regional proposals often engendered, and it permitted those who could benefit from cooperation to do so without

getting the permission of those who might be opposed to the arrangements (Thurmaier and Wood, 2002). In
counterpoint, O’Toole, Laurence, and Meier (2004) expressed concern about the dark side of these management-
dominated arrangements, i.e. that the socially and politically powerful have an advantage.

These arrangements are of interest in part because they take for granted most of the foundational principles of the
economic vision of the metropolitan area. It is self-interest as often as better services which drives this practice (Howell-
Moroney, 2008). And, even when the search for better service is the goal, it is done through a search for like-minded
departments and governments. It becomes a way to sell the “uniqueness” or “distinctiveness” of a community even as it
cooperates with others. It ducks the entire issue of governance and presumes that what is being done is some kind of
politically neutral professionally driven administrative practice.

The tactics for expanded intergovernmental cooperation continue to straddle the line between the visions of the
metropolis. As has been true for much of our history, the economic model predominates. Concerns about that model
abound, if for no other reason than its historic links to polycentric models that challenge the need for
metropolitanization of any type.

In 1999 Agranoff and McGuire suggested that there were seven “metaquestions” to be addressed concerning networks.
While that list included issues that we have touched upon including collaboration, cohesion, and accountability, we may
be adding two more:
The importance of the definition of “place” as it relates to community
The perceived relevance of “geography”
The boundaries of a network are a necessary element in the success of the network. Shared interests, shared problems,
and shared history are part of the definition of place. This in itself is enough to bring people “to the table,” but it is not
sufficient to get them to agree to act (Fisher and Ury, 1981). The barrier is that the emphasis on markets seemingly
provides justification to not act. The arrangement becomes a network whose purpose is to obfuscate and delay. The
idea of geography similarly influences the ability to act. Many regional and metropolitan efforts are “top-down.” They
are defined by geography, but oddly do not acknowledge geography. The region becomes the sum of who will meet (or
are required to meet), not a sense of geographic imperative. In this sense the EU could slowly work its way toward
regional governance because the concept of Europe as a distinct geographic entity already existed (the unease about
how “European” Eastern-bloc nations, and more pointedly Turkey, are at the root of the controversy over their
admission to the EU). If we base metropolitan regions on historically and socioeconomic, but nonetheless artificial,
criteria (federally defined MSAs) then we get the geography wrong.

Unlike Frug (2002), who utilizes the EU voting system to empower a new regional legislature that is more like a
foundational principle, transforming an existing institution can be derived from either foundational principle. The
existing regional institution is a collective of local public economies, and to empower those representatives to make
decisions that are binding on the whole regional economy is a balanced compromise between the two principles.

The important question is what inducements, incentives, or events might trigger a transformation to move off its
adversarial stance? Clearly, the easiest policy route would be for state legislatures or federal legislation to mandate or
incentivize the development of super majority voting rules. The easiest political route is a much more complicated
question. Perhaps the best route is to frame the discussion around satisfying both of our foundational principles. It could
be seen as a win-win scenario. Strong local government advocates see local governments as the building blocks of
regional institutions, while those advocating regional decision-making see institutional capacity for needs of the region
to have weight. In so doing, we are committing to the importance of both foundational principles, not to the victory of
one or the other. The lesson in the divergent responses of Florida and Ohio are important. The two states perceive
similar problems, but in one shared concerns became the basis of the development agenda, in the other protecting
“turf” became the watchword. In Florida there was value in cooperation and coordination that was proven through
continued economic growth. In Ohio the coordination and cooperation was sporadic and generally the product of
idiosyncratic relationships between center cities and counties.

Local officials are looking for new ways to balance their local interests with what they know to be the interests of the
region taken as a whole. What they lack are alternatives that can satisfy those needs to balance the local and regional.

Cross Branch Relationships

The oldest form of trans-boundary management is the relationship between different branches of government, most
particularly the relations between the executive and legislative branches. Unlike the relationships described in the prior
sections, these are relationships that are founded in two characteristics: first, these are political relationships and
therefore are grounded in political perspectives, and second, these are relationships that are founded in the
fundamental differences between the two branches. The focus of Chapter 14 is on politics and administration. Therefore,
that topic will be left for a later time.

Executive-legislative relations are important because as managers progress in their careers their role shifts from one
that is dominated by a service orientation toward a policy orientation. As managers are assigned responsibility for
advising others on policy or setting policy the nexus between the executive and legislative branches becomes more
critical. The first point is that the goals, processes, and structures of the two branches are different. A simple example is
that for legislators the end point of policy making is a legislative enactment (a new or amended law or ordinance); for an