Certified PHA HAZOP Leader Course

Day 3
Course Timings:

09:00 - 10:30 : First Session

10:30 - 11:00 : Break

11:00 - 12:00 : Second Session

12:00 - 01:00 : Prayer and Break

01:00 - 03:00 : Last Session

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HAZOP By Difference
For repetitive designs.
Accepted if there are multiple identical trains.
One train is reviewed then the recommendations are applicable to
the others.
Can become a problem where similar equipment are installed in
different plants.

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Vendor Packages:
Vendor packages are typically approached by using HAZOP by difference

Vendor packages present particular challenges

• there is often reluctance by a vendor to accept that there may be problems with their
design,
• negative participation from the vendor.
• Another common problem is the vendor’s reluctance to share information.

Recommendation
• Perform a HAZID or What-if study on the package/interfaces.

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SLIDE No. 5 OF 32
EXAMPLE key WORDS

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Guide Words
No: the intention can fail completely
More: quantitative increase When time matters
Less: quantitative decrease  Duration
 Early
As Well As: qualitative increase  Late
Part of: qualitative decrease Sequence
Reverse: logical opposite of intention  Before
 After
Other than: Identify something
Speed
completely different  Faster
 slower

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Deviations

Deviation is departures from the design intent

Example
– cooling system where fresh water continuously circulated at a rate of
1500 liter per hour and initial temperature 20 C.

What are the potential deviations in this

case?

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Deviation Guidelines
Define the point or equipment examined.

‘Low’ and ‘No’ are always merged but may be separated as appropriate.

Don’t overlook possible hazards

There may be more than one deviation from the application of one guide word.

When there is no limit unsafe to exceed in the node, mark the Cause as “N/A”.

Not all guidewords generate meaningful deviations,

There may be overlap between deviations

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Confused Deviations
confuse deviations with causes.
• a maintenance step involve replacing a check valve. Consider the application of the guideword
“Reverse” to this action.

confuse deviations with consequences.

• a maintenance step may involve replacing a gasket.
• What deviation might be generated by applying “Other Than” to “Replace Gasket”?,

confuse deviations with other deviations

• incorrect application of Reverse to Replace Check Valve would be to assign the deviation “Backflow”.

Confuse ratio with composition

• application of “Part Of” to “Composition”, a practitioner may suggest “Incorrect ratio of materials” as
the deviation.
• However, the actual parameter in this case is the ratio of materials, not composition.

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Causes
What specific failure or error would cause the node to go beyond safe limit?
find ALL the potential causes of the deviation.
There is frequently more than one cause
The cause should be a specific failure or specific error.
The failure of a safeguard is not a cause.
Grouping of causes
Where to look for causes

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Categories of Causes
a. Equipment Failures

– instrumented control system failure

– mechanical failure.

b. Human Errors

– Omitting steps.

– Failure to respond to unsafe deviation by process.

– Demographic effects

c. External Events

d. Product Deviations

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Common Causes for Loss of Containment
Overfilling

Leaking parts.

Rupturing a tube in a heat exchanger

Over-pressurizing a process vessel

Mechanical fracture

Line rupture

Failure of a vessel nozzle

Breaking off of a small bore pipe

Failure due to corrosion

Inadvertently leaving a drain, sample or vent valve open

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Common Human Errors in Process Plants

Open wrong valve

Mix wrong proportions of chemicals
Carry out procedure in wrong sequence
Fail to respond to alarm.
Fail to report mechanical deficiencies.
Open up live equipment.

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Levels of Causes
• Causes may be expressed at different levels.
• HAZOP team may identify a credible cause as “pump fails off.” However,
• there is usually a need to identify why the pump failed:
• loss of power?
• Operator error?
• mechanical failure? etc.

• There may be even more fundamental reasons for these basic causes.
• operator error could be caused by inadequate procedures or training.

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Identification of Causes

The deviation happens in the node; the cause can happen

anywhere.
External effects

– deviations in the current node can create hazards in other

nodes.
Postpone until the pump node is reached by the team

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A cause or Not
• Passing of Pressure Safety Valve
• Maintenance error
• Design related Causes
• Control valve failure
• Power Failure
• Simultaneous operation of more than required equipment
• Control loop failure

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Credibility of Causes
Credible multiple failure scenarios:
 Two concurrent human failures are credible.
 A single equipment failure coupled with a single human failure is credible.

Non-credible” scenarios
 “Double jeopardy” situations.
 Failures of safeguards
 Inadvertent opening/closing of valves if locked open or closed.
 The simultaneous failure of two independent pieces of equipment

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Double Jeopardy

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 Causes

As well as

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Consequence
The result of deviation.
Consequences shall be taken to be anything that
 impacts safety or
 cause Production interruption.
Consequences can be outside of the node being considered.
Develop consequences without safeguards because:
Consequences due to natural incidents not considered
Be clear and precise in their drafting
" None identified "

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Consequence
The consequences could arise, both from the deviation and,
from the cause itself.

It is essential to identify all of the consequences, both

immediate & delayed, and both inside & outside the section
under analysis.

Analyze how the consequences develop over a period of time.

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Consequence Assessment
Jet fire

• Pressurized leak of flammable liquid or gas

• Burning takes place at the point of release.

• Jet fires produce a Long stable flame

• Isolate the release source.

• Liquid may rainout leading to a pool fire

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Consequence Assessment
Pool fire
• Release of flammable liquid forming a pool
• Source of ignition causing combustion with a stationary flame

• Solid structures involved in a fire do not normally burn.

• Flashback may occur

• Extinguishing with water may cause boil over

Flash fire
• Release of flammable vapor and delayed ignition
• Short duration
• Develop into explosion if confined
• Burn back

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 Explosion
• Not all releases of flammable gases and vapors create explosions.
1. Over pressure of vessel
2. Vapor cloud explosion (VCE), Required conditions:
Large mass of material
High heat of combustion
Good fuel / air mixing, within explosive limits
High degree of confinement and Stable weather

3. Deflagration to detonation transition.

4. Dust explosions result from the rapid combustion of airborne particles, conditions :
The concentration within the explosible range
Ignition source of sufficient energy
Explosive atmosphere.

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Overestimating the consequences
Low pressure vessels
• Vessels with MAWP less than 15 psig.
• hydrostatically tested to 125% of the design pressure.
• 125% -200%, the initial consequence is assumed to be loss of containment.
• > 200% the vessel fails, splitting open and spilling the contents.

High pressure vessels

• MAWP > 15 psig.
• Vessels hydrostatically tested to 130% and pipelines to 150%
• Above test pressures up to 200%, the initial consequence is loss of containment.
• Above 200%, the consequence is loss of containment.
• above 400% of MAWP – the consequence will be a catastrophic vessel failure.

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Explosion regimes

1. Deflagration
Mild ignition, involves a laminar flame moves at a
subsonic speed.
Example, Vapor cloud explosion

2. Detonation
A shock reaction where the flames travel at supersonic
speeds.
It is more destructive
Example, Damaging explosions in confined area.

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Consequences of release -

Flame Jet Forms (if Ignited)

Vapour Cloud Ignites in

Congested area: explosion

Gas Vents Vapour Cloud Vapour Cloud Ignites in

Gas
Travels Downwind open area: flash fire

No Ignition
No ignition: toxic vapour
exposure
Release

Liquid Rain
Liquid and/or Liquid Flashes
Liquefied Gas To vapour

Pool Fire (if Ignited)

Vapour Cloud Ignites in

Congested area: explosion
Vapour Cloud Ignites in
Pool Slowly Vapour Plume open area: flash fire
Evaporates Travels Downwind
No Ignition
No ignition: toxic vapour
exposure
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Consequence Development - Escalation

Further study may be recommended for escalation.

Examples
• Jet fire impinging on other equipment or buildings
• Written separately.

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Trivial or Significant Consequence

• Valve closure results in overpressure

• if the excess within the line rating, deviation will not be

considered.

• If the rating is exceeded, this is a hazardous occurrence.

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BLEVE

BLEVE is likely to form a cloud of Spherical fire ball

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Technical Suggestions
Ignition Probability
• Most gas clouds do not ignite.
Worst case release scenario requirements
• Total quantity of the flammable substance is assumed to form a vapor cloud
Wind effect
• The most hazardous situation is a stable atmosphere.
Blast waves unlikely to kill people in the open

• with the exception of missiles, falling buildings and fire effects

Number of People in the Area

• if no one is around, no one will be killed.
• Most operating areas are sparsely populated most of the time.

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