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Problem solving techniques in cognitive science

Article in Artificial Intelligence Review · October 2010

DOI: 10.1007/s10462-010-9171-0 · Source: DBLP

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Artif Intell Rev (2010) 34:221–234
DOI 10.1007/s10462-010-9171-0

Problem solving techniques in cognitive science

Joan Condell · John Wade · Leo Galway ·

Michael McBride · Padhraig Gormley · Joseph Brennan ·
Thiyagesan Somasundram

Published online: 6 June 2010

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract For many years, researchers have tried to discover how humans solve problems.
This research has answered many questions, but still many of them remain unanswered.
However, knowledge gained in this field has greatly enhanced our understanding and has
enabled us to design human-like intelligent systems. In the 1920s the Gestalt psychologists
introduced a new field to cognitive science. They discovered that when presented with cer-
tain problems we use insight to reach a solution. In the 1950s Newell & Simon then brought
the field of problem solving into the information age. They experimented with the idea of
problem solving as a search for a solution in a state space. This technique is today utilized in
the field of computing and Artificial Intelligence. This paper reviews techniques and looks at
how we use previous experience gained by solving problems to solve new similar problems,
making analogies between them. Experts’ performance during problem solving is compared
to that of novices.

Keywords Problem solving · Gestalt approach · Analogies · Experts · Novices

1 Introduction

Problem solving is a very important topic in the field of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive
Science. Over the years many researchers have delved into this topic and have gained a great
deal of knowledge about the field. This research has lead to many definitions of what consti-
tutes a problem. One definition of a problem is: “whenever the present situation is different
from a desired situation or goal.” (Bransford and Stein 1984, p. 3). From this definition, the
following would constitute a problem: “You have been watching a very interesting television
series, which concludes this evening at 6.30pm, but you have a very important meeting at
the same time. You also have to watch the children tonight as your spouse is working. What

J. Condell (B) · J. Wade · L. Galway · M. McBride · P. Gormley · J. Brennan · T. Somasundram

School of Computing and Intelligent Systems, Faculty of Computing and Engineering, University
of Ulster at Magee, Londonderry, Northern Ireland
e-mail: j.condell@ulster.ac.uk

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222 J. Condell et al.

Fig. 1 The initial state of Tic

Tac Toe

Fig. 2 The goal state of Tic Tac

Toe

do you do?” The answer to this is simple, you arrange a baby sitter, set the video recorder to
record the television program, and attend the meeting. Many cognitive scientists would not
consider this as a problem as the solution is too obvious to come by. Therefore, a problem is
constituted by involving some complexity that requires some thought that is not immediately
obvious (Goldstein 2005). A more complete definition is therefore: “a problem occurs when
there is an obstacle between a present state and a goal and it is not obvious how to get around
the obstacle” (Goldstein 2005, p. 388). This criterion satisfies most cognitive scientists.
There are only two categories of problem, well-defined and ill-defined. In a well-defined
problem, the solver is provided with all the necessary information to solve the problem. All
of the relevant information can be broken down into four parts, information about: the initial
state, the goal state, legal operators, and operator restrictions (Kahney 1994).
The game of Tic Tac Toe (Fig. 1) can be used to show how these four parts make a well-
defined problem. The game starts with an empty 3 × 3 grid, this is the initial state. Then
the first player places an X into one of the empty sectors. This is a legal operator and also
an operator restriction as the player can only place an X in an empty sector. The second
player then places 0 in one of the empty sectors. Again, this is a legal operator and operator
restriction. The game continues like this until one of the players makes a straight line of three
in the horizontal, vertical or diagonal plane, or the grid is full, this is the goal state (Fig. 2).
From this example it can be seen that there is no ambiguity involved when trying to solve this
problem as the players are aware of exactly what legal moves to use in order to be successful.
In an ill-defined problem, little or no information is provided for the four parts during
the description of the problem (Kahney 1994). A good example of an ill-defined problem is:
How can we jump three double-decker buses? In this problem we know the goal state but we
are not provided with any information about the other 3 states. Do we have to do it on foot

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Problem solving techniques in cognitive science 223

Table 1 Nichelli’s experiments

Task Location of brain activity

Identifying chess pieces Pathway, occipital lobe to temporal lobe

Determining location of pieces Pathway, occipital lobe to parietal lobe
Thinking about making a move Premotor area
Remembering a piece’s moves Hippocampus
Planning and executing strategies Prefrontal cortex

or can we use a vehicle? Do we have to do it from the ground or can we use a ramp? This
example demonstrates how a lot of ambiguity can arise when a problem is ill-defined.
In Sect. 2, a discussion on the different areas of the brain used during problem solving
and the importance of these different areas is given. Then in Sect. 3, a review of the early
work done by the Gestalt psychologists who introduced this field in the 1920s is presented.
This is followed by Sect. 4, where an exploration of problem solving as a search within a
problem space is given. Section 5 explores research on how previous experience of problems
can be used to solve future problems by making parallels between the two problems. Sec-
tion 6 examines the differences between experts and novices during problem solving. Finally,
Sect. 7 provides a summary and conclusion.

2 Areas of the brain used during problem solving

In 1994 Nichelli and his co-workers carried out experiments to discover which areas of the
brain were used during problem solving. They used a positron emission topography (PET)
scan to discover the activities in the brain during a game of chess. The results showed that
there are essentially six areas of the brain activated during a game of chess. These results
can be seen in Table 1 (Goldstein 2005). Nichelli’s work can be verified by looking at what
each of these areas is responsible for.
By looking at what each of these areas are responsible for we can see if Nichelli’s results
were accurate. The occipital lobe is located at the rear of the brain as can be seen in Fig. 3. It is
used in the processing of visual information and eye movement (neuroanatomy.html 2005).
There are two temporal lobes in the brain, one on each side (Fig. 3). They help to sort new
information and are believed to be responsible for short-term memory (brainanatomy.html
2005). From this information, it can be seen that the occipital lobe and temporal lobe would
both be involved in the identification of chess pieces: the occipital lobe to process the pieces
that are seen and the temporal lobes to identify them, therefore the pathway between would
be active at this point.
The parietal lobe is located at the top of the brain (Fig. 3) and is mainly responsible
for processing somatosensory information such as touch, vibration, pain and position sense.
Damage to the right hand side of the lobe can cause viso-spatial defects (brainanatomy.html
2005). Again from this information it can be seen that the occipital and parietal lobes would
indeed be used and therefore the pathway between them.
The premotor area is located at the back of the frontal lobe. It is responsible for initiat-
ing and modifying movements (ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 2005). It can be seen that this reinforces
Nichelli’s results where they discovered that this area was responsible for thinking about
making a move.

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224 J. Condell et al.

Fig. 3 Areas of the brain

Fig. 4 The hippocampus

The hippocampus is located inside the temporal lobe (Fig. 4). Psychologists generally
agree that it plays a major part in the formation of new memories (episodic memory).
Researchers also believe that the hippocampus plays an important role in finding short-
cuts and new routes between familiar places (en.wikipedia.org 2005). Again, this informa-
tion reinforces Nichelli’s results when they discovered that the hippocampus is involved in
remembering pieces’ moves.
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is found in the cortical regions of the frontal lobe. It is par-
ticularly important for planning and executing strategies. One symptom of PFC damage is
perseverance; this causes the patient difficulty in switching from one pattern of behaviour to
another (Goldstein 2005). Nichelli’s results again, are reinforced by this information.
These areas, while being the major areas used during problem solving, are not a definitive
list. It would be impossible to find all of the areas that are used during this process, as the
number of differing real world problems is vast. Problems of differing natures require dif-
ferent parts of the brain and therefore it would be a safe assumption that during our lifetime
we use all major areas of the brain solving problems.

3 The gestalt approach

Gestalt psychologists were responsible for carrying out some of the earliest research into the
area of problem solving in the 1920s. Originating in Germany in the early twentieth cen-
tury, the Gestalt school of psychology, founded by Wertheimer, Kohler, and Koffka devel-
oped hypotheses about higher-order cognitive processes which emphasized the organizational

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Problem solving techniques in cognitive science 225

principles involved in the perception of objects and problems (Posner 1989). Primarily con-
cerned with theories of perception, the Gestalt psychologists viewed perception of objects
and forms in terms of the whole being more than the sum of the parts, and when an object
or form is perceived there is a tendency towards a perception that has ‘good form’, or ‘good
gestalt’. With regard to perception, Wertheimer formulated the Laws of Gestalt Forms. The
six laws state that objects viewed as a whole may be made up of elements that are: near to
each other; similar to each other; contain continuity in their contour; have uniform direction;
have a tendency to enclose each other; have unity through experience. This concern with
perception formed the basis for the Gestalt school’s work on problem solving, which was
primarily concerned with the perception of the relations among the elements of a problem
and the new perception needed in order to realise a solution. Successful problem solving
required creating a cognitive representation for the perception of the objects involved in a
problem then reorganizing this representation to form a new representation that permits a
solution to be determined. This new perception was termed ‘insight’; often occurring just
before a solution is realised (Goldstein 2005; Hunt and Ellis 2004).
The Gestalt approach distinguished between learning and problem solving through its
focus on productive, rather than reproductive, thought processes. The use of prior experience
in problem solving was considered as ‘learning’ and therefore of no use to an understanding
of the role insight played. Much of the Gestalt school’s work on factors that affect the prob-
lem solving process reflect misrepresentations caused by reproductive thought. The use of
productive thought was believed to produce an understanding of the relationships between
the objects in a problem, thus leading to abstract thought processes that could be applied to
future problems.
Wertheimer’s study of geometry problem solving in which both productive and reproduc-
tive methods were used to determine the area of a variety of parallelograms illustrated the
contrast of both approaches. Participants taught to use a reproductive approach, involving
the use of a series of steps to calculate the area of geometric shapes in a given training set,
were generally unsuccessful at finding the area of geometric shapes not presented in the
training set. Participants taught to use a productive approach, by considering the structural
relationships within the geometric shapes, were able to apply abstract thinking to calculate
the area of the new and novel shapes (Hunt and Ellis 2004).
To facilitate the study of insight on problem solving, a number of problems were devised
which involved multi-step tasks, where the solution quickly becomes apparent after the key
steps of a task are performed. Kohler’s classic studies of animal problem solving, Duncker’s
‘Candle Problem’, Maier’s ‘Two-String Problem’, and Luchin’s ‘Water Jug Problem’ helped
illustrate and define factors that have a detrimental effect on the problem solving process.
In Kohler’s experiments, captive chimpanzees were placed in a caged area containing boxes
and sticks and were required to use the boxes and sticks to grab bunches of bananas placed
out of reach of the caged area (Anderson 2005; Hamlyn 1969).
As illustrated in Fig. 5, the Candle Problem presents participants with candles, matches
and a box of tacks. The participants are asked to mount a lit candle on a wall without wax
dripping onto the floor. In the Two-String Problem, illustrated in Fig. 6, participants enter a
room containing two strings, suspended from the ceiling in such a way that it is impossible to
grasp both at the same time, and a pair of pliers. The problem posed is to tie the two strings
together.
Solutions for the Candle Problem (see Fig. 7) and the Two-String Problem (see Fig. 8)
require participants to perceive new relationships between objects specified by the problems.
Forming a new representation of the box used to hold the tacks, as a support for the candle
rather than as a container, in The Candle Problem, and a new representation of the pair of

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226 J. Condell et al.

Fig. 5 The candle problem

Fig. 6 The two string problem

pliers, as a weight to create a pendulum rather than as a tool, in The Two-String Problem,
allows the respective solutions to become clear. Similarly, the chimpanzees in Kohler’s study
need to form new representations of the sticks and boxes as longer sticks and climbing frames
with which to reach the bananas (Anderson 2005; Goldstein 2005).
When Duncker performed The Candle Problem experiment, the participants were split
into two groups, presenting one group of participants with all the necessary materials in boxes
and the other group of participants with all the materials separate from their boxes. It was dis-
covered that the problem was more difficult to solve for the group presented with the materials
inside boxes, whereas the group of participants presented with the empty boxes were twice
as likely to solve the problem (Goldstein 2005). In Maier’s experiments with The Two-String
Problem, only 39% of participants were able to solve the problem within the first 10 min.
Sixty-percentage of participants were unable to form a new representation of the pliers as a
weight and were therefore unable to solve the problem (Anderson 2005; Goldstein 2005). An
inability to perceive new relationships, due to prior representation through experience of an
object involved, is known as the metal set effect entitled ‘Functional Fixedness’. Functional
fixedness causes the participant to dwell on the particular function of an object, inhibiting
the formation of a new representation. An example of the Water Jug Problem, as illustrated
in Table 2 (Goldstein 2005), presents participants with three different sized jugs and requires

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Problem solving techniques in cognitive science 227

Fig. 7 Solution to the candle problem

Fig. 8 Solution to the two string problem

Table 2 The water jug problem

Problem Jug A size Jug B size Jug C size Desired quantity Solution

1 3 77 21 50 B-C-2A
2 8 80 4 60 B-C-2A
3 5 43 12 21 B-C-2A
4 6 42 9 21 B-C-2A
5 3 49 23 20 B-C-2A, also C-A
6 4 48 18 22 B-C-2A, also C-A

the measurement of specific quantities of water. Each quantity uses a set combination of the
jugs however, for the latter quantities a more efficient combination is possible. By performing
studies using insight problems, the Gestalt psychologists discovered and defined a number
of factors that have a negative effect on the problem solving process.
The Water Jug Problem illustrates another form of mental set effect termed the
‘Einstellung’ effect. Translated as ‘mechanisation of thought’, this set effect shows that

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228 J. Condell et al.

repeated mental activity often creates problem solving strategies which persist inappropri-
ately into new situations. To arrive at a solution to the Water Jug Problem participants repeat-
edly use the same strategy for the first set of required quantities though need to discover
an alternative strategy for the last set of quantities. Due to a tendency for sticking to proven
strategies, the same strategy is typically used to obtain the solution for the last set of quantities
even though a shorter solution is possible. For the Gestalt school of psychology, functional
fixedness and mechanisation of thought emphasised the inhibiting effect that prior knowledge
and experience can have on the process of problem solving (Anderson 2005; Goldstein 2005;
Hamlyn 1969; Hunt and Ellis 2004).
Gestalt psychology’s approach to problem solving was primarily concerned with the ini-
tial representation of a problem and the new representation formed when a problem is solved,
distinguishing cognitive processes that produce abstract thought from the role of prior expe-
rience and learning. Questions concerning the underlying processes and structures used in
the manipulation of representations that occur during problem solving remained unanswered
until the birth of the modern era of cognitive science, and the information processing approach
to problem solving, in the late 1950s.

4 The Information based approach

The symbol or information based approach to problem solving is centred about the premise
that solving problems can be achieved by manipulating information. This may have been
happening as part of human problem solving for many years but it was not possible to show
that only symbol-based strategies were used to solve the problems. With computer simula-
tions it became possible to show that symbol based systems work. The fact that symbol based
problem solvers can solve problems was shown by the “General Problem Solver” by Newell
and Simon in 1957, it was capable of using purely symbol based approaches to solve prob-
lems (Newell and Simon 1976, p. 116): “Symbol based systems, have necessary & sufficient
means for general intelligent action”. It was proposed by Newell and Simon that the gestalt
approach as it deals with problem solving can be explained completely with the information
based approach. A problem can be thought of as a search for a way from the initial position
to the goal.
The problem solver may be human or a machine. The problem is represented by a set
of facts. These facts are linked to make complex structures that tie together. A fact struc-
ture is called a schema. The schema must accurately represent the problem and its world
to allow problem solving. The problem space holds the full range of organisations of the
problem. A specific version of a problem is called a state and the problem space is the state
space.
To explore the state space it must be possible to change from the present state to another
one. This is done by using operators. These operators will be defined dependant on the state
space and are setup at the beginning or new operators can be found from the state space. In
basic terms a simple operator says, if X is in the state then Y may be produced from it. It
is possible for many operators to be active for a single state, so mapping the complete state
space into a graph is complex. A visual version of the state space is a state space graph or
tree. As the root of the tree the initial state can have zero or more child states depending
on how many operators are active. Each child state may have zero or more active operators.
The number of active operators is called the “Branching Factor”. The effect of having more
child states as the state tree grows is combinatorial explosion. It is one of the reasons that

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Problem solving techniques in cognitive science 229

Fig. 9 The Towers of Hanoi

Fig. 10 The hill climber

problem

problem solving is difficult. Surveying such a state tree is hard for humans as it takes time;
even computers find the searching of large trees impractical.
The ‘Towers of Hanoi’ problem space shown in Fig. 9, presents a sample search space for
a well defined problem. This search space is limited as only a small set of operators are active
at any time. The search tree is still quite large with similar results appearing many times. It is
clear that a real world problem with many operators active at a time will be more complex. In
Fig. 9, states are repeated in patterns which are used by intelligent problem solvers to reduce
the work of searching the state space, with bad options avoided so reducing the search.
In searching, many different ways of deciding how to search the state space are used.
These search strategies can make solving the problem easier or nearly impossible. The sim-
plest way of choosing which operator to select is called Backup Avoidance (Parkin 2001).
This method chooses the operators which do not make changes that lead from the goal state.
Backup avoidance is used by people as it is simple to do. Another very similar and simple
strategy is Difference Reduction. This strategy looks at the available operators and chooses
the one which will make the largest improvement toward the goal state. This means that the
improvement may approach a solution which cannot be improved on as all the operators will
make a move away from the goal state. This can cause the strategy to become stuck in a
non-goal state. This effect of being almost there but not quite means this approach can be
called a hill climbing approach (Fig. 10).
The problem solver starts of in a valley with mountains on all sides. The problem is to get
to the highest point possible. The problem solver knows that they are at the bottom of the
valley but do not know which mountain is higher so one slope is chosen. The only operator
available is to climb higher. The problem solver reaches the summit of this mountain and it is
not the highest one it may be what is called a local minimum or in this case a local maximum.

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230 J. Condell et al.

The problem solver has come to a sub optimal solution. Recovery from this solution may be
made by travelling back from the peak of the mountain and trying another ascent. This is a
strategy which takes a blocked solution and works back from it until another operator can
be chosen. This is called backtracking and is used to avoid a bad solution by trying other
solutions. Backtracking is used to work from the goal to the initial state. This is useful for
state space trees with large branching factors.
The general problem solver uses a more powerful strategy than these, called means end
analysis. This strategy is used to set sub goals instead of concentrating on the main goal
which is blocked. It then chooses operators which may help reach a solution to the problem.
Means end analysis compares alternate approaches to problem solving. An important part
of this strategy is evaluating different operators and selecting the best ones for a particular
problem. This is where intelligence comes into play (neuroanatomy.html 2005). While a
chess computer evaluates a million branch search tree, a human expert will only examine
around 100 branches before making a move.
The discovery of new operators is a vital part of solving problems as a new operator may
be needed to solve the problem. Various strategies to do this have been noted in humans
and animals. The simplest is discovery (Parkin 2001). In this technique, testing in the state
space is carried out until a new way of changing the state space is found. This is the only
way presumed possible for most animals. The method of observing others and replicating
their solutions was seen with higher primates and humans. The final method, being told of
the operator, requires language and is presumed to be available only for humans (Parkin
2001).

5 Using analogies to aid problem solving

Using analogies is a general problem solving strategy which requires a problem solver to
use the solution of a similar problem in order to solve the current problem. General strate-
gies are known as heuristics because although they are often successful, they do not guar-
antee success in contrast to algorithms, which use a procedure of steps that guarantee a
solution.
Success in using analogies depends on both recognising the similarity between the two
problems, and recalling the solution of the analogous problem. Since the recall of a solution
is required, this technique depends more on Long Term Memory (LTM) than other general
strategies do, for example means-end analysis and sub goals.
An example of how an analogy is applied to problem solving can be shown by using the
Missionaries and Cannibals problem. The problem can be stated as follows:
Problem: Five missionaries and five cannibals who have to cross a river find a boat, but the
boat is so small that it can hold no more than three persons. If the missionaries on either
bank of the river or in the boat are outnumbered at any time by cannibals, they will be eaten.
Find the simplest schedule of crossings that will allow everyone to cross safely. At least one
person must be in the boat at each crossing. (Reed 2004)
Solution: This problem can be solved by allowing a cannibal to take the boat back and
forth across the river while carrying a single passenger at a time, starting with a mis-
sionary and then alternating between cannibal and missionary passengers on successive
trips.
An analogous problem to this is the Jealous Husbands problem. It involves three husbands
and their three wives trying to cross a river. The boat is only able to carry two persons at a
time and no woman can be left in the company of another woman’s husband unless her own

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Problem solving techniques in cognitive science 231

is present. If the solution to the Missionaries and Cannibals problem is known, it can be used
to solve the Jealous Husbands problem, by substituting; husbands for missionaries, wives for
cannibals, and then pairing each couple on the same bank of the river.
In experiments (Reed 2004) it was expected that it should be easier for someone to solve
the Jealous Husbands problem after first solving the analogous problem. However, their
results showed that this was not the case. One reason suggested for this was that people did
not know the relation between the two problems. When the relation was pointed out, it helped
them solve the first problem, but not the second.
These results showed that the successful use of an analogy does not occur as readily as
might be expected. One explanation is that it is difficult to remember the correct solution
when it consists of a long sequence of moves. This suggests that the use of an analogy should
be more effective when the solution is easier to remember.
Another example of how an analogy is applied to problem solving can be shown using
the Radiation-Dispersion problem.
Problem: A tumour was located in the interior of a patient’s body. A doctor wanted to destroy
the tumour with rays of radiation. The doctor wanted to prevent the rays from destroying the
healthy tissue. As a result, the high-intensity rays could not be applied to the tumour along
one path. However, high-intensity rays were needed to destroy the tumour. So applying one
low-intensity ray would not succeed.
Solution: The doctor therefore divided the rays into several low-intensity rays. He positioned
the low-intensity rays at multiple locations around the patient’s body. The low-intensity rays
simultaneously converged on the tumour. In this way the rays destroyed the tumour (Reed
2004).
Gick and Holyoak (1980), investigated whether more people would discover the solution
to the Radiation-Dispersion problem if they were first exposed to an analogous solution. In
their experiment, they gave subjects a military story to read in which a general is trying to
capture a fortress with his army, but mines along the roads prevent him from attacking with
his entire army from one direction. Therefore, the general sends small groups of his army to
attack the fortress from different directions so that they converge on the fortress at once and
capture it. In the investigation, more than half of the subjects who were given the analogous
story gave the correct solution, as opposed to 8% when the analogy was not given. However,
when the analogy was given, but the hint linking the two stories was omitted, the success
rate greatly decreased. People could generate an analogous solution when prompted, but
they did not spontaneously recognise the similarity between the two problems. One reason
given for this is that the analogy preserves relations among the concepts in a problem but
the concepts themselves differ (Gentner 1983). In this case, the concepts that differ are those
of the army/rays and the fortress/tumour, while the solutions to both problems preserve the
relations of breaking up and converging. Therefore to use the analogy people need to see the
relationship between the two problems in a more general schema.
In a later investigation, Gick and Holyoak discovered that people were more likely to
form a general schema if they read and compared two analogous stories before trying to
solve the Radiation-Dispersion problem (Gick and Holyoak 1983). Tests performed using an
additional problem regarding dampening an oil fire by spraying many small hoses on the fire
at once showed that people who read both the military and fire stories were more likely to find
the solution to the Radiation-Dispersion problem. Thus, by creating a general schema, people
are more likely to think about the solution in general terms. It has been further suggested
that there is sufficient evidence to show that specific problems and more abstract schemata
are used in analogical reasoning. One theory is that analogous problem solving begins by
using the solution to a specific problem but as the solution is applied to other problems a

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232 J. Condell et al.

more abstract schema is formed. Forming these more abstract schemata is an important part
of acquiring expertise (Reeves and Weisberg 1994).

6 Experts versus Novices

An expert is a person with special knowledge or ability to perform an allocated task skilfully.
A novice is someone who is new to the field or activity. Recent studies on problem solving
indicate that there is a variation between the way an expert and a novice solve problems.
According to Larkin et. al., experts solve problems using means-end approaches (Larkin et
al. 1980). In a means-end approach, a person works “backward” from the unknown to the
given information. A novice however, writes down the problem, associated known terms and
then tries to identify the unknown. For example, for a given mathematical equation, a novice
moves from equations to variables, while an expert moves from variables to the equation.
An early study on how experts and novices differ in problem solving was demonstrated by
DeGroot (deGroot 1965). This study explored how chess masters out-think their opponents.
DeGroot concluded that experts are able to think through all the possibilities before making
a move. In other words, they make a greater breadth search than novices. Experts are also
able to predict all the possible counter moves of the opponent for every move considered.
Here they make greater depth first search. They are capable of recognising meaningful chess
configurations and the strategic implications of these situations. This recognition enables
them to outperform their opponents because their moves and counter moves are of a higher
quality than the novice.
Larkin et. al. also discovered vast differences between experts and novices when solving
problems based on physics (Larkin et al. 1980). Their study concludes that experts arrange
their knowledge in a hierarchical fashion and their solutions are more specific to the problem
at hand. Novices, on the other hand, have less knowledge of the problem, and hence their
solutions are more sparsely connected and poorly organised. Experts also classify physics
problems based on underlying concepts and use multiple representations to clarify the prob-
lem, whereas, the novice based such problems on the surface feature and tried to solve the
problem in a very basic manner.
Experiments on other similar expert domains such as electronic circuitry (Egan and
Schwartz 1979), radiology (Lesgold 1988) and computer programming (Ehrlich and Soloway
1984) have been carried out. These studies provided similar differences between experts and
novices identified by Larkin et al. (Larkin et al. 1980) and DeGroot (deGroot 1965). Simi-
larly, Schenk et al.., tried to understand how experts and novices differ (Schenk et al. 1998)).
They identified five main differences between the two. The first of these differences is that
novices have less knowledge about the problem domain, and therefore find it difficult to
ask appropriate questions during an information gathering interview. Overlooking important
questions during this phase might lead to inappropriate solutions. Novices tend to verba-
lise user involvement, experts on the other hand, are more willing to involve users during
the system development stage. Experts tend to react more to specific triggers in the prob-
lem-solving process, whereas, novices are more likely to react to general triggers. Novices
provided less verbalisation about hypothesis testing compared to experts. Experts generate
more goals compared to novices. Having limited goals might lead to an incomplete structure
to the problem.
Experts normally recognised features and patterns differently compared to novices. For
example, the information gathered by experts from texts, slides and videotapes are differ-
ent compared to novice (Sabers et al. 1991). Similarly, Easton and Ormerod (Easton and

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Ormerod 2001) argued that experts view management and marketing problems differently
compared to novices. Their study had many conclusions. One of these was that both experts
and novices spend equal time in solving and analysing a problem. However, the experts
provided more alternative recommendations, identified a greater number of critical issues,
and used more evaluation criteria compared to novices. Also the experts provided qualitative
solutions and novices provided more quantitative solutions. The experts tended to reach to
recommendations at a later stage of analysis but the novices provided recommendations at
an earlier stage. The novices tended to focus upon an outcome, whereas the experts tended
to focus upon process issues. The experts’ analysis was deep compared to the novices. They
also found that the experts provided richer analysis for open ended cases compared to more
constrained cases. The novices, on the other hand, provided similar quality analysis for both
open ended and constrained cases.
In contrast, Marshall (Douglas 2002) did not find any differences between novice and
expert when solving accounting problems. However, Curtis and Lawson (Curtis and Lawson
2002) explored how experts and novices perform in adventure computer games. They state
that the higher the knowledge and experience a person has on these games the better they
perform. Similarly, Bonnardel and Marmeche (Bonnardel and Marmeche 2004) found that
experts are more likely to provide enhanced creative ideas compared to novices in design
projects.
Existing studies showed that experts have the ability to reason and solve problems on a
meaningful pattern and are able to provide multiple solutions to a given problem compared to
novices (Hung 2003). In addition, an expert seeks to develop an understanding of problems
that involved thinking in terms of core concepts or big ideas like Newton’s second law in
physics. Novices, on the other hand, are much more likely to be organised around big ideas
and are more likely to search for correct formulas and use answers that fit their everyday
intuitions. Another important characteristic of an expert, unlike the novice, is their ability
to retrieve relevant information for the problem at hand. However, they take more time than
novices to solve a problem as they spend more time in analysing and understanding the
problem.
Finally, it must be remembered that experts only out perform novices in their own field
of expertise. When they are asked to solve problems outside of their expertise they perform
just the same as novices. This happens because experts rely greatly on previous experience
and gained knowledge about their field (Goldstein 2005).

7 Conclusion

This continuing research in the area of problem solving in cognitive science is of great impor-
tance if we are to develop more life-like systems in the disciplines of intelligent systems and
artificial intelligence. Goldstein said: “a problem occurs when there is an obstacle between
a present state and a goal and it is not obvious how to get around the obstacle.” (Goldstein
2005, p.388). This paper has given an overview of the issues related to problem solving and
the research that has been carried out in this field. We have seen the typical areas of the brain
used during this process and how they interact to provide a solution. We have also reviewed
the early research carried out by the Gestalt psychologists who found that our ability to
solve problems depends on how we restructure the given information to reach a solution.
This then led on to Newell and Simons experiments which explored problem solving as a
search in a problem space. We have also looked at how we can make analogies between
similar problems. This can help us reach solutions in new, similar problems. This topic ties

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234 J. Condell et al.

in with how experts deal with problems. Experts rely greatly on previous knowledge gained
by experience to solve problems in their field. This results in them using different techniques
from that of novices in the field.

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