and Eisenhow er agreed th a t Eden and F rench Prim e M inister

/
Mollet should visit th e United S tates th a t Friday an d S atu rd ay - only two
days away. The President com m ented, "’after all, it is like a family sp a t.’"
E den agreed to inform Mollet of th e plan and Eisenhow er en su red him
an invitation from America would be dispatched to Mollet immediately.
At 9:10 one of E den’s aides called back to state th a t Mollet w as delighted
to accept an d asked th a t all three governm ents an n o u n ce th e visit
sim ultaneously - 11 a.m . in the W ashington D.C., 4 p.m . in London,
a n d 5 p.m. in Paris.55 The P resident had m ade light of events in the
Suez, so as to minimize th e split th a t had recently occurred between
W estern Europe an d the United S tates.
Eisenhow er’s plans were dam pened, however, w hen he consulted
w ith Dulles (still in th e hospital), H erbert Hoover, Jr., an d George

Humphrey. These three vetoed the idea of a meeting that weekend.56
Definitely uncom fortable w ith his task, Eisenhow er now h ad to rescind
his invitation to the B ritish an d French.
T hirty-three m inutes before Eisenhow er w as sup p o sed to
an n ou n ce th e visit, he called Eden to postpone it. He began directly by
telling Eden th e visit could n o t occur as planned. "I have ju s t h ad a
p artial C abinet m eeting on th is thing, & [sic] they th in k o u r tim ing is
very, very bad...." The President proceeded to relay several reaso n s why
his cabinet m em bers h ad vetoed the meeting.
F irst off, he explained th e United S tates h ad n o t prepared for w hat
am ounted to a sum m it conference. There rem ained m uch to stu d y
ab o u t th e situ atio n in Egypt - politically and m ilitarily - before one could
occur. Besides th is the D em ocrats h ad won both houses of Congress the
previous night an d "I have to have th e S enate an d H ouse leaders in right
now. We have already issu ed invitation. They are to be here Friday and
S aturd ay , an d I have to be m eeting w ith them ."57
Eisenhow er’s disappointm ent cam e thro u g h even in the tran sc rip t
of his conversation. Even w ith logical explanations to su p p o rt his
argum ent, Eisenhow er was d istrau g h t th a t the visit could n o t happen.
He apologized to Eden saying "I do believe, in view of w hat my people
say, we will have to postpone it a little bit. I am soriy....I am really soriy
because, as I told you th is m orning, I w an t to talk w ith you [em phasis

original]." Eden tried to find out when would be a good time, but
Eisenhow er deferred, explaining th a t he needed to have a full C abinet
m eeting before he could answ er th a t question. Eventually, Eisenhow er
stated th a t he would call back in th e evening with a time. The
conversation ended th ere.58 The President an d his NATO allies
eventually would m eet, b u t it was n o t to be for some tim e yet.
On November 7 th e Soviet Union offered to send R ussian
volunteers to reinforce Egyptian troops.59 Dulles believed it w as
im probable th e R u ssian s would act on th eir th reat, b u t th a t they hoped
th e offer would unbalan ce th e situation in Egypt, an d d istu rb the cease
fire. As far as th e Secretary of S tate was concerned, w hat th e Soviets
w anted w as a bigger h an d in the cookie ja r.60 In the end, nothing cam e
of th e R ussian declaration. N asser refused th eir offer w ithout
h esitatio n .61 U ndoubtedly the Egyptian leader opposed yet an o th er
foreign governm ent peddling its doctrine in his land. Besides, N asser
h ad achieved his goals and therefore h ad no reason to continue th e fight.
The canal would be retu rn ed to Egypt an d N asser’s power am ong Arabs
h ad increased. Despite Soviet efforts, the cease-fire held.
For all in ten ts and purposes the crisis was over once th e cease-fire
w ent into effect. All th a t rem ained w as clean u p details. To th e
d isappointm ent of the P resident events h ad ru n th e course he m ost
feared, b u t h ad originally anticipated. The French an d B ritish did not

exhaust all possible avenues before resorting to military action.
Eisenhow er saw no recourse b u t to force B ritain an d F rance to end their
unjustifiable attack. Thus, N asser w as not dislodged, his power not
diffused. The W estern allies were cast as aggressors in stead of saviors.
Although America w as hailed by sm aller nations for its cease fire
initiative in th e UN, the price for su ch praise w as a distorted image of
the united W estern front and th e ab h o rren t im plication th a t America
had sided w ith the C om m unists. The Soviet Union w as given th e chance
to play th e role of White Knight to its u tm o st ability. The crisis ended in
a victoiy for N asser an d a propaganda sensation for R ussia.
From th e beginning Eisenhow er was aw are of th e potential
dangers an attack on N asser m ight bring. F our days after the
nationalization he told his advisors "Nasser em bodies th e em otional
dem ands of th e people of the area for independence an d for ’slapping
down th e white m a n .’"62 O utright opposition to the Egyptian leader was
su re to rouse an tip ath y from the rest of the Arab com m unity. Unless
the Suez situ atio n could be defused w ithout u se of force, N asser would
gain and th e allies lose. There was no justification for an a ssa u lt and
th a t w as clear to everyone except those attacking.
The P resident steadfastly refused to accept w ar as the m eans of
reversing nationalization. S upporting this allied response was n o t only
imm oral, it w as counterproductive. America’s credibility would suffer

along'with a loss of respect from third world countries.
Once the violence began, Eisenhow er did everything in his power
to p u t a stop to it. He publicly denounced B ritain’s aggression and
worked to em pty th e B ritish trea su ry - in short, bringing th e UK to the
verge of b an k ru p tcy to en su re their cooperation. W hen E den could no
longer su sta in the attack, F rance h ad no choice b u t to h alt also.
One thing m u st be clearly understood. United S tates p ressu re,
not R ussian th reats, forced an end to the aggression. The Soviet offers
of air force, navy, and troops m ay have seemed unnerving to th e general
public, b u t inside th e White House, adm inistration m em bers did not
h a rp on them . The Soviet Union would not risk annihilation in an effort
to convert Egypt, especially considering th a t N asser had sp e n t th e prior
year playing the United S tates and R ussia against one another.
The actions Eisenhow er took were successful in ending th e crisis.
Conveniently, the ram ifications of the adm inistration’s opposition to
B ritish, French, and Israeli hostilities were beneficial too. M ichael G uhin
provides an excellent explanation of th e practical advantages resulting in
Eisenhow er’s anti-aggression stance.
First, it allowed America to "counter any Soviet designs or th rea ts
over th e Suez." By condem ning the attack s on Egypt, the US rem ained in
a position to work tow ard peace w ithout joining Soviet efforts. This
m aintained th e United S tates in good standing with the re st of th e world,

while minimizing the positive appearance of Soviet efforts at peace.
In addition, G uhin noted once the USSR assau lted H ungary, th e
U nited S tates h ad th e opportunity to condem n th eir aggression also.
H ad America upheld the allies’ decision to fight, it would have appeared
hypocritical to reprobate the Soviet action - in essence a "do as I say, not
as I do" stance. The United S tates could reproach all com batants
justifiably because it consistently stood ag ain st force.63
In h is article, "Eden" Robert Rhodes Jam es wrote "Eisenhower w as
consistent th a t th e canal was n o t w orth a war. Eden w as co n sisten t th a t
it w as...."64 S tated a t this basic level, all th e reactions to the crisis are
clear. W estern E urope an d the United S tates stood a t opposite ends of
th e spectrum . There w as bound to be disagreem ent and strife am ong
th e allies. W hen it arrived Eisenhow er reverted to w hat m ight be
referred to as his com m and mode. He did as any good m ilitaiy officer is
train ed to do - he did w hat was necessary in th e situation. And, in th a t
instance, an end to the fighting was required.
The P resident was not m otivated by spite or revenge. He was
concerned w ith America’s credibility and world opinion. It seem s
apparent, however, th a t the strongest influence guiding his reaction was
related to th e justiciability - in Eisenhow er’s m ind - of th e acts
com m itted by th e British, French, and Israelis.
Had th e US considered an attack necessary, it is probable the

administration would have discovered a way around the Tripartite
D eclaration, an d any other obstacles, in order to a ssist th e aggressors.
The United S tates h ad created justifications for acts deem ed im m oral by
American citizens an d foreign governm ents before th is an d h as since
done so. The only conclusion th a t can be draw n is th a t Eisenhow er did
n o t believe th e Suez C anal w arranted forceful assertion. There were
m eans sh o rt of w ar th a t m ight resu lt in a satisfactory resolution. No
advantage could be gained in the Middle E ast or over th e Soviet Union
by resorting to force. In short, violence was resisted to avoid
endangering the W est’s position in th e global arena.
Despite US opposition to th e aggression, P resident Eisenhow er
believed th a t th e relationship with England, France, an d Israel would
heal quickly. He w ished to repair any dam age caused by the crisis as
soon as he was able and worked tow ard th a t end. Following the
im plem entation of the cease-fire, com m unications between th e United
S tates an d B ritish and F rench officials took on an am icable, if som ew hat
apprehensive, tone. Although discussion with Israel’s Prime M inister
Ben-G urion was less pleasant, it w as not hostile. In all cases, however,
apprehensions were directed tow ard th e R ussian m enace. America as
well as th e conspirators were concerned with Soviet intentions in the
Middle E ast.65 The allies h ad reverted to th eir m u tu a l obsession with
Cold W ar considerations. Details of th e final settlem ent still h ad to be

arranged, but for all intents and purposes the allies were reunited.66
After th e crisis h ad p assed N asser complied w ith all the
resolutions called for by th e United S tates an d th e UN, from arbitration
an d developm ent funds to m inim al toll in creases.67 Having achieved his
goal, control of the Suez Canal, he h ad no desire to fu rth er irritate the
world. His in te n t from th e sta rt h ad been to remove foreign influence
from Egypt, never to d isru p t passage th ro u g h the Suez. Limiting access
to th e canal would only create resen tm en t am ong th e canal u se rs and
provide an excuse to oppose nationalization. With no su ch rationale the
B ritish an d French h ad m iscalculated and acted w ithout appropriate
cause. N asser’s advantage was th a t the rest of th e world considered him
innocent. As th e crisis concluded, N asser was careful to m ain tain th a t

f
advantage.
At la st we come full circle in this ch ap ter to ad d ress the question
of President Eisenhow er’s "furious" response to th e Anglo-French
aggression. It is certain th a t the P resident took h a rs h m easu res to
p ressu re E ngland, France, and Israel to end hostilities. It is also clear
th a t he w as not m otivated by spite or revenge. R ather, Eisenhow er’s
angiy reaction can b est be explained as one of outrage. O utrage a t the
Anglo-French disregard for m odern sta n d ard s of civilization.
Eisenhow er felt disbelief th a t his NATO allies were w eakening the
position of the W est and enhancing th e Soviet image. He w as alarm ed

by the fact that British and French action endangered the power of the
U nited Nations. Lastly, th e P resident could not agree to w h at am ounted
to a breach of contract - ignoring the Tripartite D eclaration.
Simply stated , Eisenhow er believed th e B ritish an d French were
w rong in th eir desires, reasoning, and action. It w as n o t a personal
vendetta for him, except with respect to the fact th a t he w as m orally
ag ain st th eir aggression. Eisenhow er believed th a t he, as P resident of
th e United S tates, h ad an obligation to stop th e W estern Allies. Their
aggressive policy disregarded American and international m oral
consideration, leaving Eisenhow er - th e leader of th e free world - no
choice b u t to p u t a h alt to th eir attack.

ENDNOTES
1. At least three other h istorians discuss the P resident’s fuiy w hen

hostilities broke o u t in th e Middle E ast. See H erbert S. Parm et,
Eisenhow er an d th e American C ru sad es, (New York, New York: The
M acmillan Company, 1972): 485, Philip J. Briggs, "Congress an d th e
Middle E ast: The Eisenhow er Doctrine, 1957." in Dwight D. Eisenhower:
Soldier, President, S ta te sm a n , edited by Jo a n n P. Krieg (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1987): 255, and Robert A. Divine, Eisenhow er an d the
Cold W ar, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981): 85.
2 . M ichael A. G uhin, Jo h n Foster Dulles, A S tatesm an an d His Tim es,

(New York: Colum bia University Press, 1972): 291-92.
3. Foreign Relations of the United S ta te s. 1955-1957 [FRUS1, Vol. XVI,

"Suez Crisis Ju ly 26-D ecem ber 31, 1956" (W ashington D.C.: U nited
S tates Printing Office, 1990): 9-10.
4 . Ibid.: 8.
5 . Ibid.: 525-526. Special N ational Intelligence E stim ates are prepared

by various intelligence groups w ithin the governm ent - in th is case the
CIA, an d intelligence bran ch es of th e Army, Navy, Air Force, an d JCS.
6. Ibid.: 525-526.
7. Ibid.: 110.
8. Ibid.: 434.
9. Ibid.: 703.
10 . Public Papers of th e P resid en ts, "Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956,"

11. "Secretary Dulles Says U.S. Will Not "Shoot Its Way’ Through Suez
Canal." US News and World Report (41, Septem ber 21, 1956): 121.
12 . Public Papers of the P resid en ts: 883.
13. Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White H ouse Years, Waging P eace,

(Garden City, New York: D oubleday an d Com pany Inc., 1965): 39.
14 . "Angry Challenge and Response," Time, (August 13, 1956): 16.

15 . Public Papers of th e P resid en ts: 627.
16 . FRUS XVI: 430.
17 . Ibid.: 909.
18 . S tephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhow er The P resid en t, Vol. II, (New York,

New York: Sim on and S ch u ster, 1984): 339.
19 . Public Papers of th e P resid en ts: 883. The fourth principle called

"for fair an d increasing sh are of th e profits to Egypt and profits to no one
else." This issu e w as inexorably connected w ith th e three already
discussed.
2 0 . White Paper on th e N ationalization of th e Suez M aritime Canal

C om pany, (Cairo, Egypt: Governm ent Press, 1956): 54.
2 1 . According to three au th o rs colonialism w as a m ajor factor. For

th eir argum ents see: Blanche Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhow er
A Divided Legacy, (Garden City, New York: Double Day & Company, Inc.,
1981): 189, Michael G uhin: 287, and William Bragg Ewald: 212.
2 2 . FRUS XVI: 906.
2 3 . American Foreign Policy C urrent D ocum ents, 1950-1955,

2 4 . FRUS XVI: 834.
2 5 . Ibid.: 836.
2 6 . Similarly, Professor J. Philipp Rosenberg concluded "in order to be

tru e to w hat he perceived as the n atio n ’s long-term interest, th e p u rsu it
of m orality in international relations... Eisenhow er w as forced to do
som ething he did not w ant to do...he felt compelled to deny the requests
of his closest allies because he felt they were acting in an im m oral
m anner." See J. Philipp Rosenberg, "Dwight D. Eisenhow er an d th e
Foreign Policy Making Process." in Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier,
President, S ta te sm a n , edited by Jo a n n P. Krieg, (New York: Greenwood
Press, 1987): 125.
2 7 . FRUS XVI: 836.
2 8 . Ibid.: 67.
2 9 . Public Papers of th e P resid en ts: 1065-66.
3 0 . FRUS XVI: 909.
3 1 . Ibid.: 906.
3 2 . Ibid.: 910.
3 3 . Ibid.: 993-994.
3 4 . Ibid.: 1003.
3 5 . Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 91.
3 6 . Robert Divine reported the President was convinced th e R ussian

pronouncem ents were no m ore th a n propaganda ploys. Divine: 86-7.
3 7 . FRUS XVI: 995.
38 . Public Papers of the P resid en ts: 1062.
3 9 . FRUS XVI: 976.
4 0 . Ibid.: 1003.
4 1 . Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 88-89. Michael G uhin explained the

W ashington an aly sts’ perspective of the H u n g aiy /S u ez dichotomy: "To
W ashington’s way of thinking, it would be illogical a t b est for the W est to
divert attention from these tu m u ltu o u s events in E astern Europe, to
com plicate fu rth er th e situation, an d particularly, to u n d erm in e the
W est’s position against th e u se of force to settle disputes a t a tim e w hen
Moscow w as considering w hether an d w hen to move in with force."
G uhin: 286-7.
4 2 . American Foreign Policy C u rren t D ocum ents, 1956, (W ashington

D.C.: United S tates Printing Office, 1959): 462.
4 3 . FRUS XVI: 1028.
4 4 . For their full argum ents see Parm et: 485 and Cook: 189.
4 5 . Cook: 189.
4 6 . G uhin: 292-93.
4 7 . Robert H. Ferrell (ed.), The Eisenhow er D iaries, (New York: W. W.

Norton an d Company, 1981): 332.
4 8 . FRUS XVI: 835. Robert Divine rem arked th a t "the crisis

atm osphere helped en su re the President’s re-election by a com m anding
majority." Divine: 88.
4 9 . Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 92. If Eisenhow er was concerned he

adm itted it to no one.
50 . Ibid.: 56.
51. This arg u m en t is tak en u p by M aurice Vaisse. See his article

"France an d th e Suez Crisis," in Suez 1956 The Crisis and Its
C onsequences, edited by William Robert Louis an d Roger Owen, (Oxford:
Clarence Press, 1989): 142.
52 . FRUS XVI: 906. D ulles’ m atter-of-fact deliverance of these w ords

does leave one suspicious ab o u t the sincerity with w hich they were
spoken. On one side th e read er th in k s, here is w h at he said plain an d
simple, on th e other h an d th e reader w onders, is this sarcastic? Why did
Dulles say it un less there existed som e u n d ercu rren t of anger ru n n in g
either w ithin th e adm inistration or himself? Perhaps th e statem en t
represented D ulles’ efforts to convince others not to view th e situ atio n
from an agitated perspective. Consider also, w hen action w as tak en it
w as h a rsh as far as the allies were concerned. It is easy n o t to act o u t of
malice, w hen th e alternate course m ight have th e sam e m alicious
results.
The above argum ent is only considered because of D ulles’
profession. As consum m ate politician it is difficult som etim es to gage
th e m eaning behind statem en ts he m ade. But, one m u st rem em ber
Dulles m ade th is statem en t in the presence of th e P resident and h ad
little reason to deceive th e m an he worked for. Dulles seem s to have
spoken h is m ind freely with Eisenhower, hence h ad he felt otherw ise
th a n he stated, he probably would have said so. D espite sem antic
questions one could raise concerning D ulles’ rem ark, it is more
reasonable to consider his com m ent as honestly spoken.
5 3 . Ibid.: 1025.
5 4 . Eisenhow er’s public opposition to the operation minimized

internatio n al su p p o rt for B ritain’s attack. He also invoked an oil
em bargo ag ain st th e attacking nations. In addition, B lanche Cook
reported th a t th e P resident covertly worked to devaluate B ritish Sterling.
Fighting in the Suez h ad created a ru n on English money. As E ngland’s

reserves dwindled, the P resident applied US p ressu re to block all IMF
m oney tran sfers, th u s leaving the British tre a su iy with alm ost no funds.
B ritain could either accept th e cease-fire or b a n k ru p t itself. E den h ad
no choice in the m atter. Cook: 190.
5 5 . Ibid.: 1040. A uthor William Bragg Ewald praised E isenhow er for

th e proposed visit with the com m ent: "Already - in the h e a t of battle - Ike
h a s laid th e groundw ork for reconciliation." William Bragg Ewald Jr.,
Eisenhow er th e President Crucial Days, 1951-1960, (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981): 213.
56. Ibid.: 213.
57. FRUS XVI: 1045.
58. Ibid.: 1046.
59. Ibid.: 1067.
60. Ibid.: 1080.
61. Ibid.: 1096-7.
62. Ibid.: 64.
6 3 . G uhin: 292-93.
6 4 . Robert Rhodes Jam es, "Eden," in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956

Retrospective an d R eappraisal, edited by Selwyn Ilan Troen an d Moshe
S hem esh, (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990): 107.
65. FRUS XVI: UK, 1061; Israel, 1108; US,1112; France, 1117.
6 6 . From th e B ritish perspective US-UK relations were n o t in as good

sh ap e as Eisenhow er thought. Harold MacMillan, who replaced Eden as
Prime M inister in Ja n u a ry 1957, ordered a stu d y of British-U S relations.
The report concluded th a t th e base on which th e Anglo-American
alliance h ad rested was severely w eakened because of th eir disagreem ent
over Suez (Lamb: 306.)
Regardless of w hether or not the negative conclusions reached by
th e MacMillan sponsored stu d y were correct, th e Suez Crisis did not end
a friendly associations between W estern Europe an d th e U nited S tates.
If B ritish harbored laten t anger a t the US for resisting force, it w as not
frequently apparent, n o r did it se$m to affect relations of the two

countries.
67. Lamb: 306-7.

CHAPTER FIVE
S u e z C o n c l u d e d
The negotiation, conversation, and occupation of th e canal zone
continued th ro u g h December. ^Eventually all forces retreated from their
positions an d th e Suez Canal w as cleared of scuttled ships. The
b u sin ess of sailing th e Suez resum ed, b u t now u n d e r th e direction of
Egyph Egyptian troops received a h a rsh defeat, yet N asser w as never
m ore powerful. Politically his image had been enhanced. He h ad beaten
France an d E ngland by m aintaining control over th e canal. A New
Republic editor predicted on Septem ber 17 th a t after all th e talks were
complete N asser would still "save both face an d the C anal."1 After the
conferences an d the fighting were done, the com m ent proved correct on
both counts. Arab nationalism was a t a high m ark an d stayed there for
over a decade.
Some th o u g h t th e roots of this conflict could be found in th e offer
of th e United S tates, IBRD, and G reat Britain to finance the Aswan Dam
an d its su b se q u en t a b ru p t withdraw al. N asser stak ed his legitimacy in
the Arab world on com pleting th e project. But, he could not help trying
SUEZ CONCLUDED - 125 -
to p ressu re his American p artn e rs into sw eetening the deal for Egypt by
dallying w ith th e E astern block, dom inated by America’s nem esis, the
Soviet Union.
W hen N asser could n o t obtain w eapons from th e West, he
p u rch ased Czech arm s. Against America’s w ishes, he also recognized
C hina. And, to add to th e insult, th e Egyptian President plan n ed a visit
to Moscow. American diplom ats indirectly w arned N asser th a t his
actions would resu lt in repercussions. Congressional su p p o rt for the
Aswan project evaporated fu rth er with each anti-A m erican act
com m itted by Egypt. Public opinion also tu rn ed ag ain st N asser. W hen
th e Egyptian leader did n o t reverse his course, Dulles w ithdrew th e offer
to build th e Aswan Dam. Six days later N asser nationalized th e Suez
Canal. Was this an angiy reaction to the su d d en w ithdraw or a
calculated m easure to increase Egypt’s power?
It is probable th a t N asser anticipated th e w ithdraw al of Aswan aid.
It is possible also he expected to nationalize the canal in response.
Certainly, Egypt’s leader took full advantage of th e situ atio n Dulles h ad
created in cancelling th e program in w hat appeared to be an a b ru p t
m ann er. His indignant response reached sym pathetic ears in m any
sm all countries. A G allup poll'asked citizens of several countries
w heth er they approved or disapproved of th e retaliatory actions tak en by
Israel, Britain, and France. The resu lts showed overwhelming

disapproval of the a s sa u lt.2 N asser’s well acted denunciation of aid
cancellation gained him sup p o rt from aro u n d th e world. The aggressors
received no m ore th a n scorn.
It is alm ost certain th a t nationalization of the Suez C anal w as not
directly related to w ithdraw al of Aswan D am aid. Peter Woodward,
a u th o r of N asser in th e "Profiles in Power" series, noted th a t N asser

%
continued to nationalize ind u stries and b u sin esses in Egypt during the
fifteen years following th e Suez Crisis. N asser believed it n ecessary to
remove outside influences in Egypt to increase profit and Arab
nationalism . Newspapers, banks, in su ran ce com panies, public
transp o rtatio n , hotels, an d movie th eaters all were sta te controlled by
1965. Before economic troubles forced N asser to slow his
nationalization tren d over 600 busin esses were seized.3
N asser’s move to control the Suez represented only his first step in
nationalization. Egypt’s seizure of the canal w as n o t truly a retaliatory
action. Dulles h ad sim ply provided a convenient excuse for som ething
N asser planned to do anyway. Although the Aswan Dam w as im portant,
America’s cancellation of aid did not prom pt nationalization. It provided
a cover for w hat Egypt’s leader intended no m atter w hat.
In October, 1956 N asser adm itted th a t he h ad been planning to
take control of th e canal since 1954. N asser did n o t m ention th a t until
Ju n e , 1956 it h ad been im possible to do so b ecause of th e B ritish

occupation troops stationed on the b an k s of the Suez. D ue to US
p ressu re, G reat Britain h ad agreed to evacuate th eir soldiers. B ecause
of D ulles’ diplom atic blunder, Egypt h ad an excuse to fill th e v acuum
created w hen th e B ritish left.
In one way, th e Suez C anal Crisis w as a continuation of th e
political scram ble for power in the Middle E ast th a t h ad begun even
before 1955. Prior to th e crisis N asser h ad tried to play th e U nited
S tates ag ain st the Soviet Union in order to gain the b est of both E astern
an d W estern worlds. At the sam e time, he w anted to rem ain free from
th e overarching grasp of either su p e r power. Conversely, both America
an d R u ssia h ad attem pted to gain power in th e Middle E a st by
m anipulating N asser. As the crisis began th e situation rem ained th e
sam e.
America continued to try to be N asser’s friend. Although th e UK
a n d F rance believed America wowld accept th eir a s sa u lt as a fait
accom pli an d lend su p p o rt to th e attack, Eisenhow er rem ained tru e to
th e T ripartite Declaration. In effect, he supported N asser’s legitimacy
over th a t of his allies. His reasons, as we have seen were varied an d
extensive, b u t th e end resu lt w as to defend Egypt’s position. This could
n o t help b u t m ake th e United S tates m ore appealing to N asser. By
opposing Britain, France, and Israel, Eisenhow er basically en su red
N asser’s nationalization retained its validity. If th a t did n o t resu lt in

SUEZ CONCLUDED - 12 8 -
som e appreciation from th e Egyptian government, w hat would?
In th e typical R ussian way, the Soviet Union rem ained stead fast
N asser su p p o rter also. Always upholding "nationalist" m ovem ents
(outside of E astern Europe), the USSR could hardly ignore N asser.
D uring th e crisis R ussia offered m ilitary assistan ce to Egypt in an effort
to gain influence in the Middle E ast. Since N asser’s anti-w est position
m eshed well with th e Soviet stance, the R ussians were b o und try to
bring N asser into th eir sphere. To the annoyance of th e R ussians,
however, N asser refused to kowtow to his C om m unist benefactors.
In fact, N asser would allow no influence to seep in from either
nation. He sought a resolution to the Suez C anal Crisis th a t b est served
his b ran d of nationalism . He continued to work for the b etterm en t of
Egypt and avoided any obligations to the superpow ers.
N asser’s contact with th e Soviet Union increased after the crisis
w as resolved, b u t he never com m itted Egypt to th e h am m er and sickle.
D uring th e following years vitriolic doctrinal disagreem ents between
N asser an d F irst S ecretary of the C entral Com mittee of th e Soviet
C om m unist Party, Nikita K hrushchev, repeatedly occurred w ith no
agreem ent being reached.4 In the decade an d a h alf following th e canal
incident N asser accepted m uch aid from the Soviet Union, b u t little
advice.
Egyptian relations with th e United S tates did not even attain the
Soviet level. N asser m aintained ^lis an ti-Israel/an ti-W estern stan ce
m aking norm al political association nearly im possible. Although th e
Egyptian P resident never closed th e door to offers of economic
assistan ce, he also was h ard pressed to accept any th a t cam e w ith
strings attached. US aid packages invariably did so.
The US’s an d th e Soviet Union’s in terest in N asser w as explained
by th e fact th a t his power and popularity were clearly th e g reatest in th e
area. Yet, th e Egyptian P resident’s power w as one with its b asis in Arab
nationalism . The US/USSR goal of increasing foreign influence in the
Middle E a st an d N asser’s desire to consolidate A rabian su p p o rt aro u n d
Egypt were contradictory. N asser could n o t m aintain his independence
of action or position in th e Arab com m unity while a superpow er’s
doctrine w as evident. America atnd R ussia were destined to have
m inim al influence in Egypt, no m atter w hat tactics they applied.
The crisis in regards to B ritain and France h ad a negative
outcom e. As a direct resu lt of the Suez conflict, the predom inant
position of th e United S tates in th e W est w as fully revealed. G reat
B ritain’s reliance on th e United S tates w as not questioned again during
the Eisenhow er adm inistration. Although France - u n d er C harles de
Gaulle’s influence - would attem p t to reassert its independence in th e
future, th e only resu lt was isolation from America, n o t leadership in
Europe. The Suez Crisis h ad illustrated America’s ability to force its will
upon the rest of the Western world.
In Israel th e sh o rt w ar h ad a positive effect. Although Israel
cooperated w ith Anglo-French forces, its goals differed from th e B ritish
an d French. Ben-G urion h ad perceived the m ilitary action as a
preventive m easure. A m eans designed to show sim ultaneously Israel’s
strength, avoid high casualties, and w arn th e Arabs ag ain st attack,
w ithout startin g a m ajor war. The ease w ith w hich Israeli troops
advanced against Egyptian soldiers served as a clear lesson to Israel’s
enem ies. Attacking the Jew ish state was a poor idea.5
Of the p articip an ts in th s Suez Crisis only th e U nited S tates and
th e Soviet Union did n o t suffer some type of defeat. G reat B ritain and
France lost control of th e canal. Israel, although it m ight have preferred
to keep the Sinai territory won in battle, bargained it aw ay in favor of the
clear passage thro u g h th e Tiran S traights. And, Egyptian forces were
undeniably trounced by Israel’s army. It would be an o th er decade before
N asser dared attack Israel.
The superpow ers, on th e other hand, were free from loss. Their
overall situ atio n s rem ained unchanged. Both th e U nited S tates an d the
Soviet Union continued th eir ongoing efforts to gain advantages over the
other. Suez m ight have been interpreted as a victory for th e C om m unist
cause, since R ussian relations with N asser were increased. If th a t were
th e case, th e Soviet’s h ad trium phed in only a single battle. O ther areas

of the globe rem ained to be won. Besides, N asser continued to steer an
independent course from th e Soviet Union, so their victory w as n o t so
sweet, after all.
The Cold War was far from finished. N either superpow er h ad
expanded its vision of th e world to include or accept as im p o rtan t th e
independence of th ird world countries. America and R ussia both
continued to regard each other as th e players an d consign everyone else
th e p a rt of paw ns.
Most tragic for the U nitedJStates w as th a t it did n o t learn during
Suez a lesson th a t would have saved American lives and h ea rts a decade
later. Although Eisenhow er h ad supported th e nationalistically inspired
N asser, protecting Egypt against efforts to destroy it, he failed to
acknowledge th e credibility of Egyptian nationalism . Eisenhow er
disregarded th e nationalist elem ent of N asser’s position an d
concentrated only on the legitimacy of his action. Perhaps h ad th e
U nited S tates analyzed the situation, it could have learned to view
natio n alist m ovem ents as products of internal expressions, an d not
external influences. Had th a t been seen, or even accepted as a valid
possibility w hen analyzing other cases of nationalistic fervor, th e United
S tates m ight have been able to avoid th e Vietnam War.
Clearly th e chance would have been minimal. It is im probable
America would have discounted the C om m unist doctrine of Ho Chi Mihn

a n d viewed him purely as a nationalist. Although N asser h ad
nationalized th e canal an d h u n d red s of b u sin esses after th a t, he avoided
C om m unist rhetoric. Ho, also referred to national unity, b u t Americans
could not ignore his connection to Com m unism . A m ericans did not
recognize th a t Ho Chi M ihn’s power found its basis in th e sam e place as
N asser’s, in th e people.
Undoubtedly, it is w ishful thinking to say th a t the U nited S tates
could have been led by less prejudicial leaders. In th a t period, Cold War
considerations were ingrained in American society an d psyche. The
Soviet Union was th e enemy, an d C om m unism the disease it spread.
Eisenhow er believed th at, as did Dulles. Yet, tem pering his fear of
C om m unism w as an overriding desire for peace. B ecause of
Eisenhow er’s p articu lar philosophy, th e President resisted th e Cold War
inclination to su p p o rt th e allies against a potential R u ssian advance.
Instead Eisenhow er steered a course m andated by principles. Through
careful tactics th e P resident m anaged to find a way to protect against
u n d u e Soviet intervention in the Middle E ast w ithout allying with the
aggressors.
Eisenhow er’s policy preserved the peace an d denied Soviet
advances. It w as a com bination th a t proved difficult to achieve in the
adm inistrations following E i s e n h o w e r ’s . In fact, it w as a com bination
rarely, if a t all, seen since.

ENDNOTES
1. New Republic Septem ber 17, 1956: 8.
2. G allup Poll November 3, 1956: 1454. In certain cities like

M elbourne, Toronto (for England and France), an d A m sterdam (for Israel)
there is m ore approval for the action taken against Egypt. I attrib u te
this to sentim ental attach m en ts to the aggressor nations.
3. Peter Woodward, N asser (New York: Longman, 1992): 91.

# #
4. Ibid.: 154.
5. Shim on Peres, "The Road to Serves: Franco-Israeli Strategic

Cooperation," in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956 Retrospective and
R eappraisal, edited by Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shem esh. (New
York, New York: Colum bia University Press, 1990): 145-6.
134
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*3
VITA
Benjam in Joel Goldberg
B om In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 28, 1969.
G raduated Amity Senior High School in Woodbridge, C onnecticut,
J u n e 1987. B.A., B ard College, 1991. M.A. College of William and
Mary, August, 1993. PhD candidate College of William an d Mary.

Motivations Behind The Suez Crisis

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The Faculty of the Department of History

The College of William and Mary

of the Requirements for the Degree of

This Thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degre of

Approved, May 1993

This work is for my Grandfather, Julian Schultz.

Chapter One: Introduction to a Crisis......................1

Chapter Two: Leading up to the Crisis.....................11

Chapter Three: The Crisis and Its Players................. 43

Chapter Four: Standing Against the Allies................ 79

Chapter Five: Suez Concluded..............................123

I tak e th is opportunity to th a n k my thesis advisor, Professor Ed

In addition, I take this opportunity to th a n k my m other, Betty S.

Finally, I m u st th a n k Amy, my wife. Perhaps, she deserves more

The purpose of this stu d y is to exam ine th e respective reactions of

The stu d y suggests th a t P resident Eisenhow er believed he h ad no

Dwight D. Eisenhow er w as President of, the United S tates during a

critical period in American foreign relations. Between 1953 an d 1961,

th e Eisenhow er adm inistration dealt with the perceived Soviet th reat,

using th e Cold War ideology of th e United S tates to determ ine policy.

The ideology defined American in terests as antithetical to Soviet

Am erican ag ain st R ussian. D uring th is period the P resident th reaten ed

to u se n u clear force a t least twice an d repeatedly authorized aerial

espionage in his efforts to contain expansion of Soviet influence.

In m any ways these years formed the core of Cold W ar doctrine.

policy decision. A regular feature of Eisenhow er’s foreign policy w as the

vying for superiority th a t cam e to characterize A m erican/R ussian

relations during the following three decades. In m ilitary power,

technological advancem ents, and international influence th e United

S tates worked to gain the u p p er h an d . An obsession with Soviet

W herever R u ssian in tru sio n was perceived, America w as su re to react.

As w ith an y obsession, this ideology pitting US in terests ag ain st th o se of

th e USSR often w ent so far as to ignore principal factors. U nnoticed

w ent th e desires of sm aller countries th a t becam e entangled in R u ssian

an d Am erican foreign policies. The countries in w hich Soviet advances

were detected by the Eisenhow er adm inistration cam e to be viewed and

treated as paw ns on a Cold War chessboard to be moved by either the

individual states, only as representatives of one or the other superpow er.

B ecause of the obsession with counteracting Soviet advances, the

Eisenhow er adm inistration h ad m ore th a n its sh a re of foreign crises.

m eans of control was th e th re a t an d actual u se of b ru te force. D uring

crises, w hen extrem es becam e the norm , negotiations were reduced to

Princeton Professor Fred I. G reenstein explained in The Hidden

H and Presidency, Eisenhow er as Leader th a t because of Eisenhow er’s

m ilitary experience aro u n d the world, th e P resident m aintained a keen

in terest in foreign policy. G reenstein noted th a t S ecretary of S tate Jo h n

F oster Dulles "was th e publicly visible actor" in foreign affairs while,

behind th e scenes, Eisenhow er actually h ad control over all policy

decisions. From w ithin the adm inistration, th e P resid en t’s participation

during th ese crises w as evident, b u t frequently it w as n o t seen from the

outside. In day to day diplomacy it was Dulles who appeared to direct

m ost American foreign policy. Eisenhow er carefully concealed his own

involvem ent to avoid being th e target of any criticism resulting from

u n p o p u lar policies. Yet, given G reenstein’s proof, and th e large am ount

published, there is no do u b t th a t Eisenhow er m anaged American foreign

policy during his adm inistration. Dulles frequently m ay have acted as

his collaborator, b u t it w as th e P resident who was prim arily responsible

for th e final decisions.1

As Eisenhow er entered office in 1953, he helped force an arm istice