A BRIEF OVERVIEW ON

FALKLAND WAR
CDR SYED SHAFIQ RMN
COMMANDING OFFICER KD RAJAWALI

29TH AUG 23 1
 SELF INTRODUCTION
• CDR SYED MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ RMN
• 2001
• APPOINTMENTS
• ACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONS
• DIPLOMA MILITARY EDUCATION IN NATIONAL
SECURITY, STRATEGY AND POLICY : USNWC
• BSC IN NAUTICAL STUDIES : ATMA
• MASTER OF ARTS IN DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC
STUDIES : USNWC
• MARRIED
• 0194743619
• syed_3619@yahoo.com
TENTERA LAUT DIRAJA MALAYSIA 2
 WHY FALKLAND WAR?
• AGE OF NAVAL MISSILE WARFARE
• EXOCET
• SEAWOLF
• SEA SKUA
• LITTORAL STATES/ LITTORAL WARFARE
• SAME SCHOOL OF THOUGHT WITH THE
ROYAL NAVY
• REFERENCES
• PROCEDURES

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 POINTS TO PONDER
• WHY NATION GOES TO WAR?
• WHO OWNS THE OPERATIONAL
• FORCE
• SPACE
• TIME
• THOSE WHO CONTROL THE SKY, WILL
CONTROL THE AREA BELOW IT?

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WAR

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WAR

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WAR

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WHY NATION GOES TO WAR?

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9
Baroness Margaret Thatcher
(1925 – 2013)
 The Falklands
The Falklands Conflict
Conflict

Revisited
Revisited
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 UK
Falkland Islands
4250 miles

SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN

Ascension

0 25 50 miles
4000 miles
PEBBLE 0 40 80 km
SAUNDERS ISLAND
Falklands ISLAND

Dunnose
WEDDELL Head STANLEY
ISLAND

EAST FALKLAND
LIVELEY
ISLAND

SPEEDWELL
BLEAKER 500 miles
ISLAND
ISLAND
Buenos Aires
WEST FALKLAND
Falkland Islands
SETTLEMENTS South Georgia
South Sandwich Islands
Stanley – from the Sea
 Royal Marines Detachment, Falklands –
Circa 1982

Government House – Port Stanley

A Friendly Face
RECOG

The picture can't be displayed.

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Margaret Thatcher
(1925 – 2013)
POLITICAL OBJECTIVE?

TRINITY OF WAR
1. PEOPLE
2. GOVERNMENT
3. MILITARY
 Lord Carrington,
Foreign Secretary

John Nott,
Secretary of State
for Defence
 1981 DEFENCE REVIEW
BRITISH PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

• There would never be another requirement for UK

Amphibious Assault.

• The UK would not deploy outside the NATO area.

• There would never be an operation overseas without the

participation of allies.

• There would never be a requirement to operate beyond

the range of land-based air.
 NOTT REVIEW - 1981

• Accent on European Central

Front.
• Theatre tactical nuclear
weapons.
• Anti-submarine, submarine and
mine warfare.

• Lose carriers (and Fleet Air

Arm).
• Lose amphibious ships (and
probably marines).
• Lose balanced fleet.
The picture can't be displayed.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVE?

TRINITY OF WAR
1. PEOPLE
2. GOVERNMENT
3. MILITARY
The picture can't be displayed.
The picture can't be displayed.

The picture can't be displayed.

‘Force Z’ – 10th December 1941
WHAT ARE THE COGs OF
THE TASK FORCE?
 THE
BRITAIN
FALKLANDS/MALVINAS 5-6 APRIL
CONFLICT: BRITISH TASK FORCE SAILS.
THE BRITISH AIRCRAFT CARRIERS INVINCIBLE
AND HERMES , ASSAULT SHIP
NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS FEARLESS PLUS 9 FRIGATES LONDON
AND DESTROYERS AND
OTHER SUPPORT SHIPS PORTSMOUTH

NEW YORK

GIBRALTAR
WASHINGTON
NORTH ATLANTIC

OCEAN

7 FRIGATES AND
DESTROYERS JOIN
TASK FORCE FROM
GIBRALTAR

BRAZIL ASCENSION
TASK FORCE BASE

PARAGUAY

SOUTH ATLANTIC

CHILE URUGUAY OCEAN

ARGENTINA

FALKLAND
IS.
SOUTH GEORGIA
2 APRIL 1982
ARGENTINA INVADES SOUTH
FALKLAND ISLANDS SANDWICH IS.
AND 3 APRIL,
INVADES SOUTH GEORGIA
CD-99-VEGO-18 (JRN)
RECOG

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“…I am coming to see what you are doing in the
military sense…”
VADM Lombardo to BG Menendez, 8th April 1982

“What the hell are you talking about?”

Menendez’s response
 Argentinian Defenses
• Ground attack aircraft.
• AA Missile cover.
• Land-based artillery and truck-
mounted Exocets.
• Air protection by day against
inshore threats from the sea.
• Extensive minelaying.
• Nightly ‘Buenos Aires Express’
air re-supply.
• Submarines?
• Belgrano?
TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE –
As of 30th April 1982
58
 UNITED KINGDOM TASK FORCE
OBJECTIVES

• Establish a sea blockade around the Falklands.

• Establish Sea Control and Air Supremacy around

the Falklands.

• Prepare for the eventual re-possession of the

Falklands.
 • Realistic?

• Overly Ambitious?

• Necessary?
 “Black Buck”

PAYLOAD
21 1000Lb bombs, or
4 Shrike Anti-Radiation Missiles
2,000 Tons Fuel/Mission
• Inter-Service Politics?

• Blind Luck?

• Operational Fires?
 SEA HARRIERS –
From Black Buck
to ‘Black Death’
(“La Muerte Negra”)

AIR POWER?
 ARGENTINIAN NAVAL MOVES
29 April to 2 May 1982
Task Gp 79.1&2
British assessment
Aircraft carrier of possible future
and 2 destroyers ARGENTINIAN moves
Task Gp 79.4
3 frigates

Air Strike

Surface
At sea, the main conception is attack group British
avoiding decisive action by strategic or Operational area of
British Task Gp 1&2 May Task Gp
2 carriers,
tactical activity, so as to keep our fleet escorts and
in being till the situations develop in FALKLAND IS. supply ships
our situation
Rio Grande
air base Surface
attack group

Isle de los
Estados
Task Gp 3 0 200 nm
Belgrano and
2 escorts
 GENERAL BELGRANO, 1- 2 MAY 1982
0 200 nm

TOTAL
EXCLUSION
ZONE (TEZ) Falkland Is.

Operations area of
British Task Force,
1-2 May

Rio Grande
air base

1st Sighted 1400z 1 May

Burdwood Bank
(shallow
Arg Attack Orderedwater)
2307z 1 May
Task Gp 79.3
1 cruiser
2 destroyers
Belgrano
Woodward Reverses
Orders Course
Attack
0811z 2 May
Conqueror Receives new ROE
1711z 2 May

New ROE Sent

Belgrano Sinks
1207z 2 May
1857z 2 May
• Tactical Imperative worth Strategic
Risk?
• Where should OPCON of SMs be held?
• Was Argentina going for the UK COG?
• Were the Carriers the UK’s COG?
 Exocet attack on H.M.S. Sheffield, 4 May 1982
(Positions of ships are accurate but sizes of ships and aircraft
Stanley
are not to scale and flight paths of the Etendards are estimated)
75 nautical miles
from main task force
0 10 20 nm

Coventry
Two Sea Harriers
Flying “racetrack”
patrol pattern
Escort Screen

Glasgow
Alacrity
Brilliant
3. Detected by 4. Exocets Invincible
Yarmouth
Glasgow released
2. Climb to Ft Austin Broadsword
“spot targets” Exocet exhausts
fuel and “splashes” Resource
Glamorgan Hermes
Olmeda (flagship)
Arrow

1. Etendards fly 5. Etendards Sheffield hit at

in at low level turn away 52.50S, 057.16W Supply ships acting
as missile barrier
RECOG

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 British Landing Plans
Landing sites considered but abandoned
(Argentinian forces are noted in brackets)

Port Salvador
Pebble Island
(air base)

Cow Bay
Teal Volunteer
WEST FALKLANDS Beach
Port Howard San Carlos
Port Richards (1 regt) (undefended)
EAST Bluff Cove Stanley
FALKLAND
(1 regt) Goose Green Fitzroy
Fox Bay (1 regt and Deception
air base) operations
by Glamorgan
LAFONIA
(Argentinian forces
in Stanley area:
6 infantry regts,
artillery, armored
cars, air units)
Low Bay
Port Stephens
Bay of Harbours

0 25 50 nm

0 50 statute miles
 Woodward’s Dilemma

• The absence of AEW, and the challenging

surrounding terrain, will frustrate early detection
and cueing for Sea Harriers.

• Giving Sea Harriers sufficient loiter time means

holding the Carriers inside Exocet range.
25 May 1982
 “A Damned Close Run Thing…”

- Admiral Sir John ‘Sandy’ Woodward (1932-2013)

Discussion

1. What would happen if HVUs

were attacked (CoG)
2. How about Argentina’s Sub?
3. Operation Blackbuck fail?
4. CIWS
 CIWS

GOALKEEPER
PHALANX

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 CIWS
AK 630
KASHTAN

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 POINT TO PONDER
• IS IT TRUE THAT THOSE WHO CONTROL
THE SKY, WILL CONTROL THE LAND
BELOW IT?

TENTERA LAUT DIRAJA MALAYSIA 96

 AL-FIIL

TENTERA LAUT DIRAJA MALAYSIA 97

AIR POWER

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AIR POWER

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AIR POWER

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AIR POWER

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AIR POWER

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AIR POWER

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AIR POWER

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 POINT TO PONDER
• IS IT TRUE THAT THOSE WHO CONTROL
THE SKY, WILL CONTROL THE LAND
BELOW IT?

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WHY NATION GO TO WAR?

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WHY NATION GO TO WAR?

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WHY NATION GO TO WAR?

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WHY NATION GO TO WAR?

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WHY NATION GO TO WAR?

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WHY NATION GO TO WAR?

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WHY NATION GO TO WAR?

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 TRINITY COMPARISON

GOVERNMENT

GOVERNMENT

PEOPLE MILITARY
PEOPLE MILITARY

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 KEY WORDS OF WISDOM

‘In order to be
successful in war, all
levels have to be fully
committed to the
offensive spirit,
including those at the
political level’.
 FURTHER READING MATERIALS
• ON WAR, OTTO VON CLAUSEWITZ
• MASTERS OF WAR:CLASSICAL STRATEGIC
THOUGHT, MICHAEL I. HANDEL
• THE EMPIRE STRIKE BACK: THE FALKLAND
CRISIS
• 100 DAYS: THE MEMOIR OF BATTLE GROUP
COMMANDER, COMMODORE SANDY WOODWARD
• SUBMARINE OPERATIONS DURING THE
FALKALND WAR, STEPHEN R HARPER

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