Liberalism and World Politics

Author(s): Michael W. Doyle

Source: The American Political Science Review , Dec., 1986, Vol. 80, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp.
1151-1169
Published by: American Political Science Association

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1960861

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 LIBERALISM AND
WORLD POLITICS
MICHAEL W. DOYLE
Johns Hopkins University

Building on a growing literature in international political scie

reexamine the traditional liberal claim that governments founded on a resp
individual liberty exercise "restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in their foreig
look at three distinct theoretical traditions of liberalism, attributable to three the
Schumpeter, a democratic capitalist whose explanation of liberal pacifism w
invoke; Machiavelli, a classical republican whose glory is an imperialism
practice; and Kant, a liberal republican whose theory of internationalism best
for what we are. Despite the contradictions of liberal pacifism and liberal impe
find, with Kant and other democratic republicans, that liberalism does leave a
legacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful. Th
also prone to make war. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant
they would, and have also discovered liberal reasons for aggression, as he fear
might. I conclude by arguing that the differences among liberal pacifism
imperialism, and Kant's internationalism are not arbitrary. They are rooted in
conceptions of the citizen and the state.

Promoting freedom elect their governments, wars become im-

will produce peace, we have often been possible. Furthermore, citizens appreciate
told. In a speech before the British Parlia- that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed
ment in June of 1982, President Reagan only under. conditions of peace. Thus the
proclaimed that governments founded on very existence of liberal states, such as the
a respect for individual liberty exercise U.S., Japan, and our European allies,
"restraint" and "peaceful intentions" in makes for peace.
their foreign policy. He then announced a Building on a growing literature in in-
"crusade for freedom" and a "campaign ternational political science, I reexamine
for democratic development" (Reagan, the liberal claim President Reagan re-
June 9, 1982). iterated for us. I look at three distinct
In making these claims the president theoretical traditions of liberalism, at-
joined a long list of liberal theorists (and tributable to three theorists: Schumpeter,
propagandists) and echoed an old argu- a brilliant explicator of the liberal
ment: the aggressive instincts of pacifism the president invoked; Machia-
authoritarian leaders and totalitarian velli, rul- a classical republican whose glory is
ing parties make for war. Liberal states, an imperialism we often practice; and
founded on such individual rights as Kant.
equality before the law, free speech and Despite the contradictions of liberal
other civil liberties, private property, and pacifism and liberal imperialism, I find,
elected representation are fundamentallywith Kant and other liberal republicans,
against war this argument asserts. Whenthat liberalism does leave a coherent
the citizens who bear the burdens of warlegacy on foreign affairs. Liberal states are

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

VOL. 80 NO. 4 DECEMBER, 1986

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 80

different. They are indeed peaceful, yet (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 6). Excluding im-
they are also prone to make war, as the perialisms that were mere "catchwords"
U.S. and our "freedom fighters" are now and those that were "object-ful" (e.g.,
doing, not so covertly, against Nicaragua. defensive imperialism), he traces the roots
Liberal states have created a separate of objectless imperialism to three sources,
peace, as Kant argued they would, and each an atavism. Modern imperialism,
have also discovered liberal reasons for according to Schumpeter, resulted from
aggression, as he feared they might. I con- the combined impact of a "war machine,"
clude by arguing that the differences warlike instincts, and export
among liberal pacifism, liberal im- monopolism.
perialism, and Kant's liberal interna- Once necessary, the war machine later
tionalism are not arbitrary but rooted indeveloped a life of its own and took con-
differing conceptions of the citizen and trol of a state's foreign policy: "Created
the state. by the wars that required it, the machine
now created the wars it required"
Liberal Pacifism (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 25). Thus,
Schumpeter tells us that the army of an
There is no canonical description of cient Egypt, created to drive the Hyksos
liberalism. What we tend to call liberal out of Egypt, took over the state and pur-
resembles a family portrait of principlessued militaristic imperialism. Like the
and institutions, recognizable by certain later armies of the courts of absolutist
characteristics-for example, individual Europe, it fought wars for the sake of
freedom, political participation, private glory and booty, for the sake of warriors
property, and equality of opportunity- and monarchs-wars gratia warriors.
that most liberal states share, although A warlike disposition, elsewhere called
none has perfected them all. Joseph "instinctual elements of bloody
Schumpeter clearly fits within this familyprimitivism," is the natural ideology o
when he considers the international ef- war machine. It also exists independent
fects of capitalism and democracy. the Persians, says Schumpeter (1955, pp.
Schumpeter's "Sociology of Im- 25-32), were a warrior nation from the
perialisms," published in 1919, made a outset.
coherent and sustained argument con- Under modern capitalism, export
cerning the pacifying (in the sense of monopolists, the third source of modem
nonaggressive) effects of liberal institu- imperialism, push for imperialist expan-
tions and principles (Schumpeter, 1955; sion as a way to expand their closed
see also Doyle, 1986, pp. 155-59). Unlike markets. The absolute monarchies were
some of the earlier liberal theorists who the last clear-cut imperialisms.
focused on a single feature such as trade Nineteenth-century imperialisms mere
(Montesquieu, 1949, vol. 1, bk. 20, chap. represent the vestiges of the imperialism
1) or failed to examine critically the created by Louis XIV and Catherine th
arguments they were advancing, Great. Thus, the export monopolists ar
Schumpeter saw the interaction of an atavism of the absolute monarchies
capitalism and democracy as the founda- for they depend completely on the tarif
tion of liberal pacifism, and he tested hisimposed by the monarchs and their
arguments in a sociology of historical militaristic successors for revenue
imperialisms. (Schumpeter, 1955, p. 82-83). Without
He defines imperialism as "an objectless tariffs, monopolies would be eliminated
disposition on the part of a state by foreign competition.
to unlimited forcible expansion" Modem (nineteenth century) imperi-

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 1986 Liberalism and World Politics

alism, therefore, rests on an atavistic war Schumpeter's explanation for liberal

machine, militaristic attitudes left over pacifism is quite simple: Only war profi-
from the days of monarchical wars, and teers and military aristocrats gain from
export monopolism, which is nothing wars. No democracy would pursue a
more than the economic residue of minority interest and tolerate the high
monarchical finance. In the modern era, costs of imperialism. When free trade
imperialists gratify their private interests. prevails, "no class" gains from forcible
From the national perspective, their im- expansion because
perialistic wars are objectless.
foreign raw materials and food stuffs are as
Schumpeter's theme now emerges.
accessible to each nation as though they were in
Capitalism and democracy are forces forits own territory. Where the cultural backward-
peace. Indeed, they are antithetical to im- ness of a region makes normal economic inter-
perialism. For Schumpeter, the further course dependent on colonization it does not
development of capitalism and democ- matter, assuming free trade, which of the
"civilized" nations undertakes the task of coloni-
racy means that imperialism will inev-
zation. (Schumpeter, 1955, pp. 75-76)
itably disappear. He maintains that
capitalism produces an unwarlike disposi- Schumpeter's arguments are difficult to
tion; its populace is "democratized, in- evaluate. In partial tests of quasi-
dividualized, rationalized" (Schumpeter, Schumpeterian propositions, Michael
1955, p. 68). The people's energies are Haas (1974, pp. 464-65) discovered a
daily absorbed in production. The cluster that associates democracy,
disciplines of industry and the market development, and sustained moderniza-
train people in "economic rationalism"; tion with peaceful conditions. However,
the instability of industrial life M. Small and J. D. Singer (1976) have
necessitates calculation. Capitalism also discovered that there is no clearly
"individualizes"; "subjective oppor- negative correlation between democracy
tunities" replace the "immutable factors" and war in the period 1816-1965-the
of traditional, hierarchical society. Ra- period that would be central to
tional individuals demand democratic Schumpeter's argument (see also
governance. Wilkenfeld, 1968, Wright, 1942, p. 841).
Democratic capitalism leads to peace. Later in his career, in Capitalism,
As evidence, Schumpeter claims that Socialism, and Democracy, Schumpeter,
throughout the capitalist world an op- (1950, pp. 127-28) acknowledged that
position has arisen to "war, expansion, "almost purely bourgeois common-
cabinet diplomacy"; that contemporary wealths were often aggressive when it
capitalism is associated with peace par- seemed to pay-like the Athenian or the
ties; and that the industrial worker of Venetian commonwealths." Yet he stuck
capitalism is "vigorously anti-imperialist." to his pacifistic guns, restating the view
In addition, he points out that the capital- that capitalist democracy "steadily tells
ist world has developed means of prevent- ... against the use of military force and
ing war, such as the Hague Court and that for peaceful arrangements, even when the
the least feudal, most capitalist society- balance of pecuniary advantage is clearly
the United States-has demonstrated the on the side of war which, under modem
least imperialistic tendencies (Schumpeter circumstances, is not in general very like-
1955, pp. 95-96). An example of the lack ly" (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 128).1 A recent
of imperialistic tendencies in the U.S., study by R. J. Rummel (1983) of "liber-
Schumpeter thought, was our leaving tarianism" and international violence is
over half of Mexico unconquered in the the closest test Schumpeterian pacifism
war of 1846-48. has received. "Free" states (those enjoying

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 80

political and economic freedom) were
shown to have considerably less conflict
at or above the level of economic sanc-
tions than "nonfree" states. The free
states, the partly free states (including
democratic socialist countries such as
Sweden), and the nonfree states ac-
counted for 24%, 26%, and 61 %, respec-
tively, of the international violence
during the period examined.
These effects are impressive but not
conclusive for the Schumpeterian thesis.
The data are limited, in this test, to the
period 1976 to 1980. It includes, for ex-
ample, the Russo-Afghan War, the Viet-
namese invasion of Cambodia, China's
invasion of Vietnam, and Tanzania's in-
vasion of Uganda but just misses the U.S.,
quasi-covert intervention in Angola
(1975) and our not so covert war against
Nicaragua (1981-). More importantly, it
excludes the cold war period, with its
numerous interventions, and the long
history of colonial wars (the Boer War,
the Spanish-American War, the Mexican
Intervention, etc.) that marked the
history of liberal, including democratic
capitalist, states (Doyle, 1983b; Chan,
1984; Weede, 1984).
The discrepancy between the warlike
history of liberal states and Schumpeter's
pacifistic expectations highlights three ex- political participation (Machiavelli, 1950,
treme assumptions. First, his "material-
istic monism" leaves little room for
noneconomic objectives, whether es-
poused by states or individuals. Neither
glory, nor prestige, nor ideological
justification, nor the pure power of ruling people in the assembly as the source of
shapes policy. These nonmaterial goals
leave little room for positive-sum gains,
such as the comparative advantages of
trade. Second, and relatedly, the same is
true for his states. The political life of
individuals seems to have been homogen-
ized at the same time as the individuals
were "rationalized, individualized, and
democratized." Citizens-capitalists and
workers, rural and urban-seek material
welfare. Schumpeter seems to presume
that ruling makes no difference. He also
presumes that no one is prepared to take
those measures (such as stirring up foreign
quarrels to preserve a domestic ruling
the
coalition) that enhance one's political
power, despite deterimental effects on
mass welfare. Third, like domestic
politics, world politics are homogenized.
Materially monistic and democratically
capitalist, all states evolve toward free
trade and liberty together. Countries dif-
ferently constituted seem to disappear
from Schumpeter's analysis. "Civilized"
nations govern "culturally backward"
regions. These assumptions are not shared
by Machiavelli's theory of liberalism.
Liberal Imperialism
Machiavelli argues, not only that
republics are not pacifistic, but that they
are the best form of state for imperial
expansion. Establishing a republic fit for
imperial expansion is, moreover, the best
way to guarantee the survival of a state.
Machiavelli's republic is a classical
mixed republic. It is not a democracy-
which he thought would quickly degen-
erate into a tyranny-but is characterized
by social equality, popular liberty, and
bk. 1, chap. 2, p. 112; see also Huliung,
1983, chap. 2; Mansfield, 1970; Pocock,
1975, pp. 198-99; Skinner, 1981, chap. 3).
The consuls serve as "kings," the senate as
an aristocracy managing the state, and the
strength.
Liberty results from "disunion"-the
competition and necessity for com-
promise required by the division of
powers among senate, consuls, and
tribunes (the last representing the com-
mon people). Liberty also results from the
popular veto. The powerful few threaten
the rest with tyranny, Machiavelli says,
because they seek to dominate. The mass
demands not to be dominated, and their

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 1986 Liberalism and World Politics

veto thus preserves the liberties of the either case, we want more for ourselves
state (Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 5, p. and our states than just material welfare
122). However, since the people and the (materialistic monism). Because other
rulers have different social characters, the states with similar aims thereby threaten
people need to be "managed" by the few us, we prepare ourselves for expansion.
to avoid having their recklessness over- Because our fellow citizens threaten us if
turn or their fecklessness undermine we do not allow them either to satisfy
the ability of the state to expand their ambition or to release their political
(Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 53, pp. energies through imperial expansion, we
249-50). Thus the senate and the consuls expand.
plan expansion, consult oracles, and There is considerable historical
employ religion to manage the resources evidence for liberal imperialism.
that the energy of the people supplies. Machiavelli's (Polybius's) Rome and
Strength, and then imperial expansion, Thucydides' Athens both were imperial
results from the way liberty encourages republics in the Machiavellian sense
increased population and property, which (Thucydides, 1954, bk. 6). The historical
grow when the citizens know their lives record of numerous U.S. interventions in
and goods are secure from arbitrary the postwar period supports Machiavelli's
seizure. Free citizens equip large armies argument (Aron, 1973, chaps. 3-4;
and provide soldiers who fight for public Barnet, 1968, chap. 11), but the current
glory and the common good because these record of liberal pacifism, weak as it is,
are, in fact, their own (Machiavelli, 1950, calls some of his insights into question. To
bk. 2, chap. 2, pp. 287-90). If you seek the extent that the modern populace ac-
the honor of having your state expand, tually controls (and thus unbalances) the
Machiavelli advises, you should organize mixed republic, its diffidence may out-
it as a free and popular republic like weigh elite ("senatorial") aggressiveness.
Rome, rather than as an aristocratic We can conclude either that (1) liberal
republic like Sparta or Venice. Expansion pacifism has at least taken over with the
thus calls for a free republic. further development of capitalist
"Necessity"-political survival-calls democracy, as Schumpeter predicted it
for expansion. If a stable aristocratic would or that (2) the mixed record of
republic is forced by foreign conflict "toliberalism-pacifism and imperialism-
extend her territory, in such a case we indicates that some liberal states are
shall see her foundations give way and Schumpeterian democracies while others
herself quickly brought to ruin"; if, on theare Machiavellian republics. Before we
other hand, domestic security prevails, accept either conclusion, however, we
"the continued tranquility would enervate must consider a third apparent regularity
her, or provoke internal dimensions, of modern world politics.
which together, or either of them
separately, will apt to prove her ruin"
(Machiavelli, 1950, bk. 1, chap. 6, p. Liberal Internationalism
129). Machiavelli therefore believes it is
necessary to take the constitution of Modern liberalism carries with it two
Rome, rather than that of Sparta or legacies. They do not affect liberal states
Venice, as our model. separately, according to whether they are
Hence, this belief leads to liberal im- pacifistic or imperialistic, but simul-
perialism. We are lovers of glory, taneously.
Machiavelli announces. We seek to rule The first of these legacies is the pacifica-
or, at least, to avoid being oppressed. In tion of foreign relations among liberal

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 80

states.2 During the nineteenth century, the to the quarrels with our allies that be-
United States and Great Britain engaged deviled the Carter and Reagan adminis-
in nearly continual strife; however, after trations. It also offers the promise of a
the Reform Act of 1832 defined actual continuing peace among liberal states,
representation as the formal source of the and as the number of liberal states in-
sovereignty of the British parliament, creases, it announces the possibility of
Britain and the United States negotiated global peace this side of the grave or
their disputes. They negotiated despite, world conquest.
for example, British grievances during the Of course, the probability of the out-
Civil War against the North's blockade of break of war in any given year between
the South, with which Britain had close any two given states is low. The occur-
economic ties. Despite severe Anglo- rence of a war between any two adjacent
French colonial rivalry, liberal France and states, considered over a long period of
liberal Britain formed an entente against time, would be more probable. The ap-
illiberal Germany before World War I. parent absence of war between liberal
And from 1914 to 1915, Italy, the liberal states, whether adjacent or not, for
member of the Triple Alliance with Ger- almost 200 years thus may have sig-
many and Austria, chose not to fulfill its nificance. Similar claims cannot be made
obligations under that treaty to support for feudal, fascist, communist, au-
its allies. Instead, Italy joined in an alli- thoritarian, or totalitarian forms of rule
ance with Britain and France, which pre- (Doyle, 1983a, pp. 222), nor for plural-
vented it from having to fight other liberal istic or merely similar societies. More
states and then declared war on Germany significant perhaps is that when states are
and Austria. Despite generations of forced to decide on which side of an im-
Anglo-American tension and Britain's pending world war they will fight, liberal
wartime restrictions on American trade states all wind up on the same side de-
with Germany, the United States leaned spite the complexity of the paths that take
toward Britain and France from 1914 to them there. These characteristics do not
1917 before entering World War I on their prove that the peace among liberals is
side. statistically significant nor that liberalism
Beginning in the eighteenth century and is the sole valid explanation for the
slowly growing since then, a zone of peace.3 They do suggest that we consider
peace, which Kant called the "pacific the possibility that liberals have indeed
federation" or "pacific union," has begun established a separate peace-but only
to be established among liberal societies. among themselves.
More than 40 liberal states currently make Liberalism also carries with it a second
up the union. Most are in Europe and legacy: international "imprudence"
North America, but they can be found on(Hume, 1963, pp. 346-47). Peaceful
every continent, as Appendix 1 indicates. restraint only seems to work in liberals'
Here the predictions of liberal pacifistsrelations with other liberals. Liberal states
(and President Reagan) are borne out: have fought numerous wars with non-
liberal states do exercise peaceful liberal states. (For a list of international
restraint, and a separate peace exists wars since 1816 see Appendix 2.)
among them. This separate peace pro- Many of these wars have been defen-
vides a solid foundation for the United sive and thus prudent by necessity.
States' crucial alliances with the liberal Liberal states have been attacked and
powers, e.g., the North Atlantic Treaty threatened by nonliberal states that do
Organization and our Japanese alliance. not exercise any special restraint in their
This foundation appears to be impervious dealings with the liberal states.

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 1986 Liberalism and World Politics

Authoritarian rulers both stimulate and of peaceful rivalry among capitalists, but
respond to an international political en- only liberal capitalists maintain peace.
vironment in which conflicts of prestige, Leninists expect liberal capitalists to be
interest, and pure fear of what other states aggressive toward nonliberal states, but
might do all lead states toward war. War they also (and especially) expect them to
and conquest have thus characterized the be imperialistic toward fellow liberal
careers of many authoritarian rulers and capitalists.
ruling parties, from Louis XIV and Kant's theory of liberal interna-
Napoleon to Mussolini's fascists, Hitler's tionalism helps us understand these two
Nazis, and Stalin's communists. legacies. The importance of Immanuel
Yet we cannot simply blame warfare on Kant as a theorist of international ethics
the authoritarians or totalitarians, as has been well appreciated (Armstrong,
many of our more enthusiastic politicians1931; Friedrich, 1948; Gallie, 1978, chap.
would have us do.4 Most wars arise out of1; Galston, 1975; Hassner, 1972; Hinsley,
calculations and miscalculations of in- 1967, chap. 4; Hoffmann, -1965; Waltz,
terest, misunderstandings, and mutual 1962; Williams, 1983), but Kant also has
suspicions, such as those that char- an important analytical theory of interna-
acterized the origins of World War I. tional politics. Perpetual Peace, written in
However, aggression by the liberal state 1795 (Kant, 1970, pp. 93-130), helps us
has also characterized a large number of understand the interactive nature of inter-
wars. Both France and Britain fought ex- national relations. Kant tries to teach us
pansionist colonial wars throughout the methodologically that we can study
nineteenth century. The United States neither the systemic relations of states nor
fought a similar war with Mexico from the varieties of state behavior in isolation
1846 to 1848, waged a war of annihilation from each other. Substantively, he antic-
against the American Indians, and in- ipates for us the ever-widening pacifica-
tervened militarily against sovereign tion of a liberal pacific union, explains
states many times before and after Worldthis pacification, and at the same time
War II. Liberal states invade weak suggests why liberal states are not pacific
nonliberal states and display striking in their relations with nonliberal states.
distrust in dealings with powerful Kant argues that perpetual peace will be
nonliberal states (Doyle, 1983b). guaranteed by the ever-widening accept-
Neither realist (statist) nor Marxist ance of three "definitive articles" of peace.
theory accounts well for these two When all nations have accepted the
legacies. While they can account for definitive articles in a metaphorical
aspects of certain periods of international"treaty" of perpetual peace he asks them
stability (Aron, 1968, pp. 151-54; to sign, perpetual peace will have been
Russett, 1985), neither the logic of the established.
balance of power nor the logic of interna- The First Definitive Article requires the
tional hegemony explains the separate civil constitution of the state to be
peace maintained for more than 150 years republican. By republican Kant means a
among states sharing one particular form political society that has solved the prob-
of governance-liberal principles and in- lem of combining moral autonomy, in-
stitutions. Balance-of-power theory ex- dividualism, and social order. A private
pects-indeed is premised upon-flexible property and market-oriented economy
arrangements of geostrategic rivalry that partially addressed that dilemma in the
include preventive war. Hegemonies wax private sphere. The public, or political,
and wane, but the liberal peace holds. sphere was more troubling. His answer
Marxist "ultra-imperialists" expect a form was a republic that preserved juridical

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 80

freedom-the legal equality of citizens as spread further and further by a series of alliances
of this kind. (Kant, PP p. 104)
subjects-on the basis of a representative
government with a separation of powers. The pacific union is not a single peace
Juridical freedom is preserved because the treaty ending one war, a world state, nor
morally autonomous individual is by a state of nations. Kant finds the first in-
means of representation a self-legislator sufficient. The second and third are im-
making laws that apply to all citizens possible or potentially tyrannical. Na-
equally, including himself or herself. tional sovereignty precludes reliable
Tyranny is avoided because the in- subservience to a state of nations; a world
dividual is subject to laws he or she does state destroys the civic freedom on which
not also administer (Kant, PP, pp. 99- the development of human capacities rests
102; Riley, 1985, chap. 5).5 (Kant, UH, p. 50). Although Kant ob-
Liberal republics will progressively liquely refers to various classical
establish peace among themselves by interstate confederations and modem
means of the pacific federation, or uniondiplomatic congresses, he develops no
(foedus pacificum), described in Kant's systematic organizational embodiment of
Second Definitive Article. The pacific this treaty and presumably does not find
union will establish peace within a federa- institutionalization necessary (Riley,
tion of free states and securely maintain 1983, chap. 5; Schwarz, 1962, p. 77). He
the rights of each state. The world will not appears to have in mind a mutual non-
have achieved the "perpetual peace" that aggression pact, perhaps a collective
provides the ultimate guarantor of repub- security agreement, and the cosmopolitan
lican freedom until "a late stage and after law set forth in the Third Definitive
many unsuccessful attempts" (Kant, UH, Article.7
p. 47). At that time, all nations will have The Third Definitive Article establishes
learned the lessons of peace through right a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunc-
conceptions of the appropriate constitu- tion with the pacific union. The cosmo-
tion, great and sad experience, and good politan law "shall be limited to conditions
will. Only then will individuals enjoy of universal hospitality." In this Kant calls
perfect republican rights or the full for the recognition of the "right of a for-
guarantee of a global and just peace. In eigner not to be treated with hostility
the meantime, the "pacific federation" of when he arrives on someone else's terri-
liberal republics-"an enduring and grad- tory." This "does not extend beyond those
ually expanding federation likely to pre- conditions which make it possible for
vent war"-brings within it more and them [foreigners] to attempt to enter into
more republics-despite republican col- relations [commerce] with the native in-
lapses, backsliding, and disastrous wars- habitants" (Kant, PP, p. 106). Hospitality
creating an ever-expanding separate peace does not require extending to foreigners
(Kant, PP, p. 105).6 Kant emphasizes that either the right to citizenship or the right
to settlement, unless the foreign visitors
it can be shown that this idea of federalism, ex- would perish if they were expelled. For-
tending gradually to encompass all states and eign conquest and plunder also find no
thus leading to perpetual peace, is practicable
and has objective reality. For if by good fortune
justification under this right. Hospitality
one powerful and enlightened nation can form a does appear to include the right of access
republic (which is by nature inclined to seek and the obligation of maintaining the
peace), this will provide a focal point for federal opportunity for citizens to exchange
association among other states. These will join
goods and ideas without imposing the
up with the first one, thus securing the freedom
of each state in accordance with the idea of inter- obligation to trade (a voluntary act in all
national right, and the whole will gradually cases under liberal constitutions).

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 1986 Liberalism and World Politics

Perpetual peace, for Kant, is an epi- we now come to the essential question regarding
stemology, a condition for ethical action, the prospect of perpetual peace. What does
and, most importantly, an explanation of nature do in relation to the end which man's own
reason prescribes to him as a duty, i.e. how does
how the "mechanical process of nature
nature help to promote his moral purpose? And
visibly exhibits the purposive plan of pro- how does nature guarantee that what man ought
ducing concord among men, even against to do by the laws of his freedom (but does not
their will and indeed by means of their do) will in fact be done through nature's compul-
very discord" (Kant, PP, p. 108; UH, pp. sion, without prejudice to the free agency of
man? . . . This does not mean that nature im-
44-45). Understanding history requires an poses on us a duty to do it, for duties can only be
epistemological foundation, for without a imposed by practical reason. On the contrary,
teleology, such as the promise of per- nature does it herself, whether we are willing or
petual peace, the complexity of history not: facta volentem ducunt, nolentem tradunt.
(PP, p. 112)
would overwhelm human understanding
(Kant, UH, pp. 51-53). Perpetual peace, The guarantee thus rests, Kant argues, not
however, is not merely a heuristic device on the probable behavior of moral angels,
with which to interpret history. It is but on that of "devils, so long as they
guaranteed, Kant explains in the "First possess understanding" (PP, p. 112). In
Addition" to Perpetual Peace ("On the explaining the sources of each of the three
Guarantee of Perpetual Peace"), to result definitive articles of the perpetual peace,
from men fulfilling their ethical duty or, Kant then tells us how we (as free and in-
failing that, from a hidden plan.8 Peace is telligent devils) could be motivated by
an ethical duty because it is only under fear, force, and calculated advantage to
conditions of peace that all men can treat undertake a course of action whose out-
each other as ends, rather than means to come we could reasonably anticipate to
an end (Kant, UH, p. 50; Murphy, 1970, be perpetual peace. Yet while it is possible
chap. 3). In order for this duty to be prac- to conceive of the Kantian road to peace
tical, Kant needs, of course, to show that in these terms, Kant himself recognizes
peace is in fact possible. The widespread and argues that social evolution also
sentiment of approbation that he saw makes the conditions of moral behavior
aroused by the early success of the French less onerous and hence more likely (CF,
revolutionaries showed him that we can pp. 187-89; Kelly, 1969, pp. 106-13). In
indeed be moved by ethical sentiments tracing the effects of both political and
with a cosmopolitan reach (Kant, CF, pp. moral development, he builds an account
181-82; Yovel, 1980, pp. 153-54). This of why liberal states do maintain peace
does not mean, however, that perpetual among themselves and of how it will (by
peace is certain ("prophesiable"). Even the implication, has) come about that the
scientifically regular course of the planets pacific union will expand. He also ex-
could be changed by a wayward comet plains how these republics would engage
striking them out of orbit. Human in wars with nonrepublics and therefore
freedom requires that we allow for muchsuffer the "sad experience" of wars that an
greater reversals in the course of history. ethical policy might have avoided.
We must, in fact, anticipate the possibility The first source of the three definitive
of backsliding and destructive wars- articles derives from a political evolu-
though these will serve to educate nations tion-from a constitutional law. Nature
to the importance of peace (Kant, UH, pp.(providence) has seen to it that human be-
47-48). ings can live in all the regions where they
In the end, however, our guarantee of have been driven to settle by wars. (Kant,
perpetual peace does not rest on ethical who once taught geography, reports on
conduct. As Kant emphasizes, the Lapps, the Samoyeds, the Pescheras.)

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 80

"Asocial sociability" draws men together threat of new wars. But under a constitution
where the subject is not a citizen, and which is
to fulfill needs for security and material
therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing
welfare as it drives them into conflicts in the world to go to war. For the head of state is
over the distribution and control of social not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state,
products (Kant, UH, p. 44-45; PP, pp. and war will not force him to make the slightest
110-11). This violent natural evolution sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure
palaces and court festivals are concerned. He can
tends towards the liberal peace because thus decide on war, without any significant
"asocial sociability" inevitably leads reason, as a kind of amusement, and uncon-
toward republican governments, and re- cernedly leave it to the diplomatic corps (who are
publican governments are a source of the always ready for such pruposes) to justify the
war for the sake of propriety. (Kant, PP, p. 100)
liberal peace.
Republican representation and separa- Yet these domestic republican restraints
tion of powers are produced because they do not end war. If they did, liberal states
are the means by which the state is would not be warlike, which is far from
"organized well" to prepare for and meet the case. They do introduce republican
foreign threats (by unity) and to tame the caution-Kant's "hesitation"-in place of
ambitions of selfish and aggressive in- monarchical caprice. Liberal wars are
dividuals (by authority derived from only fought for popular, liberal purposes.
representation, by general laws, and by The historical liberal legacy is laden with
nondespotic administration) (Kant, PP, popular wars fought to promote freedom,
pp. 112-13). States that are not organized to protect private property, or to support
in this fashion fail. Monarchs thus en- liberal allies against nonliberal enemies.
courage commerce and private property Kant's position is ambiguous. He regards
in order to increase national wealth. They these wars as unjust and warns liberals of
cede rights of representation to their sub- their susceptibility to them (Kant, PP, p.
jects in order to strengthen their political 106). At the same time, Kant argues that
support or to obtain willing grants of tax each nation "can and ought to" demand
revenue (Hassner, 1972, pp. 583-86). that its neighboring nations enter into the
Kant shows how republics, once estab- pacific union of liberal states (PP, p. 102).
lished, lead to peaceful relations. he Thus to see how the pacific union re-
argues that once the aggressive interestsmoves of the occasion of wars among liberal
absolutist monarchies are tamed and the states and not wars between liberal and
habit of respect for individual rights nonliberal states, we need to shift our
engrained by republican government, attention from constitutional law to inter-
wars would appear as the disaster to the national law, Kant's second source.
people's welfare that he and the other Complementing the constitutional
liberals thought them to be. The funda- guarantee of caution, international law
mental reason is this: adds a second source for the definitive
articles: a guarantee of respect. The
If, as is inevitability the case under this constitu-
tion, the consent of the citizens is required to separation of nations that asocial socia-
decide whether or not war should be declared, it bility encourages is reinforced by the
is very natural that they will have a great hesita-
development of separate languages and
tion in embarking on so dangerous an enterprise.
For this would mean calling down on themselves religions. These further guarantee a world
all the miseries of war, such as doing the fighting of separate states-an essential condition
themselves, supplying the costs of the war from needed to avoid a "global, soul-less
their own resources, painfully making good the despotism." Yet, at the same time, they
ensuing devastation, and, as the crowning evil,
also morally integrate liberal states: "as
having to take upon themselves a burden of
debts which will embitter peace itself and which culture grows and men gradually move
can never be paid off on account of the constant ,towards greater agreement over their-

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 1986 Liberalism and World Politics

principles, they lead to mutual under- cooperative international division of

standing and peace" (Kant, PP, p. 114). labor and free trade according to com-
As republics emerge (the first source) and parative advantage. Each economy is said
as culture progresses, an understanding of to be better off than it would have been
the legitimate rights of all citizens and of under autarky; each thus acquires an in-
all republics comes into play; and this, centive to avoid policies that would lead
now that caution characterizes policy, the other to break these economic ties.
sets up the moral foundations for the Because keeping open markets rests upon
liberal peace. Correspondingly, interna- the assumption that the next set of trans-
tional law highlights the importance of actions will also be determined by prices
Kantian publicity. Domestically, pub- rather than coercion, a sense of mutual
licity helps ensure that the officials of security is vital to avoid security-
republics act according to the principles motivated searches for economic autarky.
they profess to hold just and according to Thus, avoiding a challenge to another
the interests of the electors they claim to liberal state's security or even enhancing
represent. Internationally, free speech and each other's security by means of alliance
the effective communication of accurate naturally follows economic interde-
conceptions of the political life of foreign pendence.
peoples is essential to establishing and A further cosmopolitan source of lib-
preserving the understanding on which eral peace is the international market's
the guarantee of respect depends. Domes- removal of difficult decisions of produc-
tically just republics, which rest on con- tion and distribution from the direct
sent, then presume foreign republics also sphere of state policy. A foreign state thus
to be consensual, just, and therefore does not appear directly responsible for
deserving of accommodation. The experi-these outcomes, and states can stand aside
ence of cooperation helps engender fur- from, and to some degree above, these
ther cooperative behavior when the con-contentious market rivalries and be ready
sequences of state policy are unclear but to step in to resolve crises. The inter-
(potentially) mutually beneficial. At thedependence of commerce and the interna-
same time, liberal states assume that tional contacts of state officials help
nonliberal states, which do not rest on create crosscutting transnational ties that
free consent, are not just. Because serve as lobbies for mutual accommoda-
nonliberal governments are in a state of According to modern liberal
tion.
aggression with their own people, their scholars, international financiers and
foreign relations become for liberal transnational and transgovernmental or-
governments deeply suspect. In short, ganizations create interests in favor of
fellow liberals benefit from a presumption accommodation. Moreover, their variety
of amity; nonliberals suffer from a has ensured that no single conflict sours
presumption of enmity. Both presump- an entire relationship by setting off a
tions may be accurate; each, however, spiral of reciprocated retaliation (Brzezin-
may also be self-confirming. ski and Huntington, 1963, chap. 9; Keo-
Lastly, cosmopolitan law adds material hane and Nye, 1977, chap. 7; Neustadt,
incentives to moral commitments. The 1970; Polanyi, 1944, chaps. 1-2). Con-
cosmopolitan right to hospitality permits versely, a sense of suspicion, such as that
the "spirit of commerce" sooner or later to characterizing relations between liberal
take hold of every nation, thus impelling and nonliberal governments, can lead to
states to promote peace and to try to avert restrictions on the range of contacts be-
war. Liberal economic theory holds that tween societies, and this can increase the
these cosmopolitan ties derive from a prospect that a single conflict will deter-

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 80

mine an entire relationship. Kant's citizens, too, are diverse in their

No single constitutional, international, goals and individualized and rationalized,
or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient, but most importantly, they are capable of
but together (and only together) they appreciating the moral equality of all in-
plausibly connect the characteristics of dividuals and of treating other individuals
liberal polities and economies with sus- as ends rather than as means. The Kantian
tained liberal peace. Alliances founded on state thus is governed publicly according
mutual strategic interest among liberal to law, as a republic. Kant's is the state
and nonliberal states have been broken; that solves the problem of governing in-
economic ties between liberal and non- dividualized equals, whether they are the
liberal states have proven fragile; but the "rational devils" he says we often find
political bonds of liberal rights and inter- ourselves to be or the ethical agents we
ests have proven a remarkably firm foun- can and should become. Republics tell us
dation for mutual nonaggression. A that
separate peace exists among liberal states.
in order to organize a group of rational beings
In their relations with nonliberal states, who together require universal laws for their sur-
however, liberal states have not escaped vival, but of whom each separate individual is
from the insecurity caused by anarchy in secretly inclined to exempt himself from them,
the world political system considered as a the constitution must be so designed so that,
although the citizens are opposed to one another
whole. Moreover, the very constitutional
in their private attitudes, these opposing views
restraint, international respect for in- may inhibit one another in such a way that the
dividual rights, and shared commercial public conduct of the citizens will be the same as
interests that establish grounds for peace if they did not have such evil attitudes. (Kant,
PP, p. 113)
among liberal states establish grounds for
additional conflict in relations between Unlike Machiavelli's republics, Kant's
liberal and nonliberal societies. republics are capable of achieving peace
among themselves because they exercise
Conclusion democratic caution and are capable of ap-
preciating the international rights of
Kant's liberal internationalism, foreign republics. These international
Machiavelli's liberal imperialism, and rights of republics derive from the
Schumpeter's liberal pacifism rest on fun- representation of foreign individuals,
damentally different views of the naturewho are our moral equals. Unlike Schum-
of the human being, the state, and inter- peter's capitalist democracies, Kant's
national relations.9 Schumpeter's humans republics-including our own-remain in
are rationalized, individualized, and a state of war with nonrepublics. Liberal
democratized. They are also homoge- republics see themselves as threatened by
nized, pursuing material interests "monis- aggression from nonrepublics that are not
tically." Because their material interests constrained by representation. Even
lie in peaceful trade, they and the demo- though wars often cost more than the
cratic state that these fellow citizens con- economic return they generate, liberal
trol are pacifistic. Machiavelli's citizens republics also are prepared to protect and
are splendidly diverse in their goals but promote-sometimes forcibly-democ-
fundamentally unequal in them as well, racy, private property, and the rights of
seeking to rule or fearing being domi- individuals overseas against nonrepub-
nated. Extending the rule of the dominant lics, which, because they do not authen-
elite or avoiding the political collapse of tically represent the rights of individuals,
their state, each calls for imperial have no rights to noninterference. These
expansion. wars may liberate oppressed individuals

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 1986 Liberalism and World Politics

overseas; they also can generate enor- troducing steadier strategic calculations of
mous suffering. the national interest in the long run and
Preserving the legacy of the liberal more flexible responses to changes in the
peace without succumbing to the legacy international political environment. Con-
of liberal imprudence is both a moral and straining the indiscriminate meddling of
a strategic challenge. The bipolar stability our foreign interventions calls for a
of the international system, and the near deeper appreciation of the "particularism
certainty of mutual devastation resulting of history, culture, and membership"
from a nuclear war between the super- (Walzer, 1983, p. 5), but both the im-
powers, have created a "crystal ball provement in strategy and the constraint
effect" that has helped to constrain theon intervention seem, in turn, to require
tendency toward miscalculation presentan executive freed from the restraints of a
at the outbreak of so many wars in the representative legislature in the manage-
past (Carnesale, Doty, Hoffmann, Hun- ment of foreign policy and a political
tington, Nye, and Sagan, 1983, p. 44; culture indifferent to the universal rights
Waltz, 1964). However, this "nuclear of individuals. These conditions, in their
peace" appears to be limited to the super- turn, could break the chain of constitu-
powers. It has not curbed military inter- tional guarantees, the respect for rep-
ventions in the Third World. Moreover, itresentative government, and the web of
is subject to a desperate technological race transnational contact that have sustained
designed to overcome its constraints and the pacific union of liberal states.
to crises that have pushed even the super-Perpetual peace, Kant says, is the end
powers to the brink of war. We must stillpoint of the hard journey his republics
reckon with the war fevers and moods of will take. The promise of perpetual peace,
appeasement that have almost alternately the violent lessons of war, and the ex-
swept liberal democracies. perience of a partial peace are proof of the
Yet restraining liberal imprudence, need for and the possibility of world
whether aggressive or passive, may not be peace. They are also the grounds for
possible without threatening liberal moral citizens and statesmen to assume
pacification. Improving the strategic the duty of striving for peace.
acumen of our foreign policy calls for in-

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 80

Appendix 1. Liberal Regimes and the Pacific Union, 1700-1982

Period Period Period

18th Century 1900-1945 (cont.) 1945- (cont.)

Swiss Cantonsa Italy, -1922 Costa Rica, -1948; 1953-
French Republic, 1790-1795 Belgium, -1940 Iceland, 1944-
United States,a 1776- Netherlands, -1940 France, 1945-
Total = 3 Argentina, -1943 Denmark, 1945
France, -1940 Norway, 1945
1800-1850 Chile, -1924, 1932- Austria, 1945-
Swiss Confederation Australia, 1901 Brazil, 1945-1954; 1955-1964
United States Norway, 1905-1940 Belgium, 1946-
France, 1830-1849 New Zealand, 1907- Luxemburg, 1946-
Belgium, 1830- Colombia, 1910-1949 Netherlands, 1946-
Great Britain, 1832- Denmark, 1914-1940 Italy, 1946-
Netherlands, 1848- Poland, 1917-1935 Philippines, 1946-1972
Piedmont, 1848- Latvia, 1922-1934 India, 1947-1975, 1977-
Denmark, 1849- Germany, 1918-1932 Sri Lanka, 1948-1961; 1963-1971;
Total = 8 Austria, 1918-1934 1978-
Estonia, 1919-1934 Ecuador, 1948-1963; 1979-
1850-1900 Finland, 1919- Israel, 1949-
Switzerland Uruguay, 1919- West Germany, 1949-
United States Costa Rica, 1919- Greece, 1950-1967; 1975-
Belgium Czechoslovakia, 1920-1939 Peru, 1950-1962; 1963-1968; 1980-
Great Britain Ireland, 1920- El Salvador, 1950-1961
Netherlands Mexico, 1928- Turkey, 1950-1960; 1966-1971
Piedmont, -1861 Lebanon, 1944- Japan, 1951-
Italy, 1861- Total = 29 Bolivia, 1956-1969; 1982-
Denmark, -1866 Colombia, 1958-
Sweden, 1864- 1945- Venezuela, 1959-
Greece, 1864- Switzerland Nigeria, 1961-1964; 1979-1984
Canada, 1867- United States Jamaica, 1962-
France, 1871- Great Britain Trinidad and Tobago, 1962-
Argentina, 1880- Sweden Senegal, 1963-
Chile, 1891- Canada Malaysia, 1963-
Total = 13 Australia Botswana, 1966-
New Zealand Singapore, 1965-
1900-1945 Finland Portugal, 1976-
Switzerland Ireland Spain, 1978-
United States Mexico Dominican Republic, 1978-
Great Britain Uruguay, -1973 Honduras, 1981-
Sweden Chile, -1973 Papua New Guinea, 1982-
Canada Lebanon,-1975 Total = 50
Greece, -1911; 1928-1936

Note: I have drawn up this approximate list of "Liberal Regimes" according to the four institutions Kant
described as essential: market and private property economies; polities that are externally sovereign; citizen
who possess juridical rights; and "republican" (whether republican or parliamentary monarchy), representa
tive government. This latter includes the requirement that the legislative branch have an effective role in publ
policy and be formally and competitively (either inter- or intra-party) elected. Furthermore, I have taken int
account whether male suffrage is wide (i.e., 30%) or, as Kant (MM, p. 139) would have had it, open by
"achievement" to inhabitants of the national or metropolitan territory (e.g., to poll-tax payers or house-
holders). This list of liberal regimes is thus more inclusive than a list of democratic regimes, or polyarchie
(Powell, 1982, p. 5). Other conditions taken into account here are that female suffrage is granted within a
generation of its being demanded by an extensive female suffrage movement and that representative govern-
ment is internally sovereign (e.g., including, and especially over military and foreign affairs) as well as stable
(in existence for at least three years). Sources for these data are Banks and Overstreet (1983), Gastil (1985), Th
Europa Yearbook, 1985 (1985), Langer (1968), U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1980), and U.S

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 1986 Liberalism and World Politics

Department of State (1981). Finally, these lists exclude ancient and medieval "republics," since none appears to
fit Kant's commitment to liberal individualism (Holmes, 1979).
aThere are domestic variations within these liberal regimes: Switzerland was liberal only in certain cantons; t
United States was liberal only north of the Mason-Dixon line until 1865, when it became liberal throughou
bSelected list, excludes liberal regimes with populations less than one million. These include all state
categorized as "free" by Gastil and those "partly free" (four-fifths or more free) states with a more pronounc
capitalist orientation.

Appendix 2. International Wars Listed Chronologically

British-Maharattan (1817-1818) Pacific (1879-1883)

Greek (1821-1828) British-Zulu (1879)
Franco-Spanish (1823) Franco-Indochinese (1882-1884)
First Anglo-Burmese (1823-1826) Mahdist (1882-1885)
Javanese (1825-1830) Sino-French (1884-1885)
Russo-Persian (1826-1828) Central American (1885)
Russo-Turkish (1828-1829) Serbo-Bulgarian (1885)
First Polish (1831) Sino-Japanese (1894-1895)
First Syrian (1831-1832) Franco-Madagascan (1894-1895)
Texas (1835-1836) Cuban (1895-1898)
First British-Afghan (1838-1842) Italo-Ethipian (1895-1896)
Second Syrian (1839-1940) First Philippine (1896-1898)
Franco-Algerian (1839-1847) Greco-Turkish (1897)
Peruvian-Bolivian (1841) Spanish-American (1898)
First British-Sikh (1845-1846) Second Phlippine (1899-1902)
Mexican-American (1846-1848) Boer (1899-1902)
Austro-Sardinian (1848-1849) Boxer Rebellion (1900)
First Schleswig-Holstein (1848-1849) Ilinden (1903)
Hungarian (1848-1849) Russo-Japanese (1904-1905)
Second British-Sikh (1848-1849) Central American (1906)
Roman Republic (1849) Central American (1907)
La Plata (1851-1852) Spanish-Moroccan (1909-1910)
First Turco-Montenegran (1852-1853) Italo-Turkish (1911-1912)
Crimean (1853-1856) First Balkan (1912-1913)
Anglo-Persian (1856-1857) Second Balkan (1913)
Sepoy (1857-1859) World War I (1914-1918)
Second Turco-Montenegran (1858-1859) Russian Nationalities (1917-1921)
Italian Unification (1859) Russo-Polish (1919-1920)
Spanish-Moroccan (1859-1860) Hungarian-Allies (1919)
Italo-Roman (1860) Greco-Turkish (1919-1922)
Italo-Sicilian (1860-1861) Riffian (1921-1926)
Franco-Mexican (1862-1867) Druze (1925-1927)
Ecuadorian-Colombian (1863) Sino-Soviet (1929)
Second Polish (1863-1864) Manchurian (1931-1933)
Spanish-Santo Dominican (1863-1865) Chaco (1932-1935)
Second Schleswig-Holstein (1864) Italo-Ethiopian (1935-1936)
Lopez (1864-1870) Sino-Japanese (1937-1941)
Spanish-Chilean (1865-1866) Russo-Hungarian (1956)
Seven Weeks (1866) Sinai (1956)
Ten Years (1868-1878) Tibetan (1956-1959)
Franco-Prussian (1870-1871) Sino-Indian (1962)
Dutch-Achinese (1873-1878) Vietnamese (1965-1975)
Balkan (1875-1877) Second Kashmir (1965)
Russo-Turkish (1877-1878) Six Day (1967)
Bosnian (1878) Israeli-Egyptian (1969-1970)
Second British-Afghan (1878-1880) Football (1969)

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 American Political Science Review Vol. 80

Changkufeng (1938) Bangladesh (1971)

Nomohan (1939) Philippine-MNLF (1972-)
World War II (1939-1945) Yom Kippur (1973)
Russo-Finnish (1939-1940) Turco-Cypriot (1974)
Franco-Thai (1940-1941) Ethiopian-Eritrean (1974-)
Indonesian (1945-1946) Vietnamese-Cambodian (1975-)
Indochinese (1945-1954) Timor (1975-)
Madagascan (1947-1948) Saharan (1975-)
First Kashmir (1947-1949) Ogaden (1976-)
Palestine (1948-1949) Ugandan-Tanzanian (1978-1979)
Hyderabad (1948) Sino-Vietnamese (1979)
Korean (1950-1953) Russo-Afghan (1979-)
Algerian (1954-1962) Iran-Iraqi (1980-)

Note: This table is taken from Melvin Small and J. David Sing
national wars fought between 1816 and 1980. In Appendices
wars during this period, but approximately 159 of them appe
This list excludes covert interventions, some of which hav
liberal regimes-for example, the United States' effort to dest
ment. Nonetheless, it is significant that such interventions
The covert destabilization campaign against Chile is recount
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (1975, Covert Action in Chile, 1963-73).
Following the argument of this article, this list also excludes civil wars. Civil wars differ from international
wars, not in the ferocity of combat, but in the issues that engender them. Two nations that could abide one
another as independent neighbors separated by a border might well be the fiercest of enemies if forced to live
together in one state, jointly deciding how to raise and spend taxes, choose leaders, and legislate fundamental
questions of value. Notwithstanding these differences, no civil wars that I recall upset the argument of liberal
pacification.

Notes

I would like to thank Marshall Cohen, Amy Gut- foreign relations) the empirical tendency of democ-
mann, Ferdinand Hermens, Bonnie Honig, Paschalis racies to maintain peace among themselves, and he
Kitromilides, Klaus Knorr, Diana Meyers, Kenneth made this the foundation of his proposal for a (non-
Oye, Jerome Schneewind, and Richard Ullman for Kantian) federal union of the 15 leading democracies
their helpful suggestions. One version of this paper of the 1930s. In a very interesting book, Ferdinand
was presented at the American Section of the Inter- Hermens (1944) explored some of the policy implica-
national Society for Social and Legal Philosophy, tions of Streit's analysis. D. V. Babst (1972, pp.
Notre Dame, Indiana, November 2-4, 1984, and will 55-58) performed a quantitative study of this
appear in Realism and Morality, edited by Kenneth phenomenon of "democratic peace," and R. J.
Kipnis and Diana Meyers. Another version was pre- Rummel (1983) did a similar study of "libertarian-
sented on March 19, 1986, to the Avoiding Nuclear ism" (in the sense of laissez faire) focusing on the
War Project, Center for Science and International postwar period that drew on an unpublished study
Affairs, The John F. Kennedy School of Govern- (Project No. 48) noted in Appendix 1 of his Under-
ment, Harvard University. This essay draws on standing Conflict and War (1979, p. 386). I use the
research assisted by a MacArthur Fellowship in term liberal in a wider, Kantian sense in my discus-
International Security awarded by the Social Science sion of this issue (Doyle, 1983a). In that essay, I
Research Council. survey the period from 1790 to the present and find
1. He notes that testing this proposition is likely no war among liberal states.
to be very difficult, requiring "detailed historical 3. Babst (1972) did make a preliminary test of the
analysis." However, the bourgeois attitude toward significance of the distribution of alliance partners in
the military, the spirit and manner by which bour- World War I. He found that the possibility that the
geois societies wage war, and the readiness with actual distribution of alliance partners could have
which they submit to military rule during a pro- occurred by chance was less than 1% (Babst, 1972,
longed war are "conclusive in themselves" (Schum- p. 56). However, this assumes that there was an
peter, 1950, p. 129). equal possibility that any two nations could have
2. Clarence Streit (1938, pp. 88, 90-92) seems to gone to war with each other, and this is a strong
have been the first to point out (in contemporary assumption. Rummel (1983) has a further discussion

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 1986 Liberalism and World Politics

empirically merely a "pious hope" (MM, pp.

of the issue of statistical significance as it applies to
his libertarian thesis. 164-75)-though even here he finds that the pacific
4. There are serious studies showing that Marxist union is not "impracticable" (MM, p. 171). In the
regimes have higher military spending per capita Universal History (UH), Kant writes as if the brute
than non-Marxist regimes (Payne, n.d.), but this force of physical nature drives men toward in-
should not be interpreted as a sign of the inherent evitable peace. Yovel (1980, pp. 168 ff.) argues that
aggressiveness of authoritarian or totalitarian from a post-critical (post-Critique of Judgment)
governments or of the inherent and global peaceful- perspective, Perpetual Peace reconciles the two
ness of liberal regimes. Marxist regimes, in par- views of history. "Nature" is human-created nature
ticular, represent a minority in the current inter- (culture or civilization). Perpetual peace is the "a
national system; they are strategically encircled, and prior of the a posterior'-a critical perspective that
due to their lack of domestic legitimacy, they might then enables us to discern causal, probabilistic pat-
be said to "suffer" the twin burden of needing terns in history. Law and the "political technology"
defenses against both external and internal enemies. of republican constitutionalism are separate from
Andreski (1980), moreover, argues that (purely) ethical development, but both interdependently lead
military dictatorships, due to their domestic fragili-to perpetual peace-the first through force, fear, and
ty, have little incentive to engage in foreign militaryself-interest; the second through progressive
adventures. According to Walter Clemens (1982, pp. enlightenment-and both together lead to perpetual
117-18), the United States intervened in the Third peace through the widening of the circumstances in
World more than twice as often during the period which engaging in right conduct poses smaller and
1946-1976 as the Soviet Union did in 1946-79. smaller burdens.
Relatedly, Posen and VanEvera (1980, p. 105; 1983, 9. For a comparative discussion of the political
pp. 86-89) found that the United States devoted one foundations of Kant's ideas, see Shklar (1984, pp.
quarter and the Soviet Union one tenth of their 232-38).
defense budgets to forces designed for Third World
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Michael Doyle is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University,

Baltimore, MD 21218.

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