Constitutional Law 1 - Bernas-782-819

782 T H E 1987 C O N S T I T U T I O N Sec.
26
O F T H E R E P U B L I C O F T H E PHILIPPINES
owned by respondent operator Zulueta. The Court invalidated the ap-

propriation saying that inasmuch "as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged to respondent Zulueta,
327
the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose." The
fact that some five months after the approval of appropriation the prop-
erty was donated to the government was found quite irrelevant to the
validity of the appropriation. "The validity of a statute depends upon
the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval, not upon
328
events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto."
One could very well question whether the private character of the
property conclusively established the private purpose of the appropria-
tion. A road, after all, even if it runs through a private subdivision, can
serve a very legitimate public purpose, especially if the subdivision
is populous. In the circumstances of the case, the more valid question
which should have been asked was not whether the projected feeder
roads would run on private property but whether the private property
was a proper object for expropriation for the construction of a feeder
road. If expropriation could have been d o n e , the appropriation, even
without expropriation, would also have been for a public purpose albeit
with incidental private benefit.
Jurisprudence on social justice also has a bearing on this provi-

sion. Appropriations for the implementation of social justice p r o g r a m s ,
even if directly they benefit mainly private individuals, must be consid-
329
ered to be for a public purpose.
S E C . 2 6 . ( 1 ) EVERY BILL PASSED B Y T H E C O N G R E S S SHALL

EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT W H I C H SHALL BE EXPRESSED IN T H E
TITLE T H E R E O F .
(2) No BILL PASSED BY EITHER H O U S E SHALL BECOME A

LAW UNLESS IT HAS PASSED T H R E E READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS, AND
PRINTED COPIES T H E R E O F IN ITS FINAL F O R M HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED
TO ITS M E M B E R S T H R E E DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE, E X C E P T WHEN
THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIES TO T H E NECESSITY OF ITS IMMEDIATE
ENACTMENT TO M E E T A PUBLIC CALAMITY OR E M E R G E N C Y . U P O N
321
ld. at 334.
^ M . at 341.
,29
See the discussion of public purpose in eminent domain cases under the Bill of Rights
and under Article XIV, Section 13.
Sec. 26 ART. VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 783
T H E LAST READING OF A B I L L , NO AMENDMENT THERETO SHALL BE

A L L O W E D , AND T H E VOTE THEREON SHALL BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY
T H E R E A F T E R , AND T H E YEAS AND NAYS ENTERED IN THE J O U R N A L .
1. Subject a n d title of bills: general prohibition of "riders."
T h e requirement that "Every bill shall embrace only one subject

which shall be expressed in the title t h e r e o f is mandatory and not di-
rectory and compliance with it is essential to the validity of legisla-
350
tion. An early decision explained the purpose of this limitation on
331
legislative power thus:
The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief pro-

posed to be remedied by this provision are well known. Legisla-
tive assemblies, for the dispatch of business, often pass bills by
their titles only without requiring them to be read. A specious title
sometimes covers legislation which, if its real character had been
disclosed, would not have commanded assent. To prevent surprise
and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provision
was intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision
the title of a statute was often no indication of its subject or con-
tents.
An evil this constitutional requirements was intended to cor-
rect was the blending in one and the same statute of such things as
were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to combine
in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing the pas-
sage of several measures no one of which could have succeeded
on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sums up in his review of the
authorities defining the objects of this provision: "It may there-
fore be assumed as settled that the purpose of this provision was:
First, to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; second, to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provi-
sions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which
might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and, third, to fairly appraise the people, through such
publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the
subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they
may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or other-
332
wise if they shall so desire."
""Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883,891 (1920).

331
W. at 891, quoting Walker v. State, 49 Ala. 329.
2
" COOLEY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, p. 143.
784 THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec. 26
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Although the requirement is mandatory, it should not be so con-

strued as to cripple or impede proper legislation. Numerous decisions
have dealt with this provision and the trend ever since Sumulong v.
1 334
Commission on Elections " has been, as noted by Justice Fernando,
towards giving the constitutional requirement a liberal interpretation.
As the Supreme Court said in Sumulong, the requirement "should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be suf-
ficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the gen-
eral subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that
335 336
general subject." Or, in the language of Justice Sanchez: "Of course,
the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or cata-
logue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it in-
form the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the
bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and,
thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon legislators." T h u s , the title " A n
Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic Act N u m b e r e d O n e Thou-
sand One Hundred Ninety-Nine, otherwise k n o w n as the Agricultural
Tenancy Act of the Philippines" was sufficient to include a provision
authorizing the Secretary of Justice, acting through a tenancy media-
tion division, to carry out a national enforcement p r o g r a m , including
337
the mediation of tenancy disputes. Similarly, the title " A n Act to Fur-
ther Amend Commonwealth Act N u m b e r e d O n e Hundred Twenty, as
amended by Republic Act N u m b e r e d Twenty Six Hundred and Forty-
O n e " was found sufficiently expressive of the provision limiting the al-
lowable margin of profit for corporations receiving at least fifty percent
338
of its power from the National P o w e r Corporation. T h e Court has also
ruled that the title " A n Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory B o a r d "
was sufficiently broad to cover a regulatory tax provision included in
333
7 3 Phil. 288 (1941).
""Malayan v. National Power Corporation, 24 SCRA 172, 180 (1968)
5
" 73 Phil, at 291.
,56
Lidasan v. Commission on Elections, L-28089, Oct. 25, 1967; Insular Lumber v. CTA,
104 SCRA 710-17 (May 29, 1981).
'"Cordero v. Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962).
J36
Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, 24 SCRA 172 (1968).
339
the act. Similarly, the title " A n Act Creating the Philippine Postal Cor-
poration, Defining Its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Provid-
ing for the Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connect-
ed Therewith" was found to be sufficiently broad to cover the removal
340
of the franking privileges of the judiciary. Similarly, the title "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized
City of M a n d a l u y o n g " was d e e m e d to include the resulting conversion
of such city into a congressional district in compliance with Article VI,
34
Section 5(3) of the Constitution. '
Such liberality, however, has not prevented the Court from invali-
dating obvious violations. T h u s , the title "An Act Amending Subsection
(c), Section Twelve of C o m m o n w e a l t h Act Numbered One Hundred
Eighty-Six, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred
Ninety-Six," was not deemed to include a provision allowing retire-
ment gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to members
of Congress because the acts mentioned in the title referred to members
of the Government Service Insurance System whereas Senators and
342
members of the House were not members of the System.
Similarly, the title " A n Act Creating the Municipality of Diana-

ton in the Province of Lanao del N o r t e " was not found sufficient to
cover a provision which in fact created the municipality of Dianaton
out of barrios some of which were outside the province of Lanao del
343
Norte. Under current laws on local governments, however, this is of
little importance. The Constitution now requires that the creation of
new municipalities must have the approval of the political subdivisions
344
to be affected. Such political subdivisions would necessarily have to
be notified in a more effective way than through the title of a bill.
2. Three readings.
In order to ensure a more thorough study of the bills, Section
26(2), copying the text of Article VIII, Section 19(2) of the 1973 Con-
"Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 75697, June 18, 1987.
^Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993). But the provision on the
franking privileges of the judiciary was declared unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
"'Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106, 110-111 (1994). Also Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. 118702, March 16,1995.
PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA479 (1965). Also Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517,522
M2
(July 30,1975). Also Tan v. del Rosario, Jr., 237 SCRA 324 (1994).
"'Lidasan v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496 (1967); but see dissent of Fernando, J.
^ArticleX, Section 10.
stitution, not only requires that there be three separate readings but also
that the separate readings be on "separate days" and that printed copies
of the bill in its final form should be distributed three days before its
passage. The only exception to the rule is when the President certifies to
the necessity of its immediate enactment. The effect of the certification
by the President is to dispense from the requirement that the readings
be on separate days and that the bill be printed in its final form and dis-
tributed three days before third reading.
The 1935 Constitution did not expressly require that bills undergo
three readings. However, on the basis of the 1935 Article V I , Section
345
21 (2) which spoke of a "last reading," the rules of both Houses pre-
scribed three readings. What lies behind this rule is sad experience. T h e
1934 Constitutional Convention noted the tendency of legislators, on
the last day of the legislative year when legislators were eager to go
h o m e , to rush bills through and to insert matters which would not oth-
erwise stand scrutiny in leisurely debate. T h e idea of the 1935 change
was to force legislators to take a deep breath before making the final
346
plunge of approval.
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,™ there was no dispute that

the VAT law bill had gone through second and third readings on the
same day. The petitioners contended that the Constitution had been
violated since certification by the President dispensed only from the
requirement of final printing and distribution three days before third
reading but not from the requirement of having the three readings on
separate days. T h e Court replied that "the ' u n l e s s ' clause must be read
in relation to the 'except' clause, because the t w o are really coordinate
348
clauses of the same sentence." H e n c e , what the provision m e a n s is
that the President's certification effects a dispensation from all the re-
quirements.
T h e 1935 rule also allowed for certification by the President but

it did not specify grounds for certification. It simply said that the Presi-
""'No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies
thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage,
except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment."
346
IV JOURNAL OF THE [1935] CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (LAUREL Ed.)
436-437,440-441.
M7
235 SCRA 630 (1994), affirmed on reconsideration G.R. Nos. 111206-08. October 6,
1995.
3 4 1
Id. at 664.
dent may certify "to the necessity of [the bill's] immediate enactment."
In the 1987 rule, however, the only ground for certification by the Presi-
dent is "to meet a public calamity or emergency." But what is the nature
of the "public calamity or e m e r g e n c y " which will justify certification
of a bill?
Again Tolentino, the VAT bill had been certified by the President
because of a "growing budget deficit." Those w h o challenged the bill
contended that a growing budget deficit, although a perennial problem,
was not a "public calamity or emergency." T h e Court replied that Sen-
ate itself had not seen fit to controvert the President's certification and
349
had accepted it. It further observed:
The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the

writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law under Art. VII,
§ 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the del-
egation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI,
§ 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of in-
dividuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential
certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural
requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by
members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard
of review.
But the Court did not say what that standard should be nor did it
in fact bother to review the factual basis. In effect it saw no significance
in the distinction between the 1935 text and the 1987 text.
It is, however, curious that Justice Mendoza, in quoting the appli-

cable text, abbreviated it by simply saying "except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." The "etc."
stood for the crucial phrase "to meet a public calamity or emergency."
Having omitted this crucial phrase, the decision went on to justify the
departure from the rule by citing a 1968 example when the House of
Representatives passed a bill on second and third readings on the same
350
day "after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent." The
decision did not say that the basis for the 1968 action of the House of
Representatives was a different 1935 text.
"•23S SCRA at 666, affirmed on reconsideration GR. Nos. 111206-08, October 6,1995.
iiB
ld. at 664-665.
788 T H E 1987 C O N S T I T U T I O N Sec. 27
O F T H E REPUBLIC O F T H E PHILIPPINES
S E C . 2 7 . ( 1 ) EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL,

BEFORE IT BECOMES A LAW, BE PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT. I F
HE APPROVES THE SAME, HE SHALL SIGN I T ; OTHERWISE, HE SHALL
VETO IT AND RETURN THE SAME WITH HIS OBJECTIONS TO THE H O U S E
WHERE IT ORIGINATED, WHICH SHALL ENTER THE OBJECTIONS AT
LARGE IN ITS JOURNAL AND PROCEED TO RECONSIDER I T . I F , AFTER
SUCH RECONSIDERATION, TWO-THIRDS OF ALL THE M E M B E R S OF SUCH
HOUSE SHALL AGREE TO PASS THE BILL, IT SHALL BE SENT, TOGETHER
WITH THE OBJECTIONS, TO THE OTHER H O U S E BY WHICH IT SHALL
LIKEWISE BE RECONSIDERED, AND IF APPROVED BY TWO-THIRDS OF
ALL THE MEMBERS OF THAT H O U S E , n SHALL BECOME A LAW. IN
ALL SUCH CASES, THE VOTES OF EACH H O U S E SHALL BE DETERMINED
BY YEAS OR NAYS, AND THE NAMES OF THE M E M B E R S VOTING FOR
OR AGAINST SHALL BE ENTERED IN ITS J O U R N A L . T H E PRESIDENT
SHALL COMMUNICATE HIS VETO OF ANY BILL TO THE H O U S E WHERE
IT ORIGINATED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF RECEIPT
THEREOF; OTHERWISE, IT SHALL BECOME A LAW AS IF HE HAD SIGNED
IT.
(2) T H E PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE T H E POWER TO VETO ANY

PARTICULAR ITEM OR ITEMS IN AN APPROPRIATION, REVENUE, OR
TARIFF BILL, BUT THE VETO SHALL NOT AFFECT T H E ITEM OR ITEMS TO
WHICH HE DOES NOT O B J E C T .
1. P a s s a g e of bills.
Two steps are required before a bill finally b e c o m e s a law. First,

it must be approved by both Houses of Congress. T h e legislative action
required of Congress is a positive act; there is no enactment of law by
351
legislative inaction. The votes of the m e m b e r s of Congress may be
obtained viva voce. However, there are instances when a roll call vote
is required and individual m e m b e r s must vote with a yea or a nay. Such
roll call vote is required (1) upon the last and third readings of a bill
[Art. VI, §26(2)]; (2) at the request of one-fifth of the M e m b e r s present
[Art. VI, §16(4)]; and (3) in re-passing a bill over the veto of the Presi-
352
dent [Art. V I , §27(1)], 277 S C R A 2 6 8 . Second, it must be approved
by the President. Approval by the President may be by positive act or by
inaction. If the President does not act on the bill within thirty days after
the receipt of the bill, the bill automatically becomes law.
"'Miller v. Mardo, 2 SCRA 398.908-9 (1961).

3 5 2
Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255. August 14,1997.
In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, there was no mechanism

which allowed verification of whether the President had acted on the
bill or not. H e n c e , if challenged, it was possible for the President to
say that he did act on the bill within the specified period even if in fact
he had sat on it. Under the new provision verification is now possible
because he is required to communicate his veto to the House where the
bill originated. "The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to
the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall b e c o m e a law as if he had signed it." From
the discussions of this provision it is clear that "otherwise" means "if
the President fails to m a k e such communication within the specified
353
period."
T h e final approval of a bill, however, does not make it immediate-

ly effective. Tanada v. Tuvera™ has m a d e it very clear that laws become
effective only after adequate publication. Tanada involved the inter-
pretation of Article 2 of the Civil C o d e which says: "Laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise p r o v i d e d . . . . " The Court said
that the phrase "unless it is otherwise provided" refers "to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which can-
not in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legisla-
ture may m a k e the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication." Omission of publication
"would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowl-
edge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. ... Significantly, this is
not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of
many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also
be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin
355
to operate."
2. Conference Committees.
In a bicameral system bills are independently processed by both
Houses of Congress. It is not unusual that the final version approved
by one House differs from what has been approved by the other. The
"conference committee," consisting of members nominated from both
'"n RECORD 134-136.

354
146 SCRA 446 (December 29,1986).
m
U. at 452-3.
Houses, is an extra-constitutional creation of Congress whose function

is to propose to Congress ways of reconciling conflicting provisions
found in the Senate version and in the House version of a bill. It per-
forms a necessary function in a bicameral system. However, since con-
ference committees have merely delegated authority from Congress,
they should not perform functions that Congress itself may not d o .
Moreover, their proposals need confirmation by both Houses of Con-
gress.
In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,™ the Court had the opportu-

nity to delve into the limits of what conference committees may do. T h e
petitioners contended that the consolidation of the House and Senate
bills made by the conference committee contained provisions which
neither the Senate bill nor the House bill had. In her dissenting opinion,
Justice Romero laid out in great detail the provisions that had been in-
serted by the conference committee. These provisions, according to the
petitioners, had been introduced "surreptitiously" during a closed door
meeting of the corrunittee.
The Court's answer to this was that in United States practice con-
ference committees could be held in executive sessions and amend-
ments germane to the purpose of the bill could be introduced even if
357
these were not in either original bill. But the Court did not bother to
check whether perhaps the American practice w a s based on a constitu-
tional text different from that of the Philippine Constitution.
There are as a matter of fact significant differences in the degree

of freedom American and Philippine legislators h a v e . T h e only rule that
binds the Federal Congress is that it may formulate its o w n rules of
procedure. For this reason, the Federal Congress is master of its o w n
procedures. It is different with the Philippine C o n g r e s s . O u r Congress
indeed is also authorized to formulate its o w n rules of procedure —
but within limits not found in American law. F o r instance, there is the
"three readings on separate d a y s " rule. Another important rule is that no
amendments may be introduced by either house during third reading.
These limitations were introduced by the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions
and confirmed by the 1987 Constitution as a defense against the in-
356
235 SCRA at 666-672.
357
W. at 668, citing also its own decision in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227
SCRA 703, 709 (1993), allowing a foreign insertion. But the provision in Prado was invalidated
on equal protection grounds.
ventiveness of the stealthy and the surreptitious. These, however, were

disregarded by the Court in Tolentino in favor of contrary American
practice.
This is not to say that conference committees should not be al-

lowed. But an effort should be m a d e to lay out the scope of what confer-
ence committees may do according to the requirements and the reasons
of the Philippine Constitution and not according to the practice of the
American Congress. For instance, if the t w o Houses are not allowed to
introduce and debate amendments on third reading, can they circum-
vent this rule by coursing new provisions through the instrumentality
of a conference committee created by Congress and meeting in secret?
The effect of the Court's uncritical embrace of the practice of the Amer-
ican Congress and its conference committees is to dismantle the no-
amendment rule.
As to the secret meeting of the conference committee, Justice

M e n d o z a had this gem: " N o r is there anything unusual or extraordinary
about the fact that the conference coirirnittee met in executive sessions.
Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to
meet behind closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise,
359
no compromise is likely to be m a d e . " This view of the Court may con-
stitute a standard of behavior tolerable for board of trustees wanting to
protect the interests of majority stockholders. In the matter of behavior
of public officials, however, the Constitution has different standards.
It c o m m a n d s the state to adopt and carry out "a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." Moreover,
the Bill of Rights guarantees the right of all citizens to information on
matters of public concern.
Finally, however, the Court was willing to paper over everything

35
under the "enrolled bill" rule ' which is treated under Section 16 above.
3. Veto power; ' i t e m veto."

In the veto power the Constitution has given to the President an
instrument of control over legislation completed by Congress. But Con-
gress may override a presidential veto by a vote of two-thirds of all its
3M
235SCRAat667.
""M. at 672.
members. The Constitution says: "If [the President] approves the same,
he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after
such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the
other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved
by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law."
As a general rule, if the President disapproves of a provision in a

bill approved by Congress, he should veto the entire bill. He is not al-
lowed to veto separate parts of a bill while retaining others. It is only in
the case of appropriation, revenue, and tariff bills that he is authorized
to exercise item-veto.
The item veto in the 1987 Constitution is a carry over from the
1973 and 1935 provisions. The 1935 provision was the outcome of an
intense debate during the 1934-1935 Constitutional Convention. M u c h
of the objection to giving the power of item-veto to the President was
grounded on the fear of giving too m u c h p o w e r to the executive and
thereby allowing him to mutilate an integral legislative act to the preju-
dice of the public welfare. The defenders of the provision, however,
looked on it more as a useful check on improvident use of public funds
360
and on oppressive revenue measures.
For the purpose of this provision, an appropriation bill is under-

stood as one whose purpose is to set apart a certain sum from the public
361
revenue for a specified purpose. No set form of words is required
to make out an appropriation. Moreover, the appropriation bill that is
subject to item-veto is any appropriation bill and not just the general
362
appropriation bill.
"Revenue bills" are those intended to levy taxes in the strict sense
of the word and do not include bills for other purposes which inciden-
363
tally create revenue.
""IV JOURNAL OF THE [ 1 9 3 5 ] CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (Laurel ed.) 7 5 6 -

819.
"'Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil. 9 1 2 , 9 1 6 ( 1 9 3 6 ) .
M
Id. at 9 1 9 . But see Villa-Real, J., dissenting.
3 6 3
1 STORY, COMMENTARIES, Sec. 880, cited in CORWIN, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1 3 4 ( 1 9 6 4 ) explaining the phrase "bills for raising revenue."
Sec.27 ART. VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 793
A tariff bill is one which imposes duties or imposts whether for

364
revenue or for regulation.
An item in a bill "is the particulars, the details, the distinct and
365
severable parts ... of the bill." It can be an entire section of a bill or a
severable portion of a section. T h u s , in Commissioner of Internal Rev-
166
enue v. Court of Tax Appeals, where the President vetoed the portion
of Section 42 of R . A . 6110 referring to 2 0 % caterers tax on restaurants
operated by hotels, motels and rest houses but leaving the rest of the
section intact, the Court upheld the veto saying:
An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section

imposing a particular kind of tax , but rather to the subject of the
tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a revenue bill which actually
imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and enumerates the per-
sons liable therefore with the corresponding tax rate. To construe
the word "item" as referring to the whole section would tie the
President's hand in choosing either to approve the whole section at
the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems
unacceptable or veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing
the collection of the kind of tax altogether. The evil which was
sought to be prevented in giving the president the power to disap-
prove items in a revenue bill would be perpetrated rendering that
power inutile.
161
In Bengzon v. Drilon, however, the veto was declared invalid.
The case involved the General Appropriations Act of 1992. The law
appropriated 500,000,000 pesos "For general fund adjustment for op-
erational and special requirements as indicated hereunder." Among
the several authorized uses of the fund was the adjustment of pension
of justices as authorized by an earlier law. The President vetoed the
use of the fund for the adjustment of the pension of justices. In declar-
ing the veto invalid, the Court said that it was not the veto of an item.
The item was the entire 500,000,000 peso allocation out of which un-
avoidable obligations not adequately funded in separate items could be
met. What the President had vetoed, according to the Court, was the
**See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,411-12 (1928).
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil, at 916.
36i
M
IK5 SCRA 329, 334-335 (1990).
7
* 208 SCRA 133(1992).
method of meeting unavoidable obligations or the manner of using the

361
500,000,000 pesos.
The 1935 Constitution had this additional sentence: "When a pro-
vision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same,
the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time veto-
369
ing the particular item or items to which it relates." T h u s , in Bolinao
310
Electronics v. Valencia, a veto of a condition in an appropriation bill
which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related
was deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever.
This sentence in the 1935 Constitution did not appear in the 1973
version; neither does it appear in the 1987 Constitution. It is submitted
nonetheless that the rule is also applicable under the present Constitu-
tion because all that the sentence does is to emphasize that an item
which can be subject of a separate veto must be a "distinct and sever-
371
able part" of a bill. This view was applied in Philippine Constitu-
312
tion Association v. Enriquez where the Court invalidated the veto of
a restriction on the use of funds for road maintenance and a restriction
on the use of funds for the purchase of medicines since the veto did not
include a veto of the appropriated funds themselves.
4. The new "doctrine of inappropriate provisions."

313
Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., marks the Court's acceptance of what
eventually would be referred to as the "doctrine of inappropriate provi-
sions." What the doctrine says is that a provision that is constitutionally
inappropriate for an appropriation bill m a y be singled out for veto even
if it is not an appropriation or revenue " i t e m . "
Gonzales involved the 1989 and 1990 General Appropriation

Acts. The General Appropriations Act of 1989 contained the following
provision:
**Id. at 144. This case, however, grew not so much out of a failure to understand item
veto as from some unfortunate historical misimpressions on the part both of Congress and of the
President. These are explained in the decision.
369
Article VI, Section 20(2), 1935 Constitution.
370
Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486,492-93 (1964)
37l
62Phil.at916.
372
235 SCRA 506,538-541 (1994).
373
191 SCRA 452 (1990).
Section 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase

of Recommended Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced by
Congress. — No item of appropriation recommended by the Presi-
dent . . . which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall
be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized
for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for
any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be
deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no correspond-
ing appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this act.
The General Appropriations Act for 1990 contained a similar one:
Sec. 16. Use of Savings. — ... Provided, That no item of ap-

propriation recommended by the President in the Budget... which
has been disapproved or reduced by Congress shall be restored or
increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other pur-
poses in this Act by augmentation. An item of appropriation for
any purpose shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Con-
gress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this Act.
Exercising the p o w e r of "item v e t o " the President vetoed the simi-

lar provisions. Were the vetoed sections " i t e m s " of an appropriation
bill?
T h e Court said that they were not "items." Explaining the Court
374
said:
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and

practice are concededly different. An item in a bill refers to the par-
ticulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts x x x of the bill.
It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purposes.
The United States Supreme Court ... declared "that an 'item' of
an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is
a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of
law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.
Having said that the sections were not budgetary items, the Court
nevertheless said that the veto was an allowable veto of distinct and
severable provisions on the basis of Article VI, Section 11(2) of the
1935 Constitution which said: "When a provision of an appropriation
374
W.at465.
bill affects one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the
provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items
to which it relates."
It is submitted, however, that, although the final conclusion is
defensible, this is a misapplication of the cited provision of the 1935
Constitution. The Bolinao Electronics case cited above involved a pro-
vision that was related to items of an appropriation bill. The veto of
the provision could be allowed but only if the items to which it was
related would also be vetoed. In effect, the cited 1935 provision was
a subsidiary rule to the rule that only items may be vetoed separately
in an appropriation bill. It was not a rule saying that separable provi-
sions which are not "items" could be vetoed separately from the entire
bill. The proper remedy in a case of a provision that has no relation to
any other in the appropriation bill is to consider it an unconstitutional
5
"rider" under Section 25(2). Gonzales did in fact consider it a rider."
In Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,™ the Court re-

iterated its view that the President possesses the power to veto a provi-
sion in an appropriation bill even if it is not an item. This time, however,
the Court argued not from the omitted 1935 provision on item veto
but from what it called "the doctrine of 'inappropriate provisions.'" It
377
said:
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which

Congress can include in an appropriations bill must "relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates," it
follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular
item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of
appropriation, is considered "an inappropriate provision" which
can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in
the category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional
provisions and provisions which are intended to amend other laws,
because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriation
bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately
dealt with in separate enactments.
m
ld. at 467.
37
*235 SCRA 506 (1994).
>ri
ld. at 534.
The intent behind this doctrine, which is not original but borrowed
by the Court from Henry v. Edwards,™ is to prevent the legislature from
forcing the President to veto an entire appropriation law thereby para-
lyzing government. The Philippine Constitution's answer to this pos-
sibility is Section 25(7) which provides for the automatic re-enactment
of the General Appropriation L a w of the previous year as a provisional
measure to serve until a new General Appropriations L a w is approved.
The Court's answer, however, is an alternative one, namely the formu-
lation of the broad doctrine that an unconstitutional provision in an A p -
propriation L a w may be singled out for veto.
It should be noted that the Philippine Constitution Association

case goes beyond Bolinao Electronics and Gonzales. In Bolinao, the
vetoed condition had relation to an appropriation which was not vetoed;
the veto of the condition was not allowed. In Gonzales, the provisions
vetoed had no relation to any item of appropriation. It was thus rejected
as a "rider" in the sense of Section 25(2). In Philippine Constitutional
Association the President vetoed conditions imposed on the use of ap-
propriations for the military equipment. The conditions therefore were
not riders. Following the Bolinao Electronic case, the Court should have
invalidated the veto of the conditions because the veto did not include
a veto of the appropriation. But the condition imposed by the bill was
that prior approval by Congress must be obtained for the release of such
funds and that such funds may not be used for the payment of planes al-
ready contracted for. The Court upheld the veto, on the ground that the
conditions were "inappropriate provisions," but allowed the funds to
stay in the budget. The condition requiring prior congressional approval
was considered "inappropriate" because: "Any provision blocking an
administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative ap-
proval of executive action must be incorporated in a separate and sub-
stantive bill." The prohibition of the use of the funds for the payment of
planes already contracted for was considered "inappropriate" because it
would involve violation of the obligation of contracts.
What all this comes down to is that under the new doctrine of
"inappropriate provisions," any provision or condition in an appropria-
tion bill which in the judgment of the President violates the Constitu-
tion may be vetoed separately from the entire bill without need to veto
"'La., 346 So., 2d., 153 (1977).

the appropriation to which they are attached. This is a judge-made rule

which expands the "item veto" rule so much debated in 1935. It ex-
pands the power of the President because admittedly it is more expedi-
tious than forcing the President to go to court to challenge the validity
of a provision in an appropriation bill.
5. Executive ' i m p o u n d m e n t . "

Another way of exercising executive veto is through what is called
"impoundment." Impoundment simply means refusal of the President
to spend funds already allocated by Congress for a specific purpose.
There is no provision in the Constitution on the subject. Impoundment
came up also in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez. To the
amount appropriated by Congress for the compensation and separation
benefits of members of C A F G U was attached a provision that "it shall
be used for the compensation of C A F G U ' s including the payment of
their separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year subsistence allow-
37
ance for the 11,000 members w h o will be deactivated in 1994." ' T h e
President did not veto the provision but said instead in his veto message
that the implementation of the provision would be subject to his prior
approval taking into consideration the peace and order situation in the
affected localities.
Those who challenged the veto contended that the provision effec-
tively required the deactivation of the C A F G U ' s and that the President
had no choice but to implement the law. T h e President on the other
hand justified his impoundment of the provision on the basis of his
Commander-in-Chief powers and on the dangerous argument that the
duty to implement the law includes the duty to desist from implement-
ing it when implementation would prejudice public interest. As Justice
Roberto Concepcion pointed out in an earlier case, "after all we still live
380
under a rule of law."
The Court, however, found in the doctrine on inappropriate provi-

sion a way out of having to decide whether i m p o u n d m e n t was legal. It
381
said:
"'235 SCRA at 544.

380
Gonzalez v. Hechanova, G.R. No. 21897 (October 26,1963). The Supreme Court! how-
ever, has heretofore refrained from passing judgment on the constitutionality of "impoundment."
See supra under Article VI, Section 27,
M
ld. at 546.
We do not find anything in the language used in the chal-
:nged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended
> deny to the President the right to defer or reduce spending, much
:ss to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But
ven if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the proper
ehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
lanifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers
f the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the cre-
:ion of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision
i an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal or amend other
iws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
S E C . 2 8 . ( 1 ) T H E RULE O F TAXATION SHALL B E UNIFORM AND

3CITABLE. T H E C O N G R E S S SHALL EVOLVE A PROGRESSIVE SYSTEM
F TAXATION.
(2) T H E C O N G R E S S MAY, B Y LAW, AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT

3 FIX WITHIN SPECIFIED L I M I T S , AND SUBJECT TO SUCH LIMITATIONS
SD RESTRICTIONS AS IT MAY I M P O S E , TARIFF RATES, IMPORT AND
( P O R T QUOTAS, TONNAGE AND WHARFAGE DUES, AND OTHER DUTIES
R IMPOSTS WITHIN T H E FRAMEWORK O F THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
TOGRAM O F T H E G O V E R N M E N T .
(3) CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND PARSONAGES

R CONVENTS APPURTENANT THERETO, MOSQUES, NON-PROFIT
EMETERIES, AND ALL LANDS, BUILDINGS, AND IMPROVEMENTS
CTUALLY, DIRECTLY, AND EXCLUSIVELY USED FOR RELIGIOUS,
HABITABLE, OR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
VXATION.
(4) NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE PASSED

ITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF A MAJORITY OF ALL THE M E M B E R S
F THE C O N G R E S S .
Power of taxation: scope and purpose.

l i e power to tax, like police power and the power of eminei
n, is an inherent power of government. "That the taxing pow<
rital importance; that it is essential to the existence of goven
382
are truths which it cannot be necessary to re-affirm." Henc<
wer need not be granted by the Constitution. Section 28, in fac
"Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514,561 (U.S. 1830).

is not a grant of power but an enumeration of limits on the inherent and

otherwise almost unlimited power.
Before looking into the limits which the Constitution has imposed,
it is necessary to look into the vastness of the power which Section 28
seeks to limit. Since there is no provision in the Philippine Constitution
which sets down the far-ranging scope of the power, one must look to-
wards the fountainhead of early Philippine constitutionalism. Article I,
Section 8, of the United States Constitution says: "The Congress shall
have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to
pay the debts and provide for the c o m m o n defense and general welfare
of the United States. . . . " It is at least this same power which the Con-
gress of the 1935 Constitution had and which has been passed on to
both the Batasan of the 1973 Constitution and to the present Congress.
The extent of the taxing power is as broad as the purpose for

which it is given. The power to tax is given in order for government to
be able "to pay the debts and provide for the c o m m o n defense and gen-
eral w e l f a r e . . . . " When one considers the broad scope of "general wel-
fare," as it is understood in the jurisprudence on police power and the
power of eminent domain, one can easily see the almost endless uses
to which the power to tax can be put by government. As the American
Supreme Court has put it, the power "is exhaustive and embraces ev-
3
ery conceivable power of taxation" " and it "reaches every subject, and
384
may be exercised at discretion." N o r may the limitation on the power
of Congress be found in the comparative practice of other states. As the
Court put it, the Court "cannot subscribe to the theory that the tax rates
of other countries should be used as a yardstick in determining what
may be the proper subjects of taxation in our o w n country. It should be
pointed out that the aforementioned taxes and duties, the State, acting
through the legislative and executive branches, is exercising its sover-
eign prerogative. It is inherent in the power to tax that the State be free
to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for
385
taxation, or exemption, infringe no constitutional limitation.'"
The obvious primary and specific purpose of the p o w e r to tax is

to raise revenue. However, from the earliest days of the history of the
'Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12 (1916).

'License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462,471 (1867).
'Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, G.R. No. 119252, August 18, 1997
power of taxation, the power to tax has been recognized as an instru-

ment of national economic and social policy. It has, for instance, been
used as an instrument for the extermination of undesirable activities
and enterprises. Justice Marshall even went to the extent of calling it
386
the p o w e r to destroy, although Philippine jurisprudence frowns on the
notion of the power to tax as the power to destroy because taxation must
387
not be oppressive. Indeed the notion of equitable taxation excludes
388
oppressiveness. And as Tan v. del Rosario, Jr. says, "Of course, where
a tax measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to
confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for,
despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional
prescriptions."
T h e power to tax has also been used as a tool for regulation. For
the purpose of regulating property the state can choose to exercise ei-
ther its police power or its power to tax. "It is beyond serious question
that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, dis-
courages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed The principle
applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously negligible ... or
389
the revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary .. ."
Another aspect of the power to tax is what the United States Su-
390
preme Court has characterized as "the power to keep alive." This is
the foundation for the imposition of tariffs designed for the encour-
agement and protection of locally produced goods against competition
from imports. "The enactment and enforcement of a number of customs
revenue laws drawn with a motive of maintaining a system of protec-
tion, since the revenue law of 1789, are matters of history ... whatever
391
we may think of the wisdom of a protection policy."
2. Limitations on the power to tax.

The power to tax exists for the general welfare. Hence, implicit in
the power is the limitation that it should be exercised only for a public
3
"*McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316,431 (U.S. 1819). The Philippine Supreme Court
frowns on the notion of the power to tax as the power to destroy.
'"See, e.g., Obillos, Jr. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 139 SCRA436.439 (October
29, 1985).
388
237 SCRA 324, 332 (1994).
"'United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42,44 (1950).
""Nieol v.Ames, 173 U.S. 509,515 (1899).
'"Hampton and Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,412 (1928).
purpose. In the words of Loan Association v. Topeka,™ "To lay, with

one hand, the power of the government on the property of the citizen,
and with the other to bestow it upon favored individuals to aid private
enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery be-
cause it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation."
It is one thing, however, to say that "there can be no lawful tax

which is not laid for a public purpose," and it is quite another thing
to determine whether a purpose specified by the legislature is public
or not. Yet, the determination of this question can be very crucial es-
pecially in dealing with revenue measures which accompany special
393
appropriations. The Loan Association case itself involved the utiliza-
tion of the taxing power to induce a bridge manufacturing company to
establish its plant in a city, and the United States Supreme Court invali-
dated the tax measure as not satisfying the public purpose test. But the
same Court later issued the warning that the Court's power to invalidate
a tax measure "must be exercised with the utmost extreme caution. ...
Otherwise, a state's power to legislate for the public welfare might be
seriously curtailed, a power which is a primary reason for the existence
394
of states."
The need for this caution can easily be seen from the expand-
ing scope of legitimate governmental concerns. This is clearly reflected
in recent Philippine jurisprudence on police p o w e r especially as it has
been influenced by the social justice provisions of the Constitution. As
the United States Supreme Court said in a case involving unemploy-
ment compensation, " W h e n public evils ensue from individual misfor-
tunes or needs, the legislature may strike at the evil at its source. If the
purpose is legitimate because public, it will not be defeated because the
395
execution of it involves payment to individuals." T h u s , a special tax
for the support of the agrarian reform program or for urban or housing
reform can be justified as for public purpose even if the immediate ben-
eficiaries are private individuals.
In Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) v. Fertiphil Corp.,™ the Court

had occasion to review the validity of L O I 1 4 6 5 , a martial rule product,
m
20 Wall. 655,664 (U.S. 1975).
3,3
Article VI, Section 25(4).
^Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,6 (1947).
3 5
* Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495,518 (1937)
""G-R No. 166006, March 14,2008.
which imposed a ten peso capital contribution for the sale of each bag
of fertilizer "until adequate capital is raised to m a k e PPI viable." PPI
was a private corporation. Clearly, therefore, the imposition was for
private benefit and not for a public purpose and therefore invalid. The
Court also found that, even if seen as an exercise of police power, the
imposition would still be invalid for not being for a public purpose.
Moreover, although the p o w e r to tax is legislative in nature, Sec-

tion 28(2) itself authorizes Congress to delegate it to the President. But
397
the President is bound by the conditions set by Congress. This is one
exception to the rule of non-delegability of legislative power.
3. Specific limits on the taxing power: "uniform and equi-

table."
T h e 1935 Constitution simply said that the "rule of taxation shall

398
be uniform." T h e new Constitution, like the 1973 Constitution, now
says that it "shall be uniform and equitable." Are the two notions, uni-
formity and equitableness, distinct limitations on the power to tax?
T h e concept of unifonnity of taxation is derived from Article

1, Section 8, of the United States Constitution which prescribes that
"all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the Unit-
ed States." It will thus be seen that whereas the American provision
whence the Philippine rule derived has reference to "duties, imposts,
and excises," that is, to indirect taxes, the Philippine requirement of
uniformity applies to taxation in general. Philippine jurisprudence,
however, from its earliest days has interpreted "uniformity" in the Phil-
ippine Constitution in the same way as "uniformity" in the American
399
Constitution. In the words of Churchill v. Conception, "uniformity"
in the Constitution does "not signify an intrinsic, but simply a geo-
graphical uniformity. ... A tax is uniform, within the Constitutional re-
quirement, when it operates with the same force and effect in every
place where the subject of it is found." Or, in the words of the American
Court, "the words 'uniform throughout the United States' do not relate
to the inherent character of the tax as respects the operation on individu-
als, but simply requires that whatever plan or method Congress adopts
^Southern Cross v. Philippine Cement, GJt. No. 158540, July 8,2004.

3W
Article VI, Section 22(1) (1935).
Phil. 969,976-7 (1916).
for laying the tax in question, the same plan and the same method must
400
be made operative throughout the United States, and at the same rate."
Thus, since the uniformity rule requires merely geographical and
not intrinsic uniformity, a levy of a tax is not unconstitutional simply
because it is not intrinsically equal and uniform in its operation upon
individuals. In other words, the uniformity rule does not prohibit clas-
40
sification for purposes of taxation. ' The taxing power may be made to
fall more heavily upon some than upon others. W h e n this happens, the
test of constitutionality is not just the uniformity rule, a rule that is easy
to obey, but also the equal protection clause and the notion of "progres-
sive system of taxation."
The requirements for valid classification under the equal protec-

tion clause are discussed under the Bill of Rights. The same require-
ments are applicable to classification for purposes of taxation: (1) the
classification must be based upon substantial distinctions which m a k e
real differences; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it
must apply not only to present conditions but also to future conditions
substantially identical to those of the present; (4) it must apply equally
402 403
to all those who belong to the same class. Or, as Tan v. del Rosario
put it, uniformity of taxation simply means that 1) the standards that
are used threfor are substantial and not arbitrary, (2) the categorization
is germane to achieve the legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all
things being equal, to both present and future conditions, and (4) the
classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same
class.
It may thus be noted that the requirement of uniformity corre-

sponds to the third and fourth requisites of the equal protection clause;
and that the first and second requirements of the equal protection clause
simply means that the statutory classification must bear some relation-
ship to the end sought to be attained. It bears emphasizing, however,
"that in the field of taxation, more than in other areas, the legislature
possesses the greatest freedom in classification. T h e reason for this is
^Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,84 (1900).

""See Report No. 2, Appendix E, of the Committee on Taxation and Debt Management,
1971 Constitutional Convention.
•""Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. City of Butuan, 24 SCRA 789, 795-96 (1968); Tan v. Del
Rosano, Jr., 237 SCRA 324 (1994).
m
231 SCRA 324(1994).
that traditionally, classification has been a device for fitting tax pro-
grams to local needs and usages in order to achieve an equitable distri-
404
bution of the tax burden." Court decisions would even go to the extent
of saying that reasonable relation between classification and legislative
purpose "has no application to a measure whose sole purpose is to raise
405
revenue."
Under the above approach to the constitutional precept on taxa-

tion, where does the word "equitable" of Section 28(1) fit in? While a
primary rule of constitutional construction is that every word must be
presumed to have a meaning that is all its o w n , this writer must none-
theless confess his inability to find any meaning which "equitable" can
add to the uniformity rule and to the equal protection clause except to
say that it is also another way of expressing "progressive system of
taxation."
4. Progressive system of taxation.
A tax is progressive when the rate increases as the tax base in-
creases. T h e second sentence of Section 28(1) commands Congress to
"evolve a progressive system of taxation." This is not to say that, absent
this provision, the Congress cannot adopt a progressive system of taxa-
tion. T h e existing system of income taxation, in fact, is progressive and
there was nothing in the old law which could prevent the legislature
406
from adopting a progressive system of taxation. The explicit men-
tion of progressive taxation in this provision reflects the wish of the
Convention that the legislature, following the social justice command,
should use the power of taxation as an instrument for a more equitable
distribution of wealth.
5. Delegated tax legislation.

As already seen, Congress may not delegate its law-making au-
thority. This rule, however, is not absolute and one exception to it is
that the power may be delegated in the instances where the Constitution
itself specifically authorizes the delegation. One such instance of allow-
able delegation is what is provided for in Section 28(2): "The Congress
""Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827,834 (1968).

m
Id. at 834.
^Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,84 (1900).
may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions is it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the Philippines." The provision is a substantial reproduction of Ar-
ticle VI, Section 22(2) of the 1935 Constitution which Marc Donnelly
01
and Associates v. Agregado* interpreted as allowing the delegation of
0
a specific legislative power. Moreover, Garcia v. Executive Secretary* *
said that the rule that revenue bills must originate from the House of
Representatives under Article VI, Section 24 does not prevent Con-
gress from exercising this delegating authority. N o r does it invalidate
the delegated authority even if it involves authority to create revenue
measures.
The phrase "within the framework of the national development

program of the Philippines" was added by the 1987 Constitution to ear-
lier provisions. It is, however, a limit not on the President but on the
legislature's authority to impose limits on what it delegates. T h e phrase
409
was explained by Commissioner M o n s o d thus:
The reason I am proposing this insertion is that an economic

program has to be internally consistent. While it is directory to the
President — and it says "within specified limits" — there are situ-
ations where the limits prescribed to the President might, in fact,
be distortive of the economic program.
If I may give an example: When you are setting tariff rates,

there must be a certain consistency among the tariffs for finished
goods, intermediate inputs, and basic materials. Once you distort
this and put a low limit on the raw materials or intermediate goods,
then we encourage assembly at the end of the production cycle.
This we did in earlier years — very high tariffs for finished prod-
ucts — and what we got was industry that was only engaged in as-
sembly and packaging operations. On the other hand, an economic
program would naturally rationalize the system of tariffs in order
to make sure that we have a good industrial structure.
We are not taking away any power from Congress. We are

just saying that as a frame of reference, the authority and the lim-
""95 Phil. 142(1954).

""211 SCRA 219,223 (1992).
""II RECORD 191-193.
AKI V I — T H E L f c U l S L A U V E DEPARTMENT 8
s prescribed should be consistent with the economic program of

jvemment which the legislature itself approves.
Tax e x e m p t i o n s .
orollary to the power to tax is the power to exempt from ta

the s a m e general and specific limitations on the power to ti
ply to the p o w e r to create exemptions. T h e exemptions, ther
ust be for a public purpose, uniform and equitable, and in co
r
with the equal protection clause. Moreover, the Constitutic
lay create e x e m p t i o n s . W h e n it d o e s , the constitutional exem
elf b e c o m e s a limit on the p o w e r to tax.
ection 28(3) is one such exemption: "Charitable institution

is and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosque
jfit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, a
iirectly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educ
mrposes shall be exempt from taxation."
his provision was originally Article V I , Section 22(3) of tl

!onstitution which read: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonagi
rents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvi
lsed exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposi
i exempt from taxation."
he original proposal of the Committee on Taxation and Del

ement of the 1971 Constitutional Convention read thus: "Noi
:emeteries, and churches, chapels, mosques, synagogues, houst
ship and parsonages and convents appurtenant thereto and a
buildings, and improvements used actually and exclusively ft
0
us or charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation."'" E>
g the provision, the Committee said:
The changes sought by the foregoing amendment are: 1)

5 limit the exemption of burial grounds to non-profit cemeter-
;s. Under the proposed provision, memorial parks will no longer
e exempt; 2) to remove or withdraw the exemption of lands and
uildings used for educational purposes, since private educational
istitutions are conducted for profit or operated as business; 3) to
imit the exemptions of lands and buildings owned by religious
'"Committee Report No. 5, Appendix H, 1971 Constitutional Convention.

institutions to those actually and exclusively used for religious

purposes, so that lands and buildings and apartments for rent, fish
ponds, haciendas, and similar income producing real estate will
not be entitled to exemption even if owned or operated by a reli-
gious institution, and regardless of the destination or use to which
such income is devoted.
Hence, the 1973 Constitution did not include the word "educa-
tional" but the 1987 Constitution restored it. And the word applies to
both profit and non-profit educational institutions with respect to realty
4
tax. " In justifying the restoration of the exemption for educational in-
stitutions, Commissioner Guingona said that the focus was on the ben-
412
efits which would redound to students through such exemption.
It must be pointed out, however, that the exemption created by the

constitutional provision is only for "taxes assessed . . . as property taxes,
413
as contra-distinguished from excise taxes." T h e properties exempted
are "lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly, and exclu-
414
sively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes."
The policy on the law on tax exemptions is that, while they must
be applied strictly, they must also be applied fairly in a m a n n e r that will
4
achieve the intent for which the exemptions were created. " T h u s , it is
important to bear in mind that tax exemptions for charitable institutions
are given in order to enhance the service they are capable of giving; tax
exemptions for religious property are given in order to ensure religious
416
liberty; and tax exemptions for educational institutions are given for
417
the sake of making quality education affordable to all.
""II RECORD 90,92-93,200-202.

4
'7<z.at45,88-89,114.
4l3
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 14 SCRA 292, 295 (1965). The exemp-
tion from property tax applies to YMCA because it is a charitable institution. But YMCA does not
qualify for the income tax exemption in Article XIV, Section 4(3) because it is not an educational
institution. Commission of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124043, October 14,
1998.
4,4
The rationale for the exemption of religious property, in relation to freedom of religion
and non-establishment, has already been discussed in the discussion of Walz v. Tax Commission,
397 U.S. 664 (1970), under Article IV, Section 8. See also II RECORD 109,113.
4l5
Catholic Church v. Hastings, 5 Phil. 701; Province of Abra v. Hernando, 107 SCRA 104,
109(1981).
4I
*II RECORD 209.
4l7
W.at 141.
In qualifying the use of the properties covered by the exemption,

it will be noted that under the 1935 Constitution the modifier was "ex-
clusively" and under the present provision the modifiers are "actually,
directly, and exclusively." The word "exclusively" has been explained
418
thus:
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusive-

ly for charitable or educational purposes is "not limited to property
actually indispensable" therefor, but extends to facilities which are
"incidental to and reasonably necessary for" the accomplishment
of said purposes, such as, in the case of hospitals, "a school for
training nurses, a nurses' home, property used to provide housing
facilities for interns, resident doctors, superintendents, and other
members of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for student
nurses, interns and residents," such as "athletic fields," including
"a farm used for the inmates of the institution."
This meaning of exclusivity, which covers not just what is indis-

pensable but also what is incidental and reasonably necessary, affects
the meaning of the words "actually and directly." The 1986 Constitu-
tional Commission did not discuss this phrase as applied to realty tax.
But the same words are used in qualifying the tax-exempt revenues
and assets of non-profit educational institutions in Article XIV, Section
4(3). T h e spirit in which the words are to be understood is shown by an
419
exchange between Commissioners Azcuna and Suarez:
MR. AZCUNA. The proponent said that the revenues of

non-stock and nonprofit educational institutions must be actually,
directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. So, until
the revenues are plowed back to an educational purpose and are
just retained in the school for reserve, would the school have to
pay taxes on these revenues?
MR. SUAREZ. If the reserve will be used for educational
purposes, actually, directly and exclusively, the school will also
enjoy the same exemption.
MR. AZCUNA. But the taxable year is reckoned from year
to year and the reserve may not be actually used until five years
from then; so is the tax postponed until such time as it is used?
""Herrera v. Quezon City Board of Assessments, 3 SCRA 186, 192 (1961), citing COOLEY
andCJS.
4I
1 V RECORD 404.
810 THE 1987 CONSTTTUTION Sec. 28
M R . S U A R E Z . There is no postponement in the enjoyment

of the exemption because it could very well happen that there may
be reserved funds there but are intended for the purchase of labora-
tory equipment, library books, et cetera.
M R . A Z C U N A . How about "retained earnings," would they
have to pay taxes on retained earnings?
M R . S U A R E Z . No, retained earnings would have to be con-
sidered in the form of reserve, in the same category.
M R . A Z C U N A . So, there will be no tax on that.
M R . S U A R E Z . No, there will be no tax.
Incidentally, it was also in this spirit that the Court read the mean-
ing of "actual and direct" use of land for educational purposes in Cen-
420
tral Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian Reform. The
Court's reading took into consideration the significant factor of growth
and expansion.
Illustrative of constitutional tax exemption is the case of the L u n g

Center of the Philippines because a m i n i m u m of 6 0 % of its hospital
beds are exclusively used for charity patients and the major thrust of its
hospital operation is to serve charity patients, the Center was d e e m e d
to be an exempt charitable institution. To determine whether an enter-
prise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the elements which should
be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate
purposes, its constitution and b y - l a w s , the methods of administration,
the nature of the actual work performed, the character of the services
rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and occu-
21
pation of the properties."
It was a different matter, however, for the property whose ben-

eficial use was given to a C o m p u t e r College. T h e property itself was
not considered exempt because it was not "actually, directly and exclu-
sively" being used either for religious, charitable, or educational pur-
422
poses.
Section 28(4) is a provision which copies Section 17(4) of the

1973 Constitution. It says: " N o law granting any tax exemption shall
420
215 SCRA86,96(1992).
42l
Lung Center v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004.
422
Systeins Plus Computer College v. Caloocan City, G Jt. No. 146382, August 7,2003.
be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of

the Congress." This requirement of a qualified majority for the passage
of tax exemption laws is an added limitation on the power to tax. The
Committee believed that while the requirement of the concurrence of a
majority of all the m e m b e r s would impose a limitation on the legisla-
ture, the limitation itself would not be too constrictive as to prejudice
"worthwhile tax exemptions, especially those needed to support or pro-
423
mote industrial and economic development."
Exemptions granted, however whether by the Constitution or by

statute, should not be extended beyond what is covered. T h u s , although
the former C a m p John Hay was declared a special economic zone, that
fact did not by itself also give to John H a y the tax exemption given spe-
424
cifically to the Subic Special Economic Z o n e under R.A. N o . 7227.
S E C . 2 9 . ( 1 ) N o MONEY SHALL B E PAID OUT O F THE TREASURY

EXCEPT IN PURSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATION MADE BY LAW.
(2) NO PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY SHALL BE APPROPRIATED,

APPLIED, PAID, OR E M P L O Y E D , DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, FOR THE
USE, BENEFIT, OR SUPPORT OF ANY S E C T , C H U R C H , DENOMINATION,
SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR OF ANY PRIEST,
PREACHER, MINISTER, OR OTHER RELIGIOUS TEACHER OR DIGNITARY
AS SUCH, EXCEPT WHEN SUCH PRIEST, PREACHER, MINISTER, OR
DIGNITARY IS ASSIGNED TO THE ARMED F O R C E S , OR TO ANY PENAL
INSTITUTION, OR GOVERNMENT ORPHANAGE OR LEPROSARIUM.
(3) A L L MONEY COLLECTED ON ANY TAX LEVIED FOR A

SPECIAL PURPOSE SHALL BE TREATED AS A SPECIAL FUND AND PAID OUT
FOR SUCH PURPOSE ONLY. IF T H E PURPOSE FOR WHICH A SPECIAL FUND
WAS CREATED HAS BEEN FULFILLED OR ABANDONED, THE BALANCE,
DT ANY, SHALL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE GENERAL FUNDS OF THE
GOVERNMENT.
1. Fiscal powers of Congress.

As already pointed out, Congress is the guardian of the public
treasury. It wields the tremendous power of the purse. "That the gov-
ernmental power of the purse is a great one is not now for the first
423
Appendix G, Report No. 5, Committee on Taxation and Debt Management, 1971 Con-
stitutional Convention.
424
John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim, GJt. No. 119775, October 24,2003.
time announced. Every student of the history of government and eco-

nomics is aware of its magnitude and of its existence in every civilized
125
government."'
The power of the purse comprehends both the power to generate
money for the government by taxation and the power to spend it. Sec-
tions 24, 25 and 29 together with Article VII, Section 22 contain the
limitations on the power to spend. Section 29 contains the limitations
on the power to tax.
The spending power of Congress is stated in Section 29(1): " N o
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an ap-
propriation made by law." Congress alone can authorize the expendi-
ture of public funds through its power to appropriate. T h e power to
appropriate carries with it the power to specify not just the amount that
may be spent but also the purpose for which it may be spent.
Guingona, Jr. v. Carague dealt with the controversy surrounding

426
automatic appropriation for foreign debt servicing. Petitioners sought to

declare the various Presidential Decrees authorizing automatic appro-
priation of amounts to be used for servicing foreign debts. T h e principal
contention of petitioners was that (1) appropriation bills under Section
24 must originate in the House of Representatives and (2) there must be
definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation. Answering the
427
first argument the Court said:
... [C]ertainly, the framers of the Constitution did not con-

template that existing laws in the statute books including existing
presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to
mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative mill. The
only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitu-
tion which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation mea-
sures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers
thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision
in a more direct or express manner.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by impli-

cation is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle that
construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied pro-
spectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
425
United States v. Butler,297 U.S. 1, 86 (1936), Stone, J. dissenting.
426
196 SCRA 221 (1991).
427
W. at 233-234.
As to the second argument, the Court resolved it by applying the

428
principles on delegation:
The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are
complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient
standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Sec-

tion 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount
needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the
Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and
other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness
incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without
the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the
need arises. The purpose of these laws is to enable the government
to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect
and maintain the credit standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specif-

ic amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the prob-
lem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by
the legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive
is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed
for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, inter-
est, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits
or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other
evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred
by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No un-
certainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the
exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.
After Congress has made the appropriation, it is the executive that

actually spends the fund.
The controversy over the Countrywide Development Fund of 1994,
429
which is the deodorized appellation of the traditional "pork barrel,"
was resolved by the Court in a manner which might be described as
tongue-in-cheek. The General Appropriation Act set aside an amount to
4 2 8
W. at 234-235.
"The origin of the name may be traced to a degrading ritual to which slaves were subject-
ed. At a fixed day and hour, a barrel stuffed with pork would be rolled out and a multitude of black
slaves, herded together in a strategic comer of the ranch or plantation, would cast their famished
bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of
their well-fed master. BERNAS, "FROM PORK BARREL TO BRONZE CASKETS, " Today, January 30, 1994.
814 THE 1987 CONSTTTUTION Sec. 29
be used for "infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and

other priority projects and activities, and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries as proposed and identified by officials concerned." The
"officials concerned" were all Representatives, Senators and the Vice-
President who were each allocated an amount. The law was challenged
on the ground that the authority given to the enumerated officials to
propose and identify projects and activities was an encroachment into
legislative power. In upholding the validity of the law, the Court said
that Congress itself had specified the uses of the fund and that the power
given to the enumerated officials was merely recommendatory to the
President who could approve or disapprove the recommendation. T h e
430
Court praised the scheme as "imaginative" and "innovative!"
2. Special funds.
Section 29(3) is new. It says: "All money collected on any tax

levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid
out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was
created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be
transferred to the general funds of the G o v e r n m e n t . " This is intended to
prevent abuse in the disposition of special funds. As the Court said in
31
PCGG v. COCOFED:*
The fundamental rule is that tax proceeds may only be used

for a public purpose, which may either be a general public purpose
to support the existence of the state or a special public purpose to
pursue certain legitimate objects of government in the exercise of
police power, and none other. As a measure to ensure the proper
utilization of money collected for a specified public purpose, the
1987 Constitution, restating another general principle, treats the
proceeds as a special fund to be paid out for such purpose. If, how-
ever, that purpose has been fulfilled or is no longer forthcoming,
the balance, if any, shall then be transferred to the general funds
of the government, which may thereafter be appropriated by Con-
gress and expended for any legitimate purpose within the scope of
the general fund. An entity, whether public or private, which holds
the tax money has no authority to disburse it or to pay any of it to
anyone, the power to dispose of such money being vested in the
430
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 521-523 (1994)
431
GJ*. Nos. 147062-64, December 14,2001.
legislature. Thus, the 1987 Constitution, like its counterparts in the

1935 and the 1973 Constitution, mandates that no money shall be
paid out of the national treasury except in pursuance of an appro-
priation made by law.
12
In Osmefia v. Orbos* part of the controversy was whether the
money that went into the Oil Price Stabilization Fund [OPSF] was tax
money levied for a special purpose. As set up by law, it was a "trust
fund" which derived funding from four sources: (1) from increase in
the tax collection from ad valorem taxes on oil products; (2) from any
increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions
of government corporations; (3) from additional amounts imposed by
the Board of Energy on petroleum products; (4) from peso savings re-
sulting from the fluctuation of the peso against currencies used for the
importation of crude oil and petroleum products. T h e question centered
on whether the additional amounts imposed by the Board of Energy was
4
a tax. T h e Court answered: "
What is here involved is not so much the power of taxa-

tion as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB
to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the
power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding con-
sideration is [not to raise revenue but] to enable the delegate to
act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law [to
protect consumers from constant fluctuation of oil prices] which
are embraced by the police power of the State.
S E C . 3 0 . No LAW SHALL BE PASSED INCREASING THE APPELLATE

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT AS PROVIDED IN THIS
CONSTITUTION WITHOUT ITS ADVICE AND CONCURRENCE.
1. Appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Section 2 of Article VIII gives to Congress the power to apportion
the jurisdiction of courts. T h u s , Congress is free to add to or subtract
from the powers of the courts except insofar as these have been fixed
by the Constitution. Section 30 is a response to the concern that the
Supreme Court might be swamped with jurisdictional concerns which
'220 SCRA 703 (1993).

'Id. at 711-712.
T H E 1987 C O N S T I T U T I O N Sees. 31-32
816
might inhibit it from an expeditious disposition of important cases. Sec-

tion 30 does not prohibit Congress from increasing the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court but simply prescribes that any such increase should
be with the advice and concurrence of the Court. T h u s , Art. 82 of the
Omnibus Investment Code of 1987 granting the right of appeal to the
Supreme Court was invalidated because it was passed without the ad-
434
vice and concurrence of the Supreme Court.
S E C . 3 1 . No LAW GRANTING A TITLE OF ROYALTY OR NOBILITY

SHALL BE ENACTED.
1. Titles o f royalty o r nobility.
This provision has traditionally been a part of the Bill of Rights.

The 1986 Constitutional Commission decided to transfer it to Article
VI.
Speaking in support of a similar provision at the 1935 Constitu-

435
tional Convention, Delegate Laurel said:
The Federalist (No. 84), speaking of the importance of the

prohibition against titles of nobility in the Federal Constitution,
says: "This may truly be denominated the cornerstone of republi-
can government; for so long as they are excluded there can never
be serious danger that the government will be any other than that
of the people."
The Filipinos have also suffered under the misguided rule

of monarchy and upon the first chance of drafting a constitution
of their own they provided that no Filipino could accept "honors,
decorations or orders or titles of honor and nobility from foreign
nations without authorization of the government." The govern-
ment was also forbidden from establishing or granting them to any
Filipino. (Malolos Constitution, Art. 32, Title IV.)
S E C . 3 2 . T H E C O N G R E S S S H A L L , A S EARLY A S POSSIBLE, PROVIDE

FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND R E F E R E N D U M , AND T H E EXCEPTIONS
T H E R E F R O M , WHEREBY THE PEOPLE CAN DIRECTLY PROPOSE AND ENACT
4 3 4
F i r s t L e p a n t o C e r a m i c s v . C o u r t o f A p p e a l s , 237 S C R A 519 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; F a b i a n v . D e s i e r t o ,
GR. N o . 129742, S e p t e m b e r 16, 1998; N a m u h e v . O m b u d s m a n , G . R . N o s . 124965. 124932 and
124913, O c t o b e r 29, 1998.
4 3 5
I I I J O U R N A L O F T H E ( 1 9 3 5 ) C O N S T I T U T I O N A L C O N V E N T I O N 1035.
LAWS OR APPROVE OR REJECT ANY ACT OR LAW OR PART THEREOF

PASSED BY THE CONGRESS OR LOCAL LEGISLATIVE BODY AFTER THE
REGISTRATION OF A PETITION THEREFOR SIGNED BY AT LEAST TEN PER
CENTUM OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH
EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PER CENTUM OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF.
1. Initiative a n d referendum.
This has been initially discussed under Section 1. When this sub-
ject was being considered by the 1986 Constitutional Commission, one
major objection to it was the matter of practicality and practicableness.
The C o m m i s s i o n , however, felt that Congress could wrestle with the
436
problem of implementation.
T h e current implementing law is R.A. N o . 6735 some of the de-

tails of which are:
Sec. 5. Requirements. — (a) To exercise the power of ini-

tiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total
number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district
is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the
same with the Commission.
(c) The petition shall state the following:

1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
2. the proposition;
3. the reason or reasons therefor;
4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided here-
in;
5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters;
and
6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hun-
dred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at
the top of every page of the petition.
4
*II RECORD 79-80.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION Sec
Sec. 6. Special Registration. — The Commission on Elec-

tion shall set a special registration day at least three (3) weeks be-
fore a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. — The Election Registrar
shall verify the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters,
voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the imme-
diately preceding election.
Sec. 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. —
The Commission shall call and supervise the conduct of initiative
or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the peti-
tion, the Commission shall, upon determining the sufficiency of
the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice
in newspapers of general and local circulation and set the date of
the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-
five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determi-
nation by the Commission of the sufficiency of the petition.
Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition.

— (a) The Proposition of the enactment, approval, amendment or
rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a
majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philip-
pines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is ap-

proved by a y the Commission, the proposition to reject a national
law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national
law shall be deemed repealed and the repeal shall become effective
fifteen (15) days following the completion of publication of the
proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official
Gazette or in newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national

law sought to be rejected or amended shall remain in full force
and effect.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by

majority of the votes cast in an election called for the purpose shall
become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclama-
tion by the Commission.
.32 ART. VI - THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Sec. 10. Prohibited Measures. — The following cannot be

the subject of an initiative or referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall
be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enact-
ment of which are specifically vested in Congress by the Constitu-
tion, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after
its effectivity.

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782 T H E 1987 C O N S T I T U T I O N Sec.

owned by respondent operator Zulueta. The Court invalidated the ap-

Jurisprudence on social justice also has a bearing on this provi-

S E C . 2 6 . ( 1 ) EVERY BILL PASSED B Y T H E C O N G R E S S SHALL

(2) No BILL PASSED BY EITHER H O U S E SHALL BECOME A

T H E LAST READING OF A B I L L , NO AMENDMENT THERETO SHALL BE

1. Subject a n d title of bills: general prohibition of "riders."

T h e requirement that "Every bill shall embrace only one subject

The object sought to be accomplished and the mischief pro-

""Central Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883,891 (1920).

Although the requirement is mandatory, it should not be so con-

Similarly, the title " A n Act Creating the Municipality of Diana-

In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,™ there was no dispute that

T h e 1935 rule also allowed for certification by the President but

The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the

It is, however, curious that Justice Mendoza, in quoting the appli-

S E C . 2 7 . ( 1 ) EVERY BILL PASSED BY THE CONGRESS SHALL,

(2) T H E PRESIDENT SHALL HAVE T H E POWER TO VETO ANY

Two steps are required before a bill finally b e c o m e s a law. First,

"'Miller v. Mardo, 2 SCRA 398.908-9 (1961).

In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, there was no mechanism

T h e final approval of a bill, however, does not make it immediate-

'"n RECORD 134-136.

Houses, is an extra-constitutional creation of Congress whose function

In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,™ the Court had the opportu-

There are as a matter of fact significant differences in the degree

ventiveness of the stealthy and the surreptitious. These, however, were

This is not to say that conference committees should not be al-

As to the secret meeting of the conference committee, Justice

Finally, however, the Court was willing to paper over everything

3. Veto power; ' i t e m veto."

As a general rule, if the President disapproves of a provision in a

For the purpose of this provision, an appropriation bill is under-

""IV JOURNAL OF THE [ 1 9 3 5 ] CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION (Laurel ed.) 7 5 6 -

A tariff bill is one which imposes duties or imposts whether for

An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section

method of meeting unavoidable obligations or the manner of using the

4. The new "doctrine of inappropriate provisions."

Gonzales involved the 1989 and 1990 General Appropriation

Section 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase

The General Appropriations Act for 1990 contained a similar one:

Sec. 16. Use of Savings. — ... Provided, That no item of ap-

Exercising the p o w e r of "item v e t o " the President vetoed the simi-

The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and

In Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,™ the Court re-

As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which

It should be noted that the Philippine Constitution Association

"'La., 346 So., 2d., 153 (1977).

the appropriation to which they are attached. This is a judge-made rule

5. Executive ' i m p o u n d m e n t . "

The Court, however, found in the doctrine on inappropriate provi-

"'235 SCRA at 544.

S E C . 2 8 . ( 1 ) T H E RULE O F TAXATION SHALL B E UNIFORM AND

(2) T H E C O N G R E S S MAY, B Y LAW, AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT

(3) CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, CHURCHES AND PARSONAGES

(4) NO LAW GRANTING ANY TAX EXEMPTION SHALL BE PASSED

Power of taxation: scope and purpose.

"Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514,561 (U.S. 1830).

is not a grant of power but an enumeration of limits on the inherent and

The extent of the taxing power is as broad as the purpose for

The obvious primary and specific purpose of the p o w e r to tax is

'Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12 (1916).

power of taxation, the power to tax has been recognized as an instru-