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W20093

JINNAH FOUNDRIES: A LESSON IN CHANGE MANAGEMENT AND

HUMAN RESOURCES RESTRUCTURING

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Zunaira Saqib, Maria Khan, and Asfia Obaid wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend
to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other
identifying information to protect confidentiality.

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western

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materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to publishcases@ivey.ca. i1v2e5y5pubs

Copyright © 2020, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2020-02-13

At 8:00 a.m. on the first day of 2018, it was still early for the full work of Jinnah Engineering Works and
Foundries (Jinnah) to start. Relishing the silence in an otherwise noisy office, Jinnah’s director Hamza Afaq was
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pondering the consultants’ recommendations for the changes at the foundry. Since its inception in 1950, Jinnah
had grown to become the second-largest foundry in Pakistan. However, this growth brought its own problems,
including internal inefficiencies resulting from a lack of formal workforce planning. The company’s practice of
hiring temporary workers daily, the absence of long-term planning, and a high attrition rate added to the issues.
As the first step in dealing with the human resources (HR) problems that plagued the company, Hamza had
partnered with HR consultants. These consultants, after a thorough analysis of the company, had presented their
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recommendations, which would benefit Jinnah but might be difficult to implement in the context of the
company’s long-established processes. Hamza now had to make a decision about how to implement the changes
without demoralizing the staff or causing delays in production.

HISTORY

Jinnah started its operations in 1950. Since its establishment, it had emerged as a prominent name in the
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foundry and machining business in Pakistan. The company developed high-end products locally to replace
imported products in the market. Jinnah provided a variety of products, ranging from plain carbon to
specialized alloy steel, thus offering a wide range of customized products according to clients’
requirements. The company’s major clients included Millat Tractors Limited, Al Ghazi Tractors Limited,
and Pakistan’s defence industry.

The manufacturing unit of the company was located in the industrial city of Faisalabad. It enjoyed
advantages as an attractive employer for semi-skilled and unskilled workers in the nearby areas. Though
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Jinnah had experienced some financial difficulties not long ago, in the recent past, regular demand for its
products had led to uninterrupted production cycles, thus limiting the impact of unexpected highs and lows
in production demands. Keeping these production levels in view, the company had stepped up its
modernization efforts on multiple fronts by introducing a new plant and machinery in the foundry section,
advanced computer-controlled machines in the machine shop, and system improvements such as enterprise
resource planning (ERP) implementation and HR restructuring at the organizational level.

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Muhammad Afaq, along with his two brothers, ran the factory as a family owned business. He held the position

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of chief executive officer (CEO), while his two brothers worked as directors of operations and finance. Over
time, sons of the three brothers had also become involved in the factory as assistant directors. Hamza Afaq, son
of the CEO, had joined the factory in mid-2013 after completing his engineering degree at the University of
Manchester in the United Kingdom. Hamza had a critical eye for problem identification and a keen interest in
seeking long-term solutions through process restructuring, automation, and control implementation.

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ISSUES IN THE FACTORY

Soon after joining the business in 2013, Hamza identified some critical and chronic challenges faced by the
company, which he perceived to be a result of poor management practices, a lack of policies, and weak and
unclear HR structures.

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One issue the company faced was a high turnover of skilled and semi-skilled employees. The company was
unable to retain these employees over the long term. Hamza attributed this problem to the company’s lack
of formal, long-term employment policies. Secondly, there was no clear chain of command or
organizational structure and no clear career path for employees. This gave rise to problems in reporting and
monitoring and, most importantly, it led to ad-hoc decision-making. There was also some duplication of
job tasks and responsibilities, and this had become a potential source of conflict, leading to wasted resources
and a culture that promoted a “blame game.” Thirdly, Hamza noted a lack of long-term orientation or proper
long-term planning. The company predominantly followed a makeshift, short-term approach toward
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production forecasting (which currently covered a maximum period of one year), growth strategizing, and
human capital planning. Apart from this, Jinnah expended no processes, resources, or efforts toward making
long-term strategic decisions in any of its functional areas.

A few months after assuming his position and assessing Jinnah’s operations, Hamza contemplated the extent to
which the challenges faced by the business could be attributed to the nonexistence of a proper HR department.
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Though his team had hired an HR officer to manage HR-related matters, it had yet to formally establish a proper
HR department. In the absence of such a department, employee relationship and management issues were
addressed mainly by the time office, respective departments, or the company’s directors. The company had no
organization-wide HR management policies or practices, largely because non-HR staff had been dealing with
HR-related issues—and this had led to issues such as high turnover, employee dissatisfaction and demotivation,
and a lack of career development and standardized training opportunities.

In order to solve these issues, the company initiated a series of studies and audits, accumulating data for
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analysis. This exercise shed light on another significant issue with the authenticity of the data, which was
essential for undertaking any process-oriented changes. To combat this issue, the company had no option
but to implement a new information technology (IT) ERP system.

IMPLEMENTING THE ENTERPRICE RESOURCE PLANNING SYSTEM

With the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) around the corner, Hamza realized that the company’s
days of operating with traditional, orthodox methods were numbered. Family owned businesses in Pakistan
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had what was known as a seth culture, where decision-making lay in the hands of a single person or owner
and governance was through an informal system. In this context, setting up an HR department was
considered unnecessary; things like hiring, promoting, and firing employees and handling grievances were
all done on a case-by-case basis by the top management. While this approach worked well with a small
number of employees, it became challenging when companies grew, and it could lead to unmanageable
circumstances at times, which could potentially halt further growth.

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As in many other family owned businesses, decision-making at Jinnah was also centralized. Strategic

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decisions regarding launching a new product or signing a new client and tactical decisions regarding hiring,
promoting, and firing employees were all dealt with by individuals rather than departments. This approach
had worked very well for the factory in the initial years, but over the past decade, when exponential growth
had led to a 100 per cent increase in the factory’s workforce, formal procedures had to be put in place to
deal with such matters. Management processes had to be automated in order to save time and effort. Hamza

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pointed out, “”You cannot control what you cannot measure, and to measure correctly you require authentic
data, which would lead to better decision-making.”

The first step of Jinnah’s ERP system implementation involved deployment in the accounts and supply chain
modules. Following the completion of this step, the deployment moved on to the maintenance, payroll/HR, and
production modules. However, Hamza soon realized that the incorporation of a new IT system alone would not
help, and he decided to restructure the accounts department, which had been running according to the same
practices for the last 20 years or so. New employees were recruited and trained strategically, and they were

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slowly embedded in the team, replacing any trouble makers. Initially, a senior chief financial officer (CFO) was
hired to be a key decision-maker and the head of the team, but due to weak HR and management policies, he
could not be retained in the factory. It took some time before a young, motivated professional joined the company
in the CFO position, and the department progressed under this new CFO’s supervision.

The decision to implement the ERP system was met with some expected resistance from the top
management and senior employees, who raised questions regarding costs and benefits associated with the
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initiative. Hamza, however, who could foresee the need for this investment in the near future, stood by his
long-term vision, taking his inspiration from some modern companies in Pakistan that had developed
international reputations. Despite these impediments, after two years of constant struggle in 2014–2016,
the implementation achieved initial success. Departments were restructured and given more autonomy,
whereas interference in daily activities by top management and directors significantly declined. This
decentralization also led to better integration and improved controls.
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HUMAN RESOURCES CHALLENGES

While the ERP system was gradually taking over from Jinnah’s traditional management, multiple HR issues
still held the factory back from growth and modernization. The major issues were an absence of formal HR
procedures and policies—and the absence of an HR department. The presence of informal procedures
created stress and anxiety and increased the workload of the production supervisors, who had to look after
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HR issues in addition to production. Hamza felt that these issues meant that the 70 per cent of the total
workforce that was employed at the lower levels in the hierarchy (see Exhibit 1) were not being heard,
whereas supervisors and middle management enjoyed excessive powers, and this resulted in unskilled
employees being exploited by senior management. The majority of lower-level factory workers earned daily
wages rather than a monthly salary.

In the previous few decades, as the factory had grown, so had the number of employees; however, more
employees had been added as temporary or daily wage workers rather than as permanent members of the
payroll. There were several reasons for adopting this approach. The main one was that the company was
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dependent on the production targets given by its clients, which were in turn dictated by various factors. For
example, tractor demand was dependent on unforeseen circumstances such as weather, infrastructure,
funding, and government policies. Therefore, despite efforts to document how much production would be
required in the following year, and consequently how many employees would be needed to fulfil targets,
the projections were never fully accurate. This meant that daily wage workers had to be hired to cater to
these uncertain production targets. Once these targets were achieved, some or most of the temporary
employees (depending on the hiring) were let go.

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However, in the previous three years (2014–2017), the factory operations had become more streamlined.

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This was partly because clients had provided Jinnah with longer-term production orders due to an increase
in construction work in the country and a focus on infrastructure development, including CPEC projects.
This meant that the company was better able to predict production targets and the number of workers needed
to achieve those targets. Despite these improvements in the production and planning process, employees
were still being hired on an ad-hoc basis.

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To work toward the resolution of these HR issues, in January 2017, Hamza contacted the business school
at the National University of Sciences and Technology to discuss the possibility of an HR project with the
factory. The business school involved its HR faculty, and negotiations on deliverables and the financial
aspects of the project commenced. The HR consultants were given details about the company’s issues and
the possible outcomes that management wanted. Following a few months of negotiations, in March 2017,
the company signed on to a project with the HR consultants from the business school that comprised four
phases. Phase 1 was intended to run a diagnosis across the company to see if the inception and establishment

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of an HR department was a feasible option. Phase 2 was intended to analyze the current structure of the
organization and conduct a job analysis of the key positions in the factory. Phase 3 was focused on designing
core HR policies for the company, and the phase 4 involved providing recommendations for organizational
restructuring and enhancement of employee satisfaction.

ABSENCE OF EMPLOYEE GRADING STRUCTURE

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The four phases were divided among four HR consultants from the business school with the head of the HR
department overseeing the entire project. As the HR consultants started working on their respective phases,
they faced a problem. During the negotiation, Jinnah had provided information about the number of
employees and their rough classifications (see Exhibit 1), but as the project progressed, it became apparent
that there was no grading structure in the factory, and it was not clear how an employee progressed from
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one designation to the next. Answers to questions of experience, skills, and education varied as HR
consultants talked to employees at different levels. Overall, there were 762 employees in the company and
88 different designations, which rose to 195 when sub-designations were included. Some of the
designations existed in only one department, while others were spread across the company and even
duplicated with different names (see Exhibit 2). The only way to categorize them was based on the
compensation they were paid. For example, a “helper” was paid the national minimum wage (Rs5001 per
day for a 12-hour shift), which meant that employees in other departments with different designations who
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were being paid the same amount were equivalent to the helper position in the company’s hierarchy.

For many years, Jinnah had focused on meeting routine production targets and, for this purpose, it
concentrated primarily on daily and monthly production meetings. This resulted in the company adopting
a reactive approach that did not support the adoption of aggressive growth strategies.

The organization could be divided into two main divisions or sections—the foundry section and the
machining section. Both sections included unskilled workers at the lower end, who primarily worked as
helpers and provided assistance as desired by the immediate supervisors. Above them were semi-skilled
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and skilled workers or technicians, who were primarily responsible for achieving production targets as
assigned by their supervisors. Each division was then further divided according to specific production
processes, and these divisions were headed by supervisors or heads of departments (HODs). This
classification was devised based on the significance of the particular production function. For example, if
machine shop 1 and machine shop 2 were performing an important interconnected task that was deemed

1
Rs = PKR = Pakistani rupee; Rs1 = US$0.01 as of January 1, 2018; All currency amounts are in Rs unless otherwise specified.

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crucial for overall production, then an HOD rather than a supervisor was designated to oversee the machine

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shops. Additionally, there was an administrative section comprising finance, accounts, store, and other
departments. It provided administrative support to different units of the company. At the top, operations
were governed by directors and the CEO, who were responsible for overseeing day-to-day operations as
well as implementing long-term company strategy.

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Hamza and his team listed the positions in each department for the very first time since the factory’s
inception (see Exhibit 3). While the list classified the rough hierarchy that existed within departments, it
further added to the confusion, as different designations existed for employees at the same level. It was also
not clear how compensation was determined, as there was no clear hierarchy within the company. To
compound this issue, it was revealed that the company was also divided into departments based on the
processes of making products—that is, it was divided based mostly on functions. This meant that there were
at least 60 departments in the company.

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It was apparent that, without an employee classification or grading structure, Jinnah’s HR policies would
be as good as useless. The HR consultants would also have difficulty completing phases 2 and 3 of the
project in the absence of a clearly defined structure. Therefore, phase 0 was initiated, where the consultants
devised a grading structure or employee classification system. This task was anything but easy. Creating a
grading structure or employee classification system was not difficult in a new organization, as the CEO or
directors could often decide on the hierarchy and hire people accordingly. However, it was an uphill task
in an organization that had been in operation for the past 70 years, with 60 different departments, more than
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80 designations, and more than half of its employees working as daily wage workers.

THE ISSUE OF DAILY WAGE WORKERS

Grading structures would typically be implemented only for permanent employees, but because fewer than
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30 per cent of workers in the factory were permanently employed, this was impractical. The first question
that needed to be answered was how to accommodate the daily wage workers within the grading structure.
The top management felt that daily wage workers were cost effective and could easily be hired and replaced
when needed. However, the HR consultants had a different opinion: they saw this as a major reason for the
exponential turnover, which resulted in delays in achieving production targets and imposed heavy indirect
costs. The company statistics showed that the average retention of lower-level employees was less than 12
months, which meant that most workers stayed with Jinnah for barely a year.
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The obvious solution to this problem was to make these workers permanent, but this was simplistic,
considering the number of problems. One problem was convincing the top management that this would not
have negative financial implications but would rather have a positive impact on the bottom line. It would
also be beneficial for daily wage workers and would offer them an opportunity to have two days off in a
month without a deduction of salary. Permanent factory workers at the lower level currently enjoyed a fixed
monthly salary of Rs14,000, with two days off in a month—a provision not available to daily wage workers.
The consultants’ analysis showed that a daily wage worker drew an average wage of over Rs20,000 per
month due to overtime payments.
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The top management was concerned that, if these workers were made permanent, they would draw a
monthly salary with an additional two holidays and additional overtime wages. However, the HR consultant
had a different opinion: an analysis of the overtime statistics showed that there was no clear pattern between
the number of workers and overtime hours (see Exhibit 4). Ideally, the presence of more daily wage workers
should lead to less overtime, but it turned out that there was more overtime at times with more workers.

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The heads of departments were unaware of this anomaly, and when asked, they were unable to answer why

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this was the case. The HR consultants felt that it was clearly due to the uncertainty around production targets
and the number of workers required to mitigate that uncertainty. Apart from this, the huge turnover of daily
wage workers also played a role in increasing overtime.

In long discussions with the HR consultants, the HODs suggested that they regularly had to act as

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recruitment consultants because the daily wage workers had a high turnover rate and quite often did not
show up for work the day after they had collected their weekly wages. This meant that, on any day, HODs
could be short of 50 required workers. Including and training new workers on a provisional basis added to
costs and caused delays in production. HODs had to struggle every day to find workers who could work in
the factory, and this wasted valuable time.

The HR consultants’ analysis indicated that employing daily wage workers as 70 per cent of the workforce was
costing Jinnah a lot of money. They suggested that a grading structure would only be useful if it were

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implemented for the entire workforce—not just the 30 per cent of workers who were permanent employees.
Hamza and his team had a different perception. They believed that workers would not want to become permanent
because this would mean a slight compromise on wages (from an average of over Rs20,000 to Rs14,000).

The HR consultants decided to ask the workers for their opinion, and this revealed interesting findings. An
HR consultant said to a labour representative, “We are considering making you permanent employees of
Jinnah, but it would mean you will have a salary of Rs15,000. Right now, you are drawing over Rs20,000
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with overtime.” The labour representative’s response was, “We would be more than happy. We want to be
permanent because it also gives you job security and other benefits. We can also take two leaves in a
month.” The consultant then asked if the workers were worried about the loss in wages, and the labour
representative said no: “We want to be permanent so we have job security. Also social security helps us to
get free medicine from government. Right now, we only do overtime when requested, and very often we
are not informed about the overtime in advance.”
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Surprisingly, the workers were not interested in drawing extra wages for overtime. It became evident that
job security was a bigger driving force for the workers than monetary benefits. This finding was also news
to the management, who had thought that labour could always be driven with overtime or money.

The HR consultants also analyzed the current HR expenses of the company and estimated the change if
these employees were made permanent. For example, the total monthly salaries for employees at the lowest
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level amounted to Rs2,194,834. If the company made them permanent and started giving them the national
minimum wage, the expenses would rise to Rs2,576,000—a difference of Rs381,166. While there was some
increase in the expenses, it was clear that the company would significantly reduce its turnover costs and
would have less overtime with a permanent workforce. Quite similar statistics emerged for all other
employee levels as well. The consultants shared these findings with Hamza, and it was agreed that daily
wage workers would be made permanent over the coming period, in different stages.

Hence, Jinnah was convinced that it wanted to shift its daily, contractual workers to permanent employee
status. It was decided that any daily wage worker who had completed five contracts of four months each
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with the company would be eligible for consideration for a permanent position. Such workers would also
be eligible for consideration for other benefits, including medical and group life insurance.

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DEVELOPMENT OF GRADING STRUCTURE

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Once the agreement to make daily wage workers permanent employees was reached, the consultants started
the work of developing a grading structure. The factory employees could be divided into multiple
categories, the first of which was unskilled labour. These employees had joined the factory with no
experience and no education; over time, they were trained, and if they stayed with the factory, they
progressed through the ranks. They started in entry-level positions as helpers, and could then move on to

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become technicians, senior technicians, supervisors, senior supervisors, and foremen in the factory.

The second category consisted of employees who came with 10–12 years of education and diplomas in
engineering. These employees usually ran the departments (processes) and often held the position of HOD.
Between HODs and helpers, there were five other levels of employees.

The third category consisted of engineers who held university degrees (16 years of education); they were

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hired directly above the HODs. They did not require any experience; hence, they often lacked basic
understanding of factory processes. The fourth category consisted of employees who worked in support
departments such as auditing, marketing, and administration. These employees usually had 10–15 years of
experience working at different designations. The fifth and final category consisted of the owners of the
factory, who held the positions of directors and assistant directors.

There was confusion in this structure. For example, it was not clear how much experience or education a
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helper would require to progress to other ranks. In some departments, there was a designation of senior
supervisor, while other departments had a foreman position. It was not clear if they occupied the same level
of the hierarchy or were on different levels. In some cases, a helper would be promoted to technician within
six months of joining the company, based on the HOD’s discretion. In other cases, helpers worked in the same
designation for 10 years. Some departments were particularly popular among helpers, who wanted to work
there rather than in some of the other departments, where the physical environment was relatively harsher;
there was no incentive for working in a harsher environment, and all helpers drew the same daily wage.
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The non-technical employees were also hard to categorize. In some cases, the non-technical departments
were led by employees with 14 years of education, and in some cases, 16 years of education. The experience
requirements and salaries also varied among employees at the same level. Engineers were given a different
salary altogether, in order to increase retention.

The biggest task for the HR consultants was to propose a standardized employment structure. The HR
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structure and salaries also needed significant effort. For example, employees within a single grade in a
single designation received variable salaries, without any logical reason or explanation. An employee
working for five years could possibly be receiving a lower salary than a newly hired employee with the
same designation and in the same department. The consultants decided to divide the employees into two
main categories: labour and officers/management. The staff (G) categories ascended from the basic grade,
G10, to G10A, G11, G11A, G12, G13, G14, and G16. Similarly, officers or managers (M) ascended from
the basic officers’ grade, M16, to M17, M18, M18A, M19, M20, and M21.

The next task was creating specific designations for these grades. Hamza, the consultants, and HODs
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discussed this and decided that the designations would be based on education and experience requirements
(see Exhibit 5). A similar exercise was conducted for the remaining grades, which included a proposed
grade, designation, required qualification, experience, and performance review period. After much
deliberation, Hamza approved this structure and the salary structure to ensure transparency and
accountability to employees. Basic salaries were approved for G10 and G10A grades (Rs14,000) and for
G11 and G11A grades (Rs15,000). These salaries met the national minimum wage.

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However, the major task was implementing the grading structure. While the factory had taken a good first step

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with this internal progression, the lack of vacancies in the upper levels of the hierarchy created an issue. There
could also be disparities when people were not competent enough to be promoted to the next grade. A new
employee at the same grade and designation would be paid the same as any senior helper who had been working
in same department at the same position for five years. Keeping the retention issue in mind, the company decided
to include loyalty as one basis for determining salaries. For example, people who had been working with the

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company for a certain period of time would be given an additional amount as an experience allowance. Jinnah
also decided to introduce a loyalty allowance based on the employee’s number of years of service. As most of
the unskilled employees had been with Jinnah for less than a year, it was relatively easy and cost-efficient to
introduce this concept, which could be further fine-tuned in coming years.

At this point, the major task for Hamza was to implement the employment structure. With too many employees
on daily wages and large disparities between the salaries of employees within similar grades, the big question
was how to implement the structure, while causing as little discomfort and dissatisfaction among employees

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as possible. It was apparent that some employees would be downgraded, while others with better qualifications
would be elevated. How could senior management be convinced, considering that some old and troubled
employees could be downgraded in the hierarchy? Was changing the entire employment structure a wise
decision at a time when major changes were being implemented across the organization?
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No
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EXHIBIT 1: NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES IN DIFFERENT CATEGORIES

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Employee Category Designations Number of
Employees
Lower-Level Helper 154
Employees Senior Helper 30
Semi-Moulder and Moulder 219

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Senior Moulder 226
Middle-Level Quality Inspectors 43
Employees Assistant Supervisor
Supervisor 39
Senior Supervisor 7
HOD 5
Management/Officers Engineers 10

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Managers 16
Deputy General Managers 2
General Managers 7
Assistant Directors 2
Directors 2
Grand Total 762

Note: HOD = head of department.

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Source: Company documents.

EXHIBIT 2: ROUGH EMPLOYEE CLASSIFICATION / GRADING

Rough Designations Rough Designations at the Rough Designations at

Classification at the Same Classification Same Hierarchy in Classification the Same
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Hierarchy in Different Hierarchy in

Different Departments Different
Departments Departments
Helper  Loading  Moulder  Crain Operator  Semi-  Kundi Man
Helper  Paint Operator Moulder  Semi-Finishing
 Lifter Helper  Induction Operator Man
 Sweeper  Furnace Man  Semi-Fitter
 Finishing Man  Semi-Welder
 Fitter  Semi-
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 Welder Technician
 Technician  Semi-Turner
 Turner  Semi-Welder
 Welder  Semi-
 Electrician Electrician
 Motor Winder  Semi-Motor
 Trainee Dae Winder
 Fitter  Semi-Fitter
 Welder  Semi-Welder
 Senior Office Boy  Office Boy,
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 Senior Drivers Drivers

 Sr. Tele Operator  Telephone
 Sr. Security Guard Operator
 Sr. Moulder  Security Guard

Note: Dae = Diploma of Associate Engineering (Three years post-secondary education programme in Pakistan); Sr. = senior.
Source: Company documents.

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EXHIBIT 3: DEPARTMENTS BY PROCESS

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# Department Number of # Department Number of
Designations Designations
1 ACCOUNTS 9 33 M/C SHOP CYLINDER 8
DEPARTMENT
2 ARC 15 34 M/C SHOP DIFFCASE 5

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3 AUDIT 3 35 M/C SHOP FRONT 6
SUPPORT
4 CO2 8 36 M/C SHOP FS FIAT 480 4
5 Co2 TRANSMISSION 2 37 M/C SHOP HUB 5
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6 CORE 3 38 M/C SHOP HUB FIAT 480 5
7 DEVELOPMENT 8 39 M/C SHOP 4

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MAINTENANCE
8 ELECTRIC 9 40 M/C SHOP PISTON 3
9 ENERGY PLANT 1 41 M/C SHOP PLATE 6
10 FETLING 1 42 M/C SMALL PARTS 3
11 GATE OFFICE 1 43 M/C TOOL ROOM 2
12 GODOWN 8 44 M/C TUBE FINAL DRIVE 5
FIAT 480
13 GOLA PRESS 1 45 MACHINE SHOP (CRANK 6
op
SHAFT)
14 GREEN SAND 7 46 MAINTENANCE 5
15 GRINDING 1 47 MANAGEMENT 12
16 GRINDING 1 1 48 MANOOR 1
17 HEAT TREATMENT 3 49 MARKETING 1
18 HIGHER 2 50 MATERIAL PREPRATION 1
MANAGEMENT
tC

19 M/C HIT Development 5 51 MONITORING 6

20 INDUCTION 4 52 MS MOLDING 1
21 INFORMATION 2 53 Welding & Finishing 1
TECHNOLOGY
22 JAM CRUSHER 1 54 PAINT & SHOT BLAST 1
23 LOADING 7 55 PRODUCTION 1
24 LOADING LIFTER 1 56 PURCHASE 3
No

25 LOGISTIC (INTERNAL 2 57 QUALITY ASSURANCE 5

LOADING)
26 LOADING 2 58 QUALITY LAB 5
27 M/C ADAPTOR PLATE 2 59 SALES LAHORE 2
28 M/C DIFFCASE FIAT 3 60 SAND DRYER GODOWN 1
480
29 M/C FINAL QUALITY 3 61 SAND WASHER 2
30 M/C INTERNSHIP 1 62 SECURITY 2
31 M/C LUB OIL SUMP 6 63 STORE 3
385
Do

32 M/C SHOP AXLE 4 64 TIME OFFICE 1

HOUSING

Source: Company documents.

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 Page 11 9B20M021

t
EXHIBIT 4: OVERTIME ANALYSIS

os
Mar 2017 Employees Total Base Overtime Total Salary Salary per Overtime per
Salary (Rs) Salary (Rs) (Rs) Employee Employee
97 859,622 648,697 1,508,319 8,862 6,688

April 2017 Employees Total Salary Overtime Total Salary

rP
(Rs) Salary (Rs) (Rs)
109 802,828 532,459 1,335,287 7,365 4,885
Lowest
Overtime
May 2017 Employees Total Salary Overtime Total Salary
(Rs) Salary (Rs) (Rs)
115 892,526 672,009 1,564,535 7,761 5,844
Highest

yo
Overtime
June 2017 Employees Total Salary Overtime Total Salary
(Rs) Salary (Rs) (Rs)
98 791,944 539,452 1,331,396 8,081 5,505

July 2017 Employees Total Salary Overtime Total Salary

(Rs) Salary (Rs) (Rs)
119 904,327 548,556 1,452,883 7,599 4,610
Highest
op
Salary
August Employees Total Salary Overtime Total Salary
2017 (Rs) Salary (Rs) (Rs)
102 859,603 593,157 1,452,760 8,427 5,815

September Employees Total Salary Overtime Total Salary

2017 (Rs) Salary (Rs) (Rs)
104 664,256 533,834 1,198,090 6,387 5,133
tC

Lowest
Salary
7-Month Average Average Average Total Salary
Analysis Employees Salary Overtime
March –
September.
106 825,015 581,166 9,843,270
No

Note: Rs = PKR = Pakistani rupee; Rs1 = US$0.01 as of January 1, 2018.

Source: Company documents.
Do

This document is authorized for educator review use only by Shahid Yaqub, Islamia University of Bahawalpur until Oct 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.
Permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu or 617.783.7860
 Page 12 9B20M021

t
EXHIBIT 5: PROPOSED GRADING FOR FIRST TWO LEVELS OF LABOUR

os
Staff/ Categories Experience Qualification Performance Explanation
Labour Review
G-10  Junior 0 No Bi-Annually Helper is at the bottom of the
Helper qualification grading system. A helper does not
 Daily Wage required need any specific qualifications or

rP
Helper experience to start. The
 Office Boy (People who performance of the helper is
are matric / reviewed bi-annually because
middle will be HODs believe some helpers learn
given a small quickly and can be promoted to
allowance.) semi-technician. They also can
quickly help replace employees who
leave for any reason.

yo
A helper is considered for the
position of junior / semi-technician
after six months to two years
(depending on performance and
supervisor recommendation).
Along with the helper, a few other
positions at Jinnah, including
drivers, security guards, and office
boys, can also start at grade 10.
op
G-10A  Junior / 1-2 Years No Annually This position is a senior position in
Semi- qualification the grade 10 category. To be hired
Technician required directly at this position, the person
 Helper must have 1.5 to 2.0 years of
 Office Boy (People who experience of working in the same
 Driver are matric / position.
 Security middle will be
given an The performance of this position is
tC

Guard
allowance.) judged on an annual basis. Junior
technicians are eligible to be
promoted to grade 11 after
spending at least two years at this
position. Based on the
recommendation of the supervisor,
they are considered for grade 11
Senior Technician positions.
No

The same is applicable for non-

technical positions. Most non-
technical people tend to remain in
this position for their entire tenure
with Jinnah.

Note: HOD = head of department.

Source: Company documents.
Do

This document is authorized for educator review use only by Shahid Yaqub, Islamia University of Bahawalpur until Oct 2023. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright.
Permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu or 617.783.7860