Professional Documents
Culture Documents
(Heidelberg)
Unreliable narrators abound not only in fiction and film, but, unfortu-
nately, in real life, too. From little children to leading politicians, unreliable
narrators can be found everywhere. Since it is in the interest of human
beings to manipulate others to make them behave in a way that ensures
their own well-being and survival, miscommunication has even been
called a part “of the proper functioning of social communication”
(Sperber 2006: 177). According to this worldview, deception and manipu-
lation are ingrained in human interactions. On the other hand, sociologists
have emphasised the crucial importance of reliability and trust “as a basic
fact of social life […]. [A] complete absence of trust would prevent [man]
even from getting up in the morning” (Luhmann [1968] 1979: 4). Social
interactions run more smoothly, and time and cognitive effort are saved
when people who communicate with one another do not have to ask
themselves in what possible ways and to what ends the narrator might be
trying to deceive them. Trust is therefore the starting point for defining
the rules of proper conduct; its function is the reduction of complexity (cf.
ibid.: 8, 21). Following Niklas Luhmann, researchers in different disci-
plines proceed from the premise that, as a necessary condition (and result)
of human interaction, trust is the basis of social life. 1 Unfortunately,
however, trust has to be distinguished from knowledge. The decision to
believe in the reliability of a person always involves a risk and may be
misguided and entail radical consequences for the future behaviour of
both speaker and listener.
We are therefore faced with a situation fraught with contradictions: As
narrators, we may profit from telling unreliable tales; as listeners, we need
reliable information. It has even been claimed that human beings have
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1 Trust has a number of positive consequences in that it “enables cooperative behavior; […]
reduces harmful conflict […] promotes effective responses to crisis” (Rousseau/Sitkin/
Burt et al. 1998: 394). Even the economy depends on the trust of buyers both in material
goods and shares.
framework in which the terms are embedded; for without this framework,
it would be impossible to fully gauge their meaning. Third, the meth-
odology—in particular, the criteria for identifying (un)trustworthy
narrators—should be explored in an interdisciplinary framework. Both
this third aspect and a fourth one, creating a typology of unreliable
narrators, are concerned with issues common to most interpretations of
particular fictional works; so far, however, they have not incorporated per-
spectives gained from other fields. The last aspect focuses on the question
of which functions unreliable narrators can fulfil. The second part of this
introduction provides a brief overview of the contributions to this
volume.
____________
accepted definition of trust is “a psychological state comprising the intention to accept
vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another”.
Quoted after Rousseau/Sitkin/Burt et al. (1998: 395); see also Möllering (2009: 140);
Möllering/Sydow (2005). Economics places significant emphasis on the role of institutions
and sanctions for breaking rules.
10 Reliability, then, is regarded as one of several dispositions that people ascribe to those
narrators whom they decide to trust. In such definitions, reliability is a sub-category of
trust (see Schweer/Thies 2005: 56). The three aspects listed here are further differentiated
and expanded in a list of 18 categories that Laucken elaborates in his brilliant article (2005:
99–109).
11 However, different scholars define reliability in different ways; Habermas (1976: 435) also
connects it to sincerity since this is the disposition which will guarantee that the speaker
will do as he says. In medicine, unreliability serves as the cover term for all kinds of aspects
that raise “questions about the accuracy of reported information” (see the contribution by
Jarmila Mildorf in this volume). For a conceptualisation that refers to the future action of
the partner, see Schipper/Petermann (2011: 246).
12 Cf. Schweer/Thies (2005: 57); Möllering (2001: 413).
13 In social psychology, trustworthiness is closely linked to (source) credibility, which has
been connected to a number of factors like expertise, attractiveness, power and dynamism.
The results of a large number of empirical studies are, however, ambivalent. For a review
of pertinent studies see Pornpitakpan (2004).
In this section, I will briefly explore some criteria for identifying unreliable
narrators put forward within the field of literary studies, which are, of
course, geared towards the interpretation of fictional narratives; they do
not cover many of the criteria that have been developed in other dis-
ciplines but which might be useful for analysing narratives. The schematic
outline may also prove helpful for other fields, just as I hope that literary
studies will profit from the criteria applied in other disciplines.
Since the criteria for detecting unreliability in narratives are situated
within, and cannot be understood apart from, the theoretical frameworks
in which they are embedded, the respective theory will serve as a reference
point of this outline. Within rhetorical narratology, the “degree and kind
of distance” (Booth 1961: 155) between the implied author and the
narrator serves as one criterion; but though there are very lucid and con-
vincing interpretations of particular literary works that feature unreliable
narrators, it is not entirely clear how one can measure this degree and kind
____________
14 Cf. Grice (1989: 368–372). In light of the first maxim, the question of truthfulness, it
seems necessary to consider what Geoffrey Leech has termed the ‘Politeness Principle’ as
well, since general rules of conversation often prohibit telling true stories which might be
embarrassing or otherwise inappropriate. Leech distinguishes between the tact maxim, the
generosity maxim, the approbation maxim, the modesty maxim, the agreement maxim and
the sympathy maxim.
15 See Sperber/Wilson (2002: 6–9); Wilson/Sperber (2004: 608, 611, 613). This makes it im-
possible to consider deliberate liars as part of “[u]nreliable narratives [which] ‘quietly and
unostentatiously violate a maxim’ (Grice 1975)” (Heyd 2011: 7). Both lying on the part of
narrators, and the intention of making the narrator the butt of the dramatic joke by
(implied) authors cannot be covered by Grice’s approach.
1.3 Typology
The most striking difference between the types of motives (and persons)
involved in untrustworthy narrations is that between people who set out
to deceive others and try to profit from their misconceptions and people
who want to tell the truth but are unable to do so. The reasons behind this
incompetence can be manifold: it might be due to a lack of insight into
the facts, some kind of emotional involvement or even obsession that
leads the narrators to distort events, a more general inability to interpret
and evaluate what is going on, the application of an inadequate pattern of
explanation or evaluation, or sheer incapability as far as social and
narrative conventions are concerned. In spite of this wealth of reasons
which may cause the involuntary self-delusion of narrators, the underlying
similarities between these various reasons deserve to be stressed as well as
the radical differences to those of the other type of storyteller who delibe-
rately misleads his or her audience. In line with these observations, the
category of intentionality plays a large role in several contributions to this
volume. Schematically, one might refer to the two basic types as the liar
and the fool—though admittedly there can be complex combinations such
as the case of a deliberate liar who at the same time fools himself.
Within literary studies, the typology of untrustworthy narrators is a
matter of contention. At first the research was concerned with identifying
different character types such as the madman, the picaro, the naïf, or the
clown; but these kinds of detailed and not very fruitful distinctions soon
gave way to another discussion which centred on the question of whether
only a homodiegetic narrator (i.e. a narrator who is part of the story world
and tells about his or her own experiences) can be called untrustworthy, or
whether ‘authorial’, heterodiegetic narrators can be called unreliable too.
This discussion made perfect sense for two reasons: First, omniscient,
own story or becomes the butt of the irony. The contributions in this
volume start from these distinctions between different kinds of unreliable
narration and further explore their distinctive features.
1.4 Functions
There are many functions that unreliable narrations may fulfill. They can
damage relationships, destroy trust, make listeners buy goods they never
wanted in the first place or, if recognised as unreliable, make them aware
of personality traits of the speaker. In different social contexts, the
detection of unreliable narrators can evoke pity just as well as hatred; it
can do damage just as well as good. The functions that unreliable
narrations can serve differ quite substantially in different disciplines; they
depend on the main research questions, the theoretical frame, and the
methodology employed.
From the narrators’ point of view, the most important function is to
convince others of the truth of their stories. As far as storytelling is con-
cerned, there are other aims involved, too, such as the interest to amuse or
entertain, to show what a good guy one is, to establish common ground or
a common identity, to become accepted by others, to break the ice, or
simply to pass the time. However, nearly all of these additional functions
in some way involve an interest in being believed; if the narrator is sus-
pected to be a fraud or a liar, he or she will have difficulty realising his
communicative intentions. We must also differentiate between the aims
and intentions of those who willfully misrepresent the truth and those
who unwittingly and naïvely want to share their misguided view of the
events.
The same difference between liars and fools should be noticed when
one explores the consequences that unreliable narrations have for those
people who are exposed to them. One might posit that a narrator who
deliberately distorts the events in face-to-face communication probably
causes some kind of damage to those listeners who believe him or her
since they act upon mistaken beliefs and probably suffer from the results
of these actions. While the liar often profits from misrepresentations, the
opposite seems to be the case with regard to unwitting but sincere
narrators. Since the latter are likely to involuntarily provide signals that
make it possible to detect their untrustworthiness, they cause damage pri-
marily to themselves. If they are recognised as untrustworthy, listeners will
arrive at less than favourable conclusions about the personality traits,
competence or ethics of the narrator in question. Moreover, narrators
who unwittingly provide insight into their ways of thinking make it
This short outline of the main aspects which are discussed in this volume
shows that there is a lot of ground to be covered. At the same time, there
are many noteworthy studies which have provided valuable insights into
the topics of (un)reliability and (un)trustworthiness. An important work
unreliability can be found in verbally told stories and in films, but that
there are media specific ways of establishing unreliability. His probing into
signs of unreliability leads him to conclude that, in particular con-
stellations, “partiality are signs of narrative reliability rather than of
narrative unreliability” (235), an insight that is, in slightly different form,
also stressed by Stephan Jaeger in his analysis of unreliable narration in
historical studies. Moreover, Brütsch agrees with other contributors to this
volume that there is no fixed relation between the type of narrative
situation (i.e. homo- or heterodiegetic narrators) on the one hand, and the
three kinds of unreliability on the other.
Markus Kuhn’s exploration of “(Un)reliability in Fictional and Factual
Audiovisual Narratives on YouTube” adds another facet to the study of
intermedial issues by discussing key topics concerning the identification of
(un)reliability in narratives across new media. Concentrating on several
narrative formats of audiovisual storytelling on YouTube, Kuhn differ-
entiates several concepts and criteria that impinge upon reliability-judge-
ments of users. He develops a theoretical framework in which he stresses
the impact of “intermedial and other media- and genre-specific contextual frames
of reference” (248). He refers back to Ansgar Nünning’s exploration of
generic and contextual frames of reference, but his discussion at the same
time provides further substantiation of the importance of interpretative
frames explored by Liesbeth Korthals Altes in this volume. In particular,
Kuhn draws attention to the alleged factuality of the tale and its cor-
respondence to events in the real world and uses Manfred Hattendorf’s
definition of authenticity in order to highlight the importance of the
believability of the media-specific narrative mediation of the events. This
appearance of trustworthiness is linked to the effect of filmic strategies
creating the impression of authenticity, i.e. stylistic patterns serving as
“signposts of authenticity”. Paying close attention to the rapid changes in
genre conventions and authenticity markers in several kinds of audiovisual
storytelling on YouTube, Kuhn singles out some combinations of devices
such as the hand-held camera or breaking the fourth wall by directly
talking to the camera. At the same time, however, he emphasises the
rapidity and simultaneity of counteractive processes: conventions are sub-
verted more or less at the same time at which they are established. The
study of (un)reliability on YouTube therefore has to be highly aware of
the particular context, of intermedial references, of the use (and possible
manipulation and functionalisation) of media-specific “signposts of
authenticity”, and of negotiation processes and commentaries by the
users. Though many of Kuhn’s insights can be transferred to other modes
of storytelling on the Internet, the example of unreliability in particular
forms of audiovisual narrative on YouTube points to a broad range of
they begin by explaining how various kinds of legal discourse narrate and
differentiate between binding (prescriptive) and non-binding (empirical)
texts. In addition, they unravel the implications of the setting of norms,
which are backed up by prototypical (though culturally variable) stories—
and which, in turn, can influence the interpretation of facts and the way in
which they are related to the law in question. Interestingly, von Arnauld
and Martini do not exclude binding legal texts and judgements from their
analysis. Narratives play a role in the decision finding process, too, since
the statements of witnesses are directed by questions concerning what is
relevant to the (breaking of the) law in question, and the judge selects and
integrates those parts of the stories that seem to be both pertinent and
reliable “into her own version of legal and factual reality—eventually, she
creates a legally valid and enforceable master narrative laid down in the
opinion of the court” (357). The criteria that von Arnauld and Martini list
for establishing the unreliability of a narrator are similar to, but also
different from those used in narratology: internal consistency; the pro-
vision of details and the expression of an adequate degree of emotionality
on the part of the narrator; external consistency (including the relation to
other stories and a ‘hegemonic’ narrative) and plausibility with regard to
culturally accepted notions of ‘normality’. The authors stress that, on the
one hand, the “ruling establishes the facts of the case; it determines the
law because it is legally entitled to do so” (361), and thus, by definition,
cannot be illegal. However, they also emphasise that the judgement may
be illegitimate and unreliable. This is demonstrated by their analysis of a
legal case study, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court
on the penalisation of sibling incest from 2008, which was finally upheld
by the European Court of Human Rights in 2012.
Stephan Jaeger’s exploration of “Unreliable Narration in Historical
Studies” also deals with the (un)reliability of the narratives of witnesses,
but he adds another dimension to the discussion in that he focuses on
historical studies. Three quotes from historical texts, placed at the begin-
ning of his chapter, highlight the importance of as well as the difficulty in
determining unreliability in different types of historical works. On the one
hand, similar to a judge, a historian is held to give an unbiased, correct
account of what happened; on the other hand, objectivity is unattainable.
In the first part of the chapter, Jaeger explores the conceptualisations of
unreliability in historical studies as well as the critical methods which are
developed to deal with the problem. ‘Source criticism’, that is the critical
evaluation of the historical text which is studied in order to get insight
into past events, is differentiated from the possible bias as well as value
judgements of historians, which Jaeger relates to the discussion of
objectivity and partiality. After an analysis of three different approaches to
the narration of past events, all of which have to face the problem that all
that is left are traces of a past, which at best add up to incomplete
narrations, the second part of the chapter deals with three narrative levels
of (un)reliability and (un)trustworthiness: primary narration, which con-
sists of the sources and the narratives of witnesses, and a secondary level,
on which Jaeger locates the (un)reliability of the historian’s discourse and
the reliability of the historian; and a third level, which also concerns the
potential unreliability of the historian’s narration; but in contrast to the
use of unreliability in the other articles of this volume, this kind of un-
reliability turns out to be both correct and sincere on a higher level: It
concerns an “unreliable narration [which] consciously undermines the
supposedly reliable narrative” (380). In this mode of writing, historians do
not fill the infinite gaps of history or smooth over and synthesise con-
trastive sources by integrating them into a seamless narrative. Instead, they
use metanarration or provide multiple points of view to highlight the gaps
and contradictions. According to Jaeger, this reveals the unreliability of
the account and makes it more reliable at the same time.
Jarmila Mildorf’s investigation of the different types and consequences
of unreliability in patients’ narratives demonstrates not only the overlap
between the questions that are asked in medicine and in narratology but
also supplies cogent arguments for a dialogue between the two fields.
Mildorf begins with a brief sketch of the two different approaches to
patients’ unreliability in medicine, clinical approaches on the one hand,
and narrative medicine and the medical humanities on the other, which
attempt to detect and deal with patients’ unreliability in completely differ-
ent ways. She also differentiates between various terms used for the de-
scription of those narratives that do not conform to physicians’ data; her
definitions of unreliability, nondisclosure, self-disclosure, deception and
dissimulation highlight both the correspondences between and the differe-
nces to narratological conceptualisations of different types of unreliability.
Revealing the grave repercussions that both the deliberate feigning of
symptoms and the unintended distortion of facts (or the incongruity be-
tween the terms and language of the patients and those of the physicians)
can have, she calls attention to the possible damage an insufficient under-
standing of unreliable narratives can cause. Mildorf succeeds decisively in
showing the potential importance of applying (and developing) narrato-
logical categories for the analysis of patients’ narratives.
The section comprising different disciplinary approaches to (un)relia-
ble narration and (un)trustworthiness closes with Brigitte Boothe’s and
Dragica Stojković’s exploration of unreliability in dream reports. This is
related to Mildorf’s chapter as such narratives are often recorded during
sessions in which patients tell their dreams. Boothe’s and Stojković’s
Works Cited