Tiu Notes Consti 81 120

ARTICLE 7 — EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
EXECUTIVE POWER; THE PRESIDENCY AND VICE-PRESIDENCY
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with,
and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation
WHERE EXECUTIVE POWER IS VESTED; POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT

1. CHIEF EXECUTIVE
‣ Executive power is vested in the President
‣ History of the Seat of Executive Power—
1. 1935 Constitution — President
2. 1973 Constitution — Prime Minister
3. 1987 Constitution — President
‣ This means that the President is "the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the
executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity. They are subject to the
President's bosom confidence and to his direction. (Villena v. Secretary of Interior 1939)
2. HEAD OF STATE
‣ The Presidency includes many other functions than just being chief executive, some of which pertain to the
“ceremonial functions” of the President, as the ceremonial head of government.
3. LEGISLATIVE POWERS MAY BE DELEGATED TO THE PRESIDENT IN CERTAIN CASES
‣ The Constitution allows in certain instances the delegation of legislative power to the President—
a. Delegation of emergency powers to the President (Art. 6, Sec. 23[2])
b. Delegation of the power to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts to the President. (Art. 6, Sec. 28[2])
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT

1. Presidential Heir during his term
‣ The Vice-President’s only constitutional function is to be on hand to act as President when needed or to succeed to
the presidency in case of a vacancy in the office.
‣ He is essentially a President in reserve
2. Member of the Cabinet based on the President’s discretion
‣ The President may appoint the Vice-President as a Member of the Cabinet and such appointment does not need the
consent of the Commission on Appointments.
‣ The President is not obliged to give the Vice-President a cabinet position because the President must be free to
choose for his Cabinet people who are his trusted personal choices.
WHAT IS EXECUTIVE POWER?

‣ Executive power includes the following powers —
1. Power of Appointment (Art. 7, Sec. 16)
2. Power of Executive Control (Art. 7, Sec. 17)
3. Power to ensure faithful execution of laws (Art. 7, Sec. 17)
4. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Art. 7, Sec. 18)
CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

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5. Power of executive clemency (Art. 7, Sec. 19)
6. Power to contract or guarantee foreign loans (Art. 7, Sec. 20)
7. Power to enter into foreign relations (Art. 7, Sec. 21)
8. Residual powers (Marcos vs Manglapus 1989)
QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter,
able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election.
Section 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same qualifications and term of office and be elected with,
and in the same manner, as the President. He may be removed from office in the same manner as the President. XXXXXX
1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines

2. Registered voter
3. Able to read and write
4. At least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
5. A resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election
ELECTION AND TERM OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which
shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-election. No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second
Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province
or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of
canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates
in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal
and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately. The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Section 5. Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice- President, or the Acting President
shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear [or affirm] that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill
my duties as President [or Vice-President or Acting President] of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution,
execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." [In case
of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted].

ELECTION AND TERM OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

‣ How is the President and Vice-President elected?
‣ The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people
‣ When does the election take place?
‣ The regular election for President and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May, unless otherwise
provided by law.
‣ How long is the term of office of the President and Vice-President?
‣ 6 years.
‣ When the President and Vice-President’s term commence and end?
‣ It begins at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same
date, six years thereafter.
‣ NOTE — Before they enter on the execution of their office, the President, the Vice- President, or the Acting President
must take an oath or affirmation, the wording of which is stated in Art. 7, Sec. 5.
‣ Is there a limitation of terms for the President and Vice-President?
‣ YES. Observe the following rules —
1. The President can only serve for 1 term
‣ He is not eligible for any re-election
‣ EXCEPT — a person who succeeds as President and has served as such for 4 years or less may run for
re-election
‣ This only applies to Presidents by succession, not election.
‣ This enabled Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, who succeeded Pres. Joseph Estrada in 2001, to run for re-
election in 2004, as she served for only 3 years.
‣ If the successor president served for more than 4 years, he becomes disqualified from re-election
2. There is no limitation of terms which a Vice-President may serve, however he cannot serve for more than 2
successive terms
‣ NOTE — Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
CANVASSING OF VOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

‣ RULE — CONGRESS HAS THE SOLE AUTHORITY TO CANVASS THE VOTES AND PROCLAIM THE WINNERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
‣ This is the function of Congress and not of the Comelec. (Macalintal v. Comelec 2003)
‣ What is the procedure for the canvassing of votes?
1. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
2. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of
the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public
session
3. Upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, Congress shall
canvass the votes.
‣ NOTE — The function of Congress is not merely ministerial. It has authority to examine the certificates of canvass
for authenticity and due execution. For this purpose, Congress must pass a law governing their canvassing
functions. Also, Congress should promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
4. The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected
‣ NOTE — In case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
‣ May Congress delegate the preliminary count of votes in a presidential election to a Joint Committee?
‣ YES. Provided that the Committee report be submitted for approval by the Congress as a body.

‣ SEE — Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163556, June 8, 2004
‣ Congress may validly delegate the initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of
canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of members of the House of Representatives and of the
Senate. The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have deprived
petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules
under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint
session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately
‣ May Congress continue the canvass even after the final adjournment of its sessions?
‣ YES. The final adjournment of Congress does not terminate an unfinished presidential canvass. Adjournment
terminates legislation but not the non-legislative functions of Congress such as canvassing of votes.
‣ SEE — Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. v. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the votes G.R. No 163783 June 22,
2004
‣ Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may continue to perform this constitutional duty of
canvassing the presidential and vice- presidential election results without need of any call for a special session by
the President. The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Sec. 4, Art.
VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly-elected President and Vice-President has
not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a
board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio.
‣ Can Congress undertake a separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of results?
‣ NO. SEE — Brillantes v. Comelec, G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004
‣ There is no constitutional or statutory basis for Comelec to undertake a separate and an “unofficial” tabulation of,
results, whether manually or electronically. By conducting such “unofficial” tabulation, the Comelec descends to the
level of a private organization, spending public funds for the purpose. This not only violates the exclusive
prerogative of NAMFREL to conduct an “unofficial” count, but also taints the integrity of the envelopes containing
the election returns and the election returns themselves. Thus, if the Comelec is proscribed from conducting an
official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice- President, the Comelec is, with more reason,
prohibited from making an “unofficial” canvass of said votes
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Section 4. XXXXX The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC— THE 2010 RULES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Rule 7. Express and implied powers. - The Tribunal shall exercise all powers expressly vested in it by the Constitution or
by law, and such other powers as may be inherent, necessary or incidental thereto for the accomplishment of its
purposes and functions. (R6)
Rule 13. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines. (R12)
Rule 14. How initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
against the President or Vice- President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for
quo warranto shall not include an election protest. (R13)
Rule 15. Election Protest. - The registered candidate for President or Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or Vice-President, as the case may be,
by filing a verified election protest with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty days after the
proclamation of the winner. (R14)
Rule 16. Quo warranto. - A verified for quo warranto contesting the election of the President or Vice - President on the
ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may filed by any registered voter who has voted in
the election concerned within ten days after the proclamation of the winner. (R16)

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (PET)
‣ RULE — The Supreme Court, sitting en banc as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President
‣ NOTE — The power of the PET includes the power to correct manifest errors on the statement of votes (SOV) and
certificates of canvass (COC). (Legarda v. De Castro 2005)
‣ Who may file an electoral protest with the PET?
‣ Only the registered candidate for President or Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third
highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or Vice-President. By this express enumeration, the
rule makers have in effect determined the real parties in interest concerning an on-going election contest. (Rule 15,
Rules of the PET)
‣ Thus, the widow of a losing candidate is not a real party-in-interest. (Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Arroyo 2005)
COMPENSATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
Section 6. The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be
determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved. They shall not receive during
their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.
‣ What are the rules to observe regarding the salaries and compensation of the President and Vice-President?
1. It is determined by law
2. It cannot be decreased during their tenure
3. Any increase in said compensation will take effect only until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during
which such increase was approved.
4. They cannot receive during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
Section 7. The President-elect and the Vice President-elect shall assume office at the beginning of their terms.
If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall have
qualified.
If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall have been
chosen and qualified.
If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect shall have died or shall have become permanently
disabled, the Vice President-elect shall become President.
Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or
become permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall act as President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a
President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the officials
mentioned in the next preceding paragraph.
Section 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or
resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of

the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected
and qualified.
The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of
the Acting President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be
subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.
Section 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected, the
President shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who
shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the
President and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven days,
enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier than forty-five
days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified
under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by
the Congress. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be
exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution. The convening of the Congress
cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within
eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
RULES ON PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

1. VACANCY IN THE PRESIDENCY (ART. 7, SEC. 7, 8)
a. Vacancy in the beginning of the term of the presidency (Art. 7, Sec. 7)
i. If the President-elect fails to qualify — the Vice President-elect shall act as President until the President-elect shall
have qualified.
ii. If a President shall not have been chosen — the Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
iii. If the President-elect dies or becomes permanently disabled — the Vice President-elect shall become President.
b. Vacancy during the term of the presidency (Art. 7, Sec. 8)
‣ In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President — the Vice-President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term.
2. VACANCY IN THE VICE-PRESIDENCY (ART. 7, SEC. 9)
‣ If there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President during the term for which he was elected — The President shall
nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall
assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately
3. VACANCY IN BOTH THE PRESIDENCY AND VICE-PRESIDENCY (ART. 7, SEC. 7, 8, 10)
‣ This applies where —
a. No President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or
become permanently disabled.
b. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-
President. (Art. 7, Sec. 8)
‣ Observe the following rules and procedure (Art. 7, Sec. 7, 8, 10)—
1. The Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as
President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen and qualified. He shall serve until the
President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of
powers and disqualifications as the Acting President. (Art. 7, Sec. 8)
‣ NOTE — the Senate President or Speaker merely becomes “acting” President until one is elected.
2. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President
and Vice-President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call

3. Within seven days, Congress must enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-
President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such call.
‣ What are the constitutional norms to observe in legislating a law calling for a special election?
1. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this
Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.
2. Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt
from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of this Constitution.
3. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed. (Art. 7, Sec. 10)
‣ Is a Special Election always necessary?
‣ NO. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next
presidential election. (Art. 7, Sec. 10)
‣ Who acts as President in default of the Senate President or the Speaker?
‣ It is determined by law —
‣ The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected
until a President or a Vice-President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability, or inability of the
officials mentioned in the next preceding paragraph. (Art. 7, Sec. 7)
‣ The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or
resignation of the Acting President. (Art. 7, Sec. 8)
INCAPACITY OF THE PRESIDENT
Section 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he
transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President
as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.
Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is
not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it
is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
‣ RULE — IN THE FOLLOWING CASES, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT —

1. PRESIDENT DEEMS HIMSELF UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE
‣ Observe the following procedure —
a. The President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office
b. Once he is able, he may transmit a written declaration to the contrary
2. THE CABINET DEEMS THE PRESIDENT UNABLE TO DISCHARGE THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE
‣ Observe the following procedure —

a. Majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office
b. The President may transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that no inability exists, in which case, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his
office.
c. Within 5 days, majority of all the Members of the Cabinet may transmit to the President of the Senate and to
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office.
d. Congress shall decide the issue. For this purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within
forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
e. Within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is
required to assemble, Congress should determine by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately,
whether the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. If so, the Vice-President shall
act as President.
SERIOUS ILLNESS OF THE PRESIDENT
Section 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public shall be informed of the state of his health. The members
of the Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, shall not be denied access to the President during such illness.
‣ RATIONALE — Former President Marcos kept the state of his health secret from the public.
‣ Section 12 envisions not just illness which incapacitates but also any serious illness which can be a matter of national
concern
DISQUALIFICATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS
Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in
any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not, during his
tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries,
Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries.
Section 6. XXXXXX They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other
source.
ARTICLE 11 — ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted,
directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the
Ombudsman, or to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure.
PROHIBITIONS ON THE PRESIDENT AND HIS OFFICIAL FAMILY

‣ RULE — THE PRESIDENT, VICE-PRESIDENT, THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET, AND THEIR DEPUTIES OR ASSISTANTS, DURING
THEIR TENURE, ARE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY PROHIBITED FROM —

1. Holding any other office or employment (Covers both public and private office employment)
2. Practice any other profession
3. Participate in any business
4. Be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries
5. Receiving any other emolument from the Government or any other source (This prohibition applies only to the
President and Vice-President)
‣ NOTE — The prohibition includes appointments in acting capacity or temporary appointments. (Funa vs Agra 2013)
‣ EXCEPT — THEY MAY HOLD OTHER OFFICES —
1. If it is expressly provided in the Constitution
‣ Such as —
a. Vice President may be appointed as a member of the Cabinet (Art. 7, Sec. 3)
b. Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council (Art. 8, Sec. 8)
2. Offices in ex-officio capacity
‣ This does not involve occupying “another office” within the contemplation of the prohibition. These offices are
incidental to the official’s primary functions
‣ Ex-officio offices do not comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but
are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials by virtue of their primary function
JURISPRUDENCE ON DISQUALIFICATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS ON THE PRESIDENT AND HIS OFFICIAL FAMILY
‣ SEE — CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO. 83896, FEBRUARY 22, 1991
‣ RATIONALE — The practice of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the
governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned and
controlled corporations, became prevalent during the time legislative powers in this country were exercised by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos pursuant to his martial law authority. There was a proliferation of newly-created
agencies, instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations created by presidential decrees and
other modes of presidential issuances where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were designated to head
or sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and other
perquisites of office. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government soon led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment.
‣ The rules on disqualifications and prohibitions on the President and his official family is stricter than other
Public Officials. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
‣ Most of the constitutional provisions on disqualifications (such as to members of Congress) to hold other office or
employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
‣ In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that "The President, Vice- President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure." In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not
being qualified by the phrase "in the Government." The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family
is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.
‣ This is because the President and the members of the Cabinet exercise more powers and, therefore, more cheeks
and restraints on them are called for because there is more possibility of abuse in their case.
‣ Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
‣ The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution does NOT apply to posts occupied in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by
the primary functions of the officials' office.

‣ The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials.
‣ The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position." Ex-officio
likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office.
‣ An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further
warrant or appointment.
‣ The term "primary" used to describe "functions" refers to the order of importance and thus means chief or
principal function. The term is not restricted to the singular but may refer to the plural.The additional duties must
not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions.
‣ Such as — Secretaries of Finance and Budget sitting as members of the Monetary Board, and the Secretary of
Transportation and Communications acting as Chairman of the Maritime Industry Authority and the Civil
Aeronautics Board.
‣ If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or
otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview
of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution
‣ The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the
official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position. The reason
is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his principal office.
DOCTRINE OF INCOMPATIBLE OFFICES

‣ SEE — Public Interest Group vs Elma, G.R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006
‣ Since the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel has the duty of giving independent and important legal advice of the
actions of heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations involving other
presidential appointees, he may not occupy a position in any of the office whose performance he must review. Such
would involve incompatible positions. Thus, he cannot be PCGG Chairman and at the same time Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel since the PCGG answers to the President.
PROHIBITIONS ON THE PRESIDENT’S FAMILY AND RELATIVES

‣ RULE — DURING HIS TENURE, THE PRESIDENT’S SPOUSE AND RELATIVES BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY WITHIN THE FOURTH
CIVIL DEGREE CANNOT BE APPOINTED AS —
1. Members of the Constitutional Commissions

2. Members of the Office of the Ombudsman
3. Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries
‣ What if such relatives are already in office when a President assumes office?
‣ The relatives are not ousted from their positions. What is prohibited is appointment or reappointment.
PRESIDENTIAL PRIVILEGES
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

‣ RULE — THE PRESIDENT IS ABSOLUTELY IMMUNE FROM SUIT DURING HIS TENURE
‣ Although the new Constitution has not reproduced the explicit guarantee of presidential immunity from suit under the
1973 Constitution, presidential immunity during tenure remains as part of the law. (Estrada v. Desierto 2001)
‣ RATIONALE — The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the
exercise of presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief
Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided
attention.
‣ EXCEPT — IF THE PRESIDENT’S VOLUNTARILY WAIVES THE PRIVILEGE
‣ There is nothing in the Constitution or laws that would prevent the president from waiving the privilege. The
President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court’s jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive belongs to him. (Soliven v. Judge Makasiar 1998)

‣ What kinds of suits are covered under the immunity?
‣ All kinds of suits are covered. Criminal, civil and administrative. (Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco)
‣ What is the scope of the immunity?
‣ All kinds of acts of the president during his tenure are covered, regardless of whether it is official or unofficial.
‣ NOTE — the remedy is to first impeach a president before prosecuting him for unofficial illegal acts, or wait for the end
of his tenure.
‣ Does a a sitting President enjoy immunity from suit for acts committed before his term as President?
‣ YES. This seems to be the implication.
‣ Who can invoke the immunity?
‣ Only the President himself. This privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the President by virtue of the office and
may be invoked only by the holder of the office, not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in
a criminal case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent
the case from proceeding against such accused. (Soliven v. Judge Makasiar 1998)
‣ Is the President still immune from suit after his tenure?
‣ YES, but only for official acts. The President is not immune for non-official acts (such as those illegal and criminal acts)
‣ SEE — Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 02, 2001
‣ After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by
him while he was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties.
‣ The 1987 Constitution has rejected the expansive notion of immunity in the Marcos Constitution. Once out of
office, even before the end of the six year term, immunity for non-official acts is lost. Such was the case of Joseph
Estrada. The cases filed against him were criminal in character. They involved plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination could these crimes, especially plunder which carried the death pen-
alty, be covered by a mantle of immunity for a non-sitting president. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as
any other trespasser.
‣ What about cabinet secretaries, can they invoke presidential immunity?
‣ NO. Unless he was acting for an on behalf of the President
‣ SEE — Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000
‣ Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President, he cannot invoke the President’s immunity from suit in
a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but merely those of a
department Secretary.
‣ Is the Vice-President also immune from suit?
‣ No jurisprudence on this.
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
‣ RULE — THE PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER TO WITHHOLD CERTAIN TYPES OF INFORMATION FROM THE COURTS, THE CONGRESS
AND THE PUBLIC
‣ What is “executive privilege”?

‣ It has been defined as “the right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the public”. Thus, presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings, like the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts,
or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be
pried open by a co-equal branch of government. (Senate v. Ermita 2006)
‣ The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of the inquiry relates to a power
textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as in the area of military and foreign relations. Under
our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning and diplomatic
powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy
greater confidentiality than others (Neri v. Senate Committee 2008)
‣ What types of information are covered by executive privilege?
‣ The types of information include those which are of a nature that disclosure would subvert military or diplomatic
objectives, or information about the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law, or information
about internal deliberations comprising the process by which government decisions are reached.

‣ It is is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique
role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary
to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on
the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. (Senate vs Ermita
2006)
1. Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order
2. Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged
3. Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
4. Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings
5. Matters affecting national security and public order.
‣ How must a claim of executive privilege be raised?
‣ A claim of privilege must be stated with sufficient particularity to enable Congress or the court to determine its
legitimacy.
‣ SEE — Senate vs Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
‣ Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining
whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it
should be respected. The lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure
impossible. However, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. (Senate vs Ermita
2006)
‣ When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom
is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one
executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest
official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
‣ By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not
only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.
‣ Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It
does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so,
and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on
how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on
first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress
doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has
requested.
‣ A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be
clearly asserted. The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor
waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the
head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The
court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so
without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
‣ Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining
whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it
should be respected
‣ The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity,
be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to
outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
‣ In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the
power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her
behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which
means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only

by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates
to exercise such power
‣ Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert
it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
ELEMENTS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

1. IT IS THE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT TO WITHHOLD MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS
FROM THE PUBLIC, THE COURTS, AND THE CONGRESS.
‣ There are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public like military, diplomatic and
national security secrets. Alluding to foreign jurisprudence, it was ruled that the President and those who assist him
must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately. (Almonte v. Vasquez, 1995)
‣ The privilege covers —
1. Military;
2. Diplomatic; and,
3. Other national security matters, such as:
a. Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door cabinet meetings (Presidential
Communications Privilege)
b. Deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated
(Deliberative Process Privilege)
‣ This is an exception to the constitutional right to information and the power of inquiry of congress in aid of legislation
‣ The Constitution of the Philippines recognizes the right of the people to information on matters of public concern
and guarantees access to official records, documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law (Sec. 7, Art. 3, 1987 Constitution)
‣ The rule on confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in
the separation of powers under the Constitution. (Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 2006)
‣ Diplomatic negotiations enjoy a presumptive privilege against disclosure (AKBAYAN v. Aquino)
‣ While the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final
contract, such information does not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national interest. These cannot be disclosed even if they constitute definite
propositions. (AKBAYAN v. Aquino)
‣ Elements of “presidential communications privilege” (Neri vs Senate) —
1. The protected communications must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President; and
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of
adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of
the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
‣ Closely related to the “presidential communications” privilege is the deliberative process privilege recognized in the
United States, which covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated, Clearly, the privilege accorded to
diplomatic negotiations follows as a logical consequence from the privileged character of the deliberative process
(AKBAYAN v. Aquino)
‣ Information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be
subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest. (Chavez vs PCGG, 1998)
2. IT IS THE INFORMATION ITSELF THAT IS PRIVILEGED, NOT THE EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS THEMSELVES
‣ When Congress exercises its powers of inquiry, the department heads are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Accordingly, only one executive official may be exempted from the power of inquiry of Congress —
the President upon whom executive power is vested and is beyond the reach of Congress except through the power
of impeachment. (Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 2006)
3. THERE MUST BE A FORMAL CLAIM OF THE PRIVILEGE WITH SPECIFIC BASIS GIVEN

‣ Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged.” It does not suffice
to merely declare that the President, or an authorized representative, has determined that it is so. In the absence of a
specific basis for the claim, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges or
whether it should be respected. (Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 2006)
‣ The specific basis of the claim must be given for the courts to judge whether or not the claim for executive privilege is
valid or not
‣ For the claim of executive privilege to be invoked, there must be a formal claim of the privilege, lodged by the head of
the department which has control of the matter, and that a formal and proper claim of the privilege requires a “precise
and certain reason” for preserving confidentiality, but Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for
the claim with such particularity as to compel the disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.
This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department (Neri vs Senate)
EXCEPTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

‣ INFORMATION COVERED BY EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE MAY BE DISCLOSED IF THERE IS A “SUFFICIENT SHOWING OF NEED”
‣ The standard to be employed in determining whether there is a sufficient interest in favor of disclosure is the strong
“sufficient showing of need” which must be shown whether that party is Congress or a private citizen. (AKBAYAN v.
Aquino)
‣ Information, even if confidential under executive privilege, must be disclosed if the right to information outweighs the
public interest of secrecy.
‣ When the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has established that the information is indeed covered
by the same, then the party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that the information is vital, not
simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political,
and economic decision-making.
‣ Note that it is for the Courts to decide whether the information must be disclosed, based on the reasons and basis
given for the claim of executive privilege in relation to the circumstances
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE DOCTRINE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

‣ SENATE VS ERMITA, G.R. NO. 169777, APRIL 20, 2006
‣ The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the
1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the
legal literature of the United States.
‣ Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress.” Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public.”
‣ Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. It has encompassed claims of varying kinds. Tribe,
in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to
speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least
three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either
judicial or legislative investigations.”
‣ One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with
Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or
diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informer’s privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the
identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions
and policies are formulated.
‣ Tribe’s comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus: Since the beginnings of our nation, executive
officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was
crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled
early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have
also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a
qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
‣ The entry in Black’s Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure
requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of

highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to
military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive’ domestic
decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-
governmental advisory and deliberative communications.
‣ That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be
asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that
privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
‣ The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, decided in 1974. In issue in that case
was the validity of President Nixon’s claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court
requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of
privilege was based on the President’s general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence.
The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is
constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers. The Court,
nonetheless, rejected the President’s claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public
interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there
addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information.
‣ Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare. Despite frequent assertion of
the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washington’s refusal to turn over treaty
negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue.
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year as
Nixon, recognized the President’s privilege over his conversations against a congressional subpoena. Anticipating the
balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon, the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest
protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling
that the balance favored the President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena.
‣ In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte
used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision
which explains the basis for the privilege: "The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations
and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which
we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the
public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and
those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and
to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government
and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
‣ Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not
involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information. Nonetheless, the Court recognized
that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in
substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens’ demands for information.
‣ In Chavez v. PCGG, the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a
"governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other
national security matters.” The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on
the right to information.
‣ Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters
recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers,” by which the Court meant Presidential
conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on
military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by
law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information.
‣ From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this
jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the
public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is
a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the
context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
‣ NERI VS SENATE, G.R. NO. 180643, SEPTEMBER 4, 2008
‣ Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to protect
public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will
receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the

President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of
the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as
the right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained
separation of governmental powers.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT; APPOINTMENTS BAN
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads
of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or
compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until
the next adjournment of the Congress.
Section 14. Appointments extended by an Acting President shall remain effective, unless revoked by the elected
President, within ninety days from his assumption or reassumption of office.
Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or
Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
ARTICLE 8 — JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.
Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a
list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
confirmation.
For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
‣ NOTE — Read this concept in relation to the Civil Service Commission and the Civil Service System in Art. 9B
NATURE OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT

‣ What is “appointment”?
‣ It is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. It is distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means the imposition of additional duties, usually by
law, on a person already in the public service.
‣ An "appointment" to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the authority
therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust.
‣ The appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with
and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective. (Bermudez vs Torres 1999)
‣ What is a “commission”?
‣ It is the written evidence of the appointment
‣ The Power of Appointment is Executive in Nature
‣ Since appointment to office is an executive function, the clear implication is that the legislature may not usurp such
function. The legislature may create an office and prescribe the qualifications of the person who may hold the office,

but it may neither specify who shall be appointed to such office nor actually appoint him. The appointing power is the
exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which, no limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those
resulting from the limited exercise of power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office. (Manalang v.
Quitoriano 1954)
‣ The power to appoint is the prerogative of the President, except in those instances when the Constitution provides
otherwise. Usurpation of this fundamentally Executive power by the Legislative and Judicial branches violates the
system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government.
‣ NOTE — The appointing authority of the President, however, should not be confused with the authority of the
legislature to impose additional duties on existing offices. Congress may decide, within Constitutional limits, who may
exercise appointing power.
‣ SEE — Bermudez vs Torres, G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999
‣ Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion on the part of the appointing authority. The power to
appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freely
according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have Indeed, it may rightly be
said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment,
discretion is an integral part thereof. the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing
power.
‣ When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such
conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be
here pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control
over all "executive departments, bureaus and offices." Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or
modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to
substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way,
the President has the power to assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can
accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion of officials under him or
altogether ignore their recommendations.
‣ SEE— Flores vs Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993
‣ An "appointment" is the designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the
duties of some office or trust or t he selection or designation of a person, by the person or persons having authority
therefor, to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the same.
‣ Appointment as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions
of a given office.
‣ The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may
exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the
necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power.
‣ Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice
of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power.
‣ Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same
time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the
President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing
the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or
indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can
only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose
and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment.
‣ In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for the first year
of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one
eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President
is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans
the essential element of choice, is no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.
‣ While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of operations
of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the appointing power on
the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice to one person is certainly an
encroachment on his prerogative.
‣ SEE — Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327
‣ Appointment is essentially a discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according
to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee, if issued a permanent appointment, should possess the

minimum qualification requirements, including the Civil Service eligibility prescribed by law for the position. This
discretion also includes the determination of the nature or character of the appointment, i.e., whether the appointment
is temporary or permanent.
‣ Is the appointing authority bound by the restrictions of a statutory next-in-rank rule?
‣ NO. One who is next in rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher vacancy but it does
not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule neither guarantees a vested right to the
holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position.
The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. (Santiago, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission 1989)
‣ May the Civil Service Commission disapprove an appointment and require the appointment of another person
whom it believes is more qualified for the position?
‣ NO. The appointing authority is given ample discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified persons to vacant
positions among those who are qualified. It is well established that the Commission may not substitute its judgment
for an executive's appointment of a qualified appointee. (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission 1989)
‣ The sole function of the Commission is to attest to the qualification of the appointee. (Luego v. Civil Service
Commission 1986)
‣ BUT — It is a different matter, however, when, after having extended an appointment that is immediately accepted, the
appointing authority withdraws the same and extends it to someone else. In such a situation the Civil Service is within
its authority when it orders the reinstatement of the first appointee. The withdrawal of an appointment already
accepted would be tantamount to removal and would violate security of tenure. (Aquino v. Civil Service Commission
1992)
WHO GETS TO FILL VACANCIES IN GOVERNMENT OFFICES?

1. DETERMINED BY THE CONSTITUTION — THE CONSTITUTION DIRECTLY PROVIDES THAT THE PRESIDENT IS THE APPOINTING
AUTHORITY
a. Heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President
by the Constitution
b. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
‣ Thus, when a law creating an office is silent as to who should appoint the corresponding officer, the President is
the appointing authority
‣ NOTE — In these cases, the President's power to appoint is a self-executing power vested by the Constitution itself
and thus not subject to legislative limitations or conditions, other than those imposed by the Constitution itself
2. DETERMINED BY LAW — THE CONSTITUTION DELEGATES TO THE CONGRESS THE CHOICE OF WHO IS THE APPOINTING
AUTHORITY
‣ Officers “lower in rank” than enumerated in the Constitution
‣ The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the—
a. President alone
b. Courts, or
c. Heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards
‣ NOTE — in this case, since Congress is empower to decide in whom to vest the power of appointment. Congress
does not make the appointment but merely decides who has the power to appoint. Accordingly, it may prescribe
limitations and conditions. When Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of
departments it may limit and restrict power of removal as it seem best for the public interest. The constitutional
authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such
laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed. The head of a department has no constitutional
prerogative of appointment to officers independently of legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be
governed, not only in making appointments but in all that is incident thereto. (U.S. v. Perkins)
‣ SEE — Rufino vs Enriga, G.R. No. 139554, July 21, 2006
‣ Congress can only vest the power to appoint officers “lower in rank” and not those officers which the
Constitution specifically vests in the President to appoint
‣ Thus, a board head cannot appoint board members with co-equal rank as him, the law can only authorise him
to appoint those lower in rank.

‣ When the authority is given to head of collegial bodies, it is to the chairman that the authority is given and not
to the body. But he can appoint only officers "lower in rank," and not officers equal in rank to him. Thus a
Chairman may not appoint a fellow member of a Board.
‣ Congress can only vest the power to appoint in the three offices enumerated in Sec. 16
‣ In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the Secretary. The law may not authorize the
Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive department.
In an agency, the power is vested in the head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest it in the
agency itself. In a commission, the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is also the
chairperson of the board. In the last three situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than the
heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint lower-ranked officers.
‣ The grant of the power to appoint to the heads of agencies, commissions, or boards is a matter of legislative
grace. Congress has the discretion to grant to, or withhold from, the heads of agencies, commissions, or
boards the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. If it so grants, Congress may impose certain conditions for
the exercise of such legislative delegation, like requiring the recommendation of subordinate officers or the
concurrence of the other members of the commission or board.
‣ The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the
"heads" of the specified offices, and in no other person. The word "heads" refers to the chairpersons of the
commissions or boards and not to their members, for several reasons.
‣ What if the law requires that the appointment be with the recommendation of another officer (such as the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice? Is such recommendation indispensable to a valid appointment?
‣ NO. Such law requiring a recommendation should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a mere
advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon
the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The
President, being the head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the
departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said
as having acted beyond the scope of his authority. (Bermudez vs Torres 1999)
PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT

‣ RULE — THE PRESIDENT IS AUTHORIZED TO APPOINT —
1. Heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution
2. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
3. Those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO APPOINT

1. THE PRESIDENT CANNOT APPOINT HIS SPOUSE AND RELATIVES BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY WITHIN THE FOURTH CIVIL
DEGREE AS —
a. Members of the Constitutional Commissions

b. Ombudsman
c. Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations (Art. 7, Sec. 13)
2. APPOINTMENTS EXTENDED BY AN ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL REMAIN EFFECTIVE UNLESS REVOKED BY THE ELECTED PRESIDENT
WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM HIS ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE (ART. 7, SEC. 14)
3. THE PRESIDENT MUST OBSERVE THE APPOINTMENTS BAN (ART. 7, SEC. 15)
‣ RULE — The President cannot make appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term
‣ Does the election ban cover appointments in the judiciary?
‣ YES. The President cannot appoint members of the judiciary even during the appointments ban.
‣ SEE — In re: Valenzuela A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC November 9, 1998
‣ The Court's view is that during the period stated in Section 15. Article VII of the Constitution — "(t)wo
months immediatey before the next presidential elections and up to the end his term" — the President is
neither required to make appointments to the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Sections 4(1) and 9 of
Article VIII simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts within the time frames

provided therein unless prohibited by Section 15 of Article VII. It is not noteworthy that the prohibition on
appointments comes into effect only once every six years.
‣ NOTE — this provision applies only to presidential appointments. There is no law that prohibits local executive
officials from making appointments during the last days of their tenure. (De Rama v. CA 2001)
‣ EXCEPT — Appointments to the following are NOT covered by the appointments ban —
a. Temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety
b. Vacancies in the Supreme Court
‣ SEE — De Castro vs Judicial and Bar Council, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
‣ In this case, the Court said the President Macapagal-Arroyo could fill the vacancy left by retiring Chief
Justice Puno even during the appointments ban. This was because the wording of Art. 8, Sec. 4 (vacancies
in the SC) is different from the wording in Art. 8, Sec. 9 (vacancies in the lower courts). Vacancies in the SC
should be filled up within 90 days from such vacancy, thus this operates as an exception to the
appointments ban. On the other hand, the vacancies in lower courts merely needs to be filled within 90
days from the submission of the list by the JBC.
4. SOME APPOINTMENTS NEED THE CONFIRMATION OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS (ART. 7, SEC. 16)
‣ These are —
a. Heads of the executive departments
b. Ambassadors
c. Ether public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
d. Other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution
‣ Such as —
i. Sectoral representatives (Art. 6, Sec. 5)
ii. Members of the Constitutional Commissions (Art. 9, B, Sec. 1[2]; C, Sec. 1[2]; D, Sec. 1[2])
iii. Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. 9, Sec. 9)
‣ NOTE — The enumeration means that Congress may not give to any other officer the power to appoint the above
enumerated officers. This list is EXCLUSIVE. Congress CANNOT make it a condition in a law that a presidential
appointment should be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments even if it falls under those offices under the
Constitution which requires no such confirmation. To do so would be, in effect, a constitutional amendment. (Calderon
vs Carale 1992). In other words, the list of those offices in the Constitution requiring the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments is exclusive, it cannot be expanded by ordinary legislation.
5. APPOINTMENTS IN THE JUDICIARY MUST FIRST PASS THROUGH THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (ART. 8, SEC. 9)
6. IN THE PROPER CASES, THE PRESIDENT MUST OBSERVE THE REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY LAW
‣ The presidential power of appointment may also be limited by Congress through its power to prescribe qualifications
for public office; and the judiciary may annul an appointment made by the President if the appointee is not qualified or
has not been validly confirmed
KINDS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS

1. PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY
a. Permanent — those extended to persons possessing the requisite eligibility and are thus protracted by the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure
b. Temporary — given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without necessary of just cause or valid
investigation, made on the understanding that the appointing power has not yet decided on a permanent appointee
and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a permanence choice is made.
‣ As such, they are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (Valencia vs Peralta)
2. REGULAR OR AD-INTERIM
a. Regular — Made by the President while Congress is in session. It takes effect only after confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments (if required_ and once approved, continues until the end of the term of the appointee.
b. Ad-interim — one made by the President while Congress is not in session (in recess, where the Commission on
Appointments does not meet). It takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress. In the latter case, the appointment is deemed “by-
passed” through inaction. The ad-interim appointment is intended to prevent interruptions in vital government

services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in government offices including the three
constitutional commissions.
3. APPOINTMENTS BY ACTING PRESIDENTS
‣ These are considered valid and effective unless revoked by the elected President, within ninety days from his
assumption or reassumption of office.
JURISPRUDENCE ON REGULAR VS AD-INTERIM APPOINTMENTS

‣ What is the nature of ad-interim appointments?
‣ The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim
appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all
the powers pertaining to the office. (Matibag vs Benipayo 2002)
‣ Is an “ad-interim” appointment, permanent in character?
‣ YES. SEE — Matibag vs Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002
‣ An ad-interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments does not alter is permanent character.
‣ The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
‣ The ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it can no
longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time
and for any reason an ad interim appointment is utterly without basis.
‣ An ad interim appointment is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has expired.
Said appointment is of course distinguishable from an ‘acting’ appointment which is merely temporary, good until
another permanent appointment is issued
‣ What is the difference between regular and ad-interim appointments?
‣ SEE — Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971).
‣ A distinction is thus made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President
nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume
office. It is not so with reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may
thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His title to such office is complete. In the language of
the Constitution, the appointment is effective ‘until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress.
‣ SEE — Matibag vs Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002
‣ An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee
and therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that "no officer or employee in the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.”
‣ Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office.
The withdrawal or revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee
before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is tantamount to removal from office.
Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but
also by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the
requirements of due process.
‣ An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the
disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the
adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two causes
are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory
conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however,
can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad
interim appointees.
‣ While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as provided by law, an appointment or
designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing
power. A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the
kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making to the three independent
constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.

‣ May the ad-interim appointment of persons be continuously renewed by the President (one and the same
person)?
‣ IT DEPENDS. SEE — Matibag vs Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002
‣ It cannot be renewed — if the ad interim appointee disapproved by the Commission on Appointments can no
longer be extended a new appointment. The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in
the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. The disapproval is a decision on
the merits, being a refusal by the Commission on Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the
qualifications of the appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from such decision, the
disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on the appointing power. In this instance, the President
can no longer renew the appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointment, but because
of a final decision by the Commission on Appointments to withhold its consent to the appointment.
‣ It can be renewed — If the ad interim appointment is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the
Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-passed appointment is one that has not been
finally acted upon on the merits by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress.
There is no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the appointment
as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of
a by-passed appointee.
STEPS IN THE APPOINTING PROCESS

1. Nomination by the President
2. Acceptance of the Nomination by the appointee
3. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (if required)
4. Issuance of the Commission
‣ NOTE — An appointment is deemed complete only upon its acceptance. Pending such acceptance, which is optional to
the appointee, the appointment may still validly withdrawn. (Lacson vs Romero)
POWER TO DISCIPLINE OR REMOVE

‣ RULE — THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE REMOVE IS INHERENT IN THE POWER TO APPOINT
‣ The power of removal may be implied from the power of appointment.
‣ The power of control is NOT the source of the Executive's disciplinary power over the person of his subordinates.
Rather, his disciplinary power flows from his power to appoint
‣ LIMITATIONS —
1. WHEN THE CONSTITUTION PRESCRIBES THE MEANS TO REMOVE AN APPOINTED OFFICIAL
‣ The President cannot remove officials appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for
separation of such officers from public service
a. Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions — can only be removed by impeachment
b. Judges and Justices of lower courts — subject to the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court
2. THE DISCIPLINARY POWER OF THE PRESIDENT IS SUBJECT TO THE CAUSES PROVIDED FOR BY LAW
‣ This inherent disciplinary power has been made subject to limitation by the legislature through the tatter's power to
provide for a civil service system one of whose main features is security of tenure: "No officer or employee in the
Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law. (Art. 9(B), Sec. 2[3])
‣ While the President has control over the judgment or discretion of his subordinates, when it comes to disposition
and movement of their “persons”, the President must obey legislative prescriptions on the subject.
‣ SEE — Ang-Angco vs Castillo, G.R. No. L-17169, November 30, 1963
‣ There is some point in the argument that the Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to
investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are
presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle
that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson v. Romero), but not with regard to those
officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be
exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest
the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article
VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of
departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of this
constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.

‣ We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of
departments it may limit and restrict power of removal as it seem best for the public interest. The constitutional
authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal
by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed. The head of a department has no
constitutional prerogative of appointment to officers independently of legislation of Congress, and by such
legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments but in all that is incident thereto.
‣ In resume, we may conclude that the action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the authority
of the President, in taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the same to
the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.
‣ What is the extent of the President's disciplinary authority over presidential appointees who belong to the
career service?
‣ This power is limited. Specifically, Section 36 of P.D. No. 807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service
Decree of the Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure
may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that petitioner is a
presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure
for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial
protection, thus, may only be removed for cause and in accordance with procedural due process." (Larin vs.
Executive Secretary)
3. THE PRESIDENT MUST OBSERVE DUE PROCESS AND THE PROPERLY PRESCRIBED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
‣ NOTE —
‣ Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by the President may be directly
disciplined by him (Villaluz v. Zaldivar), provided that the same is for cause and in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law.
‣ Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends upon the pleasure of the
President may be replaced at any time, but legally speaking, their separation is effected not by removal but by
expiration of their term. (Alajar v. Alba)
POWER OF EXECUTIVE CONTROL; FAITHFUL EXECUTION CLAUSE
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.
ARTICLE 10 — LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. XXXX
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
POWER OF EXECUTIVE CONTROL

‣ RULE — THE PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE CONTROL OF ALL THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS, AND OFFICES
‣ This means that the President is authorized and empowered to —
a. Nullity or modify acts of subordinates
b. Act through agents and department heads, their acts are deemed acts of the President
c. Re-organize the all executive departments, bureaus, and offices
d. Determine matters of policy in the executive department
‣ NOTE — This power of control couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner its extent and scope.
(Ang-Angco v. Castillo 1963)
‣ Are government-owned or controlled corporations covered under the power of control?
‣ YES. They partake of the nature of government bureaus or offices.
‣ SEE — NAMARCO vs Arca, G.R. No. L-25743, September 30, 1969
‣ The President of the Philippines' authority to review and reverse the decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors
dismissing Juan T. Arive from his position in the NAMARCO and to order his re-instatement falls within the

constitutional power of the President over all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Under our governmental
set-up, corporations owned or controlled by the government, such as the NAMARCO, partake of the nature of
government bureaus or offices, which are administratively supervised by the Administrator of the Office of
Economic Coordination, "whose compensation and rank shall be that of a head of an Executive Department" and
who "shall be responsible to the President of the Philippines under whose control his functions ... shall be
exercised.”
‣ BERNAS — The executive’s power of control over GOCCs is a question of law since the legislature may place them
under the control of the executive when their functions partake the nature of government bureaus or offices. GOCCs
may be removed from the Executive’s control when the nature of their functions is changed.
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF CONTROL

1. President must observe the limits imposed by the Constitution and Laws (Faithful Execution Clause)
2. President cannot interfere with decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, even if they are executive agencies
3. President merely has power of general supervision of local government units
ASPECTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF EXECUTIVE CONTROL

1. POWER OVER THE ACTS AND DECISIONS OF ALL OFFICERS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
‣ The President's power of control applies to the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is true
whether such officers are appointed by the President or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.
The power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate office involving the
exercise of discretion. (Rufino vs Endriga 2006)
‣ The presidential power of control over the Executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from
the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional power of the President is self-executing and does
not require any implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of control over the Executive
branch.
‣ The President sits at the apex of the Executive branch, and exercises "control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. There can be no instance under the Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is
outside the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary since there is only one. (Rufino vs Endriga 2006)
‣ President vested with executive power exercising control over the entire Executive branch .Any office in the Executive
branch that is not under the control of the President is a lost command whose existence is without any legal or
constitutional basis. (Rufino vs Endriga 2006)
‣ NOTE — The Legislature cannot validly enact a law that puts a government office in the Executive branch outside the
control of the President in the guise of insulating that office from politics or making it independent. If the office is part
of the Executive branch, it must remain subject to the control of the President. Otherwise, the Legislature can deprive
the President of his constitutional power of control over "all the executive offices." If the Legislature can do this with
the Executive branch, then the Legislature can also deal a similar blow to the Judicial branch by enacting a law putting
decisions of certain lower courts beyond the review power of the Supreme Court. This will destroy the system of
checks and balances finely structured in the 1987 Constitution among the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
branches. (Rufino vs Endriga 2006)
2. POWER TO NULLITY OR MODIFY ACTS OF ALL OFFICERS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
‣ The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. (Mondano v.
Silvosa 1955)
‣ It is such power which has been given to the President over all executive officers, from Cabinet members to the
lowliest clerk. This is an element of the presidential system where the President is "the Executive of the Government
of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in
an advisory capacity. (Villena v. Secretary of Interior 1939)
‣ The President's power of control means his power to reverse the judgment of an inferior officer. It may also be
exercised in his behalf by Department Heads. Thus the Secretary of Justice may reverse the judgment of a prosecutor
and direct him to withdraw an information already filed. Such action is not directly reviewable by a court. One who
disagrees, however, should appeal to the Office of the President in order to exhaust administrative remedies prior to
bringing it to court. (Orosa v. Roa 2006)
‣ This power, however, "merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate in the performance of
his duties. It only means that the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the
performance of his duties. (Ang-Angco v. Castillo 1963)
3. POWER TO DELEGATE OR ACT THROUGH AGENTS (DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY)

‣ The doctrine, recognizing that the Constitution has established a single and not a plural executive, postulates that "all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts
of the Chief Executive. (Villena v. Secretary of Interior 1939)
‣ Examples —
1. A decision of a department secretary, when not reprobated by the Executive, is the last step in the process of
"exhausting administrative remedies” (Demaisip v. Court of Tax Appeals 1959)
2. The Executive Secretary when acting "by authority of the President," may reverse the decision of another
department secretary. (Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano 1967)
3. The Executive Secretary has the power to modify, alter or reverse a construction of a statute given by the
Secretary of Justice. (Maceda v. Macaraig 1991)
4. The action of the Secretary of the DENR, exercising the President's power to reorganize, is presumed to be the
action of the President. (DENR v. DENR Employees 2003)
5. The acts of the Secretary of Justice in the ordinary course of the performance of his duties are acts of the
President which are controlling over all executive officers. Hence, the NBI Director must obey. (De Leon v. Carpio
1989)
4. POWER TO REORGANIZE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS, AND OFFICES
‣ The express grant of the power of control to the President justifies an executive action to carry out the reorganization
of an executive office under a broad authority of law. (Anak Mindanao v. Executive Sec. 2007)
‣ Reorganization can involve the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or even abolition of positions by
reason of economy or redundancy of functions. While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged with the
legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may include such abolition, is
permissible under present laws. (Malaria Employees v. Executive Secretary 2007)
‣ SEE — Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003
‣ The Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292) expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the
Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
President to reorganize his office “to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency”. The Office of the President is the
nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable
of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies.
‣ But the power to reorganize the Office of the President under Sec. 31 (2) and (3) of the Administrative Code should
be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Sec. 31 (1) of EO 292, the
President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Sec. 31 (2) and (3), the President’s power to
reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies
from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa
5. POWER TO DETERMINE MATTERS OF POLICY IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
‣ The term "policy" means a settled or definite course or method adopted and followed by a government, body, or
individual. (Ang-Angco v. Castillo 1963)
POWER OF CONTROL VS POWER TO DISCIPLINE OR REMOVE

‣ RULE — While the power of control pertains to the power over “acts or decisions” or officers in the executive
department. Power to discipline or remove pertains to the power over the “person” of the officers themselves.
‣ SEE — Ang-Angco v. Castillo 1963
‣ The power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." This power, however, "merely applies
to the exercise of control over the acts of the subordinate in the performance of his duties. It only means that the
President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his duties.
‣ The power of control, therefore, is not the source of the Executive's disciplinary power over the person of his
subordinates. Rather, his disciplinary power flows from his power to appoint The power to remove is inherent in
the power to appoint.Moreover, this inherent disciplinary power has been made subject to limitation by the
legislature through the tatter's power to provide for a civil service system one of whose main features is security of
tenure: "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided

by law." Article IX, B, Section 2(3). Hence, it can be said that while the Executive has control over the "judgment"
or "discretion" of his subordinates, it is the legislature which has control over their “person."
POWER AND OBLIGATION TO ENSURE FAITHFUL EXECUTION OF LAWS

‣ RULE — THE PRESIDENT MUST ENSURE THAT THE LAWS BE FAITHFULLY EXECUTED
‣ Known as the “Faithful Execution Clause”
‣ The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power and is intimately related to the other
executive functions.
‣ This is the essence of executive power which is the power to enforce and administer the laws.
‣ This means that the President can do whatever is needed to ensure that laws and treaties are followed
‣ NOTE — The President’s power to compel faithful execution is not limited to laws buy also includes the rights and
obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all the protection implied by the
nature of government under the Constitution. (In re Neagle 1890)
‣ SEE — National Electrification Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143481, February 15, 2002
‣ As the administrative head of the government, the President is vested with the power to execute, administer and
carry out laws into practical operation. Executive power, then, is the power of carrying out the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance.
‣ SEE — Saguisag vs Ochoa 2016, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
‣ This is not merely a power but also an obligation and duty imposed on the President to carry out the constitution,
laws and decisions of the Supreme Court (which have the force of law)
‣ This Court has interpreted the faithful execution clause as an obligation imposed on the President, and not a
separate grant of power.
‣ These obligations are as broad as they sound, for a President cannot function with crippled hands, but must be
capable of securing the rule of law within all territories of the Philippine Islands and be empowered to do so within
constitutional limits. Congress cannot, for instance, limit or take over the President's power to adopt implementing
rules and regulations for a law it has enacted.
‣ This mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently executive in nature. The most important self-
executory constitutional power of the President is the President's constitutional duty and mandate to "ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed." The rule is that the President can execute the law without any delegation of power
from the legislature. The import of this characteristic is that the manner of the President's execution of the law,
even if not expressly granted by the law, is justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the President must
"take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law.
‣ The faithful execution clause gives the President the following powers and duties —
1. POWER OF GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LGUS AND AUTONOMOUS REGIONS
‣ It is the power of a superior officer to "ensure that the laws are faithfully executed" by inferiors.
‣ The power of supervision does not include the power of control; but the power of control necessarily includes the
power of supervision.
‣ Such as — the power of the President over local governments is only one of general supervision.
2. POWER TO PROSECUTE CRIMES
‣ The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our
laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of
discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. (Webb vs De Leon 1995)
3. POWER TO ENTER INTO EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN STATES
‣ SEE — Saguisag vs Ochoa 2016
POWER AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In
case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend

the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority
of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not
be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and
public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof,
and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts
or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in, or directly connected with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
ARTICLE 2 — DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector
of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal, military or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AS THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
1. HEAD OF ALL THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
‣ BERNAS — The weight of authority favours the position that the President is NOT a member of the armed forces but
remains a civilian. The President’s duties as commander-in-chief represent only a part of the organic duties imposed
upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature. He is elected as the highest civilian officer. This is in
harmony with the principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”
‣ The President holds supreme military authority and is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed
forces.
‣ The President has the power to direct military operations and to determine military strategy.
‣ The President has the control and direction of the conduct of war, whether the war be declared or undeclared.
‣ Since the President is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces she can demand obedience from military officers.
Military officers who disobey or ignore her command can be subjected to court martial proceeding. (Gudani v. Senga
2006
‣ SEE — Saguisag vs Ochoa G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
‣ The President of the Philippines, as the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of the Philippine
archipelago, including all the islands and waters embraced therein and all other territories over which it has
sovereignty or jurisdiction. To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped with authority over the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), which is the protector of the people and the state. The AFP's role is to
secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

‣ In addition, the Executive is constitutionally empowered under Art. 2, Sec. 4 and 5 to maintain peace and order;
protect life, liberty, and property; and promote the general welfare. In recognition of these powers, Congress has
specified that the President must oversee, ensure, and reinforce our defensive capabilities against external and
internal threats and, in the same vein, ensure that the country is adequately prepared for all national and local
emergencies arising from natural and man-made disasters
‣ Because of the duty of the President to faithfully execute the laws, it is his President's prerogative to do whatever
is legal and necessary for Philippine defense interests. It is no coincidence that the constitutional provision on the
faithful execution clause was followed by that on the President's commander-in-chief powers, which are
specifically granted during extraordinary events of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. And this duty of
defending the country is unceasing, even in times when there is no state of lawlesss violence, invasion, or
rebellion. At such times, the President has full powers to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. It would
therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant to the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution to do
nothing when the call of the moment requires increasing the military's defensive capabilities, which could include
forging alliances with states that hold a common interest with the Philippines or bringing an international suit
against an offending state. (Saguisag vs Ochoa 2016)
2. CALLING-OUT POWER
‣ The President may call out the armed forces whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress either —
a. Lawless violence (This is to be determined by the President as a matter of policy based on the facts of each case)
b. Invasion
c. Rebellion
‣ NACHURA — Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid her in suppressing
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; this involves ordinary police action. But every act that goes beyond the
President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the
exercise of her powers. She cannot invoke a greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser power.
‣ When the President exercises the option to call on the armed forces does he thereby acquire additional or
emergency powers?
‣ NO. It simply means that he is calling on the Armed Forces to assist the police. But this does not give her
additional powers. (Lacson v. Secretary Perez 2001)
‣ NOTE — a President can claim emergency powers only when these are granted to her by Congress under Art. 6,
Sec. 23.
‣ Is this power subject to judicial review?
‣ YES. The court’s may look into —
a. The factual basis to see compliance with the requirements imposed by the Constitution; and
b. Whether or not the power has been exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion (arbitrary,
whimsical or capricious manner) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
‣ SEE — David vs Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
‣ While the Court considered the President’s "calling-out" power as a discretionary power solely vested in his
wisdom, it stressed that "this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion."This ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article VIII of 1987 Constitution
which fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the
political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the courts are authorized not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." The latter part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. It speaks of judicial prerogative not only in
terms of power but also of duty
‣ SEE — Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000
‣ When the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion, he
necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The Court cannot overrule the
President’s discretion or substitute its own. The only criterion is that “whenever it becomes necessary”, the
President may call out the armed forces. In the exercise of the power, on-the-spot decisions may be necessary
in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the
decision to call out the armed forces must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.
‣ SEE — Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001

‣ The Supreme Court said that the President has discretionary authority to declare a “state of rebellion”. The
Court may only look into the sufficiency of the factual basis for the exercise of the power.
‣ Can the President declare a “state of rebellion” or “state of national emergency” is this valid? What are its
effects?
‣ YES. But it does not give the President additional powers
‣ SEE — Sanlakas vs Reyes, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004
‣ The President’s authority to declare a “state of rebellion” springs in the main from her powers as chief executive
and, at the same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. However, a mere declaration of a
state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. There is also no basis for the
apprehensions that, because of the declaration, military and police authorities may resort to warrantless
arrests.
‣ As held in Lacson v. Perez, supra., the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected
of rebellion as provided under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Be that as it may, the Court said that, in
calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an “utter superfluity”. At most, it only gives
notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.
“The Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration
is deemed not written.”
3. POWER TO SUSPEND THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
‣ The President may, for a period not exceeding 60 days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus if the
following requisites are present —
a. Invasion or Rebellion
‣ The existence of a rebellion need not be widespread or attain the magnitude of a civil war. This is apparent
from the very provision of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of rebellion, which may be limited in its
scope to "any part" of the Philippines. (Lansang vs Garcia 1971)
b. When the public safety requires it
‣ This is to be determined by the President as a matter of policy based on the facts of each case
‣ What is the writ of habeas corpus?
‣ It is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a
designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive
whatever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.
‣ What is the “privilege” of the writ of habeas corpus?
‣ It is the right to have an immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty.
‣ NOTE — The writ is never suspended. It always issues as a matter of course. What is suspended is the privilege of
the writ. When such suspension occurs, once the officer making the return shows to the court that the person
detained is being detained for an offense covered by the suspension, the court may not enquire any further.
‣ Does the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus apply to all persons?
‣ NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ only applies to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
‣ What is the duty of the State after arrests and detention on the basis of the suspension of the privilege?
‣ During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained shall be
judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise he shall be released.
‣ Is this power subject to judicial review?
‣ YES. The court’s may look into —
a. The factual basis to see compliance with the requirements imposed by the Constitution; and
b. Whether or not the power has been exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion (arbitrary,
whimsical or capricious manner) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
‣ SEE — Lansang vs Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971
‣ Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of
government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers, under the
Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances,
under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts

within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or not he has so
acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.
‣ In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant— the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he had gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to
exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act. To be sure, the power of the Court to
determine the validity of the contested proclamation is far from being identical to, or even comparable with, its
power over ordinary civil or criminal cases elevated thereto by ordinary appeal from inferior courts, in which
cases the appellate court has all of the powers of the court of origin. Under the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances, the judicial authority to review decisions of administrative
bodies or agencies is much more limited, as regards findings of fact made in said decisions. Under the English
law, the reviewing court determines only whether there is some evidentiary basis for the contested
administrative findings; no quantitative examination of the supporting evidence is undertaken. The
administrative findings can be interfered with only if there is no evidence whatsoever in support thereof,
and said finding is, accordingly, arbitrary, capricious and obviously unauthorized. Other cases, in both
jurisdictions, have applied the "substantial evidence" rule, which has been construed to mean "more than a
mere scintilla" or "relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,"
even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
4. POWER TO DECLARE MARTIAL LAW
‣ The President may, for a period not exceeding 60 days, place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law if
the following requisites are present —
a. Invasion or rebellion, and
b. When the public safety requires it
‣ A state of martial law does NOT —
a. Suspend the operation of the Constitution
b. Supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies
c. Authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function
d. Automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
‣ NOTE — In view of these restrictions, martial law is now a toothless power.
‣ What is martial law?
‣ Martial law is essentially police power. This is borne out by the constitutional text which sets down "public safety"
as the object of the exercise of martial law. Public safety is the concern of police power. What is peculiar, however,
about martial law as police power is that, whereas police power is normally a function of the legislature executed
by the civilian executive arm, under martial law, police power is exercised by the executive with the aid of the
military and in place of certain governmental agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with existing
conditions in a locality which remains subject to the sovereignty.
‣ It authorizes the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government.
‣ The exercise of the power which resides in the executive branch of the government to preserve order and insure
the public safety in times of emergency, when other branches of the government are unable to function, or their
functioning would itself threaten the public safety.
‣ It is the law of necessity to be prescribed and administered by the executive power. Its object, the preservation of
the public safety and good order, defines the scope, which will vary with the circumstances and necessities of the
case. The exercise of the power may not extend beyond what is required by the exigency which calls it forth.
‣ What are the effects of martial law?
‣ It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case — with public necessity and safety as the primary
consideration.
‣ BERNAS — What emerges from the observations on martial law as police power as well as from the text of the
Constitution is that martial law is a flexible concept. Necessity creates the conditions for martial law and at the
same time limits the scope of martial law. Certainly, the necessities created by a state of invasion would be
different from those created by rebellion. Necessarily, therefore, the degree and kind of vigorous executive action
needed to meet the varying kinds and degrees of emergency could not be identical under all conditions.
‣ NOTE — Since the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege has
been used only once. President Arroyo declared martial law in Maguindanao on the occasion of the Ampatuan
massacre but she lifted it within weeks. What Presidents have done instead has been merely to make use of the power
to call on the Armed Forces to help the police maintain order. But this does not give them additional powers.

5. THE POWER TO ORGANIZE COURTS MARTIAL FOR THE DISCIPLINE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, CREATE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF WAR CRIMINALS
‣ SEE — Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-533, August 20, 1946
‣ Courts martial are agencies of executive character, and one of the authorities "for the ordering of courts martial
has been held to be attached to the constitutional functions of the President as Commander in Chief,
independently of legislation. The Supreme Court of the United States referring to the provisions of the Constitution
authorizing Congress to provide for the government of the army, excepting military offenses from the civil
jurisdiction, and making the President Commander in Chief, observes as follows: "These provisions show that
Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses in the manner then
and now practiced by civilized nations, and that the power to do so is given without any connection between it
and the 3d Article of the United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely independent of each other."
‣ Not belonging to the judicial branch of the government, it follows that courts-martial must pertain to the executive
department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the
President as Commander in Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline
therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.
‣ SEE — Navales v. General Abaya, G.R. No. 162318. October 25, 2004
‣ In enacting R.A. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to the civilian courts jurisdiction over those
offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over
cases mandated by the Articles of War. Thus, the RTC cannot divest the General Court Martial of jurisdiction over
those charged with violations of Art. 63
‣ SEE — Gudani vs Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006
‣ On the issue of whether the court martial could still assume jurisdiction over General Gudani who had been
compulsorily retired from the service, the Court quoted from Abadilla v. Ramos, where it was held that an officer
whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military
authorities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once
jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.
LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO SUSPEND OF THE PRIVILEGE OF HABEAS CORPUS AND ON MARTIAL LAW
‣ These are the “limitations” prescribed by the Constitution on the declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. It serves as a check on this broad power of the President
1. GROUNDS — INVASION OR REBELLION, WHEN PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES IT
2. TIME LIMIT — 60 DAYS FROM DECLARATION
3. LEGISLATIVE REVIEW — REVIEW AND POSSIBLE REVOCATION BY CONGRESS
a. Within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
b. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within 24 hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in
accordance with its rules without need of a call.
c. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may
revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President.
‣ NOTE — The Senate and the House of Representatives vote "jointly." This is a departure from the general rule that
the two Houses vote separately when deciding an issue. The purpose of the departure from the general rule is to
facilitate the override of the suspension or the imposition.
d. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension
for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
4. JUDICIAL REVIEW — REVIEW AND POSSIBLE NULLIFICATION BY THE SUPREME COURT
‣ The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within 30 days from its filing.
‣ NOTE — the Supreme Court cannot act motu proprio. There must be a petition filed by any citizen. All Filipino citizens
are given legal standing to file the petition.
POWER OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
ARTICLE 9C — THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
REVISED PENAL CODE

Article 36. Pardon; its effect. - A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. A pardon shall in no case exempt the
culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
XXXXXX
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects
4. By absolute pardon;
XXXXXX
Article 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. - Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon
2. By commutation of the sentence; and
XXXXXX
Article 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon. - Any person who has been granted conditional
pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the conditions imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance
with any of the conditions specified shall result in the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be
applied to him.
Article 96. Effect of commutation of sentence. - The commutation of the original sentence for another of a different
length and nature shall have the legal effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former.
Article 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. - Except in case of extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next
preceding article the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime committed
by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has
not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason.
Article 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any
of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon be higher than six
years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence.
POWER OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

‣ RULE — THE PRESIDENT MAY GRANT —
1. Reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures
‣ This is the sole prerogative of the President and may not be limited by law
‣ It may only be granted to convicts by final judgment
2. Amnesty
‣ This requires the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
‣ It may be granted even if there is no conviction by final judgment

PARDON AMNESTY
Granted solely by the President Granted by the President but requires the concurrence of
a majority of all the Members of the Congress
Private act which must be pleaded and proved by the Public act of which the courts should take judicial notice
person pardoned
Granted only to those convicted by final judgment for all Granted to classes of persons or communities who may
kinds of offenses be guilty of political offense (but has been recognized in
tax cases), generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction
Looks forward and relieves the offender from the Looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
consequences of an offense of which he has been offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, with which is charged that the person released by
and for that reason it does not work restoration of the amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless had committed no offense.
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the
pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence"
POWER TO PARDON CONVICTS

‣ RULE — AFTER CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT, THE PRESIDENT MAY GRANT —
1. Reprieves — postpone the execution of an offense to a day certain (such as the death penalty).
2. Commutations — a remission of a part of the punishment or a substitution of a less penalty for the one originally
imposed. The commutation of the original sentence for another of a different length and nature shall have the legal
effect of substituting the latter in the place of the former.
3. Pardons — an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
4. Remit fines and forfeitures — prevents the collection of fines or the confiscation of forfeited property. But it cannot
have the effect of returning property which has been vested in third parties or money in the public treasury.
‣ RATIONALE — the power of executive clemency is tacit admission that human institutions are imperfect and that there
are infirmities in the administration of justice. The power therefore exists as an instrument for correcting these infirmities
and for mitigating whatever harshness might be generated by a too strict application of the law.
‣ What are the limitations on the pardoning power of the President?
1. It cannot be granted in the following cases —
a. In cases of impeachment (The power to impeach those impeachable officials is vested in Congress)
b. As otherwise provided in the Constitution
‣ SEE — Art. 9C — “Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election
laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission.” This operates as a constitutional limitation on the power of executive clemency
c. In cases of legislative contempt (as it would violate separation of powers), or civil contempt (as the State is
without interest in the same)
2. A pardon can be extended only to one whose conviction is final, pardon has no effect until the person withdraws his
appeal and thereby allows his conviction to be final. (People v. Salle 1995)
3. It cannot absolve the convict of civil liability (People v. Nacional 1995)
4. It cannot restore public offices forfeited (Monsanto v. Factoran)
‣ Does a pardon also restore the convict’s civil and political rights (which are wiped by the accessory penalties)
‣ Generally, a pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage
‣ EXCEPT— when such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. (Art. 36, RPC)
‣ Does a pardon extinguish the civil liability arising because of the crime?
‣ NO. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence. (Art. 36, 133, RPC)

‣ Does the pardon wipe away the fact of the commission of the crime? (in other words, does it amount to an
acquittal?)
‣ NO. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does
not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
‣ SEE — Monsanto vs Factoran, G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
‣ While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness
‣ The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as relieving
the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or disabilities based
on the finding of guilt. But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that the offender is a "new man",
and "as innocent as if he had never committed the offense;" is to ignore the difference between the crime and the
criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of
punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more dangerous to society than one never
found guilty of crime, though it places no restraints upon him following his conviction.”
‣ A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been
done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required.
‣ May a pardon be with imposed conditions?
‣ YES. The President has the prerogative to impose conditions on the pardon, the violation of which results in the
revocation of the pardon.
‣ Any person who has been granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the
conditions imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in the
revocation of the pardon. (Art. 95, RPC)
‣ What is the consequence if the pardoned convict violates the conditions of his pardon?
‣ The pardon is revoked and a new sentence is imposed on him. It is considered as “other cases of evasion of service
of sentence” under Art. 159 of the RPC.
‣ The pardoned convict who violates any conditions of the pardon shall serve —
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period — if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon
is 6 years or less
2. The unexpired portion of his original sentence — if the penalty remitted by the granting of such pardon is more
than 6 years (Art. 159, RPC)
‣ Where conditional pardon has been granted, who determines whether the condition has been violated?
‣ The President, and the President alone, NOT the courts. The convict's acceptance of the conditional pardon carries
with it acceptance of the President's authority. If a condition of the pardon provides that the accused must not commit
a violation of any penal law, it is the President who has the sole discretion to determine whether there is such
violation. There is no need for judicial determination or conviction.
‣ SEE — Torres v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 76872, July 23, 1987
‣ The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
‣ The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
‣ In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code
which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President
has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice
is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

‣ Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict
had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Sec. 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
‣ Should a pardon be accepted by the convict?
‣ IT DEPENDS —
1. Absolute Pardon — complete even without acceptance
2. Conditional Pardon — has no force until accepted by the condemned. The condition may be less acceptable to
him than the original punishment, and may in fact be more onerous. (Cabantag v. Wolfe 1906)
‣ Is a pardoned former public officer entitled to reinstatement to her former position even without a new
appointment
‣ NO. While a pardon removes all penalties and legal disabilities, it does not restore legal office already forfeited. Since,
however, her disqualification has been removed, it qualifies her to apply for a new appointment. (Monsanto v. Factoran
1989)
‣ May the president extend executive clemency for administrative penalties?
‣ YES. The Constitution makes no distinction with regard to the extent of the pardoning power except with respect to
impeachment.
‣ SEE — Llmas vs Orbos, G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991
‣ We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.
‣ If the law does not distinguish, so we must no distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which
cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By
the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to
provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the
same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
‣ It is our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases,
which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.
‣ We wish to stress however that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases,
we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the
government.
‣ Is the grant of an executive pardon subject to judicial review?
‣ NO. (but remember the power of Courts to ascertain GADALEJ)
‣ Pardon is discretionary. It may not be controlled by the legislature or reversed by the courts, unless there is a
constitutional violation. Thus, it was a legal malapropism for the trial court to interject par. 2, Art. 135, Revised Penal
Code, recommending the grant of pardon after the convict shall have served a jail term of 5 years, considering that
this was a prosecution under a special law, and that the matter of a pardon is within the President’s exclusive
prerogative. (People v. de Gracia)
POWER TO GRANT AMNESTY

‣ RULE — THE PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER TO GRANT AMNESTY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE
MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS
‣ What is “amnesty”?
‣ It is an act of grace, concurred in by the legislature, usually extended to groups of persons who committed political
offenses, which puts into oblivion the offense itself.
‣ Amnesty commonly denotes the 'general pardon to rebels for their treason and other high political offenses or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended by some breach of the law
of nations. (Villa v. Allen 1903)
‣ Amnesty is a form of absolutory cause akin to a justifying circumstance. One a person has been given the benefit
of an amnesty, there is no more crime, thus, no criminal. It looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the
offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
‣ What is a “tax amnesty?

‣ It is a general pardon or intentional overlooking of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of
evasion or violation of revenue or tax law, and as such partakes of an absolute forgiveness or waiver by the
Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it. (Republic vs IAC 1991).
POWER TO ENTER INTO FOREIGN RELATIONS
Section 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the
prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The Monetary Board
shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and
controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may
be provided by law.
Section 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
ARTICLE 18- TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Section 4. All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been ratified shall not be renewed or extended
without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Section 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States
of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of
thevotes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other
contracting State.
THE PRESIDENT AS THE SOLE ORGAN IN THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

‣ RULE — PRESIDENT IS THE SOLE ORGAN OF THE NATION IN ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS, AND ITS SOLE REPRESENTATIVE WITH
FOREIGN RELATIONS
‣ SEE — Vinuya vs Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

‣ Not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to
construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.
‣ In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all
claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is
not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
‣ The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations.
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment -- perhaps serious
embarrassment — is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of
discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible where domestic affairs alone
involved.
‣ Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries,
and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form
of diplomatic, consular and other officials
‣ The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance
to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on
the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness.
‣ It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign
countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has
also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is
dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs.

‣ The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation
lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national
embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.
‣ The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our country’s foreign
policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this
region. For us to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
‣ SEE — Saguisag vs Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
‣ The President also carries the mandate of being the sole organ in the conduct of foreign relations. Since every state
has the capacity to interact with and engage in relations with other sovereign states, it is but logical that every state
must vest in an agent the authority to represent its interests to those other sovereign states.
‣ The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and death significance
to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of government which can act on
the basis of the best available information and can decide with decisiveness.
‣ It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most confidential information about foreign
countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him on meaningful events all over the world. He has
also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data.
‣ In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is traditionally accorded a wider degree of
discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay, validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent
standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations,
forfeiture of confidence, national embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable
consequences
‣ The role of the President in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief Executive must give
paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the right of the
sovereign Filipino people to self-determination.
‣ In specific provisions, the President's power is also limited, or at least shared, as in —
‣ Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war;
‣ Sections 20 and 21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and international agreements
‣ Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article VIII on the judicial review of executive acts
‣ Sections 4 and 25 of Article XVIII on treaties and international agreements entered into prior to the Constitution
and on the presence of foreign military troops, bases, or facilities.
ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS POWER OF THE PRESIDENT

1. Power to contract and guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic
2. Power to negotiate treaties and international agreements
3. Power to deport aliens
4. Power to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers, and consuls
5. Power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers accredited to the Philippines
POWER TO CONTRACT OF GUARANTEE FOREIGN LOANS

‣ RULE — THE PRESIDENT MAY CONTRACT OR GUARANTEE FOREIGN LOANS ON BEHALF OF THE PHILIPPINES
‣ The language of the Constitution is simple and clear as it is broad. It allows the President to contract and guarantee
foreign loans. It makes no prohibition on the issuance of certain kinds of loans or distinctions as to which kinds of
debt instruments are more onerous than others. This Court may not ascribe to the Constitution meanings and
restrictions that would unduly burden the powers of the President. The plain, clear and unambiguous language of the
Constitution should be construed in a sense that will allow the full exercise of the power provided therein. It would be
the worst kind of judicial legislation if the courts were to misconstrue and change the meaning of the organic act.
(Spouses Constantino v. Cuisia 2005)
‣ LIMITATIONS —
1. THERE MUST BE PRIOR CONCURRENCE OF THE MONETARY BOARD
‣ This is because the Monetary Board has expertise and consistency to perform the mandate which may be absent
among the Members of Congress.

2. IT IS SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS AS MAY BE PROVIDED BY LAW
‣ In order to allow Congress to act on whatever legislation may be needed to protect public interest, the Monetary
Board is required to submit toCongress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted
or guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect
of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
‣ This is to be done by the Monetary Board within 30 days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year
POWER TO NEGOTIATE TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

‣ RULE — THE PRESIDENT MAY NEGOTIATE AND ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER STATES
‣ In the negotiation phase of treaty-making, the executive may completely excludes Congress.
‣ The President may enter into the following agreements with foreign states —
1. TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS — SENATE CONCURRENCE IS REQUIRED
‣ These are agreements that are permanent and original. Such agreements should be embodied in a treaty and
need Senate concurrence.
‣ The fruit of the executive's negotiation does not become binding and treaty without the concurrence of at least
2/3 of all the Members of the Senate
‣ The President’s power to act as its representative in the international sphere inheres in the person of the
President. This power, however, does not crystallize into absolute discretion to craft whatever instrument the
Chief Executive so desires. The Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements the
President enters into, obtain the approval of two-thirds of its members. (Saguisag vs Ochoa 2016)
‣ A treaty without Senate concurrence is invalid and ineffective.
‣ NOTE — Usually, treaties are signed by cabinet members (such as the DFA secretary), it is then “ratified” by the
President and subsequently his ratification is submitted to Senate for “concurrence”.
‣ May the President be compelled to submit a treaty to the Senate for concurrence?
‣ NO. The decision to enter into a treaty is a prerogative solely of the President. Unless the President submits
a treaty to the Senate, there is nothing for them to concur in. (Pimentel v. Ermita 2005)
‣ It cannot be compelled by mandamus
2. EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS — SENATE CONCURRENCE IS NOT REQUIRED
‣ These are international agreements which are merely temporary or implementations of treaties or laws, thus,
concurrence of 2/3 members of the Senate is NOT required for its validity and effectivity.
‣ SEE — Usaffe Veterans Association, Inc. v. Treasurer G.R. No. L-10500, June 30, 1959
‣ A treaty is not the only form that an international agreement may assume. For the grant of the treaty-making
power to the Executive and the Senate does not exhaust the power of the government over international
relations. Consequently, executive agreements may be entered with other states and are effective even
without the concurrence of the Senate.
‣ While treaties are required to be ratified by the Senate under the Constitution, less formal types of
international agreements may be entered into by the Chief Executive and become binding without the
concurrence of the legislative body.
‣ There are now various forms of such pacts or agreements entered into by and between sovereign states
which do not necessarily come under the strict sense of a treaty and which do not require ratification or
consent of the legislative body of the State, but nevertheless, are considered valid international
agreements.
‣ From the point of view of the international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have
remained within their powers.
‣ Executive Agreements fall into two classes —
a. Presidential Agreements — agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external relations
and independent of or without legislative authorization
b. Congressional-Executive Agreements — agreements entered into in pursuance to acts of Congress
‣ In this case, the Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these two classes, for precisely on
September 18, 1946, Congress of the Philippines specifically authorized the President of the Philippines to
obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness with the Government of the United States, its agencies or
instrumentalities.

‣ Even granting, arguendo, that there was no legislative authorization, it is hereby maintained that the
Romulo- Snyder Agreement was legally and validly entered into to conform to the second category, namely,
"agreements entered into purely as executive acts without legislative authorization." This second category
usually includes money agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. It may be said
that this method of settling such claims has come to be the usual way of dealing with matters of this kind
‣ SEE — Saguisag vs Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
‣ Since the VFA has already allowed the entry of US troops in the Philippines, the President’s entering into
the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in the form of an executive agreement is
permissible since it merely implements an existing treaty.
‣ NOTE — the President’s power to enter into executive agreements with foreign states is merely an adjunct of
his executive power and duty to faithfully execute laws (including treaties)
POWER TO DEPORT ALIENS

‣ RULE — THE POWER TO DEPORT ALIENS IS LODGED IN THE PRESIDENT, SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS PRESCRIBED BY LAW
‣ SEE — Tan Tong v. Deportation Board, 96 Phil. 934, 936 (1955)
‣ The power to deport aliens is lodged in the President of the Republic of the Philippines. As an act of state, it is
vested in the Executive by virtue of his office, subject only to the regulations prescribed in Section 69 of the
Revised Administrative Code or to such future legislation as may be promulgated on the subject
‣ There is no provision in the Constitution nor act of the legislature defining the power, as it is evident that it is the
intention of the law to grant to the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the
country is so undesirable as to effect or inure the security, welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts
upon which the deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and
executory.
BUDGETARY POWER; OBLIGATION TO PREPARE THE NATIONAL BUDGET
Section 22. The President shall submit to the Congress, within thirty days from the opening of every regular session as
the basis of the general appropriations bill, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing, including receipts from
existing and proposed revenue measures.
INFORMATION POWER; OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS THE CONGRESS
Section 23. The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular session. He may also appear before it
at any other time.
OTHER POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
1. Power to call Congress to a special session (Art. 6, Sec. 15)

2. Power to approve or veto legislative bills (Art. 6, Sec. 27)
3. Power to consent to deputation of government personnel by the Commission on Elections and to discipline such
deputies (Art. 9C, Sec. 2)
4. By delegation from Congress, emergency powers and tariff powers (Art. 6, Sec. 23[2] and 28[2])
5. General supervision over local governments and autonomous regional governments (Art. 10)
6. Residual Powers
‣ Marcos vs Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989
‣ To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise
of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare
of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore
Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by
the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the

President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the
author advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best
lodged in the President].
‣ More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. The power of
the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of
emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only
clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears
on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in
any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in
making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public
order and security.
‣ That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcos's from returning has been recognized
by memembers of the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives
and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a
genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our laws." The Resolution does not question
the President's power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's
sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his country.
‣ What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode
and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in
that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
‣ Marcos vs Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211 October 27, 1989
‣ It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which
are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed
intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction
to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive
power.
‣ That the President has powers other than those expressly stated in the Constitution is nothing new. This is
recognized under the U.S. Constitution from which we have patterned the distribution of governmental powers
among three (3) separate branches. Article II, [section] 1, provides that "The Executive Power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." In Alexander Hamilton's widely accepted view, this statement cannot
be read as mere shorthand for the specific executive authorizations that follow it in [sections] 2 and 3. Hamilton
stressed the difference between the sweeping language of article II, section 1, and the conditional language of
article I, [section] 1: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . ."
Hamilton submitted that "[t]he [article III enumeration [in sections 2 and 31 ought therefore to be considered, as
intended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execution power; leaving the rest to flow
from the general grant of that power, interpreted in confomity with other parts of the Constitution...
‣ In Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court — accepted Hamilton's proposition, concluding that the federal
executive, unlike the Congress, could exercise power from sources not enumerated, so long as not forbidden by
the constitutional text: the executive power was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where
emphasis was regarded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed. . ."
The language of Chief Justice Taft in Myers makes clear that the constitutional concept of inherent power is not a
synonym for power without limit; rather, the concept suggests only that not all powers granted in the Constitution
are themselves exhausted by internal enumeration, so that, within a sphere properly regarded as one of
"executive' power, authority is implied unless there or elsewhere expressly limited.


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ARTICLE 7 — EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

ARTICLE 7 — EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

EXECUTIVE POWER; THE PRESIDENCY AND VICE-PRESIDENCY

WHERE EXECUTIVE POWER IS VESTED; POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT

WHAT IS EXECUTIVE POWER?

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

QUALIFICATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines

ELECTION AND TERM OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

ELECTION AND TERM OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

CANVASSING OF VOTES FOR THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

COMPENSATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

RULES ON PRESIDENTIAL AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

INCAPACITY OF THE PRESIDENT

‣ RULE — IN THE FOLLOWING CASES, THE VICE-PRESIDENT SHALL ACT AS PRESIDENT —

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

SERIOUS ILLNESS OF THE PRESIDENT

DISQUALIFICATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS

ARTICLE 11 — ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

PROHIBITIONS ON THE PRESIDENT AND HIS OFFICIAL FAMILY

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

DOCTRINE OF INCOMPATIBLE OFFICES

PROHIBITIONS ON THE PRESIDENT’S FAMILY AND RELATIVES

1. Members of the Constitutional Commissions

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

‣ What is “executive privilege”?

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

ELEMENTS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

EXCEPTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

JURISPRUDENCE ON THE DOCTRINE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

POWER OF APPOINTMENT; APPOINTMENTS BAN

ARTICLE 8 — JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

NATURE OF THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

WHO GETS TO FILL VACANCIES IN GOVERNMENT OFFICES?

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

PRESIDENTIAL POWER OF APPOINTMENT

LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER TO APPOINT

a. Members of the Constitutional Commissions

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

KINDS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

JURISPRUDENCE ON REGULAR VS AD-INTERIM APPOINTMENTS

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

STEPS IN THE APPOINTING PROCESS

POWER TO DISCIPLINE OR REMOVE

CLARENCE TIU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

POWER OF EXECUTIVE CONTROL; FAITHFUL EXECUTION CLAUSE

ARTICLE 10 — LOCAL GOVERNMENT