Chapter 4

Article 32 (1) - A constitutional monarch is to be named Yang-di Pertuan Agong

- YDPA is the supreme head of the federation

Article 39 - The executive authority of YDPA

Article 40 (1) - Limitation for YDPA’s authority

- “shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister”

Article 40 (2) - Performance which YDPA can act is his discretion

Article 43 (2)(a) - YDPA shall appoint the Prime Minister

- PM must be a member of the HOR
- PM shall commands the confidence the majority of the house
- YDPA appoint cabinet members from either House of Parliament with
advice of PM

Article 43 (4) - If PM ceases to command majority, he should tender resignation

Article 43 (7) - PM must a be Malaysia citizen

Article 44 - Legislative authority is vested in a Parliament

Article 55 (1) - Function YDPA: summon Parliament and not allowed 6 months elapsed

Article 55 (2) - Function YPDA: YDPA may dissolve a Parliament earlier than 5 years
tenure

Article 55 (4) - Function YDPA: Parliament to be summoned not more than 60 days after
the general election

Article 66 (4) - Function YDPA: assent the bill within 30 days

Article 45 (1)(a) - Function YDPA: Appoint members of senate

Article 45 (1) - HoS shall consist of 70 members

Article 45 (2) - YDPA appoints ‘best character’

Article 47 & 48 - Eligibility to be a senator

- Eligibility to be member of HoR

Article 46 - HoR made up of 222 elected members

Article 48 (3) - YDPA has power to disqualify a person from being member of House of
Parliament

Article 63 - All members of Parliaments are entitled to some privileges

- Examples from clause (1) to (3)

Article 63 (4) - Privileges in clause (2) are not applied to those commit offences
- Case: Mark Koding v Public Prosecutor [1982]
 Mark Koding v - The accused, a member of the House of Representatives, made a speech in
Public Prosecutor Parliament which was thought to be seditious and he was charged with
[1982] committing an offence contrary to s 4(1)(b) of the Sedition Act 1948 (Act
15).
- The court held that the accused right of free speech in Parliament given by
Article 63(2) of the Federal Constitution has been validly limited by the
subsequent constitutional amendment with the addition of Article 63(4).

Article 43 (3) - Cabinet members are responsible for members of Parliament

Chapter 5

Article 74 (1) - Functions of legislative body (parliament)

Article 80 (1) - Functions of Executive body (cabinet and PM)

Article 43 (2) - The appointment of cabinet members to show the absence of distinct
separation of power

Article 43 (3) - Cabinet is collectively responsible to the Parliament

Article 63 (1) - Validity of legislative (parliament) proceedings cannot be questioned in

court (judiciary)

Article 4 (1) - Judiciary can question the validity of law passed by the legislative bodies
on the grounds of constitutionality

Article 42 - YDPA may give pardons to offenders

Article 122B - YDPA appoint judges on the advice of Prime Minister

 Chapter 6
Article 160 - The absence of Islamic law as part of the source of law in the country
Article 4 (1) - Constitution is the supreme law of the land
- Any law passed that is inconsistent is void
Mamat Daud v PP [1988] - Section 298A of the
Penal Code
- Article 4(1) of the FC
Dewan Undangan Negeri - Article XXXIA of
Kelantan v Nordin Salleh & Part I of the Kelantan
anor [1992] Constitution
- Article 10(1)(c) of the
FC
- Article 10(3) of the
FC
- On May 13, 1983, Mamat Daud and two others
allegedly committed a federal crime. They acted as
unauthorised bilal, khatib and imam at a Friday prayer
at Kampong Kenanga, Wakaf Tapai in Kuala
Terengganu.
- They were charged for "doing an act which is likely to
prejudice unity amongst persons professing the
Islamic religion" under s.298A of the Penal Code
- The case against them was stillborn as the Supreme
Court, in a 3:2 majority judgment in 1987, ruled that
the offending s.298A, which was introduced in 1983
(the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code
[Amendment] Act 1983) was unconstitutional.
- The majority judgment held that Parliament did not
have the power under the Constitution to make a law
with regard to the religion of Islam (except for the
federal territories). That power belonged to the states
as Islam is a state matter.
- Plaintiff was elected to DUN after winning seat as a
representative of Semangat 46
- Plaintiff withdrew Semanagt 46 and join UMNO.
- Article XXXIA states that ‘any member of Kelantan’s
legislative assembly resigns for ny reason such
member ceases to be member of any party’.
- The Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the
enactment which prohibited party-hopping, was
inconsistent with Article 10(1)(c) of the Federal
Constitution, a provision that allows freedom of
association.
- The Supreme Court declared that such a law was
invalid because the restriction imposed by the
Kelantan constitution could not be imposed under
clauses 2(c) and (3) of Article 10 as it was a law
passed by a state legislature and not the federal
Parliament.
Muhamad Juzaili Mohd - Section 66 of the - The respondents in this case, three Muslim men with
Khamis & Ors V. State Shariah Criminal Gender Identity Disorder, filed a judicial review
Government of Negeri Enactment application at the Seremban High Court seeking a
Sembilan & Ors [2015] - Article 5(1) of the FC declaration that section 66 of the Syariah Criminal
- Article 8(1) of the FC (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment of 1992 was
unconstitutional.
- Section 66 “makes it an offense for any Muslim male
person to do any of the following in a public place: to
wear a woman’s attire, or to pose as a woman.”
- The High Court dismissed the application. However,
the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court’s
decision and declared that section 66 was
unconstitutional on the grounds that it interfered with
the respondents’ right to live with dignity and right to
life, that it discriminated based on gender, and that it
violated the respondents’ freedom of movement and
freedom of expression.
- The Federal Court then overturned the Court of
Appeal’s decision that the Shariah law on anti-cross
dressing was unconstitutional and void.
- It further said that the Court of Appeal had no
jurisdiction to declare the law unconstitutional.

Article 3 (1) - Islam is the religion of Malaysia

Che Omar B. Che Soh v PP Article 3 (1) - ​It was argued by the appellant that since Islam is the
[1988] religion of the federation, and since the Federal
Constitution is the supreme law of the land, the
imposition of the death penalty upon drug traffickers,
not being an Islamic law per se and not in accordance
with hudud or qisas laws, is contrary to Islamic
injunctions and is therefore unconstitutional.
- Supreme court held that the provision in Article 3(1)
does not actually give the meaning that Malaysia is an
Islamic state, where in reality Islamic law only applies
to Muslims merely in matters of personal laws.
- And since the Constitution makes a clear distinction
between private law and public law, offences like drug
trafficking are under the Federal List, and therefore
constitutional.
Hajah Halimatussaadiah v
Public Service Commission
Meor Atiqulrahman Bin Ishak
Dan Lain-Lain Lwn Fatimah
Bte Sihi Dan Lain-Lain [2000]
Article 11(1)
Article 11(4)
Lina Joy v. Majlis Agama
Islam Wilayah & Anor [2007]
- Paragraph 2.2.1 of the
Service Circular No.2
of 1985
- Article 11(1)
- Regulation 3(i)(i) of
School Regulation
1997
- Article 11(1) of the
FC
- Freedom of Religion
- Right to profess
- Restriction of Right to propagate
- Article 11(1) of the
FC
- Article 121(1A)
- The applicant brought an action in the High Court
challenging the validity of her dismissal by the Public
Service Commission (“the PSC”) and sought a
declaration that paragraph 2.2.1 of the Service
Circular No. 2 of 1985 which prohibited the wearing
of “Purdah” was null and void.
- The high court dismissed her case and her appeal was
also unsuccessful
- Mohamed Dzaiddin SCJ in delivering the judgment of
the court said: ‘It is trite that art 11(1) of the
Constitution guarantees the freedom of religion, where
every person has the right to profess and practise his
religion.
- However, such right is not absolute as art 11(5)
provides that this article does not authorize any act
contrary to any general law relating to public order,
public health or morality.
- The appellants wore turban as a part of the school
uniform to school. They were advised repeatedly not
to do so and to comply with the School Regulations
1997 but they refused. As a result on 3 November
1997, the Appellants were expelled from the school.
- The Appellants were unsatisfied and brought the case
to the court on the ground their right under article
11(1) of the Federal Constitution was denied.
- Court held, the School Regulations 1997 in so far as it
prohibits the students from wearing turban as part of
the school uniform during school hours does not
contravene the provision of Article 11(1) of the
Federal Constitution and therefore is not
unconstitutional.
- In this case, the applicant had applied to the National
Registration Department to change her name from
Azlina Bte Jailani to Lina Lelani and in support stated,
inter alia, that she intends to marry a person who is a
Christian.
- It was held that art 11(1) gives a person the right to
profess a religion of his choice but if Muslim wishes
to convert out of Islam only the Syariah Court is
competent to determine the matter’.
- Since the plaintiff was still a Muslim, Article 121(1A)
of the FC provides that the finality of her decision to
convert out of Islam was within the competency of a

Hjh Halimatussaadiah bte Hj
Kamaruddin v Public Services
Commission, Malaysia &
Anor [1994]
Sulaiman Takrib v Kerajaan
Negeri Terengganu; Kerajaan
Malaysia (Intervener) &
Others [2009]
Article 121 1A
Ainan Bin Syed Abu Bakar
(1939)
(conflict of interference
between civil and Syariah
courts)
Article 3(2)
- Service Circular No.2
of 1985
- Article 11(5) of the
FC
- Article 11 of the FC
- ss. 10 and 14 Syariah
Criminal Offences
(Takzir) (Terengganu)
Enactment 2001
- High court does not have jurisdiction in matters of Syariah Court
- Section 112 of the
Evidence Act 1950
- Malay rulers are Head of Islam in their respective states
Syariah Court, and not the civil courts.
- In this case, a female clerk in one of the state’s legal
adviser’s office persisted in wearing the purdah, a
piece of cloth that concealed the entire face of a
woman except the eyes, to the office despite the
advice of her employer.
- This contravened a government circular which
prohibited female civil servants from wearing attire
covering the face during office hours.
- The court held that the appellant’s fundamental right
to practice her religion is not infringed by the dress
code (virtue of article 11(5)).
- Among the other grounds of the judgment, the court
opined that the prohibition against the wearing of the
attire covering the face by female civil officers did not
affect the constitutional right to practice her religion.
The wearing of the purdah had nothing to do with the
constitutional right to profess and practice the Muslim
religion.
- Sulaiman was charged with offences under ss. 10 and
14 Syariah Criminal Offences (Takzir) (Terengganu)
Enactment 2001
- The petitioner argued inter alia that the power of the
SLA of Terengganu to create offences under item 1 of
List II of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal
Constitution is limited to the creation of offences
against ‘the precepts of Islam and that the offences
under ss 10 and 14 of the SCOT were not offences
against ‘the precepts of Islam’.
- The court held that any argument regarding ‘any law
that seeks to control the propagation of doctrines and
beliefs among persons professing the religion of Islam
is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent with
article 11 of the FC or any other provision’ is doomed
to fail from the start.
- The High Court decided that a child born to a Muslim
woman four months after her marriage to a Muslim
man is the legitimate child of that man by relying on
the provisions of section 112 of the Evidence
Enactment which clearly contrary to Islamic law.
 FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES
Article 5
Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya
Perkhidmatan Pendidikan &
Another [1996]
(right to life)
Public Prosecutor v Yee Kim
Seng [1983]
(right to life restricted by law)
Sukma Dermawan v Ketua
Pengarah Penjara Malaysia &
Anor [1999]
(right to personal liberty)
Right to life and personal liberty
- Article 5(1) of the FC
- Article 5(1) of the FC
- Section 57(1)(b) of
the Internal Security
Act 1960
- Article 5(2) of the FC
- The case concerned the allegedly wrongful dismissal
of Tan Tek Seng, a senior assistant of a primary
school.
- Tan was deprived of gainful employment without a
fair hearing, under this broad interpretation of Article
5, his dismissal was wrongful and unconstitutional.
- In ruling in his favour, the Court of Appeal held that
Articles 5 and 8 of the Constitution, which protect
personal liberty and equality under the law, must be
read with a liberal and not literal approach.
- [Article 5(1) means] all those facets that are an
integral part of life itself and those matters which go
to form the quality of life.
- In this case the accused had been charged for being in
possession of a hand-grenade in a secure area without
lawful excuse and without lawful authority, an offence
punishable with death under section 57(1)(b) of the
Internal Security Act, 1960.
- Counsel for the accused raised a preliminary issue and
submitted that the mandatory death sentence
prescribed under section 57(1)(b) of the Internal
Security Act, 1960 is unconstitutional as it infringes
articles 5(1)
- the High Court dismissed the argument by stating that
Article 5 (1) of the Federal Constitution was not
infringed because the accused was not deprived of his
life or personal liberty except under the law, for
instance, the Internal Security Act 1960, a valid law
passed by Parliament.
- "law" refers to valid law, no matter how harsh.
- The appellant was charged with an offence of gross
indecency under s 377D of the Penal Code and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six months.
- He subsequently moved the High Court for a direction
of a habeas corpus on the grounds that the sessions
court had no jurisdiction over him and therefore, his
detention in prison was void.
- The judge from the Court of Appeal held that the
expressions "unlawfully detained" and "detention"
employed in Article 5(2) do not apply to the case of a
person held in a prison in execution of a sentence
passed by a court of competent jurisdiction. (session
court was competent)
Chong Kim Loy v Timbalan
Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam
Negeri [1989]
(rights to be informed on the
grounds of arrest)
Abdul Rahman v Tan Jo Koh
[1967]
(rights to be informed of the
grounds of arrest)
Ooi Ah Phua v Officer in
Charge of Criminal
Investigation [1975]
(Right to consult and be
defended by a legal practitioner
of one’s own choice )
- Accused was detained under the order of the Deputy
Minister of Home Affairs under Section 6(1) of the
Dangerous Drugs [Special Preventive Measure] Act
1985.
- Accused was told the grounds of his arrest is related
to drug trafficking but was not informed that the arrest
is correlated with mandatory death punishment in
conjunction with Section 39B Dangerous Drugs Act
1952.
- The judge derived that “the right is to be informed at
the earliest possible moment, not in details and not
necessarily in strict legal terminology, but only in
general terms, by virtue of what power he is being
arrested and of the grounds of his arrest. But, enough
must be made known to him to afford him the
opportunity of giving an explanation of any
misunderstanding.”
- Article 5(3) of the FC - The respondent suspected the appellant of carrying a
concealed weapon upon his person and the respondent
asked the appellant whether he carried any. On the
appellant denying possession of any weapon, the
respondent invited the appellant to go to the police
station to be searched.
- The appellant refused to go to the police station
immediately and thereupon the respondent arrested
the appellant. The appellant however resisted the
arrest and he was dragged to the police station.
- The appellant then filed for damages for false
imprisonment for not being told of his arrest.
- The court held that the respondent had told the
appellant in the coffee shop regarding what the
respondent suspected the appellant of carrying.
- It was also held that if the reason was withheld, the
arrest and detention would amount to false
imprisonment, until the time he was told the reason.
- Article 5(3) of the FC - The subject had been arrested by the police he was
formally charged for armed robbery.
- Father of the subject, instructed solicitors and counsel
to attempt to see the subject but was unsuccessful.
- the appellant applied for a writ of habeas corpus and it
was alleged that the right given in Article 5(3)
regarding the right to be consulted was denied by the
police.
- The court held that the right of an arrested person to
consult his lawyer begins from the moment of arrest
but that right cannot be exercised immediately after
arrest.
- A balance must be struck between the entitlement of
 the arrestee and the duty of the police to collect
evidence.

Article 6 Freedom from slavery and forced labour

Article 7 Protection against retrospective criminal laws and repetitive trials

PP v Mohamed Ismail [1984]
(protection against
retrospective criminal laws)
- Article 7(1) of the FC
- Section 39B(1) of the
Dangerous Drugs Act
1952
- The accused was charged for an offence of trafficking
in a dangerous drug, to wit, cannabis, in contravention
of section 39B(1) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952
- On the day when the accused was found guilty, the
impugned provision was amended to provide for the
mandatory sentence of death upon conviction in all
cases of trafficking in contravention of the provision.
- Before the amendment, the Court had the option of
sentencing the accused to death or imprisonment for
life.
- The public prosecutor invited the court to impose the
enhanced penalty.
- In refusing the request, the judge held that the
amendment could not apply to the defendant’s case as
it was enacted after the offence had been committed.

Fan Yew Teng v PP [1975]
(exception for double jeopardy:
quashing of early trial)
- Article 7(2) of - An MP was prosecuted and convicted of sedition.
the FC - ​On his application, the whole proceeding was quashed
because of a failure to hold a mandatory preliminary
enquiry.
- Subsequently, the MP was prosecuted again for the
same offence and it was held that the first trial having
been quashed, the retrial does not violate the principle
of double jeopardy.

Jamali Adnan v PP [1986]
(exception for double jeopardy:
different offence)
- Article 7(2) of - In Jamali bin Adnan v PP the person charged (Jamali)
the FC was sentenced for an armed robbery with 2 revolvers
- Internal under the Internal Security Act 1960. He was later
Security Act charged again under the same Act for having bullets
1960 as well.
- The court here found that the essential ingredients (the
points) of both the offences were not the same. This
made the second charge against Jamali, which was in
possession of the bullets, valid.

Mohamed Yusoff Samadi v AG
[1975]
(exception for double jeopardy:
disciplinary proceedings)
- Article 7(2) of - The plaintiff, who was a school teacher, had been
the FC charged with five charges of using criminal force to
- Regulation 11 four girls in his class to outrage their modesty. He was
of the Public acquitted on those charges.
Service - The Public Service Commission instituted
(Disciplinary disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff with a
Proceedings) view to his dismissal under regulation 11 of the Public
Regulations, Service (Disciplinary Proceedings) Regulations, 1970

PP v Musa [1970)]
(exception for double jeopardy:
administrative detention)
Re Datuk James Wong Kim
Min [1976]
(exception for double jeopardy:
technical errors)
Article 8
Public Prosecutor v Tengku
Mahmood Iskandar [1973]
(equality)
Noorfadilla Ahmad Saikin v
Chayed Basirun & Ors [2012]
(gender equality)
1970 - He argued that the impugned provision is ultra vires
article 7(2) of the Federal Constitution as it is
improper for the Public Service Commission to
proceed on the same charges.
- The court held that the disciplinary proceeding is
valid.
- The subsequent proceeding is non-criminal in nature
and is in a forum different from a criminal court, there
is no violation of Article 7(2).
- Article 7(2) of - The respondent had been detained under s 8(1)(a) of
the FC the Internal Security Act 1960 (Act 82) since 1963
- S 8(1)(a) of the - In 1968 he was served with a restriction order and it
Internal was for breach of this order that he was charged
Security Act again.
1960 (Act 82) - He argued that the Minister is precluded from
charging him again.
- It was held that if the detainee was previously under
administrative detention under the Internal Security
Act, there is no bar to a subsequent criminal trial on
the same set of facts.
- Article 7(2) of - The Plaintiff was detained in West Malaysia under the
the FC Preservation of Public Security Ordinance, 1962
which was applied only in Sarawak.
- A writ of habeas corpus was issued to order his
release.
- But this release did not bar a subsequent detention
order which was properly made out under the correct
law.
Equality before the law
- The respondent had been convicted on charges of
causing hurt. The learned President of the Sessions
Court had made an order binding him under section
173A of the Criminal Procedure Code, having taken
into consideration the fact that the respondent was a
prince of the Ruling House of Johore.
- The judge of the high court however held that the
sentences imposed by the lower court did not reflect
the gravity of the offences and therefore, the sentences
must be set aside and a more suitable sentence
imposed on the respondent
- Article 8(2) of - The defendant (the Government) offered the plaintiff
the FC a position as an Untrained Temporary Teacher in a
Government school.
- The defendant subsequently withdrew this offer on
the grounds that the plaintiff was pregnant.

Beatrice Fernandez v Sistem
Penerbangan Malaysia & Anor
[2005]
(exception to gender equality)
Article 9
Re Soon Chi Hiang [1969]
(exception to immunity from
banishment)
Assa Singh v Mentri Besar
Johore [1969]
(exception to freedom of
movement)
- The High Court noted that the inclusion of ‘gender’ in
Article 8(2) was to streamline Malaysia’s commitment
to CEDAW.
- The Court then went on to construe CEDAW and
found that the revocation of the defendant’s offer to
the plaintiff was indeed discriminatory, and awarded
her damages
- Article 8(2) of - The applicant joined the first respondent as a Grade B
the FC flight stewardess and was bound by the relevant
collective agreement which requires all stewardesses
in the applicant to resign on becoming pregnant.
- The applicant became pregnant but she refused to
resign. Therefore, the first respondent terminated her
services.
- She commence proceedings at the High Court
submitting that the provisions of the collective
agreement contravened art 8 of the Federal
Constitution.
- Because the respective contracts were private
arrangements, the Courts were left with no choice but
to uphold the parties' freedom to contract.
Prohibition of banishment and freedom of movement
- Article 9(1) of - The applicant sought to set aside an expulsion order
the FC made against him on the ground that he was a citizen
- Article 24(2) of of Malaysia.
the FC - The applicant was a citizen by operation of law but
the order of deprivation had been made against him
under article 24(2) of the Constitution on the ground
that he has voluntarily claimed and exercised in a
foreign country, namely Communist China.
- The court held that the expulsion order can be
directed against a non-citizen and the burden is on the
applicant to show that he is a citizen.
- Article 9(2) & - The applicant was arrested under the provisions of the
(3) RRE by the Police with a view to forcibly relocating
- Restricted him to another district to preserve security and public
Residence order.
Enactment - He then filed a suit claiming that this was a violation

Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v
Sugumar Balakrishnan & Anor
[2002]
(special position: Sabah &
Sarawak)
Article 10
Public Prosecutor v Adam Adli
Abd Halim & Ors [2014]
(restriction to freedom of
speech)
Public Prosecutor v
of his rights under article 9 of the constitution.
- The court then held that Article 9 guarantees the right
to move freely throughout the federation and the right
to reside in part thereof. But clause (2) read with
clause (3) authorises the imposition of restrictions on
these rights in the interest of security, public order,
public health and the punishment of offenders.
- Article 9(3) of - Sugumar had applied to the High Court for a writ of
the FC certiorari to quash the decision of the Sabah state
government which revoked his entry permit on
grounds of morality.
- The court held that the power of the state of Sabah to
make an order against the appellant to leave Sabah is
valid and constitutional.
- The court also mentioned that both states enjoy such a
special position in accordance with Article 9(3) of the
federal constitution so citizens' right to move freely
can be limited by the special immigration laws
applied in Sabah and Sarawak.
Freedom of speech, assembly and association
- Section 4(1)(b) - Adam Adli was charged under Section 4 of
of the Sedition Malaysia’s Sedition Act after making remarks
Act interpreted to incite a government overthrow at a
post-election forum
- Though the lawyer on his behalf has stated in the
court that his speech did not produce any violence and
genuine concern, the court agreed with the public
prosecutor that the defendant’s speech was considered
to be harmful to public peace and had portrayed the
government as cruel.
- Article10 - The respondent was prosecuted for being an organizer
Yuneswaran Ramaraj [2015]
(restriction to freedom of
assembly)
Dewan Undangan Negeri
Kelantan v Nordin Salleh &
anor [1992]
Article 12
Merdeka University Berhad v
Government of Malaysia
[1981]
(1)(b) of the of an unlawful assembly under the Peaceful Assembly
FC Act 2012.
- Peaceful - This is because the PAA require the organizer to
Assembly Act notify the police 10 days before the assembly takes
2012 place
- The respondent argues that the law is unconstitutional
to article 10(1)(b) of the FC
- The court held that the rationale for enacting the PAA
is the protect the right under Article 10(1)(b).
- Article XXXIA - Plaintiff was elected to DUN after winning seat as a
of Part I of the representative of Semangat 46
Kelantan - Plaintiff withdrew Semanagt 46 and join UMNO.
Constitution - Article XXXIA states that ‘any member of Kelantan’s
- Article legislative assembly resigns for ny reason such
10(1)(c) of the member ceases to be member of any party’.
FC - In 1992, the Supreme Court, in Dewan Undangan
- Article 10(3) of Negeri Kelantan v Nordin Salleh [1992] 1 CLJ 343:
the FC [1992] 1CLJ 463, came to the conclusion that an
amendment to the Kelantan constitution, which
prohibited party-hopping, was inconsistent with
Article 10(1)(c) of the Federal Constitution, a
provision that allows freedom of association.
- The Supreme Court declared that such a law was
invalid because the restriction imposed by the
Kelantan constitution could not be a restriction
imposed under clauses 2(c) and (3) of Article 10 as it
was a law passed by a state legislature and not the
federal Parliament.
Rights in respect of education
- Article 152 - The plaintiff petitioned to establish Merdeka
(1)(b) of the University and they would teaching in Chinese. The
FC government reject the plaintiff’s petition to establish
MU.
- The plaintiff argued that Government’s act to reject is
unconstitutional.
- The court held that MU would use Chinese as the
medium of instruction which would conflict with the
national education policy.
- It is also unconstitutional to Article 152(1)(b) of the
FC
Article 13
Philip Hoalim v States
Commissioner Penang [1974]
(right to property in accordance
to law)
Sagong Bin Tasi & Ors v
Kerajaan Negeri Selangor &
Ors [2002]
(Adequate compensation)
Rights to Property
- Article 13(1) of - The applicant had by notice of motion filed in the
the FC High Court asked that certain orders made under the
National Land Code, 1965 be declared null and void.
- This is because the order had made the applicant's
land subject to rent therefore deprivation of property
under Article 13(1)
- The court held that the said article of the Constitution
does not restrict the legislative powers of Parliament,
but merely declares unconstitutional or prohibits any
illegal executive acts of depriving property.
- Article 13(2) of - Sepang Land Administrator gave written notices to
the FC the plaintiffs to vacate the land they were occupying
within 14 days failing which enforcement action
would be taken
- The plaintiff did not comply as they were not happy
with the amount of compensation.
- The first defendant claimed that the land was state
land and the plaintiff do not have any proprietary
interest in the land hence refused to compensate the
plaintiffs for the value of the land lost.
- The court held that such compensation was not
adequate within the meaning of arts 13(2) of the
Federal Constitution.
- The court also opined that the land was occupied by
the plaintiffs from generation to generation and fell
within the ‘land occupied under customary right’
under the definition of section 2 of the Land
Acquisition Act 1960 therefore the plaintiffs must be
compensated in accordance therewith.