CAMILLE JOY C.

PEREDO
2022-0174
CONSTI 2 – CASE DIGESTS
ATTY. BUTCH JAMON

REPUBLIC vs. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620

FACTS OF THE CASE:
Due to the failure to negotiate the terms in their contract, the Bureau of Telecommunications,
filed a suit against defendant PLDT praying for the following: (1) commanding the PLDT to
execute a contract with plaintiff, through the Bureau of Telecommunications, for the use of
the facilities of defendant’s telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms
and conditions as the court might consider reasonable, and; (2) for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone
connections and/or restore those severed.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be
a valid object for expropriation.

HELD:
Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, the Bureau of
Telecommunications, may require the telephone company to permit interconnection as the
needs of the government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation
which shall be determined by the court. The users of both telephone systems will benefit from
the interconnecting services. Thus, the government has the right to compel PLDT to
interconnect lines in the exercise of police power.

REPUBLIC vs. CASTELVI, 58 SCRA 336

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) entered into a lease agreement over a land owned
by Castellvi which is in Pampanga. AFP sought to renew the contract before its expiration, but
Castelvo refused. AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of contract
thus Castelvi filed an ejectment suit. Meanwhile, AFP also instituted an expropriation
proceeding. The trial court identified Commissioners to determine the actual fair market value
of the lands sought to be expropriated. The Republic averred that the fair market value of
the lands of the appellees was P. 20 or at P2000 per hectare, as the lands in the year 1949
were valued at such.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that just compensation should not be determined on the basis
of the value of the property in 1947 .The requisites for taking are:

1. The expropriator must enter a private property;

 CAMILLE JOY C. PEREDO
2022-0174
CONSTI 2 – CASE DIGESTS
ATTY. BUTCH JAMON

2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;

3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. Thus, the “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes
of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.

BEL-AIR ASSOCIATION vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Ayala Corporation executed a deed of donation covering Jupiter and Orbit Street to Bel-Air
Village Association. The Municipality of Makati opened the said streets in the interest of
general public to ease the traffic. Petitioners argued that they did not agree to open the said
streets by virtue of ownership and that they should not be deprived without due process and
just compensation.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the opening of Jupiter and Orbit Street amount to deprivation of property
without due process.

HELD:

No. The demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter street does not amount to deprivation of
property without due process of law or expropriation without just compensation since there
is no taking of property involved. It is part of the “police power” of the mayor since its
purpose of opening the streets is to ease traffic in Makati which is aimed at promoting the
general welfare.

EPZA v. DULAY
FACTS OF THE CASE:

San Antonio Development Corporation, who is the private respondent in this case, claimed
that the four parcels of land which are the subject of this case were expropriated without
reaching an agreement with regard to the compensation. A commissioner was appointed by
the court to determine the fair market value of the land in question. Later on, private
respondent claimed that the basis of just compensation should be PD 1533 which states that
it should be fair and according to the fair market value declared by the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, or by the assessor, whichever is lower.
 CAMILLE JOY C. PEREDO
2022-0174
CONSTI 2 – CASE DIGESTS
ATTY. BUTCH JAMON

ISSUE/S:

Whether PD 1533 shall be the basis for just compensation?

HELD:

No. The method of ascertaining the amount of just compensation is within the functions of the
Supreme Court. The valuation in the decree can serve as a guide but shall not be a substitute
to the court’s own judgment. Determining just compensation is a judicial function.

NPC v. CA
FACTS OF THE CASE:

National Power Corporation instituted eminent domain proceedings with the spouses Sadang
for the purchase of land for the construction of an access road to its Angat River
Hydroelectric Project. The court appointed commissioners to determine the fair market value
for the said property. It was later on priced at 7.00 per sqm.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the court erred in fixing the amount of Php 7.00 per square meter as just
compensation and in not reducing the rate of interest payable by NPC from 12% to 6% per
annum.

HELD:

Yes. The court erred in fixing the amount at Php 7.00 since it should be at Php 3.75 which is
the price it was taken from the owner. The criteria for determining the just compensation is
the price or value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the government.

DE KNECHT v. BAUTISTA
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Due to the extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard which will be linked to the Cavite Coastal
Road Project, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension pass
through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. However, residents protested thus it was
recommended that the plan be reversed to the original plan which will pass along Cuneta
Avenue. However, the Ministry argued the new route which save the government P2 million.
Thus, the government filed expropriation proceedings.
 CAMILLE JOY C. PEREDO
2022-0174
CONSTI 2 – CASE DIGESTS
ATTY. BUTCH JAMON

ISSUE/S:

Whether there is a genuine need to expropriate the properties owned by De Knecht and
others similarly situated on the ground that the choice of properties to be expropriated
seemed arbitrarily made by the DPWH

HELD:

The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial
approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so minimal
that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of functionality
strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets, while the factor of
social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While the
issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and
development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried
out for the benefit of the people.

REPUBLIC v. DE KNECHT
FACTS OF THE CASE:

On February 20, 1979 The Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation proceeding
against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan streets. De Knecht
filed a case to restrain the Government from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer
was denied by the lower court on the ground that the government had already made the
required deposit with the PNB of 10% of the amount of the compensation written in the
complaint. Meanwhile, De knecht filed petition for certiorari and prohibition was granted
setting aside the order to take possession of the property, the SC reversed the lower court
decision and granted the relief asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was
arbitrary. The case was remanded to the lower court. No further action was taken despite the
SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when the Government moved for the dismissal of
the case on the ground that the Legislature has enacted BP P 340 expropriating the same
properties for the same purpose.

ISSUE/S:

Whether an expropriation proceeding that was determined by a final judgment of the

Supreme Court may be the subject of a subsequent legislation for expropriation.

HELD:
While it is true that said final judgment of the Supreme Court on the subject becomes the
law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the Republic to take
private properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is so provided in
the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the
Republic not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate
court action or by legislation. When on 17 February 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed BP
340 expropriating the very properties subject of the present proceedings, and for the same
 CAMILLE JOY C. PEREDO
2022-0174
CONSTI 2 – CASE DIGESTS
ATTY. BUTCH JAMON

purpose, it appears that it was based on supervening events that occurred after the decision
of the Supreme Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the expropriation through
the Fernando ReinDel Pan Streets. The social impact factor which persuaded the Court to
consider this extension to be arbitrary had disappeared. All residents in the area have been
relocated and duly compensated. 80% of the EDSA outfall and 30% of the EDSA extension had
been completed. Only De Knecht remains as the solitary obstacle to this project that will solve
not only the drainage and flood control problem but also minimize the traffic
bottleneck in the area. Moreover, the decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the
Government in thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then
prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question
and thereafter by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees
in the wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of this Court must
yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.

MANOTOC v. NHA
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Pursuant to LOI No. 555 instituting nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program
(SIR) and LOI No. 557 adopting slum improvement as a national housing policy, the City of
Manila and NHA declared the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area in its priority list
for a Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) which they described as blighted areas. With this, the
President issued the challenged Presidential Decrees Nos. 1669 and 1670 which respectively
declared the Tambunting Estate and the Sunog-Apog area expropriated. The decrees gave the
City Assessor the authority to determine the market value of the lands involved and stated
that "no improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the land is squatted upon by
resident families which should considerably depress the expropriation cost". Petitioners
maintain that the Presidential Decrees providing for the direct expropriation of the properties
in question violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection of the law
because by the mere passage of the said decrees their properties were automatically
expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and possession thereof
without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation or to contest the just
compensation to which they are entitled. The petitioners argue that the government must first
have filed a complaint with the proper court under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court in
order to fulfill the requirements of due process.

ISSUE/S:

(1) Whether or not the decrees in question deprived the petitioners of their properties
without due process of law
(2) Whether or not the petitioners were denied to their right to just compensation

HELD:

The areas are summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated by decree
without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The expropriation
is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the decree. Not only
are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the expropriation, plead their side,
 CAMILLE JOY C. PEREDO
2022-0174
CONSTI 2 – CASE DIGESTS
ATTY. BUTCH JAMON

or question the amount of payments fixed by decree, but the decisions, rulings, orders, or
resolutions of the NHA are expressly declared as beyond the reach of judicial review. The fixing
of the maximum amounts of compensation and the bases thereof which are the assessed
values of the properties in 1978 deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to prove a higher
value because, the actual or symbolic taking of such properties occurred only in 1980 when
the questioned decrees were promulgated. The decision of the government to acquire a
property through eminent domain should be made known to the property owner through a
formal notice wherein a hearing or a judicial proceeding is contemplated as provided for in
Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. This shall be the time of reckoning the value of the property for
the purpose of just compensation. The so-called "conditions" of the properties should not be
determined through a decree but must be shown in an appropriate proceeding in order to
arrive at a just valuation of the property. The market value stated by the city assessor alone
cannot substitute for the court's judgment in expropriation proceedings. It is violative of the
due process and the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution to deny to a property
owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation made by a local assessor is wrong or
prejudiced.

ERMITA MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS vs.

CITY OF MANILA, 20 SCRA 849
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., filed a case for the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 to be
applicable only in the City of Manila. They pointed out that Section 1 of the said
ordinance is violative of the due process clause because it imposes Php 6,000.00
license fee per annum for first class motels and Php 4,500.00 for second class
motels. They also pointed out that the provisions of the said ordinance which opens
the premises and facilities of such establishments for inspection from city
authorities, prohibition on age and restriction on leasing any room more than twice
in 24 hours, are vague and thus violative of the due process. The license of those
who will violate the said ordinance will automatically be cancelled.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the said ordinance is a valid exercise of eminent domain.

HELD:

No. The said ordinance is a valid exercise of eminent domain. “The presumption is
towards the validity of a law.” The challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to
minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensing fees was intended to discourage
“establishments of the kind from operating for a purpose other than legal” and at the
same time, to increase “the income of the city government.”
 CAMILLE JOY C. PEREDO
2022-0174
CONSTI 2 – CASE DIGESTS
ATTY. BUTCH JAMON

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs.

SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
FACTS OF THE CASE:

The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. which is comprised of

landowners of rice lands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7
hectares sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided by Republic
Act 6657. Under the said law, landholdings which are less than 7 hectares shall not
be forced to be distributed if the owners are not willing. In a related case, the PD 27,
EO 228 and EO 229 were questioned since the said laws valuated the amount of the
said lands based on the determination of the Department of Agrarian Reform. They
claimed that just compensation should be determined by the courts.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform program is violative of the due

process.

HELD:

No. It is not violative of due process. There is no arbitrariness in the provision

related to the manner of fixing just compensation since it is only preliminary unless
accepted by all the parties concerned. If the parties do not agree, the courts will still
have the right to review the finality of the said determination.

LUZ FARMS vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS OF THE CASE:

RA 6657 which is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) which

includes raising of livestock, poultry and swine as its coverage was approved by the
President. Petitioner, Luz Farms, claimed that said law is unconstitional since it
provides product-sharing plan, including those engaged in livestock and poultry
business which they claimed it not similar with crop or tree farming. Thus, it should
not be included in the coverage of CARP which covers agricultural lands.

ISSUE/S:

Whether certain provisions of CARP are unconstitutional for including livestock and
poultry industry in their definition of agriculture.
 CAMILLE JOY C. PEREDO
2022-0174
CONSTI 2 – CASE DIGESTS
ATTY. BUTCH JAMON

HELD:

Yes. The framers never intended to include livestock and poultry in the industry
coverage of the agrarian reform program. The petitioner’s argument that the
product-sharing plan applied to corporate farms is unreasonable for being
confiscatory and thus violative of the due process of law.

CARIDAY vs. CA
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Cariday who is one of the homeowners in Forbes park who leased one portion of the
building to Hames Duvivier and to Rober Haden. Cariday then notified Forbes Park
Association (FPA) that Haden would be moving with his furniture and household and
thus requested for a clearance to be issued. However, FPA did not issue a clearance
and advised Cariday that its house cannot be leased to more than one tenant as this
would violate their restriction.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the prohibition by FPA is unconstitutional?

HELD:

No. The purpose of the restriction is to avoid overcrowding both in the houses and in
the subdivision which would result in pressure upon the common facilities such as
water, power and telephone connections, accelerate the deterioration of the roads,
and create problems of sanitation and security in the subdivision. It is also "for
aesthetic consideration and for the preservation of the peace, beauty, tranquility and
serenity of living at Forbes Park.

ICHONG v. HERNANDEZ
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner and other alien resident corporations and partnerships filed an action to
declare RA 1180 which is known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” as
unconstitutional as it denies to alien residents the equal protections of the laws and
deprives of their liberty and property without due process of the law.
 CAMILLE JOY C. PEREDO
2022-0174
CONSTI 2 – CASE DIGESTS
ATTY. BUTCH JAMON

ISSUE/S:

Whether RA 1180 violates the equal protection clause and deprives the aliens of
their liberty and property without due process.
HELD:

No. The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The law has sufficient grounds for the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of the occupation regulated. It is also prospective in operation and
recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably
protects their privilege.

KOREMATSU v. US
FACTS OF THE CASE:

Due to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during World War II, President Roosevelt
issued EO 9066 which requires Japanese-Americans to move into relocation camps
as a matter of national security. Fred Korematsu, a Japanese man, chose to stay at
his residence rather than obey the order to relocate thus he was arrested. Korematsu
was arrested and convicted of violating the order, but he argued that the law is a
violation of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE/S:

Whether EO 9066 is violative of the equal protection clause.

HELD:

The Court rules that the law was valid since it is a strategic imperative to protect
and secure U.S. from invasion. It is also based on martial necessity arising from the
danger of espionage and sabotage.