WHAT IS RUSSIA’S STRATEGY IN UKRAINE?

| 06.05.23

“What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.” — Sun Tzu

Churchill famously described Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” More
than eighty years on, perhaps this same sense of mystery obscures the Kremlin’s reasons for
invading Ukraine and annexing parts of it. Much has been written and said about what Russia’s
leadership is trying to achieve in Ukraine and how these objectives are pursued. But what is
Moscow’s fundamental strategy?

Some argue that the current full-scale invasion is a clear example of Russian imperialism, while
others maintain that the annexation is aimed at recreating the so-called Novorossiya. Although
imperialistic and revisionist motivations cannot be ruled out and can, to some degree, influence
both strategic thinking and individual decisions, this view might be rather simplistic. Furthermore,
it ignores a Russian tradition of rational yet idiosyncratic strategic thought concerning
its decision-making in foreign policy.

Yet despite the Kremlin’s misleading rhetoric, opportunistic changing of declared goals, and
general ambiguity, it is imperative that Ukraine and its Western backers understand Russia’s
likely driving political objective and how this is pursued. Misinterpreting Russia’s strategy in
Ukraine obscures what needs to be done to attack it, which is essential to denying the Russian
leadership the chance to declare a political-strategic victory and to securing Ukraine’s future as
a sovereign, economically viable nation. Ukraine and its Western backers must understand
Russia’s strategy to counter and defeat it and force Russia to seriously negotiate with Ukraine,
taking the latter’s terms into consideration.

pág. 1
At a basic level, Russia likely fears that an economically prosperous, democratic Ukraine might
offer the Russian population the prospect of an alternative political and economic system other
than an authoritarian-ruled kleptocracy. This might be partly why Russian President Vladimir
Putin tends to characterize the war in Ukraine as existential in nature, which in turn enables the
Kremlin to further mobilize the population against what it claims are the military and cultural
threats of the eastwardly expanding NATO and EU.

After failing to subjugate the country completely, this then appears to be Russia’s principal
political objective in Ukraine: keeping it from becoming an example of what an alternative political
and economic path might bring the Russian people. Crucially, this is not done solely with military
action, but rather with a coordinated concert of various instruments of power. Russia’s strategy
in Ukraine has thus become one of attrition, using military, economic, and diplomatic activities
to exhaust Ukraine and its Western backers until they accept the current situation as a new
reality. Key to this exhaustion is Ukraine’s ability to resist Russia’s presence on its territory, not
its seemingly infinite will to do so. However, this ability to continue the war effort has become
almost fully dependent on Western support, both military and economic. This is a vulnerability
unlikely to be overlooked by Russian strategists.

More than a Military Strategy

By identifying Russia’s chief political objective, it becomes possible to begin to trace the outlines
of its overall strategy to achieve that objective. Doing so requires a broader view than the
predominantly military-focused lens many analysts, commentators, and pundits use. Analyzing
the course of the conflict and its possible outcomes by mainly assessing which side has suffered
the most significant losses and has the best chances of (re)conquering Ukrainian territories is
shortsighted when considering Russian warfare. Since he published it in an article in Military
Review in 1989, Colonel Arthur Lykke’s formula has become a dominant paradigm through
which strategy is understood. War, as he described it, is a strategic effort guided by political aims
(ends), encompassing military, economic, and diplomatic activities (ways) and the resources
and instruments with which to undertake the effort (means). But this conceptualization is not
unique to American strategic culture or that of the West more broadly. In Russian strategic
thinking, too, war is seen as the use of violence to resolve a policy clash, and these three
activities—military, economic, and diplomatic—form the core components of Russian warfare.
Military activities and objectives should therefore be analyzed in conjunction with diplomatic and
economic activities, objectives, and effects. Combined, these efforts are aimed at contributing
to achieving a political victory, rather than a purely military one. This theoretical framework is
used as a lens to identify Russia’s strategy in Ukraine in pursuit of its assumed political goal,
enabling it to ultimately declare a political-strategic victory.

Tactical losses and operational setbacks in Ukraine tell a story, but an incomplete one. When
assessing how Russia’s military activities contribute to achieving its political goals, it is essential
to do so comprehensively and at the strategic level. After the Russian armed forces’ failed initial
offensive and partial withdrawal in early 2022, their main effort shifted toward the eastern and
southern parts of Ukraine. After the Ukrainian armed forces’ successful fall counteroffensive, the
front line since then has remained largely unchanged. Although it has been argued that the

pág. 2
Russian armed forces have failed in their winter offensive, it remains to be seen whether an
operational-level offensive actually materialized. Another explanation might be that Russian
armed forces launched local, tactical-level attacks to keep pressure on Ukraine’s armed forces.
By forcing them to commit reserves, the Russian armed forces might possibly hinder the
preparation of an anticipated counteroffensive, while simultaneously buying the Russian armed
forces time to prepare a defense in depth. The key takeaway here is that Russian armed forces
seem to consolidate their gains rather than launch coordinated operational-level offensives to
gain new territory. Although there might be purely military reasons for a more defensive posture,
these are presumably subordinate to, for example, the political ambition of conquering and
occupying the remaining parts of the annexed oblasts. Thus, it might be that the current military
situation is deemed sufficient to achieve the desired effects of the economic component of
Russia’s strategy.

Although the effects of sanctions aimed at weakening the Russian economy have
been the subject of widespread analysis, much less has been written on Russian efforts to
weaken the Ukrainian economy. Targeting Ukraine’s economy contributes strongly to the
Russian military-political objective of dismantling Ukraine as a strong, sovereign state. The
Russian main effort in the southeast of Ukraine might not be driven only by goals such as the
protection of ethnic Russians or the return of the historical regions of Novorossiya to Russia.
Instead, underlying economic drivers might also be the aim of annexing these specific regions.
The current occupied territories have a long history as Ukraine’s industrial motor, while during
the Cold War, Ukraine was often referred to as “the bread basket” of the Soviet Union. Important
parts of the former Soviet military-industrial complex are still situated in the southeastern
provinces of Ukraine, and the Zaporizhzhia region constitutes an important producer of metals
and machinery. Prior to the conflict, the Kherson region played a vital role in the production of
vegetable products, vegetable fats, and oils, but with the occupation of the southern regions,
Ukraine has lost about 20 percent of its farmlands. Even if Ukraine succeeds in retaking these
territories, it could take up to ten years to demine and make them usable again.

The macroimpact of this occupation is not to be neglected. As illustrated in Figure 1 (visualizing

regional contributions to Ukraine’s GDP prior to the conflict), the current Russian occupation of
the majorities of the Luhansk (1 percent of prewar GDP), Donetsk (5.2 percent), Kherson (1.6
percent), and Zaporizhzhia (4.2 percent) regions results in a combined loss of 12 percent of
Ukrainian GDP. Moreover, these losses need to be added to the economic losses Ukraine
already suffered following the 2014 annexation of Crimea (3.05 percent of GDP in 2013) and the
occupation of portions of Donetsk (a drop from 10.83 percent of Ukrainian GDP in 2013 to 5.78
percent in 2015) and Luhansk (a drop from 3.62 percent in 2013 to 1.2 percent in 2015) oblasts.
In addition, far-reaching efforts have been made to “Russify” these regions at an accelerated
pace. Ukrainian bank infrastructure and cash holdings were robbed, food stores (e.g., grain)
were looted, Russian telecom providers have been installed, and the Russian ruble has been
introduced as the only accepted means of payment.

pág. 3
Figure 1: Ukrainian GDP by region (percent of total GDP) in 2021, prior to the beginning of the
large-scale offensive. (Source: authors’ visualization based on data from the Ukrainian State
Statistics Service.)

Studying these regions in detail shows that Russia succeeded in occupying key infrastructure of
importance to the rest of the Ukrainian economy. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, for
example, accounted for almost half of Ukraine’s nuclear power production prior to the conflict,
whereas 40 percent of Ukrainian steel was produced in Mariupol. Furthermore, the Russian
offensive in southern Ukraine resulted in the occupation of several of Ukraine’s major maritime
ports (most importantly Mariupol and Berdyansk). This further facilitated Russian efforts to
impose a maritime blockade. This confronts Ukraine with severe logistical challenges, since 75
percent of its foreign trade took place through sea routes prior to the war.. The consequences
of this blockade are tangible for the rest of the world, as Ukraine is the largest exporter of
sunflower oil and one of the main exporters of wheat, barley, and maize. The drop in Ukrainian
exports has had a clear effect on world food prices, particularly in countries that rely heavily on
Ukrainian imports such as Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Despite the Black Sea Grain Initiative,
signed in July 2022, enabling Ukraine to restart exports of grain and other products from the
ports of Odessa, Yuzhne, and Chornomorsk, Russia continues to threaten to abandon deal if
Russian demands are not met. Moreover, insurance costs for shipping companies have
substantially increased, putting pressure on the profitability of export activities. This also partially
explains why Russia identified Odessa as one of the strategic objectives, as taking the city and
the area around it would effectively have allowed Russia to deny Ukraine all maritime exports.

Assessing Russian military-strategic objectives from an economic perspective also illustrates

the rationale for Russia to have fought so hard, and at such cost, for control of Bakhmut—and
pág. 4
for it to continue its war efforts in neighboring eastern regions, like Dnipropetrovsk. This region
is almost absent from discussions as a strategic objective, despite its important and longstanding
role as a center of metallurgy and military industry. During the Cold War, this region was the
world’s biggest producer of nuclear missiles. The economic importance of this region comes to
the fore when we look at the 2021 regional GDP contributions. As demonstrated in Figure 1,
Dnipropetrovsk accounts for over 10 percent of Ukrainian GDP, serving as an important
contributor to the Ukrainian economy. It moreover also serves as a hub for sea shipping. Hence,
if Russia can shift the front line further to the west (getting the region’s key infrastructure into
artillery range would suffice), it would be able to deal another serious blow to the Ukrainian
economy.

Finally, the ongoing conflict forces the Ukrainian state to continue to channel budgetary means
toward the war effort. More than 40 percent of the initially adopted state budget for 2023
was devoted to the security and defense sector, corresponding to 1.1 trillion hryvnias ($30
billion). In March, the budget was amended to further increase spending on defense by an
additional 518.2 billion hryvnias ($14.1 billion). In total, spending on security and defense
amounts to 26.6 percent of Ukraine’s GDP. Ukraine is choosing to prioritize guns over butter—
but Kyiv almost certainly does not feel it has any other choice. Moreover, Ukraine is heavily
dependent on support from the West to finance this spending. The attrition war, therefore, is not
only being executed on the battlefield; both parties are also severely exhausting each other
financially. As long as Russia will be able to exert pressure along the six-hundred-mile-long front
line, Ukraine will be forced to maintain an enormous and costly security disposition.

Meanwhile, Russia’s diplomatic efforts are linked to both its military activities and the effects
these have on Ukraine’s economy. Although Russia’s territorial gains in Ukraine might not seem
impressive considering the military losses incurred to achieve them, Ukraine did witness a 35
percent drop in real GDP and a rise in inflation of over 20 percent. The war has confronted the
country with severe economic challenges. Because Ukraine’s economy is dependent on
substantial financial aid and economic support, Russia’s comprehensive attritional strategy aims
to create a Western political perspective of doubt regarding the prospect of a quick and decisive
Ukrainian victory that can end the war. The Western willingness to continue supporting Ukraine
both militarily and financially is seen as critical for Ukraine’s ability to survive as a viable
sovereign nation and continue its effective defense and counteroffensives. If the Russian military
succeeds in keeping the Ukrainian armed forces from achieving a strategic victory in the
foreseeable future, it remains to be seen what the effect will be on the continuation of substantial
Western support. Russian diplomats might exploit the perspective of an endless war by
displaying a willingness to negotiate while simultaneously voicing a narrative that it is the West
that advocates its continuation. However, an armistice that consolidates the current front line
would give the Russian leadership its desired political-strategic victory. If brokered with the
United States and China, such an agreement would also imply recognition as a world power,
while having demonstrated successful resistance to Western economic and military power,
ultimately bringing Russia’s desired multipolar world closer. Most importantly, however, it will
ensure Ukraine cannot become the economically viable, sovereign democracy that embodies
an alternative reality for the closely related Russian people.

pág. 5
What Does This Mean for Ukraine—and its Supporters?

In crafting strategy, there is a fundamental need to account for that of the enemy. This imperative
is not new—as evidenced by Sun Tzu’s words in the epigraph that opened this article—and yet
states throughout history have made the mistake of making strategy absent a sufficient
understanding of those of their adversaries. It is crucial to assess Russia’s activities in Ukraine
through a multifaceted lens in order to identify the pillars of its overarching strategy in pursuit of
a political victory. Doing so allows Ukraine and its Western backers to attack Russia’s strategy
rather than focusing solely on inflicting losses and recapturing lost territory. In the short term,
Ukraine’s military should consider the safeguarding of its remaining industrial assets in the
center of the country as well as pursuing any opportunity to increase its export volumes. This
will provide the necessary economic means for future independent force generation while
countering the vulnerability of an overdependence on Western financial and military aid that
might become uncertain in the future. As it seems unlikely that the underlying political causes of
the current conflict will be satisfactorily addressed at the negotiating table, the war between
Moscow and Kyiv will be one of protracted attrition. Making Ukraine economically viable and less
dependent on Western support will better enable it to defend against—and attack—Russia’s
strategy. This will allow Ukraine to ultimately tip the balance in the Russian strategic calculus
against the benefits of continuing the war in pursuit of its political goal.

About Authors:
• Marnix Provoost MA is an infantry officer in the Royal Netherlands Army and currently
working as a PhD researcher at the Netherlands Defence Academy.
• Captain Dr. Pieter Balcaen is an officer in the Belgian military and conducts research in the
field of defense economics.

Source:
https://mwi.usma.edu/what-is-russias-strategy-in-ukraine/

Image credit: kremlin.ru, via Wikimedia Commons

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United
States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

pág. 6