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The Soviet Union, the Austrian Communist Party, and the Anschluss Question, 1918-1938
Author(s): Alfred D. Low

Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Mar., 1980), pp. 1-26
Published by: Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies
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ARTICLES
ALFRED D. LOW
The Soviet Union,the AustrianCommunistParty,

and the AnschlussQuestion,1918-1938
During the interwarperiod, the leadershipof the Soviet Union did a one-
hundred-eighty degree turn in its policy toward the politicallink-upbetween
Austria and Germany.The Soviets firstdenounced the victoriousWestern
powers' prohibitionof the Anschluss.Later theyshowed outrightoppositionto
the Nazi drivefor Germanunificationin CentralEurope. The AustrianCom-
munistParty and internationalcommunismpromptlvexecutedthe same turn-
about.In accordancewiththe new line,duringand at the end of World War II,
the Soviet Union joined the Allies in supportingthe restorationof Austrian
independenceand sovereignty.
Shortlyafterthe Bolsheviksseized power in October 1917, theywere con-

frontedwithproblemsof foreignpolicy.In March 1918, theysigneda separate
peace withthe CentralPowers. Afterthe armisticebetweenthe Ententeand the
CentralPowers in November1918,politicaland social revolutionsarose in many
parts of Europe and bolshevismspread to Budapest and AMunich. Under these
circumstances, then,immediatelyafterWorld War I, the Anschluss question
becamea minorand remoteproblemforSovietRussia.'
While the movenment for Germanpoliticalunificationin CentralEurope in
the 1920s directlyaffectedthe interestsof Austria,Germany,and the Central
and West European states,it was not of primaryconcernforthe Soviet Union.
It was partand parcelof the Germanquestionas perceivedby the Sovietsin the
revolutionary turmoilin Europe during1918-19. Linked to the Soviets' opposi-
tion to the peace treatiesin general,Moscow's condemnation of the prohibition
of the Anschluss was furtherrooted in its pro-GermanRapallo policy. Not
havingbeen invitedto join the League of Nations,the Soviet Union denounced
this body as a league of capitalistand imperialistoppressors,and, accordingly,
attackedthe prohibitionof the Anschluss.AfterHitler's rise to power in the
1930s,however,it becameincreasingly clear to the USSR thatAustriaheld the
key to Germandominationover CentralEurope and to Germanpenetrationof
SoutheasternEurope and thatthe Anschlusswould createan imbalanceon the
continent.The SovietsespeciallyfearedthatAustriawouldbecomea springboard
for the resumptionof the Drang nach dernOsten (drive towardtlle east). In
responseto thethreatoffascism,theythenreversedtheirforeignpolicyand came
to opposeHitler'sthrustagainstAustria.
1. Alfred D. Low, The Anschluss Movemnent

1918-1919 and the Paris Peace Conference
(Philadelphia,1974),pp.366 ff.
2 Slavic Review
Bolshevikaccession to power in Russia soon led to the Treaty of Brest-

Litovsk,whichresultedin severeterritorial losses forRussia and broughtabout
the German occupationof the Ukraine. Six monthsafter imperial Germany
imposedthe treatyupon Russia, however,World War I ended, resultingin
disasterfor the Central Powers, the dissolutionof the Austrian emiipire, and
victoryforthe West. Followingthis event,Soviet hopes forthe victoryof com-
munismin vanquishedCentralEurope provedto be shortlived, evaporatingwith
the reluctanceof the AustrianSocialiststo join in the Soviet Hungarianadven-
ture,2the overthrowof the Bela Kun regimein Hungaryafteran uneasyexist-
ence of one hundredthirty-three days,and the quick downfallof the ineptSoviet
regimein Munich.Austria's embraceof Soviet communismwould undoubtedly
have establishedan "Anschluss" with Budapest and Munich and would have
-enhancedthe chancesof the spread of communismin CentralEurope.
Austria'sunionwithHungaryunderthe Communistbannerfailed,however,
largely because the Austrian Social Democrats were successfulin retaining
controloverthe extremeleftwingofthe party.The Anschlussmovemenet, which
aimed at unionwithGermanyin 1918-19, also failed,despitemajoritysupport.
Otto Bauer, the politicalleader of the AustrianSocial Democrats,then serving
as foreignsecretary,was compelledto bow to the veto of the Great Powers on
theAnschluss.Not onlydid Austriaand Germanydenouncethepeace treatiesof
St. Germainand Versailles,but Soviet Russia brandedthemas means for the
enslavementof the vanquishedcountries.In the 1920s, it seemed logical for
theUSSR to attemptto drivea wedgebetweenthe victoriousimperialist powers
of the West and the defeatedcapitaliststatesin CentralEurope and to woo the
latterin thestruggleagainstthepeace treaties.
As earlyas March 1919,whennews of the impendingtreatieswithAustria
and Germanyreachedthe USSR, Pravda castigatedthe Allied plan to prevent
theAnschlussof AustriawithGermany,and to carryout a policyof "coercion."3
Soviet Russia was benton spreadingcommunismto all of Europe, and Central
Europe was considereda meresteppingstone,thoughperhapsthe most impor-
tantone, towardthislargergoal. From the pointof view of the socialistrevolu-
tion,then,the Anschlussmovementin 1918-19 was nothingmore than a side-
show.
Nevertheless, on May 16,Izvestiiacriticizedtheprohibition oftheAnschluss
in thepeace treatywithGermany.Versailleswouldbecomea "symbolof enslave-
ment"not onlyforGermany,but also forAustriaand the Austrianproletariat.4
FollowingtheRussian model,theAustrianCommunistnewspaper,Soziale Revo-
lution,attackedthe West for its prohibitionof the union. But the Austrian
Communistleader Toman also denouncedthe Social Democraticpolicy which,
while defyingthe West, was directedat the Anschlusswith a Germanrepublic
"personified by Noske,"5the GermanSocial Democraticministerof the interior
2. Alfred D. Low, "The First Austrian Republic and Soviet Hungary," Journal of
Central European Affairs, 20, no. 2 (July 1960): 174-203. The First Soviet Hungarian
Republic was widely referredto as an "adventure" because its staying power was doubted
fromthe very start.
3. Pravda, March 27, 1919.
4. Izvestiia, May 16, 1919.
5. Soziale Revolution (Vienna), June28, 1919.
The AnschlussQuestion,1918-1938 3
who was held primarilyresponsiblefor the bloody repressionof the German

Spartacistrevolt.
The Austrian Social Democrats,bent on maintainingpartyunity,leaned
stronglyto the left,therebyavoidingthe splitamongthe laboringmasses which
affectedalmost all other Social Democraticparties in Europe. In 1918, the
AustrianCon-imunist Party was actuallya negligibleforceand was destinedto
remainone. It focusedon social revolutionand at firstignoredthe Anschluss
problem.On November 9, 1918, in the second issue of their journal, Der
Weckruf,AustrianCommunistsput forthnumerousdemands,but did not men-
tion the Anschluss.6The First Congressof the AustrianCommnunist Party was
also silentaboutthe problem.7It was onlyin the late 1930s,underthe influence
of an apparentchangein Soviet foreignpolicy,thatAustrianCommunistscame
to opposetheAnschlussactively.
In 1918-19, Soviet Russia and the AustrianCommunistParty favoredan
Anschlussonlywitha revolutionary Communist,
and proletarian,if not outriglht
Germany,or an Anschlusswiththe Soviet HungarianRepublic.In due timeit
was possiblethatsuch a bloc mightjoin with newlyemergingSoviet republics
in Europe and perhapssoon withSoviet Russia itself.
Immediately afterthewar,the SovietpresscastigatedEntentepolicytoward
Germanyand Austria and denouncedthe prohibitionof the Anschluss. The
Sovietswere interested in exploitingnationalsensitivitiesand frustrations,
partly
to. spur the developmentof a new unifiedSoviet Grossdeutschland, but even
more in order to spread revolutionthroughoutEurope. In March 1919, the
foundingcongressof the CommunistInternational in Moscow adopteda number
of importantthesesconcernedwiththe international situationand the policyof
the Entente.8They containedsharp criticismof annexations,reparations,and
denial of self-determinationof nations,and theycondemnedthe Ententeand its
East and CentralEuropean "agents" such as Poland, Rumania,and Czechoslo-
vakia, amongothers.Simultaneously, theyexhibiteddistinctsympathyfor Ger-
mans and Austrians.These declarationsshowed that, in the spring of 1919,
German-speaking CentralEurope and Hungary,the principallosers of the war,
were consideredthe mostfertilefieldfor Communistpropagandaand the most
promisingtargetof Soviet expansionism.The Soviets were resolvedto exploit
the nationalresentment caused by the prohibitionof the Ansehlussbothin Ger-
manAustriaand theReich.
Sovietpropagandawas an outgrowth of a deeplyfeltSoviet need forexpan-
sion. A union with GermanCentralEurope mighthave enabled the USSR to
crush the nascentbourgeoisstates of Eastern Europe. As outpostsof hostile
Westernimperialismand heirs to territoriesformerlyincludedin the Russian
empire,these states constitutedan immediateand long-rangethreatto Russia.
Publicationof the termsof the Versailles Peace Treaty was taken by the
CPSU and its instrument, the Comintern,as an opportunity to denouncethe
"ultimatum."9 The AustrianCommunistorgan,Die Rote Fahne, similarlycasti-
6. Der Weckruf (Vienna), November 9,1918.
7. H. Hautmann, Die verlorene Republik: Am Beispiel der kommunistischenPartei
csterreichs (Vienna, 1971), p. 121.
8. Kommmunisticheskii Internatsional,no. 1 (May 1, 1919), p. 113.
9. Izvestiia, May 11, 1919; see also KommunisticheskiiInternatsional, no. 1 (May 1,
1919),pp. 150-63.
4 Slavic Review
gated the Treaty of St. Germain,declaringthat the "murderouspeace" of St.

Germainwas "unacceptable,"since its purposewas to "stranglethe Soviet Rus-
sian and Soviet Hungarian republicsand to enslave and colonialize" German
Austria.10On the victor's side, the radical Socialist newspaper in Paris,
L'Humanite, had previouslywarned against the "Balkanization" of Central
Europe,stressingthatAustriahad no choicebut the Anschluss.1"
Because of Russia's domesticturmoil,militaryweakness,and absence from
the peace conference, Austrianand Germanleaders of the Anschlussmovement
did not take Soviet Russia into seriousconsiderationwhen chartingtheirpolicy
in 1919. Nevertheless,shortlyafterthewar,in a letterto AustrianForeignMin-
isterKarl Rennerwrittenin August 1920, Ludo Hartmann,the Austrianenvoy
in Berlin,expressedhis hope that the Russians would "throwtheirweighton
the scales in our behalf."12But Soviet supportremainedof limitedimportance.
Even in the 1930s, when Soviet policytoward CentralEurope had undergone
substantialchanges,theUSSR at no timeexerciseda decisiveinfluenceupon the
courseoftheAnschlussmovement.
In the early 1920s,the AustrianCommunists, followingthe exampleof the
USSR, theoretically endorsedthe union,but theirsupportwas hardlyemphatic.
AfterHitler's seizureof power,the Communists-againfollowingSoviet policy
-abandoned the pro-Anschlussposition,as did the AustrianSocial Democratic
Party and the bourgeoisparties,includingthe ChristianSocials. On the eve of
the 1938 annexation of Austria, the Communistshad even discoveredthe
"6sterreichischen Menschen" (Austrian human being)-the main theoretical
underpinningof Schuschniggand the "fatherlandfront"-and had supported
the conceptof a separateAustriannation,thusgoingfurther in thisrespectthan
eitherSocial Democratsor ChristianSocials. Similarly,when Hitler annexed
Austria,AustrianCommunistswere, strangely,the firstto proclaimthat their
goal ofrestoring Austria'ssovereignty had beenmet.
In the 1920s, the Soviets took note of the vacillatingfortunesof the An-
schluss movementas well as of alternatetrendsin CentralEurope. Since the
unification movementdid not gain noticeablyin strength, the Soviets tendedto
dismissits importance.Ever readyto combatWesternimperialismand to sup-
portany challengeto thepeace treatiesof Versaillesand St. Germain,theycriti-
cized the Frenchand Italian thrustsinto Austria.But in view of theirapparent
weakness,virtualisolation,and preoccupation withdomesticproblems,the Soviet
positionon the Anschluss,not the most prominentpart of theirforeignpolicy
program,was, at best,of limitedpropagandistic significance.
On September4, 1923,in a letterto AustrianForeignMinisterGruenberger,
Austria's diplomaticrepresentative in Moscow referredto a conversationwith
GeorgiiChicherin,the Soviet commissarof foreignaffairs.Chicherindiscerned
a processofpoliticalreconstruction in Centraland SoutheasternEurope,13 whose
drivingforceswere primarilyeconomic.They were directedat the formationof
10. Die RoteFahne (Vienna), July7 andJuly31, 1919.

11. L'Humanite(Paris), March5, 1919.
12. Hartmannto Renner,August 9, 1920, in Osterreichisches Staatsarchiv,Neues
PolitischesArchiv,Carton 110, pp. 670-71 (hereaftercited as OS,NPA, with the carton
number precededbythedesignationC).
13. Reportto Gruenberger,
OS,NPA, C53,p. 42.
large new blocs and the restorationof an area which,afterthe destructionof
Austria-Hungary, had been completely atomized.Chicherinperceivedan attempt
to createa new CentralEuropean combination, consistingof Italy-the appar-
ent instigator-Hutngary, and Austria, with politicalconisiderations prevailing
in Hungaryand economicones in Austria.14
Thus,whilethe Sovietswerenothostileto a rebirthof economicunityin the
area of the defunctHabsburg Mionarchy or to the projectionof Italian influence
intoCentralEurope,in theearly1920stheylookedevenmorefavorablyupon the
Anschlussmovement, as indicatedby a reportof the Austrianenvoyin Moscow,
datedDecember20, 1924. In a discussionwiththe envoyon Soviet policiesat a
timewhenthe Anschlussquestionwas once again in the foreground, Chicherin
had reminiscedabout his visitto Austriain 1922. In thismatter,wrotethe Aus-
trianenvoy,the Sovietgovernment was "clingingto theprincipleof givingethnic
unitstherightto politicalunity."'15
Chicherin'sremarkson Austriaat thethirdsessionof the CentralExecutive
Committeewere published in Izvestiia, under the heading "Our Friendly
Relationswith Austria." In his address, Chicherinreferredto Austria's poor
economicsituationand its extraordinarily weak politicalsituation.'6Thus, the
questionof the Anschluss,whichhad abated fora while,was revived.Chicherin
assertedthatAustria,"totallydestroyedand weak," had become a playthingof
the Great Powers, which pursued different policies in Central Europe. "We
[the Soviets] do not get involvedin thisquestion [France's goal of a Danubian
confederation under Czechoslovakhegemonyor England's goal of an economic
union of the formerparts of the Austro-HungarianMonarchy]. Our relations
with Austria are extraordinarily good and our economiclinks with her grow
progressivelytighter."Accordingto the Austrian representative, the friendly
toneof Chicherin'sremarks,in an addressin whichhe had censuredvirtuallyall
Europeanstates,did notgo unnoticed.'7
In general,the SovietUnion,preoccupiedwithpressingdomesticand foreign
concerns,was relativelyindifferent towardthe futureof Austriaand the area of
theformerHabsburgEmpire.NeithertheAnschlussnor Italy'sand the Western
powers'thrustsinto CentralEurope aroused sharpopposition.Austria'spresent
and futurewere simplynot the pivot of the basic foreignpolicy interestsof
theSovietUnion.
A strongerpro-Anschluss positionwas takenin the Sovietpressin 1931,on
the occasionof the Austro-German customsunionproject,whichwas promoted
by the Germanforeignminister,JuliusCurtius,and Austria'sforeignsecretary,
JohannSchober. On March 23, 1931, Pravda, referringto the reporton the
formation of a customsunionbetweenGermanyand Austria,called it an "event
of extraordinary Afterpointingto the oppositionto the Anschluss
significance."
of Italy and of France and its allies and "vassals"-especially Czechoslovakia
and Poland-the articlewent so far as to state that "the separationof Austria
fromGermanywas and is one of the foundationsof the greedyimperialistsys-
tem." It maintainedthat the revolutionary workersof Germanyand Austria
14. Envoy's reportto Austrian Foreign MinisterMataja, in ibid.,p. 99.

15. Ibid.; see also envoy's report,July 10, 1925,in ibid.,p. 169.
16. Ibid., p. 131.
17. Ibid., p. 132.
6 Slavic Review
would not be satisfiedby a half-measuresuch as a customsunion and would

continuethedecisivestruggleagainsttheentireVersaillessystemand "its borders
which cut across the living body of the Germannation. The shoutingof the
defendersof the rapaciousVersaillessystemat a violationof the most shameful
imperialisttreatiescan only rouse contemptand generateindignationof the
workers."'8
As theAustrianambassadorreportedfromMoscow to JohannSchober,the
Soviet press seemed to be tellingboth Austria and Germanythat "it is your
good rightto preparethe nationalunion. Of course you cannotretreatwithout
makingyourselfridiculousbeforethe entireworld. Measured by what a pro-
letarianclassless commonwealth could have accomplished,your work of course
is quite pitiful."'19
The Soviet press, however,was criticalnot only of the two
states directlyinvolved,Germanyand Austria,but also of France, Italy, and
Great Britain. The Austrian ambassador even suggestedthat Stalin himself
mighthave been responsibleforthe commentspublishedin Pravda on January
25. Stalin musthave perceivedthat,even thoughthe German-Austrian customs
union did not formallycontradictthe Versailles treaty,it was still directed
against it. According to the ambassador, Moscow had first seen in the
Austro-Germanagreementan "anti-Russian grouping,"but had then relin-
quishedthis stanceafterrealizingthatit could gain moreby claimingthatit was
primarilyan anti-Versaillessettlement. During a receptionat the Commissariat
of Foreign Affairs,Litvinov commentedthat Austria, with one stroke,had
moved into the maelstromof European diplomacy.Others in the commissariat
seemedparticularlypleased because the diplomaticmoves by Austria and Ger-
manyhad administereda blow to the Briand plan for a Pan-Europe. Litvinov
also expressedhis satisfactionto the Germanambassador,von Dirksen,main-
tainingthat,because of the arrangement withAustria,war would be "prevented
or be made more difficult."20 After the mid-1930s,however, Soviet officials
reversedtheirviewson Germany'sunionwithAustriaand its likelyimpactupon
Europeanwar and peace.
On March 24, 1931, an articlein Izvestiia,like one in the precedingday's
Pravda, adjudged the Austro-Germancustomsunion agreement"an important
step" on the road toward politicalunion. The reportassertedthat "with this
agreementGermanyhad economicallyadvanced to the bordersof Italy, Yugo-
slavia,and Hungary,and thatan economicpush cannotremainwithoutpolitical
consequences."'21 The victorsof Versailles had simplyforgotten to prohibitthe
customsunion.The economicunionof Germanyand Austriadid not necessarily
contradictthe theoreticalunderpinnings of Briand's Pan-Europe. There could
be no doubt,however,thatthe CentralEuropean agreementintensified the pres-
sure of Germancapitalismupon Czechoslovakiaand Poland and strengthened its
positionvis-'a-vistheBalkanstates.
While offeringits historicperspectiveand contemporary analysis of the
drivetowardtheAnschluss,Izvestiiaon thewholeendorsedthe Germanunifica-
tion movement.This occurredseveral years before Soviet Russia, following
18. Pravda,March23, 1931;see also OS,NPA, C55,pp.507-8.

19. Envoy'sreport,March31,1931,in OS,NPA, C55,pp.502-6.
20. Ibid.,p. 505.
21. Izvestiia,March24, 1931;see also OS,NPA, C55,pp.509-12.
Hitler'sseizureof powerand the subsequentexit of Germanyfromthe League
of Nations, enteredthe League of Nations and began its uneasy cooperation
with the Westernpowers on behalfof the territorialstatus quo and of col-
lective securityagainst aggression and against the Anschluss. As Izvestiia
explained in 1931, the unificationof Germanyhad not been completeddur-
ing the periodof the nineteenth-century nationalmovementand nationalwars.
The Germanbourgeoisiehad leftseveral millionGermansoutsidethe German
state, and they had become the dominantnationalityin Austria, exploiting
millionsof Slavs. It was an ironyof historythat in the era of the proletarian
revolution,Germanunification, not yet completed,should play into the hands
of Germanimperialism.Though aware of potentialdisturbancesin the wake
of a customs union and the Anschluss,Izvestiia did not draw the obvious
conclusionsabout the adverse impact of such developmentson the Soviet
Union's own strategicand geopoliticalsituation.The tone characterizingthis
and an ensuingarticlewas one of glee at Germanyand Austria having struck
a blow at France and its allies in Centraland Eastern Europe. In the pre-Hitler
era theUSSR remainedcaughtin theweb of its Rapallo policyand was obsessed
withtheidea thatthe destruction of theVersaillessystemwas alwaysto her own
advantageand to thedisadvantageof"imperialism."
On March 31, 1931, in an anonymousfollow-uparticle,Izvestiia held that
neithertheAustriannor the Germangovernment could retreaton the Anschluss
issue withoutsufferingserious loss of credibilityand authority."Austria," it
said, "suffocateswithinher boundaries."Germanytoo would now recognizethat
she entertainedillusions about "equality."22Germanyand apparentlyRussia
were surprisedthatBritainhad joined France's protestagainstthe Germanand
Austrianmove. In responseto Briand's clear threat,made beforethe French
parliamenton March 3, 1931, thatAnschlussmeantwar, Izvestiia reprehended
"imperialist"FranceforvetoingtheAnschlussof six millionAustrians.And yet,
a few years later, Soviet Communistssuddenlytransformed imperialistFrance
into democraticFrance. Preventingthe Anschluss,ratherthan encouragingit,
becamelaudable.
It is, of course,true that Hitler's accessionto power substantially altered
the politicalsituationin all of Europe. In view of the open hostilityof National
Socialismtowardcommunism and theUSSR, it was onlya matterof timebefore
Soviet foreignpolicy was revamped.In accordancewith such changes, Soviet
policyon the Anschlussalso veeredfromone extremeto the other.But as late
as the middleof 1931,the Soviet press stilltook a favorableattitudetowardthe
customsunionproject.23Immediatelybeforethe Germanannexationof Austria
in 1938 and thereafter, the Soviet press and spokesmenof the AustrianCom-
munistParty stressedthe existenceof a separateand distinctAustriannation.
In 1931, however,therehad been no recognitionof a distinctAustriannational
characterand a separateAustrianhistory,and thusof a separateAustrianstate.
In 1931 and 1932,in faceoftherisingthreatof Hitler'sfascismin Germany,
Soviet policy still favoredboth the theoreticalequalityof the Reich and the
Anschlussand pointedonce again to the Danubian Federation,an allegedtool of
22. Izvestiia,March 27, 1931; see also envoy'sreport,March 31, 1931,OS,NPA, C55,
pp.513-14.
23. Reportof May 1931,in OS,NPA, C55,p. 514.
8 Slavic Review
Frenchimperialism, as a possible threatto both Russia and Germany.France

wantedto broadenthe federationto includeall of East CentralEurope and to
establishits hegemony.Once again the Soviet press revivedshopwornconcepts
and a stale rhetoric.
An editorialin Izvestiia on February29, 1932, entitled"Danubian Federa-
tion,"pointedto a regroupingof the Great Powers and theirlesser allies and
vassals, includinga regroupingin CentralEurope.24France wished to broaden
the Little Ententethroughthe inclusionof Austria,Hungary,and Poland. But
the USSR saw this projectedbloc as a strengthening of the militaryalliance
betweenFrance, Poland, and Rumania, which was aimed against the Soviet
Union. Accordingto Izvestiia, the Danubian bloc was also a permanentthreat
to Germany:"The Danubian Federationwill block once and forall the road to
an Austro-German union."25
French imperialism, however,had to overcomelocal obstaclesin Hungary
and Austria.Hungarywas dissatisfied boundaries,and Austria
withits territorial
was unwillingto abandonits hopes forunion with Germany.But the deep eco-
nomiccrisisin CentralEurope provedto be a powerfulally of Frenchdiplomacy.
Frenchimperialism, whichonlyrecentlyhad blockedtheAustro-German customs
union project, thereaftercontrolledAustria. The French governmenthad
forcedthe resignationof Schober and broughtabout changes in the two main
Austrianbanks,the Osterreichische Nationalbankand the Kreditanstalt,but it
had not yet realizedits ultimategoal in Austria. A monthlater,on March 27,
1932, Izvestiia continued its commenton the Danubian Federation plans,
allegingthat by sponsoringsuch a project,France wanted to shore up fascist
dictatorships which,underthe blows of the economiccrisis,began to crumible in
Central Europe and the Balkans. Furthermore,the newspaper maintained,
France wishedto createa powerfulbloc extendingfromthe Danube to the Baltic
area and comprisinga populationof one hundredand twentymillionpeople and
therebyperpetuateher own hegemonyand the Versailles settlement.26 Ac-
cordingto the Austrianenvoyin Moscow,the Sovietsheld thatthe Frenchplan
was aimedat linkingAustriaand Hungaryto the chariotof the LittleEntente.27
The Soviet leadership,obsessed then with the struggleagainst Left and
Right "deviation"at home, apparentlyhad less time for foreignaffairs.The
leaders underestimated the appeal and strengthof National Socialism in both
Germanyand Austria,as well as the stayingpowerof theauthoritarian Austrian
government. In 1932,the Sovietswere convincedthatthe Dollfussregimewould
last foronlya fewmonths,and thatAustrianNational Socialismwould eventu-
ally take over. But theyapparentlyalso concludedthata Nazi regimewould be
nothingmore than a brieftransitionto a Communistseizure of power. The
Austrianenvoyin Moscow believedthatStern,the directorof the Second West-
ern Division in the Narkomindel(Commissariatof Foreign Affairs),held that
National Socialismin Austriawas not in a retrogressive stage,but ratherin a
growingone, and that the presentAustrian regimecould not last long. The
Austrianenvoycould hardlybelievehis ears when Sternstatedthat"a National
24. Izvestiia,February29, 1932;see also OS,NPA, C55,pp.201 ff.

25. Izvestiia,February29, 1932.
26. Ibid.,March27, 1932.
27. Envoy'sreport, March29,1932,in OS,NPA, C55,pp.222 ff.
Socialist governmentin Austria would perhaps not be so bad, one must give
this Partythe chanceto demonstrate its capacities,"but he noted Stern's indis-
putablyserious intent.28 He entertainedno doubt that Stern expresseda point
of view widely held throughoutthe CommunistParty of the Soviet Union,
althoughthiscouldnotbe revealedpublicly.
Accordingto the Austrianenvoy,at the timeof the abortiveNazi coup in
July 1934 and the assassinationof Dollfuss,the Soviet press took no clearcut
positionregardingthe eventsin Austria,whichwas in sharpcontrastto mostof
theEuropeanpress.Rather,it portrayedAustro-German tensionand the defense
againstNational Socialismin Austriaas a "scuffle[Rauferei] betweendifferent
varietiesof fascism."Most Soviet newspapersseemed to exult in the serious
perilsencounteredby the "capitalistworld" as a resultof the Austrianproblem.
Parallelingthe recentFrancophileturnin policy,however,the Sovietsexpressed
greaterawareness of the growingthreatof Hitler's Germanyto world peace,
accordingto the Austrianenvoy.29He criticizedthe Soviet press for neglecting
to printan obituaryforDollfussand forfailingto express indignationover the
abominablemurder.Izvestiia was indeedquite restrainedabout the role of Ger-
man officialdom in the sordid assassination,holdingthat the recentunrestin
Austriawas the work of domesticNazis ratherthan the resultof manipulation
and unceasingagitationand propagandafromacross the border.Nevertheless,
it greetedthe ensuingdeterioration of German-Italianrelationswith particular
satisfaction.
AmbivalencetowardNazi Germany,markedby increasingawarenessof its
threatto Russia's securityand possiblyalso by fear of arousingNazi ire, char-
acterizedthe SovietUnion's attitudetowardthequestionof therestoration of the
Habsburgsversus Anschluss.Officially, the Soviet Union was opposed to both
propositions,but unofficially its oppositionto restorationof the Habsburgs
seemedto be slackening,especiallyifit meantreducingor eliminating theattempt
at Anschluss.
In close connectionwiththe crisis in Austria,manyforeign,and especially
French,newspapershad raised the questionof the restorationof the Habsburgs
in Austria.The Soviets limitedthemselvesto reprinting excerptsfromsome of
thesearticles.30They apparentlydid not sharethe viewpointof those in Austria
and abroad who thoughtthatrestorationwould definitely removethe dangerto
Austria of Germanfascism.Accordingto Izvestiia, Czechoslovakiaand Yugo-
slavia preferred the Anschlussand consideredit a "lesser evil." But the Soviets
consideredthe Anschlussa peril to peace. Some prominentindividualsin the
USSR werealso notdefinitely opposedto restoration ofthe HabsburgMonarchy.
Accordingto the Austrianenvoyin Moscow, a highofficialin the Foreign
Commissariathad expressedhimselfin a mannerquite different fromthe official
views printedin Izvestiia. The Soviet functionary opined that "the restoration
of the Habsburgsas a meansof doingaway once and forall withall Anschluss
endeavorswas not to be lightlydismissed,"and that it mightpethaps bridge
differences between France and Italy, however divergenttheir motives.The
envoy again concludedthat such utterancesdid not express merelypersonal
28. Envoy'sreport,in ibid.,p. 530.

29. Envoy'sreport,in ibid.,C56,pp.34-35.
30. Ibid.,pp.53-54.
10 Slavic Review
views,but reflectedan opinionwidelyheld-though not prevailing-in official

Soviet circles.31This indeed expressedthe views of no less a personagethan
Litvinov,a prominentSoviet diplomatand the USSR's spokesmanin Geneva.
When the Americanenvoy in Moscow "teased him a bit" with regard to the
Soviet government'sinterestin the restorationof the Habsburg Monarchy,
askinghim in what chapterof Marx or Lenin he could findauthorityfor this
policy,"he repliedthat any procedurewas justifiedwhich tendedto maintain
peace in Europe and peace forthe Soviet Union."32
The Austrian envoy's reportto Austrian Foreign Minister Berger-Wal-
denegg,made a littlelater,is similar.In it he referredto articlesby the Moscow
correspondent of the Viennese Neue Freie Presse33about Soviet policytoward
Austria,one Basseches. Sternand his deputyLinde, officialsof the Narkomin-
del, had allegedlyexpressed"very great understandingfor Austria's Catholic
policies" in the struggleagainst National Socialism and had indicatedSoviet
readinessto answerAustria'seconomicneeds. Basseches also told the Austrian
envoy of a similarconversationhe had had with Karl Radek, duringwhich
Radek admittedthatthe Sovietpress stillshoweda certainreluctanceto support
AustriaagainstGermany.
The Czechoslovak-Russianrapprochement, climaxingin a militaryalliance
in 1935, apparentlyfortified Soviet policyin supportof Austrianindependence,
in spite of the ideologicalpolarityof the two countries.Moscow recognized,
as did Prague and Vienna, that the defenseinterestsof Czechoslovakiaand
Austriawere intertwined. In talks with Soviet politiciansin June 1935, Benes
repeatedlystressedthe need for preservingAustrian independence.According
to Basseches,the tie with Czechoslovakiaforcedthe Soviets to adopt a more
activistpolicybothin theDanubianarea and in the Balkans.AftertheNovember
1918 revolutionin Germany,Soviet policy had extolled rapprochement with
Germanyand had favoredthe applicationof Bolsheviktheoriesof the nationality
problem,includingthe Anschluss,to Central Europe. But the year 1935 wit-
nessedpronouncedchanges.Some Sovietcirclesstillheldtheopinionthatthefate
of Austriadid not affectthe interestsof the USSR. Yet, the envoyreportedthat
during Benes's visit, "your correspondenthad frequentoccasions to discuss
this questionwith Soviet diplomats.A highlyresponsibleSoviet diplomatex-
plained . . . thatthe Soviet government placed a greatvalue on good relations
withVienna."34On October31, 1935, the Austrianenvoyassured the Foreign
Ministry in Vienna that Foreign Commissar Litvinov's dermarcheagainst
those stateswhichrefusedto apply sanctionsagainstFascist Italy on accountof
the Ethiopianwar,thatis, Austriaand Hungary,was "by no meansan intended
criticismof Austria."35Litvinovhimselfassured the envoythat he had not in-
tendedto hurtAustria.
On January16, 1936, the Austrianenvoy seemed puzzled that there had
been no unfriendlyarticles on Austria in the Soviet press for a long time.
31. Ibid.,p. 55.

32. Reportto secretaryof state,Moscow,June28, 1935,NationalArchives,Washington,
D.C., Box 6846,863.01/198,pp. 1-2.
33. Envoy'sreport,June27,1935,in OS,NPA, C56,pp.256-58.
34. Ibid.,pp.261-62,265.
35. Envoy'sreport,"Stimmen derSowjetpresse"[June1935],in ibid.,p. 327.
Hostilepiecesby formerSchutzbiindler(membersof the AustrianSocial Demo-

craticdefenseorganization, theSchuvtzbund),who were livingin the USSR, had
been publishedearlierin the Moscow Deutsche Zentral-Zeitung.But an article
on Austriain Izvestiia on January27, 1936, omittedany referenceto "Austro-
fascism."The author emphasizedthat Austrian ChancellorBuresch's visit to
Prague was the firstAustrian state visit since 1922, when ChancellorSeipel,
"the knownproponentof close collaborationbetweenthe successionstatesof the
former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy,"had visitedthecapitalof Czechoslovakia.36
Buresch'sjourneyto Prague was, accordingto Pravda, most significant, since
it was knownthatAustriawas the firstof severalstates"which,accordingto the
plan of Germanfascism,are to be swallowedby the Third Reich one way or the
other."37
The new orientationof Soviet foreignpolicy is clearlyreflectedin Soviet
pressstatements on Austria.EchoingCzechoslovakia'sposition,Izvestiiadeclared
that the Soviet Union was not entirelyopposed to Austrianrearmament, con-
sideringthat the AnschlussmovementthreatenedAustria's independentexist-
ence. However, the introductionof militaryservice in Austria by one-sided
proclamationraised the specterof rearmament in Hungary,whichin turnwas
closelylinkedto Fascist Germany.It was on this ground,observedIzvestiia,
thatthe statesof the Little Ententehad deliveredan energeticprotestagainst
theintroduction ofcompulsory militaryservicein Austria.38
In his reportof April 21, 1936,the Austrianenvoypointedto the inherent
contradictions in the Soviet attitudetowardAustrianaffairs.The Soviets con-
tinuedtheircriticismof Austria's domesticpolicies on politicaland ideological
grounds,while simultaneouslyexpressingconcern over the "securityof our
an essentialpartof Sovietpolicy.39
[Austrian]state,"whichwas considered
Despite the apparentdichotomy, in July1936 the Austrianenvoybelievedthat
the policyof the USSR was basicallyand relativelysimple."They apply only
one measuringrod to everypoliticalevent,to everypoliticalquestion: Does it
harmor does it benefitGermany?"German-Sovietrelationshad reacheda point
at whichit was superfluousto add thatif,in Soviet opinion,it harmedGermany,
itbenefitedRussia,and viceversa.
On July14, 1936,an articlein Pravda, entitled"The Iron Fist in the Diplo-
matic Glove" (referringto the recentlyconcludedJuly 11, 1936 Agreement
betweenAustriaand Germany),maintainedthatAustriawould have to pay for
Germany'srecognitionof its sovereigntywith "real concessions.... With a
peacefulphraseon herlip," Germanyhad obtaineda positionwhichwould enable
her "to undermineAustria more systematically."40 Other journals, including
Journalde Moscou, as well as Moscow's radio commentariesdiscussed the
Austro-GermanJuly Agreementand Germany'sdiplomaticgains against the
backgroundofItaly'sposition,whichwas weakeningas a resultof Italy'sinvolve-
ment in Ethiopia and Spain. Karl Radek had also pointedout that the new
treatycontaineda phrasequite unusual fora diplomaticdocument-thatis, the
36. Ibid.,pp.365-67;see also Izvestiia,January27,1936.

37. Pravda,January15,1936; see also OS,NPA, C56,pp.360-63.
38. OS,NPA, C56,p. 419.
39. Envoy'sreport,April21, 1936,in ibid.,p. 416.
40. Pravda,July14, 1936; OS,NPA, C56, pp. 486 ff.
12 Slavic Review
referenceto Austria's obligationto act "as a German state." Pravda asserted

thatthe economicpenetration of Austriathatwas likelyto followwould demon-
stratethattheAustro-German Agreementwas merelya preparatory stepforthe
Anschlusswith Germanyand for German penetrationof the Danubian and
Balkan states.Though theyheld out littlehope for Austria in the long run,all
of theseopinionswere severelycriticalof Germany'saggressivecourse.
The Austrianenvoywas puzzledby the Soviets'restraintin theirassessment
of Italianpolicyand of theEthiopianconflict, althoughhe himselfdiscoveredthe
clue to it. The Italian ambassadorto Moscow had assured him that "Litvinov
did not waste any time in offeringhis servicesin behalfof Italy" to liftthe
League's sanctionsagainst that country.He had done everythingpossible to
preventa definitenonrecognition of Italy's seizure of Ethiopia and to pave the
way forItaly's returnto the Stresa front.Consequently, it was evidentthatthe
Soviets had not relinquishedthe hope "to include Italy in the ring of hostile
encirclement ofGermany."'41
At othertimes,however,Izvestiia seemedto have lost all hope in regardto
Italy.Commenting on thecommuniqueissuedby representatives of Italy,Austria,
and Hungary,who had met on November11 and 12, 1936, Izvestiia pointedto
thedecliningrole of Italy in CentralEurope and converselyto Germany'sgrow-
ing strengthin the area.42Obviously,the purpose of the conference,as far as
Italy was concerned,was to stemthe tide of Germaninfluence.Beforethe open-
ing of the conferencein Vienna, the Italian governmenthad stressedthat the
Austro-GermanAgreementof July 1936 was not the startingpoint for a new
series of concessions,but the conclusion.In spite of the optimistictone of the
Vienna communique,differences betweenItaly and the other conferencepar-
ticipantsemerged.Italy stronglysupportedHungary's claim to the Austrian
Burgenland,while Austria was completelydisinterestedin the question of re-
visionof its boundaries.The onlythingAustriamighthave wantedwas German-
inhabitedSouth Tyrol,whichwas part of Italy. The attitudeand policyof the
threestatesin regardto theLeague of Nationsalso differed substantially.
Conse-
quently,the hopes of Italian politicianswere scarcelywarranted.Besides, in
Izvestiia'sview,Italy "becomesmoreand morea vassal of Germany."In March
1937,Izvestiia,commenting on Schuschnigg'sjourneyto Budapest,held thathe
apparentlywas concernedabout Italy's diminishingstrengthin CentralEurope
and had triedto compensateby establishingties with Prague via Budapest and
by seekinga rapprochement withParis and London. In short,he had attempted
to "Europeanize" Austrianpolicy.However,it was still too early to talk of a
turnaboutin Austrianforeignpolicy.43
What was deemedessentialin Moscow was a turnaboutnotonlyin Austria's
foreignpolicy,but also in her domesticaffairs.Commentingon an editorialin
Izvestiia, "Policy of the Axis, of Circles and Triangles," which appeared on
August 22, the Austrianenvoy Schwimmerpointedto the hypocritical concern
withwhichthe Soviet press followedthe struggleof the Austriangovernment
againstthe Nazis.44He claimedthatthe Soviets consideredthe penaltiesmeted
41. OS,NPA, C56,p. 487.

42. Ibid.,pp.583 ff.;Izvestiia,November16,1936.
43. "InternationalOverview,"March 20, 1937,in OS,NPA, C56, pp. 693-96; Izvestiia,
March20, 1937.
44. Envoy'sreport,September 1,1937,in OS,NPA, C56,p. 803.
out to Nazi disturbers of law and ordermuchtoo mildand accused the Austrian
chancellorof lack of energytoward the Communistmovement.The writerof
the Izvestiia article also stronglyrecommendedthe overthrowof Austrian
fascismand theproclamation ofa Sovietdictatorship.
Like otherCommunistpartiesin Europe and theworld,manyleadingmem-
bersof theAustrianCommunistPartyhad foundrefugein theUSSR. In ideol-
ogy and organization,as well as in theirlivelihood,AustrianCommunistswere
clearlydependenton Moscow and receivedinstructionsand directiveseither
directlyfromthe Kremlinor throughthe Comintern.Since early 1937,the small
illegal AustrianCommunistParty had pursued a vigorouscourse directlyop-
posed to the Anschlusspolicyof Germanand AustrianNational Socialists. In
thisimportant respectthenew policyplaced the CommunistPartyon the side of
theforcesof the Schuschnigggovernment and-because the illegal Social Demo-
craticPartyconsideredAnschlusswiththe Third Reich a greaterevil than the
continuationof the hated authoritarianSchuschniggregime-also on the side
of RevolutionarySocialists. The Social Democratshad shelved the Anschluss
policyat theirlast partyconventionin October 1933 when they annulledthe
Anschlussclause of the 1926 Linzer Party Conference.But the AustrianCom-
munistshad actuallygone furtherthanmere oppositionto the Anschluss.They
questionedthe underlyingprincipleof "ein Volk, ein Reich" and claimedthat
the Austriansrepresenteda separatenationality.Afterthe Anschlussbecame a
faitaccompli,the CommunistParty unfurledthe flagof nationalindependence,
placingAustrianson the same level of nationaloppositionto the Nazi regime
in the Reich as Czechs,Poles, and othersubjugatedpeoples of Europe.
During the 1934-38 period,the AustrianSocial DemocraticParty bitterly
opposed National Socialism in Austria and in the Reich. Anschluss with a
tyrannicalGermany,whichwould reduce Austriansto "mere cannon fodder,"
was denounced,but German Austrianswere still considereda branch of the
Germanpeople. The Communists,on the otherhand, actuallydisregardedthe
grossdeutschorientation of Marx and Engels and thatof prewarGermansocial-
ism of Bebel and Liebknecht.They were guided insteadby Soviet oppositionto
a Nazi-sponsoredunion betweenGermanyand Austria.The Anschluss,in the
Communistview, was a threatto the Soviet Union because it would bring
Czechoslovakiaand CentralEurope underNazi controland thusshifttheGerman
boundariescloserto theeast.
In the struggleagainstthe Anschluss,ideologywas bound to play an im-

portantrole, as the Communists,adept in ideologicalpropagandaand warfare,
were quick to recognize.In view of theirearlierpromotionof the movementfor
union, Social Democratic leaders, whatever their oppositionto a Nazi-led
Anschluss,could not deny that they regardedGerman Austriansbasically as
Germans.Neitherthe Socialists nor most ChristianSocials, under the leader-
shipfirstof Dollfussand laterof Schuschnigg,northefollowersoftheHeimwehr,
were preparedto considerAustria a separatenation.Their stance undoubtedly
hamperedtheir ideological struggleagainst National Socialism, and it made
some of the AustrianRightistsdisposedto strikea bargainwiththe Nazis. But
the Communists,with shrewdperceptionof propagandaand of the necessity
of wagingan effective ideologicalcampaignagainst Hitler's propaganda,simply
deniedthatAustria was a part of the Germannation,and assertedthat it was
a separatenation.This gave the Austrianstrugglethe characterof a national
14 Slavic Review
war of independenceand, after1938, gave thema clear goal: the renaissanceof
Austriansovereignty and freedom.
Accordingto Ernst Fischer,a notedAustrianCommunistafter1934,45the
order for a reorientation of the Austrian CommunistParty apparentlycame
fromStalin himselfin 1938. Referringto the late thirties,Fischer wrote in
his book Das Ende einer Illusion: "Dimitrovinformedus [!] that Stalin was
foran independent Austria,againstany formof a Danubian Confederation....
[Stalin had asked] Why shouldnot the Austriansbe a separatenation?"46 But
the theoreticalgroundfor this thesis seems to have been laid much earlier in
Austria. Accordingto Fischer,the Austrian CommunistwriterAlfred Klahr
had alreadyansweredthe questionof the special Austriancharacterpositively
in 1933. Fischer himselffirstthoughtthat Klahr had gone too far,but he ulti-
matelyreachedthe same conclusion.Accordingto Fischer,in the 1930s Com-
munistsdid not quicklyrelinquishthe view thatthe Austrianswere part of the
German nation. He himselfstill defendedthis concept in the Soviet Union
againstthe views of the influentialBulgarianCommunistand head of the Com-
intern,Georgi Dimitrov.
While in Russia, Klahr had run afoulof Soviet communism, thoughnot on
accountof his convictionthata distinctAustriannationalityexisted.Klahr and
otherAustrianCommunists wereaccusedofbeinginsufficiently criticalof Austro-
Marxism,of having judged and of still judging Otto Bauer's personalitytoo
objectively,of having endorsedhis criticalremarksabout the German Com-
munistPartypolicypriorto 1933,and on the wholeof havingbeen insufficiently
"vigilant."47During the era of the purgesin the late 1930s, the so-calledKlahr
case, a politicaldisputeinvolvingRussian Communists,Austrianand German
emigres,and Dimitrovhimself,eruptedin the USSR. Klahr escaped Russian
ire,-butafterhis returnto Austria,he succumbedto the terrorHitler unleashed
againstCommunistsand Jews.
In his book,Das Ende einerIllusion,Ernst Fischerno longerbelievedthat
the questionof a separateAustriannationwas still relevantin the viable and
neutralpostwarAustrian state. But he stressedthat during Hitler's rule this
45. Ernst Fischer was originallya Social Democrat and the assistant editor of Arbeiter-
Zeitung. After the suppressionof the Austrian workers' uprising in February 1934, he turned
in bitter disappointmentto the Communists.He fled to the USSR, and in 1938, he became
editor of the prestigious KommunisticheskiiInternatsional. He wrote articles for it under
his real name and under the pseudonyms of Peter Wieden or Pierre Vidal. A prominent
leader of the Communist Party of Austria, to which he returnedin 1945, Fischer was con-
sidered a maverick. He was expelled from the Communist Party as a result of his criticism
of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He is the author of Das Ende einer Illusion
(Vienna, 1973), which covers the postwar years in Austria, the period 1945-55. His auto-
biography has been translated into English and is entitled An Opposing Man (Vienna,
1974). In a study,"The Development of the Austrian National Character," conceived during
his stay in Moscow in the late 1930s, but not published until 1945, Fischer portrayed the
Austrian national character with both its positive and negative traits and extolled important
Austrian personalities and the struggle for freedom throughoutAustria's history. When he
read the articles he had writtenfor Kommnunisticheskii Internatsionalthree decades before,he
"blushed for shame." Still, Fischer never disavowed the view that there existed a special
Austrian nation, a thesis which he and his Austrian comrades had developed in the 1930s.
46. Fischer, Das Ende einer Illusion, pp. 61-62.
47. Fischer, An Opposing Man, p. 291.
questionwas boththeoretically and practicallyof "outstanding importance."48

In all countriesoverrunby Hitler,the nationalelementof the resistance had
beenmuchmoreeffective thanthemerepolitical, anti-Fascistelement.
Perhapsoneofthefirst indicationsofa theoretical
about-face intheAustrian
Communist Partyis foundin an article,"NationalStruggleof Liberationin
Austria,a War againstFascism,"by F. Wg.-actuallyAustrianComintern
representative PeterWieden(ErnstFischer)-in theMoscowpaper,Deutsche
on April17, 1937.The articlepuzzledtheAustrianenvoyin
Zenitral-Zeitu,ng,
Moscow.In a communication datedApril30, 1937,and addressedto Austrian
ForeignMinisterGuido Schmidt,he admitted thatit had made him "quite
pensive."49 Wiedensuggested abandoning the Social Democratic, and thusfar
also Communist, thesison Anschlussand Germannationalism. Both social
democracy and communism had erredwhentheyespoused"Anschlusswitha
SocialistGermany." Up to thispoint,thethesishad alwaysbeenthatAustria
and Germanybelongedto each other.But becauseof contradictions in the
capitalist-imperialist
system, realization
ofthisthesiswas impossible. Therefore,
theopinionthatprevailed was thatit wouldbe necessary to waituntila Soviet
Austriaand a SovietGermany emerged. However,according to Wieden,Aus-
trianCommunists werenowobligedto acknowledge thatNationalSocialismhad
"exploitedthe factthat Austriansspoke German,"and that Germansand
Austrians actuallyrepresented different
culturesand nations.The conservative
Austrianenvoyfoundit ironicand perplexing thatAustrianCommunists had
thus discoveredthe "6sterreichischen Menschen."But Wiedenwentfurther
whenhe postulated theneedfora conscious"Austriannationalism."
ThoughAustrianSocialistshad not adoptedthe theoryof an "Austrian
nation"in 1933,theyhadshelvedtheAnschluss issuefortheduration ofHitler's
regime.Apartfromthetheoretical questionof-Austrian nationalconsciousness,
in manyotherrespects thepositionoftheAustrianCommunist Partywas quite
similarto thatoftheSocialDemocrats and theRevolutionary Socialistsduring
theyears1934-38.5? In a speechat theconference of theAustrianCommunist
Partyin August1937,JohannKoplenigstatedthatthe problemof Austria's
independence and her defenseagainst Hitler-fascism was Austria's"main
politicalproblem." The Communist Partyassertedthat,as a resultof theJuly
1936Agreement withGermany, Austriahadbecomevirtually "a dependency of
Mussoliniand Hitler"and thatthe Austrianregimecompeted withtheem in
military provocations againstpeace. The sympathies of the Austriandictator-
ship,as theEthiopian warandtheSpanishCivilWar had madeclear,lay with
thewar agitators and againsttheindependence of nations.Nevertheless, Hitler
had encouraged theAustrianNazis to resortto newprovocations. According to
Koplenig,thedesireforAustrianindependence had undoubtedly grownduring
thelast years,and theappealof the Hitleriteagitationduringthesummerof
1937was allegedly less thanit had beenin 1934and 1935.51
48. Fischer, Das Ende einer Illusion, p. 59.

49. Envoy's report,April 30, 1937, in OS,NPA, C56, pp. 718-21.
50. Alfred D. Low, "Otto Bauer, Austro-Marxism, and the Anschluss Question, 1918-
1938," Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, 6, no. 1 (Spring 1979): 33-57.
51. Die Kommunisten irn Kampf fiurdie UnabhaingigkeitOsterreichs (Vienna, 1955),
pp. 14-16.
16 Slavic Review
Still,accordingto Koplenig,fascismthreatenedAustriansovereignty, and

the majorityof Austriansopposed the link-upwiththe Reich. The Communist
Party's task was to give the demand for Austrian independenceconcreteex-
pressionand a democraticand progressivedimension.This meant that Com-
munistswould have to aim their heaviest guns against National Socialism,
"againstits agentsand close allies in Austriaas well as againstthe authoritarian
Austrian dictatorship,"since the latter subordinatedthe interestsof Austria
and its people to the interestsof Germanand Italian fascism.
Anotherspeakerat the same CommunistParty conference, Erwin Zucker-
Schilling,referringto Austria's "mission" in the "German realm," its "con-
tinentalmission,"and even its "universalistsignificance," consideredit the task
of communismto "block warlike German imperialism,which under the flag
of the swastika . . . wants to conquer the Danubian realm and the southeast
of Europe." Communism,"togetherwith the small states and nations of the
Danubian realm [wants] to defendthe sovereignty,independence,and peace
of the small states and nations of Central Europe" against the expansionist
endeavorsof Germanand Italian fascism.52Such views did not differsubstan-
tiallyfromthe Social Democrats'rhetoric.Nor was Communistwillingnessto
cooperate"in the closestmanner"withotherpoliticaland social elementsof the
Austrianpeopleand to makethewar forindependenceagainstHitlera "national
struggle"unique. The Socialistspropagatedthe same line. But Communists,as
stated,went far beyond the Social Democraticposition,denyingthat Austria
was ever part of the Germannationand thatthe "Holy Roman Empire of the
German Nation" had anythingin commonwith a nationalityin the Marxist
meaningand withStalin's conceptof nationality. As the discussionat the party
conference revealed,some Communistswonderedwhetherthepreoccupation with
the theoryof nationalismwas meaningful,whetherthere was any pragmatic
purposefor concerningoneselfwith "such concepts."But the speaker pointed
to the need forjuxtaposinga "reallyfirmideologicalplatform"to National So-
cialists'ideology.The Schuschniggregimehad failedto do this,because it had
borrowedheavily,perhapsunconsciously,fromthe ideologicalarmoryof Pan-
Germanismand Nazism.
A few monthsearlier,in March 1937, at a conferenceof Austria's Com-
munistYouth Organization,JohannKoplenig had pointed out that Austrian
national consciousnesswas growingstronger.53 He charged,however,that it
was also being underminedby the inherentfalsifications of the gesamtdeutsch
(all-German) historicalconceptionwhich had even captivatedmany Christian
Socials, including Dollfuss and Schuschnigg,many Heimwehr leaders, and
broad segmentsof the Catholicintelligentsia. The historicalperspectivedistorted
the Austrians'vision,deludingtheminto thinkingthat,because Germansand
Austrianswere linkedby a commonlanguageand close culturalties,theyought
to sacrificethemselvesto the interestsof an imperialistwar and to the Gleich-
schaltungplans of Hitler's fascism.Koplenig stressed that the strugglefor
Austria's sovereigntywas not only for Austrian independencebut also for
politicaland national self-determination. The majorityof the Austrianpeople
was "Austrian,not German-national, but [was] also dedicatedto democracy,
52. Ibid.,pp. 17-20.

53. Ibid.,pp.22-25.
freedomand progress,not to authoritarianism, repression,and legitimism;the
task of the workingclass and of all progressiveforcesin Austria was to link
the struggleforthe independenceof the countrywiththe strugglefor freedom,
withthe strugglefor a democraticAustria,for a democraticrepublic."What-
ever the theoreticalmeritsof theirnew position,Austrian Communistleaders
shrewdlyanticipatedthe powerfulimpactof nationalism,as distinguishedfrom
antifascism,on the strugglesof European peoples against Nazi Germany,to
whichWorld War II in particularbears witness.
On the eve of Austria's annexation,the Communists,like the Socialists,

stressedthe importanceof Austria'spoliticalindependence, the need forbroad-
eningthenarrowbase of theAustriangovernment, and assertedthatthe defense
of Austriansovereigntywas essentialnot only for the Austrianpeople but for
all peoples of the Danubian realmand for the European balance of power and
European peace. But they went furtherthan the Austrian Social Democrats
in assertingthat Austrian nationalitywas distinctfromthe German nation.
AlfredKlahr, in several theoreticalarticlesin 1937, elaboratedon the thesis
thatthe Austrianswere a separatenation.54He pointedto a unique Austrian
culturegroundedin a specificallyAustrian history,and a national character
whichhad been describedby numerousAustrianauthorsand poets. He stated
that,in a letterto Victor Adler, FriedrichEngels had already writtenof the
Austrians'"gay excitabletemperament" and had tracedthis traitto the "happy
Celto-Germnanic-Slavic racial mixturein whichthe Germanelementprevailed."
Klahr also quoted Stalin's statementthat commonlanguage alone did not es-
tablishcommonnationality,citing England and North America as examples.
In his article,"On the National Question in Austria," Klahr raised this
question: "Can we, the CommunistParty,and the revolutionary workingclass
openlyacknowledgeand fosterthe developmentof the Austrian nation?" To
this he replied that "'we not only can do this; but we must do it today and
actuallyhave done it already."55He gave the followingexamplesto supporthis
contention:the practicalstruggleof the partyand Austrianworkingclass on
behalfof Austrianindependencehad already promotedan orientationtoward
nationalismamongthepeople.The victoryof fascismin Germanyhad sharpened
the strugglefor independencein all European countries.An attack on Aus-
trianindependence,director indirect(as in Danzig), was a blow not only to
the Austrianpeople,but also threatenedthe independenceof othernationalities
of CentralEurope and increasedthe peril of war. Some mightsay, Klahr con-
tinued,thatAustrianCommunistsfoughtforthe independenceof the Austrian
statebut not forthe nationalindependenceof Austria.Yet it was "quite wrong,
because [it was] quite formalistic,"to thus demarcatepolitical and national
independence, whichwere "most closely" intertwined. Austria's historiccourse
had shaped a unique outlook,temperament, and nationalcharacter.Therefore,
the strugglefor the preservationof Austria's sovereigntymeant the struggle
forthe preservationof the nationalcharacterand heritageof the Austrianpeo-
ple. Subjugationby Hitler would not only deliverthe Austrianpopulationto
Weg und
54. Ibid.,p. 27; see also AlfredKlahr,"Zur nationalenFrage in Osterreich,"
Ziel, March 1937,and April 1937 (reprinted in Die Kommunisten im Kampf,pp. 26-39).
55. Klahr,"Zur nationalenFrage"; also in Die Kommunisten im Kampf,pp. 28-29.
18 Slavic Review
the most brutalpoliticalsystemknown in history,but would also signifyits

nationaloppressionby Germanfascism."There maybe nationaloppressionalso
wherethenationaloppressorspeaksthesamelanguage."
In anotherarticleon the nationalquestionand the positionof the Com-
munistsin Austria,56Klahr revealedwhat he consideredthe errorsand falsifi-
cations of the gesamtdeutschhistoricalperception.But he also criticizedthe
Habsburglegendol the"fatherland front"and stressedthe importanceof forging
new ideologicalweapons for the struggleof the proletariat.A new historical
conceptionwhich would challengethe gesamitdeutsch thesis was the answer.
Reviewingthehistoryof the Austrianlabor movement, Klahr demonstrated that
in the 1890s the Austrian Social Democratic Party was no longer oriented
toward the Anschlussof Austria with Germany,but favoredthe preservation
of the territorialintegrityof the Habsburg Empire. German Austria was to
remainoutside the Reich. This orientationhad become clear when the party
had adopted its nationalityprogramin Briinnin 1899. Even when the empire
actuallybrokeup in earlyNovember1918,theconventionof the AustrianSocial
DemocraticParty, Klahr recalled,was primarilyconcernedwith cooperating
withthe new nationalstates of the Danubian realm and only secondarilywith
Anschlusswith Germany.Otto Bauer himselfhad concededthat the mass of
Austrianworkerswas at firstcool towardthe idea of union withthe Reich. It
was only the Germanrevolutionof November9, 1918, the solidaritywith the
Germanyof Bebel, Liebknecht,and Luxemburg,and the prospectof socialism
in CentralEurope, that,accordingto Klahr,had won the Austrianworkersover
to the conceptof Anschluss.
Austrian communismcontinuedits struggleagainst the Nazi conceptof
Grossdeutschland even afterthe annexation.It was a lie, Klahr asserted,that
Austrianshad wantedAnschlusswiththe Third Reich and a lie that theyhad
acquiescedin the annexation.The Nazis wantedfirstto extenda barbariandic-
tatorshipto all German-speaking peoplesunderthe slogan"Ein Volk, ein Reich,
ein Fiihrer"and thento establishthe hegemonyof the Third Reich in Europe.
What they had accomplishedon March 11, 1938, was to establishan alien,
imperialist dominationin Austria.Klahr concededthatthegrossdeutschdemands
of 1848 had had a revolutionary But duringWorld
and progressivesignificance.
War I, in his 1916 articleabout the Juniusbrochure,Lenin had suspectedthat
if therehad then existed a grossdeutschrepublic,it would have conductedas
imperialista war as thekaiserand his generalshad waged.
Klahr aimedsomeofhis majorcriticisms againsttheconceptofgrossdeutsch
Romanticism.Immediatelyafter the annexationof Austria, German fascism
had begun to assail Czechoslovakiaand incite the German minoritiesagainst
the states in whichtheylived. It attemptedto harnessgrossdeutschtraditions
of the past to its imperialisticwar policy. However unfair his criticismof
Austriansocial democracy,Klahr perceivedtheweaknessesof thegesamtdeutsch
ideologywhichhad long permeatednot only Socialist but also ChristianSocial
thought.Schuschniggclearly wanted Austria's independence,but because of
his fatefulgesamtdeutsch conceptionof Austria as the "second Germanstate,"
56. Alfred Klahr, "Die nationale Frage und die Stellungnahme der Kommunisten in
Osterreich,"CommunistInternational,October 1937; see also OS,NPA, C56, p. 44.
he had furnishedthe Austrianpeople withthe noose by whichGermanfascism

had strangledthecountryand himself.The grossdeutsch orientationoftheleader-
ship of the AustrianSocial Democratsduringthe last decades had been equally
fateful.It had allegedlynot recognizedthe new importanceof the grossdeutsch
idea in theera of imperialism. Klahr faultedthe Social Democratsfornot having
assumedvigorousleadershipof the movementforindependencesoon after1933.
Though the author claimed that already in 1925 the CommunistParty had
drawn the line against the bourgeois-national grossdeutschAnschluss solution
of the Social Democrats,he conceded"thatonlyin the last years,also belatedly,
it had begunto lead a struggleagainstthe grossdeutschorientation."57
The line of thoughtof Otto Bauer, who was both the politicalleader and
the leading theoreticianof Austria's Social Democrats,survived,accordingto
Klalir, among the RevolutionarySocialists and made polemicswith them in-
escapable.Accordingto the author,theonlybeneficiary of the AustrianSocialist
thesisof the irreversibilityof the Anschlusswas National Socialism. Bauer and
the Revolutionary Socialistshad acquiescedin thefaitaccompliof the Anschluss,
and theirthesis strengthened reactionand threatenedEuropean peace. There
existedin realityno "Gesacmtdeutschtum," but only different German-speaking
peoples. Fascist imperialismclaimedthat,because of the alleged "sameness of
blood,"therewas onlyone Germanpeople,whilein actualitytherewere numer-
ous peoplessuch as the Austrians,the GermanSwiss, the Alsatians,the Sudeten
Germans,and so forth.Konrad Henlein,the "Fiihrer"of the SudetenGermans,
shouldbe gratefulto Otto Bauer! "The strongestweapon of nationalfascismis
its nationaldemagoguerie.The Germanproletariatcannotachieve its liberation
nor,in the eventof the outbreakof war, fighttodayforpeace unless it system-
aticallyfreesitselffromthe national-fascist mythand the illusionthatGermany
had a rightto attachto herselfall the remainingGerman-speaking borderre-
gions." Otto Bauer's solution,even thoughit is presentedas a slogan for the
future,"opens all dams and permitsthe chauvinistNazi poison to be poured
into the workers'consciousness."58
In a continuationof his polemics "against Pan-Germanismin the labor
movement,"Klahr took the writerFritz Valentinto task. Like most Austrian
Socialists,Valentin,writingin Der sozialistischeKampf in Paris, acceptedthe
realityand finalityof the Anschluss.59Klahr criticizedwhat in his opinion
amountedto a recognitionof Austria's annexationand to a rejectionof the
nationalstrugglefor self-determination of the Austrianpeople. He singledout
Valentin's observationthat throughthe victoryof fascismthe unificationof
Europe had to some extentalreadybegun.Klahr comparedthisfaultyreasoning
withthatof geopoliticswhichtriedto explain "scientifically" why the rapacious
endeavorsof Germanfinancecapital were not in fact rapacious. He castigated
the use of such Fascist conceptsas "grossraumig,""kleinrdumig," and "gesacmt-
57. Alfred Klahr, "Zur Diskussion iiber die Annexion," Weg und Ziel, August 1938
(reprintedin Die Kommunistenim Kampf, pp. 93-98).
58. Ibid.
59. F. Valentin, "Gibt es eine 6sterreichische Nation ?," Der sozialistische Kampf
(Paris), 1938, nos. 9 and 10; F. Valentin, "Der faschistischeFrieden und die europaische
Revolution,ibid., 1938, no. 11; and Klahr's reply in Weg und Ziel, January 1939 (reprinted
in Die Kommunistenim Kampf, p. 109).
20 Slavic Review
deutsch,"and ridiculedthosewho lookedupon the victoryof fascismin Europe

as a steptowarda SocialistEurope.
Clearly,the volte-faceof Austrian Communistsin the seeminglyesoteric
theoreticaldiscussionof the existenceof a separate Austrian nationalitywas
startling.An abruptchange had takenplace fromfirstendorsingthe Anschluss
to ultimatelyopposingthe conceptof unification,not only duringbut also after
Hitler's Third Reich. This view reflected,
of course,the change in the Soviet
outlookon the European scene.
What was the attitudeof the Soviets to Austria and the Anschlusson the
eve of Hitler's coup against Vienna? In Berchtesgaden,German diplomacy
had encounteredfirstthe stubbornresistanceof Schuschnigg,but, accordingto
Izvestiia,60it had quicklyproducedeffectivemeans to break it. The German
militarymaneuversalong the frontiermightnot have had the desired effectif
Berlin diplomacyhad not secured in advance the "benevolentneutrality"of
London and the capitulationof Rome. The decisionof the Austriangovernment
to implementthe changesHitler demandedmade the situationin Europe more
perilous than ever. The amnestyof Hitler terroristsand the returnof the
"AustrianLegion" were merelysteps on the road to the Anschluss.The latter,
in turn,would lead Hitler'sGermanyto the Balkans,the Mediterranean, and the
Near East. Despite theseevents,Izvestiia assertedthatSchuschnigghad not yet
completely capitulated.
Through concessionsin Central Europe, Britishdiplomacy,Izvestiia con-
tinued,wished to bringabout a shiftof forcesthat would diminishthe threat
to England in the Mediterraneanarea and the Near East. London still hoped
to wean Italyaway fromGermany,but had apparentlyoverestimated the rational
powersof Italian fascismand of Mussoliniin particular.France's positionwas
contingent on Britain's.Accordingto Soviet thinking,therefore, the main fault
for Austria's desperatesituationlay withthe policies of Great Britain,France,
and Italy.Finally,Germanfascismcould also counton thesympathetic neutrality
of Yugoslavia. Givenall thesecircumstances, the Schuschnigggovernment could
not expect help fromabroad. Austria was certainlyready to unite all of its
forcesto fightthe brownperil. But the reactionaryand clerical Austriandic-
tatorship,whichin 1934 had smashedtheworkers'organizations, triedto prevent
such reconciliationby all means. Izvestiia's assessmentof Austria's foreignand
domesticsituationafterthe Berchtesgadenconferenceended on this pessimistic
note. An articlein Pravdcaon the same day referredto the reorganizationof
the Austrian governmentas a "Cold Hitler-Putsch."'61 Though the editorial
asserted that the Austrian people did not want to submitto the slavery of
Hitler'sdictatorship,it held out littlehope forAustria.
The attitudeof both the USSR and the Cominternto the faitaccompliof
the Germanannexationof Austria on March 13, 1938, was expressed in an
articlein CommunistInternational.62 Long beforeMarch 4, 1938, it declared,
60. Izvestiia,February17, 1938; A. J., "A First Step on the Road to the Anschluss,"
in OS,NPA, C56,pp.914-18.
61. Pravda,February17,1938;A. J.,"A FirstStep,"pp.919-22.
62. F. Denegel,"The Seizure of Austriaand the Masses of the People of Germany,"
Communist April 1938,pp. 343-47.
International,
GermanFascists had made preparationsfor the invasion of Austria and the

enslavementof the Austrianpeople. Even thoughthe fascistclericalregimeof
the "fatherlandfront"had deprivedthe Austrian people of their rightsand
destroyedthepartiesof the workingclass, the tradeunions,and peasant organ-
izations,"the Austrianproletariat,the huge majorityof the Austrianpeasants
-the overwhelming majorityof the Austrianpeople-unanimouslyrejectedthe
idea of havinganythingin commonwith Hitler's Germany."It was essential
forthe entireGermannationto understandthat Hitler and his associates "lie
shamelessly"when they speak of the "liberation"of the Austriansand when
theyassert that with this "liberation"theywere only fulfilling the will of the
Austrianpeople. "Germantroopshad come to Austrianot as liberators,but as
invaders,. . . as imperialistconquerors."Therefore,it was "the sacred duty"
of the Germanworkers,peasants,and intellectuals to rise in defenseof Austria's
rightto self-determination. Despite Austrians'historicaland culturalties with
Germany,Austrianswantedto be free,and "as an independentand freepeople,
to join with a trulyfree Germanpeople and otherfree European nations in
contributing their share to the developmentof a new higher culture." The
German people and primarilythe German workingclass had to realize that
thestruggleoftheAustrianpeopleforlibertyand independencewas not directed
against the German nation but, on the contrary,correspondedto the latter's
deepest interests.It required close collaboration,"a united front,"between
Social Democratsand Communistsin the Reich and betweenthem and their
refugeeleaders abroad. In lightof the outragesagainst Austria committedby
Hitler,Social Democrats'criticismof the Moscow trial of the Bloc of Rightists
and Trotskyitesin a recentissue of Der Neue Vorwdrtswas sharplycastigated,
because it made collaborationbetween Social Democrats and Communists
difficult.
The positionof the AustrianCommunistsin the wake of Austria's annex-
ationwas expressedin a manifestoof the CentralCommitteeof the Communist
Party of Austria,whichwas publishedin the pages of the French Communist
daily L'Humanite'on March 13, 1938. Accordingto the manifesto,Hitler had
subjugatedAustriain a militarysense only.63He had imposeda foreigngovern-
ment just three days beforethe schedulednational plebiscitewhich his own
agents had demandedfor many years. He had called it offfor fear of the
electoraldefeathe would have suffered.Berchtesgadenactuallyhad increased
the people's resistance"a hundredfold,"but it was weakenedwhen Hitler sent
his artillery,
tanks,and airplanesagainstthe unitedfrontof the Austrianpeople.
The manifestocalled upon Socialists and Catholics,workersand peasants,to
unite. It appealed to all Austriansto "resist the foreignintrudersand their
agents," and maintainedthat "all differences of outlook,all party differences
recedebeforethe sacred task now confronting the Austrianpeople." Of course,
Communistappeals to chase Hitler's soldiersout of Austria,to disregardthe
Nazi terror,and to make "'Red-White-Red unto Death' a red slogan" were
ratherempty.Appeals to the peoples of Europe and the world-who had just
demonstratedtheir own weakness and helplessnessto assist Austria-were
similarlyfatuous.These peoples were remindedthat not only was the peace
63. L'Humanite,March 13, 1938; Communist April 1938,p. 405.

International,
22 Slavic Review
of the Danube at stake,but also the peace of Europe, and thateverycapitulation

was an encouragement of Hitler's aggression.
The rhetoricof otherEuropean Communistpartieswas identicalor similar
in purpose.The CentralCommitteeof the GermanCommunistParty,paralleling
the Austrian manifestoand Soviet policy, warned that Hitler, throughhis
newest "crime,"Ywas relentlesslymovingtoward war. Contraryto his claim
of having "liberated"Austria, Hitler had in fact robbed the Austrian people
oftheirrightto self-determination. His international
provocationswere plunging
the Germansinto a catastropheand threatening the veryexistenceof Germany
herself.64The implicationsseemed clear. Hitler's victoryover Austria not-
withstanding, it was necessaryfor GermanCommuniststo continueto oppose
himand to helpfreeAustriafromitschainsand restoreitsindependence.
The manifestoofthe CentralCommitteeof the CommunistPartyof Czecho-
slovakiawarnedits own people thatthe entryof the troopsof the Third Reich
into Austria,which had "capitulated,"had increasedthe danger of a horrible
new war. All of Czechoslovakiahad to unite to stop Fascist violenceand de-
fend peace and internationaltreaties."Long live the united frontin defense
of the Republic of Czechoslovakia!"65 The appeal of the French Communist
Party similarlyreflectedthe traumaticimpactof Hitler's "thunderbolt"against
Austriaand Europe. Austria had becomeGermany's"vassal state." The subju-
gationof Austriaby the Berlingovernment was "only a stage in the realization
of thegreatplan of conquest."From now on Austriaformedthebridgebetween
two totalitarianstates whose threatsagainst France could not be heard with
indifferenceby any Frenchmanworthyof his name. The fate of France was
being decided both in CentralEurope and in Spain. The French Communist
appeal ended by emphasizingthe threatto France in her entirety, a concluding
note which harmonizedwith the increasinglynatiornal posture of the French
CommunistPartyon the eve of World War II.
Even afterthe annexationof Austriathe pages of CommunistInternational
reflectedthe impactof Hitler's accumulationof power in CentralEurope and
the Communistassessmentof the new and dangeroussituation.66 The author
of "InternationalSolidaritywith the Austrian People" assured readers that
CommunistInternationalwas in the frontranksof the movementvoicingsoli-
daritywith the Austrians.In the words of the GermanCommunistParty,the
Austrianswerelikea colonialpeoplesubjectedto robberyby Hitler,but the Ger-
man workingclass had to and would dissociateitselffromthe unprecedented
violencecommitted by Hitler againstAustria.
The CommunistInternationalcontinued to echo the sympathywhich
Austria'sdestructionhad arousednotonlyamongCommunist circlesbutthrough-
out Europe.67The journal reportedon meetingsheld in behalfof Austria and
its workingpeople,whichwere organizedby the Communists, the Labor Party,
the Liberals,and variouspeace movementcommitteesand cooperatives,as well
as mass demonstrations in London and Manchester.The CommunistParty of
64. Cornmunist April1938,pp.406-7.

International,
65. Ibid.,p. 406.
66. Ibid.,May 1938,pp.491-92ff.
67. Ibid.
Great Britain had issued a pamphletby Harry Pollitt entitledAustria, over

one hundredthousandcopies of which had been sold. In France, the Inter-
national Peace Campaign had adopted a resolutionprotestingfascism,and
Catholicsexpressedtheirdisgustover the "capitulation"of the Austrianclergy
to Hitler.68
At the time of Austria's annexationby Germany,the USSR was in no
positionto stemthe tide of Nazi expansionismin CentralEurope. Like France
and Great Britain,the Soviet Union was geographicallytoo remotefromthe
theaterof eventsto throwher weightintothe scales. Like the Westernpowers,
the Sovietswere neithermilitarilynor psychologicallypreparedto rendereffec-
tive assistance.In spite of the increasedthreatto Czechoslovakia,the USSR
apparentlydid not believe that Austria's annexationwould adverselyaffectits
own vital nationalinterests.But Moscow made its oppositionclear. And after
the German annexationof Austria, the USSR and the Austrian Communist
Party, not to mention Communistparties throughoutthe rest of Europe,
promptlydeviseda programforthe restorationof Austria'sindependence.
The program,of course,had littlepracticalor immediatesignificance. But
it mustbe acknowledgedthat no otherAustrianparties-neitherthe Christian
Socials nor the Social Democratsnor the RevolutionarySocialists-had even
mentionedanythingsimilar. They were still benumbedand incapable of re-
assessingAustria's state of subjugationor of chartingits future.The struggle
for the liberationof Austria thus pittedthe tiny CommunistParty not only
againstthe Nazi conquerorbut also againstthe AustrianSocial Democratsand
RevolutionarySocialists.In his article"Marxism and AustrianIndependence,"
Peter Wieden (Ernst Fischer) accused Austrian Socialist leaders of having
-onceagain embracedthe Nazi conceptof a GreaterGermanywhich underlay
the union.69Denouncingwhat he called the Nazis' falsificationof history-that
is, the doctrineof the inevitabilityand progressivenessof Austria's inclusion
into the Reich and the creationof a fullyunited Germany-Fischer accused
Karl Rennerand Otto Bauer of havingcome forwardas chiefwitnessesfor a
Nazi-dominatedGreaterGermany.Citing Bauer's articlein Der sozialistische
Kampf (Paris), he interpretedBauer's positionin favor of a gesamtdeutsche
revolutionas a repudiationof the struggleforAustria's independence.He ridi-
culed Bauer's recommendation to adopt a "revolutionary"attitudetoward the
fait accompli of Austria's occupationand both his and Renner's approval of
the Anschluss,even thoughit was effected by force.
Turning to the positionof Marx and Engels as bindingauthoritiesfor
both Social Democratsand Communists,Fischer claimed firstthat the quota-
tions used were cited out of context.Marx and Engels had always judged a
national question,for example the Irish or the Alsatian question,from the
standpointof the revolutionary movement.The struggleof the Austrianpeople
was aimednotonlyagainstsocial oppressionbut also againstnationaloppression
and foreignrule. The militaryconquestof Austriaby Germanimperialismhad
aroused the deepesthatredof the brown-shirted conquerors.Bitternessagainst
the Germanofficialsand jailers had spread to the ranks of AustrianNational
Socialiststhemselves.Along with Communists,Socialists,and Catholics,there
68. Ibid.,pp.493-94.
69. Ibid., June 1938,p. 542.
24 Slavic Review
werenow evenAustrianNazis in prisonsand concentration camps.The de facto

masterof Austriawas Buerckel,the Germangovernor,not the Austrian,Seyss
Inquart. Clearly,AustrianCommunistpolicywas tryingto establishan under-
groundpopularfront(extendingas farto therightas some disillusionedAustrian
Nazis) and preparingforthe struggleforthe restorationof Austria'sindepend-
ence. While the authorpointedto what he considereda theoreticalweaknessof
Austriansocialism,the apparentwillingnessto acceptthe "judgmentof history"
(in otherwords,therealityof theAnschluss),he resortedto outrightdistortions
of the actual positionof his opponents,claimingthat a directroad led from
Bauer's allegedlyRomantictheoryof nationality to therace theoryofthe Nazis.70
After 1848, the author stated, Marx and Engels had not renouncedthe idea
of a Greater Germany,because the Russian tsar, the Austrian emperor,and
Napoleon III representedthe most reactionarypowers of that time. Today,
however,Hitler's Germanywas "the mostreactionary, the mostbarbarousstate
in Europe." The demandfor"unionof all Germansin theThird Reich" signified
the subjugationof the Austrians,the Czechs, the Hungarians,the Swiss, the
Dutch, and othersto Germanfascism.In the struggleagainst Hitler and the
Anschluss,"a new Austriannationalconsciousnesshad arisenamongthe masses
of the Austrian people" (emphasis in the original). Otto Bauer, the author
charged,was approachingthe Austrian question not as a Marxist, but as a
Pan-Germanphilistine.While Hitler was systematically exterminatingevery-
thingAustrianand even kepttheAustrianNazis at bay,Austriawas developing
intoa nationin its own right.Consequently, it was "one of the importanttasks
ofall anti-Fasciststo place thestruggleagainstforeignrule,forthe independence
of Austriaeverywhere in the foreground."
A similarstanceon the new Austriannationalism-supportforan Austrian
popular frontreachingfromthe CommunistLeft to the Austrian Fascist but
anti-Nazi Rightand stressingthe need to combatgrossdeutschconceptsand to
restoreAustria's lost independence-are the major themesof anotherarticle
in CommunistInternational,"The German Working Class and 'Greater Ger-
many,'" by Kurt Funk. This authoralso disputedcurrenttheories,extending
beyondAustrianNazi circles,whichwere based upon "race" and "blood" and
justifiedthe annexation of Austria on the grounds that Austrians were a
part of the Germannation.71Funk chargedthatthis view-actually rootedin a
distortionof history-had influencedeven noted Social Democraticdailies such
as Het Volk. Similarly,in February1938,the Social DemocraticParty of Ger-
manyhad declaredthatalthoughit did not agree withHitler's method,it never-
theless supporteda Greater Germany.Sozialdemokrat,the newspaperof the
German Social DemocraticParty in Czechoslovakia,reportedthat the leader-
ship of the German Socialist Party opposed the policy of restoringAustrian
independenceand that it consideredsuch an endeavorreactionary.The author
chargedthat Social Democraticpoliticianswere affectedby National Socialist
Pan-Germantendencies,and particularlycriticized Sollman and Jaksch for
adoptingNazi slogans such as "problemsof space" and "march of Germanls
throughhistory."The authorconfirmedthat the Nazis falsifiedAustrianhis-
70. Ibid.,pp. 546-49.

71. Kurt Funk,"The GermanWorkingClass and 'GreaterGermany,'"ibid.,pp. 550-55.
tory,deliberately veilingnationalproblemsin mysticalobscurity.They claimed
that,since the establishment of the Reich in 1871, Austria had been outside
its sphere.Actually,Germanyand Austria had developedundertheirown eco-
nomicand culturalconditionsever since 1866. Therefore,a "GreaterGermany"
meant only new fettersfor the Germanpeople. "Today, a few monthsafter
Austria's annexation,voices were heard in Germanyasking: 'What good is
Austriato us, anyhow?' . . . The annexationof Austria fullyproved that the
Pan-Germanpolicy of conquestunleashesand fomentsthe basest chauvinistic
instincts,dominationand plunderingof othernations,and leads to the creation
and growthof parasiticelementsof the population."
AfterAustria'sannexation,the Communistsmade a special appeal to Aus-
trianCatholics.In its article,"Swastika and Christianity,"the CommunistIn-
ternationalcontrastedthe persecutionof Catholicsin Austria,"the tortureand
murderof leading Catholic politicians,"to the guaranteeof "full freedomof
beliefand opinion" in the Soviet constitution and in Soviet life.72"We Com-
munists,"the writerclaimed,"regardall Catholicsand Protestantswho do not
betraythe people to Hitler but defendtheir rightto freedomof belief and
opinionagainsthim as our fellow-fighters." Austriancommunismtriedto keep
the door of the unitedfrontopen to all, includingCatholics.The articledecried
the propagationof Hitler as the "German Messiah" and denouncedthe Nazi
comparisonof Planetta,the murdererof Dol]fuss,with Christ.
The Communiststried to temptothers as well. On November9, 1938,
Ernst Fischer,the editorof CommunistInternational, publishedanotherarticle
(under the pseudonymPeter Wieden), entitled"The Struggleof the Austrian
People forTheir NationalIndependence."73 Not onlythe masses of the Austrian
people who followedthe Socialist,Communist,and Catholicparties,but, to an
increasingextent,even the overwhelming majorityof the AustrianNazis them-
selves regardedthe dictatorshipof German fascismin Austria as intolerable
and openlydescribedit as an alien tyranny."Even that small [ !] minorityof
theAustrianpeople who had takenup a positiveattitudetowardsthe Anschluss
were,as theweekswentby,becomingmoreand moreconvincedthatthe German
potentatesregardedtheir Austrian subjects not as a part and parcel of the
Germannation but as a conqueredrace." The author quoted fromthe clan-
destineMitteilungsblatt, publishedby the Austrian Nazis, which chargedthat
Reich CommissarBuerckelpersecuted"old fighters"amongthe Austrians.The
journal accused Buerckelof aimingnot at a Germanicunion of Germanyand
Austria "but at the subjectionof Austria to Prussia's domination."Virtually
everyAustrianhad therebybecome a targetof Communistpropaganda.Com-
munist policy was out to create a broad popular front,which indeed came
into existenceafterthe Austrian liberationin 1945, withoutgiving Austrian
communismmore than a transitoryand minor political role. According to
Wieden, the dismemberment of Austria into a bundle of German provinces,
the blottingout even of the old historicname of Austria-all this was charac-
teristicof the essenceof unexpurgatedGermandomination.The authorsharply
72. Communist August1938,pp.720-22.

International,
to Freies Deutschland,no. 31 (1938) and
73. Ibid.,pp. 847-59; thiscontainsreferences
to Der Neue Vorwirts,no.273 (1938).
26 Slavic Review
rebukedseveral Germanand Austrian Social Democrats' claims to have dis-

cernedsome "progress"in the annexationof Austria by Germanimperialism.
They tendedto approve of the union, since ultimatelyfascismwould lead to
socialismin any case. What the Communistauthorfailedto pointout was that
thisline of reasoningwas quite similarto thatof the GermanCommullistParty
priorto Hitler's seizure of power in Germany,in its argumentthat the Nazifi-
cationof Germanywould ultimatelyturn out to be a mere temporarysetback
on the road to German "progress." The author continuedby approvingthe
stance of other contemporarySocial Democraticleaders, for examiplethat of
C.G., who wrote in Der Neue Vorwarts: "Every approach to the 'Greater
Germany'aims of conquest by the Third Reich must for that reason.be as
firmly avoided as the appearanceof the recognitionof the borderchalngeswhich
the Third Reich made by force."Austriancommunism,in line with the new
policy of the USSR, refusedto recognizeAustria's annexationor the concept
ofa GreaterGermany.
Duringand towardtheend ofthewar,thispositionservedcoliimullismiwell.
Even prewar Germanconquestssuch as the 1938 annexationof Austria were
simplyannulledby the West, in accordancewith Soviet policy afterthe late
1930s and thatof the AustrianCommunistParty.In 1943, the Westernpowers
and the USSR joined in the Moscow declarationof Austrian independelnce,
and thereafter the major Austrianpoliticalpartiesalso adoptedthisverystance.
Thus, theabruptchangeoftheAustrianCommunistPartyon the Anschluss

issue about 1937 ultimately becamea trailblazerin Austrianpolitics,despiteits
clearlyopportunistic basis. AfterAustria's liberation,however,it failed to pay
the AustrianCommunistParty any politicaldividends.

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The Soviet Union, the Austrian Communist Party, and the Anschluss Question, 1918-1938

Author(s): Alfred D. Low

The Soviet Union,the AustrianCommunistParty,

Shortlyafterthe Bolsheviksseized power in October 1917, theywere con-

1. Alfred D. Low, The Anschluss Movemnent

Bolshevikaccession to power in Russia soon led to the Treaty of Brest-

who was held primarilyresponsiblefor the bloody repressionof the German

gated the Treaty of St. Germain,declaringthat the "murderouspeace" of St.

10. Die RoteFahne (Vienna), July7 andJuly31, 1919.

14. Envoy's reportto Austrian Foreign MinisterMataja, in ibid.,p. 99.

would not be satisfiedby a half-measuresuch as a customsunion and would

18. Pravda,March23, 1931;see also OS,NPA, C55,pp.507-8.

Frenchimperialism, as a possible threatto both Russia and Germany.France

24. Izvestiia,February29, 1932;see also OS,NPA, C55,pp.201 ff.

28. Envoy'sreport,in ibid.,p. 530.

views,but reflectedan opinionwidelyheld-though not prevailing-in official

31. Ibid.,p. 55.

Hostilepiecesby formerSchutzbiindler(membersof the AustrianSocial Demo-

36. Ibid.,pp.365-67;see also Izvestiia,January27,1936.

referenceto Austria's obligationto act "as a German state." Pravda asserted

41. OS,NPA, C56,p. 487.

In the struggleagainstthe Anschluss,ideologywas bound to play an im-

questionwas boththeoretically and practicallyof "outstanding importance."48

48. Fischer, Das Ende einer Illusion, p. 59.

Still,accordingto Koplenig,fascismthreatenedAustriansovereignty, and

52. Ibid.,pp. 17-20.

On the eve of Austria's annexation,the Communists,like the Socialists,

the most brutalpoliticalsystemknown in history,but would also signifyits

he had furnishedthe Austrianpeople withthe noose by whichGermanfascism

deutsch,"and ridiculedthosewho lookedupon the victoryof fascismin Europe

GermanFascists had made preparationsfor the invasion of Austria and the

63. L'Humanite,March 13, 1938; Communist April 1938,p. 405.

of the Danube at stake,but also the peace of Europe, and thateverycapitulation

64. Cornmunist April1938,pp.406-7.

Great Britain had issued a pamphletby Harry Pollitt entitledAustria, over

werenow evenAustrianNazis in prisonsand concentration camps.The de facto

70. Ibid.,pp. 546-49.

72. Communist August1938,pp.720-22.

rebukedseveral Germanand Austrian Social Democrats' claims to have dis-

Thus, theabruptchangeoftheAustrianCommunistPartyon the Anschluss

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