Case 13: PEOPLE v.

VERA (Probation Law ; Government Standing)

- In the case of People v. Vera – issue is the constitutionality of the Probation Law, government
itself is questioning the constitutionality of its own law thru the city Fiscal.
- Whether OSG and Fiscal have standing on this case?
- Held: Yes, they have since they can question on their laws. There is a violation of the equal
protection clausel.
- Probation law only applicable to provinces who has financial capability thus violation the equal
protection clause.

Case 14: FLAS v. COHEN – books purchase for schools; taxpayer standing

- Taxpayers questioned it
- Whether taxpayer has standing?
- Held: Yes, they are taxpayers they have the right to question how tax is being used.

Unjieng was convicted of criminal charges and he filed an application for probation under Act no. 4221
but the Fiscal denied granting the probation for being in violation of equal protection.

Vera (Judge of the CFI) concluded that Unjieng is innocent but denied petition for probation.

- Questions of constitutionality were raised by the City Fiscal of Manila and HSBC as the private
prosecution stating that Act. No. 4221 is unconstitutional as it is in violation of the equal protection
clause for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section
11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or
otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces and it as an undue delegation
of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces.

- The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the trial court, declined to pass
upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are
affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations , and McGlue vs. Essex County as authority for the proposition that a
court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no
interest in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge
further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with
Cooley that "the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious
of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility" proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore,
the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider
the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party

ISSUE:
two fundamental questions presented, namely,
(1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these
proceedings and Whether or not PEOPLE is the proper party to raise question on constitutionality in this
case?; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional.

COURTS RULING:

And on the hypotheses that the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, represented by the
private prosecution, is not the proper party to raise the constitutional question here — a point we do
not now have to decide — we are of the opinion that the People of the Philippines, represented by
the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is such a proper party in the present
proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates
the constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a
substantial interest in having it set aside. Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the
validity of its own laws.

Other notes:

- Petitioners: People of the Philippines and HSBC

- Respondents: Mariano Cu Unjieng (Defendant in the Criminal Case); Judge Vera (Judge who heard
the application of Unjieng for probation)
- Action: Certiorari and prohibition to review decision of CFI and to stop the court from further
entertaining application of Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation so that he may be committed to prison.
- In the Criminal Case, HSBC was the private prosecutor
- CFI rendered a judgment sentencing Mariano Cu Unjieng to the penalty of imprisonment
- Cu Unjieng filed for probation in accordance with Act. No. 4221. He stated that he is innocent and he
has no criminal record and he would observe good conduct in the future.
- Questions of constitutionality was raised by the City Fiscal of Manila and HSBC as the private
prosecution stating that Act. No. 4221 is unconstitutional as it is in violation of the equal protection
clause for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section
11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or
otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective provinces and it as an undue delegation
of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces.
- The respondent, Hon. Jose O Vera, however, acting as judge of the trial court, declined to pass
upon the question on the ground that the private prosecutor, not being a party whose rights are
affected by the statute, may not raise said question. The respondent judge cited Cooley on
Constitutional Limitations , and McGlue vs. Essex County as authority for the proposition that a
court will not consider any attack made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no
interest in defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The respondent judge
further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the constitutional question and, agreeing with
Cooley that "the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious
of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
 responsibility" proceeded on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While therefore,
the court a quo admits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it refused to consider
the question solely because it was not raised by a proper party.
- Vera (Judge of the CFI) set the petition for hearing and concluded that Unjieng is innocent but
denied petition for probation.
- Herein petitioners came to the court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they
alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which fostered "the
campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of the sentence imposed
by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the
apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed
on the defendant Mariano Cu UnjiengHence this petition in the Supreme Court. writ of certiorari and
of prohibition

Herein petitioners came to the court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged
was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila

- I

PETITIONERS RAISED THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:

I. Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng under
probation

(1) Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said of the Philippine Legislature is made to apply only
to the provinces of the Philippines; it nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to
chartered cities like the City of Manila.

2) While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the effect that in the
absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be construed to include the City of
Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of general application, it is also true that Act No.
4221 is not a law of general application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in
which the respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation officer.

(3) Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act No. 4221 would not be
applicable to it because it has provided for the salary of a probation officer as required by section
11 thereof; it being immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Officer willing to act for the City
of Manila, said Probation Officer provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221 being different and
distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section 11 of the same Act.

II. Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in
excess thereof in continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit
Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution.

III. Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu Unjieng is innocent of the crime
for which he was convicted by final judgment of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous
but without foundation in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation
of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.

IV. Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate his duty, which became
imperative when he issued his order of June 28, 1937, denying the application for probation, to
commit his co-respondent to jail.

Supplemental Petition: HSBC, raised the constitutionality of the Act. 4221

RESPONDENTS DEFENSE:
In their memorandums filed on October 23, 1937, counsel for the respondents maintain that Act No.
4221 is constitutional because, contrary to the allegations of the petitioners, it does not constitute an
undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal protection clause of the
Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning power of the Executive. In an additional
memorandum filed on the same date, counsel for the respondents reiterate the view that section 11
of Act No. 4221 is free from constitutional objections and contend, in addition, that the private
prosecution may not intervene in probation proceedings, much less question the validity of Act No.
4221; that both the City Fiscal and the Solicitor-General are estopped from questioning the validity of
the Act; that the validity of Act cannot be attacked for the first time before this court;

two fundamental questions presented, namely,

(1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised in these
proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said Act is constitutional.

The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon the past and all that time has
not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly
regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines
estopped from nor assailing its validity.

The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is held
void by the courts in proper cases.

Issues of Constitutionality can be raised through:

Mandamus (Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone)

Quo Warranto (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer )

Habeas Corpus (Bailey on Habeas Corpus, Vol. I, pp. 97, 117)
original action for certiorari and prohibition (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad)

Definition:

PROHIBITION - extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed
to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with
which it is not legally vested.

Where the inferior court or tribunal derives its jurisdiction exclusively from an unconstitutional statute,
it may be prevented by the writ of prohibition from enforcing that statute.

Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's law officer, its Attorney-General, or
county attorney, may exercise his bet judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the
matter determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity