Bar Q 2014-2018

CIVIL LAW BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWER YEAR 2014
I.
Ariz and Paz were officemates at Perlas ng Silangan Bank (PSB). They fell in love with
each other and had a civil and church wedding. Meanwhile, Paz rapidly climbed the
corporate ladder of PSB and eventually became its Vice-President, while Ariz remained
one of its bank supervisors, although he was short of twelve (12) units to finish his
Masters of Business Administration (MBA) degree.
Ariz became envious of the success of his wife. He started drinking alcohol until he
became a drunkard. He preferred to join his barkada; became a wife-beater; would hurt
his children without any reason; and failed to contribute to the needs of the family.
Despite rehabilitation and consultation with a psychiatrist, his ways did not change.
After 19 years of marriage, Paz, a devout Catholic, decided to have their marriage
annulled by the church. Through the testimony of Paz and a psychiatrist, it was found
that Ariz was a spoiled brat in his youth and was sometimes involved in brawls. In his
teens, he was once referred to a psychiatrist for treatment due to his violent tendencies.
In due time, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT) annulled the union of
Ariz and Paz due to the failure of Ariz to perform and fulfill his duties as a husband and
as a father to their children. The NAMT concluded that it is for the best interest of Paz,
Ariz and their children to have their marriage annulled.
In view of the NAMT decision, Paz decided to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage of their civil wedding before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City
using the NAMT decision and the same evidence adduced in the church annulment
proceedings as basis.
If you are the judge, will you grant the petition? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, I will not grant the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
In Republic v. Molina (GR No. 108763 February 13, 1997), the Supreme Court
ruled that while the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
(NAMT) of the Catholic Church in the Philippines should be given great respect by our
courts, they are not controlling or decisive. Its interpretation is not conclusive on the
courts. The courts are still required to make their own determination as to the merits of
the case, and not rely on the finding of the NAMT.
It had been held that psychological incapacity as a ground for nullifying a
marriage is confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
marriage. The three essential requisites in order for psychological incapacity to be
approached are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. In the present
case, there was no showing that the psychological incapacity was existing at the time of
the celebration of marriage. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar
Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers In Civil Law)
MODIFIED SUGGESTED ANSWER:

No, if I were the judge, I will not grant the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
In Republic v. Molina (GR No. 108763 February 13, 1997), the Supreme Court ruled that
while the interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT) of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines should be given great respect by our courts, they are not
controlling or decisive. Its interpretation is not conclusive on the courts.
In the instant case, the courts are still required to make their own determination as to the
merits of the case, and not rely on the finding of the NAMT. It had been held that psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullifying a marriage is confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to marriage. The three essential requisites in order for psychological incapacity
to be approached are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. In this case,
there was no showing that the psychological incapacity was existing at the time of the
celebration of marriage.
Hence, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is not granted.
II.
Crispin died testate and was survived by Alex and Josine, his children from his first wife;
Rene and Ruby, his children from his second wife; and Allan, Bea, and Cheska his
children from his third wife.
One important provision in his will reads as follows:
"Ang lupa at bahay sa Lungsod ng Maynila ay ililipat at ilalagay ss pangalan nila Alex at
Rene hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at
pangalagaan lamang nila at nang ang sinuman sa aking mga anak,
sampu ng aking mga apo at kaapuapuhan ko sa habang panahon, ay may
tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o sa kalapit na mga
lungsod."
Is this provision valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The provision imposing the indivision of the property "habang panahon" is invalid.
In Santiago v. Santiago (GR No. 179859 August 9, 2010), a similar provision appears in
the will of the testator. In that case, the Court ruled that it is clear that the testator
intended the house and lot in Manila be transferred in petitioner's names for
administration purposes only, and that the property be owned by the heirs in common.
However, the same case ruled that the condition set by the decedent on the property's
indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation provided by Article 1083 of the Civil Code
which states that the period of indivision imposed by a testator shall not exceed twenty
years. Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of indivision of a property for
more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership
beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code. Thus, the provision leaving
the administration of the house and lot in Manila to Alex and Rene is valid but the
provision imposing the indivision of the property "habang panahon" is invalid as to the
excess twenty years, it being contrary to Article 1083 limiting the period of indivision that
may be imposed by a testator to twenty years. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan,
2014 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers In
Civil Law)

The provision imposing the indivision of the property "habang panahon" is invalid.
In Santiago v. Santiago (GR No. 179859 August 9, 2010), a similar provision appears in
the will of the testator. In that case, the Court ruled that it is clear that the testator intended the
house and lot in Manila be transferred in petitioner's names for administration purposes only, and
that the property be owned by the heirs in common. However, the same case ruled that the
condition set by the decedent on the property's indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation
provided by Article 1083 of the Civil Code which states that the period of indivision imposed by
a testator shall not exceed twenty years. Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of
indivision of a property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to
sanction co-ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code.
In the instant case, the provision leaving the administration of the house and lot in Manila
to Alex and Rene is valid but the provision imposing the indivision of the property "habang
panahon" is invalid as to the excess twenty years, it being contrary to Article 1083 limiting the
period of indivision that may be imposed by a testator to twenty years.
Hence, the provision is invalid.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The provision is valid. Article 944 of the Civil Code provides that "a legacy for
education lasts until the legatee may finish some professional, vocational or general
course, provided he pursues his course diligently." In this case, the intention of the
testator in transferring the property in the name of Alex and Rene is not for the purpose
of giving the property to them as their inheritance, but for them to administer the same
for the benefit of his descendants' use in pursuit of their education. Thus, this provision
is a legacy for education, which lasts as long as the legatee/s come of age or until such
legatee/s finish their course. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar
MODIFIED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The provision is valid.
Article 944 of the Civil Code provides that "a legacy for education lasts until the legatee
may finish some professional, vocational or general course, provided he pursues his course
diligently."
In the instant case, the intention of the testator in transferring the property in the name of
Alex and Rene is not for the purpose of giving the property to them as their inheritance, but for
them to administer the same for the benefit of his descendants' use in pursuit of their education.
Thus, this provision is a legacy for education, which lasts as long as the legatee/s come of
age or until such legatee/s finish their course.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The provision is not valid. Article 870 of the Civil Code provides that "the
dispositions of the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more than
twenty years are void." In this case, the provision "habang panahon" clearly provides for
inalienability of the house for more than twenty years; hence, it is void. (Assoc. Dean
Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center
Suggested Answers In Civil Law)
MODIFIED ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The provision is not valid.
Article 870 of the Civil Code provides that "the dispositions of the testator declaring all
or part of the estate inalienable for more than twenty years are void."
In this case, the provision "habang panahon" clearly provides for inalienability of the
house for more than twenty years.
Hence, the provision is void.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The provision is valid. The institution of heir in this case is a modal institution
under Article 882 of the Civil Code. In this type of institution, which is present in the
case at bar, the ownership of the thing is passed on to the heir, except that there is a
mode or charge imposed upon the heir. In a modal institution, the testator states 91) the
object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator,
or 930 the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir (Rebadila v.Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 11375, June 29, 2000). (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar
MODIFIED SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The provision is valid.
The institution of heir in this case is a modal institution under Article 882 of the Civil
Code. In this type of institution, which is present in the case at bar, the ownership of the thing is
passed on to the heir, except that there is a mode or charge imposed upon the heir. In a modal
institution, the testator states 91) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the
property left by the testator, or 930 the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir (Rabadila
v.Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 11375, June 29, 2000).
III.
The Roman Catholic Church accepted a donation of a real property located in Lipa City.
A deed of donation was execu, signed by the donor,Don Marano, and the donee, the
Catholic Chuch, as represented by Fr. Damian. Before the deed could be notarized,
Don Mariano died.
Is the donation valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The donation is void. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides that a donation of an
immovable must be made in a public instrument to be valid. In his case, it is clear that
the deed of donation never became a public instrument because the donor died before
it could be notarized. The deed of donation cannot be notarized after the death of the
donor since it is now impossible for him to acknowledge before a notary public. The
donation was never perfected. Thus, the donaion is void for not complying with the
fomalities required by law. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations
University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers In Civil Law)

The donation is void.
Article 749 of the Civil Code provides that a donation of an immovable must be made in
a public instrument to be valid.
In the instant case, it is clear that the deed of donation never became a public instrument
because the donor died before it could be notarized. The deed of donation cannot be notarized
after the death of the donor since it is now impossible for him to acknowledge before a notary
public. The donation was never perfected.
Thus, the donation is void for not complying with the formalities required by law.
IV.
Nante, a registered owner of a parcel of land in Quezon Cit, sold the property to Monica
under a deed of sale which reads as follows:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of P500,000.00, value to be paid and delivered
to me, and the receipt of which shall be acknowledged by me to the full satisfaction of
Monica, referred to as Vendee, i hereby sell, transfer, convey, and assign, as by these
presents, i do have sold, transferred, ceded, conveyed and assigned a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 2468 in favor of the Vendee."
After delivery of the initial payment of P100,000.00, Monica immediately took
possession of the property. Five (5) months after, Monica failed to pay the remaining
balance of the purchase price. Nante filed an action for the recovery of possession of
the property. Nante alleged that the agreement was one to sell, which was not
consummated as the full contract price was not paid.
Is he contention of Nante tenable? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the contention of Nante that it is one to sell is untenable, there is a perfected
contract of sale in this case when Nante agreed to sell and Monica agreed to buy the
subject parcel of land at its agreed price. Under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, there is a
perfected contract of sale at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon the thong
which is the object of the contract and upon the price. Ownership was transferred upon
delivery or upon the taking of possession by Monica, the buyer. The non-payment pf the
full price affects the consummation of the contract of sale and not its perfection.
The case of Heirs of Atienza v. Espinol (G.R. No. 180665, August 11, 2010),
differentiated a contract of sale and a contract to sell. In a contract of sale, the title to
the property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. In a contract to sell,
on the other hand, the ownership is, by agreement, retained by the seller and is not to
pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price in the contract of sale the
buyer's non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition; in the contract to
sell, the buyer's full payment of the price id a positive suspensive condition to the
coming into effect of the agreement. In the first case, the seller has lost and cannot
recover the ownership of the property unless he takes action to set aside the contract of
sale. In the second case, the title simply remains in the seller if the buyer does not
comply with the condition precedent of making payment at the time specified in the
contract.
The agreement in this case is not a contract to sell because nothing in the facts
shows that the parties agreed that ownership is retained by Nante (seller) and is not to
pass to Monica (buyer) until full payment of the purchase price. (Assoc. Dean Viviana
M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center
Suggested Answers in Civil Law)

No, the contention of Nante that it is one to sell is untenable.
Under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, the contract of sale is perfected at the moment
there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions
of the law governing the form of contracts. The case of Heirs of Atienza v. Espinol (G.R. No.
180665, August 11, 2010), differentiated a contract of sale and a contract to sell. In a contract of
sale, the title to the property passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. In a contract
to sell, on the other hand, the ownership is, by agreement, retained by the seller and is not to pass
to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price in the contract of sale the buyer's non-
payment of the price is a negative resolutory condition; in the contract to sell, the buyer's full
payment of the price id a positive suspensive condition to the coming into effect of the
agreement. In the first case, the seller has lost and cannot recover the ownership of the property
unless he takes action to set aside the contract of sale. In the second case, the title simply remains
in the seller if the buyer does not comply with the condition precedent of making payment at the
time specified in the contract.
In the instant case, there is a perfected contract of sale in this case when Nante agreed to
sell and Monica agreed to buy the subject parcel of land at its agreed price. Ownership was
transferred upon delivery or upon the taking of possession by Monica, the buyer. The non-
payment pf the full price affects the consummation of the contract of sale and not its perfection.
The agreement in this case is not a contract to sell because nothing in the facts shows that the
parties agreed that ownership is retained by Nante (seller) and is not to pass to Monica (buyer)
until full payment of the purchase price.
Hence, the contention of Nante is untenable.
V.
What is the effect of preterition?
(A) it annuls the devise and legacy
(B) it annuls the institution of heir
(C) it reduces the devise and legacy
(D) it partially annuls the institution of heir
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(B) it annuls the institution of heir (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar
Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers in Civil Law)
VI.
Miko and Dinah started to live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage in 1984. Ten (10) years after, they separated. In 1996, they decided to live
together again, and in 1998, they got married.
On February 17, 2001, Dinah filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Miko on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The court rendered the following decision:
1. Declaring the marriage null and void;
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property; and
3. Declaring that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after
liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties' properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
Dinah file a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the portion of the decision on
the issuance of a decree of nullity of marriage only after the liquidation, partition, and
distribution of properties under Article 147 of the Code. If you are the judge, how will
you decide petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will grant the motion for partial reconsideration. Section 19 (10) of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
which require that the decree of nullity of marriage be issued only after liquidation,
partition and distribution of properties, does not apply to declarations of nullity based on
Art. 36 of the Family Code. The said rule only applies if there was a second marriage
which is void because of non-compliance with the requirements of Article 40 of the
Family Code. In the case of Dino v. Dino (G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011), the
Court held that Sec. 19 (1) only applies to Family Code, Articles 50 and 51, which are,
subsequently applicable only to marriages which are deemed void ab initio or annulled
by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code. Since there is no
previous marriage in this case and the marriage was nullified under Article 36 of the
Family Code, Section 19 (1) of the said Rules does not apply. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.
Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested
Answers in Civil Law)

If I were the judge, I will grant the motion for partial reconsideration.
Section 19 (10) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which require that the decree of nullity of marriage be issued
only after liquidation, partition and distribution of properties, does not apply to declarations of
nullity based on Art. 36 of the Family Code. The said rule only applies if there was a second
marriage which is void because of non-compliance with the requirements of Article 40 of the
Family Code. In the case of Dino v. Dino (G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011), the Court held
that Sec. 19 (1) only applies to Family Code, Articles 50 and 51, which are, subsequently
applicable only to marriages which are deemed void ab initio or annulled by final judgment
under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.
In the instant case, the marriage was nullified under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Pursuant to the rule above, Section 19(1) of the said Rules does not apply. The court issued the
decree of nullity of marriage only after the liquidation, partition and distribution of properties in
consonance with Section 19(1) of the said Rules.
Hence, the motion for partial reconsideration is granted.
VII.
Due to continuous heavy rainfall, the major streets in Manila became flooded.
This compelled Cris to check-in at Square One Hotel. As soon as Cris got off from his
Toyota Altis, the Hotel’s parking attendant got the key of his car and gave him a valet
parking customer’s claim stub. The attendant parked his car at the basement of the
hotel. Early in the morning, Cris was informed by the hotel manager that his car was
carnapped.
(A) What contract, if any, was perfected between Cris and the Hotel when Cris
surrendered the key of his car to the Hotel’s parking attendant?
(B) What is the liability, if any, of the Hotel for the loss of Cris’ car?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A)
A contract of deposit was perfected between Cris and the Hotel when Cris
surrendered the key of his car to the Hotel’s parking attendant. In Triple-V Food
Services v. Filipino Merchants Insurance Company (G.R. No. 160544, February 21,
2005), it was ruled that when a car is entrusted to a valet attendant there is a contract of
deposit. Article 1962 of the Civil Code provides that a deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely
keeping it and returning the same (Durban Apartments v. Pioneer Insurance, G.R. No.
179419, March 30, 2011). Furthermore, Article 1998 of the Civil Code provides that the
deposit of effects made by travelers in hotels or inns shall be regarded as necessary,
and that the keepers of hotels and inns are responsible for the effects deposited as
depositaries subject to their being notified of the effects being brought in by the travelers
and the taking by the travelers of such precautions which the hotel or inn-keepers or
their substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance of such effects. Article 1999
of the Civil Code also provides for the liability of the hotel-keeper for vehicles introduced
or placed in the annexes of the hotel, which in this case is the basement of the hotel.
(Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations University of the
Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers in Civil Law)
(B)
The hotel was constituted as a depositary in this case. Thus, it has the obligation
to safely keep the car which is expected by Cris to be returned to him. With the loss of
the car, the Hotel is liable for the cost of the car as actual damages. (Assoc. Dean

(A)
A contract of deposit was perfected between Cris and the Hotel when Cris surrendered
the key of his car to the Hotel’s parking attendant.
In Triple-V Food Services v. Filipino Merchants Insurance Company (G.R. No. 160544,
February 21, 2005), it was ruled that when a car is entrusted to a valet attendant there is a
contract of deposit. Article 1962 of the Civil Code provides that a deposit is constituted from the
moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it
and returning the same (Durban Apartments v. Pioneer Insurance, G.R. No. 179419, March 30,
2011). Furthermore, Article 1998 of the Civil Code provides that the deposit of effects made by
travelers in hotels or inns shall be regarded as necessary, and that the keepers of hotels and inns
are responsible for the effects deposited as depositaries subject to their being notified of the
effects being brought in by the travelers and the taking by the travelers of such precautions which
the hotel or inn-keepers or their substitutes advised relative to the care and vigilance of such
effects. Article 1999 of the Civil Code also provides for the liability of the hotel-keeper for
vehicles introduced or placed in the annexes of the hotel, which in this case is the basement of
the hotel.
In the instant case, Cris surrendered the key to his car to the parking attendant and receive
a valet parking customer’s claim stub. This implies that the Hotel received the car for
safekeeping and obliged itself to return the same. This fits the definition of deposit under Article
1962.
Hence, the contract perfected is deposit.
(B)
The Hotel is liable for the cost of the car as actual damages. The hotel was constituted as
a depositary in this case. Thus, it has the obligation to safely keep the car which is expected by
Cris to be returned to him. With the loss of the car, the Hotel is liable for the cost of the car as
actual damages.
SUGGESTION FOR ADDITIONAL CREDIT:

Art. 2001 of the Civil Code provides that the act of the thief or robber, who has
entered the hotel is not deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the use of arms or
through an irresistible force. In this case, there is no indication that the carnapping was
done with the use of arms through irresistible force; hence, the hotel cannot claim that it
is not liable for the loss of Cris’ car. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar
VIII.
Tess leased her 1,500 sq. m. lot in Antipolo City to Ruth for a period of three (3) years,
from January 2010 to February 2013. On March 19, 2011, Tess, sent a letter to Ruth,
part of which reads as follows:
“I am offering you to buy the property you are presently leasing at P5,000.00 per sq. m.
or for a total of P7,500,000.00. you can pay the contract price by installment for two (2)
years without interest. I will give you a period of one (1) year from receipt of this letter to
decide whether you will buy the property.”
After the expiration of the lease contract, Tess sold the property to her niece for a total
consideration of P4,000,000.00. Ruth filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale,
reconveyance and damages against Tess and her niece. Ruth allege that the sale of the
leased property violated her right to buy under the principle of right of first refusal.
Is the allegation of Ruth tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The allegation of Ruth is untenable. There was no right of first refusal offered to
her, the wording of the letter can at most be considered a mere offer to sell or lease with
an option to buy.
In Sanchez v. Rigos (G.R. No. L-25494, June 14, 1972), the Court held that in
order that a unilateral promise to buy or to sell may be binding upon the promisor,
Article 1479 of the Civil Code requires that said promise be supported by a
consideration distinct from the price. The promisor cannot be compelled to comply with
the promise, unless the existence of a consideration distinct from the price is
established. In the present case, there was no valuable or independent consideration,
thus, it cannot be classified as a unilateral promise to sell, but is only a mere offer to
sell. Since there was valuable or independent consideration, it was not an option
contract but a mere option to buy, which may be withdrawn at any time. (Assoc. Dean

The allegation of Ruth is untenable. There was no right of first refusal offered to her, the
wording of the letter can at most be considered a mere offer to sell or lease with an option to buy.
In Sanchez v. Rigos (G.R. No. L-25494, June 14, 1972), the Court held that in order that
a unilateral promise to buy or to sell may be binding upon the promisor, Article 1479 of the Civil
Code requires that said promise be supported by a consideration distinct from the price. The
promisor cannot be compelled to comply with the promise, unless the existence of a
consideration distinct from the price is established.
In the present case, there was no valuable or independent consideration, thus, it cannot be
classified as a unilateral promise to sell, but is only a mere offer to sell. Since there was valuable
or independent consideration, it was not an option contract but a mere option to buy, which may
be withdrawn at any time.
Hence, the allegation of Ruth is untenable.
SUGGESTION FOR ADDITIONAL CREDIT:

The option to buy or offer to sell given to Ruth is one year from receipt of Tess’
letter by Ruth. The lease is for three (3) years from January 2010 to February 2013.
Tess sent the letter on March 19, 2011. The right has already expired when Tess sold
the lot to her niece.
IX.
Spouses Macario and Bonifacia Dakila entered into a contract to sell with
Honorio Cruz over a parcel of industrial land in Valenzuela, Bulacan for a price of
P3,500,000.00. the spouses would give a downpayment of P500,000.00 upon the
signing of the contract, while the balance would be paid for the next three (3)
consecutive months in the amount of P1,000,000.00 per month. The spouses paid the
first two (2) installments but not the last installment. After one (1) year, the spouses
offered to pay the unpaid balance which Honorio refused to accept. The spouses filed a
complaint for specific performance against Honorio invoking the application of the
Maceda Law.
If you are the judge, how will you decide the case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will dismiss the complaint. The invocation of the Maceda Law by the spouses is
misplaced. Section 3 of R.A. 6552 (Maceda Law) provides that it is applicable in all
transactions or contracts involving the sale or financing of real estate on instalment
payments, including residential condominium apartments but excluding industrial lots,
commercial buildings and sales to tenants. Since the subject of the case is an industrial
land, Maceda Law is not applicable. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar

If I were the judge, I will dismiss the complaint.
Section 3 of R.A. 6552 (Maceda Law) provides that it is applicable in all transactions or
contracts involving the sale or financing of real estate on instalment payments, including
residential condominium apartments but excluding industrial lots, commercial buildings and
sales to tenants.
Since the subject of the case is an industrial land, Maceda Law is not applicable. The
invocation of the Maceda Law by the spouses is misplaced.
Hence, the case is dismissed.
X.
Dorotea leased portions of her 2,000 sq. m. lot to Monet, Kathy, Celia, and Ruth for five
(5) years. Two (2) years before the expiration of the lease contract, Dorotea sold the
property to PM Realty and Development Corporation. The following month, Dorotea and
PM Realty stopped accepting rental payments from all the lessees because they
wanted to terminate the lease contracts.
Due to the refusal of Dorotea to accept rental payments, the lessees, Ruth, et al., filed a
complaint for consignation of the rentals before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
without notifying Dorotea.
Is the consignation valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The consignation is not valid. Article 1257 of the Civil Code provides that in order
that the consignation of the thing due may release the obligor, it must first be
announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment of the obligation. Moreover, Article
1258 of the same Code provides that consignation having been made, the interested
parties shall also be notified thereof. In this case Dorotea, an interested party, was not
notified of the consignation. The consignation is therefore not valid for non-compliance
with Article 1257. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations
University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers in Civil Law)

The consignation is not valid.
Article 1257 of the Civil Code provides that in order that the consignation of the thing
due may release the obligor, it must first be announced to the persons interested in the fulfillment
of the obligation. Moreover, Article 1258 of the same Code provides that consignation having
been made, the interested parties shall also be notified thereof.
In the instant case, Dorotea, an interested party, was not notified of the consignation. The
consignation is therefore not valid for non-compliance with Article 1257.
Hence, the consignation is invalid.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The consignation may be valid. Had the lessees been informed of the transfer of
the property to PM Realty, notice to Dorotea under Article 1257 may no longer be
necessary, but it is notice to PM Realty which is required. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.
XI.
An easement that can be acquired by prescription:
(A) Right of way
(B) Watering of an animal
(C) Lateral and subjacent support
(D) Light and view
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(D) Light and view (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations
XII.
J.C. Construction (J.C.) bought steel bars from Matibay Steel Industries (MSI) which is
owned by Buddy Batungbacal. J.C. failed to pay the purchased materials worth
P500,000.00 on due date. J.C. persuaded its client Amoroso with whom it had
receivables to pay its obligation to MSI. Amoroso agreed and paid MSI the amount of
P50,000.00. after two (2) other payments, Amoroso stopped making further payments.
Buddy filed a complaint for collection of the balance of the obligation and damages
against J.C. J.C. denied any liability claiming that its obligation was extinguished by
reason of novation which took place when MSI accepted partial payments from
Amoroso on its behalf.
Was the obligation of J.C. Construction to MSI extinguished by novation?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the obligation of J.C. Construction to MSI was not extinguished by novation.
Under Article 1292 of the Civil Code, in order that an obligation may be
extinguished by another which substitute the same, it is imperative that it be so declare
in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be on every point
incompatible with each other. Novation by substitution of debtor requires the consent of
the creditor as provided in Article 1293 of the Civil Code. This requirement is not
present in this case. In Magdalena Estates, Inc. v. Rodriguez (G.R. No. L-18411,
December 17, 1966), it was ruled that the mere fact that the creditor received payment
from a third person does not constitute novation and does not extinguish the obligation
of the original debtor. Since there was no novation, the obligation of the original debtor
is not extinguished. Thus, the obligation of J.C. Construction to MSI submits. (Assoc.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law
Center Suggested Answers in Civil Law)
No, the obligation of J.C. Construction to MSI was not extinguished by novation.
Under Article 1292 of the Civil Code, in order that an obligation may be extinguished by
another which substitute the same, it is imperative that it be so declare in unequivocal terms, or
that the old and the new obligations be on every point incompatible with each other. Novation by
substitution of debtor requires the consent of the creditor as provided in Article 1293 of the Civil
Code. This requirement is not present in this case. In Magdalena Estates, Inc. v. Rodriguez (G.R.
No. L-18411, December 17, 1966), it was ruled that the mere fact that the creditor received
payment from a third person does not constitute novation and does not extinguish the obligation
of the original debtor.
In the instant case, MSI did not expressed its consent as the creditor. Hence, there was no
novation. The obligation of the original debtor is not extinguished.
Thus, the obligation of J.C. Construction to MSI submits.
XIII.
Esteban and Martha had four (4) children: Rolando, Jun, Mark, and Hector. Rolando
had a daughter, Edith, while Mark had a son, Philip. After the death of Esteban and
Martha, their three (3) parcels of land were adjudicated to Jun. after the death of Jun,
the properties passed to his surviving spouse Anita, and son Cesar. When Anita dies,
her share went to her son Cesar. Ten (10) years after, Cesar died intestate without any
issue. Peachy, Anita’s sister, adjudicated to herself the properties as the only surviving
heir of Anita and Cesar. Edith and Philip would like to recover the properties claiming
that they should have been reserved by Peachy in their behalf and must now revert
back to them.
Is the contention of Edith and Philip valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, their contention is not valid as the property is not subject to reserva troncal.
Under Article 891 of the Civil Code, the ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant,
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who
belong to the line from which said property came. There is no reserva troncal here
because Anita is not an ascendant or a brother or sister of Jun. Jun cannot qualify as a
prepositus, because the property which he inherited from his ascendant was not
inherited by another ascendant by operation of law.
In Mendoza v. Policarpio (G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013), the Court ruled
that the lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from the ascendant from
whom the prepositus received the property by gratuitous title. In this case, the
ownership should be reckoned only from Jun, as he is the ascendant from whom Cesar
inherited the properties. Moreover, Article 891 of the Civil Code provides that the person
obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant. Peachy is not Cesar’s
ascendant but a mere collateral relative. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar

No, their contention is not valid as the property is not subject to reserva troncal.
Under Article 891 of the Civil Code, the ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which
said property came. In Mendoza v. Policarpio (G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013), the Court
ruled that the lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from the ascendant from
whom the prepositus received the property by gratuitous title.
In the instant case, there is no reserva troncal here because Anita is not an ascendant or a
brother or sister of Jun. Jun cannot qualify as a prepositus, because the property which he
inherited from his ascendant was not inherited by another ascendant by operation of law.
Furthermore, the ownership should be reckoned only from Jun, as he is the ascendant from
whom Cesar inherited the properties. Moreover, Article 891 of the Civil Code provides that the
person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant. Peachy is not Cesar’s ascendant
but a mere collateral relative.
Hence, the contention of Edith and Philip is invalid.
XIV.
A pedestrian, who was four (4) months pregnant, was hit by a bus driver while crossing
the street. Although the pedestrian survived, the fetus inside her womb was aborted.
Can the pedestrian recover damages on account of the death of the fetus?
(A) Yes, because Article 2206 of the Civil Code which allows the surviving heirs to
demand damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
(B) Yes, for as long as the pedestrian can prove that she was not at fault and the bus
driver was the one negligent.
(C) No, because a fetus is not a natural person.
(D) No, if the fetus did not comply with the requirements under Article 41 of the Civil
Code.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A) Yes, for as long as the pedestrian can prove that she was not at fault and the
bus driver was the one negligent.
[Note: Letter A may also be considered correct on account of Article II, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution, which provide, in part, that “The State …. shall equally protect the life
of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception ….” C and D may also be
considered correct.] (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations
XV.
Mr. Bong owns several properties in Pasig City. He decided to build a condominium
named Flores de Manila in one of his lots. To fund the projects, he obtained a loan from
the National Bank (NB) secured by a real estate mortgage over the adjoining property
which he also owned.
During construction, he built three (3) pumps on the mortgaged property to
supply water to the condominium. After one (1) year, the project was completed and the
condominium was turned over to the buyers. However, Mr. Bong failed to pay his loan
obligation to NB. Thus, NB foreclosed the mortgaged property where the pumps were
installed. During the sale on public auction of the mortgaged property, Mr. Simon won in
the bidding. When Mr. Simon attempted to take possession of the property, the
condominium owners, who in the meantime constituted themselves into Flores de
Manila Inc. (FMI), claimed that they have earlier filed a case for the declaration of the
existence of an easement before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City and
prayed that the easement be annotated in the title of the property foreclosed by NB. FMI
further claimed that when Mr. Bong installed the pumps in his adjoining property, a
voluntary easement was constituted in favor of FMI.
Will the action prosper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the action will prosper. Article 624 of the Civil Code provides that when an
apparent sign of easement exists between two estates established or maintained by the
owner of both, it shall be considered as a title to the easement should the owner of two
properties alienate one of them, unless at the time the ownership between the two
estates is divided the contrary is provided in the deed of transfer or the apparent sign of
easement is removed before the execution of the deed (Privatization and Management
Office v. Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., G.R. No. 147957, July 22, 2009, 593 SCRA 382). In
this case, neither any showing that the apparent sign of the easement was removed
before the sale on public auction, not that there was an agreement that the easement
will no longer continue; hence, the entitlement of FMI to the easement subsists. (Assoc.

Yes, the action will prosper.
Article 624 of the Civil Code provides that when an apparent sign of easement exists
between two estates established or maintained by the owner of both, it shall be considered as a
title to the easement should the owner of two properties alienate one of them, unless at the time
the ownership between the two estates is divided the contrary is provided in the deed of transfer
or the apparent sign of easement is removed before the execution of the deed (Privatization and
Management Office v. Legaspi Towers 300, Inc., G.R. No. 147957, July 22, 2009, 593 SCRA
382).
In this case, neither any showing that the apparent sign of the easement was removed
before the sale on public auction, not that there was an agreement that the easement will no
longer continue; hence, the entitlement of FMI to the easement subsists.
Hence, the action has merit.
XVI.
A congregation for religious women, by way of commodatum, is using the real property
owned and registered in the name of Spouses Manuel as a retreat house.
Maria, a helper of the congregation discovered a chest in the backyard. When she
opened the chest, it contained several pieces of jewelry and money.
(A) can the chest containing the pieces of jewelry and money be considered as hidden
treasure?
(B) who has the right to claim ownership of it?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A)
Yes, the chest containing the pieces of jewelry and money may be considered as
hidden treasure as long as they are hidden and unknown and the lawful ownership of it
does not appear as provided in Article 439 of the Civil Code. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.
(B)
Under Article 438 of the Civil Code, when the discovery of hidden treasure is
made on the property of another, one-half of thereof shall be allowed to the finder
provided the finder is not a trespasser. In this case, the owner of the land are Spouses
Manuel. Spouses Manuel owns one-half of the hidden treasure since ownership is not
transferred to the borrower but is retained by the lender in a contract of commodatum.
The other half shall belong to Maria as the finder. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan,
2014 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers in
Civil Law)

(A)
Yes, the chest containing the pieces of jewelry and money may be considered as a hidden
treasure.
Under Article 439 of the Civil Code, by treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any
hidden and unknown deposit of money, jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful ownership
of which does not appear.
In the instant case, the chest was buried which means that it was hidden beneath the
backyard. Furthermore, the ownership of the chest containing he pieces of jewelry and money
cannot be ascertained. Clearly, applying the definition of treasure under Article 439, the chest
can be considered as hidden treasure.
Hence, the chest is a hidden treasure.
(B)
Spouses Manuel and Maria owns one-half each of the hidden treasure.
Under Article 438 Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, when the discovery is made on the
property of another, or of the State or any of its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof
shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of
the treasure.
In the instant case, the finder of the treasure is Maria. The property is owned by Spouses
Manuel. The congregation merely possess the property by virtue of commodatum which means
that Spouses Manuel still retains ownership.
Hence, Spouses Manuel and Maria shall share the hidden treasure.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(A)
No, the chest containing the pieces of jewelry and money may not be considered
as hidden treasure. In the case at bar, there is no indication that the chest was hidden,
only that the helper discovered it in the backyard. And since it is clear that the property
where the chest was found belongs to the Spouses Manuel, they are presumed the
owner of the chest where the jewelry was found. The lawful ownership of the chest is
apparent. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations University of the
(B)
Since it does not come within the purview of hidden treasure, the Spouses
Manuel have the right to claim ownership over the chest as well as its contents. (Assoc.

(A)
No, the chest containing the pieces of jewelry and money may not be considered as
hidden treasure.
In the instant case, there is no indication that the chest was hidden, only that the helper
discovered it in the backyard. Furthermore, since it is clear that the property where the chest was
found belongs to the Spouses Manuel, they are presumed the owner of the chest where the
jewelry was found. The lawful ownership of the chest is apparent.
Hence, the chest is not a hidden treasure.
(B)
The Spouses Manuel has the right to claim ownership over the chest as well as its
contents.
In the instant case, the chest cannot be considered as a hidden treasure since there is no
indication that it was hidden. This means that the chest belongs to Spouses Manuel since they are
the owner of the property.
Hence, Spouses Manuel owns the chest as well as its contents.
XVII.
On March 30, 2000, Mariano died intestate and was survived by his wife, Leonora, and
children, Danilo and Carlito. One of the properties he left was a piece of land in Alabang
where he built his residential house.
After his burial, Leonora and Mariano’s children extrajudicially settled his estate.
Thereafter, Leonora and Danilo advised Carlito of their intention to partition the
property. Carlito opposed invoking Article 159 of the Family Code, Carlito alleged that
since his minor child Lucas still resides in the premises, the family home continues until
that minor beneficiary becomes of age.
Is the contention of Carlito tenable?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the contention of Carlito is not tenable. In the case of Patricio v. Dario (G.R.
N0. 170829, November 20, 2006), it was provided that to be a beneficiary of a family
home three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships
enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3)
they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. In the said case, the
partition of a family home is allowed despite the objection on the ground that a minor
grandchild still resides in the premises. Although the first two requisites are present in
this case, the third requisite is lacking because Lucas, the grandchild, is not dependent
for legal support upon his grandparents which is the head of the family who constituted
the family home in this case. Lucas still has parents who are legally obliged to support
him. Thus, he cannot be deemed as dependent for legal support upon the head of the
family, who is Mariano. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations

No, the contention of Carlito is not tenable.
In the case of Patricio v. Dario (G.R. N0. 170829, November 20, 2006), it was provided
that to be a beneficiary of a family home three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among
the relationships enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home,
and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
In the said case, the partition of a family home is allowed despite the objection on the
ground that a minor grandchild still resides in the premises. Although the first two requisites are
present in this case, the third requisite is lacking because Lucas, the grandchild, is not dependent
for legal support upon his grandparents which is the head of the family who constituted the
family home in this case. Lucas still has parents who are legally obliged to support him. Thus, he
cannot be deemed as dependent for legal support upon the head of the family, who is Mariano.
Hence, the contention of Carlito is untenable.
XVIII.
Spouses Magtanggol managed and operated a gasoline station on a 1,000 sq. m. lot
which they leased from Francisco Bigla-awa. The contract was for a period of three (3)
years. When the contract expired, Francisco asked the spouses to peacefully vacate the
premises. The spouses ignored the demand and continued with the operation of the
gasoline station.
One month later, Francisco, with the aid of group of armed men, caused the closure of
the gasoline station by constructing fences around it.
Was the act of Francisco and his men lawful? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the act of Francisco and his men were not lawful. Even when one has a right,
such as the right to enjoy his property and to exclude anyone else from the enjoyment
of such, a person cannot take the law unto his own hands and must still file the proper
action in court. Even though Francisco had the right to fence his property as part of his
right to enjoy it, Spouses Magtanggol are covered by Art. 539 which provides that every
possessor has a right to be respected in his possession despite the lapse of their lease.
Although there is no apparent force or intimidation employed, fencing off the property
would prevent Spouses Magtanggol from entering and possessing the property. The
proper recourse of Francisco is to invoke the aid of a competent court and to file an
action for unlawful detainer. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar

No, the act of Francisco and his men were not lawful.
Under Article 539 of the Civil Code, every possessor has a right to be respected in his
possession; and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to said
possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of Court. A possessor deprived of
his possession through forcible entry may within ten days from the filing of the complaint
present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the
motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.
In the instant case, even when one has a right, such as the right to enjoy his property and
to exclude anyone else from the enjoyment of such, a person cannot take the law unto his own
hands and must still file the proper action in court. Even though Francisco had the right to fence
his property as part of his right to enjoy it, Spouses Magtanggol are covered by Art. 539 which
provides that every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession despite the lapse of
their lease. Although there is no apparent force or intimidation employed, fencing off the
property would prevent Spouses Magtanggol from entering and possessing the property. The
proper recourse of Francisco is to invoke the aid of a competent court and to file an action for
unlawful detainer.
Hence, the act of Francisco and his men were unlawful.
XIX.
Who enjoys the Right of Retention?
(A) depositary until full payment of what may be due to him in deposit
(B) lessee if he advances the expenses for the repair of the leased premises
(C) bailee if bailor owes him something
(D) builder in bad faith for the recovery of necessary and useful expenses
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A) depositary until full payment of what may be due to him in deposit
[Note: Letter C will also be correct if “owes him something” refers to damages (Article
1944 in relation to Art. 1951).] (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar
XX.
Mabuhay Elementary School organized a field trip for its Grade VI students in Fort
Santiago, Manila Zoo, and Star City. To be able to join, parents of the students had to
sign a piece of paper that reads as follows:
“I allow my child (name of student), Grade- Section, to join the school’s field trip on
February 14, 2014. I will not file any claim against the school,
administrator, or teacher in case something happens to my child during
the trip,”
Joey, a 7-year old student of Mabuhay Elementary School was bitten by a snake while
the group was touring Manila Zoo. The parents of Joey sued the school for damages.
The school, as a defense, presented the waiver signed by Joey’s parents.
Was there a valid waiver of right to sue the school? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, there was no valid waiver of the right to sue the school. Article 6 of the Civil
Code provides that “rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a person with a right
recognized by law.’ As a general rule, patrimonial rights may be waived as opposed to
rights to personality and family rights which may not be made the subject of waiver
(Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102316,
June 30, 1997). The second paragraph of the waiver prohibiting the parent to file any
claim against the school, administrator, or teacher in case something happens to the
child during the trip is against public policy because it removes liability from said school,
administrator, or teacher, and thus, removing the responsibility imposed on them by
Article 218 of the Family Code. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar

No, there was no valid waiver of the right to sue the school.
Article 6 of the Civil Code provides that “rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a person
with a right recognized by law.’ As a general rule, patrimonial rights may be waived as opposed
to rights to personality and family rights which may not be made the subject of waiver
(Valenzuela Hardwood & Industrial Supply, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102316, June 30,
1997).
In the instant case, the second paragraph of the waiver prohibiting the parent to file any
claim against the school, administrator, or teacher in case something happens to the child during
the trip is against public policy because it removes liability from said school, administrator, or
teacher, and thus, removing the responsibility imposed on them by Article 218 of the Family
Code.
Hence, the waiver of right to sue the school is void.
XXI.
A delayed accession is:
(A) formation of an island
(B) avulsion
(C) alluvium
(D) change in the course of he riverbed
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(B) avulsion (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations University of
the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers in Civil Law)
XXII.
On March 27, 1980, Cornelio filed an application for land registration involving a parcel
of agriculture land that he had bought from Isaac identified as Lot No. 2716 with an area
of one (1) hectare. During the trial, Cornelio claimed that he and his predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
and occupation of the land for more than thirty (30) years. He likewise introduced in
evidence a certification to the effect that on June 14, 1980, agricultural lands of the
public domain, including the subject matter of the application, were declared alienable
and disposable agricultural land.
(A) If you are the judge, will you grant the application for land registration of Cornelio.
(B) Can Cornelio acquire said agricultural land through acquisitive prescription, whether
ordinary or extraordinary.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A)
I will not grant the application for registration. Under the law, specifically Section
48 (b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No 141), as amended by P.D. No. 1073, and Section
14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Interpreting Section 14 (1) of P.D.
No. 1529, the Supreme Court held that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
is filed and not during the entire period for registration is filed and not during the entire
period of possession, or since June 12, 1945 (Republic v. Naguit, G.R. No. 14-4057,
January 17, 2005; Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013). In
this case, the land applied for by Cornelio was declared alienable and disposable
agricultural land only on June 14, 1980, or almost three (3) months from the date of the
filing of his application on March 27, 1980. Hence, his application for registration cannot
be granted. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations University of
(B)
Neither can Cornelio acquire the land through acquisitive prescription, whether
ordinary (possession for ten (10) years in good faith or with just title) nor extraordinary
(possession for thirty (30) years regardless of good faith or just title). As a rule,
properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription under existing laws.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides the foundation for the application of Section 14
(2) to the effect that only when land of the public dominion is patrimonial, and hence,
private in character, can said land be susceptible to acquisitive prescription. But in order
that land of the public dominion may become patrimonial property, there must be an
express declaration by the State that such land is no longer needed for public service or
for the development of the national wealth to convert it as such. In this case, there is no
such official declaration, hence the land cannot be the subject of acquisition through
prescription. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014 Bar Examinations University of

(A)
If I were the judge, I will not grant the application for registration.
Under the law, specifically Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act (C.A. No 141), as
amended by P.D. No. 1073, and Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable land of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Interpreting Section 14 (1) of P.D. No.
1529, the Supreme Court held that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration is filed and not during
the entire period for registration is filed and not during the entire period of possession, or since
June 12, 1945 (Republic v. Naguit, G.R. No. 14-4057, January 17, 2005; Malabanan v. Republic,
G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013).
In this case, the land applied for by Cornelio was declared alienable and disposable
agricultural land only on June 14, 1980, or almost three (3) months from the date of the filing of
his application on March 27, 1980.
Hence, his application for registration cannot be granted.
(B)
Neither can Cornelio acquire the land through acquisitive prescription, whether ordinary
(possession for ten (10) years in good faith or with just title) nor extraordinary (possession for
thirty (30) years regardless of good faith or just title).
As a rule, properties of public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription under
existing laws. Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides the foundation for the application of
Section 14 (2) to the effect that only when land of the public dominion is patrimonial, and hence,
private in character, can said land be susceptible to acquisitive prescription. But in order that
land of the public dominion may become patrimonial property, there must be an express
declaration by the State that such land is no longer needed for public service or for the
development of the national wealth to convert it as such.
In this case, there is no such official declaration.
Hence the land cannot be the subject of acquisition through prescription.
XXIII.
After undergoing sex reassignment in a foreign country, Jose, who is now using the
name “Josie,” married his partner Ador. Is the marriage valid?
(A) Yes, the marriage is valid for as long as it is valid in the place where it is celebrated
following Article 17 of the Civil Code
(B) Yes, the marriage is valid if all the essential and formal elements of marriage under
the Family Code are present.
(C) No, the marriage is not valid because one essential element of marriage is absent.
(D) No, the marriage is not valid but is voidable because “Josie” concealed her real
identity.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(C) No, the marriage is not valid because one essential element of marriage is absent.
XXIV.
Ted, married to Annie, went to Canada to work. Five (5) years later, Ted became a
naturalized Canadian citizen. He returned to the Philippines to convince Annie to settle
in Canada. Unfortunately, Ted discovered that Annie and his friend Louie were having
an affair. Deeply hurt, Ted returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce which was
granted. In December 2013, Ted went to the Local Civil Registry of Quezon City where
his marriage contract with Annie was registered. He asked the Civil Register to annotate
the decree of divorce on his marriage contract with Annie. However, he was advised by
the National Statistics Office (NSO) to file a petition for judicial recognition of the decree
of divorce in the Philippines.
Is it necessary for Ted to file a petition for judicial recognition of the decree of divorce he
obtained in Canada before he can contract a second marriage in the Philippines?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, it is not necessary for Ted to file a petition for judicial recognition of the
decree of divorce he obtained in Canada before he can contract a second marriage in
the Philippines. Ted, who is already a foreigner being a naturalized Canadian citizen,
will be required to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officials to obtain a marriage license. (Assoc. Dean
XXV.
Mario executed his last will and testament where he acknowledges the child being
conceived by his live-in partner Josie as his own child, and that his house and lot in
Baguio City be given to his unborn conceived child. Are the acknowledgement and the
donation mortis causa valid? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The acknowledgement of the unborn child is effective because a will may still
constitute a document which contains an admission of illegitimate filiation. The donation
to the conceived child is also valid provided that the child is born later on and that it
comply with the formalities required of a will (Article 728, Civil Code). A fetus has a
presumptive personality for all purposes favorable to it provided it be born under the
conditions specified in Article 41. However, there has to be compliance with the formal
requisite for a valid last will and testament. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014
Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers in Civil
Law)
XXVI.
Isaac leased the apartment of Dorotea for two (2) years. Six (6) months after, Isaac
subleased a portion of the apartment sue to financial difficulty. Is the sublease contract
valid?
(A) Yes, it is valid for as long as all the elements of a valid sublease contract are
present.
(B) Yes, it is valid if there is no express prohibition for subleasing in the lease contract.
(C) No, it is void if there is no written consent on the part of the lessor.
(D) No, it is void because of breach of the lease contract.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(B) Yes, it is valid if there is no express prohibition for subleasing in the lease contract.
XXVII.
Fe, Esperanza, and Caridad inherited from their parents a 500 sq. m. lot which they
lease to Maria for three (3) years. One year after, Fe, claiming to have the authority to
represent her siblings Esperanza and Caridad, offered to sell the leased property to
Maria which the latter accepted. The sale was not reduced into writing, but Maria started
to make partial payments to Fe, which the latter received and acknowledged. After
giving the full payment, Maria demanded for the execution of a deed of absolute sale
which Esperanza and Caridad refused to do. Worst, Maria learned that the siblings sold
the same property to Manuel. This compelled Maria to file a complaint for the annulment
of the sale with specific performance and damages.
If you are the judge, how will you decide the case?
SUGGESTED ANSWER
I will decide in favor of Maria but only as to the share of Fe, and dismiss the
complaint with respect to Esperanza and Caridad. The property in question is co-owned
by Fe, Esperanza ad Caridad, since it has not yet been divided among them. Article 493
of the Civil Code provides that each co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and
of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign, or
mortgage it, provided that the effect of such alienation or mortgage shall be limited to
the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. The sale by Fe to Maria would therefore be binding on her 1/3 interest, but
not on the 2/3 interest of Esperanza and Caridad because their shares were not validly
sold to Maria in the absence of a written authority to Fe to sell their respective portions
to Maria as required by Article 1874 of the Civil Code. Fe can only sell whatever
property right she has, i.e. 1/3 ideal portion or undivided interest in the 500 sq. m. lot.
The sale to Manuel is valid as to the 2/3 share of Esperanza and Caridad.

I will decide in favor of Maria but only as to the share of Fe, and dismiss the complaint
with respect to Esperanza and Caridad. The property in question is co-owned by Fe, Esperanza
ad Caridad, since it has not yet been divided among them.
Article 493 of the Civil Code provides that each co-owner shall have full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign, or
mortgage it, provided that the effect of such alienation or mortgage shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The sale by Fe to Maria would therefore be binding on her 1/3 interest, but not on the 2/3
interest of Esperanza and Caridad because their shares were not validly sold to Maria in the
absence of a written authority to Fe to sell their respective portions to Maria as required by
Article 1874 of the Civil Code. Fe can only sell whatever property right she has, i.e. 1/3 ideal
portion or undivided interest in the 500 sq. m. lot.
The sale to Manuel is valid as to the 2/3 share of Esperanza and Caridad.
XXVIII.
Spouses Esteban and Maria decided to raise their two (2) nieces, Faith and Hope, both
minors, as their own children after the parents of the minors died in a vehicular accident.
Ten (10) years after, Esteban died. Maria later on married her boss Daniel, a British
national who had been living in the Philippines for two (2) years.
With the permission of Daniel, Maria filed a petition for the adoption of Faith and Hope.
She did not include Daniel as he co-petitioner because for Maria, it was her former
husband Esteban who raised the kids.
If you are the judge, how will you resolve the petition?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will deny the petition for adoption. According to R.A. 8552 or the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998, a husband and wife must jointly adopt except in the following
cases: 1) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other; 2) if one spouse
seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate child, provided that the other spouse signified
their consent thereto; or 3) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In this case, since Daniel and Maria do not fall under any of the exceptions
enumerated above, they must jointly adopt as required by law. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.

I will deny the petition for adoption.
According to R.A. 8552 or the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, a husband and wife must
jointly adopt except in the following cases: 1) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of
the other; 2) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate child, provided that the other
spouse signified their consent thereto; or 3) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In this case, since Daniel and Maria do not fall under any of the exceptions enumerated
above, they must jointly adopt as required by law.
Hence, the petition is denied.
XXIX.
Timothy executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Kristopher setting up a
business venture covering three (3) fastfood stores known as “Hungry Toppings” that
will be established at Mall Uno, Mall Dos, and Mall Tres.
The pertinent provisions of the MOA provide:
1. Timothy shall be considered a partner with thirty percent (30%) share in all of the
stores to be set up by Kristopher;
2. The proceeds of the business, after deducting expenses, shall be used to pay the
principal amount of P500,000.00 and the interest therein which is to be
computed based on the bank rate, representing the bank loan secured by
Timothy;
3. The net profits, if any, after deducting the expenses and payments of the principal
and interest shall be divided as follows: seventy percent (70%) for
Kristopher and thirty percent (30%) for Timothy;
4. Kristopher shall have a free hand in running the business without interference from
Timothy, his agents, representatives, or assigns, and should such
interference happen, Kristopher has the right to buy back the share of
Timothy less the amounts already paid on the principal and to dissolve the
MOA; and
5. Kristopher shall submit his monthly sales report in connection with the business to
Timothy.
What is the contractual relationship between Timothy and Kristopher?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contractual relationship between Timothy and Kristopher is that of
partnership. Article 1767 of the Civil Code provides that under a contract of partnership,
two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a
common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Moreover,
Article 1769 of the Civil Code states in part that receipt by a person of a share of the
profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business,
provided that the said profits were not received in payment for debt, as wages, annuity,
interest on a loan, or as a consideration for a sale. In this case, the MOA between
Timothy and Kristopher stipulated that they shall share in the profits of the business 70-
30. The contributions of the partners include a bank load obtained by Timothy and
industry in the form of managing the properties of Kristopher. Thus, the requisites for
establishing a contract of partnership are complied with. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.

The contractual relationship between Timothy and Kristopher is that of partnership.
Article 1767 of the Civil Code provides that under a contract of partnership, two or more
persons bind themselves to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund, with the
intention of dividing the profits among themselves. Moreover, Article 1769 of the Civil Code
states in part that receipt by a person of a share of the profits of a business is prima facie
evidence that he is a partner in the business, provided that the said profits were not received in
payment for debt, as wages, annuity, interest on a loan, or as a consideration for a sale.
In this case, the MOA between Timothy and Kristopher stipulated that they shall share in
the profits of the business 70-30. The contributions of the partners include a bank load obtained
by Timothy and industry in the form of managing the properties of Kristopher.
Thus, the requisites for establishing a contract of partnership are complied with.
XXX.
Joe Miguel, a well-known treasure hunter in Mindanao, executed a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) appointing his nephew, John Paul, as his attorney-in-fact. John Paul
was given the power to deal with treasure-hunting activities on Joe Miguel’s land and to
file charges against those who may enter it without the latter’s authority. Joe Miguel
agreed to give John Paul forty percent (40%) of the treasure that may be found on the
land.
Thereafter, John Paul filed a case for damages and injunction against Lilo for illegally
entering Joe Miguel’s land. Subsequently, he hired the legal services of Atty. Audrey
agreeing to give the latter thirty percent (30%) of Joe Miguel’s share in whatever
treasure that may be found in the land.
Dissatisfied however with the strategies implemented by John Paul, Joe Miguel
unilaterally revoked the SPA granted to John Paul.
Is the revocation proper?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the revocation is proper. Article 1920 provides that the principal ay
expressly or impliedly revoke the agency at will, and compel the agent to return the
document evidencing the agency. Joe Miguel may however be held liable for damages
if he abused his right in revoking the agency. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, 2014
Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers in Civil
Law)

Yes, the revocation is proper.
Article 1920 provides that the principal ay expressly or impliedly revoke the agency at
will, and compel the agent to return the document evidencing the agency.
In the instant case, Joe Miguel is the principal of John Paul. This means that he is legally
authorized to unilaterally revoked the SPA granted to John Paul in accordance with law. Joe
Miguel may however be held liable for damages if he abused his right in revoking the agency.
Hence, Joe Miguel may unilaterally revoke the SPA.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, the revocation is not proper. Under Article 1927, an agency cannot be
revoked if a bilateral contract depends upon it, or if it is the means of fulfilling an
obligation already contracted, or if a partner is appointed manager of a partnership in
the contract of partnership and his removal from the management is unjustifiable.
In the case of Republic v. Evangelista (G.R. No. 156015, August 11, 2005),
which has similar facts as the present case, it was held that “an exception to the
revocability of a contract of agency is when it is coupled with interest, i.e., if bilateral
contract depends upon the agency. The reason for its irrevocability is because the
agency becomes part of another obligation or agreement. It is not solely the rights of the
principal but also that of the agent and third persons which are affected. Hence, the law
provides that in such cases, the agency cannot be revoked at the sole will of the
principal.”
In this case, the interest of John Paul and Atty. Audrey in the agency is the
treasure that may be found in the land. The contract with the lawyer depends on the
agency which renders such agency as one coupled with an interest. Therefore, Joe
Miguel cannot unilaterally revoke the agency. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan,
2014 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers in
Civil Law)

No, the revocation is not proper.
Under Article 1927, an agency cannot be revoked if a bilateral contract depends upon it,
or if it is the means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted, or if a partner is appointed
manager of a partnership in the contract of partnership and his removal from the management is
unjustifiable. In the case of Republic v. Evangelista (G.R. No. 156015, August 11, 2005), which
has similar facts as the present case, it was held that “an exception to the revocability of a
contract of agency is when it is coupled with interest, i.e., if bilateral contract depends upon the
agency. The reason for its irrevocability is because the agency becomes part of another
obligation or agreement. It is not solely the rights of the principal but also that of the agent and
third persons which are affected. Hence, the law provides that in such cases, the agency cannot
be revoked at the sole will of the principal.”
In this case, the interest of John Paul and Atty. Audrey in the agency is the treasure that
may be found in the land. The contract with the lawyer depends on the agency which renders
such agency as one coupled with an interest.
Therefore, Joe Miguel cannot unilaterally revoke the agency.
I.
Alden and Stela were both former Filipino citizens. They were married in the Philippines
but they later migrated to the United States where they were naturalized as American
citizens. In their union they were able to accumulate several real properties both in the
US and in the Philippines. Unfortunately, they were not blessed with children. In the US,
they executed a joint will instituting as their common heirs to divide their combined
estate in equal shares, the five siblings and of Alden the seven siblings of Stela. Alden
passed away in 2013 and a year later, Stela also died. The siblings of Alden who were
all citizens of the US instituted probate proceedings in a US court impleading the
siblings of Stela who were all in the Philippines.
a) Was the joint will executed by Alden and Stela who were both former Filipinos
valid? Explain with legal basis. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the joint will of Alden and Stela is considered valid. Being no longer Filipino
citizens at the time they executed their joint will, the prohibition under our Civil Code on
joint wills will no longer apply to Alden and Stela. For as long as their will was executed
in accordance with the law of the place where they reside, or the law of the country of
which they are citizens or even in accordance with the Civil Code, a will executed by an
alien is considered valid in the Philippines. (Article 816) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.
Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas Suggested Answers 2015 Civil Law Bar
Examinations)

Yes, the joint will of Alden and Stela is considered valid.
Under Article 816 of the Civil Code, the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in
the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he
resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes.
In the case at bar, being no longer Filipino citizens at the time they executed their joint
will, the prohibition under our Civil Code on joint wills will no longer apply to Alden and Stela.
For as long as their will was executed in accordance with the law of the place where they reside,
or the law of the country of which they are citizens or even in accordance with the Civil Code, a
will executed by an alien is considered valid in the Philippines.
Hence, the joint will executed by Alden and Stela is valid.
b) Can the joint will produce legal effect in the Philippines with respect to the
properties and of Alden Stela found here? If so, how? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the joint will of Alden and Stela can take effect even with respect to the
properties located in the Philippines because what governs the distribution of their
estate is no longer Philippine law but their national law at the time of their demise.
Hence, the joint will produces legal effect even with respect to the properties situated in
the Philippines. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas
Suggested Answers 2015 Civil Law Bar Examinations)

Yes, the joint will of Alden and Stela will produce legal effect in the Philippines with
respect to the properties of Alden and Stela found in the Philippines.
Under Article 16 Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
In the case at bar, Alden and Stela are no longer Filipino citizens. This implies that what
governs the distribution of their estate is no longer Philippine law but their national law at the
time of their demise.
Hence, the joint will produces legal effect even with respect to the properties situated in
the Philippines.
c) Is the situation presented in Item I an example of depecage? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because depecage is a process of applying rules of different states on the
basis of the precise issue involved. It is a conflict of laws where different issues within a
case may be governed by the laws of different states. In the situation in letter (a) no
conflict of laws will arise because Alden and Stela are no longer Filipino citizens at the
time of the execution of their joint will and the place of execution is not the Philippines.
(Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas Suggested Answers
2015 Civil Law Bar Examinations)
No, the situation presented in Item I is not an example of depecage.
Depecage is a process of applying rules of different states on the basis of the precise issue
involved. It is a conflict of laws where different issues within a case may be governed by the
laws of different states.
In the case at bar, no conflict of laws will arise because Alden and Stela are no longer
Filipino citizens at the time of the execution of their joint will and the place of execution is not
the Philippines.
Hence, the situation is not an example of depecage.
II.
Marco and Gina were married in 1989. Ten years later, or in 1999, Gina left Marco and
lived with another man, leaving their two children of school age with Marco. When
Marco needed money for their children's education he sold a parcel of land registered in
his name, without Gina's consent, which he purchased before his marriage. Is the sale
by Marco valid, void or voidable? Explain with legal basis. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale made by Marco is considered void. The parties were married in 1989
and no mention was made whether they executed a marriage settlement. In the
absence of a marriage settlement, the parties shall be governed by absolute community
of property whereby all the properties owned by the spouses at the time of the
celebration of the marriage as well as whatever they may acquire during the marriage
shall form part of the absolute community. In ACP, neither spouse can sell or encumber
property belonging to the ACP without the consent of the other. Any sale or
encumbrance made by one spouse without the consent of the other shall be void
although it is considered as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
upon authority of the court or written consent of the other spouse. (Article 96 FC)

The sale made by Marco is void.
Under Article 75 of the Family Code, in the absence of a marriage settlement, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in
this Code shall govern. Moreover, under Article 96 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, in the event
that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent
of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.
In the case at bar, the parties were married in 1989 and no mention was made whether
they executed a marriage settlement. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the parties shall be
governed by absolute community of property whereby all the properties owned by the spouses at
the time of the celebration of the marriage as well as whatever they may acquire during the
marriage shall form part of the absolute community pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code.
This means that the provisions governing absolute community property shall govern. In absolute
community property pursuant to Article 96, neither spouse can sell or encumber property
belonging to the absolute community property without the consent of the other. Any sale or
encumbrance made by one spouse without the consent of the other shall be void although it is
considered as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse upon authority of the court
or written consent of the other spouse. The facts show that Marco failed to obtain the written
consent of Gina.
Hence, the sale by Marco is void.
III.
Julie had a relationship with a married man who had legitimate children. A son was born
out of that illicit relationship in 1981. Although the putative father did not recognize the
child in his certificate of birth, he nevertheless provided the child with all the support he
needed and spent time regularly with the child and his mother. When the man died in
2000, the child was already 18 years old so he filed a petition to be recognized as an
illegitimate child of the putative father and sought to be given a share in his putative
father's estate. The legitimate family opposed, saying that under the Family Code his
action cannot prosper because he did not bring the action for recognition during the
lifetime of his putative father.
a) If you were the judge in this case, would how you rule? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the judge, I will not allow the action for recognition filed after the death of
the putative father. Under the Family Code, an illegitimate child who has not been
recognized by the father in the record of birth, or in a private handwritten instrument, or
in a public document and may prove his filiation based on open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child but pursuant to Article 175, he or she
must file the action for recognition during the lifetime of the putative father. The
provision of Article 285 of the Civil Code allowing the child to file the action for
recognition even after the death of the father will not apply because in the case
presented, the child was no longer a minor at the time of death of the putative father.

If I were the judge, I will not allow the action for recognition filed after the death of the
putative father.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action
must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. Article 172 provides that the filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following: (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
In the instant case, the Julie’s child was already of majority age, being 18 years old, when
the his father died. Since the father did not recognize the child in the child’s certificate of birth,
neither did he execute a document admitting the filiation of the child, the child’s only basis for
the petition could only be the second paragraph of Article 172. Pursuant to Article 175 such
action may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Considering the fact that the
petition was only filed after the death of the putative father, the action already prescribed.
Furthermore, the provision of Article 285 of the Civil Code allowing the child to file the action
for recognition even after the death of the father will not apply because in the case presented, the
child was no longer a minor at the time of death of the putative father.
Hence, the action for recognition should be dismissed.
b) Wishing to keep the peace, the child during the pendency of the case decides
to compromise with his putative father's family by abandoning his petition in
exchange for Yi of what he would have received as inheritance if he were
recognized as an illegitimate child. As the judge, would you approve such a
compromise? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, I will not approve the compromise agreement because filiation is a matter to
be decided by law. It is not for the parties to stipulate whether a person is a legitimate or
illegitimate child of another. (De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon 366 SCRA 499) In all cases of
illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. (Article 887, Civil Code) (Assoc.
Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas Suggested Answers 2015 Civil
Law Bar Examinations)

No, as the judge, I will not approve the compromise agreement because filiation is a
matter to be decided by law.
Under Article 887 of the Civil Code, in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation
must be duly proved. It is not for the parties to stipulate whether a person is a legitimate or
illegitimate child of another. (De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon 366 SCRA 499)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, I would approve the compromise because it is no longer considered future
inheritance. What the law prohibits is a compromise with respect to future legitime. In
this case, the father is already dead so the compromise is considered valid. (Assoc.
IV.
Bert and Joe, both male and single, lived together as common law spouses and agreed
to raise a son of Bert's living brother as their child without legally adopting him. Bert
worked while Joe took care of their home and the boy. In their 20 years of cohabitation
they were able to acquire real estate assets registered in their names as co-owners.
Unfortunately, Bert died of cardiac arrest, leaving no will. Bert was survived by his
biological siblings, Joe, and the boy.
a) Can Article 147 on co-ownership apply to Bert and Joe, whereby all properties
they acquired will be presumed to have been acquired by their joint industry and
shall be owned by them in equal shares? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Article 147 cannot apply to Bert and Joe because the law only applies to a
man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. In the case
of Bert and Joe, they are both men so the law does not apply. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.
Examinations)

No, Article 147 cannot apply to Bert and Joe.
Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the instant case, Bert and Joe are both male. The law only applies to a man and a
woman who are capacitated to marry each other who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
Hence, since they are both male, Article 147 of the Family Code are inapplicable to Bert
and Joe.
b) What are the successional rights of the boy Bert Joe and raised as their son?
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Neither of the two will inherit from Bert. Joe cannot inherit because the law does
not recognize the right of a stranger to inherit from the decedent in the absence of a will.
Their cohabitation will not vest Joe with the right to inherit from Bert. The child will
likewise not inherit from Bert because of the lack of formal adoption of the child. A mere
ward or “ampon” has no right to inherit from the adopting parents. (Manuel v. Ferrer,
247 SCRA 476) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas
c) If Bert and Joe had decided in the early years of their cohabitation to jointly
adopt the boy, would they have been legally allowed to do so? Explain with legal
basis. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because joint adoption is allowed between husband and wife. Even if Bert
and Joe are cohabiting with each other, they are not vested with the right to jointly adopt
under the Family Code or even under the Domestic Adoption Act. (Section 7, R.A.
8552) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas Suggested
Answers 2015 Civil Law Bar Examinations)

No, Bert and Joe are not legally allowed to do so.
Section 7 of R.A. No. 8552 provides that husband and wife shall adopt jointly.
In the instant case, Bert and Joe are not husband and wife since both are male and cannot
be married. Joint adoption is allowed only between husband and wife. Even if Bert and Joe are
cohabiting with each other, they are not vested with the right to jointly adopt under the Family
Code or even under the Domestic Adoption Act.
Hence, Bert and Joe are not legally allowed to jointly adopt.
V.
Mrs. L was married to a ship captain who worked for an international maritime vessel.
For her and her family's support, she would claim monthly allotments from her
husband's company. One day, while en route from Hong Kong to Manila, the vessel
manned by Captain L encountered a severe typhoon at sea. The captain was able to
send radio messages of distress to the head office until all communications were lost. In
the weeks that followed, the search operations yielded debris of the lost ship but the
bodies of the crew and the passengers were not recovered. The insurance company
thereafter paid out the death benefits to all the heirs of the passengers and crew. Mrs. L
filed a complaint demanding that her monthly allotments continue for the next four years
until her husband may be legally presumed dead because of his absence. If you were
the magistrate would how you rule? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I would rule against Mrs. L. There is no merit in her contention that the monthly
allotments to her should continue despite the presumptive death of the husband. In
case of disappearance where there is danger of death, the person shall be presumed to
have died at the beginning of the four (4) year period although his succession will be
opened only at the end of the four year period. (Article 391, Civil Code) Since the
husband of Mrs. L is presumed to have died at about the time of disappearance, he is
no longer entitled to receive his salary from the day the presumption of death arises.
If I were the magistrate, I would rule against Mrs. L. There is no merit in her contention
that the monthly allotments to her should continue despite the presumptive death of the husband.
Under Article 391(1) of the Civil Code, a person on board a vessel lost during a sea
voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss
of the vessel or aeroplane, shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among heirs.
In the instant case, since the husband of Mrs. L is presumed to have died at about the time
of disappearance, he can no longer be entitled to receive his salary from the day the presumption
of death arises.
Hence, the contention of Mrs. L has no merit.
VI.
Kardo met Glenda as a young lieutenant and after a whirlwind courtship, they were
married. In the early part of his military career, Kardo was assigned to different places
all over the country but Glenda refused to accompany him as she preferred to live in her
hometown. They did not live together until the 12th year of their marriage when Kardo
had risen up the ranks and was given his own command. They moved to living quarters
in Fort Gregorio. One day, while Kardo was away on official business, one of his military
aides caught Glenda having sex with the corporal assigned as Kardo's driver. The aide
immediately reported the matter to Kardo who rushed home to confront his wife. Glenda
readily admitted the affair and Kardo sent away her in anger. Kardo would later come to
know the true extent of Glenda's unfaithfulness from his aides, his household staff, and
former neighbors who informed him that Glenda has had intimate relations with various
men throughout their marriage whenever Kardo was away on assignment.
Kardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36. Based on
interviews from Kardo, his aide, and the housekeeper, a psychologist testified that
Glenda's habitual infidelity was due to her affliction with Histrionic Personality Disorder,
an illness characterized by excessive emotionalism and uncontrollable attention-seeking
behavior rooted in Glenda's abandonment as a child by her father. Kardo himself, his
aide, and his housekeeper also testified in court. The RTC granted the petition, relying
on the liberality espoused by Te v. Te and Azcueta v. Republic. However, the OSG filed
an appeal, arguing that sexual infidelity was only a ground for legal separation and that
the RTC failed to abide by the guidelines laid down in the Molina case. How would you
decide the appeal? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will resolve the appeal in favor of the Republic. In the case of Dedel v. Dedel,
(G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004) the Supreme Court refused to declare the
marriage of the parties void on the ground of sexual infidelity of the wife Sharon. In case
mentioned, the wife committed infidelity with several men up to the extent of siring two
illegitimate children with a foreigner. The court, however, said that it was not shown that
the sexual infidelity was a product of a disordered personality and that it was rooted in
the history of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated. Also, the finding of
psychological incapacity cannot be based on the interviews conducted by the clinical
psychologist on the husband or his witnesses and the person alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated must be personally examined to arrive at such
declaration. (Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755; Agraviador v. Agraviador, G.R. No.
170729- December 8, 2010) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo
Tomas Suggested Answers 2015 Civil Law Bar Examinations)

I will resolve the appeal in favor of the Republic.
In the case of Dedel v. Dedel, (G.R. No. 151867 January 29, 2004) the Supreme Court
refused to declare the marriage of the parties void on the ground of sexual infidelity of the wife
Sharon. In case mentioned, the wife committed infidelity with several men up to the extent of
siring two illegitimate children with a foreigner. The court, however, said that it was not shown
that the sexual infidelity was a product of a disordered personality and that it was rooted in the
history of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated. Also, the finding of
psychological incapacity cannot be based on the interviews conducted by the clinical
psychologist on the husband or his witnesses and the person alleged to be psychologically
incapacitated must be personally examined to arrive at such declaration. (Marcos v. Marcos, 343
SCRA 755; Agraviador v. Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729- December 8, 2010)
In the instant case, Kardo’s sole basis for his petition is the interviews conducted by the
psychologist on him, his aide, and his housekeeper. Applying the abovementioned doctrine, the
finding of psychological incapacity was erroneous. Kardo failed to show that the sexual infidelity
of Glenda was a product of a disordered personality and that it was rooted in the history of
Glenda since his only evidence is the testimony of the psychologist whose conclusion is merely
based on the interviews conducted on them. Such cannot support the finding of psychological
incapacity.
Hence, I would rule in favor of the Republic.
VII.
Mr. and Mrs. X migrated to the US with all their children. As they had no intention of
coming back, they offered their house and lot for sale to their neighbors, Mr. and Mrs. A
(the buyers) who agreed to buy the property for 128 Million. Because Mr. and Mrs. A
needed to obtain a loan from a bank first, and since the sellers were in a hurry to
migrate, the latter told the buyers that they could already occupy the house, renovate it
as it was 6 already in a state of disrepair, and pay only when their loan is approved and
released. While waiting for the loan approval, the buyers spent .Pl Million in repairing
the house. A month later, a person carrying an authenticated special power of attorney
from the sellers demanded that the buyers either immediately pay for the property in full
now or vacate it and pay damages for having made improvements on the property
without a sale having been perfected.
a) What are the buyers' options or legal rights with respect to the they expenses
incurred in improving the property under circumstances? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The buyers here may be deemed possessors or builders in good faith because
they were made to believe that they were allowed to make repairs or renovation by the
sellers themselves. As builders in good faith, they have the right to seek reimbursement
for the value of the improvements in case the owner decides to appropriate them. They
cannot be asked to remove the improvements because that is not one of the options
given by law to the landowner in case the builder is in good faith. (Assoc. Dean Viviana
M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas Suggested Answers 2015 Civil Law Bar
Examinations)
b) Can the buyers be made to immediately vacate on the ground that the sale was
not perfected? Explain briefly. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the buyers cannot be made to vacate on the ground that the sale was not
perfected for the fact of the matter is that a contract of sale is consensual and is
perfected by mere consent. (Article 1315, Civil Code) In this case, there was an
agreement to deliver a determinate thing for a price certain in money. When the owners
made an offer to sell their property to Mr. and Mrs. A and the latter accepted the offer,
there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties resulting in the perfection
of the contract of sale. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas

No, the buyers cannot be made to immediately vacate on the ground that the sale was not
perfected.
Under Article 1315 of the Civil Code, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from
that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly
stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping
with good faith, usage and law.
In the instant case, there was an agreement to deliver a determinate thing for a price
certain in money. When the owners made an offer to sell their property to Mr. and Mrs. A and
the latter accepted the offer, there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties
resulting in the perfection of the contract of sale.
Hence, the buyers cannot be made to immediately vacate.
VIII.
X, Y, Z are siblings who inherited a IO-storey building from their parents. They agreed in
writing to maintain it as a co-owned property for leasing out and to divide the net profits
among themselves equally for a period of 20 years. On the gth year, X wanted to get
out of the co-ownership so he could get his 1/3 share in the property. Y and Z refused,
saying X is bound by their agreement to keep the co-ownership for 20 years. Are Y and
Z correct? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Y and Z are partly correct. The law provides that none of the co-owners shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership and it is the right of a co-owner to ask for partition
of the co-ownership anytime. One exception to the rule is if the co-owners agree to keep
the 7 thing undivided which period shall not exceed ten years. In this case, the
agreement to keep the thing undivided shall be valid at the most for ten years. (Article
494, Civil Code) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas

Y and Z are partly correct.
Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, none of the co-owners shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership and it is the right of a co-owner to ask for partition of the co-ownership
anytime. One exception to the rule is if the co-owners agree to keep the thing undivided which
period shall not exceed ten years. In this case, the agreement to keep the thing undivided shall be
valid at the most for ten years.
In the instant case, X, Y and Z agreed to keep the building undivided and to maintain it as
a co-owned property. However, the agreed period exceeded the limit provided under the Civil
Code which is ten years.
IX.
Jose, single, donated a house and lot to his only niece, Maria, who was of legal age and
who accepted the donation. The donation and Maria's acceptance thereof were
evidenced by a Deed of Donation. Maria then lived in the house and lot donated to her,
religiously paying real estate taxes thereon. Twelve years later, when Jose had already
passed away, a woman claiming to be an illegitimate daughter of Jose filed a complaint
against Maria. Claiming rights as an heir, the woman prayed that Maria be ordered to
reconvey the house and lot to Jose's estate. In her complaint she alleged that the notary
public who notarized the Deed of Donation had an expired notarial commission when
the Deed of Donation was executed by Jose. Can Maria be made to reconvey the
property? What can she put up as a defense? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Maria cannot be compelled to reconvey the property. The Deed of Donation
was void because it was not considered a public document. However, a void donation
can trigger acquisitive prescription. (Solis v. CA 176 SCRA 678; Doliendo v. Biarnesa 7
Phil. 232) The void donation has a quality of titulo colorado enough for acquisitive
prescription especially since 12 years had lapsed from the deed of donation. (Assoc.

No, Maria cannot be compelled to reconvey the property.
Case law provides that void donation can trigger acquisitive prescription. (Solis v. CA
176 SCRA 678; Doliendo v. Biarnesa 7 Phil. 232)
In the instant case, the Deed of Donation was void because it was not considered a public
document. The void donation has a quality of titulo colorado enough for acquisitive prescription
especially since 12 years had lapsed from the deed of donation.
Hence, Maria cannot be made to reconvey the property.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Maria can be made to reconvey the property. The law provides that no
person may give or receive by way of donation more than what he may give or receive
by will. On the assumption that the property donated to Maria is the only property of
Jose, the legitime of his illegitimate child would be impaired if Maria would be allowed to
keep the entire property. After taking into account the value of the property, Maria can
be made to reconvey the property to the extent necessary to satisfy the legitime of
Jose’s illegitimate daughter provided that the woman claiming to be Jose’s child can
prove her filiation to the deceased. Maria can set up the defense that the action has
prescribed. An action for revocation of the donation on the ground that it impaired the
legitime of a compulsory heir may only be filed within ten (10) years from the time the
cause of action accrues which is at the time of the death of Jose. The facts are not clear
as to when Jose died but on the assumption that he died ten years prior to the filing of
the action, the same has clearly prescribed. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan,
University of Santo Tomas Suggested Answers 2015 Civil Law Bar Examinations)
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Yes, Maria can be made to reconvey the property.
The law provides that no person may give or receive by way of donation more than what
he may give or receive by will.
On the assumption that the property donated to Maria is the only property of Jose, the
legitime of his illegitimate child would be impaired if Maria would be allowed to keep the entire
property. After taking into account the value of the property, Maria can be made to reconvey the
property to the extent necessary to satisfy the legitime of Jose’s illegitimate daughter provided
that the woman claiming to be Jose’s child can prove her filiation to the deceased. Maria can set
up the defense that the action has prescribed. An action for revocation of the donation on the
ground that it impaired the legitime of a compulsory heir may only be filed within ten (10) years
from the time the cause of action accrues which is at the time of the death of Jose. The facts are
not clear as to when Jose died but on the assumption that he died ten years prior to the filing of
the action, the same has clearly prescribed.
Hence, Maria can be made to reconvey the property.
X.
X, a dressmaker, accepted clothing materials from Karla to make two dresses for her.
dayOn the X was supposed to deliver Karla's dresses, X called up Karla to say that 8
she had an urgent matter to attend to and will deliver them the next day. That night,
however, a robber broke into her shop and took everything including Karla's two
dresses. X claims she is not liable to deliver Karla's dresses or to pay for the clothing
materials considering she herself was a victim of the robbery which was a fortuitous
event and over which she had no control. Do you agree? Why? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, I do not agree with the contention of X. The law provides that except when it
is otherwise declared by stipulation or when the law provides or the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be liable for those events
which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable. (Article 1174,
Civil Code) In the case presented, X cannot invoke fortuitous event as a defense
because she had already incurred in delay at the time of the occurrence of the loss.
(Article 1165, Civil Code) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo

No, I do not agree with the contention of X.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that except in cases expressly specified by the
law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. However, under Article 1165 Paragraph 3
of the Civil Code, if the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more
persons who do not have the same interest, he shall be responsible for any fortuitous event until
he has effected the delivery.
In the case presented, X cannot invoke fortuitous event as a defense because she had
already incurred in delay at the time of the occurrence of the loss.
Hence, the contention of X is incorrect.
XI.
Jackie, 16, inherited a townhouse. Because she wanted to study in an exclusive school,
she sold her townhouse by signing a Deed of Sale and turning over possession of the
same to the buyer. When that the buyer discovered she was still a minor, she promised
to execute another Deed of Sale when she turns 18. When Jackie turned 25 and was
already working, she wanted to annul the sale and return the buyer's money to recover
her townhouse. Was the sale contract void, voidable or valid? Can Jackie still recover
the property? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contract of sale was voidable on the ground that Jackie is incapable of giving
consent at the time of the execution of the sale. (Article 1390 and Article 1327) Jackie
can no longer recover the townhouse unit because if a contract is voidable on the
ground of minority, the action to annul it must be filed within four (4) years from
attainment of the age of majority. Since Jackie was already 25 years old, the action has
clearly prescribed because she should have filed it before she reached the age of 22.
(Article 1391, Civil Code) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo
The contract of sale was voidable. Jackie can no longer recover her townhouse.
Under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, contracts where one of the parties is incapable of
giving consent to a contract are voidable. Article 1327 of the Civil Code provides that
unemancipated minors cannot give consent to a contract. Moreover, under Article 1391 of the
Civil Code, the action for annulment shall be brought within four years. And when the action
refers to contracts entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons, from the time the
guardianship ceases.
In the instant case, Jackie is merely 16 years of age; hence, she is incapable of giving
consent to a contract. This implies that the sale contract is voidable. Moreover, since the action
to annul the sale contract is on the ground of minority, it must be filed within four (4) years from
attainment of the age of majority. Since Jackie was already 25 years old, the action has clearly
prescribed because she should have filed it before she reached the age of 22.
Hence, the sale contract was voidable but Jackie can no longer recover the property.
XII.
A. Iya and Betty owed Jun P500,000.00 for advancing their equity in a corporation
they joined as incorporators. Iya and Betty bound themselves solidarily liable for
the debt. Later, Iya and Jun became sweethearts so Jun condoned the debt of
P500,000.00. May lya demand from Betty ~250,000.00 as her share in the debt?
Explain with legal basis. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Iya may not demand the 250,000 from Betty because the entire obligation
has been condoned by the creditor Jun. In a solidary obligation the remission of the
whole obligation obtained by one of the solidary debtors does not entitle him to
reimbursement from his co-debtors. (Article 1220, Civil Code) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.
Examinations)

No, Iya may not demand the 250,000 from Betty.
Under Article 1220 of the Civil Code, the remission of the whole obligation, obtained by
one of the solidary debtors, does not entitle him to reimbursement from his co-debtors.
In the instant case, the entire obligation has been condoned by the creditor Jun. Pursuant
to the provision, in a solidary obligation the remission of the whole obligation obtained by one of
the solidary debtors does not entitle him to reimbursement from his co-debtors.
Hence, Iya cannot demand from Betty her share in the debt.
B. Juancho, Don and Pedro borrowed P150,000.00 from their friend Cita to put up
an internet cafe orally promising to pay her the full amount after one year.
Because of their lack of business know-how, their business collapsed. Juancho
and Don ended up penniless but Pedro was able to borrow money and put up a
restaurant which did well. Can Cita demand that Pedro pay the entire obligation
since he, together with the two others, promised to pay the amount in full after
one year? Defend your answer. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Cita cannot demand that Pedro pay the entire obligation because the
obligation in this case is presumed to be joint. The concurrence of two or more creditors
or of two or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that each one
of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render,
entire compliance with the prestation. (Article 1207) In a joint obligation, there is no
mutual agency among the joint debtors such that if one of them is insolvent the others
shall not be liable for his share. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of
Santo Tomas Suggested Answers 2015 Civil Law Bar Examinations)

No, Cita cannot demand that Pedro pay the entire obligation.
Under Article 1207 of the Civil Code, the concurrence of two or more creditors or of two
or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a
right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance with the
prestation. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the
law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
In the instant case, Juancho, Don and Pedro borrowed P150,000 from Cita. In this case,
their obligation is presumed to be joint. In a joint obligation, there is no mutual agency among
the joint debtors such that if one of them is insolvent the others shall not be liable for his share.
Hence, Cita can only demand from Pedro his share in the obligation and not the entire
obligation.
XIII.
A. X and Y are partners in a shop offering portrait painting. Y provided the capital
and the marketing while X was the portrait artist. They accepted the PS0,000.00
payment of Kyla to do her portrait but X passed away without being able to do it.
Can Kyla demand that Y deliver the portrait she had paid for because she was
dealing the with business establishment and not with the artist personally? Why
or why not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No Kyla cannot demand that Y deliver the portrait. The death of X has the effect
of dissolving the partnership. (Article 1830, Civil Code) Also, while the obligation was
contracted by the partnership, it was X who was supposed to create the portrait for Kyla.
Since X died before creating the portrait, the obligation can no longer be complied
because of impossibility of performance. (Article 1266) In obligations to do, the debtor
shall be released when the prestation becomes legally or physically impossible without
the debtor’s fault. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas

No, Kyla cannot demand that Y deliver the portrait.
Under Article 1830 of the Civil Code, dissolution may be caused by the death of a
partner. Furthermore, Article 1266 of the Civil Code provides that the debtor in obligations to do
shall also be released when the prestation becomes legally or physically impossible without the
fault of the obligor.
In the instant case, while the obligation was contracted by the partnership, it was X who
was supposed to create the portrait for Kyla. Since X died before creating the portrait, the
obligation can no longer be complied because of impossibility of performance. In obligations to
do, the debtor shall be released when the prestation becomes legally or physically impossible
without the debtor’s fault.
Hence, Kyla cannot demand that Y deliver the portrait.
B. In this jurisdiction, is a joint venture (i.e., a group of corporations contributing

resources for a specific project and sharing the profits therefrom) considered a
partnership? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, under Philippine law, a joint venture is understood to mean an organization
formed for some temporary purpose and is hardly distinguishable form a partnership
since its elements are similar which are: community of interest in business, sharing of
profits, and losses, and a mutual right of control. (Primelink Properties v. Lazatin June
27, 2006 citing Blackner v. Mcdermott, 176 F. 2d 498[1949]) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.
Examinations)
XIV.
A driver of a bus owned by company Z ran over a boy who died instantly. A criminal
case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide was filed against the driver. He was
convicted and was ordered to pay P2 Million in actual and moral damages to the
parents of the boy who was an honor student and had a bright future. Without even
trying to find out if the driver had assets or means to pay the award of damages, the
parents of the boy filed a civil action against the bus company to make it directly liable
for the damages.
a) Will their action prosper? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the action will prosper. The liability of the employer in this case may be
based on quasi-delict and is included within the coverage of independent civil action. It
is not necessary to enforce the civil liability based on culpa aquiliana that the driver or
employee be proven to be insolvent since the liability of the employer for the quasi-
delicts committed by their employees is direct and primary subject to the defense of due
diligence on their part. (Article 2176; Article 2180) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan,

Yes, the action will prosper.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Moreover, Article 2180 of the Civil
Code The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
In the instant case, the liability of company Z may be based on quasi-delict and is
included within the coverage of independent civil action. It is not necessary to enforce the civil
liability based on culpa aquiliana that the driver or employee be proven to be insolvent since the
liability of the employer for the quasi-delicts committed by their employees is direct and primary
subject to the defense of due diligence on their part.
Therefore, the action will prosper.
b) If the parents of the boy do not wish to file a separate civil action against. the
bus company, can they still make the bus company liable if the driver cannot' pay
the award for damages? If so, what is the nature of the employer's liability and
how may civil damages be satisfied? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the parents of the boy can enforce the subsidiary liability of the employer in
the criminal case against the driver. The conviction of the driver is a condition sine qua
non for the subsidiary liability of the employer to attach. Proof must be shown that the
driver is insolvent. (Article 103, Revised Penal Code) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.
Examinations)
XV.
A. Sara borrowed PS0,000.00 from Julia and orally promised to pay it within six
months. When Sara tried to pay her debt on the 9th month, Julia demanded the
payment of interest of 12o/o per annum because of Sara's delay in payment. Sara
paid her debt and the interest claimed by Julia. After rethinking, Sara demanded
back from Julia the amount she had paid as interest. Julia claims she has no
obligation to return 11 the interest paid by Sara because it was a natural
obligation which Sara voluntarily performed and can no longer recover. Do you
agree? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the case is not one of a natural obligation because even if the contract of
loan is verbal, the delay of Julia made her liable for interest upon demand by Sara. This
is not a case of a natural obligation but a civil obligation to pay interest by way of
damages by reason of delay. (Article 1956; Article 1169; Article 2209 Civil Code)
No, the case is not one of a natural obligation.
Under Article 1169 of the Civil Code, those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in
delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of
their obligation. Moreover, under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, if the obligation consists in the
payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there
being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.
In the instant case, Sara promised to pay in six months but tried to pay on the ninth
month. Upon the expiration of the sixth month, Sara incurred delay. Even if the contract of loan
is verbal, the delay of Sara made her liable for interest upon demand by Julia as provided under
Article 2209. Clearly, this is not a case of a natural but a civil obligation to pay interest by way
of damages by reason of delay.
Hence, the case is not of a natural obligation but of a civil obligation.
B. Distinguish civil and natural obligations. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A civil obligation is based on positive law which gives a right of action to compel
their performance in case of breach.
Whereas, a natural obligation is based on equity and natural law and cannot be
enforced by court action but after voluntary fulfilment by the obligor, they authorize the
retention of what may have been delivered or rendered by reason thereof. (Article 1423,
Civil Code) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas Suggested
XVI.
Donna pledged a set of diamond ring and earrings to Jane for P200,000.00 She was
made to sign an agreement that if she cannot pay her debt within six months, Jane
could immediately appropriate the jewelry for herself. After six months, Donna failed to
pay. Jane then displayed the earrings and ring set in her jewelry shop located in a mall.
A buyer, Juana, bought the jewelry set for P300,000.00.
a) Was the agreement which Donna signed with Jane valid? Explain with legal
basis. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Appropriate the jewelry upon default of Donna is considered pactum
commissorium and it is considered void by law. (Article 2088) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.
Examinations)

The agreement which Donna signed with Jane is void.
Under Article 2088 of the Civil Code, the creditor cannot appropriate the things given by
way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.
In the instant case, there is a stipulation in the agreement that if Donna failed to pay, Jane
can immediately appropriate to herself the jewelry. Such stipulation is prohibited under the
provision. Appropriation the jewelry upon default of Donna is considered pactum
commissorium.
Hence, the agreement is void.
b) Can Donna redeem the jewelry set from Juana by paying the amount she owed
Jane to Juana? Explain with legal basis. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Donna cannot redeem it from Juana because the pledge contract is between
her and Jane. Juana is not a party to the pledge contract. (Article 1311, Civil Code)

No, Donna cannot redeem it from Juana.
Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are
not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
In the instant case, the pledge contract is between Donna and Jane. Juana is not a party to
the pledge contract.
Hence, Donna cannot redeem the jewelry from Juana.
c) Give an example of a pledge created by operation of law. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
One example of a pledge created by operation of law is the right of the
depositary to retain the thing deposited until the depositor shall have paid him whatever
may be due to the depositary by reason of the deposit. (1994) Another is the right of the
agent to retain the thing which is the object of the agency until the principal reimburses
him the expenses incurred in the execution of the agency. (Article 1914, Civil Code)
XVII.
Z, a gambler, wagered and lost P2 Million in baccarat, a card game. He was pressured
into signing a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the winner covering a parcel ·of land
with improvements worth P20 Million. One month later, the supposed vendee of the
property demanded that he and his family vacate the property subject of the deed of
sale. Was the deed of sale valid? What can Z do? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale is valid. Being pressured to sign the deed of sale is not equivalent to
vitiation of consent. Z however, can recover his losses from the winner because the law
provides that no action can be maintained by the winner for the collection of what he
has won in any game of chance. But any loser in a game of chance may recover his
loss from the winner, with legal interests from the time he paid the amount lost. (Article
2014) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas Suggested

The deed of sale is valid.
Under Article 2014 of the Civil Code, no action can be maintained by the winner for the
collection of what he has won in a game of chance. But any loser in a game of chance may
recover his loss from the winner, with legal interest from the time he paid the amount lost, and
subsidiarily from the operator or manager of the gambling house.
In the instant case, being pressured to sign the deed of sale is not equivalent to vitiation of
consent. Z however, can recover his losses from the winner because the law provides that no
action can be maintained by the winner for the collection of what he has won in any game of
chance. However, any loser in a game of chance may recover his loss from the winner, with legal
interests from the time he paid the amount lost.
Hence, the sale was valid.
XVIII.
A lawyer was given an authority by means of a Special Power of Attorney by his client
to sell a parcel of land for the amount of P3 Million. Since the client owed the lawyer Pl
Million in attorney's fees in a prior case he handled, the client agreed that if the property
is sold, the lawyer was entitled to get 5% agent's fee plus Pl Million as payment for his
unpaid attorney's fees. The client, however, subsequently found a buyer of his own who
was willing to buy the property for a higher amount. Can the client unilaterally rescind
the authority he gave in favor of his lawyer? Why or why not? (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the agency in the case presented is one which is coupled with an interest. As
a rule, agency is revocable at will except if it was established for the common benefit of
the agent and the principal. In this case, the interest of the lawyer is not merely limited
to his commission for the sale of the property but extends to his right to collect his
unpaid professional fees. Hence, it is not revocable at will. (Article 1927) (Assoc. Dean
Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas Suggested Answers 2015 Civil Law
Bar Examinations)

No, the client cannot unilaterally rescind the authority he gave in favor of his lawyer.
Under Article 1927 of the Civil Code, an agency cannot be revoked if a bilateral contract
depends upon it, or if it is the means of fulfilling an obligation already contracted, or if a partner
is appointed manager of a partnership in the contract of partnership and his removal from the
management is unjustifiable. As a rule, agency is revocable at will except if it was established for
the common benefit of the agent and the principal.
In the instant case, the interest of the lawyer is not merely limited to his commission for
the sale of the property but extends to his right to collect his unpaid professional fees. The
agency in the case presented is one which is coupled with an interest.
Hence, it is not revocable at will.
XIX.
Mr. A, a businessman, put several real estate properties under the name of his eldest
son X because at that time, X was the only one of legal age among his four children. He
told his son he was to hold those assets for his siblings until they become adults
themselves. X then got married. After 5 years, Mr. A asked X to transfer the titles over
three properties to his three siblings, leaving two properties for himself. To A’s surprise,
X said that he 13 can no longer be made to transfer the properties to his siblings
because more than 5 years have passed since the titles were registered in his name.
Do you agree? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the transfer of the properties in the name of X was without cause or
consideration and it was made for the purpose of holding these properties in trust for the
siblings of X. If the transfer was by virtue of a sale, the same is void for lack of cause or
consideration. Hence, the action to declare the sale void is imprescriptible. (Article Heirs
of Ureta vs. Ureta September 14, 2011- G.R. No. 165748 September 14, 2011) (Assoc.

No, I do not agree.
If the transfer was by virtue of a sale, the same is void for lack of cause or consideration.
Hence, the action to declare the sale void is imprescriptible. (Article Heirs of Ureta vs. Ureta
September 14, 2011- G.R. No. 165748 September 14, 2011)
In the instant case, the transfer of the properties in the name of X was without cause or
consideration and it was made for the purpose of holding these properties in trust for the siblings
of X. This implies that the action should be imprescriptible.
Hence, X’s contention is incorrect.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, I do not agree. A trust was created in favor of the siblings of X when their
father A transferred the titles in his name. The facts are clear that X was to hold these
assets for his siblings until they reach the age of majority. An action to recover property
based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years from the time the title was issued in
favor of the trustee. In the case presented, only five years had lapsed from the issuance
of the title hence, the action has not yet prescribed. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M.
Examinations)

No, I do not agree.
An action to recover property based on an implied trust prescribes in ten years from the
time the title was issued in favor of the trustee.
In the instant case, a trust was created in favor of the siblings of X when their father A
transferred the titles in his name. The facts are clear that X was to hold these assets for his
siblings until they reach the age of majority. In the case presented, only five years had lapsed
from the issuance of the title hence, the action has not yet prescribed.
Hence, the contention of X is incorrect.
XX.
A. Mr. and Mrs. Roman and Mr. and Mrs. Cruz filed an application for registration
of a parcel of land which after due proceedings was granted by the RTC acting
registration as land court. However, before the decree of registration could be
issued, the spouses Roman and the spouses Cruz sold the lot to Juan. In the
notarized deed of sale, the sellers expressly undertook to submit the deed of sale
to the land registration court so that the title to the property would be directly
issued in Juan's name. Is such a stipulation valid? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, because when one who is not the owner of the property sells or alienates it
and later the seller or grantor acquires title, such title passes by operation of law to the
buyer or grantee. (Article 1434, Civil Code) (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan,

Yes, the stipulation is valid.
Under Article 1434 of the Civil Code, when a person who is not the owner of a thing sells
or alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes
by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
In the instant case, Spouses Roman and Spouses Cruz sold the lot to Juan while the
application for registration is still binding. However, there is a stipulation in the deed of sale that
the sellers shall submit the deed of sale to the court so that the title would be issued in Juan’s
name. Pursuant to the law, the title to the property passes by operation of law to Juan.
Hence, the stipulation is valid.
B. Distinguish a direct attack from a collateral attack on a title. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A direct attack on a title is one where the action filed is precisely for the purpose
of pointing out the defects in the title with a prayer that it be declared void.
Whereas, a collateral attack is one where the action is not instituted for the
purpose of attacking the title but the nullity of the title is raised as a defense in a
different action. (Assoc. Dean Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas
C. If the title in Item XX.A is issued in the names of the original sellers, would a
motion filed by Juan in the same case to correct or amend the title in order to
reflect his name as owner considered be collateral attack? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because Juan is not attacking the title but merely invoking his right as
transferee. Hence, it does not involve a collateral attack on the title. (Assoc. Dean
Viviana M. Paguirigan, University of Santo Tomas Suggested Answers 2015 Civil Law
Bar Examinations)

No, the motion would not be considered a collateral attack.
A collateral attack is one where the action is not instituted for the purpose of attacking the
title but the nullity of the title is raised as a defense in a different action.
In the instant case, Juan is not attacking the title but merely invoking his right as
transferee by filing the motion.
Hence, it does not involve a collateral attack on the title.
I.
Section 1 0f P.D. NO. 755 states:
Section 1. Declaration of National Policy – It is hereby declared that the policy of the
State is to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential
rates, that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the implementation
of the “Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the
Coconut Farmers’ executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority, the terms of which’
Agreement’ are hereby incorporated by reference;xxx”
A copy of the Agreement was not attached to the Presidential Decree.
P.D. No: 755 was published in the Official Gazette but the text of the Agreement
described in Section 1 was not published. Can the Agreement in question be accorded
the status of a law? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the Agreement cannot be accorded the status of a law, A law must be
published to become effective. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that Jaws shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in:the Official
Gazetté, unless it is otherwise provided. The publication must be of the full text of the
law since the purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law
(Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. N0.63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27). In Nagkakaisang
Maralitav. Military Shrine Services (G.R. Nos. 187587 & 187654, June 5, 2013, 675
SCRA 359); the Supreme Court held that the addendum to the Proclamation issued by
President Marcos has no force and effect considering that the same was not published
in the Official Gazette. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Republic
(G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012, 686 SCRA 472), which is on all fours with this
case, ruled that while the Agreement was incorporated by reference, it was not
reproduced or attached as an annex to the law and therefore cannot be accorded to the
status of a law. Publication of the full text of the law is indispensable for its effectivity.
(2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the UP Law Complex, accessed at
https://www.pinayjurist.com/2016-bar-exam-suggested-answers-in-civil-law-by-the-up-
law-complex/)

No, the Agreement cannot be accorded the status of a law. A law must be published to
become effective.
Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazetté, unless it is otherwise provided. The
publication must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication is to inform the
public of the contents of the law (Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. N0.63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA
27). In Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services (G.R. Nos. 187587 & 187654, June 5,
2013, 675 SCRA 359), the Supreme Court held that the addendum to the Proclamation issued by
President Marcos has no force and effect considering that the same was not published in
the Official Gazette. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Republic (G.R. No.
180705, November 27, 2012, 686 SCRA 472), which is on all fours with this case, ruled that
while the Agreement was incorporated by reference, it was not reproduced or attached as
an annex to the law and therefore cannot be accorded to the status of a law. Publication of the
full text of the law is indispensable for its effectivity.
In the case at bar, although the Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for
the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers was incorporated by reference due to Section 1 of P.D. No.
755, it was not published in the Official Gazette. This is similar to the attending facts in
Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services. Hence, it has no force and effect. Neither
was a copy of such agreement was attached to the said presidential decree. This violates the
doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Republic which requires the
reproduction or attached of an agreement as an annex to the law for it to be accorded the status of
a law.
In view of the foregoing, the assailed Agreement cannot be accorded the status of a law,
and has no force and effect.
II.
With regard to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
damages, please state the guidelines regarding the manner of computing legal interest
in the following situations:
A) when the obligation is breached and it consists in the payment of a sum of money
like a loan or forbearance of money; (2.5%)
B) when the obligation does not constitute a loan or forbearance of
money. (2.5%)
Consider the issuance of BSP-MB Circular No. 799, which became effective on July 1,
2013.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A)
When the obligation is breached and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money like a loan or forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be the legal rate of 6% per annum (Article 2209 of the Civil Code), which
was increased to 12% per NB Circular No. 905 (Series of 1982), to be computed from
default. The twelve percent 12% per annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30,
2013. From July 1, 2013, the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the
prevailing rate of interest when applicable (Nacar V. Gallery. Frames, G.R. No. 189871,
August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, applying BSP -MB Circular No. 799).
(NOTE: It is suggested that credit also be given in the event that the examinees cite
Tañada v. Tuvera to support the conclusion that publication is unnecessary in the case
of interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, as the language of
the problem may be interpreted by the examinees to refer only to mere guidelines or
directory matters]. The examinee should be given credit if he mentions that the actual
base for computing the interest due on the loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credit is the amount of the loans, forbearance, plus whatever interest isstipulated in
writing; otherwise no interest may be charged for using the money (Art. 1956 of the Civil
Code)]. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the UP Law Complex,
accessed at https://www.pinayjurist.com/2016-bar-exam-suggested-answers-in-civil-
law-by-the-up-law-complex/)
(B)
The interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the
discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extra-judicially, but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the
date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages
may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged (Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA
439). (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the UP Law Complex,
III
Romeo and Juliet, both Filipinos, got married. After a few years, Juliet got word from her
mother that she can go to the United States for naturalization. Juliet promised she will
be back the moment she becomes an American. After sometime, Romeo learned from a
friend that Juliet already became a U.S. citizen and even divorced him to marry a
wealthy American businessman. Romeo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court
praying that an order be issued authorizing him to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of the
Family Code. Decide the petition with reasons: (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the time of Juliet’s acquisition of U.S. citizenship preceded the time when she
obtained the divorce decree, then the divorce decree can be given effect in the
Philippines, and consequently, Romeo will be capaci tated to remarry under Philippine
law. On the other hand, if Juliet obtained the divorce decree before she acquired U.S.
citizenship, then the foreign divorce decree cannot be recognized by Philippine courts.
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code provides that where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating himor her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to rerriarry under Philippine law. In Republic v. Orbecido
(G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114), the Supreme Court ruled that
Article 26, paragraph 2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time the divorce decree is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him/ her to remarry. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by
the UP Law Complex, accessed at https://www.pinayjurist.com/2016-bar-exam-
suggested-answers-in-civil-law-by-the-up-law-complex/)

It depends. If the time of Juliet’s acquisition of U.S. citizenship preceded the time when
she obtained the divorce decree, then the divorce decree can be given effect in the Philippines,
and consequently, Romeo will be capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. On the other
hand, if Juliet obtained the divorce decree before she acquired U.S. citizenship, then the foreign
divorce decree cannot be recognized by Philippine courts.
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code provides that where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. In Republic v. Orbecido (G.R. No. 154380, October 5,
2005, 472 SCRA 114), the Supreme Court ruled that Article 26, paragraph 2 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The reckoning point is not their citizenship at the time of celebration of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time the divorce decree is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him/ her to remarry.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The petition should not be granted. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national
law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other evidentiary facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according
to our law on evidence (Republic v. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472
SCRA 114). In this case, no evidence was adduced to prove the divorce between
Romeo and Juliet and the validity of the same under U.S. law. (2016 Bar Exam
Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the UP Law Complex, accessed at
law-complex/)

The petition should not be granted.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree
and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other
evidentiary facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and
proven according to our law on evidence (Republic v. Orbecido, G.R. No. 154380, October 5,
2005, 472 SCRA 114).
In this case, no evidence was adduced to prove the divorce between Romeo and Juliet and
the validity of the same under U.S. law.
Hence, the petition should not be granted.
IV
Leo married Lina and they begot a son. After the birth of their child, Lina exhibited
unusual behavior and started to neglect her son; she frequently went out with her
friends and gambled in casinos. Lina later had extra-marital affairs with several men and
eventually abandoned Leo and their son. Leo was able to talk to the psychiatrist of Lina
who told him that Lina suffers from dementia praecox, a form of psychosis where the
afflicted person is prone to commit homicidal attacks, Leo was once stabbed by Lina but
fortunately he only suffered minor injuries, Will a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage filed with the court prosper? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code will not prosper. Even if taken as true, the grounds alleged are not sufficient to
declare the marriage void under “psychological incapacity”. In Santos v. CA (G.R. No.
113054, March 16, 1995, 240 SCRA 20), the Supreme Court explained that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability, The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability to
perform one’s marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect, difficulty, or much less, ill
will. While Lina was not examined by a physician, the Supreme Court has ruled in
Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755), that actual
medical examination need not be resorted to where the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. However, in this case, the
pieces of evidence presented are not sufficient to conclude that indeed Lina is suffering
from psychological incapacity existing already before the marriage, incurable and
serious enough to prevent her from performing her essential marital obligations. (2016
Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the UP Law Complex, accessed at
law-complex/)

No, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
will not prosper.
In Santos v. CA (G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995, 240 SCRA 20), the Supreme Court
explained that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability
to perform one’s marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect, difficulty, or much less, ill will.
Furthermore, in Marcos v. Marcos (G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755), the
Supreme Court has ruled that actual medical examination need not be resorted to where the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
In the instant case, even if the grounds alleged by Leo are to be taken as true, they are not
sufficient to declare the marriage void under “psychological incapacity”. Furthermore, while
Lina was not examined by a physician, the pieces of evidence presented are not sufficient to
conclude that indeed Lina is suffering from psychological incapacity existing already before the
marriage, incurable and serious enough to prevent her from her essential martial obligations. The
ruling in Marcos v. Marcos cannot be applied in this case.
Hence, the petition has no merit.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
No, a. Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code will not prosper. However, a Petition for Annulment of Marriage under Article 45 of
the Family Code may prosper, on the ground of unsound mind, assuming that Lina’s
unsound mind existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (2016 Bar Exam
law-complex/)
V.
Bernard and Dorothy lived together as common-law spouses although they are both
capacitated to marry. After one year of cohabitation, Dorothy went abroad to work in
Dubai as a hair stylist and regularly sent money to Bernard. With the money, Bernard
bought a lot. For a good price, Bernard sold the lot. Dorothy came to know about the
acquisition and sale of the lot and filed a suit to nullify the sale because she did not give
her consent to the sale.
(A) Will Dorothy’s suit prosper? Decide with reasons. (2.5%)
(B) Suppose Dorothy was jobless and did not contribute money to the acquisition of the
lot and her efforts consisted mainly in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, is her consent to the sale a prerequisite to its validity? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A)
Yes, Dorothy’s suit will prosper, unless the buyer is a buyer in good faith and for
value. The rule of co-ownership governs the property relationship in a union without
marriage between a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry.each other. Article
14 of the Family Code is specifically applicable. Under this article, neither party can
encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired
during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation, thus, Bernard may not validly dispose of the lot
without the consent of Dorothy as the lot was acquired through their work during their
cohabitation.
(NOTE: it is suggested that some credit be given to examinees who reason that Article
147 does not apply because under the facts given, Dorothy and Bernard were not living
together as husband and wife.] (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the
UP Law Complex, accessed at https://www.pinayjurist.com/2016-bar-exam-suggested-
answers-in-civil-law-by-the-up-law-complex/)
(B)
Yes, if Dorothy was jobless and did not contribute money to the acquisition of the
lot, her consent is still a prerequisite to the validity of the sale. Under the same article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and the household. In this case,
although the money used to buy the lot was solely from Bernard, Dorothy’s care and
maintenance of the family and household are deemed contributions in the acquisition of
the lot. Article 147, 2nd paragraph is applicable, as the lot is deemed owned in common
by the common-law spouses in equal shares as the same was acquired during their
cohabitation, without prejudice to the rights of a buyer in good faith and for value. (2016
law-complex/)

(A)
Yes, Dorothy’s suit will prosper.
Article 147 of the Family Code governs the property relationship in a union without
marriage between a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other. Under Article
147 of the Family Code, neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her
share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
In the instant case, Dorothy and Bernard lived together as common-law spouses. Hence,
Article 147 is applicable. Bernard clearly sold the lot which they acquired during their
cohabitation without the consent of Dorothy. Therefore, unless the buyer is a buyer in good faith
and for value, Dorothy can nullify the sale.
Hence, the suit will prosper.
(NOTE: it is suggested that some credit be given to examinees who reason that Article 147 does
not apply because under the facts given, Dorothy and Bernard were not living together as
husband and wife.]
(B)
Yes, if Dorothy was jobless and did not contribute money to the acquisition of the lot, her
consent is still a prerequisite to the validity of the sale.
Under the same article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and the household.
In this case, although the money used to buy the lot was solely from Bernard, Dorothy’s
care and maintenance of the family and household are deemed contributions in the acquisition of
the lot. Article 147, 2nd paragraph is applicable, as the lot is deemed owned in common by the
common-law spouses in equal shares as the same was acquired during their cohabitation, without
prejudice to the rights of a buyer in good faith and for value.
Hence, Dorothy’s consent is a prerequisite to the validity of the sale.
VI.
Pedro bought a parcel of land described as Cadastral. Lot No. 123 and the title was
issued to his name. Juan also bought a lot in the same place, which is described as
Cadastral Lot No. 124. Pedro hired a geodetic engineer to determine the actual location
of Lot No. 123 but for some reason, the engineer pointed to Lot No. 124 by mistake.
Pedro hired a contractor to construct his house and the latter put up a sign stating the
name of the owner of the project and the construction permit number. It took more than
a year before the house was constructed. When Pedro was already residing in his
house, Juan told him to remove his house because it was built on his (Juan’s) lot.
Juan filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and prayed that the house be
removed because Pedro is a builder in bad faith. Pedro filed his Answer with
Counterclaim that he is entitled to the payment of the value of the house plus damages
because he is a builder in good faith and that Juan is guilty of estoppel and laches.
(A) If Pedro is a builder in good faith, what are the rights given to Juan under the law?
Explain. (2.5%)
(B) If Pedro is a builder in bad faith, what are the rights given to Juan under the law?
Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
(A)
If Pedro is a builder in good faith and Juan is an owner in good faith, Juan has
the right to appropriate as his own the house after payment of indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, which are the necessary and useful expenses.
As to useful expenses, Juan has the option to either refund the amount of the expenses,
or pay the increase in value which the land may have acquired by reason thereof.
Alternatively, under Article 448 of the Civil Code, Juan has the right to oblige Pedro to
pay the price of the land. However, Pedro cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than that of the house. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if Juan does not choose to appropriate the house after proper indemnity. It is the owner
of the land who is authorized to exercise the options under Article 448 because his right
is older and by principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing.
If Pedro is a builder in good faith and Juan is an owner in bad faith because Juan
knew that Pedro was building on his lot and did not oppose it (Article 453 par. 2), and
Article 454 in relation to Article 447 of the Civil Code applies. Juan shall pay the value of
the house and is also liable for reparation of damages; however, Pedro also has the
right to remove or demolish the house and ask for damages. (2016 Bar Exam
law-complex/)
(B)
If Pedro is a builder in bad faith and Juan is an owner in good faith, Juan has
three options. He may appropriate the improvements without indemnity under Article
449 of the Civil Code, or demand the demolition of the house in order to replace things
to their former condition at Pedro’s expense under Article 450; or compel Pedro to pay
the price of the land. In addition to these options, Juan is also entitled to damages from
Pedro. If Pedro is a builder in bad faith and Juan is an owner in bad faith, it shall be as if
both of them were in good faith (Article 453, New Civil Code). (2016 Bar Exam
law-complex/)
VII
Benjamin is the owner of a titled lot which is bounded on the north by the Maragondon
River. An alluvial deposit of two (2) hectares was added to the registered area. Daniel
took possession of the portion formed by accretion and claims that he has been in open,
continuous and undisturbed possession of said portion since 1923 as shown by a tax
declaration. In 1958, Benjamin filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and contends that
the alluvium belongs to him as the riparian owner and that since the allu viurn is, by law,
part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered
property, Decide the case and explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will decide in favor of Daniel and dismiss the action to quiet title filed by
Benjamin, Under Article 457 of the Civil Code, the owner of lands adjoining the banks of
rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters. The accretion however, does not automatically become registered land. It
must be brought under the Torrens system of registration by Benjamin, the reparian
owner. Since he did not, the then increment, not being registered land, was open to
acqui sition through prescription by third persons, like Daniel (Grande v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962,5 SCRA 524; Cureg v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No, 73465, September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 313). (2016 Bar Exam
law-complex/)

I will decide in favor of Daniel and dismiss the action to quiet title filed by Benjamin.
Under Article 457 of the Civil Code, the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
However, the accretion does not automatically become registered land. (Grande v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-17652, June 30, 1962,5 SCRA 524; Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No, 73465, September 7, 1989, 177 SCRA 313)
In the instant case, although Benjamin is the riparian owner, the alluvium must be
brought under the Torrens system of registration by Benjamin, the riparian owner. Since he did
not, the then increment, not being registered land, was open to acquisition through prescription
by third persons, like Daniel. Daniel took possession of the alluvium in an open and undisturbed
manner since 1923 as shown by the tax declaration.
Hence, the action to quiet title should be dismissed.
VIII
Joven and Juliana are the owners of a 30-hectare plantation in Cotabato, covered by a
title. One day, a group of armed men forcibly entered their house and, at gun point,
forced them to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Romeo. Romeo got the title from
them and they were ejected from the house and threatened not to come back or else
they will be killed. The spouses went to Manila and resided there for more than 35
years. They never went back to Cotabato for fear of their lives. Word came to them that
peace and order have been restored in their former place of residence and they decided
to reclaim their land for the benefit of their grandchildren: Joven and Juliana filed a suit
for reconveyance of their property. This was opposed by the grandson of Romeo to
whom the title was eventually transferred, on the ground of laches and prescription.
Decide the case and rule on the defenses of laches and prescription. Explain your
answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The right of the registered owners, Joven and Juliana, to file suit to recover their
property, is not barred by prescription. Under Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, no title to
registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. Proof of possession by the owner in an action for
reconveyance is immaterial and inconsequential. The right to recover possession is
equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of ownership (Republic
v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 185091, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 443). The right of joven and
Juliana to recover is not barred by laches, either. Laches deals with unreasonable delay
in filing the action. The owners’ delay, if any, cannot be construed as deliberate and
intentional. They were simply coerced out of Cotabato and threatened with death if they
returned, and, thus, could not have filed the action. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested
Answers in Civil Law by the UP Law Complex, accessed at
law-complex/)
The right of the registered owners, Joven and Juliana, to file suit to recover their property,
is not barred by prescription.
Under Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Proof of possession
by the owner in an action for reconveyance is immaterial and inconsequential. The right
to recover possession is equally imprescriptible since possession is a mere consequence of
ownership (Republic v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 185091, August 9, 2010, 627 SCRA 443).
In the instant case, the right of Joven and Juliana to recover is not barred by laches,
either. Laches deals with unreasonable delay in filing the action. The owners’ delay, if any,
cannot be construed as deliberate and intentional. They were simply coerced out of Cotabato and
threatened with death if they returned, and, thus, could not have filed the action.
Hence, the suit is not barred by prescription.
IX
Butch got a loan from Hagibis Corporation (Hagibis), but he defaulted in the payment. A
case for collection of a sum of money was filed against him. As a defense, Butch claims
that there was already an arrangement with Hagibis on the payment of the loan. To
implement the same, Butch already surrendered five (5) service utility vehicles (SUVS)
to the company for it to sell, and the proceeds to be credited to the loan as payment.
Was the obligation of Butch extinguished by reason of dacion en pago upon the
surrender of the SUVs? Decide and explain.(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the obligation of Butch to Hagibis was not extinguished by the mere
surrender of the SUV’s to the latter. Dation in payment whereby prop erty is alienated to
the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales.
(Article 1245). In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor offers
another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding
debt. The undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is, the
creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be
charged against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential elements of a contractofsale,
namely; consent, object certain, and cause or consideration must be present. In dacion
en pago there is in reality an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered
as an accepted equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the
object of the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price. In any
case, common consent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale or innovation to have the
effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation (Filinvest Credit Corporation v,
Philippine Acetylene Company, inc., G.R. No. L-50449 January 30, 1982). There being
no mention in the facts that Hagibis has given its consent to accept the SUVs as
equivalent payment, the obligation of Butch is not thereby extinguished by mere delivery
of the SUVS. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the UP Law
Complex, accessed at https://www.pinayjurist.com/2016-bar-exam-suggested-answers-
in-civil-law-by-the-up-law-complex/)

No, the obligation of Butch to Hagibis was not extinguished by the mere surrender of the
SUV’s to the latter.
Under Article 1245 of the Civil Code, dation in payment whereby property is alienated to
the creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales. In dacion en
pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it
as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in one sense of
the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor,
payment for which is to be charged against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential elements of a
contract of sale, namely; consent, object certain, and cause or consideration must be present.
In dacion en pago there is in reality an objective novation of the obligation where the thing
offered as an accepted equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object
of the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price. In any case, common
consent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale or innovation to have the effect of totally
extinguishing the debt or obligation (Filinvest Credit Corporation v, Philippine Acetylene
Company, inc., G.R. No. L-50449 January 30, 1982).
In the instant case, there being no mention in the facts that Hagibis has given its consent
to accept the SUVs as equivalent payment, the obligation of Butch is not thereby extinguished by
mere delivery of the SUVS.
Hence, the obligation was not extinguished by reason of dacion en pago.
X
Jerico, the project owner, entered into a Construction Contract with Ivan for the latter to
construct his house. Jojo executed a Surety undertaking to guarantee the performance
of the work by Ivan, Jerico and Ivan later entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA) revising the work schedule of ivan and the subcontractors. The MOA stated that
all the stipulations of the original contract not in conflict with said agreement shall
remain valid and legally effective. Jojo filed a suit to declare him relieved of his
undertaking as a result of the MOA because of the change in the work schedule. Jerico
claims there is no novation of the Construction Contract. Decide the case and explain.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will decide in favor of Jerico as there is no novation of the Construction
Contract. Novation is never presumed, and may only take place when the following are
present: (1) a previous valid obligation; (2) the agreement of all the parties to the new
contract; (3) the extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) validity of the new one.
There must be consent of all the parties to the substitution, resulting in the extinction of
the old obligation and the creation of a new valid one. In this case, the revision of the
work schedule of Ivan and the subcontractors is not shown to be so substantial as to
extinguish the old contract, and there was also no irreconcilable incompatibility between
the old and new obligations. It has also been held in jurisprudence that a surety may
only be relieved of his undertaking if there is a material change in the principal contract
and such would make the obligation of the surety onerous. The principal contract
subject of the Surety agreement still exists, and Jojo is still bound as a surety. (2016
law-complex/)

I will decide in favor of Jerico as there is no novation of the Construction Contract.
Novation is never presumed, and may only take place when the following are present: (1)
a previous valid obligation; (2) the agreement of all the parties to the new contract; (3) the
extinguishment of the old contract; and (4) validity of the new one. There must be consent of all
the parties to the substitution, resulting in the extinction of the old obligation and the creation of
a new valid one.
In the instant case, the revision of the work schedule of Ivan and the subcontractors is not
shown to be so substantial as to extinguish the old contract, and there was also no irreconcilable
incompatibility between the old and new obligations. It has also been held in jurisprudence that a
surety may only be relieved of his undertaking if there is a material change in the principal
contract and such would make the obligation of the surety onerous. The principal contract
subject of the Surety agreement still exists, and Jojo is still bound as a surety.
Therefore, the case is to be ruled in favor of Jerico.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
I will decide against Jerico. The provisions of the Civil Code (CC) on Guarantee,
other than the benefit of excussion (Article 2059 (2) CC), are applicable and available to
the surety because a surety is a guarantor who binds himself solidarily (Article 2047 2nd
par.CC). The Supreme Court has held that there is no reason why the provisions of
Article 2079 would not apply to a surety (Autocorp Group v. Intra Strata Assurance
Corporation, G.R. No. 166662, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 250). Article 2079 of the Civil
Code provides that an extension granted to the debtor by the creditor without the
consent of the guarantor extinguishes the guaranty. The changes in the work schedule
amount to an extension granted to the debtor without the consent of the surety. Hence,
Jojo‘s obligation as a surety is extinguished. If the change of work schedule, on the
other hand, shortens the time of completion of the project, it will amount to a novation.
The old obligation, where Jojo was obligated as a surety is extinguished relatively as to
him, leaving Ivan as still bound. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by

I will decide against Jerico.
The provisions of the Civil Code on Guaranty, other than the benefit of
excussion (Article 2059 (2) CC), are applicable and available to the surety because, under Article
2047 Paragraph 2 of the Civil Code, a surety is a guarantor who binds himself solidarily. The
Supreme Court has held that there is no reason why the provisions of Article 2079 would not
apply to a surety (Autocorp Group v. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 166662,
June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 250). Article 2079 of the Civil Code provides that an extension
granted to the debtor by the creditor without the consent of the guarantor extinguishes the
guaranty. The changes in the work schedule amount to an extension granted to the debtor without
the consent of the surety.
Hence, Jojo’s obligation as a surety is extinguished. If the change of work schedule, on
the other hand, shortens the time of completion of the project, it will amount to a novation. The
old obligation, where Jojo was obligated as a surety is extinguished relatively as to him, leaving
Ivan as still bound.
XI
Ellen entrusted her title over the lot where she is residing to Patrick, her nephew, for
safekeeping because of her poor eyesight. Patrick, a gambler, prepared a Special
Power of Attorney empowering him to mortgage the lot. Ellen’s signature was forged.
With the help of Julia who represented herself as Ellen; Mega Bank granted a loan to
Patrick secured by a mortgage on Ellen’s lot. Due to non-payment, Mega Bank
foreclosed the mortgage and was declared the highest bidder. Title was later registered
in the name of the bank. When Ellen was notified that she should vacate the premises,
she filed a complaint to nullify the loan with mortgage, the auction sale and the title of
Mega Bank on the ground that the bank is not a mortgagee in good faith. Decide the
case with reasons. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will decide in favor of Ellen. Banks, their business being impressed with public
interest, are expected to exercise more care and prudence than private individuals in
their dealings, even those involving registered lands. The highest degree of diligence is
expected, and high standards of integ rity and performance are even required of it.
A mortgagee – usually, can rely on what appears on the certificate of title
presented by the mortgagor and an innocent mortgagee is not expected to conduct an
exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagor’s title. This rule is, however,
strictly applied against banking institutions. Mega Bank cannot be considered a
mortgagee in good faith as it failed to inspect the disputed property when offered to it as
security for the loan, which could have led it to discover the forged Special Power of
Attorney. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the UP Law Complex,

I will decide in favor of Ellen.
Banks, their business being impressed with public interest, are expected to exercise more
care and prudence than private individuals in their dealings, even those involving registered
lands. The highest degree of diligence is expected, and high standards of integrity and
performance are even required of it. A mortgagee – usually, can rely on what appears on the
certificate of title presented by the mortgagor and an innocent mortgagee is not expected to
conduct an exhaustive investigation on the history of the mortgagor’s title. This rule is, however,
strictly applied against banking institutions.
In the instant case, Mega Bank cannot be considered a mortgagee in good faith as it failed
to inspect the disputed property when offered to it as security for the loan, which could have led
it to discover the forged Special Power of Attorney.
Therefore, the case is to be decided in favor of Ellen.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
I will decide in favor of Ellen, the victim of a forged document, Section 52 of P.D.
No. 1529.provides that after the entry of a decree of registration, any subsequent
registration procured by a forged deed shall.be null and void, even if accompanied by
the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. In this case, the registered owner, Ellen, did not
lose her title, and neither did the mortgagee, Mega Bank, acquire any right to the
property (Joaquin V. Madrid, G.R. No* L-13551, January 30, 1960, 106 Phil. 1060). The
bank was defrauded because it believed the imposter who had, without authority,
gained possession of Ellen’s certificate of title, and who then forged her signature to the
deed of mortgage (De Lara v. Ayroso, G.R. No. L-6122, May 31, 1954, 95 Phil, 185). It
is not a mortgagee in good faith. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by
I will decide in favor of Ellen, the victim of a forged document.
Section 52 of P.D. No. 1529.provides that after the entry of a decree of registration, any
subsequent registration procured by a forged deed shall.be null and void, even if accompanied by
the owner’s duplicate certificate of title.
In this case, the registered owner, Ellen, did not lose her title, and neither did the
mortgagee, Mega Bank, acquire any right to the property (Joaquin V. Madrid, G.R. No* L-
13551, January 30, 1960, 106 Phil. 1060). The bank was defrauded because it believed the
imposter who had, without authority, gained possession of Ellen’s certificate of title, and who
then forged her signature to the deed of mortgage (De Lara v. Ayroso, G.R. No. L-6122, May 31,
1954, 95 Phil, 185). It is not a mortgagee in good faith.
Hence, the case is to be decided in favor of Ellen.
XII
On March 13, 2008, Ariel entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale (DAS) with Noel where
the former sold his titled lot in Quezon City with an area of three hundred (300) square
meters to the latter for the price of P300, 000.00. The prevailing market value of the lot
was P3,000.00 per square meter. On March 20, 2008, they executed another
“Agreement to Buy Back/Redeem Property” where Ariel was given an option to
repurchase the property on or before March 20, 2010 for the same price. Ariel, however,
remained in actual possession of the lot. Since Noel did not pay the taxes, Ariel paid the
real property taxes to avoid a delinquency sale. On March 21, 2010, Ariel sent a letter to
Noel, attaching thereto a manager’s check for P300,000.00 manifesting that he is
redeeming the property. Noel rejected the redemption claiming that the DAS was a true
and valid sale representing the true intent of the parties. Ariel filed a suit for the
nullification of the DAS or the reformation of said agreement to that of a loan with Real
Estate Mortgage. He claims the DAS and the redemption agreement constitute an
equitable mortgage. Noel however claims it is a valid sale with pacto de retro and Ariel
clearly failed to redeem the property. As the RTC judge, decide the case with reasons.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will decide in favor of Ariel and allow the reformation of the agreement. The
DAS and the redemption agreement constitute an equitable mortgage and Ariel may
ask for the reformation of the agreement to that of a Loan with Real Estate Mortgage as
allowed by Article 1605 of the Civil Code (CC). The circumstances clearly show that the
agreement is an equitable mortgage, such as the: a) price of the lot was inadequate
since it was only sold at P300,000 when the prevailing market value of such was
P900,000; b) the vendor, Ariel, remained in actual possession of the property after the
purported sale; and c) Ariel was the one who paid the real property taxes. Under the
circumstances, a presumption arises under Article 1602 C.C. that what was really
executed was an equitable mortgage. Moreover, Article 1603 C.C. provides that in case
of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed
as an equitable mortgage. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the UP
Law Complex, accessed at https://www.pinayjurist.com/2016-bar-exam-suggested-
answers-in-civil-law-by-the-up-law-complex/)

I will decide in favor of Ariel and allow the reformation of the agreement. The DAS and
the redemption agreement constitute an equitable mortgage and Ariel may ask for the
reformation of the agreement to that of a Loan with Real Estate Mortgage as allowed by Article
1605 of the Civil Code.
Under Article 1605 of the Civil Code, in the cases referred to in Articles 1602 and 1604,
the apparent vendor may ask for the reformation of the instrument. Article 1602 of the Civil
Code provides that the contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the
following cases:
(1) When the price of a sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate;
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
(3) When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument
extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is executed;
(4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
(6) In any other case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is
that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation.
In the instant case, the circumstances clearly show that the agreement is an equitable
mortgage, such as the: a) price of the lot was inadequate since it was only sold at P300,000 when
the prevailing market value of such was P900,000; b) the vendor, Ariel, remained in actual
possession of the property after the purported sale; and c) Ariel was the one who paid the real
property taxes. Under the circumstances, a presumption arises under Article 1602 that what was
really executed was an equitable mortgage. Moreover, Article 1603 provides that in case of
doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with right to repurchase shall be construed as an
equitable mortgage.
Hence, the reformation of the agreement should be allowed.
XIII
Peter, a resident of Cebu City, sent through Reliable Pera Padala (RPP) the amount of
P20,000.00 to his daughter, Paula, for the payment of her tuition fee. Paula went to an
RPP branch but was informed that there was no money remitted to her name. Peter
inquired from RPP and was informed that there was a computer glitch and the money
was credited to another person. Peter and Paula sued RPP for actual damages, moral
damages and exemplary damages. The trial court ruled that there was no proof of
pecuniary loss to the plaintiffs but awarded moral damages of. P20,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P5,000.00. On appeal, RPP questioned the award of moral and
exemplary damages. Is the trial court correct in awarding moral and exemplary
damages? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, the trial court is not correct in awarding moral and exemplary damages. The
damages in this case are prayed for based on the breach of contract committed by RPP
in failing to deliver the sum of money to Paula. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, in
breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad
faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of
his contractual obligation. In the same fashion, to warrant the award of exemplary
damages, the wrongful act must be accomplished by bad faith, and an award of
damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless or malevolent manner (Article 2232 of the Civil Code)
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of
known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of
fraud. In this case, however, RPP’s breach was due to a computer glitch which at most
can be considered as negligence on its part, but definitely does not constitute bad faith
or fraud as would warrant the award of moral and exemplary damages. (2016 Bar Exam
law-complex/)

No, the trial court is not correct in awarding moral and exemplary damages.
Under Article 2232 of the Civil Code, in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may
award exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner. Furthermore, under Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be
awarded in cases of breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, in breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered
when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith)
or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation. In the same fashion, to warrant the award of
exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be accomplished by bad faith, and an award of
damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or
malevolent manner.
In the instant case, the damages are prayed for based on the breach of contract committed
by RPP in failing to deliver the sum of money to Paula. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud. In this case, however, RPP’s breach was due to a computer glitch
which at most can be considered as negligence on its part, but definitely does not constitute bad
faith or fraud as would warrant the award of moral and exemplary damages.
Hence, the trial court is incorrect in awarding moral and exemplary damages.
XIV
On February 28, 1998, Arthur filed an application for registration of title of a lot in
Ternate, Cavite before the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite under Section 48(6) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141) for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. Section
48(b) of CA 147 requires possession counted from June 12, 1945. Arthur presented
testimonial and documentary evidence that his possession and that of his
predecessors-in interest started in 1936. The lot was declared alienable and disposable
(A and D) in 1993 based on a PENRO certification and a certified true copy of the
original classification made by the DENR Secretary. The government opposed the
application on the ground that the lot was certified A and D only in 1993 while the
application was instituted only in 1998. Arthur’s possession of five (5) years from the
date of declaration does not comply with the 30-year period required under CA 141.
Should the possession of Arthur be reckoned from the date when the lot was declared A
and D or from the date of actual possession of the applicant? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Arthur’s possession should be reckoned from the date of his actual possession,
by himself and his predecessors-in-interest, since 1936. Under Section 48(b) of CA.
141, as amended by PD No. 1973, the length of the requisite possession was changed
from possession for “thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the applications
to possession “since June 12, 1945 or earlier”. But possession is different from
classification. As held in Malabanan v. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587
SCRA . 172), it is only necessary that the land be already classified as A and D “at the
time the application for registration is filed” to make public the release of the property for
alienation or disposition. But the possession of Arthur even prior to the classification of
the land as A and D shall be counted in determining the period of possession. (2016
law-complex/)
Arthur’s possession should be reckoned from the date of his actual possession, by himself
and his predecessors-in-interest, since 1936.
Under Section 48(b) of CA. 141, as amended by PD No. 1973, the length of the requisite
possession was changed from possession for “thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing
of the applications to possession “since June 12, 1945 or earlier”. But possession is different
from classification. As held in Malabanan v. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587
SCRA . 172), it is only necessary that the land be already classified as A and D “at the time the
application for registration is filed” to make public the release of the property for alienation or
disposition.
In the instant case, the possession of Arthur even prior to the classification of the land as
A and D shall be counted in determining the period of possession.
Hence, Arhur’s possession should be reckoned from 1936.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Arthur’s possession should be reckoned from the date the Ternate lot was
declared alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In Zarate v. Director of
Lands (G.R. No. 131501, July 14, 2004), the Supreme Court, citing the case of
Bracewell v. CA (G.R. No. 107427, January 25, 2000), ruled that ‘possession of the
property prior to the classification thereof as alienable or disposable, cannot be credited
as part of the thirty (30) year required under Section 48(b) of CA No. 341, as amended.
in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2010), the Supreme
Court explained that the possession of Arthur should be reckoned only from the date
lots A and D were declared as alienable and disposable by the State and not from the
date of actual possession:Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act’used the words “lands of
the public domain” or “alien able and disposable lands of the public domain” to clearly
signify that lands otherwise classified; j.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks,
and sands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public
Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
“alienable and disposable” further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the
agricultural lands of the public domain. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation
to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject
of the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land
of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land
is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine
applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as
laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R.
No. 179987 September 3, 2013).
The basis of the 30 year open continuous and notorious possession in the
concept of owner of A and D land is extraordinary acquisitive prescription of immovable
property, Lands classified as forest, mineral, and national parks are properties of public
dominion which cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. (2016 Bar Exam
law-complex/)

Arthur’s possession should be reckoned from the date the Ternate lot was declared
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
In Zarate v. Director of Lands (G.R. No. 131501, July 14, 2004), the Supreme Court,
citing the case of Bracewell v. CA (G.R. No. 107427, January 25, 2000), ruled that ‘possession
of the property prior to the classification thereof as alienable or disposable, cannot be credited as
part of the thirty (30) year required under Section 48(b) of CA No. 341, as amended. in Heirs
of Malabanan v. Republic (G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2010), the Supreme Court explained
that the possession of Arthur should be reckoned only from the date lots A and D were declared
as alienable and disposable by the State and not from the date of actual possession:Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act’ used the words “lands of the public domain” or “alien able and
disposable lands of the public domain” to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified; j.e.,
mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and sands of patrimonial or private ownership, are
outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The use
of the descriptive phrase “alienable and disposable” further limits the coverage of Section 48(b)
to only the agricultural lands of the public domain. Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in
relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of
the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural land of the
public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already
classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and
overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable as laid down in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act (Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987 September 3,
2013).
The basis of the 30 year open continuous and notorious possession in the concept of
owner of A and D land is extraordinary acquisitive prescription of immovable property, Lands
classified as forest, mineral, and national parks are properties of public dominion which cannot
be acquired by acquisitive prescription.
Hence, Arhur’s possession should be reckoned from the date the Ternate lot was declared
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
XV
Peter and Paul entered into a Contract to Sell whereby Peter, the lot owner, agreed to
sell to Paul his lot on November 6, 2016 for the price of P1,000,000.00 to be paid at the
residence of Peter in Makati City at 1:00 p.m. If the full price is paid in cash at the
specified time and place, then Peter will execute a Deed of Absolute Sale and deliver
the title to Paul. On November 6, 2016, Paul did not show up and was not heard of from
that date on. In view of the nonperformance by Paul of his obligation, Peter sent a letter
to Paul that he is expressly and extra-judicially declaring the Contract to Sell rescinded
and of no legal and binding effect. Peter further stated that failure on the part of Paul to
contest the rescission within thirty (30) days from receipt of said letter shall mean that
the latter agreed to the rescission.
Paul did not reply to this letter for five (5) years. Thus, Peter decided to sell his lot to
Henry in 2021. After hearing that Henry bought the lot, Paul now questions the sale of
the lot to Henry and files a complaint for nullification of the sale.
(A) Is the exercise by Peter of his power to rescind extra-judicially the Contract to Sell
the proper and legal way of rescinding said contract? Explain. (2.5%)
(B) in case Paul made a down payment pursuant to a stipulation in the Contract to Sell,
what is the legal remedy of Peter? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A)
As a general rule, the power to rescind an obligation must be invoked judicially and
cannot be exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other has committed a
breach of the obligation. This is so because rescission of a contract will not be permitted
for a slight or casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as
would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. However,
rescission as a remedy for breach is applicable only to an obligation which is extant. Be
it noted that the contract between the parties.is a contract to sell and not a contract of
sale and in a contract to sell, there is a reservation of ownership on the part of the seller
and his obligation to convey title will only arise upon full payment of the purchase price.
Nonetheless, Peter may validly cancel the contract to sell (Olivarez v. Castillo, G.R. No.
196251, July 9, 2014). (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the UP Law
(B)
If Paul made a down payment, Peter may still cancel the contract because in a
contract to sell, the seller does not yet agree to transfer ownership to the buyer. The
non-payment of the price in a contract to sell is not a breach for which the remedy of
rescission may be availed of, but rather it is considered as a failure to comply with a
positive suspen şive condition which will prevent the obligation of the seller to convey
title from acquiring obligatory force (Ursal v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 142411,
October 14, 2005, 473 SCRA 52, citing Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144881,
October 16, 2003, 401 SCRA 54). (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by
(A)
Peter may validly cancel the contract to sell.
As a general rule, the power to rescind an obligation must be invoked judicially and
cannot be exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other has committed a breach of
the obligation. This is so because rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or
casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental violations as would defeat the very
object of the parties in making the agreement. However, rescission as a remedy for breach is
applicable only to an obligation which is extant. Be it noted that the contract between the parties
is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale and in a contract to sell, there is a reservation of
ownership on the part of the seller and his obligation to convey title will only arise upon full
payment of the purchase price. (Olivarez v. Castillo, G.R. No. 196251, July 9, 2014)
In the instant case, the contract between Peter and Paul is merely a contract to sell.
Hence, Peter may validly rescind the contract to sell.
(B)
If Paul made a down payment, Peter may still cancel the contract because in a contract to
sell, the seller does not yet agree to transfer ownership to the buyer.
The non-payment of the price in a contract to sell is not a breach for which the remedy of
rescission may be availed of, but rather it is considered as a failure to comply with a positive
suspensive condition which will prevent the obligation of the seller to convey title from
acquiring obligatory force (Ursal v. Court of Appeals. G.R. No. 142411, October 14, 2005, 473
SCRA 52, citing Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144881, October 16, 2003, 401 SCRA 54).
In the instant case, Paul had yet to pay the entire price. He merely made a down payment.
The rule above is applicable.
Hence, Peter may still rescind the contract.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
(A)
Yes, Peter validly rescinded the contract to sell his lot to Paul for the latter’s
failure to comply with his prestation to pay P1,000,000.00 on November 6, 2016 at
1:00.p.m. at the residence of Peter so that Peter will execute the Deed of Absolute Sale:
The rescission is actually the resolution of the reciprocal obligation in UP v. De los
Angeles (G.R. No. L-28602, September 29, 1970, 35 SCRA 102), the Supreme Court
ruled that the injured party may consider the contract as rescinded and act accordingly,
even without prior court action. His unilateral determination however, is provisional,
since the other party may challenge it by suing him in court. It is then the court which
will finally determine if the rescission should be set aside or affirmed. (2016 Bar Exam
law-complex/)
XVI
Don Ricardo had 2 legitimate children-Tomas and Tristan. Tristan has 3 children.
Meanwhile, Tomas had a relationship with Nancy, who was also single and had the
legal capacity to marry. Nancy became pregnant and gave birth to Tomas, Jr. After the
birth of Tomas, Jr., his father, Tomas, died. Later, Don Ricardo died without a will and
Tristan opposed the motion of Tomas, Jr. to be declared an heir of the deceased since
he is an illegitimate child. Tomas, Jr. countered that Article 992 of the Civil Code is
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the laws. He explained that an
illegitimate child of an illegitimate parent is allowed to inherit under Articles 902,982 and
990 of the Civil Code while he-an illegitimate child of a legitimate father-cannot. Civil
Law commentator Arturo Tolentino opined that Article 992 created an absurdity and
committed an injustice because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate child
can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child cannot. Decide the case
and explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will deny the motion of Tomas, Jr. to be declared as an heir of the deceased.
Tomas jr., being an illegitimate child of the deceased legitimate son, Tomas, cannot
inherit ab intestate from the deceased, Don Ricardo, because of the iron curtain rule
under Article 992 of the Civil Code. Tomas cannot argue that Article 992 is violative of
the equal protection clause because equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957, 101
Phil: 7755). It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by the UP Law

I will deny the motion of Tomas, Jr. to be declared as an heir of the deceased.
Under Article 992 of the Civil Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
In the instant case, Tomas Jr., being an illegitimate child of the deceased legitimate son,
Tomas, cannot inherit ab intestate from the deceased, Don Ricardo, because of the iron curtain
rule under Article 992 of the Civil Code. Tomas cannot argue that Article 992 is violative of the
equal protection clause because equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed (Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957, 101 Phil: 7755). It, however,
does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction .
What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification
Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification.
Hence, the motion should be denied.
XVII
Macario bought a titled lot from Ramon, got the title and took possession of the lot.
Since Macario did not have the money to pay the taxes, fees and registration expenses,
he was not able to register the Deed of Absolute Sale. Upon advice, he merely
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim and had it annotated at the back of the title. A
few years after, he received a Notice of Levy on Attachment and Writ of Execution.in
favor of Alex. The notice, writ and certificate of sale were annotated at the back of the
title still in Ramon’s name. Alex contends that since the Affidavit of Adverse Claim is
effective only for 30 days from the date of its registration, then its validity has expired.
Macario posits that the annotation of his adverse claim is notice to the whole world of
his purchase of the lot in question. Who has the superior right over the disputed
property–Macario or Alex? Explain.(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Macario is preferred since the registration of his adverse claim was made ahead
of the notice of levy and writ of execution in favor of Alex. Macario’s adverse claim,
coupled with the fact that he was in possession of the disputed property, are
circumstances which should have put Alex on constructive notice that the property
being offered to him had already been sold to another (Ching v. Enrile, G.R. No.
156076, September 17, 2008). The contention that the adverse claim is effective only
for 30 years is puerite. in Sajonas v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996,
258 SCRA 79), the Court held that the adverse claim does not ipso facto lose its validity
since an independent action is still necessary to render it ineffective. Until then, the
adverse claim shall continue as a prior lien on the property. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested
law-complex/)
Macario is preferred since the registration of his adverse claim was made ahead of the
notice of levy and writ of execution in favor of Alex.
Macario’s adverse claim, coupled with the fact that he was in possession of the disputed
property, are circumstances which should have put Alex on constructive notice that the property
being offered to him had already been sold to another (Ching v. Enrile, G.R. No. 156076,
September 17, 2008). The contention that the adverse claim is effective only for 30 years is
puerite. in Sajonas v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 102377, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 79), the
Court held that the adverse claim does not ipso facto lose its validity since an independent action
is still necessary to render it ineffective. Until then, the adverse claim shall continue as a prior
lien on the property.
XVIII
Dr. Jack, a surgeon, holds clinic at the St. Vincent’s Hospital and pays rent to the
hospital. The fees of Dr. Jack are paid directly to him by the patient or through the
cashier of the hospital. The hospital publicly displays in the lobby the names and
specializations of the doctors associated or accredited by it, including that of Dr. Jack.
Marta engaged the services of Dr. Jack because of recurring stomach pain. It was
diagnosed that she is suffering from cancer and had to be operated on. Before the
operation, she was asked to sign a “consent for hospital care,” which reads.
“Permission is hereby given to the medical, nursing and laboratory staff of the St.
Vincent’s Hospital to perform such procedures and to administer such medications and
treatments as may be deemed necessary or advisable by the physicians of this hospital
for and during the confinement.”
After the surgery, the attending nurses reported that two (2) sponges were missing.
Later, Marta died due to complications brought about by the sponges that were left in
her stomach. The husband of Marta sued the hospital and Dr. Jack for damages arising
from negligence in the medical procedure. The hospital raised the defense that Dr. Jack
is not its employee as it did not hire Dr. Jack nor pay him any salary or compensation. It
has absolutely no control over the medical services and treatment being provided by Dr.
Jack. Dr. Jack even signed an agreement that he holds the hospital free and harmless
from any liability arising from his medical practice in the hospital.
Is St. Vincent’s Hospital liable for the negligence of Dr. Jack? Explain your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, St. Vincent’s Hospital is liable. In the case of Professional Services v.
Agana (G.R. No.126297, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 478), the Supreme Court heid
that the hospital is liable to the Aganas, not under the principle of respondeat superior
for lack of evidence of an employer-employee rela tionship with Dr. Ampil but under the
principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro hac vice, under
the principle of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a hospital. .
While it is true that there was insufficient evidence that St. Vincent’s Hospital
exercised the power of control or wielded such power over the means and the details of
the specific process by which Dr. Jack applied his skills in Marta’s treatment, there is
ample evidence that St. Vincent’s Hospital held out to the patient, Marta, thatDr. Jack
was its agent (principle of ostensible agency). The two factors that determine apparent
authority are present: (1) the hospital’s implied manifestation to the patient which led the
latter to conclude that the doctor was the hospital’s agent; and (2) the patient’s reliance
upon the conduct of the hospital and the doctor, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence.
The corporate negligence ascribed to St. Vincent’s Hospital is different from the
medical negligence attributed to Dr. Jack. The duties of the hospital are distinct from
those of the doctor-consultant practicing within its premises in relation to the patient;
hence, the failure of St. Vincent’s Hospital to fulfill its duties as a hospital corporation
gave rise to a direct liability to Marta distinct from that of Dr. Jack. (2016 Bar Exam
law-complex/)

Yes, St. Vincent’s Hospital is liable.
In the case of Professional Services v. Agana (G.R. No.126297, January 31, 2007, 513
SCRA 478), the Supreme Court held that the hospital is liable to the Aganas, not under the
principle of respondeat superior for lack of evidence of an employer-employee relationship with
Dr. Ampil but under the principle of ostensible agency for the negligence of Dr. Ampil and, pro
hac vice, under the principle of corporate negligence for its failure to perform its duties as a
hospital. .
While it is true that there was insufficient evidence that St. Vincent’s Hospital exercised
the power of control or wielded such power over the means and the details of the specific process
by which Dr. Jack applied his skills in Marta’s treatment, there is ample evidence that St.
Vincent’s Hospital held out to the patient, Marta, that Dr. Jack was its agent (principle of
ostensible agency). The two factors that determine apparent authority are present: (1) the
hospital’s implied manifestation to the patient which led the latter to conclude that the doctor
was the hospital’s agent; and (2) the patient’s reliance upon the conduct of the hospital and the
doctor, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
The corporate negligence ascribed to St. Vincent’s Hospital is different from the medical
negligence attributed to Dr. Jack. The duties of the hospital are distinct from those of the doctor-
consultant practicing within its premises in relation to the patient; hence, the failure of St.
Vincent’s Hospital to fulfill its duties as a hospital corporation gave rise to a direct liability to
Marta distinct from that of Dr. Jack.
XIX
Brad and Angelina had a secret marriage before a pastor whose office is located in
Arroceros Street, City of Manila. They paid money to the pastor who took care of all the
documentation. When Angelina wanted to go to the U.S., she found out that there was
no marriage license issued to them before their marriage. Since their marriage was
solemnized in 1995 after the effectivity of the Family Code, Angelina filed a petition for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage.
(A) Decide the case and explain. (2.5%)
(B) In case the marriage was solemnized in 1980 before the effectivity of the Family
Code, is it required that a judicial petition be filed to declare the marriage null and void?
Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(A)
I will grant the petition for judicial declaration of nullity of Brad and Angelina’s
marriage on the ground that there is a lack of a marriage license. Article 3 of the Family
Code provides that one of the formal requisites of marriage is a valid marriage license
and Article 4 of the same Code states that absence of any of the essential or formal
requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, in Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 183896,
January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 646), the Supreme Court declared the marriage as void
ab initio because there is proof of lack of record of marriage license.
The certification by the Civil Registrar of Manila that, after a diligent and
exhaustive search, the alleged marriage license indicated in the marriage certificate
does not appear in the records and cannot be found proves that the marriage of Brad
and Angelina was solemnized without the requisite marriage license and is therefore
void ab initio. The absence of the marriage license was certified to by the local civil
registrar who is the official custodian of these documents and who is in the best position
to certify as to the existence of these records. Also, there is a presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty (Republic v. CA and Castro, G.R. No. 103047,
September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257). (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law
by the UP Law Complex, accessed at https://www.pinayjurist.com/2016-bar-exam-
(B)
No, it is not required that a judicial petition be filed to declare the marriage null
and void when said marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
As stated in the cases of People V. Mendoza (G.R. No. L-5877, September 28, 1954,
95 Phil. 845), and People v. Aragon (G.R. No. L-10016, February 28, 1957, 100 Phil.
1033), the old rule is that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no
judicial petition is necessary to establish its invalidity. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested
law-complex/)

(A)
I will grant the petition for judicial declaration of nullity of Brad and Angelina’s marriage
on the ground that there is a lack of a marriage license.
Article 3 of the Family Code provides that one of the formal requisites of marriage is a
valid marriage license and Article 4 of the same Code states that absence of any of the essential
or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, in Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No.
183896, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 646), the Supreme Court declared the marriage as void ab
initio because there is proof of lack of record of marriage license.
The certification by the Civil Registrar of Manila that, after a diligent and exhaustive
search, the alleged marriage license indicated in the marriage certificate does not appear in the
records and cannot be found proves that the marriage of Brad and Angelina was solemnized
without the requisite marriage license and is therefore void ab initio. The absence of the
marriage license was certified to by the local civil registrar who is the official custodian of these
documents and who is in the best position to certify as to the existence of these records. Also,
there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty (Republic v. CA and
Castro, G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257).
Hence, the petition is granted.
(B)
No, it is not required that a judicial petition be filed to declare the marriage null and void
when said marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code.
As stated in the cases of People V. Mendoza (G.R. No. L-5877, September 28, 1954, 95
Phil. 845), and People v. Aragon (G.R. No. L-10016, February 28, 1957, 100 Phil. 1033), the
old rule is that where a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial petition is
necessary to establish its invalidity.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
(B)
Irrespective of when the marriage took place, other than for purposes of remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly
instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other
than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void in Article 40 of the Family Code.connotes that such final judgment need
to be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. (Ablaza v. Republic, G.R. No. 158298,
August 11, 2010, 628 SCRA 27) (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil Law by
XX
Princess married Roberto and bore a son, Onofre. Roberto died in a plane crash
Princess later married Märk and they also had a son-Pepito. Onofre donated to Pepito,
his half-brother, a lot in Makati City worth P3,000,000.00. Pepito succumbed to an
illness and died intestate. The tot: given to Pepito by Onofre was inherited by his
father, Mark. Mark also died intestate. Lonely, Princess followed Mark to the life beyond.
The claimants: to the subject lot emerged-Jojo, the father of Princess; Victor, the father
of Mark; and Jerico, the father of Roberto.
Who among the three (3) ascendants is entitled to the lot? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jojo, Princess’s father, is entitled to the lot.
This is a clear case of reserva troncal. The Origin is Onofre. The Prepositus is
Pepito. The mode of transmission from Onofre to Pepito is donation (hence by
gratuitous title), The Reservista is Mark, who acquired it from his descendant (son)
Pepito by legitime and intestacy (hence, by operation of law). The Reservatario is
Princess, a relative of the Prepositus Pepito within the third degree and who belonged
to the line of origin (the maternal line). Line of origin is the maternal line because Onofre
(the Origin) and Pepito. (the Prepositus) are maternal half-blood siblings. When
Mark (Reservista) died, the property passed to Princess as sole. reservatario, thus
extinguishing the reserva troncal. Upon Princess’s death, the property was transmitted
ab intestato to her father Jojo. Transmission to Jojo is by the ordinary rules of
compulsory and intestate succession, not by reserva troncal, because the reserva was
extinguished upon the transmission of the property to Princess, this making Princess
the absolute owner subject to no reserva. (2016 Bar Exam Suggested Answers in Civil
Law by the UP Law Complex, accessed at https://www.pinayjurist.com/2016-bar-exam-
CIVIL LAW BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS 2017
Question No. 1
State whether the following marital unions are valid, void, or voidable, and give the
corresponding justifications for your answer:
(a) Ador and Becky's marriage wherein Ador was afflicted with AIDS prior to the
marriage. (2%)
(b) Carlos' marriage to Dina which took place after Dina had poisoned her previous
husband Edu in order to free herself from any impediment in order to live with
Carlos. (2%)
(c) Eli and Fely's marriage solemnized seven years after the disappearance of
Chona, Eli's previous spouse, after the plane she had boarded crashed in the
West Philippine Sea. (2%)
(d) David who married Lina immediately the day after obtaining a judicial decree
annulling his prior marriage to Elisa. (2%)
(e) Marriage of Zoren and Carmina who did not secure a marriage license prior to
their wedding but lived together as husband and wife for 10 years without any
legal impediment to marry. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The marriage is voidable because Ador was afflicted with a serious and incurable
sexually-transmitted disease at the time of marriage. For a marriage to be
annulled under Article 45 (6), the sexually transmissible disease must be: (1)
existing at the time of marriage, (2) found to be serious and incurable, and (3)
unknown to the other party. Since Ador was afflicted with AIDS which is a serious
and incurable disease, and the condition existed at the time of marriage, the
marriage is voidable, provided that such illness was not known to Becky. (2017
Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers
In Civil Law)
(b) The marriage of Carlos to Dina is void by reason of public policy. Article 38 (9) of
the Family Code provides that marriage between parties where one, with the
intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own
spouse is void from the beginning. Here, the wife killed her previous husband for
the purpose of marrying the second husband. (2017 Bar Examinations University
of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers In Civil Law)
(c) The marriage is void under Article 35 (4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code. The requisites of a valid marriage under Article 41 are as follows: (1) the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, except when the
disappearance is in danger of death which only requires two years, (2) the
present spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, and (3) the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding for
declaration of presumptive death of her previous spouse and this cannot be
presumed. Thus, the exception under Article 35 (4) is inapplicable and the
subsequent marriage is void. (2017 Bar Examinations University of the
Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers In Civil Law)
Alternative Answer: If the marriage was celebrated under the New Civil Code,
the marriage would be valid as no declaration of presumptive death is necessary
under Article 391 of the said Code. (2017 Bar Examinations University of the
(d) The marriage is valid as there were no facts showing that David and Elisa have
properties and children, which would render the marriage void under Article 53 of
the Family Code in relation to Article 52. In addition, David and Lina have no
impediment to marry. (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law
Center Suggested Answers In Civil Law)
Alternative Answer: If the spouses have properties and children, the marriage is
void under Article 53 of the Family Code in relation to Article 52. For a marriage
subsequent to a judgment of annulment of previous marriage to be valid, the
properties of the spouses must have been partitioned and distributed, the
presumptive legitimes of children, if any must have been delivered, and the
aforementioned facts must be recorded in the civil registry and registries of
property. In this case, the marriage was entered into the day after obtaining a
special judicial decree of annulment and it would have been impossible for David
to comply with the requirements in such a short time. Therefore, the marriage is
void. (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center
(e) If Zoren and Carmina lived together as husband and wife for 10 years prior to the
marriage, then the marriage is valid, despite the absence of a marriage license.
An exception to the rule that a marriage shall be void if solemnized without
license under Article 35 (3) is that provided for under Article 34 of the Family
Code. When a man and woman have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without legal impediment to marry each other, they may
celebrate the marriage without securing a marriage license. (2017 Bar
Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers In
Civil Law)

(f)
The marriage is voidable.

Under Article 45(6) of the Civil Code, that either party was afflicted with a sexually-
transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable is a cause by which a
marriage may be annulled, existing at the time of the marriage. For a marriage to be annulled
under Article 45 (6), the sexually transmissible disease must be: (1) existing at the time of
marriage, (2) found to be serious and incurable, and (3) unknown to the other party.
In the instant case, Ador was afflicted with a serious and incurable sexually-transmitted
disease at the time of marriage. Since Ador was afflicted with AIDS which is a serious and
incurable disease, and the condition existed at the time of marriage, the marriage is voidable,
provided that such illness was not known to Becky.
Hence, the marriage is voidable.
(g)
The marriage of Carlos to Dina is void by reason of public policy.

Article 38 (9) of the Family Code provides that marriage between parties where one, with
the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse or his or her own spouse is void
from the beginning.
In the instant case, the wife killed her previous husband for the purpose of marrying the
second husband.
Hence, the marriage is void.
(h)
The marriage is void under Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, those bigamous or polygamous marriages not
failing under Article 41 shall be void from the beginning. Article 41 of the Family Code provides
that A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. The requisites of a valid marriage under Article 41 are as
follows: (1) the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, except when the
disappearance is in danger of death which only requires two years, (2) the present spouse had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, and (3) the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of her previous spouse and
this cannot be presumed.
In the instant case, Eli failed to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of her previous spouse. Such fact cannot be presume. Thus, the exception
under Article 35 (4) is inapplicable and the subsequent marriage is void.
Hence, the marriage is void.
Alternative Answer: If the marriage was celebrated under the New Civil Code, the
marriage would be valid as no declaration of presumptive death is necessary under
Article 391 of the said Code.
(i)
The marriage is valid.

Under Article 53 of the Family Code, either of the former spouses may marry again after
compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the
subsequent marriage shall be null and void. Article 52 of the Family Code provides that the
judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be
recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not
affect third persons.
In the instant case, there were no facts showing that David and Elisa have properties and
children, which would render the marriage void under Article 53 of the Family Code in relation
to Article 52. In addition, David and Lina have no impediment to marry.
Hence, the marriage is valid.
Alternative Answer: If the spouses have properties and children, the marriage is void
under Article 53 of the Family Code in relation to Article 52. For a marriage subsequent
to a judgment of annulment of previous marriage to be valid, the properties of the spouses
must have been partitioned and distributed, the presumptive legitimes of children, if any
must have been delivered, and the aforementioned facts must be recorded in the civil
registry and registries of property. In this case, the marriage was entered into the day after
obtaining a special judicial decree of annulment and it would have been impossible for
David to comply with the requirements in such a short time. Therefore, the marriage is
void.
(j)
The marriage is valid.

Under Article 34 of the Family Code, no license shall be necessary for the marriage of a
man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. This is the exemption to the
rule that a marriage shall be void if solemnized without license under Article 35(3) of the Family
Code.
In the instant case, Zoren and Carmina lived together as husband and wife for 10 years
prior to the marriage. Clearly, the marriage is within the purview of Article 34 since the
provision merely requires at least five years. Hence, the marriage is valid despite the absence of a
marriage license.
Therefore, the marriage is valid.
Question No. 2
In 1960, Rigor and Mike occupied two separate but adjacent tracts of land in Mindoro.
Rigor's tract was classified as timber land while Mike's was classified as agricultural
land. Each of them fenced and cultivated his own tract continuously for 30 years. In
1991, the Government declared the land occupied by Mike as alienable and disposable,
and the one cultivated by Rigor as no longer intended for public use or public service.
Rigor and Mike now come to you today for legal advice in asserting their right of
ownership of their respective lands based on their long possession and occupation
since 1960.
(a) What are the legal consequences of the 1991 declarations of the Government
respecting the lands? Explain your answer. (2%)
(b) Given that, according to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, in relation
to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title must
be from June 12, 1945, or earlier, may Mike nonetheless validly base his
assertion of the right of ownership on prescription under the Civil Code? Explain
your answer. (4%)
(c) Does Rigor have legal basis for his application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title based on prescription as defined by the Civil Code given that, like
Mike, his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
was not since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and his tract of land was timber land until
the declaration in 1991? Explain your answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) As to the land occupied Mike, the same remains property of the public dominion.
According to jurisprudence, the classification of the property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of
the public dominion. There must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion. [Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013]
As to the land occupied by Rigor, the declaration that it is no longer intended for
public use or public service converted the same into patrimonial property
provided that such express declaration was in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or in a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President was
duly authorized by law. According to jurisprudence, when public land is no longer
intended for public use, public service or for the development of the national
wealth it is thereby effectively removed from the ambit of public dominion and
converted into patrimonial provided that the declaration of such conversion must
be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect. [Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009
and September 3, 2013] (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines
Law Center Suggested Answers In Civil Law)
(b) No, because the land remains property of public dominion and, therefore, not
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. According to jurisprudence, the
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion. In
order to convert the property into patrimonial, there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. [Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013]
Here, the declaration of the property into alienable and disposable land of the
public domain in 1991 did not convert the property into patrimonial in the
absence of an express declaration of such conversion into patrimonial in the form
of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. (2017 Bar
Civil Law)
(c) None, because Rigor’s possession was short of the period required by the Civil
Code for purposes of acquisitive prescription which requires ten (10) years of
continuous possession, if possession was in good faith and with a just title, or
thirty years, in any event. While the property may be considered converted into
patrimonial because of the 1991 declaration that it is no longer intended for
public use or public service (provided that the declaration be in the form of a law
of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases
where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect), Rigor failed to
complete the 30-year period required by law in case of extra-ordinary
prescription. Since the property was converted into patrimonial only in 1991, the
period of prescription commenced to run beginning that year only. Rigor’s
possession prior to the conversion of the property into patrimonial cannot be
counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period because
prescription did not operate against the State at that time, the property then being
public dominion property [Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987,
April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013]. Rigor may not likewise acquire
ownership by virtue of the shorter 10-year ordinary prescription because his
possession was not in good faith and without a just title. (2017 Bar Examinations

(d)
As to the land occupied Mike, the same remains property of the public dominion.
According to jurisprudence, the classification of the property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion. There must be
an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or
disposable, remains property of the public dominion. [Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,
GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013]
As to the land occupied by Rigor, the declaration that it is no longer intended for public
use or public service converted the same into patrimonial property provided that such express
declaration was in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or in a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President was duly authorized by law. According to jurisprudence, when
public land is no longer intended for public use, public service or for the development of the
national wealth it is thereby effectively removed from the ambit of public dominion and
converted into patrimonial provided that the declaration of such conversion must be made in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law to that effect. [Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, GR
No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013]
(e)
No, Mike may not validly base his assertion of the right of ownership on prescription
under the Civil Code.
According to jurisprudence, the classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion. In order to convert the property into patrimonial, there must be an express declaration
by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.
[Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013]
In the instant case, the land remains property of public dominion and, therefore, not
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. The declaration of the property into alienable and
disposable land of the public domain in 1991 did not convert the property into patrimonial in the
absence of an express declaration of such conversion into patrimonial in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect.
Hence, Mike may not validly base his assertion of the right of ownership on prescription
under the Civil Code.
(f)
None, Rigor have legal basis for his application for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title based on prescription as defined by the Civil Code.
The reason is that Rigor’s possession was short of the period required by the Civil Code
for purposes of acquisitive prescription which requires ten (10) years of continuous possession, if
possession was in good faith and with a just title, or thirty years, in any event. While the property
may be considered converted into patrimonial because of the 1991 declaration that it is no longer
intended for public use or public service (provided that the declaration be in the form of a law of
a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is
duly authorized by law to that effect), Rigor failed to complete the 30-year period required by
law in case of extra-ordinary prescription. Since the property was converted into patrimonial
only in 1991, the period of prescription commenced to run beginning that year only. Rigor’s
possession prior to the conversion of the property into patrimonial cannot be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period because prescription did not operate against the
State at that time, the property then being public dominion property [Heirs of Mario Malabanan
v. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and September 3, 2013]. Rigor may not likewise
acquire ownership by virtue of the shorter 10-year ordinary prescription because his possession
was not in good faith and without a just title.
Question No. 3
Josef owns a piece of land in Pampanga. The National Housing Authority (NHA) sought
to expropriate the property for its socialized housing project. The trial court fixed the just
compensation for the property at P50 million. The NHA immediately deposited the same
at the authorized depository bank and filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession with the trial court. Unfortunately, there was delay in the resolution of the
motion. Meanwhile, the amount deposited earned interest.
When Josef sought the release of the amount deposited, NHA argued that Josef should
only be entitled to P50 million.
Who owns the interest earned? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Josef owns the interest earned. In Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development
Corp. GR No. 172410, April 14, 2008, the Supreme Court has declared that upon
deposit by the appropriator of the amount fixed for just compensation, the owner whose
property is sought to be expropriated becomes the owner of the deposited amount. Any
interest therefore that accrues to such deposit belongs to the owner by right of
accession. In the case at bar, Josef became the owner of the amount deposited by
NHA; thus any interest that accrues therefrom pertains to Josef by right of accession.
(2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers
In Civil Law)

Josef owns the interest earned.
In Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp. GR No. 172410, April 14, 2008,
the Supreme Court has declared that upon deposit by the appropriator of the amount fixed for
just compensation, the owner whose property is sought to be expropriated becomes the owner of
the deposited amount. Any interest therefore that accrues to such deposit belongs to the owner by
right of accession.
In the case at bar, Josef became the owner of the amount deposited by NHA; thus any
interest that accrues therefrom pertains to Josef by right of accession.
Hence, the interest earned is owned by Josef.
Question No. 4
(a) Distinguish antichresis from usufruct? (3%)
(b) Distinguish commodatum from mutuum. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
They are distinguished as follows:
(a) Antichresis is a real security transaction wherein the creditor acquires the right to
receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, and the obligation to apply them
to the payment of the interest, if owing and thereafter to the principal of his credit
(Article 2132, NCC). On the other hand, a usufruct is a real right which authorizes
its holder to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless otherwise provided.
Antichresis is always created by contract while usufruct need not arise from a
contract because it may also be constituted by law or by other acts inter vivos,
such as donation, or in a last will and testament, or by prescription.
The subject matter of antichresis is always a real property while the subject
matter of usufruct may either be real property or personal property.
Both create real rights, but Antichresis is an accessory contract while usufruct
when created by contract is a principal contract.
During the usufruct, the fruits belong to the usufructuary not the naked owner,
while the antichretic creditor has the right to receive the fruits with the obligation
to apply the fruits to the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the
principal of the credit (Article 2132, NCC).
In atichresis, the amount of the principal and the interest charge must be in
writing in order to be valid (Article 2134, NCC) while there is no particular form
required to constitute a valid usufruct.
(b) In commodatum, the creditor or bailor delivers to the debtor or bailee

consumable or non-consumable property so that the latter may use the same for
a certain time and must return the same thing (Article 1933, NCC). In mutuum,
the creditor delivers to the debtor money or other consumable thing upon the
condition that the same amount of the same amount of the same kind and quality
is paid (Article 1933, NCC).
The subject matter of commodatum may be a movable or immovable thing which

is ordinarily non-consumable (if the thing borrowed is consumable, it is merely for
display or exhibition), while the subject matter of mutuum is either money or
consumable;
Commodatum is essentially gratuitous while mutuum may be gratuitous or with a
stipulation to pay interest;
In commodatum, there is no transmission of ownership of the thing loaned while

in mutuum, the borrower acquires ownership of the thing loaned.
In commodatum, the same thing borrowed is required to be returned while in

mutuum, the borrower discharges his obligation not by returning the identical
thing loaned, but by paying its equivalent in kind, quality and quantity. (2017 Bar
Civil Law)

(c)
Antichresis and usufruct are distinguished as follows:

(1) Antichresis is a real security transaction wherein the creditor acquires the right to receive
the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, and the obligation to apply them to the payment
of the interest, if owing and thereafter to the principal of his credit (Article 2132, NCC).
On the other hand, a usufruct is a real right which authorizes its holder to enjoy the
property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless
otherwise provided.
(2) Antichresis is always created by contract while usufruct need not arise from a contract
because it may also be constituted by law or by other acts inter vivos, such as donation,
or in a last will and testament, or by prescription.
(3) The subject matter of antichresis is always a real property while the subject matter of
usufruct may either be real property or personal property.
(4) Both create real rights, but Antichresis is an accessory contract while usufruct when
created by contract is a principal contract.
(5) During the usufruct, the fruits belong to the usufructuary not the naked owner, while the
antichretic creditor has the right to receive the fruits with the obligation to apply the fruits
to the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of the credit
(Article 2132, NCC).
(6) In atichresis, the amount of the principal and the interest charge must be in writing in
order to be valid (Article 2134, NCC) while there is no particular form required to
constitute a valid usufruct.
(d)
Commodatum and mutuum are distinguished as follows:

(1) In commodatum, the creditor or bailor delivers to the debtor or bailee consumable or non-
consumable property so that the latter may use the same for a certain time and must
return the same thing (Article 1933, NCC). In mutuum, the creditor delivers to the debtor
money or other consumable thing upon the condition that the same amount of the same
amount of the same kind and quality is paid (Article 1933, NCC).
(2) The subject matter of commodatum may be a movable or immovable thing which is
ordinarily non-consumable (if the thing borrowed is consumable, it is merely for display
or exhibition), while the subject matter of mutuum is either money or consumable;
(3) Commodatum is essentially gratuitous while mutuum may be gratuitous or with a
stipulation to pay interest;
(4) In commodatum, there is no transmission of ownership of the thing loaned while in
mutuum, the borrower acquires ownership of the thing loaned.
(5) In commodatum, the same thing borrowed is required to be returned while in mutuum,
the borrower discharges his obligation not by returning the identical thing loaned, but by
paying its equivalent in kind, quality and quantity.
Question No. 5
Jacob has owned a farm land in Ramos, Tarlac. In 2012, Liz surreptitiously entered and
cultivated the property. In 2014, Jacob discovered Liz's presence in and cultivation of
the property. Due to his being busy attending to his business in Cebu, he tolerated Liz's
cultivation of the property. Subsequently, in December 2016, Jacob wanted to regain
possession of the property; hence, he sent a letter to Liz demanding that she vacate the
property. Liz did not vacate despite the demand.
Jacob comes to enlist your legal assistance to bring an action against Liz to recover the
possession of the property.
What remedies are available to Jacob to recover possession of his property under the
circumstances? Explain your answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The remedy available to Jacob is accion publiciana, or an action for the recovery
of the better right of possession. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the
expiration of one year from accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty.
Since the entry made by Liz is through stealth, Jacob could have filed an action
for forcible entry. Ordinarily, the one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that
when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the
plaintiff learned thereof. Here, since more than one year had elapsed since Jacob
learned of the entry made by Liz through stealth, the action that may be filed by Jacob is
no longer forcible entry, but an accion publiciana. [Canlas v. Tubil, GR No. 184285,
September 25, 2009; Valdez v. CA, GR No. 132424, May 4, 2006] (2017 Bar

The remedy available to Jacob is accion publiciana, or an action for the recovery of the
better right of possession. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year
from accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
In Canlas v. Tubil, GR No. 184285, September 25, 2009; Valdez v. CA, GR No. 132424,
May 4, 2006, it was held that, ordinarily, the one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land, except that when the
entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof.
In the instant case, since the entry made by Liz is through stealth, Jacob could have filed
an action for forcible entry. Here, since more than one year had elapsed since Jacob learned of
the entry made by Liz through stealth, the action that may be filed by Jacob is no longer forcible
entry, but an accion publiciana.
Hence, the remedy is accion publiciana and not forcible entry.
Question No. 6
Tyler owns a lot that is enclosed by the lots of Riley to the North and East, of Dylan to
the South, and of Reece to the West. The current route to the public highway is a
kilometer's walk through the northern lot of Riley, but the route is a rough road that gets
muddy during the rainy season and is inconvenient because it is only 2.5 meters wide.
Tyler's nearest access to the public highway would be through the southern lot of Dylan.
May Dylan be legally required to afford to Tyler a right of way through his property?
Explain your answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. Dylan may not be legally required to afford Tyler a right of way through his
property, because Tyler already has an adequate outlet to the public highway through
Riley’s lot.
One of the requisites for a compulsory grant of right of way is that the estate of
the claimant of a right of way must be isolated and without adequate outlet to a public
highway. The true standard for the grant of compulsory right of way is “adequacy” of
outlet going to a public highway and not the convenience of the dominant estate.
In the case at bar, there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant
estate to a public highway. Even if said outlet be inconvenient, the need to open up
another servitude is entirely unjustified. [Basis: Article 649, Civil Code; Dichoso, Jr. v.
Marcos, GR No. 180282, April 11, 2011; Costabella Corp. v. CA, GR No. 80511,
January 25, 1991) (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center

No, Dylan may not be legally required to afford Tyler a right of way through his property
because Tyler already has an adequate outlet to the public highway through Riley’s lot.
One of the requisites for a compulsory grant of right of way is that the estate of the
claimant of a right of way must be isolated and without adequate outlet to a public highway. The
true standard for the grant of compulsory right of way is “adequacy” of outlet going to a public
highway and not the convenience of the dominant estate. [Basis: Article 649, Civil Code;
Dichoso, Jr. v. Marcos, GR No. 180282, April 11, 2011; Costabella Corp. v. CA, GR No. 80511,
January 25, 1991]
In the case at bar, there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to
a public highway. Even if said outlet be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is
entirely unjustified.
Hence, Dylan may not be legally required to afford Tyler a right of way through his
property.
Question No. 7
Alice agreed to sell a parcel of land with an area of 500 square meters registered in her
name and covered by TCT No. 12345 in favor of Bernadette for the amount of
₱900,000.00. Their agreement dated October 15, 2015 reads as follows:
I, Bernadette, agree to buy the lot owned by Alice covered by TCT No. 12345 for the
amount of ₱900,000.00 subject to the following schedule of payment:
Upon signing of agreement – P100,000.00
November 15, 2015 – P200,000.00
December 15, 2015 – P200,000.00
January 15, 2016 – P200,000.00
February 15, 2016 – P200,000.00
Title to the property shall be transferred upon full payment of ₱900,000.00 on or before
February 15, 2016.
After making the initial payment of ₱100,000.00 on October 15, 2015, and the second
instalment of ₱200,000.00 on November 15, 2015, Bernadette defaulted despite
repeated demands from Alice.
In December 2016, Bernadette offered to pay her balance, but Alice refused and told
her that the land was no longer for sale. Due to the refusal, Bernadette caused the
annotation of her adverse claim upon TCT No. 12345 on December 19, 2016. Later on,
Bernadette discovered that Alice had sold the property to Chona on February 5, 2016,
and that TCT No. 12345 had been cancelled and another one issued (TCT No. 67891)
in favor of Chona as the new owner.
Bernadette sued Alice and Chona for specific performance, annulment of sale and
cancellation of TCT No. 67891. Bernadette insisted that she had entered into a contract
of sale with Alice; and that because Alice had engaged in double sale, TCT No. 67891
should be cancelled and another title be issued in Bernadette's favor.
(a) Did Alice and Bernadette enter into a contract of sale of the lot covered by TCT
No. 12345? Explain your answer. (4%)
(b) Did Alice engage in double sale of the property? Explain your answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes, they entered into a contract of sale which is a conditional sale. Article 1458
(2) provides that a contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
In a contract of conditional sale, the buyer automatically acquires title to the

property upon full payment of the purchase price. This transfer of title is “by
operation of law without any further act having to be performed by the seller. In a
contract to sell, transfer of title to the prospective buyer is not automatic. The
prospective seller must convey title to the property through a deed of conditional
sale” (Olivarez Realty Corporation vs. Castillo, GR No. 196251, July 9, 2014).
(2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested
Answers In Civil Law)
Alternative Answer: No, because in the agreement between Alice and

Bernadette the ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price, which makes the contract one of
contract to sell and not a contract of sale.
Distinctions between a contract to sell and a contract of sale are well-established

in jurisprudence. In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the
vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by
agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full
payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the
vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and unless
the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas, in a contract to sell, title is
retained by the vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter contract,
payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a
breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from
becoming effective. [Saberon v. Ventanilla, Jr., GR No. 192669, April 21, 2014).
In the case at bar, the contract entered between the parties is a contract to sell
because ownership is retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee
until full payment of the purchase price. (2017 Bar Examinations University of the
(b) No, Alice did not engage in double sale. Article 1544 of the Civil Code
contemplates contracts of sale which are absolute sales. The sale to Bernadette,
however is a conditional sale wherein the condition was not fulfilled. In a
conditional sale, the non-fulfillment of the condition prevents the obligation to sell
from arising, and thus the prospective seller retains ownership without further
remedies by the buyer. Since title is reserved to Alice until Bernadette pays the
full price for the lot, the contract in this case is a conditional sale. (2017 Bar
Civil Law)
Alternative Answer: No, because there was no previous sale of the same
property prior to its sale to Chona. Despite the earlier transaction of Alice with
Bernadette, the former is not guilty of double sale because the previous
transaction with Bernadette is characterized as a contract to sell. In a contract to
sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person buying such
property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full
payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad
faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the
property. There is no double sale in such case. Title to the property will transfer
to the buyer after registration because there is no defect in the owner-sellers title
per se, but the latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the intending
buyer. [Coronel v. CA, GR No. 103577, October 7, 1996] (2017 Bar
Civil Law)

(c)
Yes, they entered into a contract of sale which is a conditional sale. Article 1458 (2)
provides that a contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
In a contract of conditional sale, the buyer automatically acquires title to the property
upon full payment of the purchase price. This transfer of title is “by operation of law without any
further act having to be performed by the seller. In a contract to sell, transfer of title to the
prospective buyer is not automatic. The prospective seller must convey title to the property
through a deed of conditional sale” (Olivarez Realty Corporation vs. Castillo, GR No. 196251,
July 9, 2014).
In the instant case, Alice sold a parcel of land to Bernadette. The contract provides that
title shall be transferred upon full payment of the price. Clearly, the contract is one of conditional
sale by virtue of such stipulation.
Hence, the contract is a contract of sale not a contract to sell.
Alternative Answer:
No, because in the agreement between Alice and Bernadette the ownership is reserved in
the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price, which makes
the contract one of contract to sell and not a contract of sale.
Distinctions between a contract to sell and a contract of sale are well-established in
jurisprudence. In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the
delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the
vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated,
in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and
unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas, in a contract to sell, title is retained by the
vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive
suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of
the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. [Saberon v. Ventanilla, Jr., GR No. 192669,
April 21, 2014).
In the case at bar, the contract entered between the parties is a contract to sell because
ownership is retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the
purchase price.
(d)
No, Alice did not engage in double sale.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code contemplates contracts of sale which are absolute sales. It
provides that If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property. Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. Should there be no
inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in the
possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there
is good faith.
In the instant case, the sale to Bernadette, however is a conditional sale wherein the
condition was not fulfilled. In a conditional sale, the non-fulfillment of the condition prevents the
obligation to sell from arising, and thus the prospective seller retains ownership without further
remedies by the buyer. Since title is reserved to Alice until Bernadette pays the full price for the
lot, the contract in this case is a conditional sale.
Hence, Alice did not engage in double sale.
Alternative Answer:
No, because there was no previous sale of the same property prior to its sale to Chona.
In a contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person buying
such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment of the
purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the prospective buyer
cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property. There is no double sale in such case. Title
to the property will transfer to the buyer after registration because there is no defect in the
owner-sellers title per se, but the latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the intending
buyer. [Coronel v. CA, GR No. 103577, October 7, 1996]
In the instant case, despite the earlier transaction of Alice with Bernadette, the former is
not guilty of double sale because the previous transaction with Bernadette is characterized as a
contract to sell.
Hence, Alice did not engage in double sale.
Question No. 8
Pedro had worked for 15 years in Saudi Arabia when he finally decided to engage in
farming in his home province where his 10- hectare farmland valued at ₱2,000,000.00
was located. He had already ₱3,000,000.00 savings from his long stint in Saudi Arabia.
Eagerly awaiting Pedro's arrival at the NAIA were his aging parents Modesto and
Jacinta, his common-law spouse Veneranda, their three children, and Alex, his child by
Carol, his departed legal wife. Sadly, for all of them, Pedro suffered a stroke because of
his overexcitement just as the plane was about to land and died without seeing any of
them.
The farmland and the savings were all the properties he left.
(a) State who are Pedro's legal heirs, and the shares of each legal heir to the
estate? Explain your answer. (4%)
(b) Assuming that Pedro's will is discovered soon after his funeral. In the will, he
disposed of half of his estate in favor of Veneranda, and the other half in favor of
his children and his parents in equal shares. Assuming also that the will is
admitted to probate by the proper court. Are the testamentary dispositions valid
and effective under the law on succession? Explain your answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Pedro’s legal heirs are his legitimate child, Alex (Article 979, NCC), and his three
illegitimate children with Veneranda (Article 873, NCC). Modesto and Jacinto, his
parents are excluded by Alex, his legitimate child. Veneranda, as a common-law
spouse, is not among Pedro’s legal heir.
Assuming that the farmland and savings are the exclusive properties of Pedro,
Pedro’s estate amounts to P5,000,000.00. Alex is entitled to one-half of Pedro’s
estate, amounting to P2,500,000.00 while the three illegitimate children divide the
remaining one-half equally, such that each will receive P833,333.33. (2017 Bar
Civil Law)
(b) No, because the testamentary dispositions impair the legitimes of Pedro’s
compulsory heirs.
Following Article 887 of the Civil Code, only Alex and his three illegitimate
children are Pedro’s compulsory heirs.
Alex, as Pedro’s sole legitimate child is entitled to a legitime of ½ of Pedro’s

estate, or P2.5 Million (Article 888, NCC). The legitime of each of the illegitimate
children is supposed to be ½ of the share of Alex, or P1.25 Million each or a total
of P3,750,000.00, but as this exceeds the balance of the estate amounting to
P2.5 Million, the latter amount must be divided equally among the three,
amounting to P833,333.33 each. The other testamentary dispositions to
Veneranda and his parents, may not be given effect, as there is nothing left of
the estate to distribute.
Note: If the farmland and the P3 Million savings were acquired during the
cohabitation of Pedro and Veneranda, these are owned in common by both of
them (Article 147, Family Code). One-half of the Ph5 Million belongs to Veranda
as her share in the co-ownership. (2017 Bar Examinations University of the

(c)
Pedro’s legal heirs are his legitimate child, Alex, and his three illegitimate children with
Veneranda (Article 873, NCC). Modesto and Jacinto, his parents are excluded by Alex, his
legitimate child. Veneranda, as a common-law spouse, is not among Pedro’s legal heir.
Under Article 979 of the Civil Code, legitimate children and their descendants succeed
the parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should
come from different marriages. Under Article 887 of the Civil Code, illegitimate children are
compulsory heirs.
Assuming that the farmland and savings are the exclusive properties of Pedro, Pedro’s
estate amounts to P5,000,000.00. Alex is entitled to one-half of Pedro’s estate, amounting to
P2,500,000.00 while the three illegitimate children divide the remaining one-half equally, such
that each will receive P833,333.33.
(d)
No, because the testamentary dispositions impair the legitimes of Pedro’s compulsory
heirs.
Following Article 887 of the Civil Code, only Alex and his three illegitimate children are
Pedro’s compulsory heirs.
Alex, as Pedro’s sole legitimate child is entitled to a legitime of ½ of Pedro’s estate, or
P2.5 Million (Article 888, NCC). The legitime of each of the illegitimate children is supposed to
be ½ of the share of Alex, or P1.25 Million each or a total of P3,750,000.00, but as this exceeds
the balance of the estate amounting to P2.5 Million, the latter amount must be divided equally
among the three, amounting to P833,333.33 each. The other testamentary dispositions to
Veneranda and his parents, may not be given effect, as there is nothing left of the estate to
distribute.
Note: If the farmland and the P3 Million savings were acquired during the cohabitation of
Pedro and Veneranda, these are owned in common by both of them (Article 147, Family
Code). One-half of the Ph5 Million belongs to Veranda as her share in the co-ownership.
Question No. 9
Danny and Elsa were married in 2002. In 2012, Elsa left the conjugal home and her two
minor children with Danny to live with her paramour. In 2015, Danny sold without Elsa's
consent a parcel of land registered in his name that he had purchased prior to the
marriage. Danny used the proceeds of the sale to pay for his children's tuition fees.
Is the sale valid, void or voidable? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale of the parcel of land is void.
There is no indication in the facts that Danny and Elsa executed a marriage
settlement prior to their marriage. Since the marriage of Danny and Elsa was celebrated
during the effectivity of the Family Code absent a marriage settlement, their property
regime is absolute community of property (Article 75, FC).
Under the regime of absolute community, the parcel of land belongs to the
community property as the property he had brought into the marriage even if said
property was registered in the name of Danny (Article 91, FC). In addition, said property
do not fall under any of the exceptions under Article 92. Therefore, the sale of the
property is void, because it was executed without the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse (Article 96, 100, FC). (2017 Bar Examinations University of
the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers In Civil Law)

The sale of the parcel of land is void.
Under Article 75 of the Family Code, in the absence of a marriage settlement, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in
this Code shall govern. Furthermore, Article 96 of the Family Code, In the absence of written
authority or consent of the other spouse, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
In the instant case, there is no indication in the facts that Danny and Elsa executed a
marriage settlement prior to their marriage. Since the marriage of Danny and Elsa was celebrated
during the effectivity of the Family Code absent a marriage settlement, their property regime is
absolute community of property. Under the regime of absolute community, the parcel of land
belongs to the community property as the property he had brought into the marriage even if said
property was registered in the name of Danny. In addition, said property do not fall under any of
the exceptions under Article 92. Therefore, the sale of the property is void, because it was
executed without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
Hence, the sale of the parcel of land is void.
Question No. 10
Briefly explain whether the following contracts are valid, rescissible, unenforceable, or
void:
(a) A contract of sale between Lana and Andy wherein 16-year old Lana agreed to
sell her grand piano for ₱5,000.00. (2%)
(b) A contract of lease of the Philippine Sea entered by and between Mitoy and Elsa.
(2%)
(c) A barter of toys executed by 12-year old Clarence and 10-year old Czar (2%)
(d) A sale entered by Barri and Garri, both minors, which their parents later ratified.
(2%)
(e) Jenny's sale of her car to Celestine in order to evade attachment by Jenny's
creditors. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The contract is voidable because Andy, being a minor, is incapable of giving
consent to a contract. Hence, the contract is voidable. [Basis: Articles 1390(1)
and 1327, Civil Code] (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law
(b) The contract of sale is void because its object, the Philippine Sea is outside the
commerce of men. [Basis: Articles 1409(1) and 1347, Civil Code] (2017 Bar
Civil Law)
Alternative Answer: The contract of sale is void as it is prohibited by a treaty,

which is considered binding law in the Philippines. Under Article 137 of the
UNCLOS, the Philippine Sea is governed by the following mandates, among
others: “No State or natural or juridical person shall appropriate any part thereof.”
(c) The contract is unenforceable because both parties, being minors are incapable
of giving consent. [Basis: Articles 1403(3) and 1327, Civil Code] (2017 Bar
Civil Law)
(d) The contract is valid and may not be annulled by either party due to the
ratification of the parents, as guardians of Barri and Garri, if done while both were
still minors. Ratification extinguishes the action to annul a voidable or
unenforceable contract. [Basis: Article 1407, Civil Code] (2017 Bar
Civil Law)
(e) The contract is rescissible because it is in fraud of creditors. [Basis: Article 1381
(3), Civil Code] (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center

(f)
The contract is voidable.

Under Article 1390(1) of the Civil Code, contracts where one of the parties is incapable
of giving consent to a contract are voidable. Moreover, Article 1327(1) of the Civil Code
provides that unemancipated minors cannot give consent.
In the instant case, Andy, being a minor, is incapable of giving consent to a contract.
Hence, the contract is voidable or annullable.
(g)
The contract of sale is void.

Under Article 1409(1) of the Civil Code, contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from
the beginning. Moreover, Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides that all things which are not
outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights
which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
In the instant case, Philippine Sea is object of the contract. The Philippine Sea is outside
the commerce of men.
Therefore, pursuant to Article 1409(1), the contract of sale is void.
Alternative Answer: The contract of sale is void as it is prohibited by a treaty, which is

considered binding law in the Philippines. Under Article 137 of the UNCLOS, the
Philippine Sea is governed by the following mandates, among others: “No State or
natural or juridical person shall appropriate any part thereof.”
(h)
The contract is unenforceable.

Under Article 1403(3) of the Civil Code, contracts where both parties are incapable of
giving consent to a contract are unenforceable, unless ratified. Moreover, Article 1327 of the
Civil Code provides Article 1327(1) of the Civil Code provides that unemancipated minors
cannot give consent.
In the instant case, both parties are minors. Pursuant to law, they are incapable of giving
consent.
Hence, the contract is unenforceable.
(i)
The contract is valid and may not be annulled by either party due to the ratification of the
parents, as guardians of Barri and Garri, if done while both were still minors.
Under Article 1407 of the Civil Code, in a contract where both parties are incapable of
giving consent, express or implied ratification by the parent, or guardian, as the case may be, of
one of the contracting parties shall give the contract the same effect as if only one of them were
incapacitated. If ratification is made by the parents or guardians, as the case may be, of both
contracting parties, the contract shall be validated from the inception.
In the instant case, a sale entered by Barri and Garri, both minors, which their parents
later ratified. Although the contract is entered by minors, their parents ratified it. Ratification
extinguishes the action to annul a voidable or unenforceable contract.
Hence, the contract is valid.
(j)
The contract is rescissible.

Under Article 1381(3) of the Civil Code, contracts undertaken in fraud of creditors when
the latter cannot in any other manner collect the claims due them are rescissible.
In the instant case, Jenny's sale of her car to Celestine in order to evade attachment by
Jenny's creditors. Clearly, Jenny intended to defraud her creditors in selling her car.
Hence, the contract is rescissible.
Question No. 11
Zeny and Nolan were best friends for a long time already. Zeny borrowed ₱10,000.00
from Nolan, evidenced by a promissory note whereby Zeny promised to pay the loan
"once his means permit." Two months later, they had a quarrel that broke their long-
standing friendship.
Nolan seeks your advice on how to collect from Zeny despite the tenor of the
promissory note. What will your advice be? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The remedy of Nolan is to go to the court and ask that a period be fixed for the
payment of the debt.
Article 1180 of the New Civil Code provides when the debtor binds himself when
his means permit to do so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period.
Article 1197 provides that the Court may fix a period if such was intended from the
nature of the obligation and may also fix the duration of the period when such depends
on the will of the debtor. (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law

The remedy of Nolan is to go to the court and ask that a period be fixed for the payment
of the debt.
Article 1180 of the New Civil Code provides when the debtor binds himself when his
means permit to do so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period. Article 1197
provides that the Court may fix a period if such was intended from the nature of the obligation
and may also fix the duration of the period when such depends on the will of the debtor.
In the instant case, there is a stipulation in the promissory note whereby Zeny promised to
pay the loan once his means permit. Pursuant to Article 1180, such shall be considered as an
obligation with a period. The Court may fix the period.
Hence, the remedy of Nolan is to pray for the Court to fix the period for the payment of
the debt.
Question No. 12
Krystal owns a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 12345 in Angeles City. Due to severe
financial constraints, Krystal was forced to sell the property to RBP Corporation, a
foreign corporation based in South Korea. Subsequently, RBP Corporation sold the
property to Gloria, one of its most valued clients.
Wanting her property back, Krystal, learning of the transfer of the property from RBP
Corporation to Gloria, sued both of them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
annulment of sale and for reconveyance. She alleged that the sale by RBP Corporation
to Gloria was void because RBP Corporation was a foreign corporation prohibited by
the Constitution from acquiring and owning lands in the Philippines.
Will Krystal's suit for annulment of sale and reconveyance prosper? Explain your
answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Krystal’s suit will not prosper.
While the Constitution prohibits an alien from acquiring or holding title to private
lands or to lands of the public domain in the Philippines, except only by way of
hereditary succession, the Supreme Court in Borromero vs. Descallar (GR No. 159310,
February 24, 2009) reiterated the consistent ruling that if land is invalidly transferred to
an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the
flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid.
In the case at bar, RBP being a foreign corporation is prohibited from acquiring
private land, making the sale of Krystal to RBP void ab initio. However, the subsequent
transfer to a Filipino citizen cured the defect, making Gloria’s title valid and defeating
Krystal’s action for annulment and reconveyance. (2017 Bar Examinations University of
the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers In Civil Law)

No, Krystal’s suit will not prosper.
While the Constitution prohibits an alien from acquiring or holding title to private lands
or to lands of the public domain in the Philippines, except only by way of hereditary succession,
the Supreme Court in Borromero vs. Descallar (GR No. 159310, February 24, 2009) reiterated
the consistent ruling that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.
In the case at bar, RBP being a foreign corporation is prohibited from acquiring private
land, making the sale of Krystal to RBP void ab initio. However, the subsequent transfer to a
Filipino citizen cured the defect, making Gloria’s title valid and defeating Krystal’s action for
annulment and reconveyance.
Hence, the suit has no merit.
Question No. 13
TRUE or FALSE - Explain your answers.
(a) All rights are considered as property. (2%)
(b) A lessee cannot bring a case for quieting of title respecting the property that he
leases. (2%)
(c) Only the city or municipal mayor can file a civil action to abate a public nuisance.
(2%)
(d) Possession of a movable property is lost when the location of the said movable is
unknown to the owner. (2%)
(e) Continuous non-apparent easements can be acquired either through title or by
prescription. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) False. Only right which are patrimonial in character can be considered property.
Rights which are not patrimonial such as the right to liberty, the right to honor,
family rights, and political rights cannot be considered as property. [Basis: II
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1992 ed., pp. 4-5] (2017 Bar
Civil Law)
(b) True. The plaintiff must have a legal or equitable title to the real property in
question or some interest therein. [Basis: Article 476-477, Civil Code]. (2017 Bar
Civil Law)
(c) False. Article 703 of the New Civil Code provides that a private person may file
an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is especially injurious to himself.
Thus, a private person may file a civil action to abate a public nuisance that is
especially injurious to him. (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines
Law Center Suggested Answers In Civil Law)
(d) False. Article 556 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of movables is
not deemed lost so long as they remain under the control of the possessor, even
though for the time being he may not know their whereabouts. Possession of a
movable, therefore is lost only when possessor losses control over it. (2017 Bar
Civil Law)
(e) False. Article 620 of the Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent
easement are acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years.
Continuous non-apparent easements and discontinuous ones, whether apparent
or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title (Article 622, NCC). An easement
must be both continuous and apparent in order to be subject to acquisition by
prescription. (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center
Question No. 14
Plutarco owned land that borders on a river. After several years, the action of the water
of the river caused the deposit of soil and increased the area of Plutarco's property by
200 square meters.
(a) If Plutarco wants to own the increase in area, what will be his legal basis for
doing so? Explain your answer. (2%)
(b) On the other hand, if the river dries up, may Plutarco validly claim a right of
ownership of the dried-up river bed? Explain your answer. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Plutarco’s legal basis for owning the increase in area would be by accretion
under Article 457 of the New Civil Code, which says the accretion of soil which is
gradually received from the effects of the current of the waters shall belong to the
owner of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers.
In order for the riparian owner to own the alluvion deposited through the said
process of accretion, the following requisites must be present:
1. That the deposit of soil be gradual and imperceptible;
2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the waters and not
artificial or man-made; and
3. That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
the rivers. All foregoing requirements are present in this case.
In this case, all three requirements above are present. Hence, Plutarco acquires
ownership over the increased area by virtue of accretion. (2017 Bar
Civil Law)
(b) No. Rivers and their natural beds, being part of public dominion (Article 502 (1),
Civil Code) are not subject to appropriation, prescription or accretion. Thus, the
dried-up river bed continues to belong to the State as its property of public
dominion and Plutarco cannot validly claim a right of ownership over it. [Republic
v. Santos, GR No. 160453, November 12, 2012] (2017 Bar Examinations

(c)
Plutarco’s legal basis for owning the increase in area would be by accretion under Article
457 of the New Civil Code, which says the accretion of soil which is gradually received from the
effects of the current of the waters shall belong to the owner of the lands adjoining the banks of
rivers.
In order for the riparian owner to own the alluvion deposited through the said process of
accretion, the following requisites must be present:
4. That the deposit of soil be gradual and imperceptible;
5. That it be made through the effects of the current of the waters and not artificial or
man-made; and
6. That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers. All
foregoing requirements are present in this case.
In this case, all three requirements above are present.
Hence, Plutarco acquires ownership over the increased area by virtue of accretion.
(b)
No, Plutarco may not validly claim a right of ownership of the dried-up river bed.
Under Article 502(1) of the Civil Code, rivers and their natural beds, being part of public
dominion are not subject to appropriation, prescription or accretion. [Republic v. Santos, GR No.
160453, November 12, 2012]
In the instant case, the dried-up river bed continues to belong to the State as its property
of public dominion and Plutarco cannot validly claim a right of ownership over it.
Hence, Plutarco has no right of ownership over the dried-up river bed.
Question No. 15
Kevin signed a loan agreement with ABC Bank. To secure payment, Kevin requested
his girlfriend Rosella to execute a document entitled "Continuing Guaranty Agreement"
whereby she expressly agreed to be solidarily liable for the obligation of Kevin.
Can ABC Bank proceed directly against Rosella upon Kevin's default even without
proceeding against Kevin first? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, ABC Bank may proceed directly against Rosella upon Kevin’s default even
without proceeding against Kevin.
Despite the designation of the contract as a “continuing guaranty”, the terms of
the document prevail. In this case, Rosella expressly agreed to be solidarily liable for
the obligation of Kevin. Under Article 2047 (Par. 2) of the New Civil Code, if a person
binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the contract is called suretyship. A
surety is under a direct and primary obligation to the creditor and may be proceeded
against in case the principal debtor does not pay as he is an insurer of the debt. Only a
guarantor, an insurer of the principal debtor’s solvency enjoys the benefit of excussion.
(2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center Suggested Answers
In Civil Law)

Yes, ABC Bank may proceed directly against Rosella upon Kevin’s default even without
proceeding against Kevin.
Despite the designation of the contract as a “continuing guaranty”, the terms of the
document prevail. In this case, Rosella expressly agreed to be solidarily liable for the obligation
of Kevin. Under Article 2047 (Par. 2) of the New Civil Code, if a person binds himself solidarily
with the principal debtor, the contract is called suretyship. A surety is under a direct and primary
obligation to the creditor and may be proceeded against in case the principal debtor does not pay
as he is an insurer of the debt. Only a guarantor, an insurer of the principal debtor’s solvency
enjoys the benefit of excussion.
In the instant case, although the contract is entitled “Continuing Guaranty Agreement”,
there is a stipulation whereby Rosella agreed to be solidarily liable for the obligation of Kevin.
Pursuant to law, such contract is deemed a suretyship. A surety’s liability is direct and primary to
the creditor.
Hence, ABC Bank can proceed directly against Rosella.
Question No. 16
Jovencio operated a school bus to ferry his two sons and five of their schoolmates from
their houses to their school, and back. The parents of the five schoolmates paid for the
service. One morning, Porfirio, the driver, took a short cut on the way to school because
he was running late, and drove across an unmanned railway crossing. At the time,
Porfirio was wearing earphones because he loved to hear loud music while driving. As
he crossed the railway tracks, a speeding PNR train loudly blared its horn to warn
Porfirio, but the latter did not hear the horn because of the loud music. The train
inevitably rammed into the school bus. The strong impact of the collision between the
school bus and the train resulted in the instant death of one of the classmates of
Jovencio's younger son.
The parents of the fatality sued Jovencio for damages based on culpa
contractual alleging that Jovencio was a common carrier; Porfirio for being negligent;
and the PNR for damages based on culpa aquiliana.
Jovencio denied being a common carrier. He insisted that he had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in supervising Porfirio, claiming that the latter had
had no history of negligence or recklessness before the fatal accident.
(a) Did his operation of the school bus service for a limited clientele render Jovencio
a common carrier? Explain your answer. (3%)
(b) In accordance with your answer to the preceding question, state the degree of
diligence to be observed by Jovencio, and the consequences thereof. Explain
your answer. (3%)
(c) Assuming that the fatality was a minor of only 15 years of age who had no
earning capacity at the time of his death because he was still a student in high
school, and the trial court is minded to award indemnity, what may possibly be
the legal and factual justifications for the award of loss of earning capacity?
Explain your answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Yes. Jovencio is a common carrier. The true test for a common carrier is not the
quantity or extent of the business actually transacted, or the number and
character of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether the undertaking is
part of the activity engaged in by the carries that he has held out to the general
public as his business or occupation [Spouses Perena vs. Spouses Zarate, GR
No. 157917, August 29, 2012].
In this case, Jovencio operated the school bus as a business and not just as a
casual occupation; he undertook to carry the students in established routes to
and from the school; and he transported students for a fee. With all the foregoing
reasons, Jovencio is deemed a common carrier despite having limited clientele.
(b) Being a common carrier, Jovencio is required to observe extraordinary diligence

over the goods and safety of its passengers, according to the circumstances of
each case. In addition, a common carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have
acted negligently in case of the loss of the effects of passengers, or the death or
injuries to passengers.
In this case, Jovencio is liable for the death of the student because, acting as a
common carrier, he is already presumed to be negligent at the time of the
accident because death had occurred to the passenger. Here, Jovencio failed to
fend off liability because he failed to prove that he observed extraordinary
diligence in ensuring the safety of the passengers. [Basis: Perena v. Zarate, 679
SCRA 208 (2012)] (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law
(c) If it can be shown that the deceased student was enrolled in a reputable
institution and was able-bodied prior to his death, the basis for the computation of
loss of earning capacity should be the prevailing minimum wage in effect at the
time of his death. The computation of the victim’s life expectancy rate should not
be reckoned from his age of 15 years at the time of his death, but on 21 years,
his age when he would have graduated from college and would have begun to
work.
[Basis: Perena v. Zarate, GR No. 157917, August 29, 2012, where the Court also
justified the indemnification of the victim’s loss of earning capacity despite him
having been unemployed because compensation of this nature is awarded not
for loss of time or earnings but for loss of the deceased’s power or ability to earn
money] (2017 Bar Examinations University of the Philippines Law Center

(d)
Yes, Jovencio is a common carrier.

The true test for a common carrier is not the quantity or extent of the business actually
transacted, or the number and character of the conveyances used in the activity, but whether the
undertaking is part of the activity engaged in by the carries that he has held out to the general
public as his business or occupation [Spouses Perena vs. Spouses Zarate, GR No. 157917,
August 29, 2012].
In this case, Jovencio operated the school bus as a business and not just as a casual
occupation; he undertook to carry the students in established routes to and from the school; and
he transported students for a fee.
With all the foregoing reasons, Jovencio is deemed a common carrier despite having
limited clientele.
(e)
Being a common carrier, Jovencio is required to observe extraordinary diligence over the
goods and safety of its passengers, according to the circumstances of each case. In addition, a
common carrier is presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in case of the loss of the
effects of passengers, or the death or injuries to passengers.
In this case, Jovencio is liable for the death of the student because, acting as a common
carrier, he is already presumed to be negligent at the time of the accident because death had
occurred to the passenger. Here, Jovencio failed to fend off liability because he failed to prove
that he observed extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the passengers. [Basis: Perena
v. Zarate, 679 SCRA 208 (2012)]
(f)
If it can be shown that the deceased student was enrolled in a reputable institution and
was able-bodied prior to his death, the basis for the computation of loss of earning capacity
should be the prevailing minimum wage in effect at the time of his death. The computation of the
victim’s life expectancy rate should not be reckoned from his age of 15 years at the time of his
death, but on 21 years, his age when he would have graduated from college and would have
begun to work. [Basis: Perena v. Zarate, GR No. 157917, August 29, 2012, where the Court also
justified the indemnification of the victim’s loss of earning capacity despite him having been
unemployed because compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of time or earnings but
for loss of the deceased’s power or ability to earn money]
CIVIL LAW BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS 2018
I
Sidley and Sol were married with one (1) daughter, Solenn. Sedfrey and Sonia were
another couple with one son, Sonny. Sol and Sedfrey both perished in the same plane
accident. Sidley and Sonia met when the families of those who died sued the airlines
and went through grief-counseling sessions. Years later, Sidley and Sonia got married.
At that time, Solenn was four (4) years old and Sonny was five (5) years old. These two
(2) were then brought up in the same household. Fifteen (15) years later, Solenn and
Sonny developed romantic feelings towards each other, and eventually eloped. On their
own and against their parents' wishes, they procured a marriage license and got
married in church.
(a) Is the marriage of Solenn and Sonny valid, voidable, or void? (2.5%)
(b) If the marriage is defective, can the marriage be ratified by free cohabitation of the
parties? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Marriage is voidable on the ground of lack of parental consent on both
sides, both being at least 18 years of age but below 21 at the time of the
marriage. Marriage between step brother and step sister is no longer prohibited
under the Family Code. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
Defect can be ratified when the party, upon reaching the age of 21, freely
cohabits with the other. Both parties must ratify the defect. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya,
2018)

(a)
The marriage is voidable.
Under Article 45(1) of the Civil Code, a marriage may be annulled for the
following cause: that the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled
was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute
parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-
one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and
wife.
In the instant case, Solenn was merely 19 years old and Sonny was merely 20
years old at the time they got married. Since they eloped, they failed to obtain the consent
of their parents, Sidley and Sonia, when they procured a marriage license.
Hence, applying Article 45(1), the marriage is voidable.
(b)
The marriage can be ratified by free cohabitation of the parties.
Under Article 45(1) of the Family Code, after attaining the age of twenty-one,
such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife, it
cures the defect.
Hence, defect can be ratified when the party, upon reaching the age of 21, freely
cohabits with the other. Both parties must ratify the defect.
II
After finding out that his girlfriend Sandy was four (4) months pregnant, Sancho married
Sandy. Both were single and had never been in any serious relationship in the past.
Prior to the marriage, they agreed in a marriage settlement that the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains shall govern their property relations during marriage. Shortly after
the marriage, their daughter, Shalimar, was born.
Before they met and got married, Sancho purchased a parcel of land on installment,
under a Contract of Sale, with the full purchase price payable in equal annual
amortizations over a period of ten (10) years, with no down payment, and secured by a
mortgage on the land. The full purchase price was PhP1 million, with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum. After paying the fourth (4th) annual installment, Sancho and Sandy
got married, and Sancho completed the payments in the subsequent years from his
salary as an accountant. The previous payments were also paid out of his salary.
During their marriage, Sandy also won PhP1 million in the lottery and used it to
purchase jewelry. When things didn't work out for the couple, they filed an action for
declaration of nullity of their marriage based on the psychological incapacity of both of
them. When the petition was granted, the parcel of land and the jewelry bought by
Sandy were found to be the only properties of the couple.
(a) What is the filiation status of Shalimar? (2.5%)
(b) What system of property relationship will be liquidated following the declaration of
nullity of their marriage? (2.5%)
(c) In the liquidation, who should get the parcel of land? The jewelry? (2.5%)
(d) Is Shalimar entitled to payment of presumptive legitime? If yes, how much should be
her share and from where should this be taken? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Legitimate. Children of void marriages under Article 36 are declared to be
legitimate [Art. 54, FC]. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
The property regime provided for in Art. 147. A void marriage under Article 36 is
governed by the property regime in Art. 147. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(c)
Since the problem did not say that Sandy is working, it may be presumed that
she is simply a house wife. Nonetheless, under Art. 147, she is deemed to have jointly
contributed to the acquisition of the parcel of land even if her efforts consist mainly of
maintenance of the household and taking care of the family. The parcel of land is
considered acquired during the cohabitation because the payment of the purchase price
was completed only during the cohabitation. They shall share equally the said property.
The jewelry is also deemed to have been acquired through the joint efforts
of the parties, hence co-owned by them, even if the money used to purchase the
same came from Sandy's lottery winnings because the money she used to
purchase the lotto ticket came from Sancho. (If Sandy becomes co-owner of the
land even if her effort is simply maintenance of the household or taking care of
the family, Sancho must likewise be considered a co-owner of the lottery
winnings purchased using Sancho's salary.) (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(d)
No, because Article 147 did not provide for the obligation to pay the presumptive
legitime of common children. Articles 50 and 51, where such obligation is provided, do
not apply to a void marriage under Article 36 of the FC. Articles 50 and 51 are
applicable only to a void marriage under Article 40 [Dino v. Dino (2011); Valdez v. RTC,
Br. 102, QC (1996)]. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

(a)
Shalimar is legitimate.
Under Article 54 of the Family Code, children conceived or born before the
judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become
final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the
subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
In the instant case, Shalimar was born after Sancho and Sandy got married and
before they filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Pursuant to Article 54, Shalimar is considered a legitimate child of Sancho
and Sandy.
Therefore, the filiation status of Shalimar is legitimate.
(b)
The system of property regime of unions without marriage under Article 147 of
the Family Code shall be liquidated following the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage of Sancho and Sandy.
Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be
owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The instant case is an example of a void marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code since both the actions filed by Sancho and Sandy is grounded on psychological
incapacity. The abovementioned rule covers void marriages. Hence, Sancho and Sandy’s
wages and salaries, and properties acquired by both of them shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
Hence, the system of property regime of unions without marriage under Article
147 shall be govern the instant case.
(c)
Both the parcel of land and the jewelry shall be co-owned by Sancho and Sandy.
Under Article 147 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by
the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.
Since the problem did not say that Sandy is working, it may be presumed that she
is simply a house wife. Nonetheless, under Art. 147, she is deemed to have jointly
contributed to the acquisition of the parcel of land even if her efforts consist mainly of
maintenance of the household and taking care of the family. The parcel of land is
considered acquired during the cohabitation because the payment of the purchase price
was completed only during the cohabitation. They shall share equally the said property.
The jewelry is also deemed to have been acquired through the joint efforts of the
parties, hence co-owned by them, even if the money used to purchase the same came
from Sandy's lottery winnings because the money she used to purchase the lotto ticket
came from Sancho. (If Sandy becomes co-owner of the land even if her effort is simply
maintenance of the household or taking care of the family, Sancho must likewise be
considered a co-owner of the lottery winnings purchased using Sancho's salary.)
Hence, in the liquidation, both Sancho and Sandy shall share the parcel of land
and the jewelry.
(d)
No, Shalimar is not entitled to the payment of presumptive legitime.
Article 147 of the Family Code did not provide for the obligation to pay the
presumptive legitime of common children. Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code, where
such obligation is provided, do not apply to a void marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Articles 50 and 51 are applicable only to a void marriage under Article 40
of the Family Code. [Dino v. Dino (2011); Valdez v. RTC, Br. 102, QC (1996)]
In the instant case, the petition which the court granted is based on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Pursuant to the rule above, it is outside
the purview of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Hence, Shalimar is not entitled to the payment of presumptive legitime.
Ill
Silverio was a woman trapped in a man's body. He was born male and his birth
certificate indicated his gender as male, and his name as Silverio Stalon. When he
reached the age of 21, he had a sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, and, from then
on, he lived as a female. On the basis of his sex reassignment, he filed an action to
have his first name changed to Shelley, and his gender, to female. While he was
following up his case with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, he met Sharon Stan, who
also filed a similar action to change her first name to Shariff, and her gender, from
female to male.
Sharon was registered as a female upon birth. While growing up, she developed male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have congenital adrenal hyperplasia ("CAH")
which is a condition where a person possesses both male and female characteristics. At
puberty, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had greatly minimized, and she had
no breast or menstrual development. Alleging that for all intents and appearances, as
well as mind and emotion, she had become a male, she prayed that her birth certificate
be corrected such that her gender should be changed from female to male, and that her
first name should be changed from Sharon to Shariff.
Silverio and Sharon fell in love and decided to marry. Realizing that their marriage will
be frowned upon in the Philippines, they travelled to Las Vegas, USA where they got
married based on the law of the place of celebration of the marriage. They, however,
kept their Philippine citizenship.
(a) Is there any legal bases for the court to approve Silverio's petition for correction of
entries in his birth certificate? (2.5%)
(b) Will your answer be the same in the case of Sharon's petition? (2.5%)
(c) Can the marriage of Silverio (Shelley) and Sharon (Shariff) be legally recognized as
valid in the Philippines? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
No, because we do not have any law recognizing the legal effects of sex
reassignment surgery. Instead, the sex of a Filipino citizen is determined at the
time of birth by the birth attendant through a mere visual examination of the
genitals of the infant. Such determination made by the birth attendant is
immutable and may not be changed by reason of sex reassignment surgery.
[Silverio v. Republic, 537 SCRA 373 (2007)] (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
No, because if the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age
of majority and not suffering from any incompetency, thinks of his or her sex. Under said
condition, the court cannot dictate on the individual concerning a matter so innately
private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences. [Republic v. Cagandahan, 565
SCRA 72 (2008)] (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(c)
No, because the validity of the marriage should be governed by the national law
of the concerned parties since the same affects the status, condition, legal capacity and
family rights and duties [Article 15, NCC]. Being both Filipinos, it is the law of the
Philippines that will apply to them and not the law of the place of the celebration of the
marriage. Applying our laws, what took place abroad between Silverio and Sharon, who
are both male, cannot be considered a marriage because the Family Code defined
“marriage” as “a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
[Article 1, FC].” Hence, a same-sex marriage, from the point of Philippine law, is not a
marriage. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

(a)
No, there is no legal basis for the court to approve Silverio’s petition for
correction of entries in his birth certificate.
In Silverio v. Republic, 537 SCRA 373 (2007), the Supreme Court ruled that
Philippines does not have any law recognizing the legal effects of sex reassignment
surgery. Instead, the sex of a Filipino citizen is determined at the time of birth by the
birth attendant through a mere visual examination of the genitals of the infant. Such
determination made by the birth attendant is immutable and may not be changed by
reason of sex reassignment surgery.
In the instant case, Silverio Stalon is born male. His birth certificate shows that he
is male. Pursuant to the rule above, such determination that Silverio is a male is
immutable and may not be changed by reason of sex reassignment.
Hence, Silverio’s petition for the correction of entry in his birth certificate has no
legal basis.
(b)
No, my answer will not be the same.
In Republic v. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72 (2008), the Supreme Court ruled that if
the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority and not
suffering from any incompetency, thinks of his or her sex. Under said condition, the court
cannot dictate on the individual concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality
and lifestyle preferences.
In the instant case, Sharon was female by birth. However, while growing up she
developed male characteristics and was diagnosed to have congenital adrenal hyperplasia
("CAH") which is a condition where a person possesses both male and female
characteristics. Such condition of Sharon made her or him biologically intersex. Pursuant
to the rule above, Sharon is free to chose what his or her sex upon reaching the age of
majority.
Hence, there is legal basis for the correction of entry in the birth certificate of
Sharon.
(c)
No, the marriage of Silverio and Sharon cannot be legally recognized as valid in
the Philippines.
Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, laws relating to family rights and duties, or to
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. Article 1 of the Family Code provides that
marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
In the instant case, since Silverio and Sharon are Filipinos, it is the law of the
Philippines that will apply to them and not the law of the place of the celebration of the
marriage. Applying Philippine law, what took place abroad between Silverio and Sharon,
who are both male, cannot be considered a marriage because the Family Code defined
“marriage” as “a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.”
Hence, a same-sex marriage, from the point of Philippine law, is not a marriage.
IV
Severino died intestate, survived by his wife Saturnina, and legitimate children Soler,
Sulpicio, Segundo and the twins Sandro and Sandra. At the time of his death, the twins
were only 11 years of age, while all the older children were of age. He left only one
property: a 5,000 sq. m. parcel of land. After his death, the older siblings Soler, Sulpicio,
and Segundo sold the land to Dr. Santos for PhP500,000 with a right to repurchase, at
the same price, within five (5) years from the date of the sale. The deed of sale was
signed only by the three (3) older siblings, and covered the entire property. Before the
five (5) years expired, Sole and Sulpicio tendered their respective shares of
PhP166,666 each to redeem the property. Since Segundo did not have the means
because he was still unemployed, Saturnina paid the remaining PhP166,666 to redeem
the property. After the property was redeemed from Dr. Santos, the three (3) older
children and Saturnina, for herself and on behalf of the twins who were still minors, sold
the property to Dr. Sazon, in an absolute sale, for PhP1 million. In representing the
twins, Saturnina relied on the fact that she was the natural guardian of her minor
children.
(a) Was the first sale to Dr. Santos, and the subsequent repurchase, valid? (2.5%)
(b) Was the second sale to Dr. Sazon valid? May the twins redeem their share after
they reach the age of majority? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Sale is valid. In co-ownership, if some of the co-owners sold the entire property
without the consent of the other co-owners the sale is not void but treated only as a sale
of the ideal shares of the selling co-owners, but without affecting the ideal shares of the
other co-owners who did not give their consent. Since the sale is valid, the agreement
for the repurchase of the entire property and its subsequent repurchase are also valid.
(Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
Sale is valid with respect to the shares of Saturnina and the three older children,
who all gave their consent to the sale of the entire property, but unenforceable with
respect to the shares of the minors. Saturnina, as the natural guardian of the minors,
does not have the power to dispose of the property of the latter because such power
belongs only to a judicial guardian and the disposition requires court approval. Any
disposition or encumbrance of the property of the minor without judicial authority, unless
ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable [Neri v. Heirs of
Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy, 683 SCRA 553 (2012)] Hence, there is no need
on the part of the twins to redeem their shares upon reaching the age of majority
because the sale of their shares is not binding upon them. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya,
2018)

(a)
The first sale to Dr. Santos is valid.
In co-ownership, if some of the co-owners sold the entire property without the
consent of the other co-owners the sale is not void but treated only as a sale of the ideal
shares of the selling co-owners, but without affecting the ideal shares of the other co-
owners who did not give their consent.
In the instant case, Severino died intestate. His heirs become co-owners of the
parcel of land. Pursuant to the rule above, the sale of the parcel of land to Dr. Santos is
not void. Since the sale is valid, the agreement for the repurchase of the entire property
and its subsequent repurchase are also valid.
Hence, the sale is valid.
(b)
Sale is valid with respect to the shares of Saturnina and the three older children,
who all gave their consent to the sale of the entire property, but unenforceable with
respect to the shares of the minors.
The natural guardian of the minors does not have the power to dispose of the
property of the latter because such power belongs only to a judicial guardian and the
disposition requires court approval. Any disposition or encumbrance of the property of
the minor without judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of
majority, is unenforceable [Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy, 683
SCRA 553 (2012)]
In the instant case, Saturnina is merely a natural guardian of the minors. This
means that she does not have the power to dispose the property without judicial authority.
The sale is unenforceable with respect to the shares of the minors.
Hence, there is no need on the part of the twins to redeem their shares upon
reaching the age of majority because the sale of their shares is not binding upon them.
V
Sol Soldivino, widow, passed away, leaving two (2) legitimate children: a 25- year old
son, Santino (whom she had not spoken to for five [5] years prior to her death since he
attempted to kill her at that time), and a 20-year-old daughter, Sara. She left an estate
worth PhP8 million and a will containing only one provision: that PhP1 million should be
given to "the priest who officiated at my wedding to my children's late father." Sara,
together with two (2) of her friends, acted as an attesting witness to the will.
On the assumption that the will is admitted for probate and that there are no debts,
divide the estate and indicate the heirs/legatees entitled to inherit, the amount that each
of them will inherit, and where (i.e., legitime/free portion/intestate share) their shares
should be charged. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The disposition of the decedent’s estate shall be governed by the following
principles: (1) there is no preterition even if the compulsory heirs in the direct line
are not mentioned in the will because the entire estate is not disposed of
[Morales v. Olondriz, G.R. No. 198994, February 3, 2016]; (2) Santino does not
become unworthy to inherit although he made an attempt on the life of the
decedent because there was no conviction [Art. 1032(2), NCC]; (3) the priest is
not disqualified to inherit from the decedent because only “priests who heard the
confession of the testator during his last illness” are declared incapable of
succeeding; (4) Sara does not become incapable of succeeding for having acted
as one of the attesting witnesses because she does not inherit by reason of the
testator’s will but by operation of law; and (5) the legacy in favor of the priest is
valid because it is not inofficious. (The foregoing principles are discussed in pp.
974-977 of my Civ. 1 Reviewer)
Since the legacy is not inofficious, the amount of P 1 Million should be
paid to the legatee first (the priest mentioned in the will). After paying the
legacies, the remainder of the estate, in the amount of P7 Million, should be
divided equally between the two legal heirs of the decedent, Santino and Sara,
each getting P 3.5 Million as their share. Of the said, P3.5 Million, P2 Million shall
represent their legitime and the P1.5 Million shall represent their share as legal
heir. On the other hand, the legacy in favor of the priest shall be charged to the
free portion. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
The disposition of the decedent’s estate shall be governed by the following
principles: (1) there is no preterition even if the compulsory heirs in the direct line are not
mentioned in the will because the entire estate is not disposed of [Morales v. Olondriz,
G.R. No. 198994, February 3, 2016]; (2) Santino does not become unworthy to inherit
although he made an attempt on the life of the decedent because there was no conviction
[Art. 1032(2), NCC]; (3) the priest is not disqualified to inherit from the decedent
because only “priests who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness” are
declared incapable of succeeding; (4) Sara does not become incapable of succeeding for
having acted as one of the attesting witnesses because she does not inherit by reason of
the testator’s will but by operation of law; and (5) the legacy in favor of the priest is valid
because it is not inofficious. (The foregoing principles are discussed in pp. 974-977 of my
Civ. 1 Reviewer)
Since the legacy is not inofficious, the amount of P 1 Million should be paid to
the legatee first (the priest mentioned in the will). After paying the legacies, the
remainder of the estate, in the amount of P7 Million, should be divided equally between
the two legal heirs of the decedent, Santino and Sara, each getting P 3.5 Million as their
share. Of the said, P3.5 Million, P2 Million shall represent their legitime and the P1.5
Million shall represent their share as legal heir. On the other hand, the legacy in favor of
the priest shall be charged to the free portion.
VI
Sammy and Santi are cousins who separately inherited two (2) adjoining lots from their
grandfather. Sammy is based overseas but wants to earn income from his inherited
land, so he asked a local contractor to build a row of apartments on his property which
he could rent out. The contractor sent him the plans and Sammy noticed that the
construction encroached on a part of Santi's land but he said nothing and gave approval
to construct based on the plans submitted by the local contractor. Santi, based locally,
and who loved his cousin dearly, did not object even if he knew of the encroachment
since he was privy to the plans and visited the property regularly. Later, the cousins had
a falling out and Santi demanded that the portion of the apartments that encroached on
his land be demolished.
Can Santi successfully file legal action to require the demolition? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because both the landowner (Santi) and the builder (Sammy) acted in
bad faith. The builder acted in bad faith because he knew, at the time of the
construction, that he was not the owner of the encroached area. The landowner
also acted in bad faith because he was aware that someone was building on his
land and yet he did not interpose any objection. Since both acted in bad faith,
they are deemed to have acted in good faith because the bad faith of one will be
cancelled by the bad faith of the other. (Alternative Answer: Sammy is a builder
in good faith under the expanded definition because Santi appears to have
consented to the construction).
Applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, the remedies of the landowner are
the following: (1) to appropriate the building on the encroached area after paying
the indemnity, which is not practicable in this situation; or (2) to compel the
builder to pay the price of the land, if the same is not considerably more than the
value of the building. The option of the landowner is, however, limited to either
option. Hence, he cannot compel the builder to remove the building from the land
without first exercising either option. The landowner is entitled to such remotion
only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the
same. [Torbela v. Rosario, 661 SCRA 633 (2011); Benedicto v. Flores, 632
SCRA 446 (2010)] (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

No, Santi cannot successfully file a legal action to require the demolition.
Under Article 453 of the Civil Code, if there was bad faith, not only on the part of
the person who built, planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the part of the
owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall be the same as though both had
acted in good faith. It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner
whenever the act was done with his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
In the instant case, both Santi, the landowner, and Sammy, the builder, acted in
bad faith. Sammy acted in bad faith because he knew, at the time of the construction, that
he was not the owner of the encroached area. Santi also acted in bad faith because he was
aware that someone was building on his land and yet he did not interpose any objection.
Since both acted in bad faith, they are deemed to have acted in good faith because the bad
faith of one will be cancelled by the bad faith of the other.
Hence, Santi cannot file a legal action to require the demolition.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Sammy is a builder in good faith under the expanded definition because
Santi appears to have consented to the construction.
Applying Article 448 of the Civil Code, the remedies of the landowner are
the following: (1) to appropriate the building on the encroached area after paying
the indemnity, which is not practicable in this situation; or (2) to compel the
builder to pay the price of the land, if the same is not considerably more than the
value of the building. The landowner cannot compel the builder to remove the
building from the land without first exercising either option. The landowner is
entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other
party fails to pay for the same. [Torbela v. Rosario, 661 SCRA 633 (2011);
Benedicto v. Flores, 632 SCRA 446 (2010)]
In the instant case, Santi, as the landowner, is limited to the two options
mentioned above. Hence, he cannot compel the builder to remove the building
from the land without first exercising either option. The landowner is entitled to
such removal only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails
to pay for the same. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
VII
Sydney, during her lifetime, was a successful lawyer. By her own choice, she remained
unmarried and devoted all her time to taking care of her nephew and two (2) nieces:
Socrates, Saffinia, and Sophia. She wrote a will giving all her properties remaining upon
her death to the three (3) of them. The will was admitted to probate during her lifetime.
Later, she decided to make a new will giving all her remaining properties only to the two
(2) girls, Saffinia and Sophia. She then tore up the previously probated will. The second
will was presented for probate only after her death. However, the probate court found
the second will to be void for failure to comply with formal requirements.
(a) Will the doctrine of dependent relative revocation apply? (2.5%)
(b) Will your answer be the same if the second will was found to be valid but both
Saffinia and Sophia renounce their inheritance? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, because the act of destroying the previous will is connected with the making
of the new will raising an inference that the testator meant the revocation of the previous
will dependent upon the efficacy of the new will. This is the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation. Here, the revocation is conditional and dependent upon the efficacy
of the new will. Since the new will in the case at bar turns out to be invalid for failure of
to comply with formal requirements, the previous will is not considered revoked. [III
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 ed., p. 145] (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
No, because when the new will is valid, the revocation shall take effect even if
the new will should become inoperative by reason of incapacity of the heirs, devisees or
legatees designated therein, or by their renunciation [Art. 832, NCC]. Here, the validity
of the new will prevents the operation of the principle of dependent relative revocation,
even if the new dispositions cannot be carried out. [[III Tolentino, Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1990 ed., p. 145] (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(a)
Yes, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation will apply.
The act of destroying the previous will is connected with the making of the new
will raising an inference that the testator meant the revocation of the previous will
dependent upon the efficacy of the new will. This is the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation. Here, the revocation is conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the
new will. Since the new will in the case at bar turns out to be invalid for failure of to
comply with formal requirements, the previous will is not considered revoked. [III
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1990 ed., p. 145]
In the instant case, Sydney made two wills. The first will was probated during her
lifetime. However, she tore it after making the second will. The second will, which was
submitted to probate after her death, was declared void for failure to comply with the
formal requirements. All elements for the application of the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation are present. There are two wills. The first will was destroyed. The new
will turns out to be invalid.
Hence, such doctrine is applicable.
(b)
No, my answer will not be the same if the second will was found to be valid but
both Saffinia and Sophia renounce their inheritance.
Under Article 832 of the Civil Code, a revocation made in a subsequent will shall
take effect, even if the new will should become inoperative by reason of the incapacity of
the heirs, devisees or legatees designated therein, or by their renunciation.
In the instant case, when the new will is valid, the revocation shall take effect
even if the new will should become inoperative by reason of incapacity of the heirs,
devisees or legatees designated therein, or by their renunciation. Here, the validity of the
new will prevents the operation of the principle of dependent relative revocation, even if
the new dispositions cannot be carried out. [[III Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines,
1990 ed., p. 145]
Hence, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is inapplicable.
VIII
Sofronio was a married father of two when he had a brief fling with Sabrina, resulting in
her pregnancy and the birth of their son Sinforoso. Though his wife knew nothing of the
affair, Sofronio regretted it, but secretly provided child support for Sinforoso.
Unfortunately, when Sinforoso was 10 years old, Sofronio died. Only Sofronio's father,
Salumbides, knew of Sabrina and Sinforoso. For the purpose of providing support to
Sinforoso, Salumbides gave Sabrina usufructruary · rights over one of his properties - a
house and lot - to last until Sinforoso reaches the age of majority. Sabrina was given
possession of the property on the basis of caucion juratoria. Two (2) years after the
creation of the usufruct, the house accidentally burned down, and three (3) years
thereafter, Sinforoso died before he could reach the age of 18.
Will the usufruct continue after the house has burned down? If yes, will it continue after
Sinforoso's death? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the usufruct will still continue after the house has burned down. The law
says that when the usufruct is constituted on immovable property of which a building
forms part, and the latter is destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the usufruct is not
extinguished. Here, the usufructuary shall have the right to make use of the land and
the materials. [Article 607, par. 1, NCC]
On the other hand, the usufruct is extinguished upon the death of
Sinforoso. The law provides that when the usufruct is granted for the time that
may elapse before a third person attains a certain age, the usufruct shall subsist
for the number of years specified even if the third person should die before the
period expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only in
consideration of the existence of such person [Art. 606, NCC]. Here, since the
usufruct is constituted only for the purpose of providing support to Sinforoso until
he reaches the age of majority, the same is extinguished upon Sinforoso’s death
even if he dies before reaching the age of majority. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

Yes, the usufruct will still continue after the house has burned down. However,
the usufruct will not continue after Sinforoso’s death.
Under Article 607 Paragraph 1 of the Civil Code, if the usufruct is constituted on
immovable property of which a building forms part, and the latter should be destroyed in
any manner whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land and
the materials. The same rule shall be applied if the usufruct is constituted on a building
only and the same should be destroyed. But in such a case, if the owner should wish to
construct another building, he shall have a right to occupy the land and to make use of the
materials, being obliged to pay to the usufructuary, during the continuance of the
usufruct, the interest upon the sum equivalent to the value of the land and of the
materials. Moreover, Article 606 of the Civil Code provides that a usufruct granted for
the time that may elapse before a third person attains a certain age, shall subsist for the
number of years specified, even if the third person should die before the period expires,
unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only in consideration of the existence of
such person.
In the instant case, Salumbides gave usufructuary rights over one of his properties
to Sabrina over one of his properties to provide support to Sinforoso to last until the latter
reached the age of majority. The law says that when the usufruct is constituted on
immovable property of which a building forms part, and the latter is destroyed in any
manner whatsoever, the usufruct is not extinguished. Here, the Sabrina shall have the
right to make use of the land and the materials. On the other hand, the usufruct is
extinguished upon the death of Sinforoso. The law provides that when the usufruct is
granted for the time that may elapse before a third person attains a certain age, the
usufruct shall subsist for the number of years specified even if the third person should die
before the period expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only in
consideration of the existence of such person. Here, since the usufruct is constituted only
for the purpose of providing support to Sinforoso until he reaches the age of majority, the
same is extinguished upon Sinforoso’s death even if he dies before reaching the age of
majority.
Hence, the usufruct will still continue after the house has burned down. However,
the usufruct will not continue after Sinforoso’s death.
IX
Newlyweds Sam and Sienna had contracted with Sangria Hotel for their wedding
reception. The couple was so unhappy with the service, claiming, among other things,
that there was an unreasonable delay in the service of dinner and that certain items
promised were unavailable. The hotel claims that, while there was a delay in the service
of the meals, the same was occasioned by the sudden increase of guests to 450 from
the guaranteed expected number of 350, as stated in the Banquet and Meeting
Services Contract. In the action for damages for breach of contract instituted by the
couple, they claimed that the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract was a contract of
adhesion since they only provided the number of guests and chose the menu. On the
other hand, the hotel's defense was that the proximate cause of the complainant's injury
was the unexpected increase in their guests, and this was what set the chain of events
that resulted in the alleged inconveniences.
(a) Does the doctrine of proximate cause apply in this case? (2.5%)
(b) Was the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract a contract of adhesion? If yes, is
the contract void? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
No. The doctrine of proximate case is applicable only in actions for quasi-
delict, not in actions for breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing
liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party.
[Calalas v. CA, G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000] Here, since the action filed by
the couple was for breach of contract, the doctrine of proximate cause is
inapplicable. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
No, because a contract of adhesion is a ready-made contract where all the terms
and conditions thereof are prepared by only one side and the only participation of the
other is affixing his signature thereto [Geraldez v. CA, 230 SCRA 320 (1994)]. In the
case at bar, it appears that the contract between the parties is entered into verbally,
hence, the contract cannot be one of adhesion. On the assumption that the contract is
one of adhesion, the same is not void because a contract of adhesion is generally valid,
the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely
[PCI Bank v. CA, 255 SCRA 299]. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

(a)
No, the doctrine of proximate cause will not apply in this case.
The doctrine of proximate case is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions for breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person
where there is no relation between him and another party. [Calalas v. CA, G.R. No.
122039, May 31, 2000]
In the instant case, since the action filed by the couple was for breach of contract
and not for quasi-delict.
Hence, the doctrine of proximate cause is inapplicable.
(b)
No, the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract is not a contract of adhesion.
A contract of adhesion is a ready-made contract where all the terms and
conditions thereof are prepared by only one side and the only participation of the other is
affixing his signature thereto [Geraldez v. CA, 230 SCRA 320 (1994)].
In the case at bar, it appears that the contract between the parties is entered into
verbally, hence, the contract cannot be one of adhesion. On the assumption that the
contract is one of adhesion, the same is not void because a contract of adhesion is
generally valid, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to
reject it entirely [PCI Bank v. CA, 255 SCRA 299].
Hence, the Banquet and Meeting Services Contract is not a contract of adhesion.
X
Sinclair and Steffi had an illicit relationship while Sinclair was married to another. The
relationship produced a daughter Sabina, who grew up with her mother. For most parts
of Sabina's youth, Steffi spent for her support and education. When Sabina was 21
years old, Sinclair's wife of many years died. Sinclair and Steffi lost no time in
legitimizing their relationship. After the 40-day prayers for Sinclair's late wife, Sinclair
and Steffi got married without a marriage license, claiming that they have been
cohabiting for the last 20 years.
After graduating from college, Sabina decided to enroll in law school. Sinclair said that
he was not willing to pay for her school fees since she was no longer a minor. Sinclair
claimed that, if Sabina wanted to be a lawyer, she had to work and spend for her law
education.
(a) What is Sabina's filiation status? (2.5%)
(b) Is Sinclair legally required to finance Sabina's law education? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Sabina is an illegitimate child of Sinclair and Steffi because she was conceived
and born outside of a valid marriage [Art. 165, FC]. She is not considered legitimated
upon the subsequent marriage of her parents because of the following reasons: (1) at
the time of Sabina’s conception, her parents were barred from marrying each other for
reason’s other than the age of the parents; (2) the subsequent marriage of the parents
is void ab initio because such marriage, not being exceptional, is not exempt from the
requirement of a marriage license. In legitimation, it is necessary that at the time of the
child’s conception the parents must not be barred from marrying each other [Art. 177,
FC] and that the subsequent marriage of the parents must not be void ab initio [Arts.
178, FC].
Here, the marriage of the parents of Sabina is not exceptional, therefore
not exempt from the requirement of a marriage license, because they were
barred from marrying each other during the period of their cohabitation. The
falsity of the affidavit of cohabitation is not a mere irregularity in a formal requisite
but a total absence of a formal requisite, which is a valid marriage license
[Republic v. Dayot, 550 SCRA 435 (2008); De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro, 545
SCRA 162 (2008)]. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
Yes, because the obligation of the parents to give support and the corresponding
right of the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate to receive support, do not proceed
from, nor based upon, the exercise of parental authority. Support is simply based on the
relationships enumerated in Articles 195 and 196 of the Family Code and the imperative
necessity for it. Hence, the right of the children to receive support extends even beyond
the age of majority [Art. 194, par. 2, FC]. Likewise, an illegitimate father is obliged to
give support even when parental authority is exercised only by the mother [Arts. 176,
94(1), 121(1) and 195(4), FC] (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

(a)
Sabrina is an illegitimate child of Sinclair and Steffi because she was conceived
and born outside of a valid marriage.
Under Article 165 of the Family Code, children conceived and born outside a
valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.
In the instant case, Sabina is not considered legitimated upon the subsequent
marriage of her parents because of the following reasons: (1) at the time of Sabrina’s
conception, her parents were barred from marrying each other for reason’s other than the
age of the parents; (2) the subsequent marriage of the parents is void ab initio because
such marriage, not being exceptional, is not exempt from the requirement of a marriage
license. In legitimation, it is necessary that at the time of the child’s conception the
parents must not be barred from marrying each other and that the subsequent marriage of
the parents must not be void ab initio.
Here, the marriage of the parents of Sabrina is not exceptional, therefore not
exempt from the requirement of a marriage license, because they were barred from
marrying each other during the period of their cohabitation. The falsity of the affidavit of
cohabitation is not a mere irregularity in a formal requisite but a total absence of a formal
requisite, which is a valid marriage license [Republic v. Dayot, 550 SCRA 435 (2008);
De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro, 545 SCRA 162 (2008)].
Hence, the filiation status of Sabina is illegitimate.
(b)
Yes, Sinclair is legally required to finance Sabina’s law education.
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support
in conformity with this Code. Moreover, Article 94(1) provides that the absolute
community of property shall be liable for the support of the spouses, their common
children, and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate
children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support. Furthermore,
Article 121(1) states that the conjugal partnership shall be liable for the support of the
spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the
support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on
Support. Lastly, Article 195(4) of the Family Code provides that parents and their
illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter are obliged
to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article. Article 194
sets forth that support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade
or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in
going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
In the instant case, the obligation of the parents to give support and the
corresponding right of the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate to receive support,
do not proceed from, nor based upon, the exercise of parental authority. Support is simply
based on the relationships enumerated in Articles 195 and 196 of the Family Code and
the imperative necessity for it. Hence, the right of the children to receive support extends
even beyond the age of majority. Likewise, an illegitimate father is obliged to give
support even when parental authority is exercised only by the mother. Sabina is an
illegitimate child covered by the abovementioned rules. She should be supported by
Sinclair as the parent.
Hence, Sinclair is legally required to provide support for Sabina’s law education.
XI
Samantha sold all her business interest in a sole proprietorship to Sergio for the amount
of PhP1 million. Under the sale agreement, Samantha was supposed to pay for all prior
unpaid utility bills incurred by the sole proprietorship. A month after the Contract to Sell
was executed, Samantha still had not paid the PhP50,000 electricity bills incurred prior
to the sale. Since Sergio could not operate the business without electricity and the utility
company refused to restore electricity services unless the unpaid bills were settled in
full, Sergio had to pay the unpaid electricity bills. When the date for payment arrived,
Sergio only tendered PhP950,000 representing the full purchase price, less the amount
he paid for the unpaid utility bills. Samantha refused to accept the tender on the ground
that she was the one supposed to pay the bills and Sergio did not have authorization to
pay on her behalf.
(a) What is the effect of payment made by Sergio without the knowledge and consent of
Samantha? (2.5%)
(b) Is Samantha guilty of mora accipiendi? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
The payment made by Sergio of Samantha’s unpaid utility bills is a payment
made a third person without the debtor’s consent, hence, Sergio can demand
reimbursement from Samantha up to the extent that such payment has been beneficial
to Samantha [Art. 1236, NCC]. Sergio is a third person not interested in the fulfillment of
the debtor’s obligation because he does not become liable for the payment of the
unpaid utility bills. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
Yes, Samantha is guilty of mora accipiendi. When Sergio paid Samantha’s
unpaid utility bills, he became entitled to demand reimbursement from the latter
because his payment has redounded to the benefit of the debtor. Hence, as to his
demand for reimbursement, Samantha became indebted to Sergio for the amount of
P50,000. As such, legal compensation has taken place with respect to said amount
because all the requisites of legal compensation are present with respect to the amount
of P50,000. Therefore, when Sergio tendered the amount of P950,000 only after
deducting the amount of P50,000, his tender of payment is valid. As a consequence, the
refusal by Samantha to accept said tender of payment, without just cause, results in the
latter being guilty of mora accipiendi. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

(a)
The payment made by Sergio of the electricity bills without the knowledge and
consent of Samantha is a payment by a third person without the debtor’s consent.
Under 1236 of the Civil Code, the creditor is not bound to accept payment or
performance by a third person who has no interest in the fulfillment of the obligation,
unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. Whoever pays for another may demand from
the debtor what he has paid, except that if he paid without the knowledge or against the
will of the debtor, he can recover only insofar as the payment has been beneficial to the
debtor.
In the instant case, the payment made by Sergio of Samantha’s unpaid utility bills
is a payment made to third person without the debtor’s consent, hence, Sergio can
demand reimbursement from Samantha up to the extent that such payment has been
beneficial to Samantha. Sergio is a third person not interested in the fulfillment of the
Samantha’s obligation because he does not become liable for the payment of the unpaid
utility bills.
Hence, Sergio is entitled to reimbursement from Samantha.
(b)
Yes, Samantha is guilty of mora accipiendi.
Mora accipiendi is the delay of the oblige or creditor to accept the delivery of the
thing which is the object of the obligation. It has the following requisites: (1) the
fulfillment requires the act of cooperation on the part of the creditor; (2) that the debtor
has done what is incumbent upon him; and (3) refusal by the creditor.
In the instant case, when Sergio paid Samantha’s unpaid utility bills, he became
entitled to demand reimbursement from the latter because his payment has redounded to
the benefit of the debtor. Hence, as to his demand for reimbursement, Samantha became
indebted to Sergio for the amount of P50,000. As such, legal compensation has taken
place with respect to said amount because all the requisites of legal compensation are
present with respect to the amount of P50,000. Therefore, when Sergio tendered the
amount of P950,000 only after deducting the amount of P50,000, his tender of payment is
valid. As a consequence, the refusal by Samantha to accept said tender of payment,
without just cause, results in the latter being guilty of mora accipiendi.
Hence, Samantha is guilty of mora accipiendi.
XII
Saachi opened a savings bank account with Shanghainese Bank. He made an initial
deposit of PhP100,000. Part of the bank opening forms that he was required to sign
when he opened the account was a Holdout Agreement which provided that, should he
incur any liability or obligation to the bank, the bank shall have the right to immediately
and automatically take over his savings account deposit. After he opened his deposit
account, the Shanghainese Bank discovered a scam wherein the funds in the account
of another depositor in the bank was withdrawn by an impostor. Shanghainese Bank
suspected Saachi to be. the impostor, and filed a criminal case of estafa against him.
While the case was still pending with the Prosecutor's office, the bank took over
Saachi's savings deposit on the basis of the Holdout Agreement.
(a) What kind of contract is created when a depositor opens a deposit account with a
bank? (2.5%)
(b) In this case, did the bank have the right to take over Saachi's bank deposit? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
When a depositor opens a deposit account with a bank, the contract created is
mutuum or simple loan [Art. 1980, NCC]. Thus, there is a debtor-creditor relationship
between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the
creditor. [Consolidated Bank and Trust Co. v. CA, 410 SCRA 563 (2003)] (Atty. Elmer T.
Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
No, because all the requisites of legal compensation are not present. While a
bank deposit is a contract of simple loan and creates a relationship of debtor-creditor
relationship between the bank and its depositor, the bank is not yet a creditor of the
depositor (Saachi) with respect to the bank’s claim arising from the alleged scam
considering the fact that the case is still pending before Prosecutor’s Office and,
therefore, not yet liquidated. Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person
asserting the set-off against the other is not clear nor liquidated; compensation cannot
extend to unliquidated or disputed claim. [Silahis Marketing Corp. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 180 SCRA 21 (1989) and International Corporate Bank, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 163 SCRA 296 (1988)] (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

(a)
The contract created is mutuum or simple loan.
Under Article 1980 of the Civil Code, fixed, savings, and current deposits of
money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning
simple loan. When a depositor opens a deposit account with a bank, the contract created
is mutuum or simple loan. Thus, there is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank
and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. [Consolidated
Bank and Trust Co. v. CA, 410 SCRA 563 (2003)]
Hence, the contract created when a depositor opens a deposit account with a bank.
(b)
No, the bank has no right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit.
While a bank deposit is a contract of simple loan and creates a relationship of
debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor, the bank is not yet a
creditor of the depositor with respect to the bank’s claim arising from the alleged scam
considering the fact that the case is still pending and, therefore, not yet liquidated.
Compensation is not proper where the claim of the person asserting the set-off against the
other is not clear nor liquidated; compensation cannot extend to unliquidated or disputed
claim. [Silahis Marketing Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 180 SCRA 21 (1989)
and International Corporate Bank, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 163 SCRA 296
(1988)]
In the instant case, all the requisites of legal compensation are not present. The
Shanghainese bank is not yet a creditor of Saachi since the claim is not yet liquidated. It
is not yet liquidated since the case is still pending before the Prosecutor’s Office. The rule
above is that compensation cannot extend to unliquidated or disputed claim.
Hence, the bank has no right to take over Saachi’s bank deposit.
XIII
Sonny, Inc. (SI) purchased several heavy machineries from Single Equipment
Philippines, Inc. (SEP) for Php 10 million, payable in 36 monthly installments. A chattel
mortgage was constituted on the same machineries as security for the amount. As
additional security, the President of SI, Stan Smith, mortgaged his house and lot. SI
failed to pay the 16th and succeeding monthly installments. SEP then commenced a
collection suit against SI, and in the course of the proceedings, a writ of attachment was
issued against Si’s properties, including the mortgaged machineries. The attached
properties were subsequently sold at public action, but the proceeds thereof were
insufficient to satisfy the judgment credit.
(a) Can SEP legally recover the deficiency? (2.5%)
(b) Instead of collecting the deficiency, can SEP commence extrajudicial proceedings to
foreclose the mortgage on Stan’s house and lot in order to recover the deficiency?
(2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, because the prohibition against the recovery of the unpaid balance of
the purchase applies only when the remedy chosen by the seller is foreclosure of
the chattel mortgage [Art. 1484, par. 3, NCC]. Here, since the remedy chosen by
the seller is to exact fulfillment of the obligation, the prohibition against the
recovery of the unpaid balance of the purchase price does not apply. (Atty. Elmer
T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
No, because when SEP commenced the collection suit, it thereby waived its
mortgage lien [Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. IAC, 176 SCRA 741 (1989)]. The remedies of
an ordinary action to collect the debt and foreclosure of the real estate mortgage are
alternative remedies and not cumulative. An election of one remedy operates as a
waiver of the other. The mere act of filing a collection suit for the recovery of a debt
secured by a mortgage constitutes waiver of the other remedy of foreclosure [Id.]. (Atty.
Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

(a)
Yes, SEP can legally recover the deficiency.
Under Article 1484(3) of the Civil Code, in a contract of sale of personal property
the price of which is payable in installments, the vendor may exercise any of the
following remedies: foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has been
constituted, should the vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments. In this
case, he shall have no further action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance
of the price. Any agreement to the contrary shall be void.
In the case at bar, SEP chose the remedy to exact fulfillment of the obligation.
The prohibition against the recovery of the unpaid balance of the purchase applies only
when the remedy chosen by the seller is foreclosure of the chattel mortgage. Here, since
the remedy chosen by the SEP is to exact fulfillment of the obligation, the prohibition
against the recovery of the unpaid balance of the purchase price does not apply.
Hence, SEP can legally recover the deficiency.
(b)
No, SEP cannot commence extrajudicial proceedings to foreclose the mortgage on
Stan’s house and lot in order to recover the deficiency.
When the seller commenced the collection suit, it thereby waived its mortgage
lien [Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. IAC, 176 SCRA 741 (1989)]. The remedies of an
ordinary action to collect the debt and foreclosure of the real estate mortgage are
alternative remedies and not cumulative. An election of one remedy operates as a waiver
of the other. The mere act of filing a collection suit for the recovery of a debt secured by
a mortgage constitutes waiver of the other remedy of foreclosure [Id.].
In the instant case, SEP already commenced the collection suit. Pursuant to the
rule above, SEP waived its right to foreclose the mortgage. The remedies available to the
seller, in which the price is payable in installments are alternative remedies, not
cumulative.
Hence, SEP cannot commence extrajudicial proceedings to foreclose the
mortgage on the house and lot.
XIV
Socorro is the registered owner of Lot A while Segunda is the registered owner of the
adjoining Lot B. Lot A is located at an elevated plateau of about 15 feet above the level
of Lot B. Since Socorro was allegedly removing portions of the land and cement that
supported the adjoining property, Segunda caused the annotation of an adverse claim
against 50 sq. m. on Lot A's Transfer Certificate of Title, asserting the existence of a
legal easement.
(a) Does a legal easement in fact exist? If so, what kind? (2.5%)
(b) If a legal easement does in fact exist, is an annotation of an adverse claim on the
title of the servient estate proper? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, it is called legal easement of lateral and subjacent support. Under the law,
no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent
land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support [Art. 684, NCC]. By virtue of this
law, an owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but his
right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building of
sufficient lateral or subjacent support. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
No, it is not proper because an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and
lateral support is no longer necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or
registered in the registry of property. The remedy in this situation is simply a judicial
recognition of its existence and such judicial recognition already binds the property and
the owner of the same, including her successors-in-interest. [Castro v. Monsod, 641
SCRA 486 (2011); Property, Rabuya, 2017 ed., p. 666; Civil Law Reviewer, Rabuya,
Vol. 1, 2017 ed., pp. 579-580] (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

(a)
Yes, legal easement in fact exist. It is called legal easement of lateral and
subjacent support.
Under Article 684 of the Civil Code, no proprietor shall make such excavations
upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support. Under the law, no proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to
deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. By virtue
of this law, an owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land,
but his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.
In the instant case, Socorro, whose lot is located at an elevated plateau 15 feet
above the level of the lot owned by Segunda, removed portions of the land and cement
that supported the adjoining property owned by Segunda. This situation is contemplated
under Article 684.
Hence, legal easement in fact exist.
(b)
No, an annotation of an adverse claim on the title of the servient estate is not
proper.
An annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer
necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property.
The remedy in this situation is simply a judicial recognition of its existence and such
judicial recognition already binds the property and the owner of the same, including her
successors-in-interest. [Castro v. Monsod, 641 SCRA 486 (2011); Property, Rabuya,
2017 ed., p. 666; Civil Law Reviewer, Rabuya, Vol. 1, 2017 ed., pp. 579-580]
In the case at bar, Segunda caused the annotation of an adverse claim against 50
sq. m. on Lot A's Transfer Certificate of Title, asserting the existence of a legal easement.
Such act is no longer necessary. Segunda should have acquired a judicial recognition of
the existence of the subjacent and lateral support. Consequently, such judicial recognition
already binds the property and the owner of the same.
Hence, such annotation of an adverse claim on the title is not proper.
XV
Simon owned a townhouse that he rented out to Shannon, a flight attendant with Soleil
Philippine Airlines (SPA). They had no written contract but merely agreed on a three (3)-
year lease. Shannon had been using the townhouse as her base in Manila and had
been paying rentals for more than a year when she accepted a better job offer from
Sing Airlines. This meant that Singapore was going to be her new base and so she
decided, without informing Simon, to sublease the townhouse to Sylvia, an office clerk
in SPA.
(a) Can Simon compel Shannon to reduce the lease agreement into writing? (2.5%)
(b) Does the sublease without Simon's knowledge and consent constitute a ground for
terminating the lease? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, because the verbal contract of lease is perfected, valid and enforceable,
hence, the remedy granted in Article 1357 of the Civil Code, i.e., to compel each other
to reduce the agreement in a public document, can be availed. While an agreement for
the leasing of a realty property for a period exceeding one (1) year is covered by the
Statue of Frauds, nonetheless, the defense of the Statue of Frauds is no longer
applicable when the contract is already executed, either wholly or partially [Averia v.
Averia, 436 SCRA 459]. The lease contract, therefore, already becomes enforceable
and Simon may resort to the remedy granted under Article 1357 of the Civil Code,
simultaneously with his action upon the contract. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)
(b)
No, because the lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part, unless
expressly prohibited in the contract of lease [Art. 1650, NCC]. Here, there is no express
prohibition for the subleasing of the leased premises. Thus, the lessee may validly
sublet the leased premises. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

(a)
Yes, Simon can compel Shannon to reduce the lease agreement into writing.
Under Article 1357 of the Civil Code, if the law requires a document or other
special form, as in the acts and contracts enumerated in the following article, the
contracting parties may compel each other to observe that form, once the contract has
been perfected. This right may be exercised simultaneously with the action upon the
contract. While an agreement for the leasing of a realty property for a period exceeding
one (1) year is covered by the Statue of Frauds, nonetheless, the defense of the Statue of
Frauds is no longer applicable when the contract is already executed, either wholly or
partially. [Averia v. Averia, 436 SCRA 459]
In the instant case, although there was no written contract, there verbal contract of
lease between Simon and Shannon is perfected, valid and enforceable. The reason is that
Shannon had been using the property for more than a year and had been paying rentals
thereon.
Hence, Simon may resort to the remedy under Article 1357, that is, to compel to
reduce the agreement in a public document.
(b)
No, the sublease without knowledge and consent of Simon does not constitute a
ground for terminating the lease.
Under Article 1650 of the Civil Code, when in the contract of lease of things there
is no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part,
without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the
lessor.
In the instant case, Simon did not expressly prohibit Shannon to sublease the
leased premises. Pursuant to the rule above, Shannon can sublease the leased property,
even without the knowledge of Simon.
Hence, the sublease does not constitute a ground for terminating the lease.
XVI
Selena was a single 18-year old when she got pregnant and gave birth to Suri. She then
left to work as a caregiver in Canada, leaving Suri with her parents in the Philippines.
Selena, now 34 years old and a permanent resident in Canada, met and married Sam
who is a 24-year old Canadian citizen who works as a movie star in Canada. Sam's
parents are of Filipino ancestry but had become Canadian citizens before Sam was
born. Wanting Suri to have all the advantages of a legitimate child, Selena and Sam
decided to adopt her. Sam's parents, already opposed to the marriage of their son to
someone significantly older, vehemently objected to the adoption. They argued that
Sam was not old enough and that the requisite age gap required by the Inter-Country
Adoption Act between Sam as adopter and Suri as adoptee was not met.
Are Sam's parents correct? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to the contention that Sam is not old enough to adopt pursuant to the
provisions of the Inter-Country Adoption Act, the parents of Sam are correct. Under said
law, the prospective adopter is required to be at least 27 years of age at the time of the
application [Sec. 9, R.A. 8043].
However, as to their contention that the requisite age gap required by the
Inter-Country Adoption Act is not met, the same is not correct. While the said law
requires that the prospective adopter should be at least 16 years older than the
child to be adopted, the said requirement does not apply if the prospective
adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the child to be adopted [Sec. 9,
R.A. 8043]. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya, 2018)

The contention of Sam’s parents that Sam is not old enough to adopt is correct.
However, the contention of Sam’s parents that the requisite age gap is not met is
incorrect.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 8043 or the Inter-Country Adoption Act, the
prospective adopter is required to be at least 27 years of age at the time of the application.
While Section 9 of the Act requires that the prospective adopter should be at least 16
years older than the child to be adopted, the said requirement does not apply if the
prospective adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the child to be adopted.
In the instant case, Sam is merely 24 years old at the time of the application.
Hence, he is not old enough to adopt under the Inter-Country Adoption Act. Moreover, it
is implied in the facts that the child is 16 years old at the time of the application. The age
gap between the child and Sam is definitely less than 16 years. However, Sam is adopting
the child of his spouse. Therefore, the requisite age gap is not required.
Hence, the contention of Sam’s parents that Sam is not old enough to adopt is
correct. However, the contention of Sam’s parents that the requisite age gap is not met is
incorrect.
XVII
Sofia and Semuel, both unmarried, lived together for many years in the Philippines and
begot three children. While Sofia stayed in the Philippines with the children, Semuel
went abroad to work and became a naturalized German citizen. He met someone in
Germany whom he wanted to marry. Semuel thereafter came home and filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for partition of the common properties acquired
during his union with Sofia in the Philippines. The properties acquired during the union
consisted of a house and lot in Cavite worth PhP2 million, and some personal
properties, including cash in bank amounting to PhP1 million. All these properties were
acquired using Samuel's salaries and wages since Sofia was a stay-at-home mother. In
retaliation, Sofia filed an action, on behalf of their minor children, for support.
(a) How should the properties be partitioned? (2.5%)
(b) Should Semuel be required to support the minor children? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
The subject properties should be partitioned equally between Samuel and Sofia,
applying the rules on co-ownership under the Civil Code. The law provides that in a
union of a man and a woman, not suffering from any impediment to marry each other
and who exclusively live together as husband and wife without the benefit of a marriage,
properties acquired by both parties during their union through their joint efforts, work or
industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership and shall be presumed to be
owned by them in equal shares [Art. 147, FC; Valdez v. RTC, Br. 102, QC, 260 SCRA
221 (1996)]. Under the same law, a party who did not participate in the acquisition shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household [Art. 147, FC].
Hence, Sofia is deemed a co-owner of the subject properties acquired by Samuel during
their cohabitation even if she was a mere stay-at-home mother. (Atty. Elmer T. Rabuya,
2018)

(a)
The subject properties should be partitioned equally between Samuel and Sofia, applying the
rules on co-ownership under the Civil Code.
Under Article 147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the
acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the
acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
In the instant case, Sofia and Semuel are living together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage. Although all the properties acquired are due to using Semuel’s wages and salaries,
Sofia stayed and contributed in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Hence, Sofia is deemed a co-owner of the subject properties acquired by Samuel during their
cohabitation even if she was a mere stay-at-home mother.
(b)
Semuel is required to support the minor children.
Under Article 195(4) of the Family Code, parents and their illegitimate children
and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter are obliged to support each to the
whole extent set forth in the preceding article. Article 194 provides that support
comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family. The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation,
even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and
from school, or to and from place of work.
In the instant case, the three minor children are the children of Semuel and Sofia
during their cohabitation. They are deemed to be illegitimate children of Semuel.
Hence, Semuel is mandated by law to support the minor children.
XVIII
Shasha purchased an airline ticket from Sea Airlines (SAL) covering Manila-Bangkok-
Hanoi-Manila. The ticket was exclusively endorsable to Siam Airlines (SMA). The
contract of air transportation was between Shasha and SAL, with the latter endorsing to
SMA the Hanoi-Manila segment of the journey. All her flights were confirmed by SAL
before she left Manila. Shasha took the flight from Manila to Bangkok on board SAL
using the ticket. When she arrived in Bangkok, she went to the SAL ticket counter and
confirmed her return trip from Hanoi to Manila on board SMA Flight No. SA 888. On the
date of her return trip, she checked in for SMA Flight No. SA 888, boarded the plane,
and before she could even settle in on her assigned seat, she was off-loaded and
treated rudely by the crew. She lost her luggage and missed an important business
meeting. She thereafter filed a complaint solely against SAL and argued that it was
solidarily liable with SMA for the damages she suffered since the latter was only an
agent of the former.
(a) Should either, or both, SAL and SMA be held liable for damages that Shasha
suffered? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
SAL is liable for damages that Shasha suffered.
In Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83612,
November 24,1994, 238 SCRA 290, the Supreme Court held that the issuance
by an air carrier of a confirmed ticket in favor of a passenger covering a multi-leg
trip abroad successive carriers attests to the fact that such carrier is the principal
in the contract of carriage with the said passenger and remains to be so,
regardless of those instances when actual carriage was to be performed by
various carriers. The issuance of the ticket also serves as proof that the carrier,
in effect, guarantees that the successive carriers would honor said passenger’s
ticket, assure him of a space therein and transport him on a particular segment of
his trip. The air carrier which issues a confirmed ticket to the passenger covering
a multi-leg trip abroad via different airlines shall be held liable for damages
occasioned by the “bumping-off” of said passenger by another carrier contracted
to carry him to a particular destination of the trip. “Bumping-off” is defined as
refusal to carry or transport a passenger and is not encompassed by the term
‘delay’. (KLM Dutch Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31150, 65 SCRA
237)
In the instant case, the journey is a multi-leg trip, Manila-Bangkok-Hanoi-
Manila. It was supposed to be carried out by two carriers, SAL and SMA. SAL is
one who issued the ticket but it was endorsable to SMA. Shasha was off-loaded
causing her to miss an important appointment as well as losing some of luggage.
Such act of SMA constitutes “bumping-off”. Hence, the carrier who issued the
ticket to Shasha is the one liable for damages as the principal in the contract of
carriage. Such is SAL.
Hence, SAL is liable for damages.
XIX
Sebastian, who has a pending assessment from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),
was required to post a bond. He entered into an agreement with Solid Surety Company
(SSC) for SSC to issue a bond in favor of the BIR to secure payment of his taxes, if
found to be due. In consideration of the issuance of the bond, he executed an Indemnity
Agreement with SSC whereby he agreed to indemnify the latter in the event that he was
found liable to pay the tax. The BIR eventually decided against Sebastian, and judicially
commenced action against both Sebastian and SSC to recover Sebastian's unpaid
taxes. Simultaneously, BIR also initiated action to foreclose on the bond. Even before
paying the BIR, SSC sought indemnity from Sebastian on the basis of the Indemnity
Agreement. Sebastian refused to pay since SSC had not paid the BIR anything yet, and
alleged that the provision in the Indemnity Agreement which allowed SSC to recover
from him, by mere demand, even if it (SSC) had not yet paid the creditor, was void for
being contrary to law and public policy.
Can Sebastian legally refuse to pay SSC? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Sebastian cannot legally refuse to pay SSC.
Under Article 2071(1) of the Civil Code, the guarantor, even before having
paid, may proceed against the principal debtor when he is sued for the payment.
In the instant case, SSC is already being sued by BIR. This means that
the rule above applies.
Hence, SSC can go against Sebastian.
XX
Simeon was returning to Manila after spending a weekend with his parents in Sariaya,
Quezon. He boarded a bus operated by the Sabbit Bus Line (SBL) on August 30, 2013.
In the middle of the journey, the bus collided with a truck coming from the opposite
direction, which was overtaking the vehicle in front of the truck. Though the driver of the
SBL bus tried to avoid the truck, a mishap occurred as the truck hit the left side of the
bus. As a result of the accident, Simeon suffered a fractured leg and was unable to
report for work for one week. He sued SBL for actual and moral damages. SBL raised
the defense that it was the driver of the truck who was at fault, and that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its driver.
(a) Is SBL liable for actual damages? Moral damages? (2.5%)
(b) Will SBL be liable to pay interest if it is required to pay damages, and delays in the
payment of the judgment award? What is the rate of interest, and from when should the
interest start running? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, SBL is liable for actual damages. However, SBL is not liable for
moral damages.
Under Article 1759 of the Civil Code, common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the
former's employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers. This
liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees. With respect for moral damages, the rule is that the same are
recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage
only where:
(1) Mishap results in the death of a passenger; and
(2) It is proved that the carrier is guilty of fraud and bad faith, even if death
does not result. (China Airlines, Ltd. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73835,
January 17, 1989, 169 SCRA 226)
In the instant case, SBL and Simeon are parties in a contract of carriage.
SBL is a common carrier. Hence, the rule above applies. The defense of
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees does not sustain SBL’s argument. He is liable for actual damages.
However, Simeon did not die. Hence, moral damages cannot be awarded.
Hence, SBL is liable for actual damages but not for moral damages.
(b)
Yes, SBL is liable to pay interest if it is required to pay damages, and delays in
the payment of the judgment award.
In Spouses Abella v. Spouses Abella, G.R. No. 195166, July 8, 2015, the
Supreme Court held that when the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money
becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest shall be 6% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction.

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CIVIL LAW BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWER YEAR 2014

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c) Is the situation presented in Item I an example of depecage? (2%)

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B. In this jurisdiction, is a joint venture (i.e., a group of corporations contributing

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B. Distinguish civil and natural obligations. (2%)

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c) Give an example of a pledge created by operation of law. (2%)

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B. Distinguish a direct attack from a collateral attack on a title. (2%)

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