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Fatwa in Indonesia
Published online by Cambridge University Press

Religion and Society in Asia
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Fatwa in Indonesia
An Analysis of Dominant Legal Ideas and Mode of
Thought of Fatwa-Making Agencies and Their Implications
in the Post-New Order Period
Pradana Boy Zulian
Amsterdam University Press

Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden
Lay-out: Crius Group, Hulshout
Amsterdam University Press English-language titles are distributed in the US and Canada by
the University of Chicago Press.
isbn 978 94 6298 185 0

e-isbn 978 90 4853 162 2 (pdf)
doi 10.5117/9789462981850
nur 717
© Pradana Boy Zulian / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2018
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted,
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without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.

Contents
Acknowledgements 7
Introduction 9
Background 9
About This Book 17
1 Understanding Religious Mode of Thought 21

Traditionalism 22
Revivalism 28
Reformism 32
2 Fatwa in Islamic Legal Theory and Indonesian Legal System 39

Introduction 39
Fatwā in Islamic Legal Theory 43
Fatwā and the Indonesian Legal System 55
Conclusion 68
3 The Dialectics of Religious Pluralism 71

Plurality of Islam and Religious Pluralism in Indonesia 72
MUI’s Fatwā on Religious Pluralism 79
The Progressive Groups’ Response 96
Competing Religious Ideas and Orientation 102
On Diversity and Tolerance 104
Competing Ideas and Mode of Thinking on Liberalism 114
Progressives on Secularism in Indonesia 123
Conclusion 127
4 The Fatwā on Sectarianism and its Social Implications 129

Introduction 129
Ahmadiyya and its Genesis in Indonesia 131
Fatwā on Ahmadiyya 137
Shi’a in Indonesia 142
Fatwā on Shi’a 149
Mode of Thought and Implications of Fatwā 157
Violence: The Case of Ahmadiyya 166
Violence against the Shi’a 174
Closing 181

5 Fatwa of Bath al-Masail Nahdlatul Ulama’ 183
Introduction 183
NU and the Preservation of Tradition 186
Factors Conditioning Traditionalism 189
Lajnah Bahth al-Masail and Its Fatwā 204
Conclusion 227
6 The Fatwa of Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah 229

Introduction 229
Muhammadiyah: The Foundation and Mode of Thought 231
The Majelis Tarjih 246
Fatwa and Social Change in Muhammadiyah 255
Conclusion 269
Conclusion 271
Appendix: Fatwa of Majelis Tarjih 1999-2010 279
Bibliography 287
Index 315

Acknowledgements
This book is a revised version of my Ph.D thesis at Department of Malay

Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS). It is a result of a long struggle
and sacrifice. As many people and parties have contributed to its completion,
in this ocassion I would like to record my deepest gratitude to those who
have made the completion of my study possible. First and foremost, I would
like to offer my thanks and gratitude to my supervisor Associate Professor
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, Head of Department of Malay Studies, for her
thorough and professional supervision. She has helped me a lot in shaping the
focus of this thesis and guided me to sociological concepts in understanding
religious thought and dynamics. Apart from academic matters, Professor
Aisha has also provided me with a lot of help in difficult time of my study.
I also thank National University of Singapore (NUS) for providing me with
a “Research Scholarship” for my Ph.D studies. It is by this scholarship that
my study at NUS became possible. I would like also extend my gratitude
to all lecturers at the Department of Malay Studies who have shared their
knowledge and expertise during my studies at NUS: Associate Professor
Syed Farid Alatas, Associate Professor Maznah Mohammad, Associate
Professor Syed Khoiruddin Aljuneid, Dr. Suriani Suratman, and Dr Sher
Banu. Special thanks is due to Dr Azhar Ibrahim, who is not only a lecturer
at the department, but also a partner in knowledge. His brotherly friendship
has been very important to me during my studies at NUS. I have also to
record my thanks to the administrative staff at the Department of Malay
Studies, Kak Rasmidah dan Kak Dahlia, for their assistance pertaining
many technical matters of my studies.
I also would like to thank Professor Muhadjir Effendy, rector of Muham-
madiyah University of Malang, Indonesia, who is currently Minister of
Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia, for his support and
permission for me to pursue my Ph.D studies. My colleagues at Faculty of
Islamic Studies, Muhammadiyah University of Malang, Indonesia (whom
I cannot name one by one), have also been helpful in many ways to the
completion of my studies. My family is the most “affected” by my studies.
Many thanks to my wife Lailatul Fithriyah Azzakiyah for her patience, un-
derstanding and support during the long journey of my academic adventure;
and all my children (Bintan Failasufa, Rahbar Zaravet Kavihilghafoor and
Izdad Efcharista Kautsar Omniyya) who have often passed their family time
without me, as I have to spend unlimited hours devoted to my studies. I
also thank my parents and parents-in-law for their doa.

8 Fat wa in Indonesia
Lastly, I have to thank Amsterdam University Press (AUP) for publishing

this book. My thanks as well as apology to Series Editor Saskia Gieling, for
her guide and patience to remind me for the completion of step by step of
this publication.

Introduction
Background
This book seeks to examine Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) in the post-New
Order (Orde Baru) Indonesia issued by three major fatwā-making agencies
(dār al-iftāʼ) in the country namely Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia (MUI), Majelis
Tarjih Muhammadiyah, and Lajnah Baḥth al-Masāil Nahdlatul Ulama’
(LBM-NU). It elucidates the key features of these agencies and the distinc-
tive methods they utilize in crafting their legal opinion ( fatwā). It also
examines major factors conditioning the genesis of legal opinion ( fatwā)
selected. Nevertheless, it should also be made clear from the outset that
this book does not aim at in-depth socio-historical analysis conditioning
the making of legal opinion ( fatwā). Another central issue analyzed is how
competing modes of thought condition as well as reflect the production of
legal opinion (fatwā) within the respective agencies. Furthermore, how legal
opinion ( fatwā) serve as a site for competing mode of thinking of dominant
agencies within the Muslim community of Indonesia will be explored.
The overriding interest of this book is in understanding the implications
of Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) on Indonesia’s plural society and the extent
to which it facilitates adaptation to the demands of rapid social change
confronting the community. While there has been a vast number of legal
opinion ( fatwā) pronounced by these organizations within the period
selected, this book will focus on legal opinion ( fatwā) that have strong
implications on the lives of Muslims within Indonesian society as they
attempt to adapt and adjust to the demands of change and challenges of
the plural society in which they live. Legal opinion ( fatwā) on sectarianism
and interreligious relations, major aspects of rituals and religious practices
as well as those dealing with issues of modernity will be examined.
In Indonesia, fatwā-making agencies are integral to Islamic groups or
movements. For example, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’(NU) are
equipped with fatwā-making bodies called Majelis Tarjih and Lajnah Baḥth
al-Masāil respectively. Other organizations such as Persatuan Islam (Persis)
also founded the Dewan Hisbah which is responsible for the production
of legal opinion ( fatwā) within the organization.1 In some organizations
1 For study on Persatuan Islam and the Dewan Hisbah, please refer to Howard M. Federspiel,
Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in the Twentieth Century Indonesia (Singapore: Equinox Publish-
ing, 2009); Syamsul Falah, Pandangan Keagamaan Persatuan Islam: Studi atas Fatwa-Fatwa
https://doi.org/10.1017/9789048531622.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) where no specific fatwā-making

institution exists, the organization nonetheless frequently functions as the
fatwā-maker for its members.
The three organizations discussed in this book are highly influential in
society. Of these, the most prominent are Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia (MUI)
which is active in producing legal opinion ( fatwā) relating to various issues
for contemporary Muslim society in Indonesia as a whole. MUI is a state-
affiliated religious body that represents both the state and the majority of
Muslim groups in Indonesia. As MUI is an organization representing almost
all Muslim groups in the country, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’
constitute part of this umbrella organization. MUI provides a forum for dis-
cussion for Muslim scholars and leaders and is seen as the most competent
council in giving guidance and rules on religious problems and questions
(iftā’).2 In general, MUI proclaims itself as a successor of the Prophet (war-
athatu al-anbiyāʼ) which functions to fulfill his legacy. Hence, it assumes
the roles as fatwā-giver (mufti), guide and servant for the community (riʽāya
wa khādim al-umma), a movement for reform and improvement (al-iṣlāḥ wa
tajdīd) devoted to inviting people to do good and forbidding evil (amr bi
al-maʽrūf wa nahy ʽan al-munkar).3 In its specific function as a fatwā agency,
MUI established a special agency responsible for dealing with Islamic legal
opinion ( fatwā) called the Fatwā Commission (Komisi Fatwa).
Historically, MUI is founded in May 1975 as the representative body
for Muslims nationwide. As the ruler strongly supported the creation of
MUI at that time, many believe that MUI is a politically created religious
institution aimed by the regime at gaining legitimacy from the religious
scholars (ulamā) in justifying strategic and potentially controversial policies
it introduced.4 The ruler’s (Suharto) support for its founding was formulated
regarding concern for the unity of Indonesian Muslims in meeting and
resolving challenges they face with the backing and participation of the
clerics (ulamā’).5 Through this political will, MUI was finally established
Dewan Hisbah Tahun 1983-1997: Laporan Penelitian (Bandung: Pusat Penelitian: IAIN Sunan
Gunung Djati, 1998); and Uyun Kamiluddin, Menyorot Ijtihad Persis: Fungsi dan Peranannya
dalam Pembinaan Hukum Islam di Indonesia (Bandung: Tafakur, 2006).
2 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa MUI Sejak 1975 (Jakarta: Penerbit Erlangga,
2011), 13.
3 See MUI’s website, www.mui.or.id.
4 The current chairman of NU, Said Agil Siradj, is among those who believe in this conviction.
See Iip D Yahya, Ajengan Cipasung: Biografi K.H. Moh. Ilyas Ruhiat (Yogyakarta: LKIS Pelangi
Aksara, 2006), 197.
5 Atho’ Mudzhar, Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: a study of Islamic legal thought
in Indonesia, 1975-1988, Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1990, 92.

Introduc tion 11
with branches spreading across all Indonesian provinces and regencies

which have expanded to more than thirty. As a country with a majority
Muslim population, matters relating to Islam occupy a central place in
politics. Although the administration of religious affairs in Indonesia has
been formally assigned to the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Kementerian
Agama), at the practical level, this ministry does not deal with specific
issues confronting Muslims. Since such a role is assumed by MUI, it can
be maintained that MUI represents the state and its legal opinion ( fatwā)
stands as the formal legal position of the state on issues relating to Islam.
The other organization which this book focuses on is Muhammadiyah.
This group has been widely associated with a puritan-reformist strand of
Islam, and for such a reason it is also often associated with Wahhabism and
Salafism. However, this description might fail to describe the whole range
of Muhammadiyah movement. To some extent, especially regarding faith,
the association of Muhammadiyah with Wahhabism is not misleading.
Similarly, the terms Salafism might also be applied to Muhammadiyah,
when it refers to a group which adheres to the principle of returning to two
primary source of Islamic law, the Qur’ān and Sunna or Prophetic tradition.6
It has also been rendered as the representative of the reformist Islamic
movement in Indonesia. Some scholars studied this movement have also
pointed to its current conservative inclinations. Founded in 1912, Muham-
madiyah was set up as an Islamic movement aimed at purifying Islam as
practiced by Javanese society at the beginning of 20th century, featured by
the syncretic amalgamation of Javanese traditions with Islamic teachings.
Although currently labeled as puritan, studies reveal that in its initial
phase, Muhammadiyah was often described as accommodative towards
local tradition. Its rigidity in dealing with local cultures and traditions only
occurred about a decade after its foundation. This paradigmatic shift is
believed to have been conditioned by the establishment of the Majelis Tarjih.
Consequently, in addition to being a think-tank of this organization, Majelis
Tarjih is also frequently identified as the agent of puritanism within this
group. This ambiguous nature of Majelis Tarjih is relevant to understanding
its mode(s) of thought and how it is reflected in legal opinion (fatwā) issued.
Majelis Tarjih is founded in 1927 with the core function of issuing legal
opinion ( fatwa) or legal determination for certain problems. Nevertheless,
it should also be emphasized here that Majelis Tarjih does not deal only
with religious issues in a narrow sense. Rather, it also claims to deal with
6 More detail and comprehensive discussion on the multiplicity of Muhammadiyah’s orienta-

tions will be presented in Chapter 6 of this book.

all contemporary problems by referring to the principles of the Qurʼān and

Sunna,7 and urges for legal reasoning (ijtihad) in resolving contemporary
issues confronting Muslim societies.
The other movement, Nahdlatul Ulama’, has been long known as the
representative of traditionalist Muslim groups in Indonesia. It is for this
reason that it is selected in this book.Interestingly, its characterization as a
traditionalist is currently questioned given competing mode of thought that
have merged within the movement. The extent to which this development
within NU impacts upon legal opinion ( fatwā) will be scrutinized. Within
NU, the Baḥth al-Masāil has played a very significant role in constructing
a religious strand of NU since its foundation in 1926. The literature on the
history of this body indicates that in its initial phase, Baḥth al-Masāil was
primarily a kind of discussion that took place in Islamic boarding school
(pesantren) as part of a mechanism in solving problems within society.
As a kind of activity, its inception is concurrent with the founding of NU.8
Subsequently, it was formalized as an independent body within NU called
Lembaga Baḥth al-Masāil or Lajnah Baḥth al-Masāil.9
Historically, NU is founded partly in response to the ascendance of the
new political power in Saudi Arabia which marked a shift from the Shafi’ite-
oriented to a Wahhabi-inclined political leadership. This change of power
was seen as a potential threat to traditionalistic Islam and its practices
as Wahhabism served as the ideological basis for the new regime which
harbored hostility to traditions maintained by traditionalist groups. At
about the same time, the call for religious reforms in Indonesia had begun to
take place spearheaded by several groups. It has inevitably created anxiety
among traditional Muslim leaders which culminated in the foundation
of NU. NU’s formal institutionalization rendered it both as community
( jamīʽa) adhering to the traditional practice of Islam as well as organization
( jamʽiyya), meaning those who formally joined NU as its members. For both,
NU developed a specific understanding of religion conditioned by as well
as reflecting its predominant mode of thought.
Apart from their significance in the life of Indonesian society, these
three fatwā-making agencies also reflect the interplay of competing
mode of thought in the formation of their legal thought as reflected in the
7 See the official website of MajelisTarjih, http://tarjih.muhammadiyah.or.id/content-3-sdet-

sejarah.html accessed on 3 April 2012.
8 See Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan Tarekat: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di
Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), 34.
9 Ahmad Zahro, TradisiIntelektual NU: LajnahBahtsulMasa’il 1926-1999 (Yogyakarta: LKIS), 69.

Introduc tion 13
fatwā-making processes as well as the substance of legal opinion ( fatwā)

issued. The selection also provides a view of their impact on the making of
legal opinion ( fatwā).
Legal opinion ( fatwā) relating to religious beliefs and practices posed by
challenges in the advancement of scientific knowledge is a case in point. It
can be illustrated by the legal opinion ( fatwā) on the determination of the
beginning of Islamic calendar called hijriya, particularly in reference to
the Holy Ramadan (fasting month) and annual religious festival following
Ramadan called Idul Fitri or Eid. For decades, Idul Fitri has not been cel-
ebrated concurrently by different groups of Muslims, Islamic organizations,
and government. It should be borne in mind that in the Indonesian context,
managing religious matters is part of the government’s responsibility.10 Not
surprisingly, Eid celebration is always preceded by an official meeting held
by the Ministry of Religious Affairs that involves representatives from all
Islamic organizations in Indonesia including MUI. The meeting popularly
known as Sidang Isbat is designed to determine the exact date of Eid. Once
an agreement is achieved, the Minister of Religious Affairs will officially
announce the date.
It is usually the case that the government’s decision differs from some
Islamic organizations. This dispute is due to different methods adopted each
party in determining the new date of the Islamic calendar that is based on
the lunar system.11 The most notable disputants are Muhammadiyah and
Nahdlatul Ulama’.12 As widely known, the former adopts the method of
10 According to classical Islamic jurisprudence, a product of ijtihad is not binding. However,

to prevent any dispute, state or government’s intervention is often required. Ibrahim Hosein, a
respected Indonesian scholar, argued that government should only be allowed to intervene in
social matters and not in matters of worship. See Ibrahim Hosen, Fiqih Perbandingan Masalah
Nikah (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 2003), 13-15.
11 For an example of how the dispute is examined by Indonesian scientists, please refer to
Farid Ruskanda, Seratus Masalah Hisab dan Rukyat (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996). See also,
Farid Ismail, Selayang Pandang Hisab Rukyat (Jakarta: Direktorat Pembinaan Peradilan Agama,
Departemen Agama Republik Indonesia, 2004); Syamsul Anwar, Hari Raya dan Problematika
Hisab-Rukyat (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2008); Heri Ruslan, “Penetapan Awal Bulan,
Seperti Apa Aturannya?”, Dialog Jumat Republika, 5 November 2010; and Farid Ruskanda (et.
al), Rukyat dengan Teknologi: Upaya Mencari Kesamaan Pandangan tentang Penentuan Awal
Ramadhan dan Syawal (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1994).
12 Other smaller Islamic organizations such as Persatuan Islam have their method of determin-
ing the new Islamic calendar determination. However, in general, they follow the government’s
decision in determining the day of Eid celebration. Although NahdlatulUlama’ members follow
government’s decision, some NU-affiliated pesantren celebrated Eid and performed Eid prayer
on the same day with Muhammadiyah’s decisions. This fact is based on personal observation.

calculation (ḥisāb)13 based on astronomical and mathematical principles,

while the latter believes in the direct vision (ru’ya) of the crescent (hilāl)
method. NU rejects calculation (ḥisāb) alone based on a conviction that this
method was never practiced during the Prophet Mohammad’s lifetime.14
The 2011 Eid was not an exception. However, unlike previous years, the
controversy in that year was much more intense. Muhammadiyah, which
celebrated Eid on August 30, 2011, a day earlier than government’s decision,
was blamed as the source of tension and confusion among Indonesian Mus-
lims since it firmly insisted on the results of its legal reasoning (ijtihad). The
controversy intensified as the meeting (Sidang Isbat) was broadcasted live
by some Indonesian national television stations. Comments were obtained
from Thomas Jamaluddin, a scientist interviewed in the program, who
maintained that Muhammadiyah’s method is out-dated. Muhammadiyah’s
insistence in adopting the method it employed was also blamed as the
factor for the irreconcilable dispute.15 The scientist further asserted that
by using a more advanced technology the dispute can be avoided. In other
words, according to him, it is the reluctance of Muhammadiyah to adopt
a more modern technology that had worsened the situation. As a result,
unlike other Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates and Qatar, Indonesia had two versions of the Eid in that year:
Muhammadiyah’s Eid coincided with the majority of Muslim countries
while NU and the government’s version was a day later.16
While the Eid celebration ran peacefully despite differences and con-
troversies on the grass-root level, the dispute resumed at another level.
Having been accused of employing an out-dated method, Syamsul Anwar
of Muhammadiyah’s Majelis Tarjih maintained in defense that the method
13 Etymologically, hisab (Arabic) means calculation. It is a derivative form of h-s-b means

“to calculate. For an explanation on hisab, see Susiknan Azhari, Ensiklopedi Hisab Rukyat,
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2005).
14 A detailed explanation of NahdlatulUlama’s position regarding ru’ya can be found in A.
Aziz Masyhuri, Masalah Keagamaan: Hasil Muktamar dan Munas Ulama Nahdlatul Ulama
Kesatu/1926 s/d Ketigapuluh/2000 (Depok: Qultum Media, 2004), 52-53.
15 http://tempointeraktif.com/hg/kesra/2011/08/28/brk,20110828-353968,id.html; see also
http://nasional.inilah.com/read/detail/1769952/perbedaan-idul-fitri-karena-penyimpangan-
astronomi; http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/id/news-392-detail-penjelasan-majelis-tarjih-
dan-tajdid-pp-muhammadiyah-soal-penetapan-idul-fitri-besok.html. Accessed on September
10, 2011.
16 Based on Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Number
148 Year 2011. The copy of the document can be accessed through: http://kemenag.go.id/file/
dokumen/keputusanmenagno148tahun2011tentangpenetapan1syawal1432h.pdf. Accessed on
September 10, 2011.

Introduc tion 15
used by NU which the government endorsed is much more out-dated.17

Moreover, some commentators even confidently argued that if the moon’s
appearance is considered, Muhammadiyah’s version of Eid day is much
closer to the truth.18 However, none of the government officials and others
who endorsed the opposite position responded to Muhammadiyah.
This description is an actual example of how modes of thought in-
fluence legal opinion ( fatwā). It has long been acknowledged that the
calculation (ḥisāb) method is regarded as modern since it is based on
astronomical and mathematical calculations while direct sight vision
(ru’ya) only accepts the direct vision of the crescent, although the vision
also involves the use of advanced technology. The debate, therefore, has
wider implications on the debate on compatibility of Islamic law and
modern science. The difference in method mirrors different modes of
thought of groups concerned.
In studying legal opinion ( fatwā) issued by these selected fatwā-agencies,
this book confines itself to the period of post-New Order Indonesia for
several reasons. The foremost is the collapse of New Order reign in 1998.
This collapse has ushered considerable changes in political and religious
life in Indonesia. Two most significant and particularly relevant of these
are political openness or political liberalization and freedom of religious
expression. Suharto’s New Order (Orde Baru) was featured by authoritarian-
ism and strict political surveillance. When the regime collapsed, political
openness was clearly manifested in the mushrooming of political parties.
In the first election in the post-Suharto Indonesia (1999), forty-eight parties
participated with a significant number of them being Islamic political
parties. Although the number of participating political parties fluctuated
from one election to another, they nonetheless indicate the climate of
political liberalization in the country. Moreover, political liberalization is
also featured in the emergence of democracy in Indonesian political life.
Relatively transparent elections and freedom of speech are among a few
consequences that have accompanied the new climate of political change.
Post-Suharto Indonesia also manifests in the emergence of more open
space for diverse religious expressions, especially from Muslim groups,
including more formalistic and bold expressions of demands for Islamic
17 http://www.dakwatuna.com/2011/09/14341/otoritas-dan-kaidah-matematis-refleksi-atas-
perayaan-idul-fitri-1432-h-tanggapan-atas-kritik-thomas-djamaluddin/. Accessed on September
10, 2011.
18 http://lemlit.uhamka.ac.id/index.php?pilih=news&mod=yes&aksi=lihat&id=53&judul=p
urnama-dan-awal-bulan-qomariyah.html. Access was done on September 10, 2011.

law and legal principles in government and administration. 19 Accord-

ingly, Islamic organizations in Indonesia found spacious room to freely
elaborate and express their positions, principles, and attitudes regarding
significant issues affecting Indonesian society. Martin van Bruinessen, for
instance, noted that the face of Islam in post-Suharto Indonesian society
diametrically differ from the previous era.20 Space has also witnessed a
“conservative turn” evident in religious violence and interreligious conflicts
as well as the emergence of transnational Islamic movements attempting
to influence mainstream Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah
and NU.21
This changing condition has also impacted on religious discourse and
practice of Islamic law in Indonesia. Inevitably, Islamic law has been
witnessing a considerable shift from earlier decades. During the era of
political authoritarianism and oppression under Suharto’s New Order
(Orde Baru) in which political restriction was an integrated feature of
the regime, open expressions of Islam in public space was perceived as a
threat to the stability of the state. Moreover, in the early days of Suharto’s
ascension to power, the relationship between Islam and the state was
characterized by hatred and suspicion. When massive student demonstra-
tion in 1998 forced Suharto to step down from the presidency and many
restrictions were lifted, a new phase of Indonesian politics was revealed.
It was accompanied by the unprecedented challenge to Muslims who
continue to seek religious guidance and rulings from the religious elite
in resolving uncertainties and complexities of life encompassing many
domains. While this has been ongoing long before the fall of Suharto, the
changing context created less restriction on the expression of religious
opinions including the domain of law and legal thought. This fact signi-
fies the basis for selection of post-New Order Indonesia as the point of
departure for this study.
19 For more discussion on Islamic law dynamic within the context of contemporary Indonesian
setting, please refer to Jan Michiel Otto (ed), Sharia Incorporated: A Comparative Overview of
the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim Countries in Past and Present (Leiden: Leiden University
Press, 2010), especially Chapter 10. A comparative perspective on the subject can also be found
in ArskalSalim and AzyumardiAzra (eds), Shari’a and Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore:
ISEAS, 2003).
20 Martin van Bruinessen, “Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam
and the “Conservative Turn” of the Early Twenty-First Century,” in Martin van Bruinessen (ed),
Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the “Conservative Turn” (Singapore:
ISEAS, 2013), 1-3.
21 Ibid.

Introduc tion 17
About This Book
This book does not deal with determining theological validity or correctness
of legal opinion ( fatwā) from a religious perspective. Rather, it seeks to
analyze legal opinion ( fatwā) as ideas emanating from diverse and compet-
ing groups within Indonesian society. As a study of the group thought, some
aspects of the sociology of knowledge are useful in guiding the approach
of this thesis. Essentially, the sociology of knowledge maintains that ideas,
beliefs, and values within society are never coincidental or arbitrary nor
do they emerge in abstract. On the contrary, they are rooted in concrete
socio-historical contexts. In Mannheim’s words, the sociology of knowledge
“seeks to analyze the relationship between knowledge and existence” and
“trace the forms in which this relationship has taken in the intellectual
development of mankind.”22 Contrary to understanding ideas in abstract
or as “narratives” which “simply sets out to show their development,”23 the
sociology of knowledge examines ideas as conditioned by the background
of social groups within a given social structure and historical context.
As Mannheim explicates “… there are modes of thought which cannot be
adequately understood as long as their social origins are obscured.”24
Understanding the socio-historical basis of ideas requires identifying
specific human agencies responsible for its making, their interplay, and
ramifications within a given society. For Mannheim, man’s ideas do not exist
independently from social groups of which he is a part of. Man “speaks the
language of his group; he thinks in the manner in which his group thinks.”
Divergences in ideas do not simply represent the plurality of divergent
conceptions of the world. On the contrary, they reflect unconscious situ-
ational motives in group thinking or the worldview and interests of social
groups. In Mannheim’s words, “it is not men in general who think, or even
isolated individuals who do the thinking, but men in particular groups who
have developed a particular style of thought in an endless series of responses
to certain typical situations characterizing their common position. On
the contrary, they act with and against one another in diversely organized
groups, and while doing so, they think with and against one another. These
persons, bound together into groups, strive in agreement with the character
22 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to Sociology of Knowledge (London:

Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1949), 237.
23 Kurt H Wolff (ed), From Karl Mannheim, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publish-
ers, 1993), 260.
24 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, 2.

and position of the groups to which they belong to change the surrounding
world of nature and society or attempts to maintain it in a given condition.”25
Two dominant styles of thought which Mannheim developed in unmask-
ing thought are ideology and utopia. The concept of ideology reflects the
idea that dominant groups can in their thinking become so intensively
bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts
which would undermine their domination. In particular circumstance,
the collective unconscious of certain groups obscure the real condition
of society both to itself and others and thereby stabilize. The concept of
utopian thinking “reflects the opposite discovery of the political strug-
gle, namely that certain oppressed groups are intellectually so strongly
interested in the destruction and transformation ofa given condition that
they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation that tend to
negate it. Their thinking is incapable of correctly diagnosing an existing
condition. They are not at all concerned with what really exists; rather in
their thinking they already seek to change the situation that exists …”26
These aspects of the sociology of knowledge contribute to explain the social
basis and meaning of competing or conflicting religious opinions. It avoids
the inadequacy of seeing religious thought merely as a reflection of certain
theological viewpoints and avoids the pitfall of labeling.
Based on some aspects of this approach, this book examines compet-
ing ideas among dominant Muslim groups in Indonesia in formulating
legal opinion ( fatwā) and Islamic legal thought as not mere reflections of
divergent opinions that emerge in a vacuum.27 Rather, legal opinion ( fatwā)
is viewed as conditioned by styles of thought and religious orientation of the
specific agencies that enunciate them. These styles of thought character-
izing legal opinion ( fatwā) functions not only as a reflection of the life
situation of the group that expresses them, but also reveals their basic
intention which it to promote and defend what exists or radically transform
it. As Mannheim explains:
(…) the ideas expressed by the subject are thus regarded as functions of
his existence. This means that opinion, statements, propositions and
systems of ideas are not taken at their face value but are interpreted in
25 Ibid, 3.
26 Mannheim, p.36.
27 On the role of social circumstance in the forming of knowledge, see Peter L Berger and
Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in Sociology of Knowledge
(Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1966).

Introduc tion 19
the light of the life-situation of the one who expresses them. It signifies
further that the life –situation of the subject influence his opinions,
perceptions, and interpretations.28
The approach used in this study thus examines how modes of thinking or
religious orientations characterized as reformist/ progressive, traditionalist
and revivalist manifested in significant fatwā-making agencies impact upon
fatwā-making and their ramifications on society.29
This book utilizes numerous primary and secondary sources including
books, journal articles, academic exercises and other materials obtained
from traditional and new media. Apart from relevant theoretical and
empirical works, both contemporary and historical, primary data on legal
opinion ( fatwā) issued by respective fatwā-making agencies in Indonesia
provide another major material for this book. In this respect, I visited the
office of MUI in 2012 and 2013 to obtain primary information relating to
legal opinion ( fatwā). Also, the MUI official statements covered widely by
various Indonesian media and websites were also utilized.
28 Mannheim, p.50.
29 Kurt H Wolff (ed), From Karl Mannheim, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publish-
ers, 1993), 260.

1 Understanding Religious Mode of
Thought
One of the main issues that this book examines is the function of the mode
of thought in conditioning Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā). In its relation to
religion, mode of thinking is reflected in groups’ perspective of religion
including what aspects of religion are deemed significant and what are
marginalized or overlooked. It is also manifested in how religious teachings
are conceived and applied. While the mode of thought of groups may shift
over time and may not be monolithic at any point in time, it is nonetheless
possible to discern dominant modes of thought as manifested in ideas,
views, opinions, and judgment held by the groups as they respond to their
milieu as opposed to those that are marginal.
Three major modes of thought are relevant to this study, namely tradition-
alism, revivalism, and reformism. The meanings attributed to these terms
must be clarified at the outset to avoid confusion as they have been used by
various scholars in diverse ways. Against the backdrop of Indonesian Islam’s
complex diversity, these typologies of the mode of thought in understanding
religious experience might be viewed as an oversimplification. However, such
categorizations are ideal types which do not ignore the dynamic interac-
tion within and between a particular social group’s religious outlook while
facilitating analyses of interplay and contestation among the variety of modes
of thought. As ideal types, these constructions are also meant to capture
the main tendencies of the mode of thought in the context of Indonesian
Muslim society without over-generalizing. In general, Nahdlatul Ulama’ is
widely associated with traditionalistic Islam as opposed to Muhammadiyah
which is predominantly classified as an Islamic reformist movement. MUI,
on the other hand, being the amalgamation of all Indonesian Muslim groups
and supported by the state, is often highlighted for its traditionalistic and
conservative bent in Indonesian Islam. The meaning of these modes of
thought as defined in this thesis and their usage in analyzing legal opinion
( fatwā) will elucidate the extent to which such dominant perceptions of
their mode of thinking hold sway, although this in itself is not the major
aim of the thesis.

Traditionalism
According to Robert Towler, traditionalism is “a style of religiousness which

clings on the old ways.”1 Its main tendency is maintaining tradition it has
received unquestioningly from generations of the past. Similarly, Karl Man-
nheim formulated traditionalism as “a tendency to cling to vegetative pat-
terns, to old ways of life.” Given its dogmatism in according to the ways of the
past at the core of its religious belief, traditionalism can be seen as a potential
as well as a manifest “reaction against deliberate reforming tendencies and
is characterized by fear of innovation.2 Similarly, traditionalism in William
Graham’s understanding refers to “an emphasis upon the historical authority
of, and the continuity with or recovery of, norms and institutions basic to a
particular cumulative tradition.”3 All these concepts of traditionalism indicate
an attitude of reluctance in dealing with the contemporary situation which
shares the attitude of conservatism. However, Karl Mannheim viewed tradi-
tionalism and conservatism as two distinct concepts. For him, traditionalism
is not “necessarily bound up with political or other sorts of conservatism.”4
It is also apparent that traditionalism is closely related to tradition
although the two can be clearly distinguished. Edward Shils describes
tradition as “anything which is transmitted or handed down from the past
to the present.”5 This formulation underlines the continuity or linkage with
the pastas an essential element of tradition. Similarly, Bauman asserts
another possible understanding of tradition as “the element of historical
continuity or social inheritance in culture, or the social process by which
such continuity is achieved.”
More fundamentally, tradition can also be interpreted as “the collective
social inheritance of particular people, culture, society, group or collectivity
and as such stands as the referent of its collective identity.”6 Similar in a way
is a definition of the term offered by Harry B Acton who defines tradition as
“belief or practice transmitted from one generation to another and accepted
1 Robert Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion (London:
Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1984), 83.
2 Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought” in Kurt H Wolff, From Karl Mannheim (London:
Transaction Publishers, 1993), 281.
3 See William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation,” The Journal
of Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), 496.
4 Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought” in Kurt H Wolff, From Karl Mannheim (London:
Transaction Publishers, 1993), 281.
5 Edward Shils, Tradition (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), 12.
6 R. Bauman, “Anthropology of Tradition,” in Neil J Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (eds), Interna-
tional Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (New York: Elsevier, 2001), 15819.

Understanding Religious Mode of Thought 23
as authoritative, or deferred to, without argument.”7 In its derivative form,

William A Graham refers “traditional” to “those societal norms and in-
stitutions that a culture perceives as congruent with or continuing older
precedents and values.” While Phillips and Schochet argue that in most
case tradition is identified with “enduring social practices” and “tacitness
is often regarded as its signature.8 Shaharuddin Maaruf’s formulation of
tradition is also instructive. He maintains that it is the “cultural or value
system which has been influential in molding or shaping the worldview of
a given people for a significant period in their cultural history. The cultural
or value system represents the stable core, which provides the basis for the
society’s responses to contemporary and future challenges.”9
It cannot be denied that understanding mentioned above portrays tradi-
tion in neutral and positive rather than negative ways. The basic knowledge
of tradition connotes neutral and even positive meanings, but an analogous
meaning cannot be applied to traditionalism since traditionalism is often
understood in a pejorative sense.10Jeroslav Pelikan, for instance, makes a
very sharp distinction between the two. For him, tradition is “the living
faith of the dead,” while traditionalism is “the dead faith of the living.”11
However, as tradition is intrinsically related to the past, 12 it is also
sometimes pejoratively perceived. For example, it is sometimes used
7 See William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation,”The Journal

of Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), 496.
8 Mark Salber Phillips and Gordon Schocet, “Preface” in Mark Salber Phillips and Gordon
Schocet (eds), Questions of Traditions (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004), ix.
9 Saharuddin Maaruf, One God, Many Paths: Essay on the Social Relevance of Religion in
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Aliran Publication, 1980), 242-243.
10 In an Islamic context, both positive and negative connotations of traditionalism could also
be found. Scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and his Malaysian disciple Osman Bakar, for
example, are often categorized as the defenders of “traditional Islam” that engaged in promoting
positive meanings of tradition. For Nasr, tradition is “… the principal milestone for spiritual
authenticity and an inf inite source of grace.” Tradition in Nasr’s thought is understood as
spirituality and perennial philosophy of Islam that should be renewed and revived in facing
the challenge of modernity. Furthermore, Nasr writes: “… at once al-din in the vastest sense
of the word, which embraces all aspects of religion and its ramifications, al-sunnah, or that
which, based upon sacred models, has become tradition as this term is usually understood,
and silsilah, or the chain which relate each period, episode or stage of life and thought in the
traditional world to the Origin, as one sees so clearly in Sufism. Tradition, therefore, is like a
tree, the root of which are sunk through revelation in the Divine Nature and from which the
trunk and branches have grown over the ages.” See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in
the Modern World (London and New York: KPI Limited), 13.
11 Jersolav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition: The 1983 Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984), 65.
12 Edward Shils, Tradition (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981), 12.

in comparison with Enlightenment and Renaissance movements that

promote discontinuation with the past, since the past is viewed as a symbol
of backwardness and primitiveness.13Tradition is also at times perceived
negatively due to confusion in mistaking it with traditionalism 14 as the tra-
ditionalists have also irresponsibly hijacked traditions for their interests.
Robert Towler describes traditionalism in terms of several salient features
such as a) firmly holding on to the past and shutting the gate of critical
inquiry; b) cherishing the certainty of the stable and secure order lodged
in the past; c) resistant to any innovation; d) affirms and reinforces the
established order; d) hostile to any change and alert in pressing innovative
endeavors back into the established mould; e) strong tendency to avoid or
dismiss all questions by directing all the issues to an exclusive custodial
authority.15
In the context of Islam in Indonesia, apart from the above traits, tradi-
tionalism is also used to refer to the practice of religion that blends with
tradition (adat), “local practice” or “the way of the ancestors.”16 Concomi-
tantly, the late Abdurrahman Wahid, the former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama,
described traditionalist Muslims as follows:
[they] are widely supposed to be rather backward in orientation and

ossified in their understanding of Islamic society and thought. It is held
that their persistence in upholding orthodox Islamic law … leads them to
reject modernity and a rational approach to life. Similarly, in matters of
theology, their determined adherence to the scholasticism of al-Asy’ari
and al-Maturidi is said to have resulted in a fatalistic understanding
of submission to God’s will and disregard for the exercise of free-will
and independent thinking. Traditionalists are furthermore accused of
being too other-worldly in their practice of ritual Islamic mysticism (ta-
sawuf ) … Thus the commonly held view of traditionalists is that they are
wholly passive community unable to cope with the dynamic challenges of
13 William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation,” The Journal of

Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993).
14 Jeroslav Pelikan, The Vindication of Tradition: The 1983 Jefferson Lecture in the Humanities
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1984).
15 Robert Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion (London:
Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1984), 82.
16 Martin van Bruinessen, “Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist
Discourse within NU,” in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), NahdlatulUlama, Traditional Islam
and Modernity in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 165.

modernisation, the sort of community that scholars regarded as belong-

ing to a dying tradition.17
In the Indonesian context, Islamic religious traditionalism is manifested in

the reverence for tradition (adat) and its incorporation into religious teachings
and practice. Moreover, it is also associated with adherence to the mystical
orientation of Islam and its influence on the attitude towards worldly life.
Despite the influence of modernism, traditionalism as a religious orientation
in Islam continues to be a major type of religious orientation among Muslims.
In general, Muslim traditionalists are characterized by certain common traits:
Firstly, they adhere dogmatically to selective interpretations of the
Qurʼān and Sunna without engaging with competing views.18 As Binyamin
Abrahamov noted, traditionalism is built on several foundations of which
strict adherence to selective teachings of the Qurʼān and Sunna of the
Prophet is a major one. Consequently, any kinds of interpretations not in
accord with its selected meaning are disregarded although traditionalists
do not object to the diversity in the understanding of Islamic teachings. In
understanding the Qurʼān, the use of reason is very limited. Hence, tradi-
tionalist can only accept certain types of interpretations of the Qurʼān and
do not evaluate competing views on the ground of principles. As Seyyed
Hossein Nasr explicates, traditional Islam accepts “… the Noble Quran as
the Word of God in both content and form: as the human embodiment of
God’s Eternal Words, uncreated and without temporal origin. It also accepts
the traditional commentaries upon the Quran, ranging from the linguistic
and historical to the sapiential and metaphysical.”19 This strict adherence
to selective readings of the Qurʼān and Sunna is termed as continuous
chain (isnad)20 paradigm of traditional Islam. This paradigm is based on
the derivation of authority primarily or even solely on linkage to a sacred
tradition through a chain of personal transmission linking intervening
17 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Foreword,” in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), NahdlatulUlama,
Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), xv.
18 Karim Douglas Crow, Roots of Radical Sunni Traditionalism Fear of Reason and the Hashwiyah
(Singapore: Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2008), 19; George Makdisi, “Remarks
on Traditionalism in Islamic Religious History”, in Carl Leiden (ed), The Conflict of Traditional-
ism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East (Austin: The Humanities Research Center the
University of Texas, 1966); and Binyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and
Rationalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998).
19 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Traditional Islam in the Modern World (London and New York: KPI
Limited), 14.
20 Isnad is a technical term in the study of hadith that means chain. This term refers to the
chain of scholars or ulama’ in transmitting hadith.

authorities to a source.21 For traditionalists, the meaning of the Qurʼān is a

self-fulfilling prophecy in nature, and for this reason, it does not need any
complicated interpretation. In technical terms, traditionalists believe that
the Qurʼān is both transmitted in very fixed and accurate method (qath’iy
al-wurūd wa qath’iy al-dalāla), which means that the meaning of the Qurʼān
is also fixed and indisputable.22
Secondly, Islamic traditionalism stands on the perception that pious
forebears of Islam are unchallenged. Azhar Ibrahim calls this tendency as
“romanticism of the medieval past.”23 Conditioned by this attitude, Islamic
traditionalism has a tendency to give overriding importance to religious
knowledge of the past which it deems as perfect and complete. Moreover,
traditionalists believe that ideas, knowledge, and values propagated by
forebears are at the same time relevant and constitute truth which can-
not be ignored. The same attitude is also applied to the formulation and
product of the thinking of Muslim scholars (ulamā’) of the past deemed
as complete, final and absolute. As a result, any attempts to contextually
understand Islam or interpret its teachings contextually is forbidden on the
basis that such interpretations were never practiced by pious fore-bearers
(salaf al-salīh). Hence, traditionalists are also often trapped in a symbolic
type of Islam. For example, in certain circles of traditionalist Muslims, the
emphasis is given to genealogical origin in the belief that only descendants
of the Prophet are authorized to teach Islam. In Indonesian history, the
debate over privilege accorded of the descendants of the Prophet (sayyids
and habaib) instanced by Jami’at Khair and al-Irsyad is illustrative. While
the latter give importance to Muslims based on a quality of their devotion to
God (taqwa),genealogy signifies a significant factor in the mode of thinking
of the former.24
Thirdly, Islamic traditionalism is ambivalent to reason and perceives
it as limited. Amidst the significance of rationality in the contemporary
context of modernity, traditionalism is becoming much more assertive
in limiting the role of reason in interpreting a religious text. Its attitude
towards reason is based on the conviction of intrinsic limitations of reason
21 William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation,”The Journal of

Interdisciplinary History, 23, 3 (1993), 502.
22 Manbaul Ngadhimah, “Potret Keberagamaan Islam di Indonesia (Studi Pemetaan Pemikiran
dan Gerakan Islam),”Innovation, Vol. VII, 14, (2008), 272.
23 Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Islamic Discourse in the Malay-Indonesian World: Critical
Perspective (Petaling Jaya: SIRD, 2014), 18.
24 See Deliar Noer, “Introduction” in Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: PergulatanOrmas-Ormas
Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), xv.

which prevents it from determining the truth.25 Azhar Ibrahim argues that
this trait of traditionalism resemble medieval mysticism which sees reason
as the enemy of human beings in achieving spirituality.26 He also maintains
that the reluctance and also suspicion of traditionalists in employing rea-
son is influenced by Sufi theosophical speculation which “draws a sharp
distinction between reason and revelation, in which the former is seen as
absolutely fallible.”27 As the result of this limited employment of reason,
traditionalists are characterized by “uncritical and dogmatic reliance on
religious traditions.”28
The fourth characteristic of traditionalism featured in Muslims mode of
thought is the fear of innovation.29 It should be made clear that innovation
in this context refers to innovation in thought and social practices and not
regarding religious rituals. This distinction is important, since traditional-
ist, despite their fear of innovation, often create rituals that are deemed as
heresy (bid’a) by revivalist and reformist. This fear of innovation is further
strengthened by the tendency of glorifying the past and of perceiving the
past as the only ideal model that Muslims must refer. Consequently, this
mode of thought defines their reluctant attitude toward social change. As
Hisham Sharabi argues, traditionalists are usually bound with historicism
as they see the past as the locus and not the future. Therefore, as Azhar
asserts, traditionalists’ views “are the opposite of the ideas of the reformists
who advocate progressive change in society.”30
Fifthly, traditionalists are usually closely linked to traditional Islamic
institutions and use those institutions as a medium in the spread of their
ideas transmitted from the past. They tend to dominate religious institu-
tions such as mosques, religious learning centers such as religious schools
(madrasah) and Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). In Indonesia, tra-
ditionalists also often dominated state-affiliated Islamic institution. The
legal opinion ( fatwā) institution in Indonesia represented by Majelis Ulama’
Indonesia is an example of state-affiliated religious institution dominated
25 Wan Muhammad Ali and Muhammad Uthman Ali, Islam dan Modernisma (Kuala Lumpur:
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, 1977), 17-18.
26 Azhar Ibrahim, Contemporary Discourse, 5.
28 Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, “Changing Roles, Unchanging Perceptions and Institutions:
Traditionalism and Its Impact on Women and Globalization in Muslim Societies in Asia,”The
Muslim World, 97 (July 2007), 481.
29 Binyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1998), chapter 2, 1-11.

by traditional-minded religious scholars. This mode of thinking impact on

religious thought including legal opinion ( fatwā).
The dominance of traditionalism bears implications on the attitude
towards social change. They are reluctant to accept social change since from
their point of view surrendering to present needs implies compromising
Islamic belief. Although they resist change, traditionalists often gradually
accommodate and adjust to changing conditions. However, they do this
on the ground of exigency rather than principles. They continue to uphold
selected religious formulations they deem “authentic” as they pragmatically
adapt to the demands of their milieu.
Revivalism
Revivalism refers to a type of mode of thought which is politically assertive

and reflects a more conscious intellectual and political formulation com-
pared to religious traditionalism. Some revivalists are engaged in political
activism and use politics as a means to achieve their ideals. They include, but
not limited to, personalities such as Abul A’la al-Mawdudi,31 Hasan al-Banna,32
Sayyid Qutb33 and Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani who are identified with the agenda
of institutionalizing an Islamic order or Islamizing society through political
means. The founding of Islamist political parties and organizations with
such a mode of thought has intensified their immense influence in the global
spread of Islamic revivalism in the contemporary Muslim world, including
Southeast Asia.34 Islamic revivalism is another response of Muslims to the
31 On Mawdudi’s thought and role in the making of Islamic revivalism, see Seyed Vali Reza
Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press); SeyedVali
Reza Nasr, “Mawlana Mawdudi’s Biography” The Muslim World Journal, 85, 1-2 (1995), 49-62.
32 For a further account on Hasan al-Banna, see Gudrun Krämer, Hasan al-Banna (London:
Oneworld Publications, 2009).
33 On Sayyid Qutb’s political thought see Sayyid Qutb and William E Shepard, Sayyid Qutb
and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam (Leiden and
New York: E.J. Brill, 1996); Muhammad Hafiz Diyab, SayyidQutb: al-Khitābwa al-Iduyulujiyya
(Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, 1989); Sayed Khatab, The Power of Sovereignty: The Political
and Ideological Philosophy of SayyidQutb (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); Adnan
A Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundation of Radical Islamism
(Westport: Praeger Publisher, 2005); John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origin of Radicalism
Islamism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Ibrahim M Abu-Rabi’, “Discourse, Power
and Ideology in Modern Islamic Revivalist Thought: Sayyid Qutb,” The Muslim World Journal,
81, 3-4 (1991), 283-298.
34 Ira M Lapidus, “Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the His-
torical Paradigms,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 40, 4 (1997), 444-460.

challenges of modernity which is featured by its strong hostility towards

the West. The seeds of religious revivalism took place more than a century
ago in the context of colonialism in the 19th century. From this point, the
puritanical stance of the revivalist mode of thought emerged. In the attempt
to alleviate the socio-economic plight of the Muslims ravaged by the impact
of colonial policies, these groups maintained the conviction that religion
could facilitate the progress of the community. However, their revivalist
orientation conditioned their view that the way forward was to return to the
pristine past of Islam which was constructed based on their image of Muslim
history and Islamic culture. In this mode of thinking, Islam, as practiced by
Muslims, has been corrupted by the influence of local and popular cultures.
This syncretic type of Islam to their mind had contributed to the stagnation
of Muslims and had to be “reformed” for Muslims to progress.35
In the contemporary period, this mode of thought is rooted in internal
and external factors impacting on newly independent Muslim states and
societies in meeting the demands and challenges of social change. Since the
1970s in Indonesia, revivalist ideas had begun circulating among student
circles and some groups. However, restrictions that the New Order regime
imposed upon dissenting voices had suppressed their demands. In the
subsequent period, the fall of Suharto’s regime has facilitated the space
for their manifestations in the religious landscape of Islamic thought in
contemporary Indonesia. While this mode of thinking dominates radical
movements and political groups such as Hizbut Tahrir and Front Pembela
Islam, its salient traits do not confine to such groups.
A central motive in this mode of thinking is the notion that the ad-
vancement of Western modernism has induced secularism of state and
society which revivalists associate pejoratively with the relativity of hu-
man values, objectification of the world or nature and the overthrow of
religion.36Therefore, revivalist discourse is strongly bent on “reviving and
returning to the fundamental teachings and precepts of the Islamic faith.”37
However, in this mode of thought, what is deemed fundamental in religious
teachings is exclusively defined by the group at the expense of others.
This exclusive trait in the revivalist mode of thought is manifested in
its credo that Islam is not a mere religion but a comprehensive religion
35 Fauzan Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century Indonesia: A
Critical Survey (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 2-3.
36 Shaharudin Maaruf, 2001, p. 3
37 Hussin Mutalib, Islam in Malaysia: From Revivalism to Islamic State (Singapore: University
of Singapore Press, NUS, 1993), 1.

(al-dīn), a whole way of life and the only path to salvation and that the
“Islamic system” is the most legitimate and authentic. While Muslim do not
object to these formulations, the meaning that revivalists accord to these,
however, are markedly different and which they alone have the prerogative
of defining to the exclusion of all others. The claim of absoluteness in its
formulation of Islam is also manifested in its strong tendency to regard
other Muslims who adhere to other interpretations and practice of Islam
as un-Islamic or even worse, outside the fold of Islam.38
In this mode of thought, Islam and state are not separable. This doctrine
is best described regarding Islam as religion and state (dīn wa dawla) or that
Islam embodies not only religious matters but also defines how a state is
run. The separation of religion (din) and state (dawla) is inconceivable as
religion is perceived as both a polity and a method of government. Their
denouncement of the present social order and insistence on what they
define as the Islamic alternative reflect elements of a utopian mode of
thinking.39
Revivalists do not see the relevance of classical Islamic tradition as a
legacy that should be preserved or revaluated so that it can contribute to the
development of the community. At the same time, they adopt the popular
credo of “returning to the Qurʼān and Prophetic tradition (Sunna).” In fact, this
relegates the entire vista of classical learning to the margins the except for few
scholars like Ibn Taymiyya and al-Mawardi.40 Unlike the traditionalists who
cherish and adhere strictly to the opinions of savants of the classical period,
revivalists reject this as blind imitation (taqlīd) and attempt to reconstruct
the past based on legal reasoning (ijtihad) which they consider pristine and
authentic. However, their adequate lack grounding in both religious sciences
and modern knowledge impairs their capacity for genuine reform.
Revivalism is not anti-modernity. Zainah Anwar, for instance, maintains
that in contrast to stereotypes that “most Islamic revivalists are not educated,
anti-modern, and society misfits, they are in fact well-educated, upwardly
mobile and motivated individuals.”41 It is hence unsurprising that while
38 SeyyedVali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jamaat-I-Islami: The Origins, Theory, and Practice
of Islamic Revivalism,” in Ali Rahnema (ed), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (Kuala Lumpur and
Beirut: SIRD and World Book Publishing, 2005), 105-106.
39 Hussin Mutalib, “Islamic Revivalism in ASEAN States,”Asian Survey, 30, 9 (1990), 877-891.
40 R. Hrair Dekmejian, “Islamic Revival: Catalysts, Categories, and Consequences,” in Shireen
T Hunter (ed), The Politics of Islamic Revivalism: Diversity and Unity (Bloomington and Indian-
apolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 4.
41 Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah among the Students (Petaling Jaya:
Pelanduk Publication, 1987), 2.

harboring strong hostility to the West and the existing order it deems secular,
western concepts including those of state and the government is heavily uti-
lized in conceiving what they imagine as an Islamic state, system or order.42
In their fixation of returning to the pristine Islam of the past, the revival-
ist mode of thought tends to reject local religious traditions and practices
which have syncretized with Islam. These include religious rituals and
ceremonies long observed by Muslims which they pronounce as innovation
or heresy (bid’a). Their preoccupation with creating a Muslim identity that
is untainted by un-Islamic elements, insistence on what they regard as
religiously permitted (halal), gender interaction, attitude towards cultural
forms and expression and many other domains of life. The halal move-
ment and awareness are not only confined to food but has also extended
to other dimensions such as banking, insurance, and economic practices,
in general. Furthermore, in the Indonesian case, as in Malaysia, Islamic
revivalism is manifested in the form of sexual segregation in attending
schools or religious classes, lectures or other public functions. Recently,
some bylaws are imposed to restrict women activities. The Indonesian
National Commission for Women identifies that there have been at least
154 bylaws that discriminate women. Among these is the obligation to wear
the veil for all women in Bangkalan, Madura. The same obligation is also
imposed on civil servants in Bulukumba, Sulawesi. According to Indonesian
National Commission for Women, there are at least 15 regions in Indonesia
that have applied rules or bylaws that potentially or even have been proven
to be discriminative against women. These areas include Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam, Banten, Gorontalo, Central Java, East Java, Lampung, South
Borneo, and North Sumatra. 43
The assertiveness of Islamic revivalism in public life is also evident in
the high demand for a stricter Islamic observance almost in all aspects
of life. Such idea as Islamic or sharī’a economy as mentioned earlier can
be attributed to this mode of thought. As Timur Kuran analyses, the idea
and practice of Islamic economy cannot be separated from the revivalist
tendency of Mawlana Abul A’la al-Mawdudi. 44 However, their project of
42 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jamaat-I-Islami: The Origins, Theory, and Practice
of Islamic Revivalism,” in Ali Rahnema (ed), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (Kuala Lumpur and
Beirut: SIRD and World Book Publishing, 2005), 106.
43 http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2010/01/29/063222253/Komnas-Perempuan-Desak-
154-Perda-Diskriminatif-Dibatalkan, accessed on 31 December 2011.
44 Among the strong supporters of this view is TimurKuran. He sees that there is a strong link-
age between Islamic economics with Islamic revivalism and fundamentalism. See TimurKuran,
Islam and Mammon: The Economic Predicaments of Islamism (Princeton University Press,

Islamizing all realms of life is more rhetorical than substantive. The move-
ment for Islamization suffers important internal debates and conflicts. For
instance, while some uphold the belief that Islamization of society has to
precede Islamization of the state, 45others opine otherwise. The demand
for Islamization of society, through the application and the formalization
of Islamic law (sharī’a), is a case in point 46as it is maintained that without
such participation, sharī’a formalization is hard to achieve.
Revivalist mode of thought is also manifested in the puritanical stance
in understanding religious teachings. They condemn all practices and ideas
deemed as un-Islamic or anathema to the Islamic faith (tawhid). It can be
seen in their attitude towards democracy. The Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia’s
insistence on the revitalization of the caliphate is not only motivated
by utopian aspiration about the reviving Islamic golden age through the
re-establishment of the caliphate but also accompanied by the condemna-
tion of democracy as un-Islamic. It can be argued that like traditionalism,
revivalism depicts an ambivalent attitude towards innovation. However,
the fields of innovation that traditionalist and revivalist fear are distinc-
tive. While the ambivalence of traditionalists has more to do with the
contemporary social change that aggressively penetrates society which is
perceived as threatening tradition, the latter’s concern is with innovation
(bid’a) in the realms of rituals (ibāda). Furthermore, while traditionalists
are innovative in creating rituals regarded as rituals (ibāda), as represented
in practices such as Barzanji, revivalists condemn such innovations as
un-Islamic.
Reformism
Reformism, as used in this thesis, refers to a type of mode of thought which

seeks to revitalize religion amidst contemporary challenges and contextual-
ize religious teachings and values with the aim of improving the well-being
Princeton, 2004); also Timur Kuran, “The Economic Impact of Islamic Fundamentalism”, in
Marty, M.E., Appleby, R.S. (Eds.), Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Polities, Economies,
and Militance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 302–341.
45 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “Mawdudi and the Jamaat-I-Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice
of Islamic Revivalism”, in Ali Rahnema (ed), Pioneers of Islamic Revival (Kuala Lumpur and
Beirut: SIRD and World Book Publishing, 2005), 106-107.
46 For discussion on the stages of shari’a formalization according to PartaiKeadilan Sejahtera’s
method, see Nandang Burhanuddin, Penegakan Syariah Islam Menurut Partai Keadilan Sejahtera
(Jakarta: Pustaka al-Jannah, 2004), 107-118.

of man and society. Elements of this mode of thought are reflected in the
views of Muhammad Abduh, an Egyptian Muslim reformer who maintains
that reform aims,
to direct the faith of Muslims in such a way as to make Muslims better

and to improve their social condition. It seeks to put an end to errors
and misunderstanding of religious texts so well that once the beliefs are
fortified, actions will be more in conformity with morality. 47
Reformist mode of thought is featured by the following indicators: a) a

strong intellectual basis; b) a focus on substance over form; c) strong social
philosophy informed critically by social sciences; d) grounded in contextual
local needs and challenges; e) clear and consistent in the commitment
to pedagogical strategies and planning; f) contain multiple and diverse
approaches and strategies in meeting its objectives. 48
Reformist mode of thought is not a denial of or opposition to tradition. Its
main objective lies in creatively synthesizing religious teachings and value
with the demands of the modern world. In the domain of religion, reformist
mode of thought does not devalue ideas of pious savants of the past nor
the eradication of their achievements and contributions. It simply means
that ideas including the legal thought of the scholars must be revaluated
where necessary, even if they arose from influential clerics (ulamā’) of that
time. Hence, in the reformist mode of thinking, contributions of the past
scholars that are of value are to be revived, modified and developed even
if they have been marginalized by the weight of conservatism. Although
it is not anti-tradition, reformist mode of thought is anti-dogma. It means
it rejects emotive overreliance on ideas and practices of the past that have
outlived their purpose.
Another remarkable trait of reformist outlook is the distinction it makes
between universal and eternal values prescribed by the religion from
teachings which are historically determined. Hence, reformist thought
denounces uncritical adherence to religious traditions and dogma of the
past. This mode of thought contradicts traditionalism in approach and
conceptualization of the heritage of the past or local traditions (adat).
While traditionalist clings onto traditions without question, reformists
47 Ibid, 81.
48 Azhar Ibrahim, “The Idea of Religious Reform: Perspective of Singapore Malay-Muslim
Experiences,” in Syed Farid Alatas (ed), Muslim Reform in Southeast Asia: Perspective from
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore (Singapore: Majelis Ugama Islam Singapura, 2009), 84-87.

advocate the need for its revaluation. 49 In reformist orientation, the basic,
humanistic and eternal aspects of the teachings and values of Islam must be
harnessed and concretized to deal with problems that have emerged within
the specific historical and socio-cultural contexts of a given community.
Hence, its emphasis is on critical appraisal of ideas that were themselves
inevitably conditioned by their contextual conditions.
Also, reformist orientation is inclusive. While it is grounded in humani-
tarian and religious traditions based on the teachings of Islam, it does not
ignore the intellectual contributions of others that are of value. Reformist
mode of thinking, therefore, entails the assimilation of contributions of
mankind that are consistent with religious philosophy. It acknowledges that
no society has the monopoly of knowledge and that ideas that contribute
to the betterment of man cannot be denied. This essential aspect of reform
is supported by ample historical evidence as far back as the inception of
Islam itself in the seventh century. Historical records reveal how Muslims
have borrowed, assimilated, refined and modified law and ideas originating
from other nations and societies for its people where these were found to
be useful and compatible with their purpose.
Another important attribute of reformist orientation is the importance it
gives to thought and practices that lead to outcomes better than what exist
regarding its impact on human life. In this mode of thought, it is meaningless
for any group simply to assert that their initiatives are reformist unless it can
be demonstrated that these have brought about improvements to human
lives and condition. This important criterion means that mere use of the
term reform concerning a particular set idea of a group without an evalu-
ation of its relevance and impact on human lives merely breeds confusion.
The reformist mode of thinking rejects the slogan of returning to the
Qur’ān and Prophetic sayings (hadith) as unconstructive as it fails to
discern what aspects of these sources one should return to and how these
are to be construed in the context of the contemporary world. As has been
briefly indicated earlier, the dark age of Muslim intellectualism was among
other factors due to widespread belief that religious interpretations have
been completely formulated by the previous generation of Muslim clerics
49 The syncretic nature of Islam in Indonesia is linked to the pre-Islamic element of Hinduism
and Buddhism. Although the exact date of the coming of Islam to Nusantara is highly debated
by historians, it cannot be denied that Hinduism and Buddhism preceded Islam in forming the
system of valuesof Indonesian societies. Given this Islamic missionaries chose to accommodate
local practices with Islamic doctrine. It is believed that from this point, Islamic syncretism
started to emerge. See Merle C Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamization from
the Fourteenth to the Early Nineteenth Centuries (Norwalk: East Bridge, 2006).

(ulamāʼ), and as such, no further legal reasoning (ijtihād) is needed for

Muslims today. Reformists severely criticize this doctrine and strongly urge
for the use of reason in the application of religious teachings and values to
the current context. In reformist thought, legal reasoning (ijtihād) is not
limited to the certain course of a period in Islamic history.50 Unavoidably,
this stance which effectively rejects conformity (taqlīd) preserved by the
traditionalist wing has had adverse consequences on the influence of this
mode of thought.51 Historically, the pejorative labeling of Kaum Muda or
the Youth Group in Malaya in the early 20th century as those who subscribe
to false theology and deviant practices is a case in point.
Legal reasoning (ijtihād), as advocated by reformists, is the “exertion
of mental energy in the search for the legal opinion to the extent that the
faculties of the jurist become incapable of further effort.”52 The vitality of
legal reasoning (ijtihād) advocated by reformist underscores the importance
of reason in understanding religious doctrine. This emphasis on reason
as a tool in understanding and appreciating religious values is a marked
feature that distinguishes reformist mode of thinking from competing
orientations.53
By employing a rationalistic approach to religion, reformists view the
urgent need to see religious teachings in its historical context, and the need
for religious thought of the present to address the current challenges. As
a result, the legitimacy of legal reasoning (ijtihād) in formulating existing
laws and practices is unchallenged. Socially, the reformist group emerged
from within the progressive strand of the religious circles. In most cases,
they also receive training in classical Islam as do traditionalists. However,
their openness and exposure to exogenous ideas stimulate their drive to
introduce reform from within. A rational approach to Islam to them is the
answer to enable Muslim to confront the present challenge of development.
It can be seen from how Muhammad Abduh, among earliest reformist
50 Wael B Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”, International Journal of Middle East Studies,
16, 1 (1984), 3-41; J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 70-71.
51 On taqlid and stagnation of Muslim thought, see Shaykh Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Issues in
Contemporary Islamic Thought (Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2005),
70-80; and Indira Falk Gesink, Islamic Reform and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolution of
Modern Sunni Islam (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010).
52 Wael B Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?”, International Journal of Middle East Studies,
16, 1 (1984), 3-41.
53 Binyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1998), vii.

Muslim, carried out his religious reforms.54 In Southeast Asian context,

reform sparked by Abduh and al-Afghani in Egypt and the Middle East in
general also found its fertile soil through local reformists who were inspired
by reform in the Arab world. In Malaya, the ideas of Muslim reformers such
as al-Hadi illustrate the point. His contributions to diagnosing the causes
of socio-economic backwardness and remedies prescribed reveal a strong
grounding in progressive religious traditions and their relevance to alleviat-
ing the plight of the Malays in the context of imperialism. Some aspects
of his reform ideas can be found in the journal al-Imam which he and his
circle of Muslim clerics (ulamā’) spearheaded. The ideas they expounded on
the problems and impediments to modernization including religious life,
the nature of elite, economic stagnation, modern education and the role of
women among others reveal serious attempts at reviewing the relevance of
religious values in facilitating adaptation to the modern world.
Another key feature of reformist orientation is their approach to un-
derstanding texts. Interpretation of texts is instrumental in the thought
of reformist since it is determinant in defining reformist attitude towards
some issues. Fazlur Rahman,55 Mohammad Sahrour, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd,
Mohammed Arkoun, Hassan Hanafi, Amina Wadud and Asma Barlas, for
example, are among those who approach Qur’anic text that enables them
to relate the Qur’anic formulation to current situation and context.56In
54 Indira Falk Gesink, Islamic Reform, and Conservatism: Al-Azhar and the Evolution of Modern
Sunni Islam (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), 165-196.
55 Fazlur Rahman’s method of Qur’anic text interpretation is popularly known as “double
movements” which firstly consists of viewing the message of Qurʼān and the Hadith as a unity
and should be understood by paying particular attention to the social context of their inception.
Next, understanding the interpretation of Qurʼān by several scholars that always incorporated
those interpretations to the context of their time, by doing this the eternal principles of the
Qurʼān can be extracted and finally those principles could be applied to contemporary setting
of Muslim societies. See Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of Qur’an (Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca
Islamica, 1994); Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984); Jon Armajani, Dynamic Islam: Liberal Muslim Perspective in
a Transnational Age (Lanham, University of America Press, 2004), 80-82; Riffat Hassan, “Islamic
Modernist and Reformist Discourse in South Asia,” in Shireen T Hunter (ed), Reformist Voice of
Islam: Mediating Islam and Modernity (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2009), 170-172.
56 Approaches and methods of those intellectual in Qur’anic interpretation can be found in
their works such as Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of Qur’an (Minneapolis, MN: Bibliotheca
Islamica, 1994); Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Tekstualitas al-Qur’an: KritikterhadapUlumul Qur’an
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2001), Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, Naqd al-Khitab al-Dini (Cairo: Sina’i Nasr, 1990),
and Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis (Amsterdam: Amsterdam Uni-
versity Press, 2006); Mohammad Sahrour, Al-Qur’an wa al-Kitab: Qira’a al-Mu’ashira (Damascus:
al-Ahli li al-Taba’awa al-Nashrwa al-Tauzi’, 1990), and DirasatIslamiyyat al-Mu’ashira fi al-
Dawlawa al-Mujtama’ (Damascus: al-Ahli li al-Taba’awa al-Nashrwa al-Tauzi’, 1990); Asma Barlas,

general, these thinkers propose a hermeneutical approach in understand-

ing Qur’anic text that will enable Muslims to comprehend Qurʼān beyond
its textual meanings. They believe that if Muslims are trapped in textual
meanings of the text without any attempt at reproducing new meanings
that correspond to the contemporary situation, Islam will lose its relevance.
Reformist mode of thought also advocates the use of concepts and theories
of modern knowledge in understanding religious texts and traditions. As
M.K. Nawaz argues, “the application of the sociological methodology to
the Qur’ān and Sunna simply means that legal norms embodied in those
sources should be interpreted in their social context.”57
Lastly, it should also be mentioned that reformist attempts to renew
religious understanding are not always a success story. As the main reform-
ist agenda is to eliminate traditional and conservative tendencies within
Muslim societies, it is inevitable that their efforts have aroused backlash
from their opponents. In many instances, reformists are confronted by
the challenge of the strong grip religious traditionalism in contemporary
society. Their critical insights tend, therefore, to be relegated to the margins
of society.
Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretation of the Qur’an (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 2002); Amina Wadud, Qur’an and Women (Kuala Lumpur: FajarBakti, 1992).
57 M.K. Nawaz, ‘Some Aspects of Modernization of Islamic Law,’ in Carl Leiden (ed), The Conflict
of Traditionalism and Modernism in the Muslim Middle East (Austin: The Humanities Research
Center the University of Texas, 1966), 71.

2 Fatwa in Islamic Legal Theory and
Indonesian Legal System
Introduction
In the history of Islamic legal theory, legal opinion ( fatwā) has played a
pivotal role1 in constructing a body of laws for the entire Islamic legal
system. Contemporary Islamic legal scholar Wael B Hallaq maintains that
one of the significance of legal opinion ( fatwā) lies in its function as an
instrument that bridges complicated legal formulations and the domain of
public understanding.2 Similarly, Alexandre Caeiro posits that legal opinion
( fatwā) is a “meeting point between legal theory and social practice.”3
Integral to legal opinion ( fatwā) is the fundamental concept of legal reason-
ing (ijtihād) which, in Islamic legal theory, can be broadly comprehended as
a medium as well as a procedure for solving unprecedented issues within
the realm of Islamic law. 4
As a form of independent legal reasoning (ijtihād), legal opinion ( fatwā)
is not confined to certain specific periods, but will always be timely and
relevant in providing a legal response to contemporary problems confronting
Muslims.5 Among legal scholars, assertions to the effect that legal opinion
( fatwā) do not emerge in response to actual problems of society are not
uncommon. N.J. Coulson, Joseph Schacht, and Brinkley Messick fall within
1 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Mawjibat Taghayyari al-Fatwa fi ‘Ashrina (n.p.: al-Ittihad al-Alami

li-Ulama’I al-Muslimin, n.d.), 11.
2 Wael B Hallaq, “Ifta’ and Ijtihad in Sunni Legal Theory: A Development Account,” in Muham-
mad Khalid Mas’ud (et.al, ed), Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas (Cambridge
and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 33. See also his article, “From Fatwa to Furu’:
Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law,” Islamic Law and Society, 1, 1 (1994), 29-65.
3 Alexandre Caeiro, “The Shifting Moral Universe of the Islamic Tradition of Ifta’: A Diachronic
Study of Four Adab al-Fatwa Manuals,” The Muslim World, 96, (October 2006), 661-685.
4 In general term, ijtihad is referred to as a mechanism of f inding legal status of newly-
emerging socio-religious problems on which no legal texts are found. See Abd al-WahhabKhallaf,
Masadir al-Tasyri’ al-Islamiy fi ma La NassanFihi (Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1993). For a comparison,
see Abdul Mun’im al-Nimr, al-Ijtihad (Cairo: al-Haiah al-Misriyya al-‘Amma li al-Kitab, 1987),
27-28; and Yusuf Qaradhawi, Al-Ijtihad fi al-Shari’ah al-Islamiyyama’aNazharatTahliliyya fi
al-Ijtihad al-Mu’ashir (Kuwait: Dar al-Qalam, 1992), 11-13; Muhammad Sulaiman al-Asyqari,
al-Wadhih fi Ushul al-Fiqh li al-Mubtadiin (Jordan: Dar al-Nafais and Dar al-Salam, 2004), 254-257.
5 Yusuf Qardhawi argues for urgency to perform ijtihad in the entire course of Muslim history.
He identifies many manifestations of ijtihad in contemporary Muslim society which one of them
is fatwā. See Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Mawjibat Taghayyari al-Fatwa fi ‘Ashrina, p. 8.

this category.6 Furthermore, they also believe that legal opinion ( fatwā)
did not contribute substantially to the development of Islamic substantive
law or legal system. Such contentions that legal opinions ( fatwā) are legal
speculations reflecting the imagination of legal opinion-makers (muftis)
have been found to contradict empirical evidence in Islamic legal history to
a large extent. Both in the past as well as present times, the issuance of legal
opinion (istiftā’) has been strongly conditioned by and responded to actual
religious-legal problems that have emerged within Muslim societies. In other
words, legal opinion ( fatwā) is not mere fiction but part of the mechanism of
legal reasoning (ijtihād) that has ensured that Islamic law remains relevant in
diverse socio-historical contexts (al-Islāmu ṣāliḥun li-kulli zaman wa makān).
Wael B Hallaq, a contemporary leading authority in Islamic law, for
instance, is one of the most prominent proponents of the above who offered
numerous evidences in support of his conviction.7 In his words, “(T)here
is massive evidence in our sources to indicate that legal opinion ( fatwā)
played a considerable role in the growth and gradual change of Islamic
substantive law.”8Similarly, in his article “Ethic, Tradition and Authority:
Toward an Anthropology of the Fatwa,” Hussein Ali Agrama discusses how
legal opinion ( fatwā) constantly responded to existential problems and
issues in the Egyptian Islamic legal tradition and contemporary times. He
maintains that jurist-consults (mufti) of al-Azhar Mosque in Cairo always
provided legal opinion ( fatwā) to people who sought explication of Islamic
law in their daily life ranging from private to public affairs.9 Elsewhere
Agrama portrays: “The seeking of fatwā is a popular practice in Egypt,
and the Fatwā Council of al-Azhar as a central fatwā-giving institution, is
always full of questioners from all walks of life.”10 The view that legal opinion
(fatwā) emerged from empirical need is also indicated in I.R. Walsh’s finding
on the role it provided since the establishment of the Muslim community
(umma). He furthermore maintained that the jurist-consult (mufti) played
a remarkable part in building up the structure of Islamic law.
Apart from these conflicting views, some scholars maintain that legal
opinion ( fatwā) in Muslim history reflect both characteristics. Saiyad
6 See N. J Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964).
7 See Hallaq, “From Fatwa to Furu’: Growth and Change in Islamic Substantive Law,” Islamic
Law and Society, 1, 1 (1994), 29-65.
8 Hallaq, “From fatwa to furu’”, p. 31
9 Hussein Ali Agrama, “Ethic, Tradition and Authority: Toward an Anthropology of the Fatwa,”
American Ethnologist, Vol. 37 (February 2010), p. 1-18.
10 Hussein Ali Agrama, Law Courts and the Fatwa Council in Egypt: An Ethnography of Islamic
Legal Practice,Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 2005, 1.

Fat wa in Isl amic Legal Theory and Indonesian Legal System 41
Nizamuddin Ahmad, for instance, falls within this tradition. He describes

legal opinion ( fatwā) as “… opinion of Islamic law (sharī’a) issued by an
expert scholar with specialized training … upon the request of one or more
questioners … about real or hypothetical situations …”11 It can, however,
be argued that both views cannot be ruled out. This is because although
questions addressed to the jurist-consult (mufti) could have originated
from facts, there was also the possibility that they were directed as part of
anticipating an act. However, to what extent the two kinds of legal opinion
(fatwā) are produced, would be a major point for investigation. From Hallaq’s
research, it cannot be refuted that legal opinion ( fatwā) played a significant
role in addressing questions that related to real problems in Muslim history.12
Legal opinion ( fatwā) is generally legal opinions or rulings about
newly-emerging problems and unprecedented issues emerging in the
society based on Islamic law (sharī’a) sources, the Qurʼān and Sunna,
whether specifically and explicitly mentioned or otherwise. Since it is
inexorably a response to new problems and issues, legal opinion ( fatwā)
is considerably important but potentially controversial. Academic studies
on the subject reveal that in some Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Pakistan, Iran, Malaysia and Indonesia, legal opinion ( fatwā) often
constitutes a source of controversy. The controversial nature of legal
opinion ( fatwā) is largely conditioned by the fact that fatwā involves
selection and evaluation of legal and ethical principles and traditions
to deal with contemporary issues. Theoretically, such differences are
understandable since the general principles derived from the Qurʼān
are inevitably subjected to a variety of meanings and interpretations
depending on socio-historical factors conditioning them and methods
employed. Hence, in some cases, the basis and reasoning of legal opinion
( fatwā) and its implications have resulted in controversies and critical
responses. Diversity in religious orientations and modes of thinking in
fatwā-making has also given rise to debates.
The example of a legal opinion ( fatwā) issued in 2010 by a cleric from
Saudi Arabia is a case in point. According to a report, the legal opinion
( fatwā) urged women to breastfeed their male colleagues to establish a
maternal relationship between men and women who share a common
workspace.13 By so-doing, it was argued, they will be considered as having
11 Saiyad Nizamuddin Ahmad, Fatwa of Condemnation … p. 61.

12 Hallaq, “From Fatwa to Furu’, xx”
13 Saudi Clerics Advocate Adult Breast-Feeding, http://www.aolnews.com/world/article/
saudi-clerics-advocate-adult-breastfeeding/19504280.

legally-permitted relationship (muhrīm), and this status will permit them

to occupy a shared working space. The controversy that arose from the legal
opinion ( fatwā) has attracted royal intervention with the Saudi monarch
issuing the decree stating that the process of issuing the legal oponion
(istiftā’) is an exclusive authority for those who are members of senior
clerics (ulama’). Such a controversial legal opinion ( fatwā) is not unique to
Saudi Arabia. Indonesia, the subject of this research, is another significant
case. The legal opinion ( fatwā) issued by the Indonesian Council of Muslim
Clerics (Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia, MUI) are also not free from contention
and controversy. Among the most controversial are legal opinion ( fatwā)
on the ban on pluralism, liberalism, and secularism; legal opinion ( fatwā)
on sectarianism and deviance of religious groups such as Ahmadiyah and
Shi’a. Equally controversial is legal opinion ( fatwā) on the determination of
new lunar calendar by Muhammadiyah and several others.14 Other than the
contents of legal opinion ( fatwā) itself, its very status within the national
legal system of some Muslim countries has also been a point of controversy.
This chapter will examine Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) from the
perspective of Islamic legal theories, the Indonesian legal system and
Indonesian society more generally. The nature, origin, position and func-
tion of legal opinion ( fatwā) will be discussed. How legal opinion ( fatwā)
differs from and its relation to Islamic law (sharī’a), Islamic jurispruedence
( fiqh), court verdicts (qaḍa), legal opinion-giver (mufti), judge (qaḍi)
and the like will also be explicated to clarify its meaning. This chapter
will also discuss the status and position of fatwā within the Indonesian
legal system. The major fatwā-making authorities in Indonesia and the
significance of legal opinion ( fatwā) in Indonesian society in the context
of massive socio-economic change following the fall of Suharto will also be
explored. This framework will be useful in mapping out the current situ-
ation of Islamic law in Indonesia. Among recent developments on Islamic
law in Indonesia is the strong wave of Islamic law (sharī’a) formalization
in certain parts of the country. It marked a substantial shift in Islamic
law development during the last decade. Closely related to this stream is
the rapid production of legal opinion ( fatwā), especially by Indonesian
Council of Muslim Clerics (Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia, MUI), which has
also created speculations among experts that after the New Order period,
14 Most of MUI’s fatwā can be downloaded through www.mui.or.id. Also, MUI’s fatwas since
1975 have been codified in one single volume. Please refer to MajelisUlama Indonesia, Himpunan
Fatwa MajelisUlama Indonesia Sejak 1975 (Jakarta: Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia and Penerbit
Erlangga, 2010).

MUI is trying to position itself within the broader Indonesian real politi-
cal landscape. This situation is partly a consequence of positional shift
experienced by MUI soon after the collapse of the New Order’s regime.15
Moreover, the result of growing criticism by certain progressive Muslim
groups toward Islamic organizations showing conservative tendencies,
including MUI.16
As the aim of this chapter is to draw a clear picture of legal opinion
( fatwā) in the context of Islamic legal theory and Indonesian legal sys-
tem, what follows is a discussion of the Indonesian national legal system.
Indonesian law is formed from three legal elements, namely customary
law (hukum adat), colonial law and Islamic law. This nature has made
Indonesian law vibrant yet problematic. This chapter will also examine
the relationship between them within the Indonesian hierarchy of legal
sources will be examined. Equally, if not pertinent, this chapter will also
analyze the status of legal opinion ( fatwā) within the legal system and the
extent of its influence in society.
Fatwā in Islamic Legal Theory
The legal opinion ( fatwā) is a paramount Islamic legal concept in Muslim

legal history and contemporary Muslim societies. However, its significance
may not correlate with its accurate understanding by Muslims in general.
Research carried out by Raihanah Abdullah provides evidence of this
incongruence in the case of Malaysia. The study revealed that the majority
i.e. 95.4% of respondents interviewed claim that they are familiar with the
term. However, the findings also show that the same acknowledge that they
do not have adequate knowledge about the nature of legal opinion ( fatwā).
Furthermore, not only is their understanding of legal opinion ( fatwā) in-
adequate, but it also varies between groups and individuals. Among 5,176
respondents, 13.9% perceived fatwā as questions and answers on religious is-
sues; 16.8% associated fatwā with forms of punishment, while 17.3% equated
15 For a brief account of this change, please refer to C. van Dijk, “Religious Authority, Politics
and Fatwa in Contemporary Southeast Asia,” in R. Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack (eds),
Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions (Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies
Program, Harvard Law School, 2007), 44-65.
16 Such criticisms can be seen for example, in K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (et.al). Kala Fatwa
Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006).

it with Islamic legal maxims. The majority, i.e. 41.1%, however, understood
fatwā as jurist-consult (mufti)’s action or stance about legal issues.17
No similar study can be found in the case of Indonesia to the best of my
knowledge. However, lay observations of Indonesians’ attitude towards legal
opinion ( fatwā) and how they respond to it, suggest that the findings on the
level of understanding of legal opinion ( fatwā) may in general not differ.
This situation is complicated by the fact that for very long time legal opinion
( fatwā) has been used for different purposes and operates differently in
various Muslim societies. Hence, Mehdi Mozaffari, an Iranian scholar, for
instance, noted that “during the long history of Islam, legal opinion ( fatwā)
has become more and more complex and also more and more vague and
imprecise.”18
Etymologically, legal opinion ( fatwā) is an Arabic word that has been
defined as formal legal responses to questions given by an authoritative
person.19 Fatwā can also be understood as providing clarity of law (tabyīn
al-ḥukm).20 It is derived from the Arabic word “fatā” meaning young, new,
beauty, similarity, and explanation.21 All those meanings are embodied
in various definitions. The origin of the term legal opinion ( fatwā) can be
traced to the Qurʼān. In the Qurʼān, the term fatwā is used in two meanings,
namely asking for a valid answer and giving a valid answer.22 The person who
gives the legal opinion ( fatwā) is called mufti, while people seeking legal
opinion ( fatwā) are referred to as mustafti. The activities of legal opinion
( fatwā) seeking are termed istiftā’. Futya or ifta’ is the institution issuing
the legal opinion ( fatwā). Al-futya or al-fatwā, according to al-Raghib,
means giving legal answers to any problems which have not been clearly
determined by law.23
17 Raihanah Abdullah, “Fatwa dan Masyarakat,” in Ahmad Hidayat Buang (ed), Fatwa di
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Syariah dan Undang-Undang, API, UM: 2004), 142-149.
18 Mehdi Mozaffari, Fatwa, Violence and Discourtesy (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press,
1998), 16.
19 M.B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam: Social Change through Contemporary Fatawa (Crown Nest:
Allen and Unwin, 2003), 1.
20 Abd al-Razaq Abdullah Shalih ibn Ghalib al-Kindi, Al-Taysir fi al-Fatwa: Asbabuhu wa
Dhawabituhu (Beirut: Mu’asasah al-Risalah Nashirun, 2008), 19.
21 For a more comprehensive etymological meaning of fatwā, please refer to Muhsin Shalih
al-Rumkiy, Dlawabit al-Fatwa fi al-Shari’ah al-Islamiyah (Mecca: MaktabahNizaz Mustafa
al-Bayan, 2007), 37-40; and Jamal Karkouri, Athar al-Urfi fi Taghayyuri al-Fatwa (Beirut: Dar
IbnHazm, 2009), 92.
22 Hasan Hamzah, “Fatwa,” in Ensiklopedi Islam Jilid III (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Encyclo-
pedia Research Center Berhad, 1998), 259.
23 Muhammad Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, Al-Fatwa fi al-Islam (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah,
1986), 46.

From the aspect of terminology, Muslim legal scholars differ in their defini-
tions of legal opinion (fatwā). Fatwā has been explained as a statement on the
law of God derived from the Islamic law (sharī’a).24 Fatwā has also been taken
to mean an explanation of Islamic law (sharī’a) on certain issues in response
to a question by either an individual or a group, identified or otherwise.25
Concomitant with this meaning, it can be asserted that jurist-consult (mufti)
as the person who issues legal opinion ( fatwā) is the informant of the law
of God due to his deep understanding of the basis (dalīl) in Islamic law.26
Scholars also differ in their understanding of how and when the Qurʼān
describes legal opinion ( fatwā). In Khalid Masud’s account, the Qurʼān
mentioned “fatwā” or fatwā-related expression twice in Surah al-Nisa: 127
and an-Nahl: 43.27 Similar view is held by Saiyad Nizamuddin Ahmad holds a
similar view. He maintains that term fatwā originated in the Qurʼān in refer-
ence to the process of istiftā’ mentioned in it. Mehdi Mozaffari does not see
that the word “fatwā” explicitly referred to in the Qurʼān, but maintained that
the Qurʼān mentioned it in derivative forms, “questioning, pronouncing an
opinion, and never a verdict, an act of law, or order.28 A more comprehensive
list of the term “fatwā” in all its derivatives is contained in the popular dic-
tionary of Qur’anic verses glossary, Fatḥ al-Rahmān li Ṭālabi Āyāti al-Qurʼān.
The word is mentioned as a verb such as yuftīkum which means that He (God)
give you fatwā, yastaftu means that they ask for fatwa, aftāna which carries
the meaning of “he gave us fatwā”, aftūni (give me fatwā), tastaftiyani or in
the form of prohibition wa la tastaftu (and do not issue a fatwā).29
Muslim legal scholars have been using legal opinion ( fatwā) in rela-
tion to several other concepts related to Islamic law namely: Islamic law
(sharī’a), Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh), legal reasoning (ijtihad) and verdict
(qaḍa). For this reason, legal opinion ( fatwā) the differences, similarities
and relationships between them and legal opinion ( fatwā) is relevant
to avoid confusion and clarify the term. It is first pertinent to explain
24 Abd al-Razaq Abd-Allah Shalih ibn Ghalib al-Kindi, al-Taysir fi al-Fatwa: Asbabuhu wa
Dlawabituhu (Beirut: Mu’ass asah al-Risalah Nashirun, 2008), 19.
25 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, al-Fatwa Baina al-Indlibatwa al-Tasayyub (Cairo: Dar al-Shahwah li
al-Nasyrwa al-Tauzi’, 1988), 11.
26 Jamal Karkouri, Athar al-Urfi fi Taghayyuri al-Fatwa (Beirut: Dar Ibn Hazm, 2009), 93.
27 Muhammad Khalid Mas’ud and Brinkley Messick, “Muftis, Fatwas and Islamic Legal
Interpretation,” in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick and David S. Power (eds),
Islamic Legal Interpretations: Muftis and Their Fatwas (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1996), 3-5.
28 Mehdi Mozaffari, Fatwa, Violence and Discourtesy (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1998), 17.
29 Ilmi Zadeh Fuad Abd al-Baqiy, Fathu al-Rahman li Thalibi Ayati al- Qurʼān (Beirut: Darul
Fikri, 1995), 338.

the concepts of Islamic law (sharī’a) and Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh)

as they bear upon the understanding of legal opinion ( fatwā) and are
misunderstood by ordinary Muslims. Classical Muslim linguists such as
Imam al-Razi and Imam Ibn al-Mandzur are generally in agreement on the
essential meaning of Islamic law (sharī’a) and its derivatives which they
maintain refer to an oasis or spring.30 Other scholar such as Muhammad
Qasim al-Mansi of al-Azhar University, Cairo, asserts that in its most basic
understanding, sharī’a means “the straight path.” However, he also believes
that it has been used in the Qurʼān in various ways to mean way (tharīqa),
method (manhaj), guidance (hudā) and religion (dīn).31 This understanding
correlates with Karim Zaidan’s definition of Islamic law (sharī’a) as the
straight path to a spring, from which people could drink.32 The term fiqh,
on the other hand in the Qurʼān is often used to mean understanding
or deepening religious knowledge.33 As a technical term in Islamic legal
theory, however, Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) has undergone a more
specif ic meaning. Mustafa Ahmad al-Zarqa, quoting a jurist of Shaf i’i
school, defined the term “fiqh” as detailed law derived from the Islamic
law (sharī’a) relating to human actions.34 Concomitant with this definition,
Subhi Mahmasani maintains that Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) originated
from higher sources or principles of law termed as basis or reason (dalīl),
origin (aṣl), or source (maṣdar)35 which etymologically, all these terms refer
to one meaning: “source.” Ibrahim bin Ali al-Shirazi defines term “fiqh” as
“knowledge on sharī’a law which is derived through the method of legal
reasoning (ijtihād).” This term is often described as knowing the law of
sharī’a through legal reasoning method (ma’rifatu al-aḥkāmi al-shar’iyyati
allati tarīquha al-ijtihād).36
Based on these definitions, it can be surmised that Islamic law (sharī’a)
is the basic source of law, while Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) are scholars’
or jurists’ interpretations of them. Another version also mentions that
sharī’a is only one, while fiqh are many; sharī’a is immutable, while fiqh is
30 See Imam al-Razi, Mukhtar al-Shihah (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 2004); and Imam Ibn
Mandzur, QamusLisan al-Arab (Cairo: Dar al-Ma’arif, n.d)
31 Muhammad Qasim al-Mansi, Taghayyaru al-Dhuruf wa Atharuhu fi Ikhtilafi al-Ahkam fi
al-Shari’ah al-Islamiyah (Cairo: Dar al-Salam, 2010), 46.
32 Abd al-Karim Zaidan, al-Madkhal li Dirasah al-Shari’ah al-Islamiyah (Beirut: Muassasah
al-Risalah, 1969), 34.
33 See the Qurʼān Chapter an-Nisa verse 78; Chapter al-Tawbah verse 122.
34 Mustafa Ahmad al-Zarqa’, al-Madkhal al-Fiqh al-‘Am (Damascus: al-Adib, 1967), 42.
35 SubhiMahmashani, Falsafah al-Tashri al-Islami (Beirut: Dar al-Ilmi li al-Malayyin, n.d), 22.
36 Ibrahim bin Ali al-Shirazi, Al-Luma’fiUshūl al-Fiqh (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah, 2009), 6.

changeable.37 Since it is the source and principle, sharī’a has been described
as “perfect, fit for all men for all times in all places.” Furthermore, sharī’a
has a universal characteristic as it is not confined to specific societies
and cultures. Its universal trait “recognizes all differences between the
sacred and the secular. It sets forth and regulates man’s relation and obliga-
tion to God as well as his relations with his fellow man.”38Hence, the late
Muhammad Daud Ali, once a professor of Islamic law at the University of
Indonesia, pointed out that Islamic law (sharī’a) is the basic legal norm
stipulated by God which has to be particularized into specific laws in order
it to be operational. In this respect, Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) plays its
part by detailing all those universal principles into substantive or positive
laws.39Another leading Indonesian legal scholar, the late Professor Ibrahim
Hosen, who has long-served as the head of legal opinion (fatwā) commission
for the Indonesian Council of Ulama’ (MUI), described fiqh as the Islamic
law according to legal scholars or mujtahid’s sharī’a. 40 Hosen distinguished
sharī’a and fiqh by detailing the latter’s features. In his view, Islamic ju-
risprudence ( fiqh) is relative, diverse, elastic and dynamic, non-binding,
beneficial, and legitimized by government.41 Similary, Rifyal Ka’bah defines
fiqh as “consisting of the legal scholars ( fuqahā), law (e.g. ḥukm) from the
result of their own juristic reasoning (ijtihād) based on the Qurʼān and
Sunna, either where there is no explicit text on the subject or where there
is a difference of opinion in understanding or interpreting the explicit
text.”42 Such views of Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) do not depart from the
opinions of classical Muslim jurists who distinguished Islamic law (sharī’a)
from Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) as knowledge on sharī’a law derived
from its detailed sources (“Al-ʽilmu bi al-aḥkāmi al-shar’iyyati al-ʽamaliyya
al-muktasab min adillatiha al-tafsīlliya).”43 Hence, unlike the sharī’a, fiqh is
37 Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), 14-15.
38 Phillip K. Hitti, Islam: A Way of Life (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), 42.
39 See Mohammad Daud Ali, Hukum Islam: PengantarIlmuHukumdan Tata Hukum Islam di
Indonesia (Jakarta: PT. RajaGrafindo, 1990), 46-47.
40 Ibrahim Hosen, Fiqh Perbandingan Masalah Pernikahan, Jilid I (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus,
2003), especially chapter I.
41 Ibrahim Hosen, Fiqh Perbandingan, 7-15.
42 Rifyal Ka’bah, “Islamic Law in Courts Decisions and Fatwa Institutions in Indonesia,” in
Feener and Mark E. Cammack (ed), Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions
(Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2007), 83.
43 Busthanul Arifin, “Foreword” in Rifyal Ka’bah, Hukum Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: YARSI,
1999), xiv.

dynamic and subject to change. Therefore, according to one scholar, fiqh “is
a discipline that develops in accordance with time and space.”44
Based on the general view on fiqh and sharī’a, the relationship between
these two concepts with legal opinion ( fatwā) can be understood. It is clear
that Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) has similar meaning with legal opinion
(fatwā), as fiqh is the result of legal reasoning (ijtihād) of legal expert (mujta-
hid) based on the Qurʼān and Sunna as the main Islamic law (sharī’a) sources,
in agreement with the changes of time and space, just as is the case with
legal opinion ( fatwā). Like fatwā, fiqh cannot be regarded as an immutable
sacred heritage, and it can be changed to meet contemporary needs. In many
cases, Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) as codified opinions of Imams of certain
schools of law consists of legal opinion ( fatwā). It can be suggested that
the relationship between sharī’a, fiqh and fatwā is a connection between
the unchangeable (al-thābit) and the changeable (al-mutaghayyar), 45 or
between the principles or root (uṣūl) and branches ( furū’). While sharī’a is
often defined as universal, all-embracing, absolute and fundamental, fiqh
and fatwā are specific, instrumental, relative and divisive.
While it is clear that Islamic law (sharī’a) differs from Islamic jurispru-
dence ( fiqh) and legal opinion ( fatwā); fiqh, fatwā, and legal reasoning
(ijtihad) cannot be clearly distinguished, and they are usually used inter-
changeably. 46 This discussion also relates to the fact that all these words
refer to the employment of reason or the dialectical relationship of text,
reason, and reality in deducing new interpretations, understanding and
legal formulation of Islam. As has been discussed earlier, in its original
meaning, the term “fiqh” etymologically simply means understanding and
did not specifically refer to any specific discipline of Islamic jurisprudence
as it is currently understood to mean. Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) as a
knowledge discipline in Islamic law developed in the second century of
Islamic calendar during the reign of Abbasid Caliph al-Ma’mun. 47 It then
44 Arifin, ibid.
45 Muhammad Qāsim al-Mansi, Taghayyuru al-Dhurūf wa Atharuhu fi Ikhtilāfi al-Ahkām fī
al-Sharī’ah al-Islāmiyah (Cairo: Dar al-Salam, 2010), 50.
46 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Shari’ah Law: An Introduction (Oxford: Oneworld Publication,
2008), 162.
47 Ahmad Hasan, The Early Development of Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamabad: Islamic Research
Institute, 1970), 3-4. However, debates circulated among scholars, whether, in the second century
of the Islamic calendar, there had been the methodology of Islamic law formulated or not.
Some scholars argued that before the codification of ushul al-fiqh by Imam al-Shafi’i, who is
believed as the founder of Islamic legal methodology; there had no methodology of Islamic law.
However, others maintain that methodology is there, although it is not explicitly mentioned as a
methodology. For further discussion, see Ahmad Baltaji, Manahij al-Tasyri’ al-Islami fi al-Qarni

became a technical terminology in Islamic law that refers to the codifica-

tion of the variety of legal schools within Islam, which established their
teachings and principles on vast subjects using legal reasoning (ijtihād) as
the primary instrument. 48
It can be said that Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) which includes legal
opoinions ( fatwā) results from the interpretations of the fundamental
source of Islamic law (sharī’a) through the employment of a method called
ijtihād. Therefore, it can be said that ijtihād is a mechanism, procedure, and
process, while Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) and legal oponion ( fatwā) are
the outcomes. People who performed legal reasoning (ijtihād) are called
mujtahid, and those who are experts in the field of fiqh are called faqīh (pl.
fuqahā). Fatwā, like fiqh, can be said as a modus of legal reasoning (ijtihād)
or the result of legal reasoning, but fiqh consists of collections of fatwā.
Al-Shihab Ibn Qasim al-‘Ibadi, al-Mahalli, and Ibn Hamam, as quoted by
Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi, maintained that legal opinion-giver (mufti) and
legal scholars (mujtahid) are one or identical. 49
The concept of legal opinion ( fatwā) should also be distinguished from
the judge-based ruling (qaḍa) to clarify its meaning and essential traits
further. It is understood that while judge-based ruling (qaḍa) is made by
the judge (qaḍi), legal opinion ( fatwā) is created by a jurist-consult (mufti).50
Although some scholars maintain that legal opinions ( fatwā) can be issued
by a judge (qaḍi), the types of legal opinion or ruling (fatwā) are confined to
ritual-related issues.51 Another important difference is that while the judge
(qaḍi) in Muslim history are usually officially appointed by governments
in dispensing justice, most jurist-consults (muftis) who pronounce legal
opinion ( fatwā) “operated privately and unobtrusively without any ties
to political authorities.”52 Therefore, the links with the government have
al-Thani al-Hijri: Dirasah Ushuliyya Muqaranah li Mashadir al-Ahkamiinda al-Aimma (Cairo:

Dar el-Salam, 2007).
48 A good introduction to understanding the teachings and Islamic legal theories developed
by four main Sunni mazhab has been written by a noted al-Azhar scholar, Shaikh Ali Gumah.
See Ali Gumah Muhammad, Al-Madkhal ila Dirasah al-Madzahib al-Fiqhiyyah (Cairo: Dar
al-Salam, 2009), 3rd Edition.
49 Muhammad Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimi, al-Fatwā fi al-Islam (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah,
1986), 54-55.
50 Mooneer Goolam Fareed, “Mufti,” in Encyclopedia of Islam and the Modern Muslim World
edited by Richard C Martin (New York: McMillan Reference, USA, 2004), 478.
51 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimi, al-Fatwā, 63.
52 Khalid Mas’ud, “Muftis, Fatwa and Islamic Legal Interpretation,” in Islamic Legal
Interpretation, 3

always been highlighted as the main demarcating line between jurist-

consults (mufti) and judges (qaḍi).53
Apart from differences in the authority that promulgates fatwā, the
most striking distinction is that while verdict (qaḍa) is final and subject
to appeal, ”fatwā is but one of many juridical opinions that are essentially
non-binding.” Peterson, for instance, explains that fatwā is legal advice,
while qaḍa is a judicial verdict. Fatwā is informative and optional, whereas
verdict (qaḍa) is enforceable. When it is issued, one has no choice but to
follow it. A fatwā differs from court judgment or qaḍa, not only in its wider
potential scope, but also because the qaḍa is binding and enforceable,
performative, while the fatwā is not. This view is also reflected in the
opinions of Ka’bah who explains that in Indonesia, Islamic courts’ verdicts
“have the force of law and can be enforced by the state,” while fatwā, on
the other hand, is considered as the binding law only from the religious
point of view.54 As it is a non-binding legal opinion, there is no obligation
to the people who asked for the fatwā to follow it. However, in many
cases, a judge can take the fatwā as the basis of his judgment in court. In
the same vein, McDonald asserts, “fatwā is a formal opinion given by a
mufti or canon lawyer of standing, in answer to questions submitted to
him either by a judge or by a private individual. By such opinion, a judge
may decide a case or a person may regulate his personal life.”55 Aharon
Layish’s position is similar. In his view, muftis’ legal opinions are “not
binding on either the person who commissioned it or on the sharī’a courts;
its acceptance is purely voluntary.”56 A similar understanding of fatwā
is also reflected in Stephen Humphreys’ analysis of sharī’a in Islamic
legal history. In his words, “… sharī’a was not defined in the form of royal
decrees and courts judgments, but through treaties and non-binding
opinion by jurist-consult ( fatwā). Moreover, much of its subject matters
are hypothetical …” Peterson’s description of fatwā confirms this. In his
words:
53 Mooner Goolam Fareed, “Mufti” in Encyclopedia of Islam …, 478.

54 Ka’bah, “Islamic Law in Courts Decisions and Fatwa Institutions in Indonesia,” in Feener
and Mark E. Cammack (ed), Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions
(Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 2007).
55 D.B. Macdonald, “Fatwa” in First Encyclopedia of Islam edited by M. Th. Houtsma, et.al,
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987), 92.
56 Aharon Layish, “Fatwa as an Instrument of Accommodation,” in M Khalid Mas’ud, Brinkley
Messick and David S Powers (eds), Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas (Cam-
bridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1996), 275.

Fatwā can range from single-word response (e.g. “yes”, “no”, or “permit-
ted”) to book-length treatises. Although it typically focuses on legal mat-
ters, fatwā also treats more general religious issues, including theology,
philosophy, creeds, and ibadat. Traditionally, despite numerous excep-
tions, the issuer of fatwā termed mufti has functioned independently of
a judicial system, indeed often privately.57
In modern times, legal opinion ( fatwā) has been experiencing significant

shifts. It is no longer a matter for the private and individual jurist-consult
(mufti) but has been part of the state’s legal affairs. This change has also cre-
ated complications. In a religious sense, legal opinion ( fatwā) is voluntary,
non-binding, yet in some Muslim countries, and it is obligatory to follow
the legal opinion ( fatwā). In the Malaysian case, as Hashim Kamali shows
that legal opinion (fatwā) does not need parliamentary approval when it has
been approved by Religious Council and the Sultan. Once it is gazetted after
those approvals, it becomes law.58 The Malaysian case is entirely different
from that of Indonesia.
The origin of legal opinion ( fatwā) in Muslim history is not an unconten-
tious one. Some scholars are of the view that the practice of fatwā-making
began during the lifetime of the Prophet Mohammad, Ka’bah who holds
this view, for instance, maintains that:
During the life of the Prophet Muhammad, people frequently inquired

about legal matters directly to him. There are many verses in the Qurʼān
that begin with “They ask you [Muhammad] regarding …” followed by a
reply introduced with the words “[Muhammad] Say that …” or “Know that
…” Muhammad himself would often preface his speech with the phrase:
“Do you know?” This question was usually answered with the expres-
sion: “God and His Messenger know best!” Only then would the prophet
mention the matter that he wanted to clarify. This nature indicates that
many questions posed by the public and the answer given to these issues
are preserved in the Qurʼān and Sunna. Some of these matters were about
legal issues, broadly def ined. As such, the Qurʼān and Sunna are the
primary sources and models for the formulation of fatwā.”59
57 Daniel C Peterson, “Fatwa” in Encyclopedia of Islam and the Modern Muslim World edited
by Richard C Martin (New York: McMillan Reference, USA, 2004), 255.
58 Hashim Kamali, Shari’ah Law, 174-175.
59 Rifyal Ka’bah, “Islamic Law in Courts Decisions and Fatwa Institutions in Indonesia,” p. 88.

Such a view finds precedent in the opinions of classical Muslim scholar Ibn
Qayyim al-Jauzi who in his Iʽlām al-Muwāqi’īn maintained that the institu-
tion of fatwā was introduced by the Prophet Muhamad himself when Islam
expanded its sovereignty over other territories. The Prophet was required
to answer questions directed to him and to settle legal disputes.60 Hence,
fatwā were issued based on injunctions revealed by God, or sometimes, by
the Prophet’s personal opinion guided and inspired by God.61 The convic-
tion that fatwā-making existed during the era of Prophet Muhammad has
also been justified on the basis of hadīth literature.62 This view has been
disputed by scholars such as al-Ghazali who opined that fatwā-making
was non-existent during the Prophet’s time as legal opinion ( fatwā) was
not needed then.63 Others maintained that fatwā-making persisted during
the period following the four caliphs and their followers (tābi’īn) based on
hadīth narrated by Abu Hurairah.64 This period coincided with the expan-
sion of Muslim territory which eventually witnessed the rise of different
legal opinions and later legal schools.65
What is agreed upon is that legal opinion ( fatwā) continues to play a
relevant role in contemporary Muslim societies. Ahmad Hidayat Buang of
the National University of Malaysia, for example, views fatwā as an essential
element of Islamic jurisprudence in the current context; for it provides
guidance and explanations about Islamic law that is related to life, deed,
belief and even the future and survival of the umma.66 Parallel to Buang’s
view, Hasan Hamzah’s definition of fatwā also underlines the engagement
with the newness of problems as one of the most important features of legal
opinion ( fatwā). He asserts that legal opinion ( fatwā) is a legal opinion on
religious issues (that have never been resolved before) based on the Qurʼān,
60 Muhammad Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimi, al-Fatwāfi al-Islam (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah,
1986), 31.
61 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimi, ibid.See also Nawir Yuslem Nurbain, Ibn Qayyim’s Reformulation
of Fatwa, M.A. Thesis (Montreal, McGill University, 1995), 14.
62 Saiyad Nizamuddin, Fatwas of Condemnation: Islam and the Limit of Dissent (Kuala Lumpur:
ISTAC-IIUM, 2006), 53.
63 Mozaffari, Fatwa… p. 18
64 The question of whether companions performed ijtihad which employed reason is one of
the important issues in Islamic legal history. For detail account on this topic, please refer to
Abdurrahman ibn Mu’ammar al-Sanusi, al-Ijtihad bi al-Ra’yi fi ‘Ashr al-Khilafah al-Rashidah:
Dirasah Tahliliya fi Ushul al-Siyasah al-Tasyri’ wa Maqasiduhu wa Tarikhuhu (Kuwait: al-Wa’ie
al-Islami, 2011). See also Jamaluddin al-Qasimi, Al-Fatwa fi al-Islam, 35.
65 Ibid, 36-38.
66 Ahmad Hidayat Buang, “PenulisandanKajian Fatwa” in Ahmad HidayatBuang (ed), Fatwa
di Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: JabatanSyariahdanUndang-Undang, API UKM, 2004), 1-3.

Sunna and other Islamic legal sources including legal reasoning (ijtihād)
by a fatwā-giver (mufti).”67
It is evident from both definitions above that legal opinion ( fatwā)
relates to new developments in society and its complex problems. Ahmad
Ibrahim as quoted by Hasnan Kasan also views legal opinion ( fatwā) as an
instrument to solve current problems. As Muslim society expanded, new
challenges emerge and require directions in agreement with the changes
occurring within specific space and time that require rulings to deal with
the needs and condition of the time. “These contemporary needs can be
handled by legal opinions ( fatwā) issued from time to time as the result of
a rigorous assessment of the legal scholars (mujtahid) and his colleagues.”68
Another aspect of legal opinion (fatwā) that has received much attention
is the authority and qualities of the mufti who is responsible for making legal
opinion ( fatwā). As a jurist-consult (mufti) exercises independent reason-
ing in creating legal opinions based on sources of law, the term mufti and
mujtahid are often equated and used synonymously. Given the significance
of his role, the requirements of being a mufti are basically similar to that
of a Mujtahid. Muslim legal philosophers have established some require-
ments for a mufti including the ability to perform legal reasoning (ijtihād),
able to implement the principles of justice, avoid the giving dispensation
(tarkhīṣ) and making things too easy (tasāhul).69 The strong intellectual and
ethical qualities demanded of a jurist-consult (mufti) are also reflected in
al-Shātibi’s comparison between the positions of jurist-consult (mufti) and
the Prophet’s based on three sources (al-mufti qāimun fi al-ummati maqāma
al-nabi). The first is famous hadith which asserts that the ulama’ are deemed
inheritors of the Prophet. Secondly, the clerics (ulama’) are said to be the
vicar of the Prophet in delivering laws (al-aḥkām) for Muslims. Finally, the
jurist-consult (mufti) is the law-giver (shāri’) based on the fact that what
they deliver is from the Islamic law (sharī’a) whether transmitted orally
from sharī’a authorities (manqūl ‘an shāhibihā) or derived from that orally
67 Hasan Hamzah, “Fatwa,” in Ensiklopedi Islam Jilid III, 259.

68 Hasnan Kasan, Institusi Fatwa di Malaysia (Bangi: PenerbitUniversitiKebangsaan Malaysia:
2008), 42.
69 Jamāl al-Dīn al-Qāsimi, al-Fatwā, 64. Those five requirements are: a) knowledgeable in the
legal arguments (adillati al-ahkām) from the Qurʼān, Sunna, ijma’ (consensus), qiyas (analogy)
and any other related field; b) knowledgeable in the science required for understanding argument
and modes of legal argument as well as method to derive laws from those source and argument;
c) having thorough knowledge of sciences related to the Qurʼān, hadith, nasihwamansuh (theory
of abrogation), Arabic language (grammar and syntax); d) exceptional ability to use all those
methods; and e) knowledgeable in Islamic jurisprudence. For a comparison, see also Ibrahim
bin Ali al-Shirazi, Al-Luma’fiUshul al-Fiqh (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyah, 2009), 127-128.

transmitted source (mustanbitun min al-manqūl). The jurist-consult (mufti),

therefore, serves not only as the messenger or deliverer of law but can also
play the role as the creator of legislation (inshā’u al-aḥkām).70
Legal opinion ( fatwā) may also be transnational in nature in the sense
that it does not emerge from the context in which it is applied. Nico J Kaptein
in his study on fatwā in the Indonesian context highlights the salient traits
of this category of fatwā in his typology of what he calls traditionalist legal
opinion (fatwā). Such legal opinion ( fatwā) emerged from Mecca in response
to problems and issues raised by Indonesians in Indonesia. In Kaptein’s view,
the importance of Mecca for the legal opinion ( fatwā) seekers was not
only due to its position as the heart of the Muslim world but also relate to
the fact that during the nineteenth century, Mecca served as the primary
training center for Indonesian Muslim scholars. This type of legal opinion
( fatwā) is also distinguished from other categories of legal opinion ( fatwā)
in that Arabic is used as the language of the fatwā accompanied by Malay
interpretations written in the Jawi script. This category of legal opinion
( fatwā) also differs in the legal methodology employed, one that adheres
more strictly to transmission of particular traditions from pious savants of
the past or taqlīd.71 Kaptein distinguishes this type of legal opinion ( fatwā)
from “modernist fatwā” which emerged locally and appeals to independent
reasoning by direct reference to the Qurʼān and Sunna or legal reasoning
(ijtihad).72 At the beginning of the twentieth century, fatwā began to be
issued by collective bodies. In the case of Indonesia, three major organiza-
tions took upon this role are Indonesian Council of Muslim Clerics (Majelis
Ulama’ Indonesia, MUI), Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’. While
these organizations also provide spiritual advice and directions that include
concepts such as advice (tausyiah), the statement of position (pernyataan
sikap), suggestion (himbauan), and the like, these essentially differ from
legal opinion ( fatwā).73
The above discussion highlights the complexities of legal opinion ( fatwā)
in Islamic legal theory. Regardless of the variety of definitions of legal
opinion ( fatwā) presented by experts and scholars, several main features
of legal opinion ( fatwā) can be summed up as follows: Firstly, legal opinion
( fatwā) deals with contemporary problems; and as part of legal reasoning
70 Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat fi Ushul al-Shari’ah Vol. 4 (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-
Ilmiyah, 2005, 7 th edition), 178-179.
71 Nico J. G. Kaptein, The Voice of the ‘Ulama’, 3-4.

(ijtihād), it is an endeavor to respond to the novelty of human conditions.

Secondly, it is the case that legal opinion ( fatwā) are essentially responses
to concrete problems and issues and are not merely hypothetical projec-
tions or speculative endeavors in Muslim legal history. Lastly, legal opinion
( fatwā) is non-binding. Unlike the debate on whether legal opinion ( fatwā)
is based on facts or is hypothetical, almost all scholars are in agreement
in maintaining that legal opinion ( fatwā) are non-binding legal opinions.
Fatwā and the Indonesian Legal System
To comprehensively comprehend the dynamics and impact of legal opinion

( fatwā) in Indonesia generally, it is important to understand the Indone-
sian legal system and the position of Islamic law within it. Anderson uses
three typologies to characterize the position of Islamic law or sharī’a in
Muslim countries. The first are those that follow and implement Islamic
law (sharī’a) as their domestic legislation, the second are secular states
which exclude Islamic law (sharī’a) from their constitution, and the third
are those that attempt to accommodate both secular and sharī’a law. In the
same vein, another typology classifies Muslim countries into four types.
The first category states that proclaim themselves as “Islamic” such as Saudi
Arabia, Brunei Darussalam, Oman, Maldives, and Pakistan. Second, those
that proclaim Islam as the “state religion” but not an Islamic state such as
Malaysia; Thirdly, secular states that have completely adopted secular law
instead of the Islamic law (sharī’a) such as Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Senegal.
Lastly, positioned between these are countries struggling to negotiate
between Islamic law (sharī’a) and secular law.74 Indonesia is a magnificent
example of the last type in both these classifications since Islamic law
exists and constitutes an important underlying element within its national
legal system. At the same time, secular law is also a major component of
the legal system based on the legacy of Dutch colonialism.75 Therefore, in
this respect, Indonesian law is deemed ambiguous in nature. Regarding its
orientation, the Indonesia legal system is best described as neither secular
nor religious. Despite the fact that 80 percent of its population is Muslims,
74 United States Commission on Religious Freedom “The State-Religion Relationship and the
Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitution of
Predominantly Muslim Countries” (March 2005).
75 For further discussion on this category, please refer to J.N.D Anderson, Islamic Law in the
Modern World (New York: New York University Press, 1959), 81.

Indonesian national law is multicultural in the sense that it is formed by at

least three types of law: customary (adat), Islamic and Dutch law.
Historically speaking, Islamic law is as old as law of tradition (hukum
adat) law within the context of Indonesian society, although law of tradition
(hukum adat) is in a sense older than Islamic law since it existed in society
before the coming of Islam to Indo-Malay archipelago widely known as
Nusantara. The existence of Islamic law in the early period of Indonesian
history, however, can be traced to the Islamic kingdoms in Nusantara,
such as Samudera Pasai, Demak, Mataram, and Gowa, although how the
judicial system in these kingdoms took form remains unclear.76 In the
modern day, the formalization of Islamic law in Indonesia is manifested in
the existence of Religious Court (Pengadilan Agama) at almost all levels of
Indonesian governmental structure. In a wider context, Islamic religious
court is one of four branches in the Indonesian judicature which includes
General Court (Pengadilan Umum), Military Court (Pengadilan Militer),
and Administrative Court (Pengadilan Tata Usaha Negara). The religious
court is responsible for administering and deciding legal disputes among
Muslims mainly related to family law such as marriage, divorce, inherit-
ance and endowment based on Islamic law which has assimilated in some
respects. Historically, the administration of Islamic law within the context
of state law dated back to Dutch colonial period which can be seen as an
Islamized version of traditional courts practiced by Indonesians even before
the coming of the Dutch.77
The administration of Islamic law as part of national judicature contin-
ued in the post-independence period. However, it was only during Suharto’s
reign that religious courts become formally established, when the Islamic
Judicature Act was passed in 1989.This event marked the accommodation of
Islamic law by the state which Muslims have struggled for a very long time.
76 Therefore, long before the coming of Dutch to the archipelago, Islamic law has been regarded
as an established law practiced by the people. When Dutch colonized the country, at the same
time, they also introduced European law for Europeans residing in Indonesia. However, the law
was then also applied to Asians, including Indonesians and Chinese. This situation was seen as
the period of marginalization of Islamic law. Ichtijanto SA analyses the application of Islamic
law within the context of Indonesian legal history through six theories. Those are the theory
of Islamic law obedience, the theory of authority reception, the theory of receptie in complexu,
the theory of recepetie, the theory of receptie exit, and the theory of receptie a contrario. See,
Ichtijanto S.A., “Pengembangan Teori Berlakunya Hukum Islam di Indonesia,” in Eddi Rudiana
Arief(ed), Hukum Islam di Indonesia: Pengembangan dan Pembentukan (Bandung: PT Remaja
Rosdakarya, 1991).
77 For further discussion, please refer to Tim Lindsey, Islam, Law and the State in Southeast
Asia: Volume I: Indonesia (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), especially Chapter 8.

The next step is the enactment of the Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi
Hukum Islam) in 1991 in which various Islamic legal opinions written by
classical Muslim scholars (ulama’) were codified which later formed the
basis of an Indonesian version of Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh). The idea of
making an Indonesian school of law (madhhab) itself emerged as early as the
1950s. Administratively, since the independence period religious court was
under the auspice of Ministry of Religious Affairs. However, following the
policy of “One Roof System” (Sistem Satu Atap) within Indonesian judiciary
system, in 2004, the government issued a law which required the transfer
of ecclesiastical court from the auspice of Ministry of Religious Affairs to
the Supreme Court.78
Regardless of the variety of typologies characterizing the place of Islam
within the state including Indonesia, legal opinion ( fatwā) continues to
form a significant element in the legal and religious domain of these socie-
ties. Even in clearly defined secular states like Turkey, where the role of
secular law is expanding and overarching, legal opinion ( fatwā) continues
to influence society. Following the introduction of the Western legal code to
Turkey as an integral aspect of the process of secularization, the clear-cut
dichotomy between Islamic law (sharī’a) and secular law became evident.
The dichotomy has led to the marginalization of Islamic law, on the one
hand, and the mainstreaming of secular legal code, on the other. While the
secular law expanded, Islamic law (sharī’a) became confined to private and
family matters only. Despite this, the influence of Islamic law through fatwā
continues to pervade everyday religious life beyond the limited domain of
the operation of Islamic law.79
The significance of legal opinion ( fatwā) as a powerful legal tool bear-
ing on lives of Muslims regardless of the nature of state constitutions is
also reflected in Ceiro’s discussion on dominant approach to the study of
Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā).80 This function of fatwā certainly applies
to the context of Indonesia. It is evident that in Indonesia, legal opinion
( fatwā) has been playing the role as a legal tool effectively even though it is
not law. In fact, certain Muslim groups in Indonesia even perceive Islamic
legal opinion ( fatwā) as more efficacious than state’s law or regulations.
The rapid growth of sharī’a-based economic activities in Indonesia which
78 See Euis Nurlaelawati, Modernization, Tradition and Identity: The Kompilasi Hukum Islam
and the Legal Practice in the Indonesian Religious Courts (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press, 2010).
79 See M. Atho’ Mudzhar, Fatwa’s of the Council of Indonesian Ulama’: p. 4.
80 Alexandre Caeiro, “The Shifting Moral Universe of the Islamic Tradition of Ifta’: A Diachronic

find their jurisdiction in legal opinions in the last decade provides a classic
instance of its profound influence on society. Long before the Undang-
Undang (Laws) on sharī’a economic activities were legalized, Indonesian
Muslims have observed and practiced what are deemed as Islamic law
(sharī’a) compliant business and its similar institutions on the basis of
MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā).
A legal opinion ( fatwā) is neither positive law nor legal verdicts (qaḍa)
that have a legal consequence for Indonesian citizens. Within the Indone-
sian hierarchy of law, it does not feature as a source of law with a legal basis.
The fact that it is extra-legal yet profoundly influences how Indonesian
Muslims think, evaluate, and conduct themselves and their relations with
others are interesting yet potentially dangerous. Being outside the scope
and restraints imposed on law-making agencies and given the wide-ranging
issues it deals with, Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) has strong potentials to
operate in isolation from and may even contradict or undermine state laws
and regulations. Aware of this fact, scholars in Islamic legal theory have
formulated some principles that should be met in the implementation of
Islamic lehal opinion ( fatwā) in a country where Islamic law is not positive
law. In this respect, Mozaffar Hossain maintains that legal opinion ( fatwā)
cannot violate a country’s national legal system. Furthermore, the use of
Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) to pronounce on matters with legal conse-
quences that undermine or contradict the laws of the modern nation-states
based on democracy as their political system is inappropriate. If these
principles are applied, fatwā-related controversies that have emerged in
Indonesian society may be resolved, provided the understanding of legal
opinion ( fatwā) among people is accurate.81 This means that while those
who seek legal opinion ( fatwā) for directions for their needs should not be
prohibited, they should not be bound by the legal opinion (fatwā). Similarly,
religious institutions that issue legal opinion ( fatwā) should not presume
legal consequences for their legal opinion ( fatwā) and those who choose
not to follow them should not be forced to do so. The only consequence is
moral one.
It is pertinent to understand why is it that legal opinion ( fatwā) plays a
powerful form of legal rulings despite its status within Muslim history and
Indonesian Islamic law. It can be asserted that the substantial influence of
fatwā in Indonesian society may be conditioned by several factors. Firstly,
legal opinion ( fatwā) as discussed above, are constantly referred to attempts
at resolving religious-legal dilemma and problems confronting Muslims.
81 Mozaffar Hossain, “The Story of Fatwa,” Interventions, 4, 2 (July 2002), p. 237-242.

More precisely, it is the primary legal reference for all kinds of the problem
not explicitly stated in the Qurʼān and Sunna or does not belong to fixed
legal categories, since those problems emerge as the consequence of the
advancement of contemporary social life. Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā)
is the major tool that provides religious rulings and opinions on a broad
range of issues encountered by Muslims in the midst of social change as
they struggle to respond to real newly-emerging problems.
Secondly, the influence of legal opinion ( fatwā) is reinforced by massive
socio-economic change and challenges of development within Indonesian
society that has occurred in the last few decades. Given its crucial role, it
is possible that during a considerably long time, Indonesian Muslims are
getting accustomed not only to the manufacturing of Islamic legal opinion
( fatwā) but the perception that it is a set of formalized law that has to be
obeyed. The phenomenon is perhaps exacerbated by the lack of sufficient
understanding of the real nature of Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) itself.
Indeed, there is a strong tendency among Muslims in Indonesia to regard
fatwā as formal and binding state law (undang-undang). This situation
is the result of the lack of understanding of the nature of legal opinion
( fatwā) within Islamic legal system and history, as well as the position of
legal opinion ( fatwā) in the context of Indonesia’s national legal system.
Thirdly, the problem is aggravated since legal opinions ( fatwā) are
pronounced collectively by dominant agencies with a large mass follow-
ing. The firm tendency of members of organizations to abide by the legal
opinion ( fatwā) of the leaders of their organizations or movements is not
unexpected, which in turn elevates the influence of legal opinion ( fatwā).
The problem is reinforced when the clerics (ulama’) themselves expect the
fatwa they issue to be taken seriously by the people (umma).
A relevant example illustrates the point. It was reported that in the
midst of MUI’s National Annual General Meeting (Musyawarah Nasional)
in Jakarta, Ma’ruf Amin, currently MUI’s general chairmen, strongly
lashed at the tendency among Indonesian Muslims to neglect MUI’s legal
opinion ( fatwā). In particular, he highlighted what he saw as a major issue
accounting for non-obedience of legal opinion ( fatwā). In his mind, it is the
absence of punishment which constitutes the major drawback for why legal
opinion ( fatwā) is not followed by Indonesian Muslims.82 Such a statement
is misleading since legal opinion ( fatwā) is essentially not meant to be
binding, what more subjected to punishment for failure to obey it. At the
same time, Ma’ruf inconsistently acknowledges that Islamic legal opinion
82 http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2010/07/100726_fatwamui.shtml.

( fatwā) is not law but more a moral rule, guidance or advice. His demands
in aggrandizing the status of Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) as law with
punitive ramifications despite his acknowledgement is clearly illustrated in
his following assertions: “Usually fatwā is issued upon request or in response
to questions. We do not intervene in the implementation of fatwā. We only
suggest that based on Islamic law a certain matter is forbidden (ḥarām) or
permitted (ḥalāl). It is up to the government what will be done next.” The
question is: If Ma’ruf acknowledges that Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) is not
binding law, why does he blame Muslims for not obeying it?
It can be argued that MUI’s inconsistency reveal the clerics (ulama’s),
especially MUI’s, fear of losing its authority, on the one hand, in the context
of post-New Order period, and its failure to differentiate the absolute from
the relative, on the other. The ulama’s authority is derived from their exist-
ence and their thorough understanding of religion. However, one cannot
exclude the influence of politics on the dominance of clerics (ulama’) in
society. It is pertinent to point out that in the New Order period, MUI had
been granted authority by the state to issue Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā)
that supported governments’ policies. As a result, when the authority gran-
tor collapsed, MUI as the grantee was beset with uncertainty and anxiety.
This post-Suharto crisis for MUI is well captured by Jajat Burhanuddin,
who argued that the tendency of Indonesian Muslims to neglect MUI’s
legal opinion ( fatwā) cannot be dissociated from historical facts. MUI was,
after all, created by the New Order regime to support government policies.
Given its conservative stamp, Muslims especially after the collapse of the
regime, are wary of MUI and prefer to follow Islamic organizations such as
Nahdlatul Ulama’ and Muhammadiyah. Though it did attempt to reorient
itself after the collapse of the New Order, the rise of conservative elements
within it, especially in the field of fatwā-making, propelled it along as it
does not want to be left by the people.83
Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā), as clear from the previous section’s discus-
sion, is part of legal reasoning (ijtihad) and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) that
are developed within actual socio-historical contexts. Issues of relativity,
subjectivity, and locality are integral to fatwā-making. Enforcing Islamic
legal opinion (fatwā), however, would drastically change its very nature and
render what is relative, absolute or absolutize the relative. It is also parallel
to regard Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) as fixed Islamic law (sharī’a). One
writer aptly surmised the problem when he maintained that Islamic legal
opinion ( fatwā) is a human creation, it is an interpretation of a religious
83 http://www.bbc.co.uk/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2010/07/100726_fatwamui.shtml.

text and not religion itself. Consequently, enforcing Islamic legal opinion
( fatwā) indicates an attempt to assert monopoly of religious truth and to
certain extent, distance religious people from their religion and has led
Muslims to act based on their simplistic reasoning and conclusion that is
sometimes misleading.84
This reassertion of conservatism is also evident in the pressures exerted
by some clerics (ulama’) after the fall of Suharto’s regime to make the gov-
ernment enact the Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) as law, or at least, take the
legal opinion ( fatwā) as a serious basis for enacting the law. Yunahar Ilyas, a
member of MUI as well as a Muhammadiyah leader, has boldly declared this
demand since for him, MUI’s religious rulings should be taken as guidance
for all Muslims. Therefore, it is not sufficient if those religious rulings are
not formally enacted within the Indonesian legal system. In his words, “I
am optimistic that fatwā will be soon enacted as laws (undang-undang) …”85
The problem is aggravated when clerics (ulama’) tend to exploit the
laymen’s lack of understanding of legal opinion ( fatwā) as an opportunity to
strengthen their authority. Yunahar Ilyas reveals precisely this tendency. Ac-
cording to him, criticism of legal opinion ( fatwā) is something not unusual.
However, those who do not support legal opinion ( fatwā) are in his opinion,
unfaithful to the religion. Hence he asserted: “If our people do not know,
they will overlook (the legal opinions); but if they have faith in their hearts,
at least they should support the legal opinion ( fatwā).” His analogy for those
who do not obey legal opinion (fatwā) as people lost in the darkness who are
unlike those who will find light in following legal opinion ( fatwā) is telling:
“If they are good people, they will be happy knowing light illuminating
their life, instead of denying the light.” Furthermore, he pointed out that in
the history of Islam, legal opinion ( fatwā) is not something foreign to the
Muslims’ mind. The clerics (ulama’) have issued hundreds of legal opinion
( fatwā), and on that basis, he asserted, that what MUI has been doing so
far should not be regarded as a threat to the society. In his words: “Please
regard it as a lantern; guiding you to the right way from the darkness.” Ilyas
is optimistic that government will enact fatwa as undang-undang (laws)
and he also proposed for the enactment of some of the Islamic law (sharī’a).
Another factor is the shift in MUI’s attitude in the realm of Islamic law
in the post-Suharto era. Moch. Nur Ikhwan maintains that MUI, a creature
of the New Order government, has almost never been in confrontation with
the state during the New Order era, as its famous legal opinion ( fatwā)
84 Hasibullah Satrawi, “MUI danMasyarakat Non-Fatwa”, Media Indonesia, 02 August 2005.

85 www.hidayatullah.com/read/12751/30/07/2010 accessed on 11 October 2010.

and advice (tausiyah) which it issues, reveal. Although it is not a statutory

body that has legal authority, MUI has never faced problems of authority,
since the state has effectively backed it up. However, the new phase with
Suharto’s downfall has “signaled major changes and heralded the period
of “Reformasi” that opened up a space for the free articulation of public
opinion. It also gave MUI a chance to reflect on its role during the New
Order and to redefine its role for the future.”86 During the Habibie presidency,
MUI still showed its support for the state. This picture drastically changed
during Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency when MUI set forth new terms
of relations with the state. From this point on, it tended to reveal signs
of opposition to the state increasingly. This change is partly a reaction
to the government’s relative liberal stance under Abdurrahman Wahid’s
rule. The period witnessed the legalization of communism in Indonesia
and attempts at establishing bilateral commercial relations with Israel.
These developments may have hardened the conservatives’ outlook. They
denounced such changes not only on religious grounds but also due to their
shifting political influence in the context of political change
It should also be noted that Reform Era (Era Reformasi) has created an
open space for all Islamic groups to speak up. In the situation in which a
free market of ideas has emerged, some progressive and liberal groups or in-
dividuals have attempted to challenge the sole authority of Muslimc clerics
(ulama’). In this context, several groups and individuals who were already
critical of MUI as a result of its notorious Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā)
began to express contestations more openly against it. As a consequence,
MUI was not only facing a difficult situation regarding its relationship to
the state; there were also indications of its authority being challenged by
competing groups. It did not occur during the New Order period as it was not
common to criticize MUI then. However, since then, liberal and progressive
Muslim groups have lashed at MUI as the representative of the radical wing
of Indonesian Muslims.87 Furthermore, some Muslim groups are of the
view that MUI’s legal authority is dubious due to its attachment to the New
Order.88 At the same time, MUI has always been in motion to strengthen
its influence and authority although it sometimes colludes with the state.
86 Moch. Nur Ichwan, “Ulama’, State and Politics: Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia after Suharto,”
Islamic Law and Society, 12, 1 (2005), 45-72.
87 Such a criticism can be traced for example in Kala Fatwa JadiPenjara. See also my critical
note on MUI’s fatwā,“Relativitas Kesesatan Aliran Sesat,” Jawa Pos, 7 November 2007.
88 C. van Dijk, “Religious Authority, Politics and Fatwas in Contemporary Southeast Asia,”in
Michael Feener and Mark E. Cammack, Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and
Institutions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 44.

These assertions and demands for Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) to form
the basis of law or to assume the force of law are clearly incongruent with
the existing legal system in which Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) does not
have legal status. Furthermore, MUI though government-funded is not even
a statutory body anchored in law, but an independent non-governmental
institution.89 The fact that such demands continue to persist reveal marked
elements of utopian orientation common in religious revivalists groups and
their discourse whereby the agenda for the extension and implementation of
Islamic law (sharī’a) law has been a major focus. In the Indonesian context,
such demands have attempted to find justification by selective interpreta-
tions of the theory of “living law.” In effect, this theory has been used in the
context of colonialism by scholars urging for the recognition of customary
law (adat). Essentially, the theory recognizes and gives significance to law
that is based on historical and empirical experience of society and can be
said to be a part of their living culture.90 By extension, many believe that
Islamic law and Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) deserves the right to be part
of Indonesian legal system. The argument also goes that positive law will
be more efficient if it contains or is in accordance with law lived by society.
The development of the legal system cannot thus only be confined to the
law or judges’ verdict and ruling themselves, but has to be extended to the
society itself.91 A good positive law, they maintain has to take living law in
the society into account, since an existing law is an “inner order” of the
society that reflects living values within the society itself.92
While these arguments of the theory of living law are acceptable, it
cannot be said that the particular version of Islamic law (sharī’a) law and
by extension, demands the formalization of legal opinion ( fatwā) by their
advocates can be said to represent the actual living law of Indonesians. To
extend the theory is problematic since it is incongruent with existing legal
conditions and the evolution of the Indonesian legal system and society.
As far as Islamic law (sharī’a) formalization is concerned, the Compilation
of Islamic Law (Kompilasi Hukum Islam), popularly known as KHI, is one
of the most valuable solutions in accommodating both their proponents
and opponents. In a minimal way, the KHI is a form of Islamic law (sharī’a)
formalization in Indonesia. Moreover, KHI is also a manifestation of
89 Ichwan, “Ulama, State and Politics,” 49

90 Ahmad Azhar Basyir, “Corak Lokal dalam Hukum Positif Islam di Indonesia (Sebuah
Tinjauan Filosofis)” Mimbar Hukum 13: 4 (1994): 29.
91 Abdul Manan, Reformasi Hukum Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2006), 22.
92 Ibid.

Indonesian Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh). The KHI that recognizes classical

Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) and its adaptations within Indonesia, largely
confined to the domain of family law are evident of the implementation of
Islamic law within the Indonesian legal system.
While many Indonesians view these as proof that Indonesian legal system
has been very accommodative to Islamic law as part of the living law in the
country, the conservative elements think otherwise and call for a system of
Islamic law that is comprehensive. For them, nothing is more needed than
the implementation of Shari’a encompassing all aspects of life applied to
all citizens regardless of the religions they embrace. The high demand for
Islamization of laws can be seen as extending its feelers to the agenda for
the legalization of legal opinion ( fatwā). The wave of Islamic law (sharī’a)
formalization has created a situation whereby Muslims think that legal
opinion ( fatwā) is legal, when it is not.
Socio-historically, the call for an extension of Islamic law (sharī’a) includ-
ing legal opinion ( fatwā) as laws beyond the KHI emerged in the late 1970s.
However, during the last decade or so, Islamic law in Indonesia has been
witnessing significant shifts in dynamics as compared to earlier decades.
During the era of political oppression under Suharto’s New Order (Orde
Baru) characterized by political restriction, expressing Islam in public
space was viewed as a threat to the stability of the state. Moreover, in the
early days of his ascension to power, the relationship between Islam and
the state was characterized by hatred and suspicion. When Suharto was
forced to step down by the massive student demonstrations in 1998 and
many restrictions were lifted, a new phase of Indonesian politics emerged.
The new phase later known as Reform Era (Era Reformasi) brought extensive
changes in the realms of politics, economy, law and socio-religious life. One
of the results that can obviously be seen in greater religious expressions in
the public space, especially from Muslim groups in Indonesia. Accordingly,
Islamic organizations in Indonesia found spacious room to elaborate and
express their positions, principles and attitudes on significant issues affect-
ing Indonesian society. Social problems developed very rapidly in line with
the wave of radical changes that ardently pushed human beings into new
and unprecedented situations. Such problems as teleconference marriage
and transplantation are but a few of the numerous examples. Indonesian
Muslim groups’ responses toward such a significant transformation, as
represented by Islamic organizations, are considerably different. The variety
of their attitudes and responses are mostly motivated by the difference of
ideological stands and mode of thought in understanding Islamic basic
teachings and sources that widely differ from one to another. Among other

things, the new phase of Islamic law in the post-Suharto Era was featured
by three major developments.
The first is the rise of Islamic law (sharī’a) formalization movements in
some areas in Indonesia. Theoretically, this situation is not unexpected. As
William Liddle once maintained, generally scriptural Islamic movements
tend to raise when the authoritarian regime collapses, and greater space
for expressions of religiosity develops.93 In this framework, the growing
of scriptural Islamic movement in the post-Suharto Indonesia could be
perceived as a natural consequence of the downfall of the regime. In line
with the strengthening of those movements, some regions implemented
Islamic law as part of their legislation. It is inevitable that such development
could relate to the new political climate in the period of uncertainty.
The Province of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam is the f irst Indonesian
state that paved the way for the formalization of Islamic law (sharī’a).
Considering Aceh’s particular position within the context of Indonesian
history and national structure, Islamic law (sharī’a) formalization in the
province can be reasonably understood.94 However, this peculiar context
for the formalization of Islamic law (sharī’a) in Aceh is often overlooked
by religious conservatives. Instead, the case of Aceh is seen as a precedent
and embarking point for broader and more extensive outreach of Islamic
law (sharī’a) formalization in many provinces and regions. Soon after Aceh,
similar movements started to take place in Java, Sumatera and Sulawesi. In
West Java, for instance, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Garut and Banten Province
are known as the avant-garde of Islamic law (sharī’a) implementation. For
the purpose of Islamic law (sharī’a) formalization, the Regent of Garut in
West Java formed Institute of Study for the Preparation of Islamic Law
Implementation (Lembaga Pengkajian Persiapan Penerapan Syariat Islam)
to prepare for Islamic law (sharī’a) formalization. In South Sulawesi, four out
of twenty-four regencies boldly implemented Islamic law (sharī’a) in their
respective regions. These include Bulukumba, Enrekang, Gowa, Takalar,
Maros, and Sinjai.95 The same case can also be noted in Sumatra. Tens of
bylaws that regulated the implementation of Islamic law (sharī’a) law were
enacted such as in West Sumatera, through Bylaw Number 11 Year 2001. In
93 William R. Liddle, “Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and
Action in New Order Indonesia”, dalam Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Development in Indonesian
Islamic Thought, Mark R Woodward (ed) (Arizona: Arizona State University, 1996), 323-56.
94 Aceh was decided as an Indonesian province with some specialties through two laws:
Undang-Undang No. 44 Year 1999 and Undang-Undang No. 18 Year 2001.
95 “Syariat Islam di JalurLambat”, Tempo Interactive, [url]http://www.tempointeraktif.com/
hg/mbmtempo/free/nasional.html[/url].

Padang, the mayor issued an instruction on 7 March 2005. Also, Bengkulu

also proclaimed the effective implementation of Bylaw Number 24 Year
2000, and Instruction No 3 Year 2004. Solok implemented Bylaw No 10
Year 2001 and Bylaw No 6 Year 2002. Furthermore, in Riau, a Committee
for Preparation of Islamic Law Enforcement (Komite Persiapan Penegakan
Syariat Islam) has been formed, pioneered by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)
and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Even though in East Java this
phenomenon is less popular, there are still in several regions attempts
to usher the process of Islamic law (sharī’a) being formalized such as in
Pamekasan, Madura, through Regent’s Letter No 450 Year 2002.96
Secondly, in addition to this phenomenon, at the national level, the
collapse of New Order regime has also opened the gate for debate on
constitutional reform in which Islamist groups have also actively taken
part. Era Reformasi is seen as the opportunity for them to “reform” the
Indonesian legal system in more Islamic ways. Unsurprisingly, the debate
to promote Islam as the state constitution has re-emerged. The debate
was marked by the high demand by certain Islamic parties to include the
seven words “with the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its followers”
(dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya) that used
to be part of the Indonesian constitution. Historically, these seven words
were included in the Indonesian Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945).
However, due to some objections by the Christians, the words were omitted
from the constitution.97
It should be noted that the struggle to bring Islamic law into the state
constitution is not confined to the post-Suharto Indonesia. Rather, it has
emerged in almost all facets of Indonesian history, although Muslim’s at-
titude toward this idea varied considerably, partly due to different methods
of struggle.98 The difference during the Reformation era from the past is that
the development of Islamic law is firmly characterized by the mushroom-
ing of Islamic-based regulations. Several examples can be presented here.
First, the birth of Law (Undang-Undang) No. 18 Year 2001 about the special
autonomous status of Nangroe Aceh Darussalam. By this regulation, Aceh
was given the privilege to implement sharī’a as its formal law. Secondly,
the birth of Undang-Undang No. 38 Year 1999 about almsgiving (zakat)
96 “56 Anggota DPR Desak Pemerintah Cabut Perda Bernuansa Syariat Islam”, Suara Pemba-
ruan, 14 June 2006.
97 For a comprehensive account on the subject, please refer to Nadirsyah Hosen, Shari’a and
Constitutional Reform in Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2007).
98 Moh. Mahfud MD, Membangun Politik Hukum Menegakkan Konstitusi (Jakarta: LP3ES,
2006), 271.

management. The third is the Law (Undang-Undang) No. 3/2006. This law
is a revision of Undang-Undang No. 7/1989 regulating the Islamic Religious
Court. Among the points revised is that the new legislation gives authority to
the Islamic court in handling economic-related legal disputes. Fourthly, Law
(Undang-Undang) No. 21 Year 2008 on Islamic banking uplifted Islamic law
(sharī’a) based banking practice into state law. The increasing demands for
Islamic law (sharī’a) formalization beyond the KHI cannot be isolated from
the clamor for and proliferation of legal opinion ( fatwā) and its enforcement
that has emerged simultaneously in the last decade or so.
The agenda for extension of Islamic law (sharī’a) and the mode of think-
ing of its advocates are not confined to Indonesia. Indeed, such revivalist
discourses extending beyond Indonesia have been critically appraised by
many Muslim legal scholars. Although the issue is regarding the prob-
lematic conception of the Islamic law (sharī’a) in the context of modern
nation states, the ideas advanced are no less significant in evaluating the
clamor and demand for fatwā and their enforcement in Indonesia. Abdullahi
Ahmed an-Naim, for instance, writes that Islamic law is not as dominantly
perceived, a legal set of technical rules devoid of purpose. Applying formal
Islamic law (sharī’a) in a state does not automatically mean that the ultimate
goal and particular outcomes of sharī’a will easily be achieved. For an-Naim,
what have to be done by Muslims is to engage in long and careful processes
of finding, re-examining and reforming Islamic legal principles, in attempts
to find appropriate and constructive methods to implement Islamic law
within the context of modernity. Islamic law has to be critically reassessed,
by re-finding and confirming its eternal principles.99 In a similar way, Leila
Ahmad critically questions whether religions are given justification to
standardize the repetition of external cultural forms of specific communi-
ties in which those religions were revealed.
In Islamic legal construction, legal philosopher Abu Ishaq al-Shātibi is also
convinced that the central issue in the application of Islamci law (sharī’a)
law is highest objective of law (maqāṣid al-sharī’a). The most important part
is to understand the objective of Islamic law (sharī’a) law and not merely
its mere application in the formal sense. According to al-Shātibi, the core
objective of sharī’a is aimed at public welfare (al-maṣlaḥa al-āmma), for Mus-
lims and non-Muslims equally. Therefore, by maqāṣid al-sharī’a, the most
important thing to do is reconstructing Islamic law (sharī’a) universal values.
Islamic law, as written in numerous books of jurisprudence, emphasize on
99 Abdullahi Ahmed an-Naim, Islam dan Negara Sekular: Menegosiasikan Masa Depan
Syari’ah,translated by Sri Murniati, (Bandung: Mizan, 2008).

the protection of life, property, offspring, and honor. These elements are
universal in dimension and do not belong to Muslims exclusively. In fact,
one of the major features of the Islamic law (sharī’a) is its universalism.100
The peak of Islamic law universalism is well described by Najamuddin
al-Thufi who opines that if common good (maṣlaḥa) is achieved within a
legal system, one can say that Islamic law is present. The common good
(maṣlaḥa) is positioned in a very respectful status by al-Thufi. The popular
legal maxim regarding this principle is: al-maṣlaḥa aqwiyyu adillatu al-
shar’i (the maṣlaḥa is the strongest shar’īa proposition). Maslaha is not
merely argumentation (hujja) when there is no text (naṣ) and consensus
(ijma’), but also has to be prioritized over the text (naṣ) and concensus
(ijma’) when there is a contradiction between them.101
The call for legalizing fatwā as part of the greater demand for Islamization
of law in Indonesia beyond the KHI cannot be isolated by such ideas based on
the principles of Islamic legal universalism. In this context, the Indonesian
national legal system is a distinctive law that has successfully taken into
consideration the plurality and diversity of traditions and values that have
developed in the society. It has drawn up to accommodate not only diversity
between ethnic, cultural and religious groups but also plurality within each.
The arrangement offers a fundamental safeguard against the authoritarian
imposition of selective rulings in the name of Islam against not merely other
citizens, but Muslim themselves who do not agree with the views expressed
based on universal principles cherished by the religion. The kinds of legal
opinion ( fatwā) that have been issued in the post-New Order era and the
extent to which they can be said to be based on universal principles of the
religion will the object of investigation in the following chapters.
Conclusion
To conclude this chapter, several points are to be clearly reiterated. In

Islamic legal theory, legal opinion ( fatwā) is a non-binding, advisory legal
opinion by a jurist-consult (mufti) that is usually issued in response to ques-
tions on contemporary religious-legal problems. Although Muslim jurists
and scholars give a wide variety of definitions of legal opinion ( fatwā), the
100 Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, al-Muwafaqat fi Ushul al-Shari’ah Vol. 1-2 (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-
Ilmiyah, 2005, 7 th edition).
101 Please refer to Jamal al-Banna, Nahwa Fiqh Jadīd, Vol. 3, translated by Hasibullah Satrawi
and Zuhairi Misrawi (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2008), 67-85.

core characteristic of legal opinion cannot be overlooked. Legal opinion

( fatwā) is different from court verdict (qaḍa) which is binding, enforceable
and final since it is produced by the formal legal body (courts). While legal
opinion ( fatwā) is produced by jurist-consult (mufti) who is usually private
and does not have formal ties with states and government, court verdict
(qaḍa) is issued by judge (qaḍi) who is appointed by the state.
However, the contemporary situation might not be fully accorded this
general description. In several Muslim countries, legal opinion ( fatwā) may
be binding and enforceable depending on legal procedures institutionalized.
More pertinently, even in non-Islamic states or in which formal procedures
legalizing legal opinion ( fatwā) are absent, legal opinion ( fatwā) though
non-binding evoke strong influence on Muslims, have been fundamental
in shaping legal ideas and are an integral part of the legal culture and
practice. The chapter analyzed major reasons that have contributed to
this phenomenon with a focus on Indonesia in the New Order period. It
also highlights the fact that though extra-legal and unrestricted by legal
principles within the purview of state laws and the constitution, legal
opinion ( fatwā) is yet able to exert a powerful influence on Muslims. It
bears significant ramifications not merely on the community but the larger
Indonesian society as a whole.

3 The Dialectics of Religious Pluralism
The Fatwa and its Challengers
Indonesia is a multicultural society comprising of diversecultural, ethnic,

linguistic and religious communities. The diversity within each commu-
nity encompassing various dimensions is no less significant. This chapter
examines Islamic legal opinion ( fatwā) about religious pluralism within the
Muslim community of Indonesia. It focuses on the legal opinion ( fatwā)
of the Central Board of Indonesian Council of Religious Scholars (Majelis
Ulama Indonesia, MUI) in the matter of religious pluralism within Indone-
sian society and their implications on the lives and well-being of members of
the community. More specifically, it will examine the genesis, justifications
for and dominant mode of thinking underlying the legal opinion ( fatwā).
These provide a mirror of the role of legal opinion ( fatwā) in shaping the
discourse and practice of religious pluralism and tolerance in the country.
A discussion on a plurality of Islam and the diversity within Indonesian
Islam itself provides the backdrop of the issues at stake.
It is surprising that whilst Indonesia is a religiously plural society where
diversity of religions, religious ideas and practices are integral to daily
life; differences in understanding and experiencing religion have become
sources of controversy both at theological and empirical levels. On a
theological level, it has become a highly-debated subject particularly by
Muslim scholars and religious leaders. At the practical point of view, on
the other hand, it has fuelled intra-religious social tensions and conflicts
among Muslim groups. Theoretically, the concept of pluralism is broad and
encompasses domains extending beyond religion. Essentially it denounces
a monolithic understanding of politics,1 law,2 cultures3 and religion. This
1 For example,see Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Pluralism: Towards a Politics of Compromise
(London: Routledge, 1999).
2 Such works as Prakash Shah, Legal Pluralism in Conflict: Coping with Cultural Diversity in Law
(London: Glass House Press, 2005); Andrea Büchler, Islamic Law in Europe? Legal Pluralism and
Its Limit in European Family Laws (Farnhamm: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011); and Paul Schiff
Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: a Jurisprudence of Law beyond Border (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), are good introductory readings to the discourse of legal pluralism.
3 The plurality of cultures is often confused with multiculturalism. It refers to a context
where different cultures living together in harmony and enjoy equal political recognition. For
basic idea on multiculturalism, see Tariq Modood, Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2007); or C. James Trotman (ed), Multiculturalism: Roots and Realities (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2002).

chapter, however, will deal only with the discourse of religious pluralism4
and freedom of religion, as espoused by the MUI through the legal opinion
( fatwā) that it proclaims. The legal opinion ( fatwā) reveals not only MUI’s
perception and stance on the religious status of non-Muslims and freedom
of belief in general, but more significantly it also extends to the views and
judgment on the diversity of religious belief within Indonesian Muslim
community itself. It is this dimension which forms the focus of analysis
in this chapter.
Plurality of Islam and Religious Pluralism in Indonesia
It is important to understand the fact of plurality of Islam in Indonesia

to evaluate the mode of thinking and values underlying the legal opinion
( fatwā) issued by MUI. Sociologically speaking, from its very beginning,
Islam in Indonesia has been pluralistic. The history of Islamisation in Nusan-
tara provides firm evidence of the pluralistic nature of Islam.5 According
to popular versions, the traders and missionaries coming from Arabia,6
India,7 Persia, 8 and China9 brought Islam to Indonesia. Although
4 Although religious pluralism refers to the discourse of diversity of religion, in practical

level it has also been used in several contexts such as theological and political. See Muhammad
Legenhausen, “A Muslim’s Non-Reductive Religious Pluralism”, in Roger Boase (ed), Islam and
Global Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and Pursuit of Peace (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 52.
5 Robert Pringle, Understanding Islam in Indonesia: Politics and Diversity (Singapore: Editions
Didier Millet Pte Ltd, 2010), 8.
6 Among ardent supporter of this theory is Naguib Al-Attas. See Naquib Al-Attas, Preliminary
Statement on a General Theory of the Islamisation of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago (Kuala
Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1989). Compare to M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern
Indonesia since c. 1200 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, 3rd Edition), Chapter I.
7 Although India is believed as one of the sources where Islam in Nusantara came from,
it is debatable on which areas of India are referred to. Pijnapell, a Dutch scholar, argued that
Gujarat and Malabar are the source of Islam in Nusantara. However, Snouck Hurgronje and S.Q.
Fatimi pointed South India and Bengal respectively. For further discussion, please refer to S.Q.
Fatimi, Islam Comes to Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute,
1963); Azyumardi Azra, Islam in the Indonesian World: An Account of Institutional Formation
(Bandung: Mizan, 2006), 10-25.
8 The defenders of Persian theory build their conviction on several basis such as: the grave-
stone of Malikussaleh (1297) in Pasai and Maulana Malik Ibrahim (1419) in Gresik, the practice
of Asyura as commemoration of the death of Hasan and Hussain, and the similarity of Syekh
Siti Jenar’s teachings in Java with al-Hallaj’s in Persia.
9 Indonesian leading historian Slamet Muljana, for instance, strongly believed that Islam in
Indonesia was coming from China and therefore it was Chinese Muslims that spread Islam in
Nusantara. See Slamet Muljana, Runtuhnya Kerajaan Hindu-Jawa dan Timbulnya Negara-Negara

The Dialec tics of Religious Plur alism 73
controversy about the historical validity of each version exists, what is

clear is that Islam introduced and practiced in the Indonesian archipelago
adapted to the cultural diversity of the inhabitants.10Some scholars have
referred to these diverse expressions and experiences of Islam in this region
as mystical Islam,11 cultural Islam, formalistic (sharī’a-oriented) Islam 12,
and political Islam.
Mystical and cultural Islam, for example, are often discussed in contradic-
tion to sharī’a-oriented Islam since the first two represent more heterodox
versions of Islam, while the latter emphasizes legal and orthodox outlook
of the religion.13 However, although the first and second types of religious
practice might be seen as less authentic expressions of Islam, it cannot be
denied that their emergence are indicative of the ability of Islam to adapt
to and accommodate local elements, cultures, and traditions. This syncretic
Islam is in a way what Merle Ricklefs refers to as “mystical synthesis” or a
kind of “reconciliation of Javanese and Islamic identities, beliefs, and style.”14
With this hybrid and blended identity, Ricklefs maintains, being a Javanese
Islam di Nusantara (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2005). Similar conclusion can also be found in Tan Ta Sen,
Cheng Ho and Islam in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2009); Sumanto Al Qurtuby,
Arus Cina-Islam-Jawa: Bongkar Sejarah atas Peranan Tionghoa dalam Penyebaran Agama Islam
di Nusantara Abad XV & XVI (Jakarta: INSPEAL Press and INTI, 2003); and H. J. de Graaf, Cina
Muslim di Jawa abad XV dan XVI: Antara Historisitas dan Mitos (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 2004).
10 Ricklefs’s trilogy on Islamisation in Indonesia, especially in Java, can give adequate analysis
on this subject. See M.C. Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social,
Cultural and Religious History, c. 1930 to the Present (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012); Mystic Synthesis
in Java: A History of Islamisation from Fourteenth to the Early Eighteenth Centuries (Norwalk:
EastBridge, 2006) and Polarising Javanese Society:
11 Syekh Siti Jenar is a popular mystic figure in early period of Islam in Java. He represented
the mystical type of Islam vis-à-vis formalistic or shari’a-oriented Islam practiced by the Wali
Songo board. Further discussion can be followed in Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Syekh Siti Jenar:
Pergumulan Islam-Jawa (Yogyakarta: Bentang, 1999); Suwardi Endraswara, Mistik Kejawen:
Sinkretisme, Simbolisme dan Sufisme dalam Budaya Spiritual Jawa (Yogyakarta: Narasi, 4th
edition, 2006); Hasanu Simon, Misteri Syekh Siti Jenar: Peran Wali Songo dalam Mengislamkan
Tanah Jawa (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004).
12 Formalistic Islam usually puts its emphasis on the observance of Islamic obligations as what
is written in Shari’a sources and ulama’s interpretations of them. In the history of Islamisation
in Nusantara, many would refer this formalistic Islam to Wali Songo (the nine saints). However,
many others tend to categorize the Wali Songo into cultural Islam since in spreading Islam they
used local cultures and tradition as medium. However, overall, I believe that the Wali Songo
are the guardian of formalistic type of Islam. See Munir Mulkhan Syekh Siti Jenar: Pergumulan
Islam-Jawa (Yogyakarta: Bentang, 1999).
13 Kuntowijoyo, Muslim Tanpa Masjid: Esai-Esai Agama, Budaya dan Politik dalam Bingkai
Strukturalisme Transendental (Bandung: Mizan, 2001), 233.
14 M. C. Ricklefs, Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural and Re-
ligious History, c. 1930 to the Present (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), 7. More specifically, Ricklefs

at the same time means to be a Muslim. In other words, mystic synthesis sug-
gests that Muslims are religiously pious while maintaining local elements in
beliefs and practices derived from pre-Islamic religious beliefs and culture.
This kind of synthesis is popularly known as Islam Kejawen in Indonesian
terminology 15or in Kuntowijoyo’s understanding it is called Jawaisme.16
Given the central position that local culture has played in Islamizing Java
and Indonesia in general,17 it is understandable that local cultural elements
are inseparable from Islamic practices and teachings. In Moeslim Abdurrah-
man’s view, Islam or Muslim cannot be reduced to a single or static meaning,
since socio-historical factors dynamically condition them.18 In a similar vein,
Reza Aslan contends that cultural elements are determinant in the formation
of religious interpretations.19 Consequently, identifying Indonesian Islam(s)
can also be done through analyzing the cultural aspects of the practice of
Islamic beliefs. It is this cultural consciousness that partly led anthropologist
Clifford Geertz to portray Indonesian Muslims regarding abangan, santri,
and priyayi.20 Although some scholars have criticized this classification, its
relevance in portraying the cultural richness of Islam in Indonesia, and the
dialectical relationship between Islam and cultures, remains.
Regarding formalistic or sharī’a-oriented form of Islam, it has been
contended that while Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) forms a central aspect
of Islamic teachings based on two most fundamental Islamic sources of law,
the Qur’ān and Sunna, the overemphasis on law as central to religious life
and expressions features as a major form of religiosity in this characteriza-
tion of Indonesian Islam. The majority of Indonesian Muslims are legally
affiliated with the Shafi’i school of law within the Sunni denomination.21
discusses this topic in his Mystic Synthesis in Java: A History of Islamisation from Fourteenth to
the Early Eighteenth Centuries (Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006).
15 Suwardi Endraswara, Mistik Kejawen: Sinkretisme, Simbolisme dan Sufisme dalam Budaya
Spiritual Jawa (Yogyakarta: Narasi, 4th edition, 2006).
16 Kuntowijoyo, Muslim Tanpa Masjid: Esai-Esai Agama, Budaya dan Politik dalam Bingkai
Strukturalisme Transendental (Bandung: Mizan, 2001), 230.
17 Purwadi, Dakwah Sunan Kalijaga: Penyebaran Ajaran Islam di Jawa Berbasis Kultural
18 Moeslim Abdurrahman, “Bangkitnya Spiritual: Islamisasi dengan Damai,” “Foreword” in
Ahmad Syafii Mufid, Tangklukan, Abangan dan Tarekat: Kebangkitan Agama di Jawa (Jakarta:
Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2006), x.
19 Reza Aslan, No god But God: The Origins, Evolution and Future of Islam (New York: Random
House, 2005), xix.
20 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1960).
21 A. Qodry Azizy, Reformasi Bermazhab: Sebuah Ikhtiar Menuju Ijtihad Saintifik-Modern
(Jakarta: Teraju, 2003). In term of following certain school of law (mazhab), two largest In-
donesian Muslim groups, Nahdlatul Ulama’ (NU) and Muhammadiyah stand on different

However, assuming that Indonesian Islam is identical to the Shafi’i school

is evidently an over-simplification. Although the majority of Indonesian
Muslims belong to the Shafi’i school of jurisprudence, there are also those
who affiliate with Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools. The existence of
these different religious schools within the Sunni tradition has enriched
the variety of religious beliefs and practices of Muslims in Indonesia. Of
the many differences found within these schools, the primary difference
between them regards legal interpretations of two basic sources of Islam,
the Qur’ān and Sunna. In Islamic legal terms, these differences occur at the
level of branches ( furū’) and not regarding basic principles (uṣūl).
Even within the same Sunni denomination, Indonesian Muslim scholars
differ in their interpretations over specific legal issues. An example of the
diversity of legal opinions is the case of inheritance law. It is accepted, as
stipulated in the Qur’ān, that daughters are entitled to half the portion
accorded to sons from their parents’ inheritance. However, many Indonesian
Muslims no longer practice such a principle based on sociological considera-
tions. Hence, the late Munawir Sjadzali, who once served as Minister of
Religious Affairs during Suharto’s reign, had proposed a new understanding
of inheritance law using the pattern of 1:1 and not 1:2 as generally accepted.22
This opinion reflects the thought of the late legal scholar Hazairin, once
a professor of law at the University of Indonesia. Hazairin argued that the
common understanding of inheritance law following patrilineal lineage is
an Arabic norm that is incompatible with Indonesian values. Alternatively,
he proposed a bilateral principle of inheritance which is seen as more
contextually rooted.23
Apart from the diversity within Sunni Islam manifested in different
Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) schools as well as diversity within each of them,
principles. While the former argues that following one of the four schools is mandatory (wajib),
the latter adopts a non-mazhab position. For further discussion on this subject, please refer to
PB Nahdlatul Ulama’, Solusi Problematika Aktual Hukum Islam: Keputusan Muktamar, Munas
dan Konbes Nahdlatul Ulama’ (1926-2010) (LTN PBNU and Khalista: Jakarta and Surabaya, 2011),
2; Djohan Effendy, Pembaruan Tanpa Membongkar Tradisi: Wacana Keagamaan di Kalangan
Genrasi Muda NU Masa Kepemimpinan Gus Dur (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010), 143-147;
Asjmuni Abdurrahman, Manhaj Tarjih Muhammadiyah: Metodologi dan Aplikasi (Yogyakarta:
Pustaka Pelajar, 2012, 4th edition), 14; and H.A. Mukti, Ijtihad dalam Pandangan Muhammad
Abduh, Ahmad Dakhlan, dan Muhammad Iqbal (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1990), 76-80.
22 See M. Wahyuni Nafis (ed), Kontekstualisasi Ajaran Islam: 70 Tahun Prof. Dr. H. Munawir
Syadzali (Jakarta: IPHI and Paramadina, 1995).
23 Hazairin, HukuM Kewarisan Bilateral Menurut al-Qur’an dan Hadits (Jakarta: Tintamas,
1982); Abdul Ghoni Hamid, “Kewarisan dalam Perspektif Hazairin”, Jurnal Studi Agama dan
Masyarakat, Vol. 4: 1, 2007, 29-67.

the non-monolithic face of Indonesian Islam is also evident in the existence

of other Muslim religious minorities, not excluding the Shi’a. The diversity
of Islam in Indonesia has been further enriched by the co-existence of these
groups within the predominantly Sunni Muslim community. Shi’a which
emerged in the early course of Islamic political history had developed its
doctrines, teachings, rites and methods of interpretation of the Qur’ān,
Sunna and some large important historical facts. It is these differences that
are often pointed out as the root causes of tensions between Sunni and Shi’a.24
According to Jalaluddin Rahmat, a renowned public intellectual, and
leader of Indonesian Shi’a, Shi’a arrived in the Indonesian archipelago
through three waves.25The first wave coincides with the first stage of the
coming of Islam to Nusantara. Evidence for this thesis though inconclusive is
based on the fact thatone of the countries of the origin of Islam in Nusantara
is Persia which is the homeland of the Shi’a. The next wave occurred in the
period of the post-Iranian revolution around the 1980s. With the victory
of the Iranian revolution against the Shah’s regime, Shi’a teachings spread
around the Muslim world including Indonesia. Roughly coinciding with the
last phase of Suharto’s New Order reign, claims Rahmat, Shi’a as attracted
followers mainly from intellectual circles since it offers a revolutionary
type of thinking and strong critique against social injustice.26 The last wave
of Shi’a in Indonesia is marked by the spread of its jurisprudence within
Indonesian society that in some respects, are markedly different from
24 On the differences of Sunni and Shi’a, please follow dialogue between Sunni and Shi’ite lead-
ers in Syarafuddin al-Musawi, Dialog Sunnah-Syi’ah (Bandung: Mizan, 1983); M. Quraish Shihab,
Sunnah-Syi’ah Bergandengan Tangan: Mungkinkah? (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2007); Tim Penulis
Buku Sidogiri, Mungkinkah Sunnah-Syiah dalam Ukhuwah?: Jawaban atas Buku Dr. Quraish
Shihab, Sunni-Syiah Bergandengan Tangan! mungkinkah? (Pasuruan: Pustaka Sidogiri, 2008);
Husin al-Habsyi and Abulhasan Ali Naqvi, Sunnah-Syi’ah dalam Ukhuwah Islamiyah (Malang:
Yayasan al-Kautsar, 1991); Husin al-Habsyi, Sunnah Syi’ah dalam Dialog: Antara Mahasiswa UGM
dan UII Yogya dengan Ustadz Husein al-Habsyi (Solo: Yayasan Ats-Tsaqalain, 1991).
25 “Cerita Jalaludin Rakhmat tentang Masuknya Syi’ah ke Indonesia”, http://www.republika.
co.id/berita/nasional/umum/12/08/30/m9jkq6-cerita-jalaluddin-rakhmat-tentang-masuknya-
syiah-di-indonesia, accessed on September 13, 2012. Cf. A.M. Hendropriyono, Terorisme: Funda-
mentalisme Kristen, Yahudi, Islam (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2009), 428; Tim Ahlul Bait
Indonesia, Buku Putih Mazhab Syiah Menurut Para Ulamanya yang Muktabar (Jakarta: Dewan
Pengurus Pusat Ahlul Bait Indonesia, 2012), 1-4; and Thohir Abdullah Alkaff, “Perkembangan
Syi’ah di Indonesia” in Abduh and Away (eds), Mengapa Kita Menolak Syi’ah (Jakarta: Gema
Insani Press, 1998). Similar conclusion on the coming of Shi’ah to Indonesia can also be read
from: http://www.syiahindonesia.com/index.php/kajian-utama/sejarah-syiah/94-melihat-
lebih-dekat-kaum-syiah-di-jawa-tengah-, accessed on September 16, 2012.
26 “Cerita Jalaludin Rahmat…” ibid. Interview with Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Jakarta, 16 December
2012.

Sunni.27Other than its difference with Sunni, within Shi’a itself, differences
in religious thought and orientations can also be found.28
Apart from the variety of jurisprudential traditions, Indonesian Islam is
also distinguished by numerous religious orientations that have character-
ized various social movements which developed during the colonial period,
particularly in the dawn of the twentieth century. This period witnessed
the emergence of diverse Islamic movements which attempted to respond
to and confront massive socio-economic mire of the Muslims under the
impact of Dutch imperialism. Using religion as a primary source of their
struggle against the imperial power, movements such as Jami’at al-Khair,
Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad, and Persatuan Islam, amongst many others
were established. Some attempted to redress the condition of their society
by embarking on theological purification of religious beliefs which they
perceived as having been corrupted and responsible for the decline and
degeneration of the community. It was in this context that some of these
groups attacked the syncretic nature of Muslim society in Indonesia as a
major factor for its degeneration and decline. One of the leading Indonesian
Muslim intellectuals, the late Nurcholish Madjid argued that during the
colonial period, tensions among Islamic movements were common. In
the political arena, wrote Madjid, there were Islamic organizations that
followed non-cooperative paths such as al-Irsyad, and those that opted
for a cooperative path such as Muhammadiyah.29 In the field of education,
Madjid continued, there were also organizations open to modern elements
of Dutch education (Muhammadiyah and al-Irsyad) and those that rejected
them and strove instead to strengthen the “original” system of Indonesian
education including the Islamic religious schools (madrasa) and boarding
school (pesantren) systems.30
However, the New Order period marked a new development regarding
intra-religious as well as the interreligious relationship. The period revealed
a marked tendency to limit the participation and expressions of Islam in the
27 “Cerita Jalaludin Rahmat…” Ibid. For a comparison on the history of Shi’ah in Indonesia,
please refer to Zulkifli, “Being a Shī‘ite among the Sunnī Majority in Indonesia: A Preliminary
Study of Ustadz Husein Al-Habsyi (1921-1994)”, Studia Islamica, Vol. 11, Number 2, 2004; and M.
Hamdan Basyar, Agama, Politik dan Pembangunan: Syi’ah dalam Kehidupan Politik Umat Islam
(Jakarta: PPW-LIPI, 1999).
28 See Abu Bakar Acheh, Syi’ah, Ali dan Mazhab-Mazhabnya (New Jersey: al-Husyaini Trust,
n.d.); and Aliran Syi’ah di Nusantara (Jakarta: Islamic Research Institute, 1977).
29 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Doktrin dan Peradaban (Jakarta: Yayasan Wakaf Paramadina,
1992), 161.
30 Ibid, 161.

public sphere. For instance, in 1985-1986 all Islamic organizations in Indonesia

had to adopt Pancasila as their sole philosophical basis (asas tunggal). As
Douglas E Ramage asserted, Islam “as a political movement is not officially
allowed to present an ideological alternative to Pancasila.”31 In the last quarter
of the New Order regime, the strong manifestations of religious revivalism
were evident. In Azyumardi Azra’s words, during this period, although
President Suharto attempted to introduce certain kinds of Javaism known
as Aliran Kejawen, the tendency of santrinisasi outweighed the attempt.32
Following the collapse of the New Order regime, diverse Islamic groups with
varying religious orientations come to the fore, ranging from conservatism to
those who espouse liberal outlook. The most striking development has been
the emergence of politically radical and fundamentalist Islamic movements
such as Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), Jamaah Islamiyah,
Salafi-Jihadist, or other Islamist movements as represented by Justice Prosper-
ous Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI).
The emergence of these radical groups in Indonesia is inseparable from the
problems of political repression during the New Order period. One of the most
obvious consequences of this movement is the growing and strengthening
of the aspiration for the enforcement of Islamic morality in public sphere.
These groups are hostile to any kinds of contemporary discourse which
they perceive as the creation of the Western world such as democracy,
gender equality, and pluralism. Democracy, for example, is seen as an un-
Islamic system based on the conviction that it grants sovereignty to the
people, while in their Islamic conception of power, God is the sovereign
and Islamic law (sharī’a) is a law that encodes this sovereignty.33 This type
of Islam also shows the same uncompromising attitude towards a discourse
on religious pluralism. Elements within this group argue that Islam is not
compatible with the idea of religious pluralism.34
31 Douglas E Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance
(London: Routledge, 1995), 40. For Muhammadiyah’s acceptance to asas tunggal, see Syarifuddin
Jurdi, 1 Abad Muhammadiyah: Gagasan Pembaruan Sosial Keagamaan (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010),
278-282.
32 Azyumardi Azra, “Foreword” in Bambang Pranowo, Memahami Islam Jawa (Jakarta: INSEP
amd Pustaka Alvabet, 2009).
33 S. Yunanto (ed), Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and South-East Asia (Jakarta:
Freiderich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2003).
34 See for example, Anis Malik Thaha, Tren Pluralisme Agama: Tinjauan Kritis (Jakarta:
Penerbit Perspektif, 2005); Adian Husaini, Pluralisme Agama Haram: Fatwa MUI yang Tegas
dan Tidak Kontroversial (Jakarta: Pustaka al-Kautsar, 2005); Adian Husaini, Pluralisme Agama:
Parasit bagi Agama-agama: Pandangan Katolik, Protestan, Hindu, dan Islam (Jakarta: Dewan
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, 2006).

On the other end, competing Muslim groups have also emerged which
promote agendas that differ radically from the Islamist groups. Among many
others, they are active in discoursing on religious pluralism in Indonesia
and are critical of dominant views that undermine or attack pluralism and
liberalism. Within Nahdlatul Ulama’ circles, for example, some supporters
of pluralism have come to the fore, be it individually or institutionally.35The
emergence of groups such as Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial (LKIS) in
Yogyakarta, Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) and the Wahid Institute in Jakarta
are but a few examples. A similar development is also apparent in the case
with Muhammadiyah. At the beginning of 2000, Muhammadiyah wit-
nessed the rise of Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network (Jaringan
Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah, JIMM) and the Center for the Study of
Religion and Civilization (Pusat Studi Agama dan Peradaban, PSAP), which
strongly articulate and advocate for the promotion of tolerance, pluralism,
and democracy within the movement.
The above discussion reveals that religious diversity has been an integral
feature of Indonesian Islam. On the sociological level, this diversity is mani-
fested in competing ideas and endeavors to realize the ideals, principles,
and teachings of Islam. The types of religious orientations that feature in
the variety of group thought are strongly conditioned by specific social and
historical contexts. Given the plurality of religious groups and thought,
essentialist pronouncements of religious authorities that demonize Muslims
by differences in their understanding of Islam appears to betray the hard
truth of diversity of religious thought and experience in Indonesia with
serious repercussions on the lives of those affected.
MUI’s Fatwā on Religious Pluralism
Constitutionally, Indonesia is a multi-religious country in which six religions

are formally allowed to be observed, one of which is Islam, a religion em-
braced by the majority which constitutes about 80 percent of the Indonesian
population.36 Within the framework of a plurality of religions, Islam itself,
as briefly discussed above, is a religion which is diverse in orientations,
35 In the Nahdlatul Ulama’ (NU) circles, such names as Masdar Farid Mas’udi, Ulil Abshar-
Abdalla, Zuhairi Misrawi, Guntur Romli, Moqsith Ghazali, among many others, are known as
strong supporters of pluralism. They actively write pieces, essays and books to influence public
on the importance of pluralism.
36 For detail f igure of Indonesian population based on religion embraced by Indonesian
citizens, see http://sp2010.bps.go.id/index.php/site/tabel?tid=321&wid=0.

interpretations, and practices.37 Sociologically speaking, the diversity of

practices and understandings of Islam in Indonesia from the outset is a
social fact that cannot be denied or ignored. This has been exacerbated by
technological advancement, cultural exchange, and assimilation that have
accompanied the processes of industrialization, modernization, and glo-
balization with ramifications on religious ideas and understanding.38Rapid
and intense social change arising from massive economic programs and
development agenda, increasing access to education, the rise of new social
classes and increasing social mobility are some of the factors that are con-
stantly impacting upon religious worldview and the complexity of religious
thought and orientations of Indonesian Muslims. Although expressions of
Islam in the public space were restrained during the New Order period,
following its collapse in 1998, contestation of opposing orientations and
interpretations of Islam became more visible, the most notable among
them is that between the radical-conservative and competing frameworks
popularly referred to as liberal or progressive.39
In the context of this changing socio-political condition, at the begin-
ning of the 2000s, a movement called Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan
Islam Liberal, JIL) aimed at being a counter-ideology for the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism was established. 40 It promotes, among other,the follow-
ing agendas: the idea of compatibility of Islam and democracy, a more
progressive and liberal interpretation of Islam, the acceptance of religious
37 In Indonesian context, a good introduction to understand the dynamics and plurality of

orientations of Islam in Indonesia, can be found in Abudin Nata, Peta Keragaman Pemikiran
Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2001). See also Rusmin Tumanggor, Jaenal
Arifin, and Fauzan, Peta Keragaman dan Kajian Tematik Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia: Kumpulan
Hasil Penelitian Tahun 2002 (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, 2004).
38 Among the tangible elements of modernization in Indonesia are various responses of Muslim
intellectuals in Indonesia. See, Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan
(Bandung: Mizan, 1987); Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectuals Response to New Order
Modernization in Indonesia (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982), M. Syafii Anwar,
Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia: Sebuah Kajian Politik tentang Cendekiawan Muslim Orde
Baru (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995). For modernization in Indonesian Islamic higher institution,
which played important part in disseminating new ideas among Indonesian Muslims, please
refer to Fuad Jabali,
39 Imam Tolkhah and Neng Dara Affiah (eds), Gerakan Keislaman Pasca Orde Baru: Upaya
Merambah Dimensi Baru Islam (Jakarta: Balitbang Departemen Agama RI, 2007).
40 Mohammad Ali, “The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia,”
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 22: 1, 2005, 1-27. See also Zuly Qodir, Islam Liberal:
Paradigma Baru Wacana dan Aksi Islam Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003), and
Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, Liberal Islam in Indonesia: Jaringan Islam Liberal on Religious Freedom
and Pluralism (Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2012).

pluralism and the need to defend the rights of minority groups. 41 Although
the idea of religious pluralism is not novel to Indonesian socio-religious
settings, the emergence of JIL is seen as the moment of the reintroduction
and intensification of religious pluralism discourse. Through its publication
in traditional and new media, JIL disseminates ideas of the urgency for
Muslims to be pluralist and tolerant. The support of the mass media has
unfailingly sent the discourse of religious pluralism to the fore and widely
circulated it among young Muslim activists and university students.
Before the founding of JIL in the 2000s, another major institution that has
actively promoted pluralism is the Paramadina Foundation under the patron-
age and leadership of the late Nurcholish Madjid, who introduced the idea
of the secularization of Islam in 1970s. Social pluralism was a cornerstone
of the mission it set about to achieve. Paramadina was founded to “face the
future with an awareness of social pluralism in a just, open and democratic
political order.”42 In its attempts to disseminate its inclusive vision of Islam,
Paramadina Foundation actively held regular classes on Islam, in which the
Klub Kajian Agama (Religious Studies Club) has been the most popular. It also
actively published books and materials to spread its message for the inclusive
understanding of Islam.43 Paramadina’s attempts included the establishment
of a university under the name of Paramadina Mulya which was intended to
support the realization of its vision of a pluralistic understanding of Islam.44
The campaigns for pluralism and its popularity among young Muslim
activists and university students did not emerge in a vacuum. Apart from
broader social processes mentioned above, its rise and development were
in response to and competition posed by other social groups with compet-
ing orientations and interpretations of Islam within Indonesian Muslim
society. The movement was challenged by several fundamentalist and
radical groups, although JIL aimed primarily to minimize the penetra-
tion and social impact of these movements. 45 The culmination of these
41 http://islamlib.com/id/halaman/tentang-jil, accessed on December 30, 2012. See also Luthfi

Assyaukani (ed), Wajah Liberal Islam Indonesia (Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal, 2002).
42 http://paramadina.or.id/?page_id=173. Accessed on December 30, 2012. Also refer to Ahmad
Gaus AF, Api Islam Nurcholish Madjid: Jalan Hidup Seorang Visioner (Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas,
2010).
43 Among books Paramadina published are: Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Doktrin dan Peradaban:
Kontekstualisasi Nilai-Nilai Islam dalam Sejarah (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2000).
44 For more comprehensive on Nurcholish Madjid and Paramadina, please refer to Ahmad Gaus
AF, Api Islam NUrcholish Madjid: Jalan Hidup Seorang Visioner (Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2010).
45 Many books were published as reactions to the rise of JIL and its agenda. For examples:
Adian Husaini, Membedah Islam Liberal: Memahami dan Menyikapi Manuver Islam Liberal di
Indonesia (Bandung: Syaamil Cipta Media, 2003), Adnin Armas, Pengaruh Kristen-Orientalis

reactions was the response of MUI in the form of legal opinion ( fatwā) that
contradicted the current of religious pluralism and the changing social
reality of Indonesian society.
In July 2005, in response to the afore-mentioned socio-religious dynam-
ics, the Central Board of MUI in Jakarta issued a legal opinion ( fatwā) that
banned pluralism, liberalism, and secularism after its 7th National Meeting
(Musyawarah Nasional). In MUI’s view, these three ideas are forbidden
(ḥarām). The legal opinion ( fatwā) (7/MUNAS VII/MUI/11/2005) endorsed
by Ma’ruf Amin, Head of Fatwā Commission of MUIand Hasanuddin,
secretary of MUI, expressed three considerations leading MUI to this
decision. The first is that MUI was convinced that the trilogy of pluralism,
liberalism, secularism and other similar religious understandings had been
widely spreading among Indonesian Muslim society. Secondly, MUI also
claimed that this development had created social disturbances amongst
Muslims and, as a consequence, the public has demanded MUI to issue
a legal rulings ( fatwā) in response to these matters. Based on these two
preceding considerations MUI decided that it was inevitable to issue a legal
opinion ( fatwā) on these three subjects as a guide for Muslims in Indonesia
confronted by these pervasive trends in the community.46 The legal opinion
( fatwā) formulates:
1. Pluralisme, sekularisme dan liberalisme agama adalah paham yang

bertentangan dengan ajaran agama Islam;
2. Umat Islam haram mengikuti paham pluralisme, sekularisme dan
liberalisme agama;
3. Dalam masalah akidah dan ibadah, umat Islam wajib bersikap eksklusif,
dalam arti haram mencampuradukkan akidah dan ibadah umat Islam
dengan akidah dan ibadah pemeluk agama lain;
4. Bagi masyarakat Muslim yang tinggal bersama pemeluk agama lain
(pluralitas agama), dalam masalah sosial yang tidak berkaitan dengan
akidah dan ibadah, umat Islam tetap bersikap inklusif, dalam arti tetap
melakukan pergaulan sosial dengan pemeluk agama lain sepanjang tidak
saling merugikan.
terhadap Islam Liberal: Dialog Interaktif dengan Aktivis Jaringan Islam Liberal (Jakarta: Gema
Insani Press, 2003), Hamadi B. Husain, Dekonstruksi Pemikiran Islam Liberal: Kritik Fenomena
JIL (Malang: Pustaka Bayan, 2007), Fauzan al-Anshori, Melawan Komspirasi JIL, Jaringan Islam
Liberal (Yogyakarta: Pustaka al-Furqan, 2003), Adian Husaini and Nu’im Hidayat, Islam Liberal:
Sejarah, Konsepsi, Penyimpangan dan Jawabannya (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002).
46 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia Sejak 1975 (Jakarta:
Penerbit Erlangga and MUI, 2011), 87.

1. Pluralism, secularism and religious liberalism … is a philosophy which

contradicts Islamic teachings;
2. It is forbidden for Muslims to embrace the philosophy of pluralism,
secularism, and religious liberalism;
3. In terms of faith and rituals, it is compulsory for Muslims to be exclu-
sive, in the sense that it is forbidden to mix Muslims’ faith and rituals
with that of other people of religion’s;
4. for Muslim who live together with other people of religion (plurality
of religion), in terms of social interactions which do not deal with faith
and ritual, Muslims should be inclusive, in the sense that they socially
interact with other people’s of religions.
MUI referred to two main sources of Islamic law, the Qur’ān and Sunna as
the textual basis in legitimizing its legal rulings ( fatwā). More specifically,
these are the Qur’anic verses quoted by MUI:
a. Chapter Alu Imran verse 19: “Lo! Religion with Allah (is) the Surrender
(to His Will and Guidance). Those who ( formerly) received the Scripture
differed only after knowledge came unto them, through transgression
among themselves. Whoso disbelieves the revelations of Allah (will find
that) lo! Allah is swift at reckoning.”
b. Chapter Alu Imran verse 85: “And whoso seeketh as religion other than
the Surrender (to Allah) it will not be accepted from him, and he will be a
loser in the Hereafter.”
c. Chapter al-Kafirun verse 6:“Unto you your religion, and unto me my
religion.”
d. Chapter al-Ahzab verse 36: “Moreover, it becometh not a believing man
or a believing woman, when Allah and His messenger have decided an
affair ( for them), that they should (after that) claim any say in their affair;
and whoso is rebellious to Allah and His messenger, he verily goeth astray
in error manifest.”
e. Chapter al-Mumtahinah verse 8-9: “Say (unto them, O Muhammad):
Lo! the death from which ye shrink will surely meet you, and afterward ye
will be returned unto the Knower of the Invisible and the Visible, and He will
tell you what ye used to do. O ye who believe! When the call is heard for the
prayer of the day of congregation, haste unto remembrance of Allah and
leave your trading. That is better for you if ye did but know.”
f. Chapter al-Qashas verse 77: “But seek the abode of the Hereafter in that
which Allah hath given thee and neglect not thy portion of the world, and

be thou kind even as Allah hath been kind to thee, and seek not corruption
in the earth; lo! Allah loveth not corrupters.”
g. Chapter al-An’am verse 116: “If thou obeyedst most of those on earth they
would mislead thee far from Allah’s way. They follow naught but an opinion,
and they do but guess.”
h. Chapter al-Mu’minun verse 71:“And if the Truth had followed their
desires, verily the heavens and the earth and whosoever is therein had
been corrupted. Nay, We have brought them their Reminder, but from their
Reminder they now turn away.”47
It goes without saying that while the textual basis for the issuance of rulings
(fatwā) is the Qur’ān, the meanings of the verses cited by MUI to justify its rul-
ings (fatwā) against pluralism are deemed self-evident.48 Like all verses of the
Qur’ān however, their meanings cannot be isolated from the socio-historical
contexts in which they were revealed and had been subjected to a variety of
interpretations. In citing these sources, MUI fails to explicate these verses
in context. It also does not explain how these verses relate to the discourse
on pluralism, liberalism and secularism in the context of Indonesia that it
seeks to ban under the banner of Islam. In MUI’s mode of thinking, the text
provides self-evident maxims that at once justify the legal opinion ( fatwā).
Apart from the Qur’anic verses, MUI also referred to certain Prophetic
sayings (hadīth) as the basis for its rulings ( fatwā). The first was a Prophetic
sayings (hadīth) narrated by Imam Muslim which ascribed to Prophet Mu-
hammad the sayings that whoever from the Jews and Christians who had
heard about him and then died while they are not faithful to the teachings he
delivered, will be the dwellers of Hellfire.49 Another is the popular narrative in
which the Prophet was believed to have sent letters to non-Muslim rulers in-
viting them to accept and embrace Islam as the new faith, including Emperor
Heraclius of Rome (Christian), al-Najasyi the King of Abyssinia (Christian) and
the Caisar (Kisra) of Persia (Zoroastrian).50 The last prophetic tradition that
47 All translations of the Qur’ān quoted here is from Muhammad Marmaduke Pickhtall, The
Glorious Qur’an (New York: Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, 2004).
48 The problem of text interpretation is always source of debate in Islam, especially the
competition over the legitimate interpretation. See Hussein Muhammad, Mengaji Pluralisme
kepada Mahaguru Pencerahan (Bandung: Mizan, 2011), 20-31; and Abdullah Saeed, Interpreting
the Qur’an: Toward A Contemporary Approach (London: Routledge, 2006) and G.R. Hawting and
A.K.A Shareef, Approaches to the Qur’an (London: Routledge, 1993).
49 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia Sejak 1975 (Jakarta:
MUI Pusat and Penerbit Erlangga, 2011), 90.
50 Ibid, 90.

MUI utilized relates to social interactions that Prophet Muhammad exempli-

fied in his lifetime. According to a Prophetic saying (hadīth) narrated by Imam
Bukhari, during his lifetime, the Prophet Muhammad interacted with Jews
in Khaibar and Christians in Najran. Even one of Prophet’s fathers-in-law
was a Jewish figure of Banu Quraidzah named Huyay bin Ahthab.51 Although
the relevance of these three Prophetic saying (hadīth) to the issue in point is
not clearly established, MUI used it as the basis for its legal rulings ( fatwā).
The legal opinion ( fatwā) defined and decided the issue through two
basis (ketentuan), namely what MUI calls general basis (ketentuan umum)
and legal basis (ketentuan hukum). In the former, MUI defines pluralism,
plurality, liberalism and secularism in general terms; while in the latter,
the legality of these key terms werediscussed. In broad terms, MUI deemed
pluralism as an idea that believes:
Pluralisme agama adalah suatu paham yang mengajarkan bahwa semua

agama sama dan karenanya kebenaran setiap agama adalah relatif; oleh
sebab itu, setiap pemeluk agama tidak boleh mengklaim bahwa hanya
agamanya saja yang benar sedangkan agama lain salah. Pluralisme
agama juga mengajarkan bahwa semuapemeluk agama akanmasuk dan
hidup berdampingan di surga.
… that all religions are the same, and because of this, the truth of religion
is relative; therefore, the people of religion may not claim that their re-
ligion is exclusively true, while others are false. Religious pluralism also
teaches that all people of all religions will be rewarded in the hereafter
and that they will live there side by side.52
MUI also makes a distinction between pluralism and plurality. While it

regards “pluralism” as a school of thought ( faham), plurality is deemed a
social fact. Hence, while MUI acknowledges the fact that in particular states
or regions, various people of religions live side by side53 which is acceptable;
pluralism, as understood by MUI, has implications which they maintain
cannot be accepted in Islam. As for liberalism, MUI took it to mean liberal
understanding and interpretations of religious texts (the Qur’ān and Sunna)
through reason per se, and which accepts religious doctrines only if they are
51 Ibid, 90.
52 Ibid, 91
53 Ibid, 91

compatible with reason.54 As far as secularism is concerned, MUI defines

it selectively to mean a separation of religious matters from worldly affairs
and in which religion rules only the relationship between human beings
and God, while the social relationship between people is solely based on
social agreement and no divine elements is involved.55
As for the legal basis (ketentuan hukum) of the legal opinion (fatwā), MUI
maintains that pluralism, liberalism, and secularism contradict Islamic
teachings. It assertively decided that they are forbidden (ḥarām) and that as
a consequence. Muslims are obliged to refrain from adopting these beliefs.
MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) does not deny the plurality of religious beliefs.
As far as it is concerned, Muslims do live with people of other faiths and
traditions and should maintain harmonious relationships with people of
other faiths but their interactions do not involve accepting and acknowledg-
ing any aspect of their faith and rituals.56
It is interesting to note that although MUI has defined its understanding
of pluralism, liberalism, and secularism in the legal opinion ( fatwā), the
legal opinion (fatwā) is also accompanied by a more elaborate explanatory
document called the explanation of the fatwā (penjelasan fatwā). In this
document, MUI for the second time explained the difference between
religious pluralism and a plurality of religions. According to MUI, the first
refers to a school of thought that regards all religions as the same and equal
which MUI equates to “relativism of religion.” As an analogy, MUI equates
the idea of religious pluralism to preference in choosing clothes in which
people can easily change depending on their preferences. A plurality, to
its mind, is different from pluralism since a plurality of religions means
diversity of religions. Plurality in MUI’s view is the law of nature (sunnatulla)
which cannot be rejected or avoided.
According to the ruling ( fatwā) and its accompanying document, the
aim of the ruling ( fatwā) is to reject and prevent the spread of relativism
of religions, namely the notion that truth is relative and not absolute, or
in other words, the idea that all religions contain equal truth. This legal
opinion ( fatwā) emphasizes that people of religions can claim the truth of
their respective religions without asserting that all religions are the same or
be involved in other religions’ rituals. However, it is acceptable to mutually
respect and create social harmony among people of different religions.57
54 Ibid, 91.
55 Ibid, 91.
56 Ibid, 92.
57 Ibid, 93-95.

As for secularism, both the legal opinion ( fatwā) and the accompany-
ing document, do not clearly explicate its meaning. The only reference to
secularism espoused by MUI is as follows:
Religious Secularism means separating worldly affairs from religious

affairs; religion is only used to govern private relationship (between hu-
man being) with God. Relationships between and among human beings
are based only on asocial agreement.58
Furthermore, it is stated:
Secularism and religious liberalism have deviated from Islamic teach-

ings and invited skepticism among Muslims on the Islamic faith and
shari’ā; they include relativism of religion, rejection of Divine law and
replacement of the law with a law which merely results from human
reasoning. This liberal interpretation of religion without any guiding
principles has led to the birth of permissivism (ibāḥiya) which affects
ethics and religious beliefs. Based on this reality, MUI is of the view that
a bold stand is urgently needed to respond to the proliferation of secular
and liberal thought in Indonesia. For this reason, MUI issued the fatwā
on secularism and liberalism.59
Inevitably, MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) has been met with vehement
criticisms, objections, considerations and even counter-arguments
among scholars and religious leaders in Indonesia.60 However, MUI has
stood its grounds on the basis that the legal opinion ( fatwā) is needed
58 This is my translation of original Indonesian version, states: “Sekularisme agama adalah

memisahkan urusan dunia dari agama; agama hanya digunakan untuk mengatur hu-bungan
pribadi dengan Tuhan, sedangkan hubungan sesama manusia diatur hanya dengan berdasarkan
kesepakatan sosial.” See penjelasan fatwā
59 It is my translation of original text from MUI’s document. The original text says: “Sekularisme
dan Liberalisme Agama yang telah membelokkan ajaran Islam sedemikian rupa telah menimbul-
kan keraguan umat terhadap akidah dan sya’riat Islam; seperti pemikiran tentang relativisme
agama, penafian dan pengingkaran adanya hukum Allah (sya’riat) serta menggantikannya
dengan hukum-hukum hasil pemikiran akal semata. Penafsiran agama secara bebas dan tanpa
kaidah penuntun ini telah melahirkan pula faham Ibahiyah (menghalalkan segala tindakan)
yang berkaitan dengan etika dan agama serta dampak lainnya.Berdasarkan realitas ini, MUI
memandang perlu bersikap tegas terhadap berkembangnya pemikiran sekuler dan liberal di
Indonesia.Untuk itu, MUI mengeluarkan fatwa tentang sekularisme dan liberalisme agama.”
60 For an example of book that views the fatwa critically, please refer to Abdurrahman Wahid
(ed), Kala Fatwa Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006).

to safeguard the faith and integrity of the community (umma). Its legal
opinion ( fatwā) has also successfully received strong support from
some Muslim groups which share its mode of thinking and justif ica-
tions. Furthermore, this legal opinion ( fatwā) clearly represents distinct
characteristics of conservatism. These are commonly distinguished by
their emotive and dogmatic adherence to a selective interpretation of the
Qur’ān and Sunna without engaging in reasoning or deliberation in the
face of competing ideas or challenges. Its traditionalistic and conservative
stance is affirmed by its attempt to dogmatically and emotively assert
and uphold the tradition it selects as the basis for legal opinion ( fatwā)
without explication. As Towler notes, this mode of thought is marked by a
certainty which is unquestioning, a feeling of security due to this certainty
because the stable, secure order is seen as something to be guarded and
cherished. The selective use of verses of the Qur’ān and Hadīth to ward
off opponents also functions to preserve their authority in the face of
challenges by opposing groups’ ideas. Religious sources are used without
careful explanation of the diversity of their meanings and the nuances of
interpretations. No attempt is made at explicating the context in which
the verses were revealed or how the Prophetic tradition (hadith) emerged.
Similarly, their specific socio-historical meaning and the universal values
underlying them are also neither elaborated nor distinguished. While the
relevance of the verses to the concepts they seek to disqualify are simply
unaddressed, the very understanding of the meaning of the concepts
targeted as un-Islamic by the legal opinion ( fatwā) are overlooked or
merely presumed. Hence, the relevance of the verses in addressing these
perceived threats is not given due consideration. The overriding concern
starkly featured in the legal opinion ( fatwā) is the literal application of
religious sources and traditions regardless of their ramifications. Thus, in
effect, the legal opinion ( fatwā) serves to delegitimize competing groups’
ideas and undermine their religious credibility while aff irming MUI
itself as the provider of the truth of Islam. It is pertinent to note that
competing groups’ views which the legal opinion ( fatwā) seeks to demol-
ish are asserted based on Islamic sources and traditions some of which
are similar to MUI’s. This means that they do not reject Islamic values
and principles in determining the relevance and compatibility between
these ideologies and the teachings and principles of Islam.61 However, as
61 Just an example of different interpretation of Qur’anic verses quoted by MUI to justify its
fatwa, see Mun’im Sirry, Polemik Kitab Suci: Tafsir Reformasi atas Kritik al-Qur’an terhadap
Agama Lain (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2013).

those interpretations in effect depart from MUI’s, they are disqualified

as un-Islamic or deviant.
Conservatism is thus clear from MUI’s conscious attempt to preserve its
traditionalistic religious perspective in the face of opposing ideas within
the society. Effectively, the legal opinion ( fatwā) serves to delegitimize
and silence ideas emanating from groups that call themselves liberal or
progressive and others advocating for inclusivism of religious views in
society. It functions to affirm and reinforce the power of MUI in opposition
to any change and reflects an alertness to press any attempt at innovation
back into the mold it has established. It avoids and dismisses all ques-
tions while insisting on putting them under lock and key of its custodial
authority. In doing so, MUI provides a conclusion in advance justified on an
already existing belief about a sanctified text rather than reasoning aimed
at discovering what is just and reasonable through engagement. It fits the
opponents view into a given, established presumption of what it deems as
Islamic or otherwise. In this way, MUI declares pluralism, liberalism, and
secularism as inconsistent with Islam. Verses selected from the Qur’ān
assume self-evident meanings without the need for careful explanation on
how they have been interpreted by commentators as well as the extent to
which they have been applied. Similarly, there are no concerted attempts
to analyze how the Prophetic tradition (hadīth) that are cited in support
the legal opinion ( fatwā) at issue. The same traits are manifested in the
complete negation of the complexity of thought bearing on these concepts
that have been advanced by Muslims as well as non-Muslim scholars. On
the contrary, the concepts are deemed self-evident maxims devoid of their
sophisticated nuances and variety of meanings in history.
MUI’s negative and ambivalent attitude towards reason and the stance it
takes in positioning grounds in opposition to faith in Islam further manifests
its traditionalist and conservative streak. The strong pejorative implication
on reason in its legal opinion (fatwā) on liberalism illustrates the point. Here
the reason is deemed as strongly associated with arbitrary understanding
and interpretation of religious texts. It is also equated with relativism and
the avoidance of ethical considerations. Such an attitude towards reason is
a stark feature of traditionalism and conservatism. It presumes that man’s
reasoning faculty is weak and can lead him astray from the correct path.
Instead of seeing reason as a tool for creating innovative ideas and discern-
ing religious teachings necessary for a man in the contemporary world,
traditionalism is evident in the caution and fear expressed on reason in
determining the teachings of Islam and its relevance to contemporary man
and society. Ideas fashioned in response to contemporary context based

on the use of reason in making sense of religious values and principles are
subject to grave doubt. Recourse to the Qur’ān is used, therefore, to reaffirm
the notion of infallible revelation that simultaneously renders engagement
with innovative ideas unnecessary given the limitations of reason. In this
mode of thinking, therefore, reason is perceived as inimical to fulfilling the
values enjoined by religion. Such a mode of thinking negates the possibility
of rethinking religious teaching in the light of present conditions.
In his study on legal opinion in contemporary Muslim society, especially
when referred to the case of legal opinion ( fatwā) in Saudi Arabia, Khaled
Abou el-Fadl associates legal opinion ( fatwā) with the nature of “despotic
government” in Saudi.62 In such situation, legal opinion ( fatwā) which po-
tentially disregards the position of other orientations has a tendency to be
authoritarian. In other words, Fadl distinguishes between the authoritarian
and authoritative.63 To some degree, MUI’s legal opinion (fatwā) about issues
discussed in the present study could be referred to as despotic and authori-
tarian ones. However, although MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) is despotic in
one sense, it cannot be entirely equated to the case of Saudi. In the case of
Saudi, legal opinion ( fatwā) is issued by a body which formally associated
with the state or by order of a ruler. In this sense, legal opinion ( fatwā) as a
form of interpretative despotism could be justified. MUI’s case is different as
MUI is not the government and its legal opinion (fatwā) cannot be regarded
as interpretative despotism, although MUI is appointed by the government.
Apart from the influence of traditionalism and conservatism, it is also
perhaps pertinent to highlight that MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) also reveals
streaks of group thinking which bear elements of utopian orientation.
The legal opinion ( fatwā) presumes the comprehensiveness of Islam as a
religion and the rejection of what are deemed ideas and ideologies which are
presumed to originate from the west including liberalism and secularism.
As Mannheim asserts:
Their thinking is incapable of correctly diagnosing an existing condition

of society. They are not at all concerned with what exists; rather in their
thinking, they already seek to change the situation that exists. Their
thought is never a diagnosis of the situation; it can be used only as a
62 See Khaled M. Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women
(London: Oneworld, 2001), Chapter 4.
63 For more elaboration on the authoritative and authoritarian, please refer to Khaled M Abou
El Fadl, The Authoritative and Authoritarian in Islamic Discourse: A Contemporary Case Study
(Dar al-Taiba, 1997).

direction for a change. In the utopian mentality the collective uncon-

scious, guided by wishful representation and the will to action, hides
certain aspects of reality. It turns its back on everything which would
shake its belief or paralyze its desire to change things.64
MUI’s def inition of pluralism and liberalism are symbolic rather than
intellectual, a common trait of utopian orientation. It has presumed that
these thoughts are western, atheistic and incompatible with Islam. Such a
view is also accompanied by a sense of holiness functions to safeguard the
social position of MUI as the authority of Islam while discrediting other rival
group’ thought that threatens its position. Its appeal to a comprehensive and
all-embracing interpretation of Islam justifies its self-sufficiency against
the encroachment of critical insights on these ideas by competing views.
The same mode of thinking is also evident in the MUI’s perception of
secularism. Essentially, its understanding of secularism involves the separa-
tion of state and religion. This type of perception is not uncommon among
Muslims in general. Azzam Tamimi’s assertions illustrate this point. In
his view, secularism is “due to the introduction of Western ways of think-
ing and judging and believing emulated by some Muslim scholars and
intellectuals.” Those intellectuals, according to Tamimi “have been unduly
influenced by the West and overawed by its scientific and technological
achievements.” In the light of this context, secularization or secularism
constitutes one of the most controversial issues facing the Muslim world.
Tamimi furthermore argues that secularization implies “the liberation
of politics from the authority of religious …” and it is also widely used to
refer to “a process aimed at the marginalization of Islam, or its exclusion
from the process of re-structuring society during both the colonial and
post-independence period.”65 MUI’s understanding of secularism resembles
this type of thought which is anti-West.
However, despite its currency, this view has been challenged as well as
developed by many others. Shaharudin Maaruf, for instance, argues that
rejection of secularism is a manifestation of utopian thinking amongst
Muslims as it in effect reject the reality of historical context which created
the need and the right of man to understand and manage the conditions of
life. Utopian thought in the rejection of secularism, he argues, is hostile and
64 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: Introduction to Sociology of Knowledge (London:

Routledge, 1991), 36.
65 Azzam Tamimi, “The Origin of Arab Secularism”, in Azzam Tamimi and John L. Esposito,
Islam and Secularism in the Middle East (London: C. Hurst and Co Publisher, 2000), 13.

contemptuous of the idea of a man confronting his life and adapting to it. In
his words, “To discredit the idea of man acting and struggling in a specific
historical context, utopian thinking opposed the idea to religion. Draw-
ing from its interpretation, utopian thinking identifies self-determinism
and human action with secularism and or secularization of anti-religion
character. The reason, empiricism, science and technology in association
with human action for self-determinism is portrayed as working towards the
overthrow of religion or replacing it, thus conferring the whole movement
with a blasphemous or irreligious character. Utopian thinking advocates a
philosophy of life reminiscent of medieval theology in which man is sup-
posed to be indifferent to the world, to be other-worldly; the world itself is
to be considered of lesser importance to the spiritual world or the world
hereafter.”66
Unlike MUI, the presumption of the meaning of secularism as a rejection
of the influence of religion in worldly life, numerous scholars differ in
this respect. For many, secularism has been understood as a separation
of church and state which does not affect the influence of religion in
society. In this sense, BrianTurner’s formulation would be relevant. He
distinguished secularism in two ways – political secularization and social
secularization.67 The first refers to “issue around the historical separation
of church and state” or “social differentiation by which we should look at
the specialization of the sub-systems of society around politics, culture,
the economy, religion and so forth.”68 The latter, on the other hand, simply
“refers to questions about practice and belief in everyday life.”69 Similarly,
the former Turkish first Islamist Prime Minister Nicmettin Erbakan, for
instance, maintains that “true secularism (separation of religion from the
state) should mean not only state autonomy but also religious autonomy
…” In his view, secularism has to respect the autonomy of religion, and by
doing so, it inherently carries the meaning of the absence of state interfer-
ence in religious matters. Erbakan also suggests that “the state should
not intervene in the religious sphere by attempting to regulate dress …
66 Shaharuddin Maaruf, Religion and Utopian Thinking among the Muslims of Southeast Asian
(Singapore: Department of Malay Studies, 2000), 11-12.
67 Bryan S Turner, “Islam, Public Religions and the Secularization Debate,” in Gabriele Marranci
(ed), Muslim Societies and the Challenge of Secularization: An Interdisciplinary Approach (New
York: Springer, 2010), 12.
68 Ibid, 12.
69 Ibid, 12.

alternatively, religious practice.”70 In its relation to religion in Muslim socie-

ties, Abdou-Filali Ansari opines that there is a difference in Muslim and
Western societies in dealing with secularism. While in Western experience,
secularism was preceded by religious reform, Ansari posits, in the context
of Muslim societies, secularism is adopted as a force for religious reform.71
Despite the existence of such competing discourse on secularism that re-
veals the complex dynamics and relationship with religion, the engagement
with them is absent within the ambit of MUI’s consideration underlying
its legal opinion ( fatwā). This situation in itself is unsurprising as “utopian
thinking does not enter into intellectual competition with rival ideas. It
simply withdraws moral and spiritual legitimacy from its rivals and deems
itself to be the fountain and conferring authority.”72 MUI’s exaggeration
of the threat of secularism to Muslim society is also unsupported by an
objective understanding of the sociological development of Indonesian
Muslims’ experience. Rather than experiencing secularization as MUI
identified, contemporary Indonesia is currently witnessing an enormous
wave of Islamisation as never before.
According to Nurcolish Madjid, secularization does not mean the ap-
plication of secularism as a closed ideology. Rather, secularization is a
sociological thought that refers to a process, while secularism is a closed
ideology that potentially creates distance between the self and the God.73
According to Madjid, “secularism and secularization are two different
contexts …” the one is ordered, and the other is forbidden. The one which
is prohibited is already apparent; that is “the application of secularism with
a consequence of negation of belief in God.” While the one which is ordered
are many, if Islam as a religion is carefully investigated it will reveal that
Islam is started by the process of secularization.74
Furthermore, Madjid also set the meaning of secularism as “liberating
development.” This liberation is urgently needed for Muslims as conse-
quence of Islam’s historical progress. It is inevitable that these historical
dynamics has made Islam to face a complicated situation. As a result,
70 John L. Esposito, “Introduction: Islam and Secularism in the Twenty-First Century”, in John
L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi (eds), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East (London: C. Hurst
& Co, 2002), 4-5.
71 As quoted in Nader Hashemi, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic
Theory for Muslim Societies (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
72 Karl Mannheim, Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: Introduction to Sociology of Knowledge
(London: Routledge, 1991), 8.
73 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), 221.
74 Ibid, 222.

many Muslims are no longer able to differentiate values that are thought
as Islamic, which is transcendental and which one is temporal.75 In such
a context, according to Madjid, secularization is not meant to be the ap-
plication of secularism and to change Muslims into secularists. However,
“it is aimed at regarding profane or worldly values as profane and worldly,
and liberating Muslim community (umma) from a tendency to regard them
as sacred.”76
The above discussion shows how MUI cited passages from the Qur’ān
and Hadith to strengthen its position against issues on examination. From
this fact, however, it can be asserted that the legal opinion ( fatwā) clearly
represents one important characteristic of conservatism, namely dogmatic
adherence to a selective interpretation of the Qur’ān and Sunna. As clear
from the above discussion, MUI showed a tendency to selectively, and not
comprehensively, interpret the Qur’ān for the purpose of strengthening
its version and at the same time disqualifying others’ interpretation and
understanding. As with the case of pluralism, it is worth noting that the
groups subjected to the legal opinion ( fatwā) also utilize the same Qur’anic
verses to justify their thought, as will be discussed in the next chapter.77
However, as those interpretations are not in accord with MUI’s understand-
ing of the same textual basis, they are deemed invalid.
The legal rulings ( fatwā) also def ies contextual interpretation and
application of religion which must change with changing contexts and
conditions. It fails to address the need to apply basic religious principles to
new ideas that have emerged and which have been rooted in contemporary
Muslims society. Such a legal opinion ( fatwā) rests on theology that is static
and assumes completion and finality. It is hence alienated and isolated
from current and living experiences of Muslims in Indonesia. The extent
of which the mode of thought depicted in the legal opinion ( fatwā) can
serve effectively in guiding the community based on a creative synthesis
between genuine religious traditions and contemporary knowledge and
experience is doubtful.
As a form of knowledge, the legal opinion ( fatwā) presented above
has strongly influenced Muslims’ discourse on religious pluralism and
attitudes towards other Muslim groups in Indonesia related to the subject
75 Ibid, 207.
76 Ibid, 207.
77 Just an example of different interpretation of Qur’anic verses quoted by MUI to justify its
fatwa, see Mun’im Sirry, Polemik Kitab Suci: Tafsir Reformasi atas Kritik al-Qur’an terhadap
Agama Lain (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2013).

of fatwā. It has been discussed somewhere, both from Islamic legal theory
and Indonesian legal system points of view, that legal opinion ( fatwā)
neither is a binding law nor does it have a forcing power for Muslims.
Even more fundamental, in the formal sense, legal opinion ( fatwā) is
not part of the hierarchy of the source of law in Indonesian legal system.
However, despite all these shortcomings, legal opinion ( fatwā) has been
very influential in shaping religious discourse in Indonesia and at the same
time govern Muslims’ attitude. In short, legal opinion ( fatwā) has played
its doctrinal role in imposing certain types of religious understanding on
the minds of ordinary Muslims. Indonesian Muslims’ attitudes toward
religious pluralism and other Muslim groups allegedly classified as deviant
have no constant presence. Rather, they resultof the dominant discourse
of religion assumed by religious elites and Islamic religious authorities
in the country. Legal opinion ( fatwā) provides a major medium of such
religious discourse.
As with any forms of knowledge, legal opinion ( fatwā) can play dual
function namely as a uniting force, on the one hand, and a dividing one,
on the other. As a uniting factor, legal opinion ( fatwā) as a form of social
construction can “bind individual and groups”78 who share membership in
a given community. In contrast, however, it can also serve as a catalyzing
force of fragmentation amongst social groups, especially when it assumes
the sanctity of religious truth.79 Also, given its power to determine religious
discourse which can be used as an instrument to impose and promote the
ideology of the group that advances it.
The legal opinion ( fatwā) has presented symbolic, verbal and dis-
cursive pressure against other Muslim groups. The discursive violence
has provided legitimacy for the ousting of groups that do not share the
same mode of thinking on Islam as MUI. While the holders of religious
authority should ideally forge harmonious and peaceful relationships
among groups within Islam, it has instead used the instrument of legal
opinion ( fatwā) to undermine it through its official authoritarian stance
on pluralism, liberalism, and secularism. The legal opinion ( fatwā) has
effectively legitimized tensions between competing groups within the
Muslim community.
78 Tim Dant, Knowledge, Ideology and Discourse: A Sociological Perspective (London: Routledge,
1991), 6.
79 Ibid, 1.

The Progressive Groups’ Response
On June 1, 2008, a number of pluralist activists in Jakarta aff iliated to

a group called National Alliance for the Freedom of Religion (Aliansi
Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama, AKBB) or marched along main
roads in Jakarta to commemorate and celebrate the birth of Pancasila,
the Indonesian state foundation, which is seen as a common platform for
plurality and diversity of Indonesian society. The march, meant to be a
peaceful action, culminated in violence.80 A group of people that were later
identified as the members of Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam)
attacked the marching group which left several prominent activists injured.
Many speculations related to the motives behind the violence emerged.
However, most related this incident to MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) that
deemed pluralism, liberalism, and secularism are forbidden (ḥarām).81
It is pertinent to highlight two issues relating to the legal opinion ( fatwā).
Firstly, the fatwā aims at guarding the unity of Muslim community (umma)
against division and dissent. It intended to serve as guidance for the Muslim
community in identifying, dealing with and anticipating any interpreta-
tions, discourses and practices of religion which are deemed to threaten
the purity of the faith potentially.82 Secondly, in doing so, the legal opinion
( fatwā) has also induced negative social repercussions that transcend the
domain of faith.83 Its negative impact has mainly affected members of the
community, many of whom are from the educated class who have the po-
tential to contribute to the development of the society. Moreover, such legal
opinion ( fatwā) has also adversely contributed to cultural stagnation and
80 Please refer to Ahmad Setiyaji, Tragedi Monas Berdarah (Jakarta: Semesta Investigasi, 2008).
81 Interview with Moh. Shofan, 29 May 2013, in Jakarta. Moh. Shofan is an activist and research
fellow at Paramadina Foundation. He was formerly a lecturer of Islamic studies at Muham-
madiyah University of Gresik, East Java. However, he was dismissed from the university after
he published his article on religious pluralism in a local newspaper. According to university
authority, Shofan’s article contradicts Islamic values, and on this basis his dismissal from the
university was done.
82 Tim Sekretariat Majelis Ulama Indonesia (ed), Mengawal Aqidah Umat, Fatwā MUI tentang
Aliran-Aliran Sesat di Indonesia (Jakarta: MUI-Pusat, 2009). See also Imam Subkhan, Hiruk Pikuk
Pluralisme di Yogya: City of Tolerance (Yogyakarta: Impulse, 2007), 31.
83 Dawam Rahardjo, “Dampak Fatwā MUI”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi
Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 2-4; and M. Guntur Romli, “Kekerasan Atas Nama
Fatwā”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute,
2006), 212-215. See also special report on social violence addressed to Ahmadiyah community
in Tempo Weekly Magazine, 5 May 2008 Edition.

human creativity.84 This chapter seeks to analyze the response of competing

ideas advanced by Muslim social groups and individuals which form the
object of the legal opinion ( fatwā). In so doing it will attempt to examine
their ideas as a function of the mode of thought of the groups concerned. The
implications of their ideas on the well-being of Indonesia’s plural society will
also be examined. To what extent the ideas espoused by these groups reflect
values that can creatively synthesize with religious traditions and facilitate
Muslims’ response to the changing social milieu and unprecedented social
changes that are taking place in Indonesian society, will also be discussed.
In prevailing discourse, pluralism, as defined by scholars, encompasses
social, political, and cultural domains. Raimundo Panikkar, a leading
authority in religious studies, for example, defines pluralism as “… the
awareness of the legitimate coexistence of systems of thought, life, and
action which on the other hand, are judged incompatible among themselves
…”85 Similarly, Diana L. Eck formulates pluralism as “the dynamic process
through which we engage with one another in and through our very deepest
difference.”86 Pluralism can also be viewed as an institution. Mohamed Fathi
Osman, for example, puts forward the view that pluralism is an institution
through which the acceptance of diversity takes place in a certain society.87
In modern society, pluralism also is what Abdulaziz Sachedina calls a
“catchword” for a new world order where many kinds of diversity exist88
and have even intensified; and therefore, attempts at encouraging religious
communities to accept pluralism is “vitally important.”89 Many believe that
pluralism is not an exclusively modern phenomenon. Speaking of religious
pluralism, Harold Coward argues that other than as “a particular challenge
facing world religions today,” religious pluralism has always been part of
the life of human beings.90 Similarly, Mahmoud Ayoub maintains that it
84 Husein Muhammad, Mengaji Pluralisme kepada Mahaguru Pencerahan (Bandung: Mizan,

2011), 63.
85 Raimundo Panikkar, “Philosophical Pluralism and Plurality of Religion”, in Thomas Dean
(ed), Religious Pluralism and Truth (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995), 34.
86 Diana L Eck, A New Religious America: How A Christian Country has Become the World’s Most
Religiously Diverse Nation (San Fransisco: Harper San Fransisco, 2001), 29.
87 Mohamed Fathi Osman, Islam, Pluralisme dan Toleransi Keagamaan: Pandangan al-Qur’an,
Kemanusiaan, Sejarah dan Peradaban (Jakarta: Democracy Project, 2012), 2.
88 Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 22.
89 David Ray Gruffin, “Religious Pluralism: Generic, Identist and Deep”, in David Ray Griffin
(ed), Deep Religious Pluralism (Louisville and Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 3.
90 Harold G. Coward, Religious Pluralism and the World Religions (Madras: Dr S. Radhakrishnan
Institute for Advance Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1983), 113. In the context of

is “a normal human situation,”91 which precedes the coming of Islam. As a

religion, Islam was revealed in a pluralistic situation where many previous
religions, faiths, and beliefs had been practiced by different peoples and
tribes in pre-Islamic Arabia.92As Islam did not emerge in a vacuum, and the
Qurʼān as the canon for Muslims also constitutes a historical response to the
social context of that period,93 the idea of pluralism and tolerance are also
integral to the Qurʼān as well as the Prophetic tradition (hadith), two most
fundamental Islamic sources on law and teachings. However, classical and
contemporary Muslim scholars are diversely divided regarding the Qur’anic
standing and formulation of religious pluralism both for inter-religious and
intra-religious contexts.94 In other words, Islam is a battlefield of competing
concepts and interpretations although these are based on the same textual
Western academia, pluralism is generally related to the work of Imannuel Kant and Jeremy
Bentham, see Pamela E. Klassen and Courtney Bender, “Introduction: Habits of Pluralism”, in
Courtney Bender and Pamela E. Klassen (eds), After Pluralism: Reimagining Religious Engage-
ment, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).
91 Mahmoud M Ayoub, “The Qur’an and Pluralism” in Roger Boase (ed), Islam and Global
Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and The Pursuit of Peace (Farnham and Burlington: Asghate
Publishing, 2010), 273-284.
92 See Ira M. Lapidus, A History of Islamic Societies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2002, 2nd Edition). See also, Mathew S. Gordon, The Rise of Islam (Westport: Greenwood, 2005).
On variety of tribes in the Arab world in the past and present, see Umar Ridho Kahhalah,
Mu’jam Qabail al-Arabiy (Beirut: Mu’asasat al-Risalah, 1995) five volumes. On general history
of Islam and specially history of pre-Islamic Arabia, see Hasan Ibrahim Hasan, Tarikh al-Islam
al-Siyasi wa al-Dini wa al-Thaqafi wa al-Ijtima’i (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahdlah al-Mishriah, 1992),
in four volumes. In 10 volume, Dr. Jawad Ali has treated the history of pre-Islamic Arabia very
extensively. See Jawad ‘Ali, al-Mufashal fi Tarikh al-‘Arab Qabla al-Islam 1-10 (Baghdad: Jami’ah
Baghdad, 1993, 3rd Edition).
93 In describing this situation, Ingrid Mattson calls it in a phrase of “God speaks to humanity”,
in which it also include “God hears and responds”. See Ingrid Mattson, The Story of the Qur’an:
Its History and Its Place in Muslim Life (Malden and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 2nd Edition),
chapter 1. The Qur’anic response to specific events is technically called as asbab al-nuzul, which
can literally and loosely be translated as the cause of revelation. A popular book on this subject
is written by Jalaludin al-Suyuthi (d.1505), Lubab al-Nuqul fi Asbab al-Nuzul (Beirut: Mu’asasah
al-Kutub al-Thaqafiah, 2002). See also Muhammad Abdul Adhim al-Zarqani, Manahil al-Irfan
fi Ulum al-Qur’an (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Arabi, 1995), especially chapter 5, 89-103.
94 For variety of views on Islam and pluralism, these two edited volumes provide important
and rich exchanges. Those are: Abdou Filali-Ansary and Sikeena Karmali Ahmed, The Challenge
of Pluralism: Paradigms from Muslim Contexts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009),
and Zulfikar Amir Hirji, Diversity and Pluralism in Islam: Historical and Contemporary Discourses
Amongst Muslims (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2010). See also Farid Esack, Qur’an, Libera-
tion& Pluralism: An Islamic Perspective of Interreligious Solidarity against Oppression (Oxford:
Oneworld Publication, 1997). For classical Muslim scholars views on pluralism, see Husein
Muhammad, Mengaji Pluralisme pada Mahaguru Pencerahan (Bandung: Mizan, 2011).

sources. The difference is conditioned by religious orientations or perspec-

tives of groups in responding to their socio-historical milieu.95
Debate on the meaning of pluralism in religious discourse abound. While
some scholars are of the view that it did not exist, others deem otherwise.
Yohanan Friedmann in tracing the evolution of concept and practice of
tolerance in Islam opined that the Qurʼān does not explicitly mention
the term “tolerance” (Ar. tasamuh).96 In a similar vein, Anis Malik Thoha
contends that the term pluralism is not known in Islamic vocabulary until
the beginning of the twentieth century. He argues that in classical literature
of Islam, the term ta’adudiya, an Arabic word for pluralism, was not found.97
Similarly, Adnan Aslan argues that in classical Islamic disciplines such as
theology (kalam), Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh), the topic of pluralism did not
to exist as an independent theme.98 However, the absence of this concept in
the basic terminology of pluralism in the Qurʼān or classical works does not
mean that the idea is non-existent in the Qurʼān.99 As Abdulaziz Sachedina
rightly argues “… the major argument for religious pluralism in the Qurʼān
is based on the relationship between private faith and its public projection
in the Islamic polity. Whereas in matters of private faith, the position of
the Qurʼān is non-interventionist, in the public projection of that faith,
the Qur’anic stance is based on the principle of coexistence, the willing-
ness of a dominant community to recognize self-governing communities
free to run their internal affairs and coexist with Muslims.100 According
to Sachedina, this Qur’anic formulation has been very fundamental in
leading the establishment of a pluralistic vision of Islam. In his words: “It
is important to keep in mind that without the Qur’anic endorsement of the
essential guiding principle of a religiously pluralistic society, namely the
acknowledgement of salvific value in other religions, the story of Islam’s
treatment of its religious minority throughout history would not have been
any different than Europe’s treatment of the non-Christian “other”.101
95 Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism and Human Rights (Gaines-
ville: University of Florida Press, 2001), 84.
96 Yohanan Friedmann, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam: Interfaith Relation in the Muslim
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
97 Anis Malik Thoha, Tren Pluralisme Agama (Jakarta: Perspektif, 2005), 181-183.
98 Adnan Aslan, Religious Pluralism in Christian and Islamic Philosophy: The Thought of John
Hick and Seyyed Hossein Nasr (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998), 186.
99 Ibid, 186.
100 Abdulaziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 23-24.
101 Ibid, 25.

Sachedina’s view is also held by many other Muslim scholars. Ahmad

S. Moussalli, for instance, posits that the Qurʼān has clearly mentioned the
basic principles of pluralism, among which is “the freedom to believe or not
to believe.”102 In agreement with this opinion, Mohsen Kadivar, an Iranian
pluralist intellectual also holds the view that the Qurʼān clearly “recognizes
people’s right to freely choose their religions while forcefully renouncing the
compulsion to impose specific religion on others.”103 While some scholars
mentioned above describe the principle of Islam and pluralism in very broad
terms, Abdou Filai-Ansary goes further to identify five principles that the
Qurʼān has laid with regard to pluralism. These are as follows: “each commu-
nity has been given a way of life and system of rules (content and methods); the
diversity of ways of life and systems of rules are a means of testing the capacity
of each community to face challenges; Had God willed it, He would have made
humanity a singular community; what is strongly encouraged is competition
in doing good –not fighting about differences and lastly, God is the final
arbiter, and it is He who will uncover the ultimate truth behind the difference
between communities (at the end of time)”.104 Since Qur’anic formulations are
normative, Filali-Ansary has attempted to relate these principles in a parallel
way to contemporary society as follows: that “diversity is a fact and ought to
be accepted as such, emphasis to compete to do good things in life; that the
various forms of life are like experiments for building the good life; (e)each
community should make the best of its customs and habits; no community
can claim to possess ultimate, most valuable form of life and lastly, “the final
words on these matters cannot be determined in history”.105 In asimilar vein,
Roger Boase identifies certain principles of interfaith derived from the Qurʼān,
such as a) that Islam does not impose coercive approach in spreading its faith;
b) ridiculing other beliefs is forbidden in Islam; c) the Qurʼān also forbids
Muslims to associate with those who ridicule their religion.106
102 Ahmad S. Moussalli, The Islamic Quest for Democracy, Pluralism and Human Rights (Gaines-
ville: University of Florida Press, 2001), 84.
103 Mohsen Kadivar, “Freedom of Religion and Belief in Islam,” in Mehran Kamrava (ed), The
New Voice of Islam, Reforming Politics and Modernity: A Reader (London and New York: I.B. Tauris,
2006), 120.
104 Abdou Filali-Ansary, “Introduction: Theoretical Approaches to Cultural Diversity,” in Abdou
Filali-Ansary and Sikeena Karmali Ahmed (eds), The Challenge of Pluralism: Paradigms from
Muslim Contexts (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press and Institute for the Study of Muslim
Civilizations, Aga Khan University, 2009), 4.
105 Ibid, 5
106 Roger Boase, “Ecumenical Islam: A Muslim Response to Religious Pluralism”, in Roger
Boase (ed), Islam and Global Dialogue: Religious Pluralism and The Pursuit of Peace (Farnham
and Burlington: Asghate Publishing, 2010), 247-266.

These universal principles are the values which are fundamental for Mus-
lim societies in their treatment of other communities of belief. Empirically, it
finds evidence in the practice of tolerance in the early history of Islam with
the establishment of the Muslim community at Medina under the supremacy
of Constitution of Medina (Sahifa Madina) which guaranteed the rights of
members of the community regardless of their status and religions.107 On
par with this historical precedent is Islam’s treatment of other religious
communities which are popularly referred to as ahl al-‘ahd that consists
of the people who are legally protected by Islamic law (ahl al-dhimma),
people of armistice (ahl al-hudna), and people who are guaranteed security
by state (ahl al-amni). The most popular among all these is the concept
of ahl al-dhimma which broadly refers to non-Muslim members of com-
munity entitled to Muslim rulers’ protection under certain conditions.108
More specifically, ahl al-dhimmy is often described as part of the political
compromise made between the ruling authorities and minority groups
that became subjected to the Muslim sovereign. Anver Emon concludes
that the protection (dhimmy) rules “were a legal expression of the way in
which the Muslim polity contended with the fact of diversity and governed
pluralistically.”109
The historical precedence leaves little doubt that the idea of pluralism is
part of the essential teaching of Islam. In complex contemporary societies,
the importance of pluralism cannot be underestimated. Hence, Ansary
sees an urgency “to address diversity in new ways, and to explore a new
approach to pluralism.” The positive attitude of agencies in understanding
religious pluralism in history has a bearing on the freedom of religion and
its practice today given the complexity of modern society. Hence Mohamed
Talbi, a respected Tunisian intellectual, maintains that “… today religious
liberty is, as a matter of fact, definitely rooted in our social life … Moreover,
we already live in a pluralistic world, and our world is going to be more and
more pluralistic in the near future. In this new world, which is expanding
107 Maher Y. Abu-Munshar, “The Compatibility of Islam with Pluralism: Two Historical
Precedents”, Islam and Civilisational Renewal, Vol. 1, Issue 4, July 2010, 613-628. Compare to
Muhammad Said Ramadhan al-Buti, “Mu’amalat daulah al-Islamiyyah li ghair al-muslimin:
al-Quds namudhajan,” Journal of Islamic Jerusalem Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, (1999), 4-5.
108 See Bat Ye’or, The Dhimmi: Jews and Christians Under Islam (Cranbury: Associated University
Presses, 1985). For a comparison, see Abdul Rahman Awang, The Status of Dhimmi in Islamic
Law (Kuala Lumpur: International Book Service, 1994).
109 Anver M. Emon, Religious Pluralism and Islamic Law: Dhimmi and Others in the Empire of
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4.

rapidly before our eyes, there is no longer room for exclusiveness. We have
to accept others as we are. Diversity is the law of our time …”110
Competing Religious Ideas and Orientation
Contrary to ideas on Islam and pluralism discussed above, MUI’s legal

opinion ( fatwā) has denounced pluralism as incompatible with Islam. Such
reflections on religious pluralism are completely overlooked or negated
in the legal opinion ( fatwā) on pluralism which essentially contradicts
contemporary realities and social fact. As discussed in Chapter II, legal
opinion ( fatwā) is a form of interpretation of principal religious sources
and traditions about specific issues or problems confronting Muslims in the
contemporary period. Studying the mode of thought or religious orienta-
tions of groups which formulate legal opinion ( fatwā) is vital in avoiding the
reductive view of legal opinion ( fatwā) reflects a “pure form” or “true Islam.”
As a mode of thinking, the legal opinion ( fatwā) espoused by MUI can be
seen as a conscious attempt by the agencies that formulate it to conserve
and preserve the integrity of its system of thought and values and secure it
against the encroachment of rival or competing ideas. Under the sanctity
of religion, it claims the completeness of its thought as justification for self-
sufficiency while at the same time dereligionizing its opponents’ ideas. In
many ways, this group’s thought is marked by conservatism and utopian ele-
ments in contrast to the progressive mode of thinking of competing groups
and ideas they espouse within Indonesia. For the purpose of the thesis, these
competing groups thought are referred to as progressive. Characterizing
a group’s thought as progressive requires theoretical clarification. While
some scholars such as Omid Safi, for example, identifies such evaluative
concept on the basis of ideas advocated on issues such as gender equality,
democracy, and pluralism,111 the characteristics utilized here include ideas
and perspective distinguished for their inclusiveness, respect for diversity
and tolerance, emphasis on commonalities of belief and principles, universal
humanism based on absolute morality, social dimension of religion, respect
for pluralism in religious thought, respect for the dignity of the individual,
freedom of belief and thought, significance of reason in understanding and
application of religious teachings, belief in distinction between universal
110 Mohamed Talbi, ibid, 107.

111 Omid Safi, “Introduction”, in Omid Safi (ed), Progressive Muslims on Justice, Gender and
Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 2003), 1-32.

principle and value of religion and historically determined expressions of

religiosity, accommodation and assimilation of new ideologies deemed
compatible with Islam.
In the Indonesian context, these distinct traits associated with progres-
sive mode of thought are seen as threats against the dominant understand-
ing of Islam. MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) is an example of direct challenge
and attack against such mode of thinking and social groups which have
resulted in serious social repercussions including pejorative labeling and
demonizing. Among these groups are Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam
Liberal, JIL),112 Paramadina,113 and many other civil society groups that share
common visions with them. Factually, both before and after the issuance of
legal opinion ( fatwā), these groups have developed counter-discourses to
challenge exclusivist and conservative tendencies of Indonesian Muslims
based on Islamic religious sources and traditions. While MUI’s legal opinion
( fatwā) have marginalized and delegitimized them within the context
of popular Muslim discourse in the country, they continue to lead in the
realm of ideas in the discourse on Islam and contemporary issues such
as pluralism, liberalism, and secularism. Though the whole range and
development of progressive thought in contemporary Indonesia extends
beyond the birth and ascendancy of groups such as Liberal Islam Network
(Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL) which began in the 2000s, this development
has been misleadingly attributed to this group.114 This identification is inac-
112 For comprehensive study on different aspects of Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), please refer to
Nicolaus Teguh Budi Haryanto, Islam and Liberalism in Contemporary Indonesia: The Political
Ideas of Jaringan Islam Liberal, Master Thesis, Ohio University, 2003; Ahmad Ali Nurdin, “Islam
and State: A Study of the Liberal Islamic Network in Indonesia, 1999-2004”, New Zealand Journal
of Asian Studies 7, 2 (December, 2005): 20-39; Ahmad Bunyan Wahib, “Jaringan Islam Liberal:
Towards Liberal Islamic Thought in Indonesia”, Profetika, 2004; Muhammad Ali, “The Rise of
the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Indonesia”, The American Journal of Islamic
Social Sciences 22: 1, 1-27; Zuly Qodir, Islam Liberal: Paradigma Baru Wacana dan Aksi Islam
Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003); Sohirin Mohammad Solihin, Emergence and
Development of Liberal Islam in Indonesia: A Critical Evaluation (Kuala Lumpur: IIUM Press,
2009); Haidar Bagir, “Islib Butuh Metodologi”, Republika, 20 Maret 2002.
113 On Paramadina Institute, please refer to Ahmad Gaus AF, Api Islam Nurcholish Madjid:
Jalan Hidup Seorang Visioner (Jakarta: Penerbit Kompas, 2010), especially chapter 9, 148-175.
114 There is a tendency among Islamist groups in Indonesia to equate all progressive groups into
one single entity. For example, although Jaringan Islam Liberal, better known as JIL, is only one
group, other progressive groups would be labeled as JIL, although factually they are not part of
JIL. On criticism and the tendency to regard all progressive-liberal groups as one, some books
on liberal Islam by conservative groups or individual can be easily found. For example, Adian
Husaini and Nuim Hidayat, Islam Liberal: Sejarah, Konsepsi, Penyimpangan dan Jawabannya
(Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2002); Adian Husaini, Membedah Islam Liberal: Memahami dan

curate and misleading since JIL constitutes one among many other Muslim
groups that uphold and is committed to the importance of pluralism, and
have been struggling to disseminate this belief throughout the modern
history of Indonesia. The proponents of religious pluralism, liberalism and
secularism in Indonesia can be found in many Islamic social groups exist
In his study, Budhy Munawar-Rachman, a very close disciple of the late
Nurcholish Madjid, a prominent Muslim reformer in Indonesia, identifies
a number of progressive Muslim circles that share common concerns on
religious pluralism and liberalism. Other than Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL),
they include Institute of the Study of Islam and Philosophy (Lembaga Studi
Agama dan Filsafat, LSAF), The Paramadina Foundation (Yayasan Parama-
dina), International Institute for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), Perhimpunan
Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M), The Wahid Institute,
Maarif Institute, Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network (Jaringan
Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah, JIMM), Lakpesdam NU, Institute of
the Study of Islam and Social (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial, LKIS),
Kalijaga State Islamic University of Yogyakarta and Syarif Hidayatullah
State Islamic University of Jakarta.115 It is also pertinent to note that while
these groups share common concerns on these issues, variations in their
social background and ideological affiliation exist. These conditions impact
their thought on specific issues.
On Diversity and Tolerance
The Problem of Semantic Confusion
Since MUI’s fatwā on pluralism, secularism and liberalism has directly

been addressed to progressive Muslim groups; the legal opinion ( fatwā)
has become one of the most important topics discussed and responded by
Menyikapi Manuver Islam liberal di Indonesia (Bandung: Syamil Cipta Media, 2003); Adnin
Armas, Pengaruh Kristen-Orientalis terhadap Islam Liberal: Dialog Interaktif dengan Aktivis
Jaringan Islam Liberal (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2003). Budi Handrianto, 50 Tokoh Islam
Liberal Indonesia: Pengusung Ide Sekularisme, Pluralisme, dan Liberalisme Agama (Jakarta:
Hujjah Press, 2007).
115 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam: Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan
Pluralisme (Jakarta: Paramadina and LSAF, 2010); and Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme:
Islam Progresif dan Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010). For variety of progres-
sive Muslim groups in Indonesia, please refer to Imam Tolkhah and Neng Dara Affiah (eds),
Gerakan Keislaman Pasca Orde Baru: Upaya Merambah Dimensi Baru Islam (Jakarta: Balitbang
Departemen Agama RI, 2007).

these groups.116 The factor combined with their positive attitude toward
diversity and pluralism and their inclination to promote tolerance has led
them to reject and to criticize the fatwā severely. At the same time, they have
also offered alternative understanding that challenges MUI’s conception.
The most fundamental response to the legal opinion ( fatwā) is the
critique of MUI’s simplified understanding and conception of pluralism.
In contrast to MUI’s assumption of pluralism as “unity of religion” or the
belief that all religions are the same, which in their understanding is unac-
ceptable in Islam, these competing groups maintain that pluralism is not a
philosophy which regards all religions as one and the same, since it is clear
that from the very beginning, all religions are inherently distinctive. In
other words, pluralism takes the reality of difference as its starting point.
The aim is not to obliterate these differences or celebrate the diversity. It
is to find ways of living with these differences. In this view, differences
cannot be taken as a reason for being hostile to nor merely tolerating one
another. Rather, paradigms and principles must be worked out to allow
for the creation of a harmonious society despite differences and disagree-
ments not only between but within religious communities.117 In this sense,
these competing ideas reveal MUI’s partial and selective understanding
of pluralism and its implications for the well-being of plural society.118 Its
understanding of pluralism as unity suggests a type of thought that paral-
lelizes pluralism with syncretism, which does not objectively capture the
thinking of competing ideas that are the target of the legal opinion ( fatwā).
116 Among many responses, a systematic attempt was made by Yayasan Paramadina and Lem-
baga Studi Agama dan Filsafat (LSAF). They compiled the response of progressive intellectuals in
Indonesia to the fatwā on pluralism, liberalism and secularism. This compilation has resulted in
two big volumes containing views of prominent progressive Muslims from diverse background.
These volume is the first comprehensive work on the subject. In addition some other works
are also produced to accompany this work. Those works are: Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed),
Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme
(Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1 and 2; Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi
Pembaruan Islam: Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme (Jakarta: Paramadina and Lembaga
Studi Agama dan Filsafat, 2010); Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan
Pluralisme: Islam Progresif dan Perkembangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010); Budhy
Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Pluralisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo, 2010); Budhy
Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo, 2010); and
Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Sekularisme (Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo, 2010).
I take benefit from all these works in identifying the response of progressives to the fatwā.
117 Maman Imanul Haq Faqih, Fatwā dan Canda Gus Dur (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 149. See also
Masdar Farid Mas’udi, “Tentang MUI dan Fatwā Kontroversialnya”, in Ahmad Suaedy (ed), Kala
Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 132.
118 Ibid.

Another significant aspect of the meaning of religious pluralism em-

phasized within this competing mode of thinking is inclusive thinking
justif ied by theology. Jalaluddin Rakhmat’s explication of the concept
illustrates the point. He maintains that pluralism is not about smoothing
out differences in religion to ensure sameness or unity of religions.119 Rather,
it is an idea that regards all religions have anequal opportunity to achieve
salvation which in academic term is known as soteriology. Integral to this
understanding of pluralism is the fundamental acknowledgment of the
salvatory value of various religious paths, instead of merely a single path or
a single understanding within that one path to God. This clearly opposes
dominant view strongly implied in MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) that salva-
tion is just for the Muslims.120 Such competing mode of thinking directly
opposes the legal opinion ( fatwā) which denies the soundness or divinity
of other religious traditions.
Furthermore, within this mode, commonalities in the realm of values
between all religious traditions are not only strongly cherished but pro-
vide a pertinent basis for practices that can contribute to meaningful
engagement and co-existence. Universal values such as commitment to
humanity, equality, social justice, concern for the environment, rendering
aid to the weak, needy, the poor and the oppressed and many other virtues
found in most religions provide the basis upon which concrete institutions
can be realized.121 Consequently, rather than uniting religion in one single
entity, pluralism means seeking common platforms and values for human
development and progress among different religious traditions. Hence, in
this mode of thinking, the concept of common bonds (kalimatun sawāʼ’) or
meeting point with other faiths, which is built on the foundation of Islamic
faith (tawhīd), the oneness of God is overriding. Such an understanding is
believed will provide strong encouragement for people of diverse religious
119 Although it is rarely the case that Shi’ism in Indonesia is associated with liberalism, the fact
that Jalaluddin Rakhmat is often classified as a liberal Muslim thinker, both before and after
his affiliation to Shi’ism, could possibly affect general Muslims’ perception of the parallelism
between them. In general, both “liberal” and “Shi’a” are two termsused in a pejorative sense by
general Muslims in Indonesia. Therefore, with or without the “liberal” label, Shi’ism is already
perceived in negative ways.
120 Jalaluddin Rakhmat, “Percakapan dengan Jalaluddin Rakhmat” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman
(ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme
(Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 813. See also Jalaludin Rakhmat’s work on Islam
and pluralism which examines important basis of pluralism in Islam in many aspect, Islam dan
Pluralisme: Akhlak Qur’an Menyikapi Perbedaan (Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2006).
121 M. Amin Abdullah, Dinamika Islam Kultural: Pemetaan Atas Wacana Islam Kontemporer
(Bandung: Mizan, 2000), 75-79.

traditions to harness, share and develop commonalities with one another

towards common good rather than accentuate differences.122 Recourse
to this ideal allows for the concretization of religious pluralism on an
exoteric level such as in the social dimension rather than confined merely
to the esoteric level of theological discourse or rituals or doctrines. In
short, the meaning of unity of religions within this mode of thought
strongly entails the idea of universal humanism, since it is premised
on the belief that all religions do not dispute on what is fundamentally
ethically good or bad.123
The distinction and meaning accorded by MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā)
also strongly connotes that pluralism (pluralisme) is distinguished from
plurality (pluralitas), as the former refers to specific ideology, “faham” or
“aliran” which in its view, has a tendency to combine different religious
tradition into one single entity or practice; while the latter refers to social
fact of diversity be it religiously, socially, politically or culturally which is
integral to all human societies. Based on such a concept, therefore, it asserts
that pluralism is contradictory to Islam. In contrast, competing mode of
thought challenges this distinction as arbitrary, and has a tendency to over-
look pluralism contained within religious texts and traditions. Rachman’s
argument illustrates the point. In his view, pluralism is closely intertwined
with aplurality, as pluralism is the actualization of theplurality of society.124
Pluralism as an understanding of diversity or plurality is inseparable from
the diversity or plurality itself as both are inexorably linked.125
The progressives’ responses to the meaning of pluralism as mentioned
above clearly underlines the point that intellectual capacity is crucial in
providing a clear and objective understanding of issues of significance in the
religious life of the community. This is in stark contrast to MUI’s explana-
tion of fatwā (penjelasan fatwā) in which it stipulated that the concepts
of pluralism, liberalism and secularism are empirical and not intellectual
definitions. This type of reasoning reveals a clear attempt to distance itself
from engaging in an intellectual exchange that is vital in clarifying these
concepts. MUI and its opponents provide an interesting case of difference
of meaning accorded by groups to the idea of pluralism which has serious
122 Azyumardi Azra, “Toleransi Agama dalam Masyarakat Majemuk: Perspektif Muslim
Indonesia” in Elza Peldi Taher (ed), Merayakan Kebebasan Beragama: Bunga Rampai 70 Tahun
Djohan Effendi (Jakarta: ICRP and Kompas, 2009), 18.
123 Ibid, 18.
124 Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Pluralisme
(Jakarta: Penerbit Grasindo, 2010), xlix.
125 Dawam Rahardjo, “Kala MUI Mengharamkan Pluralisme”, Koran Tempo, 01 August 2005.

social consequences on the lives and well-being of individuals and groups

within and between religious communities. MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā)
does not merely ignore the broader understanding of pluralism such as
socio-cultural aspects; it is also simplistically presumed that the concept
refers to themixing of teachings of different religions that will obliterate the
truth about Islam. It is also presumed to mean that certain teachings and
traditions of specific religions must be altered or adjusted to accommodate
doctrines of other religions.126 This popular misunderstanding of the concept
of pluralism in Indonesia is clearly reflected in MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā).
Challenging Authoritarian
Competing ideas against religious orthodoxy exemplified by MUI’s legal

opinion (fatwā) also addressed the issue of authoritarianism in perspectives
and ideas on religion among Indonesian Muslim religious leaders. They
perceive the legal opinion ( fatwā) as strongly exemplified by elements of
oligarchy and monopoly in the interpretation of religious doctrines. Assum-
ing itself as the fountain and conferring authority of moral and spiritual
legitimacy, MUI’s orientation renders Islam losing its liberating characteris-
tics. In this respect, the progressive mode of thinking emphasizes firmly the
belief that Islam should not rest on the meaning defined by custodians who
do not uphold or champion religion on intellectual grounds. On the contrary,
Muslims should have equal freedom to interpret their religion. Religious
texts and experiences in their view are multifaceted and inevitably admit
a multitude of interpretations. Furthermore, Islam within this mode of
thought does not impose conditions based on the status of the interpreters,
but more on the social impact of the interpretations, especially in bringing
benefit (maslaḥa) for human beings. This, they maintain, is the ultimate
criterion of religious laws or legal opinion ( fatwā) and not how textually
sophisticated and well-crafted they are. If the legal opinion ( fatwā) creates
public unrest or triggers violence and social tensions among members of the
society, it defeats its fundamental purpose in contributing to the well-being
of people who are subjected to it.127 That MUI has also restricted the scope of
the Qurʼān in its legal opinion ( fatwā) based on its selective interpretation
126 See Imam Subkhan, Hiruk Pikuk Pluralisme di Yogya: City of Tolerance (Yogyakarta: Impulse,
2007), 28.
127 Abd Moqsith Ghazali, “Oligarki Penafsiran Agama”, Dawam Rahardjo, “Dampak Fatwā
MUI”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute,
2006), 23-26.

with adverse without recourse to theeffect of legal opinion ( fatwā) in society

on others, is also highlighted by competing groups.128
In this progressive mode of thought, there is no exclusive authority in
interpreting and understanding the Qurʼān or that the Qurʼān can only be
read by official religious authority. Lessons from Muslim history are cited in
support of their claim whereby all leaders of Sunni legal schools of thought
(Hanafi, Malik, Shafi’i and Ahmad ibn Hanbal) derived their authorities as
leader (imam) not from the state, but from the recognition of the community
(umma).129 In this context, progressive thought critically argued that MUI’s
demonstration of its position as the sole custodian of Islamic religious
authority negates the plurality of thought within Islam and the multitudes
of dimensions of religious experiences, thought, and interpretations which
the scriptures and traditions upheld,130 since Islam is a religion which pays
attention to all dimensions of life. Domination in the interpretation of
religion through conferring upon oneself the sole and legitimate authority
on Islam is viewed within competing mode of thought as opening the door to
religious authoritarianism at the expense of being authoritative. The denial
or discrediting of rival ideas of religious legitimacy by declaring them as
un-Islamic or deviant without intellectualbasis reinforces the political mo-
tives in their orientation.131 While the idea of the authoritative is commonly
associated with wisdom, tolerance, and inclusiveness, authoritarianism is
characterized by the lack of intellectual interest and the desire to assert
power using any possible methods and medium.132
In the Indonesian context, it might be debated whether or not MUI is
granted with authority overruling on religious issues in the country. How-
ever, the “imagined authority” it resorts to position itself as the authoritar-
ian voice that claims the right to define the validity of interpretations of
religion; while at the same time suppressing others who uphold different
philosophical or epistemological basis to it. Furthermore, progressives relate
the authoritarian nature of MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) to the fact that the
128 Ibid, 23-26.

129 Masdar Farid Masudi, “Perbincangan dengan Masdar Farid Masudi,” in Budhy Munawar-
Rachman (ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan
Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1180.
130 Farid Mas’udi, “Tentang MUI dan Fatwā Kontroversialnya”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds),
Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 132.
131 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, “Percakapan dengan Budhy Munawar-Rachman” in Budhy
Munawar-Rachman (ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme,
Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, lix.
132 Budy Munawar-Rachman, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, lix

legal opinion ( fatwā) has ignored fundamental social considerations which

must be seriously taken into account before a legal opinion (fatwā) is finally
issued.133 Also, the fact that Islam does not have a clergy system implies that
no single religious body in Islam is privileged to subordinate any kinds of
interpretations offered by other Muslim groups.134 Although some individuals
within competing groups of activists do not reject religious authority in a
paternalistic society governed by patron-client relations such as in Indonesia,
they nevertheless maintain that intellectual ability of the authority is the
only basis for its justification failing which authoritarianism in religious
understanding and thought will prevail to the detriment of the well-being
of members of the community. In other words, the holders of authority have
to be authoritative and at the same time refrain from being authoritarian.135
Such a conviction from theprogressive wing is strengthened by the fact
that MUI has failed to evaluate and examine the concepts it declares as
forbidden (ḥarām) in its legal opinion ( fatwā). Fatwā-making is a serious
intellectual endeavor or legal reasoning (ijtihād). Hence, MUI should have
examined the issues and the implications it bears on society very deeply
and seriously. For progressives, the reasons which MUI proposed in labeling
pluralism, liberalism, and secularism as forbidden (ḥarām) does not reveal
depth in understanding the diversity of thought within the scriptures and
contemporary ideas bearing on the problem as well as their relevance for
Indonesian Muslims and non-Muslims as a whole. Rather than an intellec-
tual endeavor, it is much more motivated by hatred and political competition
with particular groups within MUI.136 While MUI’s members may have the
capacity to determine the issues at stake objectively, MUI’s legal opinion
(fatwā) is marred by its strong ideological stance at the expense of objectivity
in dealing with richness and variety of religious expressions in Indonesia.137
M Syafii Anwar, the director of International Centre for Islam and Pluralism
(ICIP) in Jakarta, agrees that the legal opinion ( fatwā) is partly motivated by
133 Interview with Moh. Shofan, Jakarta, 29 May 2013.

134 Interview with Khoiruz Zimam, Gresik, 5 June 2013. Khoiruz Zimam is a progressive-minded
Muhammadiyah activist in Gresik, East Java, and a strong supporter of JIMM. Interview with
Moh. Shofan, Jakarta, 29 May 2013.
135 For a more detailed discussion on these concepts, read Khaled M Abou El Fadl, Speaking in
God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women (London: Oneworld Publication, 2001).
136 Ahmad Suaedy, “Perbincangan dengan Ahmad Suaedy,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed),
Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme dan Sekularisme
(Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 163-164.
137 Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin, “Perbincangan dengan Siti Ruhaini Dzuhayatin,” in Budhy
Munawar-Rachman (ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism,
Liberalisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1498.

a political factor. The legal opinion ( fatwā), he maintains, has been capital-
ized by Muslim hardliner groups for the sake of their interest, or in themore
exact phrase, for the sake of political interests of thecertain religious group.138
Progressives and Social Harmony
Progressives criticized MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) from the point of view of
social and interreligious harmony in a pluralistic Indonesia. In their view,
rather than creating harmony among different social groups in a plural
Indonesia, MUI has been actively fuelling the fire of disharmony and tensions
among them. MUI’s legal opinion (fatwā) has played adeterminant role in
creating socio-religious destabilization of the country 139 and deterioration of
religious harmony. No less than the late Abdurrahman Wahid agreed with
this. In his view, the legal opinion ( fatwā) on the ban of pluralism is a great
irony.140 While ideally MUI, consisting of scholars with different background
and orientations, has the strong potential to play a mediating role for various
and contradicting religious views, it has instead partially taken the side of
particular groups at the expense of others141 incurring in the process of severe
intra-community conflicts. From this perspective, the legal opinion ( fatwā)
is clearly an error since it fails to internalize the realities of plurality that have
been integral to human life and experience. Other groups have concurred
with the view that the legal opinion ( fatwā) has created afurther negative
consequence for intra-religious harmony in Indonesia as well as the larger
society more generally.142 The issuance of such a controversial legal opinion
( fatwā) has contributed to impose risks and vulnerability of certain social
groups which easily trigger and perpetuate demonizing and violence against
them. The legal opinion (fatwā) provides fuel to those who are already prone
to violence and serve as justification and legitimacy for their actions. It is
hard not to point MUI’s legal opinion (fatwā) as the fodder for the eruption
of social violence based on faith differences.143 Amin Abdullah, the former
138 M. Syafii Anwar, “Perbincangan dengan M. Syafii Anwar,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman

(Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1083.
139 Muhammad Irsyad, “Kritik Atas MUI”, http://islamlib.com/?site=1&aid=1421&cat=conten
t&title=reportase, accessed on 9 April 2013.
140 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Lain Zaman, Lain Pendekatan”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala
Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), xviii.
141 Interview with Fuad Fanani, Jakarta, 14 December 2012.
142 Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara, xxvii.
143 Masdar Farid Mas’udi, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The
Wahid Institute, 2006), 132.

rector of Sunan Kalijaga State theIslamic University of Yogyakarta, maintains

that legal opinion (fatwā) issued by religious institutions such as MUI should
consider both private and public dimensions that are inexorably linked
though different. Abdullah argues that legal opinion ( fatwā) should rigor-
ously and carefully consider kinds of social implications and consequences
it bears on human relationships and interactions among people of diverse
religious backgrounds. Religion is not solely a matter of doctrine but also
involves connecting, relating, respecting one another within and between
communities.144
Others also sanctioned the problem of neglect of the social implications
of legal opinion ( fatwā). Wahid, for instance, argued that MUI should have
played a role in assisting the government in finding solutions to alleviate
multidimensional problems that Indonesia is facing. However, it has instead
exacerbated the problem by its legal opinion ( fatwā) which has under-
minedrelations within the Muslim community in particular.145 The social
impact of MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) has even reached the Muslims in rural
areas, who though not severelyaffected by it, are nevertheless joining the
bandwagon in labeling, rejecting and severely blaming progressive groups
for threatening their faith and unity of the Muslims. The pejorative attacks
on liberal Islam illustrate the problem. The term “liberal” used by them is
strongly associated with the lack of piety, corrosion of religious belief and
devotion, and the absence of commitment to Islam as the sole religion for
Muslims. The labeling is intended to socially exclude those who have been
labeled as such. It creates a social stigma which obstructs acceptance into
thecommunity. According to Moh.Shofan of Paramadina Foundation, this
problem would not have deteriorated if not for MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā)
prohibiting pluralism, liberalism, and secularism.146Shofan himself is an
interesting case in point. In 2006, he was dismissed from his position as
a lecturer at a university, due to his piece in a local newspaper support-
ing pluralism. In the same way, Dawam Rahardjo lost his membership in
Muhammadiyah due to his pluralistic vision.147
144 M. Amin Abdullah, “MUI, Fatwā dan Otoritas Keagamaan di Indonesia”, in Ahmad Suaedy,
et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 47.
146 Interview with Moh. Shofan, 29 May 2013, in Jakarta.
147 For more detail data and discussion on this subject, please refer to my earlier study, Pradana
Boy ZTF, “In Defense of Pure Islam: The Conservative-Progressive Debate within Muham-
madiyah,” M.A. Thesis, Australian National University, 2007.

In Defence of Freedom of Thought
Another significant trait in the mode of progressive thought is the emphasis

given to the value of freedom of thought in Islam. Within this discourse, the
legal opinion ( fatwā) is perceived as transgressing this value by banning
certain kinds of thought. Hence, Ulil Abshar, the former coordinator of
JIL maintained that the legal opinion ( fatwā) is “the strangest fatwā” that
has ever been issued as it disqualifies certain ideas (gagasan) as forbidden
(ḥarām). Fundamental legal principles in Islamic legal theory, it is main-
tained, acknowledges that adult Muslims are morally responsible for their
deeds and thought (khitāb-u Llah-i al-muta’ālliq bi al-afʽāl al-mukallafīn).
He questions how ideas on pluralism, secularism, and liberalism can
be judged and forbidden.148 In the same vein, Mustofa Bisri, a respected
Nahdlatul Ulama’s religious scholar pointed out that as types of thought,
it is useless to forbid pluralism, liberalism, and secularism. Forbidding
these ideas, Bisri argues, is equal to banning people to think, which is
impossible. As opposed to banning, he strongly maintains that ideas should
be comparatively challenged with ideas. Furthermore, he contends that
ideas cannot be judged and tried until they have been implemented in the
forms of deeds and actions and their effects on people’s rights and interests
are analyzed.149Rejection and criticism to MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) in
defense of freedom of thinking are also expressed by Dawam Rahardjo. He
maintains the significance of the use of reason in religion. He argues that
banning thought is equal to restricting freedom of thought.150
The progressives also evaluated the legal opinion ( fatwā) on the basis
of the level of intellectual capacity of MUI. MUI through the legal opinion
(fatwā) has revealed to the public its partiality and limitations in reasoning.
Abdurrahman Wahid argued that the conservative thinking of MUI’s elites
is adverse to all segments of Indonesia as a nation.151 Rahardjo perceives that
the legal opinion ( fatwā) reflects MUI’s perception of Indonesian Muslims
148 Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Fatwā MUI dan Konservatisme Agama”, Media Indonesia, 3 August
2005.
149 Mustofa Bisri, “Fatwā MUI, Refleksi Ketidakpercayaan Diri: Wawancara dengan K.H.
Mustofa Bisri”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid
Institute, 2006), 253.
150 Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, Jakarta, 12 December 2012. See also Dawam Rahardjo,
“Dampak Fatwā MUI”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwā Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid
Institute, 2006), 2-4.

as weak in preserving their identity in all sense of the term. Since they
are weak and unable to withstand cultural elements that are constantly
impacting upon them in the pluralistic society in which they live, MUI’s
sees the need to protect them from these potential threats that would
undermine and threaten their identity. However, MUI’s very response as
exemplified in its legal opinion ( fatwā) is revealing of its insecurities and
limitations in facilitating the community towards assimilating and adapting
to the processes of change constantly impacting upon Indonesian society.
Rahardjo sees the legal opinion ( fatwā) as a strong indication of the lack
of confidence on the part of MUI in facing the realities of contemporary
influences presented in ideas such as liberal democracy.152
This phenomenon can also be attributed to the reluctance or hostility of
Muslim elites and masses in facing the impact of globalization. Muslims in
Indonesia are experiencing insecurity and anxiety in the midst of massive
social change. The lack of certainty and deterioration in the rule of law in
Indonesia has contributed to thelack of trust in government. The distrust
is clearly manifested in assertions for Islam as the basis for asolution to
the problems. In this context, legal opinion ( fatwā) has become a powerful
instrument in providing quick direction and path towards helping the Mus-
lims adjust to deal with issues that they are confronted with. Yet, MUI’s legal
opinion (fatwā) has impeded this serious challenge. Its legal opinion (fatwā)
has created a hostile attitude towards the reality of thesocio-cultural life of
the Muslims. Instead of harnessing modern concepts to facilitate Muslims’
adaptation to the modern world, the legal opinion ( fatwā) has instead
impeded the possibility of synthesizing and harmonizing the religious
traditions and values with relevant contemporary ideas that will create
and improve the well-being of Muslims.
Competing Ideas and Mode of Thinking on Liberalism
It is important to note that in the context of contemporary Indonesian

Islamic landscape, the term liberalism, and liberal Islam is often used and
understood synonymously. Hence, although liberalism is used more broadly
in scholarship to encompass other dimensions of society,153 MUI’s usage of
the term liberalism in its legal opinion ( fatwā) refers to the religious aspect
152 Interview with Dawam Rahardjo, 12 December 2012, Jakarta.

153 In fact, liberalism is not only related to religion, since this term can also be liberally applied
to any other field such as politics and economy. For discussion on the dynamics of liberalism as

or what it perceives as aliberal tendency in understanding Islamic doctrines

and traditions. This essentialist and monolithic meaning of the terms are,
however, incongruent with the broader meaning that has been delineated
within the discourse on liberalism in Indonesia which extends beyond the
domain of religion or theology. Munawar-Rachman’s delineation of the
concept is instructive. For him, liberals are those who: a) resist theocracy
and any ideas related to the establishment of an Islamic state; b) support
the idea of democracy; c) defend the rights of women; d) uphold the rights
of non-Muslims; e) defend the freedom of thought; and f) and strive for the
idea of progress.154
Moreover, it is pertinent to note that MUI’s usage of the term refers
essentially to ideas and understanding of Islam upheld by groups that differ
or depart from its selective interpretations or preference. It must be made
clear that as with the case of pluralism, those who are deemed liberals
or identify themselves as such, do not discard Islam as amajor source of
their philosophy. While they uphold competing views and orientations
on specific issues relating to the above, these are consciously supported
by recourse to religious sources and traditions. It is on this basis that the
competing groups whose views are targeted in the legal opinion ( fatwā)
base their responses to the very understanding of the term by MUI. For
example, liberalism in MUI’s concept is equated with permissiveness or
relativist ideology (al-ibaḥiyya).155 This equation is based on the presump-
tion that since that the core value of liberalism is freedom, it must admit
relativism. Interestingly, although both MUI and competing groups agree
that the core value of liberalism is freedom, the articulation of the term and
the expression of underlying meanings of the value by both parties differ.
MUI equates freedom with absolute freedom or freedom without restriction.
As such it assumes that liberalism allows people to do as they please without
bounds or restrictions. In other words, freedom is pejoratively perceived
as permissiveness.
In contrast, competing mode of thought perceives freedom as a positive
element of human beings and society. Liberalism within this mode has
a philosophical concept of freedom, see Ludwig von Mises, Liberalism (San Fransisco: Cobden
Press, 2002). Also Paul Kelly, Liberalism (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2005).
154 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Islam dan Liberalisme (Jakarta: Friedrich Nauman Stiftung,
2010), 26. It is important to note that by liberalism, it seems that MUI refers only to Islamic
liberalism, in spite of the fact that liberalism is not one. For this reason, in this chapter, the term
liberalism and liberal Islam will be used interchangeably.
155 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwā MUI Sejak 1975 (Jakarta: MUI Pusat and Penerbit
Erlangga, 2011), 93.

nothing to do with permissiveness. More accurately, Munawar-Rachman

perceives liberalism as a philosophy that seeks to extend the areas of
individual freedom and enhance social progress. It accords thehuman be-
ings right to thechoice subject to some basic principles,156 namely mutual
respect for the rights of the members of society and the rule of law. In line
with this conviction, liberalism emphasizes the cultivation of reason and
social awareness of individuals in fulfilling their obligations. It also aims at
building an independent society without excessive state intervention.157 It is
reiterated that these competing views on liberalism captured in responses
of progressive Indonesian Muslims are grounded in perceptions of Islamic
values and tradition.
Such alternative discourse finds no place in the thinking of MUI which
misleadingly presumes that a society adopting liberalism is unbounded
by restraints and values thereby instilling fear and anxiety and opposition
to it. In Ulil Abshar Abdalla’s analysis, this fear stems from distrust of
human beings apart from a humiliation of man’s analytical and intellectual
abilities. The fear of liberalism and freedom also carries the connotation
that people are unable to think, to manage and to control their ability if
they are granted freedom.158 Moreover, the meaning of liberalism as freedom
is often pejoratively equated to moral decay such as free sex practice and
non-obedience to religion. Zuly Qodir, for example, strongly resists this
perception by arguing that liberalism is fundamentally about revealing
the liberating forces of Islam often hidden by Muslims themselves.159 More
fundamentally, the ethics of freedom or liberation is a fundamental value
in Islam, and it is human beings that are granted with this freedom, includ-
ing freedom of choice and free will. Therefore, the doctrine of freedom or
liberation is nothing alien to Islamic tradition since it can be traced from
the classical Islamic disciplines such as theology and philosophy.160
This basic meaning of liberty underlines competing groups’ positive
attitude of the concept. However, since “freedom” itself is negatively viewed
and forms a major reason for rejecting liberalism, it is pertinent to have
156 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Islam dan Liberalisme (Jakarta: Freidrich Naumann Stiftung,
2011), 3.
157 Ibid, 3.
158 Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Islam dan Kebebasan”, in Hamid Basyaib, Membela Kebebasan:
Perbincangan tentang Demokrasi Liberal (Jakarta: Freedom Institute and Pustaka Alvabet,
2006),228.
159 Interview with Zuly Qodir, Yogyakarta, February 2013.
160 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liberalisme: Islam Progresif dan Perkem-
bangan Diskursusnya (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), 145.

a clearer understanding of what it means. Conceptually, anessential ele-

ment of freedom is the absence of coercion both external and internal that
requires people to do or abstain from. This external force could come from
an authority outside of an individual such as politics, religion, tradition,
community or others. Moreover, the concept of freedom is also associated
with obedience.
This view is contested by competing progressive thought which submits
that freedom, in whatever meaning, does not contradict obedience since
obedience is an initial condition and freedom is the result of this initial
situation. Consequently, contrasting freedom with obedience does not
make sense. According to Ulil while emphasizing obedience, the Qurʼān
also pays considerable attention to the idea of freedom as the initial condi-
tion for being obedient.161 On this basis, he opines that freedom in Islam
can be expressed in at least in three contexts: a) freedom to embrace any
particular religion or to leave it; b) the absence of coercion in adopting
any religion also suggests the freedom of corporation; and c) freedom of
interpretation.162 Underlying all these is overriding principle of the freedom
of the human being. The misunderstanding of freedom will lead people to
rebel against religion and revelation, thereby, restrict thefreedom that has
been doctrinally endorsed by revelation. Ulil further maintains that such
an understanding will restrict what has been acknowledged in religion and
erroneously confine its application.163
The challenge to understanding liberalism as an absolute freedom also
comes from Maman Imanulhaq, a leader of al-Mizan Islamic Boarding
School, in Majalengka, West Java, who firmly believes that liberalism is not
absolute freedom. It would be more accurate to comprehend it as an attempt
to place individual rights in a sacred position as God has granted all persons
with fundamental rights such as theright to live, freedom of expression,
and freedom of religion. Maman maintains that if liberalism is understood
in this way, it will not be perceived as a threat but will turn religion into a
living force (élan vital) for positive changes.164 Although freedom in Islam is a
161 Ulil Abshar Abdalla, “Argumen Islam untuk Kebebasan”, paper presented for Public Lecture,
Freedom Institute, Jakarta, July 15, 2013.
162 Saidiman Ahmad, “Argumen Islam untuk Kebebasan”, Koran Tempo, 15 April 2011.
163 Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, “Agama, Akal dan Kebebasan: Tentang Makna ‘Liberal’ dalam Islam
Liberal”, Foreword in Abd Moqsith Ghazali (ed), Ijtihad Islam Liberal: Upaya Merumuskan
Keberagamaan yang Dinamis (Jakarta: Jaringan Islam Liberal, 2005), xvii.
164 Maman Imanulhaq Faqieh, “Perbincangan dengan Maman Imanulhaq Abdulfaqih”, in
Budhy MUnawar-Rachman (ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism,

virtue, Muslims themselves have ignored or misunderstood this. According

to thecompeting mode of thought, this fact betrays historical precedence
as exemplified by the liberating attitude of anearlier generation of Muslims
who had suffered from misery in Mecca for thirteen years. As they experi-
enced this misery, they understood the meaning of and appreciated freedom
well. However, when Muslims came into power and assumed a position as a
ruling class, they committed the same fault as other power holders, namely
oppression. For this reason, progressives believe that Islamic liberalism
and the value of freedom must be revived in society. More than a virtue,
competing groups often describe the teaching of freedom in Islam as a pearl
of wisdom.165 Related to this point is the connection between liberalism
and happiness. The progressives maintain that earlier generation of liberal
Muslim believed in the correlation between liberalism and happiness.
Freedom is seen as the key to happiness, not only for theindividual but
also happiness for communities and even a state.166
The above discussion on freedom signifies the moral autonomy of the
individual in Islamic tradition and teachings. Competing ideas maintain
that in Islam the individual subject is fully responsible for himself and that
based on this responsibility, individuals gain freedom. As the individual is a
responsible subject who has consciousness, he cannot be forced. Freedom, in
their thought, necessitates responsibility. Therefore, progressives argue that
when people are granted freedom, they at the same time do not ignore their
responsibilities.167 The basis of the concept of freedom and responsibility,
according to progressives, can also be traced through Islamic legal tradi-
tion. Legally speaking, Islamic legal provision states that those who are
under coercion do not have any obligation. In such a context, awareness
of the importance of individual rights, the maintenance of pluralism and
tolerance, the limitation of state’s role, and willingness to regulate politi-
cal activities as a rational contract between the rulers and the ruled will
emerge.168 According to Ahmad Sahal, the former activist of Liberal Islam
Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal, JIL), this is the essence of liberalism.169
165 Hamid Basyaib (ed), Membela Kebebasan: Percakapan tentang Demokrasi Liberal (Jakarta:
Alvabet, 2006), 225.
166 Luthfi Assyaukani, “Dua Abad Islam Liberal”, in Bentara Kompas, 2 Maret 2007.
167 Hamid Basyaib (ed), Membela Kebebasan: Percakapan tentang Demokrasi Liberal (Jakarta:
Alvabet, 2006), 225.
168 Ibid, 225-228.
169 Ahmad Sahal, “Anti-Liberalisme dari Kanan: Untung Ada Mas Dawam”, in Ihsan Ali-Fauzi,
et.al (eds), Demi Toleransi, Demi Pluralisme (Jakarta: Yayasan Abad Demokrasi, 2012), 411.

Other than freedom, progressives also relate liberalism to independ-

ence. As Dawam Rahardjo posits that in the field of economy, liberalism
has resulted in capitalism or free market economy system that will bring
prosperity to the nations, which has brought about exploitation of the strong
against the weak. Liberalism can also be manifested in the idea of freedom
and independence. The difference between freedom and independence is
that the former touches more on micro-individual, while the latter operates
more on macro-collective level. Therefore, it is not surprising that liberalism
is basically an inspiration for independence.170
Another dimension of the meaning of liberalism which relates to freedom
advanced by competing groups is the freedom of thought. Amien Rais, the
former leader of Muhammadiyah in the 1990s, maintains that liberalism
is an inspiration for freedom of thought for members of society who seek
for solutions to avariety of problems confronting it.171 Therefore, if there is
acompetition of ideas and rivalry in dealing with or concrete problems, it
should be praised and even advisable.172 Returning to history, competing
groups maintain that that freedom of thought is an integral aspect of Islamic
teachings that has its roots in the earliest practice of Islam. Quraish Shihab,
a leading exegete in Indonesia, contends that thinking is a religious obliga-
tion. In Islam, he suggests, it is not the validity of thought that becomes a
central issue, but the seriousness of thinking, responsibility, and benefits
carried by certain thought. Allah will not punish any thought, even though
it is wrong when these three basic considerations have been fulfilled.173
By referring back to the history of earlier generation of Muslim philoso-
phers, progressives reveal the significance Islam paid to the freedom of
thought. The practices of liberalism in the meaning of freedom of thought
have been introduced since the classical era as exemplified by Muslim
philosophers, legal scholars and theologians.174 In an Islamic context, lib-
eralism refers to freedom of thought and expression. In Islamic philosophy,
for example, freedom of thought emerged as an alternative to orthodox
170 M. Dawam Rahardjo, Kritik Nalar Islamisme dan Kebangkitan Islam (Jakarta: Freedom
Institute, 2012), 6.
171 Amien Rais, “Perbincangan dengan Amien Rais”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed),
172 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam, 430.
173 M. Quraish Shihab, Secercah Cahaya Ilahi: Hidup Bersama al-Qur’an (Bandung, Mizan, 2013,
2nd edition), 451.
174 Zuly Qodir, Islam Liberal: Varian-Varian Liberalism Islam di Indonesia 1991-2002 (Yogyakarta:
LKIS, 2010), 84-85.

understanding. In Islamic mysticism, the same doctrine also exists. There-

fore, it is inevitable that some scholars maintain that the root of Islamic
liberalism could be traced to these two disciplines: Islamic philosophy
and mysticism. Philosophy gives intellectual and rational basis, while
Islamic mysticism serves as the spiritual foundation.175 Freedom of thought
is also seen as a medium through which more progressive understanding
of Islam can be achieved. Through the project of liberalism, progressive
Muslims aim at presenting a liberal-progressive type of Islam through the
employment of certain method which includes hermeneutics.176 Liberalism
can be treated as a focus in the study of Islam, in order to make Islam
contextual and perform dialogues with all contexts and contemporary
realities productively.177
Closely associated with the core concept of freedom of thought, compet-
ing groups also advance how religious texts are understood in Islam. Being
liberal within this mode also means to understand religious texts by way
of rational-contextual reading. A liberal Muslim, within this view, is not
imprisoned and bound by texts. Rather, he will comprehend the text ration-
ally. Rationality is any organization of knowledge which is in accordance
with logic. As long as the ideas are based on the application of reason as
opposed to dogmatic and emotive influences it should not be denied, but
encouraged.178 Therefore, progressives declare that if what is understood
by liberalism is atheism, it should be rejected. It is reiterated that the ideas
and mode of thinking of those who defend and uphold liberal Islam reveals
anevident attempt at creatively synthesizing basic teachings, doctrines
and values of Islam with other philosophies or selective aspects of them
that are compatible with it. It is through such assimilation and synthesis
that Islam can respond to undeterred social changes that are taking place
within the context of modern society.179 It must be highlighted that MUI’s
attitude towards liberalism and its presumption of what it means strongly
conditioned by its notion that liberalism is a western concept. This view has
175 Luthf i Assyaukani, “Perbincangan dengan Luthf i Assyaukani,” in Budhy MUnawar-

Rachman (ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Liberalisme
dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1002-1004.
177 Luthfi Assyaukani, Islam Benar versus Islam Salah (Depok: Kata Kita, 2007), 60.
178 Zainun Kamal, “Perbincangan dengan Zainun Kamal,” in Budhy MUnawar-Rachman (ed),
(Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 2, 1704-1705.
179 Ibid,1704-1705.

been analysed within competing group thought. Luthfi Assyaukanie, for

example, argues that liberal Islam isbasically a rejuvenation of Islamic reform
movements in thenineteenth century in almost all parts of the world. Identi-
cal to Assyaukani’s position, Rahardjo goes further back in history to support
his view that the roots of Islamic liberalism (in the meaning of freedom of
thought) lies in the Prophetic tradition. Utilizing religious sources such as
Prophetic sayings (hadīth), he argues that the fundamental values of freedom
of thought based on reason and moral responsibility and accountability
underlying liberalism can be found in the dialogue between the Prophet
and Mu’adz bin Jabbal when the latter was appointed a governor in Yemen
which emphasized and endorsed the significance of legal reasoning (ijtihād).
Another Prophetic tradition (hadīth) used by Rahardjo relates to the Prophet’s
dialogue with a farmer who had misunderstood his opinion. The Prophetic
tradition (hadīth) narrated that the Prophet had asserted antuma’lāmu bi
umūri dunyākum (you are more knowledgeable in your worldly issues).180
The reference to basic Islamic doctrines and principles consistent with the
values of liberalism is also evident from Imanulhaq’s interpretation of the
term. He views that the core spirit of liberalism has been laid down by the
Prophet himself, by liberating his people and understanding their individual
rights. In this context, he sees that liberalism is fundamental to the purpose
of Islamic religiosity.181 Differing from Assyaukani, Rahardjo and Imanulhaq,
Ahmad Syafii Maarif and Masdar Mas’udi acknowledges that liberalism, be
it politically or economically defined, did not originate from Islam. They,
however, maintained that this does not mean that Islam does not have any
correlation with liberalism.182 In its most basic meaning, liberalism is a chal-
lenge to the dogma that the Scripture can only be read and interpreted by
church authority. It does not mean unbounded authority as strongly implied
in MUI’s thinking.183
By and large, it can be concluded that while MUI sees liberalism as a
potential danger for Indonesian Muslims, progressives perceive it as a
180 M. Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Liber-
alisme (Jakarta: ), xxxvi.
181 Maman Imanulhaq Faqieh, “Perbincangan dengan Maman Imanulhaq Abdulfaqih”, in
Budhy MUnawar-Rachman (ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism,
183 Masdar Farid Mas’udi, “Perbincangan dengan Masdar Farid Mas’udi,” in Budhy Munawar-

necessity. It is not surprising, as a consequence, that in contrast to MUI that

labelled liberalism as forbidden (ḥarām), the progressive mode of thought
views it as basically part of Islamic teachings. In this respect, an important
question to be posed is that if the meaning of liberalism as understood by
progressives is more positive rather than negative, what factors could have
led to the rejection of the concept. Tholhah Hasan, the former minister
of religion offers a hypothesis. He views that the pejorative meaning of
liberalism in Indonesia as followed by MUI is a result of simplistic way of
thinking.184 In other words, MUI’s position and progressives’ stand reflect
contrasting styles of thought.
In summary, liberalism is not a monolithic or simplistic concept as re-
sumed by MUI and reflected in its legal opinion ( fatwā). On the contrary, it
comprises a variety of meanings captured in competing modes of thinking
in thediscourse of Indonesian Muslim groups. Essentially for MUI, liberal-
ism is taken to mean anti-religion. This understanding is not only simplistic
but partial as MUI has arbitrarily and dogmatically presumed it to mean
only that which is negative regardless of its variety of meanings and nuances
in thediscourse on the concept. At the same time, its understanding is also
elusive without recourse to serious analysis and systematic research of its
meaning and application even in Muslim history and religious traditions.
MUI’s views and mode of thinking has been strongly critiqued by competing
ideas, based on historical precedents and alternative ways of interpreting
Muslim history and traditions. The simplistic and elusive understanding of
liberalism as shown by MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) induces and reinforces
fear and tension of what it deems as apotent threat to Islam and the Muslims.
On the one hand, competing views reveala contrast conceptual under-
standing of liberalism. Grounded in religious traditions, they challenge the
simplistic notions of the concept and metaphorically bridges religious teach-
ings with contemporary challenges through reasonable and contextual
interpretation of Islam. In this way, they attempt to ensure the relevance
of Islam and its dynamism within changing condition of Indonesian so-
ciety. The perspectives they offer attempt to adapt religious traditions to
thecontemporary world in which Muslims live.185
184 Muhammad Tholhah Hasan, “Percakapan dengan Muhammad Tholhah Hasan,” in Budhy
185 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, “Perbincangan dengan Budhy Munawar-Rachman”, in Budhy
Munawar-Rachman (ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralism, Lib-
eralisme dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, xlix.

Progressives on Secularism in Indonesia
The third important aspect of MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) is secularism. It

is evident that in the legal opinion ( fatwā), secularism is perceived as the
separation of state and religion as well as themarginalization of religion
from public life. In contrast, competing views maintain that MUI’s under-
standing of secularism is misleading, if not erroneous. Within this mode of
thinking, secularism is elucidated as not synonymous with anti-religious
attitude or the marginalization of religion from public life. It is an exag-
geration to perceive secularism as anti-religion. Those who oppose MUI’s
understanding explain that the concept is theoretically not tantamount to
a denial of religion but admits that religion should be separated from the
state. This does not automatically mean that secularism is anti-religion in
concept and practice.186
According to Azyumardi Azra, misperception of the proper meaning of
secularism emerges, among other factors, from the fact that it is a theory
of separation of religion and state. This basic formulation carries meaning
that religion is part of theprivate dimension of society, on the one hand,
and that state should refrain from regulating religious issues, on the other.
By this understanding, Azra argues, it should not be understood that in
a country which adopts the principle of secularism, religion will decline,
become marginalized, and oppressed.187 In support of his understanding,
Azra compares the nature of religious practice in Turkey and the United
States. Although both are declared as secular countries, the significance
of the influence of religion in the lives of people remains pervasive. Fur-
thermore, differences exist in the way the states manage religion in the
public sphere. While in Turkey secularism is implemented in the form
of elimination of religious symbols in public life; in the United States,
secularism is manifested in the state refraining from active intervention
and management of religious affairs which opens possibilities for the
expression of religious practices and symbols in public life.188 This means
that secularism does not inevitably involve the marginalization of religion
from public life.
186 A. Munir Mulkhan, “Percakapan dengan A. Munir Mulkhan”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman

(ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme dan Sekular-
isme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1.
187 Azyumardi Azra, “Percakapan dengan Azyumardi Azra,” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed),
188 Azyumardi Azra, Dari Harvard Hingga Makkah (Jakarta: Republika, 2005), 10-11.

A similar perception is found in the thinking of Husein Muhammad who

strongly disagrees with the presumption that secularism is negative because
it means the separation of religion and state. Muhammad maintains that
this does not mean that Islam rejects secularism. For Muhammad, a key
ingredient in secularism is the orientation towards the reality of the world
and its significance to man’s existential conditions.189 He argues that Islamic
teachings and texts acknowledge the fundamental differentiation between
worldly life and hereafter,190 and the importance of man’s rootedness and
his struggle in his specific socio-historical condition which is the major
element of secularism.
While MUI views secularism as a dangerous force for Indonesian
Muslims, the competing groups perceive the concept from a broader socio-
political dimension, argues for stress its vital importance in Indonesian
society. Quoting Indonesian founding father Sukarno, Rahardjo maintains
that secularism is an important and a fundamental element which binds
Indonesia as a nation. The basis for this argument is that only through
secularism can there be equal opportunity for different social groups to live
and unite despite the vast diversity of its people.191 In this context, Rahardjo
points out that rather than understanding secularism from a religious point
of view, secularism should be understood from a wider perspective which
encompasses the values of freedom, rights, democracy and equality within
Indonesia’s plural society.192 Furthermore, Rahardjo explains that as a mat-
ter of principle, secularism has ensured freedom of religion and conscience
and justice to all religions and beliefs as long as they do not violate the
constitution, the creation of laws on the basis of social consensus and moral
and ethical norms and tolerance amongst different beliefs, worship and
religious practices.193 Based on this conviction, Rahardjo denounces its
presumption that secularism is anti-religion or inherently leads to the
189 A. Syafii Maarif, “Percakapan dengan A. Syafii Maarif”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed),
190 Husein Muhammad, “Percakapan dengan Husein Muhammad”, in Budhy Munawar-
Rachman (ed), Membela Kebebasan Beragama: Percakapan tentang Pluralisme, Liberalisme
dan Sekularisme (Jakarta: LSAF and Paramadina, 2010), Book 1, 676.
191 Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam:
Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme (Jakarta: Grasindo, 2010), xxix-xxx.
192 Rahardjo in Rachman, Ibid.
193 Ibid, xxxi.

decline and marginalization of religion.194 Like Azra, Rahardjo pointed out

that secularism is managed in various ways such as in the case of Turkey.195
The notion that secularism is not incompatible with religion also finds
support in the view of Komaruddin Hidayat who maintains that secular-
ism is essentially a rational approach to understanding state dynamic and
political activity through modern political theory. In this sense, religion
stands on themoral ground. In this way, secularism is not incompatible
with Islam.196 Others maintain that secularism is intertwined strongly with
democracy. Djohan Effendi’s view illustrates the point. He views that as far
as democracy is concerned, secularism is an essential element since the
principles of democracy cannot be fully implemented without secularism.
He argues that secularism places all religions on equal position without any
particular religion being privileged or having the upper hand. This equality
in the treatment of religions, he emphasized, is a fundamental principle
of democracy.197 Furthermore, Effendi also contends that secularism is a
pre-requisite for achieving more subtle values of civic life.198
Some Indonesian scholars have attempted to distinguish between secu-
larism and secularization and their relationship with Islam. Although some
aspects of their views appear to support the understanding that secularism
creates distance between man and God and in that sense is incompat-
ible with religion, conceptual distinctions and categorization of thought
reflected in their views reveal sophisticated nuances that cannot be said
to be similar to MUI’s simplistic over-generalisation and judgment. The
debate over the distinction between secularization and secularism and its
consequences on Islam dates back to the 1970s in the midst of the resurgence
of Islam in Indonesia in which the clamor for the rejection of secularism
was rife. Deemed a western philosophical model that has contributed to
the decline and degeneration of the Muslims, the scare of secularism was
194 Dawam Rahardjo, “Percakapan dengan Dawam Rahardjo”, in Budhy Munawar-Rachman

195 Dawam Rahardjo, “Preface” in Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Reorientasi Pembaruan Islam:
Sekularisme, Liberalisme dan Pluralisme, Paradigma Baru Islam Indonesia (Jakarta: LSAF dan
Paramadina, 2010), lx.
196 Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Argumen Islam untuk Sekularisme, 29.
197 Djohan Effendi, “Percakapan dengan Djohan Effendi”, Budhy Munawar-Rachman (ed),
198 See also Husein Muhammad, “Percakapan dengan Husein Muhammad,” in Budhy Munawar-

accompanied by the demand for the return to Islam as religion (al-dīn). It

was in this context that the late Nurcholish Madjid distinguished seculariza-
tion as a process of change from secularism as a philosophy and urged for
Indonesian Muslims not to reject the former as it is an inevitable process of
change induced by modernization. According to Madjid who is popularly
known as Cak Nur, secularization is not an ideology as is the case with
secularism which potentially creates distance between self and the God.199
Furthermore, Madjid also evaluates secularization as a “liberating devel-
opment.” This liberation is urgently needed for Muslims as consequence of
Islam’s historical progress. It is inevitable that this process has contributed
to the dynamic evolution of Muslims as they confront new conditions and
challenges. As a result, many Muslims are no longer able to differentiate
values that are thought as Islamic, which is transcendental and which
one is temporal.200 Although this type of distinction is often criticized by
those who reject secularism and secularization, Madjid’s differentiation
of secularization and secularism can be theoretically validated. Jose
Casanova, a leading sociologist of religion, for example, emphasizes the
importance of clarity in understanding secularization and secularism to
avoid confusion. Secularization usually refers to actual or alleged empirical-
historical patterns of transformation and differentiation of ‘the religious’ …,
while secularism “refers more broadly to a whole range of modern secular
worldviews and ideologies which may be consciously held and explicitly
elaborated into philosophies of history …”201
An important point that can be drawn from the discussion on Islam and
secularism in Indonesia is that in the Indonesian context, secularism is a
contested concept with a variety of meanings attributed to it. MUI’s legal
opinion ( fatwā) that denounces secularism as with the case of pluralism
and liberalism overlooks and ignores this complexity and sophistication
of thought and ideas about this issue. Mulkhan argues that the attitude of
MUI on secularism rest on its imagination of its roots in western European
history. Stemming from the West, it has been essentialized as atheistic and
rejected on the ground that it threatens the identity and belief of Muslims.
This type of thinking has created a paradox for Muslims in Indonesia. While
on the one hand, they are trying to modernize by employing reason, taking
benefit of tradition as well as theexperience of Western countries, on the
199 Nurcholish Madjid, Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan (Bandung: Mizan, 1987), 221.
200 Ibid, 207.
201 Jose Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms”, in Craig Calhoun, et. al. (eds),
Rethinking Secularism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 54-55.

contrary, they reject the West which they have caricatured as irreligious.202
The legal opinion ( fatwā) in effect denies the reality of historical context
which has created the need for man to understand and manage the condi-
tion of his life and adapt to it. The ambivalent attitude towards reason and
empiricismthat are imbued into the concept of secularism in association
for human action are presumed as working to overthrow religion.
In conclusion, it can be asserted that the legal opinion (fatwā) on pluralism,
secularism, and liberalism substantially contradicts contemporary realities
as well as contributions of Islam in human development. It has revealed the
conservative streak of MUI and groups alike. It cannot be denied that far from
allowing religious principles and values to help adapt Muslims to the realities
of the world in which they live and contribute to its progress, the legal opinion
(fatwā), on the contrary, has ignited, provoked and contributed to unfounded
suspicions and mistrust amongst Muslims which basically contradicts the
teachings and values Islam.203 It is also clear that MUI’s understanding of
pluralism, liberalism and secularism is ideological in the sense that it func-
tions to guard its position against competing groups’ ideas. It ignores and
overlooks intellectual thought and reasoning on the subject matter widely
debated and discussed by scholars and thinkers both within and beyond
Indonesia. The critical understanding of these concepts from progressive
Muslim scholars in Indonesia represents different religious perspectives and
orientations in interpreting and making sense of contemporary concepts
and ideas, its compatibility with religious traditions and principles and their
relevance to Indonesian society. Essentially, they reveal a more inclusive,
rational and humanistic orientation based on the centrality of man and his
moral judgment and responsibility. In further contrast to the revivalist mode
of thinking reflected in MUI’s fatwā, the competing mode is socio-historically
grounded when upholding the eternal values of Islam.
Conclusion
The above discussion on MUI’s legal opinion (fatwā) on pluralism, liberalism

and secularism reveal strong elements of the traditionalist/conservative
modes of thinking as well as traits of utopian orientation that are incongru-
ent with social reality. This legal opinion ( fatwā) contradicts the reality of
aplurality of Muslim communities in Indonesia since the ban on pluralism
202 Ibid, 104.

203 Ibid, 61.

has in itself defied the fact that Indonesian Islam is plural. Pluralism within
Indonesian Islam is evident from the very inception of the religion within the
archipelago and has intensified with social change induced by the processes
of technological advancement and their ramifications on society. Political
shifts in the context of the post-New Order has but exacerbated the process.
In essentializing pluralism, liberalism and secularism MUI negate diver-
sity of views and meanings associated with this thought within Indonesian
religious discourse and Islamic traditions. Its exclusive and selective justifi-
cations underlying the legal opinion ( fatwā) devoid of intellectual thought
and engagement is also revealing of its ideological attempt to guard and
preserve its interest as the authoritative voice of Islam against challenges
from competing Muslim groups’ thought and orientation.

4 The Fatwā on Sectarianism and its
Social Implications
The Case of Ahmadiyya and Shi’a
Introduction
Apart from pluralism, liberalism, and secularism, MUI has also pronounced
legal opinion ( fatwā) on religious sects within Indonesian Islam. This
chapter focuses on MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) on the religious status and
legitimacy of Ahmadiyya and Shi’a. These religious minority groups have
been subjected to both verbal abuse and physical violence and discrimina-
tion in recent years. A spate of violence against them, apparently induced
by religious motives has sparked in several parts of the country against
them.1 To mention some examples,2 in June 2005, Ahmadiyya members
in Parung, West Java, were attacked by some members of certain Islamic
organizations. In December 2007, mass violence targeted at Ahmadiyya
members occurred in Kuningan, also in West Java. Several months later,
similar riots took place in Sukabumi on 28 April 2008; and in 2011, the same
hostility occurred to Ahmadiyya community in Pandeglang, West Java.3
Other than the Ahmadiyya, the Shi’a, another minority group, has also
been subject to pejorative labeling, threats, and demonization based on
the perception that the group has deviated from Islam’s basic tenets. While
the matter of freedom of belief or faith is upheld as a fundamental legal
principle in many advanced societies, in countries such as Indonesia those
who are alleged as deviants and spoilers of the religion could be prosecuted
as was the case with the Shi’a in Sampang, Madura. In 2012, a Shi’a cleric in
1 The Centre for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies (CRCS), Gadjah Mada University,
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, has annually published annual report on religious life in Indonesia
since 2008. Those reports are important in providing facts, data and analysis on how religion
operates within the context of Indonesian society. It also provides records on religiously-inspired
violence throughout Indonesia. For more information see http://crcs.ugm.ac.id.
2 Extensive discussion on social impact of the fatwa, especially in relation to faith-based
violence will be presented in Chapter 5 on Ahmadiyyaand Shi’a.
3 Ahmadiyya is basically not a new Islamic group in Indonesia. Its presence is even earlier
than the founding of the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama’, which
was founded in 1926. For more detailed discussion on Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, please refer to
Iskandar Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2005). See also Ahmad
Gaus AF, Sang Pelintas Batas: Biografi Djohan Effendi (Jakarta: ICRP and Kompas, 2009), 216-223.

Sampang was legally sanctioned by local Sunni leaders under the charge of
spreading heretical interpretations of Islam. Furthermore, Sunni leaders
in Madura also pushed the provincial government of East Java to ban Shi’a
through a formal provincial regulation to prevent the spread of the teach-
ings of Shi’a. 4 Controversy again arose when violence against Shi’a sparked
once more in August and September 2012 when some Shi’a followers were
tortured, and their lives were threatened. Some of them were killed, and
their homes and properties were burnt.5
This unfortunate spate of sectarian conflicts and tensions appeared to
have been induced by religiously-motivated conflicts which arose around or
after the proclamation of legal opinion (fatwā) by MUI bearing on the status
of these religious minorities or sects. Although it cannot be conclusively
established if these violent attacks targeted at both the Shi’a and Ahmadiyya
were indeed caused by the legal opinion ( fatwā), it cannot be denied that as
areligious legal ruling or opinion, legal opinion ( fatwā) is highly persuasive
and exerts a strong influence on Muslims’ religious life and understanding.
Its proclamation on the deviance status of these sects cannot be isolated
from the conflicts even if did not cause them. It is also pertinent to note
that no further legal opinion ( fatwā) were issued following the escalation
of violence in those specific locations. In fact, MUI in East Java province
even justified the legal opinion ( fatwā) against Shi’a as necessary to arrest
what it perceived to be sectarianism-induced conflicts prevalent in that
district. The legal opinion ( fatwā) targeted against these groups cannot be
said to ease or quell suspicions and deep hostility against them harbored by
some Indonesians. While there is a need to avoid over-generalizing the legal
opinion ( fatwā) as the cause of violence and aggression against these groups,
the legal opinion ( fatwā) nonetheless cannot be delinked completely from
the tensions and attacks against them.
This chapter will examine the possible factors conditioning MUI’s legal
opinion ( fatwā) on Ahmadiyya and Shi’a and the modes of religious thought
that characterize its making. Competing views and orientations amongst
Indonesian Muslims in response to the legal opinion ( fatwā) will also be
examined. The chapter will also analyze the ramifications of the legal
opinion ( fatwā) on Ahmadiyya and Shi’a communities.
4 http://www.setara-institute.org/en/content/ officials-turn-blind-eye-religious-tensions-
rise-indonesia, accessed on August 27, 2012. In January 2012, Indonesian Cleric Council or
Majelis Ulama Indonesia, East Java Province has issued a fatwa that declared Shi’ah as “sesat dan
menyesatkan” (deviant and deviated from Islamic teaching). The fatwa is stated in Keputusan
Fatwa Majelis UlamaIndonesia (MUI) Prop. Jawa Timur No.Kep-01/SKF-MUI/JTM/I/2012.
5 “Serangan Laknat Lebaran Ketupat”, Tempo weekly magazine, 9 September 2012, 100-101.

The Fat wā on Sec tarianism and its Social Implications 131
Ahmadiyya and its Genesis in Indonesia
The Ahmadiyya sect is a fast growing international revivalist movement

within Islam with followers spreading across 200 countries around the
globe.6 Historically, it was started by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in Qadian,
a village in Punjab Province, India sometime in 1888. In the context of
imperialism and the socio-economic backwardness of the Muslims in India,
the movement attempted to reform Muslim society based on a particular
theology and religious doctrine.7 From the outset of its birth, the doctrine
and tenets of this sect have aroused controversies among Muslim societies,
especially in India and later the rest of the Muslim world.8 Ghulam Ahmad
led Ahmadiyya up to his demise in 1908, after which the leadership of the
movement was succeeded by his faithful disciple, Hazrat Maulana Hakeem
Nuruddin. Subsequently, in 1914 Ghulam Ahmad’s son Mirza Bashiruddin
Mahmud Ahmad assumed the leadership of the movement. During this
period, the movement split into two groups following irreconcilable internal
disputes among its members.9 Bashiruddin became the leader of one group
of Ahmadiyya currently known as “Qadiani Ahmadiyya” or internation-
ally known as “Ahmadiyya Muslim Community”centered in London. 10
Another group was led by Muhammad Ali who left Qadian for Lahore and
developed the “Lahore Ahmadiyya” or “The Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement
in Islam” (Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha’at-e-Islam Lahore).11 According to
6 http://www.alislam.org/introduction/index.html, accessed on September 1, 2013. See

also Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmood Ahmad, Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam (Islamabad: Islam
International Publication, 2007).
7 The original name of the village was Islampur. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s ancestors were religious
elite of the area, and said to be moved from Persia due to family dissension. The ruling monarch
granted his ancestors a power over administrating religious affairs, this position is known as
Qadi. Then, Islampur was popularly known as Islampur Qadi Majjhi which by the passage of the
time was called in a shorten name as Qadi and later Qadian. See Muhammad Ali, The Ahmadiyya
Movement I: Founder (Lahore: Colured Printing Press, 1918), 1-2; and Bashiruddin Mahmood Ahmad,
Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam (Islamabad: Islam International Publication, 2007), 5-8.
8 Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmood Ahmad, Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam (Islamabad: Islam
International Publication, 2007), 5.
9 See Fatkhurrahman Ahmadi Djajasugita, Benarkah Ahmadiyah Sesat? (Yogyakarta: Penerbit
Darul Kutubil Islamiyah Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia, 2007), iv.
10 The official website of this movement is www.alislam.org. Following the partition of India
into two separated countries of India and Pakistan, the center of Qadiani Ahmadiyya moved
to Rabwah, Pakistan as Punjab, where Qadian locates, belong to India. However, in 1947, when
Ahmadiyya was denounced as non-Muslim minority by Pakistani government, the centre of
this movement was moved to London.
11 The official website of this movement is www.aaiil.org

Fathurrahman Ahmadi Djajasoegita, the leader of Gerakan Ahmadiyah

Indonesia (GAI), the proponent of Lahore Ahmadiyya in Indonesia, the
most fundamental issue leading to this split is the distortion of Ahmadiyya
teachings by Bashiruddin. The distortions include the claim of the prophet-
hood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and the creed of takfīr i.e. the denouncement
of those who do not believe in his prophethood as unbelievers (kāfir).12
Moreover, Djajasoegita also claims that Bashiruddin subscribed to view that
the founder was a caliph (khalīfah) similar to the the four rightly-guided
caliphs in theearly period of Islam (khalīfah rashīdah). These doctrines,
according to Djajasoegita, are misleading.13 The split marked significant
internal conflict within Ahmadiyya which entails not only a conflict of its
fundamental teachings but also the complexity of the historical dynamics
of the movement along with the evolution of the diversity of thought and
doctrine within it. Consequently, it is not surprising that both the Qadian
and Lahore Ahmadiyya groups have built their narratives of the split to sup-
port the validity of their positions.14 The dissension persists up to present
day, and both groups continue to maintain the organizations, doctrines,
and teachings in their respective ways.
The main controversy surrounding Ahmadiyya by mainstream Muslim
religious authorities is the understanding that its tenets and doctrines con-
tradict the basic teachings of Islam. Amongst these, the most controversial
is the position of Ghulam Ahmad as the Promised Messiah and Mahdi.
Others include his claim as the reincarnation of Jesus who was given the
title al-Masīh (“one who finds God”) and his position as the manifestation
of the promise of God through Prophet Muhammad’s saying (hadīth) that
a guided reformer will be sent to a man in their darkest moment. Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad was also believed to have announced that he is Jesus and
also Muhammad at once. They also claim that the Ahmadis have their
scripture other than the Qur’ān. These beliefs have led religious authorities
of mainstream Islam in many Muslim countries to denounce Ahmadiyya
as a non-Muslim sect or inf idel (kāfir),15 as exemplif ied in the case of
12 Djajasugita, Benarkah Ahmadiyah Sesat, iii.

13 Ibid, iii.
14 Muhammad Ali, The Ahmadiyya Movement IV: The Split (Lahore: Coloured Printing Press,
1918), 9-10.
15 For example, see Wahbah Musthafa al-Zuhaili, “Masyairi wa Hukumi ala Thaifah al-
Qadiyaniyah”, Preface in Syaikh Mandzur Ahmad, al-Ushul al-Dzahabiyah fi Raddi ala al-
Qadiyaniyyah (Mecca: al-Maktabah al-Imdadiyah, 1428 AH), 12.

Pakistan,16 Saudi Arabia, and some other Islamic countries. The stance
against them has been employed by MUI to support its legal opinion ( fatwā)
against Ahmadiyya.17
These claims have been refuted by the dissenting faction within the
Ahmadi sect. They assert that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad never made the
claim that he was a Messiah or Prophet and in fact rejected any such ac-
cusations, even if many of his statements may be understood in that way.
Like Muhammad Ali, the second Hazrat Ameer of Lahore Ahmadiyya, in
a manifesto published on 2nd October 1891 in Delhi asserted that Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad rejected the accusation that he has declared himself as a
Nabi.18 It was further maintained that he had also stated that he is not a
prophet but a reformer (muḥaddath), namely one who is spoken to by God.
In refuting his opponents’ claim that Mirza Ghulam’s idea of a reformer
(muḥaddath) is not completely separated from the concept of prophethood
since a reformer (muḥaddath) must have certain qualities of a prophet,
Muhammad Ali maintained that such a claim should not be equated with
prophethood.19 He also maintained that Ghulam Ahmad has also made
the distinction between the concept of reformer (muḥaddath) and Prophet
(Nabi) and explained that the word nabi literally means “Prophet” is used in
its metaphorical sense to mean the reformer (muḥaddath or mujaddid).20
Moreover, detailed explanation of the concept of prophethood (nubuw-
wat) by Ghulam Ahmad has been uncovered to justify that the meanings
attributed to them mean appearances or manifestations of some qualities of
prophethood in a person who is not a prophet.21 Muhammad Ali elucidated
that nubuwwat zilli or zill nubuwwat means shadow of the Real Prophet.22
In the same vein, Djajasoegita in his book Anwar al-Islam asserted that
Ghulam Ahmad had stated that he never rejected the Holy Qur’an as the
book of Allah, Muhammad as a Prophet; or affirmed that he was a Prophet.
The allegation that Ahmadiyya had also declared that there exist some
16 The declaration of Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim minority in Pakistan was published after

unanimous vote of the Senate and National Assembly of Pakistan on 7 September 1974. Praise
is often addressed to Prime Minister Ali Bhutto for his firm stand on this issue.
17 Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, Invitation to Ahmadiyyat (Rabwah: Ahmadiyya
Muslim Foreign Missions Office, 1961), 1.
18 Muhammad Ali, The Ahmadiyya Movement I: The Founder (Lahore: Coloured Printing Press,
1918), 21-22.
19 Ibid, 23.
20 Ibid, 24.
21 Ibid, 46.
22 Muhammad Ali, Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (The Promised Messiah) and the Finality of
Prophethood (Lahore: The Ahmadiyya Anjuman-I-Isha’at-I—Islam, n.d.), iii.

distortions and addition to the Qur’ān was also denied.23 Generally, members
of Ahmadiyya also believe that Ghulam Ahmad had neither declared a
new religion nor innovated one. They strongly reject the classification of
Ahmadiyya as non-Muslim, and insist that Ahmadis are Muslims, and
embrace Islam as their religion.24 Paradoxically, however, while insisting
on the unity of Islam and identifying themselves as no different from other
Muslims who follow different ideologies, in many ways Ahmadi thinkers
and leaders frequently attempt to distinguish Ahmadis from any other
Muslims,25 which only strengthens the assumption that they are outside
the fold of Islam by those who are hostile to them.26
In the Indonesian context, the existence of Ahmadiyya is basically
as old as the established Islamic organizations such as the two largest
Islamic groups, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama’ (NU) founded in
1912 and 1926 respectively. Its arrival in the archipelago can be traced back
to the pre-independence period although the precise date of its coming
is inconclusive. According to Qadiani or Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia’s
(JAI) version, Ahmadiyya reached Indonesia sometime in 1925 through
the efforts of Rahmat Ali from India who disseminated Ahmadiyya teach-
ings in Tapaktuan in the western coast of Aceh. It was believed that he
was able to attract the interest of some local people, although many had
rejected his new teachings.27 After Ali’s arrival, other Ahmadi missionaries
from India and Pakistan followed. He later left Aceh for Java sometime in
1931. In Jakarta, it successfully attracted other followers. Subsequently, the
Ahmadiyya board in Jakarta was established in 1932 with only 27 members.28
Legally, the existence of Ahmadiyya is recognized by Indonesian law. It
received the status as a social organization and institution in 1953 by the
23 Fathurrahman Ahmadi Djajasugita, Benarkah Ahmadiyah Sesat?, 3.

24 Karimullah Zirvi, Welcome to Ahmadiyyat: The True Islam (United States: Ahmadiyya
Muslim Jamaat, 2010), 51. See also Nanang RI Iskandar, Fatwa MUI dan Gerakan Ahmadiyah
Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Darul Kutubil Islamiyah, 2005), especially Chapter 3; and Mulyono,
“Siapakah yang Disebut Muslim?” online article can be accessed through this link: http://
ahmadiyah.org/siapakah-yang-disebut-muslim/
25 Bashiruddin Mahmood Ahmad, Ahmadiyyat or The True Islam (Islamabad: Islam Inter-
national Publication, 2007), 9. See also Anonymous, “Ahmadiyya Muslim Community: An
Overview”, http://www.alislam.org/introduction/index.html
26 For example see M. Amin Djamaluddin, Ahmadiyah Menodai Islam: Kumpulan Fakta
dan Data (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, 2007); M. Amin Djamaluddin,
Ahmadiyah Membajak al-Qur’an (Jakarta: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam, 2000).
27 Interview with Dodi Kurniawan, Tasikmalaya, 26 May 2013.
28 Zainal Abidin EP, Syarif Ahmad Saitama Lubis: Dari Ahmadiyah untuk Bangsa (Yogyakarta:
Logung Pustaka, 2007), 267-294.

Ministry of Justice of the Republic and the Directorate of the Relations of

Political Institutions (75/D.I./VI/2003).29
It is worthy to note that the split within the Ahmadiyya sect is also re-
flected in the history of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia. The Qadiani Ahmadiyya’s
following is identified with Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) currently
centered in Bogor, West Java. The Lahore Ahmadiyya, on the other hand,
known as Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI) takes Yogyakarta as the
center for its activities.30 While the Qadiani Ahmadiyya started in Sumatera,
the Lahore Ahmadiyya came into contact with the natives (pribumi) for
the first time in Yogyakarta, Java Island. Asvi Warman Adam, a leading
Indonesian historian of Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian
Institute of Sciences), noted that two Lahore Ahmadiyya missionaries,
Maulana Ahmad and Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig visited Yogyakarta in 1924
to attend the National Congress (Muktamar) of Muhammadiyah.31 It was
recorded that they were welcomed by the Muhammadiyah Central Board
and were given the opportunity to deliver talks about Islam, especially in
the position of Jesus within Ahmadiyya doctrine.32 The visit seemed to have
been impactful, as four years later, in 1928, a leading figure of Muhammadi-
yah, Raden Ngabehi Djojosoegito (1889-1966) founded Gerakan Ahmadiyah
Indonesia, the Lahore Ahmadiyya branch in Indonesia. In addition to be-
ing an activist of Muhammadiyah, Djojosoegito is the cousin of Hasyim
Asy’ari (1871-1947) and Wahab Hasbullah (1888-1971), the founding fathers
of Nahdlatul Ulama’ (NU). Furthermore, Adam also maintained that Irfan
Dahlan (b. 1907), the son of Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923), the founding father
of Muhammadiyah, was also on the board of Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia
(GAI).33 Also, in 1925, four Muhammadiyah youths including Irfan Dahlan,
were sent to Lahore to study Islam. Many sources, however, maintained that
Irfan not only studied, but also served as an Ahmadi missionary who was
later sent to Thailand to spread this movement. This historical narrative
of the relationship between Ahmadiyya and mainstream Islam groups
was perhaps intended to reveal the peaceful co-existence of the sect with
29 A. Yogaswara, Heboh Ahmadiyah: Mengapa Ahmadiyah Tidak Langsung Dibubarkan?

(Yogyakarta: Narasi, 2008), 82.
30 The official website of GAI is www.ahmadiyah.org
31 Asvi Warman Adam, “Belajar dari Sejarah Ahmadiyah”, Indo Pos, 24 April 2008.
32 http://ahmadiyah.org/gerakan-ahmadiyah-indonesia/sejarah-singkat-gai/, accessed on
2 September 2013.
33 Ibid.

other Islamic groups, especially Muhammadiyah, in the pre-independence

period.34
For a relatively extended period, the narrative of Irfan’s involvement
in Ahmadiyya which marked the close relationship between Ahmadiyya
and Muhammadiyah was assumed as a historical fact by most Indonesian
Muslims. However, it is currently disputed by his family. In a correspondence
between Winai Dahlan, a son of Irfan, a professor at Chulalongkorn University,
Thailand, and Ahmad Najib Burhani, a researcher of Lembaga Ilmu Pengeta-
huan Indonesia (LIPI), and a young scholar in Muhammadiyah, the former
firmly rejected his father’s association with Ahmadiyya. He maintained that
though it was true that Irfan and three other youths from Yogyakarta were
sent to Lahore to study Islam not long after the coming of Maulana Ahmad
and Mirza Wali Baig to Yogyakarta, this did not mean that Irfan became a
member of Ahmadiyya. Winai also rejected in toto as slander ( fitna), the
opinion that Irfan’s visit to Thailand was as an Ahmadi missionary.35
With the passage of time, when Ahmadiyya, both Lahore, and Qadian
started to make headway in Indonesia, other Islamic groups reacted dif-
ferently. Among those who did accept Ahmadiyya was Persatuan Islam
(PERSIS) then under the leadership of Ahmad Hassan (1887-1958). Persatuan
Islam was very active in contesting Ahmadiyya beliefs. This fact is also con-
firmed by the JAI’s narratives which revealed that debates occurred in April
1933.36 It is pertinent to note that despite the differences with some Islamic
organizations, Ahmadiyya is encountered with Islamic organizations on
the whole in the pre-independence period of Indonesia were marked by
peaceful intellectual and theological exchanges. It is also claimed that
during Sukarno’s reign, Ahmadiyya established good relations with the
34 For discussion on the relationship of Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyya, please refer to

Iskandar Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2005), especially Chapter VI. See
also Herman L Beck, “The rupture between the Muhammadiyah and the Ahmadiyya,” Bijdragen
tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 161, No. 2/3 (2005), 210-246.
35 http://ahmadiyah.org/irfan-dahlan-ahmadiyya-clarification-dr-winai-dahlan/, accessed
on 1 September 2013.
36 The debate was described as follows: On April 14, 1933, the program was started with
questions and answers, the following day on April 15, 1933 the debate entered the core issue
namely on the life and death of Isa and April 16, the debate on the same subject continued. In
that debate, Ahmadiyya was represented by Rahmat Ali, Abubakar Ayyub and Mohammad
Sadiq. While non-Ahmadi (Persatuan Islam) was represented by A. Hassan and others. The
note-taker of this debate was Taher Sutan Gelar Tumenggung, while the leader was Moh. Syafii
from PSII. See Zaenal Abidin EP, Syarif Ahmad Saitama Lubis: Dari Ahmadiyah untuk Bangsa
(Yogyakarta: Logung Pustaka, 2007), 271.

state.37 However, this situation changed during the New Order period.
The non-conducive situation for Ahmadiyya continued in the post-New
Order period, where this group has frequently been subjected to threats
and violence.
Fatwā on Ahmadiyya
Since the decade of the 1980s, MUI held the perception that Ahmadiyya is
a problem for the Muslim community in Indonesia. In 1980 when Hamka
headed MUI, it issued a legal opinion ( fatwā) pronouncing the deviance of
Ahmadiyya. The legal opinion ( fatwā), however, pronounced only the status
of Qadiani Ahmadiyya as deviant (sesat). Other Ahmadiyya group called
Lahore Ahmadiyya was not labeled as deviant. The Qadiani is defined as
not only deviant but also outside the fold of Islam.38
On 25 July 2005, a legal opinion legal opinion ( fatwā) on the same subject
was issued by MUI. The fatwā (11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005) was endorsed
by Ma’ruf Amin and Hasanuddin proclaimed that Ahmadiyya is a deviant
sect (sesat). It further stated that this sect also leads people astray from the
true path (menyesatkan). The double pronouncement of the sect as deviant
(sesat) and leading to deviance (menyesatkan) strongly imply that Ahmadiyya
is not merely a group that transgresses Islam, but it also actively invites
others (Muslims) to transgress the religion, i.e. by persuading other Muslims
to “convert” from their affiliation to becoming Ahmadi. While this legal
opinion ( fatwā) reaffirmed an earlier legal opinion ( fatwā) pronounced by
MUI in 1980, it also extended more radically some aspects of the earlier legal
opinion ( fatwā). The earlier fatwā had proclaimed that only the Qadiani
Ahmadiyya and not the Lahore sect is outside the fold of Islam. Based on this
fatwā, therefore, those who follow the teachings of the former are considered
as apostates (murtad).39 By this fatwā, MUI advises those who have been
involved in Ahmadiyya to return to the right path (al-rujūʽ ila al-ḥaq), i.e.
follow Islamic teachings by the Qur’ān and Sunna. The fundamental differ-
ences in the 2005 fatwā are that it declared Ahmadiyya as a whole as deviant.
Furthermore, it pronounced that it is imperative for the government of In-
donesia to eliminate the spread of Ahmadiyya, dissolve all its organizations,
37 Ibid, 279-280.
38 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia sejak 1975 (Jakarta:
MUI Pusat and Penerbit Erlangga, 2011), 40-41.
39 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 96.

ban any of its activities as well as close all its houses of worship and any other
properties related to the sect.40
The legal opinion ( fatwā) says:
1. Menegaskan kembali fatwa MUI dalam Munas II Tahun 1980 yang

menetapkan bahwa Aliran Ahmadiyah berada di luar Islam, sesat dan
menyesatkan serta orang Islam yang mengikutinya adalah murtad.
2. Bagi mereka yang terlanjur mengikuti Aliran Ahmadiyah supaya segera
kembali kepada ajaran Islam yang hak (al-ruju’ ila al-haqq), yang sejalan
dengan Al-Qur’an dan Al-Hadis.
3. Pemerintah berkewajiban untuk melarang penyebaran paham Ah-
madiyah di seluruh Indonesia dan membekukan organisasi serta menutup
semua tempat kegiatannya.41
1. Reaffirm MUI’s fatwā in the 2nd National Meeting in 1980 which proclaim
that Ahmadiyya is outside the fold of Islam, it is deviant and lead people
to deviance. Muslims who adhere to Ahmadiyya are considered apostate.
2. Those who have been following Ahmadiyya are advised to return to the
right path which is compatible with the principle of the Qur’ān and Sunna.
3. It is an obligation for the Indonesian government to ban the spread of
Ahmadiyya across the country and to dissolve the organization as well
as to close all its centers of activities.
In issuing this legal opinion ( fatwā), MUI employed two bases of justifica-
tions: the social and textual or doctrinal. About the former, four reasons
were adduced. Firstly, in MUI’s perception, Ahmadiyya has been active in
converting Indonesian Muslims, even though MUI had issued its legal opin-
ion (fatwā) against it more than two decades ago. Secondly, MUI maintained
that Ahmadiyya’s efforts at proselytizing Muslims had induced serious
social tensions and conflicts within the community. Consequently, ag-
grieved Muslims have asked MUI to intervene to stop the conflicts. Finally,
the fatwā had to be issued to protect and guard the purity of the Muslim
faith (aqīda) against the threat of those seeking to undermine the faith. 42
40 Ibid, 99.
41 Ibid, 99.

On the ground of theology, the legal opinion ( fatwā) utilized several

verses from the Qur’ān to legitimize its stance on the deviant status of the
Ahmadiyya. These are:
a. Chapter Ahzab (33) verse 40: “Muhammad is not the father of any man
among you, but he is the messenger of Allah and the Seal of the Prophets,
and Allah is ever Aware of all things.”
b. Chapter al-An’am (6) verse 153: “And (He commandeth you, saying): This
is My straight path, so follow it. Follow not other ways, lest ye be parted
from His way. This hath He ordained for you, that ye may ward off (evil).”
c. Chapter al-Maidah (5) verse 105: “O ye who believe! Ye have charge of your
souls. He who erreth cannot injure you if ye are rightly guided. Unto Allah
ye will all return; and then He will inform you of what ye used to do.”
Also, the legal opinion ( fatwā) also cited several Prophetic tradition (hadith)
in support. The first isthe one narrated by Imam Bukhari in which the
Prophet Muhammad was ascribed to have said to the effect that there will
be no prophet after Muhammad. “La nabiyya ba’diy” that “ … there is no
prophet after me.” The other, narrated by Imam Tirmizi, underlined the same
point but with the additional phrase that prophethood has come to an end
with the demise of Prophet Muhammad. The hadīth said: “Inna al-risālata
wa al-nubuwwat aqadin qatha’at, falā rasūla ba’diy wa la nabiyya,” that
“verily the revelation and prophethood have ceased, no prophet after me.”43
As with the case of the previous legal opinion ( fatwā) on pluralism, in
this fatwā, MUI also published the explanatory document to elaborate
its position further. This document reveals that MUI justified the legal
opinion ( fatwā) methodologically as an attempt to respond to religious
problems within Indonesian Muslim society. Its statements reveal that
the legal opinion ( fatwā) was made in response to questions raised by
Indonesian Muslims through diverse platforms and channels including
MUI’s meetings at all levels and complaints by the public via e-mails.
This legal opinion ( fatwā) was also justified on the basis that rigorous
and thorough studies of documented materials published by Ahmadiyya
communities on many aspects of the sect including its history, teachings,
doctrines and fundamental ideas had been made. The most important
and fundamental contention against the sect based on this materials
pertains to the status of Ghulam Ahmad as the sealer of prophecy in
Islam (khatamu al-nabiyyīn). Although the document is thirteen pages
long, MUI mainly dealt with the issue of prophethood claimed by Ghulam
43 Ibid, 97-98.

Ahmad. Based on the latter’s writings, it conclusively revealed that he

had proclaimed himself f irstly as the reformer (mujaddid), then the
awaited Mahdi (al-Mahdi al-Maw’ūd), al-Masih the promised (al-Masīḥ
al-Maw’ūd), and f inally as the prophet and messenger of Allah. 44 MUI
concluded that proclaiming oneself as a prophet or messenger of Allah
tantamount to apostasy.
Apart from these, unlike other legal opinion ( fatwā) issued by MUI,
this fatwā found justification about the views and decisions of other Is-
lamic organizations. In particular, reference was made to the decree of the
Council of Islamic Law (Majma’ al-Fiqh al-Islāmiy) of the Organization of
Islamic Conference (OIC) at its Second Congress in Jeddah in 1985 which
proclaimed Ahmadiyya apostate based on its belief in prophethood after
Muhammad. Another source of reference was the declaration by Rabiṭa
Ālam Islāmiy (Association of the Muslim World) at its meeting in Mecca
in 1973 in which Ahmadiyya was pronounced as deviant and apostate. A
similar fatwā issued by Islamic Research Centre (Majma’ al-Buhūth al-
Islāmiy) in Cairo, Egypt was also cited.45 Furthermore, MUI also contended
that Malaysia, Brunei, and Saudi Arabia had banned the sect, while in
Pakistan and India, the birthplace of Ahmadiyya, Ghulam Ahmad is legally
considered as an unbeliever. The Pakistani government has even acted more
boldly by pronouncingthe status of Ahmadiyya as a non-Muslim minority.
Within Indonesia itself, MUI referred to Islamic organizations such as NU,
Muhammadiyah, and Persatuan Islam in justifying its legal opinion ( fatwā).
According to MUI, Muhammadiyah has banned Ahmadiyya in 1926.46 While
it did not clearly mention the date of the prohibition by NU, it stated that
NU’s decision regarding Ahmadiyya defined in its Baḥth al-Masāil’s meeting
44 Ibid, 101-113.
45 Ibid, 112.
46 Although MUI claimed that Muhammadiyah has banned Ahmadiyya in 1926, a research by
Zulkarnain Iskandar shows different conclusion. Rather than seen as the year of Ahmadiyya ban,
1926 was the year when the relationship between Muhammadiyah and Ahmadiyya strength-
ened. Even the son of Ahmad Dahlan, Muhammadiyah founding father, Djoemhan, took part
in Muhammadiyah-Ahmadiyya relationship by participating in a Muhammadiyah group of
expedition to Lahore in 1924. In India, the son of Ahmad Dahlan changed his name into Irfan
and was reported to reside in Bangkok until his passing away in this city as a Lahore Ahmadiyya
preacher. See Zulkarnain Iskandar, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia (Yogyakarta: LKIS 2005),
187. Asvi Warman Adam, an Indonesian historian, notes that it was in 1929, and not in 1926
that Muhammadiyah started to ban Ahmadiyya. See Asvi Warman Adam, “Tengoklah Sejarah
Ahmadiyah”, Seputar Indonesia, 21 February 2011. Other source, mentioned it was 1928 that ban
by Muhammadiyah issued through Maklumat Number 294. Please refer to http://ahmadiyah.
org/gerakan-ahmadiyah-indonesia/sejarah-singkat-gai/, accessed on February 14, 2013.

in Lirboyo, Kediri, is in support of MUI.47 As for Persatuan Islam, MUI stated

that in 1933 and 1934 in Bandung and Jakarta respectively, its leader, Ahmad
Hassan, had strongly rejected Ahmadiyya. 48
As mentioned earlier, there are two groups of Ahmadiyya, namely the
better known Qadian Ahmadiyya and the Lahore Ahmadiyya. In Indo-
nesia, these two groups exist and have been renamed Jamaat Ahmadiyah
Indonesia (JAI)49 and Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI), respectively.50
The fundamental difference between these two groups of Ahmadiyya is
that the GAI or Lahore Ahmadiyya does not believe in the prophethood of
Ghulam Ahmad as does the JAI or Qadian Ahmadiyya. The legal opinion
( fatwā), however, applies to both groups regardless of these differences. In
MUI’s view, there is no significant distinction between the two. Although
the Lahore Ahmadiyya regards Ghulam Ahmad as a reformer, MUI does not
see this as a consideration for excluding the Lahore Ahmadiyya from its legal
opinion ( fatwā). It argued that proclaiming someone as God’s messenger
invited legal sanction. Though the Lahore Ahmadiyya does not regard Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet but still believe in his position as reformer
(mujaddid) and mahdi, they are nonetheless deemed, deviant.51
It is also pertinent to note that MUI has also enumerated other criteria
in determining the religious status of Muslim groups’ beliefs and practice.
Although these were enumerated about another legal opinion ( fatwā) on
the deviant practice of Islam passed by MUI on November 6, 2007, they are
nonetheless relevant to the issue at hand. The 2007 legal opinion (fatwā) was
held in response to, among many other issues, the emergence of some groups
deemed to promote the unusual or deviant practice of Islamic teachings.
This legal opinion ( fatwā) endorsed by the then general chairman of MUI,
47 An interesting fact relating to NU and Ahmadiyya was also presented by Asvi Warman
Adam. According to him, the founder of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia was the Muhammadiyah
Raden Ngabehi Djojosoegito, who was the cousin of Hasyim Asy’ari, the founding father of NU.
See Adam, ibid and http://ahmadiyah.org/gerakan-ahmadiyah-indonesia/sejarah-singkat-gai/
48 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia Sejak 1975 (Jakarta:
49 For a brief history of Qadian Ahmadiyya or Jemaat Ahmadiyya Indonesia, please refer to
Zaenal Abidin EP, Syarif Ahmad Saitama Lubis: Dari Ahmadiyah untuk Bangsa (Yogyakarta:
Logung Pustaka, 2007), especially Chapter 9.
50 Please refer to official website of Gerakan Ahmadiyah Lahore Indonesia, http://ahmadiyah.
org. Compare with other books written by activists of GAI such as Nanang R.I. Iskandar, Mujad-
did, Masih dan Mahdi (Jakarta: Darul Kutubil Islamiyah, 2009), Nanang R.I. Iskandar, Dasawindu
GAI (Jakarta: Darul Kutubil Islamiyah, 2008), Minhadjurrahman Djojosoegito, Pengertian yang
Benar tentang Ahmadiyah (Yogyakarta: Darul Kutubil Islamiyah, 2010).

the late Sahal Mahfudh and general secretary Ichwan Sam, established the
criteria for groups deemed as deviant.
According to this legal opinion ( fatwā), a deviant group is characterized
by one of the following criteria: 1) rejects the pillars of imān and Islam; 2)
believes and follows teachings incompatible with the sharī’a; 3) believes
in revelation after the Qur’ān; 4) refuses the authenticity of the Qur’ān; 5)
interpreting the Qur’ān, not on the basis of Qur’anic exegesis principles; 6)
rejects the position and role of hadīth as the source of Islamic teachings;
7) humiliates the prophets; 8) rejects the status of Muhammad as the last
messenger; 9) alters the principles of rituals (ibāda) that have been outlined
by the Islamic law (sharī’a); and 10) blames other Muslims as unbelievers
(kāfir) without valid textual reference from Islamic law.52
MUI maintains that political freedom in the expression of religion in the
post-Reformasi era has brought negative implications for Islam as under the
banner of freedom, some thought and activities contradictory to the Islamic
faith and Islamic law (sharī’a) have emerged.53 Furthermore, MUI states:
Thought/ism and activities which are contradictory to Islamic faith and

sharī’a should not easily develop in society, as it will surely create conflicts
and strife among the community (umma), apart from victimizing those
who have been misled or led astray. Consequently, there should be serious
attempts at preventing and deterring the (development) of sects and
efforts should be made to invite them to the correct path.54
Shi’a in Indonesia
In comparison to Ahmadiyya, it can be said that from a historical point

of view, Shi’a is signif icantly different. While Ahmadiyya is a modern
phenomenon, Shi’a has established its existence along with the history of
Islam itself. The contributions of Shi’a, especially in cultural and intellectual
fields, are pivotal in the construction of Islamic heritage and have enhanced
52 http://hidayatullah.com/read/24676/08/09/2012/10-parameter-majelis-ulama-indonesia-
(mui)-tentang-aliran-sesat.html, accessed on 14 February 2013.
53 Keputusan Rapat Kerja Nasional Majelis Ulama Indonesia tentang Pedoman Identifikasi
Aliran Sesat in Ainul Yaqin (ed), Fatwa dan Keputusan MUI tentang Ajaran Syi’ah (Surabaya:
MUI Jawa Timur, 2012), 91-100.
54 Ibid, 91-92.

the richness and depth of Islam.55 Etymologically, in its original context, the
Arabic word shī’a simply means partisan or followers.56 The term initially
called shī’atu‘Aliy or the party of ‘Ali refers to those who took sides with Ali
ibn Abi Thalib and supported him in many important events in Islamic
history especially during the civil war between ‘Ali and Mu’awiyya arising
from the controversy surrounding the murder of the third Caliph Uthman
bin Affan.57 However, other opinions trace the emergence of Shi’a to the
period as early as the Prophet’s time, when a group of people including
Salman al-Farisi, Abu Dharr al-Ghiffari, al-Miqdad bin al-Aswad al-Kindi
and Ammar bin Yasir, were referred to as Shī’atu‘Ali or Asḥāb ‘Ali.58
Whether Shi’a started as a political or religious and spiritual movement
has been one of the most debated topics in scholarship. On the one hand,
the association of the history of Shi’a with politics is inevitable, as one of
the most fundamental issues regarding the divide between Sunni and Shi’a
is the question of succession of the Prophet as the leader of community
(umma). Moreover, competition between various groups within Muslim
communities in Medina over the claim of post-Prophet leadership cannot
be ignored as a political one. On the other hand, as Prophet Muhammad
is above all a religious and spiritual leader, the problem about his succes-
sion cannot be isolated from the spiritual dimension of religious authority
(marja’iyat-i ‘ilmi) even though scholarship, in general, tends to give more
attention to the political dimension.59 In this respect, a Shi’a scholar Syed
Husain Mohammad Jafri has objected to such an orientation which in his
view reveals the trappings of the separation of church and state which does
not exist in Islam.60 Apart from this divergence of perspectives, it may also
be possible to suggest that while the matter may have been induced by
55 S. Waheed Akhtar, Early Shī’ite Imamiyah Thinkers (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House,
1988), vii.
56 Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, Shi’ite Islam (Albany: State University of
New York, 1975), 33.
57 See Heinz Halm, Shi’ism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004, 2nd Edition), 1; Syed
Farid Alatas, “The Tariqat al-Alawiyyah and the Emergence of Shi’i School in Indonesia and
Malaysia,” Oriente Moderno, Nuova serie, Anno 18 (79), Nr. 2 (1999), 323-339.
58 Arzina R. Lalani, Early Shī’ī Thought: The Teachings of Imam Muhammad al-Baqir (London
and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 2.
59 See, for example, Harun Nasution, Teologi Islam: Aliran-aliran, Sejarah, Analisa, Perband-
ingan (Jakarta: UI Press, 1986); Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Tarikh al-Madzahib al-Islamiyah:
al-Siyasah wa al-Aqaid wa Tarikh al-Madzahib al-Fiqhiyyah (Cairo: Dar al-Fikri al-‘Arabi, 2002)
Volume I, 29-55; and M. Dhiauddin Rais, Teori Politik Islam (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 2001).
60 Syed Husain Mohammad Jafri, The Origins and Early Development of Shi’a Islam (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), chapter 1.

politics initially, it has evolved into complicated religious dimensions as it is

not uncommon in history that religious formulations are closely intertwined
with politics. It should not be overlooked that the initial dispute between
Sunni and Shi’a was that of the leadership of the Muslim community (umma)
upon Prophet Muhammad’s death. While the majority believed that the
Prophet did not designate his successor clearly and had left it in the hands of
Muslims to choose, the minority group of Muslims insisted that Ali has been
previously chosen by the Prophet to lead the Muslim community (umma)
after his demise. This root problem developed its theological justifications
and interpretations of history. The major ones used by the Shi’ais the event
known as Ghadir Khumm which refers to a Prophetic tradition (hadīth) in
which the Prophet upon his return from farewell pilgrimage (hajj al-wadā’)
in Mecca had indicated Ali as leader of Muslim community (umma) after
him;61 the “Episode of Paper and Pen” before the Prophet’s death;62 the saqifa
61 It is reported that in a place between Mecca and Medina called Ghadir Khumm, Prophet held
Ali by his hand in front of the rest of pilgrims and said: “Everyone whose patron I am also has ‘Ali
as a patron (man kuntu mawlahu fa-‘Ali mawlahu). The validity of this tradition is undisputable
among both Sunni and Shi’ah. But, they differ in deriving the meaning of the hadith. Shi’is
interpreted this saying as clear indication of Ali’s appointment as a successor to the Prophet;
while Sunnis, on the other hand, regarded it as an endeavour made by the Prophet to strengthen
Ali’s authority which was weakening. Others said that the dispute between Sunni and Shi’ah lies
in the interpretation of word mawla, which is seen by Shi’ah as equal to master, while in Sunni’s
understanding, mawla means friend not master. Therefore, Sunni Muslims rejected this event as
a sign of Ali’s designation as Prophet’s successor. Among the argument posed by Sunni Muslims
is that if Ali is really desired and designed by the Prophet as his successor after his death, he
would not deliver his utterance in Ghadir Khum, but during the haji wada’ (the final pilgrimage)
which was attended by almost all Prophet’s companions. Furthermore, Sunni maintains that
hadith of Ghadir Khum is no more than a Prophet’s response to those who criticized Ali. If it is
true that Ali was chosen by the Prophet as his successor, Sunni argument continues, why did
Ali keep silent on the matter and hide the truth. See Ibid.
62 It is reported by Bukhari, one of the most authoritative Sunni Traditionists, through Ibn
‘Abbas authority, that when the Prophet’s illness was becoming more and more serious, he asked
for pen and paper to write something on. According to this tradition, Prophet said that what
he intended to write is something that will not lead Muslims into error. However, the Prophet’s
illness deteriorated and Umar said that it is enough for Muslims to have the Book of God. Umar’s
words have made people dispute. Realizing this situation, Prophet asked the people to leave him
and not to quarrel in his presence. Ibn Abbas went out saying: “The greatest of all calamities is
what intervened between the Apostle and his writing.” Similar to the first event, the Episode of
Paper and Pen is also interpreted in different ways by both Sunni and Shi’ah. The Shi’ah claim
that what the Prophet wished to write down was the confirmation of Ali’s leadership after his
passing. This claim is also advanced and supported by claims circulated among Shi’is that the
Prophet died with his head on Ali’s lap. In contrast, within the Sunni circles, they offered various
explanations on what actually the Prophet wanted to write. Some Sunni traditions confirmed
Ali’s position during the death of the Prophet, while another version said the Prophet passed

event pertaining to the dispute among Muslim groups in Medina over

claims to leadership after the Prophet;63 and the civil war between Ali and
Mu’awiyya, popularly known as the Battle of Ṣiffin. Chiefly motivated by
Uthman bin Affan’s murder, the battle ended through arbitration (taḥkīm)
or arbitration which later defeated Ali. Ali’s decision to resort to arbitration
(taḥkīm) had created disagreement and even anger among a certain faction
of his followers who chose to walk out of his garrison and form an extremist
line known later as khawārij which literally means those who separated.64
Those who were faithful to Ali supported Ali’s position and formed the core
of early generation of the Shi’a.
All these important historical events, which were clearly political, have
been a source of disputes between Sunni and Shi’a. This controversy, mainly
away on the lap of his wife Aisha, not Ali. See Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The
History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 16.
63 Many historical sources mentioned that while ‘Ali as the closest relative of the Prophet, and
Abbas his only surviving uncle, were preparing the ritual of washing and burial of the Prophet’s
body, the Anshar (native Medinan who provided aid during Meccan Muslims emigrated to
Medina) gathered in Saqifah of Banu Sa’adah, a place belonging to the tribe of Sa’adah, which
is chosen due to its neutrality among the Awz and Khazraj, two competing tribes from the
Anshar. This meeting was intended to discuss the claim of ummah’s leadership in the post-
Prophet period. The competition over leadership of the ummah was intensified when Khazraj
tribe nominated its chief, Said bin Ubadah as the leader of Muslim community. Realizing this
situation, the leader of Awz tribe, Asid ibn Haydar come to Muhajirun faction and reported
the situation. Abu Bakr and Umar ibn Khattab, two prominent Muhajirun, came to the saqifah
and soon involved in dispute with Anshar on the leadership. Anshar believed that the right of
leadership should fall in the hand of Anshar based on the reason that when the Prophet was
refused and prosecuted by his own tribe, the Quraysh in Mecca, the Anshar extended their
hands to offer him shelter and later embraced Islam. For this reason, more than any other
tribes, Anshar is the most entitled of leadership. In response to Anshar’s intention, Abu Bakar
defended Muhajirun’s privilege over the leadership of the ummah, arguing that as Muhajirun of
the Quraysh were first who embraced Islam, and that the Prophet is from Quraysh, the leadership
of ummah has to be the right of Quraysh. Furthermore, for unity of Muslims, he nominated either
Ubaidah ibn al-Jarah or Umar ibn Khattab, two prominent Muhajirun members, as the leader of
ummah succeeding Prophet Muhammad. But, both refused the nomination and asked Abu Bakar
himself to assume the leadership, based on the facts that he is the oldest member of Quraysh
tribe, and he had accompanied Prophet Muhammad in his trip from Mecca to Medina. Umar
ibn Khattab, Ubaidah ibn Jarah and Bashir ibn Sa’d then performed a bai’at to the leadership
of Abu Bakar which formalized the position of Abu Bakar of the first caliph in Islam. Upon
knowing this development, ‘Ali rejected to vow his allegiance to Abu Bakar, although many
source also mentioned that ‘Ali later changed his stand and extended his support Abu Bakar,
after the demise of his wife, Fatima.
64 For more comprehensive account on civil war in Islam, especially the battle of Siffin, please
refer to al-Tabari, The History of al-Tabari Volume XVII: The First Civil War, translated by G.R.
Hwating (Albany: State University of New York, 1996).

driven by politics at that time, continues to the present day and often su-
persede religious, intellectual, and spiritual dimensions. Shi’a, however, is
not merely confined to the political question. It has also developed creeds,
doctrines, teachings on certain aspects of Islam. Moreover, it is pertinent
to note that the Shi’a community is not a homogenous entity. Doctrinal
tensions, irreconcilable disputes, and internal divergence exist within
them which resulted in the emergence of groups such as Imamiya (Ithna
Ashariya), Zaidi, Ismaili, Kisaniyah, and others.65
The origin of Shi’a in the archipelago remains debated by historians.
Two main views exist.66 The first prescribes that the coming of Shi’a to
Nusantara coincided with the coming of Islam to the region during the
reign of the Abbasid Dynasty in Arabia.67 Among the supporters of this view
are Ali Hasymi, Abu Bakar Aceh, Agus Sunyoto and Jalaluddin Rakhmat.
They strongly believe that Islam first arrived in Nusantara through Aceh
comprised two dominant schools, namely Shafi’i and Shi’a.Abu Bakar Aceh,
for instance, maintained that the early existence of Shi’a in Nusantara can
be traced to the Islamic sultanate of Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and
Indonesia through intermarriage between members of the local royal family
with descendants of the House of the Prophet (ahl al-bait) from Persia and
Gujarat.68 Furthermore, Abu Bakar Aceh maintained that the first Islamic
sultanate in Nusantara, Perlak in Aceh, was a Shi’ite sultanate which marked
Shi’a as once an important political force in the archipelago.69
Similarly, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, chairman of Shi’a organization in Indo-
nesia (Majelis Syura Ikatan Jama’ah Ahlulbait Indonesia, IJABI), also holds
this belief. In his view, Shi’a in Indonesia occurred in four phases. The
first phase which took place around 8th century was marked by taqiyya70
65 See Muhammad bin Abdul Karim al-Syahrastani, Al-Milal wa al-Nihal: Aliran-aliran Teologi
dalam Sejarah Umat Manusia (Surabaya: PT Bina Ilmu, 2006), 124-173; Muhammad Abu Zahrah,
Tarikh al-Madzahib al-Islamiyah: al-Siyasah wa al-Aqaid wa Tarikh al-Madzahib al-Fiqhiyyah
(Cairo: Dar al-Fikri al-‘Arabi, 2002) Volume I, 29-55; Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn
Tabataba’i, Shi’ite Islam (Albany: State University of New York, 1975),68-76; and M. Quraish
Shihab, Sunnah-Syiah Bergandengan Tangan! Mungkinkah? Kajian atas Konsep Ajaran dan
Pemikiran (Jakarta: Lentera Hati, 2007), 63-84.
66 For more detailed account on controversy of the coming of Shi’ah to Nusantara, please
refer to Zulkifli, The Struggle of the Shi’is in Indonesia, Doctoral dissertation Leiden University,
2009, 3-10.
67 “Kisah Kang Jalal Soal Syiah Indonesia (Bagian 1)”, Tempo 03 September 2012.
68 Abu Bakar Atjeh, Aliran Syi’ah di Nusantara (Jakarta: Islamic Research Institute, 1977), 35.
69 Ibid, 31.
70 ‘Allamah Tabataba’i viewed that taqiyya is one of the most understood aspects of Shi’ah. In
its technical meaning, taqiyya means hiding one’s religion or “certain of his religion practice
in situation that would cause definite or probable danger as a result of the actions of those who

(dissimulation) as a strategy. By this, Rakhmat meant that the followers

of Shi’a pretended to be the followers of Shafi’i school due to their small
number and for security reasons. Although the scarcity of textual material
regarding this postulation renders it is difficult to verify, Rakhmat’s point
correlates to what Aceh maintained. Rakhmat also justified his contention
by highlighting some religious practices in early Indonesian Islam derived
from the tradition of Shi’a. These included Tabot, a traditional annual
celebration by Muslims in Bencoolen, Sumatra,71 and Pariaman, which
commemorate the tragedy of Karbala in which Husayn, the grandson of
the Prophet was massacred by the Umayyads.
The second phase, according to Rakhmat, occurred in the late 1970s
onwards as an impact of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. The triumph
of the Islamic revolution in Iran led by Khomeini sparked interest on Shi’a
in many of parts of the Muslim world including Indonesia.72 This wave was
further followed by intensive studies on Shi’a jurisprudence ( fiqh) which
constitutes the third phase of Shi’a’s presence in Indonesia. It was marked
by active movements of students to centers of learning in Iran where they
studied theology, Islamic philosophy, and Islamic law (sharī’a). According
to Zulkifli’s studies, at this point the role of Indonesian Qum alumni is
pivotal. Qum is a renowned learning center in Iran. Some prominent leaders
of Shi’a in Indonesia are reported as having been educated in the colleges
of learning in Qum (hawza ilmiyya). Upon their return to Indonesia, these
Qum alumni taught at learning centers in Indonesia owned and developed
by Shi’a.73 In this phase, Rakhmat maintained, the seeds of conflicts started
to spread, as the teachings of Shi’a became more widespread and followers
of the Shia started to preach their teachings publicly. The phases culminated
in the formation of Shi’a-affiliated organizations in Indonesia such as IJABI
(Ikatan Jamaah Ahlulbait Indonesia)74 and ABI (Ahlul Bait Indonesia).
This perspective of the early phase of the influence of Shi’a has been
contested by scholars such as Hamka and Azyumardi Azra on the grounds
are oppsed to his religion or particular religious practices”. See Allamah Tabataba’i, “Taqiyyah”,
in Syed Hossein Nasr, et. Al (eds), Shi’ism: Doctrines, Thought and Spirituality (Albany: State
University of New York, 1988), 204.
71 “Tabot, Jejak Syiah dalam Tradisi Indonesia,” Tempo.co, 02 September 2012.
72 Zulkifli, “Praksis Taqiyah: Strategi Syiah Indonesia untuk Pengakuan”, in Dicky Sofjan (ed),
Sejarah dan Budaya Syiah di Asia Tenggara (Yogyakarta: Sekolah Pascasarjana Universitas
Gadjah Mada, 2013), 292.
73 See Zulkifli, The Struggle of the Shi’is in Indonesia, Doctoral dissertation Leiden University,
2009, 30-37.
74 “Empat Periode Penyebaran Syiah di Indonesia”, Tempo, 2 September 2012, and interview
with Jalaludin Rakhmat, in Jakarta, December 2012.

of lack of historical evidence. In Azra’s evaluation, though there existed

Persian influences in many fields of life in Nusantara, they do not decisively
prove the coming of Shi’a into the archipelago as far back as the 8th century
as it is only in the era of Safavid reign that Persia became the center of Shi’a
movement. The Safavid ascendance as the center of Shi’a political and
intellectual movement took place much later than the period claimed by
the supporters of the first view. Quoting Van Ronkel’s finding, Azra also
critically maintained that traditional practices often associated with Shi’a
such as Tabot in Bencoolen and Pariaman do not necessarily reflect its
widespread influence in the given period of conversion to Shi’a precisely.75
Despite the controversy, it is an undeniable the fact that the Shi’a com-
prises one of the many Muslim groups living in Indonesia. Many educational
and social institutions run by Shi’a are evidence of its long established
history in the country. In the contemporary setting, according to Zulkifli’s
study,76 the more visible presence of Shi’a cannot be separated from Shi’ite
leaders and scholars such as Husein al-Habsyi,77 Husein Shahab, Jalaluddin
Rakhmat,78 and Haidar Bagir. Studies on Shi’a in Indonesia have also consist-
ently pointed out that the intellectual inclination and contributions of the
Shi’a has been the major factor in attracting many Indonesian Muslims to
convert or at least to be sympathetic to it.79
Those who converted to Shi’a are mostly religious scholars and intel-
lectuals who have wide influence within society. Husein al-Habsyi, for
instance, is a prominent religious scholar who founded an Islamic boarding
school (pesantren) in Bondowoso, East Java, Indonesia, and later established
another boarding school in Bangil, East Java, currently known as one Shi’a
learning center in Indonesia.80 Jalaluddin Rakhmat is a prominent public
intellectual in Indonesia who formerly served as a professor at the University
of Padjajaran in Bandung. Rakhmat is also a prolific writer who wrote
75 Azyumardi Azra, “Kaum Syiah di Asia Tenggara: Menuju Pemulihan Hubungan dan Ker-
jasama”, in Dicky Sofjan (ed), Sejarah dan Budaya Syiah di Asia Tenggara (Yogyakarta: CRCS,
2012), 5-31.
76 Zulkifli, The Struggle of the Shi’is in Indonesia, Doctoral dissertation Leiden University, 2009
77 Husein al-Habsyi is believed as important figure behind the spread of Shi’a in contemporary
Indonesia. For more discussion on Husein al-Habsyi, please refer to Fadil Su’ud Ja’fari, Islam
Syiah: Telaah Pemikiran Imamah Habib Husein al-Habsyi (Malang: UIN-Maliki Press, 2010).
78 Jalaluddin Rakhmat is one of leading Muslim intellectual in Indonesia. It is important to
note that before affiliating to Shi’ah
79 Interview with Muhsin Labib, Jakarta, December 2012
80 http://ahlulbaitindonesia.org/berita/417/ustadz-husein-al-habsyi-pejuang-dan-guru-sejati/.
See also Fadil Su’ud Ja’fari, Islam Syiah: Telaah Pemikiran Imamah Habib Husein al-Habsyi
(Malang: UIN-Maliki Press, 2010).

wide-ranging topics covering issues about social sciences, Islamic thought

to Islamic mysticism.81
Fatwā on Shi’a
Apart from Ahmadiyya, the Central Board of MUI also issued a legal opinion
(fatwā) on the Shi’a in 1984. The fatwā, which originated a few years after the
Iranian Revolution in 1979, was endorsed by Ibrahim Hosen and Musytari
Yusuf. However, this fatwā did not explicitly pronounce on the deviance
of Shi’a. Without explicating clearly its views on Shi’a, the fatwā strongly
advised Indonesian Muslims to be aware (waspada) of Shi’a.82 The statement
“to be aware of Shi’a” is an ambiguous phrase. On the one hand, it can be
understood as permission for Shi’a to develop in Indonesia, since it is not
deviant (sesat). On the contrary, it can also be interpreted as a euphemistic
form of a ban since it carried a strong warning to Muslims in Indonesia to
be wary of Shi’a as a potential threat or danger. The first possibility finds
support in the view of Umar Shihab, one of MUI’s chairpersons, who argued
that Shi’a is a legitimate school of thought (madhhab) in Islam and MUI
did not issue any legal opinion ( fatwā) pronouncing it as deviant (sesat).83
However, Shihab’s interpretation of this ambiguous legal opinion ( fatwā)
has been viewed with suspicion given his affiliation to Shi’a. His views
have also been subjected to severe criticism by other scholars (ulama’)
within MUI.84
In 2011, the conflict between Shi’a and Sunni groups in Sampang, Madura,
East Java, erupted. Shortly after the violence erupted and while in the midst
of tension and conflict, a legal opinion ( fatwā) asserting that Shi’a is a
deviant Muslim sect was issued by MUI of that province. The fatwā (No.
Kep-01/SKFMUI/JTM/I/2012) was released in the meeting of MUI of East
Java Province on 21 January 2012. It stated:
81 For detail information on Jalaluddin Rakhmat, please refer to Dedy Jamaluddin Malik and
Idi Subandy Ibrahim, Zaman Baru Islam Indonesia: Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Abdurrahman
Wahid, M. Amien Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, Jalaluddin Rakhmat (Bandung: Zaman Wacana Mulia,
1998)
82 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Himpunan Fatwa Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia Sejak 1975 (Jakarta:
83 http://news.okezone.com/read/2012/01/01/337/550019/mui-pusat-syiah-tidak-sesat, accessed
on 14 February, 2013.
84 http://www.voa-islam.com/news/indonesiana/2012/02/03/17601/bela-syiah-prof-dr-umar-
shihab-terdiam-dimarahi-habib-zein-alkaff/, accessed on 14 February 2013.

1. Mengukuhkan dan menetapkan keputusan MUI-MUI daerah yang men-

yatakan bahwa ajaran Syi’ah (khususnya Imamiyah Itsna Asyariyah dan/
atau yang menggunakan nama samaran Madzhab Ahlul Bait dan semi-
salnya) serta ajaran-ajaran yang mempunyai kesamaan dengan faham
Syi’ah Imamiyah Itsna Asyariyah adalah SESAT DAN MENYESATKAN.
2. Menyatakan bahwa penggunaan istilah Ahlul Bait untuk pengikut Syi’ah
adalah bentuk pembajakan kepada ahlul bait Rasulullah Saw.85
1. Affirm the decision of regional offices of MUI which stated that the
teaching of Shi’ism (especially those of the Twelver Shi’a or who use the
pseudo name of Ahl al-Bayt) and other teachings which are similar to
the Twelver Shi’a are DEVIANT AND LEAD TO DEVIANCE.
2. That the use of term Ahlul Bait for the followers of Shi’ism is a misap-
propriation of the house of the Prophet Muhammad.
It is evident from this quote that the legal opinion ( fatwā) claimed to be
a response to numerous requests from Muslim leaders across East Java
who demanded that Shi’a should be declared as deviant (sesat). After a
long list of considerations which included quotes from the Qur’ān, ḥadīth,
some excerpts of books written by Shi’a scholars, Sunni ulama’ as well as
Indonesian ulama’, the legal opinion ( fatwā) pronounced as follows: “The
decision of MUI’s regencies that Shi’a (especially Imamia Ithna Asharia
or its pseudo name Madhhab Ahl al-Bait and the like) is deviant and that
other sects which bear similarities with Shi’a are deviant (sesat) and lead
Muslims astray (menyesatkan) is affirmed.”86
Furthermore, the legal opinion ( fatwā) also upheld that:
a. Kepada umat Islam diminta untuk waspada agar tidak mudah ter-
pengaruh dengan faham dan ajaran Syi’ah (khususnya Imamiyah Itsna
Asyariyah dan/atau yang menggunakan nama samaran Madzhab Ahlul
Bait dan semisalnya)
b. Kepada umat Islam diminta untuk tidak mudah terprovokasi melakukan
tindakan kekerasan (anarkisme), karena tindakan tersebut tidak dibenar-
kan dalam Islam serta bertolak belakang dengan upaya membina suasana
kondusif untuk kelancaran dakwah Islam.87
85 Yaqin, Ainul (ed). Fatwa dan Keputusan MUI tentang Ajaran Syi’ah (Surabaya: Majelis Ulama
Indonesian Provinsi Jawa Timur, 2012), 76.
86 Ibid, 11-12.
87 Ibid, 76-77.

a. Muslims are required to be cautious in order to avoid being vulnerable

to the influence of the philosophy ( faham) of Shi’ism (especially the Ithna
Ash’aria or those who use the pseudo name of Ahl al-Bayt);
b. Muslims are required not to be provoked into perpetrating violence, as
it is not permitted in Islam and is contradictory to efforts at doing good
work in propagating the faith (dakwah Islam).
The justification for the earlier legal opinion (fatwā) issued by Central Board
of MUI in 1984 differed from the new fatwā. As Alwial-Habsyi, a Shi’a thinker
in Bangil, East Java, maintained, the earlier fatwāwhich stated that Muslims
in Indonesia should be cautious (waspada) of Shi’a appeared to have been
motivated by the political situation in the 1980s during which Shi’a was
associated with the threat of radical Islam. The new fatwā, however, based
on justifications adduced seem to have been precipitated by the motive of
protecting belief (aqīdah) or more specifically the perceived threat against
the faith of the community (umma).88
The legal opinion (fatwā) functions to legitimize MUI as the sole repre-
sentative and authority of true Islam against the perceived threat of Shi’a
which has it labeled as wayward or deviant. The emotive sentiment against
Shi’a which has hardened cannot be isolated from the fear that Shi’a has
been gaining influence among prominent thinkers in Indonesia some of
whom have been mentioned above. While the consistent politically induced
reaction against Shi’a by some factions beyond Indonesia since the Iranian
revolution in 1979 cannot be overlooked, locally specific conditions in the
post-New Order period are equally pertinent as precipitating the unprec-
edented development of Shi’a which may have impacted on the recent legal
opinion (fatwā). The followers of Shi’a in Indonesia are often well-educated,
and many of them are university graduates. They have been very active in the
publication sector and especially in the field of religious and secular education
in Indonesia. Jalaludin Rakhmat is perhaps one of Indonesia’s most prominent
intellectuals. He defines Indonesian Shi’a regarding an intellectual movement
rather than a revolutionary one. He is the initiator of the Jalal Center which
serves mainly as a platform for dissemination of his philosophical thought.
The Ikatan Jamaah Ahlulbait Indonesia (IJABI), apparently the largest Java
based Shi’a association is very active in the publications sector and organizes
conferences and dialogues with Sunni scholars and other religious communi-
ties. In the post-Suharto era, Shi’a too appeared to benefit from the general
climate of political liberalization being more openly engaged and involved in
88 Interview with Muhammad Alwi al-Habsyi, 2 November 2013 in Bangil, East Java.

an intellectual exchange with other Indonesian thinkers. It has established

several institutions of higher learning such as the Muthahahari Center of
Training for Accelerated Learning (MCenter) in Bandung, the Islamic College
for Advanced Studies (ICAS) in Jakarta that aims to address the challenges and
opportunities for contemporary Muslims in the age of globalization, Fatimah
Islamic Organization or Yayasan Fatimah in Jakarta, al-Jawhad Foundation of
Islamic Studies in Bandung and several others. Numerous publications relat-
ing to Shi’a have also emerged from well-known publishing houses including
Pustaka Hidayah, Mizan, Lentara and YAPI Jakarta in recent years.89
It is pertinent to note that rather than resolving the conflict, the legal
opinion ( fatwā) has exacerbated the situation.90 According to the formal
document issued by MUI of East Java Province,91 the legal opinion ( fatwā)
was legitimized based on an extensive list of considerations which can be
classified into three categories: organizational or institutional, social, and
doctrinal.
From the organizational point of view, the legal opinion ( fatwā) was
supported by preceding legal opinion ( fatwā) issued by MUI offices in the
hierarchy of the religious bureaucracy as well as other Muslim civil society
organizations in East Java. Reference was made to the earlier legal opinion
( fatwā) on Shi’a which was issued by the Central Board of MUI in 1984 for
support. This 1984 fatwā stated that Shi’a is fundamentally different from
Ahl al-Sunna which is the mainstream school of thought of Indonesian
Muslims.92 The fatwā was further backed up by another formal decree;
namely, the decree of Ijtima’ Ulama Komisi Fatwa MUI se-Indonesia (The
National Assembly of Scholars of Fatwa Commission) passed on 26 May
2006 on Taswiya al-Manhaj (the unification of method). It was mentioned in
this decree that differences are to be tolerated as long as they occur within
the realm of majal al-ikhtilāf, i.e. (controversial issues arising within Ahl
al-Sunna wa al-Jamāa’s religious views). However, beyond this boundary,
they are no longer regarded as mere differences, but deviance.93
89 Marcinkowski Christoph, Shite Identities: Community and Culture in Changing Social

Contexts (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010), 207
90 While many people believe that the conflict was chiefly caused by individual and internal
family conflict, Ma’ruf Amien argues that this is not really the case. It is the ideological difference
that mainly fuels the conflict. See Ma’ruf Amin, “Menyikapi Fatwa MUI Jatim”, Republika,
08 November 2012.
91 See Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) Prop. Jawa Timur, No. 01/SKF-MUI/
JTM/I/2012; and Ainul Yaqin, (ed), Fatwa dan Keputusan MUI tentang Ajaran Syi’ah (Surabaya:
MUI Jawa Timur, 2012).
92 Ibid, 40.
93 Ibid, 40.

It is furthermore proclaimed that the legal opinion ( fatwā) on Shi’a is

the culmination and conclusion of standpoints, requests, and legal opinin
( fatwā) from MUI’s regional branches lower in the hierarchy of the religious
bureaucracy and supported by other Muslim civil society groups in East Java
which saw the danger of the spread of Shi’a in certain districts and regions in
the province. They include Badan Sillaturrahmi Ulama Pesantren Madura,
Jam’iyyah Ahlussunah wa al-Jamaah Bangil, Pasuruan, some Muslim clerics
from many Islamic boarding schools in East Java, and Nahdlatul Ulama’
(NU) in Sampang, Madura. The legal opinion ( fatwā) mentioned that almost
all MUI’s regional offices have also clearly expressed their stand on the Shi’a
community in East Java either through formal letters directly sent to MUI’s
office in East Java Province or through meetings which specially discussed
and decided on the status of Shi’a in Islam. MUI maintained that these
meetings were conducted several times in many places across the province.94
Attempts were also made at justifying the legal opinion ( fatwā) on the
basis of social realities and circumstances. In this respect, MUI adduced
data and facts through investigations or reports by members which point
to the expansion of Shi’a in specific localities. East Java MUI claimed that
based on reports from some Muslims and local leaders, a branch of Shi’a,
namely the Twelver Shi’a or Shi’a Ithna Ash’ariyah (using the pseudo name of
Ahlul Bait) was currently expanding in several areas in East Java. In addition,
evidence also points to considerably significant numbers of educational
institutions in East Java that taught and spread the doctrines of Shi’a. This
situation (which impliedly involves “conversion” of Sunni Muslims), East
Java MUI pointed out, undermines social harmony amongst Muslims in
these areas.
According to MUI, the Shi’a’s active attempts at propagating their teach-
ings to Indonesian Muslims have induced tension and conflict amongst
Muslims. In fact, the argument continues, social conflicts that involve
members of Shi’a Ithna Ash’ariya is not a new phenomenon but have been
ongoing in Indonesia. MUI of East Java Province believes that this situa-
tion can only be resolved by eradicating the source of the problem. This
impliedly meant that the followers of Shi’a themselves are the source of
the problem. Deterring the source can be clearly inferred as eliminating
Shi’a from Indonesian soil. In fact, the chairman of East Java Province MUI,
94 The fatwa mentioned two meetings were held to response the issue. The fatwa does not specify
the place of the meeting but the participants of meeting were MUI offices under the Surabaya
Coordinating Unit. The second meeting mentioned is attended by MUI offices under Besuki
Coordinating Unit which includes most of MUI offices in the eastern part of East Java Province.

Abdusshomad Buchori, strongly contended that the existence of Shi’a in

Madura is the most fundamental factor triggering the conflict. “As long as
Shi’a exists, the conflict will never cease,” he asserted.95 MUI’s perception
of Shi’a as a threat is also manifested in the investigation of Shi’a-owned
properties such as schools and centers which were also viewed suspiciously.
The most compelling consideration of MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā),
however, is the issue of the doctrinal legitimacy of Shi’a. I refer to this
factor as doctrinal since MUI attempted to define the position of the Shi’a
by examining the works of Shi’ite and non-Shi’ite scholars on Shi’a.96 In this
respect, MUI identified several tenets of Shi’a which it deems as contradic-
tory to Islam. The first is contractual marriage, better known as temporary
marriage (nikah mut’a). This practice, according to MUI, is no more than
a gate to the practices of adultery, the institutionalization of free sex and
prostitution that humiliates the dignity of women. It is also legally and
practically contradictory to the government of East Java Province’s program
in eradicating prostitution in the province. Another principal teaching of
Shi’a seen as contradicting Sunni belief is the attitude of followers of Shi’a
toward prophetic tradition (hadith) or the Prophetic tradition. According
to the legal opinion ( fatwā), the Shi’a views hadīth differently from the
Sunnis since they believe that the hadīth which include deeds (af’āl), sayings
(aqwāl), and decisions or examples (taqrīr), not only refer to the Prophet
but also to Imams of the Shi’a. At the same time, the Shi’a also regards those
imams as infallible (ma’ṣūm) just like the Prophet. Another Shi’a principle
perceived as contradictory to Sunni belief is that they reject the authenticity
of the Qur’ān based on the belief that there has been a distortion (taḥrīf ) to
the Qur’ān. Imāma is also another fundamental issue since Shi’a believes
that upholding leadership (imāma) is part of the Muslim creed. Other issues
presented by MUI included the tendency of Shi’a to interpret the Qur’anic
verses which only supports their group, denigration of the Prophet, the view
that some Prophet’s companion as apostates and the belief that denounces
those who do not believe their imams as polytheist and unbelievers. Based
on all these considerations, MUI of East Java Province decided that the
doctrines and teachings of Shi’a are incompatible with Indonesian Islam
95 “MUI Jatim: Kalau Syiah Masih Ada, Tetap Ada Konflik!”,http://nasional.kompas.com/

read/2012/09/03/15355642/MUI.Jatim.Kalau.Syiah.Masih.Ada.Tetap.Ada.Konflik, accessed on
September 10, 2012.
96 The books are: al-Sharastani’s al-Milal wa al-Nihal, Ibn Hazm’s al-Fashl fi al-Milal wa al-Ahwa
wa al-Nihal; Export Revolusi Syi’ah ke Indonesia, Dialog Apa dan Siapa Syi’ah, and MengenalSyi’ah,
all are written by Ahmad Zein Alkaf; and other two sources Syi’ah Bukan Islam?written by
Lajnah Ilmiyah HASMI and a paper by Abdurrahman Aziz Siapakah Pendiri Syi’ah?

and ahl al-sunna wa al-jamā’a. Therefore, it is deemed deviant and leads

Muslims to deviance (sesat dan menyesatkan).
Inevitably, the legal opinion ( fatwā) has attracted severe criticism from
many segments of Indonesian Muslims. However, East Java MUI simply
dismissed the critics for what it believes are their ignorance and misunder-
standing of the nature of legal opinion ( fatwā). In response to the criticism
that the fatwā is the triggering factor for the violence, Ainul Yaqin of East Java
Province’s MUI challenges the criticism as an anomaly. To him, by default,
“it is the task of the ulamā’ to provide true answers to society on unclear
matters.” Leaving the community (umma) in obscurity is not a wise attitude,
says Yaqin, since Muslims should be informed of the truth.97 He contends
that the fatwā is needed to ensure harmony among Muslims. He also chal-
lenged the critiques by alleging that they have ignored the problematic
creed of Shi’a teachings.98 Also, he maintained that while creating harmony
is a good thing, but this is impossible with Shi’a since harmony cannot be
built with a group that has spread hatred and disrespect against prominent
figures of Islam such as Abu Bakr, Umar ibn Khattab, Uthman, and Aisha.99
It is also important to present the standpoint of the Central Board of
MUI in Jakarta on this legal opinion ( fatwā). Based on information from
Central MUI’s inner circle, it was revealed that when the conflicts between
Sunni and Shi’a groups in East Java was escalating, the Central Board of MUI
in Jakarta held several meetings that aimed to discuss and decide on the
status of Shi’a. More specifically, the meetings were designed at issuing a
legal opinion ( fatwā) on the status of Shi’a as MUI of East Java Province has
previously done. However, this plan could not be easily realized, because
some Shi’a activists were part of MUI’s board members.100 Although initially
a rumor, the media subsequently exposed that two of MUI’s chairmen,
Umar Shihab and Muhyiddin Junaidi were affiliated to Shi’a.101 This fact
was then confirmed by Cholil Ridwan, another MUI chairman, who spoke
of his frequent discussions with Shihab over issues regarding Shi’a and he
had no doubt of Shihab’s affiliation to Shi’a.102
97 Ibid, 12.
98 Ibid, 33.
99 Ibid, 13.
100 Personal communication with one staff at MUI Headquarter in Jakarta.The respondent
mind to be named.
101 Islamic media coverage published this issue quite excessively, for example the websites of
www.voa-islam.com, www.suara-islam.com, nahimunkar.com, and www.hidayatullah.com.
102 http://www.voa-islam.com/lintasberita/eramuslim/2012/04/09/18599/ustadz-cholil-ridwan-
akui-umar-shihab-pembela-utama-syiah-di-forum-internal-mui/, accessed on 15 February 2013.

The boldness of East Java Province’s MUI in dealing with the issue of Shi’a
was not reflected in the deliberations of Central Board of MUI or MUI in
other provinces across Indonesia. The attitude of the Central Board of MUI
was ambivalent. Initially, they viewed the legal opinion ( fatwā) as locally
specific confined only to Madura and East Java as Amidhan, chairman of
MUI in Jakarta, had asserted.103 However, as the issue gradually escalated,
Ma’ruf Amin, the head of Fatwa Commission of MUI in Jakarta, then stated
that the fatwā on the Shi’a as deviant was being prepared by MUI.104 This
statement was confirmed by the general secretary of MUI, Ichwan Sam.105
However, MUI in Jakarta did not issue any fatwa relating to the status
of Shi’a. Nevertheless, at the end of 2012, Ma’ruf Amin on behalf of the
Central Board of MUI clearly stated its support for the legal opinion ( fatwā)
issued by MUI of East Java Province.106 He explained that in response to the
Sunni-Shi’a conflict in Sampang, Madura, MUI members in Sampang had
consulted the members of the Central Board of MUI in Jakarta, and the latter
had formed a team responsible for investigating the real situation on the
ground. Since it took a long time for the team to accomplish its task while
solutions and religious answers on Sunni-Shi’a conflict in Sampang were
urgently required, the Central Board of MUI in Jakarta granted authority
to MUI in Sampang, Madura to issue a legal opinion ( fatwā) in response to
the spread of Shi’a teachings by the Shi’aleader, Tajul Muluk. Based on the
findings, the MUI’s office in Sampang subsequently issued a legal opinion
( fatwā) that declared Shi’a as deviant. According to the Central Board of
MUI, this step was in compliance with the conditions and procedures of
issuing legal opinion (fatwā). Evidence and data on the problem, a reference
to classical works by Muslim scholars, a reference to MUI’s previous legal
opinion ( fatwā) on Shi’a (1984), and the criteria on deviant sects issued by
MUI in 2007 were utilized as bases for support. About deviant sects, Ma’ruf
Amin asserted that in East Java, other than Sampang, there were many
other regional MUI offices which had also issued legal opinion ( fatwā) on
the same subject. After having an intense consultation with MUI in Jakarta,
MUI of East Java Province finally supported, affirmed and legitimized those
legal opinions ( fatwā). Ma’ruf Amin concluded that based on this lengthy
103 http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2012/08/30/173426499/Hanya-MUI-Jawa-Timur-yang-
Teken-Fatwa-Syiah-Sesat, accessed on 15 February 2013.
104 http://www.eramuslim.com/berita/nasional/mui-fatwa-sesat-aliran-syiah-tinggal-tunggu-
waktu.htm, accessed on 15 February 2013.
105 Ibid.
106 Ma’ruf Amin, “Menyikapi Fatwa MUI Jatim”, Republika, 08 November 2012.

and rigorous process, the legal opinion ( fatwā) of East Java Province MUI
on Shi’a was on the right track.107
It is pertinent to note that not all MUI offices agreed with the legal
opinion ( fatwā). The major disagreement rested on theological grounds.
The position of MUI in West Java Province illustrates the point. Rafani
Achyar, the secretary of MUI West Java Province, argued that it was not easy
to decide on the status of Shi’a and to label it as deviant since Shi’a is not
different from Sunni doctrinally.108 In the same vein, its chairman believes
that Shi’a cannot be equated with other deviant Islamic sects such as the
Ahmadiyya on doctrinal grounds.109
Mode of Thought and Implications of Fatwā
These two legal opinion ( fatwā) on Ahmadiyya and Shi’a as deviant sects
once again reveal strong streaks of conservatism in MUI’s mode of thinking.
One visible aspect of this mode of thinking is the attempt to consciously
cling onto selective rulings while negating competing views on the grounds
of principles and rational deliberation. Within this mode of thinking, only
the group’s selective version of Islamic tradition is upheld to the exclusion
of others. The exclusive stance is strongly depicted in its assertions which
are devoid of engagement with competing claims irrespective of their
consequences on the lives of those affected by the fatwā. An example is
clearly manifested in MUI’s formulation of the legal opinion ( fatwā) on the
criteria of deviant groups discussed earlier which was invoked as one of
the basis in justifying the legal opinion ( fatwā) against Shi’a. MUI asserted
that deviants are those who believe and follow teachings incompatible
with the Islamic law (sharī’a). The pertinent question of what is Islamic law
(sharī’a) and whose definitions of Islamic law (sharī’a) they are referring to
are neither deliberated nor discussed.
Although the concept of Islamic law (sharī’a) is not a neutral one as
contending ideas persist over what it means, no attempt is made to explicate
its precise meaning.110 Another criterion stipulated in the legal opinion
( fatwā) is that deviants are those who interpret the Qur’ān outside the
107 Ibid.
108 http://bandung.detik.com/read/2012/05/02/180714/1907454/486/, accessed on 15 February 2013.
109 “Tentara Dekati Ulama Cegah Kasus Sampang Terjadi di Jabar,” Suara Pembaruan, 28 August
2012.
110 http://hidayatullah.com/read/24676/08/09/2012/10-parameter-majelis-ulama-indonesia-
(mui)-tentang-aliran-sesat.html, accessed on 14 February 2013.

established method of Qur’anic exegesis. This statement is simultaneously

exclusive and vague. Such an assertion strongly suggests that there is a
single acceptable interpretation of the Qur’ān. Qur’anic exegesis itself is a
rich field of study manifested by the vast diversity of Muslim thought and
interpretations. MUI’s assertion implies strongly that there is only one
certain; while others are wayward. This attitude is dangerous and reveals
an attempt to cling consciously to a particular selective understanding
without considering others on the basis of principles which effectively
closes possibilities for engaging with the diversity of religious thought and
opinion within the community.
Central to the conservative orientation in the justification for the legal
opinion (fatwā) is the need to safeguard and preserve the sanctity of the com-
munity (umma) and their identity against what is perceived as the threatening
on slaught of Shi’a deemed to undermine the faith and unity of the believers.
The legal opinion (fatwā), in this sense, functions to deflect competing views
of Islam advanced by rival groups while vesting in MUI the exclusive authority
to represent Muslims and discredit others as outside the mainstream of Islam.
In this respect, MUI is indifferent to the arguments and ideas of its opponents
on the rational or intellectual ground. It arrives at the legal opinion ( fatwā),
not through the intellectual process but emotional identification and sense
of loyalty to particular interpretation and understanding of Islam. The word
sesat – as the keyword in MUI’s fatwā on Ahmadiyya and Shi’a – in Indonesian
conveys multiple meanings. Literally, sesat means “misleading,” or “deviant.”
As a matter of faith, its implications are highly serious and convey adverse
consequences against those labeled or demonized as such. Being labeled as
deviant bear grave consequences on the victims. In the case of Islam, as with
some other religions, after the era of prophethood which ended with the
passing of Prophet Muhammad, no one single religious doctrine is sterile of
competing interpretations. The split between the Sunni and Shi’a illustrates
the problem. As such none can claim a single interpretation as the most valid
at the expense of other interpretations. Even among the Prophet’s closest
companions (ṣaḥaba), many important issues within the history of Islam
were disputed. Without careful study and deep understanding of the history
of Islam, theological denouncements through legal opinion (fatwā) that ad-
monishes groups as deviant (sesat) reveals but the emotive and authoritarian
mode of thought of the agencies that issue it.
Even in the classical Islamic tradition, Muslim scholars have warned of
the dangers of accusing other groups as unbelievers merely because they up-
hold different interpretations or believe in dissenting principles. Al-Ghazali,
for example, was known to have warned of the serious consequences of

accusing any one as an unbeliever or deviant since even if it can be proven

that the person is ninety-nine percent deviant, there is still the possibility
no matter how remote, that he/she may still be a believer. Therefore, it is
not justifiable to label one as unbeliever (kāfir) or deviant simply because
they uphold different views or challenge the beliefs of the majority. Letting
a thousand deviants live, in his opinion, incurs a lighter sin than spoiling
the name and endangering the life of a single Muslim.111
On the Ahmadiyya, MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) has clearly brushed
aside the fundamental debate within the group that has taken place in
history. It merely essentialized the group and declared it as a whole as
deviant. It is not the intention here to require MUI to alter its position on
the Ahmadiyya or determine which group within it is rightful or otherwise
on theological grounds. The overriding interest is to understand the salient
characteristics of its mode of thinking in determining how it arrives at its
judgment in pronouncing on the group’s fundamental religious belief. There
is clearly a lack of engagement with what the members of the sect regard
as fundamental differences within them. While the legal opinion ( fatwā)
denounces Ahmadiyya as a whole as deviant by the doctrine of prophethood
which is indeed controversial, it has simply brushed aside fundamental
differences in how Ahmadiyya members themselves have responded to
the issue. This has resulted in provocative responses from the Ahmadiyya
community which have been widely ignored by MUI.
Soon after the legal opinion ( fatwā) was issued, Gerakan Ahmadiyah
Indonesia (GAI) responded by issuing manifesto (maklumat) 01/PB-MA/
GAI/0005 signed by the general chairman Fathurrahman Ahmadi Djojosoe-
gito and the chairman Nanang Iskandar. The letter critically objected to the
legal opinion (fatwā) and criticized the failure of MUI to rigorously examine
the fundamental differences in belief within Ahmadiyya. Moreover, it
also critically sanctioned the insensitivity of the legal opinion ( fatwā) in
festering harm and impeding social integration among Muslims.112 In his
Fatwa MUI dan Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia, Nanang fiercely criticized
MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) as invoking potent consequences in denouncing
Ahmadiyya as a whole as unbelievers (kāfir). He asserted that MUI must be
mistaken (khilāf ) in deciding the status of Ahmadiyya as deviant (sesat)113
111 Quraish Shihab, “Kesefahaman, Urat Nadi Persudaraan Islam”, “Preface” in Tim Ahlul Bait
Indonesia, Buku Putih Mazhab Syiah Menurut Para Ulamanya yang Muktabar: Penjelasan Ringkas-
Lengkap untuk Kerukunan Umat (Jakarta: Dewan Pengurus Pusat Ahlul Bait Indonesia, 2012).
112 Maklumat GerakanAhmadiyah Indonesia (GAI), Number 01/PB-MA/GAI/0005.
113 Nanang RI Iskandar, Fatwa MUI dan Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (Yogyakarta: Darul
Kutubil Islamiyah, 2005), 1.

and called for a reconsideration or even revision of the legal opinion ( fatwā).
Similarly, a Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI) activist in Kediri, East Java,
Mutohir Alabas, viewed the legal opinion ( fatwā) as discrediting Lahore
Ahmadiyya members. For this reason, he strongly urged MUI to revise the
since GAI and JAI are fundamentally different.114 Although Alabas’ point
is pertinent, he may not be aware that the 2005 legal opinion ( fatwā) on
Ahmadiyya has already denounced both Ahmadiyya as deviant (sesat).
This legal opinion ( fatwā) was a revision to the earlier 1980 legal opinion
( fatwā) which only determined the Qadiani Ahmadiyya as deviant.115 A
formal response in written form was also expressed by Jemaat Ahmadiyah
Indonesia (JAI) not long after the legal opinion ( fatwā) was issued. The
statement revealed that as an expression of solidarity and for the sake of
harmony for all Indonesian Muslim groups, JAI would respect the legal
opinion ( fatwā) and accommodate its official consequences, as long as they
are not contradictory to the principles of the group. Other formal responses
by Ahmadiyya were also expressed in The White Book, We Are Muslims
(Buku Putih Kami Orang Islam) that once again insisted on the position of
Ahmadis as Muslims.
While there has been non-acceptance of Ahmadiyya, especially the
Qadiani faction, their greater expression of Ahmadiyya sect in the period
following the fall of Suharto may be deemed as a threat to MUI as the
spokesman for Islam in Indonesia. Giving its waning influence as a result
of the loss of patronage after Suharto, the legal opinion ( fatwā) serves
as an effective tool for the reassertion of MUI to claim authority in the
domain of Islam against competing religious groups. While it was largely
traditionalistic in this mode of thought, in the new condition, it has become
self-conscious of the need to preserve its influence amongst Indonesian
Muslims. Hence, its conservatism is evident in the 2005 and later legal
opinion ( fatwā) against the Ahmadiyya. These later legal opinions ( fatwā)
can be seen as more conscious efforts to preserve its power in guarding and
protecting the community (umma) against perceived threats of disunity
stirred by competing religious groups and opponents.
The justifications that form the basis of MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā)
on Shi’a reveal similar conservative attempts at preserving its position
as representative of the community (umma) against competing voices on
Islam. In this respect, ideas of its opponents are caricatured in reductive
and essentialist ways. The doctrines of Shi’a upon which MUI’s legal opinion
114 “Ahmadiyah Lahore Minta MUI Revisi Fatwa Sesat,” Tempo, 16 February 2011.
115 See MUI Pusat, Himpunan Fatwa MUI Sejak 1975

(fatwā) utilized as justification for proclaiming its followers as deviant illus-

trate the point. As discussed earlier, the major grounds for the legal opinion
( fatwā) of MUI of East Java Province against Shi’a include the practice of
temporary marriage (nikah mut’a), the controversy regarding Shi’a claims
that there exist distortions in the Qur’ān, the understanding of Prophetic
tradition (hadith) according to Shi’a, and the question of leadership (imāma).
To a large extent, the views on these doctrines overgeneralize and simplify
how the followers of Shi’a themselves perceive their purpose and meaning.
MUI’s style of thought reveals the selective construction of knowledge of
Shi’a to support the validity of its legal opinion ( fatwā). By selective we
mean that MUI presents opinion and facts regarding Shi’a which is mostly
extreme and exaggerated. While Shi’a is not a single entity, and from time
to time transformations of thought as well as attitudes have taken place
within it, these are not reflected in MUI’s essentialist construction.
The selection of the issue of temporary marriage in Shi’a is itself a reflec-
tion of essentialism of the teachings of Shi’a. It conveys the imagination that
the practice is central to Shi’a and raises the scare that the institution is
rampantly practiced. Yet, no clear evidence is cited in support of these pre-
sumptions. Furthermore, the notion that temporary marriage is analogous
to prostitution and facilitates adultery is exaggerated and far-fetched. They
contrast with Shi’a scholars’ explication of the function of this institution
which is hardly considered and debated intellectually.116 Allamah Husayn
Tabataba’i and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, for instance, have maintained that
temporary marriage (mut’a) was practiced during the time of the Prophet,
especially after migration (hijra) until his death, as well as during the first
caliph’s (Abu Bakar) reign. Evidence of such marriage such as the ones by
Zubayr al-Sahabi who married Asma binti Abu Bakar, the daughter of Abu
Bakar has been cited in support. From this marriage were born Abdullah
ibn Zubayr and Urwah ibn Zubayr, who are among prominent companions
of the Prophet.117 Based on this historical precedence, Shi’a scholars have
maintained that if this practice is illegitimate, “it would never have been
performed by people who were among the foremost of the companions.”118
They also argued that historically, the ban of temporary marriage (mut’a)
116 For practical dimensions of nikahmut’ah and Sunni scholars’ agreement on the ban of
contemporary marriage in Islamic law, please refer to Muhammad Baqir, Fiqih Praktis II Menurut
Al-Qur’an, As-Sunnah dan Pendapat Para Ulama’ (Bandung: Karisma, 2008) , 117-126.
117 Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, “Appendix II
Mut’ah or Temporary Marriage”, in Allamah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, Shi’ite Islam
(Albany: State University of New York, 1975), 227.
118 Ibid, 227.

took place only during the second caliph Umar’s rule as a result of abuses to
the practice. The caliph threatened those who practice it with the punish-
ment of stoning.119 Furthermore, such marriage has also been defended on
the basis of verses from the Qur’ān and Sunna.120 This includes:
a. Chapter al-Nisa’ verse 24 which says: “And [also prohibited to you are
all] married women except those your right hands possess. [This is]
the decree of Allah upon you. Moreover, lawful to you are [all others]
beyond these, [provided] that you seek them [in marriage] with [gifts
from] your property, desiring chastity, not unlawful sexual intercourse.
So for whatever you enjoy [of marriage] from them, give them their due
compensation as an obligation. Moreover, there is no blame upon you for
what you mutually agree to beyond the obligation. Indeed, Allah is ever
Knowing and Wise.”
b. Chapter al-Māʼidah verse 87:“O you who have believed, do not prohibit the
good things which Allah has made lawful to you and do not transgress.
Indeed, Allah does not like transgressors.”
c. Chapter al-Mu’minūn verses 5-7: “And they who guard their private parts.
Except for their wives or those their right hands possess, for indeed, they
will not be blamed. However, whoever seeks beyond that, then those are
the transgressors.”
d. Chapter al-Ma’arij verses 29-31: “And those who guard their private parts.
Except for their wives or those their right hands possess, for indeed, they
are not to be blamed. However, whoever seeks beyond that, then they are
the transgressors.”
The Prophetic sayings (hadith) cited in support of the legitimacy of con-

temporary marriage is the one narrated by Bukhari and Muslim from
Abdullah Mas’ud to the effect that Muslim warriors are permitted to marry
women temporarily.121Tabataba’i and Nasr had also explicated mut’a mar-
riage as a way in which Islam protected Muslims from potential sin. Both
maintained that the institution preserved public interest.122 They also
argued that considering the fact that permanent marriage does not satisfy
the instinctive sexual urge of certain men and that adultery and fornication
are according to Islam among the most deadly of poisons, destroying the
119 Ibid, 227.

120 See Tim Ahlul Bait Indonesia, Buku Putih Mazhab Syi’ah Menurut Para Ulama’nya yang
Muktabar (Jakarta: Ahlul Bait Indonesia, 2012), 73-75.
121 See Tim Ahlul Bait Indonesia, Buku Putih, 74.
122 Allamah Tabatabai and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, 229.

order and purity of human life, Islam has legitimized temporary mar-
riage under special conditions by virtue of which it becomes distinct from
adultery and fornication and free from their evil and corruption. The
legitimacy of temporary marriage in Islam, they argued, is allowed with
the aim of allowing within the sacred law, possibilities that minimize the
evils resulting from the passions of men, which if not channeled lawfully,
manifest themselves in much more dangerous ways outside the structure
of religious law.123
Such arguments above are not taken into consideration by MUI which
has instead essentialized mut’a as destructive to the morality and equated
it with prostitution without addressing the views of Shi’a scholars who
have attempted to defend its relevance on theological and social grounds.
Characteristic of MUI’s traditionalistic religious leanings, no attempts at
appraising those justifications by the fundamental distinction between
historically specific rulings and absolute principles of Islam are carried out.
Examining the actual effects of this practice in contemporary society is also
wanting. Instead, in attempting to preserve its position as the dominant
representative of Islam, MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) reveals the strong
tendency to over-exaggerate the practice as though it is central to the belief
of Shi’a. Citing it as a major ground in declaring Shi’a as deviant without
careful analysis of the diversity of views within Shi’a themselves on the
validity of the practice today is yet another manifestation of the function of
the fatwā in attempting to preserve MUI’s position as the authority on Islam.
MUI’s conservative streak in maintaining its position at the expense of
genuine engagement is further manifested in its recourse to essentialist
depictions that brushes aside the variety and differences of opinions of
beliefs of Shi’a on other issues it cited. For instance the view that Shi’a
as a whole believe that certain verses in the Qur’ān have been distorted,
popularly termed as taḥrīf illustrate the problem. This is closely linked to
the notion that Shi’a prescribes a different version of the Qur’ān. The Shi’a
is also believed to blame the Prophet’s companions such as Abu Bakr, Umar
ibn Khattab, Uthman bin Affan and some Prophet’s wives over matters
stemming from disputes relating to political succession.
Many of these presumptions have been disputed at length by prominent
Indonesian Muslim thinker. Haidar Bagir, the Director of Mizan Publishing
House, a prominent Islamic book publisher, and closely associated with
Shi’a explicated that it is inevitable that there exist certain elements within
Shi’a throughout history who disputed on the text of the Qur’ān from the
123 Ibid, 229-230.

Sunni version. However, he maintained that it should also be borne in mind

that the majority of Shi’a religious scholar ( jumhūr), had agreed that the
copy of the Qur’ān compiled during Caliphate of Uthman is complete and
perfect. Also, those who traveled to and visited diverse Shi’a countries will
understand that the Qur’ān that they read is completely the same as that
of the Sunni Muslims.124
Furthermore, Bagir also revealed partiality in the views of the Sunnis
in so far as they fail to acknowledge that the debate over the issue of
distortion or change (taḥrīf ) is also found within certain Sunni scholars
themselves. The evidence he presented is a Prophetic tradition (ḥadīth) on
the missing verse of the Qur’ān which was deemed to have been kept by
‘Aisha and the statement of the second Caliph Umar ibn Khattab on the loss
of the verse on stoning. In Bagir’s view, certain prominent Sunni scholars
such as Ibn Hajar al-Athqalani, Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, and Imam al-Shafi’i
also presented some views on the alteration and/or the incompleteness of
Qur’anic text.125 Bagir maintains that although this issue was also raised by
prominent Sunni scholars, none of the Sunni Muslims accept this view. He
contended that the same method of reading and thinking should be applied
in comprehending this issue when evaluating the views of the Shi’ites.126
The lack of attention paid to differences in thought within Shi’a com-
munities on these disputes was also raised. Bagir proposed, as an example,
the tendency among followers of Shi’a to blame the Prophet’s companions
such as Abu Bakr, Umar ibn Khattab, Uthman bin Affan and some of the
Prophet’s wives. However, he contended that it should also be taken into
consideration that groups within Shi’a such as Zaydia and others accepted
the Caliphate of Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, and paid respects to them.
Similarly, many scholars of Shi’a branch of Ithna Ash’aria also revised their
views on the companions and their caliphate. This was made clear at the
conference of Majma’ Ahl al-Bait in London in 1995, in which the acceptance
of the three caliphs before Ali (Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman) was clearly
declared.127
Bagir’s article, which calls for a more balanced study of Shi’a, can be
broadly seen as representing different ideological and epistemological
foundations in constructing and then defending certain knowledge.
124 Haidar Bagir, “Syiah dan Kerukunan Umat”, Republika, 20 January 2012.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid. An important point regarding discussion on Shi’ah and the Qur’an is the role that Ali
bin Abi Thalib played in the compilation of the Qur’an in the reign of Uthman bin Affan, see
Abubakar Atjeh, Aliran Syi’ah di Nusantara (Jakarta: Islamic Research Institute, 1977), 10-19.
127 Bagir, ibid.

Although the legal opinion ( fatwā) could have played a significant role in
enlightening Muslims and creating greater awareness of as well as prevent
hostility between Sunni and Shi’a, its emotive appeal thwarts this poten-
tial. As is frequently the case, intellectual discussion on religious issues
is reduced to labeling based on theological dogma. In this way, heterodox
views adopted by the minority are marginalized or rendered invalid.
It is not only the fact of imbalance in discussion in the sense that theological
arguments are used to suppress intellectual argument as a form of knowledge
that recur in the legal opinion (fatwā), but the Foucaultian formula that power
determines knowledge reinforces the problem. The position of the central
board of MUI within the religious bureaucracy has exerted influence on other
MUI branches at the provincial and regional levels. It is in this context that
East Java Province MUI attempted to gain MUI’s central board approval. As
has been mentioned, Ma’ruf Amin had written an article in support of the
legal opinion ( fatwā).128 This support was seen as legitimizing not only the
legal opinion ( fatwā) enunciated by MUI of East Java Province but also other
Muslim groups that subscribe to the same stand on the deviance of Shi’a.
For many followers of Shi’a, Ma’ruf Amin’s article reflects the irrespon-
sible manner of religious scholars in making the legal opinion ( fatwā).
Jalaluddin Rakhmat, a leader of Shi’a in Indonesia and the founder of
Ikatan Jamaah Ahlulbait Indonesia (IJABI) responded to the legal opinion
( fatwā) very severely. In his view, those who issued the fatwa lack profound
understanding and intellectual depth apart from committing erroneous
judgment and carelessness.129 Similarly, other Shi’a leader from Ahlul Bayt
Indonesia (ABI) such as Muhsin Labib even boldly maintained that MUI’s
fatwa can be seen as a “license to kill.”130Other Shi’a follower, Alwi al-
Habsyi of YAPI Bangil contends that the legal opinion ( fatwā) is peculiar
since it is based on insuff icient and partial knowledge on Shi’a which
has been selected to fit MUI’s ideological stand.131 In supporting his view,
Rakhmat makes reference to the attitude of classical religious scholars
(ulamā’) who were very cautious in dealing with legal opinion ( fatwā).
He cited Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal, the great Imam and the founder of
Hanbali school who cautioned the seriousness of fatwā-making given its
implications on man and society when he asserted to the effect that “…
128 Ma’ruf Amien, “Menyikapi Fatwa MUI Jawa Timur,” Republika, 8 November 2012.
129 Interview with Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Jakarta, 16 December 2012.
130 Interview with Muhsin Labib, Jakarta, 14 December 2012.
131 Interview with Muhammad Alwi al-Habsyi, 2 November 2013.

whoever is involved in legal opinion ( fatwā), is involved in a matter of

utmost seriousness.”132
Another major problem in the mode of thinking characterizing MUI’s
legal opinion ( fatwā) is the lack of sufficient consideration and care of
its implications on the lives of those proclaimed as apostates or outside
the fold of Islam. In its attempt to purify religious life in Indonesia from
elements which it perceives as undermining the faith (aqīda) of Muslims,
the legal opinion ( fatwā) has given rise to tragic consequences affecting
the lives, liberty, and property of the victims. Socially, it can be viewed
as legitimizing persecution and violence addressed to allegedly deviant
Muslim groups or at the very least, not quelling persecution against them.
In the Ahmadiyya case, social violence and discrimination imposed upon
them occurred after the issuance of the legal opinion ( fatwā). In the case
of the Shi’a, the conflict between Sunni and Shi’a, as the case in Sampang,
has taken place before the legal opinion ( fatwā) is issued. Although the
legal opinion ( fatwā) regarding Shi’a has been justified as imperative in
addressing the ongoing conflict between Sunni and Shi’a and bringing it
to an end, it had, on the contrary, exacerbated social unrest and further
discrimination against the Shi’a. No attempts were also made to quell the
continuing violence.
It is also important to note that the legal opinion ( fatwā) against Shi’a
and recent mass hatred over Shi’a in Indonesia is an indication of the strong
influence of Salafism within Indonesian religious institutions as well as lay
Muslims, in general. Radical Salafism ascribes the emergence of Shi’ism as
part of a Jewish conspiracy to divide Islam. Based on this conviction, the
anti-Shi’a attitude among Salafists is widespread. In this context, it can be
asserted that although the so-called Salafi groups do not explicitly exist
within MUI, the orientation they reveal is a clear indication of thestrong
influence of Salafism.
Violence: The Case of Ahmadiyya
On July 15, 2005, just before the issuance of the legal opinion ( fatwā) against
the deviance of Ahmadiyya, the center of Ahmadiyya’s activities in Parung,
Bogor, West Java, was attacked by thousands of people. A media report
mentioned that the attacks involved approximately ten thousand people.
The center which also hosts an Ahmadi college called Mubarak Campus was
132 Jalaluddin Rakhmat, “Menyikapi Fatwa tentang Fatwa”, Republika, 10 November 2012.

destroyed. This was not an isolated case. Not long after, other violence took
place more frequently against the Ahmadiyya community. Some of these
attacks began as early as July 8, 2005.133 The riot took place in the midst of
Jalsa Salana, an annual meeting held by Ahmadiyya members. The jalsa
was planned for three days and attended by 1,514 Ahmadis, 35 guests from
foreign countries, and 376 people who consisted of government officers
and Muslim scholars in Indonesia.
It can be said that the attacks did not occur incidentally. Rather, it was
planned carefully as revealed by a series of facts before the attacks. For
example, approximately eighty people under the leadership of M. Amin
Djamaluddin, the director of Institute for Research and Study of Islam
(Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam) were concentrated around the
parking field close to Ahmadiyya center. It was finally revealed that the
crowd was waiting for a chance to meet Ahmadiyya representatives. Earlier,
Djamaluddin has sent a letter to the police office requesting the permis-
sion and approval that police has granted for Ahmadiyya to hold the Jalsa
Salana, be revoked. Djamaluddin’s letter furthermore contained a threat
to the effect that if the approval was not revoked the masses themselves
will dissolve the Ahmadis. When Djamaluddin and his group finally met
Ahmadiyya representatives, in the name of Muslims, he quoted the deci-
sion of the Islamic World Association (Rābiṭa Alam Islamiyya) and ordered
Ahmadiyya members to leave Parung and dissolve their organization within
a week. The situation created extreme tension and uneasiness. In defend-
ing their rights, Ahmadiyya members insisted on staying in the complex.
However, they paid a very high price for their decision as in the following
days they were bombarded with violent attacks which caused destruction
to lives and property belonging to them.
Anticipating attacks directed at his organization, the chairman of
Ahmadiyya in Kemang, Bogor, had sent a letter to the police requesting
protection for the security of Ahmadiyya members and properties. However,
rather than obtaining a positive response, he received a letter that contained
an instruction to close down Mubarak College. The letter was jointly signed
by the Regent of Bogor, Head of Bogor Regional Parliament, Vice-Head of
133 Description of violence and attacks to Ahmadiyya in this section mostly relies on a report
by Mujtaba Hamdi, “Sang Liyan dan Kekerasan: Kasus Penyerangan Kampus Mubarak Jemaat
Ahmadiyya Indonesia, Kemang-Bogor-Jawa Barat”, in Rumadi and Ahmad Suaedy (eds),
Politisasi Agama dan Konflik Komunal: Beberapa Isu Penting di Indonesia (Jakarta: The Wahid
Institute, 2007), 224-230. The factual description of the attack can be watched through video
entitled: “Penganiayaan Terhadap Jamaat Ahmadiyah di Indonesia”, http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=yPAORBa1bX0

Bogor Regional Parliament, Bogor Regional Military Chief-officer, Bogor

Regional Police Chief-officer, Head of Fatwa Commission of Majelis Ulama
Indonesia (MUI) Bogor, and Head of Ministry of Religious Affair Bogor
Office. In his report, a writer referred to a series of violence targeted at
Ahmadiyya on July 8-14, 2005 as “prelude” to the attack on 15 July, under the
command of a radical Muslim leader by the name of Habib Abdurrahman
Assegaf.134 It is important to note that during the attack, principal local
government officers were present. However, rather than preventing Habib
and his supporters from attacking Ahmadiyya and protecting them, the
police even ordered Ahmadiyya members to leave the site to avoid further
destruction, casualties, and fatal injuries.
From a religious point of view, the disjuncture between the teachings of
peace and tolerance in Islam and how it has been used to legitimize acts
of violence against others who call themselves Muslims, albeit adhering to
different beliefs and interpretations of Islamic teachings, even if they are
deemed as infidels, is indeed glaring. However, it would be more surprising
to know that violence in Parung constitutes only one of the many other
occurrences of violence targeted at the Ahmadiyya. The attack on the
Ahmadiyya center was followed by others that involved the destruction of
Ahmadi mosques and other properties in other parts of Bogor, West Java,
and Indonesia.
In the following years, violence to Ahmadiyya did not cease. A report
by Tempo Magazine in May 2008 revealed that a mosque in Sukabumi,
West Java, was burnt to ruins and three classrooms in an Islamic school
(madrasa) were devastated. According to the report, in Majalengka, West
Java, an Ahmadiyya member had put up a simple poster in front of his
house which read “Kami Penganut Ahlussunah Waljamaah” (we are the
followers of Ahlusssunah Waljamaah) to avoid mass anger.135 Another report
by Tempo also listed chronologically the attacks, violence, and harassments
directed at Ahmadiyya members. At the beginning of 2011, the newspaper
reported that a group of people from Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders
Front) attacked and destroyed an Ahmadi mosque in Makassar. This was
followed by a bigger riot which took place in Cikeusik, Pandaglang, West
Java, in February. In that incident, Ahmadiyya members were attacked.
Three Ahmadis were reported dead, while a significant number of houses
belonging to them were destroyed and burnt. On March 11, tens of people
134 Brief profile of Abdurrahman Assegaf can be read from this link, http://www.gatra.com/
politik/8862-habib-abdurrahman-assegaf-bumi-hangus-aliran-sesat.html.
135 “Luka Ahmadiyah”, Tempo, 8 May 2008.

were reported occupying an Ahmadi mosque, al-Ghofur Mosque in Cianjur,

West Java. The reason of this action is that Ahmadiyya kept their activities
running in the mosque although they have been banned by the legal opinion
( fatwā) issued by MUI. Two days later, still in Cianjur, a mosque in the
district of Haurwangi was destroyed in a mass attack. Books and many
other printed materials on Ahmadiyya were also burnt. On 30 March, a
house of an Ahmadiyya leader in Tasikmalaya, West Java, was attacked by
an unidentified person. A casualty was reported as a result of this assault,
while tens of Ahmadiyya members escaped to more secure sites.
Four days later, on 4 April 2011, the regional government of Bogor closed
a mosque where Ahmadiyya members ran their daily religious activities.
The local government argued that the closure is based on the protest
and complaint addressed to the government by local citizens. On May
27, violence against Ahmadiyya in Makassar also occurred. However, the
police were able to successfully control the attack.136 It is highly possible that
non-religious elements have induced the violence. As Sami Zubaida pointed
out, “the politics of sectarianism is not always to do with religion as such, but
with the sects as an ‘ethnic marker’ of communal boundaries and interests.”
Zubaida further maintained that solidarities and tensions between Sunni
and Shi’a do not always stem from religious similarity or difference,137 but
could also involve other non-religious factors. However, how the politics of
sectarianism becomes justified on theological grounds such as through the
legal opinion ( fatwā) against Ahmadiyya cannot be overlooked.
Apart from the spate of violent attacks targeted at the Ahmadiyya since
2005 in May 2013, another series of violence against them recurred. This
time, it took place in Tasikmalaya, West Java. A village called Wanasigra,
Tenjowaringin, had been attacked by a group of around 200 unknown
people at midnight of May 5, 2013. Many casualties resulted from this attack.
As many as 24 buildings, mostly residential houses owned by Ahmadiyya
members were heavily destroyed, including two schools and a prayer-house
(muṣalla).138 It was estimated that four out of the six thousand residents
in Wanasigra are Ahmadis.139 Although the legal opinion ( fatwā) may not
have caused the violence, it cannot be isolated from the escalating tensions
136 “Rentetan Kekerasan terhadap Ahmadiyah 2011”, Tempo Interaktif, 18 February 2012. See
also “Setahun 15 Kekerasan terhadap Ahmadiyah”, Tempo Interaktif, 7 February 2011.
137 Sami Zubaida, “Sects in Islam”, in Peter B Clark, The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of
Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 557.
138 http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2013/05/05/058478061/ Ratusan-Orang-Serang-Rumah-
Jemaah-Ahmadiyah, accessed on 10 May 2013.
139 Interview with Dodi Kurniawan, 28 May 2013, in Tasikmalaya, West Java.

against the sect. The legal opinion ( fatwā) does not attempt to quell the
grievous and hostile spate of attacks and treatment directed at this cult.
My fieldwork in this district during that period provided me the op-
portunity of witnessing the full impact of the aftermath of the violence.
I was also able to obtain firsthand information and data on the violence
and treatment suffered by the group directly from my meetings with
local Ahmadiyya leaders and activists in the district which were not
otherwise easily accessible. It was about two weeks after the attack when
I visited the site to conduct interviews with Ahmadiyya leaders both in
Tasikmalaya and the neighboring region of Garut. My meetings took place
with Munawarman, an Ahmadi activist, and leader of Ahmadiya’s Youth
Movement in Tenjowaringin, Tasikmalaya, West Java, who discussed with
me the problems of social exclusion and discrimination that Ahmadiyya
had experienced since the legal opinion ( fatwā), as well as recent attacks
that had occurred. As an Ahmadi youth leader in Tenjowaringin, Munawar
himself had been subjected to serious threats by unidentified groups of
people and pressured to renounce his current belief as an Ahmadi.140 For this
reason, he had to be evacuated to a safer place by his friends and relatives.
I was also brought to Wanasingra where I interviewed Dodi Kurniawan,
a local Ahmadiyya leader. Despite being briefed before the visit by local
leaders of the gravity of the aftermath of the violence in the areas I visited,
I was nonetheless shocked at what greeted me when I arrived.
Around fifty members of the Brigade Mobil, an elite unit of Indonesian
Police force, were guarding the village. Some were standing with arms in
hand while others were sitting at a security post, ready for an emergency.
Two police trucks were also parked nearby. It was evident to me that the
village was under serious threat of recurring attack. I was met with suspi-
cious faces and a tensed atmosphere as I entered the village. The grim view
of the village was startling. I saw many houses and their fences destroyed
with modest pieces of wood replacing them temporarily. The pathological
condition in which they live due to the prolonged violence and trauma
they experience is also manifested in their distrust and suspicions towards
visitors like me. I had in fact been warned by my informant not to take
unkindly to the cold reception of the owner of the house in which I stayed
during the brief period of my fieldwork. In Garut, I participated in a function
held at a local Ahmadi mosque in commemoration of Ahmadiyya Caliphate.
The mosque was not identifiable as it had no signboard indicating the name
140 Interview with Munawarman, leader of Ahmadiyya Youth in Tasikmalaya, West Java, 25 May
2013.

of the mosque which is a common practice in Indonesia and elsewhere in

the world. It was situated beyond a locked green gate surrounded by a five
meter high covered fence. I was informed by another local Ahmadiyya
leader that this huge gate was only recently installed to protect the mosque
from the mass attack which according to him had been occurring since the
issuance of MUI’s fatwā.141
At the function, two Ahmadi preachers delivered lectures. Although the
main topic of the talk was on Ahmadiyya’s caliphate and the necessity to fol-
low this global leadership, the most striking was the condemnation of MUI’s
legal opinion ( fatwā) on the deviance of the sect. The legal opinion ( fatwā)
was criticized and made fun of and was frequently referred to and taken as
an example of the ignorance of religious leaders towards the commitment
of creating peace and harmony among Muslims. The first-hand experience
in observing the condition of the Ahmadiyya community in Garut and
Tasikmalaya conveyed to me the hardship they are facing stemming from
their religious belief, the most evident being the fear and insecurity in their
daily lives. This is understandable as attacks on the Ahmadiyya community
in Tasikmalaya in 2013 were only a small picture of how the group has been
experiencing social discrimination for a considerably long period.
Apart from these violent outbursts, the Ahmadiyya have also experi-
enced social exclusion and other forms of discrimination. Dodi Kurniawan,
an Ahmadiyya leader I interviewed, identified at least five areas in which
they have been discriminated. Firstly, they were often refused for registra-
tion of marriage in the office of Muslim religious administration (Kantor
Urusan Agama) based on the ground that they are non-Muslims. Although
on several occasions officials eventually agreed to register the marriage,
this only occurred after heated arguments.142Secondly, since Ahmadiyya
is deemed as deviant, they also face the problem of accessing their rights
as Indonesian Muslim citizens, such as the right to perform pilgrimage
to Mecca under the administration of the state.143 In this case, Ahmadis
often resolve the problem by registering in other province or region other
than their place of residence. More crucial is the problem pertaining to
their rights as citizens. Ahmadis are prohibited to state “Islam” as their
religion in their national identity cards (Kartu Tanda Penduduk), based
141 Interview with Cecep Ahmad Santosa, 27 May 2013, in Garut, West Java.
142 For comparison, see “400 Pasangan Tak Bisa Menikah Karena Ahmadiyah”, http://www.
setara-institute.org/id/content/400-pasangan-tak-bisa-menikah-karena-ahmadiyah-1, accessed
on September 1, 2013.
143 Interview with Dodi Kurniawan, in Tasikmalaya, 26 May 2013.

on the legal opinion ( fatwā) that they are non-Muslims. Although Dodi
acknowledges that this is only a small matter, its social effect cannot be
ignored. Thirdly, Ahmadis are often discriminated in the educational sector.
Dodi presented the example that in Majalengka, West Java, students who
are from Ahmadiyya background are not provided with seats in school.
Similarly, Rahmat Syukur another respondent shared with me examples of
discrimination manifested in the form of interrogation by staff or teachers
of Ahmadi students.144 As Kurniawan expressed: “I am disappointed, not
because I am an Ahmadi, but because discrimination has been imposed
on children of the nation.”145 Fourthly, most Ahmadis who are civil servants
usually experience discrimination in their career, particularly in the local
level. Lastly, respondents also complained of a violation of properties once
they are found to belong to Ahmadis.
Feedback from respondents provides further evidence of the implications
of MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) on the rights of Ahmadis as citizens. Not only
did the legal opinion ( fatwā) deem Ahmadiyya as a whole as deviant, it
also called upon the government to ban them and their activities and close
down their properties and houses of worship. The impact of the ruling on
life and liberty is evident. As mentioned earlier, this legal opinion ( fatwā)
has departed substantially from the earlier 1980 ruling in this respect and
is more revealing of the hardline approach targeted at the Ahmadis.
Chronologically, Syukur also maintained that threats experienced by
Ahmadis were not a new phenomenon as it dated back to as early as the
1980s when the legal opinion ( fatwā) against Ahmadiyya was first issued. He
acknowledged that “we have experienced all these things for a considerable
period of time.” He concluded that the legal opinion ( fatwā) had merely
reinforced legitimacy for some hardline Islamist groups against others.
He contended that while many people tended to perceive the New Order
period negatively, he instead contended that in relation to the Ahmadiyya
community, that period was a positive one. This was because compared
to the Reformasi period, the most salient difference for the implication of
the legal opinion ( fatwā) in the New Order period was social stability. The
strong power of the state did not bring about any fatal social consequence
to Ahmadiyya then as radical Islamic elements were unable to oppress
their opponents.146 However, Kurniawan offered a different perspective.
144 Interview with Rahmat Syukur, in Garut, West Java, 27 May 2013.
145 Interview with Dodi Kurniawan, in Tasikmalaya, West Java, 26 May 2013.
146 Interview with Rahmat Syukur, in Garut, West Java, 27 May 2013. See also Moch. Nur Ichwan,
“Towards a Puritanical Moderate Islam: The Majelis Ulama Indonesia and Politics of Religious

Quoting the Secretary of Ahmadiyya central board, Zafrullah Pontoh, he

maintained that the influence of the state is never absent in the context of
social unrest related to Ahmadiyya.
The lack of serious consideration for the implications of the legal opinion
( fatwā) has invited grave consequences on the lives and well-being of mem-
bers of these communities. Kurniawan, for instance, strongly highlighted
that the legal opinion ( fatwā) has adversely impacted his community: “We
can feel the difference of our social integration before and after the issuance
of fatwā in 2005”. The legal opinion ( fatwā) which has declared Ahmadiyya
as deviant was strongly felt to provide legitimacy and justification for
them to be targeted as objects of violence. The legal opinion ( fatwā) also
legitimized the position of Ahmadiyya as the enemy of the people, religion,
and state. Syukur, the leader of Ahmadiyya of Garut Regency, endorsed
this evaluation. He viewed that the legal opinion ( fatwā) has unfailingly
triggered people’s emotional tensions, which turned into intimidation,
violence, trauma and other adverse consequences.147 As Kurniawan added,
“We are in a most vulnerable position for attack. Moreover, we are accused as
a group that has caused the split of the unity of Indonesia (NKRI)”.148 Syukur
observed that while violence and killing have been common to Ahmadiyya
members since February 2011, and that though the legal opinion ( fatwā)
may not have caused the violence that erupted against the community, “the
implications of fatwā is far beyond what people and MUI itself may have
imagined.” Statistically, he added, eighty percent of violence to minority
groups in Indonesia affected Ahmadiyya communities.
The legal opinion ( fatwā) has also raised criticisms by non-Ahmadiyya
pluralist groups for its exclusive elements and adverse social repercussions.
Dawam Rahardjo, for example, maintains that the Ahmadiyya themselves
have never promoted violence against people of the faiths they attack. For
instance, although they often attack the doctrine of Christianity, they are
not hostile to Christians. Furthermore, amidst violence that they frequently
face, they have been consistently non-violent against the perpetrators of
hostility and violence against them. They are a pacifist Islamic group. Gener-
ally, as citizens of nations including Indonesia, they have been law abiding
and despite their persecution have not resorted to violence.149
Orthodoxy”, in Martin van Bruinessen (ed), Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam:

Explaining the “Conservative Turn” (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), 84-85.
147 Interview with Rahmat Syukur, Garut, 27 May 2013.
149 Dawam Rahardjo, “Djohan Effendi dalam Pete Pemikiran Gerakan Islam,” in Elza Peldi
Taher (ed), Merayakan Kebebasan Beragama: Bunga Rampai 70 Tahun Djohan Effendi (Jakarta:

Violence against the Shi’a
As with the case of the Ahmadis, the followers of Shi’a in several parts of
Indonesia have also been experiencing social discrimination, intimidation,
and violence relating to their religious status. However, the case of the Shi’a
differs from the Ahmadiyya’s, at least in two respects. Firstly, the legal
opinion ( fatwā) that clearly stated the deviance of Shi’a was only issued
in 2012, although this was not the first legal opinion ( fatwā) directed at
Shi’a. The first as mentioned earlier was proclaimed in 1984 by the Central
Board of MUI in Jakarta. In this earlier legal opinion ( fatwā), the status of
Shi’a as a deviant sect was not clearly mentioned.150 The case is different for
the Ahmadiyya, especially Qadiani group since it has been categorized as
deviant Islamic group since 1980 by MUI Central Board. Violence against the
Shi’a as taken place at least six years before the issuance of the legal opinion
( fatwā) by MUI of East Java Province,151 while the Ahmadiyya’s experience
of being the subject of the vicious circle of violence began only after the legal
opinion ( fatwā) was issued. However, this fact does not necessarily isolate
the legal opinion ( fatwā) from the prolonged social unrest and conflicts
which have adversely impacted the communities of Shi’a in Indonesia, as
in the case of Sampang, Madura, East Java, in recent years.
In order to get a clearer understanding of the situation of Shi’a in com-
parison to Ahmadiyya, on the one hand, and to locate the role and social
impact of MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā), on the other, the following sections
will examine violence, intimidation, threat and discrimination targeted
at Shi’a communities, which have been experienced by many followers of
Shi’a in Sampang, Madura, East Java, even before 2012.Howthe followers of
Shi’a in Indonesia have responded to the problem will also be discussed.
A report on recent religious-based violence to Shi’a in Sampang issued by
KONTRAS152 Surabaya in 2012 narrates the history of violence in the villages
ICRP and Kompas, 2009), 10.

150 It is important to note that attempts to qualify Shi’ah as deviant never ceased after the
issuance of fatwa in 1984. Although not directly organized by MUI, in 1997 a seminar on Shi’ah
which resulted in recommendation to restrict the scope of Shi’ah movement was held. For more
factual description on the seminar and the response of Shi’is see O. Hashem, Jawaban Lengkap
atas Seminar Sehari tentang Syi’ah (Surabaya: YAPI, 1997).
151 “Fatwa Sesat Bagi Syi’ah Bermula dari Kesepakatan yang Dicederai”, Mimbar Pendidikan
Agama, Number 305, February 2012, 9-11.
152 KONTRAS is a shortened name for Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan,
or the Commission for Disappeared People and the Victims of Violence. This NGO is popular for
its struggle over justice on those who are victims of violence, mostly by powers. This has made
KONTRAS often in opposition to the state apparatus. Its first director, human rights fighter

of Nangkernang, Karang Gayam, Omben, Sampang in Madura very clearly. It

is evident that although the violence cannot be separated from the presence
of Shi’a in the villages which has been categorized as deviant by East Java
Province MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā), the conflict itself was not directly
triggered by the legal opinion ( fatwā). The existence of Shi’a in Sampang,
Madura dates back to the decade of the 1980s which involved a local cleric by
the name of Makmun or more popularly known as Kiai Makmun. Although
the coming of Shi’a in Sampang is a local event, it has a global dimension,
since Makmun’s interest in Shi’a emerged only after the fall of Shah Reza
Pahlevi’s regime in Iran which, for many, marked the triumph of the Islamic
regime.153 Makmun’s interest in Shi’a has led him to send his sons, one named
Tajul Muluk (who later became the central figure in Sunni-Shi’a conflict in
Sampang) to study in Yayasan Pesantren Islam (YAPI), a prominent Shi’ite
educational institution in Bangil, East Java.
The report maintained that Makmun consciously adopted an under-
ground strategy in spreading the teachings of Shi’a amongst his fellow
villagers.154 Tajul Muluk continued his education in Saudi Arabia where
he advanced his study of Islam in general, and Shi’a, in particular. Upon
his return from Saudi to Sampang, Tajul continued his father’s activity. In
diametric opposition to his late father’s strategy, Tajul openly declared his
affiliation to Shi’a as well as publicly invited other Muslims to follow his
choice. It is believed that Tajul did not find any difficulty in persuading other
Muslims in his village to “convert” into Shi’a. Apparently, his personality was
an important factor which attracted other Muslims to follow his step and
become his loyal followers. The new converts built a small boarding house
and residence for Tajul Muluk which soon became the center for teaching
Shi’a in the village and its surrounding area. With the passage of time,
this situation aroused discomfort among local Sunni Muslim leaders who
adopted persuasion in deterring his affiliation to Shi’a, on the one hand, and
to stop him propagating the teachings of Shi’a, on the other. Consequently, as
Munir, was assassinated in 2004 on his flight to Netherlands for pursuing his master in legal
studies. Many believe that the murder of Munir was closely related to his activism in KONTRAS.
For more information, please refer to www.kontras.org
153 Kontras Surabaya, Laporan Investigasi dan Pemantauan Kasus Syi’ah Sampang (Surabaya:
Kontras Surabaya, 2012), 3.
154 In the context of Shī’ism, dissimulation from public identification for security purposes is
a unique as well as one of most misunderstood doctrines. This is called taqiyah. See Allamah
Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba’i, Shi’ite Islam (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1975), 223-225. For critical examination on taqiyah please refer to Musa al-Musawi, Meluruskan
Penyimpangan Syi’ah (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1994).

early as 2006, several meetings and negotiations took place which involved
not only religious leaders but also government officials.155 The meetings
were uneasy and involved lengthy debates, arguments, counter-arguments,
and tensions. It culminated in an ultimatum for Tajul Muluk to terminate
all his Shi’a-related activism and to leave the village.
Another option offered to Tajul should he refuse to leave the village was
that he relinquished his affiliation to Shi’a. Tajul insisted on upholding his
belief and was expelled from his village on 2 April 2011, but still within the
region of Sampang under the protection of the local police. While waiting,
Tajul Muluk found that there was no significant progress with his case and
his community. Subsequently, he decided to leave Sampang for Malang for
security reasons. His departure was then followed by intensive coordination
among local governmental and religious leaders to legitimize the deviance
of Shi’a teachings he had brought to Sampang. Many reasons could be pre-
sented for the motive of this coordination, amongst them being a systematic
attempt to marginalize the Shi’a community and delegitimize the teachings
of Shi’a, especially in Madura, and in other places in Indonesia, subsequently.
Although Tajul was banned from entering the village, during his exile
he frequently visited his family in the village secretly. However, his visit
was not always successful, and he was finally found by local authorities
which only worsened the tension between them. The culmination of all
these episodes is the mass attacks on the Shi’a complex in Nangkernang
in December 2011. The masses burnt some buildings including a boarding
school and residential complex belonging to a local Shi’a leader.156 Following
this riot, hundreds of Shi’a followers were then confined in a sports hall
belonging to the government of Sampang which functioned as a shelter
for those who have lost all their properties, including houses. In this venue,
they lived in the state of uncertainty for around ten months from the time
the attacks exploded. A change took place when on 20 June 2012 they were
then transferred to Sidoarjo, East Java, outside of Madura Island. Natu-
rally, although this transfer was meant to be an improvement of the Shi’a
survivors’ condition, it inevitably brought many new problems to them.157
155 For detail of the meetings, please refer to Kontras Surabaya, Laporan Investigasi, 4-6.
156 Summarised from Kontras Surabaya, Laporan Investigasi dan Pemantauan Kasus Syi’ah
Sampang (Surabaya: Kontras Surabaya, 2012).
157 For detail data please refer to “Laporan Tanggap Kemanusiaan Keadaan Penyintas Syi’ah
Sampang yang Direlokasi di Sidoarjo”, 9 July 2013. This report can be accessed online through
http://kontras.org/data/Laporan%20Keadaan%20Pengungsian%20Warga%20Syi’ah%20Sam-
pang%20di%20Rusunawa%20Jemundo_9%20Juli%202013.pdf, accessed on September 20, 2013.

Sunni sources claimed that the major cause of the riot in December 2011
is the presence of Shi’a in Sampang and their betrayal of the agreement that
was signed by Tajul Muluk previously.158 Furthermore, social tensions and
conflicts which involved Shi’a in Madura and also in any other regions were
adduced as the factor which led Sunni religious leaders in most parts of
East Java Province to ask MUI of East Java Province to issue a legal opinion
(fatwā) that declared the status of Shi’a as deviant.159 It has to be noted that a
legal opinion ( fatwā) on deviance of Shi’a had previously been issued by the
local MUI in Sampang, Madura.160 It is claimed that the legal opinion (fatwā)
which MUI of East Java Province proclaimed against Shi’a was issued by MUI
of Sampang. The legal opinion ( fatwā) was approved by other MUI offices
across the Island of Madura which issued identical legal opinion ( fatwā),
aimed at resolving ongoing social conflicts, as claimed by Abdussomad
Buchori, the chairman of MUI of East Java Province.161 However, this claim
was criticized as instead of a creating a more conducive and peaceful social
milieu, the legal opinion ( fatwā) contributed to the opposite result. In other
words, rather than creating a more conducive situation for both conflicting
groups to live peacefully; after the repentance was had issued, violence
and social discrimination occurred more frequently. The repentance was
inevitably regarded by most Sunni Muslims in Madura as legitimizing the
denial of a group which is not acknowledged by legal authorities.
Such a consequence was experienced by Nur Kholis (22), a follower of Shi’a
in Sampang, who had shocked the public when he revealed threats addressed
to him by Sunni religious authorities upon his rejection to confess that Shi’ais
deviant and perform the repentance (tobat) to return to the right path.162
Kompas reported that on August 5, 2013, Nur returned to his residence in
Sampang, Madura, after a trip to Bali. To his surprise, he was suddenly taken,
along with four other followers of Shi’a, to a house of a local cleric (kiai) by
the name of Saifuddin. In the house were local leaders including the regent
(bupati), head of villages, head of hamlets, chief of local police along with some
of his members, and four other kiais.Witnessed by all above-mentioned, Nur
159 See Ainul Yaqin (editor), Fatwa dan Keputusan MUI tentang Ajaran Syi’ah (Surabaya: Majelis
Ulama Indonesian Provinsi Jawa Timur, 2012), 10-11.
161 Ibid, 10.
162 http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/08/12/1949018/ Penganut.Syiah.Jika.Tak.Tobat.Saya.
Akan.Dibunuh, accessed on 25 August 2013.

and his fellow followers of Shi’a were forced to sign a letter stating their “return
to the right path.”He was the first to be asked to sign. However, he refused and
insisted that he is a follower of Shi’a and will not leave his faith under whatever
circumstance. This rejection was responded boldly by Kiai Saifuddin who was
reported to have threatened Nur with his life if he did not leave the village.
Nur was furthered informed that no guarantee of safety will be granted to
him if he chose to stay in the village, while at the same time remain a follower
of Shi’a. He finally left for Jakarta as he had no other choice.163
Hertasning Ichlas, a lawyer and director of Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan
Hukum Universalia (YLBHU),who has been very active in providing legal
advice and aid for Shi’a communities in Sampang, revealed what he knew
of the condition of Shi’a in Sampang. According to Ichlas, the followers of
Shi’a who did not leave the village were forced to sign the pact of repent-
ance just as Nur Kholis’ case. Those who rejected the call had their houses
burnt. Ichlas also confirmed Nur Kholis’ move to Jakarta and his temporary
residence at the office of YLBHU.164 Nur Kholis’ case is only one example of
adverse social consequence contributed by the legal opinion ( fatwā) on the
deviant status of Shi’a in Madura by MUI of East Java Province. It illustrates
the role and impacts that legal opinion ( fatwā) brought to society. Given
the situation, it is almost impossible to isolate the legal opinion ( fatwā) in
legitimizing firstly the forced movement of the sect and the ban of Shi’a
from Indonesian soil. Likewise, it is difficult to deny the fact that the legal
opinion ( fatwā) has also influenced the majority of lay Muslims who do
not have anadequate understanding of the nature of Shi’ato blindly blame
it as deviant and an enemy of Islam.
Although the reality of exacerbating this adverse situation is evident, it
appears that MUI, as the institution responsible for legal opinion (fatwā),
tended to ignore it and did not take it as a consideration in endorsing the legal
opinion (fatwā). Factually, MUI’s stance on the heresy of Shi’a had been taken
for granted by the majority of Muslims in Indonesia which has worsened the
relationship between Shi’a and Sunni in Indonesia that was already marred
by suspicions and hatred and had exploded in tension and violence. This legal
opinion (fatwā) evidently portrays the conservative attitude of dominant ele-
ments within MUI who seek to preserve their position as the spokesman and
representative of Islam in Indonesia as solely the preserve of Sunni Muslims.
163 “Penganut Syi’ah: Jika Tak “Tobat” Saya Akan Dibunuh”, Kompas Online,http://nasional.
kompas.com/read/2013/08/12/1949018/Penganut.Syiah.Jika.Tak.Tobat.Saya.Akan.Dibunuh.
accessed on 15 September 2013.
164 Personal communication with Hertasning Ichlas, 25 August 2013.

Closely associated with the above is the absence of consideration of

the implications of the legal opinion ( fatwā) on the rights and status of
the followers of Ahmadiyya and Shi’a as citizens. The lack of intellectual
depth on this issue is yet another characteristic of the revivalist mode of
thought. The legal opinion ( fatwā) does not pay heed to the operating laws
of the state within the context of Indonesia. Its emotive rallying call for
the need to eliminate threats to the sanctity of the community (umma) is
unaccompanied by a reflection of its implications on the rights of citizens
affected by the ruling. While MUI may be able to pronounce a sect as devi-
ant, proclaiming that the state should ban its organizations and close down
its places of worship and other properties, has implications for their rights
and dignity as citizens which are not given enough consideration. In fact,
as a consequence of the legal opinion ( fatwā), the Indonesian government
issued a Joint Decree or Surat Keputusan Bersama (SKB) which, among other
things, prohibited Ahmadi communities across the country to declare their
existence by, for instance, putting signboards on all Ahmadiyya properties,
including offices, schools, and even mosques.165 The mode of thought of
MUI also reveals the sheer lack of awareness of the fundamental rights of
Indonesian citizens who are the victims of the legal opinion ( fatwā). This
has incited critical responses. Syukur criticizes the Indonesian govern-
ment’s lack of commitment to implementing the state constitution and
laws in providing protection to minority religious groups. Constitutionally,
the existence of religious groups are acknowledged and protected by the
state, but as Syukur lamented, in Ahmadiyya’s case, “we do not enjoy such
acknowledgment and protection.” He strongly opines that the legal opinion
( fatwā) is unconstitutional and hence asserts, “Are not we also Indonesian
citizens?” Furthermore, he boldly contends that the state should be embar-
rassed by its failure to uphold the constitution”.166 An Ahmadi intellectual
Djohan Effendi also expresses his rejection to the paradoxes of legal opinion
( fatwā). For him, it is logically difficult to grasp that while MUI has asked
Ahmadis to return to the right path, MUI did not take into consideration that
the legal opinion ( fatwā) has practically victimized Ahmadis as potential
objects of violence, and violated their rights as citizens. Impacted by the legal
opinion ( fatwā), nothing had been done to protect their rights as citizens.
In fact, the government itself took an anti-Ahmadi stance.167

166 Interview with Rahmat Syukur, in Garut, West Java, 27 May 2013.
167 Ahmad Gaus AF, Sang Pelintas Batas: Biografi Djohan Effendi (Jakarta: ICRP and Kompas,
2009), 222.

As highlighted earlier, one of the grounds adduced by the legal opinion

( fatwā) in declaring Ahmadiyya as deviant is that Islamic states such as
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have long banned Ahmadiyya from the country.
However, the late Abdurrahman Wahid has responded to this argument
by contending that Saudi Arabia differs fundamentally from Indonesia,
since Saudi is an Islamic state, while Indonesia is as secular based on the
Pancasila.168 Furthermore, Wahid maintained that if the ban of Ahmadiyya
is based on the fact that they practice a kind of Islam that is different from
those practiced by the majority of Indonesian Muslims, other religions such
as Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism practice different faiths from the
majority of Indonesian. “Are not their faiths different with the majority of
Indonesian Muslims’ faith?” asked Wahid.169 Similarly, Syafii Anwar asserts:
“I am not an Ahmadi, but I am very disappointed if such a legal opinion
( fatwā) is always used and even misused by certain groups that perpetrate
violence and destruction. I think such implications should be looked into
by MUI before the legal opinion ( fatwā) is issued.”170
The tendency to overlook the broader legal and ethical conditions impact-
ing on the legal opinion ( fatwā) is also evident in the case of the Shi’a. The
proclamation of the Shi’a as a whole as deviant by the legal opinion ( fatwā)
and the escalation of actions taken against them that adversely persecuted
them and infringes on their rights and liberty illustrate, once again, the
conservative and authoritarian mode of thinking of the groups involved.
An Indonesian social critique, for instance, has lashed at the legal opinion
( fatwā) on the grounds that it cannot be said to reflect the knowledge and
rigorous study that has been undertaken by Muslim Scholars around the
Muslim world and in the history of Islam. The legal opinion ( fatwā) has
also blatantly disregarded the consequences of Indonesia’s commitment
as a signatory to the “Amman Message” which took place on 4-6 July 2005.
Among the key points acknowledged in the Message is the recognition of
two Shi’ite schools, the Ja’fari and Zaydi are Muslims. The Amman Message
embodies three essential points:
168 K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid, “Lain Zaman, Lain Pendekatan”, in Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds),
Kala Fatwa Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), xxvi-xxix.
169 Ibid, xxxvii.
170 “MUI Perlu Mereformasi Diri: Wawancara dengan M. Syafi’i Anwar dan Djohan Effendi”, in
Ahmad Suaedy, et.al (eds), Kala Fatwa Jadi Penjara (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006), 245.

1. It recognizes the validity of all eight madhhabs (legal schools) of Sunni,

Shia, and Ibadhi Islam; of traditional Islamic Theology (Ash’arism); of
Islamic Mysticism (Sufism), and of true Salafi thought.
2. It forbids takfīr (declarations of apostasy) between Muslims.
3. It sets forth the subjective and objective preconditions for the issuing
of fatwas, thereby exposing ignorant and illegitimate edicts in the name
of Islam.171
The conservative characteristics underlying the mode of thinking of the

legal opinion ( fatwā) is not isolated from the wider milieu of the experience
of Islam in the post-New Order period. Kurniawan of Ahmadiyya perceives
the recent legal opinion ( fatwā) as a significant regression in religious
tolerance showed by Indonesian Muslim leaders. He compared the intoler-
ance of certain groups of religious scholars (ulama’) to the type of religious
attitude and orientation amongst the elite that prevailed back in 1925 when
an official missionary from India, Maulana Rahmat Ali, came to Tapaktuan,
Sumatera. As he brought new teachings, his was resisted by local religious
leaders. However, that resistance did not take on any physical violence but
was largely manifested in disputes at the level of ideas. This, he maintained,
showed how tolerant religious leaders were at that time compared to the
current context.172 Historically, such a claim is legitimate since such facts
were also highlighted by a non-Ahmadi writer, Ahmad Gaus who pointed
out that although there were certain adverse reactions from Muslim leaders
in Minangkabau and Jakarta, no ban or violence had emerged then. The
reactions were mainly in the form of debates and exchanges of ideas and
arguments. All opposing parties showed respect in the engagement.173
Closing
This chapter examined legal opinion ( fatwā) pertaining to sectarianism

with a focus on Ahmadiyya and Shi’a pronounced by MUI. It reveals vari-
ations and commonalities of specific conditions influencing the various
legal opinion ( fatwā) affecting these minority communities over space
and time in Indonesia and highlights substantive departures from earlier
171 See, The Amman Message (Jordan: The Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought, 2008)
172 Interview with Dodi Kurniawan, in Tasikmalaya, 26 May 2013.
173 Ahmad Gaus AF, Sang Pelintas Batas: Biografi Djohan Effendi (Jakarta: ICRP and Kompas,
2009), 220-222.

legal opinion ( fatwā) affecting them prior to the post-New Order period.
The chapter maintains that the legal opinion ( fatwā) on the whole has
reinforced strong elements of conservatism within MUI. It seeks to preserve
MUI’s authority within mainstream Islam or ahl al-sunna wa al-jamā’a
against the perceived threat of competing religious voices seeking to
undermine the faith of the Indonesian Muslim community (umma). In
clinging on rigidly and emotively to selected interpretations and views on
Islamic teachings and traditions, the legal opinion ( fatwā) has essentialized,
labeled and demonized the groups targeted while disregarding their potent
and adverse consequences on the lives of those impacted. The legal opinion
( fatwā) have impaired religious pluralism and intra-community relations
with grievous implications on the rights of the members of the targeted
groups as believers as well as their status as citizens.

5 Fatwa of Bath al-Masail Nahdlatul
Ulama’
A thought is never born in emptiness. It is conditioned by the social setting

surrounding it. So enormous is the influence of social condition on one’s
thoughtthat it is reasonable to denote that one’s opinion or idea and even policies
resulting from political authority is a product of its time
– K.H. MA. Sahal Mahfudh, Nuansa Fiqih Sosial, xxv
In fact, the system of adopting a madhhab does not contradict the system of
ijtihād and taqlīd. Rather, it sets both in harmonious balance. Each system
is good and should be used by Muslims toachievethepure teachings of Islam.
However, they should be employed properly by the right persons and should not
be misused
– K.H. Achmad Siddiq, KhitthahNahdliyah, 56
Introduction
Lajnah Bahth al-Masāil1 Nahdlatul Ulama’ (hereafter will be referred to

as LBM-NU) is a special council and legal opinion ( fatwā) agency within
NU responsible for providing legal responses and answers for NU members
on new issues that have not been legally determined. In general, NU is
widely acknowledged as a traditional Islamic organization.2 This term is
1 Bahth al-masāil literally comprises of two words: bahth means the discussion and al-masāil
(the plural form of al-mas’ala) means problems. It refers to a mechanism employed within NU in
attempts to solve unprecedented issues in Islamic law. Therefore, bahth al-masāil is an activity.
However, it should not be confused with the Lajnah Bahth al-Masāil which refers to a specific
council within NU responsible for the performing of bahts al-masāil. The word lajnah itself
means committee or council.
2 Generally, Indonesian Islam is often described in term of traditionalist and modernist.
These two models are represented by two largest Islamic organizations in the country, Nahdlatul
Ulama and Muhammadiyah respectively. However, with the passing of the time, the dichotomy
of traditionalist and modernist for these two Islamic movements need elaboration. In the current
context, there have been convergence between the two, and as a result, evaluating NU as merely
traditionalist Muslim community is no longer valid, as is the case with Muhammadiyah as a
modernist Islam group. Closer examination will reveal that in certain areas, modernist elements
pervade within NU while traditionalistic elements are evident in Muhammadiyah’s thinking. We
will deal with this topic in relation to fatwa and Islamic legal thought in many parts of this thesis.

commonly used to denote the fact that NU consistently maintains elements

of tradition and culture within its religious practice.3 In a more technical
sense, it is identified with NU’s strict adherence to a specific school of reli-
gious thought popularly referred to as Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā’a (aswaja).4
By far, these central motives of the movement has been associated with
backwardness, antiquity, and close-mindedness and constantly used to
distinguish NU from its modernist counterparts such as Jami’at al-Khair
(1901), Muhammadiyah (1912), al-Irsyad (1914) and Persatuan Islam (1923). NU
has also been commonly evaluated as a movement with a traditionalistic
religious outlook or orientation. The use of this term is identified with the
sociological meaning of traditionalism which essentially refers to a mode
of religious orientation or thought which refers to distinct traits beyond
mere adherence to and assimilation of local cultural beliefs and practices
in religious thought and a particular school of religious thought and specific
religious traditions per se. More accurately, it is characterized by several
traits. Firstly, an overriding tendency to cling dogmatically to the opinions
of pious savants of the past as absolute, final and immutable. Secondly, a
reluctance or ambivalence to evaluate religious traditions and values taking
into consideration changing socio-historical conditions. Thirdly, a tendency
to be bound by the letter of selective religious teachings and rulings ir-
respective of their effects on actual conditions; Fourthly, non-distinction
between Islamic ideas as socio-historically conditioned and the universal
and eternal values underlying them. Lastly, a general lack of concern with
the consequences of thought espoused and a general aversion to rethinking
aspects of religious tradition imperative in the face of social change.
Although scholars perceive this long established religious movement
as traditionalistic, NU is in many ways non-monolithic not only in term
its social composition but also in differing strands of religious views and
orientations among agencies that comprise it. Since the 1980s or so, shift
and transformation has featured religious discourse within this movement,
especially in the selection and conceptualization of issues confronting
3 Mujamil Qomar, NU Liberal: Dari Tradisionalisme Ahlussunah ke Universalisme Islam

(Bandung: Mizan, 2002), 26.
4 The term ahl al-sunna wa al-jama’a is a controversial one. On the one hand, it refers to a
general understanding of the followers and practitioners of sunna (Prophetic tradition) and
those who affiliate themselves to any jamā’a (groups). On the other hand, the term has been used
more specifically and technically to refer to a theological sect in Islam which develops specific
doctrines and teaching. In this second sense, ahl al-sunna wa al-jamā’a known also as by the
acronym aswaja is upheld by NU. We will return to discussion of this topic in the next section.

Fat wa of Bath al-Masail Nahdl atul Ul ama’ 185
Muslims in contemporary Indonesia.5 The competing modes of orienta-

tion are also evident in approaches to understanding the religious law
and traditions. The above quote from the late Sahal Mahfudh (d. 2014), a
prominent religious scholars (ulama’)6 of NU, is a case in point. It strongly
illustrates a departure from the traditionalistic approach to understanding
religious traditions and signals the significance of understanding religious
thought within a perspective that emphasizes the dialectical relationship
between social conditions and Islamic thought in general. It also reflects
the mode of thinking of agencies within NU that urge for moving beyond
rigidity of texts and dogma in the attempt to make Islamic law relevant to
the present condition. Mahfudh’s idea that the formulation of texts is bound
by particularities of its socio-historical contexts and that understanding
texts in a vacuum will constrain the relevance of religious teachings in
meeting the needs of the present world are by no means an isolated one
within the movement today.
This chapter examines the dominant mode of NU’s religious style of
thought as reflected in its fundamental creed and basic doctrine as well as
its legal methodology. The impact of the mode of thought on selected legal
opinion ( fatwā) issued by the LBM-NU in the post-New Order period will
be analyzed. In this respect, the predominant understanding of NU as a
traditionalistic movement will be critically appraised. Competing religious
orientations within the movement, factors conditioning them and their
implications on legal opinion ( fatwā), if any, will also be examined. How
these mode(s) of thought reflect as well as facilitate effective response by
NU to the impulses and demands of change both internally and externally
will be examined. The extent to which NU’s mode of thinking through
5 For more comprehensive discussion on NU younger generation and the dynamics of contempo-
rary Islamic thought in NU, please Djohan Effendi, Pembaruan tanpa Membongkar Tradisi: Wacana
Keagamaan di Kalangan Generasi Muda NU Masa Kepemimpinan Gus Dur (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010),
and La Ode Ida, NU Muda: Kaum Progresif dan Sekularisme Baru (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2004).
6 The term ulama’ is basically a plural form of singular ʽālim (religious scholars). However,
in an Indonesian usage, ulama’ is used to refer to both singular and plural. This thesis will
follow this version. Sahal Mahfudh is a prominent ulama of NU widely known for his thought
on on social dimension of Islamic law called the fiqih sosial. See MA Sahal Mahfudh, Nuansa
Fiqih Sosial (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2007). Mahfudh’s thought on fiqih sosial has also been subject
of academic research. For example, see Arief Aulia Rachman, Metodologi Fikih Sosial M.A.
Sahal Mahfudh (Studi Keberanjakan dari Fikih Tekstual ke Pemahaman Fikih Kontekstual dan
Relevansinya dengan Hukum Keluarga Islam, M.A. Thesis, Faculty of Islamic Law, Kalijaga State
Islamic University, Yogyakarta, 2010. See also Suyadi, Konsep Fiqih Sosial dan Implikasinya
terhadap Pendidikan Islam (Telaah Pemikiran KH. MA. Sahal Mahfudh), Undergraduate Thesis,
Walisongo State IslamicUniversity, Semarang,2004.

legal opinion ( fatwā) can harmonize the changing social contexts with its
fundamental dogma and creed that have been part of its long-established
conviction will also be analyzed.
NU and the Preservation of Tradition
The founding of NU is mostly associated with attempts to preserve Islamic

traditionalism in Indonesia. Established in the pre-independence period on
31 January 1926, in Surabaya, East Java, the founding of NU was preceded by
remarkable ideological tensions among Muslim groups in Indonesia.7 In
general, there are two closely related factors leading to the foundation of NU.
The f irst is the internal factor manifested in the ideological rivalry
between traditionalist and modernist Muslims. The rise of modernist
trends in Islam sometimes occurred at the end of the nineteenth century
in response to the conditions of the Muslims under Dutch colonialism.
In this context, traditionalist Islam was challenged as the impediment to
the progress of the Muslims by competing groups who advocated for the
reinterpretation of religious beliefs and practices viewed as obstructing
reform of the community. For the traditionalist religious elite, the chal-
lenge was seen as a threat to religious traditions,8institutions, and the
practice of traditional Islam which has long been established in Indonesian
religious life. Consequently, the introduction of ideas by Indonesian Muslim
modernists such as Ahmad Dahlan and Ahmad Soerkati who attempted to
combine puritanical Islamic understanding of Abdul Wahhab of Nejd with
elements of Islamic modernism of Muhammad Abduh was viewed with
7 Djohan Effendi notes that the first quarter of twentieth century in Indonesian Islam was
featured by the contestation of opposing orientation: salafiyah and traditionalist. The first refers
to Muslims groups which campaign for purification of Islamic teachings from local elements
which could endanger the purity of Islam, and at the same time urge direct reference the Qurʼān
and Sunna as well as to early generation of Muslims before the emergence of classical schools of
law. The second, refers to Muslims who believe in the maintaining of classical schools of law as
it is believed as the continuation of Prophet’s teachings and traditions. For more comprehensive
discussion, see Djohan Effendi, Pembaruan tanpa Membongkar Tradisi: Wacana Keagamaan di
Kalangan Generasi Muda NU Masa Kepemimpinan Gus Dur (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), Chapter 2.
8 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Pandangan Hidup Kyai dan Visinya Mengenai
Masa Depan Indonesia (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2011), 145; and Miftahurrahim Syarkun, “Visi NU dalam
Percaturan Global”, in Yayan Musthofa and Fathurrahman Karyadi (eds), Menggagas NU Masa
Depan (Jombang: Pustaka Tebuireng in cooperation with LAKSNU, 2010), 10. Martin van Bruines-
sen views this factor as only secondary to international factor which in his view is the main
drive behind the founding of NU. See Martin van Bruinessen, NU: Tradisi, Relasi-Relasi Kuasa
dan Pencarian Wacana Baru (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2009), 13-40.

strong suspicions by traditionalists. In this sense, it is hard to refute that

NU is founded as a reaction to Wahhabism which is hostile to traditions
practiced by NU and which are deemed as heresy (bid’a).9 The penetration
of modernist movements and their influence exacerbated socio-religious
tensions among these groups.
Efforts were initiated by Sarikat Islam (SI), under the leadership of Haji
Omar Said Cokroaminoto, to reconcile these conflicting groups. Several
congresses aimed at building consensus between modernists and tradition-
alists were held to this effect. The first congress held in Cirebon on October
31, 1922, under the banner of the Congress of Islamic World of East Indies
(Muktamar ‘Alam Islam Hindi al-Sharqiyya), failed to bridge the opposing
orientations as the modernists pursued their attacks against traditional-
ists. They urged the latter to leave their strict adherence to school of law
(madhhab), and the works of classical religious scholars (ulama’), and to join
the credo of return to the Qur’an and Sunna (kembali kepada al-Qurʼān dan
Sunnah), instead. The traditionalists defended their creed strongly. Wahab
Chasbullah10 of Tashwīrul Afkār11 emphasized the importance of reference
to school of law (madhhab) and classical religious scholars (ulama)’s works
for the purpose of proper understanding of the Qurʼān and Sunna.12 In this
friction, the traditionalists were eventually marginalized. Their most severe
defeats were in the fourth congress held in Yogyakarta on 21 August 1925
and subsequently in the next congress in Bandung in 1926.
The problem was compounded by the unstable political situation of the
Muslim world at that time with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and
the shift of power in the Hijaz from King Sharif Husein to King Ibn Saud.
9 Masdar Farid Mas’udi, “Preface”, in Munawir Abdul Fattah, Tradisi Orang-Orang NU

(Yogyakarta: LKiS), xi.
10 For a discussion on Wahab Chasbullah’s roles in NU and Indonesian politics, please refer
to Greg Fealy, “Wahab Chasbullah, Traditionalism and the Political Development of Nahdlatul
Ulama”, in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity
in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 1-41. For a comprehensive biography see
Saifuddin Zuhri, Almaghfurllah K.H. A. Wahab Chasbullah: Bapak dan Pendiri Nahdlatul Ulama
(Jakarta: Yayasan A Wahab Chasbullah and Yayasan Saifuddin Zuhri, 1999).
11 Tashwirul Afkar is an organization founded by A Wahab Chasbullah. This is an important
medium where traditionalists and modernists met to discuss controversial issues. Among
important figure of Tahswirul Afkar was Mas Mansoer who assumed position of secretary when
Chasbullah was the chairman. However, following the founding of Muhammadiyah branch in
Surabaya in 1921, Mas Mansoer was more inclined to accept modernist Muhammadiyah position
and finally left Nahdatul Wathan.
12 Miftahurrohim Syarkun, “Visi NU dalam Percaturan Global”, in Yayan Musthofa and Fathur-
rahman Karyadi (eds), Menggagas NU Masa Depan (Jombang: Pustaka Tebuireng in cooperation
with LAKSNU, 2010), 11.

The new Saudi monarch organized a Congress with the aim of reviving
the caliphate for Muslims worldwide known as the Congress of Caliphate
(Mu’tamar al-Khilafah) in which Indonesian Muslim scholars and leaders
were nominated to attend. While Cokroaminoto from SI and Mas Mansur
from Muhammadiyah were chosen as delegates, Chasbullah’s nomination
was revoked for the reason that he did not represent any organization.13
The shift in power in Arabia was viewed by traditionalist Muslim scholars
as threatening given difference in the rulers’ affiliation to school of law
(madhhab) and religious leanings. Sharif Husein belonged to Shāfi’i school,
while Ibn Sa’ud was a follower of Wahhabism.14 The late Abdul Muchith
Muzadi, an NU scholar, maintained that Wahhabi rulers of Saudi Arabia
exaggerated their mission to purify Islamic teachings which resulted in
the destruction of numerous important historical sites of Islam under the
pretext that these would lead Muslims into dualism.15
Concerned with the new regime’s attempts to “cleanse” religious practices
and beliefs, Chasbullah delivered his messages to King Ibn Saud. The mes-
sage highlighted, among other, concerns the imperative to preserve religious
rituals such as visiting tombs of the Prophet, Companions, saints, religious
scholars, and the pious forebears and the chanting of prayer.16 Nevertheless,
this message was not taken seriously by participants of the congress which
resulted in Chasbullah’s decision to leave the group.
In anticipation of attacks against their religious understanding and
practice, Chasbullah organized a meeting of fifteen leading traditionalist
religious leaders (kiai) on January 31, 1926. The meeting resulted in the
decision to found an organization of Islamic religious scholars (ulama’)
called Nahdlatul Ulama’ (literally means the awakening of the ulama’),
aimed at defending and strengthening traditionalistic Islam in the Dutch
Indies.17 Chasbullah also initiated the formation of the committee to discuss
the case of Hijaz (Komite Merembuk Hijaz). This committee approved of his
visit to Arabia as representative of traditionalist Muslims in Indonesia.18
13 Abdul Muchith Muzadi, Mengenal Nahdlatul Ulama (Surabaya: Khalista, 2006), 6. See also
Mujamil Qomar, NU Liberal: Dari Tradisionalisme Ahlussunah ke Universalisme Islam (Bandung:
Mizan, 2002), 33.
14 Miftahurrohim Syarkun, 12.
15 Abdul Muchith Muzadi, NU dalam Perspektif Sejarah dan Ajaran (Refleksi 55 Tahun Ikut
NU) (Surabaya: Khalista, 2006), 33.
16 Miftahurrahim Syarkun, 13.
17 Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah NU 1952-1967 (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2007, 3rd Edition), 21.
18 Miftahurrahim Syarkun, 14. See also A. Muchith Muzadi, NU dalam Perspektif dan Ajaran
(Surabaya: Khalista, 2006), 34.

The committee was later formally converted to Nahdlatul ‘Ulama in the

meeting mentioned above with Hasyim Asy’ari as its first general chairman
(raīs akbar).
This brief historical account reveals that the birth of NU was a response
to the challenge posed by the new outlook of Islam conditioned by vast
social changes that were occurring in Indonesia under Dutch imperialism.19
The analysis of the Indonesian historian, Kuntowijoyo on the birth of NU,
sheds insights on this point. He maintains that NU was a response to two
significant conditions namely the politicization of Islam pioneered by the
Sarikat Islam (SI); and modernist ideology hostile to traditionalistic Islam
based on pre-industrial agrarian traditions of the past. Its religious orienta-
tion as a function of symbolic formation of traditional society became the
subject of attacks heresy (bid’a) by modernists.20 Similarly, Ahmad Arifi puts
forth three aspects which explain the birth of NU political, socio-cultural,
and religious,21 all of which are mutually intertwined.
Factors Conditioning Traditionalism
To a large extent, NU is predominantly traditionalistic. Karl Mannheim,

for instance, formulated traditionalism as “a tendency to cling to vegeta-
tive patterns, to old ways of life.” Towler describes some salient features
of traditionalism. Those are: a) unquestioning certainty of religious
traditions; b) strong tendency to cherish and maintain unchanging tradi-
tions; c) resistance to any innovation deemed to threaten the established
belief; d) hostility to any change and efforts to push them back into the
established mould; and e) the tendency to avoid or dismiss all questions
while insisting on putting them back under lock and key of a custodial
authority.22 These traits are to a large extent revealed in basic concepts,
doctrines, and teachings that form the credo of NU. Of these the most
significant are: a) doctrine of aswaja; b) attitude toward culture and mysti-
cism; and c) Islam with reference to school of law (Islam Bermadzhab)
and imitation (Taqlid).
19 Djohan Effendi, Pembaruan Tanpa Membongkar Tradisi: Wacana Keagamaan di Kalangan

Generasi Muda NU Masa Kepemimpinan Gus Dur (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 3.
20 Kuntowijoyo, Paradigma Islam: Interpretasi untuk Aksi (Bandung: Mizan, 1991), 197.
21 Ahmad Arifi, Pergulatan Pemikiran Fiqih “Tradisi” Pola Mazhab (Yogyakarta: Elsaq Press,
2010), 78-81.
22 Robert Towler, The Need for Certainty, 82.

The Aswaja Doctrine
As a central credo, the doctrine of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā’a (aswaja) mani-

fests NU’s traditionalist mode of thought as it is an attempt to maintain the
pattern of unquestioning reliance on selective religious rulings lodged in the
past. Alternative views or teachings that endeavor to analyze this creed are
rejected as they are deemed to undermine its certainty and stability. The
doctrine of aswaja is employed to differentiate NU’s religious orientation
from modernist Muslim groups which advocate direct reference to the
Qurʼān and interpreting religious teachings and a critical attitude towards
accepting the opinions of religious scholars (ulama’), by, for example, not
accepting their consensus (ijmā’).23 This mode of thinking mirrored in the
creed of aswaja distinguishes NU from other Muslim groups.
It is pertinent to note that basic terms in Islam are often subject to
multitudes of meanings. Consequently, a single term can be understood
in diverse ways including their general and technical meanings. It is this
divergence of meaning that has created controversy regarding the nature
of ahl al-Sunnawa al-jamā’a. As a generic term, ahl al-Sunna wa al- jamā’a
refers to a Prophet’s sayings (hadith) foretelling the possible split of Muslims
into seventy-three sects among which only one will be saved.24 This group is
called ahl al-Sunna wa al- jamā’a. It consists of three distinct words of ahl,
sunna and jamā’a. The word ahl carries several meanings such as family
or relatives, and the followers of the certain school of thought. Prophetic
tradition (sunna) can be understood as way or path and is comprehended
as the prophetic traditions, manifested in his sayings, deeds or approval.
Jamā’a broadly carries the meaning of community or group. Therefore,
ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā’a in its basic and general understanding mean all
Muslims who follow and practice the sunna and affiliate themselves to the
Muslim community ( jama’a). In addition to this general understanding, the
term has also been more technically to refer to those who follow Ash’ari and
Maturidi schools of thought in term of theology (aqīda), adopt one among
four schools of law (madhhab) of Islamic jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki,
Shafii, and Hanbali), and those who in terms of Islamic mysticism follow
23 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren, 228.

24 The hadith says: “The Jews split into 71 groups and Christians into 72, while my followers
will split into 73. All groups will be in the hell, except one group. The companions of the Prophet
(sahabah) asked: Who is the only saved group? Prophet replied: “Those are ahl al-sunnah wa
al-jamaah (the followers of sunna and jamaah)”. “What is ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamaah?” Ahl
al-sunnah wa al-jamaah is what my companions are and I am on it”.

the teachings of al-Ghazali and Junaid al-Baghdadi.25 These three aspects

are deemed as forming a unity which encompasses the principal aspects of
Islam based on the method of thinking (manhaj) of Ash’arite and Maturidi
in the field of faith (aqīda) and the four major schools of Islamic jurispru-
dence ( fiqh). Aswaja, however, has been used ideologically to distinguish
a group from others such as the Sunni from the Shi’ites.26 It has also been
appropriated to distinguish and reject the rationally-oriented Mu’tazila.27 In
the context of NU, the adoption of ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā’a refers to those
who follow the Ash’arite theology enriched by religious thought consonant
with the socio-cultural condition of Indonesian Islam. For this reason, this
specific meaning of ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā’a is unique compared to the
understanding of the term employed in other Muslim countries.
Based on NU’s National Meeting (Musyawarah Nasional) in 2002, ahl al-
Sunnawa al-jamā’a is defined as those who strongly follow the Qurʼān and
exemplary practices of the Prophet, his companions, pious forebears and
those who revive their teachings.28 As ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā’a is the main
doctrinal denominator of NU, it is stated that those who adhere to ahl al-Sunna
wa al-jamā’a are integral to NU, although they are not NU members regarding
organizational affiliation.29 Again, the meaning given to this concept indicates
the employment of the general sense of ahl al-Sunna wa al- jamā’a.
The main features of ahl-Sunna wa al-jama’a in NU’s sense of the term are
manifested in the attitude towards moderation (tawasuṭ and i’tidal), balance
(tawāzun), tolerance (tasāmuḥ), and invitation for doing good (amar ma’ruf
nahi munkar).30 Moderation (tawasuṭ and i’tidal) are two principles which
advocate taking a middle path between two opposing extreme positions.
They imply a balance between reason and revelation, pre-determinism
25 Ahmad Arifi, PergulatanPemikiran Fiqih “Tradisi” Pola Mazhab (Yogyakarta: Elsaq Press,
2010), 66; Samsul Ma’arif, Mutiara-Mutiara Dakwah K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari (Bogor: Kanza Publish-
ing, 2011), 109-112; Miftahurrohim Syarkun, 25-26; Busyairi Harits, 23.
26 Muhammad Tholhah Hasan, Ahlussunah wal Jamaah dalam Persepsi dan Tradisi NU
(Jakarta: Lantabora Press, 2005), xii.
27 Before founding his own school, Abu Hasan al-Asy’ari was the follower of Mu’tazilah and
studied under Mu’tazilah scholar al-Juba’i. There are two reasons that motivated al-Asy’ari to
leave Mu’tazilah, namely his dissatisfaction of Mu’tazilah ideology, and his dream of meeting the
Prophet. See Muhammad Idrus Ramli, Mazhab al-Asy’ari, Benarkah Ahlussunah Wal-Jamaah:
Jawaban Terhadap Aliran Salafi (Surabaya: Khalista, 2009), 19-23.
28 Busyairi Harits, Islam NU: Pengawal Tradisi Sunni Indonesia (Surabaya: Khalista, 2010), 23.
29 Salahuddin Wahid, Salaluddin “Menggagas NU Masa Depan” in Yayan Musthofa and Fathur-
rahman Karyadi (eds), Menggagas NU Masa Depan (Jombang: Pustaka Tebuireng in cooperation
with LAKSNU, 2010).
30 A. Muchith Muzadi, NU dalam Perspektif Sejarah dan Ajaran (Refleksi 55 Tahun Ikut NU)
(Surabaya: Khalista, 2006), 27.

(Jabaria) and free will of human agency (Qadaria). Balance (tawāzun)

involves the principle of balancing devotion to God with humanitarian
orientation and harmony between the past and the present. Toleration
(tasāmuḥ) means tolerance of differences of opinions and views both on
religious and social issues while amar ma’rūf nahi munkar invites sensitivity
towards humanity and encouragement for people to do virtuous deeds for
society.31
By this understanding, it is clear that NU has formulated a very unique
meaning of and an exclusive claim on the term of ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā’a.
Such a claim can also be seen from the reaction of NU to other groups claim-
ing to be followers of the ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā’a. It is stated that among
other factors leading to its publication is the emergence of groups in Muslim
society who claim themselves as followers of ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā’a such
as the Salafis, but who abstain from practicing doctrines and teachings
of ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā’a.32 Moreover, NU’s version of ahl al-Sunna wa
al-jamā’a is believed to be distinctive compared to the understanding of the
concept as developed in the Middle Eastern countries. This situation is due
to differences in the social, cultural, political and religious contexts in both
these regions. While Middle Eastern society is formed by the experience
of monarchy as a political system with textual orientation, Indonesian
religious orientation is mostly moderate as the result of its long-established
tradition.33Similarly, Muhammad Tholhah Hasan identifies three contexts
in which the doctrine of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-jamā’a is understood in NU,
namely doctrinal, political and socio-cultural,34 which once again reveal
the specific meaning of aswaja developed by NU over the years. However,
according to Malik Madani, the current general secretary of NU Central
Board, ahl al-Sunna is not a teaching but refers to the supporters of the
teaching of sunna and jamā’a.35
The aswaja in NU’s conception is both a school (madhhab) and a method
of thought (manhaj), as formulated by Hasyim Asy’ari, the founding father of
31 Miftahurrohim, 26; Muchith Muzadi, 26-27. See also Muhyiddin Abdusshomad, Hujjah NU:
Akidah, Amaliah, Tradisi (Surabaya: Khalista, 2012), 7.
32 PW NU Jawa Timur, Aswaja an-Nahdliyah: Ajaran Ahlussunah wa al-Jamaah yang Berlaku
di Lingkungan Nahdlatul Ulama’ (Surabaya: Khalista and LTN PW NU Jawa Timur, 2007), 4-5.
33 Nur Syam, “Membaca K.H. Hasyim Asy’ari Melalui Hermeneutika: Sebuah Catatan Pen-
gantar”, Foreword in Achmad Muhibbin Zuhri, Pemikiran KH. M. Hasyim Asy’ari tentang Ahl
al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah (Surabaya: Khalista, 2010), vi.
34 Muhammad Thalhah Hasan as quoted by Arifi, 2010, 63-64.
35 Kiai Malik Madani: Islam Aswaja, Islam yang Wajar, http://www.nu.or.id/a,public-
m,dinamic-s,detail-ids,44-id,38970-lang,id-c,nasional-t,KH+Malik+Madani++Islam+Aswaja+
+Islam+yang+Wajar-.phpx. Accessed on 16 November 2013.

NU.36 As a result, the centrality of aswaja within NU is relatively uncontested.

However, the establishment of aswaja doctrine has been lately criticized by
NU younger generation of members which indicates a rift within NU. One
factor leading to this clash of thought is different religious orientations that
are emerging within the movement. Most of the senior clerics in NU perceive
aswaja as a fundamental doctrine of the school of thought which originated
from classical scholars of the past. They regard this tradition as important
as a revelation of God. The younger generation, on the other hand, views
these classical traditions or intellectual inheritance as a legal product of the
past which is highly influenced by its socio-historical context. Its binding
quality is associated with strong fanaticism in clinging to the opinions of
savants of the past. These dynamics reveal that while NU is predominantly
traditionalistic in this aspect, competing groups within the movement are
beginning to question its credo and seeking a new understanding of tradition.
Attitude towards Tradition and Mysticism
Another major trait of NU’s religious orientation is its accommodative at-

titude towards local tradition and culture that have developed in the past.
NU believes that tradition is an essential part of human life and culture
as a human creation of positive virtue which should be maintained for the
well-being of society.37 Consequently, NU flexibly accommodates local
customs and practices so long as these are not deemed to offend the values
of religion. This attitude is based on the principle of preserving old elements
which are virtuous and admitting new ones which are purposeful for man
(al-muḥāfaḍatu ala al-qadīm al-ṣālīh wa al-akhdhu ala al-jadīd al-aṣlaḥ).
As an example of the assimilation of local customs and traditions into
religious life is the practice of thanksgiving (slametan), gathering (kondan-
gan) and traditional party (kenduri) which are aspects of Javanese tradition
long observed before the coming of Islam. While other Muslim groups deem
it imperative to purify Islam from such practices, NU’s religious perspective
differs. It believes that in such practices as thanksgiving (slametan), there
are elements of virtue in so far as it facilitates devotion to God through
remembrance of Him and prayers for the deceased and loved ones. None
of all these values, claims NU, contradicts Islamic teachings, and for this
36 Miftahurrahim Syarkun,”NU dalam Percaturan Global,” in Yayan Musthofa and Fathurrah-

man Karyadi (eds), Menggagas NU Masa Depan (Jombang: Pustaka Tebuireng in cooperation
with LAKSNU, 2010), 27.
37 Aswaja an-Nahdliyah, 33.

reason, there is no basis on which such practices should be abolished

although the Prophet Muhammad did not practice them in his lifetime.38
NU’s rejection of the association of these practices with innovation or her-
esy (bid’a), which can loosely be defined as innovation in religious practices
is yet another revealing instance of traditionalism. Its distinctive argument
on heresy (bid’a) illustrates the point. It questions whether those who label
these cultural practices as heresy (bid’a) are not, in fact, guilty of innovation
themselves as they do not refer to religious scholars (ulama’) for an opinion
or ruling and are even hostile to them. NU maintains that recourse to
the opinions of the religious scholars (ulama’) will reveal that they do not
condemn heresy or innovation (bid’a) as astray (sesat), and pronounce on
the illegality of these practices.39 NU’s position on the religious scholars
(ulama’) within the context of Islamic law (sharī’a) reveals its traditionalistic
attitude towards the spiritual legacy of the past. 40
NU’s traditionalism is also evident in its mystical orientation towards
Islam. Although this type of religious experience has often been pejoratively
understood, NU believes that it has benefitted the community. In Gus Dur’s
words, the Sufi or mystical orientation that NU members adopt has provided
them with “moral discipline and degree of social cohesiveness which enables
them to endure change, including political changes.”41 Furthermore, he
maintained that in contrast to the rigid puritanical and Islamic modernist
movement, “NU’s religious teachings allow for flexibility.” These teachings
also “demonstrate the depth of NU’s ability to sustain its tradition in the
face of turbulent changes which have shaken the Muslim world over the
past and half centuries.”42
Taqlid and Islam Bermadzhab
Another element of traditionalism in NU is its stand towards imitation

(taqlīd) and school of law (madhhab). NU believes that following one of the
four Sunni legal schools (Hanafite, Malikite, Shafiite, and Hanbalite) is com-
pulsory in observing Islamic teachings. This doctrine is popularly known as

39 Nur Hidayat Muhammad, Hujjah Nahdliyah, 23.
40 Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Cuture (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1965), 192-93.
41 Abdurrahman Wahid, ”Foreword”, in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama’:
Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), xiv.
42 Ibid.

Islam with affiliation to school of law (Islam Bermadzhab). 43 Theoretically,

a school of law (madhhab) is a complex entity which must include such
elements as a method of law deduction (istinbāṭ), legal reasoning (ijtihad)
and compendium of their teachings ( fiqh).44 Based on this definition, in the
context of Islam affiliated to a certain school of law (Islam bermazhab), NU
believes that practicing imitation (taqlīd) does not mean blind imitation
of school of law (madhhab)’s teachings as a whole, but is confined only
to following strictly selective opinions of leaders (imams) which are part
of the complete set of rulings within a school of law (madhhab). In other
words, imitation (taqlīd) is not permitted to imams or schools of law which
produced only sporadic thought and at the same time do not stand on the
firm method of legal deduction. 45
However, the practice of aff iliated to a certain school of law (Islam
Bermadzhab) and imitation (taqlīd) have been observed long before the
founding of NU as a formal organization. Following school of law (madh-
hab) seems to have been a conscious religious preference of traditional
religious leaders (kiai) long before NU was formally established. Conse-
quently, this preference is further accompanied by attempts to refer all
issues and problems in Islamic law to sources and references (marāji’)
established systematically by classical relisgious scholars (ulama’) or their
legal scholars (mujtahid) fore-bearers46 which are mostly written in classic
books in Islamic studies known as Kitab Kuning which literally means
Yellow Books.
This doctrine marks an important point of divergence between NU’s
traditionalism from its modernist counterparts. While NU urges that imi-
tation (taqlīd) within school of law (madhhab) is fundamental, modernist
groups such as Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam strongly advocate for
the exercise of legal reasoning (ijtihad) which could be perceived as not giv-
ing strong importance to the teachings of Imam of school of law (madhhab)
or classical religious scholars (ulama’). Manifestations of traditionalism
in these aspects of NU’s belief are built on several bases, namely:
a. It is believed that the Muslim community (umma) has agreed that
in understanding the Islamic law (sharī’a), reference to authoritative
sources of transmission is fundamental;
43 Pengurus Besar NU, Anggaran Dasar dan Rumah Tangga Nahdlatul Ulama (Jakarta:
Sekretariat Jendral PB NU, 2004), 3.
44 Achmad Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyyah, 54.
46 Moesa, Nasionalisme Kiai,135.

b. It is stated in the prophetic tradition that the community (umma) should

follow the majority for the sake of their salvation;
c. Finding reliable religious scholars (ulama’) is not an easy thing in the
contemporary setting, 47 and as a result referring to reliable school of
law (madhhab) is inevitable;
d. The knowledge of each leader (imam) of the school of law (madhhab) is
indiscriminately reliable;
e. These imams are absolute legal expert (mujtahid) or absolute legal
expert (mujtahid mustaqil) able to exercise independent thinking,
create method of thinking (manhaj al-fikr), and establish procedures
in making and deducing law (istinbāṭ);
f. The transmission of imams’ teachings to loyal disciples who consistently
spread and develop respective schools of law supported by the original
thought of their imams of school of law (madhhab);
g. Following a school of law (madhhab) reflects an acknowledgment of
chains of intellectual tradition among school of law (madhhab)48 which
guarantees the purity of their teachings.
In short, NU believes that adopting a school of law (madhhab) is a “scientific

responsibility,” that allows for “mutual respect” for NU’s religious scholars
(ulama), leaders (imams) of school of law (madhhab) and their followers. 49
NU’s traditionalism also clearly manifested in its defense of imitation
(taqlīd) against the attacks by modernists for promoting a spirit of reli-
gion that is uncritical and authoritarian. For NU, imitation (taqlīd) is an
inevitable aspect of belief which cannot be negated by believers. It also
ought to justify the practice on the ground that it is not absolute or static as
those who practice it are still able to find reasons for certain deeds (amal)
and rituals they practice. It maintains that blind imitation (taqlīd al-a’ma)
applies only to a blind-follower (muqallid) who does not have a thorough
understanding of the detail reasoning (dalil) of specific ritual (amal). For
NU, even Muslims who are unable to exercise legal reasoning are not free
from imitation (taqlīd) since in exercising legal reasoning, they must follow
certain methods created and employed by a legal expert (mujtahid) or leader
47 Samsul Ma’arif, 113-114. See also Muchith Muzadi, 123-125.

48 Tim PWNU Jawa Timur, Aswaja An-Nahdliyah, 24-25. For example, Imam Abu Hanifah, the
founder of Hanafite school, had been reported of meeting Imam Malik ibn Anas, the founder of
Malikite school, when the former performed his pilgrimage. Imam Shafi’i, the founder of Shafi’ite
school, is a disciple of Imam Malik, while Ahmad ibn Hanbal is a disciple of Imam al-Shafii.
49 Ahmad Arifi, Fiqih “Tradisi” Pola Mazhab, 167.

(imam) in deducting certain legal conclusions.50 Furthermore, Hasyim

Asy’ari, the founding father of NU, maintained that imitation (taqlīd) is
not the only method for Islam bermadzhab as legal reasoning (ijtihad) is also
acknowledged within school of law (madhhab).51 Imitation (taqlīd) is also
defended as non-monolithic regarding its meaning. For example, according
to one version, imitation (taqlīd) can be classified into four groups:
Firstly, following certain school of law (madhhab) while thoroughly un-
derstanding the reasons behind certain teachings and methods employed.
Secondly, following certain imams or schools of the law who are not fully
and consistently aware of both the grounds and methods used. Next, fol-
lowing the opinions of imams merely based on the belief that the opinions
are true and by Islamic teachings, as modeled by the Prophet, without
any knowledge of the reasons and methods employed. Lastly, following
teachings transmitted by certain imams and schools of law and believing
in the reliability of this chain of knowledge transmission.52
This categorization of imitation (taqlīd) is an attempt to defend imitation
(taqlīd) against those who see the practice as the uncritical following of the
teachings of certain schools of law. NU religious leaders (kiai) also assert in
defense that imitation (taqlīd) is equivalent to critical following (ittiba’)53
and not merely blind imitation. In the context of NU’s Islamic legal thinking,
critical following (ittibāʽ) and imitation (taqlīd) carry identical meanings.
The reasons they adduce to justify their stand reveals clearly the strong
tendency to rely on the authority of rulings of savants of the past. They
maintain that there is no difference between critical following (ittibāʽ)
and imitation (taqlīd), the religious scholars (ulama’) have agreed that for
Muslim masses unable to exercise Islamic legal reasoning from the primary
source of Islamic law, imitation (taqlid) is imperative and the Qurʼān has
repeatedly ordered Muslims who are not knowledgeable to inquire from
those who are.54It is also maintained that there is a mutual and dialectical
relationship between imitation (taqlīd) and critical following (ittibāʽ) as
both are not contradictory.55
50 Muhyiddin Abdusshomad, 44-45.

51 Achmad Muhibbin Zuhri, Pemikiran K.H. M. Hasyim Asy’ari tentang Ahl al-Sunnah wa
al-Jamaah (Surabaya: Khalista, 2010), 167.
52 M.N. Harisuddin, “Ijtihad dan Taqlid dalam Pandangan K.H. Abd. Muchith Muzadi”, Jurnal
Falasifa, Vol. 2, No. 2, September 2011, 59.
53 See Moesa, Nasionalisme Kiai,footnote number 47, 134.
54 Nur Hidayat Muhammad, Hujjah Nahdliyah: Kelimuan, Tradisi, Tawawuf (Surabaya:
Khalista, 2012), 4-5.

The mode of thinking underlying NU’s standpoint on imitation (taqlīd),

on the whole, reveals the dominant traits of traditionalism in which reason
is viewed with ambivalence or restricted to specific group namely those
who are deemed knowledgeable. It reflects NU’s strong tendency to cling the
rulings of the savants. NU’s traditionalism is conditioned and maintained
by several factors including the role of its religious elites or religious leaders
(kiai), its educational system and the position of classical religious sources
within its legal thought and tradition.
In general terms, the position of the traditional religious leaders (kiai)
is central to NU’s traditionalistic system. The term kiai refers to religious
leaders or Islamic religious scholars in Java.56 They are cherished as experts
in Islamic knowledge and sometimes own or lead a boarding school (pesant-
ren) where they teach religion based on classic Islamic books57 known as
Kitab Kuning.58 In most cases, religious leaders (kiai) play a central role in an
Islamic boarding school (pesantren).59 Historically speaking, the emergence
of religious leaders (kiai) in Indonesia, especially in Java, coincided with
the rise of socio-politico-religious phenomena during the nineteenth and
twentieth century. Among those phenomena is the resurgence of religion in
Java.60 The kiai is also used to refer to religious elites are religious scholars
(ulama’) and ustādh. Previously, kiai and ustādh are used respectively to dis-
tinguish traditional religious leaders from their modernist counterparts.61
However, with the passage of time such a distinction is no longer valid as
modernists also use the term kiai to refer to their religious leaders. While
the term ulama’ relates to a kiai who is a scholar on Islam, kiai, on the other
hand, involves a broader category. Until the decade of the 1970s, almost
all kiai are the leaders of an Islamic boarding school (pesantren). It is also
interesting to note that although ideally, a kiai is a person knowledgeable
in religious issues; in fact, many kiai do not master Islamic knowledge
56 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Kiai dan Kompleksitas Tipe-tipenya”, Foreword in Pradjarta Dird-

josanjoto, Memelihara Umat: Kiai Pesantren-Kiai Langgar di Jawa (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2013), xiii.
57 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi Pandangan Hidup Kyai dan Visinya tentang
Masa Depan Indonesia (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2011), 93.
58 Literally, kitab kuning means yellow books. This refers to classical Islamic books taught in
pesantren in many branches of Islamic knowledge such as ushul fiqh, fiqh, tafsir, and hadith.
These books usually printed in yellow paper, and for this reason, the name kitab kuning is
attributed.
59 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren, 94.
60 Ibnu Qoyim Ismail, Kiai Penghulu di Jawa: Perannya di Masa Kolonial (Jakarta: Gema Insani
Press, 1997), 17.
61 Abdurrahman Wahid, “Foreword” in Pradjarta Dirdjosanjoto, Memelihara Umat: Kiai
Pesantren-Kiai Langgar di Jawa (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2013), xiii.

adequately. This type of kiai is usually distinguished by personal charisma,

genealogical lineage, or spiritual prowess. By this measure, not all kiai in
NU fall under the category of ulama’.62
As the center and the holder of authority in Islamic knowledge, kiai also
functions as a marja’, namely source of reference for the general public in
dealing with important issues. As a marja’, kiai employ certain methods
in solving challenges and problems in Islamic law, and Muslims widely
follow their sayings. Principally, kiai’s strong authority is defined by several
supporting factors, such as: a) his understanding of Islamic knowledge
based on their understanding of works written by the classical religious
scholars (ulama’); b) piety or high standard of morality manifested by
their devotion to rituals (ʽibāda), sincerity in struggling for humanity and
many other virtues; c) genealogy, namely that a certain religious leaders
(kiai) is usually the offspring of reputable religious scholars (ulama’) or the
descendant of founders of reputable Islamic boarding schools (pesantren);
and d) prowess (karāma) which are generally associated with magic and
supra-natural prowess.63
The combination of all these factors strengthens the kiai’s position as
leaders of their society. The kiai in an Islamic boarding school (pesantren)
are usually identified with the traits of charismatic leadership.64 Based
on his charisma, kiai in pesantren are regarded as central figures able to
perform multiple functions such as social, cultural and religious engineer-
ing. Therefore, it is understandable that the influence of kiai over their
students (santri) will continue in shaping many aspects of their life even
when they have left the boarding school (pesantren).65
Apart from their position as leaders at Islamic boarding school (pesant-
ren), religious leaders (kiai) played a variety of roles in history. For example,
they were actively involved in the struggle for Indonesia’s independence. The
defining role of Kiai Wahid Hasyim in formulating the state philosophy of
Pancasila is a case of kiai’s involvement in fields of life other than religion.
The centrality of the role of religious leaders (kiai) in the preservation
of traditionalism can be better understood from within their social and
religious contexts. Although it is not always the case, a religious leaders
(kiai) usually builds the chain of his knowledge and influence in a boarding
62 Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama’, 21-22, especially footnotes number 2.

63 M. Nur Hasan, Ijtihad Politik NU: Kajian Filosofis Visi Sosial dan Moral Politik NU dalam
Upaya Pemberdayaan Civil Society (Yogyakarta: Manhaj, 2010), 43.
64 Abd Halim Soebahar, 64.
65 Ibid, 64.

school (pesantren) which serves as one of the oldest educational institutions

in Nusantara.66
In the attempt to comprehend the maintenance of traditionalism within
NU, the role of Indonesia’s system of religious education is a significant
factor. Before the emergence of the modern educational system, the Islamic
boarding school (pesantren) is the most accessible alternative education for
Muslims. Nurcholish Madjid argues that the contribution of Islamic board-
ing school (pesantren) in the formation of national education in Indonesia is
very eminent.67 It is a unique educational institution not only due to its long
establishment but also its specific culture, tradition, method of learning.68
Islamic boarding school (pesantren) is often classified as a traditional and
dated Islamic educational institution. It has been playing an important role
in transmitting and maintaining Islamic traditional knowledge within NU.
In general, it constitutes a fundamental component of religious education;
the others are being the religious leaders (kiai) and the religious school
(madrasah). These three elements play fundamental and defining roles in
the transmission of traditionalism in NU. Other than these three elements,
the introduction and penetration of new ideas in Islamic thought have
extended the traditional chain of knowledge and center for intellectual
learning into unique forms. For example, NU young generation’s activities in
many study circles have provided not only a new breeding ground for NU’s
intellectual development but also paved a new way for the transformation
of NU’s mode of legal thought, in particular, and Islamic thought in general.
Moreover, recent prominent diaspora of NU’s leaders to many centers of
excellence around the world has not only contributed to the enrichment
and sustainability of both the basis and chain of knowledge within NU
insignificant ways but also showed the ability of NU in integrating with
contemporary ideas without losing its distinctive identity.
According to Martin van Bruinessen, the main reason for the emergence
of Islamic boarding school (pesantren) is the need for the transmission of
traditional Islam from the chain of s classical references written centuries
ago. Principally, the number and types of references accepted by the Islamic
boarding school (pesantren) are limited. These works are deemed as final
66 See Salahuddin Wahid, “Menemukan Kembali Mutiara Terpendam yang Terlupakan”,

Preface in Mardiyah, Kepemimpinan Kiai dalam Memelihara Budaya Organisasi (Yogyakarta:
Aditya Media, 2012), xvii.
67 Nurcholish Madjid, Bilik-Bilik Pesantren (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997), 3.
68 Mardiyah, Kepemimpinan Kiai dalam Memelihara Budaya Organisasi (Yogyakarta: Aditya
Media, 2012), xxiii.

and closed to any rethinking or modifications. Only their explanation and

clarification are considered to be possible.69
It is important to emphasize that during its course of existence, the
boarding school (pesantren) has undergone several significant transforma-
tions including the wave of modernization within the boarding school
(pesantren). As the religious leader (kiai) is central in the pesantren, trans-
formation and innovation taking place in the pesantren cannot be separated
from the types, models, and nature of kiai’s leadership. As Halim Soebahar
argues innovations adopted by Islamic boarding school (pesantren) is part
of the attempt of Islamic boarding school (pesantren) to deal with social
changes, when established, conventional and traditional methods are no
longer able to tackle this task. Principally, Abd Halim identifies three types
of innovation in the Islamic boarding school (pesantren), namely innovation
in the conceptual realm in the form of introduction of new ideas, innovation
in the form of new technology, and innovation in the form of new structure
and functions.70 However, the role of Islamic boarding school (pesantren)
as the center for the maintenance of traditionalism within NU is unchal-
lenged. Greg Barton maintains that when the dichotomy of traditionalism
and modernism expanded beyond the realm of ritual and became more
sociological, the association of Islamic boarding school (pesantren) and
students (santri) with traditionalism is inevitable.71
One important trait of boarding school (pesantren) education is its
emphasis on classical Islamic subjects. Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) is
the most favorable subject taught in many NU’s Islamic boarding school
(pesantren). Almost all Islamic boarding school (pesantren) have taken
Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) as the compulsory subject compared to others
such as Prophetic tradition (hadith), exegesis (tafsīr), or Islamic theology.
Ahmad Arifi believes that this fact has significantly shaped individual
characteristic of NU members72and in a broader sense also the characteristic
of NU’s traditionalistic orientation. Muhammad Hamim of Lajnah Bahth
al-Masāil in Pesantren Lirboyo also asserts that Islamic jurisprudence
( fiqh) has overweighed other subjects not only because the boarding school
(pesantren) has determined so but also due to strong interest of the students
69 Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning: Tradisi-tradisi Islam di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan,
1995), 17.
70 Abd Halim Soebahar, Modernisasi Pesantren: Studi Transformasi Kepemimpinan Kiai dan
Sistem Pendidikan Pesantren (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2013), 177.
71 Greg Barton, Biografi Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid (Yogya-
karta: LKIS, 2010), 72-73.
72 Ahmad Arifi, 3.

(santri) to this course.73 It is not only Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) which is

taught as fundamental and the most important subject in boarding school
(pesantren), but also any other subjects related to fiqh, including practical
skill such as skill of problem examination (bahth al-masāil). In the case
of Pesantren Lirboyo, in Kediri, East Java, for example, the skill of bahts
al-masāil has been taught as early as the level of primary school (madrasa
al-ibtidāiyya). This skill continues to be taught at the degree of secondary
education (madrasa thanāwiya), and junior high school (madrasa ʽāliya).
The methods used for all these levels are usually identical distinguished
only by the material being taught at each level.74
Martin van Bruinessen calls this phenomenon as an exaggeration in the
rigidity of Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh). Interestingly, Martin also identifies
that this is not unique to traditionalist In Martin’s word: “Both traditional-
ists and reformists, incidentally have tended to exaggerate the rigidity of the
school of law (madhhab). It is true that Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) books
prescribe in great detail what has to do in enormous specific situations,
but a fair amount of flexibility and freedom has always existed because
Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) is neither a complete nor a consistent system.”75
In a more fundamental sense, Martin analyses NU’s attitude of imitation
(taqlīd) as a reflection of a pessimistic view of history.76
It is impossible to refute that the boarding school (pesantren) plays a
primary role in transmitting traditional knowledge and maintaining legal
( fiqh) orientation of NU. More significantly, the primacy of boarding school
(pesantren) role in forming the body of law or ritual-legal ( fiqh) orientation
of NU was later advanced by the founding of a higher boarding school
(ma’had ʽāly), a university-level pesantren in Sukorejo, Situbondo, East
Java. The founding of this ma’had ʽāly is motivated by a fear of the shortage
of religious scholars (ulama’) within NU due to a significant number of
NU’s religious scholars (ulama’) passing on.77 This model of education is
founded on 21 February 1990, and has significantly contributed to not only
the emergence of an ulama’ generation within NU, but also strengthened
the dynamic of Islamic legal discourse in this organization Compared to
73 Interview with Muhammad Hamim HR, in Lirboyo, Kediri.

75 Martin van Bruinessen, “Tradition for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist
Discourse within NU”, in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama’: Traditional Islam
and Modernity in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 169.
76 Ibid, 168.
77 Asrori S Karni, Etos Studi Kaum Santri: Wajah Baru Pendidikan Islam (Bandung: Mizan,
2009), 253.

its modern counterparts, Muhammadiyah, which will be discussed in the

next chapter, NU is known as the center of religious scholars (ulama’),
while Muhammadiyah known for its social services orientation, is often
viewed as facing a crisis of ulama’. However, despite the impression of
NU as the center for ulama’, NU is still beset by the scarcity of religious
scholars (ulama’) in the future. This fact clearly shows that NU’s attention
to the transmission, continuity, and sustainability of traditional Islamic
knowledge is enormous.
One last factor important to underline is a reference to classical religious
sources. The maintenance of traditionalism within NU is also supported
by a long established tradition of reference to classical sources of Islamic
teaching known as the Kitab Kuning. Unsurprisingly, the Kitab Kuning plays
a paramount role in constructing the body of knowledge in NU and Islamic
boarding school (pesantren). In his comprehensive study on Kitab Kuning,
Martin van Bruinessen shows the centrality of Kitab Kuning within the
tradition of Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). Although it is an integral
part of the pesantren, Bruinessen identifies that even before the existence of
pesantren as a center for religious education, Kitab Kuning has been widely
known by traditional Muslim society in Indonesia, especially in Java.78
The centrality of Kitab Kuning can also be traced in the construction of
NU’s legal stance ( fiqh) as a medium through which proper understanding
of the Qurʼān and Sunna is sought.79 NU has set some classical sources
which can be referred to in dealing with certain issues. This collection of
Kitab Kuning is known as the reliable books (al-kutub al-mu’tabara). In
NU National Congress (Musyawarah Nasional) in Situbondo in 1983, NU
defined al-kutub al-mu’tabara as books that have to be referred in deducing
Islamic law. The books must be written by scholars of the four schools of
law (madhhab). Furthermore, this also means that any decisions on Islamic
legal issues which rely on books other than the works of scholars within
certain school of law (ulama madhhab) will be deemed as invalid.80
Reference to reliable books (al-kutub al-mu’tabara) is believed to be the
method through which the purity of Islamic teachings is preserved. The late
Abdul Muchith Muzadi maintained that following certain schools of law
reflects the strong attempt to maintain the purity of Islam.81 Tantamount to
78 Martin van Bruinessen,

79 Nur Hidayat Muhammad, Hujjah Nahdliyah: Keilmuan, Tradisi, Tasawuf (Surabaya: Khalista,
2012), 1-2.
80 Munawir Abdul Fattah, Tradisi Orang-Orang NU, 24.
81 Muchith Muzadi, NU dalam Perspektif Sejarah dan Ajaran, 129.

this principle, the majority of NU religious leader (kiai) also firmly believe
that there are two systems which are possible to adopt to preserve the purity
of Islam, namely indpendent legal reasoning (ijtihad), on the one hand, and
the system of following school of law (madhhab) which is also known as
imitation (taqlīd), on the other. By far, the first is described as deducing law
from the Qurʼān and Sunna directly by the aid of reason, while the second is
understood as following the teachings of legal expert (mujtahid) or leader
(imam) who can deduct law from the primary source of law.82
Lajnah Bahth al-Masail and Its Fatwā
Etymologically, bahth al-masāil is an Arabic term. It is a compound form

of words bahth and al-masāil. Bahth is a noun of the verb bahatha which
carries meanings such as to discuss, examine or look up;83 while masāil is
a plural form of a problem (masʼala). It may entail a meaning of discussion
of challenges, which principally describes the main function of this body.
The discussions are conducted by religious scholars and involve responses
to any problems which require legal determination. For that reason, bahth
al-masāil both in its older and newer forms and contexts are closely related
to fatwā-making. Before the institutionalization of bahth al-masāil, kiai
served as individual jurist-consult (mufti) since, in some cases, they had to
respond to problems of Islamic law raised by Muslims in their respective
areas. In general, there were two types of legal opinion ( fatwā) developed
at that time, namely fatwā on Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) related to rituals
and legal opinion ( fatwā) related to socio-cultural issues. This second type
of legal opinion ( fatwā) is also known as preventive legal opinion ( fatwā).84
Hence, before its founding as a formal institution, bahth al-masāil refers
to a tradition of religious deliberation practiced long before the establish-
ment of NU as a formal organization85 as represented by the existence of
traditions such as discussion (shawir) and circles (halaqa).86 Ali Maschan
Moesa explicates:
82 Ali Maschan Moesa, 134.

83 Ahmad Warson Munawwir, Kamus al-Munawwir Arab-Indonesia Terlengkap (Surabaya:
Pustaka Progresif, 1997), 59.
84 Imam Yahya, “Akar Sejarah Bahtsul Masa’il” in Imdadun Rahmat (ed), Kritik Nalar Fiqih
NU: Transformasi Paradigma Bahtsul Masa’il (Jakarta: Lakpesdam, 2002), 8.
85 See Sahal Mahfudh, “Bahtsul Masail dan Istinbath Hukum NU”, vi-vii.
86 Ali Maschan Moesa, Nasionalisme Kiai Konstruksi Sosial Berbasis Agama (Yogyakarta: LKiS,
2007), 126.

Bahth al-Masāil is a tradition which had taken place long before the
birth of NU when kiais, senior santri, and alumni of pesantren practiced
a model of meeting to deduce fatwā from classic books they have studied.
It is an indication that the tradition is only effective in the pesantren
circle. Moreover, under certain conditions, the ability to participate in
forums of bahth al-masāil becomes a parameter of the depth and level
of knowledge of a kiai and an important criterion in considering him for
a position within the structure of NU such as a member of the shuria.87
Although initially confined to verbal exchanges the bahth has moved further
to document the results and conclusions of its deliberations.88The result of
this forum was published in a newsletter known as LINO (Lailatul Ijtima’
Nahdlatul Oelama), the meeting night of Nahdlatul Ulama. This newsletter
had been very instrumental in facilitating debates on Islamic legal issues
among NU’s ulama. Disagreement on certain matters could lead to very
intense exchanges of thought. The dispute between Kiai Mahfudh Salam
in Pati, Central Java, and Kiai Murtadlo, in Tuban, East Java, over the use of
Javanese language in Friday sermon, serves as an obvious example.89 The
former stands on the position that Friday sermons in the Javanese language
is permitted, while the latter prohibit translation of Friday sermons into Java-
nese. It is for this reason that in the present day, using Arabic as a medium of
Friday sermon is a popular practice in Tuban and its surrounding regions.90
The bahth al-masāil’s emphasis on skills or methods in deducing law
or legal opinions from classical texts is an integral part of the Islamic
boarding school (pesantren) education system.91 So important is the
position of the bahth al-masāil within the tradition of Islamic boarding
87 Ali Maschan Moesa, Nasionalisme Kiai, 129.

88 However, in general the archival tradition or skill in NU is not seriously emphasized.
Consequently, many important decisions resulting from the bahts al-masail forum are not well-
documented. This situation is a major constraint in attempts to study bahts al-masail. Researcher of
bahts al-masail such as Ahmad Zahro and Ahmad Muhtadi Anshor acknowledged this shortcom-
ing. See Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Bahtsul Masail 1926-1999 (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004),
67; and interview with Ahmad Muhtadi Anshor, Tulungagung, East Java, 9 December 2013.
89 Sahal Mahfudh, “Preface” in Ahkam al-Fuqaha
90 See Ali Maschan Moesa, Nasionalisme Kiai, footnote number 38, page 126.
91 It is reported that Kiai Wahab Chasbullah, one of the NU’s founding fathers, founded a small
discussion group known as Tahswirul Afkar in Surabaya. Through this small group, a number of
prominent NU kiais often met and discussed any issues both religious and non-religious. This
meeting is further seen as seed for the formalization of bahts al-masail as a formal institution.
See Greg Fealy, “Wahab Chasbullah, Traditionalism and the Political Development of Nahdlatul
Ulama”, in Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity
in Indonesia (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), 1-41.

school (pesantren), that is has been formally institutionalized into lajnah

bahth al-masāil. Although not all Islamic boarding school (pesantren)
institutionalize the bahth al-masāil into committe (lajna), as an activity,
bahth al-masāil is almost inseparable from pesantren life, although it varies
from one pesantren to another.92 The case of Pesantren Lirboyo in Kediri,
East Java provides an example. Known as one of the centers for bahth
al-masāil, the ability to perform bahth al-masāil seems to be a major focus
of the pesantren. The importance of this skill in Pesantren Lirboyo could
also be seen from the fact that it is taught as early as primary school level
(madrasa al-ibtidāiyya). Muhammad Hamim HR, a teacher, and chair of
LBM at Lirboyo Pesantren explains that the training at the lower level
covers simple case studies in Islamic law aimed at introducing referencing
to traditional legal sources.93
Activities of bahth al-masāil in the Islamic boarding school (pesantren)
are meant to train students (santri) with skills to enable them to respond
to actual issues that emerge in Muslim society. It is not an exaggeration,
therefore, to assert that bahthal-masail, as a forum or mechanism through
which problems in Islamic law are solved, began as part of Islamic board-
ing school (pesantren) activities and curricula. It has developed from the
level of the Islamic boarding school (pesantren) to a forum for resolving
national issues.94 Historically, the incorporation of bahth al-masāil into the
structure of NU took place in 1926 amidst the first Congress of NU. However,
its formalization as a committee (lajna) only occurred in 1989 based on
recommendations of the 28thcongress.95 From this point, the distinction
between bahth al-masāil as learning tradition and as an organized body
should be clearly made. In other words, Lajna Bahth al-Masāil (LBM) which
refers to a council should not be confused with bahth al-masāil as a general
mechanism for discussing and resolving issues on Islamic law within Islamic
boarding school (pesantren) system or tradition.
This shift has impacted on fatwā-making in NU, including how NU issues
legal opinion ( fatwā). While previously fatwā was issued by individuals,
collective fatwā-making after the institutionalization of LBM-NU began al-
though there is no significant difference between them. Both are responses
to questions posed by Muslims and both employ same methods namely
92 Ali Maschan Moesa, Nasionalisme Kiai, 127.

93 Interview with Muhammad Hamim HR, Lirboyo, Kediri, East Java, 24 November 2013.
94 Achmad Kemal Riza, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law in Indonesia: The Case of Nah-
dlatul Ulama Bahtsul Masail in East Java, Master Thesis, The Australian National University,
2004, Chapter II.
95 Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU, 68.

relying strictly on selective opinions or rulings from classical religious

scholars (ulama’) predominantly within the Shafii school of law.96
From an organizational point of view, Lajnah Bahth al-Masāilis a sub-
structure also known as Badan Otonom (Banom) or autonomous body within
NU which is granted the right to manage its organizations. Structurally, it
is coordinated by the Shuri’a, the legislative body of NU and is organised
hierarchically. Problems unresolved by the lower level within the hierarchy
will be forwarded to the higher authority for resolution.97 In general, the
participants of this forum are the members of Shuri’a, NU’s ulama’ who do
not assume any structural position within NU and the leaders of pesantren.
Differences legal opinion ( fatwā) resulting from bahth al-masāil units
whether in the pesantren or NU structure would not invalidate each other.98
The bahth al-masāil plays and assumes two important functions and
responsibility: practical and ideological. Practically, it is responsible for
issuing any legal opinion ( fatwā) related to socio-religious issues, and
even formulating issues relating to matters of politics.99 In other words, the
responsibility of this forum is to deduce decisions relating to any Islamic
legal matters beyond the legal issues (masāil al-fiqhiyya), theology and
Islamic mysticism (tasawuf ).100 Ideologically, in its relation to the type of
Islam which follow certain school of law (Islam bermadzhab) and imitation
(taqlīd), bahth al-masāil functions to preserve the “classical tradition of
scholarship.101” by strict adherence to selected opinion of savants of the past
within the Shafii school of law.102
Broadly speaking, there are two types of legal opinion ( fatwā) produced
by LBM-NU, namely legal opinion (fatwā) on legal ( fiqh) and non-fiqh issues.
Legal ( fiqh) issues can be further classified into two: ritual law ( fiqih ritual)
and law related to social issues ( fiqih sosial). The former refers to practical
guidance in man’s transcendental relationship with God, while the last
has more to do with the horizontal dimension of society which includes
social and economic aspects of life. The purpose of this classification is to
96 Ali Maschan Moesa, 128.

97 Ahmad Munjih Nasih, “Bahtsul Masail dan Problematikanya di Kalangan Masyarakat
Tradisional”, Al-Qānūn, Vol. 12, No. 1, Juni 2009, 108.
99 Ibid, 129.
100 Sahal Mahfudh, vi.
101 Achmad Kemal Riza, Continuity and Change, 2
102 Sahal Mahfudh, “Bahtsul Masail dan Istinbath Hukum NU: Sebuah Catatan Pendek” , Preface
in Ahkamul Fuqaha’: Solusi Problematika Aktual Hukum Islam, Keputusan Muktamar, Munas
dan Konbes Nahdlatul Ulama’ (1926-2010) (Jakarta and Surabaya: Lajnah Ta’lif wan Nasyr PB-NU
and Khalista, 2011), v.

identify the frequency of ritual and social aspects of LBM’s decisions. Also, it
also aims at identifying the most suitable method of dealing with practical
religious issues in society.103
Methodologically, as the consequence of imitation (taqlīd) and Islam
bermadzhab principles, LBM-NU relies on the opinions of the legal experts
(aqwāl al-mujtahidīn) in the forms of written opinions (aqwal al-manṣūṣ)
if the problem being solved is not found in explicit utterances of those
written opinions. Sahal Mahfudh maintained that deduction of law (iṣtinbaṭ
al-aḥkām) in NU is “not deducing legal conclusion from the original text of
the Qurʼān and Sunna, rather it is based on the principle of bermadzhab,
applying dynamically the texts produced by Muslim legal scholars (fuqahāʼ)
in the context of a specific issue being sought for legal determination.”104
This method of reference is popularly known as madhhab qawlī, namely
identifying legal status of issues in Islamic law by referring to opinions of
ulama.105 This also means quoting views and opinions of Sunni ulama in
verbatim form to maintain its unity of meaning.106 Although madhhab qawlī
has long served as the standard method of legal referencing in NU, there was
methodological shift within NU when a new madhhab or method was in-
troduced, namely madhhab manhaji. Differing from the first method which
relies solely on the sayings (qawl) of ulama from the sunni madhhab, the
new method makes direct reference to the Qurʼān and Sunna by employing
the following procedures: a) quotes from the verses of the Qurʼān, followed
by reference to exegesis of the ulama’; b) citations of Prophetic tradition
(sunna/hadith) which also confirms the chain of transmission that qualifies
the validity of certain hadith or sunna; and c) reliance on consensus of the
scholars (ijma’). These two methods were later enriched by the principles
of legal reasoning based on certain school of law (ijtihād madhhabi).107
This method is employed in response to the level of law involved (taṭbīq
al-sharī’a) akin to the process of national and/or regional legislation.108 In
addition to method of qawli, another method employed is analogy (ilḥaqy)109
adopted when the qawli method cannot be used.
The methods of qawli, ilḥaqi, and manhaji are not practiced simultane-
ously. Rather, they reflect the chronological methodological shift in NU
103 Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU, 70.

104 Sahal Mahfudh, “Preface”, ix.
105 Muhyiddin Abdusshomad, Hujjah NU: Akidah, Amaliah, Tradisi, 48-49.
106 Aswaja an-Nahdliyah, 8-10.
109 Interview with Ahmad Muhtadi Anshor, Tulungagung, East Java, 9 December 2013.

although the formulation of these methods took place in a congress held

in Bandar Lampung in 1992. This methodological shift is an indication
that NU sees the need for more reliable and responsive methods in making
fatwā. Therefore, the methodological shift from qawli to manhaji, and
from manhaji to ijtihād madhhabi, can clearly be seen as attempts of NU
to adjust its legal doctrine and legal methods with rapid social change.
In understanding such a shift, the thesis of law as a mirror of society is
particularly relevant. S Vago believes that law is basically a reflection of “the
intellectual, social, economic, and political climate of its time.” As a reflec-
tion of all these social elements, “law is inseparable from the interests, goals,
and understandings that deeply shape or comprise social and economic
life.” More specifically, law is also a reflection of “the particular ideas, ideals,
and ideologies that are part of a distinct ‘legal culture’ –those attributes of
behavior and attitude that make the law of one society different from that
of another.”110On this basis, it can be asserted that methodological shift
and transformation in NU’s legal thought reflects the impulse of change
within the community of NU which is predominantly traditionalistic. These
three methods of qawli, ilhaqy and manhaji are applied to almost all kinds
of problems that have emerged In order to systematize its dealing with
problems based on the doctrine of aswaja, NU formulates its procedure for
deducing law based on thematic (mawdhū’i), applicative (qanūniya) and
empirical (waqīi’iyya).111
Albeit bahth al-masāil in NU is traditionalistic in the sense that it is highly
dependent selective rulings within Shafiʽi madhhab based on the past, it is
claimed that this council applies principles of democracy, dynamism and
open-mindedness in law making.112 It is democratic in the sense that bahth
al-masāil will consider all opinions regardless of the status, position or age
of those who present them. Furthermore it is dynamic in the sense that
legal opinion ( fatwā) issued by LBM-NU are always in response to newly
emerging problems in Muslim society, while its open-mindedness features
in the allowing for reference to other schools of law and the employment
of “agree to disagree” principle.113
Criticisms that madhhab qawli, as one of the most preferred methods
of bath al-masāil is stagnant, exist. However, such criticism, has been as
attacked on the basis that in many cases, NU’s religious scholars (ulama’)
110 S. Vago, Law and Society (Upper Saddle River, NJ: New Prentice Hall, 2009), 3.
112 Sahal Mahfudh
113 Ibid, 6.

has arrived at legal determination of certain practices (amal) without any

textual reference, but using the method (manhaj).114 Therefore, contrary to
the general impression of stagnancy of thought within NU, bahth al-masail
contains dynamic elements evident in exchanges among NU members.115
Ahmad Zahro who studied bahth al-masāil from 1926 to 1999 also offers his
critique. In his view, the perception on the static nature of this council is
not valid given dynamic interaction of ideas between religious leaders (kiai)
and a number of NU’s younger thinkers. Zahro also noted the willingness of
NU to undergo methodological transformation in revising its fundamental
methods of Islamic legal reasoning and law deduction in 1992.116
The dynamic of legal method developed by NU is also reflected in NU’s
position towards legal reasoning (ijtihad).117 By far, it does not deny ijtihād
but views it as possible only by those who are qualified as an absolute legal
expert (mujtahid mustaqil or mujtahid muṭlaq).118 The constraint reflected
in this conviction has inevitably given rise to the view that NU is anti-legal
reasoning (ijtihad). Moreover, the term istinbāṭ, in the sense of deducting
Islamic law directly from the Qurʼān and Sunna, is not popularly employed
in NU.119 Rather, deduction of law (istinbaṭ al-aḥkām) is formulated as the
application of texts written by classical religious scholars (ulama’) to
certain issues.120 However, this view may not reflect comprehensively the
real internal debate and dynamics within NU regarding the exercise of
legal reasoning (ijtihad), as NU’s religious scholars (ulama) are not in total
agreement on the nature, meaning and the application of legal reasoning
(ijtihad) in NU. Achmad Siddiq, a former chairman of NU legislative body
(shuri’a), for instance, raised an interesting point regarding legal reasoning
114 Sahal Mahfudh, “Preface”, vii.

115 Interview with A Muhtadi Anshor, Tulungagung, East Java.
116 Ahmad Zahro, Tradisi Intelektual NU: Bahtsul Masail 1926-1999 (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004), 4.
117 Ijtihād is generally defined as full devotion of ability from an Islamic legal scholar in deduct-
ing Islamic law from its detailed arguments. Other Islamic legal scholars defines the scope of
ijtihād is both in the realm of law deduction and the practical application of law. See Muhammad
Abu Zahra, Ushūl al-Fiqh (n.p.: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, n.d.), 379.
118 Mujtahid muthlaq or mujtahid mustaqil refers to those who have met the requirement of
being mujtahid and are able to exercise independent and individual ijtihad. Muhammad Abu
Zahra defines the requirements of mujtahid are as follows: a) deep understanding of Arabic,
b) understanding of the Qur’anic science including knowledge on the abrogation of certain
verses of the Qurʼān(ilm nāsikh wa mansūkh), c) knowledge on prophetic tradition, d) knowledge
on the consensus and the controversies among ulama’, e) knowledge on qiyās (analogy), f)
understanding the philosophy of law, g) the purity of intention and belief. See Muhammad Abu
Zahra, Ushul al-Fiqh (n.p.: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, n.d.), 380-389.
119 Ahmad Arifi, Fiqih “Tradisi”, 193.
120 Sahal Mahfudh, “Preface” in Ahkamul Fuqaha, ix.

(ijtihad) and its opposition to imitation (taqlīd). In fact, Siddiq suggested

that following the system of school of law (madhhab) does not contradict
legal reasoning (ijtihad) with imitation (taqlīd). Rather, it has more to do
with a combination of these two contexts in harmonious proportion.121 The
exercise of legal reasoning (ijtihad), he argued, is not an obligation for all
Muslims. In contrast, it is also impossible that all Muslims will practice
imitation (taqlīd) without reference to the opinions of certain school of
law (madhhab) which basically are the result of legal reasoning (ijtihad)
by imam mujtahidīn.122 Moreover, according to Mahfudh, legal reasoning
(ijtihad) is “a connecting bridge for disparities between contemporary
events and context and the period of revelation”. Therefore, the employ-
ment of legal reasoning (ijtihad) is not only possible, but it is also a basic
and urgent need for Muslims in coping with contemporary world situation
and challenges. Furthermore, the exercise of independent legal reasoning
(ijtihad) has been exemplified in the history of Islam, not only during the
time of the Prophet. Mahfudh concludes that legal reasoning (ijtihad) is
much more needed today.123
Furthermore, it is believed that NU employs a certain type of contem-
porary model of legal reasoning (ijtihad) called collective legal reasoning
(ijtihād jama’ī). As Nadirsyah Hosen explains, legal reasoning (ijtihad) has
been exercised in NU in the form collective legal reasoning (ijtihād jama’i).
This type of legal reasoning (ijtihad), Hosen concludes, can be presented
as an alternative to individual legal reasoning (ijtihad) which is almost
impossible to be exercised in current situation due to complexities of
contemporary societies which requires specialties in many fields of life
including academic life. Inevitably, such situation has prevented a person to
be conversant in many fields of knowledge in the same time,124 and qualify
as a mujtahid al-fardi (individual legal expert) or mujtahid mustaqil based
on the criteria of the past.
Nevertheless, amidst facts and opinions revealing the existence of
ijtihād, NU’s ulama’,in general, reject such a claim. Not only is it gener-
ally known that Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari, its founding father, had implicitly
acknowledged the shutting of the gate of ijtihād.125 NU’s contemporary
religious scholars (ulama’) has also been reluctant to refer to their activities
121 Achmad Siddiq, Khitthah Nahdliyyah (Surabaya: Khalista, 2005), 56.

122 Ibid.
123 MA Sahal Mahfudh, Nuansa Fiqih Sosial (Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2007), xlv.
124 Historically, many Muslim scholars were jurist, doctor, philosopher, poet, at the same time.
125 Achmad Muhibbin Zuhri, Pemikiran KH. M. Hasyim Asy’ari tentang Ahl al-Sunnah wa
al-Jamaah (Surabaya: Khalista, 2010), 169.

as legal reasoning (ijtihad) as a reflection of their sense of modesty in

not surpassing the authority of classical ulama’.126 Despite the fact that
legal reasoning (ijtihad) has practically been employed, especially in the
recent context, dominant agencies remain ambivalent with respect to legal
reasoning (ijtihad).127
A significant change in NU occurred in the 1980s under the leadership
of Gus Dur. Through his cultural strategy, Wahid has significantly been
able to bring NU out of marginal position politically, socially and intel-
lectually. Among the important steps to dynamize NU, Wahid attempted
to develop and bring to the center and reformist orientation within NU. As
general chairman of NU, Wahid accorded trust to NU’s young generation
and encouraged them to explore new ideas and possibilities.128 From this
point, some new intellectual circles started to emerge within NU. The
process sparked the emergence of critical and competing voices question-
ing several basic doctrines of NU, including the fundamental doctrine of
aswaja.
Fatwā
The compendium of LBM’s legal opinion ( fatwā) compiled in Ahkamul

Fuqāhāʼ, during the period of 1926-2010, reveal 456 legal opinion ( fatwā)
which have been issued resulting from various meetings such as congress
(Muktamar), national meeting (Musyawarah Nasional), and grand confer-
ence (Konferensi Besar). Other than these, 31 legal opinion ( fatwā) under
the category of thematic religious issues (masāilal-dīnīyya al-mauḍūiyya)
and 14 fatwa in the f ield of legal religious issues (masāilal-diniyya wa
al-qanūniyya) have also been pronounced.129 During the period of post-
New Order Indonesia, numerous legal opinions ( fatwā) by LBM have also
emerged in response to issues raised by members of NU. In the period of
1999 to 2010, in addition to conventional legal opinions ( fatwā) on rituals,
there are a moderate number of legal opinions ( fatwā) which encompass
non-religious issues. The legal opinions ( fatwā) issued from 1999 to 2010
are listed below:
126 Interview with Ahmad Muhtadi Anshor, Tulungagung, East Java, 9 December 2013.
127 Interview with Ahmad Muhtadi Anshor, Tulungagung, East Java, 9 December 2013
128 Abu Mujahid, Sejarah NU Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaah di Indonesia (Bandung: Toobagus Group,
2013), 264.
129 Ahkamul Fuqaha, 746-970.

Table 5.1 The fatwā of Bahth al-Masāil 1999-2010
No Year Subject of Fatwa
1 1999 Determination of the beginning and end of months in the

Islamic calendar
Performing prayer together (doa bersama) with people of other
religions
Guardian (wali hakim)in marriage
Women in idda performing hajj
Fasting on the day of Arafah
Cultivation of crickets as a business
Selling caterpillars, worms, and ants for bird feeding as
business
Paying to enter a competition
Rights to land
Non-Muslim members of parliament
Compatibility between Islam and democracy
NU’s responses to civil society groups
Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa and socio-cultural development
Islam and gender equality
Appropriation of the state’s resources for people’s welfare
Shari’a on the status of state funds and principles of
governance
2 2002 Stay overnight (mabit) at Muzdalifah

Performing pilgrimage for the deceased
Almsgiving for professionals
Endowment by cash
Anthrax disease
State’s debt
Punishment for corruption
Money politics and bribery
Fighting injustice resulting in death
3 2004 Bribery in admission into the civil service

Punishment for producers of drugs and psychotropic
Determination of paternity by DNA tests
Legalization of localized prostitution(lokalisasi prostitusi)
Method of Islamic law decision-making in NU
Endowment
Education system in NU

No Year Subject of Fatwa
4 2006 Officiating ceremony for non-Muslims’ houses of worship

Use of recycling water (air mutanajjis)
The responsibility of insurance enterprise on housing loans
Limitation period for presumption of death
Circumstantial evidence
Prized quiz(kuis berhadiah)
Translated oath
Face of operation
Television popular gossip program
Human trafficking
Fikra al-Nahdliyya (the NU’s system of thought)
Globalization, universalism and human rights in NU’s
perspective
Talfiq (combining opinions of four schools of law)
Methodology in Islamic law making
Al-Kutub al-Mu’tabara (sources of authority accepted by NU)
5 2010 Electronic transaction

Profit-sharing and shari’a banking
Bugging telephone
Postponing burial
Burying Muslims and non-Muslims in a common cemetery
Illegal fishing
Minimum age of marriage
Conditional divorce (ta’liq talaq)
The format of Bahth al-Masail’s provisions
The relevance of positive law and shari’ah
Female circumcision
This table shows the variety of issues responded to by LBM-NU which

reflects both ritual and social issues. Most fatwā on ritual issues serve
as guidance for NU members in practicing Islamand distinguish them
in some ways from other Muslim groups within Indonesia. Compared to
the decade prior to the collapse of the New Order, an important feature
of fatwā in the post New Order period is that it deals more heavily with
social and political issues. As it is impossible for this study to analyze all
post New Order fatwā and their implications, emphasis will be given to
fatwā covering non-ritual issues such as democracy, gender equality, money
politics, national economy, human rights and globalization. Analyzing the
mode of thinking in the selective fatwā facilitates a better understanding
of the type of religious orientation dominant within the movement and
competing ones, if any.

These fatwā selected can be classified as follows: 1) fatwā relating to

pluralistic nature of Indonesian society; 2) fatwā relating to gender rela-
tions; 3) fatwā pertaining to socio-political issues; and 4) fatwā relating to
scientific discoveries and invention.
Fatwā on Non-Muslim
As above table reveals, since 1999 there were three fatwā issued relating to
this topic, namely: a) fatwā on praying together (doa bersama) among peo-
ples of different religions and non-Muslim members of parliament; b) fatwā
on officiating non-Muslim’s house of worship issued in 2006 andc) fatwā
on burying Muslims and non-Muslims in one general cemetery complex.
On performing praying together with people of other religions, the fatwā
stipulated that it is forbidden to conduct prayers together with people of
other religions, unless the substance of the prayer is not contradictory to
Islamic law (sharī’a). The conclusion derived in this legal opinion ( fatwā)
is based on the opinions of classical religious scholars (ulama’) namely
Sulaiman bin Manshur al-Jamal, Sulaiman bin Muhammad al-Bujairi,
Muhammad al-Khatib al-Syirbini, and Yahya bin Syaraf al-Nawawi. Among
the arguments presented are that it is an obligation for Moslems to prevent
any kinds of evil including hearing the utterance of other religion that Allah
is one god among three gods.130
Furthermore, the legal opinion ( fatwā) also mentioned that cooperation
with people of other religions are permitted provided that the cooperation is
on the level of worldly engagements that can bring benefit for Muslims such
as trade and other positive enterprises.131 This legal opinion ( fatwā) is based
on the authority of two scholars of the past, Muhammad Nawawi bin Umar
al-Bantani and Sulaiman bin Muhammad al-Bujairamai. In the words of the
former, physical exchanges with people of other faith is not forbidden; while
the later suggests strongly that a compassionate feeling for non-Muslims is
forbidden and developing relationships with them is makrūh.132
The other legal opinion ( fatwā) relating to relations between Muslims
and non-Muslims relation is the status of non-Muslim members of parlia-
ment. On this issue, the LBM-NU defines that it is forbidden for Muslims
to delegate administration of state to non-Muslims except for following
reasons: a) where in the fields, Muslims themselves are unable to perform
directly or indirectly; b) Muslims are able to perform certain tasks, but
130 Ahkamul Fuqaha’, 559.

131 Ahkamul Fuqaha’, 561
132 Ibid.

there are indications that they are betraying the trust; and c) as long as
the delegation to non-Muslims are beneficial.133 This legal opinion ( fatwā)
is based on an interpretation of the Qurʼān, Surah al-Nisa, verse 141which
stipulates that: “Those who wait upon occasion in regard to you and, if a
victory cometh unto you from Allah, say: Are we not with you? And if the
disbelievers meet with a success say: Had we not the mastery of you, and did
we not protect you from the believers? Allah will judge between you at the Day
of Resurrection, and Allah will not give the disbelievers any way (of success)
against the believers.”
Moreover, reference is also made to the opinions of classical religious
scholars (ulama’) such as Ibn Hajar al-Haitami, Abdul Hamid al-Syirwani,
Ibn Qasim al-Abadi, Jalaluddin al-Mahalli, and al-Mawardi. Al-Syarwani,
for example, forbids asking for assistance from unbelievers (kafir), even
in the situation of rebellion. Similarly, Ibn Qasim al-Abadi maintained
that seeking for assistance of unbelievers (kafir) is absolutely forbidden in
whatever situation. However, the moderate positions that allow for such
help from unbelievers (kafir) in exigent condition is also adduced.134
As for legal opinion ( fatwā) on officiating non-Muslims’ houses of wor-
ship, LBM’s legal opinion ( fatwā) pronounces that officiating non-Muslims’
houses of worship is basically forbidden, except for those who are compelled
to do so. This legal opinion ( fatwā) is based on the Qurʼān, Sunna, exegesis
of the Qurʼān, and the opinions of religious scholars (ulama’). Compared
to other legal opinion ( fatwā), this fatwā is different in terms of reference
to the Qurʼān and Sunna. It is obvious from previous sections’ examination
that NU mostly adopt reference to classical scholars though (qawly method)
in dealing with Islamic legal problem. Direct reference to the Qurʼān and
Sunna in this fatwā could be seen as implementation of revision to the
method of NU’s istinbāṭ from qawly and ilhaqy to manhaji.
The fatwā issued stipulates that “Officiating non-Muslims” house of
worship is basically forbidden (ḥaram). Even further, it can lead to disbelief
(kufr) if it is accompanied by apostasy (rida). Exception can be made for a
Muslim who is in an exigent condition (mukrah) from the sharī’a perspective
while he still holds the faith.” The Qur’anic basis cited is Surah al-Maidah
verse 2 which states s: “And let not your hatred of a folk who (once) stopyour go-
ing to the inviolable place of worship seduce you to transgress; but help ye one
another unto righteousness and pious duty. Help not one another unto sin and
transgression, but keep your duty to Allah. Lo! Allah is severe in punishment.”
133 Ahkamul Fuqaha’, 580.

134 Ahkamul Fuqaha’, 580-581.

Obviously, LBM’s legal opinion ( fatwā) on non-Muslims exemplifies

strongly its traditionalistic orientation. This mode of religious thought is
clearly discernible in its approach of clinging uncritically to the opinions
and rulings of religious fore-bearers of the past in searching for rulings
pertaining to dilemma and issues confronting contemporary Muslims living
in Indonesia’s highly diverse multicultural society. The reference to classical
religious scholars (ulama’) is determining source and justification for its
rulings is made devoid of attention to variation in the contexts of these
societies with those of the past. Furthermore the selective legal traditions
utilized including those from Prophetic sayings (hadith) and verses from the
Qur’ān are extracted without analysis of specific socio-historical contexts in
which they emerged. Generally little, if any attempts were made to discern
historical specificities from universal elements of the fundamental values
and teachings of Islam in the creation of these legal opinions ( fatwā). Spe-
cific problems which classical religious scholars (ulama’) have addressed
were not distinguished from the current consideration underlying the
concrete issues raised. Generally, the opinions of the classical scholars on
the relation of Muslims and non-Muslims selected emerged in the context
of early Islam where warfare was dominant. Yet no attempts were made to
contextualize these sources. The mere reference to the opinions of savants
of the past can also be viewed as the tendency to glorify the authorities of
the past as perfect at the expense of the present. In this mode of thought, the
views, ideas and contributions of prominent Indonesian Muslim scholars
and religious personalities on the issue of Islam and religious pluralism
and multiculturalism as discussed in Chapter 3 are simply negated or
overlooked. Equally pertinent the legal opinion ( fatwā) as a whole reveals
the lack of concern for its effects on lives in general. It is oblivious to how
selective rulings determined bear upon the principles or philosophy of Islam
in the concrete context of Indonesian society. The text quoted both from
the Qurʼān and classical religious scholars (ulama’) are applied without
considering the context. The legal opinion (fatwā) that restricts cooperation
of Muslims with people of other faiths to worldly engagements benefitting
the Muslims such as trade and other positive enterprises is a classic instance
of the problem. The potential implication of breeding exclusive orientation
amongst Muslims is obscured in this mode of thought. Essentially it is
oblivious to the extent to which it is consistent with the fundamental values
of the religion in the promotion of good deeds for humanity as a whole.
It is also pertinent to note that the legal opinion ( fatwā) is in a way, one
sided as it refrains from actively encouraging Muslims to contribute to the
promotion of all including Muslims’ welfare and well-being. The fact that it

attempts to confine Muslim-non-Muslim co-operation to worldly matters

is also another manifestation of the lack of regard for the implication of
legal opinion ( fatwā) on society and fundamental teachings of the religion.
It suggests that efforts by Muslims to understand another’s philosophy or
religion should not be encouraged. This is clearly incongruent with the
teaching that humanity has been created in diversity so that man can learn
from one another without restriction to any particular domain. It is also at
odds with the fundamental principle in Islam that God has revealed truth to
mankind as a whole and that learning from all strengthens the community.
Fatwā Relating to Gender Issues

In 2010, LBM-NU issued a legal opinion ( fatwā) on the controversial topic
of female circumcision. This controversial issue is discussed with relatively
detailed explanation although the discussion tends to be one sided. In
examining the topic the legal opinion ( fatwā) deals with some related issues
such as the Islamic law (sharī’a) basis of this practice, its benefits, its legal
status and the suitable time for a woman to be circumcised. Considering
the time of its issuance, it is obvious that the legal opinion ( fatwā) was
issued amidst the controversy regarding female circumcision which arose
in many parts of the world including Indonesia.
The legal opinion ( fatwā), however, did not clearly state LBM-NU’s
standpoint on the issues, but the provision of the legal opinion ( fatwā)
raises the impression that LBM-NU validate female circumcision. The legal
opinion ( fatwā) declared that:
The ulama differ in their views on female circumcision. Some opine that
it is sunna, while others subscribe to the view that it is mubaḥ. According
to Imam Shafii, it is obligatory, just as circumcision for males … Opinions
which forbid female circumcision are basically not based on dalil shar’i.
They only maintain that female circumcision imposes pain on the victim
(females).135
The legal opinion ( fatwā) also cited a Prophetic sayings (hadith) of the
Prophet which states: “… Indeed, circumcision is sunna for males; and it is
makruma (noble) for females.” It furthermore explained that the word sunna
(desirable) in this context is not the antonym of al-wājib (obligatory) as it
cannot denounce that meaning when it is used in hadīth, but it is used to
distinguish between legal provisions for males and females. The implication
135 Ibid, 919.

from this Prophetic tradition (hadith) is that if circumcision is obligatory

(wājib) for men, it will become desirable (sunna) for women.136
The tendency of LBM’s supportive attitude towards female circumci-
sion can also be seen from the justifications used in support of female
circumcision. They are as follows: it is based on the Islamic law (sharī’a),
it promotes purity (ṭahāra), cleanliness which can prevent genital-related
diseases, stabilizes sexual desire, enforces religious teachings over tra-
dition and prevents social and psychological consequences of not being
circumcised.137 Furthermore, it is also mentioned that the suitable time
for female circumcision is on the seventh day of a baby’s birth.138 As with
other LBM’s fatwā, the basis for this fatwā is mostly derived from opinions
of classical religious scholars (aqwal al-ulamā’). Ibn Hajar al-Athqalani,
Yahya bin Syaraf al-Nawawi, Abu al-Hafidz al-Ṣawi, Zain bin Ibrahim and
al-Shantiqi are among classical religious scholars (ulama’) whose works are
cited to legitimize the conclusion that female circumcision is advisable.
This legal opinion ( fatwā) is another evidence of traditionalism in
LBM-NU’s mode of thinking. It relies heavily on selected religious opinions
of the past and disregards competing opinions on ground of principles. It
also does not take into consideration present discourse on the problems
and potential dangers of female circumcision prevalent in the Muslim
world. Some Muslim scholars for example have opined the view that
female circumcision is not found Islamic law, but reveals continuity with
pre-Islamic customary practices of some traditional societies.139 Further-
more, the legal opinion ( fatwā) has also been contested by many women’s
social groups even within NU. Internally, competing opinions which reject
female circumcision are evident although they do not displace the legal
opinion ( fatwā). Muzaenah Zain of Fatayat, a female youth wing of NU,
maintains that female circumcision is not stipulated both in the Qurʼān
and Sunna.140 It is also asserted that female circumcision represents unfair
treatment for women as it can create psychological trauma and physical
harm to them. It is also maintained that in more fundamental sense,
female circumcision undermines a more equal relationship between men
and women.
136 Ibid, 919.

137 Ibid, 918
138 Ibid, 918.
139 Husein Muhammad, Fiqih Perempuan: Refleksi Kiai atas Wacana Agama dan Gender
(Yogyakarta: LKIS, 2001), 49.
140 https://www.jurnalperempuan.org/kontroversi-sunat-perempuan.html. Accessed on
5 January 2015.

Traditionalism is further manifested in the lack of regard for the implica-

tions of legal opinion ( fatwā). It is pertinent to note that while LBM-NU’s
legal opinion ( fatwā) shows a strong leaning towards legitimizing the
practice of female circumcision which has been challenged even internally
as hindering gender equality, the same organization had issued an earlier
legal opinion ( fatwā) in 1999 strongly supporting gender equality. The legal
opinion ( fatwā) upheld that Islam is a religion of justice and equality and
that unequal gender relation in contemporary society is a fact which deviates
from the spirit of Islam.141 However, establishing a more equal relationship
between men and women is not easy. According to LBM three fundamental
barriers hinder this goal namely theological, cultural (people’s perception),
and political. From a theological perspective, LBM believe that some in-
terpretations and understanding of religious doctrines are incompatible
with the principle of gender equality. From a cultural point of view, the
domination of patriarchal culture is identified as one of the most important
factors. This cultural factor has relegated women to a subordinate position,
and has furthermore contributed to marginalize their status as second class
members of society. The same situation also occurs in the political domain
where many political practices discriminate women. In the context of formal
political institutions, the positions of women are marginalized.142
In order to cope with this situation, the LBM urges for continual at-
tempts at: a) reinterpreting some significant aspects of religious teachings;
b) critically reviewing cultural practices and understanding which tend to
discriminate women; and c) eradicating any political practices which relegate
women to subordinate positions in society. Stemming from this position, LBM
advocates for the employment of historical, sociological, and anthropological
approaches in understanding scriptural doctrines relating to gender issues.
Interpretations of Islamic doctrines in the form of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)
which are male-biased should be seen as a reflection of certain socio-cultural
conditions. This means that when socio-cultural situations change and the
new social system require justice in gender relations, the interpretation of the
Qurʼān and hadīth should seriously consider be revaluated based on Islamic
principles.143 Interpretation of Islamic texts relating to gender is not regarded
as merely a part of religion, but should also be seen as a result of legal reason-
ing (ijtihad) which is bound by the law of relativity and greatly depend on
social changes occurred in society. The legal opinion (fatwā) called for the
141 Ahkamul Fuqaha, 804.

142 Ibid, 804.
143 Ibid, 805.

urgency of interpretation of religious doctrines which are more compatible

with the principle of justice and public good. In other words, the need to
formulate a new jurisprudence rule the issue of women affairs ( fiqh al-nisāʼ)
which speaks in defence of women rights is deemed urgent, in parallel with
the need for a just and democratic social system.144
These two legal opinions ( fatwā) on gender issues show two different
modes of thought within LBM-NU: traditionalistic and reformist. Consider-
ing the persistence of traditionalism amidst the emergence of competing
ideas and religious orientations in the more recent legal opinion (fatwā), an
important question that arises is how such contrasting modes of thought can
exist within a single movement. This divergence is an obvious indication of
the challenge that competing social groups are posing to the predominance of
traditionalism within NU. The competition of religious orientations of groups
within NU is a consequence of the open space for religious expression in the
post New Order period as well as educational diversity within NU. Many of
NU’s younger generation are no longer educated in Islamic boarding school
(pesantren), but they have been trained in many modern educational systems
within and beyond Indonesia. This trend has inevitably facilitated reorienta-
tion of mode of thinking and religious ideas for certain circles within NU.
Fatwa on Social Issues

In 1999, during the congress of Bahth al-Masāil al-Dīnīyah in Lirboyo,
Kediri, East Java, the LBM dealt with problems such as Islam’s response
to democratization, empowerment of civil society, ahl al-sunna and the
development of culture and society, the restoration of the national economy
oriented to the interest and welfare of the people and the position of the
Islamic law (sharī’a) on the practice of corruption, collusion and nepotism,
known by the acronym KKN in Indonesia.
On democracy LBM believes that democracy is an ideal system of govern-
ance. Literally, democracy means governance of the people (al-siyāda li
al-umma) by the people. It regulates the relationship between the state and
its people on the basis of the rule of law and universal humanitarian values
such as equality, freedom and pluralism. Viewed from the principle that the
relationship between the state and people is based on social contract with
the people entitled to choose the government, it can be said that democracy
is basically compatible with Islamic teachings as Islam views governance
as a mandate (amana) and the imperative of upholding justice.145 Further-
144 Ibid, 805-806.


more, the fatwā stipulated that governance should be run appropriately by

applying the following principles: al-shūra which entails the principle of
decision making based on participation of those who are involved in public
affairs directly; equality (musāwa), a principle which views all people as
equal without discrimination based on races, religion, gender, position, and
social class; justice (al-adāla), the application of which will lead leaders of
society to take objective decisions without bias and freedom (al-ḥurriyya)
by which is meant freedom of responsible expression. In LBM-NU’s view,
these principles were practiced by the Prophet.146
As not everyone can be directly involved in the process of decision making,
the establishment of representative body such as ahl al-hall wa al-ʽaqd is nec-
essary. This representative body, in NU’S view, consists of selected people who
are honest, reliable, knowledgeable and communicative. These qualifications
will enable them to perform the function of voicing the people’s aspiration
that forms the basis for legislation and government. The scope of political
powers in the context of democracy should be based on the principles which
have been formulated by religion. The principles are as follows:
a. Teachings, law and rules which have been determined based on the
provision of the Qurʼān and Sunna;
b. In matters not specified in the Qurʼān and power holders are granted
the authority to legislate provided that they follow the system of legal
reasoning (ijtihad) and valid method of law-making (istinbāṭ al-ahkām).
c. In matters relating to state and society beyond rituals, decisions made
and their implementation are dependent on choice and agreement of the
people or their representatives but they should substantially refer to the
principles of religion and universal humanitarian values.147
Other than issues mentioned above, NU also responded to issues directly

bearing on governance including state’s debt, money politics, and corrup-
tion. In 2002, in a national meeting in Jakarta, these issues were intensely
discussed. LBM defines corruption as a major betrayal (ghulūl) of the man-
date of the people.148 It strongly recommended capital punishment for these
crimes deemed major and subversive as they impair the well-being of the
state and its people.149 On money politics LBM pronounces that money meant
146 Ibid, 797.

147 Ahkamul Fuqaha’, 797-798.
148 Ibid, 827.
149 Ibid, 829.

as a gift in order to influence or alter fair and objective decision in matters

of public interest is tantamount to bribery which is also a major crime.150
In the context of the post New Order, this legal opinion ( fatwā) marks the
relative openness in which problems of governance are discussed. It clearly
departs from earlier rulings in the context of the changing political climate
and management of religion by the state. Although on the whole legal opin-
ion ( fatwā) on social issues, including corruption, are still to some extent
rhetorical and not deeply rooted in rigorous examination of its nature and
social implications, they are indeed novel. It attempts to address significant
social problems confronting Indonesian society although how these general
principles can be implemented in relation to concrete problems within
Indonesian society remain to some extent vague. On the whole, reiteration
of general principles of rules of governance based on past sources, charac-
teristic of traditionalism, remains dominant. In deeming corruption a major
sin punishable by death since it creates unjust enrichment and exacerbates
social inequality, the legal opinion ( fatwā) does not conceptually discern
various forms and gravity of corruption which invite serious repercussions
on attempts at implementing it. Hence while the legal opinion ( fatwā) can
be said to deal with new issues in the post New Order period, the mode of
thinking underlying it is into unfettered by traditionalism.
Fatwā on Science and Technology

Attitude towards the determination of the beginning of new month in the
Islamic calendar represents one important example of LBM-NU’s attitude
towards innovation in science and technology. In general, there are two
methods known for this purpose, namely direct vision of the crescent (ruʼya
al-hilāl) or more popularly known as ruʼya and ḥisāb.151 The first method is
based on the view that the new month in the Islamic calendar known as
hijriya, is only valid if the crescent moon can be visibly seen by one’s bare
eyes. The second, on the other hand, is a method which is strongly based
on calculation.152 According to NU, the direct vision of the crescent (ruʼya
al-hilāl) is a practice which has been exemplified by the Prophet and the
four rightly guided caliphs and upheld by the four imams of Islamic schools
150 Ibid, 830.

151 In general, there are three system of calendar known in the world, namely solar calendar
which takes solar movement as the basis of determination and is used for Gregorian calendar
system; lunar calendar, and luni-solar calendar. See Mutoha Arkanuddin, “Hisab-Rukyat Awal
Bulan Hijriyah”, Training Module, unpublished.
152 More comprehensive discussion on hisab will be presented in the next chapter on
Muhammadiyah.

of law.153 In NU’s view general decision (ithbāt al-ʽamm) of the beginning

of new month in Islamic calendar, which only relies on ḥisāb without the
confirmation of a physical vision, is not allowed by the imam of Islamic
legal schools of law. Furthermore, the Congress of NU’s ulama’ in 1983, had
clearly pronounced that it is not obligatory to follow the determination of
the beginning of Ramadan and Shawal using the ḥisāb method. LBM also
cited ulama’s views to the effect that the determination of the beginning of
Ramāḍan and Shawwal can only be ascertained by direct vision or complet-
ing thirty days of the month (bi al-ru’ya aw itmāmi al-‘adad thalathīna
yawman).154 This view according to LBM is based on majority of the ulama
of the past. In this case reference is made to ʽAbdurrahman bin Muhammad
Ba’lawi and Taqiyuddin al-Subki. Ba’lawi argued that the month of Ramadan
is not fixed. Therefore, knowing a new month is only through sighting the
crescent or completing Ramadan in thirty days. Al-Subki opined that deter-
mination of the new month based on calculation (ḥisāb) is unacceptable as
it is contradictory to the agreement (ijmā’) of classical ulama.155
Hasyim Muzadi, the former leader of NU argues that in this issue, NU
follows three principles of obedience to God (ta’abuddi), the use of reason
(ta’aqquli), and ethical principle (tabi’i).156 Muzadi furthermore sees that
the employment of ḥisāb and ruʼyat are complimentary. This means that
both methods are used proportionally. Ḥisāb is required for valid calcula-
tion and estimate, while ruʼya is a method by which the calculation and
estimates can be validated and verified. Other than these two methods,
Muzadi maintains that understanding of Islamic jurisprudence is obligatory
in seekinga solution when these two methods are irreconcilable. NU, in
Muzadi’s view, combines all these three elements.157
Consistent with the traits of traditionalism, LBM-NU has clearly relied
on the opinions of a selective chain of authorities of the medieval period
without ample consideration for competing views and current scientific
knowledge. This attitude is also based on perception that seeing the crescent
moon which marks the beginning of new month is a fundamental aspect of
the ritual of fasting which cannot be negated, failing which the fundamental
aspect of the religion is compromised.158 Although this interpretation is not
unanimous, NU’s legal opinion ( fatwā) does not engage in debates on this
153 Munawir Abdul Fattah, Tradisi Orang-Orang NU, 215.

155 Ahkamul Fuqaha, 386
156 Rukyatul Hilal Perspektif Nahdlatul Ulama’, Republika, 26 September 2008.
157 Ibid.
158 Interview with Abdul Mughits, Yogyakarta, 21 January 2013.

issue on the basis of principles. The lack of consideration for consistency of

approach in making the legal opinion ( fatwā) is yet another manifestation
of its traditionalistic trait. Abdul Mughits, a member of the Committee of
Astronomy (Lajnah Falakiyah)159 of NU in Yogyakarta for instance acknowl-
edges the contradictory nature of the adoption of ruʼya by NU. In his view,
based on the general categorization of NU as an organization which does
not strongly rely on scriptures, it is surprising that NU in the case of ruʼya
strongly hold on the scripturalist approach. The fatwā is also oblivious to
its repercussions on society in general as it advocates that both Indonesian
Muslims and the Indonesian government are not permitted to follow the
international direct vision of the crescent (ruʼya al-hilāl) as Indonesia is
not part of other Muslim countries (al-balad al-wāḥid).160 The social and
practical implications of the legal opinion (fatwā) on intra-Muslim relations
are also not given ample consideration. The fatwā has resulted in Muslim
declaring fast and id celebrations on different days within Indonesia. In the
age of planning, it clearly impedes certainty in administration of public life.
The discussion above underlines that while traditionalism predominates
in the mode of thinking of LBM-NU’s legal opinion ( fatwā) generally, there
are also signs of internal shifts and rise of competing group thought. The
predominance of traditionalism has been observed by scholars such as Mar-
tin van Bruinessen who maintains that most of NU’s legal opinions ( fatwā)
are marked by such features as non-innovation, rejection of legal reasoning
(ijtihad) and independent reasoning with respect to the Qurʼān and Sunna.
Furthermore, Bruinessen argues that the traditionalistic tendency of NU’s le-
gal opinions (fatwā) lies in its over-reliance on the works of classical religious
scholars (ulamaʼ) which hinders NU’s ulamaʼ from contextualizing those
classical formulations in dealing with contemporary problems. Similarly
Sahal Mahfudh also noted that LBM has not played a satisfactory role in
the endeavors to resolve contemporary challenges confronting Indonesian
society. The main cause for this situation, according to him is the strict
adherence to the Shafi’i school of law. Criticism to Lajnah Bahth al-Masāil is
also due to its mode of thought that strictly text bound and rejects any kinds
of alternatives not compatible with the rulings contained in the classical
books (kitab kuning), without giving guidance to create solutions which are
in accordance with the principles mentioned in the kitab.161
159 Lajnah falakiyah is a special section within the structure of NU responsible for dealing with
issues related to hisab and rukyat.
161 Martin van Bruinessen, 193

These arguments may be valid in describing the predominant mode of

thinking in NU’s legal opinion ( fatwā). However, since 1992 new develop-
ments have taken place within NU with the new formulation of change
in NU’s methodology in Islamic law making. Some signs of shift in mode
of thinking in fatwā can be discerned although as Husein Muhammad,
one of prominent progressive NU kiais had acknowledged, the change in
methodology has not been fully implemented. The signs of shifting mode of
thought in NU’s orientation cannot also be isolated from rapid social change
confronting Indonesian society particularly in the post New Order period.
This shift may be confined to certain social groups within the movement.
Imam Ghazali Said, for instance, maintains that issues which have come to
be dealt by Bahth al-Masāil are of a social and political nature.162This implies
that NU has shifted from ritually-oriented to more socially and empirically-
oriented issues. I believe that on the whole, the fatwā do not give rise to the
kinds of social implications akin to MUI’s. Consistent with the non-monolithic
orientation of NU’s elite,163some scholars such as Djohan Effendi, Mujamil
Qomar and Muhtadi Anshor have noted elements of reform based on Islamic
tradition in the thinking behind some of NU’s fatwā in the recent decade.164
However, it can also be said that the liberalisation of thought within NU is
partial, as not all NU members easily accept the transformation. Dissention
in perspectives between the older generation (lapis tua) and the younger
generation (lapis muda), terms used by Qomar, to distinguish groups not on
the basis of age but progressivity of thought, have been noted.165 Although
many observers both from NU internal circles and outsiders view NU as
witnessing great transformation in the form of emergence of progressive
thought, fear of the reawakening and domination of conservative wing
cannot be hidden. Syafiq Hasyim, for instance, maintains that during
Abdurrahman Wahid’s leadership, the conservative wing was marginal-
ized from mainstream discourse due the strength of his leadership,166 but
consequently gained momentum thereafter. Wahid himself, as noted by
162 “Majalah Sudah Menggantikan Kitab”, Supplement the Wahid Institute XII/Tempo 24-30 Sep-
tember 2007, 13.
163 Mujamil Qomar, NU Liberal: Dari Tradisionalisme Ahlussunah ke Universalisme Islam
(Bandung: Mizan, 2002), 248-262; Djohan Effendi, Pembaruan Tanpa Membongkar Tradisi:
Wacana Keagamaan di Kalangan Generasi Muda NU Masa Kepemimpinan Gus Dur (Jakarta:
Kompas, 2010); interview with Ahmad Muhtadi Anshor.
Generasi Muda NU Masa Kepemimpinan Gus Dur (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010).
165 Mujamil Qomar, 265-266.
166 Syafiq Hasyim, “Kebangkitan Sayap Konservatif”, in Khamami Zada and A. Fawaid Sjadzili
(eds), Nahdlatul Ulama: Dinamika Ideologi dan Politik Kenegaraan (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 182.

Hasyim, believed that the phenomenon of awakening of the conservative

wing is due to the domination of Arab universities’ alumni in the bahth
al-masāil. However, Hasyim challenges this view, as some NU members who
graduated from universities in the Arab world, to his mind are progressive
and should not be judged solely from their educational background, but their
rejection of important significant contemporary issues such as women’s
political rights and reproduction, ideas on religious reforms and the idea
of separation of state and religion.167 The factor of modern education of
NU members and its impact on the development of competing orientation
within the movement was also adduced by Djohan Effendi who believes that
the emergence of young kiai within NU are able to combine classical Islamic
intellectual heritage with critical contemporary discourse as the result of
their education. This group, according to Effendi, has the experience of
critical thinking and transfer modern learning into NU, manifested in the
interrogation of the already-established religious doctrines within NU.168 In
this context, legal opinion ( fatwā) has become the battlefield of knowledge
between conservatives and progressives within NU.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the dominant religious orientation of NU and

signs of competing orientation within it in the post New Order period. How
its mode of thinking is manifested in its religious creed, and approach to
understanding Islam is discussed. Its manifestation in relation to NU’s
legal methodology in deducing legal opinion ( fatwā) is also analyzed. This
chapter has also analyzed the function of NU’s religious orientation by
focusing on a selective group of legal opinion ( fatwā). Essentially, legal
opinion ( fatwā) analyzed pertain to social problems, inter-faith relations,
gender and modern knowledge.
This chapter reveals that NU is predominantly traditionalistic in terms of
its history and its basic doctrines. Traditionalism within NU remains preva-
lent given the conditioning effects of certain socio-historical factors. These
include among others, the central role of the kiai, the system and culture
of learning in traditional religious education, the strict adherence to the
preservation of classical religious works as the main reference in dealing with
167 Ibid, 183.

Generasi Muda NU Masa Kepemimpinan Gus Dur (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 151.

contemporary issues. However, within this predominantly traditionalistic

community, competing mode of thought and religious orientations are show-
ing signs as a result of changing socio-political condition within Indonesian
society exacerbated by the fall of Suharto’s regime as well as the diaspora of
NU members in acquiring modern education within and beyond Indonesia.
From issues and the substance of legal opinion ( fatwā), LBM-NU does
not show any reluctance to deal with contemporary issues. However, in
developing its epistemology of Islamic law, especially as represented by
the fatwā on contemporary issues, NU does not depart radically beyond its
traditionalistic mode of thought given its persistent reliance on the method
of written text (qawl manṣūṣ) of classical Muslim jurists especially from
the Shafi’i school. However, a shift in orientation is evident but possibly
confined to specific groups within NU which might seem to some as a
contradictio in terminis. This is evident in NU’s legal opinion ( fatwā) on
issues such as inter-religious relations, gender and determining the new
month as opposed to its stance on democracy and social problems such as
corruption. In the context of socio-political change, all these legal opinion
( fatwā) reflect competing orientations within NU although traditionalism
remains dominant.

6 The Fatwa of Majelis Tarjih
Muhammadiyah
One salient feature of Muhammadiyah movement is its critical thinking, which

by its nature will enable re-interrogating the dialectical relationship between
“text” and “realities, or between “normativity” of the Qur’ān and Sunna and the
“historicity” of Muslims’ understanding of respective texts in particular periods.1
– M. Amin Abdullah
Introduction
Muhammadiyah is widely known as an Islamic movement which promotes

social reforms and a new understanding of Islamic teachings including
Islamic law. In this field, Muhammadiyah’s legal stance manifests in the
adherence of a principle of non-affiliation to any Islamic school of law
(madhhab) principle and belief in the urgency of performing legal reason-
ing (ijtihad). Muhammdiyah formulates its position regarding Islamic
law through the establishment of a council called Majelis Tarjih, which
is specifically responsible for solving Islamic legal problems within the
movement, in particular, and Indonesian Muslims, in general.
Some studies maintain that this council has been effective in bringing
effect to an essential principle of Islamic law, the highest objective of law
(maqāṣid al-sharī’a)2 and assuming an instrumental role as a body which
facilitates collective legal reasoning (ijtihad) within the movement.3Scholars
1 M. Amin Abdullah, “Manhaj Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Keislaman,” in Muham-

mad Azhar and Hamim Ilyas (eds), Pengembangan Pemikiran Keislaman Muhammadiyah:
Purifikasi dan Dinamisasi (Yogyakarta: LPPI UMY, 2000), 7.
2 See Fathurrahman Djamil, Metode Ijtihad Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah (Jakarta: Logos,
1995). For comprehensive theoretical study on maqashid al- sharī’a, M Khalid Masud’s work is
useful. It provides good insights into basis for understanding this concept, by referring to one
of the most important Muslim jurists, Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi. See Muhammad Khalid Masud,
Shatibi’s Philosophy of Islamic Law (Petaling Jaya: Islamic Books Trust, 2005). For a comparison,
please refer to Jasser Auda, Maqashid al-Shari’ah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A System Approach
(London and Washington: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2007), and Muham-
mad Sa’id bin Ahmad bin Mas’ud al-Yubi, Maqashid al-Syari’ah al-Islamiyah wa ‘Alaqatuha bi
al-Adillati al-Syar’iyyah (Riyadh: Dar al-Hijrah li al-Nasr wa al-Tauzi’, 1998).
3 See Rifyal Ka’bah, Hukum Islam di Indonesia: Perspektif NU dan Muhammadiyah (Jakarta:
Universitas Yarsi, 1999).

examining non-ritual legal opinion ( fatwā) of Majelis Tarjih, have also

highlighted the rationality of the agency and its success in purifying and
dynamizing Islam. 4 In other words, Majelis Tarjih is deemed significant
in the formulation and dynamization of Muhammadiyah’s legal thought.
Based on this very fact, the Majelis is the locomotive for Muhammadiyah’s
reform (tajdīd) movement.5
However, currently, Majelis Tarjih has been subject to frequent criticism
for being irresponsive and rigid in dealing with contemporary legal issues.
Consequently, the general impression that has emerged is that Muham-
madiyah is undergoing a shift towards conservative leaning. The basis
for this claim is the wider observation of Muhammadiyah as a movement
characterized by two competing groups and orientations, conservative and
progressive wings over some critical issues.6In the context of this competing
thought, both Muhammadiyah members and outsiders often view Majelis
Tarjih as a proponent of the progressive group as opposed to Majelis Tabligh
(the missionary council) which is perceived as the conservative wing. One
possible factor leading to this classification maybe the fact that the Majelis
Tarjih underwent significant “reform” in orientation and method.
This chapter is an examination of Muhammadiyah’s mode of thought
by focusing on Majelis Tarjih’s legal opinion ( fatwā) and its legal thought.
It will critically examine the extent to which the association of Muham-
madiyah as reformist movement is reflected in the legal opinion ( fatwā) of
Majelis Tarjih, especially in the post-New Order period. As analyzing Majelis
Tarjih cannot be isolated from Muhammadiyah in general, this chapter
will revisit some basic facts of Muhammadiyah which include its history,
fundamental doctrines, legal thought and recent developments impacting
on the movement. Regarding Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh), Muhammadiyah
declares itself as a non-school of law (madhhab) Islamic group which, among
other things, means that it does not adhere to the teachings of any school
of law (madhhab) including Shafiʽi. However, despite this non-school of
law (madhhab) doctrine, Muhammadiyah has developed its school of law
(madhhab) in the so-called Madhhab Tarjih. This chapter will also discuss
factors conditioning the prevalence of its mode of thought including the
4 Syamsul Anwar, “Fatwa, Purif ication and Dynamization: A Study of Tarjih in Muham-
madiyah,” Islamic Law and Society, 12: 1, 28-44.
5 M. Amien Rais, “Preface”, in Fathurrahman Djamil, Metode Ijtihad Majelis Tarjih Muham-
madiyah (Jakarta: Logos, 1995).
6 Pradana Boy ZTF, In Defence of Pure Islam: The Conservative-Progressive Debate within
Muhammadiyah, Master Thesis, Faculty of Asian Studies, Australian National University, 2007.

The Fat wa of Ma jelis Tar jih Muhammadiyah 231
nature of transmission of Islamic legal knowledge within Muhammadiyah

and its impact on legal thought or legal opinion ( fatwā).
Muhammadiyah: The Foundation and Mode of Thought
Many believe that Ahmad Dahlan,7 the founder of Muhammadiyah, was

influenced by reformist vision through his trips to the Holy City of Mecca
in 1889 and 1903. During the period of his sojourn, Dahlan studied Islamic
knowledge from Nusantara scholars (ulama’) residing in Mecca including
Nawawi al-Bantani, Sheikh Khatib al-Minangkabawi, Kiai Mas Abdullah
of Surabaya and Kiai Faqih of Maskumambang Islamic boarding school.
He also dealt with ideas of Muslim reformers at the time which deeply
influenced him and which he started to spread on his return to Java.
On his return, Dahlan served as one of secretary (ketib amin) within
the Kraton of Yogyakarta. This position had undoubtedly enabled him to
publicly disseminate his vision of Islam through his sermons and religious
activities. These had largely to do with matters of rituals some of which
conflicted with established traditionalist Islam. Amongst these was his view
that the direction for prayer (qibla) in Masjid Gade did not accurately face
Mecca and his attempt to change it which contradicted with the religious
belief of traditional religious elite such as Kiai Kamaludiningrat, the head of
Islamic religious officer (Ketua Penghulu) within the palace (Keraton) circle.
The conflict cost him his appointment.8 The rejection indicated that public
(both his community and the religious officials of his time) did not easily
accept Dahlan’s ideas. Consequently, he built his langgar (small mosque)
which in his view correctly faced to the Mecca (qibla).
Scholars identified several related factors which they claimed led to the
foundation of Muhammadiyah. Among these factors are: firstly, the belief
7 The exact date of Dahlan’s birth is disputable among scholars. Some historians indentified
1869. Other said Dahlan was born 1870. Dahlan passed away in February 23, 1923. See Haedar
Nashir, Muhammadiyah Gerakan Pembaruan, 110-111.
8 Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Pesan dan Kisah Kiai Ahmad Dahlan dalam Hikmah Muhammadiyah
(Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2010), 2. The dispute started from the controversy surround-
ing the correction of the qiblah direction. As Alfian and Mukti Ali noted, around 1896, Dahlan
found that the Masjid Gedhe or Sultan Mosque did not correctly face towards Mecca which brought
consequence that all other mosques in Yogyakarta to have wrong direction towards the qiblah.
This finding motivated Dahlan to an initiative of correcting the qiblah direction by drawing
white lines in the Sultan Mosque which will enable Muslims to face the correct prayer direction.
However, when the chief penghulu was aware of the change, he and his old-established penghulu
became so furious and ordered to neglect the correction by erasing the already-drawn lines.

that Muslims did not uphold the guidance of the Qur’ān and Sunna which
had resulted in the widespread polytheism (shirk), heretical practices and
superstitious orientations which undermined their dignity. Secondly, weak-
ness of the community due to the absence of a strong Islamic organization
in Indonesia. Thirdly, the failure of most Islamic educational institutions
in producing well qualified Muslims; the general adversity of Muslims
trapped in acute fanaticism, dogmatism, formalism, traditionalism and
conservatism; awareness on the threat potentially faced by Islam, and the
penetration of Zending mission.9 A respected Muhammadiyah scholar, the
late Kuntowijoyo was basically in agreement that no single factor leads to
the foundation of Muhammadiyah. Dahlan’s ideas, in Kuntowijoyo’s view,
was responses to at least three processes – modernization, rationalism,
and Javaism. Dahlan responded to modernization by attempting to blend
elements of modernism with the practices of Islam in Indonesia which
was hitherto forbidden. In dealing with Javaism (Jawaisme) often equated
with traditionalism, Dahlan took a pro-active approach at first followed
subsequently by a positive attitude based on the principle of urging for the
right and forbidding for the wrong (amar ma’ruf nahi munkar).10
Both external and internal factors played a major role in the founding
of Muhammadiyah. However, the primacy of indigenous factor cannot be
overlooked. As Mitsuo Nakamura pointed out: “… the Muhammadiyah
movement must be regarded as a development from within Javanese society
rather than as a ready-made import from without.” Nakamura based his
finding on close observation in Kotagede, Yogyakarta, the birthplace of
Muhammadiyah in which rituals that Muhammadiyah opposed were
practiced.11 Muhammadiyah’s genesis has also been attributed to the larger
context of the role of reform ideas in the Arab world in general. In this
socio-religious dynamics, Dahlan formulated his ideas of reforming society
through renewal (tajdīd) and reform (iṣlāḥ) which he sought to implement
through legal reasoning (ijtihad), echoing the credo of returning to the
Qur’ān and Sunna (al-rujūʽ ila al- Qur’ān wa al-Sunna) and social reforms
as has been mentioned earlier. On this basis, therefore, Muhammadiyah
is widely known as identical to a renewal (tajdīd) movement. In its formal
9 Haedar Nashir, Muhammadiyah Gerakan Pembaharuan (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadi-

yah, 2010), 34.
10 See Kuntowijoyo, “Jalan Baru Muhammadiyah”, Preface in Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Islam
Murni dalam Masyarakat Petani (Yogyakarta: Bentang Budaya, 2000), xi-xx.
11 Mitsuo Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah
Movement in a Central Javanese Town c.1910-2010, 2nd Enlarged Edition (Singapore: ISEAS), 2012, 165.

and technical sense of this movement, Haedar Nashir argues that renewal
(tajdīd) is purification and renewal or reform.12
The Muhammadiyah movement is by no means monolithic regarding
the variety of labels and orientations that attributed to it. It is a janus face
(dhu-wujūh) organization.13 Among others are the characters of Muham-
madiyah as a reformist, puritan, and modernist. Scholars such as James
L. Peacock, Mitsuo Nakamura, Deliar Noer, Alfian, William Shepard and
Ahmad Jainuri are among others who hold these views. These terms are
often used interchangeably resulting in the lack of clarity of their meanings.
This section will examine how Muhammadiyah religious orientation and
mode of thought discussed in scholarship.
Muhammadiyah as Puritan
The basis of the association of Muhammadiyah with puritanism is its mis-

sion to purify Indonesian Muslim society. For the purpose of this book,
the term puritanism is used interchangeably with revivalism. Founded
in 1912 in the context of syncretic Islam in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah
embarked on attempts at purifying Islamic teachings deemed to have been
polluted by local traditions and practices. This syncretism is perceived
to have contributed to the degeneration and decline of the Muslims. It
is pertinent to note that Muhammadiyah began in Kauman, a suburb
(kampung) situated in the west of city square (alun-alun) of Yogyakarta.14
The choice of Yogyakarta as its birthplace is fundamental, to understanding
the puritan nature of this movement. Yogyakarta is the heart of Javanese
culture and value system, or a microcosm of “Javanese society as a whole,”
to borrow Alfian’s word.15 The centrality of Javanese culture value system
of Yogyakarta people is anchored in the Palace of Yogyakarta known locally
as Keraton Ngayogyakarto Hadiningrat.
The Palace of Yogyakarta is not only a political entity but the institu-
tion and center for the preservation of Javanese culture. As both political
and cultural institution, the palace (Keraton) had assimilated Javanese,
12 Haedar Nashir, Muhammadiyah gerakan Pembaruan (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah,

2010), 292.
13 Mitsuo Nakamura, Bulan Sabit Muncul dari Balik Pohon Beringin, translated by M. Yusron
Asrofie (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1983), 226.
14 For historical account on Kauman as a kampung from which Muhammadiyah movement
emerged, see Ahmad Adaby Darban, Sejarah Kauman: Menguak Identitas Kampung Muham-
madiyah (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2010).
15 Alfian, Muhammadiyah, 136.

Hindu-Buddhist, and Islamic cultures when Islam served as a new value

system through peaceful Islamization in the archipelago. James L. Peacock
maintains that Yogyakarta is “a major center”16 for the incorporation of
Islamic elements in predominantly Javanese practices, or the Javanization
of Islamic teachings. The assimilation also manifests in the titles accorded
to rulers as both political and religious leaders.17
The marriage of Islamic and Javanese elements furthermore manifests
in the institutionalization of Islamic religious authority within the compli-
cated structure of Yogyakarta Palace called Kepenguluan. The formation
of religious authority within the palace (keraton) circle is reflected in the
Sultan’s function as the protector of Islam, the official religion adopted by
the palace (keraton).18 As Javanese Kings, Sultans are expected to believe,
uphold and practice the concept of religion as a “cloak” for rulers (agama
ageming aji).19 He is projected to be the role model in the practice of religion
and protect it within the larger societal milieu. One manifestation of this
protection is the establishment of some mosques under the patronage
of the palace (keraton). Among those mosques is Great Mosque (Masjid
Agung) or Masjid Gedhe Kauman in which Dahlan, was a secretary for
religious affairs (ketib amin) replacing the position of his father, Kiai Haji
Abu Bakar, upon the latter’s passing away.20 As an institution, the head of
Islamic affair (kepenguluan) is a leader called ketua penghulu who is assisted
by nine officers.21 Among the most important role of these ketibs played is
delivering Friday sermons as well as serving as advisors to the Sultan in
Islamic religious affairs.22
In this context, Dahlan pursued his mission of purifying religious prac-
tices and local culture which had in his view deviated from the original
16 James L Peacock, Muslim Puritans: Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asia (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 23.
17 Such a title as Senopati ing Alogo Khalifatullah Sayyidin Panotogamo, which literally means
the commander in the battle, the vicar of the God, and the regulator of religion, clearly indicate
such assimilation and the dual role of a sultan both as political ruler and religious patron.
18 HM Nasruddin Anshoriy Ch, Matahari Pembaruan: Rekam Jejak KH Ahmad Dahlan (Yog-
yakarta: JB Publisher, 2010), 43.
19 Raharjo Suwandi, The Quest for Justice: The Millenary Aspiration of a Contemporary Javanese
Wali, (Leiden: KITLV, 2000), 82.
20 Ahmad Dahlan, born as Muhammad Darwisy, was the fourth child of seven. As most of his
siblings were female, he was the first of two sons his parents belong to. The change of name from
Muhammad Darwisy to Ahmad Dahlan occurred upon his return from Mecca for pilgrimage
and learning Islam from many respective ulama in Mecca, including those from Indonesia.
21 Nasruddin Anshoriy, Matahari, 45.
22 Ahmad Faizin Karimi, Pemikiran dan Perilaku Politik Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (Gresik:
MUHI Press, 2012), 131.

teachings of Islam and contributed to polytheism (shirk). In his opinion,

this would preserve the substance of teachings of Islam based on the core
sources of its tenets, the Qur’ān and Sunna. In a technical sense, Muham-
madiyah sees its efforts at purifying what it believes to be genuine Islamic
teachings and practices as a manifestation of renewal (tajdīd), as indicated
earlier. Its scholars maintain that purification is one meaning of renewal
(tajdīd) which does not reduce or narrow its scope. Rather, it serves to
clarify the Muslims’ way of life at the time which had been tainted by non-
Islamic elements.23 Its primary agenda is popularly known by the acronym
TBC (takhayul, bid’ah and churafat).This agenda includes thanksgiving
(selamatan), traditional party (kenduren),24 and visiting tombs especially
those of respected figures, such as the nine saints believed to have spread
Islam in Nusantara known locally as walisongo. Initially aimed at clearly
distinguishing Islamic teachings from the practices of Javanese tradition
containing Hindu-Buddhist elements, in its later phase, the doctrine of
anti-TBC gradually transformed into the doctrine of anti-local traditions.
Consequently, it is inevitable that Muhammadiyah members, in general,
are suspicious of and reluctant to accept or even reject syncretic local
traditions and practices, and that Muhammadiyah lacks appreciation for
them. Although this may well describe the domination of the exclusivist
orientation of Muhammadiyah members and elites, their attitudes towards
culture is not monolithic.
Muhammadiyah’s rigid stance has invited adverse social repercussions.
It has contributed to developing an exclusive orientation among some
Muhammadiyah activists in practicing religion. Nakamura’s observation
is relevant. In Kotagede, he visibly witnessed the rejection of local and
traditional practices under the banner of Islam and bold attempt to correct
these allegedly heresy (bida) practices by Muhammadiyah activists. On
this basis, Nakamura concluded that the arrogance of reformist Muslim
activists is “a reflection of their conviction that they “understand better”
Islam than the rest of the population.”25 It is not difficult to agree with
Nakamura’s observation on the suspicious and non-inclusive attitude of
Muhammadiyah members against others who do not share their views and
23 Haedar Nashir, Muhammadiyah Gerakan Pembaruan (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah,

2010), 292.
24 Slametan and kenduren are traditions meant as thanksgiving. It has varied forms but in
general the main goal is identical. It is mor commonly practiced in rural areas than in urban
contexts. The basis for the performance of slametan is also varied, since it relates to important
events of life such as birth and marriage or even the cultivation and harvesting period for farmers.
25 Nakamura, The Crescent Arises, 174.

practice of Islam. This tendency to perceive other Muslims as revivers of

the heresy (bidʽa) has also induced inevitable tensions with traditionalist
group such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU),26 whose practice of Islam deemed
as heretical. Equally pertinent, this purification doctrine has not only
distanced Muhammadiyah from other Muslims it has also significantly
contributed to Muhammadiyah rigidity in evaluating any tradition by its
interpretation of the sacred texts – the Qur’ān and Sunna.
Muhammadiyah as Reform Movement
Muhammadiyah is also known as reformist Muslim group. A possible

answer to understand the association of Muhammadiyah with reformism
relates to the adoption of ideas and agenda of Muslim reformers in the
Middle East at the beginning of the 20th century. In the context of imperial-
ism which dominated large parts of the Muslim world and the general
socio-economic mire of Muslims, prominent personalities and scholars such
as Ibn Taimiyya, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani,
Muhammad Abduh, and Muhammad Rashid Rida,27 urged for direct refer-
ence to the Qur’ān and Sunna to achieve pristine Islamic teachings. They
also advocated for opening the gate of legal reasoning (ijtihad) declared
closed by the followers of schools of Islamic law (madhhab), and called for
the awakening of Muslims from their decline and backwardness.
In the context of massive socio-economic change and problems impact-
ing on Muslims in Indonesia, Muhammadiyah attempted to embark on its
mission to uplift the condition of the people. One of its most prominent
contributions has been reform in religious education. Dahlan manifested
his reform in the synthesis of two polar systems of education, namely the
Islamic boarding school (pesantren) and the Dutch system. Traditional
26 In the contemporary setting, responses to anti-bid’ah movements of Muhammadiyah are

massive and severe. Some publication by Nahdlatul Ulama’ activists against the so-called bid’ah
are now common. For example, Ahmad Zaki Mubarok and Muallimin Muntari, Sunnah-Bud’ah:
Rahmat atau Permusuhan (Solo: Tinta Media, 2011), Mohammad Nor Ichwan, Bid’ah Membawa
Berkah: Amalan Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah yang Dianggap Sesat Tetapi Membawa Manfaat Bagi
Umat (Semarang: Syiar Media Publishing, 2013, 6th print); H.M. Madchan Anies, Tahlil dan
Kenduri: Tradisi Santri dan Kiai (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2009).
27 According to Adaby Darban’s study, among the books that Ahmad Dahlan read which later
enhanced his reformist orientation are: Kitab al-Tauhid, al-Islam wa al-Nashraniyya and Tafsir
Juz ‘Amma by Muhammad Abduh,Farid Wajidi’s Kanz al-Ulum: Durrah al-Ma’arif, Ibn Taimiyya’s
Fi al-Bid’ah and al-Tawassul wa al-Wasila, Rasyid Rida’s al-Manar, and Magazine of al-Urwat
al-Wuthqa published by Rashid Rida. See Ahmad Adaby Darban, Sejarah Kauman: Menguak
Identitas Kampung Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Suara Muhammadiyah, 2010).

Islamic boarding school (pesantren) system only emphasized religious

knowledge in its classical and traditional sense which had produced alumni
who were detached from and ill-equipped with knowledge of the modern
world. In contrast, the Dutch educational system offered an exclusively
secular education which also created negative views against religion an
impediment to modernization, on the other. These different educational
systems did not only manifest in the distinctions of orientations but also
the practice of segregation by Dutch colonial government towards the
indigenous people. Modern education was only provided for Dutch students
and the children of Indonesian (Javanese) aristocrats who maintained
close political ties with the Dutch colonial government. Consequently,
marginalized classes of society were excluded from this educational system.
As a consequence, traditional Islamic boarding school (pesantren) which
were to a large extent traditionalistic both in pedagogy and content of the
curriculum accommodated them.
M. Amien Rais, the former chairman of Muhammadiyah Central Board,
maintains that the manifestation of Muhammadiyah’s reform initiatives
are: its educational activities modeled upon modern schools in the context
of its time and the technological approach it employed in developing or-
ganizational activities, especially its socio-economic units.28 For Peacock,
Muhammadiyah reformist leanings can be effectively grasped from
the social structure and values closely identified with the movements.29
Structurally the movement stands in contrast to the hierarchical nature of
Javanese society in general as well as its traditionalistic counterparts such as
Nahdlatul Ulama.30 This feature greatly influences the dynamics of this or-
ganization and facilitates social mobility within it. Consequently, authority
in Muhammadiyah is much more defined by leadership capacity and ability
rather than genealogical lineage. This nature implies that Muhammadiyah
members stand on equal opportunity in being the holders of authority both
organizationally as well as intellectually although genealogically they are
28 M. Amien Rais, “Preface” in Kelompok Studi Lingkaran (ed), Intelektualisme Muhammadiyah

Menyongsong Era Baru (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), 9.
29 James L Peacock, Muslim Puritans, chapter 4.
30 Regarding the issue of hierarchy, being raised in a Muhammadiyah milieu, I am personally
not aware of the hierarchical nature in the chain of Islamic authority in Islam. Consequently,
in my social encounter with some traditionalistic Muslims in Singapore. I was surprised by
a question of my sanad in studying the Qur’ān. Such a question basically emerges from the
belief embraced by certain groups of Muslims that in studying the Qur’ān Muslims should be
connected toa chain of masters culminating in the Prophet Muhammad. Failure to fulfil such
a prerequisite will cast doubt on how the Qur’ān is studied. However, being a movement which
is not heavily burdened with such hierarchy, this belief is not known to Muhammadiyah.

not part of (elite or aristocrats) of Muhammadiyah. In other words, from

a modern point of view, Muhammadiyah is a merit-based organization
which to some extent, adopts meritocracy as a principle of its intra-social
mobility and leadership selection. This situation is different in the case
of traditionalistic groups where lineage plays a determinant role in the
formation of authorities. Moreover, this situation is strengthened by the
fact that most religious leaders (kiai) especially in Java are connected to
each other through familial relationships. In the case of Muhammadiyah,
religious leaders (kiai or ulama’) as a social institution does not exist in its
traditional connotations.
Peacock also maintains that this attitude is also on par with the Muham-
madiyah stance towards women as evident in the practice of them attending
Friday congregation such as in Yogyakarta, and the greater roles they play
in mosques compared to their traditionalist counterparts.31Peacock also
highlighted the difference in how the manifestation of social solidarity
within the movement although how this factor relates to reform is unclear.
He contends that reformist movement is unlike traditional Muslim groups
that maintain solidarity through social gatherings which blend elements of
tradition, religion witnessed in long-established events such,
The lesser frequency of slametan among the reformists can also be

interpreted as a lessening of the neighborhood and household ties, as
well as of concern for harmonizing these socio-spiritual realms. Santri
replaces slametan with prayers. The central place for prayer is not home
but a mosque. (M)oreover, the prayers are oriented not to face-to-face
relationships but Allah.32
In Muhammadiyah lexicon, the meaning of reform equals renewal (tajdīd)

which carries the sense of renewal in the sense of improvement or bet-
terment.33 Other than this, the term is also used to signify three important
aspects- thought, the praxis of movements and ethos. The first encompasses
methods, approaches and thought resulting from; the second deals with the
management of the organization and technological innovations and the last,
world-view, values, and ethics.34 Asjmuni Abdurrahman, the former chair
31 Peacock, Muslim Puritans, 108-109.

32 Peacock, Muslim Puritans, 114.
33 See Afifi Fauzi Abbas, “Tarjih dan Pembaharuan Hukum Islam,” in Afifi Fauzi Abbas (ed),
Tarjih Muhammadiyah dalam Sorotan (Jakarta: IKIP Muhammadiyah Press, 1995), 3.
34 Abdul Mu’thi, “Tradisi Tajdid di Muhammadiyah”, Suara Muhammadiyah, Number 05/99,
01-15 March 2014, 27.

of Majelis Tarjih argues that the dimensions of renewal (tajdīd) include the
purification of ritual and faith, the formation of ethics; the formation of the
dynamic, creative, progressive and futuristic attitude of life; and the improve-
ment of leadership, organization, and ethos within the context of Muham-
madiyah.35 However, it is important to note that the formal identification of
Muhammadiyah with tajdīd and the formulation of renewal (tajdīd) in the
formal sense of this organization is only a later creation as the first formula-
tion of the concept of renewal (tajdīd) took place in 1968. This formulation
was very simplistic and did not include a comprehensive explanation of
the concept. Consequently, in 22nd Majelis Tarjih Congress held in Malang,
East Java, in 1989, the idea of renewal (tajdīd) was intensively discussed and
reformulated in response to severe criticisms against Muhammadiyah.36
Another main feature identifying Muhammadiyah with reformism is its
employment of legal reasoning (ijtihad) and the principle of returning to the
Qur’ān and Sunna. Briefly speaking, legal reasoning (ijtihad) as understood
and promoted by Muhammadiyah is an anti-thesis to the closing of the
gate of legal reasoning (ijtihad) believed to have been declared by clerics
(ulama’) of the classical era on the basis that the founders and Imams of
Islamic schools of law (madhhab) have formulated Islamic law in detailed
and comprehensive ways. Abduh, one of leading Muslim reformers from
whom Dahlan derived his inspiration, believed that legal reasoning (ijtihad)
is the goal of Islamic reform. In this context, Abduh criticized reference
to works on Islamic knowledge produced at the time when Islam was in
decline. He urged for direct reference to the Qur’ān and Sunna. Unlike
common perception Abduh also advised for reference to the works of clerics
(ulama’) but he confined such references to those produced before the rise
of Islamic schools of law (madhhab).37 Inspired by Abduh, Dahlan did not
reject the textual legacy of the classical scholars (ulama’) despite his strong
call for returning directly to the Qur’ān and Sunna.38
This doctrine of returning to the Qur’an and Sunna (al-rujūʽ ila al-Qur’ān
wa al-Sunna) in the view of Kuntowijoyo is an ambiguous concept, as it can
invite both liberating and limiting consequences.39In the latter, the concept
35 Asjmuni Abdurrahman, Manhaj Tarjih Muhammadiyah: Metodologi dan Aplikasi (Yogya-

karta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2012), 286.
36 Fathurrahman Djamil, Metode Ijtihad Majelis Tarjih, 57-58.
37 See Mukti Ali, Ijtihad dalam Pandangan Muhammad Abduh, Ahmad Dakhlan dan Muham-
mad Iqbal (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1990), 58-59.
38 Ibid.
39 Kuntowijoyo, “Jalan Baru Muhammadiyah”, Preface in Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Islam Murni
dalam Masyarakat Petani (Yogyakarta: Bentang Budaya, 2000), xi-xx.

may mean that Muhammadiyah should not practice any teachings and
rituals not explicitly mentioned in both texts. In contrast, in the liberation
sense, this creed opens a wider opportunity for interpretation of Qur’anic
teachings more independently without the burden of fatalistic conformism
and dependence on forebearers of schools of law, technically known as
imitation (taqlīd) or taqlīd al-a’ma. 40 In this respect, Dahlan attempted to
implement the concept of al-rujūʽila al-Qurʼān wa al-Sunna in the second
sense. He tried to combine textual formula of the scripture with contextual
situations harmoniously.41His approach differs from the dominant tendency
of Muhammadiyah members in the current situation who adopt al-rujūʽila
al-Qur’ān wa al-Sunna in the limitation sense.
The Muhammadiyah’s reformist-leaningis also associated with its
emphasis on critical thinking. Amin Abdullah, the Head of Majelis Tarjih’s
between1995-2000, asserts that critical thinking is one of the most salient fea-
tures of the movement. Upholding the view that Dahlan practicedal-rujūʽila
al- Qur’ān wa al-Sunna in the liberation sense, Abdullah believes that relating
text and context were prominent in Ahmad Dahlan’s thought. Furthermore,
he argues that Dahlan was concerned and critical of Muslims’ understanding
of the Qur’ān at the time featured by rigidity in being bound by texts. As a
result, ethical values within the Qur’ān were not adequately grasped and
understood which inhibited the Qur’ān from serving as an ethos for concrete
action. The same attitude was perceived in examining texts which encouraged
people to seek for knowledge. Seeking knowledge for action was understood
very narrowly regarding studying religious knowledge in its classical sense.
This knowledge with all its branches was examined exclusively apart from
natural sciences (al-ulūm al-kawniyya) and human sciences and social reality
(al-ulūm al-insaniyya). In Abdullah’s view, the encounter of Muhammadiyah
and other cultures and civilizations such as Europe and Christianity had
inspired Dahlan to interpret the Qur’ān in a new light.42
Many view Dahlan’s vision of reform anchored on religious traditions as
unique. In comparison to reformers in other parts of Muslim world such as
Abduh and Muhammad Iqbal, Dahlan’s unusual position is that he was not
a merely a man of thought but a pragmatist, 43 or a man of action.He was able
40 Pradana Boy ZTF, Para Pembela Islam: Pertarungan Konservatif dan Progresif di Tubuh
Muhammadiyah (Jakarta: Gramata Publishing, 2009), 66.
41 Pradana Boy ZTF, Another Face of Puritan Islam: Muhammadiyah and Radicalism among
the Youth, paper presented at International Research Conference on Muhammadiyah, Muham-
madiyah University of Malang, Indonesia, 29 November-2 December 2012.
42 M. Amin Abdullah, “Manhaj Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Keislaman”, 7-8.
43 Alfian, Muhammadiyah,

to translate normative doctrine of Islam into practice and institutionalizing

his ideas in the form of a social movement, 44 though many of his thoughts
are not recorded which creates some difficulty in studying his intellectual
legacy. His contributions have been well evaluated by many. Haedar Nashir,
the current President of Muhammadiyah, for instance, argues that Dahlan’s
pragmatism should not supersede his ideas of socio-religious reforms which
could be considered exceptionally outstanding by the standards of his time.45
Conceptually, reformism has been understood as a mode of thinking
characterized by the following traits:
a. Base on strong intellectual basis;

b. The focus on substance over form;
c. A strong social philosophy informed critically by diagnostic social
sciences;
d. Grounded in contextual local needs and challenges; having a clear and
consistent commitment to pedagogical strategies and the importance
of planning;
e. Incorporating diverse approaches and strategies relevant to issues
addressed;
f. Assimilative of intellectual thought on contemporary knowledge and
the traditions concerned. 46
Some of these features of reformist orientation are evident in Muhammadi-

yah’s mission, particularly in the early period of its inception. For instance,
the movement’s strong involvement in social services and educational
reform is a clear influence of the emphasis on social philosophy and the
need to modernize society. Dahlan’s ability to identify social problems
rooted in Javanese society at his time and the efficacy of formulae he offered
in alleviating them also reflects his critical ability to synergize traditions
with the contextual problems of his community creatively. However, the
rigid approach and stance adopted by current dominant elements within
the movement justified by reference to its founders reveal inconsistencies
with some of the defining traits above.
44 Mukti Ali,
45 Haedar Nashir, Muhammadiyah Gerakan Pembaruan, 37.
46 Azhar Ibrahim, “The Idea of Religious Reform: Perspective of Singapore Malay-Muslim
Experiences”, in Syed Farid Alatas (ed), Muslim Reform in Southeast Asia: Perspective from
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore (Singapore: Majelis Ugama Islam Singapura, 2009), 84-87.

Among many other things, the puritanism of Muhammadiyah manifest-

ed in its non-accommodative attitude towards syncretic Islam illustrates
the point. The tendency towards labeling these as un-Islamic and hereti-
cal is at the expense of critical insights and examination of their social
significance and actual ramifications in the community. Muhammadiyah’s
attitude towards scripture and its strong tendency to cling on selective
readings or interpretations of the scriptures in understanding religion
has made it less accommodative of competing views and knowledge. Its
credo of al-rujūʽ ila al-Qur’ān wa al-Sunna, although which though has the
potential of being liberated has also been dominantly understood and
applied in a restrictive sense. In this sense, the credo of referring to the
Qur’ān and Sunna has been appropriated as a function of puritanism or
revivalism. Therefore, the reformist and a puritanical or revivalist streak
of Muhammadiyah should be clearly distinguished. While elements of
its reform efforts remain evident in the social and practical domain, its
mode of religious thought and religious creed markedly reveal elements
of Puritanism or revivalism.
Currently, criticism addressed to Muhammadiyah for its reformist tendency
in its efforts to confront overwhelming practical challenges. The movement is
said to be heavily involved in ad-hoc-type reform efforts which have nonethe-
less been its mainstay as a reform movement. In attempting to continue to
fulfill its mission, Muhammadiyah faces a new challenge namely the necessity
of continuously formulating a dialogical and integrative relationship between
religious ideology and modernity.47 By this circumstances, Muhammadiyah
has to deal with the imperatives of actual space (kedisinian), current realities
(keapaan), and readiness (kesiapan). This situation requires every generation
of Muhammadiyah to think uniquely regarding how to creatively combine
religious traditions with a profound understanding of the contemporary
conditions in alleviating problems confronting the community.48
This challenge has been impeded by the strong tendency to focus on
practical activities at the expense of intellectual struggle which threatens
to reduce the movement to intellectual stagnation. Hence, the late Nurcholish
Madjid asserted to the effect that while it is undoubted that Muhammadiyah
has managed to carry out pragmatic (amaliah) reform, such efforts should
be accompanied by reform of thought necessary in meeting the complex
47 M. Saad Ibrahim, “Mengapa Muhammadiyah Digugat?” paper presented at Muhammadiyah

Up-date Seminar, Center for the Study of Islam and Philosophy, Muhammadiyah University of
Malang, 20 February 2010.
48 Ibid.

demands of the contemporary condition confronting Indonesian Muslims.49

In this respect, the reflections of the Muhammadiyah scholar, Muhadjir
Effendy of Muhammadiyah University of Malang is understandable. Effendy
questions the dominant association of Muhammadiyah with modernism
and critically examines this largely taken for granted evaluation. While
he concedes that it differs from traditionalist Islam of Nahdlatul Ulama,
however, he maintains that it should be critically evaluated against current
standards of what is modern.50 Similarly, Syafii Maarif, the former chairman
of Muhammadiyah Central Board, contends that one of the biggest problems
that Muhammadiyah is currently facing is its weakness in the framework or
perspective on Islam as a result of its overwhelming social activities. Although
Maarif acknowledges that Muhammadiyah was not formed as an intellectual
movement, he asserts that it cannot ignore this dimension in this current age.51
Competing Orientation
Being mostly associated with reformism and Puritanism or revivalism,

Muhammadiyah is a non-monolithic entity. Its puritan or revivalist streak
as above discussed is revealed among other ways in attitude towards local
tradition, customs or culture. However, Muhammadiyah members’ attitude
towards the practice of culture and tradition is non-monolithic. Munir Mul-
khan’s study, for instance, clearly demonstrates the variety of orientations
within the movement. Those are: al-Ikhlash Muhammadiyah or those who
do not practice what they deem as syncretic Islam but tolerate them; Islam
Murni (those who practice what they define as pure Islam and strongly reject
local elements in religious practices), Marhaen Muhammadiyah (Marmud)
namely the group who follow Muhammadiyah’s practices but at the same
time subscribe to non-pious (abangan) type of Islam, and Muhammadiyah
NU (Munu), namely members of Muhammadiyah who observe traditional
Islam as practiced by Nahdlatul Ulama.52 Although Mulkhan’s findings
49 Quoted by Haedar Nashir, “Kritik atas Modernisme Muhammadiyah”, in Ajang Budiman and
Pradana Boy ZTF (eds), Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah: Refleksi Satu Abad Perjalanan
Muhammadiyah (Malang and Jakarta: PSIF UMM and Best Media, 2010), 17.
50 Muhadjir Effendy, “Membincang Modernitas Muhammadiyah”, in Ajang Budiman and
Pradana Boy ZTF (eds), Menggugat Modernitas Muhammadiyah: Refleksi Satu Abad Perjalanan
Muhammadiyah (Malang and Jakarta: PSIF UMM and Best Media, 2010), 21.
51 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Keniscayaan Kebebasan Berfikir dalam Muhammadiyah”, paper
presented at Muhammadiyah Up-date Seminar, Center for the Study of Islam and Philosophy,
Muhammadiyah University of Malang, 22 May 2010.
52 Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Marhaen Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Galang Press, 2010).

are locally-specific, it underscores the critical observation that not all

Muhammadiyah members are hostile to local traditions as it is commonly
presumed.
Kuntowijoyo provides another observation that bears upon the diversity
of mode of thinking within the movement. In his view, it might be true
that Muhammadiyah has a tendency to reject local traditions, this does
not mean that it is predominantly an anti-culture movement. According
to Kuntowijoyo, the identification of Muhammadiyah as an anti-culture
movement is misleading as culture is not identical to tradition. Theoretically,
it includes such entities as a system of knowledge, education, and effective
and efficient use of time. It would be more appropriate to say, in his view,
that Muhammadiyah is a new cultural movement.53 Mulkhan suggests that
the rigidity and reluctance of elements within Muhammadiyah in deal-
ing with local traditions and cultures are due to the lack of knowledge of
contemporary Muhammadiyah activists on the nature of Dahlan’s attitude
towards local traditions and cultures.54 As many sources suggest, Dahlan
had an open personality and was not hostile to Javanese culture. The Sultan
of Yogyakarta’s sponsor to Dahlan’s second trip to Mecca also suggests
that the founder had maintained good relations with the ruler despite his
orthodox belief. In other words, Dahlan was believed to be a man with high
cultural awareness and appreciation. Hence, the shift of Muhammadiyah
from cultural into rigid stance is a post-Dahlan development. The shift
of orientation from cultural to the puritan type of Islam coincided with
the influence of Wahhabi teachings in Indonesia through Minangkabau.
The penetration of this influence on Muhammadiyah activists from this
region is evident in the thinking of personalities such as Haji Rasul and the
establishment of Majelis Tarjih with its strong sharī’a orientation.55 Muham-
madiyah’s respect to Javanese culture is also evident in its adoption of the
Javanese code of conduct, the use of Javanese language in Muhammadiyah’s
publication, communication, and ritual, the introduction of Javanese style
53 Kuntowijoyo, Muslim Tanpa Masjid: Esai-esai Agama, Budaya dan Politik dalam Bingkai
Strukturalisme Transendental (Bandung: Mizan, 2001), 158-170.
54 A. Munir Mulkhan, Islam Kultural Kiai Dahlan: Mengembangkan Dakwah dan Muham-
madiyah Secara Cerdas dan Maju Bersama Kiai Ahmad Dahlan (Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah
Ilmu, 2012), 8-9.
55 See Ahmad Najib Burhani, “The Ideological Shift of Muhammadiyah from Cultural into
Puritanical Tendency in 1930s”, Jurnal Masyarakat dan Budaya, Vol. VIII, No. 1, 2006, 1-22.

dress for its uniform as well as participation in the Javanese cultural groups
and movements.56
Other than competing orientations in dealing with local traditions,
some groups within Muhammadiyah also differ in their approach and
conceptualization of contemporary issues such as religious pluralism,
renewal of Islamic thought and law and understanding of the Qur’ān.
Responses to these matters also reveal competing orientations that not
always bear the characteristics of revivalism or puritanism. The competi-
tion has led to the divergence of Muhammadiyah’s response to many issues
in Islam. Furthermore, it has also induced tensions and conflict within
the movement. In this dispute, competing reform-oriented groups are
marginalized. The ousting of some prominent Muhammadiyah progres-
sive scholars from the list of Muhammadiyah board in the 2005 Congress
illustrates the point.57
The marginalization of progressive elements within Muhammadiyah
coincides with the penetration of some Islamist factions within this
movement. Such penetrations are understandable since Muhammadiyah
shares particular common outlook and dogma with some Islamist groups in
Indonesia. As an example, the credo of al-rujūʽ ila al- Qur’ān wa al-Sunna is a
common principle upheld by the Salafi groups. In more general terms, some
Muhammadiyah groups share same orientation in understanding the Qur’ān
with those of scripturalist groups. From a theoretical point of view, diverse
orientations of Muslims in understanding the Qur’ān could be generalized
into three broad categories-scriptural, semi-contextual and contextual. In
short, in the context of Muhammadiyah, all these orientations exist.
Another manifestation of such competing orientations within Muham-
madiyah is also evident in group’s attitude towards democracy within the
movement. Here again, the contestations between dominant agencies from
marginal ones can be discerned. Fuad Fachruddin’s research is relevant in
this respect. In his study, Fachruddin reveals four distinct ideas manifesting
in different orientations, namely: the secularist-rejectionist that aspires for
the autonomous enforcement of Islam in terms of moral and ethical basis;
the supporters of sharī’a enforcement and the Islamic state; those who do
not support Islamic state but aspire for the involvement of civil Islam in
56 Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Revealing the Neglected Missions: Some Comments on Javanese
Elements in Muhammadiyah Reformism”, Studia Islamica, Vol. 12, Number 1, 2005, 101-130.
57 I have dealt this topic in details in my master thesis. For more information, please refer
to Pradana Boy ZTF, “In Defence of Pure Islam: The Conservative-Progressive Debate within
Muhammadiyah,” M.A. Thesis, Faculty of Asian Studies, The Australian National University, 2007.

the process of practical politics, and; those who maintain the non-political
nature of civil Islam.58
The Majelis Tarjih
Prior the establishment of Majelis Tarjih, Muhammadiyah’s orientation to

fiqh was less intense. Dahlan is believed to practice a madhhab-oriented fiqh
especially the Shafi’ite school of law.59This belief might be true because-
Majlis Tarjih was only founded around fifteen years after Muhammadiyah
was established. Syamsul Anwar, the current chairman of Majelis Tarjih,
explains that the founding of Majelis Tarjih is related to the expansion of
Muhammadiyah both institutionally and socially which necessitated the
leadership to be involved in much more complex issues. Consequently, the
leadership became responsible not only for managerial and organizational
affairs but also religious issues including issuing a legal opinion (fatwā). The
inevitable necessity for a division of labor within the movement eventu-
ally culminated in the foundation of a council specifically responsible for
Islamic religious matters that is now popularly known as Majelis Tarjih
which literally means the Council of Islamic Law.60
Historically, the birth of Majelis Tarjih intertwined with the role of Kiai
Haji Mas Mansur,61 then chairman of East Java Muhammadiyah Provincial
Board and Muhammadiyah Central Board. The initiative to set up this
particular Council on Islamic law emerged in the sixteenth Muhammadiyah
58 Fuad Fachruddin, Agama dan Pendidikan Demokrasi, Pengalaman Muhammadiyah dan

Nahdlatul Ulama’(Jakarta: Penerbit Alvabet, 2006), 101-104.
59 A document dated 1924 mentions that Ahmad Dahlan or Muhammadiyah at the time
practiced Shafi’i fiqh. This document is recently revealed and a book based on this document
is published. As it informs practices of fiqh which diametrically dissent from Muhammadiyah
beliefs and practice today, it has aroused negative response from Muhammadiyah.
60 Syamsul Anwar, “Fatwa, Purif ication and Dynamization: A Study of Tarjih in Muham-
madiyah,” Islamic Law and Society, 12: 1, 28-44.
61 Kiai Mas Mansur was born in Surabaya, East Java. Considering his role in initiating the
Majelis Tarjih and formulating some important documents for Muhammadiyah, many view him
as an ideologue for Muhammadiyah. Interestingly, before his membership in Muhammadiyah,
Mas Mansur was co-founder of a traditionally-oriented Islamic group called Tashwirul Afkar
along with Kiai A Wahab Chasbullah, one of the most important minds behind the foundation
Nahdlatul Ulama’ in 1926. Due to some principle disagreements with Chasbullah, he finally
left Tashwirul Afkar and joined Muhammadiyah. Mansur was appointed the first chairman of
Majelis Tarjih and subsequently chairman of Muhammadiyah central board. See Syaifullah,
K.H. Mas Mansur, Sapukawat Jawa Timur (Surabaya: Hikmah, 2010). See also Darul Aqsha, Kiai
Haji Mas Mansur, 1896-1946: Perjuangan dan Pemikiran (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005).

Congress in Pekalongan, Central Java in 1927, although this council was only
formalized in the subsequent year in the Yogyakarta Congress. Mas Mansur
viewed that the establishment of councils responsible for the formulation
and solving of new problems within Muslim society was urgent for Muham-
madiyah. The basis for this proposal was a case of Muhammadiyah in East
Java, where members were often distressed by unresolved debates which
often involved tensions over many issues considered as not principle ( furū’),
especially those relating to rituals.62
Mansur proposed three nomenclatures-Majelis Tasyri’ or the legislative
council, Majelis Tanfidz or the executive board, and Majelis Taftisy or the
judicative council, which is parallel with the principle of trias politica in a
modern state. However, instead of adopting all or one of these, the council
was named Majelis Tarjih. Based on the principles of the council (Qaidah
Lajnah Tarjih) issued by Central Board of Muhammadiyah in 1971, Majelis
Tarjih is responsible for: a) investigating and understanding knowledge of
Islam in order to guard its purity; b) formulating guidance in matters of
faith, ethics, ritual and relationship among human beings; c) issuing fatwā
and advice, both on request or otherwise when the fatwā is deemed urgent;
d) facilitating differences of opinions and understanding in the field of
religion in order to achieve public benefits (al-maslaha), and; e) improving
the quality of religious scholars (ulama’).63 Mulkhan surmised that the main
responsibility of Majelis Tarjih is to decide on the legal status of any issues
disputed among community (umma) in the practice of religion.64
Tarjiḥ also refers to a specific term in the study of the textual basis of
Islamic law (dalīl). It is a method of examining texts when different or even
contradictory textual basis occurs on any particular issue. In the context of
the philosophy of Islamic law (ushūl al-fiqh), scholars call this contradiction
as ta’aruḍ al-adilla.65 Popular examples of contradiction between texts
62 Wawan Gunawan Abdul Wahid, “Tajdid, Manhaj Tarjih, dan Produk Hukum Majelis Tarjih”,
Suara Muhammadiyah, Number 05/09, 1-15 March 2014, 18-19.
63 Majelis Tarjih PP Muhammadiyah, Qaidah Lajnah Tarjih Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta:
Majelis Tarjih PP Muhammadiyah, 1971), 2.
64 A. Munir Mulkhan, Masalah-masalah Teologi dan Fiqih dalam Tarjih Muhammadiyah
(Yogyakarta: SIPRESS, 1994), 25.
65 Theoretically, contradiction among texts(ta’arudl al-adillah) is possible due to complexity
of early Muslim community which refered to the Prophet in attempts to resolve problems. The
references to the Prophet are not always valid as it is also possible that Prophet’s sayings are
used for political purposes. In anticipating this situation, the scholars of Islamic legal philosophy
(al-ushuliyyin) developed amechanism by which such contradiction could be resolved. Those
procedures are: 1) al-jam’u wa al-tawfiq (combining and agreement), 2) al-tarjih (identifying the
most reliable text), 3) al-Naskh (abrogation), and 4) al-Tasaquth (leaving aside both contradictory

include the waiting period (idda) for a woman whose husband are deceased
and the problem of usury (riba). On the first issue, for instance, two Qur’anic
verses appear contradictory. The first is Chapter al-Baqarah verse 234 which
states to the effect that for women whose husbands have passed away,
their waiting period (idda) is four month and ten days. The other is Surah
al-Thalaq verse 4 rules that women whose husbands have passed away while
they are pregnant, the period of waiting (idda) is up to the time of birth.66
On usury (riba), two hadith exist which are viewed as contradictory. The
first qualifies that only usury resulting from debt (riba nasi’a) is forbidden
(haram). However, another Prophetic saying (hadith) forbids barter trading
except involving goods of the same value which can be inferred as a ban on
usury resulting from trade.67 As a method of reconciling contradictory texts,
many definitions of tarjīḥ have been offered by Muslim jurists as Wahbah
Zuhaili and Shalih Salim al-Nihami listed in their books. Nevertheless,
regardless of the variety of definitions, tarjīḥ refers to a mechanism for
identifying the most reliable (arjaḥ) among two conflicting interpretable
textual basis (dalilain al-dhanniaini) on specific issues.68
By this basic understanding, it is evident that Majelis Tarjih mainly deals
with texts. Implicitly, Anwar acknowledges this fact. Citing Nasr Hamid Abu
Zayd who classifies Islam as textual civilization (haḍāra al-nass), Anwar
maintains that such a pattern can also be applied to the Muhammadiyah
case.69 It is unsurprising as a result that the adoption of term tarjiḥ as a name
for the council has sparked discussions. Rifyal Ka’bah suggests that the
enactment of the phrase tarjīḥ and not tashrī’ as the name of the designated
council is intended to avoid the perception and identification of Muham-
madiyah as a law-maker or law-giver (musharri’) or more precisely the
maker of sharī’a. However, Ka’bah values such intent as an exaggeration
as although sharī’a is a divine construction, at the practical level institu-
tions are responsible for ensuring and managing it about specific context
of time and space.70 Also, while Islamic law (sharī’a) legislated by God is
texts). See Shalih Salim al-Nihami, al-Ikhtilaf al-Ushuli fi al-Tarjih bi Katsrati al-Adillati wa
al-Ruwati wa Atsaruhu (Kuwait: Wizarah al-Awqaf wa Su’un al-Islamiyah), Part 2. See also
Wahbah Zuhaili, Ushul al-Fiqhi al-Islamiy (Damascus: Dar al-Fikri, 1986), 1173-1185.
66 Wahbah Zuhaili, Ushul al-Fiqhi al-Islamiy (Damascus: Dar al-Fikri, 1986), 1174.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid, 1185-1186.
69 Syamsul Anwar, “Beberapa Hal tentang Manhaj Tarjih dan Pemikiran Keislaman dalam
Muhammadiyah,” in in Muhammad Azhar and Hamim Ilyas (eds), Pengembangan Pemikiran
Keislaman Muhammadiyah: Purifikasi dan Dinamisasi (Yogyakarta: LPPI UMY, 2000), 27.
70 Rifyal Ka’bah in Afifi Fauzi Abbas,

universal and global (mujmal) in nature, human agencies are required for
its application in different situations.
The leaders of Majelis Tarjih, however, offer differing views. The late Ah-
mad Azhar Basyir, the chairman of Muhammadiyah Central Board between
1990-1994, for instance, explicated that the selection of term tarjiḥ refers to
specific nature of its assignments, namely to research into more reliable
sources and basis in implementing Islamic teachings in the fields of belief
(aqīda), rituals (ibāda), and human relationship (mu’āmalat). As such, tarjīḥ
is not a research and study on the opinions of Muslim scholars (ulama’)
of the past. Rather, it directly studies the Qur’ān and Sunna.71 Similarly, to
clarify the use of term tarjīḥ that might cause misunderstanding, Anwar
explains that in the course of time, there have been changes in the meaning
of tarjīḥ. It is not only a procedure of examining texts but also includes
“intellectual endeavor to study new cases that have not been addressed by
earlier jurists.”72 In short, Anwar concludes, tarjīḥ carries the same meaning
as legal reasoning (ijtihad).
While agreeing with Ka’bah’s identification of possible motives behind
the adoption of the term tarjīḥ, the writer is inclined to believe that it may
be motivated by the credo of returning to the Qur’an and Sunna (al-rujūʽ
ila al-Qur’ān wa al-Sunna) which unintentionally places texts in a chief
position. Consequently, Majelis Tarjih has turned into a medium where
the institutionalization of textualism takes place. The basis of this claim is
the observation that most Muhammadiyah members show a scripturalist
tendency towards legal thought pronounced by the Majelis. One of the most
famous pronouncements of Majelis Tarjih is a document called Himpunan
Putusan Tarjih or the compilation of Majelis Tarjih’s decrees) popularly
known as HPT. This document has been a fundamental and instrumental
tool for Muhammadiyah members in dealing with issues in Islamic law,
especially relating to rituals. Considering this paramount role it plays, it is
unsurprising that most Muhammadiyah members show strong tendency to
cling onto the HPT. Inevitably, the HPT has also unintentionally dictated the
monolithic orientation of Muhammadiyah’s principles on ritual issues. As
a result, in some cases, when Muhammadiyah members stand on different
versions on the point of rituals although it has already been determined
based on the certain textual basis, internal problems within Muhammadi-
yah arise. It is evident that from this stage, the institutionalization of the text
71 M. Muchlas Abror, “Dinamika Majelis Tarjih”, Suara Muhammadiyah 05/99, 28 Rabiul

Akhir-13 Jumadil Ula 1435 H, 26.
72 Syamsul Anwar, “Fatwa, Purificatin and Dynamization…”, 33.

through HPT has strongly influenced the rigidity of Majelis Tarjih in dealing
with contemporary problems. In many cases, HPT serves as a standard
reference book which will judge whether some thought and practices within
Muhammadiyah are faithful to Muhammadiyah doctrines or not.
The recent case which involves Syakir Jamaluddin, a lecturer at the
Faculty of Islamic Studies, Muhammadiyah University in Yogyakarta
(UMY), illustrates the problem. In 2008, Syakir wrote a book on prayer
called Shalat Sesuai Tuntunan Nabi: Mengupas Kontroversi Hadis Seputar
Shalat.73 However, trouble erupted as the book is held as not faithful to the
legal decision (keputusan) of Himpunan Putusan Tarjih,74 although Syakir
wrote in his personal capacity as an academic and not a member of the
movement. Such rigidity is not a new phenomenon. More than two decades
ago, Mulkhan had suggested for Majelis Tarjih to move beyond its textual
orientation. He argued that clinging too strongly onto texts will potentially
hinder the dynamic development of legal thought within Muhammadiyah.
Mulkhan rightly predicted this situation:
… it is time for Tarjih to uphold more progressive and anticipative activi-

ties by conceptualizing Islam in a broader sense. If the main orientation
of Tarjih is constantly placed on the solving of contradictory opinions
circulating by identifying the most valid textual basis, its function in
guiding and leading society’s religious life will not be fulfilled, especially
in the face of more rapid and global social change.75
Such a tendency will only constrain and impede opportunities to develop

alternative religious thought. Moreover, if the discussion of Tarjihis
confined to what is written in the book of Himpunan Putusan Tarjih
(HPT), this will not facilitate the active engagement and development
of new opinions relevant to resolving issues and problems addressed.76
The rigidity is becoming much more intense as the institutionalization of

Majelis Tarjih, by its nature, involves structural interference. By the rapid
expansion of Muhammadiyah, Majelis Tarjih also has to follow the structure
73 For more detailed information, see Syakir Jamaluddin, Shalat Sesuai Tuntunan Nabi:
Mengupas Kontroversi Hadis Seputar Shalat (Yogyakarta: LPPI UMY, 2008).
74 This information is obtained from Hilman Latief, a lecturer at Faculty of Islamic Studies,
Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta. The conversation took place in Malang, 29 March 2014.
75 A. Munir Mulkhan, Masalah-masalah Teologi dan Fiqih dalam Tarjih Muhammadiyah
(Yogyakarta: SIPRESS, 1994), v.
76 Ibid.

of Muhammadiyah leadership and therefore exists in three levels similar

to the movement- central board, regional and district.77 Although some
leaders of Majlis Tarjih do not view this structure as reflecting a hierarchical
relationship, it still results in some degree of inflexibility of Majelis Tarjih in
responding to contemporary issues independently. Saad Ibrahim, a Majelis
Tarjih scholar and Chairman of Muhammadiyah East Java Provincial Board,
explains that all these boards are independent in producing their thought
without the need for any approval from the central board as long as the
fatwa or any Islamic legal thought they produce is practiced within the
confine of their area of authority.78 However, it should also be emphasized
that decisions made by the lower structure cannot contradict the decision
or fatwa issued by Majelis Tarjih central board.79
In general, Majelis Tarjih is responsible for issuing two types of legal
pronouncements, namely the decree (keputusan) and legal opinion ( fatwā).
These two types of pronouncement are processed through a different mech-
anism. A decree (keputusan) is issued through a Majelis Tarjih’s National
Conference called Musyawarah Nasional Tarjih which involves Majelis
Tarjih structures at the provincial level across Indonesia as well as Majelis
Tarjih personals at the Central Board. Before a keputusan is achieved in the
Munas and then announced to Muhammadiyah members, it has to be sent
to the Central Board of Muhammadiyah for approval. On the other hand, the
process for issuing a legal opinion ( fatwā) is much more flexible, simpler and
more frequent. Fuad Zein, a member of the legal opinion ( fatwā) division
of Majelis Tarjih, informs that in most cases, questions proceeded the fatwā
of Majelis Tarjih. Prior to its weekly meetings, a member of the division will
be assigned to prepare a draft of the legal opinion ( fatwā) to be discussed
at the meeting. When the members of meeting reached an agreement, the
legal opinion ( fatwā) is then published in Suara Muhammadiyah an of-
ficial magazine of Muhammadiyah released on a fortnightly basis. In some
cases, the fatwā is sent directly to questioners.80 The differences between
these two legal pronouncements are that while the decree (keputusan) is
binding on Muhammadiyah members, the legal opinion ( fatwā) is not.
Furthermore, while the status of decree (keputusan) is indisputable, there
are different perceptions regarding legal opinion ( fatwā). Zein maintains
77 See Syamsul Anwar, “Fatwa…”, 34.

78 Interview with Saad Ibrahim, in Malang,
79 Syamsul Anwar, “Fatwa…”, 35.
80 Interview with Fuad Zein, member of Fatwa Division, Majelis Tarjih PP Muhammadiyah,
16 January 2013.

that all legal opinion ( fatwā) issued by the central board of Majelis Tarjih
can be regarded as the legal opinion ( fatwā) of Muhammadiyah.81 However,
Saad Ibrahim of Muhammadiyah Provincial Board of East Java believes
that a legal opinion ( fatwā) can only be considered as the formal stance of
Muhammadiyah if discussion at the national level forum is over.82 In the
domain of religious matters, Majelis Tarjih’s pronouncements deal with
two dimensions: practical guidance and discussions on Islamic thought.
The first deals with practical issues raised by members of the community
and is legally binding, while the second is discourse, dialogue and theory
aimed at widening the horizon of thought and not designed as binding legal
provisions like the first.83
In a formal sense, in producing its legal though in whichever form,
Majelis Tarjih cannot deviate from some fundamental principles defined
by Muhammadiyah. These include the principles of returning to the Qur’an
and Sunna (al-ruju’ ila al- Qur’ān and Sunna), legal reasoning (ijtihad), and
non-school of law (madhhab) version of Islam. It is evident at this point that
these doctrines differ from Nahdlatul Ulama’ which consciously declare
imitation (taqlīd) as one of its methods in observing Islamic teachings.
Muhammadiyah, on the other hand, adopts the principle of legal reasoning
(ijtihad), critical following (ittiba’), conscious selection of opinions (talfiq)
and identification of the most reliable basis (tarjīḥ). Legal reasoning (ijtihad)
is defined as the full devotion of reason in deducing Islamic law (sharī’a)
under the category of interpretable law (ḍanni) through the employment
of particular methods by those who are capable and competent both in
methods and the substance of the problems.84 Ittiba’ is defined as following
the opinions of Muslim scholars (ulama’) accompanied by knowledge and
awareness of arguments and basis of particular views.85 Talfiq is attitude of
combining views of scholars (ulama’) on certain issues. For Muhammadi-
yah, talfiq is acceptable provided it involves comprehensive examination
through the process of verification and identification on the status of certain
basis (tarjīḥ). Furthermore, methodologically, Muhammadiyah also adopts
the specific approach of textual (bayani) and demonstrative (burhani).
81 Interview with Fuad Zein.

82 Interview with Saad Ibrahim, 18 November 2013, in Malang, East Java.
83 Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam PP Muhammadiyah, Tafsir Tematik
al-Qur’an tentang Hubungan Sosial Antarumat Beragama(Yogyakarta: Pustaka SM, 2000), ix.
84 Keputusan Munas Tarjih XXV, tentang Manhaj Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam.
85 See Keputusan Munas Tarjih XXV tentang Manhaj Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran
Islam, chapter 3, point a.

While differences in doctrine and credo between Nahdatul Ulama’ and

Muhammadiyah cannot be ignored; as styles of thought or mode of thinking,
a little distinction exists between them. In some ways, streaks of traditional-
ism are not absent in law or the making of legal opinion. Through the MT,
Muhammadiyah promotes the culture of clinging firmly to interpretations of
Muslim scholars (ulama’) even if the system of making pronouncements and
fatwā are not bound to a chain of classical authorities confined to a specific
school of law (madhhab). Its appropriation of the principle of legal reasoning
(ijtihad) is also not unfettered by rulings and interpretations of meanings
that have been attributed to Qur’ān and Sunna by selective authorities.
Institutionally as well, the determination of rulings which cannot contradict
the Central Board’s position reflects the imperative to adhere strictly to
determinations of the higher agency within the structure of the council.
As has been discussed earlier, the dynamic of Majelis Tarjih closely relates
to the availability of Muslim religious scholars (ulama’) in this organization.
As criticism of the lack of religious scholar (ulama’) in Muhammadiyah is
pervasive, this implies that the dynamics and quality of Islamic legal thought
produced by Majelis Tarjih are often questioned. In the attempt to confront
this criticism, a significant change took place in 1995 when Muhammadiyah
held its congress in Aceh. The Majelis Tarjih is responsible for the new task as
the accelerator of intellectualism within Muhammadiyah. The change of its
formal name to Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam (MTPPI)
under the leadership of Amin Abdullah marked this new era. The selection
of Amin Abdullah, according to Ahmad Syafii Maarif, is based on the firm
proposal that Muhammadiyah should be incisive in showing its intellectual
face.86 To a large extent, this proposal proved to be effective. In the period
1995-2005, MTPPI reoriented Tarjih. Amin Abdullah’s leadership during this
period resulted in significant positive developments. The most important
amongst them is the formulation of Manhaj Tarjih (the methodology of
tarjih). The official document states as follows:
The need to improve the manhaj (method) of Islamic thought within

Muhammadiyah is, on the one hand, a necessity given the intensity
and extent of progress in social life. On the contrary (this need) is an ac-
knowledgment of the historical process and its implications for thought.
The manhaj is a methodological framework for formulating ideas and


procedures in dealing with them. It contains fundamental assumptions,

principles, methodology and its operation. It is comprehensive, flex-
ible, functional, tolerant, open, and responsive to scientific and social
development.
One of Muhammadiyah features as a religious movement is its socio-
cultural character, its dynamism in responding to developments in so-
ciety by referring to Islamic teachings (al-rujūʽila al- Qur’ān wa al-Sunna
al-Maqbūla). While on the other hand, Islam provides a normative refer-
ence for current problems, its teachings have to be applied in specific
socio-historical contexts. This mission of the movement necessitates
it to produce ideas, review as well as reconstruct its method (manhaj).
The combination of awareness and endeavors to cope with the problem of in-
tellectual stagnation within Muhammadiyah has resulted in the formulation
of the new method by Majelis Tarjih called Manhaj Tarjih dan Pengembangan
Pemikiran Islam and publication of a book on interreligious social interac-
tion titled Tafsir Tematik al-Qur’an tentang Hubungan Sosial Antarumat
Beragama.87 However, this endeavor has ended in controversy, as Majelis
Tarjih during this period was viewed as reviving liberal thought by dominant
agencies within Muhammadiyah. The culmination of this controversy
was the replacement of the name of MTPPI to Majelis Tarjih dan Tajdid.88
Therefore, from the institutional points of view, Amin’s attempts were not
successful. Despite the importance of the reformulation he pioneered, Majelis
Tarjih under him was perceived to have deviated significantly from its ideal
role and position. Some describe this as “pengembangan pemikiran Islam”
(the improvement of Islamic thought). As a result, in the 2005 Congress, the
phrase was erased from the formal name of the council and the new name
of Majelis Tarjih dan Tajdid was offered instead. This saga is pertinent in
understanding the transformation of Muhammadiyah’s legal thought which,
for most of part, was dominated by the ideology of Puritanism, revivalism,
and elements of traditionalism. This orientation is manifested in its text
bound tendency and the fetters of confinement to particular rulings and
interpretations of ulama’ based on its credo of going back to the Qur’ān and
Sunna.
87 Majelis Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam PP Muhammadiyah, Tafsir Tematik

al-Qur’an tentang Hubungan Sosial Antarumat Beragama(Yogyakarta: Pustaka SM, 2000).

Fatwa and Social Change in Muhammadiyah
This section will present some legal opinions ( fatwā) of Majelis Tarjih to
examine the mode of thought and religious orientation of Majelis Tarjih and
how they are reflected in dealing with practical problems that have arisen
within society. Numerous legal opinions ( fatwā) have been issued in the
post-New Order period by Majelis Tarjih. The abundance of the fatwā is in
response to a significant number of requests for fatwā from Muhammadiyah
members across Indonesia. Of this fatwā relating to rituals predominate.
However, for purposes of this thesis, only fatwā which have direct social
implications will be examined.89 These fatwā can be categorized as follows:
fatwā pertaining new scientific inventions and discoveries; fatwā relating
to te family; fatwā on inter-religious relation; fatwā on women and gender
relation; fatwā relating to socio-political issues and fatwā relating to Islamic
economics.
Scientific Invention and Discoveries
In 1999, Majelis Tarjih issued a fatwā in response to a question on the legality

of marriage via telephone, marriage between parties infected by HIV, and
mechanical slaughtering of theanimal. These three distinct issues were
discussed simultaneously in one fatwa. On the first question, Majelis Tarjih
argued that wedding solemnisation through phone calls not be acceptable
from the perspective of Islamic law. It maintains that marriage is a physical
and spiritual bond between men and women which are preceded by an
agreement (ʽaqd). In the case where the groom and bride are geographically
separated, the marriage cannot take place via the phone as Islamic law has
provided for conditions for solemnisation through a person who represents
either one of the parties (proxy).
In the case of marriages between the HIV-infected couple, the fatwā
asserts that there is no barrier to such a wedding provided that the couple
can meet the terms and condition of the marriage. The most important point
89 Besides the fact that all the fatwa issued by Majelis Tarjih are published in Suara Muham-
madiyah, a fortnightly magazine published by Muhammadiyah Central Board and six volumes
on Tanya Jawab Agama, all the fatwa discussed here are derived from the archive of Majelis
Tarjih and Tajdid PP Muhammadiyah’s office in Yogyakarta. The document is in the form of
computer files which can be easily printed. The reason for this is that the archive lists fatwa
in a chronological order, while the compilation lists the fatwa in a more thematic order which
covers wide periods extending beyond the purpose of this research. I thank Amiruddin, staff
or Majelis Tarjih and Tajdid in Yogyakarta office, for providing me with the copy of the fatwa.

in this marriage is that both parties must be HIV-infected. Two justifications

for this legal opinion ( fatwā) were adduced. The first is the Chapter al-Nur
of the Qur’an verse 26 which states: Vile women are for vile men and vile
men for vile women. Good women are for good men, and good men for good
women; such are innocent of that which people say: For them is pardon and
a bountiful provision.
Also, the Islamic legal maxim that acts which have the least harmful ef-
fects is more favorable (irtikabu akhaffu ḍararain)was also cited in support.
The legal opinion ( fatwā) strongly advised that such a couple should not
have any offspring, as this would incur risks of harm on their lives.90 On
the issue about animal slaughtering, the legal opinion ( fatwā) in question
did not deal with the legal status of mechanical slaughtering but on the
matter of reciting basmala in the ritual.
Subsequently, in 2002, Muhammadiyah issued a fatwā on the determina-
tion of the new month in the lunar calendar. This controversial fatwā was
not published for the first time. As is widely known, Muhammadiyah adopts
the method of calculation (ḥisāb) in determining the beginning of the new
month in the lunar calendar which differs from the practice by Nahdlatul
Ulama’. The legal opinion ( fatwā) maintained that since its inception in
1912, Muhammadiyah has attempted to harmonize the ideal dimension of
revelation with real conditions of human civilization. The first dimension
is returning to the Quran and Sunna (al-rujūʽila al-Qur’ān wa al-Sunna),
while the second is the core of Islamic thought in Muhammadiyah. In the
light of this objective of attaining harmony, the Himpunan Putusan Tarjih
decided that al-sūmu wa al-fitru bi al-ruʼyati wa la mani’abi al-ḥisāb, i.e. that
ritual of fasting and celebration of Ied determined by direct vision of the
crescent (ruʼya) and calcutaion (ḥisāb) simultaneously is not prohibited.
Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that empirically Muhammadiyah has
never practiced direct vision (ru’ya) or using bare-eyes in determining the
beginning of Islamic Calendar (Ramadan, Shawwal, and Dhulhijja). This
practice is due to a belief that the teaching of Islam is not narrow, and as
such calculation (ḥisāb) should be adopted as the method of determining
the beginning of the new month.91
90 Fatwa Number 3/1999. This fatwa is also published on Suara Muhammadiyah Magazine,
No. 1 Year 84/1999.
91 Fatwa Number 05 B, 2002. This fatwa is published on Suara Muhammadiyah, Number 5,
87/2002. Other than the fatwa on this issue, Muhammadiyah also published a book explaining
Muhammadiyah’s preference for hisab and the principles of its method. See Majelis Tarjih dan
Tajdid PP Muhammadiyah, Pedoman Hisab Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Majelis Tarjih dan
Tajdid PP Muhammadiyah, 2009).

Apart from these, in 2005 Majelis Tarjih issued a legal opinion ( fatwā) on
artificial insemination and human cloning which can be considered con-
troversial issues discussed by Muslim scholars in Indonesia. The important
question raised is whether Islam allows a man to transcend the bounds of
destiny determined by God by using scientific-technological inventions in
matters of health as instanced by artificial insemination and cloning for
those who are unable to bear children. The legal opinion ( fatwā) affirms
the validity of in-vitro fertilization. However, it confined the permissibility
of this practice to couples who are validly married to one another. It means
that only the sperm and ovum belonging to the same married couple can
be used and inserted into the uterus of the wife. In justifying this legal
opinion ( fatwā), the Majlis referred to two verses from the Qur’ān namely:
Sura al-Nisaʼ verse 21, which states: How can you take it (back) after one of
you has gone in unto the other, and they have taken a strong pledge from
you? In addition, the legal opinion ( fatwā) also cited Chapter al-Baqara
verse 223 which stipulates: Your women are a tilth for you (to cultivate) so go
to your tilth as you will and send (good deeds) before you for your souls, and
fear Allah, and know that you will (one day) meet Him. Give glad tidings to
believers, (O Muhammad).
The legal opinion ( fatwā) deems ḥarām cases where the fertilized egg is
inserted into another wife’s uterus (if a man is married to more than one
women). The same fatwā also pronounced on the status of human cloning. In
the view of Majelis Tarjih, human cloning is ḥarām (forbidden). This is based
on the principle that the birth in people has to be by the law of nature which
in Islamic lexicon is known as sunnatu-Llah. Furthermore, a human being is
born with the qualities of God’s best and honored creatures (Chapter al-Tīn:
4), (Chapter al-Isrā’: 70). The goal of life for humans is to attain happiness both
in worldly life and in the hereafter (Chapter al-Baqara: 201), as vicegerents
of God on earth (Chapter al-Baqarah: 30). To achieve the goal of their life,
human beings have to devote their lives to God through ʽibada (worship)
(Chapter al-Dhariyat: 56). Majelis Tarjih defines ʽibada as obedience to God,
doing good for humans, and protecting nature from destruction.
The last legal opinion ( fatwā) of Majelis Tarjih relating to scientif ic
discoveries and invention occurred in 2008. It pertains to the legal status
of marriage solemnisation through video conferencing. Arising from the
advancement of technology, this is an example of a practice which does
not have precedence in the past. Departing from Majelis Tarjih’s response
to a similar issue in 1999, this legal opinion ( fatwā) opined that wedding
solemnisation through video conferencing is valid in the eyes of Islam. It
maintains that in Islam, marriage is a process which consists of the guardian

(wali) of a bride consenting to the marriage of his daughter called ijab. The
groom accepts the offer by the custodian (qabūl). The ijab-qabūl, therefore, is
an essential aspect of the solemnisation. It requires four conditions, namely:
the consent (ijab) and the acceptance (qabūl) done in one place or forum;
compatibility of consent (ijab) and acceptance (qabūl); non-withdrawal of
the agreement before acceptance by the groom and solemnization taking
effect immediately and not postponed to a future date.92
Although one of the requirements mentions that ijab-qabūl has to be
done in one place or one forum, Majelis Tarjih interpreted this condition
more widely, not confined to a physical sense. It allowed for the solemnisa-
tion to occur simultaneously although in different places. In the past, this
has been practiced and agreed upon by religious scholars (ulamaʽ) although
via a traditional media such as by letters or proxy. In consideration of this,
the legal opinion ( fatwā) concluded that the most advanced technological
invention such as video conferencing which enables both parties to com-
municate and interact simultaneously in real time offers a much more
reasonable alternative. For this reason, Majelis Tarjih views that wedding
solemnized through video conference is acceptable and valid.
On the whole, these legal opinions ( fatwā) are positive. The fatwā give
overriding recognition to the well-being of humans. It upholds human life
and dignity of man and relevant modern scientific knowledge to enable
Muslims to adapt to and utilize the benefits of scientific knowledge with
the aim of improving their condition. They also reveal efforts to facilitate
improvement in human condition and alleviate hardship without being
trapped by rulings established in the past. Nevertheless in arriving at it
rulings, the basis of legal opinion ( fatwā) remains confined essentially
to selective interpretations of verses from the Koran it deems relevant to
analyzing the problems at issue. The principles extracted from these verses
are not always clearly explicated. Furthermore, the legal ( fatwā) do not
engage with nor draw upon principles and ideas within the contemporary
ethical discourse on these issues such as those about In-vitro fertilization
and cloning prevalent in the Muslim world and beyond. The implications
of these practices on society are also not investigated. Based on theological
viewpoints, the legal opinion ( fatwā) cannot, therefore, be of universal
relevance beyond the community of the members of Muhammadiyah. In
these respects, the legal opinion ( fatwā) can be considered as revealing
streaks of traditionalism. Even the legal opinion ( fatwā) on direct vision
(ru’ya) versus calculation (ḥisāb) does not delve systematically into their
92 Fatwa Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah No. 24, 2008.

social implications in the context of modern societies that demand planning

and precision in meeting their socio-economic needs.
Apart from the manifestations of traditionalism in the above legal opin-
ion ( fatwā), the fatwā on solemnization of marriage via video conferencing
also reveals inconsistency with the 1999 legal opinion ( fatwā) on the validity
of marriage via the telephone. The difference may well reflect competing
modes of thinking amongst agencies responsible for making legal opinion
within Majelis Tarjih. While the following fatwā mirrored greater openness
in revaluing traditions and rulings of the past in determining the idea of
place in effecting marriage, the earlier fatwā tended to adopt legal opinions
of the past despite changes induced by scientific innovation.
Fatwa relating to Family Matters
In 2007, Majelis Tarjih responded to a question on nikah sirri, a marriage

which is not officially registered. The legal opinion ( fatwā) pronounced that
it is obligatory for Muhammadiyah members to register their marriage as
many benefits can be derived from marriage registration which includes
clarity of status for both parties with all its legal consequences. In defining
the status of marriage not registered by the state (nikah sirri), Majelis Tarjih
describes the evolution of the practice of registration of marriage in the
history of Islam. It revealed that the term nikah sirri is known during the
era of Imam Malik, the founder of the Maliki school of law. However, the
meaning of the term differs from its usage in contemporary context. In its
older meaning, nikah sirri means a marriage which has met all require-
ments according to Islamic law, namely ijab-qabūl (consent and acceptance)
between two consenting parties and witnesses. However, witnesses are
required not to declare the marriage publicly. In other words, it is a marriage
which is not accompanied by declaration of marriage (iʽlan al-nikāḥ) in the
form of wedding reception (walimatu al-ʽursh).93
In its current context, especially in Indonesia, this type of marriage
satisfies the conditions of marriage such as guardian (wali) for the bride
and witnesses. However, as the marriage is not contracted in the presence
of a marriage registrar or judge (qaḍi) no marriage certificate can be issued
to the parties. The Majelis maintained that registration of marriage is an
aspect of human relations (mu’amala). Citing Chapter al-Baqara verse 282, it
states that the agreement should be recorded in writing which in the context
is analogous to registration. The verse reads: “O you who believe! When you
93 Fatwa Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah Number 13, 2007.

contract a debt for a fixed term, record it in writing. Let a scribe record it in
writing between you in (terms of) equity.” Therefore, although marriage reg-
istration is not known during the time of Prophet and ulamaʽ, Majelis Tarjih
opined that it is obligatory. Although this legal opinion (fatwā) supports an
innovative practice of contemporary society Majelis Tarjih maintains that it
is consistent with Islamic values as the change is required to allow for the
relevance of Islamic tradition to the demands of the contemporary society.94
Similar to the ones above, this outcome of this fatwa appears to contribute
to alleviating uncertainty and potential hardship with non-registration of
marriage. The result in requiring registration of marriage as a necessity in
the contemporary context of Indonesia would possibly bring about positive
social ramifications. However, the feature of traditionalism remains in so
far as the fatwā relies strongly on selected verses of the Qur’ān and their
interpretations. The verse quoted specifically relating to debts is extended to
encompass marriage without clearly explicating the ground for the extension
of principles. Furthermore, the foundation for the legal opinion ( fatwā) is
widely theological and rather isolated from the discourse on circumstances
within Indonesia propelling the practice and investigation of their actual
effects or consequences within the community. Although such a trajec-
tory is significant in shedding insights into the problem and raising greater
awareness of the phenomenon and its implications this dimension was not
adequately addressed in the fatwā.
Another important legal opinion ( fatwā) relating to the family law and
family involves the legal status of divorce outside of court.95 Majelis Tarjih
stated that such a divorce invalid based on several reasons. Firstly, such a
practice does not respect the dignity of women. The fatwā explained that
in classical jurisprudence ( fiqh), a husband is granted an absolute right to
divorce which takes effect the moment it is pronounced. This situation,
according to Majelis Tarjih disadvantages women, undermines the stability
of the family, invokes legal uncertainty and threatens the stability of the
social order. It maintains that for the sake of benefit (al-maslaha), a divorce
is only deemed valid if it is done through court. In this case, a change in legal
provision is adopted by Majelis Tarjih, from absolute right of the husband
to divorce from a divorce that is permitted only through the court.96
94 Ibid.
95 Collin’s Dictionary translates talaq as “a form of divorce under Islamic law in which the
husband repudiates the marriage by saying ‘talaq’ three times”. See http://www.collinsdictionary.
com/dictionary/english/talaq.
96 Fatwa Majelis Tarjih Number 12, 2007.

Islam, the legal opinion ( fatwā) continues, pays close attention to the
family as an institution and views it as a sacred institution. Tantamount
to this view, Islamic family law regarding marriage uphold that marriage
should not be easily dissolved without adequate safeguards. Although
divorce is permitted (ḥalāl) from an Islamic law perspective, it is detested by
God. The fatwā also quotes the Kompilasi Hukum Islam (KHI), which states
that rigorous examination by the court is an essential part of the divorce
process. The KHI also qualifies that a divorce can only be achieved after
the court formally determined so. This legal opinion ( fatwā) is consistent
with the aim Muslim law reform about divorce that has been implemented
in many parts of the Muslim world. It endorses safeguards that check rash
and hasty divorce. In some jurisdictions such as Malaysia, pronouncement
of divorce outside the court is not only invalid but constitutes and offense.
While the legal opinion ( fatwā) is a step towards improving the status of
wives, it also pertinent to note that it fails to deal with the issue of the
legality of divorce pronounced by husbands without cause. This oversight
is revealing for the persistence of traditionalism which does not question
a husband’s absolute right of divorce (ṭalaq) based on selective inference
of certain Qur’ānic verses irrespective of its consequences on the stability
of the marriage institution. The single focus on upholding divorce (ṭalaq)
pronounced in court while remaining silent on talk without causes based
on the very reasons adduced by the Majelis clearly manifests the traits of
traditionalism. After all, traditionalists tend to be oblivious to the implica-
tions of their thought.
Fatwa on Interreligious Relation
In a pluralistic society such as Indonesia where diversity of cultures and

religions interact, marriage between people from diverse cultural and
religious backgrounds is inevitable. However, this social reality is not eas-
ily accepted given dominant religious orientations. In responding to this
sensitive issue, Majelis Tarjih upheld in its divorce (ṭalaq) that Muslim jurists
agreed that Muslim women are forbidden (ḥarām) to marry anyone other
than Muslim men. According to its legal opinion ( fatwā), Muslim jurists
are also in agreement that Muslim men are also forbidden (ḥarām) to marry
women of polytheist faiths such Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism and
the like. However, they dispute over the marriage of Muslim men to women
of other monotheist traditions such as Jews and Christians, which in the
Qur’anic term are referred to Ahl al-Kitab (People of the Book). Majelis Tarjih
asserts that while some jurists permit such a marriage based on Chapter

al-Maidah verse 5, some scholars (ulama’) forbid such marriage. Among

major reasons adduced are the following: the current context of People of
the Book differ from those who existed in the time of the Prophet, People
of the book in the contemporary situation are clearly polytheists who assert
that Uzair is the son of God (in Jewish belief) and that Jesus is also the
Son of God in Christian belief. Also, it is maintained that interreligious
marriage will not realize happy families (keluarga sakinah) which is the
main goal of the marriage. Furthermore, the number of Muslim women has
outnumbered those of Muslim men, so the community will not experience
the shortage of women. Finally forbidding interreligious marriage is an
attempt of preventing destruction (shadh al-dhari’a) and guard the faith
of Muslim couples and their offspring. In general, the fatwā reflects the
dominant traditionalistic mode of thinking opinions.
It is unclear if the fatwā issued by Majelis Tarjih permits marriage
between a Muslim male and a kitābiyya. The absence of a precise stand
on arguments explicated against such marriage and the concurrence of
selective juristic opinions reflects similar elements of traditionalism. The
view that it is forbidden (ḥarām) for Muslim females to marry anyone
but a Muslim male is a case in point. The position stems from the general
stance that a husband has authority over his wife. Hence a non-Muslim
male should not have guardianship over a Muslim woman which would
necessarily be the case if he married here. It is also based on the assump-
tion that a wife is more susceptible to be influenced by her husband than
vice versa. Such basis of relationship, however, may not mirror changes in
family relations and expectations of marital life today. As Tahir Mahmood
submits, Although Islam has made an improvement by allowing its followers
to seek marriage partners among scriptural (kitābiya) communities, the
traditionalistic interpretation under which the concept of kitābiya was
greatly restricted, denied women the freedom to marry even those men
whose religion were recognized as kitabi.97 More generally, the fatwā also
reflects adherence to circumscribed definition of kitabiyah at the expense
of others without justification by religious values. The position also reveals
a belief that presupposes assumptions about the “other” from which conclu-
sions are then made in advance about their ability to achieve the objective
of marriage in Islam. The style of thought allows for justifications based on
“self-proclaimed truths instead of attempt to develop principles in support
97 Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, “Non-Muslim Marriage in Singapore”, Gavin W. Jones, et.al
(Ed), in Muslim, Non-Muslim Marriage: Political and Cultural Contestations in Southeast Asia
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2009), 301.

of the ruling. The ruling also fails to discuss laws and practices in other
Muslim states, past and present.98
The Majelis Tarjih also issued another legal opinion ( fatwā) dealing with
Muslim and non-Muslim relation in 2004. The fatwā presented some textual
basis from Prophetic tradition and empirical evidence from Indonesian
context. Furthermore, it mentioned that there is an unwritten agreement
among religious leaders in Indonesia that Indonesian people of religions are
one, although they are different. By one, it refers to the fact that Indonesians
regardless of their religion, attempts to build Indonesia as a society and to
realize peace and prosperity for all Indonesian people irrespective of their
background and identities. However, at the same time, they are different
in term of faith, rituals, and forms of prohibition within their respective
religious tradition. On this difference, it is obligatory for all peoples of
religion to respect each other. In this way, tolerance and interaction among
people of religion can be ensured. This legal opinion ( fatwā) clearly dif-
fers from competing mode of thinking of social groups within Indonesian
Muslim community discussed in the previous chapter.
Fatwa on Women and Gender Relation
In 2009, Majelis Tarjih issued a response to a question posed by a Muham-

madiyah member on the aurat of women. The specific problem raised was
whether a Muslim woman who lives with a non-Muslim woman in a shared
place such as dormitory need to conform to the ruling on aurat or whether
the situation can be considered as emergency (ḍarurat). The legal opinion
( fatwā) maintained that principally, Muslim women who experience such
a case remain under an obligation to cover their aurat. The situation does
not provide an exception for freely exposing their aurat. This fatwā illustrate
the kinds of constraints women are expected to put up with in adapting
to changing conditions.
The legal opinion ( fatwā) on dating is another example of the challenges
and problems confronting Muslims in adjusting to the demands of social
change and the extent to which dominant agencies’ mode of thinking
facilitate this process. The legal opinion ( fatwā) does not explicate clearly
the legal status of dating but is inclined to permit dating under certain
circumstances. Majelis Tarjih explained that dating could be understood
in three ways- the free relationship between men and women for the sake
of enjoyment; dating in the ways that lead to adultery and dating meant as
98 Ibid, 22.

a prelude to marriage. Based on selected readings of texts, Majelis Tarjih

concluded that dating in the third sense is permitted in Islam.It is not
erroneous to draw from the legal opinion ( fatwā) a hostile attitude towards
dating unless for the purpose of marriage. This sentiment underlying the
fatwā can be said to reflect continuities with values of modesty and virtue
in traditional society. Effectively, it deters gender interaction through dating
unless accompanied by the intention of marriage. In actuality, the legal
opinion ( fatwā) may not be easily implemented as one may not know for
sure the direction a relationship will take to avoid dating in the first place.
Traditionalism is also evident in response to the issue on the permis-
sibility of women involved in social activism. While the Majelis Tarjih has
positively responded to it, several preconditions abound in the fatwā– the
woman can balance between public and domestic affairs, she has to prior-
itize domestic over public matters. If the activities of the organization are
incidental, they should be prioritized over family commitment provided
that the commitment is not an essential matter. Furthermore, obtaining
the permission of the husband is obligatory. At the same time, a husband is
obliged to understand that public interest is part of Muslim responsibility
under the category communal responsibility ( farḍ kifāya) which incurs sins
if not responsibly taken up. The fatwā also qualifies that if the family com-
mitment is incidental in nature, it should be prioritized over organizational
activities which are routinely held. Should there be a clash between two
related activities, the activities with greater benefit should be prioritized.
On the whole, it can be said, that the legal opinion ( fatwā) allowing women
to participate in society is conditioned by the unstated assumption that her
primary role is that of a homemaker. Hence, her commitments to public life
must be considered against the wishes of her husband as well as the family.
At no point should her devotion to the household be compromised by her
involvement in society? The fatwā clearly mirrors the prevalence of division
of roles along gendered lines analogous to traditional society. While many
women are educated and have become professionals contributing to society
in their right, the fatwā reveals a lack of adequate consideration for changing
conditions of women and their growing expertise much needed in society.
Islamic Finance
Another manifestation on traditionalism is the legal opinion ( fatwā) on

interest from savings. In 1999, in responding to the question on the permissi-
bility of bank interest, Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah referring to a previous
legal opinion ( fatwā) on the same subject, maintained that very low bank

interest does not constitute usury (riba). Therefore, it is permitted to deal

with banks. Quoting the Committee of Islamic Jurisprudence (Lajnah Fiqih
Islam), Majelis Tarjih also holds the view that banks which apply interest
for administrative purposes are not categorized as interests which contain
usury (riba) elements.
While this legal opinion ( fatwā) appears to depart from dominant views
which uphold that interest in conventional banks is forbidden (ḥarām) in
so far as it permits low interest, it does not challenge the predominant view
that interest is equivalent to usury. This standpoint is based on selective
interpretation of the verse of the Qur’ān at the expense of other rulings
anchored on the same sources without recourse to clear justification on the
ground of principles. The legal opinion ( fatwā) is also pronounced without
consideration for competing views on the problems of perception and
implementation of administrative costs as a decent substitute for interest.
Fatwā and Social Issues
In some respects, a legal opinion ( fatwā) issued by the Majelis has positive
implications for the development of the community. It encourages initiatives
that have the potential of being useful to society. The legal opinion ( fatwā)
on the use of almsgiving funds for the purpose of education is a case in point.
Almsgiving is a ritual in Islam which takes the form of giving a certain
amount of wealth for religious purposes. The Qur’ān has defined seven
groups of almsgiving (zakat) recipients. The question raised is whether the
funds can be used for the purpose of public benefits such as building schools
or other public facilities. Majelis Tarjih argued that using almsgiving fund
for such purposes is permitted and is analogous to distribution to recipients
namely jihād fi sabili-Llah. Here, Muhammadiyah adopts the meaning of
the term jihād, not as warfare, but struggle and endeavor to enforce religion
through the establishment of educational institutions.
Another kegak opinion ( fatwā) which is also generally positive if the
prohibition of bribery, a common practice in Indonesia which has cre-
ated adverse consequences among Muhammadiyah members who finally
raised this issue to Majelis Tarjih. In its response, Majelis Tarjih ruled that
in general, people involved in bribery by giving any form of inducement
to obtain unfair privileges are committing a sin forbidden by sharī’a. It
asserted that Muslim jurists have agreed that bribery is forbidden (ḥarām).
The fatwā, however, attempts to make distinctions between permitted and
non-permitted circumstances in which bribery can be placed in the specific
context of entry into the civil service. The fatwā distinguished between

two groups – those not entitled to certain jobs due to inability to fulfill the
qualification and those who can meet the requirement, but due to close
competition resort to bribery tobe selected. For those in the first group, the
legal opinion ( fatwā) deems that it is forbidden (ḥarām) for them to receive
the salary, while it permits the second to get a salary. However, it nonethe-
less qualifies the latter guilty of sinning as they have resorted to unfair
dealings in bribing the authority. These groups are distinguished from
another group involving those who are in some cases entitled and eligible
for certain posts in the civil service. However, as system dictates, they are
made to pay a certain amount of money or provide some gratification as
failure to do so will result in rights being revoked although they have been
formally and officially accepted. In such a case, they are permitted to receive
the salary, and it is good and permitted (ḥalāl). The basis of legal opinion
( fatwā) appears to be conditioned by exigent circumstances confronting
the individuals involved. Although it takes into consideration hardship or
disadvantage suffered by the person who resorts to bribery in legitimizing
or prohibiting incomes derived from corruption, the legal opinion ( fatwā)
cannot take as shedding adequate insights into the phenomenon and its
ramifications. While it opposes the practice, the legal opinion ( fatwā) does
is not reformist in substance in this sense.
The legal opinion ( fatwā) prohibiting smoking cigarettes is another
case in point. The fatwā was issued by Majelis Tarjih dan Tajdid, Central
Board of Muhammadiyah (Number 6/SM/MTT/III/2010). It pronounced
that smoking cigarettes are prohibited (ḥarām) based on several reasons.
It maintains that it is an act which attracts harmful effects (al-khabāith)
and hence violates the teachings of Islam as encapsulated in the Qur’ān,
Chapter 7: 157. Secondly, smoking cigarette contributes to gradual suicide.
Doctrinally, it is contradictory to the Qur’anic principle mentioned in the
Chapter al-Baqarah verse 195 and Chapter al-Nisa verse 29. Furthermore, it
endangers both self and others. It also contains substances that are addic-
tive and dangerous although its effects are not felt immediately. Moreover,
from a sharī’a point of view, smoking a cigarette is contradictory to the
highest goals of Islamic law (maqāshid al-sharī’a) of protecting religion
(ḥifdh al-dīn), the soul (hifdh al-nafs), the mind (hifdh al-ʽql), family (hifdh
al-nasl), and wealth (hifdh al-mal). While this legal opinion ( fatwā) may
have positive outcomes on society, the mode of thinking cannot be said
to be reformist. The fatwā does not take into consideration systematic
research that has been carried out on smoking and its effects. It is also
devoid of consideration for why despite its ill-effects, smoking has not been
prohibited in most contemporary societies while raising awareness of its

potential harm remains prevalent. The legal opinion ( fatwā) has also not
taken into consideration why Muslim states have not issued similar legal
opinion ( fatwā). It is such considerations that would have provided a deeper
understanding of the phenomenon and its ramifications. The selection of
legal opinion ( fatwā) mentioned above reveals that fatwā issued by Majelis
Tarjih encompass diverse problems confronting members of the movement.
They provide a glimpse into the mode of thought of dominant agencies and
competing orientations within the institution. While Muhammadiyah
is puritan and reformist, the fatwā selected reveal the predominance of
traditionalism although competing orientations do exist to some extent.
To a large degree the approach to legal opinion ( fatwā) as instanced above
reveals a preoccupation with the validity of legal rulings and problems of
sin and damnation common in traditionalist religious discourse. Fuad
Zein of Majelis Tarjih in Yogyakarta argues that the fatwā reflect ritualistic
preoccupation within the community.99 While Zein’s observation cannot be
denied, it is pertinent to note that as a social movement, the attitude, and
orientation of Muhammadiyah members are also shaped and conditioned
by its elites. In other words, the ritualistic tendency of Muhammadiyah
members as reflected in the types of Majelis Tarjih’s fatwā reflects the mode
of thought of its leaders.
The legal opinion ( fatwā) above indicates the capacity of its elites to
respond effectively to the challenges of social changes. In turn, it strongly
hinges on a thorough understanding of religious traditions as well as mod-
ern knowledge relevant to the problems confronting the society. Closely
intertwined with this factor is the role of Muhammadiyah’s system of
education in the cultivation of religious scholars (ulama’) and the role and
position of the religious scholars (ulama’) within the movement.
In the early period of its inception, Muhammadiyah has amalgamated
two polar models of education. As such it has been associated with develop-
ing a balanced system of education which gives emphasis to both Islamic
and modern knowledge.100 Its conception of religious scholars (ulama’)
illustrates the point. As Khozin, a scholar of Muhammadiyah University
of Malang, asserts:
99 Interview with Fuad Zein, in Yogyakarta, 16 January 2013.

100 For more comprehensive discussion on Muhammadiyah education, please refer to Khozin,
Jejak-jejak Pendidikan Islam di Indonesia: Rekonstruksi Sejarah untuk Aksi (Malang: UMM
Press, 2006), 165-186. See also Syarifuddin Jurdi, et.al (eds), 1 Abad Muhammadiyah: Gagasan
Pembaruan Sosial Keagamaan (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 246-252; and Hamdan, Paradigma Baru
Pendidikan Muhammadiyah (Yogyakarta: Arruz Media, 2009), 97-105.

[the] perception of Muhammadiyah about religious scholar (ulama’) is

one who is well versed in religious sciences as well as knowledge of the
modern world. Therefore, Muhammadiyah ulama’ are those who have
the deep religious knowledge and can deal with any religious issues
confronting society. At the same time, they are also able to provide an
efficient response to social, economic and political problems faced by
the people. It is this type of ulama’ which the Muhammdiyah system of
education aims to achieve.101
However, the cultivation of such religious scholars (ulama’) remains a major

challenge. Muhammadiyah’s understanding of itself as a reform movement
has to some extent impeded progress towards achieving this objective.
Essentially, its orientation is one that tends to reject tradition as an impedi-
ment to progress. In the domain of education, the anti-tradition-attitude of
Muhammadiyah is evidently manifested in the form of relative ignorance of
the heritage of classical scholarship which is often referred to as intellectual
legacy (turath). Consequently, educational institutions which function as the
center for legacy (turāth) studies are very limited within Muhammadiyah.
Data published on Muhammadiyah’s official website reveals this imbal-
ance in Muhammadiyah’s education system. Muhammadiyah is currently
running as many as 2,604 elementary schools, 1,772 secondary schools, and
1,143 senior high schools. The total figure for all these schools amounts to
5,519. At the same time, the number of Islamic boarding schools owned and
run by Muhammadiyah ranging from elementary to senior high schools
level comprises only 67 or about 1.2 percent of a total number of schools
run by Muhammadiyah.102 Inevitably, this condition has contributed to the
lack of religious scholars with adequate mastery of Islamic traditions. Such
criticism emerged more than two decades ago.103 While Muhammadiyah
education can produce skilled personalities in many fields of life, education
designated to produce religious scholars (ulama’) is limited to few religious-
based schools and Islamic boarding schools (pesantren).
Ideally, the transmission of Islamic knowledge could be carried out in Mu-
hammadiyah universities through the faculties of Islamic studies. However,
the universities have not been fully able to play prominent roles in generating
101 Khozin, Jejak-jejak Pendidikan Islam, 190.

102 Lihat http://www.muhammadiyah.or.id/content-8-det-amal-usaha.html.Accessed on
28 February 2014.
103 Haedar Nashir, “Muhammadiyah dan Transformasi Figur Ulama’” in Kelompok Studi Ling-
karan (ed), Intelektualisme Muhammadiyah Menyongsong Era Baru (Bandung: Mizan, 1995), 55.

religious scholars (ulama’), especially in Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) within

Muhammadiyah. The teaching of the development of religious sciences
has to be a large extent been marginalized within the institution given the
demands of industrialization and competition for the acquisition of strategic
fields of modern knowledge. Consequently, studies on religion, philosophy,
and history have failed to attract keen interest within the universities.
A significant institutional shift which saw the merging of Islamic studies-
related faculties into an exceptional faculty in 1990 reflected the growing
problem. It was spurred by dwindling student enrollment in the field of
religious-related studies. The policy has contributed to constraining the
depth and extent of the curriculum in religious sciences which exacerbates
the problem.
In responding to the need for progressive education for religious scholars
(ulama’), some circles within Muhammadiyah have attempted to initiate
programs to revitalize education for its members in the last four decades.
However, these programs could not be sustained to a large extent. The trend
in establishing new centers for transmission of Islamic legal knowledge is
also manifested in the founding of some “Muhammadiyah Boarding School”
(MBS) such as in Yogyakarta; Klaten, Central Java; and in Garut, West Java.
However, studies on the effectiveness of these alternative schools in institut-
ing a progressive system of education that facilitates the creation of religious
scholars (ulama’) relevant for the contemporary world remains wanting.
Conclusion
This chapter analyses the genesis of Muhammadiyah as an Islamic move-

ment founded at the beginning of the twentieth century. Among the impor-
tant factors leading to its foundation is the internal socio-economic decline
of Indonesian society under imperialism, the penetration of modernism,
and the wave of Islamic reformism in the Muslim world. Its focus on “reform’
by attempts at purifying syncretic Islam from elements of local culture and
traditions has contributed to the movement being closely identified as both
Puritan and reformist. However, a closer examination of the institutional
norms and methods employed in law making by its fatwā-making agency
strongly reveal elements of traditionalism. Majlis Tarjih is responsible for
issuing legal opinion ( fatwā) in response to questions raised by members of
the movement across Indonesia, is discussed. Founded about fifteen years
after Muhammadiyah’s foundation in 1912, Majelis Tarjih is believed as have
changed Muhammadiyah’s inclination into more legal ( fiqh)-type of Islam.

This chapter examined a selection of legal opinion ( fatwā) issued by the

Majelis in the post-New Order period. It maintains that traditionalism in
the mode of thinking conditioning fatwa is predominant even though some
of the legal opinion ( fatwā) issued are useful in improving the well-being
of the community.

Conclusion
In examining legal opinion ( fatwā) in Indonesia, this thesis has confined

itself to focusing on selected legal opinion ( fatwā) in the post-New Order
(Orde Baru) issued by three major fatwā-making agencies (dār al-iftāʼ)
namely Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia (MUI), Lajnah Baḥth al-Masāil Nahdlatul
Ulama’ (LBM-NU), and Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah. These fatwā-making
agencies have been selected because of their wide influence within the
Muslim community of Indonesia. While numerous legal opinion ( fatwā)
have been pronounced in this period, inevitable constraint of the thesis
necessitates confining our examination to a selection of those which have
significant consequences on Muslims in Indonesia’s plural and rapidly
changing society. The legal opinion ( fatwā) that have been selected include
those that deal with issues relating to pluralism and modernity. This study
elucidates the distinct processes and methods used by these agencies in
arriving at legal opinion ( fatwā). It also examines the contextual circum-
stances conditioning their genesis. Justifications adduced for these legal
opinion ( fatwā) are also examined. Another major dimension explored
is how legal opinion ( fatwā) is conditioned by modes of thought of the
groups that issue them. The interplay between competing modes of thought
between and within a specific agency is also discussed. This trajectory
reveals legal opinion ( fatwā) as a site for competing modes of thought
of dominant agencies within the Muslim community of Indonesia and
analyses the unconscious motives of group thought. The overriding concern
of this study is the implications of legal opinion ( fatwā) on the well-being of
Indonesia’s plural society and the extent to which it facilitates adjustment to
the demands of modernity and social change. It is hoped that these central
problems which this thesis investigates contributes to enhance understand-
ing of legal opinion ( fatwā) in Indonesia beyond existing scholarship.
This study reveals the variety of modes of thought of the three selected
fatwā-agencies in Indonesia. The influence of modes of thought in the
formation of legal opinion ( fatwā) by MUI, Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah,
and Lajnah Baḥth al-Masāil NU are enormous. Three types of religious
orientations that are discussed in this study are traditionalism, revivalism
and reformism. Given diverse ways in which these terms have been used
in scholarship and popular usage, this thesis elucidates their sociological
meanings to ensure consistency and clarity and avoid confusion. Although
this study is not primarily aimed at critical evaluation of dominant
perceptions of the religious orientations of the selected fatwā-making,

it departs from these evaluative categorisations to some extent. While

Muhammadiyah has been widely acknowledged as puritan and reformist,
the study of its mode of thought in fatwā-making process and methods as
well as in substance of selected legal opinion ( fatwā) reveal some elements
of traditionalism within this movement. This study also reveals that while
NU is strongly deemed as traditionalistic, emerging competing mode of
thought within the movement cannot be overlooked. The strong trend
towards conservatism and revivalism in MUI as manifested in its legal
opinion ( fatwā) on pluralism, secularism and liberalism as well as those on
sectarianism in the post-New Order period departs from the general view
that this umbrella Islamic organisation is predominantly traditionalistic.
Generally, this study defines traditionalism as a mode of thought which
emotively clings onto the past, preserving it at the expense of adapting to
inevitable social change. This reluctance to deal with contemporary changes
is the predominant feature of traditionalistic Islam. It is manifested clearly
in the context of legal opinion ( fatwā) in which references to authorities
of the past predominate at the expense of contemporary ideas bearing on
the specific legal opinion ( fatwā) in question. The mere reference to the
authority of the past without critically analysing their relevance on the
ground of principles in their application to the issues in focus recur in the
modes of thought in all the three agencies. It applies equally to Majelis Tarjih
Muhammdiyah despite its credo of returning to the Qur’ān and Sunna by
means of legal reasoning (ijtihad). In actuality, the interpretations selected
from these sources are not unfettered by determinations or rulings the
Council (Majelis) strictly adhered to.
Revivalism, unlike traditionalism on the other hand, is a mode of thought
which is exclusivist and reveals strong political motives bent on achieving an
Islamic society which it defines as pristine to the exclusion of all others. In this
mode of thought, Islam is not merely a religion but a comprehensive system
of belief which governs all aspects of life. In its mode of thought, furthermore,
Islam is reduced to rigidly defined system that has no place for ideas and
philosophy which the group deems alien to its construction. While it too
emphasises return to the past, this past is a reconstructed one which it seeks to
impose on contemporary society. Central to its preoccupation in achieving its
version of an Islamic society and state is its single minded agenda of removing
impurities it deems as corrupting Muslims’ identity. These include syncretic
elements not merely confined to local cultural traditions elements but also
ideas, practices and institutions which are perceived to have originated from
the west. Although it is not anti-modernity, it is unintellectual and should not
be confused with genuine progressive religious orientation. Its dogmatic and

Conclusion 273
uncompromising traits in understanding religion is manifested in MUI’s legal

opinion (fatwā) on sectarianism as well as those relating to liberalism, plural-
ism and secularism. In justifying these legal opinion (fatwā), its conservatism
is also evident in its strong adherence to selective traditions of the past which
it employs to these issues without clear explication of principles or reasoning.
Both traditionalism and revivalism differ markedly from reformism, a
mode of thought which is strongly characterised by rationality and humanity
in understanding basic teachings and values enjoined by Islam. Reformism is
also generally based on strong intellectual basis in diagnosing complexities
of problems of society. While it is deeply anchored in progressive religious
traditions, it is inclusive in its efforts at creatively synthesising religious
values and traditions with modern knowledge relevant to contemporary is-
sues. This mode of thought gives strong attention to actual outcomes of ideas
on human lives rather than dogmatic adherence to texts. This thesis reveals
that while some legal opinion ( fatwā) issued by fatwā-making agencies do
reveal outcomes that are positive to society in some instances, the level of
abstraction of problems and radius of vision cannot be said to be reformist.
The legal opinion ( fatwā) examined in this book are those issued in the
period of post-Suharto Indonesia. This period is selected as the point of
departure as Indonesia in the post-Orde Baru has witnessed significant
transformation characterised among others by freedom of religious expres-
sions in public space, evidence of competing religious views among Muslims
as well as the emergence of radicalism among some Muslim groups. The
“conservative turn” of Indonesian Islam is manifested in the attitude of
dominant groups towards the phenomenon of plurality in religiosity. Fur-
thermore, the period is also featured by unprecedented violence justified in
the name of religion. These changes in religious beliefs and practice are also
evident in the domain of law. The strong political formulation of Islamisation
and Islamic law (shari’a) formalisation is one among many manifestations.
Fatwā also provides yet another site in this competition of religious beliefs.
Theoretically speaking, legal opinion ( fatwā) is non-binding Islamic legal
opinion and therefore differ markedly from law in its essence. However,
despite this fact, legal opinion ( fatwā) plays a very significant role in defin-
ing and dealing with many contemporary issues in Indonesian society. This
study reveals how legal opinion ( fatwā) is conditioned by mode of thought
of its agencies. Competing mode of thought within a specific organisation
or movement may reflect diversity of orientations of specific social groups
within the agency and the interplay between them. Dominant as opposed
to marginal orientations within a single agency are also highlighted where
necessary. This study reveals that MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) relating to

freedom of religion and belief examined in Chapters III and V mirror strong
elements of conservatism and revivalism. The legal opinion (fatwā) declares
pluralism, liberalism and secularism as prohibited in Islam and forbidden
(haram) for Muslims. A major justification adduced is that these ideologies
potentially undermine the purity of the faith and the unity of the com-
munity (umma). Sociologically, the legal opinion ( fatwā) contradicts the
reality of plurality of Muslim communities in Indonesia, since the ban on
pluralism has in itself denied the fact that Indonesian Islam is plural from
its very inception centuries ago. While acknowledging plurality as a fact,
MUI’s legal opinion ( fatwā) rejects pluralism which it defines as acceptance
of spirituality of other faiths. In MUI’s view, pluralism is an ideology or phi-
losophy or ism ( faham) which regards all religion as one and the same, and
based on such reason, it contradicts the basic tenets of Islam. In legitimizing
its position towards pluralism, MUI cited selective interpretations both
of the Qur’ān and Sunna without recourse to competing views and their
evaluation. Its negation of other views and interpretations in affirming its
own, cloaked in absolute terms, reveals strong traits of conscious attempt
to preserve its position as defender of Muslims in Indonesia. Its exclusive
interpretation of the meaning of liberalism as acceptance of religion only on
the basis of reason despite competing views is yet another manifestation of
its selective streak. By this measure, MUI believes that liberalism can lead to
the ideology of ibāḥiya (permissiveeness) or relativism. Among three issues
that MUI dealt with in its fatwā, secularism is the most poorly articulated.
The only visible definition of secularism by MUI is the simplistic one of
separation of religious life from worldly affairs. On the whole, the legal
opinion ( fatwā) on these issues lack clarity and analytical insights and is
marred by overgeneralisation and lack of rigorous examination.
Fatwā on pluralism, liberalism and secularism has aroused response from
progressive Muslim groups in Indonesia devoted to the struggle for a more
inclusive society that not merely tolerates the “other” but accept them on
the same spiritual terms. Chapter IV examines these responses in terms
of modes of thought of these agencies. In critically appraising this legal
opinion ( fatwā), they offered competing views informed by sociological
understanding of the concepts debated. Grounded in religious traditions,
they challenge the simplistic notions of the concept and attempt to bridge
religious teachings with contemporary rational thought and contextual
interpretations of Islam. In this way they sought to ensure the relevance of
Islam and its dynamism to the changing condition of Indonesian society.
The perspective they offer attempt to adapt religious traditions to the
contemporary world in which Muslims live.

Conclusion 275
Yet, another legal opinion ( fatwā) which reveals MUI’s revivalist and
conservative streak is the legal opinion ( fatwā) on sectarianism which
pronounced Ahmadiyah and Shi’a as deviant groups. On Ahmadiyah, the
present legal opinion (fatwā) is a revision of an earlier one issued in the 1980s
which deemed only Qadiani Ahmadiyah as outside the fold of Islam. This
legal opinion ( fatwā) is based on the justification that this specific group’s
belief in the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad, its founder, undermines the
basic doctrine of Islam. The present legal opinion (fatwā), however, extends
to the Lahore Ahmadiyah as deviant which was hitherto not the case.
Although this legal opinion ( fatwā) was explicitly motivated by issues of
faith (aqīda), the change in the fatwā after more than two decades suggests
factors beyond belief (aqīda). The expansion of Ahmadiyah in some regions
across Indonesia is perhaps among other factors conditioning this shift.
Apart from the Ahmadiyah, the Shi’a, another Muslim minority group is
also subjected to such attack through legal opinion ( fatwā). As with the
Ahmadiyah’s case, a legal opinion ( fatwā) on Shi’a was also issued in 1980s
without pronouncing Shi’a as deviant. It was the legal opinion (fatwā) issued
by MUI of East Java Province in 2012 that declared Shi’a as deviant (sesat).
This change in the legitimate status of Shi’a is closely related to the greater
presence of Shi’as in Indonesia in the domains of organizational expansion,
educational development and intellectual activities.
While the purpose of these legal opinion ( fatwā) as articulated is to
guard and purify of the community (umma)’s faith, it has ushered severe
social repercussions on these groups. Without committing the pitfall of
overgeneralizations in blaming legal opinion ( fatwā) as the major trig-
gering factor for religious-based violence, the role of legal opinion ( fatwā)
in triggering or contributing to sectarianism-based violence targeted at
Ahmadiyah and Shi’a members cannot be overlooked. While MUI rejected
the association of its legal opinion (fatwā) with the eruption of violence, the
absence of efforts to quell them through legal opinion ( fatwā) cannot be
negated. The violence experienced by these two minority groups took place
not only at the physical level, but also on psychological and social levels.
Discrimination experienced by both Ahmadiyah and Shi’a communities
in many places in Indonesia are undeniable proof of the aggravation of
the problem by the legal opinion ( fatwā) even if they did not cause them.
The chapters above also highlighted plausible factors conditioning MUI’s
conservatism and revivalist orientation mirrored in the legal opinion (fatwā)
discussed. In the context of loss of patronage with the fall of Suharto and the
rise of competing groups positioning themselves as spokesmen and repre-
sentatives of Islam for Muslims in Indonesia, the hardline stance reflected

in MUI’s legal opinion (fatwā) is instructive. This plausible motive is also

reinforced by the overt justifications it offers for all the legal opinion (fatwā)
namely the protection and preservation of the unity of the community
(umma). This selective sense of danger obscures reality while legitimising its
role as guardian of the faith. The above chapters also elucidated the processes
and methods by which the legal opinion (fatwā) discussed were arrived at
which are not easily accessible elsewhere. It also revealed the dynamics
and complexity of attitudes and opinions within MUI and the influence
of dominant mode of thought on legal opinion (fatwā) within this agency.
Apart from MUI’s case, this present study also reveals that both Muham-
madiyah and NU are non-monolithic communities. NU is predominantly
traditional, but the last two decades have witnessed the emergence of
competing mode of thought within this movement. The same situation
can also be seen in the case of Muhammadiyah. Therefore, fatwā of both
Muhammadiyah and NU are found to reveal some streaks of change while
reflecting dominant modes of thinking of these agencies. The discussion in
chapter VI on NU examines this phenomenon. It finds the predominance
of traditionalistic mode of thought in NU through the methods adopted in
issuing legal opinion (fatwā). The chapter also delved into the mechanisms
and institutions by which traditionalism is preserved and reinforced within
NU. In this respect, the central place and role of the institutions of religious
leaders (kiai), Islamic boarding school (pesantren) and classical Islamic
literature (kitab kuning) within the movement were examined.
This chapter also revealed instances by which legal opinion ( fatwā) of
NU mirror strong features of religious traditionalism. The example of legal
opinion ( fatwā) on inter-religious relations served as a case in point. The
fatwā issued pronounced on the impermissibility of non-Muslim members
in parliament and forbid Muslims to delegate their affairs or concerns
to non-Muslims, except in exigent circumstances. NU’s reluctance in ac-
cepting modern scientific inventions or knowledge as exemplified by its
strong adherence to the method of diecrt vision of the crescent (ru’ya) in
determining the new month in the Islamic calendar system based on lunar
rotation provided another example of the predominance of traditionalism
within this agency. Its dogmatic reliance on selective authorities of the
past without contextual reflections on empirical situation and its lack of
recourse to contemporary knowledge and discourse on issues at hand in
fatwā-making is also revealing of its mode of thought.
This thesis also identified some shifts in religious orientation within
NU more recently. Fatwā on issues such as democracy and gender relation
illustrated the phenomenon. NU’s views on certain religious understanding

Conclusion 277
as hindering gender equality is instructive. However, while the legal opinion

( fatwā) urged for the need to review traditional views on Islam amidst the
challenge of social change, the bases of the legal opinion ( fatwā) and other
similar ones have not generally departed from traditional methods and
approaches in understanding and interpreting religious doctrines which
include multidisciplinary approaches informed by social sciences.
In the case of Muhammadiyah, Chapter VII reveals that its gradual shift
towards a more legalistic-type of Islam with the existence of Majelis Tarjih is
accompanied by a leaning to traditionalism as evident in the procedures it
adopts in fatwa-making and the substance of its legal opinion (fatwā). This
despite its credo of returning to the Qur’ān and Sunna by way of legal reason-
ing (ijtihad). At the same time, the puritanical orientation of the movement
remains. The examination of Muhammadiyah’s legal opinion (fatwā) in the
period of post-Suharto Indonesia encompassing several issues reveal its
ambivalence towards social change and modernity as instanced in its stance
on women and gender relations. While some of its legal opinion ( fatwā)
reveal support for long established legal reforms such as those pertaining
to registration of marriage and legality of divorce pronounced in court, it is
pertinent to note that these ideas are not novel and may indicate pragmatic
response to pressing demands for change within Indonesian society. The
lack of comprehensive reflections on the state of the law on marriage and
divorce in arriving at legal opinion (fatwā) on a specific issue in this domain
is another manifestation of traditionalist response to change. While the
outcome of some of these legal opinion ( fatwā) are no doubt positive and
reveal elements of progress, they cannot be deemed to reflect standards of
reformist mode of thought. Generally, the bases advanced for many of these
legal opinion (fatwā) are strictly confined to limited theological arguments
and sources without recourse to prevailing religious and ethical discourse
(beyond theology) on these issues on the global plane. The legal opinion
( fatwā) on solemnisation of marriage through video conferencing, in-vitro
fertilisation, bank interest and several others illustrate the point.
On the whole, this study reveals that selected legal opinion (fatwā) issued
in the post-New Order period issued by these three prominent agencies are
predominantly influenced by traditionalist, conservative and revivalist
modes of thought. While some reformist traits exist in fatwā and fatwā-
making, this mode of thought remain marginal. These predominant modes
of thought bear strong implications on the extent of the role of legal opinion
( fatwā) in contributing to the development and well-being of Indonesia’s
plural society and the challenges of social change.

Appendix: Fatwa of Majelis Tarjih
1999-2010
No Year Subject of Fatwa or Keputusan
1. 1999 Tatawu’ prayer after the ablution

The slaughtering of animal during the pilgrimage
Wedding solemnization through phone calls, marriage of HIV affected
persons, the renewal of marriage, the mechanical slaughtering for
animal
Prayer for ihram
Reciting basmallah before salam during the Friday sermons and after
Raising hands during praying
Folding hands (sedekap) during i’tidal
Friday and ashr prayers in one time
Prayer and sermon for asking rain (istisqa)
The obligation to recite al-Fatiha
Lying in filling the receipt of regular expenditure
The civil servant and servant of society as shirk
On sunna fasting
Various matter related to prayers
Assisting dying spouse, many issues related to adzan (prayer call and
iqamah (second prayer call)
Various matter related to prayers
Meaning of many terms in Indonesian Islam
Bid’ah (heresy), Sunna, and Sunni-Shi’ah
Difference and similarities of Muslim groups
Bank interest and various issues related to hadith
Altering or selling endowment
Adzan and iqamah in the newborn-baby’s ears
The obligation of wearing headscarf and legal status of listening to music
Two qullah water volume, the distance of jama’ qashar, and gold
almsgiving
Answering adzan in the restroom, and responding to the salam at the end
of prayers
Raising hands and the sitting ways in prayers
Distributing inheritance
Obligation of a husband to his wife and children who embrace different
faith
The status of excessive profit
On volume of two qullahs
Reciting basmallah before and after al-Fatiha

2. 2002 The management of orphanage funds

Almsgiving funds for education
Various issues on pilgrimage
The legal status of respecting flags
Legal status of covering the ankle
Some provisions on almsgiving
The legal status of business and investment
The determination of beginning of lunar calendar
3. 2003 Raising hands in praying

Fasting in ‘Arafah day
Allah resides in ‘Arsy
Bid’ah
Payment time for pilgrimage fine
Fine for taking off pilgrimage cloth (ihram)
Reunion of divorced couple emotionally
Clerics, school of thought and political parties
On Surah al-Furqan verse 28
On hadith narrated by al-Hakim
On state-funded pilgrimage
Hadith on tarawih prayer (night prayer during fasting month)
On aurat* and women headscarf
Friday prayer not in the mosque
The length of months in lunar calendar
Prayer for the body of idiot
Sermon is longer than prayers
The night of lailat al-qadar
Obligatory bathing, tayammum, and wearing the sarong
Dating in Islamic perspective
Camping for female students
Legal status of engagement
Marriage guardian
Folding hands after i’tidal
Tattoo, mantra and magic water
Substituting prayer
Shalawat and barzanji
Pilgrimage saving
Muhammadiyah and tahlilan
Tahiyat al-masjid during the sermon
4. 2004 Issues related being imam (prayer leaders)

Emotional divorce
Inheritance of marriage-wealth (harta gono-gini)
Inheritance of three male siblings
Income almsgiving

Appendix: Fat wa of Ma jelis Tar jih 1999-2010 281
Marriage between cousins

Promise of scholarship
Endowment savings
Arts and culture
Ma’mun (followers of prayers) proceed imam (leader of the prayer)
Endowment inheritance
Reunion after divorce by letters
Begging
On natural disaster
Reciting ushalli and doing qunut
Opening prayers
Postponing debt payment
On al-masih, suffocation of the sujud
Troubling advocates
The heresy of isra’ mi’raj and yasinan
Insubordinate marriage
Wasting the budget
The shirk of sixth sense
Drug and alcohol
Movements during prayers
Postponing prayers
Prayers in a hurry
Berdua-duaan
Interaction with non-Muslims
Sitting on gravestone
Sexual intercourse during menstruation
Walking in front of prayers
Inkar al-Sunnah (the rejecters of sunna)
Pawning
Internet multi-level marketing
Deportation
Successful entrepreneur
Inheritance for grand-children
Income almsgiving
Istikharah suffocation
On reciting Yasin chapter and prayer of 40 people
Rabbit meat
Land of endowment
Takbir during hari raya
On the name of “Muhammadiyah”
Used water
Prophet’s health
Discussions on marriage
Order for sacrifice

5 2005 Meats and skins of sacrificed animals

Graves behind mosques
Prowess of a kiai
Favorable (sunnah) Friday prayers
Shalawat and takbir during hari raya
Sujud syukur and recitation
Reunion of couple in the hereafter and reciting Qur’an during
menstruation
Baby insemination and cloning
Limits of arts
Legal status of congregational dzikir 1
Legal status of congregational dzikir 2
Thaharah, water and defiling filth
Sacrificing one cow for seven people
Motorcycle auctions
Groups for animal sacrifice
Jamaah Tabligh and shaving beards
Pilgrimage celebration
Prayers in two languages
Regular favorable prayers
Position of step mothers
Visiting tomb and reciting Yasin
Sacrifice one sheep for whole family
The counting of dzikir
Lafadz (pronouncing) of marriage consent
Positions of bodies’ head
Preacher being late in delivering his sermon in Ied
Marriage of pregnant women
Earlier adzan and shalawat
Thanksgiving, Friday favourable prayers, cigarette and qunut
Interest of loan and saving cooperative
Debt from religious financial institution
Multiple prayers
Adzan, iqamah and praying by one person
Ied sermon
6. 2006 Walimah qurban

Inheritance without children
Taqlid (imitative conformism), opening suffocation and shalawat
The meaningof words “al-kainat” and “al-ikhtiar”
Closing prayer (shalat witr), night prayer and substituting fast
Prayer mats and BNI Banking
Opening prayers
Bank interests

Food with no basmalah recitation

Inheritance with adopted children
On sitting in the prayer and cemetery
Death, cloning, animal slaughtering and USG
Animal sacrifice and pilgrimage
Praying by somebody’s own words
On the book of Nur Muhammad
Debt for pilgrimage expense
Sheltering orphans
Interreligious marriage
On couples’ calling, celebration and Ramadhan prayer
On public chanting and 23 rakaat Ramadhan prayers
7. 2007 On zakat according to Tarjih and the other book

On fake financial aids
Trading goods’ almsgiving
The enjoyment of world-life and hereafter
Salam tasyahud
The starting time of Ied sermon
The legal status of smoking
Inheritance
Transferring aqiqah and pilgrimage cost
Agreement on the beginning of month
Arafah fasting
Divorce out of courts
The legal status of nikah sirri
Thalilan ceremony
On difference of chanting in adzan
On late prayer followers (ma’mum)
Opening prayer
On some issues and ritual related to pilgrimage
The suffocation after second sermons
Chanting loudly
Some prohibition related to grave
On abrogation
Becoming muslim due to marriage, Muslims who do not observe prayers,
and euthanasia
Burying two bodies in one hole
Hadith on Muhammad birthday and alms for parents
Distribution of inheritance 1
Distribution of inheritance 2
Some issues on obligatory almsgiving and Ied
Between terms “silaturrahmi” and “sillaturahim”

8. 2008 Deceased’s debt

Is it permitted to exchange skin of cow with goat in animal sacrifice
Before-hand prayer in Isha’ prayers
Some issues regarding sitting methods in prayers
On adultery and its legal consequences
Procedure of performing extra takbir in Ied prayers
Sitting method in prayers
On activist-wives
On shirk al-asbab (polytheism based on some causes)
On fardlu kifayah (communal obligatory)
Raising hands during praying
Friday prayers for women
Consuming food (meat) at non-Muslim countries
On some peculiar readings of Arabic terms
Utilizing endowment assets
Sentence to end the du’a
Miqat makani
Dividing inheritance
Muhammadiyah as non-Mazhab movement
Professional almsgiving and pension fund
Almsgiving of chicken husbandry
Unutilized endowment land
Prayer during solar and lunar eclipse
Marriage ceremony via phone
Almsgiving of cars and pirated goods
Almsgiving fund for investment
Validly transmitted hadith through reliable chains
Tahlil
Al-Fatihah recitation for deceased and cloth for Muslim women
The function of prayer barrier in mosques
On mihrab (special space for leaders of prayers)
Reciting basmallah in prayers
9. 2009 On almsgiving (two parts)

Replacing somebody’s pilgrimage
Bribery for civil servant admission
Islamic perspective on installment
Practicing Jesus’ prayers
Closing prayers (shalat witir)
Muslim women’s aurat
Muhammadiyah’s belief on the day of judgment and Awaiting Messiah
Almsgiving fund donated for victims of natural disaster
Donation in certain amount
Method of prayer for sick people
The law of pornography

Procedure of night and morning prayers

On disaster
On Ied’s takbir
On sum of donation
Legal status of utilizing magic fetish
Praying in cemeteries
Women cutting hair
On polio vaccine
Circulating donation box during Friday prayer
Global ru’yat
On wearing bio-fir necklace
Some habits during Ied
On Facebook
On beards and veil
Takbir competition
On Ahmadiyah and pornography
On I’tikaf guidance
Extra takbir and sermon special for women
Surah chanting in prayer
Maulid celebration
Necklace for medicine and mobile phone ringtone
Some issues in prayer’s chanting
Electing political parties
Earthquake and other disaster mentioned in the Quran
Endowment and donation
Consuming shark and seal
Distributing inheritance for adopted children
Prayer leader facing ma’mum (prayer followers) during praying
10. 2010 Solar eclipse

Spirit going around houses
On rambling spirit
The murder of Jesus
Almsgiving for development
Legal status of smoking
Takbir on two Ied
On abortion
Cheating spouses
Masturbation and spending money for girls
Sitting methods of two-rakaah prayers
Slaughtering chicken and dying chicken’s eggs
The distinctiveness of passing away on Wednesdays and Fridays
Ethics of Qur’an recitation
Controversy on some aspects of tarawih prayer

On label “almarhum” (for male deceased) and “almarhumah” (for female

deceased)
Fidyah
Basin licked by dog
Women who do not wear headscarf
Showing off
Paying left fasting
* Parts of body which are permitted to be visible except in certain circumstances.

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Documents
Fatwa Majelis Ulama’ Indonesia Number: 7/Munas VII/11/2005.

Fatwa Number 05 B, 2002. This fatwa is published on Suara Muhammadiyah, Number 5, Year
87/2002. Other than fatwa on this issue, Muhammadiyah also published a book explaining
Muhammadiyah’s preference to hisab and the principles of hisab method.
Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia, Maklumat Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI), Number 01/
PB-MA/GAI/0005.

Bibliogr aphy 313
Hartini, Rahayu. Kedudukan Fatwa MUI Mengenai Penyelesaian Sengketa Melalui Basyar-
nas Pasca Lahirnya UU No. 3 Tahun 2006 tentang Pengadilan Agama, Research Report,
Muhammadiyah University of Malang, 2007.
Ibrahim, M. Saad “Mengapa Muhammadiyah Digugat?” paper presented at Muhammadiyah
Up-date Seminar, Center for the Study of Islam and Philosophy, Muhammadiyah University
of Malang, 20 February 2010.
Keputusan Munas Tarjih XXV, tentang Manhaj Tarjih dan Pengembangan Pemikiran Islam.
Subakir, Ahmad (et.al). “Respon Tokoh Islam Atas Fatwa MUI tentang Gerakan Ahmadiyah
di Indonesia”, Research Paper, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2007, Directorate of Islamic Higher Education,
Ministry of Religious Affairs, The Republic of Indonesia. Full text can be accessed through
http://ern.pendis.kemenag.go.id/DokPdf/ern-III-06.pdf.
Surabaya, Kontras. Laporan Investigasi dan Pemantauan Kasus Syi’ah Sampang (Surabaya:
Kontras Surabaya, 2012).
Undang-Undang No. 44 Year 1999 and Undang-Undang No. 18 Year 2001.
United States Commission on Religious Freedom “The State-Religion Relationship and the
Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitution
of Predominantly Muslim Countries” (March, 2005).
Newspapers and Magazines
“56 Anggota DPR Desak Pemerintah Cabut Perda Bernuansa Syariat Islam”, Suara Pembaruan,
14 June 2006.
“Ahmadiyah Lahore Minta MUI Revisi Fatwa Sesat,” Tempo, 16 February 2011.
“Empat Periode Penyebaran Syiah di Indonesia”, Tempo, 2 September 2012.
“Fatwa Sesat Bagi Syi’ah Bermula dari Kesepakatan yang Dicederai”, Mimbar Pendidikan Agama,
Number 305, February 2012, 9-11.
“Kisah Kang Jalal Soal Syiah Indonesia (Bagian 1)”, Tempo 03 September 2012.
“Luka Ahmadiyah”, Tempo, 8 May 2008.
“Majalah Sudah Menggantikan Kitab”, Supplement the Wahid Institute XII/Tempo 24-30 September
2007, 13.
Abror, M. Muchlas “Dinamika Majelis Tarjih”, Suara Muhammadiyah 05/99, 28 Rabiul Akhir-13
Jumadil Ula 1435 H, 26.
Abshar-Abdalla, Ulil. “Fatwa MUI dan Konservatisme Agama”, Media Indonesia, 3 August 2005.
Satrawi, Hasibullah. “MUI danMasyarakat Non-Fatwa”, Media Indonesia, 02 August 2005.
Adam, Asvi Warman. “Belajar dari Sejarah Ahmadiyah”, Indo Pos, 24 April 2008.
Ahmad, Saidiman. “Argumen Islam untuk Kebebasan”, Koran Tempo, 15 April 2011.
Amien, Ma’ruf. “Menyikapi Fatwa MUI Jawa Timur,” Republika, 8 November 2012.
Assyaukanie, Luthfi. “Dua Abad Islam Liberal”, Bentara Kompas, 2 March 2007.
Bagir, Haidar. “Islib Butuh Metodologi”, Republika, 20 March 2002.
Bagir, Haidar. “Syiah dan Kerukunan Umat”, Republika, 20 January 2012.
Boy ZTF, Pradana. “Relativitas Kesesatan Aliran Sesat,” Jawa Pos, 7 November 2007.
Husaini, Adian. “Solusi Damai Muslim Sunni-Syi’ah”, Jurnal Islamia-Republika, 19 January 2012.
Mu’thi, Abdul. “Tradisi Tajdid di Muhammadiyah”, Suara Muhammadiyah, Number 05/99,
01-15 March 2014, 27.
Rahardjo, M. Dawam. “Kala MUI Mengharamkan Pluralisme”, Koran Tempo, 01 August 2005.
Rakhmat, Jalaluddin. “Menyikapi Fatwa tentang Fatwa”, Republika, 10 November 2012.
Rukyatul Hilal Perspektif Nahdlatul Ulama’, Republika, 26 September 2008.

Ruslan, Heri. “Penetapan Awal Bulan, Seperti Apa Aturannya?”, Dialog Jumat Republika,
5 November 2010.
Suara Muhammadiyah Magazine, No. 1 Year 84/1999.
Tempo Weekly Magazine, 5 May 2008 Edition.
Wahid, Wawan Gunawan Abdul. “Tajdid, Manhaj Tarjih, dan Produk Hukum Majelis Tarjih”,
Suara Muhammadiyah, Number 05/09, 1-15 March 2014.

Index
Abul A’la al-Mawdudi 28, 31 Intolerance 181
Abdurrahman Wahid 24-5, 43, 62, 87, 111-3, 180, Istifta’ 40, 42, 44-5
194, 198, 201 Istinbat 195-6, 208, 210, 216, 222
Ahl al-Bait 146, 150, 164 Islamic courts 50, 67
Ahlul Bait Indonesia 147 Istinbat 95, 196, 208, 210, 216
Ahmadiyah 42, 132, 134, 138, 141, 159-60, 275 Istinbat al-Ahkam 208, 222
Ahmadiyya 129-42, 149, 157-60, 166-74, 179-81 Ithna Ashariya 146
Ahmad Dahlan 135, 186, 231, 240 Ittiba’ 197, 252
Al-Azhar, Fatwa Council 40 Jalaludin Rakhmat 151
al-Azhar, Mosque 40 Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah
al-Azhar, University 46 (JIMM) 79, 104
Baḥth al-Masāil 12, 140, 202, 204-7, 209-10, 221, Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL) 79-80, 103-4, 118
225-7 Jumhur 164
Baḥth al-Masāil, Lajnah 9, 12, 183, 201, 204, 207, Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia 134-5, 160
271 Komisi Fatwa 10, 152
Baḥth al-Masāil, Lembaga 12 Lahore 131
al-Banna, Hasan 28 Lahore Ahmadiyya 131-3, 135-7, 141, 160, 275
Brunei Darussalam 55, 140, 146 Liberalism 42, 79, 82-7, 89-91, 95-6, 103, 107, 110,
Cokroaminoto 187-8 112-6, 118-22, 126-29, 272-4
Conservatism 33, 61, 78, 88-90, 94, 102, 157, 160, Madrasa 27, 77, 168, 200, 202, 206
182, 232, 272-5 Madhhab 57, 149-50, 181, 183, 187-8, 190, 192,
Deviant 35, 89, 95, 109, 129, 137-42, 149-51, 194-7, 204, 208-9, 211, 229-30, 236, 239, 246,
155-61, 163, 166, 171-75, 177-80, 275 252-3
Élan vital 117 Majelis Tarjih 9, 11, 14, 229-30, 239-40, 244,
Fazlur Rahman 36 246-267, 269, 271-2, 277
Fiqh 202, 204 Majelis Ulama Indonesia 9-10, 27, 42, 54, 62, 71,
Fiqh, Majma’ al-Islamiy 140 82, 84, 96, 115, 130, 137, 138, 141-2, 149, 152,
Freedom of religion 72, 96, 101, 117, 124, 274 168, 172, 271
Front Pembela Islam 29, 78, 96, 168 Malaysia 14, 31, 41, 43, 55, 140, 146, 261
Garut 65, 170-73, 179, 269 Malaysia, National University of 52
Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia 132, 135, 141, Mas Mansur 188, 246-7
159-60 Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 131-3, 141
Hasyim Asy’ari 135, 189, 192, 197, 211 Mode of thought 12, 21, 27-35, 37, 64, 88, 94, 97,
Hasyim Muzadi 224 102-3, 107-9, 115, 118, 122, 157-8, 160, 179, 185,
Hisab 14-5, 223-4, 256, 258 190, 217, 225-26, 228, 230-1, 233, 255, 267,
Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia 10, 29, 32, 66, 78 272-3, 276-7
Ibn Saud, King 187 Mode of thinking 9, 21, 26, 28-30, 33-5, 67, 71-2,
Ideology 17-8, 28, 78, 80, 91, 93, 95, 107, 115, 126, 84, 88, 90-1, 95, 102-3, 106, 108, 114, 120, 122-3,
189, 191, 242, 254, 274 127, 157, 159, 166, 180-1, 185, 190, 198, 214, 219,
IJABI (Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia) 221, 223, 225-7, 241, 244, 253, 262-3, 266, 270
146-7, 151, 165 Mufti 10, 40-2, 44-5, 49-51, 53-4, 68-9, 204
Ijtihād 12-4, 30, 35, 39-40, 45, 46-9, 52-5, 60, Muhammad Abduh 33, 35, 186, 236
74-5, 110, 117, 121, 183, 188, 195, 197, 199, 204, Muhammadiyah 9-11, 13-6, 21, 42, 54, 60-1, 74-5,
208-12, 220, 222, 225, 229-30, 232, 236, 239, 77, 79, 104, 110, 112, 119, 134-6, 140, 142, 183-4,
249, 252-53, 272, 277 187-8, 195, 203, 223, 229-33, 235-269, 271-2,
Imam 197, 204, 211, 223-4, 226, 239, 259 276-7
Imamiya 150 Muhammadiyah, University of Malang 7, 243,
Indonesia 7, 9-17, 19, 24, 27, 29, 41-2, 44, 47, 50-1, 267
54-7, 59, 62-9, 71-2, 74-80, 82, 87, 93-5, 97, Muhammadiyah, University in Yogyakarta 250
102-4, 108, 110-5, 119, 122-7, 129, 131-2, 134-8, Muhammad Rashid Rida 236
140-2, 146-53, 156, 159-61, 165-8, 170-1, 173-4, Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd 36, 248
176, 178-81, 185-6, 188-9, 198-200, 203, 212, New Order 9, 15-6, 29, 42-3, 60-2, 66, 68-9, 76-8,
214, 217-8, 221, 225, 228, 232-3, 236, 245, 251, 90, 128, 137, 151, 172, 181-2, 212, 214, 221, 223,
255, 257, 259-61, 263, 265, 269, 271, 273-5, 277 226-7, 230, 255, 270-2, 277

Orde Baru 9, 15-6, 64, 271, 273 Sociology of knowledge 17-8

Organization 9-13, 16, 28, 43, 54, 59-60, 64, 77-8, Social change 9, 27-9, 32, 59, 80, 97, 114, 120, 128,
120, 129, 132, 134, 136-8, 140, 146-7, 152, 167, 184, 189, 201, 209, 220, 226, 250, 255, 263, 267,
179, 183, 187, 191, 195, 202, 204, 207, 220, 225, 271-2, 277
232, 233, 237-9, 246, 253, 275 Sunni 74-7, 104, 130, 143-5, 149-51, 153-8, 164-6,
Paramadina (Foundation) 81, 103-4, 112 169, 175, 177-8, 181, 191, 194, 208
Pesantren 12, 27, 77, 104, 148, 153, 175, 198-207, Syncretic 11, 29, 73, 77, 233, 235, 242-3, 269, 272
221, 236-7, 268, 276 Tahrif 154, 163-4
Pluralism 42, 71-2, 78-9, 81-6, 89, 91, 94-111, 113, Taqlīd 30, 35, 54, 184, 189, 194-8, 202, 204, 207-8,
115, 126, 127-9, 139, 182, 217, 221, 245, 271-4 211, 240, 252
Prophet 10, 14, 25-6, 51-3, 84-5, 121, 132-3, 139-47, Tasikmalaya 65, 169-71
150, 154, 158, 161, 163-4, 188, 190-1, 194, 197, 211, Tolerance 71, 79, 98-9, 101-2, 105, 109, 118, 124,
218, 222-3, 260, 262-3 168, 181, 191-2, 263
Prophethood 132-3, 139-41, 158-9, 275 Tolerant 81, 181, 254
Puritan 11, 233, 244, 267, 269, 272 Tradition 11-2, 22-5, 30-3, 36-7, 41, 54, 56, 68, 73,
Puritanism 11, 233, 242-3, 245, 254 75, 77, 84, 86, 88-9, 94, 97-8, 102-3, 106-9,
Puritanical 29, 32, 186, 194, 242, 272 114-8, 121, 123, 126-8, 144, 147-8, 154, 157-8,
Qada 42, 45, 49-50, 58, 69 161, 164, 181-4
Qadian 131-2, 136, 141 Traditional 12, 25, 28, 37, 56, 81, 147-8, 181, 183,
Qadiani Ahmadiyya 131, 135, 137, 160, 275 186, 189, 193, 195, 198, 200-3, 206, 219, 227,
Qur’an 11-2, 25-6, 30, 34, 36-7, 41, 44-8, 51-4, 59, 235-8, 243, 258, 264, 276-7
74-6, 83-5, 88-90, 94, 98-100, 108-9, 117, 186-7, Traditionalism 21-7, 32, 37, 89-90, 184, 186, 189,
190-1, 197, 203-4, 208, 210, 216-7, 219-20, 222, 194-6, 198-201, 203, 219-21, 223-5, 227-8, 232,
225, 240 253-4, 258-62, 264, 267, 269-3, 276-7
Radicalism 273 Traditionalist 12, 19, 24, 26-8, 30, 32-3, 35, 54,
Reform 10, 12, 30, 34-6, 62, 64, 66, 93, 121, 131, 89, 127, 144, 186-8, 190, 202, 231, 236, 238, 243,
186, 226-7, 229-30, 232-3, 236, 238-42, 261, 261, 267
268-9, 277 Turkey 55, 57, 123, 125
Reformism 19, 21, 32-3, 236, 238, 241, 243, 245, Ulama’ 10, 26, 33, 35-6, 42, 47, 53, 57, 59-62,
269, 271, 273 149-50, 152-3, 155, 165, 181, 185, 187-8, 190,
Reformist 11, 19, 21, 27, 33-7, 202, 212, 221, 230-1, 194-9, 202-3, 205, 207-12, 215-19, 224, 231, 238,
233, 235-8, 241-2, 266-7, 269, 271-3, 277 247, 249, 252-4, 258, 260, 262, 267-9, 271
Revivalism 19, 21, 28-32, 78, 233, 242-3, 245, 254, Umma 10, 40, 59, 88, 94, 96, 109, 142-4, 151, 155,
271-4 158, 160, 179, 182, 195-6, 247, 274-6
Revivalist 19, 27, 29-32, 63, 67, 127, 131, 179, Utopia 18
242-3, 275, 277 Utopian thought 91
Sayyed Hossein Nasr 25, 161-2 Utopian thinking 18, 92-3
Scriptural 65, 220, 262 Utopian orientation 63, 90-1, 127
Scripturalist 225, 245, 249 Utopian mode of thinking 30, 91
Senegal 55 Utopian aspiration 32
Sharī’a 31-2, 39, 41-2, 45-50, 53, 55, 57-8, 60-1, Utopian mentality 91
63-8, 73-4, 78, 87, 142, 147, 157, 194-5, 208, Violence 16, 95-6, 108, 111, 129-30, 137, 149, 151,
215-6, 218-9, 221, 229, 244-5, 248, 252, 265-6, 155, 166-70, 173-5, 177-81, 273, 275
273 Wahab Chasbullah 135, 187-8
Sharif Husein, King 187 Wahhabi 11, 188, 244
Shi’a 42, 76-7, 129-30, 142-58, 160-1, 163-6, 169, Wahhabism 11-2, 187-8
174-81, 275

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Fatwa in Indonesia

Published online by Cambridge University Press

The Religion and Society in Asia series presents state-of-the-art cross-disciplinary

Published online by Cambridge University Press

Pradana Boy Zulian

Amsterdam University Press

Published online by Cambridge University Press

isbn 978 94 6298 185 0

© Pradana Boy Zulian / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2018

Published online by Cambridge University Press

1 Understanding Religious Mode of Thought 21

2 Fatwa in Islamic Legal Theory and Indonesian Legal System 39

3 The Dialectics of Religious Pluralism 71

4 The Fatwā on Sectarianism and its Social Implications 129

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6 The Fatwa of Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah 229

Appendix: Fatwa of Majelis Tarjih 1999-2010 279

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This book is a revised version of my Ph.D thesis at Department of Malay

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Lastly, I have to thank Amsterdam University Press (AUP) for publishing

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such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) where no specific fatwā-making

https://doi.org/10.1017/9789048531622.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

with branches spreading across all Indonesian provinces and regencies

6 More detail and comprehensive discussion on the multiplicity of Muhammadiyah’s orienta-

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all contemporary problems by referring to the principles of the Qurʼān and

7 See the official website of MajelisTarjih, http://tarjih.muhammadiyah.or.id/content-3-sdet-

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fatwā-making processes as well as the substance of legal opinion ( fatwā)

10 According to classical Islamic jurisprudence, a product of ijtihad is not binding. However,

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calculation (ḥisāb)13 based on astronomical and mathematical principles,

13 Etymologically, hisab (Arabic) means calculation. It is a derivative form of h-s-b means

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used by NU which the government endorsed is much more out-dated.17

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law and legal principles in government and administration. 19 Accord-

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About This Book

22 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to Sociology of Knowledge (London:

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https://doi.org/10.1017/9789048531622.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

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According to Robert Towler, traditionalism is “a style of religiousness which

https://doi.org/10.1017/9789048531622.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

as authoritative, or deferred to, without argument.”7 In its derivative form,

7 See William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation,”The Journal

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in comparison with Enlightenment and Renaissance movements that

[they] are widely supposed to be rather backward in orientation and

13 William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation,” The Journal of

https://doi.org/10.1017/9789048531622.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

modernisation, the sort of community that scholars regarded as belong-

In the Indonesian context, Islamic religious traditionalism is manifested in

https://doi.org/10.1017/9789048531622.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

authorities to a source.21 For traditionalists, the meaning of the Qurʼān is a

21 William A Graham, “Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation,”The Journal of

https://doi.org/10.1017/9789048531622.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

https://doi.org/10.1017/9789048531622.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press

1 Understanding Religious Mode of Thought 21

2 Fatwa in Islamic Legal Theory and Indonesian Legal System 39

3 The Dialectics of Religious Pluralism 71

4 The Fatwā on Sectarianism and its Social Implications 129

6 The Fatwa of Majelis Tarjih Muhammadiyah 229

Appendix: Fatwa of Majelis Tarjih 1999-2010 279