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Apr.

20, 2023 CUNY Graduate Center


The picture becomes murkier still with infinitival VP adjuncts, in which the gap truly appears to
What can the presence or absence of A-bar gaps in adjunct clauses tell us about constituency
be optional:
and movement in the surrounding environment?
Gapped and gapless VP-adjuncts
Jon Nissenbaum, Brooklyn College
(6) a. Someone left this snow here [for me to shovel ] Purpose clause
jnissenbaum@brooklyn.cuny.edu
b. Someone left this snow here [for me to shovel it] Rationale clause
Preliminaries. Isn’t the distribution of gaps predictable from the syntax?
Strikingly, the presence or absence of a gap correlates with a difference in meaning:
The ability of an infinitival clause in English to contain a non-subject gap is often dependent on
• The gapped version (6a) — dubbed “purpose clause” by Faraci 1974 — implies only that
the syntactic environment.
the speaker needs to shovel the snow that has been left (perhaps by happenstance).

SOME ENVIRONMENTS REQUIRING GAPS • The gapless (6b)—a “rationale clause”—entails something about the intent of the agent.
Unlike (6a), the snow in (6b) can’t have been left by happenstance; it can only have been
(1) Some snow [(for me) to shovel (up)] is in the driveway. Infinitival relative left as part of the agent’s plan for the speaker to end up shoveling it.
cf. *Some snow (for me) to shovel it ...
(2) This type of snow is easy [(for me) to shovel ] Tough-movement Puzzles:
cf. *This type of snow is easy (for me) to shovel it ...
• What is responsible for this meaning difference, and why should it correlate with the presence
SOME ENVIRONMENTS INCOMPATIBLE WITH GAPS vs. absence of a gap?

(3) I shoveled this snow up Root clauses • Why is the gap completely optional in too/enough clauses?
cf. *I shoveled up
In the remainder of this talk, I will report on progress toward unification of these constructions.
(4) He expressed a desire [(for me)] to shovel this snow up] Complement clauses
Everyone’s happy [(for me)] to shovel the snow up]
I’m supposed [to shovel the snow up] Part Two will present evidence for something similar with too/enough — the ”attachment site”
is key, in that the presence of a gap always disambiguates toward a surface scope reading.
cf. *He expressed a desire (for me) to shovel up
. *Everyone’s happy for me to shovel up In Part One, I will summarize a body of work (going back to Faraci) showing a difference in the
. *I’m supposed to shovel up attachment sites of Prupose and Rationale clauses.

These facts should follow from standard assumptions about semantic composition. The infinitival Specifically, Purpose Clauses like (6a) are attached low, internal to the VP, while Rationale
clause contains a gap if and only if its sister is a predicate of individuals. Clauses (6b) are VP-external, likely adjoined to the vP:

(7) vP
""!!!!!
""""
SEEMING COUNTEREXAMPLES: MIXED ENVIRONMENTS !!!!
"""" !
(5) a. This snow is light enough [for me to shovel (it)] too/enough clauses vP Rationale Clause
"""!!!!!!
"""" !!!!
b. Frank is too angry [for me to talk to (him) now] """
subject V object Purpose Clause
cf. *#This snow is light for me to shovel (it)
. *#Frank is angry for me to talk to (him) This suggests the possibility of an explanation for the syntactic part of the alternation — i.e. that
This clause expresses something that seems to relate to a ”threshold” there is something about the attachment site that determines whether an infinitival VP-adjunct
can contain a gap. If so, the alternation in (6) is not exceptional after all.
• The lightness of the snow in (5a) is below the threshold that would make shoveling it
I will attempt to demonstrate that both the obligatory gap in a Purpose Clause and the agentive
impossible; and
entailment of a Rationale Clause — that is, both the syntactic and the semantic parts of the
• Frank’s anger in (5b) is above the threshold that makes my talking to him possible. alternation — follow from the difference in attachment site.

Strikingly, the infinitival clause licensed by too/enough allows a gap, but this gap is optional. The argument builds upon recent advances in our understanding of the articulated structure
within the verb phrase. I will suggest that if we assume a highly articulated VP structure,
In the second part of the talk, I will try to show (reporting joint work with Bernhard Schwarz) that together with a corresponding theory of decomposition of verbal meanings, the differences (and
even here the optionality is an illusion — the two versions (gapped and gapless) have different similarities) between the two types of infinitival adjunct can be attributed in full to the meanings
surrounding structures once we scratch below the surface. (and semantic types) of the constituent to which each type of adjunct attaches.

2
1. A few preliminaries about the distinction between PCs and RCs 2.2. Low vs. high attachment—Evidence for the correlation

• The two types of infinitival VP adjuncts are similar, but they have distinctive properties. Purpose clauses are always attached lower than Rationale clauses.
[See Faraci 1974, Huettner 1989, Jones 1985.] (Faraci 1974, Huettner 1989)

(7) vP
⇒ Purpose clauses are VP-internal, containing a gap bound to the matrix object. ""!!!!!
"""" !!!!
"""" !
(8) a. Max brought his cat2 here [for me to admire 2 ] Purpose clauses vP Rationale Clause
"""!!!!!!
"""" !!!!
b. His cat2 was brought t2 here [for me to admire 2 ] " ""
c. Max brought his cat2 here [ 2 to sniff me] subject V object Purpose Clause

⇒ Rationale clauses are external to the VP, and are not dependent on the matrix object.
§ Control of PRO (infinitive Subject gaps)
(9) a. Max brought his cat here [(in order) for me to admire it] Rationale clauses
(16) a. They1 brought Max2 along [(in order) pro1 to amuse themselves]
b. Max brought his cat here [(in order) for me to cheer up]
b. They1 brought Max2 along [(*in order) OP 2 t 2 to talk about himself]
A useful diagnostic: Purpose clauses are incompatible with “in order”.

(10) a. Max brought his cat2 here [(*in order) for me to admire 2] (17) They brought Max along [OP pro to introduce {themselves1 /*himself2 } to t]
b. Max brought his cat2 here [(*in order) 2 to sniff me]
c. Max1 brought his cat2 here [(in order) 1 to annoy me] § Relative ordering
• Purpose clauses must have a gap. In contrast, the only allowable gap in a Rationale Clause is (18) a. They brought Max along [ to talk to himself] [(in order) to amuse themselves]
pro controlled by the matrix subject.
b. * [(in order) to amuse themselves] [ to talk to himself]
A restatement of the puzzle: Why should the presence/absence of a gap, and the meaning
difference, correlate with low–vs.–high attachment?
(19) a. George put that gun on the table [for me to shoot him with ] [in order to prove
I’m a coward]
2. The syntax of infinitival adjuncts
b. * George put that gun on the table [in order to prove I’m a coward] [for me to shoot
2.1. Purpose clauses as ‘Null Operator Constructions’ him with ]

• The object-dependent gap in a Purpose clause arises through operator movement. § VP-fronting
[Chomsky 1977, Browning 1987]
(20) a. * I said I’d invite Max over. . . and [invite Max over] I did [ to talk about himself]
(11) CP
$##
$$ # b. I said I’d invite Max over. . . and [invite Max over] I did [ to amuse myself]
OP1 C
&%%
&& % (21) a. * I said I’d invite Max over. . . and [invite Max over] I did [for you to talk to ]
C TP
(''
((
( '' b. I said I’d invite Max over. . . and [invite Max over] I did [for you to talk to him]
for me to rake t1

• Given these assumptions, our initial puzzle should be restated somewhat, and broken
• Internally, then, PCs have the syntax of infinitival relative clauses, but modify some constituent into two pieces.
other than a NP.
⇒ Puzzle one: Why is null operator movement obligatory in a VP-internal infintival adjunct?
(12) a. Here are [some leaves [OP for you to rake t]] Infinitival relatives And why is it impossible in a VP-external adjunct?
b. [Some leaves [OP for you to rake t]] are right here
⇒ Puzzle two: How and why exactly does the meaning of an infinitival adjunct change
(13) I left them (right here) [OP for you to rake t] Purpose clause depending on whether it is VP internal or VP-external?

(14) [Someone [OP t to rake the leaves]] is right here Infinitival relative

(15) I invited him over [OP t to rake the leaves] Purpose clause

3 4
3. Some differences (and similarities) in meaning • Huettner’s (1989) intuition:
Purposive infinitivals all have a common basic meaning, and the differences between them result
• The meanings of purposive adjuncts are modal. from their external syntactic environment.
(They express something about purposes/goals/designs/intent.)
• Specific parts of this basic intuition that I’d like to flesh out:
(22) a. Max built that house for his kids to inherit ] Purpose clause
⇒ Some vPs describe actions, and Rationale clauses are understood as describing the agent’s
b. Max built that house for his kids to inherit it Rationale clause
intended purpose in carrying out the action.
(23) a. Mary put these papers on the desk [for you to sign ] Purpose clause ⇒ Some verbs evoke result states as part of their meanings, and Purpose clauses express
b. Mary put these papers on the desk [for you to sign them] Rationale clause something about goals/intentions that relate to these states (rather than to the events
that cause them).
(24) a. Someone left this snow here [for me to shovel ] Purpose clause
b. Someone left this snow here [for me to shovel it] Rationale clause ⇒ The reason that the meanings differ only subtly in many cases (and are sometimes not
distinguishable) is that when the result state is taken to be the direct, intended consequence
of an action, the most salient goal that can be expressed about the result state is simply
• A difference in entailments about the agent’s intention can often be teased out. the one held by the agent of the causing event.

♦ Rationale clauses express the intended purpose of an action (by the actor)
♦ Purpose clauses can express a more abstract intention—not necessarily that of an agent A crude semantics for purposive infinitivals
⇒ An abstract desire or aim that pertains to a result state?
• Purposive infinitivals express goals/intentions/desires.

Passives, unaccusatives and adjectives bring out the difference more sharply ⇒ for Ned to talk to me means, essentially, that it is desired that Ned talk to me.

(25) a. The patient is here [for the doctor to see ] • Statements of desire involve restricted quantification over possible worlds
b. The patient is here [for the doctor to see him] (Hintikka 1969, Kratzer 1981; see also Huitink 2005, Nissenbaum 2005)

(30) Note about semantic types (and conventions I will adopt for naming variables):
(26) Quote from the stork in Dumbo (after delivering baby Dumbo to his mother)
- Variables named ‘s’ range over possible situations/events/states/worlds (type s)
“Straight from heaven, up above, - Those named ‘w’ will be limited to the special case of possible worlds
Here is a baby for you to love.” (Infinitival relative)
- Functional types and variables:
(27) a. A baby is here for us to love Purpose clauses ‘P ’ ranges over functions of type #e,st$; ‘p’ ranges over type #s,t$
A baby arrived for us to love
A baby was brought here for us to love (31) The meaning of a for-infinitival adjunct clause (rough version):
The stork brought a baby here for us to love
[[for Ned to talk to me]]C = λs.[Ned talks to me in every world accessible from ws that
b. # A baby is here for us to love her Rationale clauses is compatible with the goals/intentions/desires salient in C]
# A baby arrived for us to love her
# A baby was brought here for us to love her where ws is the world of s.
# The stork brought a baby here for us to love her
(32) The meaning of a for-infinitival adjunct clause with null operator movement:
• Purpose clauses are compatible with a restricted class of predicate types [[Oi for Ned to talk to t i ]]C x = λxλs.[Ned talks to x in every world accessible from ws
that is compatible with the goals (etc) salient in C]
(Faraci 1974, Bach 1982, Jones 1985)

(28) a. I bought that convertible for you to admire change of state


• In short:
b. # I drove that convertible for you to admire non-change of state

(29) a. I planted that tree for my kids to play on ‘positive’ change ⇒ A plain infinitival adjunct (like a Rationale clause) is a function of type #s,t$, and expresses
a salient purpose related to the ‘world (event, etc.) of evaluation’.
b. # I chopped it down to prevent my kids from playing on ‘negative’ change
c. I chopped it down to use as firewood a pragmatic difference? ⇒ A purpose clause is just the same thing with a gap, that is, a property of type #e,st$.

5 6
4. A joint solution to both puzzles This Adjective-like predicate can be modified by an adjunct of the same type.

• To begin with, we can now restate the two puzzles, now in minimally more precise terms.
(35) ...
⇒ Puzzle one: Why must a VP-internal infintival adjunct have semantic type #e,st$? And VP !st"
""""!!!!!!
why must a VP-external adjunct have type #s,t$? " "" !
!est"
DP V
"""!!!!!!
⇒ Puzzle two: Why does a VP-external purposive adjunct necessarily express the intentions .-
. - """"
" !!
of the agent? Why do we get precisely the pattern of entailments we get with VP-internal object V!!est"!est"" #e, st$
**))))
purposive adjuncts?   ***
* )
)
 bake 

 

#e, st$ #e, st$
boil Result adjoined CP
• Baker’s Conjecture: $##
 bring 
  Predicate $$
$ ##
 
(33) All verb phrases contain an underlying Adjective at their core. [Baker 2003] build
vP
**))))
***
* )
) ⇒ Adjuncts that modify this complement will necessarily have operator movement.
DP v
**))))
,,++ *** ) (36) a. CP!st" b. CP!e,st"
subject v VP $$### (('''
((''' $$ ## (( '
(( ' $$ # OP1 C
CAUSE DP V **)))
.- $## for Mary to talk to him ***
* ))
)
. - $$ # for Mary to talk to t1
object V Adj
 
BE 
 bake  Moreover, if it’s correct that XP-adjunction isn’t permitted to non-maximal projections [Chomsky

 
 boil  1986], we have an explanation for why Rationale clauses can’t have null operator movement—the
bring semantic type can only be #s,t$.

 

 build 

 

... A simple example:
“[T]ransitive verbs always decompose syntactically into (37) Phoebe brought Max here
something like [x CAUSE ... [y BE [ADJECTIVE (to/of z)]]]” Baker [2003: 83]
(38) • Phoebe is the agent of a volitional act.
A series of head-to-head movements (Adj-to-V, followed by V-to-v) derives the right word order • Max becomes (as the result of Phoebe’s volitional act) transported.
(with a morphologically complex verb preceding the direct object). • There is a result state consisting in Max’s being here
• An alternate version of the Conjecture: (39) Some items from the lexicon:
All change of state verbs (not just transitives) select an Adjective-like complement. This com- a. [[ResultPred here]] = λxλs.[s is the state of x being here]
plement denotes a result-state propery: it is predicative (i.e. of semantic type #e,st$.
b. [[V bring]] = λP!e,st" λxλs. bringing(x)(s) & ∃s# [s# ≤p s & P(x)(s# ) ]
(34)
vP c. [[v cause]] = λp!st" λxλs.event(s) & agent(s)(x) & ∃s# [cause(s# )(s) & p(s# )]
000/////
000 /
DP *))
v • The meaning differences will follow as well — once we take into account that agentive
,,++ ** )))
*** ) events (as opposed to states) are goal-directed.
subject v VP
0 000////
00 // ⇒ Agentive event make the agent’s goals salient.
DP V
**))))
.-
. - *** ) ⇒ States do not come with inherent goals. Determining which goal is salient is a more flexible
object V #e, st$ matter.
  Result

 bake  Predicate So...
 
boil
( )
 bring 
  Ø If a purposive adjunct (like (36b)) modifies the Result Predicate node, in a sentence like
 
build ...
(40) We brought Max here [Oi for Mary to talk to t i ]
This version of Baker’s conjecture is compatible with Gonsalves’ [2008] suggestion (citing work
of Mora Gutiérrez [2001]) that the meanings of such constructions should be paraphrased along it will be interpreted as expressing some (contextually salient) purpose that relates to the result
the lines ‘x causes y to be ADJ by V-ing’ state of Max’s being here.

7 8
(41)
!st"
vP
"""!!!!!!
"""" ! • IMPOSSIBLE:
DP v!est"
"""!!!!!! A gapless purpose clause
2211 """" !
we v!!st"!est"" VP !st"
"""!!!!!!
"""" !
A sentence like We brought Max here for Mary to talk to him can never get a parse that includes
DP V!est"
"""!!!!!! a constituent like 45, because of the type mismatch:
43
4 3 """"
" !!
Max V!!est"!est"" #e, st$
Result (45) #??$
bring Predicate
000///// Result
000 / Predicate
#e, st$ CP!e,st" 000/////
***
*)))
) 000 /
Result * ) !s,t"
#e, st$ CP
Predicate OP1 C 000/////
***)))) Result 000 /
**
* )) for Mary to talk to him
for Mary to talk to t1 Predicate
here

(42) [[[here] [Oi for Mary to talk to t i ]]] = here


(by (39a), (32), and Predicate Modification)
The type mismatch can’t be overcome by means of the gapless adjunct modifying a small clause
λxλs.[s is the state of x being here, and Mary talks to x in every possible world ws as in (46a). Why?
that is compatible with the salient goals/intentions/desires]
(46) a. b.
#s, t$ ??
000/////
On the other hand... if a purposive adjunct (like (36a)) is adjoined to the highest node: Result 000 /
!!est"!est""
Predicate V #s, t$
(43) **))))
*** )
Result
!st" * )
vP
"!!!! #s, t$ CP!s,t" bring Predicate
"""" !!! 0 00//// """
"!!!
!!!!
""" """ !!!! Result 000 // """"
" !!
"""" !!!!
"" !! Predicate for Mary to talk to him Max here for Mary to talk to him
vP!st" CP !st"
&&%%
000///// 000///// & %
000
0 // 000 / Max here
!est"
DP v for Mary to talk to him
000/////
2211 000 / ... It follows from the thesis (Baker’s conjecture, or my variant) that the relevant verbs select
we v!!st"!est"" VP!st" properties, not small clauses. So (46b) is impossible.
**))))
***
* )
)
DP *)))
V!est"
43
4 3 ***
* )
) ⇒ Purposive infinitivals without gaps can only be parsed in construction with a higher part
!!est"!est""
Max V #e, st$ of the VP than the result predicate.
Result
bring Predicate ⇒ Consequently they can only be interpreted as being related to a causing event, not the
result state.
here
⇒ In contrast, Purposive infinitivals with gaps can only be parsed in construction with the
...then it can only be construed as expressing a purpose related to the causing event
very lowest part of the VP — namely the result predicate.
— i.e., the agent’s purpose.

(44) [[[vP we bring Max here] [for Mary to talk to him]]] =


(by (39a,b,c), (31), and Predicate Modification)

λs.event(s) & agent(s)(we) &


∃s# [cause(s# )(s) & bringing(Max)(s# ) & ∃s## [s## ≤s# & s## =state of Max being here]],
and
Mary talks to him in every possible world ws compatible with the salient goals]

9 10
5. A remaining problem: Stative Predicates 5.2. Evidence in favor of the Rothstein/Baker suggestion

While this approach to the differences between PCs and RCs explains the patterns of entailments • The object-dependent gap in a Purpose clause arises through operator movement.
(about agentive intentions) in agentive sentences like (47): While Rothstein argued that there are no small clauses embedded in stative sentences, she iden-
tified some environments in which stative small clauses are found.
(47) They brought Max here [for us to talk to (him)]

(52) a. My shampoo keeps [AP flies around]


... it does not explain why the same pattern holds in stative sentences like (48) and (49):
b. My shampoo keeps [V P flies buzzing around]
(53) a. b.
(48) a. Max is here [for us to talk to ] V V
$## (('''
b. Max is here [for us to talk to him] $$
$ ## (( '
!st"
V AP V VP2!st"
$$
$## (('''
(49) a. This snow here [for me to shovel ] # ((
( ''!est"
keeps DP #e, st$ keeps DP V
b. This snow here [for me to shovel it]
87 87 (('''
8 7 Stative 8 7 (( '
flies Predicate flies V!!est"!est"" #e, st$
The gapless adjuncts in the (b) sentences above attribute agentive intentions (to someone named Stative
or unnamed). around buzzing Predicate

But these sentences involve plain stative predicates. Why can’t the gapless adjuncts in these around
examples express goals relevant to the states described by constituents like [Max here], as in the
Surprisingly, a gapless purpose clause turns out to be possible in the environment that
following structure:
Rothstein identified as a true stative small clause:
(50) ... *))
V
***
* ))
)
Imagine the following is part of the conversational background: I love swatting flies, and I get
V AP!s,t" bored if there are none around. Luckily (for me), I started using a new type of shampoo...
*)
***
*
)))
)
is AP!s,t" CP!s,t" (54) a. My shampoo keeps flies around [for me to kill (them)]
&&%% **))))
& % *** ) b. # My shampoo keeps flies buzzing around [for me to kill them]
tM ax here for us to talk to him
⇒ (54a) can express a desire not held by an agent of any causing event.
5.1. A suggestion
(55) V
**))))
⇒ There is no such constituent in a stative sentence. *** )
V *)))
AP!st"
⇒ Instead, stative predicates combine with a (quasi-)eventive be (Rothstein 1999), hence are ***
* ))
not saturated in their maximal projections. keeps AP!st" CP!st"
$## **))))
$$ # *** )
(51) VP!st"
*)))
flies around for me to kill them
***
* )
)
DP V!est"
65 ((''' Compare with a non-small-clause selecting counterpart:
6 5 (( '
tM ax V!!est"!est"" #e, st$
Stative (56) # My shampoo brings flies around for me to kill them
is Predicate
⇒ Seems to imply that the shampoo intends for me to kill the flies!
here ⇒ [flies] is an argument of brings, not an argument of around.

⇒ Rothstein argued that be introduces a situating event argument, and relates it (and the • These facts suggests that Rothstein and Baker were right — there is no
external argument) to the state-predicate that it selects as its complement. ‘predicate-internal subject’ in a copular stative sentence!
Note that Baker [2003] comes to essentially the same conclusion.

⇒ Crucially for our purposes, this situating event can be understood as having an As expected, the deviant examples become good if the adjuncts contain gaps:
inherent goal (whether or not the goal is held by the external argument).
(57) My shampoo brings flies around [for me to kill ]
(58) My shampoo keeps flies buzzing around [for me to kill ]

11 12
6 Summary 7 EXTENSIONS (1) PARASITIC GAPS

Where do we stand? There is one well-known exception to the generalization that a high VP-adjunct cannot contain
a gap:
• We started with a puzzle about the distribution of gaps inside VP-adjuncts.
• Movement in the matrix VP licenses a gap that would otherwise be prohibited
• We saw evidence pointing to a three-way correlation among:
(Engdahl 1982, Taraldsen 1982)
– the attachment site of the adjunct
– the presence or absence of a gap
– the semantic contribution of the adjunct (59) *We brought Max here [in order for Mary to talk to t i ]
(60) Who did you bring t i here [in order for Mary to talk to t i ]
• We then saw that a few simple assumptions about the syntax of VPs can help explain the
correlations
In earlier work (Nissenbaum 1998, Nissenbaum 2000) I have argued that these so-called ”Parasitic
Gaps” (PGs) are derived by the same restrictive composition principles that (as we have already
Conclusions: If the reasoning is valid, we have evidence for seen) forces low VP-adjuncts (Purpose Clauses) to contain gaps. Specifically:

⇒ Baker’s (2003) hypothesis, derived from work on Edo and Chichewa, that a large class of ⇒ the gapped vP adjunct is a predicate of individuals derived by empty operator movement to
transitive VPs have stative roots the edge of the adjunct clause (Chomsky 1977, 1986; Browning 1986) i.e. a null operator
structure
⇒ A restrictive, compositional approach to the distribution of clauses with A-bar bound gaps
(null operator constructions) ⇒ the movement in the matrix clause targets a propositional constituent the vP to derive a
predicate of individuals

What’s next? ⇒ the gapped adjunct modifies this predicate

• In what follows, we will see that there is a way to license a gap in a Rationale Clause
(61) vP
"""!!!!!
⇒ If there is movement in the main clause, a Rationale Clause can have a non-subject gap """ !!!!
""""
" !!
object1 "!!!! vP
""""
⇒ This so-called parasitic gap construction is licensed by the same restrictive composition !!!!
principles that otherwise disallow RCs from containing gaps """"
" !!
vP Rationale Clause
***
*))) 000/////
* )) 0 00 /
λ1 vP λ2 for Mary to talk to t2
• The “epilogue” will be a brief look at the puzzle concerning gapped infinitives with too/enough (('''
(( '
subject V t1

⇒ Notice that these odd and exceptional instances of gapped high adjuncts provide
rather striking support for the general approach and conclusions of Part One.

⇒ The mechanisms that we seemingly must attribute to the mental grammar in order to
explain the distribution and interpretation of non-subject gaps in Purpose Clauses, predict
this exceptional behavior in Rationale Clauses (and other high-attached adjuncts.

13 14
8 Extensions (2): TOO and ENOUGH
8.2 A striking exception to Faraci’s Generalization
Recall that the degree operators too and enough license an infinitival clause that would otherwise
not be able to appear with adjectival predicates: It turns out that there is a way to “get around” Faraci’s Generalization: namely, when there is
movement (Nissenbaum and Schwarz 2011):
(62) a. This snow is light enough [for me to shovel (it)] too/enough clauses
b. Frank is too angry [for me to talk to (him) now]
(65) Mary1 , who John is too angry at t1 [for me to talk to now] ...
cf. *#This snow is light for me to shovel (it)
. *#Frank is angry for me to talk to (him) ⇒ Under the very same conditions that license a parasitic gap, an antecedent that would
be otherwise unavailable for a gap in a too-infinitival becomes possible.

(Since too and enough pattern together, I will stick with too for the remainder of the section.)

Faraci’s Generalization, revised:


⇒ The puzzle with which we began is that these degree infinitivals seem to have completely
optional gaps. ⇒ The gap in an infinitival with too must be anaphoric either to the subject of the AP
⇒ Given the conclusions that we have drawn thus far, this optionality is not just puzzling it containing too, or to a non-subject antecedent that has undergone movement.
should be downright impossible. Is our ’restrictive’ compositional theory wrong??

No!! Complex degree phrases headed by too show scope ambiguities with intensional operators Towards an explanation
(Heim 2001). In joint work with Bernhard Schwarz (Nissenbaum and Schwarz 2011), we showed
that these scope ambiguities are limited to gapless degree phrases. The gapped versions are ⇒ If Nissenbaum and Schwarz (2011) were correct to conclude that gapped degree-phrases
restricted to an in situ interpretation. with too are restricted to an in situ interpretation, then movement of an otherwise un-
available antecedent, as in (42faraci3), would derive a predicate of individuals and thereby
provide an attachment site for the degree phrase to raise to — in effect, similar to parasitic
gap licensing in a Rationale Clause.
Here’s some corroborating evidence that the optionality is merely an illusion that is somewhat
simpler to illustrate than the scope ambiguities, and which is compatible with the reasoning that
we saw in previous sections.

8.1 Faraci’s Generalization

Faraci (1974) observed that there is a quite sharp restriction on the gaps that can appear in
degree phrases. Namely:

⇒ The gap in an infinitival with too must be anaphoric to the subject of the AP containing
too.

(63) a. Otis is [too loud] [for us to invite ]


b. *Otis talks too loud [for us to invite ]

(64) Frank is too angry at Mary [for me to talk to now]

In (63b), Otis is the subject of the VP, not the AP containing too, and is sharply deviant in
comparison to (63a), in accord with Faraci’s generalization.

Similarly, the gap in (64) can only be construed with Frank as its antecedent; it is utterly
impossible to understand (64) with Mary as the antecedent.

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