Current Debates in the Study of the Industrial Revolution

Author(s): Steven M. Beaudoin

Source: OAH Magazine of History , Fall, 2000, Vol. 15, No. 1, The Industrial Revolution
(Fall, 2000), pp. 7-13
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of Organization of American
Historians
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 Steven M. Beaudoin
Current Debates in the
Study of the Industrial Revolution
TI he industrial revolution represents a tremendous turning
point in human history. As such, it has generated a vast
collection of studies on its nature, causes, and consequences.
These run the gamut from grand theories on industrialization's
diffusion to detailed local studies of its varied impacts (1). This article
strives to bring some order to this assortment by grouping the
literature into four categories: definition and characteristics; context
and causation; impacts and scope; and global implications. The first
three of these categories focus primarily upon the Western experience
because it has served as an example for both those seeking to copy
it and scholars who have studied industrialization outside the West
(2). Since direct imitation is impossible, however, the fourth category
includes the different issues that have arisen from such attempts.
Although far from exhaustive, this brief survey should acquaint
readers with some of the concerns currently shaping this subject and
offer them a starting point for their own forays into the literature.
Definition and Characteristics
Industrialization concerns technology and organization. It is
the adaptation of new technology to the manufacturing process
(such as the replacement of human and animal labor with steam
and electricity) and the invention of new machinery to harness
that power more effectively for both production and transporta
tion. This substitution results in the complete restructuring of
both the manufacture and the marketing of goods. At the same
time, the place of manufacturing in the overall shape of the
economy shifts to accentuate the secondary sector. In the
European case, workshops gave way to factories, small shops
yielded to department stores, and agriculture ceded its promi
nence to manufacturing, which itself witnessed further concentra
tion in the rise of big business.
Despite such deceptive simplicity, the very nature of the industrial
revolution has remained an open question. This is particularly true
in French history. Using W. W. Rostow's model of industrialization
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as a series of stages, historians frequendy wrote of French backward
ness, leading some to question if France had an industrial revolution
at all (3). In recent decades, however, this view has been replaced by
a more nuanced appreciation of French economic growth, which
rivaled Britain's, and the recognition that technological and particu
larly organizational change was more prominent in the realm of
artisanal manufacturing, like the silk and furniture industries, and
not in the expected areas of mining and steel. Without necessarily
creating factories, manufacturers in France began to operate growing
workshops in a manner that increased production and decreased
skill. Though smaller in scale, French workshops came to mirror the
large factories of England in significant ways (4).
More recendy, a debate over the speed and extent of the change
ushered in by industrialization has renewed among British histori
ans. This pits those who depict industrialization as a fundamental
and relatively rapid transformation between 1750 and 1850 against
gradualists who argue that growth rates during these years were
smaller than previously believed, technical change and high produc
tivity were isolated to certain economic sectors like cotton, and
working-class politics followed traditional patterns throughout much
of the nineteenth century (5). Britain was still the world's first
industrial state, but the process was slow and change was incremen
tal. This controversy is often reflected in the choice of the terms
"industrial revolution" or "industrialization" to characterize the
transformations involved. For the most part, the gradualists currently
appear to hold the upper hand. In a recent attempt to "rehabilitate
the industrial revolution," however, Maxine Berg and Pat Hudson
argue that the gradualists have over-emphasized national and aggre
gate data (6). According to these scholars, economic innovation,
alterations in female and child labor, and demographic change are
much more remarkable when analysis shrinks to the regional level.
In the end, most historians have eschewed an older notion of
1750 as a sharp boundary between a traditional, pre-modern world
and the industrial age. Fewer historians thus write of first and second
OAH Magazine of History Fall 2000 7
Beaudoin/Historiography
I portray it as the product of supply-sided economics. Falling
Women at work in the lumberyards, 1919. (Courtesy of the National Archives
and Records Administration, NWDNS-86-6-6S[7].)
industrial revolutions, arguing instead that industrialization was a
lengthy process that extended into the twentieth century throughout
much of Europe. At the same time, while change may have been
gradual, it was no less real for those who experienced it. The
difference lies chiefly in whether one defines industrialization in
economic or human terms. In the marriage of economic and social
history, measuring and labeling such change will continue to cause minor
dispute, but so far, both sides remain committed to at least a common
framework of industrialization. The types of technological and organi
zational change have varied as industrialization spread across the globe,
but the core of this definition retains its efficacy.
Context and Causation
Of course, the debate over the nature of industrialization bleeds
over into the discussion of its causes. Gradualists, for example,
8 OAH Magazine of History Fall 2000
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wages in the late eighteenth century meant that demand
was a weak motivator of technical and organizational
change (7). This runs counter to new work on an
eighteenth-century consumer revolution in Britain and a
proliferation of goods evident in probate inventory studies
(8). This controversy represents a larger concern with the
context in which industrialization developed, for if some
historians have pushed its chronological scope forward,
others have pulled it back. In the process, they have
emphasized the importance of capital formation, demo
graphic growth, and proto-industrialization (9).
In the realm of capital formation, historians have
remarked upon the significant roles of both the state and
world economies. Through mercantilist policies of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European states
amassed reserves of precious metals, built infrastructure,
and protected fledgling industry (10). The wealth gener
ated by the world economy was more significant, however,
because it prevented a severe contraction of the European
economy when wages declined and prices rose in the
second half of the eighteenth century. High demand in
Europe's colonies made up for the drop in buying power
among many European wage-earners. Thus, while a
debate exists over just how important colonial wealth
was to industrial development, with some arguing that it
was the source of investment and others refuting this by
demonstrating that most investment capital came from
domestic sources, world trade remained an essential origin
of materials and markets for fledgling industries (11).
Population growth was another significant spur to
industrialization, particularly the increase in urban popula
tions. By 1800 over twelve million Europeans lived in
cities, up from approximately six million in 1650. This
increase provoked greater spending on infrastructure
and commercial improvements. Furthermore, the rise
of a fashion-conscious urban elite stimulated production
and inspired incentive for cost-saving innovations, par
ticularly in England. The larger numbers of Europeans also
provided a large, mobile workforce for the factories that would
later dot Europe's landscape (12).
Most of the work currently being done on the roots of industri
alization, however, pertains to the relatively new concept of proto
industrialization. This refers to the growth in home manufacturing
that surpassed both family and local needs. By complementing
agriculture with such traditional activities as spinning and weaving,
peasants represented a cheap and plentiful labor supply that allowed
many merchants to meet growing demand. This contributed to
population growth by allowing younger couples to marry, acquainted
larger segments of the population with production and market
experience, and stimulated investment in technological innovation.
Yet some have objected to this thesis as too expansive and ideologi
cal. It groups many traditional activities together in a framework that
 Beaudoin/Historiography

can seemingly only lead to industrialization. It does not take into Family life has also become a subject of intense interest. Initially,
account the diverse nature of manufacturing during this period historians argued that industrialization gave rise to the modern
and the flexibility of the peasant economy, in which some nuclear and affective family (19). While early modem historians have
communities abandoned "putting out" for more intensive agricul successfully countered this view, there is no doubt that industrializa
ture in later years (13). tion transformed the family in significant ways. The chief impact
Still, the concept has won many adherents. For the economic was the separation between work and home, divorcing the family
historian Jan de Vries, it is time to augment the notion of an industrial from its earlier role as a productive unit. However, the transfor
revolution with that of an "industrious revolution" (14). Approach mations that followed proceeded along different paths for the
ing the household as an economic unit, de Vries asserts that during middle and working classes.
the eighteenth century, families broke with traditions of working Among the middle class, the nuclear family prevailed. Where
primarily to subsistence levels and shifted instead to a new form of once women were rational even ruthless entrepreneurs working
resource/time allocation that enhanced their connections with alongside their husbands, factories pushed middle-class women into
markets, both as producers and consumers. So, as real wages the home to concentrate almost exclusively on domestic activities.
declined in the latter half of the century, families increased the What arose was a new "cult of domesticity" (20). Middle-class men,
number of women and children in manufacturing. This maintained too, transformed their ideals to meet new economic realities.
the flow of goods to which the entire family had grown accustomed. Industrialization initially raised the independent factory or shop
De Vries thus accounts for both lackluster economic data during owner to the pinnacle of middle-class manhood. But, as business
what was supposed to be a period of "take-off" and the proliferation concerns grew and more middle-class men found themselves "orga
of goods associated with the consumerism that altered family and nization men," a new concept of masculinity arose in the late
work life and helped spur further change (15). nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "masculine domesticity."
Masculine domesticity permitted middle-class men to base their
Impacts and Scope manhood on their home lives, tinkering in the garages and tending
If much of the debate surrounding the causes and nature of the lawns of their new suburban homes (21). Of course, such ideals
industrialization has fallen into the purview of economic historians, underwent significant revision in the twentieth century as middle
its impacts form a large part of the social history domain. Work class women re-entered the workforce, indicating that industrialization's
experience, social protest, and the family are among the many impact on gender follows no linear path.
subjects that have caught the attention of social historians. On the For the working class, industrialization reinforced the importance
topic of work experience, most historians have moved beyond an of the extended family, as migrants to new industrial cities relied on
earlier standard of living debate that pitted "optimists" against aunts and uncles to acclimate them to their new environment.
"pessimists" to concentrate on how the workday changed for average Similarly, despite the ideal of domesticity, many working-class
workers (16). And here, there is more agreement. Workers suffered women had to work outside the home to support their families,
from tighter discipline while the relationship with employers became forcing them to rely on female kin to tend to their domestic
more impersonal and bureaucratic. This was true not only for early responsibilities. In essence, then, the working-class family re
factory laborers, but also for the growing segment of white-collar mained an economic unit. As such, it defied the social ideal and
workers who staffed government and business offices. Factories and suffered as a consequence. Mothers who worked were deemed
workshops also replaced a traditional emphasis on skill with a inadequate, while their husbands' masculinity was challenged.
routinization that reduced most workers to semi-skilled status. This Moreover, since female networks were often essential to working
change decreased workers' sense of accomplishment and diminished class families, many laboring men felt alienated from both their
the control that skill had once afforded most artisans (17). homes and workplaces. Many working-class men also resented
Not surprisingly, workers fought many o? these changes with the fact that women, since they earned lower wages, could drive down
techniques that ranged from machine-breaking to revolution. For the all wages in the workplace (22). As a result, working women faced
most part, only skilled workers met with success. Some measure o? the real potential for harassment and abuse in both environments.
control eluded semi-skilled workers until the turn of the century, Despite such divergence, working-class and middle-class families
when unionization bridged more traditional separations by craft. did share one attribute; they gradually had fewer children. As
Larger numbers and greater cohesion allowed workers to attain some industrialization progressed, children were pushed out of the workforce,
of their goals. By this point, however, goals had shifted away from becoming a liability because they did not contribute to family
control over the work environment (aside from safety considerations) resources. Initially, children entered factories and worked alongside
to "instrumentalism," using work as an instrument to greater their families just as they had in agriculture. But as middle-class
enjoyment of life outside the workplace. Thus, unions strove reformers tried to force their ideals upon the working class, and as
primarily for shorter hours and higher wages. Demands for more the supervision of working children shifted from their kin to
systemic reforms fell to political parties like the Socialists, which also unknown foremen, pressure to pass child labor laws mounted.
gained influence as democratization spread throughout much of Eventually, however, it was the growing complexity and size of
Europe after 1880(18). machinery that made child labor obsolete. New emphasis on

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Beaudoin/Historiography

mandatory education replaced labor by the end of the nineteenth
century, and ultimately a new stage of life, adolescence, arose to
describe that period after actual childhood had ended but work life
had yet to begin (23).
This catalog of industrialization's impacts could go on to include
such developments as the growth of new state functions to accom
pany labor and welfare legislation and the continued secularization
of European society, but space is limited (24). Suffice it to say that
the industrial revolution had a truly sweeping impact. But this was
not limited to the West. Historians have thus also studied industri
alization as a global phenomenon.
Industrialization as a Worldwide Phenomenon
In this area, historians have split their attention between two
topics: industrialization's impact on the global balance of power and
the spread of industrialization. While scholars readily agree that
industrialization significandy altered the West's position in the
world, they disagree over the exact nature of causation. Traditionally,
historians argued that the economic needs of industrial nations
spurred the search for new sources of materials and markets, leading
to "new" imperialism. But evidence now indicates that Europe
remained its own best trading partner; colonies offered few economic
rewards. It was the perception of that need, particularly the fear of
compering against one another, that mattered most. Industrialization
also contributed the technology that was essential to Europe's
colonization of sub-Saharan Africa, while European rulers used
imperialism to bind industrial workers to their nations, diluting
discontent with tales of imperial escapades and thereby decreasing
the potential for working-class protest (25).
Even in areas that were not colonized, industrialization drew ever
larger numbers into a market-oriented economy. The newly indepen
dent nations of Latin America, for example, developed neocolonial
immigration. By the 1950s, the working class in many Latin
trading ties with European states based on the cultivation of raw
materials for European markets. The village economies that had American states was already politicized, with state-sponsored
co-existed alongside colonial haciendas slowly disappeared as economic support firmly entrenched in their political culture.
more Latin Americans catered to the needs of distant markets for
cheap raw materials. As a result, these nations acquired tremen
dous trade deficits from their enhanced dependence on European
manufactured goods (26).
Finally, industrialization contributed to the growing numbers of
Europeans living abroad. Many aristocrats eagerly participated in
colonial administration because they had been displaced by the
rising middle classes in their home countries, while immigrants
in the Americas were frequently peasants who could no longer eke
out a living in changing European economies or artisans who
resented de-skilling (27).
As for industrialization's spread, conclusions are more tentative,
for this is a process that continues to unfold. In fact, scholars have
offered a new term to describe this development: industrial evolution.
This phrase refers to those areas that have undergone partial
industrialization, like Brazil, where the world's fourth largest com
puter industry thrives alongside industries that retain a reliance on
cheap manual labor, not technology. Therefore, the questions that
drive this area of research concern the causes of industrialization in
latecomer settings, including areas that underwent full industrial
revolutions, especially Russia and Japan, and those that are currendy
in various stages of industrialization, like Southeast Asia and Latin
America. One of the chief factors to emerge from these inquiries is
the importance of the state in amassing the capital needed for
technology acquisition. In the process, these states frequendy press
their populations harder through taxation and promote the develop
ment of nonindustrial export goods. In Russia, the grain trade and
foreign investments spurred early industrialization, while the Stalinist
state completed the process by forcing workers into factories. In
Japan, on the other hand, a more developed commercial economy
added to the profits from a reinvigorated silk industry to fund
technological innovation beginning in the 1870s. One final factor
arises from a comparison of Russian and Japanese innovations:
both societies benefitted from a tradition of selective borrowing
from other civilizations. Russia had previously imitated Byzantine
and then Western culture and technology, while Japan had
borrowed from China (28).
More recently, an interesting debate has developed from
comparisons of the Pacific Rim and Latin America. In seeking to
explain why Latin American industrialization and overall eco
nomic development have proved much less successful than East
Asia's, some scholars have emphasized the importance of culture.
They argue that Confucianism made it easier for leaders to
"squeeze" their populations during the difficult process of moving
from import-substitution to export-substitution (29). Confucian
ism stressed group loyalties over excessive individualism, while
promoting hard work, a somewhat limited consumer demand,
and sacrifice for the good of society and the nation. In Latin
America, on the other hand, unionization and concern for social
welfare were already well established, thanks in part to European
Other scholars argue that culture offers too vague an explanation.
They emphasize, instead, the resources each area had as it
approached economic development. The Pacific Rim was not as
rich in natural resources as Latin America. Thus, Latin American
nations could avoid "squeezing" their citizens by turning to
exports of natural resources, while East Asian populations had to
swallow the bitter pill that came with the implementation of
export substitution and further industrialization (30).
Conclusion
These debates denote a fundamental challenge in the history of
the industrial revolution; its defining characteristics, technological
and organizational transformation, allows vast room for variation.
Today, for example, some scholars write of a "third industrial
revolution" based on information technology. One thing is clear,
however; as the process continues to unfold, there will be no
shortage of historical works on this pivotal transformation in the
history of humankind.

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 Beaudoin/Historiography

Endnotes
1. For recent surveys and literature
reviews, see David Cannadine,
"The Past and the Present in the
English Industrial Revolution,
1880-1980," Past and Present
103(1984): 114-31;PatHudson,
The Industrial Revolution (New
York: Routledge, 1992); Joel
Mokyr, ed., The British Indus
trial Revolution: An Economic
Perspective (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1993); Peter N.
Steams, Interpreting the Indus
trial Revolution (Washington,
DC: American Historical Asso
ciation, 1991); and Peter N.
Steams, The Industrial Revolu
tion in World History (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1993).
2. In this essay, the United States is
included with the West since its
industrial revolution followed
closely the European experience.
3. According to Rostow, these stages
include an initial take-off of tech
nological innovation in certain Englishwomen in munitions factory during World War I. (Courtesy of the National Archivesand Records
Administration, NWDNS-86-G-8B [162 A].)
economic sectors, followed by a
more extended period of adapta
tion during which technology spreads to different areas of 10. On mercantilism, see the excerpts printed in D. C. Coleman,
manufacturing and produces higher growth rates, and finally ed., Revisions in Mercantilism (London: Methuen, 1969);
maturity, in which new technology can be used in all branches and D. C. Coleman, "Mercantilism Revisited," Historical
of production. Some historians have been highly critical of this Journal 23 (1980): 773-91.
interpretation, but it remains a useful tool for comparisons. W. 11. DuPlessis, Transitions to Capitalism, 194-202. On the impor
W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Commu tance of colonial trade, see Sydney Mintz, Sweetness and Power:
nist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961). The Place of Sugar in Modem History (New York: Viking, 1985).
4. For an excellent summary of this debate, see Colin Heywood, The 12. Jan de Vries, European Urbanization, 1500-1800 (Cambridge:
Development of the French Economy, 1750-1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); Daniel Roche, The Culture of
Cambridge University Press, 1995). Clothing: Dress and Fashion in the Ancien Regime (Cam
5. David Cannadine reviews this debate in "The Past and the Present bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Beverly Lemire,
in the English Industrial Revolution." Fashion s Favourite: The Cotton Trade and the Consumer in
6. Maxine Berg and Pat Hudson, "Rehabilitating the Industrial Britain, 1660-1800 (New York: Pasold Research Fund, Oxford
Revolution," Economic History Review 45 (1992): 24-50. University Press, 1991); and Lorna Weatherill, Consumer
7. Joel Mokyr, "Demand vs. Supply in the Industrial Revolution," Behaviour and Material Culture in Britain, 1660-1760 (Lon
Journal of Economic History 37 (1977): 981-1008, reprinted in don: Roudedge, 1988).
Joel Mokyr, ed., The Economics of the Industrial Revolution 13. On the proto-industrialization debate, see Peter Kriedte, Hans
(Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985). Medick, and J?rgen Schlumbohm, eds., Industrialization before
8. Neil McKendrick, John Brewer, and J. H. Plumb, eds., The Birth Industrialization: Rural History in the Genesis of Capitalism
of a Consumer Society: The Commercialization ofEighteenth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Sheilagh Ogilvie
Century England(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). and Markus Cerman, eds., European Proto-industrialization
9. For an excellent introduction, see Robert S. DuPlessis, Transitions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); L A. Clarkson,
to Capitalism in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge Proto-industrialization: The First Phase of Industrialization?
University Press, 1997). (Basingstoke, Eng.: Macmillan, 1985); and D. C. Coleman,

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Beaudoin/Historiography

"Proto-Industrialization: A Concept Too Many," Economic Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1980); Eric Hobsbawm,
History Review 36 (1983). The Age of Capital, 1848-1875 (New York: Scribner, 1975);
14. Jan de Vries, "The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Eric Hobsbawm, Labouring Men: Studies in the History of
Revolution," Journal of Economic History 54 (1994): 249-70. Labour (New York: Basic Books, 1965); William Sewell Jr.,
15. One element of causation that has received little attention in the Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from
last decades is the entrepreneurial spirit evident in early indus the Old Regime to 1848 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
trialization. Early modern historians have indicated that later Press, 1980); David F. Crew, Town in the Ruhr: A Social
economic transformations owe a great deal to seventeenth- and History of Bochum, 1860-1914 (New York: Columbia Uni
eighteenth-century developments, but the cultural components versity Press, 1979); Joan Scott, The Glassworkers ofCarmaux
of that connection are less exact. Keith Thomas, for example, has (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Richard J.
demonstrated a substantial shift in English views of the natural Evans, ed., The German Working Class, 1888-1933: The
world and the concept of risk during the seventeenth century Politics of Everyday Life (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1982);
that has significant implications for the industrial revolution. Gary Gersde, Working-Class Americanism: Politics of Labor in
See Keith Thomas, Man and the Natural World: Changing a Textile City, 1914-1960 (New York: Cambridge University
Attitudes in England, 1500-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); David Montgomery, Workers' Control in America:
Press, 1996). The role of culture is even more pronounced when Studies in the History of Work, Technology, and Labor Struggles
industrialization is viewed in global perspective, given the (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Sean Wilentz,
pronounced lead the Chinese had in technology. Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the
16. On the standard of living debate, see A. J. P. Taylor, ed., The American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New York: Oxford
Standard of Living in Britain in the Industrial Revolution University Press, 1984); and Roy Rosenzweig, Eight Hours for
(London: Methuen, 1975). What We Will: Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City,
17. The classic statement on this topic is E. P. Thompson, "Time, 1870-1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism," Past and Present 19. On the family, see Tamara K. Hareven, "The History of the
38 (1967): 56-97; and E. P. Thompson, The Making of the Family and the Complexity of Social Change," American
English WorkingC/ass(Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1968). Historical Review 96 (1991): 95-124.
See also Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg, eds., Working 20. Mary P. Ryan, Cradle of the Middle Class: The Family in Oneida
Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western County, New York, 1790-1865(New York: Cambridge Univer
Europe and the United States (Princeton: Princeton University sity Press, 1981); Nancy F. Cott, The Bonds of Womanhood:
Press, 1986); Leonard R. Berlanstein, The Working People of "Woman's Sphere" in New England, 1780-1835(New Haven:
Paris, 1871-1914 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1984); and Pe
ter N. Steams, Lives of Labor: Work in a
Maturing Industrial Society (New York:
Holmes and Meier, 1975). On white
collar workers, see Michael Miller, The
Bon Marche: Bourgeois Culture and the
Department Store, 1869-1920 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981); Susan
Porter Benson, Counter Cultures: Sales
women, Managers, and Customers in Ameri
can Department Stores, 1890-1940 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1986); and J?rgen
Kocka, White Collar Workers in America,
1890-1940: Social-Political History in Inter
national Perspective (Beverly Hills: Sage Pub
lications, 1980).
18. On working-class protest and goals, in
addition to the works cited above, see
Charles Tilly, The Contentious French
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard
University, 1986); Patrick Joyce, Work,
Machine room in a Westinghouse factory, ca. 1910. (From Crystal Eastman, Work Accidents
Society, and Politics: The Culture of the and the Law, The Pittsburgh Survey, ed. Paul Wunderwook Kellogg [New York: Charities
Factory in Later Victorian England (New Publication Committee, 1910], facingpage 105.)

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Yale University Press, 1977); Leonore Davidoff and Catherine
Hall, Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle
Class, 1 780-1850 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987);
and Bonnie Smith, Ladies of the Leisure Class: The Bourgeoises
of Northern France in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981).
21. On masculine domesticity in particular, see Margaret Marsh,
"The Suburban Man and Masculine Domesticity, 1870-1915,"
in Meanings for Manhood: Constructions of Masculinity in
Victorian America, ?d. Mark Carnes and Clyde Griffen.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). On masculin
ity in general, see Peter N. Steams, Be a Man! Males in
Modern Society, 2nd ed. (New York: Holmes and Meier,
1990); and the other essays in Carnes and Griffen, eds.,
Meanings for Manhood.
22. Tamara K. Hareven, Family Time and Industrial Time: The
Relationship between the Family and Work in a New England
Industrial Community (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1982); Elinor Accampo, Industrialization, Family Life, and
Class Relations: Saint Chamond, 1815-1914 (Berkeley: Univer
sity of California Press, 1989); and Michael Anderson, Family
Structure in Nineteenth-Century Lancashire (Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press, 1971).
23. In addition to work on the middle- and working-class families
listed above, see Katherine Lynch, Family, Class, and Ideology
in Early Industrial France: Social Policy and the Working-Class
Family, 1825-1848 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1988); Colin Heywood, Childhood in Nineteenth-Century
France: Work, Health, and Education among the "Classes
Populaires" (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); L.
Narindelli, "Child Labor and the Factory Acts," Journal of
Economic History 40 (1980): 739-55; and John R. Gillis, Youth
and History: Tradition and Change in European Age Relations,
1770-Present(New York: Academic Press, 1974).
24. For a general discussion of industrialization's extensive impacts,
see Peter N. Steams and Herrick Chapman, European Society
in Upheaval: A Social History Since 1 750, 3rd ed. (New York:
Macmillan, 1992).
25. J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1965); V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest
Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Oudine (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1975); D. K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire,
1830-1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973); Tony
Smith, Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain,
and the Late Industrializing World Since 1815 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1981); Daniel R. Headrick, The
Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Michael
Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technol
ogy, and Ideologies of Western Dominance (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989).
26. In addition to the essays in The Cambridge History of Latin
America, vol. 6, ed. Leslie Bethell (New York: Cambridge
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Beaudoin/Historiography
University Press, 1986), see Immannuel Wallerstein, The
Modern World System, 2 vols. (New York: Academic Press,
1980); Celso Furtado, The Economic Development of Latin
America, trans. Suzette Macedo (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
versity Press, 1970); Roberto Cortes Conde, The First Stages of
Modernization in Spanish America (New York: Harper and
Row, 1974); and Florencia Mallon, The Defense of Commu
nity in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and
Capitalist Transformation, 1860-1940 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1983).
27. Dudley Baines, Emigration from Europe, 1815-1930(NewYork:
Cambridge University Press, 1995).
28. For an introduction to industrialization's spread, see Steams, The
Industrial Revolution in World History. On issues in latecomer
industrialization, see the classic essays in Alexander
Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspec
tive: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard
University, 1962). On Russia and the Soviet Union, see John
McKay, Pioneers for Profit: Foreign Entrepreneurship and
Russian Industrialization, 1885-1913 (Chicago: University of
Chicago, 1970); William Blackwell, The Beginnings of Russian
Industrialization, 1800-1860 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1968); Reginald Zelnik, Labor and Society in Tsarist
Russia: The Factory Workers of St. Petersburg, 1855-1870
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971); and Hiroaki
Kuromiya, Stalin s Industrial Revolution: Politics and Workers,
1928-1932 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988>.
On Japan, see Marius B. Jansen and Gilbert Rozman, eds.,
Japan in Transition: From Tokugawa to Meiji (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986); Johannes Hirschmeier and
Tsunehiko Yui, The Development of Japanese Business, 1900
1980, 2nd ed. (Boston: G. Allen and Unwin, 1981); and Hugh
Patrick, ed., Japanese Industrialization and Its Social Conse
quences (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
29. Import-substituting industrialization refers to industrializing in
order to substitute domestically produced consumer goods such
as textiles, clothing, and shoes for their imported counterparts.
Export substitution refers to altering the tariff system in order to
then profitably export those items.
30. See the essays in Gary A. Gerefft and Donald Wyman, eds.,
Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America
and East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
Steven M. Beaudoin is an assistant professor of history at Centre
College in Danville, Kentucky, and is currendy serving as director of
the Centre-in-Europe Program in Strasbourg, France. His recent
publications include an entry on the welfare state in the Encyclopedia
of European Social History, and an article on charity and state
assistance in nineteenth-century Bordeaux in the Journal o? Social
History, part of his ongoing research on civil society in late
nineteenth-century France.
OAH Magazine of History Fall 2000 13