Democracy and Security

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Project for a Kantian Europe

Rolf Schwarz

To cite this article: Rolf Schwarz (2017): Project for a Kantian Europe, Democracy and Security,
DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2017.1284591

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2017.1284591

Published online: 06 Feb 2017.

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DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2017.1284591

Project for a Kantian Europe

Rolf Schwarz

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
Immanuel Kant’s political treatise Perpetual Peace can be seen as a Democratic peace;
international law;
project for world peace with practical value. Applied to contem- international security;
porary word politics, the United Nations is commonly seen to be political theory
the closest approximation of this project. This article argues that
such a view is misguided and fails to perceive that the United
Nations lacks crucial elements of a Kantian peace federation.
Kant’s argumentation for perpetual peace rests on two pillars:
peace through law and peace through institution. Both of these
are necessary conditions that must be supplanted by an exclusive
peace federation of republican states in order to make a sufficient
guarantee for lasting peace. Viewed from this perspective, the
European Union comes closest to a real-world Kantian peace
federation, even though it remains a regional organization, and
despite the current challenges it faces.

Introduction
Speaking about projects for world peace in historical or contemporary perspec-
tive cannot be done without reference to Immanuel Kant. Scholars of interna-
tional relations nevertheless do think that is possible. The so-called democratic
peace theory has sparked a lively scholarly debate between liberal international
relations scholars and Realists on how to explain the absence of war between two
democracies.1 Referring to an “empirical law in international relations,” Realists
have attributed the peacefulness of democracies to the specific conditions of the
Cold War (bipolar world) and Liberals to the inherent characteristics of demo-
cratic states (institutions and shared norms). The debate was initiated by a series
of articles by Michael Doyle (1983) on Kant’s political philosophy and its
contemporary relevance. Over the years, however, the debate in international
relations has taken on its own form, and the debate has been waged without
making reference to Kant’s political philosophy at all. Even more disturbing, the
debate and particularly its predominant (Anglo-American) version have come
to be at odds with Kant’s political philosophy.
This article has two objectives: It speaks to scholars of international relations
and claims that Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy can be seen as a project for
world peace with practical value. Explaining the democratic peace theory cannot

CONTACT Rolf Schwarz rolf.schwarz@graduateinstitute.ch

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.
© 2017 Taylor & Francis
2 R. SCHWARZ

and must not be done without reference to Kant. His treatise Perpetual Peace
contains practical elements on how to construct lasting peace between states in
contemporary world politics. Second, this article speaks to political philosophers
who see the United Nations as the closest approximation of Kant’s peace
project.2 This article argues that such a view is misguided and fails to perceive
that the United Nations lacks crucial elements of a Kantian peace federation.
Kant’s argumentation for perpetual peace rests on two pillars: peace through law
and peace through institution. Both of these are necessary conditions that must
be supplanted by an exclusive peace federation of republican states in order to
make a sufficient guarantee for lasting peace. Viewed from this perspective, the
European Union comes closest to a real-world Kantian peace federation, even
though it remains a regional organization. Despite current criticisms of its
institutions and despite ongoing conflicts in its Southern and Eastern neighbor-
hood, it remains a peace project that could, through gradual expansion, approx-
imate the Kantian ideal.

Kant on peace and the state of nature

In order to understand Kant’s view on international relations, it is necessary to
look at the basic premises of his political philosophy. For Kant there exists a
moral duty to bring about peace. “Reason, as the highest legislative power,
absolutely condemns war as a test of rights and sets up peace as an immediate
duty.”3 Kant speaks here of external peace, that is, peace between states. He is not
referring to the mere absence of war but to a permanent and lasting peace.4 For
Kant the duty to bring about such a peace is an a priori duty that can be realized
only through law and demands some kind of human initiative.5 The reason for
the need to inaugurate and secure such a “genuine state of peace” can be found
in Kant’s notion of the state of nature.
On the domestic level, the state of nature for Kant is “one of war,”6 which is
characterized by “violent and malevolent” behavior and “fighting” among
human beings.7 In this state of nature there can be no universally rightful
condition. This is because in the absence of a sovereign, “each has its own
right to do what seems right and good to it and not be dependent upon another’s
opinion on this.”8 In such an anarchic condition there can be no freedom,
because there is no protection of individual rights from the coercive imposition
of others. This situation is morally unacceptable since it negates the key essence
of our humanity—to follow our own ends autonomously.9 Kant posits, there-
fore, the necessity of a regulating agent (a sovereign) that can overcome this
lawless state of nature. This sovereign is for Kant—as it is for Hobbes—the
highest and supreme power and has illimitable rights since the sovereign is not a
subject to law nor bound by legal duty.10
On the international level, the state of nature seems similar to that on the
domestic level, namely “one of war” and of lawlessness11: “Peoples who have
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 3

grouped themselves into states may be judged in the same way as individual
men living in the state of nature, independent of external law; for they are a
standing offence to one another by the very fact that they are neighbours.”12
And in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant writes: “in their external relationship
with one another, states, like lawless savages, exist in a condition devoid of
right.”13 In Perpetual Peace he writes rather ironically:
The depravity of human nature is displayed without disguise in the unrestricted
relations which obtain between the various nations. It is therefore to be wondered
at that the word right has not been completely banished from military politics as
superfluous pedantry, and that no state has been bold enough to declare itself
publicly in favour of doing so.14

Peace through law

The question at hand is, therefore, how a “law governed external relationship”
can be achieved. For Kant the answer is to be found (a) in the application of
existing international law and (b) in creating a new set of cosmopolitan law. The
overall importance of law and the centrality of an “immutable standard of right”
for Kant’s political philosophy have been pointed out by several authors.15,16 In
Perpetual Peace this is formulated thus: “The Rights of man must be held sacred,
however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make … For all politics
must bend the knee before right.”17
With regard this question, how a law governed external relationship can be
established, Kant mentioned first the application of existing international law.
Here the right to go to war (ius ad bellum) is considered the only lawful way of
states to forcefully pursue their right in the state of nature:
In the state of nature, the right to make war (i.e. to enter into hostilities) is the
permitted means by which one state prosecutes its rights against another. Thus if a
state believes that it has been injured by another state, it is entitled to use violence, for it
cannot in the state of nature gain satisfaction through legal proceedings.18

To this Kant adds another principle of international law, the laws in war (ius
in bello). Here Kant’s attitude is more complex.19 On the one hand, he is hesitant
to accept the “conception at all of such rights,” because it will easily lead to
contradiction, but on the other hand, he nevertheless mentions several con-
straints on the conduct of war. In the Metaphysics of Morals he stated:
The attacked state is allowed to use any means of defence except those whose use would
render its subjects unfit to be citizens. For if it did not observe this condition, it would
render itself unfit in the eyes of international right to function as a person in relation to
other states and to share equal rights with them.20

In the Sixth Preliminary Article of Perpetual Peace, Kant identifies further

constraints on the conduct in war.21 Yet despite these qualifications (Kant
further adds that the Sixth Preliminary Article should be considered a law “of
4 R. SCHWARZ

the strictest sort”), the crucial point for Kant remains that all existing interna-
tional law is insufficient to further the progress toward perpetual peace.
In Perpetual Peace Kant therefore introduces a new concept of law: cosmo-
politan law. Kant proposes that public law ought to be divided into state,
interstate, and cosmopolitan law. Just as the state of nature among individuals
can be overcome in the domestic context through state law (a republican
constitution), and the state of nature among nations by interstate law (a peace
federation), so can the state of nature among individuals and nations be over-
come by cosmopolitan law (a right to hospitality).22 In Kant’s own words:
We now come to the essential question regarding the prospect of perpetual peace.
What does nature do in relation to the end which man’s own reason prescribes to
him as a duty, i.e. how does nature help to promote his moral purpose? And how
does nature guarantee that what man ought to do by the laws of his freedom (but
does not do) will in fact be done through nature’s compulsion, without prejudice
to the free agency of man? This question arises, moreover, in all three areas of
public right—in public, international and cosmopolitan right.23

It is essentially this legal innovation of cosmopolitan law that addresses a key

problem of Kant’s political philosophy, namely as to whether interference by a
state in another state is permitted or not.24 In order to answer the question as to
whether Kant grants or even demands such a right to interference in the internal
affairs of a state, a few aspects need clarification. For Kant the key reason for the
absence of perpetual peace is the lawless state of nature, both within states
(before a lawful constitution has been formed) and between states. If perpetual
peace is to be achieved, then this twofold state of nature has to be overcome. In
both cases this is to happen through the creation of an agency or institution that
is able to guarantee and, if necessary, to enforce law. The domestic-international
analogy, however, has its limits: “For as states, they already have a lawful internal
constitution, and have thus outgrown the coercive right of others to subject them
to a wider legal constitution in accordance with their conception of right.”25
Once domestic anarchy is overcome, it is replaced by the concept of state
sovereignty. There is an inherent dichotomy between this state sovereignty one
the one hand and the concept of freedom and individual rights on the other
hand. This becomes clear if one thinks of a lawful state that has overcome the
domestic anarchy but fails to grant individual liberties and rights to its citizens;
such a state ultimately falls short of its very purpose, which is to develop all
human capacities through the establishment of a civil society that guarantees
“the greatest freedom.”26 Although Kant stresses in Perpetual Peace that “any
legal constitution, even if it is only in small measure lawful, is better than none at
all,”27 there are reasonable doubts that a totalitarian state28 would qualify as a
lawful state in the Kantian sense. Indeed, such a state would lose its status as a
moral person and hence its right of self-determination.29 Kant offers yet another
situation in which interference in the internal affairs of a state is justified: against
the “unjust enemy.” This is a state “whose publicly expressed will, whether in
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 5

word or in deed, displays a maxim which would make peace among nations
impossible and would lead to a perpetual state of nature if it were made into a
general rule.”30 Forceful interference in this particular case must not mean that
the unjust “offending state” will disappear “as it were, from the face of the earth,”
nor must it be directed against the people of this state. The intention is rather
that the people of the respective state are made “to accept a new constitution of a
nature that is unlikely to encourage their warlike inclination.”31 Here Kant is
consistent in his argumentation, since the emphasis is laid on the establishment
of a lawful constitution with a peaceful inclination.

Peace through institution: Free federation or world republic?

In addition to the first aspect of Kant’s peace project (peace through law), he
develops a second line of argumentation, which is that perpetual peace will be
achieved through the establishment of an institution—a peace federation (foedus
pacificum). This second aspect has traditionally evoked very different interpreta-
tions by scholars especially with regard to the question of what kind of institu-
tion Kant had in mind. Kant himself is ambiguous in this respect and seems to be
wavering between a statist and a cosmopolitan approach.32 The cosmopolitan
reading of Kant suggests that he had an international state (“Völkerstaat”), a
kind of world republic (“Weltrepublik”) in mind.33 The statist interpretation,34
on the other hand, argues that Kant tended toward a free federation of states, in
Kant’s words a “föderative Vereinigung”35 or a “Staatenkongress.”36
Despite these ambiguities, Kant is very clear about one fact, namely that
neither existing international law nor the presence of cosmopolitan law alone
is sufficient in establishing peace—rather, peace must formally be established:
“But peace can neither be inaugurated nor secured without a general agree-
ment between nations.”37 And further on:
There is only one rational way in which states coexisting with other states can
emerge from the lawless condition of pure warfare. Just like individual men, they
must renounce their savage and lawless freedom, adapt themselves to public
coercive laws, and thus form an international state (civitas gentium), which
would necessarily continue to grow until it embraces all the peoples of the earth.38

Yet while Kant sees such an international state as theoretically optimal,

he admits to several problems with such a proposition in reality.39 The
first problem Kant observes is an inherent contradiction in the very idea of
an international state, because in it many nations would form only one
nation. This, however, is not compatible with international law understood
as law between nations or states.40 Second, such a solution is “not the will
of nations according to their present conception of international right.”41
Third, such a proposition runs contrary to the lawful freedom of states
since any world republic would necessarily become despotic. “For the laws
6 R. SCHWARZ

progressively lose their impact as the government increases in range and a

soulless despotism, after crushing the last germs of goodness, will finally
lapse into anarchy.”42 And in another passage: “But if an international
state of this kind extends over too wide an area of land, it will eventually
become impossible to govern it and thence to protect each of its members,
and the multitude of corporations this would require must again lead to a
state of war.”43
In Perpetual Peace Kant is arguing that a perfect solution is impossible and
that, therefore, the “positive idea of a world republic” must be rejected in favor of
the “negative substitute in the shape of an enduring and gradually expanding
federation likely to prevent war.”44 Kant calls this federation “Völkerbund,”
“Friedensbund” (pactum pacificum), “Staatenverein,” “Staatenkongress,” and
“Föderation.” While Kant is at times inconsistent in the use of these different
terms,45 some general remarks about this kind of federation can be made. First,
such a peace federation has no enforceable laws.
This federation does not aim to acquire any power like that of a state, but merely to
preserve and secure the freedom of each state in itself, along with that of the other
confederated states, although this does not mean that they need to submit to public
laws and to a coercive power which enforces them, as do men in a state of nature.46

Second, the federation is “negative” in the sense that in can only avoid war
and not positively establish and implement rights. Its purpose is to abolish
war. From this follows, as Kant asserts, “the ultimate end of all international
right, is an idea incapable of realisation. But the political principles which
have this aim, i.e. those principles which encourage the formation of inter-
national alliances designed to approach the idea itself by a continual process,
are not impracticable.”47
Third, such a federation represents a compromise for Kant, given the con-
straints of state sovereignty, and the importance of state autonomy on the one hand
and the need for a lawful framework for international relations on the other.48
The condition which must be fulfilled before any kind of international right is
possible is that a lawful state must already be in existence. For without this, there
can be no public right, and any right which can be conceived of outside it, i.e. in a
state of nature, will be merely a private right. Now we have already seen above that
a federative association of states whose sole intention is to eliminate war is the only
lawful arrangement which can be reconciled with their freedom.49

Exclusive versus inclusive federation

A further question regarding the form of the institution is expedient. If we accept
the proposition that Kant most likely had a “free federation of states” in mind,
the question remains whether this federation was to have an inclusive or an
exclusive character. An inclusive federation would include all states, irrespective
of their domestic character (i.e., both liberal republics and non-liberal states).
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 7

This would correspond largely to the present-day United Nations or historically

to its predecessor, the League of Nations.50 Proponents of an exclusive federa-
tion of states argue that Kant had a federation in mind that included only
republics.51 Republics are defined in the first definite article of Perpetual
Peace, where Kant makes a distinction—often overlooked by scholars of the
democratic peace theory—between republics and democracies:
In order not to confuse the republican constitution with the democratic (as is
commonly done), the following should be noted. The forms of a state (civitas) can
be divided either according to the persons who possess the sovereign power or
according to the mode of administration exercised over the people by the chief,
whoever he may be. The first is properly called the form of sovereignty (forma imperii),
and there are only three possible forms of it: autocracy, in which one, aristocracy, in
which some associated together, or democracy, in which all those who constitute
society, possess sovereign power. They may be characterised, respectively, as the power
of a monarch, of the nobility, or of the people. The second division is that by the form
of government (forma regiminis) and is based on the way in which the state makes use
of its power; this way is based on the constitution, which is the act of the general will
through which the many persons become one nation. In this respect, government is
either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the political principle of the separation
of the executive power (the administration) from the legislative; despotism is that of
the autonomous execution by the state of laws which it has itself decreed. Thus in a
despotism the public will is administered by the ruler as his own will. Of the three
forms of the state, that of democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism,
because it establishes an executive power in which all decide for or even against one
who does not agree; that is, all, who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction
of the general will with itself and with freedom.52

Kant’s assertion on democracy being necessarily despotism might be startling

to the modern reader, who is accustomed to recognize democracy as the ultimate
and sole legitimate form of government. The central characteristics of any
political system are a separation of powers, a pluralistic governance method in
the exercise of power, and recognition of fundamental rights in order to allow
protected areas for individuals from state interference. That is why modern
liberal democracy can properly be regarded as the closest approximation of a
Kantian republic, and not as a form of despotism by the majority or the
prevailing opinion.
Consistent with Kant’s insistence on the domestic and lawful order of states, a
peace federation must consist only of republics and must be exclusive in nature.
Only then can it “grow until it embraces all the peoples of the earth”53 and
establish an ever-expanding separate peace.”54 The main textual argument for an
exclusive reading of Kant’s federation can be found in the Second Definitive
Article of Perpetual Peace:
[the] idea of federalism, extending gradually to encompass all states and thus leading
to perpetual peace, is practicable and has objective reality. For if by good fortune one
powerful and enlightened nation, can form a republic (which is by its nature inclined
to seek perpetual peace), this will provide a focal point for federal association among
8 R. SCHWARZ

other states. These will join up with the first one, thus securing the freedom of each
state in accordance with the idea of international right, and the whole will gradually
spread further and further by a series of alliances of this kind.55

Some authors have argued that this passage does not make it clear whether the
other states also have to be republics like the nation that provides the focal point
and hence cannot be seen as an argument for an exclusive federation.56 However,
an argumentation for an inclusive reading of Kant’s federation seems implausible:
First, in the passage above, as well as throughout Perpetual Peace, Kant leaves no
doubt that it is by their very nature that republics have, in general, a peaceful
inclination.57 Hence, any confederation of such republican states may be expected
to have the same peaceful inclination. Textual evidence on this point can be found
in On the Common Saying; This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in
Practice where Kant states: “each state must be organised internally in such a way
that the head of state, for whom war actually costs nothing (for he wages it at the
expenses of others, i.e. the people), must no longer have the deciding vote on
whether war is to be declared or not, for the people who pay for it must decide.”
And further on: “Each commonwealth, unable to harm the others by force, must
observe the laws on its own account, and it may reasonably hope that other
similarly constituted bodies will help it do so.”58
Second, the argument that any exclusive federation would inevitably have other
federations or single states as enemies,59 and hence increase the dangers of the
state of war,60 must be dismissed on the grounds that Kant’s peace project does not
deal with a momentary absence of war but rather with the possibility of perma-
nently barring war.61 Moreover, in the process toward this perpetual and perma-
nent peace, Kant accepts war to be a necessary mechanism.62 The process toward
the ultimate goal of perpetual peace (assuming that such a goal is attainable) might
thus very well include the temporary increase of wars. Indeed, several scholars
have found that democratization can lead to more conflicts and wars and that
emerging democracies are more war-prone than consolidated democracies.63
There might even be a necessity of war, in the sense of warfare pushing leaders
into a more peaceful direction; at least in Europe, peace was achieved only after
two devastating world wars, and, from that angle, Kant’s view of war being a
necessary mechanism toward permanent peace proved prescient.
Finally, Kant’s argumentation regarding perpetual peace rests mainly on the
three Definite Articles, whereby the articles are interrelated and each article
builds up the other.64 Booth and Williams have stressed Kant’s emphasis on the
“intimate relationship not only between internal and external…but also in terms
of the character of the international system.”65 Thus, taken together, the first two
Definite Articles (“The Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican”
and “The Right of Nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States”) leave
no doubt that Kant envisaged a confederation of republican states. He foresaw a
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 9

slow but gradually extending federation, “beginning with a small number of like-
minded states and eventually encompassing the entire globe.”66
As these points have shown, there are few reasons to believe that Kant had an
inclusive peace federation in mind. The more plausible reading suggests that
Kant was speaking of a federation made up of republics formed with the goal of
removing war between them. This exclusive reading of Kant’s peace federation is
consistent with the textual evidence found in Perpetual Peace and the reference
to a “gradually extending” federation.67

Kant’s peace federation in practice

Before looking for empirical examples of a Kantian peace federation, it might be
appropriate to recall the four main theoretical features of such a federation. First
of all, Kant proposes a federation of states that has one main purpose, which is to
abolish war. Second, any peace federation in the Kantian sense must provide a
minimum of legal proceedings for its member states by which disputes can be
settled in a “civilised manner…not in a barbaric manner (like that of savages) by
acts of war.”68 Third, such a federation must further provide sufficient legal
protection for individual rights and freedoms both within the member nations
(ius civitatis) and within the federation—in Kant’s words, within “a universal
state of mankind (ius cosmopoliticum).”69 And, finally, such a federation must be
made up of republican states.70 Following Kant, republican states are character-
ized by the form of government (forma regiminis)—perhaps better termed the
form of rule—and not by the form of sovereignty (forma imperii)—i.e., the form
of state. According to Kant, the latter may be a democracy, autocracy, or
aristocracy, whereas the former (form of government) may only either be
republican or despotic. Republican governments guarantee freedom, respect
legal equality, and are characterized by their dependence on a single legislation.
Approximations of Kantian peace federations in today’s world politics
must hence fulfill four conditions: the purpose of abolishing war perma-
nently, the rule of law between states, legal guarantees for individual human
rights within states, and democratically legitimized political rule.

The United Nations (UN)

Many authors today consider the UN as a peace federation in the Kantian sense.71
According to one author, “Kant’s project also anticipates our century’s most
forward-looking practical projects in the field of international relations—the
League of Nations after the First World War and the United Nations since
the Second.”72 It is clear that the UN goes further in many respects than its
predecessor the League of Nations.73 Following the four criteria mentioned above,
the UN clearly meets the first aspect (i.e., abolishing war) through article 1 of the
UN Charter, where the purposes of the organization are stated: “The Purposes of
10 R. SCHWARZ

the United Nations are: 1. to maintain international peace and security.”74

Furthermore, the UN calls for the peaceful settlement of disputes among its
members75 and also provides legal mechanisms for this.76 Thus also the second
criterion is met. Yet when looking at the two remaining criteria (legal protection
for individuals and an exclusive federation), it becomes clear that the UN differs
from the Kantian peace federation in several aspects. With regard to the protection
of individual rights, the UN has passed several human rights conventions and has
even introduced its own system of monitoring compliance.77 However, the UN is
still lacking enforcement mechanisms to protect individual rights. Some human
rights conventions such as the International Covenant of Civil and Political Right
(ICCPR) do not even provide the possibility of individual complaints.78 A further
problem arises from the lack of universal legal personality, meaning that only if a
country is part of a given UN human rights treaty regime will its citizen have the
legal mechanisms for the protection of their rights.79 The establishment of an
International Criminal Court setting up international legal personality might close
this gap in the future, but currently it has jurisdiction over only four main
crimes.80 Finally, the UN differs from a Kantian peace federation in that it
represents an inclusive federation that comprises both liberal democracies (this
corresponds roughly to the Kantian term “republics”) and authoritarian and even
totalitarian regimes. Membership of the United Nations is open to all “peace-
loving states.”81 No reference is made to the internal organization, let alone to the
“moral legitimation” of member states.82 Judged against the criteria given above
the present-day UN thus only partially fulfills the requirements for a peace
federation in the Kantian sense.83

The Organization on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE)

At the beginning of the 1990s, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe (CSCE) entered a new stage in its existence. In December 1994 it was
permanently institutionalized and renamed the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE has received renewed interest in aca-
demic writing, especially with regard to its role in forming and maintaining a zone
of peace in Europe.84 It is against this background that the institutional framework
of the OSCE will be analyzed in the following paragraph and judged with regard to
whether or not it fulfills the four requirements for a Kantian peace federation.
The OSCE is clearly a federation of states with the single purpose of abolishing
war between its members. The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 states the purposes of
the then CSCE as follows: “Motivated by the political will, in the interest of
peoples, to improve and intensify their relations and to contribute in Europe to
peace, security, justice and co-operation.”85 The peaceful purpose of the CSCE is
also underlined in Principle I (Declarations on principles guiding relations
between participating states) and Principle V (Peaceful settlement of disputes)
of Basket I of the Final Act.86 In 1990, with the end of the Cold War, these
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 11

purposes were repeated and reaffirmed in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe:
“To uphold and promote democracy, peace and unity in Europe, we solemnly
pledge our full commitment to the Ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act. We
affirm the continuing validity of the Ten Principles and our determination to put
them into practice.”87 With the formal institutionalization of the CSCE at the
Budapest follow-up meeting in 1994, the newly renamed OSCE received its
present institutional structure. Since 1994 the OSCE has fulfilled the first
criterion of a Kantian peace federation in the sense that it represents a perma-
nent institution that has as its purpose the abolition of war among its members.
The OSCE’s current prominent role in the management of the crisis in and
around Ukraine underlines its commitment to peaceful resolution and the
abolition of war among its members.
With regard to legal mechanisms to resolve conflicts, there are currently
several legal mechanisms in place to react quickly to such disputes and,
ultimately, to resolve them.88 These “institutionalized mechanisms,” as they
have come to be called, go beyond the consensus rule adopted in 1975. They
include (a) the querying of other states about their military activities (Unusual
Military Activities), (b) the convening of bilateral and multilateral meetings on
human rights violations, (c) facilitation of the peaceful resolution of disputes
by a group of third-party experts (the Valletta Dispute Settlement Mechanism),
and (d) a Court on Conciliation and Arbitration. The OSCE’s role in conflict
prevention and resolution has been judged as follows: OSCE missions are able
to “monitor developments, promote dialogue between the disputing parties,
establish contact points for solving problems…ensure close OSCE cooperation
with local authorities [and] ensure that potentially explosive situations…do not
deteriorate into war.”89
The third feature of a Kantian peace federation—the legal protection for
individuals—is almost completely missing in the institutional framework of
the OSCE. Although human rights and fundamental freedoms appear promi-
nently in the First and Third Basket of the Helsinki Final Act (the so-called
human dimension), and despite the existence of a formal institution (since 1992)
—the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)—the OSCE clearly
falls short of this third criterion. The HCNM is empowered to gather informa-
tion and to promote dialogue with regard to minority rights.90 It is not, however,
supposed to determine the legality of or the compliance with actions against
minorities, nor is it a mediator in the classical sense.91 Furthermore, minority
rights represent only a small portion of human rights. Mechanisms to legally
enforce and protect other human rights, especially civil and political rights, do
not exist. The HCNM is both limited in scope and limited (just like the UN
human rights mechanism) in its enforcement.
Regarding the final point, the OSCE meets—at least in theory—the Kantian
standard of an exclusive federation. This becomes clear when looking at the
Charter of Paris, where it is stated: “We undertake to build, consolidate and
12 R. SCHWARZ

strengthen democracy as the only system of government of our nations. In this

endeavour, we will abide by the following: Human rights and fundamental
freedoms […]. Democratic government […] and … Democracy.”92 However,
in reality several OSCE countries clearly fall short of this standard and cannot
be considered democracies.93 The most obvious cases in point are Azerbaijan
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan.94
In sum, it can be said that the OSCE fulfills the first two criteria of a Kantian
peace federation (federation of states and legal mechanisms) but does not meet
the last two points (legal protection for individual rights and an exclusive
federation). Furthermore, it is clear that the OSCE has not succeeded in forming
a complete zone of peace, as the conflicts in Bosnia and Chechnya have shown.
Any assessment of the OSCE must thus be a mixed one. Emanuel Adler
concludes: “While OSCE conflict-prevention and crisis-management practices
have made some difference in a few areas, such as Nagorno-Karabakh and
Kosovo, in Bosnia and Chechnya the OSCE was almost powerless to stop
conflicts after they erupted.”95 The OECD’s recent engagement in the crisis in
and around Ukraine has also seen mixed results, and thus underlines again that
it depends on the will of its member states whether as an organization it can
effectively fulfill its role as peace mediator and in conflict prevention.
With regard to the question above as to whether the OSCE can be considered
a peace federation in the Kantian sense, the answer once again depends on where
the emphasis is laid: yes, with regard to the legal mechanisms and to the
exclusive character of the OSCE (at least in theory); and no, when the aspect
of individual rights and the de facto inclusive character of the OSCE (containing
several authoritarian member states) are taken into count. We consider the latter
argument certainly to weigh more. However, it should also be stressed that the
institutional framework of the OSCE is certainly closer to a Kantian peace
federation than that of the UN. One final point needs to be stressed here: it is
not the “failure” of not having avoided violent conflicts from erupting within its
territory that makes the OSCE fall short of the Kantian standard (after all, Kant
speaks about progress toward perpetual peace)96 but rather the absence of a
comprehensive and sufficient protection of individual rights and the existence of
non-liberal member states. Arguably, these two points could change over time.
Viewed from this perspective, the OSCE might be called a Kantian peace
federation in the making.

The European Union (EU)

The European Union is more than merely another international organization in
which countries cooperate with each other voluntarily. Rather, it represents a new
type of institution that may be classified as a supranational institution. The EU has
its own mechanisms of law setting, of monitoring compliance, and even of
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 13

enforcing this law, and it represents a legal framework that is situated between
national and international law. This has been both a weakness of the EU, as
citizens have found it hard to understand Europe’s purpose and functioning, but
also its strength, as the EU has proven adaptable to new challenges. Currently,
however, Europe finds itself in a political crisis. The euro crisis has exposed deep
fault-lines between mainly Northern European member states, imposing fiscal
discipline, and debt-ridden Southern Europe, calling for more fiscal spending in
order to boost economic growth. The refugee crisis has furthermore exposed
divergent attitudes between East and West Europe and has exposed a lack of
solidarity in dealing with the crisis collectively. On top of that, the United
Kingdom voted in June 2016, as the first country in the EU’s history, to leave
the union, and the consequences of this are still unclear. Some have already called
for a “renationalization of Europe” and advocated an association of newly assertive
nation-states rather than a “disjointed, ineffectual, and unpopular” union.97
In answering the question whether the EU represents an example for a
Kantian peace federation, it must first of all be stressed that the EU’s founding
fathers—Jean Monnet, Konrad Adenauer, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak,
and Alcide De Gasperi, among others—designed it with a view to abolish war
among its members and proposed the creation of a common economic market
as a means of achieving this. This purpose of fostering peace among its member
states was visible in the Preamble of the Treaty on the European Union
(“Maastricht Treaty,” 1992): “Resolved to implement a common foreign and
security policy…, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its indepen-
dence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the
world.”98 And further on: “The objectives of the common foreign and security
policy shall be: … to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the
principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter.”99
In the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007, which amends the Treaty on the European
Union, similar reference is made in stressing that the European Union’s aim is
“to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples,” and it “shall
contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth.”100
Among the member states of the EU, the threat and use of force is forbidden
by international customary law and by peremptory norm (ius cogens), and
disputes are to be solved by peaceful means. Mary Kaldor has pointed out that
even outside of its territory, the EU is taking a more active role in solving
conflicts and is thus acting as a “new type of horizontal institution.”101 This
later aspect, however, should, in my opinion, not be overestimated as it pertains
little to Kant’s project for perpetual peace and only to the means with which
peace is to be ultimately established.
Regarding the issue of legal mechanisms to resolve disputes between mem-
bers, the EU relies mainly on cooperation to resolve disputes rather than
enforceable laws.102 This seems in line with the Kantian view that a federation
14 R. SCHWARZ

of states, in contrast to a world republic, does not have to have coercive powers
but rests on the voluntary will of its members.103 In sum, it can be argued that
the EU roughly meets the first two points of a Kantian peace federation. As
Kinsella et al. have put it: “It is certainly true that stable peace has been achieved
among members of the EU. For countries now so highly interdependent, the EU
institutions are essential in solving members’ common problems and perhaps in
preventing tensions that could endanger the peace.”104
Regarding the final two criteria, the EU is without doubt very similar to the
Kantian model of a peace federation. The European Union represents an
exclusive federation. Membership is restricted to democratic European states.
Article F of the 1992 Maastricht treaty already clearly stated: “(1) the Union shall
respect the national identity of its Member states, whose system of government
are founded on principles of democracy; (2) the Union shall respect funda-
mental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”105 This was confirmed by Article
49 of the Lisbon Treaty. By explicitly mentioning “principles of democracy” and
“fundamental rights,” it becomes clear that membership in the EU is reserved
only for those states that meet these norms.106 With regard to the admission of
the new member states, especially in Eastern Europe, both political and eco-
nomic criteria (democracy and market economy) have been set out.107 In this
sense the European Union seems to be closer to Kantian peace federation than
the United Nations.
As to the final criterion (legal protection for individuals), the European Union
also clearly meets the Kantian standard. In recent years numerous studies have
shown that the European Court of Justice represents a strategic actor within the
EU framework that is willing and capable of ruling against member states’
interests and thus protecting individual rights.108 Detailed empirical evidence
has also described how this affirmation occurs in disparate issue areas, such as
trade liberalization, sexual equality, and state liability. Despite the different
outlooks of the various studies, one can note that there exist today effective
mechanisms to secure individual rights within the EU system. In view of this and
the Kantian demand for a minimum standard of cosmopolitan law (see his
Third Definite Article), the EU seems to be the closest realization of a peace
federation in the Kantian sense in today’s world.109

Conclusion: Toward a Kantian Europe

The present article has argued that Kant’s argumentation for perpetual peace
rests essentially on two pillars: peace through law and peace through
institution.110 Regarding the second aspect, this article has shown that in
Perpetual Peace Kant has substituted the idea of a world republic for a free
federation of states. The four constitutive elements of such a Kantian peace
federation are that its primary purpose is to abolish war among its members, that
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 15

there are legal mechanisms to resolve disputes between members, that a suffi-
cient level of legal protection for individuals exists, and that such a federation be
made up of republican states.
A textual reading of Kant’s idea of perpetual peace has brought forward two
theoretical points relevant to debates in international relations: First, the (Anglo-
American) debate on the democratic peace is misguided in its exclusive focus on
the democratic nature of states and the dyadic relationship of two democratic
states. This debate has adopted a simplified definition of electoral democracy
and thereby has missed Kant’s crucial distinction between the method of rule
(republican versus despotic) and the form of state (autocracy, aristocracy, and
democracy). Kant argued that a republican way of government was theoretically
conceivable in all forms of state—as an example Kant mentioned the case of an
autocracy, the Prussia of Frederick the Great. In reality, this mixture of repub-
lican principles with any form of state is unlikely and—more importantly—not
practicable in the long term, as institutional guarantees against arbitrary rule are
absent.111 The crucial characteristic of republican rule (in the Kantian sense) is
hence the institutional protection of individual rights, a separation of powers,
and a pluralistic governance method in the exercise of power. Electoral democ-
racies, as defined in the mainstream debate on the democratic peace, do often
not account for all of these.
Second, Kant never argued that republican states alone would be a sufficient
guarantee for peace. Instead, liberal states can bring about perpetual peace only in
conjunction with an international institution (a peace federation) and in conjunc-
tion with guarantees for human rights (the right to hospitality across states).
When applying these theoretical elements in identifying Kantian peace fed-
erations today, two striking findings can be made, which are pertinent to
political philosophers. First, and contrary to the widely held view, the United
Nations only partially fulfills the requirements for a peace federation in the
Kantian sense. Second, viewed from the perspective of the four criteria above,
other organizations, such as very partially the OSCE but also, more specifically,
the European Union, seem to be a closer realization of the Kantian peace project.
This finding is surprising in that the scholarly debate on the European Union
(and here particularly on the EU legal system) mainly has neglected this point
and has instead been waged in terms of neo-functionalism versus intergovern-
mentalism. The fact that Europe’s founding fathers created a head without a
body—a unified bureaucracy but not a united European nation—has been its
fatal flaw.112 The recent political crisis in Europe has strengthened those who
advocate a return to national autonomy and abandon the project of continental
union and a European peace federation. Valuable insights for the democratic
peace debate in international relations and for debates on the contemporary
relevance of Kant’s political philosophy could be gained if scholars adopted a
slightly different outlook and took a more pronounced interest in regard to what
kind of supranational body is being created in Europe. The exclusive nature of
16 R. SCHWARZ

the European peace federation and the existence of effective mechanisms for
individuals to challenge national law in EU institutions can be seen as a reason
for the absence of war in Europe. And the fact that another devastating
European war seems unthinkable after 70 years of peace remains undoubtedly
a major historical achievement and an approximation of the Kantian ideal of
perpetual peace.

Notes
1. See, for example, Michael Brown, S. Lynn-Jones, and S. Miller, Debating the Democratic
Peace (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); David A. Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism:
The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Jack S.
Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18 (1988):
653–73; Sebastian Rosato, “The Flawed Logic of the Democratic Peace Theory,”
American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 585–602.
2. See, for example, Pauline Kleingeld, “Kantian Patriotism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs
29 (2000): 313–341; and Ottfried Höffe, “Ausblick: Die Vereinten Nationen im Lichte
Kants [Outlook: The United Nations in Light of Kant],” Zum Ewigen Frieden [Perpetual
Peace], edited by Ottfried Höffe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), 245–72.
3. Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace,” Kant: Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 104.
4. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 98.
5. Although Kant calls “the great artist Nature” the guarantee for perpetual peace, this
should not diminish the importance of human agency in the process toward peace:
Gallie writes on the guarantee of nature that this is not a guarantee “in any known sense
of the term.” Rather, it is a guarantee if we choose so. See W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of
War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 10.
6. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 98.
7. Immanuel Kant, “Metaphysic of Morals,” Kant: Political Writings, edited by Hans Reiss
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 137.
8. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, 137.
9. Antonio Franceschet, “Sovereignty and Freedom: Immanuel Kant’s Liberal
Internationalist ‘Legacy,’” Review of International Studies 27 (2001): 219.
10. Franceschet, Sovereignty and Freedom, 220. Kant’s view of the state of nature and the
political solution to this (sovereign authority) is derived from Thomas Hobbes. On
Hobbes’s influence on Kant’s political philosophy, see Richard Tuck, The Rights of War
and Peace: Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 207–25.
11. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, 165.
12. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 102.
13. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, 165.
14. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 103.
15. See, for example, Hans Kelsen, Peace through Law (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1944); and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann and James Bohman, Frieden durch
Recht: Kants Friedensidee und das Problem einer neuen Weltordnung [Peace through
Law: Kant’s Idea of Peace and the Problem of a New World Order] (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1996).
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 17

16. Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 27. Steiger speaks of an “indissoluble union” between
peace and law. See Heinhard Steiger, “Frieden durch Institution. Frieden und
Völkerbund bei Kant und danach,” in Frieden durch Recht (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
1996), edited by Lutz-Bachmann/Bohman, 142.
17. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 125.
18. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, 167.
19. Andrew Hurrell, “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations,” Review of
International Studies 16 (1990): 188.
20. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, 168.
21. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 96.
22. Otfried Höffe, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Theory of Law and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 179. See also Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The
Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
23. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 112.
24. Daniele Archibugi, “Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law, and Peace,” European Journal
of International Relations 1 (1995): 447. William (2012) interprets Kant’s political
philosophy as aiming “in a consistent and principled way towards eternal peace” and
argues against Kant scholars, such as Orend and Shell, who claim that Kant endorsed a
modified just war theory that allows for intervention under certain conditions. See
Howard Williams Kant and the End of War: A Critique of Just War Theory
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 50ff; Brian Orend, War and International
Justice: A Kantian Perspective (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2000);
Susan Meld Shell, “Kant on Just War and ‘Unjust Enemies’: Reflections on a
‘Pleonasm,’” Kantian Review 10 (2005): 82–111.
25. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 104.
26. See the Fifth Proposition in Immanuel Kant, “Idea for a Universal History with a
Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 45.
27. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 118, footnote.
28. We follow the definition of totalitarian states by Juan Linz, “Totalitarian and
Authoritarian Regimes,” in Handbook of Political Science, vol. III, edited by Nelson
Polsby and Fred Greenstein (Reading: Addison Wesley, 1975).
29. Friedrich Kambartel, “Kants Entwurf und das Prinzip der Nichteinmischung in die
inneren Staatenangelegenheiten. Grundsätzliches zur Politik der Vereinten Nationen
[Kant’s treaties and the Principle of Nonintervention in the Internal Affairs of States:
Some Fundamentals on the Politics of the United Nations],” in Lutz-Bachmann
/Bohman, Frieden durch Recht, 240. See also Carl J. Friedrich, Inevitable Peace
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948), 178.
30. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, 170.
31. Ibid.
32. See, in particular, Georg Cavallar, “Kantian Perspectives on Democratic Peace:
Alternatives to Doyle,” Review of International Studies 27 (2001): 243; Michael Doyle,
“Kant, Liberal Legacy, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (1983):
205–35 and 323–53; Georg Cavallar, “Kant’s Society of Nations: Free Federation or
World Republic?” Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (1994): 461–82; and Hurrell,
Kantian Paradigm, 189ff.
33. Proponents of this reading are Daniele Archibugi, “Models of International
Organization in Perpetual Peace Projects,” Review of International Studies 18 (1992):
295–317; Archibugi Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical
Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); David Held, Cosmopolitan
18 R. SCHWARZ

Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995); and
Martin Wight, System of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977).
34. The following scholars adopt a statist interpretation of Kant: Cavallar, Kantian
Perspectives; Gallie, Philosophers of War and Peace; F. H. Hinsley, Power and the
Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963); and Allen W. Wood, “Kant’s Project
for Perpetual Peace,” in Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation, edited
by Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1998),
59–76.
35. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 113.
36. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, 171.
37. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 104.
38. Ibid., 105.
39. Kant’s change in argumentation—from a theoretical to a pragmatic argument—is
noteworthy here. Some IR scholars have brought forward theoretical arguments in
favor of a world state as the only means to fulfill state sovereignty within a society of
states. See Alexander Wendt, “Why a World State Is Inevitable,” European Journal of
International Relations 9 (2003): 491–542. Others have argued that the ultimate goal of a
state-like world federation with coercive authority should be preceded as a first, prag-
matic step by a voluntary league without coercive powers. See Kleingeld, Kant and
Cosmopolitanism, notably 43–44, 69, and 188, who thinks not only that Kant advocated
such a federation but also that he was right to do so.
40. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 102.
41. Ibid., 105.
42. Ibid., 113.
43. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, 171.
44. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 105.
45. Hurrell, Kantian Paradigm, 191, footnote 44.
46. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 104.
47. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, 171.
48. Hurrell, Kantian Paradigm, 193.
49. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 129.
50. Article 4.1 of the Charter of the United Nations makes it clear that the UN will accept
“all peace-loving states” as members, irrespective of their internal character. Proponents
of this inclusive reading of Kant include Cavallar, Kant’s Society of Nations, and Wood,
Kant’s Project for Perpetual Peace.
51. See Ernst-Otto Czempiel, “Kants Theorem und die zeitgenössische Theorie der inter-
nationalen Beziehungen [Kant’s Theory and Contemporary International Relations
Theory],” in Lutz-Bachmann/Bohman, Frieden durch Recht, 317. See also Kleingeld,
Kant and Cosmopolitanism, in which she converges on the point that the only form of
state compatible with each individual’s fundamental right to freedom is a republican
state in which citizens give themselves laws through their representatives. At the same
time, the people of any kind of state should be recognized as politically autonomous and
therefore should be respected. This therefore does not allow for a modified just-war
theory or a justification for externally induced regime change, as in Iraq in 2003. See
Williams, Kant and the End of War, 163.
52. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 99ff.
53. Ibid., 105.
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 19

54. Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review 80
(1986): 1158. See also Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1993).
55. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 104.
56. Cavallar, Kantian Perspectives, 244.
57. See especially Kant’s economic argumentation in the First Definite Article of Perpetual
Peace (Kant, Perpetual Peace, 100).
58. Immanuel Kant, “On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, but It Does
Not Apply in Practice,” in Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 90–91. My emphasis.
59. Cavallar, Kantian Perspectives, 245.
60. Hurrell, Kantian Paradigm, 193.
61. In other words, eternal peace is the end condition and not characteristic of the process
thereto. Kant is nowhere arguing that on the path toward peace, war will disappear. For
Kant’s views on the possibility of war between republics and non-republics and on
imperial warfare, see Michael W. Doyle, “Die Stimmer der Völker. Politische Denker
über die internationalen Auswirkungen der Demokratie [The Voice of People: Political
Thinkers on International Consequences of Democracy],” in Immanuel Kant: Zum
Ewigen Frieden [Immanuel Kant: Perpetual Peace], edited by Ottfried Höffe (Berlin:
Akademie Verlag, 1995), 236.
62. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 110.
63. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Dangers of War,” in
Debating the Democratic Peace, edited by Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and
Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 301–34; and Edward D. Mansfield and
Jack Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2005).
64. Kambartel, who shares this interrelated reading of the three Definite Articles, argues yet
further that any interpretation of Kant must also see the Preliminary Articles in
connection with the Definitive Articles. See Kambartel, Kants Entwurf, 246.
65. Ken Booth and H. Williams, “Kant: Theorist beyond Limits,” in Classical Theories of
International Relations, edited by Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann (Houndmills:
Macmillan, 1996), 89. On the interrelated character of the Definite Articles, which
form in the words of Booth and Williams “a comprehensive theory of politics on a
global scale,” see also Booth/Williams, Kant: Theorist beyond Limits, 91–92.
66. Michael Williams, “Reason and Realpolitik,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 25
(1992): 111.
67. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 104.
68. Kant, Metaphysic of Morals, 171.
69. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 98–99.
70. Ibid., 99.
71. See, for example, Kleingeld, Kantian Patriotism; Höffe, Ausblick; John Allphin Moore
and Jerry Pubantz, The New United Nations: International Organization in the Twenty-
first Century (London: Routledge, 2006); and Thomas G. Weiss, “The United Nations:
Before, during, and after 1945,” International Affairs 91 (2015): 1221–35.
72. Wood, Kant’s Project for Perpetual Peace, 62.
73. Steiger, Frieden durch Institution, 157.
74. Article 1 of the UN Charter (1945).
75. See article 2 (3) and article 33 of the UN Charter, where it says: “All Members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means.” and “The parties to any dispute … shall,
first of all, seek a solution by … peaceful means.”
20 R. SCHWARZ

76. The UN has the right to use force under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The Security
Council may decide on both military and nonmilitary (e.g., economic sanctions) mea-
sures in order “to maintain or restore international peace and security.”
77. For a critical overview of the UN human rights system, see Philip Alston, The United
Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) and
Rosa Freedman, The United Nations Human Rights Council: A Critique and Early
Assessment (London: Routledge, 2013).
78. This requires the ratification of the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR; as of
October 2016, only 115 states had ratified (compared to 168 that have ratified the
ICCPR). See http://indicators.ohchr.org/.
79. Additionally each human rights treaty regime has only a very specific and thus limited
jurisdiction.
80. The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established by the Rome Statute on
17 July 1998. With the ratification of 60 states on 11 April 2002, the Court entered
into force on 1 July 2002. The Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction over the crime
of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
81. Article 4 (1) of the UN Charter.
82. Kambartel, Kants Entwurf, 243.
83. Kambartel, Kants Entwurf, 243; and Steiger, Frieden durch Institution, 161.
84. Emanuel Adler, “Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE’s Security Community-building
Model,” in Security Communities, edited by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 119–60; and Gregory Flynn and
Henry Farrell, “Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE, Norms, and the
‘Construction’ of Security in Post–Cold War Europe,” International Organization 53
(1999): 505–35.
85. The Helsinki Final Act is reprinted in Arie Bloed, The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe: Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972–1993 (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic, 1993), 141ff. The quote is from Bloed, The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 141.
86. Principle I states: “The participating States, reaffirming their commitment to peace,
security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and co-
operation.” See Bloed, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 143 and
145, respectively.
87. “The Charter of Paris for a New Europe” is reprinted in Stefan Lehne, The CSCE in the
1990s: Common European House or Potemkin Village? (Vienna: Wilhelm Braumüller,
1991), 113ff. The quote is from Lehne, The CSCE in the 1990s, 115.
88. The following draws mainly on Adler, Seeds of Peaceful Change, 125–28.
89. Walter Kemp, “The OSCE in a New Context: European Security towards the Twenty-
first Century, RIIA Discussion Papers 64 (1999): 20.
90. Aristoteles Constantinides, “The Involvement of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe in Issues of Minority Protection,” Leiden Journal of
International Law 9 (1996): 373–95, is willing to concede, that despite its shortcomings
and weaknesses, the OSCE system has contributed to protection of minorities in some
East European states.
91. Adler, Seeds of Peaceful Change, 125.
92. Lehne, The CSCE in the 1990s, 113. My emphasis.
93. Here the definition of democracies given by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour
Lipset, Democracy in Developing Countries, vol. II, Africa (Boulder: Westview, 1988), xvi
is adopted. They define political systems as democratic when the following criteria are
met:
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 21

(1) meaningful and extensive competition […] for all effective positions of government
power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; (2) a highly inclusive level of
political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and
fair elections, such that no major […] social group is excluded, and (3) a level of civil
and political liberties […] sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and
participation.
94. For the shortcomings of these countries with regard to the third criterion (a level of civil
and political rights), see the “Annual Survey of Freedom Country Ratings” by Freedom
House at http://www.freedomhouse.org/rankings.pdf. For the emerging semi-
authoritarian character of these political systems, see Fareed Zakaria, The Future of
Freedom. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003);
and Marina Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2003).
95. Adler, Seeds of Peaceful Change, 130.
96. See the original title of Kant’s Perpetual Peace in German: “Zum Ewigen Frieden.”
Hence a better English translation would be “Towards Perpetual Peace” or “Towards
Eternal Peace.”
97. Jakub Grygiel, “The Return of Europe’s Nation-states,” Foreign Affairs 95 (2016):
94–101.
98. Treaty on the European Union (1992), Preamble. Maastricht. Emphasis added.
99. Treaty on the European Union (1992), Article J.1. Maastricht.
100. Treaty amending the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community (2007), Article 2. Lisbon. The full text of the Lisbon Treaty can be
found at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%
2FTXT.
101. Mary Kaldor, “European Institutions, Nation-states, and Nationalism,” in Cosmopolitan
Democracy. An Agenda for a New World Order, ed. Daniele Archibugi and David Held
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 92.
102. Steiger, Frieden durch Institution, 162.
103. Kant, Perpetual Peace, 104.
104. David Kinsella, Bruce Russett, and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice
(Boston: St. Martin’s, 2000), 303.
105. Treaty on the European Union (1992), Article F. Maastricht; and Treat on the European
Union (2007), Article 49. Lisbon.
106. The importance of a “sufficient level of civil and political rights” in determining whether
a state is democratic or not has been mentioned above.
107. See the Copenhagen criteria from 1993, which have been set out as a guideline for
admitting new members. But even earlier admissions to the EU (especially that of Spain,
Greece, and Portugal or the denial of Turkey) were guided by this principle. See
Kambartel, Kants Entwurf, 244. With regard to the last round of enlargement to
Eastern Europe, however, more emphasis seems to have been put on economic perfor-
mance than democratic or legal standards.
108. Karen Alter, “Who Are the ‘Masters of the Treaty’?: European Governments and the
European Court of Justice,” International Organization 52 (1998): 122. For the growing
literature, see also Karen Alter, “The European Union’s Legal System and Domestic
Policy: Spillover or Backlash?,” International Organization 54 (2000): 489–518; Geoffrey
Garrett, R. Daniel Kelemen, and Heiner Schulz, “The European Court of Justice,
National Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union,” International
Organization 52 (1998): 149–76; Walter Mattli and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Revisiting
the European Court of Justice,” International Organization 52 (1998): 177–209.
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109. Roberto Belloni, “Peace in Europe” in The Palgrave Handbook of Disciplinary and
Regional Approaches to Peace (Berlin: Spinger, 2016), 411–23.
110. Steiger, Frieden durch Institution, 149.
111. The changing whims of an enlightened autocrat are highlighted for the Prussian case in
the Müller-Arnold trial, when Frederick the Great intervened in the court’s judicial
autonomy. On this episode and the potential disregard for republican principles by an
enlightened autocrat in the realm of foreign policy, see Georg Cavallar, Pax Kantiana
(Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1992), 153–5.
112. Jakub Grygiel, “The Return of Europe’s Nation-states,” Foreign Affairs 95 (2016): 97.