Ah Eng Lai (Editor) - Religious Diversity in Singapore-IsEAS Publishing (2008)

Religious Diversity
in Singapore
The Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) was established in 1988 as a think-tank
dedicated to fostering good governance in Singapore through strategic policy research
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00 ReligiousDiversity Prelims 2 7/16/08, 9:46 AM

Religious Diversity
in Singapore
EDITED BY
LAI AH ENG
I ~-,~
~
Lee Kuan Yew
of
• School Public Policy
.F5
I Institute of
Policy Studies
National University of Singapore
INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

First published in Singapore in 2008 by
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Pasir Panjang
Singapore 119614
E-mail: publish@iseas.edu.sg
Website: <http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg>
jointly with
Institute of Policy Studies
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
National University of Singapore
29 Heng Mui Keng Terrace
#06-06
Singapore 119620
E-mail: ips@nus.edu.sg
Website: <www.lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/ips>
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies.
© 2008 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors
and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publishers or
their supporters.
ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
Religious diversity in Singapore / edited by Lai Ah Eng.

1. Singapore—Religion—Congresses.
2. Religious pluralism—Singapore—Congresses.
3. Religious tolerance—Singapore—Congresses.
I. Lai Ah Eng.
BL2085 R381 2008
ISBN 978-981-230-753-8 (soft cover)

ISBN 978-981-230-754-4 (hard cover)
ISBN 978-981-230-755-2 (PDF)
Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd

Printed in Singapore by Utopia Press Pte Ltd

CONTENTS
List of Figures and Tables ix

List of Appendices xii
Foreword xv
President S. R. Nathan
Preface xvii
Tommy Koh
Acknowledgements xix
The Contributors xxi
Abbreviations xxxiii
Glossary xxxvii
Introduction xliii
Lai Ah Eng
I THE LANDSCAPE OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

1 Religious Influences and Impulses Impacting Singapore 3
Tham Seong Chee
2 Religious Trends and Issues in Singapore 28
Tong Chee Kiong
3 Keeping God in Place: The Management of Religion
in Singapore 55
Eugene K. B. Tan

vi Contents
4 Discourses on Islam in Southeast Asia and Their Impact

on the Singapore Muslim Public 83
Azhar Ibrahim
5 Global Christian Culture and the Antioch of Asia 116

Jean DeBernardi
6 “Religiously-inspired”, “India-derived” Movements in Singapore 142

Vineeta Sinha
7 Baha’is in Singapore: Patterns of Conversion 167

Foo Check Woo and Lynette Thomas
8 Diversities and Unities: Towards a Reformist Buddhism

in Singapore 195
Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng
9 The Sathya Sai Baba Movement in Singapore: Its Service

Mission and Philosophy of Communal Identity Construction 215
Nagah Devi Ramasamy
10 The Muslim Religious Elite of Singapore 248

Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman
11 The Evolution of the Sikh Identity in Singapore 275

Arunajeet Kaur
12 Religious Processions: Urban Politics and Poetics 298

Lily Kong
II RELIGION IN SCHOOLS AND AMONG THE YOUNG
13 From Moral Values to Citizenship Education:

The Teaching of Religion in Singapore Schools 321
Charlene Tan
14 Religious Education as Locus of Curriculum:

A Brief Inquiry into Madrasah Curriculum in Singapore 342
Sa’eda Buang

Contents vii
15 Mission Schools in Singapore: Religious Harmony,

Social Identities, and the Negotiation of Evangelical Cultures 362
Robbie B. H. Goh
16 Religious Switching and Knowledge among Adolescents

in Singapore 381
Phyllis Ghim-Lian Chew
III RELIGION IN THE MEDIA
17 Religious Reasons in a Secular Public Sphere:

Debates in the Media about Homosexuality 413
Kenneth Paul Tan
18 The Internet and Religious Harmony in Singapore 434

Randolph Kluver, Benjamin H. Detenber, Lee Wai Peng,
Shahiraa Sahul Hameed, Chen Yanli, and Pauline Hope Cheong
IV RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIAL SERVICES
19 Muslim Organizations and Mosques as Social Service Providers 459

Enon Mansor and Nur Amali Ibrahim
20 Hindu Temples in Charities and Social Services 489

Sinniah Vivakanandan and Nagah Devi Ramasamy
21 Delivering Welfare Services in Singapore:

A Strategic Partnership between Buddhism and the State 505
22 Saving the City through Good Works:

Christian Involvement in Social Services 524
Mathew Mathews
V INTERFAITH ISSUES AND INTERACTION
23 Religious Diversity, Toleration and Interaction 557

Ten Chin Liew

viii Contents
24 Negotiating Christianity with Other Religions:

The Views of Christian Clergymen in Singapore 571
Mathew Mathews
25 The Inter-Religious Organization of Singapore 605

Lai Ah Eng
26 Interactions among Youth Leaders of Different Faiths:

Realities from the Ground and Lessons Learnt 642
Charles Phua Chao Rong, Anita Hui and Yap Ching Wi
27 Building Bridges between Christians and Muslims:

A Personal Journey 668
See Guat Kwee
28 Conclusion: Some Remarks on Religious Diversity

in Singapore 689
Lai Ah Eng
Index 695

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES
FIGURES
18.1 Responses to the Statement “The Availability of
Religious Material on the Internet Is Disruptive to
Religious Harmony” 443
18.2 On-line Activities Related to One’s Own Religion
by Religion 446
18.3 On-line Activities Related to Others’ Religion by Religion 446
TABLES
2.1 Religions and Population Distribution by Religion
in Singapore, 1849–1931 32
2.2 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by
Religion for the Years 1980, 1990 and 2000 37
Ethnic Group and Religion for the Years 1980, 1990
and 2000 39
Religion and Ethnic Group for the Year 1990 39
Religion, Ethnic Group and Sex for the Year 1990 42
Religion and Age Group for the Years 1990 and 2000 43
2.7 Malay Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by
Religion and Age Group for the Year 1990 44
2.8 Indian Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by

x List of Figures and Tables
Table
2.9 Chinese Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by
2.10 Proportion Reporting “No Religion” by Age and
Ethnic Group for the Year 2000 45
Religion and Highest Qualification Attained for the
Years 1990 and 2000 47
2.12 Educational Stream by Christianity 48
2.13 Religious Affiliation by Stream of Education 48
2.14 Resident Working Population Aged 15 Years and Over by
Religion and Occupation for the Year 1990 49
Religion and Type of Dwelling for the Year 2000 49
3.1 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Above by Religion 57
6.1 “Religiously-inspired”, “India-derived Movements”

in Singapore 147
16.1 Number and Percentage of Respondents and Switchers by

Age Group and Type of School 386
16.2 Percentage of Respondents by Age Group and Religion 387
16.3 Percentage Comparison of Data Sample with Singapore
Census 1980, 1990 and 2000 387
16.4 Percentage of Grandparents, Parents and Respondents by
Religion 388
16.5 Percentage of Switchers by Religion 389
16.6 Percentage of Switchers in Terms of Language Used 390
16.7 Percentage of Respondents by Level of Knowledge on
Religions in Singapore 391
16.8 Ways of Finding out about Other Religions 398
16.9 Percentage of Interviewees in Relation to Their Introducers 402
16.10 Percentage of Interviewees in Relation to Switching Time 402
18.1 Comparison of the Religion of Internet Users and the

General Population in Singapore 442
18.2 Comparison of Engagement in Different On-line
Religious Activities by Religion 445

List of Figures and Tables xi
Table
24.1 Agreement to Statement “Inter-religious Dialogue between
Religious Leaders Can Be Fruitful” 574
24.2 Agreement to Statement “I Would Have Dialogue with
Leaders of Other Faiths if I Had the Opportunity” 576
24.3 Agreement to Statement “It Would Be Best for Inter-religious
Dialogue to be Conducted by Denominational Leaders and
not the Average Church Pastor” 577
24.4 Agreement to Statement “I Have Fears that Inter-religious
Dialogue Can Lead to Compromising Religious
Convictions” 578
24.5 Agreement to Statement “I Find It Difficult to Receive
Donations (without Any Strings Attached) from a
Non-Christian Religious Group for Any Activity of
My Church” 580
24.6 Agreement to Statement “It Will Be Difficult for Me to
Cooperate with Another Non-Christian Religious Leader
for a Charity Drive in My Community” 581
24.7 Agreement to Statement “I Would Find It Ethically
Difficult to Lead in Prayer in a Gathering of Religious
Leaders where Each Leader Will Lead in Prayer Following
His Religious Tradition” 583
24.8 Acceptance of Practice — Following a Procession around
a Coffin Led by a Chinese Medium/Buddhist Monk 591
24.9 Acceptance of Practice — Bowing to a Coffin of a
Deceased Family Member during a Chinese/Buddhist/
Hindu Funeral 591
24.10 Acceptance of Practice — Eating Food Which Has Been
Offered by Family Members to an Idol 592
24.11 Acceptance of Practice — Holding Joss-Sticks/
Other Religious Objects in a Non-Christian Funeral Rite
with a Clear Conscience That One Is Not Engaged in
Any Worship but Merely Following along with Others 592
24.12 Acceptance of Practice — Placing Flowers at a
Non-Christian Altar Table in Honour of One’s Ancestors 592
24.13 Agreement to the Statements — None of the Above Are
Acceptable Options 593
26.1 General Household Survey 2005 — Resident Population by

Age Group, Ethnic Group and Sex 661

LIST OF APPENDICES
7.1 Survey Questionnaire for Research Project with the

Institute of Policy Studies 186
9.1 Background Information and Activities of the

Sathya Sai Baba Centres in Singapore 238
11.1 Survey on Sikh Identity in Singapore 293

11.2 Interview Guidelines 294
16.1 The Questionnaire 408

16.2 Guidelines to Interviewers 409
18.1 Internet’s Influence on Religious Harmony in Singapore 453
19.1 Timeline of the Development of Muslim Social Service

Organizations in Singapore 483
20.1 Survey on Services Provided by Hindu Temples 499
22.1 Survey of Christian-related Services 545
24.1 Survey Background and Questions 598
25.1 Major International Events and Participation by the IRO 632

25.2 Major Local Activities, Events and Issues Undertaken by
the IRO 633

List of Appendices xiii
25.3 The 2004 IRO Conference: Enriching Interfaith and

Multiracial Harmony 636
26.1 Research Questionnaire 662

26.2 Two Examples of Interfaith Youth Events and Lessons Learnt 665

FOREWORD
The world is experiencing growing religious pluralism amidst rapid

globalization. Religious pluralism has two faces: it can promise peace and
harmony through mutual tolerance and understanding, but it can also pose
challenges to social cohesion. Recent global and regional events and
developments have shown how religion can be misused and misinterpreted to
cause conflict among countries and peoples, be it through military intervention
or incendiary words and actions of zealots. Yet, all religions teach love of
humankind, peace and harmony, and share the same golden rules to treat
others as one would like to be treated himself and forgive those who have
wronged us. Such common religious teachings are now being actively harnessed
to nurture harmonious personal and group behaviour for the larger common
good of society.
Singapore has long been an example of religious pluralism. Our largely
religious population adheres to the tenets of various faiths and an extensive
range of religious traditions, customs, expressions and organizations. This
overlaps with an equally impressive range of ethnic and cultural diversity.
Adding yet another layer to this diversity is the Singapore state which is
strongly secular in its administration and yet fully supportive of freedoms to
adhere to one’s faith. The state also engages with the different religious groups
for the purpose of nation-building. I believe that Singapore’s experience of
religious pluralism, its record of peaceful inter-religious relations and its
management of mutual religious recognition could be a useful reference as we
deal with the challenges that are apt to influence our society from the growing
impact of religious practices and preachings from around the world.
This book is the result of extensive research and a rare collaboration that
cuts across religions, disciplines and interests. Its collection of reflective essays
provides a range of information, illustrations and insights of Singapore’s
religious landscape, discusses candidly specific religious issues and

xvi Foreword
developments, and offers suggestions for managing them. It will help to

address, to a certain extent, the concern about the need for understanding
both the intra-religious and inter-religious tensions that surround us.
I would like to congratulate IPS, especially Dr Lai Ah Eng, the editor of
this book, for taking the initiative to address a difficult subject and delivering
a seminal volume.
S.R. Nathan
President
Republic of Singapore

PREFACE
This book is the outcome of a three-year research project led by my colleague,

Dr Lai Ah Eng. The project’s objectives were threefold: to identify key trends
and issues pertaining to religious harmony in Singapore; to offer insights and
suggestions to policy-makers; and to contribute to inter-religious understanding
and harmony. These objectives are also consistent with IPS’ mission of
undertaking strategic policy research and of building bridges among our
diverse communities and stakeholders.
It is never easy to undertake research on religion because of the potential
sensitivities. It becomes all the more difficult when we study religion at a time
when it has been politicized and hijacked by violent groups to further their
political agendas. But, for that very reason, this book is both timely and significant.
The attention to religious revivalism, ethno-religious issues, inter-religious
interaction and intra-religious divisions further adds to the book’s importance.
Given the challenging nature of the project, it was necessarily a long and
arduous journey and it required the collective effort of many good people.
Among them were academics, religious practitioners and graduate students
from a range of disciplines and backgrounds. Without their diligence,
commitment, objectivity and courage, this book would not have been possible.
On behalf of IPS, I would like to thank each and every one of the
contributors to this book. IPS is also indebted to President S.R. Nathan who
so kindly agreed to write the Foreword to this book.
I should also record our deep appreciation of Singapore Pools (Private)
Limited for sponsoring the entire project.
Finally, I would like to congratulate Ah Eng for adding one more seminal
volume to Singapore’s growing literature on religion and ethnicity.
Professor Tommy Koh

Chairman
IPS Management Board

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book is the outcome of a research project titled Religious Diversity in

Singapore that was conducted between January 2004 and December 2006 by
the Institute of Policy Studies. Many people and processes were involved in
this huge research and book project.
A conceptual brainstorming session with invited religious and civil
society representatives, academics and interested individual citizens was
first conducted in February 2004, followed by a workshop on 1–2 September
2005 during which thirty research papers were discussed. This book
comprises revised versions of most of the workshop papers. The chapter
writers themselves comprise both individuals who responded to the call for
participation and those invited to undertake specific topics within their
areas of research and expertise.
Throughout the project, the availability of participants and coordination
of their work to match the project’s requirements was a constant problem. At
times the coordination became a weary nightmare, but this was made up for
by many participants who were dream teams to work with. Overall, the many
opportunities to discuss with individuals who were highly committed to the
project and appreciative of understanding religious diversity in Singapore
always served as a reminder that the project was worthwhile.
There are many people as well as organizations to thank for many reasons
in this project. I would first like to thank the Singapore Pools (Private)
Limited for sponsoring the entire project. The participants of the conceptual
brainstorming session are to be thanked for speaking freely and frankly and
for their many suggestions and moral support. Equally heartfelt thanks are
due to those who gave permission to researchers to access their organizations
for surveys, interviews and observations, and to those who responded. The
participants at the project’s workshop must also be thanked for their comments
and suggestions on the papers presented. The project benefited much by way

xx Acknowledgements
of the papers’ analyses and recommendations being subject to their public

and professional scrutiny.
My colleagues at IPS are gratefully acknowledged: the Institute’s chairman
Professor Tommy Koh and deputy director Mr Arun Mahizhnan for their
support and encouragement; Dr Gillian Koh, IPS’ publications coordinator,
for working with the publisher, ISEAS, on contractual details; Ms Irene Lim
and Ms Claris Wang for their tremendously helpful and efficient administration
of the project; and Ms Kartini Saparudin without whose technical and filing
assistance I simply could not have managed.
Many others helped to make this book’s publication possible. I thank
the many readers of the individual chapters for their useful comments.
Ms Rahilah Yusuf of ISEAS Publishing is gratefully thanked for her copy-
editing role and handling production of this book. I would also like to thank
the Asia Research Institute, my current place of employment, for allowing me
the time to work on the last stages of the manuscript.
Last but not least, I would like to thank the book’s contributors as well
as their research assistants. One of my main concerns in this project was
finding enough researchers for various topics. While it was true that I could
not find a suitable participant each time I started on a search, it also always
did turn out that I would eventually meet someone who would help with a
suggested name or two, which I would follow up on, with the end result
unfailingly being a secured contributor. Such good luck, good support
and, as one participant saw it, “the good God’s grace and guidance” not only
led the project to receive a bumper crop of contributions at the end of the
long haul, but also to each one being undertaken with much care, concern
and commitment.
Once again, I thank all for their goodness, grace and guidance in making
this book possible.

THE CONTRIBUTORS
ARUNAJEET Kaur graduated from the National University of Singapore in

1996 with a BA in History and English Language, and in 2003 with an MA
from the South Asian Studies programme. Her MA thesis was on the role of
Sikhs in the colonial policing of British Malaya and the Straits Settlements.
Her research interest has been on the Sikhs, leading her to write and direct a
theatrical performance about the personality Gurchan Singha or “Singa” in
1997 at the Substation. In 1999, she curated and organized a national
exhibition about the role of Sikhs in the British Imperial Army, commissioned
by the Sikh community. She is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and is working on a book
project regarding the Sikhs in Singapore.
AZHAR Ibrahim is a Lecturer with the Asian Languages and Cultures

Academic Group, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore. He is also currently a PhD candidate at the Department
of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, and his topic of
investigation is the “Characterization in Modern Malay Literature: A Study
of Human Types and Its Social Meanings”. He completed his MA on “The
Understanding of Islam as Reflected in Classical Malay Texts: A Study of the
Interplay between Religion and Values” at the same department in 2001. He
co-edited Islam, Religion and Progress (2006) and Moral Vision and Social
Critique: Selected Essays of Syed Hussein Alatas (2007). His research interests
include sociology of religion, sociology of literature, classical and modern
Malay literature and Malay language and intellectual development.
CHEN Yanli graduated in 2007 with a first class honours in Communications

Studies from Nanyang Technological University (NTU) where she majored
in communications research. At NTU, Yanli was awarded the President’s

xxii The Contributors
Research Scholarship to pursue academic research in the areas of Internet and

religion as well as gaming interactions. She was also the recipient of the
University’s Nanyang Scholarship. Her research studies have been published
in peer-reviewed conferences and journals such as the Heidelberg Journal of
Religions on the Internet and the Crossroads Conference 2004 in Istanbul,
Turkey. She is currently a Research Associate with Millward Brown
International.
Pauline Hope CHEONG (PhD, Annenberg School of Communication,

University of Southern California) is Associate Professor at Hugh Downs
School of Human Communication, Arizona State University. She researches
the social implications of information and communication technologies,
particularly the socio-technical gaps in access and media use among
traditionally marginalized populations, including ethnic minorities, religious
communities, females and youths. Prior to her current appointment, she
was Assistant Professor at the University at Buffalo, State University of New
York. Pauline enjoys multi-method and comparative research for the
development of contextually sensitive frameworks and understanding of
social change. She has presented more than thirty papers at international
conferences, and has published in multiple international refereed journals,
including New Media and Society, Journal of Computer-Mediated
Communication, Critical Social Policy, Prometheus, and Information,
Communication and Society.
Phyllis Ghim-Lian CHEW is Associate Professor/English Language and

Literature at the National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore. She lectures and supervises post-graduate students on
language methodology and sociolinguistics. She has been keynote and/or
plenary for many conferences in linguistics, women’s studies and comparative
religion. She is past president of AWARE (Association of Women for Action
and Research), founder-president of UWAS (University Women’s Association
of Singapore), a past director of the UNAS (United Nations Association of
Singapore) and ELLTAS (English Language and Literature Teachers’
Association of Singapore). She received a PSC scholarship to do her Masters
in 1982 and an NIE scholarship to do her PhD in Macquarie University in
1989. Other awards include Teacher of the Year award and Teaching Excellence
awards from Nanyang Technological University, as well as the Ministry of
Community Development Long Service Award for many years of voluntary
social work.

The Contributors xxiii
Jean DeBERNARDI is Professor of Anthropology at the University of

Alberta (Edmonton), Canada. She received her training as a cultural
anthropologist at Stanford University, Oxford University and the University
of Chicago, and has been teaching in Canada since 1991. Her current
research explores the modernization of Taoism, focusing on religious and
cultural pilgrimage to the Taoist temple complex at Wudang Mountain,
South-central China. She has conducted extensive ethnographic research
on Chinese popular religion in Malaysia and Singapore and recent
publications include Rites of Belonging: Memory, Modernity and Identity in
a Malaysian Chinese Community (2004) and The Way that Lives in the Heart:
Chinese Popular Religion and Spirit Mediums in Penang, Malaysia (2006).
She is currently completing a monograph entitled If the Lord be not Come
…: Evangelical Christianity and the Brethren Movement in Singapore and
Malaysia.
Benjamin DETENBER (PhD, Stanford) teaches communication theory and

research classes at the School of Communication and Information, Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore since 1998. Earlier, he taught at the
University of Delaware and Stanford University. He has many years of
experience in video production and non-commercial radio, and has consulted
with high-tech companies, taught communication skills to school teachers,
and given numerous presentations to educators and media professionals. He
has conducted studies on the psychological and emotional impact of media
presentations, processes and outcomes associated with social cognition, and
theoretical aspects of public opinion. His recent research is on the social and
psychological impact of the Internet and computer-mediated communication
(CMC). His recent journal publications (co-edited) include: Singaporeans’
attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and their tolerance of media portrayals
of homosexuality (2007), Mining the Internet plateau: An exploration of the
adoption intention of non-users in Singapore (2006), and The impact of
synchronicity and civility in online political discussions on perceptions and
intentions to participate (2005).
ENON Mansor is a social worker by profession. She graduated from the

National University of Singapore with honours in sociology in 1998 and a
Master of Social Science (Social Work) degree in 2003. Enon has worked in
the Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association (SANA) and the National Council
of Social Services. In 2000, she and two colleagues formed Insyirah Consultancy
which specializes in providing consultancy and support for the social service

xxiv The Contributors
sector. Currently she is also a speaker on family life education for the Health
Promotion Board. Enon has also volunteered her services in various
organizations, including the former PPIS-MENDAKI Family Service Centre,
Family Resource and Training Centre and the Muslim Converts’ Association
of Singapore. Among her co-authored publications are Tranquil Hearts: A
Guide to Marriage (1998) and Jalur Hidayah (2000), a marriage guidance
handbook. The results of a research project on ageing that she managed have
been published in the book Growing Old in the Malay Community (1992).
FOO Check Woo graduated with a BSc (Chemistry) from Nanyang University,
Singapore (1980) and MSc (Chemistry) from the National University of
Singapore (1987). He is currently pursuing a part-time MSc in Information
Studies at Nanyang Technological University. Check Woo is the group manager
responsible for food science and quality assurance in a regional research and
development company. He has been a writer, having co-authored two books
on classical Chinese poetry in English (1991 and 1996), served as a co-editor
for the proceedings of the 7th World Congress of Food Science and Technology
(1987) and worked as a foreign language expert in Wuhan, China (1998–
2000). Check Woo has been a Baha’i since 1973 and has served on both local
and national Baha’i governing councils, as well as various departments and
offices of the national Baha’i council, including the Office of Environment
and the Office for Inter-Faith Activities. He is currently the Chairman of the
national Baha’i governing council and a member of the IRO Council.
Robbie Boon Hua GOH is head of the department of English Language and
Literature, National University of Singapore. He teaches and writes on
nineteenth century British literature, Christianity in Asia, the construction of
Asian social identities, and popular culture. Recent publications include
Sparks of Grace: The Story of Methodism in Asia; Contours of Culture: Space and
Social Difference in Singapore; Christian Ministry and the Asian Nation: The
Metropolican YMCA in Singapore; Asian Diasporas: Cultures, Identities,
Representations (co-edited with Shawn Wong); Theorizing the Southeast Asian
City as Text (co-edited with Brenda Yeoh), and articles in Urban Studies,
Journal of Religion and Society, International Journal of Urban and Regional
Research, and various collections of essays. His edited volume, Ethnic
Nationalisms: Narration, Race and Cultural Politics in Asian Societies from
Independence to Globalization is forthcoming.
Anita HUI aspires to become a research academic specializing in the moral

education of children. She recently graduated with a MA in Psychology of

The Contributors xxv
Religion from Heythrop College, the Specialist Philosophy and Theology

College of the University of London. She also holds an MSc degree in Child
Development from the Institute of Education, University of London. Anita
is an active member in many volunteer organizations. Her internship at Kong
Meng San Phor Kark See Monastery, her leadership as the Vice-President
(Student Social Club) at the Methodist International Centre and as the
Course Coordinator (Little Bodhi Garden, Children Sunday School) have
helped her gain a better understanding of different religious practices and the
potentials of interfaith engagement.
Randolph KLUVER (PhD, USC) is Director of the Institute for Pacific Asia
and a Research Professor in the Department of Communication at Texas
A&M University. Previously, he was Executive Director of the Singapore
Internet Research Centre, and Associate Professor in the School of
Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore. He has published over thirty peer-reviewed journal articles and
book chapters, and is the author, editor, or co-editor of four books. His
current research interests include the role of the Internet in Asian societies,
Asian political communication, globalization, and the political and social
impact of information technologies. His recent publications include The
Internet and National Elections: A Comparative Study of Web Campaigning
(edited with Kirsten Foot, Nicholas Jankowski, and Steve Schneider, 2007),
and Asia.Com: Asia Encounters the Internet (edited with K. C. Ho and
Kenneth C. C. Yang, 2003).
Lily KONG is Director of the Asia Research Institute, National University of

Singapore. She is a social and cultural geographer and is Professor in the
Department of Geography, National University of Singapore. Her research
has spanned a wide range of social and cultural issues, from religion, to music,
cultural policy, cultural economy, landscapes and nation, nature and the
environment. Her recent publications include Landscapes: Ways of Imagining
the World (with Hilary Winchester and Kevin Dunn) and Politics of Landscape:
Constructions of “Nation” in Singapore (with Brenda Yeoh).
KUAH-PEARCE Khun Eng is Associate Professor and Head of Department

of Sociology and Honorary Academic Director of the Centre for
Anthropological Research, University of Hong Kong. Her research areas
include the relationship between mainland Chinese and Chinese in the
diaspora, Chinese women and their network capitals, and religion (Buddhism)
and politics. She is the author of State, Society and Religious Engineering:

xxvi The Contributors
Towards a Reformist Buddhism (2003) and Rebuilding the Ancestral Village:

Singaporeans in China (2000). She is editor or co-editor of Chinese Women
and Their Social and Network Capitals (2003), Where China Meets Southeast
Asia (2000), Overseas Chinese and the Qiaoxiang Society (Qiaoxiang yimin yu
difang shehui) (2003), Chinese Voluntary Organisations in the Diaspora (2006),
and At Home in the Chinese Diaspora: Memories, Identities and Belongings
(forthcoming).
LAI Ah Eng is senior research fellow, Asia Research Institute, National

University of Singapore and was, until recently, senior research fellow at the
Institute of Policy Studies. She graduated from Universiti Sains Malaysia,
University of Sussex and Cambridge University with BSoc Sc (Economics),
MPhil (Development Studies) and D Phil (social anthropology) degrees
respectively. She has worked in various research capacities at the Consumers’
Association of Penang, Housing Development Board (Singapore), the National
Archives of Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore) and
Institute of Policy Studies, and lectured at the Departments of Sociology and
Social Work, National University of Singapore. Her research areas include
multiculturalism, migration, family and heritage. Her major publications
include Meanings of Multiethnicity: A Case Study of Ethnicity and Ethnic
Relations in Singapore (1995), Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic Pluralism and
Social Cohesion in Singapore (2004), and Secularism and Spirituality: Striving for
Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah Education in Singapore (co-
edited) (2005). She has also written articles on ethnic, gender and family issues.
LEE Wai Peng (PhD, Wisconsin-Madison) was an Associate Professor and

Sub-Dean at the School of Communication and Information (SCI), Nanyang
Technological University, Singapore. At NTU, her research areas included
persuasion and public opinion in the contexts of health and political
communication. She was part of the Singapore Internet Project research team
and an associate of the Singapore Internet Research Centre (SIRC). Her
research projects included risk perception of HIV/AIDS, e-health,
e-government, and Internet and religion. She taught research methods, public
opinion and persuasion, and introductory communication and media courses.
She also supervised a twenty-station computer-assisted telephone interviewing
facility and a focus-group research lab. As Sub-Dean, she handled student
and alumni affairs. She lives in Cork, Ireland.
Mathew MATHEWS completed his PhD at the National University of

Singapore with the thesis “Clergy and Counsellors: Mental Health Care in

The Contributors xxvii
Singapore”. Besides his undergraduate and graduate training in sociology,

Mathew received his training in religion at Liberty University and Grand
Rapids Theological Seminary. While Mathew’s main research interests are
related to issues on mental health and family, he is always keen to examine
how religion intersects these and other aspects of human society.
NAGAH DEVI Ramasamy graduated from the National University of

Singapore in 2004 with a Bachelor of Social Sciences (Honours) in sociology.
She is presently completing her Master’s in Sociology by research at NUS.
Her current research is ethnographic in orientation and is concerned with a
detailed examination of the Sathya Sai Baba spiritual movement in Singapore.
Her research interests include the sociology of religion, new religious
movements, voluntarism, racial and ethnic studies, gender issues, and urban
anthropology. As a graduate student, she also undertook some part-time
undergraduate teaching and worked as research assistant on some projects of
the faculty.
NOOR AISHA Abdul Rahman (PhD) is currently Assistant Professor at

the Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore. Her
research areas include Malay legal history and institutions, Muslim law and
its administration in Singapore and Malaysia, and sociology of religion
(Islam and Malay religious orientations). She authored Colonial Image of
Malay Adat Laws (2005) and co-edited Secularism and Spirituality: Striving
for Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah Education in Singapore
(2005). She has also written several articles, including “Traditionalism and
its Impact on the Administration of Justice: the Case of the Syariah Court
of Singapore”, in InterAsia Cultural Studies 5, no. 3 (Dec 2004). She
recently completed a research project on marriages among minors in the
Muslim Community of Singapore. She is currently a member of the Board
of Trustees of ISEAS, the NUS Institutional Review Board, and the National
Heritage Board.
NUR AMALI Ibrahim is currently pursuing his PhD in the Department of

Anthropology, New York University, with funding from the Henry M
MacCracken Fellowship. He attained his Bachelor of Arts (First Class
Honours) in 2001 from the National University of Singapore, where he
majored in Southeast Asian Studies. He plans to continue developing
research interests in Southeast Asia on the social lives of youths, the
anthropology of Islam, religious formations in the secular age, and incidents
of conflict and violence.

xxviii The Contributors
PHUA Chao Rong, Charles read his MSc (Research) and BSc (Hons) in
International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political
Sciences under a Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) scholarship. At university,
he was involved in student/youth activities and was one of the first Singapore
citizens to receive the Goldman Sachs Global Leaders Award (2004), an
honour awarded annually to the top 100 second-year undergraduates from
seventy-seven world-renowned universities, for their academic and leadership
excellence. He also received the HSBC-NYAA Youth Excellence Award and
the University of London Union’s Honorary Life Membership. Charles
writes for the SAF’s POINTER Journal and serves in the exco of the
National Youth Achievement Award Gold Award Holders’ Alumni. His
interest in interfaith work sprang from his contact with Catholic, Methodist
and Buddhist establishments throughout his schooling life. He believes
world peace is attainable through everyone’s right understanding of religions
and their teachings.
SA’EDA Buang is a lecturer with the Asian Languages and Cultures Academic
Group, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University.
Her research interests are in the areas of Islamic and Muslim education,
literature, curriculum reformation and alternative assessments. She has written
chapters, presented papers relating to madrasah and Islamic education at
international seminars and was guest editor of the Asia Pacific Journal of
Education’s special issue on “Muslim Education: Challenges, Opportunities
and Beyond”, Vol. 27, no. 1 (March 2007). She was involved in the madrasah
teachers’ training needs survey conducted by the Islamic Religious Council of
Singapore in 2004.
SEE Guat Kwee completed an MA degree in Islamic Studies and Christian-

Muslim Relations at Hartford Seminary CT USA in 2007. Her MA thesis is
entitled “History of Christian-Muslim Relations in Singapore since the
country’s independence in 1965. She has lived with Muslim women from
Turkey, Morocco, Germany, Syria and Saudi Arabia over the last three years.
Guat has spoken at interfaith seminars in Singapore to encourage Christian-
Muslim and interfaith relations, and also at the International Conference on
“Islam, The West, and the Rest. Towards a Multicultural World: Conflict or
Reconciliation” organized by Institut Agama Islam Negeri, Alauddin Makassar
in 2005. Her article “Muslim-Christian Dialogue: Signs of Hope” appeared
in European Judaism in 2005. In 2007, she received the Celie J. Terry Award
for academic achievement and interfaith action in the community. Guat
graduated from the National University of Singapore in 1981 and worked at

The Contributors xxix
the Singapore Economic Development Board for over eighteen years during
which she undertook different portfolios.
SHAHIRAA Sahul Hameed is Research Associate at the School of

Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore. She obtained a Master of Soc Sc from the National University of
Singapore and a BSc (Hons) form Curtin University and a BA from Murdoch
University. Shahiraa works closely with researchers at the Singapore Internet
Research Centre, based in NTU. She is interested in the social and
psychological impacts of new media on society and the individual and the
interaction between the individual and new communication technologies.
She also helps with supervising the School’s research facilities.
Charlene TAN (PhD) is Assistant Professor in Policy and Leadership Studies,

National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Her recent publications include a co-edited book Critical Perspectives on
Values Education in Asia (2007); “Creating ‘good citizens’ and maintaining
religious harmony in Singapore” (British Journal of Religious Education,
forthcoming); and “The teaching of religious knowledge in a plural society:
the case for Singapore” (International Review of Education, forthcoming). She
is on the editorial board of international journal Reflective Practice and her
research interests include comparative education in Asia, reflective practice,
values education, and philosophical issues in education.
Eugene K. B. TAN is assistant professor of law at Singapore Management

University’s School of Law. A lawyer by training, Eugene is a graduate of the
National University of Singapore, the London School of Economics and
Political Science, and Stanford University where he was a Fulbright Fellow.
His inter-disciplinary research interests include the mutual interaction of law
and public policy, the regulation of ethnic conflict, and governance and
public ethics. He has published in these areas in various edited volumes and
internationally-refereed journals such as The Australian Journal of Asian Law,
Citizenship Studies, The China Quarterly, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Ethnopolitics,
Hong Kong Law Journal, Journal of Asian Business, and Terrorism and Political
Violence. He currently teaches a university core curriculum course in Ethics
and Social Responsibility at the SMU.
Kenneth Paul TAN is Assistant Dean (Academic Affairs) and Assistant

Professor of Political Science at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,
National University of Singapore (NUS). An award-winning teacher, he has

xxx The Contributors
taught at the NUS’ Political Science Department and University Scholars

Programme. His research interests have spanned political theory, comparative
politics, and cinema studies, specializing in Singapore studies and focusing
on topics such as democracy, civil society, media, multiculturalism, and
meritocracy. He authored Renaissance Singapore? Economy, Culture, and
Politics (edited volume; 2007) and Cinema and Television in Singapore:
Resistance in One Dimension (forthcoming) and has also published in journals.
The 1995 Lee Kuan Yew Postgraduate Scholar, he received his PhD in
social and political sciences in 2000 at the University of Cambridge. In
1994, he obtained a first class honours degree in the School of Economics
and Politics at the University of Bristol on a Public Service Commission
overseas merit scholarship. He is the founding chair of the Asian Film
Archive’s board of directors, and sits on the board of directors of theatre
company The Necessary Stage.
TEN Chin Liew is Professor of Philosophy at the National University of

Singapore. He was previously Professor of Philosophy at Monash University,
Australia, Visiting Professor at the City University of New York, and
Adjunct Professor at Charles Sturt University, Canberra. Elected a Fellow of
the Australian Academy of Humanities in 1989, and the Academy of Social
Sciences in Australia in 2000, he has also been an Invitation Fellow, Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science, and an Honorary Consultant, Law
Reform Commission of Victoria. He is on the editorial boards of several
international journals in Australia, the United States and the United
Kingdom, and is an Associate Editor of the Australian Journal of Philosophy.
His publications have appeared in journals of philosophy, law, politics, and
the history of ideas. His books include Mill on Liberty (1980); Crime, Guilt,
and Punishment (1987); four volumes of collected essays, Was Mill a Liberal?,
A Conception of Toleration, The Soundest Theory of Law, and Multiculturalism
and the Value of Diversity (2004); and Theories of Rights (2006).
THAM Seong Chee is the current president of the United Nations Association
of Singapore (UNAS). He was formerly Professor and Head of the Department
of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore. He has a wide interest in
sociological and anthropological subjects. His publications include books
and papers on modernization, education, linguistics, literature, religion, and
culture. In recent years, he has written papers on various UN and UN-related
issues relating to development and the environment. He is a member of the
Board of International Trustees of Biopolitics International, Athens and also
Vice-President of the Singapore Association for the Advancement of Science.

The Contributors xxxi
While still in academia he also served on the National Library Board, the
Board of Trustees of ISEAS, adviser to the Ford Foundation Southeast Asia
Programme and was vice-chairman of the UNESCO Advisory Committee
for the Study of Southeast Asian Cultures.
Lynette THOMAS has a BA (Hons) in French from the University of

Newcastle-upon-Tyne (1975) and a MEd from the National University of
Singapore (1992) for which she presented a dissertation on the Parent’s Role
in the Pre-school Child’s Language Development. She also holds a Royal
Society of Arts Certificate in TEFL and taught at the British Council in
Singapore. She has been a homemaker, freelance writer and editor, and
volunteer for numerous agencies, notably the Singapore Breastfeeding Mothers’
Group for which she earned a Long Service Award from the Ministry of
Community Development in 1999 for ten years of voluntary service. Since
1995 she and her business partner have run Bookaburra, a children’s bookshop.
Lynette has been a Baha’i since 1987 and has served on both local and
national Baha’i governing councils, as well as various offices of the national
Baha’i Council, including the Office of Environment, the Office for the
Advancement of Women and the Office of Information. Currently she is the
Secretary General of the national Baha’i governing council.
TONG Chee Kiong teaches at the Department of Sociology, National

University of Singapore. Chee Kiong completed his undergraduate training
at the University of Singapore and obtained his MA and PhD from Cornell
University, USA. His research interests focus on ethnicity, religion and the
nation state in Southeast Asia. His publications include Rationalizing Religion:
Religious Conversion, Revivalism and Competition in Singapore (2007), Chinese
Death Rituals in Singapore (2004), Chinese Migrants Abroad (2002), and
Alternate Identities: The Chinese of Contemporary Thailand (2001). Chee
Kiong has also published papers in the British Journal of Sociology, Diaspora,
International Migration Review and International Sociology.
VINEETA Sinha is Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology,

National University of Singapore. She obtained her PhD in Anthropology
from the Johns Hopkins University. Her research interests include the critique
of concepts and categories in the social sciences, the history of the social
sciences, teaching of sociological theory, sociology and anthropology of religion,
forms of Hindu religiosity in the Indian diaspora and the anthropology of
health and medicine. The courses she teaches include “Social Thought and
Social Theory”, “Sociology of Everyday Life”, “Sociology of Food” and

xxxii The Contributors
“Sociology of Religion”. She recently published her first book A New God in
the Diaspora? Muneeswaran Worship in Contemporary Singapore (2005). Some
recently published articles include “Theorising talk about ‘religious pluralism’
and ‘religious harmony’ in Singapore”, in Journal of Contemporary Religion
(2005); “Decentring Social Sciences in practice through individual actions
and choices”, in Current Sociology (2003); and “Merging different sacred
spaces: enabling religious encounters through pragmatic utilization of space?”,
in Contributions to Indian Sociology (2003).
VIVAKANANDAN Sinniah is Chief Executive Officer of Ang Mo Kio –

Thye Hua Kwan Hospital. He has wide-ranging experience spanning over
seventeen years in the public sector and social services. He was previously
Chief Executive Officer of Singapore Indian Development Association
(SINDA), head of corporate services in a statutory board, and Director of
Services, Planning and Policy Division of the National Council of Social
Services. During his tenure at SINDA, the organization was awarded the Best
Volunteer Management System Award (2002) and the e-Society Excellence
Award (2005). He introduced more than fifty new programmes, raised its
active volunteer pool from 100 to more than 4,000 and was also commended
for his outreach work with low-income families. He has also been an active
volunteer with Tamil Murasu, Sree Ramar Temple, Tembusu Programme,
National Longevity Insurance, IT Services Co-operative Limited, National
Library Board, and Bukit Batok Home for the Aged. He has an MSc degree
from the University of Sydney and a BA (Honours) from the National
University of Singapore.
YAP Ching Wi manages the Youth Ministry of the Buddhist organization,

Kong Meng San Phor Kark See Monastery. Trained in social work at the
National University of Singapore and social policy and planning at the
London School of Economics, she has worked with communities from the
arts, the non-profit sector, inter-religious engagement, gender issues and
animal welfare. Grateful for and inspired by these communities’ compassion
and commitment, her professional focus is in developing inter-disciplinary
and inter-sectoral collaborations towards building trust and moral values.
The KMSPKS Youth Ministry supports the personal and spiritual
developments of young adults and facilitates the Buddhist youths’
contribution towards Singapore’s community development, including
enhancing inter-racial and inter-religious understanding. It recently
supported the Singapore Inter-faith Forum (SIFY), an initiative arising
from the National Youth Forum.

ABBREVIATIONS
4PM Malay Youth Literary Association

ABIM Angkatan Belia Islam
AEF Asia Evangelistic Fellowship
AMLA Administration of Muslim Law Act
AMD Advance Medical Directive
AMP Association of Muslim Professionals
ARI Asia Research Institute
BAPA Religious and Educational League of Radin Mas
Bawaean Putra Speak Takraw Club
CATI Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing
CDAC Chinese Development Assistance Council
CDC Community Development Council
CME Civics and Moral Education
CNN Cable News Network
CSGB Central Sikh Gurdwara Board
Darul Arqam Muslim Converts Association
DRH Declaration of Religious Harmony
FCBC Faith Community Baptist Church
FEBA Far East Broadcasting Associates
FGCBF Full Gospel Christian Businessman Fellowship
FSC Family Service Centre
HBI Himpunan Belia Islam
HDB Housing Development Board
HEB Hindu Endowments Board
IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri
ICCI Interreligious Coordinating Council in Israel
IDSS Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
IIIT International Institute of Islamic Thought

xxxiv Abbreviations
IIUM International Islamic University Malaysia

IPS Institute of Policy Studies
IRCC Inter-Racial Confidence Circles
IRO Inter-Religious Organization
ISA Internal Security Act
ISEAS Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
ISKON International Society for Krishna Consciousness
ISTAC International Institute of Islamic Thought and
Civilization
ITE Institute of Technical Education
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
LBKM Prophet Muhammad’s Birthday Memorial
Scholarship Fund Board
LMS London Missionary Society
Majlis Pusat Central Council of Malay Cultural Organizations
Singapore
MCS Medical Counselling Service
MCS-SANA Muslim Counselling Service of the Singapore Anti-
Narcotics Association
MCYS Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports
Mendaki Council for the Development of Muslim Community
MINDEF Ministry of Defence
MMO Malay-Muslim organization
MND Ministry of National Development
MOE Ministry of Education
MRHA Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act
MTFA Muslim Trust Fund Association
MUIS Islamic Religious Council of Singapore
MWA Metta Welfare Association
NCCS National Council of Churches in Singapore
NCSS National Council of Social Services
NFP not-for-profit organization
NE National Education
NGO non-government organization
NKF National Kidney Foundation
NRM New Religious Movements
NU Nahdlatul Ulama
NUS National University of Singapore
NVPC National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre
NYC National Youth Council

Abbreviations xxxv
OMF Overseas Missionary Fellowship

PA People’s Association
PCMR Presidential Council of Minority Rights
PERDAUS Adult Religious Students’ Association
PERGAS Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers
Association
PERKAMUS Literary Association
PLU People Like Us
PPIS Young Women Muslim Association
RE Religious Education
RIMA Centre for Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs
RK Religious Knowledge
RME Religious Moral Education
ROS Registries of Societies
SAF Singapore Armed Forces
SAFF-PERDAUS Youth Wing of PERDAUS
SBF Singapore Buddhists Federation
SCEM Singapore Centre for Evangelism and Mission
SCTA Singapore Ceylon Tamils’ Association
SDU Social Development Unit
SE Spiritual Education
SGPC Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee
SINDA Singapore Indian Development Association
SIP Singapore Internet Project
SKML Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim League
SMTUK SMT Uthavum Karangal (Helping Hands)
SNHA Singapore National Heart Foundation (formerly
SHF, Singapore Heart Foundation)
Sriwana Malay cultural dance group
SSA Singapore Soka Association
SSCOS Sathya Sai Central Organization of Singapore
STMWS Singapore Tenkasi Muslim Welfare Society
Taman Bacaan Singapore Malay Youth Association
VWO voluntary welfare organization
YSA Young Sikh Association

GLOSSARY
adi original
aghawat chieftains
ahli sunna wa’al jama’a people of the approved way (with reference to
the early theologians)
ajaran sesat/songsang deviation
akal reason
al-Fatihah a prayer taken from the opening chapter of
the Qur’an
amal maaruf nahi mungkar forbidding evil and enjoining good
amrit baptism ceremony
aqidah belief, faith, creed
arathi camphor flame
arccanai offering
ardas prayer, supplication to God
asatizah religious teachers
ashram hermitage
asuras demons
at-tasawwuf science of sufism
Baha’ullah glory of God
Bai shen praying to the gods
Baisakhi Birth of Khalsa
baitulmal common fund
Bani Scripture
bhajan devotional hymns
bhakti devotional
ceramah public talk
chura a low caste similar to Mazhabi
dakwah endeavours to make Muslims better Muslims

xxxviii Glossary
or to spread the message of Islam to non-

Muslims
dana transfer of property according to sastric or
classical text rites so as to reach a fit recipient
dar al-Harb abode of war
dar al-Islam abode of peace
dar al-Sulh/dar al-‘Ahd abode of treaty
darurat state of temporary suspension/postponement
for the implementation of syariah
dharma Buddhist teaching (Way of Higher Truth)
dhimmi protected status of non-Muslims residents in
an Islamic state
dianah religion
Diwali Festival of Lights, celebrating the victory of
good over evil
dukkha suffering
Dussehra festival that celebrates the victory of Durga
over Mahisa Asura
fa-ming religious name
fardhu ain compulsory rituals and theology that must be
learned and practised
fatwa religious opinion/legal opinion
fiqh Islamic jurisprudence
fitrah nature
giani priest
gotong royong mutual help
gurdwara Sikh place of worship
Gurmukhi script the Sikh scriptures are written in
guru spiritual teacher or head of a religious sect
guru bhakti devotion to a spiritual master
hadith traditions relating to the words and deeds of
the Prophet Muhammad
hafiz one who memorizes the Qur’an
haj pilgrimage
halal permissible according to Islamic law
haram prohibited according to Islamic law
hijab veil or headcover worn by Muslim women
Holi a one-day spring festival with the practice of
throwing coloured water

Glossary xxxix
homam act of making an oblation or burnt offering to

the gods by throwing ghee into a sacrificial
fire
hudud penal code of the Islamic law
ibadah worship
ijtihad the use of one’s independent reasoning and
legal judgement on a point of law not explicitly
covered by the Qur’an or the sunna
ilmu sifat knowledge on the attributes of God
jat caste title for those who were land owning
farmers with a strong military tradition
jemaah community of believers
kach shorts, one of the five emblems of the Sikh
kanga comb, one of the five emblems of the Sikh
karma action, ritual act or religious observance
Kaur suffix to Sikh female names, meaning princess
kavadi burdens; it is also a portable altar decorated
with peacock feathers and attached to the
devotee through 108 vels pierced into the skin
on the chest and back
kebatinan mysticism
kerah steel bangle, one of the five emblems of the
Sikh
kesh unshaven hair, one of the five emblems of the
Sikh
khalsa pure, the baptized Sikh
kirpan dagger, one of the five emblems of the Sikh
kirtan hymns sung in Gurmukhi
kitab jawi Jawi scriptures
kitab kuning yellow scriptures (indicating its well-used state)
kitab usul al-din scriptures on the roots or fundamentals of
religion which form the basis of theology
korban ritual slaughter of animals according to Muslim
rites for Hari Raya Haji
Krishna Jayanti festival celebrating the birth of Krishna
Kshatriyas warriors
lughah Arabic grammar
madrasah religious school
mahants head of a Sikh religious centre or institution

xl Glossary
mahfudzat a codex of Muslim scholars’ traditions

Mazhabi those of lower Hindu castes who convert to
Sikhism
mujaddid receivers
mujahidin warriors of Islam
mujtahid the person with the authority to pass an ijtihad
muthalah al-hadith science of methodology of the Hadith
nahu Arabic grammar
Pali a Prakit language that is a scriptural and
liturgical language of Theravada Buddhism
pater familias father of the family
pesantren Muslim boarding schools in Indonesia
pondok Muslim boarding school
Ponggal a harvest festival from Tamilnadu
Puranic that of the tradition of the eighteen collections
of Hindu mythological scriptures
qira’ah the reading of the Qur’an
Radha Soami Satsang a religious sect that incorporates teachings of
the Sikh scriptures with that of its religious
leaders, both past and present
rathams chariots
Rehat Meryada codes of conduct
rukhsah exemption
sabha assembly
sahijdhari those who abide by the teachings of the ten
gurus but do not necessarily maintain the
Khalsa appearance
salaf first generation of Muslims
salaffiyah early reformist
salwar kameez ethnic Punjabi costume
samadhi state of higher cognition; completion,
contemplation or absorption
samelans gatherings
San-gui-yi Triple Gem (Buddha, Dharma and Sangha)
Sanatan Dharma pluralistic mode of Sikh tradition popular in
the 19th century
Sangha Buddhist order of monks and nuns
Sant holy teacher
sarf/saraf branch of Arabic grammar concerning gender
and number
sati virtuous woman

Glossary xli
satsang literally, true company; company of a higher

truth, guru or assembly of people who listen
to or talk about truth
seva service
sevadars providers of service
Shuntian Gong Temple of Submission to Heaven
Sikh Seeker
Singh Lion
sirah biography of Prophet Muhammad
Sivarathi annual festival dedicated to Siva
siyasa Islamic government and politics
shan-tang benevolence hall
Sudras peasants
sunna words and deeds attributed to the Prophet
Muhammad
syariah code of law derived from the Qur’an and
from the teachings and example of
Muhammad
syura consensus
tafsir Qur’anic exegesis or commentary
tahzib teaching of discipline or moral education,
sometimes called as ta’dib or ta’adib
tajwid method of reciting the Qur’an in proper
intonations and notes
takaful Islamic insurance
tarikat path or Sufi order
tasawur Islamic worldview
tauhid belief in the unity of God or monotheism,
pertaining to basic Islamic faith to affirm the
Oneness of Allah
Timiti fire-walking festival in honour of the mother
goddess, Mariamman
tudung veil or headcover worn by Muslim women
ulama Islamic scholars
ummah entire Muslim community
umrah minor pilgrimage
usrah reading and discussion circles
ustaz teacher
usul al-din roots or fundamentals of religion which form
the basis of theology
usul fiqh principles of jurisprudence

xlii Glossary
Vaisayas farmers and traders

vedas any of the oldest and most authoritative Hindu
sacred texts, composed in Sanskrit and
gathered into four collections
wajib obligatory
wakaf endowments
waris potential beneficiaries/guardian
wirid chants and verses for supplications
xin-tu believers
xiu xin spiritual cultivation
yaagam Vedic sacrifice
yao-cai-dian traditional herbal shop

INTRODUCTION
Lai Ah Eng
BACKGROUND
Religious and ethno-religious issues are inherent in multiethnic and multi-
religious societies, and require ongoing attention.
Singapore is no exception. It has long been a multiethnic, multicultural
and multi-religious society, being historically and contemporarily at the
crossroads of some of the world’s major and minor civilizations, cultures,
religions and traditions. Today, every major religious tradition in Singapore
probably has within it a full religious spectrum, from orthodox, traditional
orientations to reform movements and independent spiritual clusters, while
other minor religions and movements have created or renewed spaces,
membership and expressions in the rapidly evolving city. Most have regional
and global links and influences. Religious affiliation is high and religious
identification is strong among the population. These have also occurred
against a background of growing religiosity and religious change since the
1970s. Recent global, regional and local events and developments have
further put the spotlight on religion, and raised issues concerning religious
identity, inter-religious relations and their impact on social cohesion.
Despite the diverse and dynamic religious landscape however, there is a
lack of in-depth knowledge, nuanced understanding and regular dialogue
about various religions and the meanings of living in Singapore’s multi-
religious world. Indeed, claims of ignorance, lack of inter-religious
understanding, dialogue and interaction, negative stereotyping and other
inter-religious encounters among individuals and groups present potential
points of misunderstanding and tension. Some overlaps between ethnicity
and religion further lend a heightened dimension and significance to ethno-
religious identities and issues. While much is happening on the ground,

xliv Introduction
studies and published literature are few or limited in scope and research has
generally fallen behind realities and developments. Literature on various
religions, while abundant, tends to be focused on their respective religious
concerns and congregations. There is a lack of systematic studies or surveys
and little on religion in national census coverage.
Recognizing that religious diversity and issues in Singapore need to be
better appreciated, understood and managed, The Institute of Policy Studies
(IPS) undertook the Research Project on Religious Diversity and Harmony
in Singapore (2004–2007). The project’s objectives were threefold: (1) to
identify key trends and issues, (2) to offer insights and suggestions for
policy, practice and social management, and (3) to contribute to inter-
religious understanding and harmony, in the interests of social cohesion
and the common good in Singapore. Given the challenging nature of the
project, it was necessarily a collective effort. A conceptual brainstorming
session with invited religious and civil society representatives, academics
and interested individual citizens was first conducted in February 2004,
followed by a workshop on 1–2 September 2005 during which thirty
research papers were discussed.
This book is the final outcome of the IPS research project and comprises
revised versions of most of its workshop papers. Its themes follow closely that
of the research project, while its chapters’ varying emphases on research,
educational value and management implications reflect the project’s objectives.
While focused on Singapore, the book bears in mind the wider and unavoidable
global and regional impulses and impacts on Singapore’s religious diversity,
and these are discussed wherever relevant, in many chapters.
The chapters themselves are the outcomes of individuals’ own responses
to the call for participation and of invitations to some to undertake specific
topics within their areas of research and expertise. The schedules of
potential participants, as much as the project’s own timing, largely
determined the final list of chapter writers, who consist of academics,
religious practitioners and graduate students. All chapters are based on
their writers’ own recent research works or on research specifically
conducted for the project. Coming from a variety of disciplines and
backgrounds, the researchers’ approaches and methodologies are wide-
ranging. They include questionnaires, surveys, interviews, focused group
discussions, participant and naturalistic observations, case studies and
philosophical and personal reflections, besides referring to a variety of
published sources. As such, all chapters contain much primary and
secondary data of both a quantitative and qualitative nature.

Introduction xlv
THE BOOK’S THEMES AND SUMMARIES OF CHAPTERS

This book’s twenty-eight chapters are arranged along five themes: first,
Singapore’s religious landscape, followed by religion in the specific arenas of
schools and the young, media, social services, and interfaith issues and
interaction.
Theme I on Singapore’s religious landscape is the most extensively covered,
with twelve chapters exploring both macro forces and specific religions and
issues that reflect Singapore’s diversity and give meaning to its specific contexts,
expressions and nuances.
Chapter 1 by Tham Seong Chee aptly opens up the landscape’s diversity
and complexity, first with a tracing of the long journey travelled by religion
in general from about the fifteenth century to the present, followed by a
discussion of the religious impulses and influences that impact on Singapore
in particular. Shedding insights on the relationship between state and
religion on the one hand and between religion and society on the other,
Tham points out that the religion-based meaning system or “sacred canopy”
of the past has, along religion’s journey, undergone change and differentiation
consequent on several inter-related processes of secularization,
globalization, modern capitalism, democratic liberalism and pluralism. The
religious impulse remains, but now has to take into account the dominance
of the state where the “laws of man” supersede the “laws of God” in the
management of contemporary problems and needs. The religious response
itself to pluralism and secularism is manifested in different forms,
from accommodation to rejection and opposition. How these developments
have an impact on secular and multi-religious Singapore are then examined
briefly through the following: the state’s secular policy in relation to the
society’s religious diversity; several contentious issues such as abortion, stem
cell research, human organ transplants, the building of integrated resorts
which include casinos (which in turn raise issues of gambling addiction and
prostitution), and gay rights; and the rise of new religions.
Major religious trends, various religions and religious issues in Singapore
are given focused and detailed attention in Chapters 2 to 12. In Chapter 2,
Tong Chee Kiong offers, through census data, an analysis of the religious
landscape in Singapore, from the early days of its founding to the present.
The picture that emerges is one in which the society is marked by a high
degree of multi-religiosity, as well as significant changes in the religious
landscape. In different periods, religions have waxed and waned. Some, such
as Christianity, have been highly successful in recruiting members while

xlvi Introduction
others, such as Taoism, have seen their memberships decline. The data also
shows that there is a correlation between religious affiliation and several
socio-demographic variables, including age, education, occupation, and socio-
economic status. For example, Christians in Singapore tend to be younger,
more educated and have a higher socio-economic status, whereas Taoists tend
to be older, less educated and come from lower socio-economic groups.
Another key variable is ethnicity. Religious affiliation is culturally or ethnically
structured to some extent, with most Malays being Muslim, most Indians
being Hindu, and Chinese, to a lesser degree, adopt Chinese religions.
The state’s management of religion as part of Singapore’s religious landscape
is given focused attention in Chapter 3 by Eugene Tan. He points out the
paradox in which Singapore is a secular state and multi-racial country yet
religion is envisaged to have a role in nation-building, and asks whether,
given religion’s tremendous pull on Singaporeans of various faiths, a strong
religious identity can co-exist with a strong Singaporean identity. He examines
the state’s institutional and legal framework for secularism and the management
of religion in Singapore within the governing ethos of multiculturalism
(which includes multi-religiosity), highlighting the plethora of institutions
overseeing various faiths which nestles with a coercive, pre-emptive legislative
regime in forestalling any religious extremism and interfaith conflicts. He
argues that the fear of vulnerability in the post-9/11 “war against terror”
ensures that scrutiny, surveillance and sensitivity would be hallmarks of the
state’s tightrope walk between secularism on the one hand, and wielding
control and influence over religion and its expression for the purposes of
state- and nation-building, on the other. He also examines the policy impulses
behind the state’s co-option of religion to reinforce the teaching of moral
values, to sustain economic vitality, and to urge the practice of one’s religion
in keeping with the secular and multi-racial mores of Singaporean society.
Subsequent Chapters 4 to 12 following the macro contexts discussed in
earlier chapters to examine specific religions which make up and add to the
dynamic local religious landscape, each through its own particular features,
expressions and developments. These include both “old” and “new” religions,
such as Islam, the “minority” religion in Singapore and “majority” religion in
Southeast Asia and currently undergoing a global gaze; Christianity, the
religion that came alongside colonialism and now returning via global
evangelical circuits; Hinduism and India-derived religions; Buddhism; the
Sathya Sai Baba Movement; Sikhism and the Baha’i Faith.
In Chapter 4, Azhar Ibrahim looks at discourses on Islam in Southeast
Asia, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia, and examines their impact on
the Singapore Muslim public. He identifies the following as the main

Introduction xlvii
subjects and issues in the dominant discourses on Islam in Singapore:

Islamizing trends in Muslim intellectual and cultural life; the denouncement
of secularism and humanism; the advocacy of plurality, diversity and
moderation; and the debate on reformism versus traditionalism in which
both competitively claim authenticity. He further argues that the
[under]development of certain discourses amongst the Muslim public is
conditioned by “gatekeepers”, which in turn determines the types and
quality of local discourse on Islam. He concludes with a call for critical
reflection of both favoured and absent discourses.
While the main Christian churches and denominations such as
Catholicism, Methodism and Presbyterianism have long established themselves
in Singapore since early colonial days, contemporary evangelical Christianity
in Singapore that makes the city appear as the Antioch of Asia is the subject
of Jean DeBernardi’s investigation in Chapter 5. She provides a brief
background on the development of diverse forms of evangelical Christianity
in Europe, North America and Singapore, and analyses several common
forms of evangelical practice. She also investigates the ways in which
contemporary Singaporean Christians interpret the call to be evangelical in
their Christian practice, and the local impact of global Christian networks
whose leaders often propose innovative Christian practices using mass media
and contemporary technologies, but which are sometimes construed by non-
Christians as being aggressive proselitization. Because Christian leaders play
a crucial role in proposing or rejecting such forms of evangelical practice to
their followers, she concludes that the most appropriate response to potentially
insensitive forms of proselytization is education and dialogue.
In Chapter 6, Vineeta Sinha departs from the “traditional” Hinduism
commonly associated with many local Indians, to focus on new religiously-
inspired “India-derived” movements and groups, which have added much
diversity to Singapore’s religious landscape since their importation in the
mid-1960s and which now attract a substantial number of followers, including
from outside the Indian-Hindu community. Many of these groups, including
the Ramakrishna Mission, Radha Soami Satsang, Brahma Kumari Raja Yoga
Centre, Sai Baba Movement and Sri Aurobindo Society, do not perceive
themselves to be “religious” or “non-Hindu” even if some have developed
within the framework of Hinduism, and show a considerable variety of
beliefs, practices and organizational structures. At the same time they share
some generic or common features such as the founder guru; claims to
universal appeal and membership by individual choice and a personal quest;
“difference” from mainstream, institutionalized religions especially in
promoting a de-ritualized stance; a claim to a logical, rational and modernist

xlviii Introduction
approach to life and spirituality while also asserting a connection with ancient
wisdom and tradition; and a focus on the individual and his/her self-
development, at the same time subscribing to the notion of seva (community
service) as essential practice. The author also explores the groups’ functioning
as conditioned by local multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity while being
connected with centres in India and elsewhere, and offers some explanation
for their appeal to English-speaking, literate, middle-class and upper-class
professionals and members of different ethnic groups and religious sensibilities.
In Chapter 7, Foo Check Woo and Lynette Thomas examine the patterns
of conversion within a less known and “new” religion in Singapore that
arrived in the 1950s which saw a peak of membership only in the 1980s and
1990s — the Baha’i Faith. The authors’ small-scale study shows Baha’i
converts and adherents to be mainly young, English-speaking, middle-class
with tertiary education, and Chinese, many of whom were formerly Taoists
or Christians but were dissatisfied with their former religions. Many had also
converted when they were overseas students in North America, or are Malaysian
in origin, while a significant percentage of adherents are from “other” ethnic
backgrounds. Their study also examined the decisions among converts to
embrace the faith in terms of the attractiveness of its spiritual principles —
Progressive Revelation, the Oneness of God and the Unity of Mankind —
and its social teachings located in the independent investigation of truth, the
need for harmony between religion and science, and the principle of equal
opportunities for men and women. Besides shedding some light on this little
known community, the study also reveals some of the complex religious,
inter-religious and cultural aspects of conversion, particularly at the personal
and familial levels.
In Chapter 8, Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng also departs from the “traditional”
Buddhism commonly associated with many local Chinese to focus on its
reformist nature. She examines the processes of religious modernization
and Buddhicization within the Singapore Buddhist landscape which has
resulted in a movement towards Reformist Buddhism, as well as examines
its unifying religious ideology. She also explores the extent to which this
development appeals to modern needs and its impact on policy formulation
for religious harmony.
Chapter 9 by Nagah Devi Ramasamy follows from the earlier chapter on
India-derived new religious movements to focus on one such movement —
the Sathya Sai Baba. She examines the movement in charities and social
service provision as well as its facility in foster multiethnic and multi-
religious identity amongst Singaporeans, through its philosophy of communal
identity construction and seva (community service). She also explores a

Introduction xlix
significant development in the local religious landscape: the communal union

between the multi-ethnic cum multi-religious memberships existing within
the local Sai Baba Movement.
Chapter 10 by Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman follows from the earlier
chapter on the impact of Islamic discourses in Southeast Asia on Singapore
to focus on the local dominant Muslim religious elites or ulama. Using the
sociological concept of traditionalism, the author provides rare and valuable
insights into the ulamas’ backgrounds and styles of thought as portrayed in
their writings found in the Malay media and other sources such as their
sermons. She also examines the concretization of their traditionalist mode
of thinking in relation to some significant issues and events affecting the
Malay Muslim community, such as organ donation and transplant, stem
cell research, secular knowledge (versus religious knowledge), reason (versus
traditionalism), the wearing of headscarves in schools, the arrests of local
Jemaah Islamiyah members and madrasah education. She further looks at
how the “new” traditionalist ulama attempt to deal with modern issues such
as government and politics, the economy, globalization, poverty and
development. Finally, she also discusses the impact and ramifications of the
ulama’s traditiionalism on the general development of the Malay community
and its political participation within Singapore. As a political force itself,
she shows how this religious elite is essentially apolitical but works to be
recognized and legitimated as the sole experts and authority on Islam and
on knowledge and modern issues affecting the Muslim community, over
and above the Malay political leadership.
In Chapter 11, Arunajeet Kaur also focuses on a little-known religion —
that of the small Sikh community in Singapore. Although the Sikhs are a
visible and ostensibly homogenous community due to their unique physical
appearance and established places of Sikh worship (gurdwaras), her study
reveals a different reality. It points out that, over time since immigration,
Sikhs in Singapore have evolved away from the Sikh religious ideals propagated
by the religious authorities in original homeland Punjab, with only one-third
of local Sikhs maintaining their unique appearance, and a further select
minority within this third understanding and practising the religion as
institutionalized by the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee (SGPC)
in Amritsar, Punjab. Arunajeet’s study charts and explains the evolution of
Sikh identity in Singapore, taking us through colonial and post-colonial time
periods and major specific phenomenon and issues set within broader social
and economic contexts. The picture is at once a story of immigration and
settlement and of inter-generational adaptations and changes. The latter are
reflected most visibly in the physical differences among the Amrit Dharis,

l Introduction
Sahaj Dharis and “cropped” and intricately in the identity and community
issues involving the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari identity, the gurdwaras’ leadership,
language and competing lifestyles for families, genders and youth.
The final chapter in this segment on the diversity of Singapore’s religious
landscape offers an illustrative example of religious expression in the city. In
Chapter 12, Lily Kong explores the ways in which Thaipusam processions —
one of the most colourful, organized, and long-lasting religious processions in
Singapore — by their very visibility foreground the relationships between the
secular and the sacred, while contributing to a construction of identity and
community and simultaneously surfacing fractures therein. She examines the
secular state’s management of religious processions, including the regulation
of time and space for such events as well as over their noise production, and
the tactics of adaptation, negotiation and resistance in participants’ responses
to the state’s management. She also explores participants’ experience of these
processions in terms of two contrasting senses of communitas and fault-lines
within “community” based on age, class and nationality; their investment of
sacred meanings in these processions and the nature of their “sacred experience”;
and the manner in which such activities, associated state actions, and
participants’ responses evoke reactions from non-participants.
Theme II focuses on religion in schools and among the young. The
school being a major site and agent of state and institutional policies as well
as of personal development and group dynamics, its religious orientations
and influences are important aspects of early religious socialization, experiences
and inter-religious encounters among the young. These aspects, as well as
religious orientations and shifts among the young themselves, reveal much
about religious diversity and change in Singapore.
In Chapter 13, Charlene Tan examines the teaching of religion in schools.
She first discusses the government’s attempts to teach religious beliefs and
practices in Singapore schools for the purposes of inculcating moral values
and promoting citizenship education, initially through the compulsory
Religious Knowledge (RK) subject introduced to all secondary schools in the
1980s, followed by a new Civics and Moral Education (CME) programme
which replaced RK in 1992, and to a lesser extent through National Education
(NE) launched in 1997. She argues that the government’s approach of
introducing various religions to students in a historical, objective and detached
manner makes it difficult for students to imbibe the moral teachings
propounded by the religions or be committed to promoting religious harmony.
She further argues for the introduction of Spiritual Education (SE) in terms
of its enduring value on personal development, its advantage in avoiding the
problems and challenges associated with a multi-religious subject, and its

Introduction li
encouragement to act morally driven by intrinsic reasons rather than for

reasons stipulated by the state.
The discussion on teaching religion in government and government-
aided schools is followed by an examination of two distinct types of religion-
related education in the Muslim madrasah and the Christian mission schools.
In Chapter 14, Sa’eda Buang examines religious education in the madrasah
which is expected to offer a curriculum that focuses on religious subjects in
keeping with its role as an institution to produce Muslim religious elites.
Historically, national and economic development and demands of the state,
particularly during the post-World War II period, have necessitated the
madrasah to revisit its long-held position as classical curriculum practitioner
time and again. An earlier resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the early
twentieth century also sought to effect madrasah curriculum reform, which
was swiftly put in place but short-lived. In recent years, the curriculum
purpose of the six remaining full-time madrasah has again come under
scrutiny and reformulation, to make them be responsive to larger economic
and socio-political transformations. The author examines two main aspects of
madrasah education: the socio-historical aspect of madrasah curriculum
development and main issues such as syllabuses, subjects and texts; and the
underlying philosophical considerations. In explicating on the interplay of
socio-educational determinants and principles that affect curriculum planning,
she points out that power assertions between elite groups and the Muslim
public have directly stunted the growth and progress of early madrasah
education and subsequently, even though the curriculum has been in dire
need of reform and the Muslim community itself is in need of change in
religious and social outlook. She concludes that present challenges to madrasah
education are multi-faceted and formidable — not only must there be a
formulation of an all-encompassing and yet achievable curriculum purpose
that combines a sound philosophy of man and education, mental dexterity,
pragmatism, vision as well as a strong sense of humanity, there must also be
the ability to galvanize support from various quarters for such a curriculum.
In Chapter 15, the role of religion as moral and spiritual “benefits” in the
Christian mission schools that came alongside colonialism are given particular
focus by Robbie Goh. He briefly traces their historical role and development
and ascertains the means by which they achieved a reputation for excellence
and maintained that reputation even after independence and the creation of
a national school system. Although mission schools have had to negotiate
their distinctive character in the light of national educational imperatives and
currents, the quality of a distinctive school “spirit” and its “moral” benefits,
which have been effected largely through non-curricular or structural means,

lii Introduction
have persisted throughout their history. The result is a distinctive character of

mission schools which has been broadly acknowledged to play a significant
part in the Singapore educational landscape not only or primarily in academic
terms, but also in terms of the “moral” training for which these schools are
held in high regard. The author points out that the superior efficacy of moral
influence (which arises from the inherently Christian nature of the mission
schools) over a Religious Knowledge (RK) curricular approach (in which a
multi-religious, pluralistic curriculum is inculcated through abstract classroom
dictates), argues for an enhancement of the structural leeway given to mission
schools to carry out their project of Christian moral influence. At the same
time, he notes that a number of safeguards clearly have to be set in place to
protect the religious sensibilities of non-Christian students and to avoid
Christian evangelization.
Chapter 16 shifts the attention from schools and policies to school
adolescents. Picking up on the major trend of religious conversion and
switching in Singapore, Phyllis Chew reports on her study of religious switching
and knowledge among school adolescents in this chapter. Her study reveals a
notable permeation of religious thought in adolescent life with 82 per cent of
adolescents identifying themselves as having a religion, primarily the Buddhist,
Christian and Muslim faiths. The most common period for adolescent religious
switching to occur is between the ages of fifteen and sixteen, with switchers
mainly from the Buddhist/Taoists, Christian and Hindu faiths, and often
facing parental opposition initially. On the whole, adolescents switch not
because of a personal quest for truth but because of peer-group influences and
the need to “solve a problem”. The popular choice for a switch is from Taoism
to Christianity, and/or from Buddhism to free-thinker status. When the
switch is to Christianity, it is also to a church that is youth-focused and that
preaches a this-worldly gospel of care, cheer and prosperity. The switch away
from the Taoist/Buddhist faiths is because of adolescents’ disenchantment
with the practice of their rites/rituals and their inability to operate in the
adolescents’ preferred language choice of English or Mandarin. The study
also reveals adolescents’ knowledge of religions to be poor, drawn mainly
from Internet and chat-room sites and peer groups. At the same time, most
are aware of the need to be tolerant of religions in multi-religious Singapore
and not to be offensive.
The third theme of religion and religious diversity in Singapore relates to
that which takes place in one of the most public spaces of information and
exchange of views — the media. Two chapters discuss two important religion-
related issues as discoursed through the media — homosexuality and Internet

Introduction liii
use for religious purposes — and surface issues pertaining to the secular-
religious distinction in the public sphere and the potentials for religious harm
and harmony through cyberspace.
In Chapter 17, Kenneth Paul Tan looks at the way the national print
media stage-managed public debate in 2003 over the question of non-
discriminatory hiring policies in the Singapore Civil Service with respect to
homosexuals. Through a close reading of mostly “pro-gay” and “anti-gay”
arguments voiced, in particular the religiously inflected arguments of authorities
from the Muslim, Buddhist, Roman Catholic and Protestant Christian
communities, he locates obstacles to an open, free, empirically supported,
normatively justified and sincere discussion that should ideally characterize a
mature public sphere. He suggests that it is the artificial distinction between
the religious and the secular, and the insistence on formal secularism that
excludes all religious reasons from the public sphere, that has been responsible
for a public sphere that is defensive, dogmatic and disengaged, and that
distorts the capacity for more open public dialogue motivated by a collective
pursuit of higher-order knowledge of what is good. The strict and formal
secularism can also have the effect of demonizing religious reasons and
transforming them into a defensive discourse, with complexity, subtlety,
variety, and engagement being distorted into simple “us” versus “them”
modes of reasoning. The author points out that the case study clearly shows
that religious people and even authorities can have a range of views ranging
from the conservative to the most liberal, but a siege mentality reduces
discussion into a battlefield of rigid notions of good and evil and right and
wrong, all marked by suspicion and hostility between the forces of religion
and secularism. Finally, he suggests that the media can play a more strategic
role in stage-managing future public debates to produce and admit more
nuanced arguments that destabilize simple “pro” and “anti” modes of
discussion, starting with removing the religious/secular distinction in the
public sphere so as to free up discussion, remove suspicion and increase good
faith in one another.
In Chapter 18, Randolph Kluver et al. examine Internet use by
Singaporeans for religious purposes. Recognizing that the Internet is becoming
a popular medium for gaining access to religious information, teachings,
communities and experiences, the authors note that it is a rich source of both
useful and false and sometimes inflammatory information about religious
faiths. Their study, based on a national survey and interviews with religious
leaders, pays attention to the way the Internet might increase or decrease
religious understanding and harmony among diverse faith communities.

liv Introduction
Some interesting findings include the following: (1) the Internet has become
an important source for religious information and activity in Singapore, in
line with global trends; (2) most survey respondents believed that the Internet
can be a potential threat to religious harmony; (3) Singaporeans use the
Internet more for matters related to their own religion than to learn about
other religions; (4) Singaporeans are more likely to use local sites for religious
purposes than foreign sites; (5) firm support by Singaporeans and religious
leaders for government regulation of the Internet on religious matters;
(6) most religious leaders see the Internet as a helpful medium for users to
learn both about their own and about other religions; and (7) some religious
leaders believe that the Internet provides an easy context for religious conflict
through the posting of harmful materials and are concerned over the
authenticity of religious information online.
Theme IV is about the roles of religious organizations in social services
— a domain which many are traditionally strong in and have continued to
remain so through a re-invention of themselves and flexible adjustments to
the larger multi-religious environment and secular state. Chapters 19 to 22
trace the motivations, roles and activities of Muslim, Buddhist, Christian
and Hindu-based organizations in the development of the local social
services sector historically and contemporarily. They also discuss the
organizations’ collaboration with the state and other selected intra-, inter-
religious and secular organizations, and the forces and impulses which
motivate them to do so.
Enon Mansor and Nur Amali Ibrahim, in two distinct sections in Chapter
19, discuss the historical and contemporary roles and activities of Muslim
agencies and mosques as social service providers. For Muslim agencies, the
majority of their clients remain Muslims, but they also service a sizeable
percentage of non-Muslims. They have also established external relationships
and collaborations with state agencies and other non-Muslim organizations,
both faith-based and secular. Working with non-Muslim organizations seems
to be part and parcel of their experiences and a practical necessity, Muslims
being a minority. However, they ensure that the collaboration effort is consistent
with Muslim beliefs and practices. This section also discusses the internal and
external dynamics that contribute to the organizations’ rationale, guiding
principles and perceptions in collaborating with non-Muslim organizations,
which are also common perceived to be easier to work with in some respects
than Muslim organizations.
The second section on mosques shows that besides being places for
prayers, they are also important institutions which address social issues in
the community. The experiences of four different mosques studied reveal a

Introduction lv
huge range of social services offered to meet different needs of various

segments of the Muslim population as well as their varied resources,
collaborations and leadership and orientations/values. Some common
problems faced by mosques in social services provision include insufficient
funding, lack of expertise, ineffective use of available resources, and gaps in
expectations between mosque staff and congregants. Although the mosques’
social services programmes cater mostly to the Muslims, there are spaces in
which interaction between Muslims and people of other religious groups
takes place, including those for fostering inter-religious understanding and
correcting misperceptions about Islam.
In Chapter 20, Sinniah Vivakanandan and Nagah Devi Ramasamy
examine the role of Hindu temples in social services. They trace the historical
evolution of the temple, from being a focal centre for worship, interaction
and safe haven for early Hindu migrant workers to their position as largely
places of ritualistic worship by the 1970s. However, temples have been
subject to pressures for change towards greater performance of the mandatory
seva (service) since the 1980s, such pressures coming from more informed
and educated devotees and neo-spiritual movements, loss of youth members
unable to identify with rituals, and examples set by organisations of other
religions. The authors also identify gaps in current services rendered and offer
recommendations for future development of social service by Hindu temples.
Chapter 21 by Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng focuses on Buddhist institutions
in the delivery of welfare services. She examines the intersection of state
ideology and Buddhist ideology which produces a philanthropic Buddhist
culture that encourages Buddhist organizations and individuals to become
actively involved in charity works and social and welfare services. Concretely,
she traces how the Buddhist temple, through its Buddhist Sangha and the
Buddhist notion of compassion, has always been simultaneously a sacred and
welfare space as it evolved over time, first as home for the destitute and tea
house for the needy, and then to benevolence hall, medical free clinic, and
provider of shelter and services.
Christian churches have historically been involved in social service
provision, especially so among those strongly rooted in “social gospel” theology
which emphasizes good works for the betterment of humanity as the unique
call of Christians. However, in Chapter 22, Mathew Mathews examines the
case of Protestant churches in Singapore which, to a large extent, are
theologically conservative and traditionally more concerned with “soul saving”
than “bread giving” but which, together with church-affiliated social service
organizations, form the largest block in Singapore’s social service landscape.
He establishes the main types of services they offer: help for families and

lvi Introduction
youth; half-way houses, care facilities including hospitals and institutional

homes; and facilities for the disabled. He also examines their motivations for
involvement — integrating faith and works and obtaining legitimacy vis-à-vis
the state and community — and describes how ideological, spiritual and
material resources are mobilized. In examining how Protestant churches and
their organizations are successful in adapting to the secular state and multi-
religious society, he also discusses the common perception that their social
service provision is a front for proselitization.
The fifth and final theme focuses on what probably constitutes the most
difficult and challenging about religious diversity: interfaith issues and
interaction. Given their inevitability and their potentials for both peace and
conflict, it is necessary to understand their specific forms and expressions,
and the principles and values by which they are approached by individuals
and groups, leaders and laities, and the society as a whole. Four chapters help
us towards this understanding.
Ten Chin Liew leads the way with a philosophical approach to
understanding religious diversity in Chapter 23. He argues for acknowledging
the existence of genuine, but sometimes incompatible or even conflicting
beliefs about religious matters as our starting point, in order to face a central
political issue of the basis on which people with such differences are to live
together harmoniously and in cooperation with one another. In his view, the
first step is to establish good grounds for religious toleration: having a proper
understanding and application of religious beliefs, showing respect for sincere
believers of all kinds by letting them lead their lives in accordance with their
fundamental values so long as they do not harm others, and rejecting a
theocratic state in favour of a secular one. At the same time, he sees mere
toleration as being insufficient as it is compatible with mutually tolerant
religious groups living compartmentalized lives without any dialogue or
interaction. He observes that in Singapore, several other social ingredients
have been added in order to avoid this, including housing and educational
policies and a meritocratic approach. He argues in particular for a meritocratic
society which, properly tempered, provides opportunities for social mobility
and encourages the emergence of multiple and criss-crossing social identities
whereby religious divisions need not coincide with, and be amplified by,
other social divisions.
In Chapter 24, Mathew Mathews focuses on a specific area of inter-
religious interaction: how Christian clergymen negotiate their religion with
other religions. This is a particularly valuable chapter, given that the steady
growth of Christianity in Singapore, especially the more conservative segment
of it, is a cause for concern in terms of inter-religious harmony as this

Introduction lvii
category is allegedly more resistant to enter into partnerships with other

religious groups and opposed to making concessions and compromises to
their exclusivist faith and practice. Through a study of a diverse sample of
clergymen, Mathews documents their views on four areas of tension —
inter-religious dialogue, inter-religious relations, evangelistic practices and
participation in non-Christian ritual — and relate these to various
demographic and attitudinal variables. He further demonstrates how
clergymen attempt to negotiate the tensions between their evangelistic
mission and their need to peacefully co-exist in a secular nation state, by
providing theological rationalizations while being always mindful not to
dilute their exclusivist stance.
In Chapter 25, Lai Ah Eng explores the relatively old and only inter-
religious set-up in Singapore: Inter-Religious Organization (IRO). She traces
the IRO’s historical development and major activities since 1949, as well as
examines some of the inherent issues raised and problems encountered in
inter-religious relations and collaboration even as such an organization aspires
to spread inter-religious goodwill and understanding and share similar values
drawn from their respective religious traditions. In assessing its contributions
to interfaith awareness, peace and understanding, she argues that the IRO,
despite some of its weaknesses and lack of statutory authority, is a necessary
inter-religious institution in a multi-religious society.
Chapter 26 by Phua Chao Rong, Anita Hui and Yap Ching Wi explores
another new dimension of interfaith relations: conscious and active attempts
at interfaith engagement among youth leaders. The authors identify some
ground realities of youth interfaith engagement in Singapore that have
developed largely only the last few years and conclude that this engagement
is limited and in need of improvement and better coordination in general.
They also point out how the social taboo of religion as sensitive has contributed
to the abstinence from and lack of interest in youth interfaith work, while the
sensitivities of interfaith engagement potentially compromise its integrity and
future development and success. They further identify another important
factor limiting the development of interfaith engagement: the intergenerational
gaps between leaders (seniors) and participants (youths). Finally, they argue
for stronger grass-roots collaborations between faith-based organizations with
a clear set of direction, support and guidelines set by governmental agencies,
and the leadership and shared knowledge by the long-established IRO.
Concretely, they propose a four-phase model for youth interfaith engagement
based on friendship, social action, mutual study and intellectual exchange,
with the objective being to build a foundation of interfaith youth leaders and
a working understanding of various religious teachings.

lviii Introduction
The final chapter under the theme of interfaith issues and interaction is,
perhaps aptly, one that describes a personal journey of encountering faith and
the interfaith, interspersed with scholarly insights on interfaith dialogue and
understanding. In Chapter 27, See Guat Kwee traces her journey in Christian-
Muslim relations in Singapore and overseas. Her journey had first begun
during a stay in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a Christian. That stay
led her next to interfaith issues and the Muslim community upon her return
to Singapore, and onto graduate studies in the United States where she met
scholars and practitioners of interfaith dialogue and obtained a better
understanding of the history and contexts of Christian-Muslim relationships.
In living and studying together with Muslims, she was able to experience a
community bonded by friendship and the pursuit of understanding and
peace. She sees an urgent need for Christian-Muslim and other types of
interfaith dialogue as a way to build relationships between people of different
faiths, with this endeavour encompassing both joint study and scholarship
and working together on practical projects. The aim is to overcome mutual
ignorance, appreciate shared history and acknowledge collective past wrongs,
deal with misconceptions and personal distrust, form friendships, and work
together for peace and the common good. Towards this end, the author also
offers concrete suggestions for Singapore: the establishment of a centre for
dialogue and study of world religions and the creation of “Sister City”
relationships to engage Singaporeans of different faiths, traditions and ages.
SOME REMARKS ON RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

IN SINGAPORE
This book does not make strong and firm conclusions about religious diversity
in Singapore in view of the huge gaps of knowledge of the highly wide-
ranging and complex landscape. Instead, in its concluding chapter, it identifies
some important research and knowledge gaps, and makes some general
remarks on the implications and challenges posed by several trends and
dimensions of religious diversity for state-society and interfaith relations.
These trends and dimensions pertain to the growing binary worldviews of
secularism and religiosity and the artificial and antagonistic distinctions made
between them; religious expressions in public spaces; religious proselytization
and conversion; external religious influences and impacts on local communities;
political mobilization by religion and its management by the state; and
specific inter-religious issues.
The consequent need to clarify, balance and nuance diversity and unity
within an “always under construction and in dialogue” approach and the

Introduction lix
complexities and sensitivities of construction and dialogue are also raised. In

particular, the section points out that the role of the state, since it is a key
player, needs to be carefully considered and managed in seeking the diversity-
unity balance, as too much diversity can result in divisiveness and fractiousness
but too much control can mean state hegemony and repression. At the same
time, it calls for going beyond the usual focus on the state to examine diverse
religions and religious communities with their own worlds and realities as
these offer motivations, fulfilments and meanings of their own which the
state cannot or will not be able to substitute. Finally, while potential areas of
inter-religious tensions require sensitive management, it is argued that interfaith
education, dialogue and collaboration, despite their inherent difficulties, are
likely to become an important mechanism and process in seeking the unity-
diversity balance and in the ongoing construction of religious harmony.
The religious landscape in Singapore and indeed the world can only
become more diverse. This book attests to the need, among others, for
empirically grounded research and higher order social knowledge and insights
into this unprecedented diversity, towards better social understanding and
management of religion for the common good of all living in a multi-
religious at the same time shared environment and nation-state.

Religious Influences and Impulses Impacting Singapore 1
PART I
The Landscape of
Religious Diversity
01 ReligiousDiversity Pt I/Ch 1 1 7/16/08, 9:47 AM

2 Tham Seong Chee

RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES AND

IMPULSES IMPACTING
SINGAPORE
Tham Seong Chee
INTRODUCTION
A discourse on religion will need to consider three pivotal social institutions
and how they interact with each other, that is, society, state, and religion
itself. Current international trends would suggest that it is also necessary to
view all three social institutions in their broader global context. Among other
developments, globalization, has made possible as well as encourage closer
ties among the adherents of a religious faith transcending national borders,
while simultaneously afford more effective mobilization in support of shared
causes and concerns. Major and critical issues that now confront mankind
command global or multinational cooperation and this too, has drawn the
attention and involvement of religion. Moreover, contemporary majority
thinking is towards pluralism in religious belief and in cultural development.
The religious impulse then could be of internal as well as external genesis.
Religion, State and Society (1)

Looking back, one can detect a criss-cross, up-and-down and to-and-fro
trajectory in the evolution of relationships among the three social institutions
of society, state and religion. This, at least, is the case of the West, which
3
3

4 Tham Seong Chee
continues to exercise extensive influence over much of the world since the
Industrial Revolution. How they relate to and have an impact on each other
is complex and therefore challenges sociological praxis. For example, in what
way can one say that religion is the “cause” and not the “effect” in social,
economic and political change? Similarly, what religious impulses can one
claim to have emanated from society or even the state? Or, is it the other way
round where societal change or intervention from the state has created the
impulses for religious change?
It could be argued that religion as a “sacred canopy”1 characterized the
early societies and rudimentary states. Religion, as it were, was regarded as
the sacred cosmos — a divinely sanctioned spiritual-moral foundation for the
construction of a God-loving and God-fearing society or state. For example,
in medieval Europe, the support of the Roman Catholic Papacy was critical
in ensuring political legitimacy to rule. Acts of opposition and disobedience
to church authority invited sabotage and, in a worse case scenario,
ex-communication.
Religion-inspired mapping of society is perhaps exemplified most sharply
by classical Hinduism. In terms of religion and society, Hinduism cannot be
understood without recourse to the caste system. The central aspect of
Hinduism is that of fulfilling duties according to the caste into which one is
born. The origins of the caste system go back to the early history of Hinduism
when peoples of the Aryan race invaded India. Out of this was constructed
the pyramidal caste system: Brahmins (priests), Kshatriayas (warriors) and
Vaisayas (farmers and traders), all three considered “twice born” and therefore
could participate in rituals and study the wisdom of the Vedas.2 Below these
three castes were the Sudras (peasants) who were regarded as “once born”, and
below the Sudras were the outcastes, members who not only performed the
meanest of tasks but were despised and oppressed. Classical Hinduism,
therefore, not only provided the religious justification for social organization
but rigidified the status system.
In the case of the early history of Islam, religion became the basis of social
organization, providing in the process a comprehensive and complete moral-
ethical system for the conduct of life (syariah) from family relationships to the
responsibilities of political leadership, the conduct of war, the management of
business, care for the poor and destitute, and fulfilling duties to God. The
syariah is commonly known as Muslim law, upon which an ethical society in
obedience to the teachings of God (as exemplified in the revelations of the
Prophet Muhammad and documented in the Qur’an) may be realized. Pious
Muslims, in particular therefore, do not differentiate between the “secular”
and the “religious”. For them, every thought and action has a religious
connection and its permissibility or otherwise should be judged in accordance
4

with a religiously sanctioned scale of values. Compared to Christianity and

Hinduism, the religion of Islam remains a powerful influence in Muslim
thinking on how a spiritually guided moral-ethical society may be constructed.
The source of this religious impulse is the Qur’an itself, which Muslims
believe to represent the very word of God — sacred, unchangeable and
relevant for all times.
The moral-ethical philosophy of Confucianism represents another
interesting example. Though not a religion (Confucius himself had explicitly
denied this), its adoption as the organizing principle for the construction of
the state is comparable to the early intention of the major world religions.
Both Confucianism as well as the world religions discussed so far were guided
by the concern to ensure peace and stability within the state and concomitantly,
harmony and social cohesion. Taoism, as it evolved to assume religious
significance, did not supplant Confucianism but on the contrary, filled the
spiritual vacuum left by Confucianism. Similarly, when Buddhism became an
accepted faith in China, its stress on moral-ethical self cultivation harmonized
nicely with Confucianism. The impulse of Buddhism was therefore moral-
ethical perfection and the accumulation of merits in order to achieve total
release (Nirvana enlightenment) from the cares and temptations of this
world. It was also tolerant. The relationships underlying Confucianism,
Taoism and Buddhism implicitly allowed Confucianism to function as the
ideology of the state and as the basis of Chinese secularism. Chinese attitude
to religion has in general been “instrumental” rather than ideological. There
has never been an instance in Chinese history where attempts were made to
create a “heaven on earth”. Chinese religion as it exists today is syncretistic —
a combination of folk religion, Taoism, Buddhism and deified Confucianism.
Religion, State and Society (2)

Yet, the sacred canopy proved impermanent. Tears and cracks began to appear
from the fourteenth century onwards in Europe. Humanist ideas associated
with the Renaissance began to take root in Italy. In the sixteenth century,
Martin Luther (1483–1546) set in motion the Reformation despite efforts to
counter it by the established church (Counter Reformation). The nature of
religious practice would henceforth change drastically. Schism reared its head
and led to the founding of the future Protestant Church. Luther’s message
and later, John Calvin’s (1509–64), was that “Man was answerable to God
alone” and not to human agents of God, be they lords or clergy. Papal
authority over the laity (society) was therefore, further eroded.
By the late seventeenth century, a revolutionary intellectual disposition
had crystallized that was to challenge and eventually displace religion’s
5

6 Tham Seong Chee
hitherto all-encompassing influence on state and society — the era of the

Enlightenment. The torrent of intellectual energy epitomized in the works
of Descartes, Locke, Newton, Leibniz, Kant, Goethe, Voltaire, Rousseau,
Adam Smith and David Hume, to name the main protagonists, criticized
both church and government. Collectively, they altered the then existing
worldview founded on religion and in the process introduced a new
construction — one that rested firmly on man’s rationality, autonomy and
creative genius. In short, man was seen as the master of his own fate.
Henceforth, development and the progress of man itself were to depend on
his dominance over nature. Instead of the pursuit of divine will and purpose,
the universe was reconstructed and impregnated with human meanings.
This opened the door for secularization, the separation of religion from the
business of the state, and simultaneously the validation of the intellect as
the organizing norm for social ascent. No less important were the bursts of
scientific and technological activities that followed the Enlightenment. In
the process, what science could not explain or prove was regarded as
superstition. Scepticism and agnosticism became rampant and further
weakened the hold of religion on thought and action.
The values and attitudes of the Renaissance, the Reformation and the
Enlightenment have remained the intellectual bedrock of Western
civilization. Secularization, the cumulative withdrawal of the role of religion
in the affairs of the state, could be said to be inevitable given the
circumstances. Equally pertinent was the rise of capitalism led by the
emerging European bourgeoisie which further eroded the role of religion in
matters pertaining to state and society.
The characteristics of capitalism as conceptualized by Weber3 were anti-
traditionalism, rationalism, dynamism and calculated long-term planning to
ensure economic gain (the profit motive). The central motif was rationality
which was to permeate all areas and levels of life, from the legal system to the
political structure, social behaviour, scientific and technological pursuits and
management of the economy, labour relations and even philosophy and the
arts. Understood this way, capitalism may be said to have strengthened
secularism and in the process widened the separation between religion and
the state. Thus, from the time of the Industrial Revolution, religion’s influence
on the development of the state in Europe waned — a situation which
prompted Goethe (1749–1832) to epitomize knowledge and power over
religious faith as depicted in the character of Faust.
Christianity’s reaction to the rise of capitalism was exemplified in due
course by the flowering of Protestant sects — a process that had begun during
the Reformation. The development of the printing industry made available

translations of the Christian scriptures that reached out to a much wider and
more varied community of believers. This in turn allowed for a diverse
interpretation of the Bible and concomitantly the emergence of “new prophets”,
charismatic preachers and cult leaders. The ethos of capitalism then, implicitly
encouraged religious diversity both because of its values and attitudes as well
as its transformative power in social relations and economic practices, that is
to say, in the make-up of the social structure and in the new trades and
industries that came about. No longer were religious truths taken literally.
Be that as it may, the essential driving force of capitalism is the profit
motive. While it fulfils the yearnings for “this worldly” comforts, wealth and
power, it cannot provide answers to the deeper questions of human existence,
that is, the religious and spiritual motivations that are inherent to the human
psyche. Moreover, there is also the ugly side manifested by capitalism that
protagonists of socialism and communism had tried to expose and ameliorate
especially in the early post-war period. Indeed, despite capitalism’s triumph,
a residue of communistic-socialistic ideology and practice remains in various
guises in countries such as China, Russia, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba.
Capitalism, socialism and communism are “Godless” ideologies. The fact
that socialism and communism surfaced to address the perceived inequalities
and inequities of capitalism does testify, once again, to the dominating belief
that man has all the answers to his needs. However, the negative developments
coming out of capitalism and its practice have, as it seems the case, revitalized
the religious impulse, especially in countries and regions where poverty,
corruption, disease, lack of human rights and bad governance prevail.
RELIGION AND POLITICS IN GOBAL PERSPECTIVE

How then has religion adjusted to the challenges posed by the global capitalism
in practice? Has it been reactive and adaptive? Have current existential
conditions and global uncertainties given religion a new dispensation? Or
indeed, is there now a reversal of the process of secularization consequent on
the apparent religious resurgence in Asia, Africa, South America, the United
States and parts of Eastern Europe including the Russian Federation? What
social and political impulses are at play?
The situation that religion finds itself does vary from faith to faith, from
state to state and from society to society. In Asia, Africa and South America,
membership in religious institutions (church, mosques, temples, etc.) has
risen. In contrast, in Western Europe, church attendance continues to fall. In
the case of America, there is an apparent resurgence of religious fundamentalism
(the religious right) in politics and “born again” Christian evangelism. In the

8 Tham Seong Chee
case of Muslim countries, both history and contemporary tensions obtaining

between the West and the Muslim world have led to religious radicalism and
the hijacking of religion by extremists for political struggle. Equally notable
is the rise of religions of “experience” as against religions of “expression”.
Others have used such terms/categories as “live religions” as against
“conservation/canned religions” and “dynamic” as against “open religions”.4
To be sure, they were alluding to the growth of religions of “emotion” in
contrast to institutional religions characterized by “worship and sacrifice,
theology and ceremony and ecclesiastical organisation”.5 Whether religions of
“emotion” represent a new religious impulse or is adaptive is moot. Finally,
there are those who decline any religious affiliation yet declare themselves
believers in a personal God (inner religion). What does this mean? What are
the precipitating circumstances that have prompted such an attitude? What
implications, if any, do these have on religion and the state?
There is no doubt that religion and politics are now intertwined as a
result of cumulative globalization underpinned by the spread of global
capitalism. At the same time, unlike the period of the Renaissance when
confidence in human progress prevailed and shaped human response to the
challenges of existence, current uncertainties have made many return to
religion to seek meaning and direction in their lives. In this connection,
two major consequences for religion may be detected as a result. First is the
expansion of transnational religious outreach, by the Catholic and Protestant
churches (in the early days by missionaries and evangelical groups from the
West) and in recent years by Muslim missionary and welfare groups financed
by oil-rich Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia. Other countries
that have benefited from global capitalism such as Japan and South Korea,
have established religious outlets beyond their national borders as exemplified
by the Buddhist Soka Gakai and the Korean Reformed Church of Reverend
Sun Myung Moon, both examples of “new religions”. Second, the
transnational outreach of these major world religions have directly and
indirectly forced the state to take steps to ensure that it does not pose a
threat to its national development policies, especially in multi-religious
states. Globalization then, may be said to have dual consequences: both for
the national economy (in the sense that it needs to retain control over the
power of multinational corporations to influence local economic and social
practices); and for nation-building which obviously involves the management
of inter-religious relations and practice.
Globalization thus has moved religion to a new but much more uncertain
plane at both the national as well as international levels. By the same token,
the logic of modern capitalism, characterized by the world as a free market,

is now securely embraced by one and all, engulfing in the process all other
ideologies. In this connection, the most potent grand idea of the twentieth
century has been that of freedom and democracy — an idea quite in line
with the ethos of capitalism, child of the European Enlightenment. No
wonder that Francis Fukuyama was moved to declare the “end of history”
as if to suggest that liberal democracy would erase all “ideology” based
conflicts in future.7
MODERN CAPITALISM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY:

IMPACT ON RELIGION
As mentioned earlier, intellectually and ideologically, both modern capitalism
and liberal democracy make logical bedfellows. However, their impact on
various religions and religious practices show significant differences. This is
especially true for Christianity and Islam in which, as religions of the prophetic
tradition, each has in its evolution striven to create a God-fearing society
encapsulated by the “sacred canopy”.
Impact on Islam
In the case of Islam, this religious motivation remains a powerful influence in
Muslim minds. As mentioned earlier, the concept of secularism, the separation
of politics from religion does not exist in Islamic doctrine. No doubt Muslims
now live in a variety of existential circumstances and are citizens of a variety
of countries practising a variety of political beliefs. In brief, Islam recognizes
three existential conditions: (1) Dar al-Islam (literally the abode of peace)
where Islam and Islamic law prevails in the territories and countries concerned,
(2) Dar al-Harb (literally the abode of war) where Islam and Islamic law is
proscribed or where the individual struggles against the will of God, and
(3) Dar al-Sulh, also Dar al-‘Ahd (literally the abode of treaty) where treaty
obligations made between Muslims and non-Muslims living in the same state
or territory allow for the practice of Islam and Islamic law.8 The last relates to
Muslims living as a minority within a state.
It follows, therefore, that Muslims in various degrees of religious conviction
harbour sentiments of an Islamic society governed by the syariah — that
system of Islamic law accountable to the Qur’an and later, as Muslim society
grew and expanded, incorporating the sayings and traditions attributed to the
Prophet Muhammad. The religious laws of the syariah are the result of the
intuitive experience of the Prophet and represent the ethical system towards
which Muslims expressed their total submission to the will of God. Islamic

10 Tham Seong Chee
ethics, as stressed by Gibb, is “revealed ethics, not the product of rational

speculations or of social experience”.9 This overlap between religion and
society found its most perfect form in the first century of Islam’s history when
the four “rightly guided” caliphs (Abu Bakar, Umar, Uthman and Ali) ruled
over the Muslims. This period of Islamic history is regarded, in ethical terms,
as the most perfect by modern-day Muslims, a time when Muslims lived and
practised fully the commands of God. It was during this period that a truly
ethical society was attained.
This yearning for the perfect past continues to have a hold on Muslim
thought and thus colour their response and reaction to the exigencies of
modern-day life. Followers of traditional Islam not only hark back to the
perfect past but believe fervently that by recapturing and reinstating the past,
the social evils, injustices and economic disparities of contemporary society
would be overcome. For Muslims in general, the life of the first generation of
Muslims (salaf ) and the Islamic impulse that gave rise to the civilization of
Islam continue to excite and inspire. Perhaps, more than that, it was the form
of Islam that was fundamental and pure, untainted by “additions”, “accretions”
and “ deviations” as a result of the spread of the religion through conquest or
conversion. Hence, a consistent effort on the part of Muslim religious
authorities as represented by the ulama throughout much of Islamic history
to the present day, has been to expunge contrary beliefs and practices that
undermine Islamic monotheism. This was to reach its apex of intensity with
the teachings of the Muslim puritan movement in Saudi Arabia, the so called
Unitarians (Arabic: Muwahhidun) founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahab (1703–92) in the eighteenth century. There is no doubt that generations
of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and Medinah were aware of his teachings which
came to be known as Wahhabism. In this respect, it can be argued that
advocates for the establishment of a Muslim theocracy are calling for the re-
institution of the “sacred canopy”.
In Islam’s response to the demands of globalization underpinned by
modern capitalism, one can detect various forms of religious rationalization.
First of all, the vast majority of Muslims desire the fruits of modernization
and at the same time believe that they can attain them. The nineteenth and
early twentieth century revivalists of Islam had all acknowledged the importance
of science in the struggle for advancement. However, this must not result in
the erosion of Islamic values and concomitantly their Islamic identity. This
means in effect faithful obedience to the laws of Allah (syariah) as espoused
by Prophet Muhammad. This also means that the practice of syariah, as
mentioned earlier, constitutes the foundation of the Muslim polity and its
ethical system. It follows that Muslims in this category share the belief that
10

answers to all their problems and predicaments for all times are already found
in the Qur’an. It is up to its adherents to find them using their God-given
intellect. Understood thus, the majority of Muslims are fundamentalists
despite the negative connotations that fundamentalism has given rise to
in public discourse. Thus, in modern Muslim discourse the terms
“fundamentalism”, “revivalism” and “reformism” may be taken to mean one
and the same thing.
Another form of religious rationalization refers to the thoughts and
actions of a radical Muslim minority that is directly opposed to the West and
its institutions. These are the religious radicals or so-called “jihadists” referred
to in Western media. In Western discourse on Islam, the term “jihad” has
been interpreted as “holy war”, an interpretation that is partial but does not
address the central meaning of the term. The Encyclopaedia of Islam defines
jihad as “a divine institution of warfare to extend Islam into Dar al-Harb, the
abode of war/struggle/disbelief in non-Islamic territories or to defend Islam
from danger”.
According to the sunnah (words and deeds attributed to the Prophet
Muhammad), jihad is not lawful unless it involves summoning of unbelievers
to belief, that is to say, when unbelievers have accepted either Islam or have
a protected status within Islam (dhimmi). Currently, jihad as understood by
Muslims in general also means “struggle” within oneself to overcome moral-
ethical weaknesses or to achieve excellence in everyday pursuits. In short,
Muslims are reminded by their leaders to see life as a constant struggle for
perfection — this at least is the case of Muslims who have embraced modern
capitalism and pluralism. However, Muslim radicals are driven more by
memories of the past, beginning with the Crusades and extending onto the
political manipulations of Arab-Muslim societies in the Middle East in the
nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century until the present.
These manipulations include the ousting of Ottoman control and the
subsequent fragmentation of the Arab-Islamic heartland by the British and
French colonial forces; the invasion of the Suez Canal in the1950s; American
support for Iraq under Saddam Hussein in the war with Iran (ostensibly to
check the spread of militant Islam), the covert American support provided to
the mujahidin (warriors of Allah) in Afghanistan to oust the Russian occupation
of that country (and which the Americans abandoned after having met their
objective to check Soviet/Russian expansionism and which subsequently led
to the rise of the ultra-conservative Taliban government); the genocide in
Bosnia; the plight of the Palestinians; and the invasion of Iraq by the American-
led coalition with the continuing carnage and instability. Further, the perceived
restrictions put on the practice of Islam in the West and elsewhere by
11

12 Tham Seong Chee
followers of the faith is seen as a denial of religious freedom and ipso facto an
act against Islam. In the eyes of the radicals, Islam is under “siege” (a Dar al-
Harb situation) everywhere.
Thus, it comes as no surprise that Muslim radicalism is aimed specifically
at the West and its institutions including the Christian faith. Muslim radicals
not only regard themselves as defenders of the faith but at the same time as
“renewers” (mujaddid) in which, according to one tradition (hadith), Allah
would send a “renewer” to rouse “drowsy” people back to the fountainhead
of revelation and faith. In an important sense, the religious rationalizations of
the radicals have swayed sections of Muslims to the detriment of orthodox
or mainstream Islam, despite their one-sided, unbalanced, selective, evil or
perverse interpretations of Islamic doctrine.
A third response is found in the apparent rise in the practice of Islamic
mysticism or esoterism. Commonly known as Sufism (Arabic: At-tasawwuf )
it has been described as “metaphysical” Islam or the inner dimension of Islam.
It is the science of direct knowledge of God in which its doctrines and
methods are derived from the Qur’an and Islamic revelation. In a sense, it is
the obverse of doctrinal or intellectual Islam, and allows followers to leap
from human reason to knowledge of God. Sufi orders (tariqah or “path”) are
founded on the precept that esoterism is inherent in all “true belief ” in God
and theoretical knowledge is nothing without “the eye of the heart”. In the
history of Islam, all levels of Muslim society, from the most powerful and
learned to the most common, have in some degree or other professed Sufism
as the path to a complete knowledge of God. Indeed, Sufis played a major
role in the early Islamization of Southeast Asia because they were able to tap
into pre-existing esoteric impulses associated with Hinduism. Such esoteric
impulses are evident in the practice of Javanese mysticism (kebatinan) — a
practice which though frowned upon by orthodox Muslims, nonetheless hold
sway even among some members of the Indonesian elite. No doubt some
movements claiming to show the mystical path to God are suspect and are
therefore proscribed by religious authorities.
Fourthly, despite mainstream Islam’s insistence on orthodoxy, like
Christianity, it has not been able to expunge so called “deviations” (Malay:
ajaran sesat/songsang) which usually assume the form of cults led by charismatic
individuals who claim special spiritual powers by dint of inheritance, association
or command from God or His prophets, in particular the Prophet Muhammad.
In Malaysia such cults are not only regarded as a political and religious threat
to Sunni Islam (Arabic: Ahl al sunna wa’al jama’a) but also as morally
offensive because of the excesses of their leaders. Still, movements regarded by
the religious authorities and establishments as “deviationist” continue to be
reported from time to time — suggesting another facet of the ongoing
12

struggle within Islam for the hearts and minds of its adherents in a changing
and uncertain world underpinned by globalization and the challenge posed
by Western economic and cultural dominance.
Impact on Christianity
How then does Christianity compare? In what way(s) has the religious
impulse evolved in modern times? And in what forms has that impulse
assumed? Needless to say, the most significant difference in the case of
Christianity is its full acceptance of the notion of secularism — the clear
demarcation between affairs of the state and religious practice, this at least in
ideological terms if not in practice. Indeed, the notions of liberal democracy,
human rights and free-market economy are now given full rein — a situation
that seems to have resulted in a backlash against rampant secularism as
witnessed by the gathering political influence of the American religious right.
Key issues that have united the American religious right (evangelists, born-
again Christians, traditional Catholics, Southern Baptists, conservative
organizations such as the Focus on Family group, Latino evangelists and even
orthodox Jews) include: abortion, gay marriages, HIV Aids, euthanasia stem
cell research and excessive pornography purveyed by the media and film
industry, not to mention the spate of corporate scandals and the perceived
threat of Islamic radicals. It is excessive liberty and licence granted in the
name of freedom and human rights which the religious right blames as the
cause for their prevalence. The fact that some American judges at both the
state and federal levels are seen to be too liberal in adjudicating religiously
sensitive matters has also raised anger. The issues of abortion, gay marriage,
stem cell research and euthanasia hit directly at the core of the Abrahamic
faiths. Indeed, Creationism (in opposition to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution)
— the worldview based on the teachings of Christianity that it is God who
brought order out of chaos, is now enjoying a revival. It can thus be seen that
the aforementioned societal developments have provided a powerful impulse
for religious reaction, not only in reaction to “rampant” secularism and its
underlying processes, but equally in reaction to the threat posed on the future
of the church and what it represents. There is then an uneasy tension between
state and religion.
It would appear that religion is able to re-assert its influence on matters
hitherto reserved for the state, to reinstate what one pro-right senator has
called “a biblical worldview”. It implies that the order created by man has
failed and only a return to the ways of God that the current “chaos” can be
overcome. Implicitly, such a reaction is a contemporary indictment of the
arrogance of man and the state of mind that had characterized the
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14 Tham Seong Chee
Renaissance. The question is: Will the spread of liberal democracy and
modern capitalism to other parts of the world, as in the American case, lead
to the same outcome?
In Europe, in contrast to America, secularism reigns supreme. In the case
of Spain and Holland, the “laws of man” seem to have prevailed as when gay
marriage is made legal. Holland and Switzerland have legalized euthanasia,
despite the opposition of the Vatican, the capital of Roman Catholicism. The
Spanish government has also passed legislation to facilitate divorce. In several
European countries, issues such gay rights and the right of abortion are
decided by parliament. Support for these issues or otherwise depends on
sentiments on the ground. And given the lack of religiosity in general,
religion-based voting is not on the cards. Instead, in such countries as the
United Kingdom, mainstream religion such as the Anglican Church has
apparently embraced the ethos of liberalism, human rights and secularism as
when it consented to the ordainment of women priests and of late, even
women’s appointment as bishops. It also recognizes gay rights as when gay
priests are allowed to remain in the church despite opposition from the
membership. However, the archbishop of late had spoken of the public’s
unhappiness and distaste for the high rate of abortion in the United Kingdom.
It would appear that one’s choice of lifestyle is not in contention except the
taking of life as in abortion.
Yet, in most developing countries outside Europe, religion is thriving.
In the Russian Federation, there is a total reinstatement of the Russian
Orthodox Church following the collapse of communism. The same has
happened in China where the Roman Catholic Church has been reinstated.
In Catholic majority countries, the potential for the church to play a
political role is ever present should it decide to provide spiritual-moral
support to causes perceived to be just. The best example is found in the case
of the Philippines where “people power” saw the dismissal of two
governments in recent years. The reasons for this are varied: the tolerance
or intolerance as the case may be, of the governing elite to the activities of
the church; the support of the laity for the church and the church’s resources
to mobilize that support; the relative openness of the political system; the
historical role of the church in state formation; and last but not least, the
church’s willingness or unwillingness to observe to the letter, the biblical
maxim “to grant what is due to God to God and what is due to Caesar to
Caesar”. What can be said is that by and large, the church in developing
countries has not fallen victim to political co-optation.
Still, the church’s role is not aimed at capturing political power. Its
impulse is also not in reaction to secularism but the result of perceived social
and political ills that have come about, such as poverty, misrule and corruption,
14

abuse and neglect of human rights, and last but not least, moral decay. Be that
as it may, liberation theology that guided the response of the Catholic clergy
in non-European countries in the past is now being put in question. In Brazil,
about 20 per cent of its Catholic population of 97 per cent have switched to
the Pentecostal faith while others have turned to Christian evangelism. It
would appear that the socialistic-communistic underpinning of liberation
theology have put off many of its supporters. Similarly, the recent spate of
scandals involving paedophile priests and the issue of celibacy have cast the
Catholic church in bad light. In any case, in strictly secular states, the
involvement of the church in what are perceived to be secular matters (either
real or putative) has been proscribed by law and other means, especially in
multi-religious states.
Impact on Other World Religions

Compared with Christianity and Islam, Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism by
nature of their theologies and geographical provenance are not “world
conquering” religions. Islam has the most comprehensive system of ethics
within the syariah to constitute the basis of government. As such, the syariah
could very well provide what Gibb has termed “a steel framework” for the
unification of the entire Islamic community (ummah) — hence the radicals’
call for the re-establishment of the Caliphate to lead Muslims back to the
Golden Age. In the case of Christianity, the unifying factor is the theology
and doctrines of the church but this too, is subject to some diversity in form
and practice. The laws governing Christian states no doubt reflect Christian
morals, but they have evolved from an indigenous base and after long years
of democratic struggle and constitutional government.
Compared to Islam and Christianity, Buddhism’s main doctrinal thrust is
that of spiritual self-cultivation (the Four Noble Truths and the Eight-fold
Path) and human compassion. Its founder had rejected the world of
government and politics to pursue enlightenment, that is to say, release from
the world of greed and suffering. In Buddhist states like Thailand, Myanmar
and Laos, government and politics remain secular though in the case of Sri
Lanka, the Buddhist clergy of late had shown some restiveness as a result of
the unsettled internal conflict. No Buddhist political party in Asia such as the
Komeita Party in Japan has yet to capture power. In general, Buddhist
scriptural teachings served as the basis for the conduct of everyday life rather
than political conduct.
In the case of Taoism, its founder, an archivist in the Imperial Court, had
also rejected the artificial and affected (unnatural) lifestyle of the court and
then left to pursue a life of simplicity, close to and guided by the lessons of
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16 Tham Seong Chee
nature. Confucianism was a political doctrine founded on moral-ethical

concerns that its founder believed was critical to the peace and unity of the
divided Chinese rudimentary state. However, like Hinduism, it was not
meant to be repeated elsewhere. Both Korea and Vietnam adopted
Confucianism as the state ideology after undergoing Chinese imperial rule,
both the result of external imposition and later on, acceptance. In the case of
Japan, which was never conquered, Confucianism was assimilated into the
state’s mode of governance. Hinduism was embraced by the early Southeast
Asian states and was largely a peaceful process. In accordance with Hindu
cosmology, it provided religio-political legitimacy to the early kings and
shaped state-craft.
In contemporary times, both Hinduism and Islam in India and Buddhism
in Sri Lanka have acquired a degree of political salience. The case of Sri Lanka
has been briefly mentioned. In India, Hinduism’s relationship with Islam
goes back to early sixteenth century when the Moghuls ruled India. The
demarcation of India and the establishment of Pakistan in the middle of the
last century, and the bloody clashes that ensued between Hindus and Muslims
have left bitterness between the two religious groups. The rule of the Hindu
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in the late 1990s has resulted in an overt
expression of Hindu-based nationalism. The Babri mosque in Ayodhya served
as the flash-point for religious conflict because the site of the mosque happens
also to be the birth place of Ram, the supreme God, the Hindu model of the
ideal man and the seventh incarnation of Vishnu. This assertion of identity
on the basis of religion is not new, but it does at the same time pit one religion
against another. A similar situation obtains in recent Indonesian history
where members of the now banned Laskar Jihad which, in the name of Islam,
attacked Christians in eastern Indonesia. Christian places of worship have
also been attacked and razed in Jakarta. It is possible that there is also a
religious (including racial) dimension in the internal conflict in Sri Lanka —
government being in the hands of the majority Buddhist Sinhala-speaking
population and the irredentist Tamil Tigers who are mainly Hindus.
RELIGION AND THE STATE: THE CASE OF SINGAPORE

This final section attempts to locate Singapore’s position in the overall
scheme of things as has been outlined thus far.
Secular State Policy and Religious Diversity

Singapore has embraced the politics of pluralism and the values of modern
capitalism in its economic pursuits. In governance, it has chosen the path of
16

full secularism and the rule of law. In religious and cultural matters, the state
has very much left the management of both to their respective adherents
except on issues of state interest. What the state has done thus far is to ensure
that “no religious groups are involved in politics” and that “religious
organizations not stray beyond the bounds of educational, social and charitable
work”.10 Other legal instruments to ensure toleration and respect for religious
differences are found in the Sedition Act, the Penal Code, the Societies Act,
the Newspaper & Printing Presses Act and the Internal Security Act. The
1969 Presidential Council for Minority Rights also guarantees the
constitutional rights of minorities in religion, culture and employment.
During the colonial period, religious proselytization with the intention to
convert Muslims was proscribed as in the case of the Malay States — a step
informed by the religious-motivated riots in Singapore in 1915 and 1951
respectively. This arrangement continues to be respected and Singapore remains
outside the provision of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights
that provides for freedom of the individual to choose the religion of his/her
choice or to change it. Given the extensive power of the state, the religious
impulse would of necessity be bounded.
All the major religions in Singapore (Buddhism, Christianity, Taoism or
Chinese religion, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Sikhism, not to mention
Zoroastrianism and Baha’ism) are of external provenance. Therefore, how
these religions fare and their positions on social and political issues elsewhere
will have either a positive or negative impact on the various religious
communities and their perceptions towards each other in Singapore. In
particular, present global tensions involving Muslims and Christians and the
tensions prevailing in India among Hindus and Muslims have drawn religion
onto issues that are otherwise non-religious, to the extent that divisions
between secular and religious affairs has become blurred.
Furthermore, in the case of Singapore, there are social and psychological
strains emanating from the push for economic competition and security
within the world of modern capitalism that have given religious institutions
a new impulse, and in the process deepen religiosity among their followers.
This is perhaps best exemplified in the increase in the number of church,
temple or mosque-based organizations ministering to the poor, sick, lonely,
homeless, jobless, and those unable to cope with the demands of life. A
corollary is that uncertainties and crises resulting from rapid and frequently
unpredictable change throughout the world have also intensified the search
for meaning and purpose in human existence, and thus deepened religiosity.
Among the younger generations of Singaporeans, better education and
knowledge of the world (accessible through the internet and the mass media)
have given them greater freedom to chart their life pursuits, including their
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18 Tham Seong Chee
choice of religion. In this regard, the variety of religions practised in Singapore

not only fascinates but equally provokes, given the fact that most Singaporeans
claim to have a religion. Equally, other than Christianity, all other religions in
Singapore overlap or conflate with race or ethnicity. Fifty-one per cent of
Chinese Singaporeans (who form 75 per cent of the total population) are
either Buddhists or Taoists (two religions that have co-existed peacefully for
a long time); almost the entire Malay population (15 per cent of Singapore’s
population) have remained Muslim; and two-thirds of Indian Singaporeans
(4 per cent of the total population) continue to practise the Hindu faith. It
is also pertinent to note that historically, Chinese attitude to religion was
ambiguous. Religion has never assumed the proportion of a political ideology.
This probably had a connection with the influence of Confucian teachings
which permeated all levels of the society. Whether the new generations of
Chinese Singaporeans share this religious attitude today is difficult to ascertain.
Still, given the current religious trends and the high incidence of conversion
to other religions, this merits further observation.
What then, are the dynamics and pragmatics of religious practice in
Singapore? Is religion reactive or accommodating vis-à-vis the dominance of
the state as exemplified by its legal powers? In what sense has religion made
a difference in maintaining peace and harmony in multi-racial, multi-religious
and multi-cultural Singapore? And last but not least, is the prospect of
religion entering through the back door to influence state policies (such as
through the power of the vote) real or a figment of the imagination? In this
regard, it is worthwhile to note and be reminded that religion is not merely
“faith”; it can generate emotional power such that feelings long dormant can
seize the imagination of its adherents under certain circumstances.
Be that as it may, current national policies have largely pre-empted
potential threats to inter-racial and inter-religious harmony. Secularism has
moved religion out of the equation on state matters. The parity of status
granted to all the major religions (and now the “new religions” as well) has
removed in one stroke, potential inter-religious contentions. Furthermore,
religious and ethnic minorities are also granted equal access to public goods:
in the allocation of land for the construction of places of worship and
devotion; in the care and disposal of the dead; in representation at public
functions; in official patronage when religious festivals are celebrated, etc. All
these provide comfort and assurance to religionists of whatever faith and add
authenticity to the multi-religious policy.
The constant reminder that “national identity” must supersede “religious
identity” when religious issues of an external provenance threaten harmony is
backed up by documented cases of arrest, detention and deportation of
trouble makers who use religion to cause mischief and dissension. The
18

concern for “survival” — a concern that arose following Singapore’s departure

from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 — still reverberates, now in the face
of economic globalization and in particular the emergence of Indian and
China as economic powerhouses in Asia. Be that as it may, political leaders
continue to stress the need for resilience in order to cope with the rapid and
constant changes of the global economy on which Singapore’s “survival”
depends. This state of mind is shared by most thinking Singaporeans, including
religious and community leaders. At the same time, religious leaders are
receptive to inter-religious dialogue, this for reasons of goodwill, toleration
and mutual adaptation to the legal parameters governing religious practice.
There is then a “don’t rock the boat” mindset which contributes to religious
harmony. Last, but not least, is the practice of meritocracy in public life —
in education and employment. This has ensured that any divisiveness caused
by prioritizing religion and race are neutralized.
Equally, secularization in governance can be said to have aided the
acceptance of the philosophy of pragmatism — a reality that has had an
impact on religion’s role in influencing and shaping state policies. Pragmatism
as practised has an over-riding economic definition or is governed by economic
logic. It is the outcome of the recurring concern for “survival”. This is
illustrated by the way the state has handled such contentious issues as abortion,
euthanasia, gay rights, stem cell research, donation of human organs and vices
such as gambling, prostitution and drug abuse.
Some Contentious Issues

Abortion is considered morally wrong by all the major religions. Catholics,
Protestant groups and Muslims in particular have expressed concern in the
past. However, to overcome religious opposition, the government made a
distinction between the rights of a religion and the rights of the individual, in
that it would allow “women who want abortions be allowed to get one”
guided by his/her conscience.11 This seems to validate the constitutional
provision that “a person has inalienable rights to his/her body.” Religious
groups, in this regard, are encouraged to preach the message of “conscience”
to its adherents. Thus, the pro-life impulse of religion is necessarily
circumvented to address the practical consequences arising from unwanted
pregnancies, notwithstanding the fact that abortion sometimes is done in
order to save the life of the pregnant mother.
The pragmatic approach to dealing with pro-life and religion-based
objections to state policy is also found in euthanasia. In this the government
has passed legislation to enable individuals the right to end his/her life by
depositing a signed Advance Medical Directive (AMD) ahead of the event.
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20 Tham Seong Chee
This is on condition that the person was of rational state of mind at the time
of his/her decision and that no medical cure was likely or forthcoming, while
other safeguards to prevent abuse have also been laid down. There are two
contrasting arguments underlying this legal provision. Firstly, the legal provision
recognizes the right of the individual to his/her own life. It is up to him/her,
if he/she has a religious faith to answer to God. Secondly, in view of the
medical cost to both the individual and the government, not to mention the
care and concern of the family members should the medical condition linger,
the pragmatic consideration has prevailed.
The subject of stem cell research also pits pragmatism against religion but
in a diametrically different way. As it is known, the promotion of stem cell
research has an underlying pro-life motivation. Its primary purpose is to
minimize pain and lengthen life through the application of medical science.
In this regard pragmatism complements religious doctrine. But at the same
time, there is a powerful economic dimension given the fact that there is a
huge market for services relating to the discoveries made in stem cell research.
A further complicating dimension is that stem cell research touches directly
on the use of the human embryo, which proponents of religion declare is
“life”. To overcome this objection, the government-initiated Ethics Committee
(which included representations of the various religions and which considered
their submissions) has published a set of guidelines — the most important
being its determination of the point in time when life is said to begin
following conception.
Pragmatic prioritization also shaped the implementation of the Human
Organs Transplant Act (HOTA). This particular issue refers directly to
Islamic doctrine which states that the human body is inviolate, being a gift
from Allah, and therefore should be kept whole. To circumvent this objection,
the state introduced various provisions, the main one being to exempt
Muslims from the requirements of the act. Non-Muslims are automatically
included in the act, but Muslims have to “opt in” voluntarily in order to be
included. The HOTA has been revised to include other human organs
besides the kidney to save lives through human organ transplant — a
procedure that harmonizes perfectly with religious doctrine. It is on the
basis of this argument that caring and pragmatic Muslims in Singapore
have formed a society to urge Muslims to support HOTA by “opting in”
and at the same time request the government to remove the current provisions
aimed at assuaging Muslim sensitivity.
The recent announcement of the government to build two “integrated
resorts” which would include a casino in each is another indication of state
pragmatism. The states’ rationalization for instituting these two projects is
20

once again based on economic criteria — that it would have a ripple effect
on the economy and make Singapore more attractive to tourists in the
highly competitive and lucrative tourist market. And in any case,
Singaporeans are already indulging in different forms of gambling in
Singapore and in neighbouring countries. To soften disquiet from the
various religious representations made against the resorts’ set up (which
appears to be unified and widespread) the government emphasized that the
casino would not be the dominant feature of the resorts. More importantly,
it would put in place procedures aimed at limiting access to the casino by
locals and at the same time set up facilities to cope with the damaging after-
effects of addictive gambling.
Gay rights is still a taboo subject in Singapore despite the clamour from
its supporters. Still, the government has shown some shift of late, as when it
was publicly announced that there should be no discrimination against the
employment of gays in the army and the Civil Service, but gay gatherings
would be banned. There is an unequivocal stand among those with religious
faiths against recognizing gay culture, a stand informed by developments
among their co-religionists in many Western countries. Such recognition
would imply accepting the rights of gay couples to marry, adopt children and
claim for legal rights hitherto reserved for couples who are man and woman.
The gay lifestyle has been closely associated with the incidence of HIV Aids
and the government’s guarded approach so far to dealing with this phenomenon
has the support of all religions. Still, the rights of gays to employment
without discrimination, while morally correct, is also sound in economic
terms as it would ensure that all Singaporeans are productively engaged,
whatever their choice of lifestyle.
The issue of prostitution has engaged the religious leaders of all faiths
and denominations for a long time. Prostitution and gambling are regarded
as the gravest forms of human moral degradation, not only because doctrinal
teachings say so but equally for their multiple negative effects on the family
and society. For Muslims the consumption of alcohol is equally condemned
because it distorts the mind. And yet, prostitution, gambling and alcohol
consumption are regarded as inherent to modern capitalism which treats
each of these as legitimate components of the economy. Here again, a
pragmatic frame of mind prevails wherein prostitution is regarded as a
matter of choice both for the vendor as well as the buyer of such services.
The states’ stand seems to be that religion-based moral reservations against
prostitution should be built into the church’s/mosque’s/temple’s/synagogue’s
sermons to members of their respective congregations and in that way,
mitigate the adverse consequences.
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22 Tham Seong Chee
The Rise of Religiosity

It can be seen that moral issues that can provide religion the impulse to
influence and sway government policy is constrained by the twin impact of
secularism and pragmatism within the framework of demands imposed by
modern capitalism and pluralism. Religion as it were, has to accommodate
the claims of the state as a first charge. Does this then affect religious
doctrine? What can religion do to offset this? This has to do with the
maintenance of the purity and distinctiveness of a religious doctrine in order
to preserve its identity as a religious faith in the eyes of its real and potential
believers. While religious leaders may be converted to the idea of inter-
religious harmony, in their daily ministrations they have to ensure that their
adherents remain faithful and loyal to their chosen religious faith. Thus, the
questions of “conversion”, proselytization and religious “renunciation” need
to be addressed. This is especially pertinent in view of the rise in religiosity
among the young, and the acknowledgement of all religious faiths that there
should be no compulsion or coercion on the matter of religious choice. There
is then an unresolved tension between acknowledgement and practice or,
alternatively, between inclusiveness and exclusiveness. How the different
religions negotiate through this complexity now and in the future will have
a shaping influence on society at large. Religion becomes “evil” as Kimball
argues, when it makes claims to absolute truths, imposes on followers blind
obedience and accepts that the ends justify the means.12
Against this background, there has arisen of late a new religious attitude
among some Singaporeans which may be termed “internal/private” religion,
that is, belief in a Supreme God or Creator without professing any specific
religious faith or formal ties to a religion. It is a form of civil religion, a
moral-ethical compass for life in a turbulent world, yet must subsist on the
teachings of the main religions in order to have meaning, purpose and
direction. Is this then a manifestation of Singapore’s growing cosmopolitan
societal make-up characterized by diversity and tolerance? Or is it a
contemporary manifestation of the syncretic attitude of the majority Chinese
toward religion? Or is this the consequence of deepening secularism,
pluralism and the rule of law that puts a premium on the management of
life in this world as against life in the hereafter?
An important facet of the religious spectrum in Singapore that may have
future implications for the state relates to the Chinese community which
makes up 78 per cent of the population. Fifty per cent of Chinese Singaporeans
declare Buddhism and Taoism as their religion. There is also a high percentage
who do not profess any religion, most probably practitioners of Confucianism
22

or free-thinkers. At the same time, the rate of conversion to Christianity in

particular is higher than conversion to Buddhism and Taoism. A major
reason for this is the fact that both Buddhism and Taoism together with
Chinese folk religion (three components of Chinese religion) were until
recently, mainly confined to the observance of rituals connected with the
rites-of-passage and calendrical celebrations.13 There is now clear evidence
that both Buddhism and, to a lesser extent, Taosim are undergoing a process
of reform and renewal which stress doctrine and exegesis, that is, on the
philosophical and intellectual aspects of the religion, in order to seek answers
to contemporary problems and predicaments. A related aspect is that Chinese
families in Singapore exemplify the greatest religious diversity — a situation
that can either encourage greater tolerance to religious differences or lead to
family conflict which potentially threatens inter-religious harmony. Buddhism
and Christianity are the most active religions among Chinese Singaporeans.
Both Buddhism and Taoism are inherent to Chinese history and culture
whereas Christianity remains the religion of choice among many of the
English/Western educated elite. In this regard, Hinduism in Singapore shares
comparable experience with Buddhism and Taoism.
Finally, as in the developed liberal democracies of the West where new
existential conditions have led to the flowering of “new religions”, a comparable
development is observable in Singapore as well. What are the reasons for this?
What do “new religions” offer to their adherents that established/institutional
religions are unable to? And what religious impulses underlie the “new
religions”? Does democratic liberalism, because it allows for openness and
freedom of thought, empty the universe of coherent meanings and offers
instead a multiple and varied search for new anchors among adherents of
“new religions”? Or are “new religions” to be regarded as religious revivalism
and evangelism combined?
One view is to regard the rise of “new religions” as a reaction against
secularization on the one hand and, on the other, as the “failure” of established/
institutional religions to meet the emotional needs of their adherents.
Secularization has led to disenchantment with the world, hyper-rationalism
and a premium put on instrumentality. This has deprived the individual of
transcendent perspectives which could provide meaning and purpose for his
daily struggle. According to Durkheim, the elementary form of religious
experience is characterized by passion and ecstasy: warmth, uplift, revivification,
abnormal surge of strength, effervescence, frenzy, transfiguration, rapture,
metamorphosis, over-excitement, spiritual exaltation, etc.14 “New religions”
are, in that respect, fundamentally grounded on emotions. Are “new religions”
then examples of religious renewals, a re-enrichment of the symbolic universe
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24 Tham Seong Chee
weakened by secularization and a reaction against ethical religion represented

by the established religions, where systematization of doctrine and
acclimatization of religious practice in everyday life remain the norms? If so,
one could legitimately regard religious renewals as attempts to re-assert
emotional experience over a hyper-rationalized world — in short, a form of
“de-secularization” protest.
With regard to established/institutional religion, modernization and
secularization have curtailed or limited its role in shaping and influencing
policy decisions of the state, though the need to preserve its doctrinal teachings
remain. In this connection, even the religious fundamentalist who is driven
to re-institute the sacred canopy is forced to grapple with the demands of
modernization and secularization. This, in a sense, has created a religious
“market place”. Criticism levelled at established/institutional religion is that
it has become too arid and bereft of the emotional depths that drive the
religious impulse in new religions. Seen in this way, adherents of “new
religions” (especially charismatic movements) are attracted to the new religious
language (glossolalia [speaking in “tongues”], touching, embracing, miracle
performing, sharing and personal narratives or testimony — a meta language
that is both expressive and poetic.15 Indeed, hymns sung are resonant of the
beat and rhythm of modern “pop-music” except for the lyrics. This appeals to
the tastes, temper and aesthetic dispositions of the youthful who constitute
the congregational majority.
Can “new religions” be regarded as an important component of modern
youth culture born out of deepening secularization pivoted on liberal
democracy and modern capitalism? Or, alternatively, are “new religions”
cathartic in that they offer relief from stress and work demands of everyday
life in modern capitalism? In this, all religions in Singapore in different
degrees are offering counselling and pastoral care to mitigate work and
relationship problems by recourse to their respective religious creed. In a
recent survey Singapore was declared as “a nation of believers” and that
religions were “reaping a harvest of believers”. The level of religiosity was
recorded at 59 per cent of which 9 per cent said they were very religious and
50 per cent said that they were somewhat religious.16 Among those converted,
34 per cent reported that conversion to a “new religion” gave them meaning
and purpose in life, and 38 per cent converted as a result of encouragement
from family and friends. Most converted to Christianity (44 per cent) and
Buddhism (26 per cent).
Thus “new religions” may also be regarded as a reaction to the existential
conditions created by the processes of secularization and modern capitalism.
They offer their adherents a sense of community closeness, individual
24

empowerment, healing, fellowship, therapy and a unified experience of awe

and submission to God in worship. For some, participation in “new religion”
worship may even be “a fashion of the moment” occasioned as it were by the
fact that society has become a “market place” for religion.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has attempted to show how the processes of secularization and
rationalization, the outcome of European intellectual development since the
sixteenth century, have affected and shaped the relationship between the state
and religion on the one hand, and the relationship between religion and
society, on the other. These processes have anchored the state as the arbiter in
matters pertaining to social organization and religious practice and at the
same time fostered the institutionalization of modern capitalism. Globalization
entails pluralism, the acceptance of diversity and the rule of law at both the
national and international levels. It is the state that enacts laws and enforces
them. These laws ensure the orderly development of society as well as the
pursuit of religious aims and purposes. Indeed, it is the laws of the state which
now provide the “sacred canopy” under which society functions and religion
operates. The religious impulse therefore, has to accommodate the overarching
power of the state. Still, the adaptive capacity of religion remains vigorous, as
witnessed by the growth of “new religions” and the resurgence of the religious
right, not to mention the use of religion for political and nefarious aims and
purposes. As such, the underlying tension between religion and the state is
ongoing, as indeed the underlying tension between the major world religions
which in some countries have become more intense. The health and vitality
of society then depends on the harmonious and mutually reinforcing roles of
religion and the state in managing human affairs.
Notes
Views expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the author.
1. Berger, The Sacred Canopy.
2. Srinivas, Caste in Modern India.
3. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism.
4. Wach, Types of Religious Experience; Bastide, Les Ameriques Noires; Bergson, Les
Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion.
5. Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 452–57.
7. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man.
8. Glasse, The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 93.
9. Gibb, Studies on the Civilisation of Islam, pp. 196–97.
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26 Tham Seong Chee
10. Maintenance of Religious Harmony, Cmd. 21 of 1989, pp. 1–12.

11. Ibid.
12. Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil, pp. 71–126.
13. Tham, Religion and Modernisation, pp. 132–49.
14. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life.
15. Hervieu-Leger, “Present Day Emotional Renewals”, pp. 139–47.
16. “God and Us”, Straits Times, Special Report, 16 July 2005, pp. S1–S4.
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———. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York:
Faber and Faber, 1969.
Bergson, Henri. Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion. Paris: PUB, 1946.
Douglas, Mary. Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology. London: Barrie and
Rockliff, 1970.
Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: A Study of Religious Sociology.
London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971.
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1981.
Gibb, Hamilton A. R. Studies in the Civilization of Islam. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1989.
Glasse, Cyril. The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam. London: Stacey International, 1989.
Maintanence of Religious Harmony. Cmd. 21 of 1989. Singapore: Singapore National
Printers, 1989.
Peters, Francis. E. The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
Rudolph, Otto. The Idea of the Holy. London: Oxford University Press, 1957.
Srinivas, Mysore Narasimhachar. Caste in Modern India and Other Essays. Bombay:
Asia Publishing House, 1970.
Straits Times. “God and Us”. Saturday Special Report. 16 July 2005, S1–S4.
Swatos, William H. Jr., ed. A Future for Religion? New Paradigms for Social Analysis.
London: Sage Publications, 1993.
26

Tham, Seong Chee. Religion and Modernisation: A Study of Changing Rituals among
Singapore’s Chinese, Malays and Indians. Singapore: Graham Brash, 1985.
Wach, Joachim. Types of Religious Experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1951.
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism. London: Unwin
University Books, 1971.
———. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.
Yang, C. K. Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of
Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1970.
27

28 Tong Chee Kiong
RELIGIOUS TRENDS AND ISSUES

IN SINGAPORE
Tong Chee Kiong
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents an analysis of the religious landscape in Singapore,
beginning from the early days of its founding to the present,1 using census
data. The picture that emerges is one where the society is marked by a high
degree of multi-religiosity as well as significant changes in the religious
landscape. In different periods, religions have waxed and waned. Some, such
as Christianity, have been very successful in recruiting members. Others have
seen their membership decline. The data also shows that there is a correlation
between religious affiliation and several socio-demographic variables, including
age, education, occupation, and socio-economic status. For example, Christians
in Singapore tend to be younger, more educated and have a higher socio-
economic status. Obversely, Taoists tend to be older, less educated and come
from lower socio-economic groups. This structural differentiation will be
analysed and discussed. Another key variable is ethnicity. Despite being a
multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, religious affiliation is culturally or
ethnically structured to some extent. Most Malays are Muslim, most Indians
Hindu, and Chinese, to a lesser degree, adopt Chinese religions.
THE EARLY RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE

At the point when Sir Stamford Raffles landed in Singapore in 1819, it was
believed that there existed an Orang Laut2 population of no more than 150
28
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02 ReligiousDiversity Ch 2 28 7/16/08, 9:47 AM

Religious Trends and Issues in Singapore 29
(Song 1984). This community was believed to have “long been converted to
Islam” (Evans 1927). However, other accounts exist. Bartley (1933) suggests
that the population was larger, and certainly included Chinese, as there were
already gambier plantations owned and cultivated by the Chinese prior to
1819. Bloom (1986) cites some estimated figures: a total population of about
200, consisting of a few Orang Laut families, about a hundred Muslim Malay
fisher folk (thought to have settled on the island in 1811), and a community
of about forty Chinese pepper and gambier cultivators. The Chinese were
likely to have adhered to a form of Chinese religion.
As with Islam, archaeological and historical evidence suggest that
Buddhism and Chinese religion of some form existed in Singapore prior to
Raffles’ arrival. Ke (1984) cites eye-witness accounts of the remains of Buddhist
sacred architecture on Fort Canning in 1822, suggesting the existence of a
pre-Islamic population in Indianized Southeast Asia, including Singapore. A
Chinese temple, Shuntian Gong (Temple of Submission to Heaven), dedicated
to the earth deity Dabogong (originally in Malabar Street, but currently
settled after several moves in Lorong 29, Geylang), was first built in 1796,
according to an inscription inside the temple. It is believed to be the first
Chinese temple in Singapore (Lee et al., 1994).
Chinese religion took root with the arrival of Chinese migrants, mainly
from South China, from the early nineteenth century onwards. Each dialect
group began to establish its own presence and develop its own temples as the
Chinese community grew in numbers. The Fujians established their own
temples (for example, Hengshan Ting at Silat Road, established in 1828); the
Teochews established Yuehaiqing Miao in Phillip Street in 1826; the Cantonese
erected Haichun Fude Si in 1824; the Hakkas established the Yinghe Guan
in 1823; and the Hainanese had a Tianhou temple on Beach Road in 1857.
Given the European appearance at the time of Singapore’s founding, a
Christian presence would soon become evident, mainly through missionary
efforts. In 1821, Reverend M. Laurent Marie Joseph Imbert of the Societe des
Mission Etrangeres (the French Mission Society) visited Singapore, en route
to China. His one-week stay in Singapore resulted in a letter to the bishop,
stating that “there were only twelve or thirteen Catholics in Singapore, who
led a wretched life” (in Buckley 1902; Teixeira 1963). The growth of the
Catholic population was not confined to Europeans alone. There were also
Chinese Catholics who were either converted in Singapore or arrived in
Singapore already as Catholics. The latter were usually the wealthier merchants.
Aside from the Catholic church, there were also a great variety of other
Christian denominations that soon established themselves in Singapore. The
earliest non-Catholic Christian presence was the London Missionary Society
29

30 Tong Chee Kiong
(LMS), formed by lay persons and missionaries from various denominations

in England (Sng 1993). Missionary work started as early as the founding of
Singapore in 1819, with the arrival of Samuel Milton that year. He started a
school for Malay and Chinese boys. The next missionary to arrive was
Claudius H. Thomsen in 1822. He started classes for both Malay boys and
girls by 1828. Apart from LMS, the main Protestant denominations established
in the nineteenth century include four main groups — Anglican (1826),
Brethren (1864), Presbyterian (1881), and Methodist (1885). Since the turn
of the century, various other groups have taken root as well, such as the
Seventh Day Adventists (1905), Assembly of God (1926), Lutherans (1927),
Salvation Army (1935), Baptists (1937), Bible-Presbyterians (1952), Christian
Nationals’ Evangelism Commission (1952), and the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints (1968) (Tan 1980; Hinton 1985; Sng 1993).3
Hinduism was brought into Singapore by Indian immigrants who came
as early as 1819 as part of Sir Stamford Raffles’ entourage. Later immigrants
brought their religion with them and established temples very rapidly. Most
of the early immigrants were convicts brought to Singapore for construction
work (Sandhu 1969) for the coffee and sugar plantations (Mahajani 1960).
About 98 per cent of these labour immigrants were from South India (Sandhu
1969). Given that about 80 per cent of the early Indian migrants into Malaya
were Hindus, it follows that Hinduism in Singapore is essentially of a South
Indian variety. The remaining 20 per cent of the migrants were Muslims,
Sikhs and Christians. The first Hindu temple, located in Bras Basah Road,
was believed to be founded by one Naraina Pillay from Penang, in 1819.
However, it was soon demolished (Tan 1961/62). Another temple was later
constructed in 1827, dedicated to the goddess Mariamman, in South Bridge
Road. It stands today as the oldest Hindu temple in Singapore.
Present Religious Groups in Singapore

Singapore Muslims are primarily of the Shafie school of thought within the
Sunni Islamic sect. Adherents to this doctrine are commonly known as
orthodox or Sunni Muslims and constitute over 90 per cent of the entire
Muslim community today (Farah 1994). As with other Sunnis, Singapore
Muslims follow a comprehensive system of community law, the syariah.
Christians belong to the Catholic church and a great variety of other Christian
denominations, including mainline Protestant churches (Anglicans,
Presbyterians, Methodists and Lutherans), neo-Calvinists (Baptists, Brethrens,
and Bible Presbyterians) as well as other independent churches. Reflecting the
South Indian origins in Singapore’s Indian population, patterns of Hindu
religious practice veer towards South Indian styles in the republic. These are
30

clearly evident in the way South Indian domestic religious practices, festivals
and ceremonial styles prevail over North Indian equivalents. Similarly, there
is a predominance of South Indian temples which differ from North Indian
ones in design and iconographic style, as well as in separate priesthoods and
segregated patronage. Adherents to Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Chinese
religion in Singapore sometimes also display evidence of syncretic beliefs and
practices infused with local traditions or animism, or are influenced by the
religious practices of other world religions.
“Chinese religion”, which is used here as a collective term to describe
the myriad beliefs adhered to by the majority of the Chinese population, is
by far, the most difficult to characterize. The difficulty in characterization
is due primarily to the eclecticism of the religion which is reflected in the
varied nomenclature adopted to describe it. For example, Elliott (1955)
termed it “shenism”. Topley (1954a, 1956, 1961), who has researched the
various Chinese religious practices, institutions and associations in Singapore,
termed it the “anonymous religion”. Comber (1954, 1955, 1958), in turn,
referred to it as the “religion of the masses”. Nyce (1971) characterized it as
“Chinese folk religion”. Wee (1976) has attempted to clarify the status of
these various strands of Chinese religions by using Buddhism as an organizing
base-line. She distinguished between Buddhist systems which refer directly
to specific Buddhist canonical traditions (Theravada and Mahayana schools)
on the one hand, and those which have no direct Buddhist canonical
reference, on the other. Of the latter, there are two groups: “shenism” (no
canonical tradition of any kind); and “sectarianism” (with each sect having
its own canonical tradition).
Ancestor worship is also an important element of Chinese religious
practices. It has sometimes been described as an extension of filial piety, an
important value in Chinese society and strongly rooted in Confucianist
thought. Such is the manifestation of mutual care between generations, as
much a part of the relationship between the living and the dead, as it is
among the living. In another very important sense, ancestor worship also acts
as a “stimulus to morality” (Addison 1925), for the consciousness that the
ancestors are watching and will judge and reward or punish according to one’s
conduct, heightens the moral sense of the community. Indeed, Addison
(1925) and Hinton (1985) argue that ancestor worship is the most important
religious phenomenon in the life of the Chinese. However, it is seldom seen
as composing a distinct religion (Tamney and Hassan 1987), and is regarded
more as a part of Chinese religious life in general. Further, there is also
Confucianism. Although it is sometimes argued that Confucianism is not a
“religion” but a moral code or philosophical system, Leo and Clammer
(1983) noted that in Singapore, Confucius is regarded by some as a specific
31

32 Tong Chee Kiong
deity in his own right, worshipped apart from other deities and constituting
the centre of a specific religious complex.
Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism are also represented in Singapore,
the latter far more so than the former. In addition, a Japanese branch of
Buddhism, the Soka Association (formerly Nichiren Shoshu Association up
till 1992) is also growing in significance (Clammer 1988).
RELIGIOUS TRENDS 1849–2000

1849 to 1949
Records of religious adherence in Singapore have been kept only intermittently
and pre-independence records are mostly silent on religion. The latter is
perhaps indicative of a lack of concern on the part of the colonial rulers about
the religious inclinations of the population, who were free to subscribe to
whichever religion they chose, as long as they did not create problems.
The first systematic data available on religion in Singapore is found in the
1849 census. Table 2.1 indicates, even in this early period, that the dominant
religion in Singapore was already Chinese religion,4 accounting for 52 per
TABLE 2.1
Religions and Population Distribution by Religion in Singapore, 1849–1931
Religion 1849 1911 1921 1931

Buddhism/
Taoism/
Confucianism 27,526 (52.0%) 216,501 (69.4%) 310,163 (72.8%) 411,665 (72.5%)
Islam 22,007 (41.6%) 53,595 (17.3%) 69,604 (16.3%) 86,827 (15.3%)
Christianity 1,861 (3.5%) 16,349 (5.2%) 21,386 (5.0%) 30,068 (5.3%)
Hinduism 1,452 (2.8%) 15,580 (5.0%) 19,772 (4.6%) 31,128 (5.5%)
Sikhism — 146 (0.05%) 1,022 (0.2%) 2,988 (0.5%)
Judaism 22 (0.04%) 707 (0.2%) 623 (0.2%) 777 (0.14%)
Others 23 (0.04%) 14 (0.004%) 38 (0.009%) 306 (0.05%)
No religion Not listed Not listed Not listed Not listed
Not stated Not listed 62 (0.02%) 3,269 (0.8%) 3,694 (0.7%)
TOTAL 52,891 (100%) 311,9871(100%) 425,8772(100%) 567,453 (100%)
Notes:
1. This total was calculated by adding the total population of each racial group. It left the religion of
8,669 unaccounted for. Some of these might have had no religion which was not a category captured
in the data collection. Some of the discrepancy might also be due to inaccuracies in the data collection.
2. This total is higher than the total calculated by adding up the total population in each racial group.
This is presumably another case of inaccurate data.
Source: Census of Population, 1849, Marriot 1911: Nathan 1921: Vlieland 1932.
32

cent of the population. The next largest group was the Muslims (classified in
the census as Muhameddans), with 41.6 per cent. At this time, Christianity
accounted for a very small proportion of the population (3.5 per cent), and
Hinduism (2.8 per cent).
One key feature of religion at this point in Singapore’s history is that
religious affiliation was pretty much tied to ethnicity, that is, almost all
adherents to Chinese religions were Chinese, all Mohammedans were Malays,
and all Hindus were Indians. It was only in Christianity that we see some
degree of “cross-ethnicity”. The vast majority of Christians then were the
Europeans, although there were a few Chinese converts, Eurasians as well as
a small number of Indians, particularly from Kerala, who were Catholics.5
The religious picture in 1921, the next available set of data on religion
in Singapore, was not dissimilar to the census of 1849. In 1921, the
number of Chinese religionists had grown to 69.4 per cent of the population.
On the other hand, Islam, as a percentage of the total population had
declined to 17.3 per cent. Hinduism grew by 2.2 per cent to 5 per cent of
the population. Similarly, Christianity grew to 5.2 per cent. It is important
to note that in some ways, the growth trajectories of the different religions
are a direct function of the population growth of the different ethnic
groups. Between 1849 to 1921, the policy of recruiting indentured labourers
to work in the tin mines and rubber plantations in Singapore and Malaya,
resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of Chinese, and to a smaller
extent, Indian migrants to Singapore. For example, in 1830, there were
only 6,555 Chinese living in Singapore. By 1849, the number had grown
dramatically to 27,988.6 The period between 1849 and 1921 saw particularly
dramatic growth, with over 164,000 Chinese in Singapore in 1901 (72.1
per cent of the total population), and 315,151 by 1921 (75.1 per cent of
the total population) (Saw 1970, pp. 56–57).
Thus, the early shift in religious orientation was due more to migration
rather than any major social changes in Singapore society. For example, in
1921, 97.5 per cent of all the Chinese in Singapore claimed adherence to
Chinese religion. Only 2.4 per cent of the Chinese claim adherence to
Christianity. Like the Chinese, the changes in religious affiliation among the
Indian population were due more to migration rather than religion switching.
However, as the Indians migrated from more diverse religious backgrounds,
this is reflected in the diverse religious make-up of the Indians in Singapore.
In 1921, 61 per cent of the Indians claimed adherence to Hinduism, 29.3 per
cent were Muhammedans, and 5.9 per cent were Christians. It should be
noted that this religious diversity among Indians in Singapore is still evident
in present-day Singapore. This present-day religious diversity continues to
33

34 Tong Chee Kiong
reflect migration rather than conversion, and religious conversion among

Hindus remains today, as was then, relatively low.
In early Singapore from 1819 to the 1920s, most of the religious groups
were primarily interested in looking after their own flocks within their
respective ethnic communities. For Islam, Hinduism, Taoism and Buddhism,
there was little interest in proselytizing the religions. Christianity, however,
being primarily the religion of the English colonizers, had various missionary
groups that tried to convert indigenes. Thus, Texiera reports that in 1829,
there were over 200 Catholics in Singapore, and by 1832, there were 300
Catholics (Texiera 1963, p. 20). Similarly, Buckley noted that between 1832
and 1838, the congregation witnessed 130 baptisms, (as well as 64 deaths and
20 marriages) (Buckley 1984, p. 247). The growth of the Catholic population
could not be sustained if it had been confined to the European population.
Chinese converts became a majority in the Catholic profile although the vast
majority of the Chinese population remained non-Christians. These Chinese
Catholics were converted either before or after they arrived in Singapore,
Chinese Catholic arrivals being usually the wealthier merchants rather than
the lower class Chinese labourers (Tan 1988, p. 58).
Another group that converted to Catholicism in the nineteenth century
consisted of Indian migrants. Their presence in Ophir Road led to the
establishment of the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes there in 1888, and an
adjacent Catholic school of the same name. However, while Christianity had
some success in converting the immigrant Chinese and Indians, it made no
impact among the Malay population in Singapore. For the Chinese and
Indians, accepting Catholicism did not necessarily mean giving up their
Chinese or Hindu practices, as there was a high degree of syncretism in the
practices of these early Catholics, including the use of vernacular languages in
their churches.
A group that was particularly open to conversion, particularly to Protestant
Christianity, was the Eurasian population.7 Tamney and Hassan argues that
colonialism and the concomitant political and economic domination of the
British (politically and economically) created a situation in which the British/
European cultural practices ascended to a position of dominance and
superiority over the other main cultures (Tamney and Hassan 1987, p. 39).
This cultural dominance was spatially manifested in the form of many
cultural symbols: the centrality of churches, cemeteries, sport grounds,
architecture and so forth. The cultural hierarchy also became institutionalized
and embedded in the social consciousness of the people so much so that
people would use the symbols of Western culture, such as language and
religion for personal or social gratification and advancement. Language was
34

more readily adopted than religion because it involved less of a redefinition of

self, but religion was also adopted by some Chinese and Indians for whom the
co-identification of ethnicity and religion was not strong. For Eurasians who
claimed past European ancestry and a position of hierarchy just below the
Europeans, religion and language were easier to adopt.
The census of 1931 paints a similar picture as the census of 1921.
Chinese religion remained the dominant religion of Singapore, accounting
for 72.5 per cent of the population. The number of adherents to the other
religions remained relatively stable, with 15.3 per cent of the total population
Muslims (from 16.3 per cent in 1921), 5.5 per cent Hindus (4.6 per cent in
1921), and 5.5 per cent Christians (compared to 4.6 per cent in 1921).
1950 to 1979
The 1931 census was the last census that data was collected for religion; data
on religious affiliation was not collected in subsequent censuses until 1980.
For example, the report for the 1947 census noted that “no enquiries as to
religion was made (as) past experience have shown it to be of little value in
Malaya where the entire Malay population is Muhammedan, practically every
European and Eurasian is Christian and the great majority of Chinese hold to
the national religion of China which some describe as Confucian and others
prefer to regard as ancestor worship” (Report of the 1947 Census, p. 123).
Similarly, in the 1957 census, although there was data regarding the number
of religious organizations in Singapore and religious specialists as an
occupational group,8 no data was collected on religious affiliations. This is
regrettable as clearly, the period from 1950 to 1979 witnessed significant
changes in the religious make-up of Singapore, especially the growth in
Christianity and the decline of Taoism.
The history and growth of Christianity in Singapore has been delineated
by Hinton in three stages (Hinton 1985, pp. 14–28). The first, 1819 to
1930, was characterized as one in which Christianity grew slowly. He suggested
that the multiplicity of languages in Singapore during this period made
missionary endeavours difficult. Moreover, immigrants expected to return to
their homelands after a period in Singapore and were thus not prepared to
make permanent and major religious changes. Moreover, the target of Christian
missionaries during this period was really China, rather than Singapore. The
second period, from 1900 to 1950, was characterized as a period where the
“seeds of hope” were sown, as immigrants began to settle down and the
temporary immigrant mentality shifted. This meant that some became more
open to change and enjoyed greater freedom from traditional ties. Moreover,
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36 Tong Chee Kiong
this was the period when the first generation of local-born Singaporeans
contributed to population growth rather than through immigration, and
which, according to Hinton, provided greater opportunities for conversion.
The 1950s to 1980s was characterized as a period of “harvest time”. In
this period, many new Christian denominations were established in Singapore.
New congregations also grew among the older denominations. Moreover, the
changes in the educational system, particularly after self government in 1959
and independence in 1963, meant that, increasingly, the English language
was more commonly used. Christianity, with its English literature, agencies
and missionaries from the West, became more accessible. There was also a
tide of missionaries from the United States. The consequence of this was a
rise in the levels of proselytization and a growth of main churches and the
introduction of new Christian denominations into Singapore.9
This period also saw the introduction of para-church organizations, such
as the Overseas Missionary Fellowship (1952), the Varsity Christian Fellowship
(1952) and the Youth for Christ (1956). These para-church groups were
particularly significant in changing the religious profile of Singapore, as they
have, as their primary mission, the proselytization and conversion of
Singaporeans. Moreover, these groups, particularly Youth for Christ and the
Inter-School Christian Fellowship, targeted the young, especially those in
schools. These efforts proved particularly successful, as evidenced, after a
period of fifty years, by the resumption of data collection on religion in the
1980 census.
1980 to 1990
The active proselytization by Christians as well as changes in the educational
system and the language of education in Singapore was reflected in the
changes to the religious profile of Singaporeans according to the 1980 census.
Chinese religion remained the dominant religion in Singapore, with 29.3 per
cent Taoists and 26.7 per cent Buddhists who were practically all Chinese.
However, although still having the largest number of followers compared to
the 1931 census, it registered the highest rate of decline as a religious
category. Both Islam and Hinduism remained relatively stable, with 10.3 per
cent and 3.7. per cent of the total population respectively, and ethnically
based, with practically all Malays claiming to be Muslims and all Hindus
made up of Indians.
Data on “No Religion” as a category was collected for the first time in the
1980 census. It is interesting to note that a significant 13.6 per cent of the
population in 1980 claimed to have no religion. In addition, they are primarily
36

Chinese, particularly the younger Chinese. For example, 15–16 per cent of
Chinese below the age of 40 claimed to have no religion, compared to only
8 per cent for those 50 and over.
There was a significant increase in the proportion of Christians in
Singapore during this period, drawing new members from the Chinese
community and to a smaller extent, the Indians. Among the Chinese, the
percentage of Christians increased from 2.4 per cent in 1921 and 2.8 per cent
in 1931, to 10.6 per cent in 1980. Among the Indians, it grew from about
6 per cent to 12.4 per cent. However, as the demographic profile of the
Singaporean population in 1921–31 is qualitatively different from that in
1980, the comparison made should not be interpreted to represent a simple
lineal conversion trend. Even so, it is clear that in the intervening fifty years
from 1931 to 1980, both Christianity and “No Religion” emerged to become
significant categories.
1990 to 2000
As can be seen from Table 2.2, Singapore today still remains a multi-religious
society. Buddhism has the largest group of adherents, accounting for 42.5 per
cent of the population in Singapore in 2000. The next largest religious group
is Islam, which constitutes 14.9 per cent of the population and whose
adherents are primarily ethnic Malays. Following closely behind are Christians
who form 14.6 per cent of the population. Taoism, which used to be the
religion with the most followers in 1980 (30 per cent), has seen a falling
number of adherents. It now constitutes only 8.5 per cent of the population.
Followers of Hinduism are a minority, with adherents comprising around
TABLE 2.2
Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion
for the Years 1980, 1990 and 2000
Year 1980 1990 2000

Religion/Percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0
Christianity 10.1 12.7 14.6
Buddhism 27.0 31.2 42.5
Taoism 30.0 22.4 8.5
Islam 15.7 15.3 14.9
Hinduism 3.6 3.7 4.0
Other Religions 0.5 0.6 0.6
No Religion 13.0 14.1 14.8
Source: Census of Population 2000.
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38 Tong Chee Kiong
4 per cent of the population from 1980 to 2000. Interestingly, a significant

14.8 per cent of Singaporeans claim to have no religion.
While the censuses of 1980, 1990 and 2000 demonstrate roughly the
same trends in changes in religious affiliation, there are some significant
differences that are worth sketching. First, while Christianity as a religion
continues to attract new members (its population grew from 5.3 per cent to
10.6 per cent from1931 to 1980, and to 14.8 per cent from 1980 to 2000),
its rate of growth has actually declined. In fact, the fastest growing religion in
those intervening twenty years was Buddhism, not Christianity, especially
between 1990 and 2000. In Christianity, there has also been a change in the
profile of the converts. From 1950 to 1990, Christianity had been most
successful in attracting the younger, educated Singaporeans. This has partly
to do with the strategy of the churches, in targeting the young as the most
fertile ground for growth. However, from 1990 onwards, the churches realized
that the outreach among the young may be reaching a saturation point. They
began to focus on the large group of older Singaporeans who were open to
religious proselytization, adding it to their outreach programme, and changing
the way Christianity is presented to this category. Thus, from 1990 to 2000,
we see a significant growth in the number of older Singaporeans, especially
Chinese, converting to Christianity.
RELIGION AND ETHNICITY

As pointed out earlier, one of the more interesting features regarding religious
affiliations in Singapore is that religion is closely associated with ethnicity.
For example, from 1980–2000 (Table 2.3) Malays have remained religiously
homogenous, with 99.6 per cent consistently practising Islam. Islam is in a
relatively stable position in terms of number and proportion of its followers,
being supported by a relatively cohesive and homogenous Malay community
with no sign of significant conversions to other religions. However, the
Muslim community is not as ethnically homogenous as is commonly assumed.
In 1990, 12.2 per cent of all Muslims in Singapore were Indian by ethnic
origin (Table 2.4) and hence were different in linguistic and cultural traditions
from the majority of the Muslims who are Malay. In other words, Malays, as
an ethnic group, is religiously homogenous, but Muslims, as a religious
group, is more heterogeneous. A possible reason for the religious homogeneity
among Malays may be the close inter-relationship between Malay identity,
culture and religion, to the extent that in Singapore, they are seen as identical.
Thus, a Malay who converts to another religion is seen as having given up his
culture, and is often ostracized from the community.
38

TABLE 2.3
Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Ethnic Group
and Religion for the Years 1980, 1990 and 2000
Ethnic Group/Religion 1980 1990 2000

Chinese 100.0 100.0 100.0
Buddhism 34.3 39.4 53.6
Taoism 38.2 28.4 10.8
No Religion 16.4 17.7 18.6
Malays 100.0 100.0 100.0

Islam 99.6 99.6 99.6
No Religion 0.1 0.2 0.1
Indians 100.0 100.0 100.0

Islam 22.1 26.5 25.6
Hinduism 56.3 53.1 55.4
TABLE 2.4
Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over By Religion
and Ethnic Group for the Year 1990
Religion Chinese Malays Indians Others

Buddhism 99.6 — 0.2 0.2
Taoism 100.0 — — —
Christianity 88.3 0.2 6.7 4.8
Catholic 78.1 0.2 11.2 10.5
Protestant 94.4 0.2 4.0 10.5
Islam 1.0 85.5 12.2 1.6
Hinduism 0.2 0.1 99.5 0.2
Other Religions 17.2 0.1 79.4 3.3
No Religion 98.9 0.2 0.6 0.3
Religion in the Indian community was relatively stable from 1980 to

2000. Hinduism remained the most popular religion and had the largest
following of 55.4 per cent in 2000 (Table 2.3). Although Hinduism was the
39

40 Tong Chee Kiong
religion for slightly more than half of the Indian population, the 1990 census
statistics reveal that about 99.5 per cent of the followers of Hinduism were
Indians (Table 2.4). This was a clear indication that Hinduism is primarily
the religion of Indians than of any other ethnic group. The proportion of
Christians who are Indian hovered at around a constant 12 per cent over the
past two decades (Table 2.3). Compared to the case of the Chinese where the
conversion (to Christianity) trend was strong, the Hindus seem to be able to
resist Christian conversion. There are, nonetheless, a significant number of
Indians who are Christians. However, this is not due to conversion in
Singapore; rather, they had already converted to Christianity in India, and
migrated to Singapore where they maintained their religious identity. In a
sense, the case of the Hindus is the reverse of the Muslims. As a religious
group, it is rather homogenous. However, as an ethnic group, the Indians are
relatively more heterogeneous, with a significant number of Muslims and
Christians. Hinduism is thus viewed by the other ethnic groups as an “Indian”
religion, although a significant number of Indians are not Hindus.
In terms of religion, the Chinese display the greatest heterogeneity of all
the major ethnic groups. Traditional Chinese religion (Buddhism and Taoism)
was still the most significant religion for the Chinese, with followers totaling
64.4 per cent of the Chinese population in 2000 (Table 2.3). In 1990,
practically all the followers of Taoism and 99.6 per cent of the Buddhists in
Singapore were Chinese (Table 2.4). Thus these two religions were strongly
acknowledged as “Chinese” in nature. Since 1980, Buddhism has achieved a
steady growth and surpassed Taoism as the main religion of the Chinese in
1990. By 2000, there was a significant increase in Buddhism with as many as
54 per cent of Chinese claiming to be Buddhists (Table 2.4).10
By 2000, Christianity overtook Taoism as the second most important
religion among the Chinese after Buddhism. In 1980, Christians made up
just 10.9 per cent of the Chinese. This figure increased to 16.5 per cent in
2000 while followers of Taoism declined substantially from 38.2 per cent in
1980 to 10.8 per cent in 2000 (Table 2.3). A sizeable number of the Chinese
also claimed to have no religion. This group of non-religionists comprised
about 18 per cent of the Chinese population in 1990 and 2000. Of those
who claimed to have “No Religion” in 1990, as many as 98.9 per cent were
Chinese (Table 2.4). The category of non-religionists, however, must be
treated with caution. Many Chinese who claim to have no religion do, in
practice, carry out many of the rituals associated with Chinese religion, such
as the worshipping of ancestors at home, praying to the gods, or making
occasional visits to temples. Some still pray to the gods when faced with
personal problems. More importantly, if they were to return to religion, it will
40

probably be back to Chinese religion. However, it is also true that even if they
do continue to practise some of the rituals, the degree of commitment to
Chinese religion is generally lower than that of their parents.
The linkage between religious affiliations and ethnicity is critical to our
understanding of religious change in Singapore. For example, because of the
linkage between religion and culture, for both the Malays and to a degree the
Indians in Singapore, there is greater resistance to conversion to another
religion. For the Chinese in Singapore, religion is less central to their ethnic
identity, and community resistance to conversion is therefore lower. It is
easier for a person who is dissatisfied with the religion of his/her parents to
convert, but the religious options can be more limited. While there are some
who convert to Islam, mainly for reasons of inter-marriage,11 Islam is viewed
by most Chinese as a “Malay” religion,12 just as Hinduism is viewed as an
“Indian” religion. Thus, a Chinese who chooses to convert will more likely
turn to Christianity or claim to have no religion.
RELIGION AND GENDER

The 1990 census indicated that there were more females (14 per cent) than
males (11.1 per cent) professing Christianity, but more males (15.3 per
cent) than females (13.3 per cent) who claimed to have no religion. This
pattern is especially pronounced among the Chinese, where 15.7 per cent
of the females, as compared to 12.3 per cent of the males, professed
Christianity. In contrast, 19.4 per cent of the Chinese resident males
claimed to have no religion, compared to 16.6 per cent of the Chinese
resident females. On the whole, however, there is no significant statistical
difference in the correlation between religion and gender. This is interesting
if we consider the role of women in Chinese religion. Traditionally, religious
Taoist practices, particularly within the confines of the home, are carried
out by the women on behalf of the whole family. Religion, in fact, is
“women’s work”, and men are really only responsible for public rituals
when the family presents a formal face to the public.
RELIGION AND AGE

There is a significant correlation between religion and age in Singapore. For
the Chinese, there is also a generational divide, between the religion of the
parents and that of their children. While there was an overall decline of
Taoism among all the age groups in 2000, the decline was especially marked
among the younger generation. Buddhism was popular across all age groups
41

42 Tong Chee Kiong
TABLE 2.5
Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Religion,
Ethnic Group and Sex for the Year 1990
Males
Religion Total Chinese Malays Indians Others
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(1,147,993) (897,942) (152,730) (86,579) (10,742)
Buddhism 30.9 39.4 — 0.6 4.3
Taoism 22.4 28.6 — — 0.3
Christianity 11.1 12.3 0.2 11.2 62.2
Catholic 4.3 4.1 0.1 7.1 51.7
Protestants 6.8 8.2 0.1 4.1 10.5
Islam 15.9 0.2 99.6 29.2 26.3
Hinduism 3.9 — — 51.7 0.7
Others 0.5 0.1 — 5.8 1.5
No Religion 15.3 19.4 0.2 1.5 4.7
Females
Religion Total Chinese Malays Indians Others
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(1,128,741) (897,883) (147,235) (71,806) (11,817)
Buddhism 31.3 39.1 0.1 0.8 9.2
Taoism 22.5 28.2 — — 0.6
Christianity 14.0 15.7 0.2 13.4 59.2
Catholic 5.2 5.2 0.1 8.3 48.3
Protestants 8.8 10.5 0.1 5.1 10.9
Islam 14.9 0.2 99.5 24.4 23.2
Hinduism 3.4 — — 53.7 0.7
Others 0.6 0.2 — 6.8 2.1
No Religion 13.3 16.6 0.2 0.9 5.0
but still had more adherents among those 55 years and older. Generally, the
bulk of Christians tend to be from the younger generation. In 1990, among
those aged 55 and above, 11.1 per cent professed Christianity while the
figure was 13.2 per cent for those in the 15–24 age group and 14.0 per cent
in the 25–34 age group. In 2000, the 25–34 age group still had the highest
proportion of Christians (Table 2.6). However, the proportion of Christians
in the 15–24 age group (12.8 per cent) was actually slightly lower than that
in the 55 and over age group (13.7 per cent) in 2000. This can probably be
attributed to the high conversion rates during the 1970s and early 1980s
42

TABLE 2.6
Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and
Age Group for the Years 1990 and 2000
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55 & over

Religion
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Christianity 13.2 12.8 14.0 15.8 12.7 15.7 11.4 14.4 11.1 13.7
Buddhism 29.1 38.9 29.8 40.2 32.6 41.5 34.2 44.9 32.0 47.4
Taoism 18.9 8.4 18.6 5.6 22.8 6.9 26.6 9.9 29.7 12.7
Islam 17.7 18.6 17.2 15.1 13.2 15.7 12.4 13.0 13.8 12.3
Hinduism 3.6 3.5 3.9 4.6 3.4 4.5 3.6 3.6 4.2 3.5
Others 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
No Religion 16.9 17.3 16.0 18.1 14.8 15.0 11.2 13.7 8.6 9.8
when the bulk of the younger people were converted. Much of that generation
of early Christians would now be in the 55 years and over cohort, resulting
in a relatively large percentage of older Christians. Moreover, among the
Christians, there has been a change in conversion strategy. Whereas the
fastest growing churches were previously the charismatic churches which
attracted younger people, proselytization has now shifted focus to the older
generation. This is especially with Chinese dialect churches which draw the
older dialect-speaking Chinese.
A closer look at the Malay age groups reveals that there was no significant
relationship between age and religion, the figures showing high levels of
homogeneity among the age groups (Table 2.7). There was also little variation
within the Indian community across age groups. However, it can be observed
that the percentage of Christians was slightly higher among the younger
Indians than the older ones, especially those aged 60 years and above (Table
2.8). This is similar to the general trend found among the Chinese, although
to a lesser extent.
The Chinese community showed a change across the age groups in the
three religious categories of Taoism, Christianity and No Religion. Buddhism
increased its following and garnered a significant number of adherents among
the various age groups. In 1990, 38 per cent of those aged 60 and above
claimed to be followers of Taoism. However, the percentage fell to 26.9
among those in the 15–24 age cohort and 23.8 per cent among those in the
20–29 age group (Table 2.7). In 2000, there continued to be a higher
concentration of Taoists, believed to be all Chinese, among the older age
43

44 Tong Chee Kiong
TABLE 2.7
Malay Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by
Religion and Age Group for the Year 1990
60 years
Religion Total 10–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59
& above
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(299,965) (59,387) (84,619) (69,917) (33,135) (25,520) (27,387)
Buddhism — — — 0.1 0.1 — —
Taoism — — — — — — —
Christianity 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Catholic 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Protestant 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Islam 99.6 99.7 99.6 99.5 99.5 99.7 99.5
Hinduism — — — — — — —
Others — — — — — — —
No Religion 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
TABLE 2.8
Indian Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by
60 years
Religion Total 10–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59
& above
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Buddhism 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7
Taoism — — 0.1 — 0.1 — —
Christian 12.2 11.8 12.6 12.9 12.1 12.4 10.5
Catholic 7.6 7.5 7.7 7.8 7.9 8.2 6.7
Protestant 4.6 4.3 4.9 5.1 4.2 4.2 3.8
Islam 27.0 31.9 25.2 25.8 28.8 24.5 26.2
Hinduism 52.6 48.8 53.8 52.9 51.3 54.4 54.8
Other Religions 6.3 5.9 6.8 6.5 5.5 6.6 5.9
No Religion 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.9
groups (Table 2.6). In contrast, Christianity was more popular among the
younger Chinese. In 1990, Christianity was professed by 11.8 per cent of the
Chinese aged 60 and above, but among those in the 20–29 age group, 16.2
per cent were Christians (Table 2.9). The data shows that the Chinese,
especially the younger generation, are abandoning traditional religious practices
44

TABLE 2.9
Chinese Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by
60 years
Religion Total 10–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59
& above
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Buddhism 39.3 38.1 38.0 39.3 40.4 42.1 39.5
Taoism 28.4 26.9 23.8 25.9 30.2 34.1 38.0
Christianity 14.0 13.5 16.2 15.1 12.9 11.9 11.8
Catholic 4.7 4.4 4.1 4.6 5.6 5.4 4.6
Protestant 9.3 9.1 12.1 10.5 7.3 6.5 7.2
Islam 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
Hinduism — — — — — — —
Other Religions 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
No Religion 18.0 21.2 21.7 19.3 16.1 11.6 10.5
for Christianity or have become non-religionists. The proportion of Chinese

claiming to have no religious affiliation rose across the age groups. However,
as in the previous decade, there was a higher prevalence of non-religionists
among the younger age groups (Table 2.10).
RELIGION AND EDUCATION

Education appears to be an important factor that differentiates people
religiously. In 1990 and 2000, the categories “Christianity” and “No
Religion” were positively associated with level of education. Among the
non-student population, those with university (and above) qualifications
TABLE 2.10
Proportion Reporting “No Religion” by Age and Ethnic Group for the Year 2000
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55 & over

Ethnic Group
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Chinese 21.8 22.5 20.6 23.0 17.9 19.1 13.5 16.7 10.6 11.9
Malays 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0
Indians 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.6 1.1 0.6 1.6 0.5 1.7 0.4
45

46 Tong Chee Kiong
registered the highest percentages in the categories of “Christianity” and

“No Religion”. In 2000, Christians formed the largest religious group
among university graduates (33.5 per cent), although their proportion
declined slightly since 1990 (Table 2.11). Another 28.9 per cent of university
graduates claimed to have “No Religion”. In contrast, amongst those who
had below secondary education, only 6.4 per cent were Christians while 7.7
per cent professed “No Religion” (Table 2.11).
While Christianity seems to be found among those with a higher
educational attainment, the reverse is true for those who adhere to Taoism. In
2000, the largest group of Taoists (13.2 per cent) came from those with below
secondary education. Among those Taoists who had university qualifications,
the proportion fell to 2.7 per cent (Table 2.11). Thus the data suggests that
better educated Singaporeans, especially the Chinese, tend to abandon their
traditional faiths to become Christians or non-religionists. While Taoism has
seen a decline among the better educated, Buddhism, on the other hand,
appeared to have attracted a significant number of followers among graduates.
The proportion of graduates professing Buddhism increased from 15.1 per
cent in 1990 to 23.6 per cent in 2000 (Table 2.11). However, the bulk of
Buddhists (51.5 per cent) were still those with a lower level of education, that
is, below secondary qualifications.
The language stream of an individual appears to have a strong correlation
with the religious affiliation of the resident population. Those who had an
English stream education seemed more inclined to be Christians, while a high
proportion of Taoists and Buddhists came from Mandarin stream educational
backgrounds. An in-depth survey undertaken in 1988 on 1,025 HDB
(Housing Development Board) public housing households also showed a
correlation between educational stream and religious affiliation. While 25.4
per cent of those with an English stream education were found to profess
Christianity, only 7.1 per cent of those from the Chinese stream schools were
Christians (Table 2.12).
On the other hand, 67 per cent of those with a Chinese stream education
and 73.5 per cent of those with no formal education consider themselves
Taoists, whereas only 39.6 per cent of respondents with an English stream
education claim to be Taoists (Table 2.13). Thus, just as Christianity is seen
as a religion of the English educated, Taoism seems to be correlated with
those who had a Chinese stream education. I suggest that those with a higher
level of education tend to gravitate towards a religion that fits more closely
with their worldview, and which they view as more rational and systematic,
rather than follow their parents’ religion which is based on ritual practices
and sentiments.
46

02 ReligiousDiversity Ch 2
TABLE 2.11
47
Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and Highest Qualification Attained for the Years 1990 and 2000
Total Full time Students Below Secondary Secondary Post Secondary University
Religion
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Christianity 12.7 14.6 17.1 14.3 6.3 6.4 16.1 14.6 24.7 20.8 39.3 33.5
Religious Trends and Issues in Singapore
Buddhism 31.2 42.5 29.0 37.3 34.1 51.5 30.3 41.6 25.7 38.3 15.1 23.6
Taoism 22.4 8.5 18.2 8.5 29.4 13.2 14.8 5.8 13.0 5.5 7.4 2.7
Islam 15.3 14.9 12.0 16.2 17.1 17.2 17.3 18.9 8.5 11.2 2.6 3.5
Hinduism 3.7 4.0 2.9 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.9 4.1 3.1 3.5 3.5 6.9
Others 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9
No Religion 14.1 14.8 20.3 19.3 8.7 7.7 16.9 14.3 24.4 20.0 31.1 28.9
7/16/08, 9:47 AM
47
47
48 Tong Chee Kiong
TABLE 2.12
Educational Stream by Christianity
Educational Stream Non Christians Christians

Chinese 93.0 7.1
English 74.6 25.4
No Education 96.4 3.7
Total 88.8 3.7
Source: Report of the Survey on Chinese Customs and Rites in Singapore, 1988.
TABLE 2.13
Religious Affiliation by Stream of Education
Chinese English No education

Shenism 67.0 39.6 73.5
Buddhism 17.2 17.5 18.4
Total 45.7 27.6 26.8 100.0
Source: Report of the Survey on Chinese Customs and Rites in Singapore, 1988.
RELIGION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

As with findings relating to education, the majority of Christians and those
who profess to have “No Religion” tend to be from a higher socio-economic
background. In 1990, 28.3 per cent of Christians and 24.6 per cent of non-
religionists were found among those in the professional and technical
occupations (Table 2.14), which also tend to be more prestigious and better
paid. In contrast, only 11.2 per cent of Taoists were found in the same job
sectors (Table 2.14). The bulk of Taoists were employed in the production
and sales/service sectors, which are viewed as less prestigious. These occupations
had low proportions of Christians and non-religionists.
Using housing type as another indicator of social economic status, the
statistics in the 2000 census reveal a similar trend as with occupation.
Christians and non-religionists tend to live in private dwellings and better
HDB housing categories, while those living in smaller HDB flats tend to
profess Taoism. In 2000, 34.3 per cent of Christians and 24.2 per cent of
non-religionists lived in private apartments and houses, while only 4.2 per
48

TABLE 2.14
Resident Working Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and
Occupation for the Year 1990
Professional Admin & Sales/ Production

Religion Total Clerical Others
/Technical Managerial Service and Related
Buddhism 30.9 23.0 33.9 29.9 34.6 32.7 30.8
Taoism 20.9 11.2 18.9 13.7 25.5 27.4 18.4
Christian 13.3 28.3 18.7 18.0 7.8 4.7 17.8
Catholic 4.8 8.5 6.7 7.1 3.5 2.1 6.1
Protestant 8.5 19.8 12.0 10.9 4.3 2.6 11.7
Islam 15.0 9.0 3.4 16.2 16.1 20.6 8.8
Hinduism 3.9 3.3 2.5 3.8 3.8 4.5 5.6
Others 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.9
No Religion 15.4 24.6 21.9 17.8 11.6 9.7 17.7
cent of Taoists lived in the private residences. The highest proportion of

Taoists (11.8 per cent) lived in one and two room HDB flats (Table 2.15).
CONCLUSION
From the preceding overview of the religious landscape in Singapore,
several trends can clearly be discerned. There has been a substantial growth
in the number of Christians, a rapid decline in adherence to traditional
Chinese religion, an increase in the number of persons who claim to have
TABLE 2.15
Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and
Type of Dwelling for the Year 2000
HDB 1& 2 HDB 3 HDB 4 HDB 5 Private Apt

Religion rooms room room room & Exec & House
1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
Christian 5.5 6.8 8.0 9.7 10.0 10.2 20.3 17.4 30.0 34.3
Buddhism 27.8 41.8 32.2 46.3 34.1 46.3 29.4 39.5 26.1 30.1
Taoism 32.7 11.8 25.1 10.5 23.2 9.8 15.3 6.4 13.2 4.2
Islam 16.1 23.7 19.9 16.7 16.2 17.4 11.9 14.3 3.3 2.8
Hinduism 4.7 5.2 3.3 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.2 3.7 3.6
Others 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9
No Religion 12.8 10.5 11.1 12.5 12.2 11.9 18.4 17.4 22.9 24.2
49

50 Tong Chee Kiong
no religious affiliations, and some indications suggesting a revivalism in

Buddhism. In addition, the findings suggest that the shifts in religious
affiliations tend to follow certain demographic patterns. For instance,
Christians tend to be younger in age, speak English as a dominant home
language, and of higher socio economic status in terms of occupation,
income, and housing type. If this survey data is taken at face value, then
non religionists share almost the same characteristics as the Christians,
except that while Christianity seems to appeal more to the English educated,
“No Religion” as a category attracts both English educated and Chinese
educated Singaporeans. However, as earlier noted, the category of non-
religionists should be treated with caution as some individuals who claim to
be non-religionists still perform certain religious rites. Often, these people
are unsure which religion they should identify themselves with and hence
regard themselves as belonging to no particular religious group. This suggests
that the quantitative surveys on religion may be skewed on the high end for
those who claim to have “No Religion”. Taoists, on the other hand, exhibit
very different demographic characteristics. They tend to be older in age,
speak dialects at home, and have relatively lower socio economic status. In
this sense, those who are followers of Taoism are, in demo-graphic terms at
least, the opposite of those who are Christians.
One of the main features of the current religious scene in Singapore is
that the traditionally accepted “boundaries” of the respective religions have
become amorphous and ambiguous. The religious ground is shifting. For
example, there has been a distinct growth in Christianity and decline in
Taoism in Singapore. While their numbers may be comparatively small, the
fact that Christianity is most successful among the emerging younger,
better-educated and more affluent Singaporeans, means that their dominance
may be greater than their numbers suggest. In a sense, if this trend continues,
we may find a demographic structure in which religious differences will
coincide with language and social class differences. As such, a two prong
problem emerges. On one level, we see an intertwining of ethnicity and
religion, where the population is differentiated along ethno-religious lines,
with Indians being largely Hindus, Malays as Muslims and Chinese as
Buddhists and Taoists. On another level, an intertwining of social class and
religion, with Chinese from lower socio-economic status being primarily
Taoists and those from the higher socio-economic class being Christians
and non-religionists.Taking into account the strong emotional sentiments
that can be attached to religion, the issues surrounding religious change and
conversion, and inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations are fascinating
topics for investigation.
50

Notes
1. This chapter is based on Chapter 2 of my book, Rationalizing Religion: Religious
Conversion, Revivalism, and Competition in Singapore (Leiden: Brill, 2007). I
would like to thank the editors for permission to reprint this chapter in a slightly
revised form.
2. Meaning “sea people”.
3. The precise dates of establishment cited for each denomination have varied from
source to source, so the dates represented here are drawn from one of the two
sources accredited.
4. At this time, Chinese religion as a category did not exist. In the census, it was
categorized as Buddhism/Taoism/Confucianism. However, the colonial authorities
had some problems classifying what constituted Chinese religion. In fact, in the
report, they noted that many Chinese classified themselves as Confucians, but
since Confucianism is a philosophy and not a religion, it is problematic. By the
1921 census, Chinese religions were in fact classified under “Other Religions”.
5. This was true to such an extent that the report of 1921 in fact noted that, “The
number of non-Christians among the Europeans and Eurasians and the number
of non-Muhammedans among the Malays are so small that the Committee
recommended that the only tables to be published in this report should be those
dealing with Chinese and Indians.”
6. Chinese migration to Singapore in the early nineteenth century was the result
of various push-pull factors. The Chinese that came to Singapore were mostly
from the southern provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien, two provinces which
were more receptive to migrating because of their early contact with the
British tea traders. As a result of the contact, information about a place which
offered the opportunity to make a fortune could have been transmitted easily.
More importantly, the floods, famines and droughts frequently experienced in
China, made life difficult. The natural calamities, coupled with the lack of
good credit facilities in rural communities, meant that many peasants were
tenant farmers who were often exploited with high rents (Yen 1986, p. 2)
China was also characterized by civil unrest; the Taiping Rebellion in
1857–64, the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and the power struggle between Sun
Yat Sen and Yuan Shih Kai; which prevented any form of stable family life.
Adding to this misery, the large population and the inability to find employment
induced many Chinese to migrate.
7. Eurasians refer to an ethnic community in Singapore that was the result of inter-
marriage between the British and European men and Chinese, Indian women
and other locals.
8. The census noted, for example, that there were 1,536 persons from religious
organizations involved in community work and 1,009 persons in the occupational
group of kathis, clergy, and related religious orders.
9. The main denominations included Anglicans, Methodists, Brethrens and
51

52 Tong Chee Kiong
Presbyterians and the new Christian denominations, which included the Southern
Baptists, Lutheran Church of America, Christian Nationals Evangelism
Commission, and the Bible Presbyterians.
10. Given the highly complex nature of Chinese religions, religious affiliations,
particularly based on the census data, are more difficult to interpret. Chinese
religion, especially popular religion, is a syncretic mix of Taoism, Buddhism,
Confucianism, and ancestor worship. For example, based on the qualitative
interviews with informants, many Chinese who claim to be Buddhists in fact
practise rituals, such as the worshipping of Guan Yin, and Guan Kong, which
would generally be considered as Taoist religious practices. In Singapore, however,
Buddhism, as a religious label, is seen as being of higher status, and thus many
ascribe to this religious label even if they are not, religious speaking, Buddhists.
Thus, in analysing the data, there are probably far more Taoists and fewer
Buddhists than the census data implies. Due to the process of the
intellectualization of religion in Singapore, the Chinese are making a clearer
distinction between Taoism and Buddhism as religious belief systems. Buddhists
in Singapore, particularly the younger Chinese, are more knowledgeable about
the beliefs and rituals of Buddhism.
11. In Islam, a person who marries a Muslim must “convert” to Islam for the
marriage to be legally recognized under syariah law.
12. In fact, conversion to Islam, for the older Chinese, is referred to as “jip huan”,
which means literally to enter into “Malayness”, and is frowned upon.
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Bartley, William. “Population of Singapore in 1819”. Journal of the Malayan Branch
of the Royal Asiatic Society XI (1933): 177.
Bloom, David. “The English Language and Singapore: A Critical Survey”. In Singapore
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Buckley, Charles Burton. An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore. Singapore:
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Census of Singapore 1849. Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, no. 4.
Reprint n.p.: Krauss, 1950.
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Clammer, John. “Singapore’s Buddhists Chant a Modern Mantra”. Far Eastern

Economic Review, 29 December 1988, pp. 26–27
Comber, Leon. Chinese Ancestor Worship in Malaya. Singapore: Donald Moore,
1954.
———. Chinese Magic and Superstition in Malaya and Singapore. Singapore: Donald
Moore, 1955.
———. Chinese Temples in Singapore. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1958.
Elliot, Alan J. A. Chinese Spirit-medium Cults in Singapore. London: Royal
Anthropological Institute, 1955.
Evans, Ivor H. N. Papers on the Ethnology and Arg∫aeology of Malay Peninsular.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927.
Farah, Caesar E. Islam: Beliefs and Observances. New York: Barron’s, 1994.
Hinton, Keith. Growing Churches Singapore Style: Ministry in an Urban Context.
Singapore: Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1985.
Ke, Zongyuan. “What was it Crawford saw on Fort Canning”. Heritage, No. 6.
Singapore: National Museum, 1984.
Khoo, Chian Kim. Census of Population, 1980, Singapore; Release No. 9: Religion and
Fertility. Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1981.
Lau, Kak En. Singapore Census of Population, 1990, Release No. 6: Religion, Childcare
and Leisure Activities. Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1994.
Lee, Cheuk Yin, Alan K. Chan and Timothy Y. H. Tsu. Taoism: Outlines of a Chinese
Religious Tradition. Singapore: Taoist Federation, 1994.
Leo, Juat Bei and John Clammer. “Confucianism as Folk Religion in Singapore: A
Note”. In Studies in Chinese Folk Religion in Singapore and Malaysia, edited by
John Clammer. Singapore: Contributions to Southeast Asian Ethnography,
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Mahajani, Usha. The Role of the Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaysia, Bombay:
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1922.
Nyce, Robert. “Chinese Folk Religion in Malaysia and Singapore”. The Southeast
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Century”. Journal of Asian Studies 24, no. 1 (1964): 75–90.
Sandhu, Kernial Singh. Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of their Immigration and
Settlement. London: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
Saw, Swee Hock. Singapore Population in Transition. Philadelphia: University of
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2nd edition. Singapore: Graduate’s Christian Fellowship, 1993.
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54 Tong Chee Kiong
Song, Ong Siang. One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore. London:
John Murray. Reprint, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Tamney, Joseph B. and Riaz Hassan. Religious Switching in Singapore: A Study of
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1911. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1886.
54

Keeping God in Place 55
KEEPING GOD IN PLACE

The Management of Religion
in Singapore
Eugene K. B. Tan
INTRODUCTION
We have enjoyed racial and religious harmony since Independence. This

does not prove that our social fabric is inherently stronger than other
multi-racial societies, or that we are immune to the serious problems
which have afflicted so many of them. It only shows the amount of care
which has gone into tending it and strengthening it.
(Shared Values White Paper 1991, p. 4)
Singapore has enjoyed racial and religious harmony since its independence in
1965. What is not so evident is the tremendous care, effort, and pre-emptive
prudence invested in nurturing multi-religiosity as an integral part of
Singapore’s multi-racialism framework. Buttressed by the state’s professed
commitment to secularism, racial and religious harmony is one of Singapore’s
five Shared Values. This stability is jealously guarded by the state especially
since rapid modernization has neither resulted in the decline of religious
belief nor the downgrading of importance of religious institutions among
Singaporeans. Religious faith is a “major part of Singapore’s cultural ballast”
and exerts a tremendous pull on Singaporeans (Shared Values 1991, p. 8;
Tong 2002). Singapore’s rich religious heritage is also celebrated as a source
55
55

56 Eugene K. B. Tan
of strength, with places of worship attended in large numbers by locals and

promoted as tourist sites of interest. Singapore’s architectural landscape, with
many prominent religious buildings, is a legacy of religious developments in
early modern Singapore history (Lee Geok Boi 2002). Yet, consider the
paradox: religion has been selectively co-opted in secular Singapore’s nation-
building process. Can a strong religious identity co-exist with a strong
Singaporean identity?
This chapter begins with a description of the multi-religious landscape of
Singapore and notes some aspects of the religious state of play. It then
examines the institutional and legal framework in the management of religion
within the context of an evolving, putative Singapore model of secularism.
The policy impulses behind the state’s co-option of religion to reinforce the
teaching of moral values, to sustain economic vitality, and to urge the practice
of one’s religion in keeping with the secular and multi-racial mores of
Singaporean society are examined. It shows that the state engages in a
tightrope walk between secularism and control and influence over religion,
and religious expression for the purposes of state- and nation-building.
THE RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE IN SINGAPORE

The Backdrop of Religious Pluralism
Religion has always played a key role in the construction, political legitimation,
and national integration of political entities in Southeast Asia. Since the late
first millennium, itinerant traders and travellers to Southeast Asia brought
with them Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, and Islamic ideals and traditions.
Less commonly appreciated is the fact that these value systems, especially
Buddhism and Hinduism, had provided lessons on public leadership, public
morality, learning and virtue and the dignity of the individual (de Bary
2004). Later on, European colonialism catalysed the spread of Christianity to
Southeast Asia. By the turn of the twentieth century, Singapore was very
much the heart of the Muslim world in maritime Southeast Asia. Modernist
Islamic ideas, including dissenting ones, emanating from the Arab Middle
East were propagated through religious scholars and in Islamic publications
originating from Singapore and the region (Roff 1994; Riddell 2001).
Singaporeans’ religious affiliation has remained relatively stable over the
last twenty-five years. Buddhists constitute the largest religious group, followed
by Muslims, non-religionists, Christians, Taoists, and Hindus (see Table
3.1).1 Taking Buddhists and Taoists as a consolidated group, they constitute
slightly more than half of all Singaporeans, with the number of Buddhists
56

TABLE 3.1
Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Above by Religion
% change between
Faith 2000 (%) 1990 (%) 1980 (%)
1980 and 2000
Buddhism 42.5 31.2 27.0 + 15.5
Islam 14.9 15.3 15.7 – 0.8
No religion 14.8 14.1 13.0 + 1.8
Christianity 14.6 12.7 10.1 + 4.5
Taoism 8.5 22.4 30.0 – 21.5
Hinduism 4.0 3.7 3.6 + 0.4
Others 0.6 0.6 0.5 + 0.1
Source: Singapore Department of Statistics 2000.
increasing by a significant 15.5 per cent between 1980 and 2000. The growth
and revitalization of Buddhism can be attributed to its “intellectualization”
and “reformist” trends resulting in it becoming popular with former Taoists.
The rise of a canonical form of Buddhism and the rapid decline of rituals and
customs (commonly associated with Chinese folk religions) help distinguish
Buddhism more clearly from Taoism (Wee 1976; Kuah-Pearce 2003). Younger,
better-educated Buddhists increasingly propagate their faith through emulating
the outreach and fellowship that Christian churches are noted for.
The number of Christian adherents has shown a steady increase since the
1950s. They form the largest religious group among university graduates,
with one-third of graduates professing Christianity in 2000. If this pace of
growth continues, Christianity will become the second largest religious group
by 2010. Christians also tend to be of relatively higher social-economic status
(in education, occupation, and income). Half of the Christian population
reside in larger HDB flats (viz. 5-room and executive flats), private flats, or
houses.2 The higher profile of charismatic Christian churches is manifested in
their being “fervent in mission activities, exhibiting strong evangelistic zeal”
by the young “born-again” converts. These churches also place emphasis on
an experiential religious experience which stresses a personal relationship
with God (Kuo, Quah and Tong 1988, pp. 4–5, 12–14).
Singaporeans’ religious beliefs also tend to be divided along racial lines.
For instance, 99.6 per cent of Malays are Muslims while almost two-thirds of
Chinese (64.4 per cent) are either Buddhists or Taoists. Slightly more than
half of Indians (55.4 per cent) are Hindus. About half of “Others” are
Christians. The Chinese are also far more likely to have no religious affiliation
57

58 Eugene K. B. Tan
than Malays and Indians. Linguistically, there is a strong correlation between

religion and language. Almost 40 per cent of Christians use English as their
home language. Taoists and Buddhists tend to use Mandarin and Chinese
dialects while three-quarters of Hindus use Tamil as the home language.
Given the strong correlation between race, home language, and religion,
Malays, Indian-Muslims and Indian-Hindus tend to demonstrate strong
sense of religious group identity. In contrast, ethnic Chinese of different
faiths show varying and significant changes in religious group identity (Chan
2003, pp. 14–15).
Unsurprisingly, religion has an “underlying influence on nuptiality, fertility,
and the population control programme” (Saw 1999, p. 58). Singaporeans are
also relatively generous in donating to religious organizations and causes. The
National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre’s (NVPC) 2004 survey revealed
that 97 per cent of Singaporeans aged fifteen years or more donated SGD438
million to charities and religious organizations, with 52 per cent of these
donations made in the form of church tithes, Islamic zakat, and temple “oil
money” (NVPC 2005, pp. 14–18).3
Overview of Religious State of Play in Singapore

Buffeted by the continuing global phenomenon of religious resurgence,
Singapore is affected by the rise of religious fundamentalism, powerful
transnational associational pulls with renewed religiosity of the various
mainstream faiths, and new forms of post-traditional/new age spirituality. In
response, the government maintains a watchful eye on external influences. It
is prepared to move pre-emptively against any threat to social cohesion and
harmony (Hill 1999). In the 1980s, liberation theology was closely watched.
Today, radical and militant Islam — alongside aggressive evangelization by
any faith — is closely monitored. The government operates from the
conservative and realist premise that religious harmony cannot be taken for
granted and that efforts have to be continually exerted to ensure that
moderation and social responsibility prevails in the practice of one’s faith.
The government is acutely aware that religious differences tend to
reinforce racial and cultural identities and differences. It also recognizes
that religion can be a salient but powerful instrument of social change that
can be used to rally faith communities, and as justification for subtle
opposition and protest against perceived or real socio-economic and political
injustices. Increasingly, there is also recognition of the need to develop
deeper inter-religious understanding and appreciation especially at the mass
level in order to counter religious divisiveness. While Singaporeans’ increased
religiosity per se purportedly is not a concern, the perception that
58

Singaporeans, particularly Muslims, are interacting less with Singaporeans

from other faiths, is.
This overarching fear and vulnerability ensure that close scrutiny,
interventionist surveillance, and ultra-sensitivity to perceived threats are
hallmarks of the government’s policy towards religion. Legislation such as the
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) (Cap. 167A), Internal
Security Act (ISA) (Cap. 143) and soft-law norms such as the Declaration of
Religious Harmony are relied upon in forestalling any religious extremism
and interfaith conflicts. Supplementing the pervasive watchfulness is the
didactic ritual of remembering ethnic riots in Singapore’s pre-independence
history (Hill 2003). This requires that those earlier episodes of ethno-violence
“must be engraved — burnt into the collective memory of all Singaporeans:
1969: 13 May, 1964: Prophet Mohamed’s birthday, 1950: the Maria Hertogh
riots” (Hansard 1988).4
Despite the diversity, the state of religious and racial group relations is
positive pre- and post-9/11 as attested to by the 2001 and 2002 Survey on
Social Attitudes of Singaporeans (Chan 2003, 2002). “A certain level of resilience
and robustness is evident… [and] Singaporeans continued to be optimistic
about the future of race and religious group relations in Singapore” (Chan
2003, p. 11). The 2002 Survey further noted that satisfaction and optimism
of race and religious group relations are distinct dimensions such that “high
satisfaction with racial/religious group relations does not necessarily imply
high optimism about such relations in the future” (Chan 2003, p. 18).
The tendency to view everyday phenomenon in ethnic terms is
unsurprising given the saliency of ethnic consciousness in popular and
official discourse. It reflects a norm of socialization, reinforcing racial
stereotypes and differences among the various races. Where the Malay
community is concerned, racial and religious identities are not only
prominent but also conflated. As 99.6 per cent of Malay-Singaporeans
profess Islam, Malays are regarded synonymously as Muslims, and Muslim
identity is treated as an integral part of Malay identity. In the last two
decades, the religious identifier for Malays has become more prominent.
This double affiliation, Malay-Muslim (or “Malay/Muslim” in official
Singapore discourse) is of fairly recent vintage — it was not used in the
ascription of the Malay community prior to the 1980s — is an indication
of the growing significance of religion as a social marker.
Within the community itself, such an identity nurtures a greater
community self-consciousness of the double bond of race and faith. This
resort to the “Muslim” identifier is in part a legacy of the state’s encouragement
of recourse to religion as a bulwark against the effects of cultural and moral
enervation in the modernization process. By the late 1970s, the government’s
59

60 Eugene K. B. Tan
concern with the Malay-Muslim community’s “3D” problem of drugs, divorce,

and delinquency was palpable. Malay civil society, Islamic organizations, and
the Islamic faith were mobilized to help counter the social and moral decline
(Ismail and Abdullah 2000). As Malay and Muslim identities are deemed
coterminous, this has resulted in the Malay-Singaporeans’ Islamic identity
being more sensitive and less negotiable. Chua and Kwok (2001, p. 116)
astutely point out the implications:
[T]he tightly drawn “community” boundaries, doubly marked by a

sense of “Malayness” and the religious injunctions of Islam, appear to
have the effect of reducing individual and sub-group differences within
the Malay-Muslim community itself, or at least, not to allow the
differences within to be aired outside the community…. [T]he term the
Malay community with the Islamic faith as its chief characteristic is used
in Singaporean public discourse without any reservation about the
referent’s presumed “unity.” One of the consequences of these tightly
drawn boundaries is that a general conservatism prevails among Malay-
Muslims in Singapore. But the conservatism is fraught with ambivalence,
torn between the desire to preserve “traditions” and the need to open the
community to new bodies of knowledge and economic opportunity.
Global developments after 9/11 have encouraged an affirmation of Muslims’

Islamic identity in solidarity with their co-religionists elsewhere within the
global Muslim ummah. Malay-Muslim Singaporeans have generally been
unsettled and discomforted by the negative coverage on Islam in the
international media, as well as by the non-Muslim perception that Islam
condones violence committed in its name. At the same time, as a minority
community, Malay-Muslims have become more self-conscious as Muslims,
and insecure at the suspicion that they may be sympathetic to Islamic
extremism, and have responded by stressing Islamic “moderation”.
Even if it reflects social reality, conflating Malay and Muslim identities
can be unconducive to deeper social cohesion since it reinforces racial and
cultural difference with the religious cleavage. Thus, problems afflicting the
Malay community are almost always profiled as racial, cultural, and religious.
Although it would be misleading to equate increased religiosity of the Malay-
Muslims with Islamism (understood here as Muslim political activism), the
government’s concern with the Malay-Muslim way of life in recent years is
evident. Indeed, it is this conflation of race and religion that constraints the
closer integration of Malay/Muslims in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF).
The government is concerned that primordial loyalties of ethnicity and
religion may trump the civic and secular loyalties to the Singaporean nation.
60

Then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew (2001) reaffirmed the government’s
concern, first publicly enunciated in 1987:
We must never put the person in a situation where he may face a conflict
of loyalties. I said in answer to a question some nearly two years ago that
it is a difficult matter to put a Malay Muslim of deeply religious family
background in charge of a machine-gun. We should never have to ask
this of anyone. Some of you were disturbed by my frankness. But when
I faced crises in the 1960s I could not afford to be wrong. Was this
discrimination or was it common sense — a policy of prudence? … For
nearly every job, a person’s race and religion are irrelevant. But in the
security services, because of our context, we cannot ignore race and
religion in deciding suitability.
For the government and the Malay-Muslim community in Singapore alike,

the concerns are real. The responsibilities of citizenship require that male
Singaporeans, Malay-Muslims included, perform compulsory National Service.
Yet their loyalty is regarded as ambivalent (Peled 1998).5 The role of Malay/
Muslims in National Service and the larger national security apparatus remain
a major issue. Until this matter is resolved, the common space and nation-
building mechanism par excellence that national service is touted to be
remains a contested symbol of the loyalty of the Malay-Muslims and prevents
their meaningful participation as full-fledged citizens. The concerns of
government and society were further amplified with the arrest of Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) terrorist suspects in Singapore in late 2001 and early 2002,
soon after 9/11. An atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust between
Malay-Muslims and non-Muslims hung uneasily. The Malay-Muslims were
themselves confronted by self-doubt and ambivalence as to how home-grown
extremists could have arisen from their ranks.
Against this backdrop is the apparent increased religiosity of believers of
other faiths accompanied by insensitive proselytization especially by evangelical
Christians. Despite Singapore’s rapid urbanization and modernization,
Singapore has not become more secular. Instead, there is now a belated but
growing religious sector within Singapore’s civil society that seeks to participate
in the public policy discourse, and which draws on their individual religious
value systems to inform their choices in the public realm. The Internet and
other modes of communication have made the transnational element of
religion more visible and the management of religion more challenging. It is
no surprise then that the government has spared no effort in seeking to
strengthen Singapore’s social cohesion and ensuring that good sense and
religious harmony prevail and are enhanced.
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62 Eugene K. B. Tan
THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The Constitutional Setting
Although secularism is a cardinal principle of political governance, the
separation of religion and state is not written into Singapore’s Constitution.6
Article 15 of the constitution provides religious freedom and the right to
propagate one’s religion as fundamental liberties. So fundamental is such a
right that Emergency ordinances promulgated under Article 150 shall not
validate any provision inconsistent with “the provisions of this Constitution
relating to religion, citizenship or language”. Further, Articles 16(2) and
16(3) provide that every religious group has the right to establish and maintain
educational institutions for children and provide such instruction in its own
religion, and that no person shall be required to receive instruction in or to
take part in any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other than his own.
As an overarching commitment to the multi-racial ethos, the Presidential
Council of Minority Rights (PCMR) was established as a constitutional
safeguard.7 Besides ensuring that the minorities are not discriminated against,
the PCMR also plays a key role in the appointment of members of the
Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (PCRH).
Limited legal pluralism is embedded in Singapore’s English-based common
law legal system through some community autonomy for the indigenous
Malay-Muslim community. In areas of Muslim personal law such as marriage,
divorce and inheritance, Article 153 of the Singapore Constitution provides
for legislation (viz. Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) (Cap. 3)) in
“regulating Muslim religious affairs and for constituting a Council to advise
the President in matters relating to the Muslim religion”. The (Malay-)
Muslim community enjoys several privileges not accorded to the other races/
religion. Besides being governed by syariah law in personal matters,8 the
community enjoys free tertiary education (qualified in 1989), state support
for various aspects of its religious life including the mosque-building
programme and the haj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the appointment of a
minister-in-charge of Muslim affairs in the Cabinet.
The Substantive Content of Freedom of Religion:

The Belief-Action Distinction
Religious freedom under Article 15 is not absolute and unqualified in
Singapore. This is not surprising since absolute freedom is a sure and potent
recipe for conflict in a multi-religious society. Religious liberty in Singapore
is subject to the belief-action distinction: religious beliefs are protected but
actions motivated by such beliefs, and which are contrary to Singapore’s laws,
62

are not protected. In the mid-1990s for example, there were several well-
publicized cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses, a proscribed group in Singapore,
regarding the ambit of religious freedom. The cases largely dealt with whether
citizens conscripted into the Singapore Armed Forces could cite their religious
beliefs for exemption from military service. In this line of cases, the Court of
Appeal emphasized the belief-action distinction:
It is therefore not illegal to profess the beliefs of Jehovah’s Witness per se,
nor is it an offence to be a Jehovah’s Witness. A citizen’s right to profess,
practice or propagate his religious beliefs, even as Jehovah’s Witness, has
not been taken away. It is the manner of carrying out these activities that
is circumscribed by the relevant orders. (Chan Hiang Leng Colin [1996]
1 SLR 609 at 615; emphasis is mine)
Prima facie, religious beliefs even of a proscribed group are not illegal.
However, actions flowing from such religious beliefs are proscribed if they
offend against the onerous requirements of public order or public service.
The court agreed that National Service is “clearly a secular issue” and
conscientious objection is not tolerated since “the whole system of universal
National Service will become unstuck” (Hansard 1990c). It also agreed that
“the sovereignty, integrity and unity of Singapore are undoubtedly the
paramount mandate of the Constitution and anything, including religious
beliefs and practices, which tend to run counter to these objectives must be
restrained”.9 The jurisprudence demonstrates two key principles: first, that
the right to religious freedom has to be balanced against the interests of the
larger community; and, second, the state’s central role in restricting the
unbridled expression of the right to religious freedom.
That community interests take precedence over those of the individual
even in the exercise of fundamental liberties was affirmed in Nappalli Peter
Williams v Institute of Technical Education [1999], where the Court of Appeal
reiterated that in exercising one’s religious beliefs, a citizen’s constitutional
right to freedom of religion can be circumscribed if, by the citizen’s actions,
the exercise of the right becomes prejudicial to the common good. The court
stated that, “Article 15 taken as a whole demonstrates that the paramount
concern of the Constitution is a statement of citizen’s rights framed in a wider
social context of maintaining unity as one nation” (p. 576). In this case, an
employee of a government educational institution refused to take the national
pledge or sing the national anthem because of his religious objections. It was
held that his actions did not entitle him to constitutional protection since
they went against his employer’s policy of encouraging and instilling students’
allegiance to the nation.
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64 Eugene K. B. Tan
The Legislative Framework

There are several key legislations that provide a variety of options as part of
the enforcement arsenal in dealing with individuals and groups in the religious
realm that pose a public order threat.
Societies Act
Under the Societies Act (Cap. 311), a society that represents, promotes, or
discusses religious matters is a “specified society” and has to be registered by
law. This means that registration of such a society is not automatic and not
of right and subject to inquiry by the Registrar of Societies. An unregistered
society is deemed to be an unlawful society. This registration requirement
provides a powerful mechanism by which the state can proscribe religious
groups which are deemed to be “prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good
order in Singapore”.10 As then Chief Justice Yong Pung How noted, “the
basis for the de-registration clearly flowed from the danger of allowing
absolute freedom of religion which might create a complete denial of a
government’s authority and ability to govern individuals or groups asserting
a religious affiliation.”11
Penal Code and Sedition Act

The criminal justice system also provides its support for the maintenance of
religious harmony (Chan Sek Keong 2000). Chapter 15 of the Penal Code
(Cap. 224) provides for criminal offences relating to religion including
injuring or defiling a place of worship, disturbing a religious assembly,
uttering words or sounds to deliberately wound religious feelings. The Penal
Code was recently amended to provide for enhanced penalties for religiously
(and/or racially) aggravated offences. Under the Sedition Act (Cap. 290), it is
an offence, inter alia, “to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between
different races or classes of the population of Singapore”. In 2005, three
bloggers were convicted under the Sedition Act for posting Web-blog
comments that were anti-Muslim.
Internal Security Act

Where more draconian measures are needed, the government can resort to
“pre-emptive” powers under the Internal Security Act (ISA) (Cap. 143) which
was originally enacted to deal with the communist insurgency in British
Malaya after the World War II. The ISA allows for preventive detention for
64

renewable two-year periods where “it is necessary to do so” to prevent a

person from acting in any manner prejudicial to [the] Singapore’s security
and the maintenance of public order or essential services. The ISA has been
applied to persons deemed to be agitating racial and religious discord, including
the arrests and detention since 2001 of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspected
terrorists. The ISA was also used in 1987 against alleged Marxist anti-state
conspirators which involved mainly Catholic Church activists (Barr 2005).
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act

In a sense, this Bill is a recognition of a retrogression, or potential
deterioration, in religious harmony. The Government takes no joy in
introducing it….It is not something which we are proud of. We introduce
it more in sorrow than with joy. It is to prevent us sliding backward. It
is an act aimed at preserving common sense and harmony. (Hansard
1990b)
The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) has its genesis in
1986 when the Internal Security Department reported on over-zealous
evangelical Christian proselytization and the impact that it had on religious
communities competing for membership. This religious fervour was
accompanied by the mixing of religion with politics by some groups. Enacted
in 1990, the MRHA seeks to legislate religious moderation and tolerance and
to keep religion and politics separate (Winslow 1990). It also established the
Presidential Council for Religious Harmony, an advisory body comprising
lay leaders and religious leaders to advise the President on matters affecting
religious harmony. Its main specific functions are to delineate conduct that
are regarded as harmful to religious harmony, and to provide recommendations
on the issuance of restraining orders by the government, with the president as
a check against abuse, against any person inciting, instigating or encouraging
any religious group or religious institution to feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-
will or hostility between different religious groups. In recognizing the power
of the pulpit, the MRHA has its focus on religious leaders who “are viewed
by the flock and their worshippers as having closer links to God and with an
aura of holiness and divinity, make it all the more imperative that if religious
leaders want to enter into politics, they come down from the pulpit and
participate as citizens” (Hansard 1990a).
With gradations of pre-emptive measures, the MRHA widens the
options the government can exercise in religious matters that present concerns
to public order. The MRHA is less draconian than the ISA and seeks to
circumspectly deal with the threat away from the glare of open court
proceedings that can inflame religious passion further (Straits Times 2001).
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66 Eugene K. B. Tan
In national security matters, there is judicial support for a pre-emptive

approach:
In my view, … [the] submission that it must be shown that there was a
clear and immediate danger was misplaced for one simple reason. It
cannot be said that beliefs, especially those propagated in the name of
“religion”, should not be put to a stop until such a scenario exists. If not,
it would in all probability be too late as the damage sought to be
prevented would have transpired. In my opinion, any administration
which perceives the possibility of trouble over religious beliefs and yet
prefers to wait until trouble is just about to break out before taking
action must be not only pathetically naïve but also grossly incompetent.12
THE PUTATIVE SINGAPORE MODEL OF SECULARISM

As religions tend to encompass comprehensive world-views on all dimensions
of human existence, the Singapore political leadership has never assumed that
religion and politics are distinct spheres of influence and experience. It is
acutely aware of the power of religion to mobilize, motivate and enforce
behaviour, values, and norms among the faithful. Several features stand out in
the relationship between state and religion in Singapore.
First, while the secular nature of the government is a given, it is inaccurate
to describe Singapore as a dogmatic secular state. The state/government
tacitly recognizes that it may be challenged by a largely religious society.
Singapore’s secularism does not seek to eliminate religion from the public
sphere. Instead, the Singapore model seeks to protect religions from state
intervention and vice versa. Yet, the state is deeply involved in, concerned
with, and exerts a measured influence over religious matters. It also strives to
align the thinking and expectations of the various faith communities on the
role that religion can play in Singapore’s development. The political leadership
constantly urges faith communities to observe studiously the ground rules for
continued harmony. Even as the state actively seeks constructive engagement
and partners religion in the state- and nation-building agenda, it ensures that
religion does not encroach into the political domain. This desire of the state
to induct, yet ensure control over religion, has been characterized as an “often
ambivalence stance” (Hill 2004).
Second, the government recognizes that the various religions and cultures
of Singaporeans can be usefully mobilized for the purposes of nation-building.
Through its unique structure, rules and values, religion is a form of “communal
action” through which faith communities can either support or obstruct
different types of socio-political and economic interactions in the secular
world. All this points to a variegated and pragmatic form of secularism — one
66

that seeks to harness the powerful potential of religion while ensuring that the
secular always takes precedence over the sacred in political discourse, public
policy and governance. In recent years, the Inter-Religious Organization
(IRO), a non-government organization founded in 1949 representing ten
religions, has been actively included in the government’s efforts to promote
greater religious understanding and harmony (IRO 2001). For instance,
government leaders participated in the memorial service and prayer session
for the victims of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster. This
suggests that the state is conscious and appreciative of the role of religion in
helping to cope with the vagaries of life.
Third, the state also exerts a symbolic and putative influence on the
administration of faiths subscribed to by Singapore’s racial minorities, viz.
Islam, Sikhism, and Hinduism. This by no means suggests that the state
seeks to influence theological inputs or engage in the doctrinal intricacies of
the different faiths. Instead, the state holds the power to appoint some or
all office-bearers in these religions’ administrative bodies. This provides the
state with the assurance that they are able to positively influence the
administration of these faiths in Singapore. The most extensive government
influence is on the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) wherein all
office-bearers are appointed by the government. In matters concerning the
Hindu faith, there is the Hindu Advisory Board, and the Hindu Endowments
Board (Cap. 364), created in 1969, which looks after Hindu religious and
charitable endowments. For the Sikh faith, the Central Sikh Gurdwara
Board Act (Cap. 357) establishes the Central Sikh Gurdwara Board to
manage the Central Sikh Temple, maintain a register of all adult Sikh
believers, and to further the welfare of the Sikh community.13 Like the
Hindu counterpart, there is a Sikh Advisory Board as well.
Fourth, the state recognizes the need for increased vigilance, tolerance
and understanding within and among faiths. In such matters that could
potentially affect peace and stability, the government has always erred on the
side of caution. For example, it did not hesitate to exercise powers of censorship
in disallowing the screening of Martin Scorsese’s film, The Last Temptation of
Christ. It also banned Salman Rushdie’s book, The Satanic Verses, and it also
did not grant a public entertainment license for the English-Malay version of
the play, Talaq (Seet 2002) which focused on domestic violence in a Muslim
household. All these decisions were made on the basis of not allowing
religious tensions to brew. They are underpinned by the precautionary
principle — that if more harm than good was likely, then preventive
measures are better rather than curative ones. Religious sensitivities can be
incited easily and emotions once uncorked cannot be reined in without
severely undermining the social fabric and cohesion. It is this philosophy
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68 Eugene K. B. Tan
that guides the rules for speech at the Speakers’ Corner as well. Any speech
that is religious in nature, and which “cause feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-
will or hostility between different racial or religious groups” is strictly
prohibited.14 As the then Attorney-General noted, “preventive law is more
effective in realizing the goal of racial tolerance and peaceful existence
among its various communities. Preventive laws also prevent small fires
from developing into conflagrations that destroy the social fabric and
jeopardize national security” (Chan Sek Keong 2000, p. 25).
Fifth, the state endeavours to draw a distinction between public and
private life in order to preserve its hegemony in the former sphere. It urges the
enlargement of “common spaces” as a means of ensuring that Singaporeans
continue to interact in the public sphere without the identity markers of
religion, language and race becoming stumbling blocks. National schools are
common spaces and regarded as a key arena for value formation and national
integration. As such, the government has insisted on a common school
uniform policy. However, under the “globalising force of the resurgence of
Islam”, Muslims are more conscious of modest dressing (Chua 2000,
pp. 283–85) and some parents had sought to have their school-going children
put on the tudung (headscarf ). In the tudung controversy in 2002, the issue
at stake was whether the wearing of the tudung in national schools should
be permitted (see Thio 2002; Law 2003a, 2003b). The government’s
uncompromising stand was explained thus:
The government seeks to expand the common space Singaporeans share.

Schools require pupils to wear uniforms, regardless of race, religion or
social status. Allowing exceptions would fragment the common space
and invite competing demands from different communities.15
In essence, the government regards wearing the tudung in national schools

primarily as a symbol of exclusiveness that prevents students from interacting
and, consequently, is a threat to national integration. Nevertheless, in deference
to Islamic requirements, national schools continue to allow Muslim girls to
dress in track pants for physical education classes and have long permitted
Muslim pupils and employees time-off to attend Friday mid-day prayers.
There is no ban on the tudung at institutions of higher learning. Except for
frontline customs and immigration officers, government employees (including
teachers) are not prevented from wearing the tudung, and there is no evidence
that tudung-clad government employees are isolating themselves in national
schools and the workplaces.
68

Sixth, the public face of religion is evident and is regarded as part of

associational life. The government recognizes that the public and private
spheres are increasingly fluid, porous and less definitive in an age of
globalization, coupled with rapid scientific and technological advancements
that result in moral, ethical, and religious issues acquiring a higher profile.
Religion and religious groups have a substantive presence in Singapore’s
associational life and demonstrate the extent to which religion can help
develop social capital. Three examples illustrate this. Singapore’s approach in
managing the socio-economic and educational under-performance among
the various races has a significant ethnic dimension through the formalization
of the ethnic self-help groups. Additionally, for Malays/Muslims, the religious
dimension is also significant in two other ethnic self-help vehicles that mainly
cater to the Malays/Muslims: (i) MENDAKI (Council on Education for
Muslim Children), the first ethnic self-help group, created in 1982, and
(ii) Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) set up in 1991 (Siddique
2001a, 2001b). In contrast, the identities of the other three self-help groups
for the Chinese (Chinese Development Assistance Council or CDAC), Indians
(Singapore Indian Development Association or SINDA), and Eurasians
(Eurasian Association) are avowedly secular in outlook and disposition. Again,
this fusion of race and religion elements where the Malay organizations are
concerned reflects the recognition accorded to the Islamic identity.
Another obvious manifestation of religions’ public face outside of the
faith realm is in the provision of social welfare and community services.
Officially incorporated into Singapore’s “many helping hands” social assistance
framework, these faith-based voluntary welfare organizations (VWOs) play a
prominent role in the provision of welfare and social services to the less-
privileged and less fortunate, often on a faith-blind basis. This arrangement
benefits both the faith-based VWOs and the government. For the VWOs, it
means that they have a legitimate and public profile and are able to play their
part in doing good for society in accordance with their religious values.16 For
the government, such civic engagement strengthens the social fabric and
“does not lock the government into providing welfare services for everyone
and at all times…” and gives “the impression of a burgeoning non-profit and
voluntary sector in Singapore” (Kadir 2004, p. 331). It is important that
policy-makers and VWOs continue to recognize the need for the latter’s
delivery of such welfare services be faith-blind and unconditional, and certainly
not a subterfuge for proselytization.
The role of religious inputs in public policy discourse in Singapore is
increasingly evident (Straits Times 2005; Thio 2004b). This is not surprising.
69

70 Eugene K. B. Tan
As most Singaporeans regard religion with importance, they will draw on

their religious value systems to chart their moral bearings and inform their
choices in the public realm. On the part of the government, it is trying to
reach out to faith communities, in line with the promotion of active citizenry
and a more consultative form of government. Citizens motivated by religious
convictions are free to offer their views on policies, laws, the performance of
public institutions and the state of morality in Singapore. This coheres with
the fundamental liberties of free speech and freedom of religion. However,
the rules of engagement are still in a developmental and testing stage. The
dilemma is that policy-making sits squarely in the secular realm while religion-
inspired policy feedback and inputs are in the religious realm. It remains
unclear to what extent religion-inspired policy feedback will be factored in
future policy-making. Furthermore, while religious groups are entitled to
preach their values and beliefs to their communities, they must not mobilize
their congregations to be confrontational in their engagement with the state.
Neither should religious groups undermine the government’s authority,
legitimacy as well as the democratic process.
In any case, the government increasingly solicits views from all quarters
and has sought to demonstrate that constructive religion-inspired feedback
and inputs have a place in Singapore’s political discourse. One can discern
this in major issues such as on permitting casino gaming in Singapore and
in bioethical issues involving concerns of morality. In these issues, religious
groups across the various faiths have provided their considered moral counsel
and feedback (for example, Harvey 2004). All major faiths, for example,
objected to the proposal to liberalize gaming laws to allow casino gaming.
When announcing the decision that Singapore would allow casino gaming,
the Prime Minister acknowledged the convictions of those who opposed
the casino gambling for religious reasons. However, he pointed out that
secular and pragmatic considerations had to prevail in public policy-making
in a multi-racial, multi-religious society. National interest is always given
priority and the government “cannot enforce the choices of one group on
others, or make these choices the basis of national policy” (Lee Hsien
Loong 2005). In recognition of their concerns and the need for buy-in by
the various faith communities for the policy decision to allow casino
gambling, the Prime Minister invited them to work with the government to
minimize the social impact.
ROLE OF RELIGION IN NATION-BUILDING

While it acutely recognizes the Janus-face of religion, the government seeks to
harness religion as a constructive force in nation-building. It is this innate
70

ability of religion to inculcate good citizenship, temper the rough edges of

secular life by providing a moral anchor, and encourage industriousness, self-
reliance, and associational life that the government seeks to harness. It is an
enlightened and strategic secularism at work wherein religion is paradoxically
very much in public life and yet largely constrained in its ambit in the
political sphere (cf. Hill 2001). In establishing the Shared Values, the
government was concerned that the national value system had to be compatible
with existing cultural and religious heritages in order for it to have popular
resonance and acceptance. It recognized that using “any one single religion or
culture as the basis for building a common Singaporean identity” would only
alienate the other groups. This belief that a society’s moral values can be
buttressed by the inculcation of religious values is a long-standing one even
if inchoately manifested. As early as 1967, Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee
(Hansard 1967) raised the value of using religion as a mode of instruction of
moral values:
… National Servicemen will receive, in addition to technical training

specific to their Branch, instruction in moral values. This will teach
them what good citizenship means and explain to them the nature of
their social responsibilities. It is my intention, when the training manuals
on this subject have been drafted, to seek guidance of the Inter-Religious
Council of the Republic, both on the content of moral instruction and
on the method of implementation. I am sure that there is a substantial
common ground among the great religions of the world, whose values,
if imparted to our youth, will make them better men.
By the late 1970s, Singapore’s impressive economic success as a newly

industrializing economy led to the quest for an economic development model
that could ensure sustainable progress and prosperity. Embedded within this
concern was the belief that certain cultural and moral values are fundamental
to Singapore’s success (Tan Tai Wei 1994; Tamney 1988; Pereira 2005).
Earlier, the Report on Moral Education (Ong 1979, p. 12) noted that “religious
studies help to reinforce the teaching of moral values”. The government had
concluded that “religions provided the best and the most dependable basis for
inculcating moral values in our older children and producing the honest,
upright citizens that we would all wish to see.”
In 1982, the government announced the introduction of compulsory
Religious Knowledge (RK) classes for upper secondary school students (15–
17 years of age) to ensure that the younger Singaporeans did not lose their
moral values in the onslaught of Westernization and hedonism. Implemented
in 1984, the RK programme aimed to reinforce the moral values taught at
earlier stages of the educational curriculum (Gopinathan 1988; Tan Jason
71

72 Eugene K. B. Tan
2000). The government emphasized that religious knowledge was distinct

from religious education/instruction and religious propagation. Students in
the upper secondary levels were offered six options, viz. Bible Knowledge,
Buddhist Studies, Confucian Ethics, Hindu Studies, Islamic Religious
Knowledge, and Sikh Studies.17 Foreign scholars were invited to develop the
curriculum with Confucian Studies taking prominence (Tu 1984). This
foregrounded the salient introduction of an ersatz Confucianism in Singapore’s
political governance ethos (Kuo 1996; Lele 2004).18
Within five years of its introduction, however, the government became
concerned over the RK programme’s detrimental effect on ethnic relations.
The government stated that the RK programme emphasized differences while
inadvertently encouraging teachers and students to proselytize and interact
with those of the same faith. It also played a contributory role in religious
revivalism within Singapore. The government acknowledged that national
schools should not impart religious beliefs and that the RK programme was
not entirely in accordance with its secular approach nor even-handed in
religious matters. The programme was abruptly discontinued in 1990 and
replaced by the Civics and Moral Education (CME) programme (Tan and
Chew 2004; Tamney 1992).
THE GRASSROOTS AND QUASI-BOTTOM-UP APPROACH

In the post-9/11 environment of heightened security consciousness, the
government is concerned that Singapore’s social fabric may not withstand
the impact of a terrorist attack in Singapore. This was especially so in the
aftermath of the arrests and detention of the terrorist JI members in 2001
and 2002. Increasingly aware that a coercive legislative framework has its
limitations, the government has sought to chart new directions to engender
better inter-racial and religious understanding. It has attempted to do so
mainly by translating the concept of tolerance in more grounded and
tangible ways. This entails confidence-building and dialogue efforts in two
principal forms: the creation of Inter-Racial Confidence Circles (IRCC) at
the individual constituency level and Harmony Circles at workplaces and
organizations; and the introduction of the Declaration of Religious Harmony.
The promotion of interfaith dialogue and interaction highlights the
importance of relations at the grassroots even as institutional mechanisms
remain dominant (Sinha 2005). These mechanisms themselves also ensure
that the government continues to exert a measure of control and influence
over issues of race and religion. In January 2002, the government initiated the
rapid formation of IRCCs at every constituency. Operating under the auspices
72

of the government-linked Citizens’ Consultative Committees, the IRCCs are

meant to be a more intimate, grassroots-oriented platform to build and to
strengthen the trust and confidence among the different races. The IRCCs
have organized activities such as visits to places of worship and the celebration
of festivities to facilitate inter-ethnic/inter-religious learning and appreciation.
It is envisaged that the IRCCs would, in time, offer a viable mechanism to
deal with serious racial or religious problems on the ground, if they ever
occur. However, the IRCC organizational top-down nature suggests that the
state continues to be an indispensable intermediary of sorts in facilitating
better inter-racial and inter-religious understanding. Such a development is
not surprising, and is consistent with the state’s dominance in managing
ethnic relations. Yet, genuine inter-ethnic and inter-religious understanding
cannot be engendered by artificially induced interactions from the top down.
This is a process that patently needs to be bottom-up. One limited attempt
in this direction was the Declaration of Religious Harmony (DRH) which
involved various religious leaders.
The government-led efforts to craft a code of conduct for faith
communities were in essence an attempt to exert moral suasion on the leaders
and believers of the various faiths to practice moderation in exercising their
beliefs. This entailed clearly laying out the rules of religious conduct and
ensuring that they are shared and understood by Singaporeans. In the late
1980s, the government had explored the recommendation of implementing
a “Declaration of Principles” through a non-legislative, non-enforceable
approach. However, the government decided against it because such “a list of
do’s and don’ts to guide religious leaders and members of their flock”, was
deemed ineffective. While the MRHA was targeted at religious elites, the
DRH’s exhortatory approach sought to appeal to the masses. Its working
group, comprising of leaders of the major religious groups, deliberated on the
initial draft provided in October 2002 by the prime minister and on 9 June
2003, the DRH was unveiled. As a tangible manifestation of interfaith
dialogue, consensus- and norm-building, the DRH signals the tentative
movement towards soft-law instruments, to complement the coercive legal
approach as part of the management strategy (see also Thio 2004a).
CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS: THE SPECTRE OF

RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND PERCEIVED
MALAY-MUSLIM EXCLUSIVENESS
Islam in Singapore continues to be perceived as presenting challenges to the
government. Religious issues pertaining to Islam that are perceived to be
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74 Eugene K. B. Tan
presenting challenges to Singapore society are regularly profiled in the political

landscape. In the 1990s, with the strong accent of Islamic revivalism in
Southeast Asia, the Singapore government paid closer attention to the religious
dimensions of the Malay-Muslim community, in particular the re-Islamization
in daily-life behaviour. Islamic revivalism has also led to the government’s
concern with growing exclusivity and a closed Muslim community, even as
the Muslim community itself views its increased religiosity as being more
indicative of a self-renewal of spirituality rather than the insistence on a
particularized system of Islamic values and ethics or as tacit support for a
radical or militant form of Islam.
The arrest of JI terrorist suspects in Singapore in 2001 and 2002 created
an atmosphere of ambivalence, suspicion and distrust of Malay-Muslims by
the non-Malays (Desker 2003; Andrew Tan 2002). The terrorism threat from
within became an explicit security issue (Ministry of Home Affairs 2003).
Put simply, the key concern is the Muslims’ supposed susceptibility to radical
and militant Islam. In particular, the multi-racial framework was seen to be
under strain in dealing with the Malay-Muslims’ expressions of increased
religiosity (Kadir 2004b; Hussin 2005). In response, the government has re-
committed itself to the enlargement of the common space, a work-in-progress
since 1999. The role of MUIS has become even more critical in ensuring that
the religious development of the Muslim community continues to be a
positive force for integration and nation-building.
To reiterate, one key challenge for Singapore’s multi-racialism is managing
the increased religiosity of the Malay-Muslims. In particular, secularism sits
uncomfortably with multi-racialism and multi-religiosity in determining the
extent to which religious expression, as part of one’s ethnic identity, should be
allowed in common spaces. The specific challenge is whether Singapore’s
multi-racialism can accommodate the development of a more spiritual
orientation by the Malay-Muslims. The concern with a rigid Islamic identity
is that it would lead to exclusionary practices and undermine integration.
Furthermore, there is fear that the Muslims’ increased religiosity would result
in self-segregation, an isolated “micro-community” and an unilateral closing
of common space.
The government and Muslim leadership continue to urge Muslims to
practise their faith in the context of a multi-racial society with “moderation”
as the defining attribute. This official encouragement of the development of
a Singaporean-Muslim autochthonous practice of Islam places emphasis on
moderation, a sensitive recognition of multi-racialism and the need for
common spaces and their enlargement. The Singapore approach to promoting
“Islamic moderation” and inter-religious understanding is buttressed by the
central concerns of social cohesion and religious tolerance. Indeed, having
74

declared itself “an iconic target”, Singapore is gearing itself for the impact of
a terrorist attack on its social fabric even as it seeks to continually forge its
national resilience. In light of the JI arrests, the government’s stand is that it
is critical for the Muslims to take the “moderate path” — by this is meant not
interpreting and practising Islam narrowly and rigidly, not to remain the
silent majority but to speak up against extremists and militants who advocate
intolerance and extremism. In dealing with the terrorism threat, the focus has
been on a binary characterization of the religious state of play facing the
Malay-Muslims as one of “radical versus moderate” Islam.19
Nevertheless, Singapore has taken a broad-based community approach in
advancing inter-religious tolerance, and more importantly, understanding as
well as ensuring that the madrasahs and mosques remain key agents in
promoting moderate Islam and national integration. This includes the revamp
of Islamic religious education in Singapore’s six full-time and seventy-seven
part-time madrasahs to make the religious curriculum relevant to a knowledge-
based economy (Noor Aisha and Lai 2006). Through the umbrella, multi-
sectoral Community Engagement Programme, launched in early 2006,
Singaporeans of various races and faiths are encouraged to reach out to one
another. There is also a transnational dimension through the Asia-Middle
East Dialogue for support and engagement in a civilizational dialogue between
Asia and the Middle East. This platform also acts as a means by which the
Singapore experience is seen as exemplary and applauded by Muslim-majority
societies. What is perhaps most significant is the endeavour to forge a
distinctive Muslim Singaporean identity embodying the Malay-Muslim
community seeing itself as an integral part of Singapore’s “pluralistic and
progressive society and a globalized and secular state”.20
To this end, MUIS has been promoting the drive towards a “Muslim
Community of Excellence”. In early 2005, MUIS unveiled its proposed “Ten
Desired Attributes of the Singaporean Muslim Community of Excellence”
with the aim of helping Muslim Singaporeans understand and excel in their
dual roles and identities as Muslims and citizens. The objective is to craft an
identity that is religious, socially progressive, and open to living as a Muslim
minority in a secular, multi-racial and multi-religious Singapore (Mohd
Alami Musa 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). The Muslim community is exhorted to
be open to a diversity of views and be forward-looking.
CONCLUSION
Singapore is simultaneously a profoundly secular and religious society. The
rich diversity of multi-cultural and religious life also means potentially
competing needs and goals. This chapter has argued that religion has
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76 Eugene K. B. Tan
multiple roles and a public face despite Singapore being a secular state (not
society). In a society where 85 per cent of Singaporeans profess to belonging
to a faith, religion forms a core part of many Singaporeans’ identities and
value systems. However, religion continues to pose numerous challenges to
a multi-racial, secular Singapore. The transnational characteristics of religion,
embodied in a global imagined community of faith believers, coupled with
revivalist tendencies in all major faiths, also directly impact local religions.
Scientific and technological advancements have further brought to the fore
ethical and moral issues that demand religion to express its value, doctrinal
systems publicly.
It is a truism that we must take faith seriously and that keeping God in
place is a never-ending work-in-progress. This entails not just merely asserting
that religion is important but requires the necessity and appreciation by the
state, policymakers, society, and faith communities in understanding the
subtleties and complexities in which religion and public life impact each
other. Notwithstanding the state’s tendency to rely on moral panic and fear,
religion in Singapore has been characterized by a public ethos of tolerance,
civility and respect. This rosy picture does not under-estimate the sub-texts of
religious competition, the occasional distrust and misunderstanding between
religious groups, and religion as a potential challenge to the government’s
authority and legitimacy because religion celebrates a higher truth.
Notes
Much of the research and writing was done in 2004 and 2005 when the author was
based at Stanford Law School and at the Solomon Asch Centre for the Study of
Ethnopolitical Conflict, University of Pennsylvania, USA. He thanks the faculty and
colleagues at both institutions for the collegial sharing of experiences and ideas. Ms
Sonia Moss of the Stanford Law School Robert Crown Library provided assistance in
obtaining research materials from various libraries in the United States, Canada, and
Britain. The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s alone and the usual
caveats apply.
1. In the 2000 Census, the Singapore Department of Statistics regards religion as
the “religious faith or spiritual faith of a person regardless of whether or not he
regularly attends religious ceremonies in a temple, mosque, church or other
religious building. He may or may not practise his faith or belief ”.
2. In contrast, a large majority of Buddhists and Muslims reside in HDB flats.
3. Cf. Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (2004, see pp. 12
and 18 and Table 14) noted that religious bodies were identified, relatively
speaking, as one of the more corrupt institutions in Israel, Norway and Singapore.
4. The shorthand “Hansard” will be used in this chapter to refer to Parliamentary
Debates Singapore Official Report.
76

5. Peled perceptively describes the “Trojan horse” dilemma in Singapore’s National

Service system as one where the state demands military service of its male
citizens yet harbours security concerns and mistrust of the loyalty of Malay-
Muslims bearing arms.
6. Secularism is understood as the ideology of separating religion and state, and of
the state being neutral vis-à-vis the various religious faiths and between religion
and non-religion.
7. The PCMR has the general function of considering and reporting on “matters
affecting persons of any racial or religious community in Singapore” as may be
referred to the Council by Parliament or the government. Its particular function
is to draw attention to any bill or to any subsidiary legislation if the council
deems them to be a differentiating measure. See, generally, Part VII of the
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Revised edition).
8. Since August 1999, following amendments to the Supreme Court of Judicature
Act and AMLA, the (civil and secular) Family Court has concurrent jurisdiction
in selected areas.
9. Chief Justice Yong Pung How in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR 662
at 684. For a case comment, see Thio (1995).
10. The Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) was dissolved under s. 24(1) of
Societies Act. The Jehovah Witnesses and the Holy Spirit Association for the
Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) are two well-known
entities that have been deregistered.
11. Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR 662 at 688.
12. Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR 662 at 683 per Chief Justice Yong
Pung How.
13. In 1987, the administration and management of Sikh temples were left entirely
to the Sikh community.
14. Clause 3(c)(ii) of the Public Entertainments and Meetings (Speakers’ Corner)
(Exemption) Order, made pursuant to section 16 of Public Entertainments and
Meetings Act (Cap. 257, 2001 Revised edition).
15. Lim Chee Hwee, Press Secretary, Singapore’s Ministry of Education in his reply
captioned, “Malays in Singapore”, The New York Times, 16 March 2002, to the
article “By Barring Religious Garb, Singapore School Dress Code Alienates
Muslims”, The New York Times, 27 February 2002.
16. This includes participating in Singapore’s National Day parades, see Metraux
(2001).
17. A seventh subject, “A Study of World Religions”, was still-born.
18. On Singapore as a “Confucianist society”, see Lee Kuan Yew (2000, pp. 542 and
545–49).
19. On the contested understanding of moderation within the Muslim-Singaporean
community, see PERGAS 2004. That Muslim-Singaporeans are “moderate” in
their religious views and practice of their faith has been affirmed many times by
the political elite: see, for instance, The Straits Times (2002). This is confirmed
in the longitudinal national survey on religion (Chan 2002).
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78 Eugene K. B. Tan
20. For a discussion on the initiatives mentioned in this section, see Tan, Eugene
(2007).
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———. “The Singapore State’s Response to Religion: From Co-optation to Legislative

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———. “Loyalty and the SAF”. Speech at the dialogue session with the Association
of Muslim Professionals and the Majlis Pusat, 2 March 2001.
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———. “Keeping with The Times While Remaining Faithful to Islam”. Straits
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———. “Malays in Singapore”. 16 March 2002.
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82 Eugene K. B. Tan
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609 (Court of Appeal)
Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of Technical Education [1999] 2 SLR 569 (Court of
Appeal)
Legislation
Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap. 3, 1999 Revised edition)
Central Sikh Gurdwara Board Act (Cap. 357, 1985 Revised Edition)
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Revised edition)
Hindu Endowments Act (Cap. 364, 1994 Revised edition)
Internal Security Act (Cap. 143, 1985 Revised edition)
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (Cap. 167A, 2001 Revised edition)
Penal Code (Cap. 224, 1985 Revised edition)
Public Entertainments and Meetings Act (Cap. 257, 2001 Revised edition)
Sedition Act (Cap. 290, 1985 Revised edition)
Societies Act (Cap. 311, 1985 Revised edition)
82

Islam in Southeast Asia and Impact on the Singapore Muslim Public 83
DISCOURSES ON ISLAM IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE SINGAPORE
MUSLIM PUBLIC
AZHAR IBRAHIM
INTRODUCTION
This chapter highlights and evaluates the discourses on Islam that are found
amongst the Singapore Muslim public. Understanding Islamic discourse in
Singapore will be limited if one ignores the intellectual, cultural setting of the
Muslim world of maritime Southeast Asia in which Singapore is geographically
and culturally part of. In highlighting the types of discourses in the region,
primarily in Malaysia and Indonesia, which exert some forms of influence on
the local discourses on Islam, we are evaluating not only the types of discourse
that are present and notably favoured, but also those that are absent and
possibly not favoured.1 It is hoped that from this evaluation, we can reflect
critically on some of the urgent and important issues in order to enhance the
local discourses on Islam, bearing in mind the context and needs of the
Singapore Muslim public.
Generally local discourse on Islam amongst the Muslim public covers a
wide array of subjects and issues, including the following: (1) pietistic
devotionalism where traditionalistic understanding of religion forms its core;
(2) the debate on reformism versus traditionalism, whereby both compete for
the claim of “authenticity”; (3) the call for public (read community) morality
83
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84 Azhar Ibrahim
in which deviancy and especially juvenile delinquency has been of some

concern; (4) the denouncement of secularism and humanism as Western
imports which are deemed as undermining Islam; (5) the Islamizing trends in
Muslim intellectual and cultural life; (6) the advocation of plurality, diversity
and freedom; and (7) the denouncement of violence and radicalism. These
discourses, though discussed and debated amongst the Muslim intelligentsia,
inevitably have effects on the thinking of the general Muslim public. However,
the (under)development of certain discourses, is conditioned not so much by
their strength and viability, but by “gatekeepers” who determine the setting
and tone of discourse on Islam locally. This in turn, determines the types and
quality of the discourse on Islam in Singapore.
Recent Interest in and/or Fascination about Islam

In the post-September 11 era of anxiety over terrorism, we have witnessed a
greater interest about Islam. Some are geared towards understanding Muslims
better; some attempt to engage a critical discussion of views and ideas within
Muslim society; others attempt to ascertain the link between Islam and
radicalism/terrorism, while others seek inter-religious understanding,2 where
previously few saw the importance of understanding Islam in context in
Southeast Asia.3 An engaging critical discourse augurs well for a competition
of ideas, especially where it induces a synthesis of perspectives. Today we
can observe a steady increase in both quantity and quality of works on
subjects pertaining to Muslims, especially those published in English.4 Post-
September 11 has seen a more robust interest in Islam, to the point where it
has created an “Islam industry” in academia and the mass media. There is a
basic desire to know if and how Islam in Malay society might contribute or
respond to present day radicalism and extremism.5 Some political scientists
and sociologists have suddenly become “experts” on Islam or on Muslims in
contrast to the pre-September 11 period when the concern for conducting
research on Muslims’ religious life was relegated to a less prestigious academic
enterprise, or deemed less scholarly.6
However, there remains a relative neglect of the study of the religious life
of Singaporeans in general and Muslims in particular. This is because dominant
discourse seems to be more interested in addressing present anxiety on
religious extremism, moderate Islam and political Islam, all of which focus on
whether Islam contributes to violence or offers an apologetic defence of it.
This tendency demonstrates an example of the captive mind in the era where
academic imperialism is still hegemonic.7 There are several instances where
the concern within the discourse raise issues which are altogether irrelevant,
imitative, repetitive and even misplaced. A bibliographic survey will indicate
84

this. For example, one paper published in a local publication, echoes views
that are not unlike the Islamists’ discourse of creating an Islamic state and
how “Islam” should treat its non-Muslim subjects, even though ironically, in
the local context, Muslims are themselves in a minority position.8 Another
paper confidently refers to an index to measure the level of Islamic governance,
without even problematizing much of the ambiguity of the concept of
“Islamic state”,9 while some others repeat the clamour for Islamization of
Malay socio-cultural and intellectual lives10 and the importance of cultivating
the right dakwah (the call to make Muslims “better Muslims”).11 Interestingly,
joining the chorus are local institutes that have recently developed interests
on Islam and Muslims in Singapore and Southeast Asia.12
Institutional and academic discourse on Islam may not necessarily concern
or pay serious attention to the types of religious orientations, practices and
issues that are of interest to local Muslims themselves. This is partly due to
two factors. First, inadequate or irrelevant questions are raised due to academic
faddism and captive thinking in current scholarship as noted above,13 that is
beset by the (re)production of dominant unthinking perspectives, such as to
ascertain how “terroristic” Muslims are, and how their institutions, such as
madrasahs, harbour extremist or terroristic tendencies. Second, the paucity
and disinterest at the local level in studying local and religious life, as
conditioned by the above factors, and because of a secular intellectual milieu
where the subject of religion is seldom given priority, which hardly
problematizes religious trends and practices.
DOMINANT AND PERIPHERAL THINKING AMONG

MUSLIMS IN SINGAPORE
Within Singapore’s Malay Muslim community, four broad strands of thinking
and discourses can be identified: (a) religious traditionalism, (b) dakwah
revivalism, (c) religious reformism, and (d) Sufi spiritualism.14 I will focus on
the first two strands as they are dominant among Muslims in Singapore.
Religious Traditionalism and the Promotion of Piety

A general survey of Muslim’s public discussion on Islam, be it in Malay or
English, indicates a primary concern on aqidah (doctrinal affirmation), ritual
practices and right ideas, and therefore the calling for avoidance or aversion
of practices or thoughts that could undermine one’s aqidah. Traditionalism
refers to “a tendency to cling to vegetative patterns, to old ways of life” and
“a tendency to cling to the past and a fear of innovation”.15 A traditionalist-
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86 Azhar Ibrahim
revivalists religious discourse is often marked by the concern with issues like
aqidah16 and the dangers of deviating from it;17 the meanings of Prophetic
Traditions;18 ritualistic laws concerning prayers19 and the warnings against
those who neglect it;20 tithe and Islamic inheritance law;21 halal food;22
dressing and modesty especially hijab or tudung for women;23 the moral
decadence and social problems of Muslims;24 the enhancement for ritual
devotionalism and the importance of moral and good behaviour;25 matters
concerning public uncertainty over ritualistic laws;26 the efficacy of the Sunni
mazhab as opposed to any other schools of thought or Shiism;27 the (dis)unity
of the Muslim ummah;28 the importance of dakwah propagation29 be it to
Muslims or non-Muslims; the general explication of the basic teachings to
Muslims and non-Muslims alike;30 and biographies of religious personalities.31
Religious instruction is provided by religious teachers (asatizah) whose
teachings have wide public appeal not only in mosques and madrasahs but
also in the local mass media.
Generally, traditionalists claim that they are the true custodians and
interpreters of Islam. Their main concern is to promote Muslim piety, both
at individual and public levels. Hence morality in the public domain becomes
their great concern. The traditionalist thinking basically views that religious
piety can only be promoted and sustained if the environment is free from
“un-Islamic” elements. Yet, it hardly poses any overt challenge to the status
quo, which makes them different from the politically-inspired Islamist who
aspires the restoration of syariah in Muslim society or the creation of an
Islamic state. In the main, devotional discourse is aimed at promoting correct
religious observation. One of its common lament is moral degeneration due
to the abandonment of religious teachings and the neglect in providing
religious education to the community, especially to youth who are often
deemed as “deviant”, “lost” and “deserting” the religion. Thus it is not
surprising that the drug addiction and alcohol consumption among Muslim
youths are seen as a manifestation of “de-islamization” and therefore calls for
a religious solution to this.32
Such demonization of youth for embracing “yellow culture” means little
empathy on the issues and challenges that this group encounters. Religious
traditionalists see tradition as the perfection of ideas and values formulated in
the pristine past as opposed to the corrupted present, and that the reformists’
advocation for change and reformulation of some religious concept is
unwarranted and misleading.33 Such a historical and romanticized reading of
the past ignores or rejects the intellectual affirmation of present day scholarship
which is inclined to see that a critical attitude towards one’s tradition can be
as a source of empowerment and dynamism, especially when there is a
86

contextual discernment.34 At the same time, in recent years, we see asatizah

groups (as represented in Singapore Religious Scholars’ Association,
PERGAS) increasingly participating in a more intellectual type of discourse,35
partly motivated by their intellectual interests and partly in response to the
challenge posed by critical perspectives from contemporary scholars on
subjects relating to Islam and Muslims. PERGAS leadership’s criticisms of
the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies initiatives that brought in two
speakers from Indonesia and Malaysia for a public forum is a case in
point.36 That episode demonstrates a response by a local group that claims
to be a custodian of the religion but that is not comfortable with alternative
voices that differ from or are against its own.
The advocates of traditionalism and neo-traditionalism are to be
distinguished from those revivalists who champion an Islamic alternative.
Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, whose works are ironically celebrated in
revivalist circles, for instance, criticizes the preoccupation with the creation of
an Islamic state and the like. Such thinking, according to him, allows for the
neglect of “an Islamic personhood”: “Now it is true that the Ummah and the
Islamic state are paramount in Islam, but so is the individual Muslim, for how
can the Ummah and the Islamic state be developed and established if individual
Muslims…are no longer good Muslims.”37
In general, religious traditionalism more than religious modernism is
dominant in the local religious discourse. However, to understand this
dominant religious orientation is crucial, not just for a better appreciation
and understanding of the religious life of the Malays, but also to highlight the
importance, in the context of the increasing interest on Islam discourse, that
it is sheer naivety to simply link religious devotionalism with religious
radicalism, sometimes even to the point of linking all religious learning
conducted informally or through madrasahs with breeding radicalism and
terrorism.38
The Dakwah Calling or the so-called Revivalism

The dakwah phenomenon that began to appear in the mid-seventies has had
an impact on the intellectual discourse of Islam in Singapore. As a socio-
religious and cultural phenomenon, it can be explained by the popular
religious sentiments that arose from several sources in various Muslim societies
since the World War II.39 But its internal dynamics stem from the recurrent
call to Muslims to improve their lives and strive towards a more progressive
living, through an essentially “Islamic framework” that is imagined as authentic
for Muslims.
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88 Azhar Ibrahim
The dakwah in Singapore initially emerged, like the dakwah phenomenon

in Malaysia, within the local university campus, but in the subsequent
decades have significantly affected the religio-cultural awareness of the larger
Muslim community.40 The dakwah intellectual interest is much like that of
ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia/The Islamic Youth Movement) in
Malaysia, both in content and pedagogical style. The dakwah phenomenon
can be observed in various sectors of Muslim life, at campus, with Muslim
student bodies actively promoting and local mosques’ committees, together
with a few other Malay-Muslim organizations. Darul Arqam of Singapore for
instance, was formed at the height of religious revivalism to facilitate the
conversion of non-Muslims to the fold of Islam.41
In general, the dakwah period was characterized by a growing confidence
that Islam is the significant solution (if not the solution) for the community’s
predicament.42 The concern of guiding “Muslims to become better Muslims”
stems from the moralistic injunction of “forbidding evil and enjoining good”
(amal maaruf nahi mungkar) as well an outlook to improve the lot of the
Muslims through a “return” to Islam. It was also during this period, a time of
transition in the processes of modernization and urbanization, that we see an
anxiety over a number of issues deemed as needing urgent address. These are:
(1) the intellectual development of Muslim undergraduates and the importance
of filling the “leadership vacuum”;43 (2) how modern challenges affect or erode
Muslim identity;44 (3) the economic participation of Muslims in supposedly
“unIslamic” institutions and mechanisms;45 (4) Malay-Muslim educational
under-achievement and the need to improve the madrasah education system.46
At the height of the so-called revivalist enthusiasm, there was great faith
that the dakwah movement could make a difference in the lives of Malay-
Muslims, especially through the role of undergraduates and university graduates
to lead the community, since this group, as hailed by one writer, is “better
equipped with the Islamic concept as an ideology”. As attested in the following
rhetorical idealism:
if we truly desire the Islamic dakwah movement to move energetically, all

existing shortcomings must be eradicated. It is important that we integrate
our efforts. For this we need common interest, and towards this we have
to unite. We are being confronted by various anti-God “isms”, the first
example being communism. Countering communism is a very basic task
in Islam as it denies the existence of God. We are also faced with the
danger from other materialistic “isms” besides communism. As a person
who professes a religion, it is our duty to attack all anti-God movements
— with all our resources.47
88

In short the enthusiasm for dakwah activism echoed the concern and
conviction that Muslims need to preserve their identity, and that their
participation in modernity is in consonance with religious teaching as long as
the participation is not void of spiritual and religious dimensions.
Nevertheless there were cautious and critical views of the dakwah activism.
As one writer, then a student activist, opined:
The emphasis given by Singapore revivalists on the “Islamic State” is yet

another reflection of a misfocusing of priorities. While the commitment
to the concept and ideal articulated and expressed as practical deeds is
understandable for Muslim communities that are majorities in their
particular polities, the situation is totally different for those who those
that are minorities.48
Indeed, the above remark is still relevant today. We still come across,
from time to time, discussions which are highly utopian, such as on how and
whether syariah is to be restored and how Muslims can live in a secular state,
since there is such an idea that it is only in an Islamic state and environment
that Muslims can live “authentically”.49
It was during the dakwah period, alongside an emerging intelligentsia
educated and conversant in discoursing in English, that we see an
“intellectualization” of Islam discourse and the increasing publication on
Islam in English, especially works by “revivalist” figures. The rhetorical South
African-born Ahmad Deedat, at one time venerated as an “intellectual hero”
with his famous fiery religious debates and open challenges, articulated in
English and impressed the post-independent generations who were no longer
satisfied with the traditional pietistic calling of their parents’ generations. The
dakwah movement that permeated in university campus conducted usrah
(informal study circles) for Muslim undergraduates. The campus usrah had
always been an avenue for discussion, but the subject matter until then was
often concerned with matters of worship and devotion (and perfecting it),
rather than on wider socio-cultural issues.50 The undergraduates’ publications
of Sedar and later The Fount journals, reflected the state of intellectual
preoccupation and interest amongst them in which there was a preponderance
of ideas of revivalists from Egypt (Syed Qutb and Hassan al-Banna) and
Pakistan (Abu A’la Maududi).51 Outside the campus, youth organizations
such Muslim Youth Assembly (HBI), now defunct, were active in initiating
discourse on Islam, which saw the publication of Syed Qutb’s Milestone (n.d.)
and Muhammad Hamidullah’s Introduction to Islam (1981), popular amongst
the enthusiasts of revivalism in Singapore, as well as in the region.52
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90 Azhar Ibrahim
In summary, the dakwah endeavour is one that advocates socio-political,

cultural and intellectual Islamism, and speaks of the need for Muslims to
embrace “authenticity” which is imagined to have existed in the glorious past.
Indeed, this search for an “authentic” model and identity has been the
hallmark in the revivalist period. Where the early reformists (salaffiyah) called
for the return to the prophetic “pristine past” yet were accommodating to
Western technology and scientific achievements, the revivalists also read the
history of the classical past as something truly “Islamic”, to be restored or
emulated. But they perceive the modern era as being dominated by Western
thought and paradigms, and is secular for Muslims and must therefore be
resisted by Muslims. At the same time, they are not all puritan since they have
no qualms about consuming the products and achievements of present
modernity. They have no problems adopting Western concepts like democracy,
social sciences, technology and the like, except that they add an “Islamic”
adjective to them, such as “Islamic economics” and “Islamic democracy”).
Secularism has become the revivalists’ number one enemy, given their
simplistic binary thinking that all ideas and institutions originating from
the West is secular/atheistic while theirs is Islamic. This is attested by the
many pamphlets that are produced which not only attack secularism as a
Western import but also Muslims whom they think are impiously secular.
Where decades ago the reformist and modernist groups came under strong
criticism by the traditionalists,53 the present-day neo-traditionalists and
revivalists portray the reformist/liberal groups as a sell-out or simply outside
the fold of Islam.54 Often, in their enthusiasm to impose their “holistic
and comprehensive” Islamic mode of thinking and practice, revivalists are
insensitive to the prevailing practices and ideas that are found in their
society. They celebrate the revivalism of Islam without giving much thought
to the cultural and historical contexts and conditioning of certain practices
which they are too quick to condemn as un-Islamic. This offends the older
generation of Muslims.55
Rhetorics of Cultural and Intellectual Islamization

Moreover, revivalists see that Muslims can become true and developed Muslims
only with the establishment of Islamic institutions. The present situation
where Muslims live in a polity that is yet to be “Islamic” is viewed as darurat,
denoting that it is something “permissible” for the time being but has to be
changed or corrected ultimately. Therefore, it is not uncommon amongst this
group to harbour the notion of creating an Islamic state. In their evangelistic
mode, very much through pamphleteering, ceramahs (speeches), and usrahs,
they set to embark on cultural Islamization of their society, covering all
90

aspects of life they can imagine. Every facet of human issues and problems are
offered an “Islamic perspective”. Thus there is much enthusiasm in economics,
science, linguistics, education, anthropology, banking, literature and other
disciplines that are deemed better when given “Islamic perspectives” and
theologically in consonance with the Islamic faith. The International Institute
of Islamic Thought (IIIT) based in the United States, spearheaded this
Islamization project, which to date remains a rhetorical call with more
pietistic concerns than scientific inquisitiveness, and oftentimes props up
shoddy perspectives but is protected from scrutiny by virtue of its self-
proclaimed “Islamic” perspectives. It is no surprise that young undergraduates,
especially those who are not able to make sense of modernity or are poorly
informed on the intellectual and modern history of present civilizations,
see the propositions of the Islamization of knowledge as viable and
efficacious, while modern (read Western) knowledge are considered
wayward and problematic.56
In this discourse, theological certainty and the affirmation of faith is its
prime concern rather than a scientific and humanistic endeavour to understand
man and nature. As a result, theory of knowledge and all its epistemic hair-
splitting takes centre stage, rather than pedagogical and sociological theorizing/
praxis geared towards addressing society’s pressing problems. In the anxiety to
prove the tauhidic (doctrinal affirmation on the unity of God) superiority of
this Islamic science, this project incessantly criticizes Western thought as
ungodly, secularist, materialistic, relativistic and the like, as if all in the West
think monolithically. Simply put, by demonizing “Western” epistemology, it
automatically affirms the validity of the authentic Islamic science, when the
very idea that is promoted is actually anti-intellectual and anti-scientific. At
a closer look, the preoccupation of Islamizing the sciences demonstrates, on
the one hand, a desire to participate in science and to appropriate the fruits
of modernity. On the other hand, there is a puritanical tendency that aims to
eradicate any kind of questioning of the project’s absolute dogmatism. Its
concern for science is even more limited. It is not even exploring and
developing science in order to bring Muslim societies out of under-
development; it only wants to prove that Western-derived sciences are
theologically unacceptable to Islam and therefore a danger to Muslims.
Thus it is no surprise that there is no concrete development or advancement
that has come about from this much discussed Islamizing of knowledge and
science.57 Instead we hear endless narcissistic rhetoric on the supposedly
superior Islamic epistemology over Western ones, its favourite target being
“Western” relativism which is seen as bad in comparison to its absolutism.
Some have even gone on to claim how science was promoted in Islamdom,
in contrast to the church’s Inquisition that hampered scientific pursuit.
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92 Azhar Ibrahim
This historical romanticism feeds superior feelings based on the glories of

a “golden past”, yet remains ignorant of the depressing state of present
Muslim societies. In its pious tone, it asserts that science mastered and
practised must be directed to serve God; yet it remains arrogant in refusing
to address concrete human problems like poverty, malnutrition, under-
employment, shortage of land and resources, corruption and many others
that have plagued many societies.
The Malaysian Connection And The Indonesian

(Mis)Connection
The drive towards a re-intensification of religious life is the hallmark of the
dakwah phenomenon in Singapore. Dakwah is seen as not only making
Muslims better Muslims but also as leading the way for them to attain
development and progress. However, unlike its counterparts in Malaysia and
Indonesia, the dakwah enthusiasm in Singapore was more marked by activism
than intellectualism, even though the dakwah activists who were active in the
1970s such as Himpunan Belia Islam (HBI) could not sustain their vigorous
conviction. Generally the Malaysian connection asserts more influence on
Singaporean Muslims than the Indonesian counterpart, due to linguistic and
cultural affinity, the ease of communication and travel, easy availability and
distribution of works, and similar socio-political and intellectual environments
between Malaysia and Singapore. The height of the dakwah period in the
1970s saw the prominent leadership of ABIM, religious scholarship with
neo-traditionalistic outlook and preachers and scholars well known for their
critical views on issues pertaining to Muslim religious life.58 The formation of
the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) and International
Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC),59 saw Muslim
Singaporeans enrolling in these institutions of higher learning, apart from the
traditional Middle Eastern universities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and
Jordan. It is interesting to note that there are more young Singaporean
Muslims enrolled in IIUM or ISTAC than in the reformist Indonesian
institutions of religious learning such as the Institut Agama Islam Negeri
(IAIN) where, at the Syarif Hidayatullah campus in Jakarta, the Paramadina
circle and other reformistic-liberal groups can be found.60
In short, the Malaysian discourse, which has greater preponderance to
the exclusivist tenor commonly found among revivalists, has set the tone for
the local discourse, in comparison to the Indonesian reformist-modernist
scholarship. Therefore it is not unusual that the local discourses is familiar
with revivalist and neo-traditionalist Malaysian scholars of Islam such as Syed
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Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, Muhammad el-Muhammady and Haron Din

(whose works are commonly available here) than with those reformist-minded
Indonesia scholars like Nurcholish Madjid, Harun Nasution, Moeslim
Abdurahman and Abdul Munir Mulkhan.61 In fact many prominent ABIM
leading figures such as Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Sidek Fadil and Mohd
Nor Manuty are well known in local circles and whose works are easily
available in local bookstores. In recent years, especially with emerging degree/
diploma tie-ups with Malaysian universities, there is a greater presence of
Malaysian scholars of Islam conducting courses in Singapore.62
The connections with Malaysia and Indonesia have led one political
scientist to note the following:
In Indonesia, Islamization has taken on broader and generally less legalistic

forms. There is a thriving liberal Islam movement and a continuing
emphasis on “deconfessionalised” or pluralist political discourse.
Islamization has not led to a demonstrable rise in Islamism…In Malaysia,
by contrast, Islamization has resulted in a more narrow and exclusivist
manifestation of the faith. Islamist sentiment is rising, leading to a much
wider array of shari’a based statutes….63
Such an observation also tells us about the type of discourse from Malaysia
that penetrates or diffuses into Singapore.64 For example, the dichotomous
idiom of secular-religious common in Malaysian Islam discourse can also be
found in its repetitive expression in Singapore. In contrast, the Indonesian
reformistic circles of Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid, Abdul Munir
Mulkhan, Moeslim Abdurahman and few others are hardly known in the
local discourse on Islam. The young Indonesian Muslim intellectuals who are
critical of traditionalism, such as the late Ahmad Wahib and Ulil-Abshar
Abdalla, who are bent on re-constructionism, are hardly known here65 except
for the denouncements against them by the conservative ulamas in Indonesia.
Another obvious absence is the rationalistic theological school of thought
(known as Muktazilite) initiated by the Indonesian, Harun Nasution.66
Interestingly, not only are these ideas absent in the local discourse, the
Singapore Muslim public is even warned of such works as the local
distribution of books on Islam would suggest.67 The lack of exposure to
such writing is unfortunate, since the Indonesian critical discourses are
fairly grounded in social sciences and pluralistic appreciation of the Islamic
traditions, apart from their contextual discernment and tenor in addressing
the issues of time and place.
In general, there is weak intellectual relationship established with the
scholarship of contemporary Indonesian Islam as promoted in the leading
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94 Azhar Ibrahim
Indonesian Muslim universities and think-tanks. On the contrary, scholar-

preachers from Malaysia are well received, albeit still selectively. Malaysian
scholar-preachers like Harun Din, Amran Kasimin and Ismail Kamus are
household names that are known for their ceramah, workshops and forums.
Almost unknown are a group of Malaysian scholars who engage in a much
more rigorous and critical scholarship on Islam, such Mohd Faisal Othman,
Mohd Nasir Omar, Farish A. Noor, and even the controversial Kassim
Ahmad, whose writings are available in both English and Malay.
The Vehemence against Secularism

Ever since Syed Muhammad Naguib Al-Attas’ publication of Islam and
Secularism, the criticism and condemnation of secularism has become even
more popular in the discourse of Islam in the Malaysian and Singapore
contexts. The prime target of the revivalists’ critique of the predicament of
contemporary society is now secularism. The latter is seen as an antithesis to
authentic Islam, which is deemed as a holistic system or way of life that can
be the antidote to all modern frailties and excesses.68
One obvious feature of this anti-secularism is the inability to distinguish
between the process of secularization in society and secularism as a socio-
political outlook.69 The dichotomous distinction of the religious and secular
is not only intellectually problematic, but also generates psychological
anxiety, since the secular phenomenon is deemed as necessarily irreligious
or could undermine religion itself. The following statement on the
negativities of secularism is expressed in the following article published in
Risalah, a PERGAS’ publication:
…. pemikiran sekular boleh dihinggapi oleh mereka yang bergelar Muslim

jika konsep dan tasawwur Islam yang betul tidak diterapkan kepada
mereka. Ini juga adalah kerana ummat Islam, semenjak zaman penjajahan
telah pun terdedah kepada sistem pendidikan dualistik. Kesyumulan
Islam seolah-olah tidak diakui dalam pendidikan umum, walaupun
kebebasan beragama diakui secara dasarnya. [Translation: Secular thoughts
can be manifested by those who claim to be Muslims especially if correct
Islamic concepts and worldviews are not imbibed by them. This is
because the Muslim community since the colonial period has been
exposed to a dualistic educational system. The holistic dimension of
Islam is not recognised in the education system, even though freedom of
religious belief is recognised generally].70
A binary position taken is common as if the ideological trapping of modernity

stands between two poles: the Western-derived secular modern system and
94

the “authentic Islamic” worldview (tasawur). In this thinking, it is imperative

that the Islamic alternative takes a stand against the debilitating effects of
secularism. Clearly, not only is the dichotomous distinction made between
Islam and secularism hardly problematized,71 it is as if when one accepts a
secular institution and system, then he/she does not take Islam holistically.
BETWEEN MODERATE AND MEDIOCRE IDEAS

Another topic of interest in the post-9/11 environment is to distinguish
between the moderation as preached in Islam against those groups that
legitimize violence in its name. Explaining such a distinction to the larger
public becomes a particularly important challenge. One example is a book
published by Muhammad Haniff Hassan entitled Muslim … moderate …
Singaporean = Muslim … moderat … warga Singapura.72 On the one hand,
the book is a commendable effort in explaining the importance of moderation
as a principle in social life, and also to assuage the non-Muslim public that
local Muslims are committed to peace and reject radicalism. On the other
hand, the breadth and depth of its deliberation leaves much to be desired, as
it is beset by many problematic assumptions and reductionism which point
to the limitations of the ideas and idioms of currency in the local discourse on
Islam. These include the primacy of ulamas whose opinions and deliberations
must be sought as they are considered the custodians of Islam and the only
legitimate group to give an “authentic” version and explanation on Islam.
While claiming to explain Islam’s moderation in a multi-racial context, it
also appears as defensive and apologetic. The writer himself speaks as though
there is one “representative” interpretation of Islam. Apart from an absence of
a thorough and rigorous discussion on moderation, be it in reference to
classical and contemporary sources, the book’s leitmotif is more one of
ambivalence and inconsistency of argument, rather than a substantive
advocation of what constitutes the virtues of moderation. An example
from the book illustrates the author’s ambiguity, utopian thinking and
exclusivist position:
We cannot deny that the legal system in most countries often do not
share the philosophy of Islam. Nevertheless, this is not a justification for
us to totally reject all existing laws or to love in total disregard of
laws…We should not be silent to the policies and laws that are opposed
to the principles of syariah. These are the munkar that we are obligated
to correct either with our hands, words or at least in our hearts. Now
how do we accomplish this? We need to prioritize the issues that have to
be addressed based on the degree of the maslahat, mudarat….This
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96 Azhar Ibrahim
should be accomplished through the process of consultation between

various official religious authorities, ulama and religious organizations.
Laws that are in conflict with the syariah are of various types….There are
a few aspects of criminal laws in Singapore that may be inconsistent with
the syariah or Hudud. Nevertheless to change them now would be
unrealistic and beyond the capability of existing da’wah work while
raising them as issues would be a waste of current resources. In addition,
such actions may raise unnecessary oppositions that will complicate
da’wah activities and the practice of Islam. On the other hand to neglect
or the failure to uphold those laws could result in social problems that
will affect the Muslim community as weak. It is also important to note
that in areas where there are conflicts, the solution may not necessarily
be to promulgate or change the particular laws. Instead in the issue of
banking, a better solution would be to offer an alternative to the current
banking institutions. With such alternatives, Muslims are able to free
themselves of the unIslamic practice while displaying the beauty of Islam
(Muhammad Haniff Hassan, 2003 pp. 16–17).
Many of the views expressed are problematic, for example: (1) that
syariah laws are the only legitimate laws to be upheld by Muslims; (2) that the
prevailing economic arrangements are un-Islamic; and (3) the simplistic
equating of syariah with hudud.73 Neither is Islamic banking referred to as a
more Islamic alternative anywhere when discussed and its viability is accepted
at the surface level only.74 It also gives the impression that all Muslims (or
Islam) have a single monolithic view on the subject of politics, law, economics,
etc. For instance, the book claims that “the legal systems in most countries
often do not share the philosophy of Islam.”75 But is there the legal system
that Muslims should subscribe to, and was there ever one in history? Such a
position is akin to the Islamists’ claim of “Islamic perspectives” on the state,
economy, politics, culture and the like. Moreover, contemporary institutions
of politics and economics are simply denounced and brushed aside as “un-
lslamic”, without any justification of what is inherently “un-Islamic” in these
institutions and how “Islamic” their alternatives are.
Moreover, the book does not fundamentally espouse the importance and
significance of moderate views vis-à-vis extremist ones, but is more a defensive
reminder that nowhere should Muslims compromise their religious conviction,
especially when encountering issues that affect the larger society. For instance,
on the question of syariah (invariably understood as hudud) Muslims should
take the following position:
The issue of moderate Muslim and others pertaining to Muslims in
Singapore will become more critical in the future. Soon we should
96

expect Muslims in Singapore to be required to make their stand on the

issues of the Hudud law and establishment of an Islamic state. With a
clear concept of moderate Muslims, Singaporean Muslims should be
able to explain concepts like national integration, social integration,
nation building and the Singapore identity, which are often posed by
non-Muslims. Nonetheless, in this process, we should not ingratiate
ourselves by trying to please all parties or specific groups. We have to be
clear on the areas in which we disagree on, and where disagreement
exists, we should uphold the principles of peaceful process, law and
harmonious ties with society. (Muhammad Haniff Hassan 2003,
pp. 6–7)
However, the following can be asked: (1) Does “non-acceptance” mean a

doctrinal compromise or irreligiosity?76 (2) Is there one single opinion that
syariah, especially its hudud manifestation, should be accepted by all Muslims?
That the book claims to represent “Islam” also reflects exclusivist thinking
even though it claims intellectual and religious openness.
Finally, despite the repeated affirmation of the need to be contextual even
amongst the religious circles, there is hardly any concrete discussion on the
realities of contemporary society and how institutional and individual agency
can offer and/or impede moderation. In other words, the moderation that is
advocated is still a normative assertion, and its analysis is hardly being put in
the context of today’s realities. Basically the book argues that moderation is
enjoined by Islam, but care and qualification must be made so that this
moderation is not in conflict with religious precepts. Herein lies the main
problem of such apologetic and idealistic deliberations in many religious
discourses — of being more committed to textual adherence than being
sensitive to contextual needs. Here, a perceptive view of the Indonesian
scholar Hasyim Muzadi, also a leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), is relevant:
[The] apologetic attitude tends to be normative and idealistic. It seems
to wish for the ability to address all problems of humanity by adopting,
formally and directly, religious doctrines as written in the holy book.
This is the reason that this attitude tends to disregard reality. Even when
they see reality, whatever they see must be succumbed to the orthodoxy
of religious texts. This attitude is taken as a defense mechanism to
protect them from outside threats, challenges, and criticisms.77
The Preacher Sets the Pitch

In a religious discourse marked by religious devotionalism the existence of
religious forums, lectures and sermons remain largely centred on doctrinal
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98 Azhar Ibrahim
affirmations and pietistic and moralistic advocations. Certain subjects

predominate over others. For instance, there are more lectures and forums
that highlight virtuous women as pious wives and mothers,78 instead of
deliberating on the subject of Muslim women’s challenges in modern contexts
and patriarchal biases.79 Subjects of eschatological narrations, fantastical
miraculous feats as experienced by great religious personalities and the warning
of the imminent coming of the Day of Judgement are, from time to time,
impressed upon the Muslim public, instead of engagement in issues and
challenges facing contemporary Muslim society.80 The height of the dakwah
era saw overseas preachers like Ahmad Deedat of South Africa and Imran
Hoessein of Trinidad enticing the local Muslim audience with their
captivating and thundering evangelical predictions and imaginings.
Interestingly, such speakers, especially Imran Hoessein, were invited several
times, which suggests the general inclination and receptivity towards the
eschatological imaginings about the imminent end of the world with the
coming of a messiah. Apparently, when such claims were repeated again and
again, there were hardly any critiques made by the religious authorities or
amongst the educated Muslim intelligentsia.
The call for preparedness for the coming of the end of the world is not
just an eschatological explication but surely has psychological ramifications
on the local Muslim public. At a time when Singaporean Muslims need to
be informed and exposed to the importance of accommodation and creativity
in adjusting and adapting to the challenges of modernization, they hear
instead religious preachers who, without responsible qualification, doom
the present reality as an antithesis to Islam. Furthermore, when such
rhetoric is made in salvational tones, it is likely to attract more of those who
have adjustment problems or are despaired by the current situation. It was
also in the context of the evangelical Christian missionaries’ attempt to
proselytize among the local Malay community in the late 1970s and 1980s,
which caused much anxiety and dissatisfaction, that Ahmad Deedat’s fiery
speeches became popular and his books and speeches widely distributed in
some local bookstores, even until today. At present, the local religious
discourse is still being enamoured by moving sermons and speeches of
preachers from Indonesia. A.A. Gym of Indonesia is currently a favourite
household name, where the equally gifted preachers, Zainuddin M.Z. and
Habib Sheikh al-Jufri used to be. From Malaysia preacher-scholar
personalities like Ismail Kamus, Prof. Harun Din, Dr Hassan Ali,
Muhammad el-Muhammady and Dr Masitah Ibrahim are as popular as
ever both in media and lavish forums and seminars.
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A Selective Bibliographic World

The availability of literature related to Islam is also conditioned by its
dominant discourse. Popular and devotional religious writings seem to
dominate the market. Recent publications are hardly of any serious studies
about Malay-Muslim society of Singapore.81 Books written in Malay are
mainly from Malaysia and Indonesia, in which the revivalist and neo-
traditionalist writings predominate. In many cases, it is easier to find works
that criticize Muslim reformism and liberalism by conservative/ Islamist
writers than those by reformists and liberals.82 Their apologetic and defensive
tenor is reminiscent of the journalism and pamphleteering on Islam in the
1970s and 1980s. Translations of exclusivist and revivalist works are also
easily available, such as those by Maududi, Maryam Jameelah and Syed Qutb.
One significant addition today is the various works by Sheikh Yusuf Qardawi,
which range from critiques against secularism to issues on women, syariah,
terrorism and many other legal fatwas.83
SCHOLARSHIP AND INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE IN

ISLAMIC DISCOURSE
Internal intellectual dynamics also contribute directly to the Islamic discourse
in Singapore. In this, the presence of a critical pool of leading intellectuals
is crucial. For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s, Syed Hussein Alatas,
who lectured and lived in Singapore then was active in writing, publishing
and giving talks both within and without campus. His book Kita Dengan
Islam, Tumbuh Tidak Berbuah (Islam and Us: A Growth Without Fruit,
1979) is a collection of critical essays that focused on the problems of
Muslim societies of today, especially in the Malay-Indonesian context. His
book Biarkan Buta (Let Them Be Blind, 1974), a compilation of debates
between MUIS and himself on the issues of organ donation that were
published in Berita Harian, was the first intellectual challenge against a
religious administration, questioning openly the justification for the
prohibition of organ donation by the local fatwa ruling council.84 Alatas
was also known for his sociological and critical diagnosis of society’s problems
and challenges, and is an example of a public intellectual who demonstrates
the commitment to speak truth to power.
Nowadays however, the local Muslim intelligentsia is generally not at the
forefront of discourse even though it has more exposure to reformist, revivalist
or liberal ideas. There is also greater receptivity to traditionalist and revivalist
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100 Azhar Ibrahim
discourses, while modernist and reformistic ones are kept at a distance,

perhaps occasionally read, quoted and acknowledged, but hardly promoted
publicly. A selective discourse is at work here and group ideology and interest
may well explain this. As gatekeeper and custodian of Islam, the religious
circles (asatizah/ulama) determine what is legitimate and authentic discourse.
Even Muslim professionals who are not confident of their own knowledge
about Islam readily consult the asatizah/ulamas.
The challenge of intellectualizing the discourse on Islam depends on
two inter-related factors. The first is that religious scholars move beyond
religious devotionalism into research and deliberation on how religion
affects society and vice versa. The second is the opening up of spaces for
Muslim intellectuals and the educated public to engage in critical and
pluralistic perspectives on the challenges that the local community is facing.
In recent years, MUIS has been active in inviting scholars of contemporary
Islam to give talks to the local Muslim public, such as Asghar Ali Engineer,
Tariq Ramadan, Abdullahi An’Naim, and Chandra Muzaffar.85 This is a
good step, though selection of lecture themes is critical so that the scholars’
expertise can be tapped to give insights into local issues,86 alongside the
local intelligentsia’s discernment of their own problems and contexts. If in
the past, this was predominantly led by religious preachers, today they are
mostly academics who have taught in Euro-American universities. However,
these talks are exclusively in English which, while much welcomed by
English-medium audiences, is inaccessible to the Malay heartlanders whose
medium of religious deliberation is primarily Malay. Here, there seems to
be a disjuncture in which more educated and English-speaking groups are
exposed to contemporary international Muslim scholars, whereas a significant
majority are limited in their exposure to only religious preaching and
instructions by local and regional religious teachers who focus primarily on
devotional religious life, rituals, and sometime mysticism.87
As religious traditionalism predominates in the religious discourse, the
space for reformist and critical discourses on Islam is much circumscribed.
Generally, revivalist thinking since the 1970s has brought some changes in
the choice of lifestyles, practices and ideas amongst the Muslim public.
However, they are essentially not different from the traditionalists’ standpoints,
apart from showing more interest in diverse topics and concerns that affect
Muslims. The dakwah preoccupation amongst student organizations in
campuses and in Malay Muslims non-government organizations (NGOs)
like Jamiyah88 and Darul Arqam means there is little space and recognition
for intellectual discourse on Islam, since the main concern is to ensure and
preserve the intensification of Muslims’ religious life.
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The current intellectual opening up among local religious teachers and

elites will determine the future discourse on Islam in Singapore. Even as more
asatizah engage in the discussion of socio-political and cultural issues that
affect the community, this does not necessarily mean an automatic
improvement in the quality in deliberation. As long as there is a persistent
dichotomous view between the “religious” and the “secular” sciences, the
asatizah themselves are denied of an intellectual culture that can provide
critical and creative insights. Nor should they be expected to be the “expert”
or sole authority on every topic of societal concern ranging from medical
ethics to banking operations and moral decadence.
Muslim intellectuals in their various capacities as academics and
professionals can contribute towards a more substantive, critical and contextual
discourse on Islam that is particularly cognizant of and sensitive to local
needs. What is also needed is the participation of concerned citizens in the
discourse. Within a diversity of interpretations and engagement, there can be
no single group that can claim exclusive rights to the interpretation or
representation of Islam. An intellectual environment unfettered by the fear of
censure by a moral authority must first be created as a public space for critical
engagement and deliberation. Moreover, the quality of critical discourse can
only be improved with serious engagement of contexts and multi-disciplinary
perspectives. Content-wise, a rigorous, critical engagement with the Islamic
religious and intellectual traditions of the past and present is necessary, going
beyond current romanticism and apologetics. Last but not least, participation
by all, without the fear of being morally excluded and labelled as unfaithful
to the religion, must exist in all public discourses.
CONCLUSION
The voices of critical perspectives are few and far in between. Intellectual
discourse can only emerge if there is an engaging and critical environment
for an exchange of ideas and that are always being corrected and reformulated
based on contextual needs. If the intelligentsia itself remains intellectually
insular, confining religion to the domain of ritual perfection and piety,89
then one cannot expect a high degree of intellectual deliberation and
creativity. The latter is further hampered if there is a pervasive sentiment of
anti-intellectualism and imitative scholarship or lack of interest, especially
among the middle classes, who are better educated and have access to
intellectual resources.
As in many other societies, there is no monolithic discourse on Islam in
Singapore. This chapter highlights the dominant types of discourse that have
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102 Azhar Ibrahim
emerged within the local Muslim community. Furthermore, being in a similar

linguistic and cultural space, Singapore Muslims’ discourse mirrors and is
very much influenced by their Malaysian traditionalist and revivalist
counterparts.90 The reformist or modernist Indonesian and even Malaysian
discourses are hardly known or well received. Including the critical perspectives
from Indonesian Islam, which integrates perspectives from the social sciences,
would enhance the local discourse in breadth and depth.91 This would also be
a positive response to the regular call for the opening of spaces for critical
multi-perspectives on Islam: “the tradition of a healthy debate within the
community, as found say in places such as Indonesia and Iran, is central to the
very essence and spirit of Islam.”92
The pedagogical aspects of how Islam is being taught and discussed are
as important as the contents. The issue is as much one of critical depth as
expanding the breadth of discussion. A discourse that is primarily concerned
with devotional commitment to religious precepts is inevitably an instructional
one and in many cases involves memorization which in turn hampers creativity
and critique. A civic and democratic kind of orientation within the religious
discourse is therefore needed in order to mitigate the exclusivist and ahistorical
thinking from dominating the intellectual landscape.93 Likewise, an intellectual
discourse which neglects or is prejudicial to religion will not be able to
comprehend the dynamics of a particular society in which religion is central
to its worldview and practices.
Most significantly, the study of Islam in Singapore cannot afford to
ignore the historical, geographical and cultural contexts in which Singaporean
Muslims are located and feel they belong. In the midst of the anxiety to
comprehend how Islam is manifested in Malay-Muslim society, its contextual
and particular understanding must be recognized before we readily import
foreign experts and consultants from far away contexts to tell us about
Muslims and Islam in Singapore and the region, under the false assumption
that all Muslims think, (re)act and feel uniformly regardless of time and space.94
Notes
The author wishes to thank Dr Lai Ah Eng and Dr Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman
whose encouragement is always inspiring. Views expressed herein remain solely the
author’s responsibility.
1. For a general survey on studies on Malays and Muslims of Singapore, see Syed
Farid Alatas, Keadaan Sosiologi Masyarakat Melayu (Singapore: Association of
Muslim Professionals, 1997); Hussin Mutalib, “Muslim Studies in Singapore”;
Abdullah Alwi Hj Hassan, “Islam di Singapura: Satu Pengenalan”.
2. See Syed Farid Alatas, “Islam and the West after September 11, 2001”.
102

3. See Houben, “Southeast Asia and Islam”, pp. 149–70; Stark, “Beyond ‘Terrorism’
and ‘State Hegemony’, pp. 307–27; Rahim, “The Road Less Traveled: Islamic
Militancy in Southeast Asia”, pp. 209–32.
4. These are not new since there are several academic studies and publications on
Malays and Islam carried out at the Department of Malay Studies, NUS.
Amongst others are theses by Chandra Muzaffar, Tham Seong Chee, Shaharuddin
Maaruf, Sa’eda Buang, Sharon Siddique, Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, Azhar
Ibrahim and a few others. Refer to Department of Malay Studies Handbook,
NUS, 2004.
5. See for instance, Tan “Terrorism in Singapore: Threat and Implications”,
pp. 1–18; Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore”,
pp. 489–507.
6. See Shaharuddin Maaruf, “The Social Sciences in Southeast Asia: Sociology of
Anti-Sociology and Alienated Social Sciences”, in Syed Farid Alatas, ed., Reflections
on Alternative Discourses from Southeast Asia, pp. 88–103.
7. On this subject see Syed Hussein Alatas, “Academic Imperialism”, pp. 32–46.
8. Read Muhammad Haniff Hassan, “Clarifying the Concept of Dar Al-Islam &
Dar Al-Harb and the Relationship between Muslims & Non-Muslims”,
pp. 3–7.
9. Muhammad Haniff Hassan, “Towards an Index of Islamic Governance”.
10. Zhulkeflee Hj. Ismail, “Melayu Baru”, pp. 3–5. A contrasting view, also in
response to Islamization of Malay cultural lives, can be found in Imran Hashim,
“Changing Nature of Malay Identity”, pp. 16–17.
11. Mohamad Hannan bin Hassan, “Dakwah Bukan Hanya Usaha Menyampaikan
Islam Sahaja”, pp. 9–12.
12. Also, consider the research, forums and publications initiated by local Malay-
Muslim organizations such as Research Institute of Malay Affairs and Centre of
Contemporary Islamic Studies. In recent years, there have been several initiatives
made by local organizations, including MUIS, to organize conferences on Islam
and Muslims.
13. See Syed Hussein Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits, and
Problems”, pp. 23–45.
14. This point is deliberated by Azhar Ibrahim in “Critical Perspectives on
Contemporary Islamic Thought”.
15. Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought”, pp. 95, 99; see Towler, The Need for
Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion.
16. Mohd Abdai Rathomy, Tiga Serangkai Sendi Agama: Tauhid, Fiqih, Tasauf; Haji
Mohd Taha Suhaimi, Qadha’ dan Qadar: Rukun Iman yang Keenam; Ahmad
Sonhadji Mohamad, et al., Pengetahuan Ugama Islam; Osman Jantan, Pedoman
Ilmu Tauhid.
17. Abu Bakar Hashim, “Akidah Islamiah”.
18. Syed Ahmad Semait, Hadis Qudsi: Analisa dan Komentar and Kuliah Subuh:
Pada Membicarakan Hadis 40.
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104 Azhar Ibrahim
19. Mohd. Ikram Mohd Ariff, et al., Boy Meets Tekong: NS Guidebook for Muslims.
20. Adam bin Ismail, “Hukum Bagi Orang Yang Meninggalkan Solat”, pp. 5–6.
21. Syed Isa Semait, Panduan Ibadat Zakat; Firdaus Yahya, Huraian Ilmu Faraidh.
22. Mohd. Salleh Daud, trans., Halal dan Haram dari Pandangan Al-Quran dan
Sains.
23. Ridzuan Wu, A Glimpse into the Islamic Discourse on the Use of Headscarves.
24. Osman Jantan, “Pengabaian Tanggungjawab dan Pencemaran Diri Meruntuhkan
Nilai-nilai Agama dan Moral”.
25. Ahmad Sonhadji Muhammad, Pendidekan Budi Pekerti, 2 vols.; Yaacob Elias,
Islam dan Pedoman Hidup; Habsah Senin and Firdaus Yahya, Zikir dan Doa
Pilihan.
26. Haji Daud Ali, Kemusykilan Agama di Radio; Syed Abdillah Ahmad Aljufri,
Anda Bertanya Saya Menjawab (Kemusykilan Agama); Dzulkifli Mohammed,
Masalah Terkini di dalam Islam: Siri Kemusyikilan Agama 3.
27. Prosiding Seminar Ahli Sunnah dan Syi’ah Imamiyyah: Aspek Persamaan dan
Perbezaan. Anjuran Pusat Pengajian Umum, UKM, Bangi 1993; Abdullah
Fahim Hj Ab. Rahman, “Konsep Ahli Sunnah Waljamaah dan Kedudukannya
di Malaysia”. 6 (1986).
28. Politik Melayu dan Penyatuan Ummah.
29. See Ridzuan Wu, ed., Readings in Cross-cultural Da’wah. Singapore: The Muslim
Converts’ Association of Singapore; Muktamar Dakwah, Anjuran Jawatankuasa
Haiah Dakwah.
30. See Understanding Islam; Moulavi M. H. Babu Sahib, Know Islam.
31. Syed Hassan bin Muhammad Al-Attas, Umar bin Abd al-Rahman: kisah dan
sejarah al-Qutub al-Anfas al-Habib Umar bin Abd al-Rahman, pengasas Ratib al-
Attas; Mohd Taha Suhaimi, Sejarah Hidup Syeikh Muhammad Suhaimi.
32. See Wu, “Erosion of Islamic Identity”, pp. 68–76; Mutalib, “Masalah Belia-belia
Kita: Islam Jalan Penyelesaian”.
33. See Ibrahim Abu Bakar, Islamic Modernism in Malaya: The Life and Thought of
Sayid Syekh Al-Hadi 1867–1934. Compare this to Wan Muhammad Ali &
M. Uthman El-Muhammady, Islam dan Modenisma.
34. The dynamic aspect of the tradition has been highlighted before by Shaharuddin
Maaruf, “Some Theoretical Problems Concerning Tradition and Modernization
Among the Malays of Southeast Asia”.
35. Refer to Konvensyen Ulama Pergas 2003.
36. PERGAS’ criticized the institute for its invitation to Zainah Anwar of Sisters in
Islam (Malaysia) and Ulil Abshar-Abdalla of Jaringan Islam Liberal in Indonesia.
See their papers in Political and Security Outlook 2003: Islam: The Challenge from
Extremist Iinterpretations, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003.
37. See Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism.
38. See Azhar Ibrahim, “An Evaluation of Madrasah Education: Perspectives and
Lessons from the Experiences of Some Muslim Societies”, pp. 93–124.
39. See Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia; Zainah Anwar, Islamic
Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah Among the Students.
104

40. Refer to A. B. Shamsul, “Inventing Certainties: The Dakwah Persona in Malaysia”,

pp. 112–33.
41. See Ridzuan Wu, The Call to Islam: A Contemporary Perspective.
42. This was a period of greater confidence amongst the Muslim undergraduate
community that saw its role as being to uplift the welfare and development of
the local Muslims. See M. Dzulqifly Muhamad, “The University of Singapore
Muslim Society”. In recent times, the Muslim Students’ Society at the National
University of Singapore has demonstrated a similar sentiment. See “Summary
Report: Meeting with Malay Members of Parliament”, The Fount Journal Issue
2, 2000, pp. 123–26.
43. Ibrahim Hassan, “The National University of Singapore Muslim Society —
Challenges Ahead”.
44. Ridzuan Wu, “Erosion of Islamic Identity: The Singapore Challenge”.
45. Fazida A. Razak and Jamari Mokhtar, “‘Riba’: Responses of the Muslim World
and Singapore Muslims”.
46. Hussin Mutalib, “Education and Singapore Muslims: An Overview of the Issues,
Parameters and Prospects”, pp. 1–14; Zainul Abidin Rasheed, “Islamic Education
in Singapore”, pp. 19–23.
47. See Maarof Salleh, “Aspects of Dakwah in Singapore”, pp. 24–25.
48. Bohari Jaon, “Reconsiderations: An Introspection on the Islamic Revival in
Contemporary Singapore — Its Genesis and Orientation”, pp. 19–38.
49. Muhammad Haniff Hassan, “Negara Islam — Satu Pandangan”, pp. 3–5.
50. Perhaps a summary by Sidek Baba says it all: “The subject discussed cover the
issues of ibadah, the importance of knowledge, the relevant meaning of jihad,
the significance of iman, understanding of shariah, rights and duties of the
youth, the importance of family life and parenting among others”. See “The
Study-Circle (Usrah) Movement of Malaysia: A Collaborative Approach to
Islamic Learning”, Muslim Education Quarterly 19, no. 2 (2002): 4–12.
51. See M. Kamal Hassan, “The Influence of Mawdudi’s Thought on Muslims in
Southeast Asia: A Brief Survey”, pp. 429–64.
52. As early as the Seventies, works by Syed Qutb and Abdul Ala’ Maududi were
already popular and circulated amongst the Malay speaking intelligentsia as
reflected in the publication of Jernal Jihad a university journal from Malaysia.
See Abu A’la Maududi, Islam dan Kemajuan Moden.
53. See The Real Cry of Syed Shaykh al-Hady. With Selections of His Writings by His
Son Syed Alwi al-Hady, edited by Alijah Gordon.
54. Refer to Hafiz Firdaus Abdullah, “Membongkar Aliran Islam Liberal”, pp. 7–9;
M. Shiddiq al-Jawi and Jakfar bin Hj. Embek, “Usul Fiqh Islam Liberal?”
Risalah, pp. 13–15.
55. A point noted by Mohamed Abu Bakar in “Generasi Muda dan Kesedaran
Islam: Konflik dan Integrasi dalam Masyarakat Melayu”, pp. 51–59.
56. Read Zhulkeflee Hj. Ismail, “Ilmu-Suatu Renungan: Pengetahuan atau
Pengertian”, pp. 3–5.
57. Read Fazlur Rahman, “Islamization of Knowledge: A Response”, pp. 1–11.
105

106 Azhar Ibrahim
58. They are Syed Hussein Alatas, Chandra Muzaffar, Shaharuddin Maaruf, Faisal
Othman, Farish A Noor, Zainah Anwar and Rustam Sani, among others.
59. ISTAC was founded by Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas. See Mona Abaza,
“Intellectuals, Power and Islam in Malaysia”.
60. See Andi Faisal Bakti, “Paramadina and Its Approach to Culture and
Communication”, pp. 315–41.
61. Perhaps the only ideas of Nurcholish that were made known locally were
through the publication of “Pemahaman Terhadap Adjaran Islam Dan Masaalah
Pembaharuannja pada Zaman Sekarang”, pp. 61–68. Since Muhammad Kamal
Hassan’s scathing critiques of Nurcholish’s ideas, they are no longer easily
accepted by the Malay-speaking discourse on both sides of the Causeway. Refer
to Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order”
Modernization in Indonesia.
62. One such scholar is Wan Mohd Noor, a former lecturer from ISTAC. Wan
Mohd Noor is also a consultant to several local religious and educational
organizations. See his book, Budaya Ilmu: Satu Penjelasan.
63. See Greg Fealy, “Islamization and Politics in Southeast Asia: The Contrasting
Cases on Malaysia and Indonesia”, pp. 165–66.
64. A common theme noted in local Muslim publications such as Risalah by
PERGAS.
65. See Zuhairi Misrawi and Novriantoni, Doktrin Islam Progresif: Memahami Islam
Sebagai Ajaran Rahmat.
66. See Martin and R. Woodward with Dwi S. Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam:
Mu’tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol and Fauzan Salleh, Modern
Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century Indonesia.
67. It is not easy to find works by liberal groups in local bookstores and public
libraries. Instead we easily find books that criticize the latter. See Hartono
Ahmad Jaiz and Agus Hasan Boshori, Menangkal Bahaya JIL dan FLA. Compare
this with M. Muhsin Jamil, Membongkar Mitos Menegakkan Nalar: Pergulatan
Islam Liberal Versus Islam Literal. See also Muhammad Ali, “The Rise of the
Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Islam”, pp. 1–27.
68. Since the publication of Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas’ Islam and Secularism,
the idea that the current secular arrangement is not “Islamically holistic has been
adopted by various groups to suit their very own ideological agendas. Another
fatal criticism on secularism was Muhammad Kamal Hassan’s thesis that primarily
targeted Nurcholish Majid’s ideas.
69. See Bassam Tibi, Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change.
70. “Cabaran Sekularisasi dan Globalisasi Barat kepada Harakah Islamiyah Nusantara:
Perspektif Singapura”, Risalah 4 (July–Sept 2001) (author unknown).
71. Such topics have gained much attention within Indonesian circles. See Mohamed
Arkoun’s Islam Agama Sekuler: Penelurusan Sekularisme dalam Agama-agama di
Dunia.
72. Muhammad Haniff Hassan. Muslim … moderate … Singaporean = Muslim …
moderat … warga Singapura.
106

73. This subject is best discussed by Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name:
Islamic Law, Authority, and Women.
74. On the critique of Islamic banking, refer to Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam:
Religion and Politics in the Arab World.
75. See Muhammad Said Al-Ashmawy, Against Islamic Extremism: The Writings of
Muhammad Said al-Ashwawy.
76. Abu Bakar Hamzah, Kafir Sebab Perlembagaan.
77. See Hasyim Muzadi, “Same Faith, Different Names: Islam and the Problem of
Radicalism in Indonesia”, p. 97.
78. See Mohd. Salleh Daud, Pedoman Isteri; Syed Ahmad Semait, 100 Tokoh Wanita
Terbilang.
79. See Suzaina Kadir, “When Gender is Not a Priority: Muslim Women in Singapore
and the Challenges of Religious Fundamentalism”, pp. 109–33.
80. The growing market for such miraculous narration of Sufistic figures are couched
in popular Sufi imaginings. Read Johar Buang, Hari Terakhir Seorang Sufi and
Berjalan di Atas Udara.
81. Two recent local works are worthy of mention as participants’ views on Islam in
Malay society: Suratman Markasan, Bangsa Melayu Singapura Dalam Transformasi
Budayanya and Maarof Salleh, Tambak Minda: Mengamat Perkembangan Islam
Semasa.
82. Read Eickelman and Anderson, “Print, Islam and the Prospects for Civic
Pluralism: New Religious Writings and Their Audiences”.
83. Many of Qardawi’s works in Arabic have been translated into Malay, published
in Malaysia and Indonesia and distributed here. See Yusuf Qardhawi, Bicara Soal
Wanita; Problema Kemiskinan: Apa Konsep Islam; Halal dan Haram dalam Islam;
Pertentangan Islam dan Sekular: Sekular Pasti Tersungkur.
84. Syed Hussein Alatas, Biarkan Buta.
85. Refer to Saeed, Muslims in Secular States; Abu-Rabi, Contemporary Islamic
Intellectual History.
86. Academic discourse has also been initiated by other Muslim organizations such
as the Association of Muslim Professionals which, through its research subsidiary
RIMA, with the support of Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF), held a seminar
in 2005 on “Covering Islam: Challenges and Opportunities for Media in the
Global Village”. In 2004, Centre for Contemporary Islamic Studies (CCIS) and
KAF organized the “International Seminar on Islam and Democracy: The
Southeast Asian Experience”.
87. See Shaharuddin Maaruf ’s critiques on the religious establishment of monopolistic
tendencies in “Religion and Utopian Thinking among Muslims of Southeast
Asia”, Paper presented at 4th ASEAN Inter-University Seminar in Social
Development, 16–18 June 1999, Prince Songkla University, Pattani, Thailand,
pp. 1–22.
88. For a brief survey of Jamiyah’s activities, read Petra Weyland, “International
Muslim Network and Islam in Singapore”, Sojourn 5, no. 2 (1990): 219–54.
89. One study has shown that the local religious leadership has an inclination only
107

108 Azhar Ibrahim
to read literature pertaining to devotional Islam — see Mohd Salleh Lamry,

“Perlakuan Komunikasi Elit Agama Tempatan: Satu Kajian Etnografi di Sabak
Bernam, Selangor”, Jurnal Antropologi dan Sosiologi 16, 1988, pp. 41–62.
90. For example, Malaysia’s Islam Hadhari is identified as in consonance with
MUIS-initiated “Ten Desired Attributes”. See Abbas Mohd Shariff, “Nilai ‘Risalah
Islam’ dan “Islam Hadhari’: Ke Arah Pembinaan Insan Mulia”, in Kamsiah
Abdullah et al. (eds.), Budaya: Memeluk Akar Menyuluh ke Langit (Singapore:
Jabatan Bahasa dan Budaya Melayu, NIE, NTU, 2006). For the reformist
Indonesians on the other hand, the deliberations on civil society and role of
religion in social transformation spur greater intellectual response. Read Bahtiar
Effendy, “Wawasan Al-Quran tentang Masyarakat Madani: Menuju Terbentuknya
Negara-Bangsa yang Moden”, Paramadina 1, no. 2 (1999).
91. The Indonesian intellectual discourse is marked by three main concerns. According
to Bahtiar Effendy, these are: (1) reformulation in religious thought, (2) political
and bureaucratic reforms and (3) social transformation. See “Islam dan Negara:
Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktek Politik Islam di Indonesia”, Prisma, 5, May
1995, pp. 3–28.
92. Yaacob Ibrahim, “The Variety and Diversity in Islamic Practice”, in Perspectives
on Doctrinal and Strategic Implications of Global Islam, Part I, Global Islam:
Doctrinal and Strategic Implications, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003, p. 3.
93. A point also raised in Azyumardi Azra, “Recent Developments of Indonesian
Islam”, Indonesian Quarterly XXXII, no. 1 (2004): 10–18; Abdullah Saeed,
“Towards Religious Tolerance Through Reform in Islamic Education: The Case
of the State Institute of Islamic Studies of Indonesia”, Indonesia and the Malay
World 27, no. 79 (1999): 177–91.
94. See Edward W. Said, “Impossible Histories: Why the Many Islams Cannot be
Simplified”, Harper’s Magazine, July 2002.
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GLOBAL CHRISTIAN CULTURE

AND THE ANTIOCH OF ASIA
Jean DeBernardi
INTRODUCTION
As a network religion that spans the globe, evangelical Christianity is one of
the most important social movements of the last two centuries. As a
consequence of evangelism and missions, Christian communities exist in all
parts of the world, and Christian leaders often pronounce their religion a
universal brotherhood. But evangelical Christianity is highly diverse and
plural, with networks that are multiple and overlapping.
The term “evangelical” does not describe any particular group or
denomination, but rather tends to be applied to a variety of churches and
organizations formed in the eighteenth century or later under the influence
of widespread revivalist movements. As a religious movement, evangelical
Christianity has changed over time, but nonetheless continues to have at its
core a “remarkably constant” set of features (Bebbington 1989, p. 4). Scholars
of evangelical Christianity commonly cite David Bebbington’s formulation of
these persistent features, which are: “conversionism, the belief that lives need
to be changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; Biblicism, a
particular regard for the Bible; and what may be called crucicentrism, a stress
on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross” (Bebbington 1989, p. 3). Mark Noll
observes that these traits “have never by themselves yielded cohesive,
institutionally compact, or clearly demarcated groups of Christians”, but they
do identify “a large family of churches and religious enterprises” (Noll 2001,
116
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Global Christian Culture and the Antioch of Asia 117
p. 13). One recent study estimates that out of two billion Christians in the
world, 650 million are evangelical (Noll 2001, p. 278).
Evangelical Christians living in multi-cultural, post-modern North
America and Europe are aware that attempts to convert others to their
religion may cause offence or lead to the charge of intolerance. Indeed, some
Christian theologians and historians now conclude that proselytism is based
on absolutist assumptions of divine election that no longer have a place in a
diverse, pluralistic world. Many Christians now participate in inter-
denominational and inter-religious dialogues, seeking to build unity rather
than division, and theologians like Taiwanese Presbyterian Choan-Seng Song
(1990 [1979]) have proposed alternatives to the exclusive Christian doctrine
of salvation, emphasizing for example the development of an Asian theology
contextualized in Asian philosophy and culture.1 But Song’s views are not
widely popular in Singapore, where most churches are evangelical and mission-
minded.
I base this paper on ethnographic research conducted between 1995 and
2005, including interviews in 2004 with key Christian leaders whom I asked
to comment on contemporary Christianity in Singapore. But before deeper
consideration to contemporary forms of Christian practice is given, let me
briefly consider the history of the development of evangelical Christianity
in Singapore.
EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY IN SINGAPORE:

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The history of Christianity in Singapore is directly related to the rise of the
non-conformist Protestant denominations of Britain, Europe, and North
America. Space constraints do not permit a detailed discussion of these
denominations, but it is important to point out several important innovations
promoted by non-conformist Christians as they have also had an impact on
Christianity in Singapore. First, they engaged in privately-funded philanthropic
work, including the establishment of institutions of public education,
orphanages, and the practice of private fund-raising. Second, whereas national
religions were connected with the state using religious hierarchies to draw a
social boundary between different national groups, they sought to overcome
national boundaries by creating networks that transcended dynastic boundaries.
Third, evangelical Christians also promoted a form of individualism when
they emphasized the inner reformation of the self.2
The Protestant involvement in foreign missions began to gain momentum
in the early nineteenth century. As European imperial expansion offered an
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“open door”, evangelical Christians expanded their ambitions to include the

conversion of so-called heathens and pagans, and through missionary efforts
funded by private donation Christianity became a religion of empire. The
European Christians took as their mandate Jesus’ command to “Go ye into all
the world and preach the gospel to every creature” (Mark 16:15).
Early Churches in Singapore

In the early years of British imperialism in South and Southeast Asia, the
Anglican church was the official church of the East India Company. Anglican
chaplains primarily served the British population, including military and
naval personnel, but from time to time some launched missionary efforts. But
most of the missions in the region were the work of Catholics, the oldest
denomination in the region, having arrived with Portuguese conquest of
Malacca in 1511 (Roxborogh 1992), and non-conformist Protestants, the
majority of whom were Scots or English, but whose numbers also included
Germans, New Zealanders, Canadians, and Americans. Dutch missionaries
also introduced Christianity in the East Indies (Indonesia) in particular after
the nineteenth century when pietist revival in Europe led to the promotion of
new forms of missionary activity. Among the earliest Protestant missionaries
to Singapore were congregationalists associated with the London Missionary
Society’s (LMS) Ultra-Ganges Mission, which was active from 1819–44
(Harrison 1979).
When the LMS relocated its mission to China after the first Opium War,
their mission effort was taken over by independent, Brethren, and Free
Presbyterian missionaries. From the 1880s onwards, Methodist missionaries
began to develop educational and social ministries, laying the groundwork
for a highly successful and influential Christian school system. In 1928, a
mere fourteen years after its founding in American, the Assemblies of God
successfully launched a mission, introducing American-style Pentecostalism
to Singapore, and in 1937 the Overseas Chinese Baptist Church (Swatow)
was established. Other denominations followed, and when the communist
revolution in 1949 forced missionaries and missionary agencies to leave
China, many relocated to Singapore and Malaya, further intensifying the
Christian presence in the region.3
Although many of the Protestant missionaries sought to learn Asian
languages and worked in a mission field, their day-to-day practices were
otherwise quite similar to those that non-conformist evangelical Christians
deployed in European cities to address social problems arising from migration,
industrialization, and poverty. From the outset, Christian missionaries involved
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themselves in providing education in vernacular languages (although English

often proved more popular), offering free or low-cost medical assistance, and
sheltering and educating orphans.
In the 1930s, new waves of evangelical revival impacted Singapore, but
these came not from America or Europe, but from China, and took some of
their vital energy from the rise of Asian nationalism. John Sung, the son of a
Methodist preacher in Fujian Province, had studied at Union Theological
Seminary in New York, where he encountered and rejected liberal theology.
After his return to China he made seven evangelistic visits to Singapore,
where he influenced the development of a number of Chinese Christian
churches (Sng 2003 [1980], pp. 172–79). Chinese evangelist and author
Watchman Nee (1903–72) adopted the Brethren model of the autonomous
local church, and urged Chinese Christians to establish indigenous churches
built with local resources. Chinese members of the Little Flock movement
who migrated to Singapore, Malaya, and the Philippines propagated Watchman
Nee’s local church movement, and in 1932 founded a Christian Assembly in
Singapore (Tan 1980, p. 9). In the 1960s, Kong Duen Yee (a.k.a. Mui Yee),
a born-again Hong Kong movie actress, staged a highly successful revival
campaign that introduced Pentecostal practices like speaking in tongues,
prophecy, and healing to participants in Chinese Christian churches. As a
consequence, some leaders in those churches left to form independent
charismatic local churches in Singapore and Malaysia, including the influential
Church of Singapore which lays claim to the distinction of being Singapore’s
first independent charismatic church.
Churches in Singapore in the Post-Independence Period

In the post-independence period, new waves of revival originating primarily
in North America had enormous impact on English-educated Christians in
Singapore. Many recall the staging of two major mass events in Singapore:
the Billy Graham Crusade of 1978, which ensured the prestige and influence
of American-style evangelical Christianity, and a national Bible Rally
organized in 1982 by the Full Gospel Christian Businessmen’s Fellowship
(FGCBF). The latter cooperated with 100 churches to organize and sponsor
the event, inviting Korea’s Paul Yonggyi Cho as the main speaker (Sng 2003
[1980], p. 296).
Because the FGCBF worked outside the parameters of regular Christian
denominations, the group was highly successful in introducing to English-
educated Singaporean Christians many practices associated with an emergent
charismatic movement, including speaking in tongues and prophecy. But
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120 Jean DeBernardi
when participants attempted to introduce these practices into their churches,

divisions arose, leading members to depart, often to join new independent
charismatic churches. Decades later, the so-called “Signs and Wonders”
movement associated with John Wimber and Peter Wagner proved far less
divisive. Many Singaporean churches accommodated internal differences by
the simple expedient of organizing separate services for traditional and
charismatic forms of worship, the latter youth-oriented and incorporating
contemporary Christian music.
In recent decades, Singaporean Christians have founded a number of
popular independent churches, including several growth-oriented mega-
churches with enormous Sunday meetings that break into cell groups during
the week. These huge meetings are often simultaneously broadcast in a
number of auditoriums, and Singapore’s titanium-clad City Harvest Church
even provides its services as live webcasts on its website. Although they may
be identified as charismatic in light of their emphasis on such practices as
speaking in tongues and being slain in the spirit, Singapore’s independent
charismatic churches undoubtedly continue to maintain the four distinctives
of evangelical Christianity: conversionism, activism, Biblicism, and
crucicentrism. Many support impressive programmes of missionary training
and outreach both locally and in the Southeast Asian and East Asian regions.
In North America, denominations that scholars typically categorize as
mainline Protestant like Anglicans, Methodists, Lutherans, and Presbyterians
are internally diverse, with evangelical and non-evangelical wings. But
Singaporean Christian leaders unanimously observe that in Singapore the
non-evangelical wing of mainline Protestantism is virtually non-existent.
Meanwhile, in the post-colonial period, the Anglican church in Singapore has
incorporated charismatic forms of Christian practice and engages in evangelical
outreach. Some speculate that the turn towards charismatic and evangelical
practices has been a strategy by which Anglican leaders in Singapore and
Malaysia seek to shake off negative associations with colonialism, as the
Anglican church remains, after all, England’s national church. Meanwhile,
Methodist Bishop Dr Robert Solomon recently provided leadership in the
work of the Methodist Missions Society in five countries in the region, and
was a leading participant in the Singapore Centre for Evangelism and Mission
(SCEM) 2005 GoForth Missions Conference.
Singapore, the Antioch of Asia

Singaporean Christians, proud of their contribution to world missions, often
describe Singapore as the Antioch of Asia, alluding to a multi-ethnic city
located in what is today Turkey that was the cradle of Christianity in the first
120

century A.D. In addition to church or denominationally-based mission

programmes, Singapore also hosts a number of local, regional and international
missionary organizations, training institutes, Bible schools, and mass media
outlets. To give a small sampling, these include the headquarters of the
Overseas Missionary Fellowship (OMF) International, the present-day
successor to Hudson Taylor’s China Inland Mission, and the offices of the
regionally-focused Asia Evangelistic Fellowship (AEF).
Missionary training institutes include the Asian Cross-Cultural Training
Institute housed in a Brethren Bethesda Pasir Ris Mission Church, which
attracts students from throughout East and Southeast Asia. Among many
Christian mass media organizations is the Far East Broadcasting Associates
(FEBA), an international, non-denominational Christian radio network that
broadcasts throughout East and Southeast Asia. Singapore also has a number
of inter-denominational organizations, including the National Council of
Churches in Singapore (NCCS), which has many objectives such as providing
“an agency through which the Government of Singapore may consult the
Council on matters of common concern to its members” (NCCS 2004, p. 7),
the Evangelical Fellowship of Singapore, and the Singapore Centre for
Evangelism and Mission (SCEM).
GLOBAL AND LOCAL FIELDS OF PRACTICE

Most of the innovative Christian teachings and practices that have passed
around the world in the last decades of the twentieth century have passed
through Singapore, including the spiritual warfare movement, the Health
and Wealth gospel, and the Alpha course. Influential Christian leaders like
John Wimber, Kenny Hagin, and Peter Wagner promote such programmes
globally through lecture tours, books, and the internet.4 Singapore’s Christian
leaders are keenly aware that they may utilize innovative practices and teachings
to mobilize interest and participation, and many make selective use of elements
drawn from the competing theologies now in circulation. But they undoubtedly
combine these new practices with Christian practices inherited from their
training and from previous waves of revival.
Singapore’s 450 or so Protestant churches exist within a local nexus of
relationships that includes a range of different denominations, from the
conservative Bible Presbyterians and Brethren to the Methodists, Anglicans
and Presbyterians. As Many Faces, One Faith — a 2004 book published by the
National Council of Churches of Singapore — points out, these churches
also maintain global links through historic ties, ethnic congregations, the
training of overseas pastors and church workers at institutions like the Singapore
Bible College and Trinity Theological College, and involvement in overseas
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122 Jean DeBernardi
missions (NCCS 2004, pp. 110–30). Although connected with groups

elsewhere, each of these also has its own local history and lineage, and some
Christian churches have been identified with Singapore’s Anglo-Chinese elite
since the colonial era. At present, Christian-run schools like those run by the
Methodist church are regarded as being among Singapore’s best primary and
secondary schools, and many senior government officials in the civil and
military services and in business are Christians.
Some Singaporean Christian churches proudly celebrate the depth of
their unique heritages with the publication of well-researched, handsomely
produced commemorative volumes and histories (see also NCCS 2004).
Nonetheless, under the powerful influence of global Christian trends,
denominational distinctions are losing ground. One Christian leader described
Singaporean Christianity as practising a widely popular form of “globalized
Christianity” with the result that diverse denominations now employ very
similar styles of worship. Another leader described a trend towards using
public relations management models to “grow” churches, including the striking
mega-churches that accommodate astonishing numbers of worshippers every
Sunday. Mega-churches like City Harvest, for example, make highly effective
use of the Internet to promote themselves in an intensely competitive urban
market, advertising to the world that “here is success, here is power”. These
churches have enjoyed particular success with Singaporean youth.
One pastor noted that thirty years ago, Singaporean Christians would
simply attend a church close to where they lived and often would make a
lifetime commitment to a denomination, but that today the Singapore church
scene is a “buffet” where Christians make use of the light rail system,
expressway and car to seek a church that met their needs. Singaporean leaders
also commented on the use of entertainment to draw Christians to churches
like City Harvest, where the pastor’s wife is a well-known pop singer, but also
the use of magic shows by Faith Community Baptist Church’s (FCBC)
Lawrence Khong, who reportedly regards mass media as the “pulpit of the
world”, and seeks to employ it for the task of “sowing and reaping”. One
leader commented that “the Sunday show is designed to entertain,” adding
that people went to church to network and look for business partners.
CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF EVANGELICAL

CHRISTIAN PRACTICE
Although contemporary evangelical Christianity is diverse in its programmes,
I discuss here seven major emphases that are global in their reach but which
122

find local expressions in Singapore. These are redemptionist-evangelical

theology, lifestyle or self-help evangelism, social service-evangelism, cross-
cultural or inter-cultural evangelism, evangelism where you live, Biblicism,
and lay leadership training. I briefly describe these below.
Redemptionist-evangelical Theology
The theological interpretation that motivates the strongest evangelical reading
of the Bible for Protestants is dispensational pre-millennial theology, which is
based upon a reading of Bible prophecy that in fact only became current in
the nineteenth century (Ryrie 1953, 1996; Kyle 1998). According to this
reading of the Bible, God’s chosen people were the Jews, and many of the
prophecies regard the Jewish people. When many Jews refused to accept their
Messiah, however, God’s grace was extended to the gentiles, and here is where
the period of church history begins. The figure of Christ is central to this
history — Christ is the head and the church is the body. Christ and his
church come together in the communion ceremony but will only be
permanently reunited when the church is “raptured” into heaven, and
Christians anticipate this rapture (a term invented in the nineteenth century
that has no exact equivalent in the Bible) as an almost mystical climax to
Christian history.
Although in Britain this reading of the Bible was associated with the
Brethren movement, North American fundamentalist Christians widely
adopted and promoted it. Despite the doubts expressed by many thoughtful
Christians, a version of pre-millennial theology continues to have widespread
influence, although Christians today know it through the fictional writings of
authors like Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins, whose works include the well-
known 1995 novel, Left Behind. This immensely popular novel offers a
fictionalized account of the rapture, which sweeps the believers to heaven,
leaving non-believers behind on earth to face the apocalypse known as the
Tribulation. We also find the influence of pre-millennial eschatology in books
not specifically focused on end-time thinking like Rick Warren’s The Purpose-
Driven Life (2002).
Although the pre-millennial theology has widespread currency due to the
influence of popular media, nonetheless, it is only one of several theological
interpretations available to evangelical Christians. One leader noted, for
example, that he favoured a millennial view, observing that for him the
evangelistic motivation derived from the Great Commission and the evangelical
view of salvation.
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124 Jean DeBernardi
Lifestyle or Self-help Evangelism

Singaporean evangelical Christians sometimes focus on converting others,
but also continue a very old Christian tradition of using the Christian “grace
message” to promote reform of the self towards holiness, an intimate experience
of God, and greater self-perfection. Rather than seeking to proselytize non-
Christians, lifestyle evangelism often takes on the challenge of inspiring
nominal Christians to become active and to seek internal transformation. For
example, the popular Alpha course proposes that participants seek to “build
a relationship with God” and to personally experience spiritual gifts. Originally
developed at Holy Trinity Brompton, London and described by its promoters
as a course in basic Christianity designed to evangelize non Church-goers, the
Alpha course now maintains websites in twenty-three countries, including
Singapore (see alpha.org 2005). In testimonials to the course on the Singapore
website, participants report that after taking the Alpha course, they were able
to give up smoking, improve their health, and find forgiveness in relationships
(see alpha.org.sg 2005).
A second prominent contemporary example of self-help evangelism is
Joel Osteen’s 2004 book, Your Best Life Now: 7 Steps to Living at your Full
Potential, which quickly reached number one on the New York Times bestseller
list and which Osteen and his wife have promoted on the talk show circuit.
In this book, Osteen describes a Christian path for individuals who seek to
realize their “full potential” so that they can become “happy, successful,
fulfilled individuals” (Osteen 2004, p. ix). In Singapore, many popular
Christian leaders offer similar messages. For example, Joseph Prince of New
Creation Church offers in his on-line publications, an essay that recommends
that Singaporeans “seek the kingdom of God” if they wish to be stress-free
and healthy (Prince 2004).
Social Service
Evangelical Christian churches in Singapore also continue the nineteenth
century tradition of offering social services, including education, medical aid
and diverse forms of philanthropic activity. For example, the Methodist
church in Singapore runs a number of highly regarded government-aided
schools, some established in the nineteenth century. Philanthropic efforts
include recent inter-denominational effort to raise funds for Saint Luke’s
Hospital for the Elderly which was built in 1996, and numerous outreach
programmes sponsored by individual churches. The most extensive and
impressive of these is Touch Community Services which is associated with
Faith Community Baptist Church. Their website notes that “Our mission is
to establish and provide for the needy and disadvantaged in our society an
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integrated network of community-based services that strengthens the family,

believing that every individual is unique and capable of reaching his or her
highest potential”, thereby directly addressing the goal of social amelioration
(Touch Community Services 2004).
Cross-cultural or Intercultural Evangelism

Singaporean Christians of many denominations avidly contribute to support
missionary activities, subscribing to the notion that they are at the cutting
edge of “Operation World” (Johnstone 1993). Their leaders express the desire
to be at the forefront of the movement to reach “unreached peoples and
groups”, and outreach may further include investing resources to provide
special religious services for Indonesian (understood to be Muslims) and
Filipino (assumed to be Catholics) guest workers in Singapore.
Missionary activities now take a number of new forms. One advertisement
for a missionary training centre notes that missionaries now include “non-
residential missionaries, urban church-planting, international teams, holistic
ministries, and the great challenge of the 10/40 Window”. For example,
Singaporean Christians often mention “tent-making”, which refers to the
practice of seeking to convey the Christian message while travelling or
working in places like China. Some Singaporean church members become
involved in programmes offering diverse forms of short-term charitable support,
and while so engaged may pass on Christian materials to individuals whom
they meet (a practice sometimes described as “friendship evangelism”). Audio-
visual media offer new possibilities for evangelism, including cassette tape
ministries, radio programming, and most spectacularly the global distribution
of the “Jesus” film, a two-hour docudrama that has been dubbed into 977
world languages (including at least one Chinese tribal minority language) and
shown over six billion times.5 One Christian leader further reported that in
2004, over 500 Singaporean Christians served overseas on a long-term basis,
some of whom were trained specialists offering highly valued skills. For
example, since 1996, a Singaporean medical doctor from a Brethren assembly,
together with his wife, has been organizing three-month training courses for
village doctors in China, a contribution recognized in 2001 with a Yunnan
Friendship Award (Sng 2003 [1980], pp. 343–44).
Since the majority of Singaporean Christians are ethnically Chinese,
many churches and organizations focus their evangelistic outreach efforts on
China. Singaporean Christian leaders report that they enjoy excellent relations
with the Chinese government, which recently sent a delegation to Singapore
to study how the government and church work together. The United Bible
Societies (a global network of 141 Bible societies) recently collaborated with
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126 Jean DeBernardi
the China Christian Council to establish the Amity Printing Company in

Nanjing, which since 1988 has engaged in legal Bible printing and distribution.
The Amity Printing Company has now printed over 49 million Chinese
Bibles and Testaments at a subsidized cost for sale through Chinese churches
and distribution centres — a development that the Bible Society of Singapore
hails as a “modern miracle”. Since 1991 Singapore’s Trinity Theological
College has been involved in training students from mainland China (Sng
2003 [1980], p. 342).
Evangelism Where You Live (I): Community Outreach

Singapore’s Christians also do the work of evangelism at home. Because the
government limits tracting and open-air proselytizing, evangelical Christians
must find other strategies to enact the requirement that they seek to influence
the non-Christian “other” to accept the Christian message. This commonly
involves the organization of church-based outreach events to which members
invite non-members (although one leader reported that these events rarely
resulted in conversions). In a recent book, Pastor Lawrence Chua further
proposes a programme of community penetration designed to reach
Singaporean heartlanders who do not fit the typical profile of Christians, who
tend to be well educated, English-speaking and financially better off (Chua
2004, p. 31). His proposals for evangelical activism involve finding reasons to
knock on doors in high-rise residential blocks, and ways to introduce the
Christian message through friendship evangelism. Some Christian leaders
instruct their members to take advantage of every opportunity to proselytize,
even providing them with workbooks where they may keep a log of persons
whom they sought to convert, from parents and grandparents to friends and
fellow workers. Indeed, this may be the most controversial aspect of their
practice, since the conversion of one or more family members may result in
conflict, and outreach to strangers risks offending practitioners of other
religions. But Singaporean Christian ministers and leaders are increasingly
aware of these risks.
Evangelism Where You Live (II): Prayer Evangelism

In the 1990s, a network of charismatic Christian leaders introduced and
promoted a number of innovative forms of prayer, including praying for
nations, spiritual warfare prayer and prayer-walking. The contemporary sources
for these forms of prayer evangelism may be found in the writings of authors
like Peter Wagner (1991, 1998) and also in widely popular works like Patrick
Johnstone’s Operation World (1993) and George Otis Jr.’s Strongholds of the
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10/40 Window: Intercessors Guide to the World’s Least Evangelized Nations

(1995). Many Christians in Singapore are aware of (and some enthusiastically
promote) these practices, including members of non-charismatic
denominations that tolerate a modicum of third wave charismatic practices as
a way of avoiding schisms and the loss of members.
Biblicism
We also find in contemporary Singapore a renewed Biblicism expressed in the
emergent popularity of Bible study among educated, professional Singaporeans,
who equate advancement in their religion (like advancement in their careers)
as involving continuous study. Such studies may be undertaken in church-
based Bible study classes or cell groups, or by joining a local branch of the
inter-denominational Bible Study Fellowship International, which offers a
seven-year programme of Bible study with the goal of enhancing an individual’s
relationship with God. Evangelical Christians have traditionally emphasized
not only reading the Bible but also communication skills in the form of Bible
exegesis and effective exhortation.
Lay Leadership
Many evangelical Christian churches emphasize lay involvement, and have
long fostered the development of lay leaders through the assignment of
responsibilities like the teaching of Sunday school classes or the leading of
Bible study or cell groups. A more recent development is the attempt of
evangelical Christians to integrate their work with their faith, sometimes
taking time off work to do theological studies at institutions like Vancouver’s
Regent College which offers courses “to assist people wanting to deal with
issues of spirituality, priorities, leadership and mission in the workplace”
(Regent College 2005–06). At the same time, Christian leaders are emerging
who are not pastors, and more Singaporean churches have pastors in suits
and ties than in clerical robes, blurring the boundaries between the lay and
the cleric.
CONTEMPORARY EVANGELICAL STRATEGIES

IN SINGAPORE
The Social and Legislative Setting
According to the 2000 census, 42.5 per cent of Singapore’s population
identify themselves as Buddhist, 14.6 per cent as Christians (both Protestant
and Catholic), 14.8 per cent as non-religious, and 8.5 per cent as Taoist.
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For Christians, the goal of church growth has been elusive. Many leaders
ascribe the stagnation of the last fifteen years to two main factors. The first
is the government’s prohibition on the organization of religious youth
groups and religiously-oriented activities in schools. The second and perhaps
more important is the increasing popularity of Buddhism. Like Christians,
many contemporary Buddhist organizations forge international links, draw
on huge financial resources to acquire land and build facilities, use methods
of mass appeal, and take a modernized approach to their activities. Singapore’s
Taoists have also begun to modernise their practices, and have renewed
their connections with prestigious Taoist institutions in China like Beijing’s
Baiyun Guan.
As mentioned above, Christian activism — the “expression of the gospel
in effort” — is deeply ingrained in the evangelical Christian interpretation of
the Bible, an interpretation that profoundly informs Christian programmes
of proselytism and outreach (Bebbington 1989, p. 3). In addition to supporting
missions, Singapore’s evangelical Christians believe themselves to have a
responsibility to do the work of evangelism at home.
As Simon Coleman has observed of charismatic Christians in Europe,
proselytism is often not so much about converting others as it is about
reinforcing one’s commitments by pronouncing them to others under the
guise of proselytism. Consequently, he concludes that “[m]issionisation is not
merely a matter of attempting to transform the potential convert, but also —
perhaps even primarily — a means of recreating or reconverting the charismatic
self ” (Coleman 2003, p. 17).
In contemporary Singapore as in Europe, many practices that have a
proselytizing aim have as their primary audience not the absent unconverted
but the gathered believers who collectively enunciate their intentions. But
Singaporean Christians engage in the imperative to preach the gospel to all
nations in a rather different field of practice from what Coleman describes for
Europe. A Singaporean Christian’s social environment may include family
members who maintain private shrines in their homes for devotion to their
favorite Hindu or Taoist deities, Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, secular European
co-workers, and neighbours in Housing Development Board high-rise flats
whose multi-ethnic composition is legislated by the state. As a result of this
state-guaranteed diversity, their neighbours probably will include Malay
Muslims, Catholics, Hindus, and Taoists. Undoubtedly, the potential for
inter-religious and indeed intra-familial conflict exists when Christians seek
to make converts of non-Christians in such a diverse context.
In multi-ethnic and multi-religious Singapore, state legislation and sanction
set the formal conditions affecting various aspects of religious practice,
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including proselytization and evangelism. Freedom of religion is

constitutionally guaranteed, but is also informed by concern to maintain
racial and religious harmony. Article 15 of Singapore’s Constitution is entitled
“Freedom of Religion”, and provides that “Every person has the right to
profess and practice his religion and to propagate it” (Singapore-Constitution
1995). But Singapore’s Societies Act requires that all religious groups must be
registered, and the government has de-registered some groups, including the
Singapore Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Unification Church.
In 1982, the government proposed to promote moral values in secondary
schools through “Religious Knowledge” classes offering six different options
(Bible knowledge, Buddhist studies, Hindu studies, Islamic religious
knowledge, world religions, and Confucianism). But the programme was
cancelled in 1990 after it was found that teachers, including Christian ones,
were using the classroom as a site for proselytization.
In 1990, the government further enacted the Maintenance of Religious
Harmony Act as a means to respond to perceived threats to religious harmony,
including insensitive Christian and Muslim proselytism and entry of religious
groups into the political arena. If a complaint is lodged and an individual
deemed to have infringed the Religious Harmony legislation, the response is
often cautionary, but the penalty may be more severe, including prosecution,
fine or imprisonment, and restrictions on the individual’s exercise of leadership
in a religious group (see also Kuah-Pearce 2003, pp. 145–65). As a consequence,
Christians must exercise considerable discretion in their outreach efforts. For
example, Christians now label some potentially sensitive publications
distributed by their churches “For Christians Only”, to avoid the charge that
they are proselytizing non-Christian populations. Since the attacks on the
World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, the government has revisited the
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, and also enacted a Declaration on
Religious Harmony. The latter is not a legal document but rather an ethos or
code for conduct that “affirms the values that have helped to maintain
religious harmony in Singapore; and serves as a reminder of the need for
continued efforts to develop stronger bonds across religions in Singapore”
(Channel News Asia 2002).
Diverse Outreach Programmes

At present, Christian churches and organizations engage in diverse
programmes of outreach to Singapore’s non-Christians, or “pre-Christians”,
as some have termed them (see Chua 2004). These include church-planting
and community care, especially in Singapore’s predominantly non-Christian
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130 Jean DeBernardi
heartland, education, childcare, eldercare, hospital visitation, marriage

counselling, and the (re)introduction of services in Mandarin and in Chinese
dialects like Hokkien, Hakka and Cantonese. When the government
launched the formation of “Inter-racial Confidence Circles” which seek to
encourage multi-ethnic interaction in order to build trust and bonding,
some Christians organized their own “circles of friendship” to encourage
peer mentoring and to help one another to “pastor the community”.
Meanwhile, one charismatic leader noted that in 2004, members of the
Singapore Kindness Movement promoted “World Kindness Day”, seeking
to revive the kampong (village) spirit of the past “by intentionally blessing
a neighbour with an act of kindness”.
Many leaders expressed the opinion that reaching youth was crucial for
the long-term vitality of Christianity in Singapore. One leader noted with
discouragement that the current social climate was permissive and worldly,
and that many young people were disinterested in religion. He observed that
it was impossible to reach youth at home by knocking on doors, and that
Christians could not longer reach them through their schools. He added that
for many years, Christians had sponsored youth-oriented organizations in
schools and universities, including groups like Inter-School Christian
Fellowship, Youth for Christ, Campus Crusade for Christ, the Navigators and
the Varsity Christian Fellowship. But the government banned these
organizations from primary and secondary schools, with the sole exception of
the Girls’ and Boys’ Brigades which have Christian roots but are nonetheless
deemed acceptable. Despite these government-imposed limitations, recent
letters to the Straits Times Forum suggest that for some non-Christian
Singaporeans, overzealous proselytism in schools, including “verbal assaults
on other religions”, remains an issue (Yawning Bread 2005).
Some Singapore Christians use chance encounters with strangers as an
occasion for proselytism, while others approach family members and involve
family ties. To explore these forms of evangelism, during April and May
2004, I informally interviewed a random sample of ten Chinese and two
Malay Muslim taxi drivers. I found that the Malay drivers were reluctant to
discuss religion. The Chinese drivers, by contrast, were typically expansive on
the topic of religion. They included one practising Buddhist, one Chinese
immigrant who had been converted to Christianity after a construction site
accident, and eight who practised Chinese popular religion.
One of the popular religionists complained that he did not know much
about his religion since no one had taught him. Another, whose daughter was
Christian, described Chinese popular religion somewhat uncomfortably as
“idol worship”. Four of the popular religionists had attended Christian
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services at the urging of their children and had considered becoming Christian.
One was very concerned that his Christian children would not know how to
perform Buddhist or Taoist ceremonies for their ancestors, and contemplated
conversion for that reason. On the other hand, another who had seriously
considered conversion commented that the person had to have a miraculous
experience before they would truly convert. Many recommended to me their
favourite places of worship, which ranged from tiny God of Prosperity
temples to the more impressive Christian churches, including City Harvest’s
new titanium-clad church. The single convert was the migrant worker from
China whose foot had been shattered in an accident. Charismatic Christians
had visited him in hospital and prayed for him, and when he able to walk
again sooner than expected after five surgeries, he had chosen to join their
church. He reported with a mixture of sadness and anger that since his
conversion some of his brothers and sisters would no longer speak with him.
Two taxi drivers reported distressing encounters with customers who
ridiculed their charms for safe driving. One said that some young Christians
who were his passengers had told him that his charm was just wood and was
useless. He commented that they should not have done that since it hurt him,
but that he did not know how to argue with them. Another said that young
Christian passengers who had taken his taxi had told him that his Buddha
was just wood and stone, and that he should accept Jesus instead. His
response was to invoke the Hokkien proverb, “I’ve eaten more salt that you’ve
eaten rice!”, emphasizing their youth and lack of experience. At the same
time, several of the drivers highly praised the churches for their work with
youth and their promotion of moral values.
On subsequent visits to Singapore in 2004 and 2005, other taxi drivers
have confirmed that they commonly encounter Christian passengers who
seek to convert them. As discussed above, evangelical Christianity in its
original form sought to revive Christianity and to turn nominal Christians
into “heart” Christians who lived their religion. But transferred into a cross-
cultural setting, Christian revivalists sometimes label non-Christian religions
“inauthentic” and “ineffective” forms of religious belief — a practice that has
the potential to cause deep offence.
Christian Responses to Local Cultures

Many Singaporean Christian leaders are aware that the Christian message is
one that some find intolerant in a multi-cultural, multi-religious setting.
After all, certain forms of Christian theology and practice draw a firm
boundary between the saved and unsaved. This boundary is further hardened
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132 Jean DeBernardi
when Christians refuse to participate in non-Christian rituals including,

most importantly, funeral ceremonies and the rituals associated with the
veneration of ancestors.
Although tensions do exist, we also find significant congruencies between
local cultures and Christianity. One highly-trained Christian leader insightfully
commented that his denomination fit well with both Chinese and Indian
cultures since it taught that the individual must fulfil their family and social
responsibilities, be accountable to the group, and conform to the expectation
of its members. He further noted that the activist aspect of evangelical work,
including an emphasis on missions, appealed to the Chinese since many had
a strong entrepreneurial spirit and enjoyed seizing opportunities. Finally, he
observed that, whereas English-educated individuals sometimes adopted the
Western culture of rebellion and anti-authoritarianism, traditional Chinese
culture still taught the honouring of authority.
Other leaders discussed strategies by which the Christian message could
be contextualized or indigenized in Chinese culture. One charismatic-oriented
leader commented that his church had an active programme of outreach to
the Chinese in Singapore’s predominantly non-Christian heartland, and that
they had adopted three guidelines for that work. The first is not to belittle
Chinese culture as superstitious but to call on Chinese Christians to practise
Chinese culture privately as individuals. The second is to make use of
important festivals as a way of contextualizing the church. For example, some
Singaporean churches now use the Mooncake Festival and Chinese New Year
as opportunities for community outreach, making visits to non-Christians to
offer mooncakes and red packets. (The converted Chinese taxi driver had
participated in these programmes, and reported that Taoists sometimes just
loudly shooed them away, and would not take any invitations or gifts). The
third is to emphasize the similarity between Biblical and Chinese values like
respect for elders, care for society above self, and viewing the Christian
community as a (social) body. Meanwhile, several leaders stressed the notion
that Christianity was an Eastern not a Western religion, and one mentioned
the potential rhetorical usefulness of the widely-read book, The Discovery of
Genesis: How the Truths of Genesis Were Found Hidden in the Chinese Language,
whose authors claim that the stories of Genesis were graphically preserved in
Chinese characters (Kang and Nelson 1979).
Although these practices suggest an accommodation to Chinese culture,
nonetheless in the 1980s and 1990s, conversion from traditional Chinese
religion in many churches entailed a strictly enforced requirement that new
converts put away or even destroy their idols in what is sometimes termed
a “bridge burning” ritual of conversion. As one leader observed, new
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Chinese Christian converts typically have a family altar displaying statues of

deities like the Goddess of Mercy in their homes, and the church expects
them to make a transition by removing or destroying these items. Some
churches send a “converting team” to the home to remove them the day
after an individual professes his or her conversion. Indeed, one lay leader
reported to me in 1997 that his church had required a new convert to
smash porcelain images worth over $6,000 that he had kept in his home.
Needless to say, those who practise Chinese popular religious culture may
find this kind of act upsetting and disrespectful.
Although the requirement persists that converts make a transition from
their previous religious practices, some churches report taking a gentler
approach nowadays by, for example, simply praying for the person to ask the
pastor to remove the idols. Meanwhile, one charismatic leader reported that
the ritual of removal also has a spiritual dimension since “if the household
worshipped it, the spirit will be on the premises and we must get them to go
even if the idol is removed”. He reported that the pastor exercised his God-
given authority to command the spirit to go away.
PRAYER EVANGELISM IN THE 1990S

In this section I discuss several innovative forms of prayer evangelism that
became popular in Singapore in the 1990s. During this period, charismatic
Christian leaders Peter Wagner and George Otis organized and led a
remarkable global movement named “AD2000 and Beyond”, which
participants described as a movement of movements and a network of
networks. As the year 2000 approached, they sought to mobilize evangelical
Christians worldwide for the task of world evangelism. As one important
aspect of their programme of global mobilization, their leaders proposed
ten forms of innovative prayer, including spiritual warfare, spiritual mapping,
and the AD2000 Prayer Track (Wagner 2000). Christians provide
extraordinary levels of financial support to local charitable outreach, church-
planting, and global missions, but they also regard prayer as crucial to their
success in making converts. Consequently, these programmes and proposals
found enthusiastic acceptance among a number of influential Singaporean
Christian leaders (see also DeBernardi 2008).
Spiritual Warfare
During research visits to Singapore in 1997 and 1999, I found spiritual
warfare to be one of the most discussed forms of prayer evangelism, and that
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134 Jean DeBernardi
many books and pamphlets on this and related topics were widely available
in Singapore’s Christian bookstores (DeBernardi 1999, 2005). These included
several influential books by Peter Wagner (1991, 1994, 1998), and also a
book by critic Chuck Lowe (1998), who concluded that the practices
associated with spiritual warfare were extra-Biblical. Perhaps anticipating
objections, Wagner claimed to have been directly inspired by the Holy
Spirit, noting that he and other Christian leaders sensed in the early 1990s
that “the Holy Spirit is saying, ‘Prepare for warfare’ ” (Wagner 1991, p. 3).
Although addressed to a Christian audience, in a multi-religious context
like Singapore, the militant rhetoric of the spiritual warfare movement was
one that was potentially offensive to non-Christians whose deities (whom
one author termed “cultural ethnic demons”) were the likely targets of
spiritual warfare prayer. As contextualized in Singapore, these forms of
prayer undoubtedly reinforced the boundary between the supplicant’s own
beliefs and practices and those of other religions, especially Asian polytheistic
ones such as Hinduism and Taoism.
In one of his earliest publications on spiritual warfare, Wagner proposed
that unconverted regions of the world were under the control of territorial
spirits rooted in specific “geographical areas and population centres” (Wagner
1991, p. 3). Citing Biblical precedents, he proposed a constellation of
practices designed to help Christians in their battle to overcome these
territorial spirits. As a first step, prayer warriors perform spiritual mapping
(which one charismatic Christian explained as a diagnostic practice designed
to help identify what kind of prayer and other help a community might
need), and seek to identify the territorial spirits responsible for the failure
to convert non-Christians. Wagner proposed that once Christians had
identified the local territorial spirits that were impeding the task of
evangelism, they should engage in three activities that took them into the
larger world to attack spiritual strongholds. The first is prayer walking, in
which Christians walk inconspicuously in small groups to pray at targeted
areas identified as spiritual strongholds (for example a red light district, a
bar-filled street or a temple). The second is the prayer march, in which
Christians gather en masse to process through city streets to a site where
they hold a well-publicized rally. The third is the prayer journey, where
Christians travel in groups to visit powerful “spiritual strongholds” that
transcend local communities, like Ephesus and Mount Everest. In 1997, for
example, Wagner and his team of prayer intercessors undertook a secret
prayer journey to Mount Everest, whose Nepalese and Tibetan names
meant “Mother of the Universe”, They called their campaign “Operation
Ice Castle”, and scaled Mount Everest where they “assaulted” the “seat of
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the Mother of the Universe” — a wall of ice 6,000 metres high (Wagner
1998, p. 37).
George Otis’ popular 1995 book, Strongholds of the 10/40 Window:
Intercessors Guide to the World’s Least Evangelized Nations, provides specific
guidelines to identifying spiritual strongholds, and recommends a form of
intercessory prayer termed “praying through the 10/40 window” (or “praying
through the window”). According to Otis, the term 10/40 refers to countries
that lie within the area from 10 degrees to 40 degrees north of the equator,
including Northern Africa, the Middle East, India, China, and Mainland
Southeast Asia. This area, Otis notes, “is littered with an astonishing diversity
of natural and man-made sacred sites” which are “important points of contact
with the spirit world”, but also “targetable elements in the Enemy’s deceptive
web” (Otis 1995, p. ii). Additionally, as the book’s cover notes, “the 10/40
Window contains the birthplace of every major non-Christian religion on
earth — Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Taoism, Confucianism,
Bahai, Sikhism, Judaism, and Jainism.” Strongholds of the 10/40 Window also
has specific entries by nation which provide detailed information on local
spiritual strongholds so that intercessors can target them in their prayers.
There is no entry for Singapore, but the entry for Malaysia proposes that
intercessors pray over specific “Spiritual Power Points” like the Shah Alam
Mosque near Kuala Lumpur and Penang’s Snake Temple and also during
spiritual events like the Hindu festival Thaipusam and the Islamic Ramadan
(Otis 1995, p. 156). Those who engage in spiritual warfare sometimes
travelled to such sites to pray against specific deities, and also time their visits
(and their intercessory prayers) to coincide with special events like festivals or
the Muslim fasting month.6
Prayers and Deliverance

Many Singaporean Christians interviewed in 1997 and 1999 for this research
were familiar with and favourably disposed towards the constellation of
practices associated with the AD2000 and Beyond Movement, including
spiritual warfare, spiritual mapping and praying through the 10/40 window.
In response to these proposals, for example, a small interdenominational
group of high-level Christian leaders, including charismatic Christians and
Anglicans, conducted spiritual mapping of the island. As an active participant
in Peter Wagner’s spiritual warfare network, Pastor Lawrence Khong of Faith
Community Baptist Church also led a Singaporean delegation to the 1998
Global Conference on Intercession, Spiritual Warfare, and Evangelism in
Guatemala City, an event that drew over 5,000 participants.
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Starting in 1995, a number of charismatic Christian leaders also formed

an AD 2000 and Beyond United Prayer Track in Singapore. Participants
gathered for forty-day prayer fasts at Singapore’s Anglican Cathedral, and on
1 July 1997, the launch date of one of these forty-day fasts — participants
further participated in PrayerWave Asia, a “partnership of prayer networks all
over Asia” to offer a “chorus of prayer on behalf of the hundreds of unreached
people groups in Asia” (Prayerwave Asia 1997). In the weeks that followed,
participants gathered to collectively “pray for nations”, and also divided into
small groups to pray for the world’s diverse countries and “unreached people
groups”. At the conclusion of the forty-day prayer fast in 1997, seventy-two
churches and Christian organizations (the majority of which were charismatic
in their practices) cooperated to organize the National Day Festival of Praise
at Singapore’s Indoor Stadium, an event that coincided with Singapore’s
National Day celebration. The date 9 August was the day of a coordinated
event — Citywalk, whose organizers gave participants a set of six maps
marked with walking tours of downtown Singapore that identified prayer
points, including Parliament House, banks and financial houses, shopping
malls and entertainment centres, as well as Sir Stamford Raffles’ landing site
and statue. The event ended with “Citylight”, a programme of coordinated
prayer whose beginning was timed to coincide with the strike of the national
anthem during Singapore’s National Day Parade.
The AD2000 and Beyond network was dismantled in 2001, but the
LoveSingapore network continues to organize 40-day prayer fasts, and
handsomely produced prayer guides are available for downloading from their
website (LoveSingapore 2006). The emphasis on prayer evangelism persists,
but community outreach now takes new forms. In a recent publication, for
example, one of LoveSingapore’s influential leaders recommends that the
Christian engage in “united fervent prayer” as a “spiritual weapon”, observing
that “only prayer can tear down the strongholds in the minds of the unsaved”.
But the author also recommends that the Christian perform deeds of kindness
in order to overcome community resistance (Chua 2004, pp. 76–77).
Practitioners of prayer evangelism and spiritual warfare vividly imagine
the deities of non-Christian religious practices as demonic opponents whom
Christians should seek to overcome in a war waged against dark principalities.
Indeed, some charismatic Christians deem a wide range of Chinese cultural
practices to be demonic, from martial arts and deity worship to traditional
Chinese medicine, qigong and acupuncture. Consequently, it is not surprising
that although interest in spiritual warfare has declined, the deliverance ministry
— which Wagner described as “ground level spiritual warfare” — continues
to be widely popular.
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Deliverance is the practice of using prayer and spiritual authority to

command and bind spirits that Christians believe to be troubling individuals.
Many charismatic pastors view the ministry of deliverance as crucial for those
who were dedicated to a god or a goddess in their youth, and require the new
convert to actively repudiate those ritually created bonds. The spirits that
practitioners of the deliverance ministry seek to repudiate are not limited to
those of Chinese deities. At a recent ritual performed in Singapore, the
ecclesiastically high-ranking participants exorcised the spirits of snakes, martial
arts, freemasonry and colonialism, in a psychologically-oriented ritual that
seemed to be as much about driving out the past as dealing with spirits.
CONCLUSION
In the post-9/11 environment in Singapore, the government’s efforts to
promote awareness of and sensitivity to issues regarding religious harmony
have led many Christian leaders to become aware of the potential problems
that insensitive evangelism can cause. In my interviews with Christian leaders
in 2004, I sought to ascertain the status of spiritual warfare theology in
Singapore’s Christian community. I found that most of those interviewed
expressed concern over the militant, aggressive flavour of spiritual warfare
rhetoric, and of the practice of prayer walks designed to conquer Singapore’s
territory. As one person insightfully commented, the language of spiritual
warfare was not “positive”, and furthermore was “out of place in an Islamic
context where they talk about jihad”.
Although charismatic Christians continue to engage in forms of “power
evangelism” involving healing and prophecy, spiritual warfare prayer and
prayer walks appear to have been superseded by an emphasis on activities that
a charismatic leader described as more “personal and personable” forms of
“genuine good neighbourliness”, including both individual acts of kindness
and “special community blessing events”. Some also engage in the organized
practice of “community penetration” by giving gifts to non-Christians during
Chinese festivals, singing Christmas carols in the open spaces between HDB
high-rise flats, or prayer walking with the aim of breaking down “invisible
walls” (see Chua 2004).
As discussed above, Singapore’s evangelical Christians devote significant
financial resources and time to activities like spiritual self improvement, Bible
study, social services, community outreach and missions. Although prayer
evangelism may be a less central aspect of evangelical practice, and although
spiritual warfare prayer in particular may not play a significant role in the
religious practice of most Christians in Singapore today, nonetheless globally
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spiritual warfare remains a vibrant and influential practical theology. Indeed,

novels that promote the mentality of intra-religious struggle continue to hold
sway over the imagination of many North American Christians, many of
whom have offered highly negative judgements of Islam since 9/11. Probably
no form of government control can prevent the circulation of these judgements,
which the media widely reports and which are easily available on the Internet.
The government of Singapore has already placed limits on and seeks to
control extreme forms of aggressive and/or insensitive proselytizing. But as
the interviews with taxi drivers reveal, even a brief conversation may be
perceived as hurtful. Because the role of Christian leaders is crucial in
proposing innovative forms of evangelical practice to their followers or rejecting
them, the most appropriate response to potentially insensitive forms of
proselytism is education and dialogue, including the continuation of inclusive
inter-religious dialogues among religious leaders.
Notes
The research on which this chapter is based was funded by the Social Science and
Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research, the University of Alberta Humanity, Fine Arts, and Social
Sciences Research Fund, and the Institute of Policy Studies. Special thanks are due to
the IPS project coordinator Dr Lai Ah Eng, and to the Christian leaders who agreed
to interviews with me in April and May 2004, and who offered comments on an
earlier draft of this chapter, including Professor Simon Chan, Reverend Lawrence
Chua, Dr Lee Soo Ann, Dr Bobby Sng, Bishop Dr Robert Solomon and Bishop Hwa
Yung. Their insights inform this chapter on many points, but in order to protect their
anonymity, their comments are attributed to “Christian leaders” rather than using
their names or titles. I also wish to thank a number of non-Christian contacts whom
I interviewed informally, including Victor Yue, Master Lee Zhiwang, and Ms Tan
Zhixia. The author takes sole responsibility for the accuracy of the content and the
views expressed.
1. C. S. Song has been an active leader in the World Alliance of Reformed
Churches which affirms missions as one of its basic commitments, but which
emphasizes that Christians in different times and places have enriched their
understanding of the Gospel “with their own religious and cultural heritage”
(WARC 1996).
2. For further information on the development of non-conformist Christianity in
Europe and North America, see Bebbington 1999; Binfield 1977; and Ward
1992.
3. On the history of Christianity in Singapore, see DeBernardi (n.d.); Goh 2003;
Hunt, Lee, and Roxborogh 1992 (this study focuses on Malaysia but includes
138

some discussion of Singapore); National Council of Churches of Singapore

(2004); and Sng (2003 [1980]).
4. The prominence of evangelical Christian authors on the bestseller list is one
measure of their success. Indeed, the sale of Christian books accounts for 36 per
cent of the $4.2 billion-a-year Christian products industry (Johnson 2005).
5. This information was taken from the Jesus Film Project website: <http://www.
jesusfilm.org/aboutus/index.html>.
6. For example, the organizers of the 1998 Global Conference on Intercession,
Spiritual Warfare, and Evangelism in Guatemala City, which drew 5,000
participants, scheduled the conference to coincide with the feast day of the
Mayan saint known as San Simon (or Maximon). The conference convener, El
Shaddai’s Harold Caballeros, claimed that evangelical Christians had liberated a
small market town from this powerful territorial spirit, and on the final day of
the conference, the organizers took fifty bus-loads of participants to Amolonga,
carefully orchestrating a collective “Triumphal Entry” into the town (see
DeBernardi 1999).
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Alpha.org. <http://alphacourse.org/welcome/index.htm> (accessed 5 August 2005).
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Binfield, Clyde. So Down to Prayers: Studies in English Nonconformity 1780–1920.
London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1977.
Channel NewsAsia. “Need to Tackle Proselytism when Drafting Religious Code:
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———. “Asia’s Antioch: Prayer and Proselytism in Singapore”. In Proselytization
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Revisited: Rights Talk, Free Markets, and Culture Wars, edited by Rosalind Hackett.
London: Equinox Publishers, 2008.
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Johnstone, Patrick. Operation World. Carlisle: OM Publishing, 1993.
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Buddhism in Singapore. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003.
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Inter-varsity Press, 1998.
LaHaye, Tim and Jerry B. Jenkins. Left Behind: A Novel of the Earth’s Last Days.
Wheaton: Tynedale House Publishers, 1995.
LoveSingapore <http://www.lovesingapore.org.sg> (accessed 5 June 2006).
Lowe, Chuck. Territorial Spirits and World Evangelism? : A Biblical, Historical and
Missiological Critique of Strategic-Level Spiritual Warfare. Ross-shire, Great Britain:
Mentor/OMF, 1998.
National Council of Churches of Singapore. A Guide to Churches and Christian
Organizations in Singapore. Singapore: NCCS, 2003.
———. Many Faces, One Faith. Singapore: NCCS, 2004.
Noll, Mark A. American Evangelical Christianity: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell
Publisher, 2001.
Osteen, Joel. Your Best Life Now: 7 Steps to Living at your Full Potential. New York:
Warner Faith, 2004.
Otis, George Jr. Strongholds of the 10/40 Window: Intercessors Guide to the World’s Least
Evangelized Nations. Seattle, Washington: YWAM, 1995.
Prayerwave Asia. “July First 1997”. Singapore: AD2000 United Prayer Resource
Network, 1997.
Prince, Joseph. “Becoming Stress-Free and Healthy”. Solid Rock. December 2004.
<http://www.newcreation.org.sg> (accessed 10 August 2005).
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Regent College. “Marketplace Institute at Regent College: Vocation Institute, A

Resource of Regent College”. http://www.regent-college.edu/academics/
marketplace/index.html>, 2005–06 (accessed 10 August 2005).
Roxborogh, John. “The Roman Catholic Church”. In Christianity in Malaysia: A
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Roxborogh, pp. 1–33. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1992.
Ryrie, Charles C. The Basis of the Premillennial Faith. Neptune: Loizeaux Brothers,
1953.
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Couch, pp. 93–98. Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1996.
Singapore-Constitution International Constitutional Law Document Status.
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Sng, Bobby E. K. In His Good Time: The Story of the Church in Singapore, 1819–2002.
3rd ed. Singapore: Bible Society of Singapore and Graduates’ Christian Fellowship,
2003 [1980].
Song, Choan-Seng. Third Eye Theology. Revised ed. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis
Books, 1990 [1979].
Tan, Charles K. H. The Teaching of Witness Lee and the Local Church (The Church in
Singapore) Evaluated. B.A. Research Paper, Singapore Bible College, 1980.
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(accessed 10 August 2005).
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43–50. Chichester: Sovereign World, 1991.
———. Spreading the Fire: A New Look at Acts — God’s Training Manual for Every
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———. Confronting the Queen of Heaven. Colorado Springs: Wagner Institute for
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———.“Summary Report: AD2000 United Prayer Track”. <http://www.ad2000.org/
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142 Vineeta Sinha
“RELIGIOUSLY-INSPIRED”,
“INDIA-DERIVED” MOVEMENTS
IN SINGAPORE
Vineeta Sinha
NAMING A ‘NEW’ PHENOMENON: A QUESTION OF

TERMINOLOGY
In the course of research for this chapter, I discovered an interesting collection
of theoretical works on the subject of “new religious movements” (NRMs),
four of which were especially eye-catching: The Historical Dictionary of New
Religious Movements (2001), edited by George D. Chryssides; The Oxford
Handbook of New Religious Movements (2004), edited by James R. Lewis;
Encyclopedia of New Religious Movements (2005), edited by Peter B. Clarke
and Encyclopedia of New Religions, New Religious Movements, Sects and
Alternative Spiritualities (2004), edited by Christopher Partridge. It is significant
that in the year 2006, a student of the field of “new religions” has access to
an accumulated body of resources such as historical dictionaries,
encyclopedias, handbooks and guidebooks in addition to an astonishing
array of empirical data about NRMs across the globe and sophisticated
theorizing about a subject that, only a short fifty years ago, was still in its
infancy. This suggests three important points: (1) the phenomenal global
growth of “new religious movements”, especially in the second half of the
twentieth century, (2) the huge scholarly interest in the phenomenon as
well as creative attempts to make sense of it, and (3) the institutionalization
142
142

“Religiously-inspired”, “India-derived” Movements in Singapore 143
of this sub-field of study in the social sciences. Expectedly, the emergent

field is not defined by consensus; instead, the vibrant debates within have
raised fundamental questions about definitions, concepts and modes of
theorizing this new phenomenon. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to
enter these discussions in detail; only one strand of the conversation is
relevant to the present purpose: the question of definitions.
Scholars agree that something “new” is happening in religious domains
globally, and that novel and innovative expressions of religiosity are not only
asserted by participants but also that different kinds of evidence for this are
pervasive. A primary challenge is to figure out how this “new” religious style
is to be discoursed and theorized, and this entails addressing the following
questions: How are these individuals (with a new religious style) who have
organized themselves into collectivities and their religious ideas to be denoted?
Do they constitute a new religion? Are they, in fact, religions at all? What
should the emergent groups be called? A range of alternatives have not only
been offered — sect, cult, new religious movement, alternative spirituality,
alternate religious tradition, religious reform movement — but are themselves
also disputed and contested. A good example is the description “cult” —
which is rejected by many scholars on grounds that it carries negative
connotations, is thus pejorative and, most importantly, does not accurately
represent the substance and intent of many of the groups encapsulated under
the label NRMs. The description “new religious movements” seems to have
emerged from the list on offer as a safe, neutral and legitimate choice and is
increasingly used in scholarly discourses on the subject (Arweck 2002; Barker
1989; Beckford 1986; Bromley and Hammond 1987; Clarke 2006; Gordon
1995; Wilson 1999). The literature also attests to the variety and complexity
within the broad category of NRMs, with examples cited from practically all
major religious traditions and all corners of the globe (Clarke 2005; Partridge
2004). This chapter focuses on a sample of such movements of the Indian
variety and their presence on the island nation-state of Singapore.
Scholars have argued that “the phenomenon of new religious movements
is itself not new in the history of Hinduism” (Sharma 1986, p. 220),
highlighting further the classical, medieval and pre-independence periods in
Indian history as having given rise to a variety of novel religious movements
(Majumdar 1953; Sarma 1944; Sen 1961 cited in Sharma 1986, p. 220).
Academic interest in the emergence of new religious movements” in India, is
itself not recent but has engaged scholars since at least the 1940s.1 The range
of such movements has often been catalogued under “pre-independence” and
“post-independence” moments of Indian history. In the former category, the
end of the nineteenth century saw the advent of the Arya Samaj and Brahmo
143

144 Vineeta Sinha
Samaj movements, the Ramakrishna Mission as well as the Theosophical

Society. Their appearance on Indian soil was far from a random event. Rather,
the contributing factors were multi-dimensional and complex. Scholars have
detailed the dynamics of Indian social life and the complex interplay of
India’s political, social, economic and religious components (Ambroise 1982;
Farquhar 1967; Panikkar 1963), leading to the genesis of these groups which
certainly defined themselves as “new”, “unorthodox” and “different” in
challenging socio-cultural and religious traditions. The movements in this
period were explicitly defined by the spirit of reform, and aimed in particular
to revolutionize Hinduism, ridding it of caste, idolatry, its backward social
customs such as sati, child marriage and prohibitions on widow re-marriage,
etc; and thus to “modernize” the religion. In the post-1947 period, a different
set of India-derived movements have been listed, including the Sai Baba
movement, Hare Krishna movement, Divine Light Mission, Sri Aurobindo
Society and Transcendental Meditation.
Apart from distinguishing the movements on the basis of dates and
periodization, the more salient point is that the rationale driving pre-
independence movements (such as the Arya Samaj and the Brahmo Samaj)
was decidedly different from the agendas of the groups that have emerged in
India (and in the United States through Indian input) through the 1960s,
1970s and beyond. The 1960s have been defined as a period dominated by
counter-cultural and anti-establishment trends, especially in the industrialized
parts of the world, but clearly not exclusively so. The questionings about the
nature of religion, its place in the modern world and the kind of religiosity
that is appropriate for such a context were being asked in developing, non-
industrialized parts of the world as well, including in India. Students of
Indian religion have viewed the rise of NRMs in India in the 1960s and
1970s as a response to such intense questionings.
To date, the scholarly output that theorizes the emergence of such
movements has been phenomenal. Interestingly, the object of study in question
has been named and renamed over time and the corresponding conceptual
terminology and theoretical apparatuses have been constituted and
reconstituted, framed by such descriptors as “neo-Hindu” (Babb 1974; Menon
1983; Partridge 2004; Woodhead 2002) groups, “Hindu religious movements”
(Ambroise 1982), “Hindu-related movements” (Knott 1985), “new religious
movements” (Clarke 2005; Coney 2000), and “New and/or Neo-Hindu
NRMs” (Clarke 2006). The rather awkward and admittedly inelegant title of
this chapter, “religiously-inspired, India-derived reform movements”, instead
of reproducing the existing terminology, was necessitated both by conceptual
considerations as well as the nature of ethnographic material from Singapore.
144

While not denying some usefulness of existing descriptions, my view is

that umbrella terms like “neo-Hindu groups”, “Hindu religious movements”
and “new religious movements” tend to obscure the rich diversity of spirituality,
belief and practice to be found within this cluster. The result is that one may
miss the considerable variety and some significant internal differences by
subsuming a number of groups under one linguistic and conceptual banner.
My own choice does not at the outset necessarily characterize the various
groups in terms of “religiosity”, “non-religiosity” or “anti-religiosity”. It is a
descriptive term which acknowledges that the movements were founded and
inspired by an attachment to a set of religious and philosophical precepts and
geographically emanate from the Indian sub-continent. It holds these groups
together while at the same time indicating that they differ internally. Most
importantly, a majority of the movements I have examined in Singapore
expressedly distanced themselves from the label “religion” and some of them,
from the term “Hindu” itself. They also do not see themselves “reformist”,
“radical” or politically driven. Describing them using terminology such as
“neo-Hindu”, “Hindu reform movements” or even “religious movements”
new or otherwise, are problematic as they run contrary to the self-descriptions
of followers and, more importantly, to their explicit rejection of the labels
“Hindu” and “religion”. It is thus important to consider alternative ways of
representing these movements analytically, hence the formulation “religiously-
inspired, India-derived movements”.
COMING TO SINGAPORE
Historians have argued that the presence of Indian populations in significant
numbers outside the Indian sub-continent is the outcome of involuntary
and voluntary migration (Gosine 1993; Jain 1993). Religious beliefs and
rituals were initially carried overseas in the form of personal spiritual
attachments rather than as organized groups or movements. While such
groups as the Arya Samaj and Brahmo Samaj have been present in locales
outside India since the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the
presence of “new religious movements” in the Indian diaspora was the
direct outcome of the more recent and second wave of migration of Indians,
and is largely a post-World War II phenomenon. Both in the “classical” and
contemporary moments, these migrating communities have been defined
by a strong sense of religious pluralism as well as ethno-linguistic differences
and regional variations.
The appearance of “reform movements” (rooted in South Asian religious
traditions) outside the Indian sub-continent (especially in the “West”), occurred
145

146 Vineeta Sinha
largely after World War II (Coney 2000), and typified the period between the
1950s and the 1970s. What accounts for the contemporary presence of these
movements in Singapore? An important starting point is the recognition that
these movements were imported into Singapore from India, with the exception
of such groups as Divine Light Mission, Transcendental Meditation and
International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), which arrived
here from the United States of America. Was their importation a historical
accident and when does this happen? At this point, one needs make a
distinction between the formal organization of the group as a society in the
Singapore context and the presence of individual devotees and followers of
these movements. It is reasonable to surmise that, informally, devotees of
various Indian gurus and adherents of the guru bhakti tradition would have
pre-dated the formal organization of these groups in the local context. Thus
ideas, philosophies and the ritual base of these groups would expectedly have
been present first and foremost in the form of personalized spiritual
attachments. Many of the early followers of these groups came from the
North Indian Hindu communities — such as the Punjabi, Sindhi, Bihari and
Uttar Pradeshi linguistic groups. Subsequent to their arrival in Singapore and
in enlarged numbers, an administrative requirement under the Societies Act
made it necessary for them to be officially recorded as “registered societies”,
before they could operate as religious or spiritual groups and engage in
particular activities. This gave the movements a legitimate and official status
and they drew more members from both the local and expatriate populations.
The formal registration of these arriving movements from India is not
recorded earlier than the 1960s, starting with the Arya Samaj and the
Ramakrishna Misson in 1962. Through the 1970s and 1980s, the importation
of these movements into Singapore intensified, as seen by their respective
dates of registration (see Table 6.1). What is further striking is that the
importation of such groups is certainly not a thing of the past but very much
defines the contemporary moment as well. This bears testimony to the
burgeoning pace at which new religious movements continue to emerge from
an Indian context. Additionally, their presence in Singapore reveals the global
nature of these movements in finding adherents and supporters in places
outside India, not just amongst ethnic Indians but sometimes appealing more
to non-Indians and non-Hindus.
In Singapore, far from disappearing, forms and modes of religious
expression have persisted despite its modern and secular outlook. Here,
attachment to religion is strongly discernible, as seen in census data over at
least the last fifty years, and confirmed by social science analyses of the local
religious scene (Tong 1992; Kong 2005). Today, every major religious tradition
146

TABLE 6.1
“Religiously-inspired”, “India-derived” Movements in Singapore
Name of Movement Date of Registration

1) Amriteswari Society, M.A. Center 1996
2) Art of Living Centre
(Shri Shri Ravi Shankar) 2000
3) Arya Samaj, Singapore 1962
4) Brahma Kumari Raja Yoga Centre 1981
5) Chinmaya Seva Centre 1990
6) Eckankar Satsang 1979
7) Geeta Ashram 1972
8) Kala Mandir (Temple of Fine Arts) 1968
9) Radha Soami Satsang, Beas, Singapore 1980
10) Raghavendra Swami Mandali 2006
11) Ravidas Satsang Sabha 1957
12) Sri Aurobindo Society 1972
13) Sree Narayana Mission 1948
14) Shirdi Sai Baba Sansthan, Singapore 2005
15) Shri Krishna Mandir 1997
16) Sri Paramhans Advait Mat Society 1985
17) Sri Ramakrishna Mission 1962
18) Sri Ram Chandra Mission 1994
19) Sadhu Vaswani Centre, Singapore 1985
20) Shiv Mandir Shree Shree 108 Baba Chunninathji
Singapur Sat Sang 1972
21) Sree Sathya Sai Seva Samithi 1975
22) Sree Gnianananda Seva Samajam 1972
23) Transcendental Meditation Exact date could not
be verified
in Singapore has within it a full religious spectrum from very orthodox,

traditional religious orientations to independent spiritual clusters and new
religious movements. For instance, an account of the Singaporean brand of
Hinduism, as manifested in the observance of such festivals as taipucam
(Thaipusam), Timiti, Sivaratri, Krishna Jayanti, Diwali, Ponggal, Dussehra,
Holi, etc., would be incomplete without due attention to a range of “India-
derived” groups which enjoy a popular local following. Some prominent
examples include the Ramakrishna Mission, Radha Soami Satsang, Brahma
Kumari Raja Yoga Centre, Sai Baba movement, Sri Aurobindo Society, Amma’s
Society and the Art of Living Centre. My earlier research2 (Sinha 1985) has
pointed to the considerable variety of belief, practice and organizational
structures that typify these eight groups.
147

148 Vineeta Sinha
Introduced into Singapore since the 1960s, the “India-derived” movements

by now attract a substantial number of followers, from both within and
outside the Indian-Hindu community. However, despite this long presence,
sociological and anthropological understanding of India-derived reform
movements in Singapore is limited. The field suffers from academic neglect
and has only received negligible attention, primarily from research students
in tertiary institutions. While the latter have attended to ethnographic details
of single movements, no overall, comprehensive structural account of these
groups is as yet available. On the other hand, there is at least some literature
on “homegrown, Hindu-related” organizations (Sinha 2005).3
BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF RESEARCH

An initial curiosity about the fate of the eight movements I had researched in
1985 prompted this present study on “India-derived” movements. A survey
of the contemporary scene, using data from the Registrar of Societies and my
own fieldwork, generated a large and comprehensive list which made it
possible to map this field. During my recent fieldwork, I enumerated twenty-
three movements across Singapore (including the eight from my previous
research, one of which is not registered), the earliest of which was registered
in 1948. However, only fifteen were contacted and surveyed for this research.
Some groups could not be contacted, although they are still registered and
thus assumed operational, while several others declined participation in the
project. While most of the groups were enthusiastic about the research and
were more than happy to offer information, a few were more guarded and
tentative in their responses.
It should be borne in mind that, even though all religious organizations
and associations have to be registered as a society or a company before they
can function legitimately, many groups (some “unregistered” and others
“deregistered” or “dissolved”) continue to operate in informal, diffused and
non-organized modes. Religious/spiritual groups may be refused registration
or dissolved for a variety of reasons. All registered societies are expected to
adhere to a body of rules and regulations as specified in the Societies Act.
Under this act, the stated mission and objectives of religious societies should
not work against national interests and disturb public peace in any way.
Should the latter be perceived to be the case, the society in question could be
de-registered. Despite these legalistic and bureaucratic requirements, the
enthusiasm amongst Singaporeans for founding religious groups, institutions
and organizations, including importing a branch of a religious movement
from the outside, remains high. In the case of the movements I researched, it
was not difficult for me to establish their presence and to locate their
148

representatives. Almost all of these groups are registered (either as a society or

a company) and basic information (date of registration, contact numbers,
address and premises of operation) about them is available from public
records and the Internet, which proved a very useful tool for sourcing
information. Many operate websites while their publicity material are also
available in local Indian restaurants and cultural associations.
These “India-derived” groups are visible and conspicuous locally. Some
have had a presence here for some four to five decades; some older ones have
diminished in importance while other “new” ones have surfaced. Some of the
more recent arrivals are more integrated into “mainstream” Hindu domains
(of temple worship and domestic Hinduism), drawing freely and openly from
the ritual base, belief structure and sacred texts therein, such as Amma’s
Society, Shri Krishna Mandir and Chinmaya Seva Centre, which utilize texts
such as the Bhagvad Gita and the Guru Granth Sahib. These newer groups
have no objections to being perceived as “Hindu”, and are much more
engaged with local Hindu domains. In fact, having emerged from mainstream
Hinduism, these groups promote some aspect of the philosophy, ritual complex
or sacred literature of this religious tradition. Their emphasis is less on
reform, radicalism and the assertion of differences within Hinduism, and
more on refocusing attention on specific aspects of the religion such as yoga,
meditation, seva, self-development and acquiring experiential knowledge.
This cluster of movements is different from another set (including Radha
Soami, Eckankar Satsang, Divine Light Mission, Sai Baba, Transcendental
Meditation and Brahma Kumari, Raja Yoga, etc.) that are self-consciously
eclectic, syncretic and universal, as they do not want to be identified either as
a religious group or as part of Hinduism.
My focus here is the particular manifestation of religiosity of the cluster
of “India-derived” groups that may or may not perceive themselves to be
“religious” within the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and secular framework of
the modernist nation-state of Singapore. Thus, the varying religious styles in
this block of movements are examined, as well as the level and mode of
institutionalization therein. This entails exploring relations between religious
beliefs, religious experience, and religious practice and the kind of consciousness
thus generated. The study of social and economic backgrounds of adherents
of a “small” group, always of great sociological interest, is particularly so in
this study. This is in view of the fact that these movements appeal to
categories of English-speaking, literate, middle- and upper-class professionals
from different ethnic groups and religious sensibilities. This in turn raises a
secondary research concern: Is there a “fit” between the aspirations and
expectations of middle classes and the specific spiritual and philosophical
claims carried in the principles of such groups?
149

150 Vineeta Sinha
Another primary concern in this research is to explore the day-to-day

functioning of these groups in Singapore. Expectedly, this would be
conditioned by specific readings of the local scene, with regard to its multi-
ethnicity, multi-religiosity as well as the emphasis on the need for interfaith
dialogue and religious harmony. I use specific examples to illustrate the
particular responses the groups have made in order to function effectively in
Singapore, while at the same time are being plugged into concerns that
emerge from their connections with centres in India and elsewhere.
The research required different kinds of data, thus necessitating recourse
to a variety of data collection and analysis strategies. The methodological
approach here was grounded in an ethnographic and qualitative logic, while
the analytical stance is comparative and sociological. To study the distribution
of these movements, a qualitative survey was undertaken to procure particular
kinds of historical, organizational, institutional and demographic data about
them. In addition, face-to-face in-depth interviews with selected members at
all levels of organization within these movements generated invaluable data.
The material for this chapter was obtained through fieldwork carried out
between May and September 2005. Data were collected through participation
observation, direct personal interviews with adherents of these movements
and as well as a review of literature generated by the movements themselves.
CHARACTERISTICS OF “INDIA-DERIVED” MOVEMENTS

A broad set of features that the groups share on the basis of self-definition can
be abstracted from this research. First, the founder of each movement is seen
as a guru/teacher. The groups claim a universal appeal, and membership is by
individual choice and an outcome of personal quest. A majority of the groups
claim to be “different” from mainstream, institutionalized religions, especially
in promoting a de-ritualized stance towards spirituality. Furthermore, the
groups claim to offer members a logical, rational and modernist approach to
life and spirituality, while also asserting a connection with ancient, timeless
wisdom and tradition. While the focus is on individual self-development, the
notion of seva (service) to the community and self-development are considered
equally essential.4 Although my research does indicate a variety of attitudes,
beliefs, and styles of behaviour within the same block of movements, they
nonetheless share the above traits which are briefly elaborated below.
Guru-founder: Importance as Spiritual Guide and Teacher

The founder of each movement is seen as a guru/teacher, whose importance
continues in varying degrees in contemporary times. The guru does not
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merely provide spiritual guidance but, more importantly, helps individuals

cope with problems of daily secular living. Thus a guru, by his or her own
example, shows individuals the way to proper action, that is, behaving in
ways so as to eliminate one’s accumulated karma as well as to prevent the
accumulation of further karma. The quotation, “What a Guru does is more
important than what he tells us” (Brent 1972, p. 17) would apply to most of
these movements. Weber’s concept of an “exemplary prophet”, which he
thought to be important in prophetic movements of an ascetic or mystical
nature (Peacock 1955, p. 92), is also applicable to, and illustrated by, the
groups in question. In some cases, one encounters a living guru; in others the
founding figure is valorized as a spiritual guide and in yet others, a guru has
reached Samadhi and is deified and worshipped by followers. Not all gurus are
male; some prominent founders and spiritual leaders (Amma’s Society, BK
Raja Yoga, Sahaj Yoga) are women who are extremely popular gurus.
Claims to Universalism
The movements strongly assert their openness to one and all, without
discrimination. This is logically relates to an emphasis on the individual
person, further reinforcing the claim to universality and to being unconcerned
with ascribed statuses. The movements explicitly reject all association with
caste identity and purity-pollution issues. While the movements are open to
all, regardless of age, gender, religion, ethnicity and political affiliation, those
groups that profess to be monotheistic (for example, Radha Soami Satsang)
or are exclusivist, insist on a formal initiation ceremony for group membership.
Others do not think initiation to be an important criterion for group
membership, as the notion of “belonging” to the group is more fluid. Those
with a monotheistic orientation show a need for closed-group formation and
an insistence on boundaries, and it is important for a believer in a monotheistic
framework to declare the supremacy of his or her commitment over other
available orientations. This tendency of such groups to form group boundaries
provides a contrast to the “openness”, flexibility and tolerance — characteristics
of “traditional” Hinduism.
Membership through Individual Choice and Personal Quest

Entry into and commitment to a particular group is asserted as being the
result of a personal quest. Consequently, there is an implied notion of
“rebirth” or second birth, which accords a new spiritual identity and status
upon the individual. This also relates to their very groupness, and negates the
idea of being born into the group. Membership in a group is a matter of self-
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declaration by an individual, in contrast to what happens in the traditional

Indian-type religion with its emphasis on membership by birth within groups
— caste, sub-caste, tribe, village and family. The individual has the ability to
decide for himself or herself how to manage his or her life, which suggests
adherence to a self-centred orientation.
Claims to Being “De-ritualized”

With the exception of a few, all the movements express a drive and leaning
towards plainness and simplicity. The emphasis is on a minimal, unadorned,
non-elaborate approach to divinity. With some exceptions (Sai Baba movement,
Amma’s Society, ISKCON) all other groups make claims to being anti-ritual
or at least to a de-ritualized approach to divinity. For example, with respect
to Hinduism, the aim is to get rid of elaborate religious paraphernalia, the
emphasis being on believing and understanding rather than simply doing.
Some examples of rituals that are rejected and criticized include the
performance of arccanai, yaagam and homam within the context of theistic
Hinduism. These are seen to be “unthinking” and imitative religious behaviour
which are not based on understanding and appreciation of spirituality but on
habitual and customary practices. Practices that are considered legitimate
include personal meditation, attending satsang, talks, workshops, educational
lectures and symposia and bhajan sessions. The claim to be “de-ritualized”
allows groups to assert and mark a difference from “traditional Hinduism”,
which is understood as an orthodox and temple-based practice.
“We are Not a Religion or a Religious Group”

The conception of what “religion” is or is not has been redefined by the
groups especially those that reject the “religious” dimension altogether.
“Religion” may be interpreted variously by actors in varying situations (as in
the case of Radha Soamis). Generally speaking, these groups regard “religion”
as something that one enters by birth, family or caste denomination. Hence,
to them, whatever is a matter of individual personal choice cannot be “religion”.
There is a strong rejection of mainstream religiosity, particularly Hinduism,
including all that it is perceived to represent — its institutions (for example,
Hindu temples, Brahmin priesthood and mediation with divinity), caste and
notions of ritual purity and pollution and its “excessive” ritualism.
Claims to Possess a Logical, Rational and Modernist Stance

These movements are deliberately and consciously “founded” by particular
individuals and their formation can be dated historically. Also, as this is a
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recent phenomenon, the adherents make explicit claims to being “modern”,

by re-interpreting or modifying established religious traditions so as to
generate new and more modern revisions. This cluster of attitudes expressed
by them can be interpreted as “modernist” in orientation, if modernism is
regarded as a particular mode of grappling with reality that sees itself as
consciously breaking from a ”traditional” mode of doing things. This sort
of consciousness is modernist especially because of its emphasis on the
ability to achieve a religious status rather than being ascribed one (Bellah
1964), and because of its highly rationalized stance towards life. For Max
Weber, the dominant process in the transition from what he calls “primitive”
to ”modern” religion is rationalization — which is reflected in varying
degrees in the groups examined. They all claim a logical and rational
approach to fundamental human concerns (such as the nature of ultimate
reality or divinity and the relationship of humans to divinity), grounded in
a systematic and studied attitude and, most importantly, it is based on
evidence available to all through personal experiential verification. Yet, it is
interesting that the groups also draw upon an ancient, spiritual tradition to
which they claim a connection. This longevity of ideas becomes the basis
for legitimacy and efficacy of their philosophies.
Complementarity of Perspectives:
Transcending Religious Boundaries
In line with the asserted universalism and non-particularism of the movements,
one sees in many of the groups a concomitant emphasis on a complementarity
of spiritual perspectives. While several of the groups reject the label “religious”,
and opt for the more acceptable “spiritual” alternatives, the local leaders of
these groups are also aware that “religious” identities are primary in Singapore
and that multi-religiosity defines this society. Thus, a common refrain in the
discourse is the idea that “we are not just for Indians or Hindus, we are open
to people of all ethnic groups and religions.” The groups are aware that they
carry “Indian”/“Hindu” sounding names, and that they are viewed as being
connected to these labels. There is thus an explicit attempt to transcend
religious boundaries and demonstrate their openness to all. At an articulated
level, the groups may reject institutionalized religiosity and the label “religion”,
but in practice there is often considerable overlap in membership and
commitment between the followers of orthodox “temple type” Hinduism and
Sikhism, and adherents of the newer groups. There are, of course, important
exceptions to this and variation is to be expected, depending on the degree of
flexibility and acceptance of the particular group and the attitude and
interpretations of the individual members. This overlap in membership shows
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that there are no sharp divisions between the practitioners of theistic,

orthodox Hinduism and self-proclaimed “modernists”, and that much
interaction is in fact present.
It is possible to identify two such categories of movements here: some are
more exclusive and insist on singular, declared membership and allegiance
(for example, Radha Soami and Shirdi Baba Sansthan “only believe in No. 1
not No. 2”5), while others are less concerned with drawing and maintaining
boundaries of the group and members are free to come and go as they please,
and also go elsewhere. Some groups demand exclusive allegiance (such as the
Shirdi Sai Baba group) but members are also participants in “other” types pf
religious behaviour without feeling anxiety or discomfort; this translates into
practice the notion of “complementarity” of religious perspectives.
Emphasis on Seva and Self-development

Given the emphasis on achieved identities and statuses, practically all the
movements privilege the individual and his/her spiritual development. The
ultimate goal of membership in the group is to assist an individual attain a
level of spiritual growth and self-realization. Yet, seva through mainly voluntary
work is seen as intimately connected with the development of individual
spirituality. Thus, almost all the groups, especially in the present, define their
agendas in terms of explicit engagement with local communities. This translates
into different sorts of voluntary and service-oriented work, ranging from
operating old folks’ homes, orphanages, donation of time and other resources,
offering counselling services for youths, prisoners, food donation programmes,
and free educational services. This dimension of the “work” performed by
these movements is imperative not just from the viewpoint of their own
agenda, but is particularly crucial in the local context for another reason.
Increasingly, the leadership of these movements has realized that, in order to
acquire legitimacy and approval within the community, it is important that
they are not seen exclusively as a “religious” or “spiritual” group, but also as
being concerned with broader social, cultural, and economic concerns of
the local community. As such, these groups also present themselves as a
“welfare society”, which includes a concern with spiritual issues but is not
exclusively defined by them. This lesson/realization is especially relevant for
groups that want to formalize their presence in the local context. It is ironic
that the very rejection of the label “Hindu” by a particular group could
actually work against itself in specific instances. At least one movement did
not gain approval for offering counselling for prisoners, on grounds that it
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was not a “Hindu” group, while several Hindu temples could offer this
service without any problems.
Diverse Backgrounds of Followers

Structurally, the groups are interesting in terms of the socio-cultural, religious
and economic profiles of the followers. Again, while variation within the
block of movements is to be expected, some broad features can be identified.
In terms of numerical strength, a “small” group size is observed — where
membership and participation is evident in hundreds rather than in
thousands. Members are largely from middle-class and upper, middle-class
backgrounds and are English-educated professionals. There are exceptions
to this such as the Sai Baba movement which attracts a substantial number
of non-English speaking, Chinese participants. Despite the Indian
connection (both geographic and ethnic), and the association with Hinduism
and, in some cases, Sikhism, the groups see significant participation from
non-Indian and non-Hindu communities. Thus, despite numerical
dominance of ethnic Indians, one sees a sizeable multi-ethnic, multi-religious
representation in the various groups locally. In fact this ability to transcend
ethnic and religious boundaries is highlighted by local leaders and members
as proof of a group’s universal appeal and the relevance of its teachings. The
group is also seen to be “successful” if it can indeed attract members outside
the Indian and Hindu fold. In terms of gender, the movements report more
participation by women rather than men. Members are generally older in
their thirties and upwards; I did not encounter a predominance of members
in their teens or twenties. Young children are present due to parental
involvement. Registration procedures in Singapore require at least 60–70
per cent of the founding committee to be Singaporean. As such, these
groups are initiatives led by citizens but once founded, they draw members
of the Indian and non-Indian expatriate communities as ordinary members
as much as they do locals.
SOME SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHTS

The discussion thus far describes the local presence and following of
movements that have originated outside Singapore. It is impossible to offer
a general set of factors to account for the popularity of all the movements
in Singapore. Each movement has a history — both in India and Singapore
— which merits detailed study for a fuller understanding while offering
some insights, and also raises many more questions that need to be pursued.
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In the following section I abstract from my ethnography some themes and

problematics for broader sociological reflection.
Local and Global Connections

The movements are mainly imports from India and are not indigenous to
Singapore, but have over time become more and more embedded in, and
engaged with the local scene. My data show that while the groups must, by
necessity, have a firm local grounding, they also reveal global orientations.
While travelling well, the reality is that they originated elsewhere — something
the group members are quite conscious of. Additionally, branches of these
groups exist all over the world. For instance, the Sai Baba group, Transcendental
Meditation, Eckankar Satsang, Radha Soami Satsang, Amma’s Society and
ISKCON now have a worldwide presence, with members on all continents
and who are not just limited to ethnic Indians. The local groups reveal a
solidarity, not only with the “headquarters” in India but also with other
branches that are scattered globally, and interact with them through a variety
of initiatives, including the latest communication technologies. This
simultaneous attention to local and global contexts is a challenge to the
groups they have to come to terms with in their day-to-day functioning. How
this dual focus translates into practice locally and with what impact, if any,
varies with each of the group in question, and is an important arena of
consideration. For instance, are there any tensions that emanate from this
dual attention? Does the local context assume greater importance, given the
demands and exigencies of day-to-day existence?
Inter-religious and Interethnic Dimensions, Effects on

Local Hinduism
Having done research in this domain in the 1980s, it strikes me that the
language of “reform” and absolute “difference” (from other religious traditions)
that was freely expressed then was somewhat muted and subtle some twenty
years later. In the current discourse, we still hear “we are distinct from
traditional religions” assertions. However, the tone of overt disapproval and
criticism of “other religions” were noticeably absent. For example, in my
earlier research, I commonly heard that Hindus are “idol worshippers” and
that Hinduism encourages “blind faith” and is “too superstitious and ritualistic”
— a sentiment not as often articulated in the present. There was also some
distancing from the idea of being “reformist” and “radical”, especially as a
religious group. When I probed further, the fear of being viewed as an
“extremist” religious group or a “cult” surfaced as explanatory factors. This
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wariness, contextualized within a post-9/11 climate, is perhaps unsurprising.

Although some groups staunchly expressed their autonomy and difference
from all other groups, many more highlighted the commonalities and overlaps
in terms of agendas, interests and philosophies both with other such groups
and with “traditional” religions. This is highly significant sociologically. It
says something about the self-consciousness amongst group members and
particularly leaders: that they are located and have to function within a multi-
ethnic, multi-religious context which privileges and promotes religious
pluralism and harmony, and is a way of negotiating religious differences that
might lead to conflict and tension.
Whether this stance generates genuine inter-religious appreciation and
acceptance of religious differences is a separate issue. Given that the movements
do appeal to a broad cross-section of Singaporeans from different religious
backgrounds, the following questions are pertinent: Do these groups’ activities
facilitate interfaith dialogue in a post-9/11 climate? How do the followers of
these groups describe their membership to these groups? I would argue that
responses to these queries further our understanding of the discourses of
inter-religious dialogue and religious harmony which are currently dominant
in the religious landscape of Singapore.
The preponderance of Indians and Hindus in these groups is hardly
surprising. One question that surfaces here is the relationship between
“ ‘Hindus’/‘Hinduism’ ” and the followers/teachers of these groups. How are
these movements positioned within the broader context of Singaporean
Hinduism? What kinds of interaction exist within these constitutive strands?
What is the effect of the presence of these Indian movements on traditional,
temple-type Hinduism? Some of the movements have indeed become part
and parcel of Singaporean Hindu domains, through interaction with Hindu
organizations and Hindu temples. At the same time, the movements I surveyed
do provide a meaningful contrast to a strong core of theistic, temple-based
Hinduism. It is interesting to ask if there are tensions in this co-location of
diverse religious orientations. Many of the groups in question steer away from
being associated with “Hinduism” or “Sikhism” despite carrying names
associated with religious traditions and the fact that the founding inspiration
of the gurus did obviously draw from the teachings and philosophies of these
religions. My research suggests that this association is avoided as it is seen as
being somewhat “restrictive”, working against the assertion of “difference”
and the claim to universalism.
Large numbers of local non-Indians and non-Hindus are attracted to
these groups which present their teachings as “universally applicable” and not
confined to any specific ethnic, religious or cultural heritage. How do “Hindu”
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members of these groups interact with “others” and who constitute this latter
category? How do they understand “religion” and how is it redefined,
particularly in view of the fact that many of these groups categorically state
that they are not a “religious group”? The tight association between ethnic
and religious identities in the local discourse may be weakened, given the
non-Indian and non-Hindu membership of the groups. My data suggests
that followers have little difficulty negotiating their ethnic and religious
identities, and seem to cross carefully drawn racial and religious boundaries
easily. While some of the groups do interact with the Hindu Endowments
Board (HEB), the Hindu Centre and some of the Hindu temples, many
others do not have any such connections and work independently.6 Nor do
they associate with other similar movements. There are also examples like the
Sai Baba which stresses syncretism and complementarity of all religions,
although to an observer, some dimensions of the group’s religious activities
are perceived to be embedded in practices and rituals of Hinduism (for
example, the singing of Sai bhajans which invoke the names of Hindu deities
such as Siva, Vishnu, etc.). In this context, the idea of being unique and
unlike others is strongly expressed, such as ”we are different, not like any
other group here”. As far as the general Hindu population is concerned, I
encountered isolated cases in which Hindus did not want to associate
themselves with followers of these new groups and argued that their teachings
were not part of Hinduism. Given the phenomenal visibility of gurus and
spiritual teachers from India in Singapore, some members of the Hindu
community are sceptical about the authenticity and spiritual value of
particularly the “newer arrivals”, many of whom were referred to as “frauds”
and “cheats”.7 There is disapproval of some of these movements, but even
here a tolerant and “live and let live” attitude, typically associated with
Hinduism, prevails.
Additionally, the groups in question do not challenge established religious
authority overtly. Nor do they offer themselves as alternatives to existing
religious traditions but only as supplements to them. Some examples of this
are the Sai Baba movement, the Ramakrishna Mission and the Sri Aurobindo
Society. These Indian movements came to Singapore as innovations. Prior to
their arrival, there already existed an established inherited Hindu tradition in
Singapore. There is no evidence that these new directions in Indian religious
thought have become or have ever been a divisive force in Singapore. Within
the local context, some of these movements have no inhibitions in interacting
with the larger Hindu domain. However, there are exceptions to this. For
instance, the Hare Krishna movement and the Divine Light Mission are
groups that are not registered officially but elicit mixed feelings both from
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official bodies and lay persons. Generally speaking, Hindus in Singapore do

not seem worried by the occurrence of modernist Indian movements here.
Some say that it is precisely in the nature of “Hinduism” to be all-embracing,
eclectic, syncretic and unconcerned with boundaries.
The Indian membership in these movements is to be expected. Since the
local branches of the Indian movements maintain links with the headquarters
in India (and also elsewhere), there is a general orientation away from
Singapore and towards India. For Indians this is not a problem because
kinship ties in the past and present with India provide familiarity with the
sub-continent. However, in the light of a substantial non-Indian membership
of these Indian movements, it would be interesting to examine how the non-
Indian members handle this orientation towards India. For instance, there is
evidence that many ethnic Chinese in Singapore have become Sai Baba
devotees. Since the personality of Sai Baba holds the group together, devotees
frequently make trips to India to visit him. Visiting a guru’s ashram resembles
a pilgrimage, and this is true for members of other movements too. With
respect to the Chinese Sai Baba devotees, it is also interesting how they have
adjusted to the ritual activities of the movement and how the organization
has responded to this cluster of members by innovating, for example, in
composing Sai bhajans in Mandarin and English and including these in their
weekly bhajan sessions to be sung by all followers, Chinese and non-Chinese.
The Appeal of New Movements

It is impossible to offer a general argument as to why these movements appeal
to so many individuals. Almost every person I spoke to had a unique and
“miraculous” tale to relate with regard to his or her conversion to the group.
My data point to the complexity of issues involved in affiliation to a religious
or spiritual group. The movements in Singapore now attract a substantial
number of “devotees” and some of the movements in question are overtly
missionary in wanting to increase membership and spread the “word’, while
others are unconcerned about making new converts or enlarging their
numerical size. Overall, the rising popularity of these movements can be
partially located in the way these movements present themselves and their
obvious appeal to potential members. That “ours is a spiritual path, leading
man to God. We are not a religious cult” is a sentiment echoed by adherents
of several movements. The claim by a group that it is not “religious”8 group,
but a “spiritual” one which attends to the individual and his/her spiritual
needs, facilitating self knowledge through experience and experimentation, is
certainly a factor. Such a claim appears to be based on the rational, scientific
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and objective, and is significant in the local context where the attraction to
rationalized religiosity has been reported in all the major religious traditions
(Tong 1992).
Historically, Hinduism (as well as Buddhism and Jainism) has grown by
absorption and assimilation rather than by rejection and elimination. It is
asserted by members that the philosophy of the new movements is their
universal applicability, not clothed in any specific ethnic, religious or cultural
heritage. In other words, no direct links between ethnicity and “religious” or
“spiritual” affiliations are made. Thus, neither religion nor ethnicity are
perceived to be barriers to membership in movements of this kind, again
stressing the element of personal autonomy (free from inherited and ascribed
traditions and identities) in making a spiritual choice. The movements seem
to appeal to a particular group of individuals, namely the English-speaking,
literate, middle-class professionals. It is my view that to some extent there is
a fit between the aspirations and expectations of middle-class individuals and
the specific claims made by these movements. Here, I am referring to the
modernist attitude portrayed by the movements and the progressive, modern,
rationalist and objective stances of some middle-class individuals. This does
not suggest that only middle-class individuals find the philosophy of the new
movements appealing. I hypothesize that individuals who are concerned
about locating meaning behind their actions (religious or otherwise), not
following tradition blindly, and having some control over their destiny,
would be attracted to movements of this kind precisely because they provide
alternative methods of dealing with the problems, spiritual or otherwise,
confronted under conditions of modernity. Even such groups as the Arya
Samaj, which was founded with an explicit desire to bring the misguided
Hindu back to the “true” Hindu path, in today’s Singapore, no longer carries
out this mission and plays a more diffused social, cultural and educational role.
Social Services
While my research focus was not designed to pay particular attention to the
social service dimension of the movements in question, it became clear as my
fieldwork progressed that this was a most essential component of the “work”
the groups perform locally. One is particularly struck by the latter in view of
the groups’ primary concentration on the individual self and his/her spiritual
growth and development. There is an increasing presence of the movements
in the public sphere, both in Singapore and globally in being concerned with
concrete issues grounded in the realities of a temporal existence. The emphasis
on seva, is concretized through a range of social service and voluntary tasks
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undertaken by members in educational, cultural, welfare-related and charitable

activities, as part of their spiritual development and work. This concurrent
attention to the self and the other seems to require a delicate balancing act.
The focus on one’s spiritual state requires an inward orientation while the
social service dimension calls for an external, societal engagement. This move
from the private realm to the public/civic space is also interesting in view of
the sharp separation of the “religious” domain from other, especially “political”
spaces in Singapore, and the clear circumscription of the religious domain
here. The social service component of the “work” performed by these groups
clearly signals that they are addressing and responding to a larger socio-
economic, political and cultural issues they perceive to be prevalent in society,
such as poverty, unequal access to resources (educational, medical and
nutritional and social and cultural capital), and the presence of needy people
and groups in society. Seva brings them forcefully in to the realm of civil
society, and raise attendant tensions inevitable in this process.
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

It has been quite typical to examine the NRMs using terminologies and
concepts for analysing religious institutions and organizations, however
these movements have been named or defined in the literature. There is a
strong awareness in the scholarly community that one is witnessing
something different and novel in the realm of religiosity and those new
conceptual tools are necessary to theorize this domain. Scholars have noted
here a discursive shift from “religion” to “spirituality” (Clarke 2006), calling
for a clarification of fundamental conceptual categories, in particular the
former category. Substantively, the NRMs, including the ones discussed in
this chapter, offer an inner directed religiosity, where the primacy of the self
and experiential spiritual knowledge over textual knowledge are prioritized.
They offer an alternative mode of conceptualizing one’s relationship to the
divine, in addition to being unconventional in allowing the self to construct
an appropriate, relevant and desirable spirituality. There is tremendous
appeal in this formulation as indicated by the large numbers of followers
the movements attract.
The India-derived movements examined here do provide a meaningful
contrast to the strong core of theistic, temple-based, domestic, festival-oriented
Hinduism in Singapore. Yet, institutionalized Hinduism is not under threat
from the presence of these NRMs and their growing numbers. It is interesting
that a few of the movements self-consciously define themselves not in religious
terms but in the language of “spirituality” and “lifestyle choice”, and assert
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their distinction from institutionalized religions — a position they share with

NRMs from other religious traditions as well. As the research on these “India-
derived” movements has demonstrated, the raw materials used to create a
“new” philosophy and theology can be traced to one or more of the mainstream
India-based religious traditions such as Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and
Jainism, while sometimes also drawing upon ideas from monotheistic religious
traditions such as Islam and Christianity. This explains their eclecticism and
syncretism. Despite this ancestry, they are also clear innovations within a
realm of inherited religious and cultural traditions. Even in the midst of these
innovations, the element of guru bhakti tradition, a link with the devotional
strand of Hindu religiosity, is strongly discernible in the very constitution of
these groups. My broader research on Hinduism in Singapore reveals the
centrality of a guru or spiritual advisor in the journey towards self-development,
in both NRMs and the wider community of Hindus. The difference is that
the devotion is either directed at a living guru who leads by example, or a
founder guru who has attained Samadhi and has also been deified.
Historically, Singapore has been and continues to be a fertile ground for
the sustenance of “traditional” religions as well as novel “religious” movements
— both local and imported. In fact, given the history of Singapore and the
constitution of its population by migrant groups, the island has been defined
by religious pluralism since the mid-nineteenth century. Even more so today,
as my research has demonstrated, a strong sense of choice and religious
experimentation defines the local religious domain as Singapore hosts a vast
array of religiosities across a number of diverse religious traditions which
make it possible for the existence of the official, institutional variety and the
myriad innovative interpretations of popular religions. Yet, while private
religiosity is constitutionally guaranteed and is indeed largely unregulated,
the relevant authorities are more circumspect about collectivized expressions
of religiosity in the public domain, and these are thus subject to a variety of
regulations and constraints.
Interestingly, the physical location of Singapore assumes a different kind
of strategic importance today, and is in fact focal in facilitating different kinds
of religious and spiritual traffic to routinely pass its shores. Thus, it is not
uncommon for spiritual leaders of many of these India-derived movements to
stop over to deliver lectures and to meet with their followers in Singapore, en
route to North America or Europe. The gurus are therefore regularly visible
and have a presence, and they are in fact much more accessible to their
followers in the local context than they would be in India, given the size of
the local community.
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As mentioned, these NRMs are a global, transnational phenomenon.

However, this globality is not a new feature but one that has defined them
since their very inception. These movements have certainly travelled well and
this has contributed to their success. Clearly, one can no longer ignore the
presence of “new” forms of religiosity in the modern world, and neither is this
a passing moment. Even as new religious groups have risen and disappeared,
others have taken their place.
Notes
1. Some examples of early works on the subject include: Brent 1972; Colpe 1978;
Eschmann 1974; Farquhar 1967; Gonda 1965; Mangalwadi 1977; Pannikar
1963; and Sarma 1944.
2. My undergraduate honours thesis research (Sinha 1985) focused on an
ethnographic account of the Radha Soamis in Singapore, with attention to eight
India-derived groups and their local functioning.
3. Social science and historical accounts of Hinduism in these regions remind us of
the “Indian connection” as the basis for recognizing pluralism within the realm
of practice. However, there is yet another dimension that adds to the pluralism
that is routinely recognized in local manifestations of Hinduism — the advent
and input of what is refer here as “home grown” Hindu groups. These “home
grown” groups display attempts to formulate specific versions of Hinduism and
represent responses to the exigencies of the local situation, demonstrating an
engagement with specific socio-cultural, political, ethnic and religious forces
current in Singapore. The three “home grown” groups are: (1) Krishna Our
Guide (registered in 1968), (2) The Hindu Centre (registered in 1978), and
(3) Sri Samayapuram Mariamman Pillaigal (registered in 2005). A case is made
for viewing these as instances of indigenous innovation — constructed with an
awareness of local conditions but utilizing an inherited, imported religious
tradition as the base — in which select features of Hinduism are highlighted,
culminating in an attachment to varied styles of religiosity within the domain of
Singaporean Hinduism.
4. It is interesting to hear how some groups describe themselves. The following
images are abstracted from the group’s publicity brochures and other literature
(which incidentally in Singapore are regularly published in the four official
languages — English, Malay, Tamil and Mandarin), published by the groups
themselves. The Shirdi Sai Baba Sansthan (Singapore) aims “to be a non-profit
making society that propagates ‘spirituality’ as opposed to religion, whiel retaining
independence from any particular religion, opening membership to people
across religions, classes and races”; Sahaj Marg (The Natural Path) is taught and
practised under the auspices of the Shri Ram Chandra Mission, which defines
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164 Vineeta Sinha
itself as “a non-profit organization”. The Mission was established in the Indian

state of Uttar Pradesh in 1945 by the “Grand Master of the System” — Shri Ram
Chandra. Sahaj Marg is described as “a system of practical training in the
spirituality of Shri Ram Chandra. It is in essence the well-known Raja Yoga (yoga
of the mind — a system of modern life) remodelled to suit the needs of modern-
day life. The practice is simple, without rituals or ceremonies, and is central to
the heart”; The Chinmaya Seva Centre in Singapore “is part of the global
Chinmaya Mission which carries out the humanitarian work of its preceptor,
H.H. Swami Chinmayananda”. It defines itself as “an organization dedicated to
providing individuals from all backgrounds, the knowledge enshrined in the
original scriptural texts of India.” The Sree Narayana Mission presents itself as
“a charitable organization” named after Sree Narayana Guru, a philosopher and
social reformer, who valued “community togetherness and international
brotherhood”. In Singapore, the mission “through its numerous welfare
programmes has benefited the Singapore aged, sick and infirm regardless of race,
culture, creed or religion. In addition to providing community service, the
Mission also promotes educational and cultural activities”.
5. This is a reference to Shirdi Sai Baba, No. 1 and Sathya Sai Baba, No. 2; the
members of the Shirdi Sai Baba Sansthan in Singapore do not acknowledge any
links between the two individuals and members are expected to adhere to this
belief as part of the group’s teachings.
6. ISKCON operates out of the Lakshminarayan Temple, a Sai Baba group holds
some activities in Krishnan Temple, and previously held weekly bhajan sessions
at the Perumal Temple.
7. Specific names of gurus and groups were overtly mentioned critically in this
context, and I was not requested to keep these references confidential. However,
these concrete references have been omitted here in the interest of sensitivity.
8. Here, “religion” is reduced to its institutionalized, orthodox dimension and thus
seen to be tradition-bound, limited, oppressive and above all, “traditional”, as
explained to me by informants to mean “old fashioned” and “rigid”.
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Baha’is in Singapore 167
BAHA’IS IN SINGAPORE
Patterns of Conversion
Foo Check Woo and Lynette Thomas
INTRODUCTION
There are at least 2,000 adherents of the Baha’i Faith in Singapore today. The
Baha’i Faith is the youngest of the world’s independent religions and the
Baha’is are followers of Baha’u’llah (meaning “Glory of God”), the Prophet-
Founder of the Baha’i Faith. This religious community has been registered in
Singapore as an independent religious entity since 1952 (Spiritual Assembly
of the Baha’is of Singapore, 1998), yet little is known about this nascent
community.
The Baha’i Faith in Singapore had its beginnings in 1950 with the arrival
of Dr and Mrs Shirin Fozdar from India (Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of
Singapore, 2000). By 1952, there were a total of twelve declared believers,
which was sufficient for the Baha’i community to form the first Local
Spiritual Assembly. The election of the first governing body for Baha’i affairs
took place in April 1952 and the Local Spiritual Assembly was duly
incorporated in July of that year (Inter-Religious Organization, Singapore
2001).
There is neither priesthood nor clergy in the Baha’i Faith (Effendi 1974).
The administration of the Baha’i world community is based on the unique
system of Houses of Justice (or Spiritual Assemblies), which extends from the
local to the international level. These elected bodies are responsible for
ministering to the needs of the individual as well as the community at large.
167
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168 Foo Check Woo and Lynette Thomas
There have been very few studies carried out on the Baha’i community of
Singapore. An academic exercise (Yeo 1980) focused on the phenomenon of
witnessing from the angle of boundary maintenance, by looking primarily at
the structure of the Baha’i community through a predetermined framework
of a sectarian movement. Chew (1997) is a descriptive and research-oriented
study focusing mainly on a comparison of Taoism and the Baha’i Faith and
the former’s impact on the latter. Chew (1996) has also written on the
emergence of the Baha’i Faith in Singapore but more from a historical rather
than cross-sectional perspective. The Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of
Singapore has also published a brochure on the Baha’is in Singapore but the
information is largely general and historical in nature. In 2001, the Inter-
Religious Organization (IRO) published a book comprising short accounts of
the nine major religions in Singapore, including the Baha’i Faith, but these
accounts describe the main features of religion rather than about its believers.
The Association of Baha’i Studies, a committee of the Spiritual Assembly of
the Baha’is of Singapore, has published six volumes of its journal The Singapore
Baha’i Studies Review (1996–2001). The journal comprises scholarly articles
on comparative religion and contemporary humanistic issues from a Baha’i
perspective. Ong (2000) has also written on Mrs Shirin Fozdar, a well-known
Baha’i in Singapore as well as an early advocate of the women’s movement,
and through her, we have had a glimpse of the workings of the early Baha’i
community of Singapore. Nevertheless, her account is largely personal and
anecdotal and centres only on one personality.
As the Baha’i Faith has been established in Singapore for only slightly
more than fifty years, it is estimated that at least 80 per cent of its 2,000
adherents are first-generation Baha’is. It is therefore particularly appropriate
at this juncture of the growth of the Baha’i community of Singapore to
understand what motivated the first generation Baha’is to switch from their
previous religious affiliation or, if they had no particular religious affiliation,
to declare themselves as followers of Baha’u’llah.
This study attempts to understand the pattern of conversion among the
Baha’is in Singapore over the last forty years or so and to redress some aspects
of the lack of common knowledge about the Baha’i Faith in Singapore. More
specifically, the study attempts to answer the following questions:
1. Are the teachings of the Baha’i Faith especially attractive to an economic,

social or ethnic group?
2. When and where did the respondents declare their belief in Baha’u’llah?
Are the teachings of the Baha’i Faith especially attractive to the youth,
adult or elderly?
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3. Are there key messages in the Baha’i teachings and/or significant actions
of the Baha’i community of Singapore that resonate with a significant
number of its membership?
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Definition
Conversion in the context of this study may be defined as the process of
leaving a religious organization for that of the Baha’i Faith. It also covers those
Baha’is who, at the point of declaration in their belief in Baha’u’llah, had
already left their previous religious organization or who had no previous
affiliation with any religious organization.
This definition is not ideal because conversion is clearly an inner process
differing from one individual to another, and one that goes beyond the
outward declaration of belief, which in the case of membership in the Baha’i
community of Singapore, involves the signing of a declaration card. Is signing
the declaration card the defining moment that signals an individual’s belief in
Baha’u’llah? Or is it a gradual and growing conviction in one’s mind that life’s
meaning and purpose lie in the direction as described by that particular
religion? Can one distinguish between an authentic conversion and one with
ulterior motives? Bearing in mind these difficulties, we are nonetheless adhering
to this practical definition of conversion.
Methodology
This study relied on a questionnaire survey and case studies. The use of a
questionnaire survey facilitated reaching out to a bigger group of respondents
with structured questions and bounded answers, and allowed for statistical
analysis of the responses. The face-to-face interviews in the case studies
complemented the more quantitative questionnaire survey by fleshing out
the skeletal frame of the information obtained through the questionnaire.
Questionnaire Survey
The questionnaire was divided into four sections (see Appendix 8.1). The
first section covered the current personal data of the respondents. Its objective
was to obtain a typical profile of the respondent and insights into whether the
teachings of the Baha’i Faith are especially attractive to a particular economic,
social or racial group. The second section was to obtain the personal data of
the respondent’s spouse, to supplement the profile of the respondent. The
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third section gathers data of the respondent at the point of declaration. This
data helps to answer the second question as to when and where did the
respondents declare their belief in Baha’u’llah, and whether the teachings of
the Baha’i Faith are especially attractive to the youth, adult or elderly. In the
fourth and most important section, the questions covered various aspects of
the respondents’ religion and religious conversion.
The target in the distribution of the questionnaire was to obtain responses
from 100 first-generation Baha’is (about 5 per cent of the total Baha’i
population). The prospective respondents were chosen randomly during the
period May to October 2004. The questionnaire was either posted to them or
handed to them personally by this chapter’s writers. Although the intent was
to obtain a random sampling of respondents, in reality the sample set was
drawn from the more active members of the Baha’i community of Singapore.
This was partly because not all its members were contactable and partly
because many of those contactable did not fill out the questionnaire. Eventually,
105 questionnaires were received, of which 102 were deemed complete or
almost complete with all essential details and were accepted.
Case Studies
Of the 102 accepted respondents, a total of sixteen (10 per cent) were chosen
as case studies. Respondents from different former religious backgrounds (as
well as from the category of no religious affiliation) were selected to ensure a
representative sample. Altogether, five Taoists-Buddhists, four Christians,
three with no religion, two Hindus and two Buddhists were interviewed.
The interviews were conducted in the respondents’ homes, each lasting
an average of thirty minutes. They were tape-recorded and subsequently
transcribed to facilitate collation, processing and analyses. The interviewees
were assured of the interviews’ confidentiality and were briefed on the purpose
of the study before they agreed to be interviewed. On the whole, interviewees
were willing to share intimately their feelings about their conversion, itself an
intensely personal affair and one subject to many influences and pressures.
The following questions were used as guidelines:
1. What was your religion prior to declaration?
2. Describe what you did as a follower of that religion?
3. Could you share with us the periods of time when you were staunch in
your previous faith and when you were not? Were you at all unhappy in
your previous religion?
4. Were you investigating other religions before converting to the Baha’i
Faith?
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5. Can you share with us how much you know about other religions?
6. Was there anything in the Baha’i Faith that prevented you from becoming
a Baha’i?
7. What was the “tipping point” which made you decide to become a
Baha’i?
8. Was there any inter-generational impact when you became a Baha’i?
Sometimes, additional questions were added to the list in order to clarify
information provided by the interviewees.
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY FINDINGS

Current Profile of Respondents
Fifty-five (55) respondents were female and forty-seven (47) were male. The
median age range of all respondents was 40–49. The female respondents had
a median age range of 40–49 while the male respondents had a slightly higher
median age range (45–54).
The majority of respondents were Chinese (74.5 per cent) based on their
parents’ ethnicities. None of the respondents had Malay parentage while 8.8
per cent were of Indian parentage. Only 2 per cent were of mixed parentage
(Chinese-Indian or Indian-Chinese) while a significant proportion of the
respondents (14.7 per cent) were of other ethnic parentage (other than
Chinese, Malay and Indian).
A slightly small majority of respondents were Singaporeans (65.7 per
cent). Malaysians with permanent residence status (12.7 per cent) and other
permits (6.9 per cent) made up 19.6 per cent while other nationalities with
permanent residence status (10.8 per cent) and other permits (3.9 per cent)
made up a significant 14.7 per cent.
Taking into consideration both the ethnicity and nationality profiles of
the respondents, it is therefore not surprising that there is a significant
visual presence of a diversity of races and nationalities in the Baha’i
community of Singapore.
The majority of the respondents (62.7 per cent) had tertiary education;
53.9 per cent had a university degree while 8.8 per cent had a diploma. The
proportion of male respondents with a tertiary education (42 per cent) was
higher than that of the female respondents (31 per cent). In the Singapore
Census of Population 2000 for resident non-students aged 15 years and over,
the proportion of population with tertiary education (polytechnic, other
diploma and university) was only 22.8 per cent (16). Although the sampling
was probably not representative of the whole Baha’i community of Singapore,
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this is still an indication that the education level of the more active members
of the Baha’i community in Singapore, if not all its members, was significantly
higher than the general population in Singapore.
At the time of the survey, none of the respondents were unemployed
although there were 13 homemakers, 7 retirees and 2 students (21.6 per
cent). A significant majority of the employed respondents (70 per cent) held
a professional, technical or managerial position (62.9 per cent), which is
reflective of their high education levels. The majority of the employed
respondents worked in the “other services” industry (56.3 per cent).
The ratio of respondents staying in Housing and Development Board
(HDB) flats to those staying in other types of dwelling is 62:38 as compared
to the typical ratio of 85:15 for the general population of Singapore. However,
as more than 90 per cent of the respondents consider or perceive themselves
as middle-class, the lower ratio of 62:38 for HDB to other types of dwelling
is not unexpected. When the type of dwelling is combined with the language
most frequently spoken at home for the respondents, the results are quite
interesting compared to that of Singapore Census of Population 2000 for
HDB flat dwellers. The majority of the Singapore population staying in
HDB flats speak Chinese dialects (50 per cent) followed by Mandarin (36.6
per cent) and then English (18.3 per cent). However, the trend for the Baha’i
respondents staying in HDB flats is in the opposite direction: the majority
speaks English (60.3 per cent), followed by Mandarin (19 per cent) and then
Chinese dialects (17.5 per cent).
Most of the respondents (91.2 per cent) considered themselves as middle-
class while only 1 per cent considered themselves as rich. Close to 70 per cent
of the respondents were married and 84 per cent of their spouses were Baha’is.
It is reasonable to assume that if both husband and wife profess the same
religious beliefs, there would be greater mutual support and the couple would
be more active in their religious community.
Profile of Respondents at Point of Declaration

The peak decade during which the respondents declared themselves Baha’i
(31.4 per cent) was the 1980s, while 84.3 per cent of respondents declared
during the three decades stretching from 1970s to the 1990s. As the Baha’i
Faith came to Singapore only in 1950, the early years in Singapore did not see
a significant growth in the number of adherents. It was only after the second
decade of the establishment of the Baha’i Faith that the numbers surged to
26.5 per cent among respondents.
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The declarations took place mainly in Singapore (60 per cent) and
Malaysia (23 per cent). One interesting observation is that there was a
sizeable number of respondents who had declared while in the United States
(5 per cent) and Canada (3 per cent), while none of the respondents had
declared while in the United Kingdom which was a more popular destination
for students from Singapore and Malaysia till the late 1980s. It would seem
that the believers in the North American continent were more proactive in
teaching the faith as compared to those in the United Kingdom.
The median age range of all respondents was 40–49 while the median age
range of all respondents at the point of declaration was 20–29. This correlates
well with the peak decade of declaration in the 1980s, which was about
twenty years ago.
Based on the nationality of the respondents at the point of declaration,
there was an obvious movement of Malaysian Baha’is to Singapore in the
intervening years, with many of the Malaysian Baha’is subsequently taking up
Singapore citizenship or permanent residence.
Comparing the educational status of the respondents at the point of
declaration with their educational status at the time of the survey, many
respondents have clearly moved on from their secondary and upper secondary
levels of education to tertiary levels of education. When comparing the
current education status of the respondents with the general Singapore
population, it is conjectured that the higher educated members of the
Baha’i community of Singapore are significantly more active. It is also
highly plausible that the active members of the Baha’i community of
Singapore have, in accordance with the teachings of the faith, placed great
importance on education, and have thus gone on to attain higher levels
of education.
This movement up to higher levels of education in the intervening years
is also reflected in the comparison between the employment status of the
respondents at the point of declaration and their current employment status.
Many who were students at the point of declaration had moved on to
professional, technical or managerial positions. Most of the respondents
(82.4 per cent) considered themselves middle class at the point of declaration
while none considered themselves rich. There were more poor respondents
(17.6 per cent) at the point of declaration, who have since moved up the
economic ladder. Only 24.5 per cent of the respondents were married at the
time of declaration as many of them were still schooling, and the median age
range of all respondents was 20–29 at the point of declaration. This indicates
the attractiveness of the Baha’i Faith to the young.
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Religious Status of Respondents at Point of Declaration

The largest group of respondents (41.2 per cent) who declared themselves as
Baha’i did not have a religious upbringing or considered themselves as not
having a religion, at the point of declaration. Of this group, about 9.5 per
cent were probably dissatisfied with their previous religious beliefs and had
ceased these beliefs or left their previous religious organizations for some time
already, and thus, considered themselves as having no religion. However, in
the case study interviews of those who had declared themselves as not having
a religion at the point of declaration, all responded in the affirmative when
asked the question: “Did you believe in God or a divine Creator or a
Universal Consciousness?”
It is interesting to note that the next largest group of respondents was
from the Buddhist tradition (40 per cent), followed by respondents from the
Christian tradition (17.6 per cent) and the Taoist tradition (16.7 per cent).
When examining the religious status of the parents of those respondents
without religion, it was found that the majority of their parents were Taoists
(54.8 per cent). This reinforces the earlier point made that respondents with
no religion at the point of declaration were already dissatisfied with their
previous religious beliefs, including those of their parents.
Investigators of Religious Truth

Of greater significance is the fact that 65 per cent of all respondents were
investigating religious truth. This was as high as 71 per cent for respondents
who were previously Buddhists (13.7 per cent of total respondents) and 69
per cent for those previously with no religion (41.2 per cent). Clearly, the
majority of respondents were searching for religious truth and decided to
embrace the Baha’i Faith. Additionally, 72 per cent of the respondents knew
of another religion other than their own prior to conversion. This was as high
as 83 per cent for respondents from the Hindu tradition. Yet even among the
respondents from the Christian tradition (who are generally known to avoid
contact with other religions) a majority (56 per cent) knew something about
another religion. The best-known religion was Christianity (57 respondents)
followed by Buddhism (40 respondents) and Islam (22 respondents).
It is also interesting to note that for the respondents with a religion at the
point of declaration, their religion was very similar to those of their parents
except for the Christians. It is clear from the survey that one-third of the
respondents who were previously Christians were first generation Christians,
as none of their parents were Christians.
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Many of the respondents first heard of the Baha’i Faith from friends (37
per cent), family and relatives (27 per cent) and colleagues (11 per cent). Others
(5 per cent) heard from acquaintances and teachers (4 per cent). This trend
is related to “connectivity”, with the connectivity with friends obviously the
highest. Interestingly, about 9 per cent first heard of the faith from strangers.
First Impressions of the Baha’i Faith

The first impression respondents about the Baha’i Faith were generally neutral
among half the respondents (49.0 per cent), and low in the negative (4.9 per
cent) and high in the positive direction (46.1 per cent). More respondents
from the Christian tradition were impressed with the faith than not. This
same trend was also apparent among the respondents from the Taoist tradition.
The respondents from the Buddhist tradition were non-committal, and the
same trend to a less extent was true among the respondents with no religion.
For those mainly former Christians who reacted negatively to the faith upon
first hearing it (4.9 per cent), the main reason given was that the Baha’i Faith
is a cult. This can be largely explained by the Christian belief that “Christ is
the only Way”.
There were however several reasons as to why many of the respondents
reacted favourably to the faith when they first heard of it. The fundamental
teachings of the Baha’i Faith, namely the oneness of God (that is, there is only
one God and all religions worship the same God), progressive Revelation
(that is, different prophets come at different times of history to bring the
message of God) and the unity of mankind (that is, all human beings are
equal irrespective of gender or race), resonated with the self-cultivated beliefs
of the respondents. The majority of the respondents (65 per cent) were
searching for religious truth and many of them had studied other religions
before they encountered the Baha’i Faith, and had arrived at the same tenets
by themselves.
However, it is also true that many of the respondents who reacted very
positively were impressed by the conduct of the Baha’is who taught them the
faith. The respondents used statements like, “very courteous, pleasing and
internally beautiful teacher”, “gentle, courteous, always smiling Baha’is”,
“conduct of the Baha’i volunteers” and “enjoyed the freedom to ask questions”.
First Meeting of Respondent with the Baha’is

It was usually within a year that most respondents had their first meeting with
Baha’is after first hearing about the faith. Thereafter, the probability of
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respondents who would attend a meeting with Baha’is after the first year
dropped steeply. However, the duration between the first meeting and the
declaration of the respondent was more gradual, although a significant
proportion (40 per cent) declared within a year of attending a meeting with
the Baha’is.
The first meeting with the Baha’is usually took place in the home of the
Baha’is (55 per cent) and in the Baha’i Centre (31 per cent). The activity
during the first meeting however, did vary considerably. The main activities
were firesides, nineteen-day feasts, social gatherings and holy days celebrations.
Investigation of the Faith

The spiritual teachings of the Baha’i Faith mainly prompted many of the
respondents (34.3 per cent) to investigate the faith. It was followed by the
fulfilment of prophecies (22.5 per cent) and its social teachings (20.6 per
cent). The faith’s spiritual teachings touched the hearts of respondents with
no religion and those from the Buddhist tradition to a lesser extent than those
with other religions prior to the conversion. The fulfilment of prophecies, as
expected, mainly prompted respondents from the Christian tradition and
those who had studied Christianity in the course of their investigation. The
social teachings resonated most with those with no religion and from the
Taoist and Buddhist traditions.
The majority of the respondents investigated the faith through self-study
(62 out of 102 respondents) and by attending firesides (61 out of 102
respondents). The least popular method of investigation was through
correspondence (5 out of 102 respondents).
Of the spiritual teachings of the Baha’i Faith, the most attractive was on
progressive revelation (37.3 per cent) followed by oneness of God (25.5 per
cent) and the unity of mankind (22.5 per cent). These three teachings are also
the most basic tenets of the Baha’i Faith. Other teachings such as life, death
and the soul, prayers and meditation, faith, and greatness of the day, attracted
far fewer (less than 5 per cent for each).
Of the faith’s social teachings, the principle of the independent
investigation of religious truth was considered the most attractive social
principle by 33.3 per cent of respondents. This principle was appreciated
equally by both male and female respondents. It was followed closely by the
principle of the harmony of religion and science (26.5 per cent) and by
the principle of equal opportunities for men and women (20.6 per cent). The
principle of harmony of religion and science resonated more with the male
176

respondents, while the principle of equal opportunities was almost exclusively

appreciated by female respondents.
Investigating the Baha’i Faith, the majority of the respondents (52 per
cent) were touched by the truth in Baha’i teachings. A smaller proportion
(21.6 per cent) saw the translation from teachings into action by Baha’i
friends and were encouraged to continue their investigation. Another 16.7
per cent — more females than males — were encouraged to continue their
search by relatives and friends.
FINDINGS FROM CASE STUDIES

As listed in detail in an earlier section, questions raised with the sixteen
selected interviewees as in-depth case studies revolved around their religious
backgrounds prior to conversion, decisions in converting to the Baha’i Faith,
and the impact of their conversion on relationships with parents. As conversion
from a previous particular faith is a central theme, the case studies are
presented below according to the interviewees’ previous religious backgrounds.
Taoists
Most of the five respondents from this background cited family obligations
to follow the religious practices of their parents, such as visiting the temple
celebrating festivals, ancestor worship, funeral rites, and burning “Hell
money”. This obligation is especially enjoined upon the eldest son, and in
one case the respondent was expected to assist her mother as temple
medium. Most of the respondents stated that the various practices were
devoid of meaning for them and that they really only performed them out
of obedience to their parents.
One former Taoist did not consider his family to be particularly religious,
although they did follow practices such as ancestor worship and occasional
visits to the temple. Prior to becoming a Baha’i, he did not consider himself
a staunch Taoist, mentioning in fact that he only prayed with joss sticks
rather reluctantly. Another respondent mentioned only that there were bound
to be periods when she was staunch and others when she was not. One
interviewee, who has been a Baha’i for over fifteen years, remembers that he
was staunch in a certain sense only when he was a child but, as he matured,
he found these practices somewhat meaningless but carried them out in
deference to his mother and the family. An interviewee with a similar outlook
mentioned that she also took part in the various rites out of obedience to her
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parents, rather than considering Taoism as a religion in which she was

staunch or weak. Another noted that he was fairly staunch right up to the
time he was in secondary school and university, although he was also
questioning some of the beliefs such as how other faith communities were
viewed, the question of many deities versus one God, and the lack of
documentary evidence for some of the beliefs and doctrines.
With regard to obstacles faced in becoming Baha’is, two interviewees
cited parental objections and one of whom also found the Baha’i laws an
obstacle, another feared at first that it might be a sect, while a fourth feared
it might clash with his then religion. Overcoming these obstacles was difficult
for some. The interviewee who cited laws as one of the obstacles to his
accepting the faith found them “troublesome” but admitted he was reacting
to how he was brought up, as the eldest son, to be obedient to certain rules
and regulations. He was also worried about his parents’ objections. Similarly,
another interviewee was concerned that she would in some way go against her
mother’s religion by embracing another faith. A third interviewee was initially
asked by her parents to make sure she was not getting involved in a cult or
sect. Another interviewee took four years from first hearing of the Baha’i
Faith to declare himself a Baha’i, when he realized there was nothing that
contradicted what he had been brought up to believe.
When asked what tipped the balance in favour of becoming a Baha’i, one
interviewee mentioned being struck by the concept of progressive revelation.
Another interviewee could not identify a tipping point, but simply felt there
was “a time of ripening or when you are ready”. She also felt the Baha’i Faith
was logical and not in opposition to the principles of Taoism or any other
religion. A third interviewee identified two factors as the tipping point: the
behaviour or example of his Baha’i friends, and the life of Baha’u’llah. For
another, it was a gradual process that took about three years of investigation
before he was “on the brink” and felt impelled to make a decision one way or
the other. Another interviewee, however, took a very short time to make the
decision to become a Baha’i and declared her faith on only the second
meeting, after being told that there is a difference between an admirer and a
believer who has to “practise what they believe”.
Inter-generational impact was a significant factor in determining when
the interviewees became Baha’is. One said that his parents felt that it was a
foreign religion that had no resonance with Chinese culture. However, his
deliberate attempts to appease his parents (by continuing to use the joss
sticks, for example) and the fact that Baha’i laws prohibit alcohol, drugs and
sexual relations before marriage helped reduce his parents’ objection to the
faith. Another interviewee encountered some opposition from her mother
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during the investigation phase and both parents warned her to check that it
was not a cult or a sect. Out of respect for her parents, she did not become
a Baha’i for about two years. Respect for his parents was also very important
to another interviewee who had encountered some opposition from his
family when he started first attending Christian activities, as he was then not
supposed to continue participating in the various Taoist rites. However, he
found nothing in the Baha’i Faith “that contradicts ancestral worship” but
there is “a lot of stress on unity”. Similarly for another interviewee, placating
his parents was important in helping them accept that conversion to the
Baha’i Faith would not lead to disunity and conflict. Conversely, one other
interviewee did not experience much family objection in the months following
her conversion. However, if there was a discrepancy in how she behaved and
the teachings of the faith, then would they question her.
Christians
For one of the four former Christian interviewees, the practice of Christianity
had lapsed because she was unable to reconcile herself to some of the
teachings of the Church. Another had become somewhat disenchanted with
her denomination and, prior to becoming a Baha’i, had spent three years
attending other churches of various denominations. When not actively
attending church activities, she continued to pray and read the Bible. A third
respondent considered himself a “born-again” Christian, and was actively
involved in church activities and individual practices such as prayer and
reading the Bible. The fourth was a practising Methodist at the time of
conversion. Of the three active church-goers, one was disturbed by the lack
of unity — even overt racism — that she detected in the congregation, but
the other two were happy with the faith.
For three out of the four interviewees the message of the Baha’i Faith
made an immediate impression and they became Baha’is very quickly. For
one, there was no real perceived obstacle, but when pressed it was felt that the
name Baha’i sounded Middle Eastern and that was associated with fanaticism.
However, the Baha’is she met impressed her so much that this initial
apprehension disappeared. Another perceived no obstacle at all and in fact
took a very short time to decide to become a Baha’i. When pressed, he
admitted that there was a slight resistance but it was towards organized
religion in general. For the third interviewee there was no resistance at all. She
was introduced to the faith, read some books about it and found that it
resonated with what she already believed in. The fourth interviewee found
the key intellectual challenge was to determine the truth of Baha’u’llah’s claim
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to be the return of Christ. In addition he had formed very close bonds with
members of the Methodist Youth Fellowship and this emotional closeness
made the decision to become a Baha’i difficult.
Some of the interviewees took very little time to decide to become a
Baha’i — one decided within half an hour of asking the question “What is the
Baha’i Faith?” The tipping point for her was simply “a desire to open my
mouth and ask”. On further probing, she mentioned that she did not feel as
if she was “switching faiths” and saw it more as “a natural development”. The
claim by Baha’u’llah that He was the fulfilment of Christ’s prophecy that He
would return was the tipping point for another interviewee who had considered
the claim and was convinced of its truth. Another said that he was not
actively searching when he was “suddenly” introduced to the key principles
and teachings of the Baha’i Faith. His conversion was almost immediate as he
did not think “there would be anything to prevent me from saying yes”. The
teaching about Progressive Revelation was cited as the tipping point for the
fourth interviewee, which she described “was something that I had believed
in my heart … and it just seems to all fall into place”.
One of the interviewees said that she had far less problems after becoming
a Baha’i than after becoming a Christian, since she could still participate in
Taoist prayers and eat the food prepared for the various rituals. Her parents
also met the Baha’is when they came to help out on the farm and this helped
to reduce any perceived objections. Another said there was very little in the
way of negative inter-generational impact. His father, a Christian, was in fact
very open and encouraging and his mother felt that a religion that believes in
“universal fellowship” was acceptable to her. One interviewee said that her
parents were against her becoming a Baha’i and indeed until today, they do
not discuss it. For another interviewee, however, there was no issue as his
parents had already passed away by the time he became a Baha’i.
Free-thinkers
Although not espousing any particular religion at the time of conversion,
these three interviewees were asked a qualifying question: “Did you believe in
God or a divine Creator or a Universal Consciousness?” All responded in the
affirmative. Only one mentioned having been brought up a Roman Catholic
as this made it easier to attend a convent school. These interviewees were also
asked: “Since you believed in God, why were you not a follower of any
particular religion?” or “Were you curious about religions or investigating any
in particular?” The former Roman Catholic had left the faith because of her
perception that the believers were not following a way of life that matched the
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teachings, and because she had met pious members of other faiths. She had
begun to investigate more about Buddhism. Another interviewee was confused
by the number of religions all claiming to be the way to God and was
investigating Christianity and Buddhism. The third had attended some
Christian rallies and camps and had some Christian friends.
Two out of the three free-thinkers claimed there were no obstacles to
their accepting the Baha’i Faith. One expressed that she “just took time to
investigate”, and the other also said that “it was quite easy … to accept the
faith” after investigating. The third mentioned that the “Muslim sounding
names, places” scared her off because she had “always viewed Muslim things
as fanaticism”. However, she overcame this by reading the Baha’i writings, to
which she was attracted. The poetry and images of the Baha’i holy writings
were what “really attracted” and influenced her most in her decision to
become a Baha’i. For the other two, it was the teachings on life after death
that tipped one towards the faith, and simply the fact that it felt right at the
time to become a Baha’i.
In terms of inter-generational impact, it was very positive for one, as the
faith “stresses so much on harmony in the family life … tolerance of differences
and mutual respect to each other”. A second responded that there was no
resulting conflict with parents at the time of conversion as she was already
married by then.
Hindus
Of the two interviewees, one was already not practising any of the rites or
rituals, was not particularly staunch and had no strong beliefs about any
religion. If anything, his belief was in the oneness of all religions, although he
was not looking seriously at any other religion. The other interviewee performed
the ritual daily prayers, fasting, and going to the temple, but felt unhappy
with her faith, primarily because she was told she could only pray through the
priest rather than directly. She felt attracted to other religions such as
Christianity through the personage of Jesus Christ and Islam through listening
to the chanting of Qur’anic verses.
Both interviewees expressed having virtually no obstacles to accepting
the faith. The first had married a Baha’i and saw through her example how
the faith was “a religion that was uniting the world together” — something
that he already felt comfortable with. The example of his wife was what
tipped the Baha’i Faith in his favour. For him, there was no inter-generational
impact because his family “was not too concerned about what I was following”.
The second was searching, even beseeching God to give her a religion she
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could believe in. Her intense desire for a religious belief found the teachings
of oneness of God and oneness of religion to be what tipped the balance. She
was fifteen at the time of her conversion and her mother was not aware of
what religion she was following, although she told her that she noticed “she
can see some changes in me”.
Buddhists
One of the two interviewees attended Buddhist temples instead of
accompanying her parents to Taoist temples, and attended classes for a time.
The other stated that on the one hand he had respect for the monks and
helped out when there were big festivals, but on the other hand he could not
understand why the monks and believers could not be on an equal footing.
He also found it hard to comprehend the teaching on reincarnation. The
other interviewee was brought up in a Buddhist family and went to the
temple every week when she was schooling. She also fasted and observed
the ritual prayers. However, she only felt staunch during the annual Buddhist
fasting period when fasting was coupled with prayers. There were other times
when she noticed there was bickering and backbiting among the members of
the community, and this led to a certain amount of disillusionment.
The first interviewee admitted knowing “a bit only” of other religions, for
example, some of what she termed “surface” issues of Taoism through visits to
the temple. The other began an investigation of Christianity during secondary
school through peer influence. However she was discouraged from investigating
Buddhism by her friends, and from having anything to do with Islam by her
father. She reported that it took a month from the time she heard of the faith
for her to become a Baha’i. Her initial reaction to the faith was one of concern
because the names were “so Islamic” and she grew up having been taught that
“Muslims were bad people”, but this was overcome through her attraction to
the “essence of the teachings” as well as the writings of the central figures of
the faith. The “need to give something of myself personally” and finding that
in the Baha’i Faith was cited was the main reason for her becoming a Baha’i.
The other interviewee also had some misgivings initially when hearing
about the faith as she found the names “very foreign” and unfamiliar. In fact
she first thought it was a cult, but this did not deter her from contacting the
Baha’is to find out more. A strong desire to “make a fresh start” and choose
between the religion of her upbringing and the Baha’i Faith was the tipping
point for her. When she became a Baha’i there were no objections by her
parents because she continued to go to the temple with them as a gesture of
support. However, there was a certain amount of censure from her sisters who
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are Christians “and really believe — until today — that I am worshipping

Satan”. Her parents had no objections, simply a concern that the Baha’i
marriage ceremony would be recognized.
In summary, the case studies illuminate the issues of conversion from one
faith to another and offer, albeit limited, insights into religious feelings about
various religious communities in Singapore.
In general, many who professed a particular faith before their declaration
as Baha’is really no longer held particularly strong convictions or they were
already questioning some of the practices of their prior religions. This was
mainly true for those of every religious background except the Christians,
three out of four of whom were actively and mindfully practising their faith.
The free-thinkers, though not espousing any particular religion, were definitely
not atheists as all of them professed a belief in God.
Another feature was that when they were younger, they did not question
the religious practices of the family, but rather accepted and took part in the
various rites and rituals. Later on, even when questions surfaced, these
practices often continued out of a sense of deference to the older generation
or the faith community to which they belonged. It seems that for most
interviewees, the Christians being a notable exception, the deeds of the
believers often did not match the standards set by the holy texts which were
what led to their disaffection or disillusionment.
The lack of deep knowledge of other religions among the interviewees is
noteworthy. In many cases (about half the interviewees), it was merely a lack
of interest, while some were actively dissuaded by family members from
deviating from the family tradition. However, there were a few who were
actively reading up about other faiths and all three free-thinkers seemed to
know more about other religions either through schools, camps to which they
had been invited by friends, or self-directed learning.
The main factors which tipped the interviewees in favour of the Baha’i
Faith were the conduct of individual Baha’is and the teachings of the faith,
particularly the principle of Progressive Revelation and other spiritual
principles. Some could not care to pinpoint a direct causal link, but found
themselves ready to accept the faith after a period of getting to know about
it. While nearly half of them found no obstacles to their becoming Baha’is,
others were initially fearful that it was either a cult or sect, or that it was
somehow connected to Islam (which they associated with fanaticism). Some
also felt that there might be parental objections to their becoming Baha’i,
while only one had a problem “giving up” the former religion.
The majority of the interviewees reported a positive reaction on the part
of their parents to their becoming Baha’is. In large part, this is because the
183

new Baha’is helped to placate their parents by continuing the various rites
and rituals expected of them. This is often in direct contrast to other religions,
notably some branches of Christianity, which often expressly forbid it. Often,
such families had had conflictual experiences when those members who had
converted refused to perform such practices as burning joss sticks or going to
the temple. Where there was opposition from the family, most Baha’i converts
had taken a soft approach and either not brought the faith up for discussion,
or continued to practice the rites of the family religion out of respect.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
One of the aims of this study was to determine whether the teachings of the
Baha’i Faith are especially attractive to particular sectors of society. The
findings suggest that those who consider themselves English-speaking and
middle-class and have tertiary education are more attracted to the faith. Most
of the respondents working in “other services”, that is, non-technical, non-
manufacturing and non-business sectors, as knowledge professionals and
include such professions as civil servants, teachers, medical workers, social
workers, insurance agents, etc. Perhaps such professions are more people-
oriented, allow more time and opportunity for investigation, and are more
grounded in philosophy than some other vocations and therefore more open
to considering different worldviews and thus different religions.
As to whether the Baha’i Faith is attractive to particular ethnic groups, no
clear conclusion can be drawn since a majority of the respondents (74 per
cent) were of Chinese origin, which reflects the proportion in the Singapore
population as a whole. What is clearer is that Chinese Baha’is who were
formerly Taoists or Christians were dissatisfied with their former religions. It
is also noteworthy that a significant percentage (14.7 per cent) may be of
“other” racial parentage. This is a reflection of the attractiveness of the
principle of the oneness of humanity enshrined in Baha’i writings.
The second question was which age group was more drawn to the Baha’i
Faith and the place of their declaration as Baha’is. The median age of the
respondents was in the 20–29 year age bracket, indicating that young adults
who are newly independent appear to be most likely to declare their belief in
the religion. It may be surmised that this is because it is during their twenties
that they are between family responsibilities, as it were — more independent
from their parents than before and not yet tied down with families of their
own — and so with the relative freedom to investigate their aims and purpose
in life. It is also interesting to note that many of those (17 per cent) who
declared their belief as Baha’is outside Singapore and Malaysia did so in
184

North America (the United States and Canada). This may indicate that the
Baha’is of North America were, at least at that time, more proactive in
teaching prospective followers about the faith.
A third research question was whether there are any key messages in the
Baha’i teachings and/or significant actions of the Baha’i community of
Singapore that resonate with a significant number of its membership. The
spiritual teachings which most attracted them to the faith were the three basic
principles — Progressive Revelation, the Oneness of God and the Unity of
Mankind. It is interesting to note that those from Christian backgrounds
were also attracted by the fact that Baha’u’llah is considered by Baha’is to be
the fulfilment of biblical prophecies.
Some of the social teachings were also significant in converts’ decision to
embrace the Baha’i Faith. These include the independent investigation of
truth and the need to have harmony between religion and science. This
would also appear to corroborate the finding that those with higher levels of
education are more inclined to accept the faith. A high proportion (all
women) cited the principle of equal opportunities for men and women as
being a draw factor, and for a number of respondents, the principle of putting
the teachings of the faith into action was significant. In fact, many mentioned
the qualities of their contacts as being a significant pull factor in favour of
their accepting the faith. All respondents mentioned having a positive first
impression of the Baha’i community. It is also interesting to note that the
time of their first meeting with Baha’is to the time of their declaration was
usually one year or less.
Although this study is relatively limited in scope, being based on a small
sampling of the Baha’i community of Singapore, it has nonetheless shed some
light on this little-known community. It has also revealed some of the
religious, inter-religious and cultural aspects of conversion, particularly those
related to self needs, family relationships and religious/social teachings of the
faith. This not only contributes to our knowledge of the Baha’i community,
but also of the complex processes of conversion and inter-religious dimensions
involved in multi-cultural and multi-religious Singapore, particularly at the
personal and familial levels.
185

APPENDIX 7.1
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESEARCH PROJECT

WITH THE INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES
(Editor’s note: The layout and spacing which appear in this questionaire do not
correspond with that in the original questionnaire)
SECTION 1 — CURRENT PERSONAL DATA OF RESPONDENT
Name:
Address: Singapore
Phone (Home): (Mobile):
Email:
Best day/time to call if we need more information to complete questionnaire:
1.1 Sex:
Male ❑ Female ❑
1.2 Age:
15–19 ❑ 20–29 ❑
30–39 ❑ 40–49 ❑
50–59 ❑ 60–75 ❑
75 > ❑
1.3 Ethnicity:
Father Mother
Chinese ❑ Chinese ❑
Indian ❑ Indian ❑
Malay ❑ Malay ❑
Others ❑ Others ❑
1.4 Nationality:
If Non-Singaporean
Singaporean ❑ Singapore PR ❑
Malaysian ❑ Others ❑
Others ❑
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1.5 Highest Education Level Attained:

Primary ❑ Secondary ❑
Upper Secondary ❑ Polytechnic ❑
University ❑
1.6 Occupation:
If Not Working
Professional/Technical/Managerial ❑ Unemployed ❑
Clerical/Sales/Services ❑ Retired ❑
Production & Related ❑ Student ❑
Labourers ❑ Homemakers ❑
Others ❑
1.7 Industry:
Manufacturing ❑ Construction ❑
Other Goods Industries ❑ Wholesale & Retail Trade ❑
Hotel & Restaurants ❑ Transport & Communications ❑
Financial Services ❑ Business Services ❑
Other Services Industries ❑
1.8 Housing:
HDB Flat ❑ Other Public Flat ❑
Condominium & Private Flat ❑ Terrace House ❑
Semi-Detached ❑ Bungalow ❑
1.9 Perceived Economic Status:

Poor ❑ Lower Middle Class ❑
Upper Middle Class ❑ Rich ❑
1.10 Language Most Frequently Spoken at Home:

English ❑ Mandarin ❑
Chinese Dialects ❑ Tamil ❑
Other Indian Languages ❑ Malay ❑
Others ❑
1.11 Marital Status:

Single ❑ Married ❑
Divorced/Separated ❑ Widowed ❑
If married, number of years married:
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SECTION 2 — CURRENT PERSONAL DATA OF SPOUSE (IF APPLICABLE)
2.1 Age:
15–19 ❑ 20–29 ❑
30–39 ❑ 40–49 ❑
50–59 ❑ 60–75 ❑
75 > ❑
2.2 Ethnicity:
Father Mother
Chinese ❑ Chinese ❑
Indian ❑ Indian ❑
Malay ❑ Malay ❑
Others ❑ Others ❑
2.3 Nationality:
If Non-Singaporean
Others ❑
2.4 Highest Education Level Attained:

University ❑
2.5 Occupation:
If Not Working
Others ❑
2.6 Industry:
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2.7 Religion:
Hindu ❑ Jew ❑
Zoroastrian ❑ Buddhist ❑
Taoist ❑ Christian ❑
Muslim ❑ Sikh ❑
Baha’i ❑ No Religion ❑
If Baha’i, when did he/she declare? (Year): Where:
2.8 Number of Children:
SECTION 3 — PERSONAL DATA AT THE POINT OF DECLARATION
3.1 When did you declare? (Year): Where:
3.2 Age:
15–19 ❑ 20–29 ❑
30–39 ❑ 40–49 ❑
50–59 ❑ 60–75 ❑
75 > ❑
3.3 Nationality:
If Non-Singaporean
Others ❑
3.4 Education Level Attained Then:

University ❑
3.5 Occupation:
If Not Working
Others ❑
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3.6 Industry:
3.7 Housing:
HDB Flat ❑ Other Public Flat ❑
Condominium & Private Flat ❑ Terrace House ❑
Semi-Detached ❑ Bungalow ❑
3.8 Perceived Economic Status:

Poor ❑ Lower Middle Class ❑
Upper Middle Class ❑ Rich ❑
3.9 Language Most Frequently Spoken at Home:

English ❑ Mandarin ❑
Chinese Dialects ❑ Tamil ❑
Other Indian Languages ❑ Malay ❑
Others ❑
3.10 Marital Status:

Single ❑ Married ❑
Divorced/Separated ❑ Widowed ❑
If married, number of years married:
SECTION 4 — PERSONAL BELIEFS AT THE POINT OF DECLARATION
4.1 Your religion prior to declaration:

Hindu ❑ Jew ❑
Muslim ❑ Sikh ❑
Baha’i ❑ No Religion ❑
4.2 If you had a religion, had you already left the religion:
Yes ❑ No ❑
190

4.3 If yes, why did you leave?
4.4 Were you on an independent search after religious truth then?

Yes ❑ No ❑
4.5 Did you have knowledge of other religions besides your own?
Yes ❑ No ❑
4.6 What other religions did you investigate? (May tick more than one)
Hindu ❑ Jew ❑
Muslim ❑ Sikh ❑
4.7 Were you the first in your family to become a Baha’i?

Yes ❑ No ❑
4.8 Were you the first male/female in the family to become a Baha’i?
Yes ❑ No ❑
4.9 Did you feel then that you were leaving your previous religion?
Yes ❑ No ❑
Why?
4.10 Parents’ Religions:

Father Mother
Hindu ❑ Hindu ❑
Jew ❑ Jew ❑
Zoroastrian ❑ Zoroastrian ❑
Buddhist ❑ Buddhist ❑
Taoist ❑ Taoist ❑
Christian ❑ Christian ❑
Muslim ❑ Muslim ❑
Sikh ❑ Sikh ❑
No Religion ❑ No Religion ❑
191

4.11 When did you first hear about the Baha’i Faith? (mm/yy)
4.12 From whom did you first hear about the Baha’i Faith?
Father ❑ Mother ❑
Husband ❑ Wife ❑
Son ❑ Daughter ❑
Relative ❑ Friend ❑
Colleague ❑ Acquaintance ❑
Teacher ❑ Stranger ❑
Book ❑ Magazine ❑
Newspaper ❑ Radio ❑
Television ❑ Internet ❑
4.13 What was your first impression? Positive ❑ Neutral ❑ Negative ❑
4.14 If positive or negative, please give reasons:
4.15 When did you attend the first Baha’i meeting? (mm/yy)
4.16 Where was that meeting held?
4.17 What was the occasion for that meeting?
4.18 What was your first impression of the meeting?

Positive ❑ Neutral ❑ Negative ❑
4.19 If positive or negative, please give reasons:
4.20 What aspect of the Baha’i Faith first prompted you to investigate it?
(Tick only one.)
Life of Baha’u’llah ❑
Fulfilment of Prophecies ❑
World Order of Baha’u’llah ❑
Spiritual Teachings of Baha’u’llah ❑
Social Teachings of the Baha’i Faith ❑
Other (please describe):
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4.21 How did you investigate the Faith? (You may tick more than one.)
Self study of Baha’i books ❑
Face-to-face discussions with a Baha’i friend ❑
Correspondence with a Baha’i friend ❑
Attend firesides ❑
Attend public talks ❑
Join study circles ❑
4.22 Which spiritual teaching attracted you most? (Tick only one.)
Oneness of God ❑
Progressive Revelation ❑
Unity of Mankind ❑
Life, Death & the Soul ❑
Prayers & Meditations ❑
Greatness of this Day ❑
4.23 Which social teaching attracted you most? (Tick only one.)
Harmony between religion and science ❑
Equal opportunities, rights and privileges to men and women ❑
Elimination of the extremes of wealth and poverty ❑
Seeking spiritual solutions to economic problems ❑
Compulsory universal education ❑
Adopting an international auxiliary language ❑
The independent search for truth ❑
Sustaining a balance between development and environment ❑
Establishing a world federation ❑
4.24 In investigating faith, what motivated to continue your search?

(Tick only one.)
Truth of Baha’u’llah’s teachings ❑
Relatives and friends, who were Baha’is ❑
Translation into action of Baha’u’llah’s teachings by the community ❑
4.25 What finally made you decide to declare as a Baha’i?
193

References
Baha’u’lláh.The Kitab-i-Aqdas. Translated by the Universal House of Justice, 1993.
Mona Vale, Australia, 1873.
Census Population of Singapore. Singapore: Department of Statistics, Ministry of
Trade and Industry, 2000.
Chew, Phyllis Ghim Lian. “Life, Death and Immortality: The Taoist Religion in
Singapore”. The Singapore Baha’i Studies Review 2, no. 1 (1997): 59–90.
———. “The Emergence of the Baha’i Faith in Singapore (1950–1972)”. The
Singapore Baha’i Studies Review 1, no. 1 (1996): 23–48.
Inter-Religious Organization. Religions in Singapore. 3rd ed. Singapore 2001.
Ong, Rose. Shirin Fozdar: Asia’s Foremost Feminist. Singapore, 2000.
Singapore Baha’i Studies Review 1–6 (1996–2001).
Shoghi, Effendi. God Passes By. National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the
United States, New Edition, 1974, pp. 213–19.
Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Singapore. The Baha’i Faith, Singapore. Singapore,
1998.
Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Singapore. The Baha’i Faith: 50 Years in Singapore.
Singapore, 2000.
Yeo, Hock Choon. Baha’i Community: A Study of Identity Consolidation with A Special
Focus on Witnessing. Academic Exercise, National University of Singapore, 1980.
194

Diversities and Unities 195
DIVERSITIES AND UNITIES

Towards a Reformist Buddhism
in Singapore
INTRODUCTION: REINVENTING A
SYNCRETIC BUDDHISM
Singapore is made up of originally migrant populations that arrived during
the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A vast majority of the Chinese
migrants were peasants who came from the two coastal provinces of Guangdong
and Fujian in South China. When they arrived, they brought along their
cultures and religion and reproduced them in a colonial environment, including
knowledge of a syncretic Chinese religious belief system which was a composite
mixture of Buddhism, Taoism and Chinese folk beliefs.1
Scholars of Chinese syncretic religion refer to this form of syncretism in
various terms. For example, Tan called it “Chinese religion” (Tan 1995,
p. 139), while Elliot termed it “Shenism” (Elliot 1955). Wee noted that the
majority of the Singaporean Chinese Buddhists were in fact practising Chinese
religion with Buddhist elements (Wee 1976, pp. 155–88), while in my own
work, Elliot’s definition of Shenism is adopted here, as the Chinese continually
termed their religious act as “bai shen”, literally “praying to the gods”. This
syncretic system presents the Chinese cosmological worldview with a synthesis
of Taoist and Buddhist metaphysical ideas, with Confucianism providing the
moral base. It is therefore essential to explore the intersections of the Taoist,
195
195

196 Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng
Buddhist, Confucianist and Shenist universes to understand how the early

Chinese viewed their belief system.2
These syncretic religious rituals continue to be practised by the older
generation Chinese in Singapore. According to Watson, the Chinese were
concerned with the ritual practices rather than the ideological purity of their
religious practices (Watson 1988, p. 5). Religion was seen to serve an
instrumental function rather than for expressive spiritual needs, although at
times the two came hand-in-hand. The result of such practices was the
emergence of various types of religious cults, some Buddhistic while others
are Taoist and Shenist in nature. Thus, we see a proliferation of the cults of
Guandi, Ancestors, Heaven, Heavenly Mother or Empress, Goddess of Mercy
(Guanyin), Dabogong (Great Paternal Uncle) and others since the days of
early immigration and which have continued into the present (Kuah-Pearce
2003, pp. 33–49).
It should also be noted that during the colonial years, there was also a
small group of Singhalese migrants who came to Singapore as labourers to
work primarily on the roads and railways. They, too, brought along a syncretic
brand of Theravada Buddhism into Singapore, which was again interspersed
with Sri Lankan folk religious practices.
This author’s research on Buddhism started in the mid-1980s during
which the main bulk of data was collected using a questionnaire survey and
ethnographic interviews conducted in 1984–85. A total of 250 Chinese of
different age groups were interviewed and they were selected from people
who visited various temples. A standard questionnaire was also issued to 260
Reformist Buddhists to tap their views and 126 monks and nuns were also
interviewed extensively.
VARIETIES OF BUDDHISTS3
As religious communities in Singapore are undergoing religious
modernization and rationalization, it comes as no surprise that the Chinese
in particular are beginning to become more aware of their religious affiliation
and to distinguish between Buddhism and syncretic Chinese religion. This
is reflected in the 1990 census survey which found that 31.8 per cent of
household heads surveyed labelled themselves Buddhists and 23.8 per cent
are Shenists (Chinese traditional beliefs)/Taoists (Department of Statistics
1994, p. 63). Likewise, the 2000 census shows an even greater increase of
Buddhists in Singapore and a corresponding decline in Taoism/Chinese
traditional beliefs. Within the Chinese community, 54 per cent of Chinese
called themselves Buddhists while only 11 per cent are practitioners of
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Taoism and Chinese traditional beliefs (Department of Statistics 2001 (2),

p. 112; Kuah-Pearce 2003, p. 246).
At the organizational level, there are over 100 Buddhist and Buddhist-
Taoist temples in Singapore. Many Chinese temples are of a combination of
Buddhist and syncretic Chinese religion, the largest of which is the Phor Kark
See Temple. There are also several Theravada temples, a popular one of which
is the Mangala Vihara Buddhist Temple. Apart from these, there are also
several lay Buddhist organizations such as the Cheng Beng Buddhist Temple,
Singapore Buddha Sasana Society and Singapore Buddha Yana Organization.
All these Buddhist temples and associations are members of the Singapore
Buddhist Federation, an umbrella body that provides leadership for the
Buddhist community in Singapore.
According to Wee, believers of canonical Buddhism and Chinese religion
can be grouped into three categories namely, the “unambiguous Theravada
and Mahayana Buddhists who are aware of Buddhist theology; non-
differentiating ‘Buddhists’ who make use of both canonical Buddhism and
Chinese syncretic religions; and unambiguous practitioners of Chinese
syncretic religions” (Wee 1976, p. 169). However, with religious
modernization and changes, it is possible to identify the following categories
of syncretic Buddhist practitioners: Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana Buddhists,
Mahayana Buddhists, Therevada Buddhists, Reformist Buddhists and
Nichiren Shoshu Buddhists.
Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana Buddhists
A sizeable number of Chinese practise Shenism and Mahayana Buddhism,
especially the older generation. From an earlier survey in the mid-1980s,4
over 70 per cent of those in this category are fifty years old and above, with
over 65 per cent of these practitioners women. They visit both the Shenist/
Taoist and Buddhists temples.
There are several characteristic features of the Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana
Buddhists. First, they are predominantly Chinese dialect-speaking and attend
rituals that are conducted by dialect-speaking monks. When they encounter
various problems such as mundane domestic affairs, illnesses, emotional and
psychological problems, and social and marital discords, they would consult
a Taoist priest or spirit-medium and go to a Buddhist temple to pray for
assistance. Second, they neither attend one temple nor go to temples on a
regular basis. Individuals often visit temples only when the need arises.
Participation is purely on a voluntary basis. This is reflected in the 1990
census which shows that 62.3 per cent of the Buddhists and 66.5 per cent of
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the traditional Chinese believers/Taoists visited temples only occasionally. In

contrast, over 50 per cent of Christians and the Muslims make weekly visits
to the church and mosque respectively (Department of Statistics 1994(6),
p. 69). Third, these Chinese syncretic religious believers visit different temples
as they are not bound to one temple. Individuals visit different temples for
different purposes to help solve their religious and mundane problems. As
such, many such temples do not have members but believers, xin-tu. Of the
260 respondents surveyed, over half said that they have visited different
Shenist and Buddhist temples and requested various ritual services. As such,
temple membership is, in fact, a recent invention. Only with Reformist
Buddhism has there been an increasing push for adherents to become members
of a Buddhist organization. Here, membership is through formal application
and one becomes a member through the payment of a subscription fee.
The Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana Buddhist boundary is a flexible and elastic
one capable of incorporating everyone in it. Because of its non-membership
requirement, one can move in and out of membership readily. In the early
years, it was assumed that one is Shenist-Mahayana Buddhist unless declared
otherwise. This allowed for the ethno-religious link imposed by the Singapore
state, which neatly slotted 67 per cent of the Chinese into the Shenism/
Taoism and Buddhism category (Department of Statistics, 2001 (2), p. 112).
Mahayana Buddhists
Since the mid-1980s, as a result of religious modernization and rationalization,
individuals have experienced a high level of inner tension as a result of having
to choose between Shenism and canonical Buddhism. According to Weber, a
radical religious ethic can develop depending on the level of tension and the
resolution sought. As such, especially among those younger age groups, they
have chosen canonical Buddhism. From the 1984–85 questionnaire survey
and ethnographic interviews, 90 per cent among those who have declared
themselves as Buddhists are Chinese Mahayana Buddhists.
In the differentiation from Shenists, Mahayana Buddhists take the vow
of paying homage to the Triple Gem (Buddha, Dharma and Sangha), san-gui-
yi which is administered by a monk. This symbolic transformation is
symbolized by the adherents being given Buddhist names, fa-ming which
they use on special occasions. By becoming Buddhist, they acquire a new
identity and join formal membership of one or more Buddhist organizations.
They are expected to participate in temple activities regularly, contribute
financially and assist the temples in their activities. About 60 per cent of
Mahayana Buddhists surveyed were in the age group 50–59 and over
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60 years, 20 per cent were in the age group 30–49 years and 15 per cent in
the age group 20–29 years. Even though they are formally Mahayana Buddhists,
some might still occasionally resort to Shenist and Taoist rituals when the
need arises. But they are dissuaded from consulting spirit-mediums and
engaging in animism, and are encouraged to remove Chinese syncretic religious
icons and statues from their home altars. A majority of these Buddhists now
have only a home altar devoted to Buddhist deities and their ancestors.
It is to be noted here that the shift from Shenism to Mahayana Buddhism
is a gradual process. This is especially so with the privatization of religion as
argued by Luckmann, in which the theological focus is now being confined
to the private individual sphere (Luckmann 1967). In Singapore, Mahayana
Buddhists are being subjected to this process of religious privatization and
secularization, made possible as a result of the socio-political and economic
stability in post-independent Singapore that liberates adherents from the
concerns of mundane living and re-channels their energies on individual
spiritual pursuits. Buddhism, with its focus on karma and afterlife, allows for
spiritual fulfilment.
Theravada Buddhists
Within the broad Theravada Buddhist tradition in Singapore are the
Singhalese, Thai, Cambodian and Burmese sub-traditions. The Thai,
Cambodian and Burmese sub-traditions are patronized mainly by the
Chinese. Southeast Asian monks of these sub-traditions, especially Thai
monks, are reputed for their magical acts and are widely consulted. The
small community of Singaporean Singhalese have their own Theravada
temples and Singhalese monks who cater to this community. There is also
a small group of Straits Chinese Theravada Buddhists who build their own
temples and hired Singhalese monks to provide spiritual guidance. Individual
Theravada Buddhist households and individuals become members through
membership subscription.
Among the Straits Chinese Therevada Buddhists, the main language of
communication is English and Malay, including between monks, laities and
among members, while religious services are conducted in Pali language.
Malay is most common among the elderly members as it is traditionally the
mother-tongue of the Straits Chinese while English is spoken by the younger
members. Today, members speak a mixture of Malay and English. Another
feature is the regular weekly religious service, attended on the whole by 85 per
cent of members of a temple. On most occasions, all family members will
attend the service together. It is thus not uncommon to find family members
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of different generations attending the service together. Yet another feature is

the focus on both Buddhist theology and social activities for a temple’s
members. Among the younger members, 95 per cent attended Buddhist
classes and were well-versed with Buddhist Dharma. In recent years, many
have also joined the Reformist Buddhist movement to promote scriptural
Buddhism to the public.
Reformist Buddhists
Since the 1990s, Reformist Buddhists have become a formidable group
within the Buddhist community. However, they are not homogenous but fall
within two broad categories: the Mahayana Reformist Buddhists and Theravada
Reformist Buddhists. Within the Mahayana reformist group is an increasingly
influential sub-group based on Tibetan Buddhist tradition whose members
call themselves the Tibetan Mahayana Reformist Buddhists. However,
increasingly Reformist Buddhists prefer to be known as non-sectarian in their
approach, and call themselves “Buddhayana” to signal their adherence to
non-sectarianism.
Reformist Buddhists are attracted to Reformist Buddhism for the following
reasons. First, they rejected a God-created world which they argue features
notions of superior versus inferior and authority versus subordination. In
place, they favour the egalitarian approach of Buddhism. Second, they believe
in personal effort in the attainment of enlightenment, instead of dependence
on an omnipotent God. Many are well-educated and highly successful middle
and upper middle-class Buddhists whose personal efforts in religious
spiritualism can be regarded as what Weber terms “the path of mastery” to
religious asceticism. According to Weber, it is precisely the mastery of the
individual life and social conditions that is highly favourable to the development
of a new religious ethic, that of Ascetic Protestantism. In his argument,
Ascetic Protestantism allowed an individual to realize his or her religious
commitment in a secular world without the need to renounce and lead a
monastic life (Weber 1958). In this sense, choice of practice among the
Reformist Buddhists is thus very much determined by their understanding
and interpretation of Buddhism, which is shaped largely by their intellectual
background. They are able to read books on Buddhist philosophy, Buddhist
psychology and the like with much ease. Through Buddhist texts and books,
they are able to focus on those Buddhist teachings that they feel are relevant
to their needs and put them into practice. They also hope to encourage others
to follow them through their exemplary behaviour. In these ways, they have
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embarked on a gradual process of restructuring Buddhist practices, placing

emphasis on the Dharma and meditation.
The practices of Reformist Buddhists appeal to like-minded educated
Chinese of professional backgrounds. It is thus not surprising to see an
increased number of better-educated middle-class and younger Chinese
attracted to Reformist Buddhism. Overall, this process of rationalization and
restructuring of Buddhism has a class overtone attached to it.
Reformist Buddhists have established lay Buddhist organizations that are
popular among the younger and better-educated Chinese. The survey findings
of five lay Buddhist organizations with 260 respondents show that over 70
per cent of the members belong to the 20–40 years age group; about 15 per
cent are less than 20 years old with the remaining 15 per cent over the age of
50 years. Over 80 per cent of them have ten to twelve years of education and
12 per cent have tertiary education. About 75 per cent of the Reformist
Buddhists surveyed practised Reformist Buddhism for five years or less and
are thus very new to its practice. Among them, there are slightly fewer men
than women, with 35 per cent male members.
Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish between the English-speaking
and the Chinese-speaking Reformist Buddhists with their respective lay
organizations, even though they are all bilingual. In post-colonial Singapore,
English language continues to be accorded an elite and hence higher status
vis-à-vis other languages. Thus, the English-speaking Buddhist lay organizations
too assume a higher status. However, since the 1990s, the promotion of
Mandarin by the state has led to Mandarin now being considered as a high-
status language, all the more so with the globalizing impact of the Mandarin
language today. As such, today the Chinese-speaking Buddhist lay organizations
have also established a niche for themselves.
The language divide also correlates with the socio-economic statuses of
the members. English-speaking members mostly consider themselves as
middle and upper middle-class. In terms of occupation, 15 per cent have
professional qualifications and work as doctors, engineers, computer analysts
and teachers; 30 per cent have technical qualifications; 20 per cent have
management qualifications and are managers and management personnel;
while 30 per cent have secretarial and clerical skills. A gender divide can
also be seen where a majority of the women work as clerks and secretaries
in the private sector. On the other hand, about half of the Chinese-speaking
reformist Buddhists regard themselves as middle-class while the other half
see regard themselves as lower middle-class. Some 65 per cent of those from
the middle-class come from a business background and run small- and
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medium-sized family businesses or business partnerships with others. Others

are in managerial, technical and service positions. The lower middle-class
are in technical, clerical and secretarial positions.
Nichiren Shoshu Buddhists

Since the late 1970s, an imported Buddhist sect, Nichiren Shoshu, has
emerged in the Singapore Buddhist scene and gained substantial members.
Today, it is entrenched in the local Buddhist landscape. Its substantial
membership has been saved through its ability to attract disenchanted Shenists
who want a change in their religious affiliation in a new sectarian group
(Wilson 1982). As a lay organization, Nichiren Shoshu functions as a new
Buddhist sect with exclusive membership, monopoly of religious truth, equality
among its members, voluntary membership, sanctions against members,
absolute loyalty and acts as a protest group (Wilson 1982, pp. 91–91). In the
initial years, its members came from working-class backgrounds and this is
still true today, although in recent years, some members also come from the
middle classes. It is able to attract members because of its aggressive
proselytization, simplistic ritual practice, exclusive membership and well
organized social activities (Kuah-Pearce 2003, pp. 257–60). Today, the sect
has embedded itself securely in the Singapore society with a stable membership
population through both religious and social activities, including participation
in the National Day Parade, the Vesak Celebration and other cultural events.
Its primary objective is to be socially relevant, with a simplified Buddhist
teaching of the Lotus Sutra to attract members.
EMERGING REFORMISM IN THE BUDDHIST COMMUNITY

Since the early 1980s, many among the younger Chinese population have
found fault with the syncretic Chinese religious belief system in three main
aspects. First, they find that this belief system consists only of ritual practices,
and hence theologically, they find it ill-equipped to meet their spiritual needs.
Many also question the usefulness of the rituals that surround the various
practices both at home and at the temples. They find that many Buddhist
temples provide and reinforce syncretic ritual practices that are non-Buddhistic,
irrational and meaningless in helping them to gain deeper understanding of
the Buddhist teachings and spiritual cultivation. Second, they question the
role of the Buddhist order of monks and nuns (Sangha) in a modern Singapore.
They regard the Sangha as catering to the expressive and ritual needs of the
older generation of Chinese migrants, and indeed it is often regarded as a
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religion of the elderly, with the temples functioning as old men’s and
particularly, old women’s clubs. Third, younger Chinese see the Sangha as
catering primarily to the “dead” instead of to the living. This is so because of
the focus on funerary rites performed by the monks and nuns.
Overall, as a result of the changing needs and demands of the younger
and more educated generation, Chinese syncretic religion and syncretic
Buddhism are undergoing processes of religious modernization and
rationalization to become more in tune with modern needs. In this process of
religious transformation and reform, three main actors are involved: the lay
community, the Sangha and the Singapore state.
In Reformist Buddhism, the central focus veers away from syncretism
and ritualism and instead, focuses on ideological purity and Buddhist teachings.
Here, ideological purity means the purging of all non-Buddhistic elements
but encompasses various Buddhist traditions. As such, it is possible to identify
two types of Reformist Buddhists.
First, there is the non-sectarian Reformist Buddhists who have taken on
a non-sectarian approach and prefer to call their practice as “Buddhayana”,
instead of the conventional sectarian names such as “Mahayana”, “Theravada”
or “Varjayana” Buddhism. In so doing, Reformist Buddhism adopts relevant
and selected scriptural tenets from the different Buddhist traditions that
best suits the needs of the adherents and answers their contemporary
spiritual and social needs.
Second, there are the Mahayana and the Theravada Buddhist reformists
whose primary focus is not the attainment of enlightenment, but with this-
worldly needs. To them, enlightenment through monkhood is only one path
to salvation. The pursuit of spiritualism in a lay person’s capacity as well as
becoming engaged in humanistic activities such as socio-welfare activities, are
also means of attaining enlightenment in this world. In this sense, Reformist
Buddhism can be linked to the development of Engaged Buddhism. However,
unlike Engaged Buddhism in some parts of the world which encourages its
adherents to become social and politically conscious and engaged in the social
development of the community, Reformist Buddhism in Singapore takes on
the welfare and charity role without encouraging political activism.
In general, Reformist Buddhism in Singapore can be seen as a scriptural
and social religion where the adherents are both knowledgeable about religious
doctrine as well as are actively involved in socio-welfare and cultural types of
works, caring for cultural development as well as the needs of the under-
privileged people in society. This is consistent with the “bodhisattva ideal”
expounded under the Mahayana tradition, which is most commonly invoked
in the pursuit of various socio-welfare activities by the Reformist Buddhists.
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Central Tenets of Reformist Buddihst Teaching5

Among the various Reformist Buddhist groups, the exposition of Buddhist
teaching, Dharma, is of paramount significance. The key scriptural tenets
that are expounded to the adherents and the general public are: (1) the
doctrine of causation, that is, the Four Noble Truths; (2) the theory of karma,
Rebirth and Merit-making; (3) Morality and Ethics; (4) Buddhist Work
Ethics; (5) Compassion and Humanity; and (6) the Eight-fold Path. The
primary idea behind these Buddhist teachings is to teach the Reformist
Buddhists to understand the causal relationship between life, suffering and
death. Let us explore briefly these key Buddhist teachings.
The Doctrine of Causation

The key teaching in Buddhism is on causal relations: that of causality and
that of the causally-conditioned phenomenon (Kalupahana 1976, p. 26) in
all spheres including psychic, moral, social and spiritual (ibid., p. 27).
The four main characteristics of causation are objectivity, necessity,
invariability and conditionality that are tested throughout the life process
(ibid., pp. 26–27).
The theory of causation attributes the cause of suffering to craving and
attachment of the material and sensual kinds, which is the result of ignorance.
It also teaches that only through pure thoughts and eradication of cravings
and attachments can humans be free from suffering. This theory is the Four
Noble Truths, which explains that all material things, social processes and
human emotions are impermanent and clinging to them causes suffering
(dukkha). But in our social existence, it becomes almost impossible to let go
of materialism and human emotions. In Buddhist teachings, the Eight-fold
Path directs an individual out of suffering by adopting right views, right
aspiration, right speech, right actions, right livelihood, right exertion, right
mindfulness and right concentration.
The Theory of Karma and Rebirth

Related to the theory of causation is the notion of karma and rebirth.
Buddhism argues that sufferings are the result of bad karma, which is caused
by negative actions of body, speech or mind. All actions have a cause and an
effect. Thus good actions result in good karma while bad ones result in
suffering. Thus, the present actions of an individual will determine the
204

outcome of one’s rebirth in one of the six realms of existence within the
Buddhist cosmology: the human, heaven, asuras, animal, hell and pretas
planes of existence. Doing good deeds will ensure that an individual is reborn
in the human realm and with a good karma in the next life. To ensure a
human rebirth, individual needs to perform merit-making to accumulate
merits for good karma.
Most Buddhist societies have made merit-making an important part of
Buddhist practice. In Southeast Asia and South India, alms-giving to Buddhist
monks and the acceptance of alms by the monks will accrue merits to the
givers. Other acts that will accrue merits to the givers include making
donations for temple building and temple repairs, as well for the community
good. When a son becomes a monk, he also accumulates merits for himself
and his parents. Merit-making is also important for the deceased ancestors to
ensure a rebirth in the human world. Individuals, but more often monks and
nuns, transfer merits to the dead through special prayers at the request of the
living kin. Merit-making is thus regarded as an insurance policy to ensure a
good karma for the individual in the present and future.
Morality and Ethics

Within Buddhist teaching, morality and ethics featured prominently. Among
the Reformist Buddhists, they focus on the five groups of vices, namely:
(1) taking life, both of oneself and of others; (2) taking what is not given;
(3) wrong indulgence in sensual pleasure; (4) falsehood; and (5) use of
intoxicants (Kalupahana 1976, p. 58). To the Reformist Buddhists, Buddhist
moral teachings should provide guidance to one’s daily existence and hence,
the need to follow these rules strictly so as not to commit wrongdoings such
as killing, lying, intoxicant drinking, adultery and stealing. However, individual
reformists interprets these moral teachings in their own ways so as to cater to
their own needs and modern living, which may be liberal or fundamental in
approach to religious dogma. The fundamentalist reformists tend to interpret
these moral ethical values in an orthodox and literal manner, while the liberal
reformists adopt an interpretation which allows for a wider range of
interpretations and actions.
In most cases, certain values that can be applied to modern living are
followed while others are less emphasized. For example, killing is often
interpreted as avoidance of all kinds of animals in their diet and confining
their food intake to a vegetarian one. In recent years, this is also linked to the
animal rights movement. Thus, Reformist Buddhism is also linked to Engaged
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Buddhism in their championing actions for animal rights. A second offspring

of this is the championing of non-violence and peaceful actions in social
activism. The Buddhist values and arguments against sexual misconduct and
the need to observe Buddhist morality are widely used nowadays in their
efforts to help stop the spread of AIDS. Lying is a common act in everyday
life and Reformist Buddhists interpret this act liberally and accept the act that
telling “a white lie” is acceptable if no harm is caused. However, stealing is not
acceptable to the Reformist Buddhists. Finally, the use of intoxicants is often
viewed as a bad habit leading to addiction and the cause of marital and family
disharmony, social discord, violence, and child and wife abuse. Half of my
respondents regarded social drinking as acceptable.
Buddhist Work Ethic

Another Buddhist teaching is that of hard work, honesty and loyalty to
one’s occupation. However, occupations that encourage cheating and
dishonesty are undesirable. Reformist Buddhists regard professions such as
law and commerce as likely to compromise morality. But many also accept
that such professions are part of modern life and development and as long
as those who are in these trades treat others fairly, feel that they should not
be penalized by the Buddhist community. The Reformist Buddhists also
argue for more compassion and understanding in the workplace, and that
superiors have the responsibility to look after their workers. To them, an
ethical workplace is where workers are treated fairly in terms of remuneration
and working conditions.
Compassion and Humanity

Compassion has been the hallmark of Buddhism which emphasizes the need
to help all sentient beings. The existence of the category of bodhisattvas, such
as Bodhisattva Alvalokeitsvara (Guanyin Pusa) and Mahabodhisattva
Kistagarbha (Dizhangwang Pusa) in the Mahayana tradition, spells out universal
needs for compassion and humanity to all irrespective of their ethnicity, social
background and status. To the Reformist Buddhists, they put this into
practice by having kind thoughts and kind actions and actively supporting
various types of charity and welfare works for their own community and
others. Many give donations as well as provide active participation to various
welfare causes, thereby generating a religious philanthropic culture within the
Singapore context.
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The Eight-fold Path (Aryio Atthangiko Maggo)

In Buddhism, understanding the causes of suffering is one small step
towards gaining enlightenment. To enable one to move out of suffering,
Buddhism prescribes the Eight-fold Path where, by following the eight
moral virtues laid down, one is able to move out of suffering, or at least
lessen suffering (Kalupahana 1976, p. 59). The eight moral values include
right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right living, right
effort, right mindfulness and right concentration (ibid., p. 59). If one is
able to practice these eight moral values in daily life, then it is possible for
an individual to eliminate physical, sensual and material desires and reach
a stage of selflessness. This selflessness will ultimately lead to the cessation
of all future births, allowing one to enter Nirvana. While Nirvana is the
coveted goal of all Buddhists, for the Reformist Buddhists, all observations
of Buddhist ethics and morality are aimed at attaining spiritualism in this
life. They believed in the process of self-cultivation of “an inner-worldly
asceticism” that will lead to a “this-worldly rational adjustment” (Weber
1958), which will lead them on the path towards enlightenment.
CONTAINING TENSIONS AND ENHANCING

DIVERSITIES IN HARMONY
Religious modernization and rationalization have to contest with forces of
orthodoxy. While there is general consensus among the primary actors over
the need to rationalize and Buddhicize Chinese syncretic religious practices
and to eliminate syncretic elements from Buddhist practices, there is also
resistance to change. Resistance comes from both the conservative quarters of
the laity and the Sangha population who find it hard to cope with all the
changes pertaining to reformism. Among the Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana
Buddhists, many who have been brought up to understand the significance of
ritualism and have less concern for Dharma, find it difficult to understand
the sudden switch to an austere and ritual-less type of practice. This is
especially so for the elderly laity whose piety is based on their ability to carry
out the rituals to the most minute detail. Likewise, orthodox monks and nuns
who were trained to be erudite in ritual performances and religious liturgy
have found it hard to cater to the new needs of a new generation of literate
and intellectually curious Buddhists.
Tensions also exist within the Sangha for the following reasons. First,
some monks and nuns oppose the rapid pace of reformism. Second, others
call for the retention of religious rituals including the syncretic elements,
207

arguing instead for a Buddhist reinterpretation of these ritual practices.

Third, contestation of leadership between the ritualist and reformist camps
within the Sangha often arise. The traditional authority structure given to the
elderly ritual-erudite monks and nuns have given way to a new leadership
structure based on scriptural knowledge which favour the younger reformist
monks and nuns. This has aroused dissatisfaction not only among certain
sectors within the Sangha, but also among the elderly adherents who have
long association with and support for some elderly monks and nuns. Among
the reformist members themselves within the Sangha, there is also much
contest for leadership and power, which has also resulted in rising tensions
within the reformist camp.
Despite these growing tensions and the temple as a place of contestation
between the reformists and the orthodox camps and within the reformist
camps, there are few open and public conflicts. This can be attributed to
several reasons. First, between the orthodox and reformist camps, it is generally
agreed that the supportive nature of Shenist-Taoist-Mahayanist Buddhists
towards reformism have helped to avert any kind of overt conflicts. Second,
the reformists have also attempted to understand the reasons behind the
reproduction and continuation of syncretic Chinese religious practices in
modern day Singapore. Instead of calling for the elimination of these syncretic
practices, we are now witnessing a reinterpretation of these practices and their
symbolic significance as part of a cultural tradition within the Chinese
community on the one hand, and Buddhicization of some of the cultural
meanings of these practices on the other. In this sense, what we are witnessing
is a gradual separation of elements of the culture from elements of religion,
although the two can come together.
In modern Singapore, this separation of culture and religion is becoming
more distinct with the privatization of religion rapidly taking place, and with
individuals claiming personal religious faith as opposed to kinship-based or
community-based religious faith. Privatization of religion involves the
individual becoming conscious of the religious ideology and embracing it in
a conscious manner for their personal spiritual needs and development.
Luckmann sees the development of a private religious sphere within the
individual as the most significant religious change that has taken place in the
twentieth century (Luckmann 1967, p. 101). Among Singaporeans, there are
those who increasingly regard their religious belief as an integral part of their
private domain and not the concern of others, including their family members.
Along with this is the understanding of individual freedom of worship and
faith. As a result of this privatization of faith, we witness large numbers of
208

young people switching religions. Among the non-Christians, a large number

are turning to Christianity and others to Reformist Buddhism. Among the
Christians, some have switched to Reformist Buddhism while others have
moved to other Christian denominations.
A third reason for non-open conflict is the approach of monks and nuns
in adopting different strategies to cope with the needs of both the traditionalists
and reformists. In many temples, ritualism continues to be conducted but at
the same time, shifting its focus to Dharma teaching and meditation to cater
to the new needs. They are able to do so as a result of the separation between
the religious and the cultural elements as well as the reinterpretation of the
ritual elements. For example, the Buddhist interpretation of death and ancestor
worship differs from the Chinese Confucian interpretation. Irrespective of
this, the temple continues to be a central focus catering to the dead and to
ancestor worship, with the proliferation of collabariums, memorial halls and
the numerous ritual services for them. To perform these ritual services, the
temples also continue to rely on the ritual experts while turning to a small
group of local reformist monks for Dharma exposition and meditation skills.
Some temples import monks primarily from mainland China and Sri Lanka
for the Mahayana and Theravada temples respectively.
Thus, despite tensions, on the whole the different factions within the
Buddhist community at large and each temple in particular adopt a policy of
accommodation and avoid overt conflicts. They usually resolve tensions in an
amicable manner. For those unable to resolve their differences, the tendency
is for the reformist quarters to split off from their parent temple and form
their own organizations. This is true for both the lay Buddhists and the
Reformists monks and nuns. There are numerous lay Buddhist organizations
with lay leadership and which function without a monastic leader, and they
are extremely popular among the young people. Likewise, young Reformist
monks who feel constrained by the traditional structures often move out of
their temple and start their own Buddhist organizations, bringing along with
them the reformist adherents. The result of this has been the rapid proliferation
of lay Buddhist societies since the late 1980s.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS TOWARDS

REFORMIST BUDDHISM
Today, we see diversities within the Buddhist landscape which comprise
reformists and traditionalists on the one hand, and who are differentiated by
their sectarian and sub-sectarian labels on the others. Despite these diversities
209

however, they are able to coordinate their activities and cater to the needs of
the diverse groups of adherents at localized and community levels without
open conflict.
The global and local movement towards Reformist Buddhism has great
implications for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Singapore society. First, it
is regarded as a private religion and hence its focus is on individuals and their
religiosity. Reformist Buddhism too engages in proselytization but subtly.
There is thus always a need for Reformist Buddhists to be moderate in their
proselytization efforts in order not to raise religious tensions in a multi-
religious Singapore. Second, among the different factions within the Buddhist
community, there is a need to balance the differing needs of adherents in
order that tensions do not spill out and become open and serious conflicts.
Third, Reformist Buddhism needs to avoid the pitfalls of fundamentalist and
radical religious groups. They need to emphasize on collaboration both
within the Buddhist community and with other religious groups.
At the national policy level, it is imperative for the state to take into
consideration the diversities within the Buddhist landscape in its policies so
as to create an equal playing field for the different traditions and sectarian
groups. Likewise, as Buddhism straddles different ethnicities, national and
local policies (at the community levels) should take into consideration the
diverse ethnic backgrounds of Buddhists. Third, national and local policies
support collaborations both within the Buddhist community, as well as
between the Buddhist and other religious communities, especially in the area
of social and welfare activities. In short, religious variations and diversities
should be recognized and given equal treatment. At the same time, national
and local policies could provide various types of incentives to encourage both
intra- and inter-religious collaborations.
In a highly globalized world, it is imperative for us to understand how the
diverse Reformist Buddhist movement in Singapore is plugged into the
global circuit and connected through a web of religious networks at local,
regional and global levels and the implications of these networks on the local
movement. It is inevitable that Singapore-based Buddhist groups will network
with other Buddhist groups throughout the world and indeed, many have
established strong global connections. Religious networking is an important
process to enhance each group’s religious capital and to tap into the experiences
and expertise of their counterparts elsewhere. This is particularly so in the
discharge of Buddhist Dharma as well as the educational, charity and welfare
work conducted by these religious groups.
At the same time, the global Buddhist movement has entered a new
phase of development and demands social justice through a heightened sense
210

of social consciousness, in what some scholars term “Engaged Buddhism”.

Engaged Buddhism emphasizes on social justice for all and is very concerned
about the development of individuals and groups within a community.
Engaged Buddhism can also become politically involved and seeks social
justice. In some ways, this form of Engaged Buddhism is akin to Christian
Liberation Theology movements that fight against social injustices for the
wider community. Thus, many engaged Buddhists have become involved in
social developmental and welfare projects that aim to help the poorer and
marginalized groups within the community. This trend may be expected to
grow locally and globally.
The state also needs to take into consideration the increasing
globalization of all religious groups in Singapore, and Buddhism is no
exception. Here, the state can tap into two areas. The first is to encourage
the development of niche areas on a transnational level, such as the
development of religious charity and welfare works. Increasingly, as religious
institutions in Singapore are no longer working only within its national
boundary, they can be encouraged to develop strategies and structures that
allow them to synergize with their overseas counterparts. This will encourage
more collaboration which will lead to better understanding among the
various religious institutions and their adherents. Second, the state can
encourage transnational cross-religious communications and collaborations.
This will enhance inter-faith dialogue and thereby lessen tensions and
conflicts among religions. Third, the state needs to adopt a sensitive approach
to the treatment of Buddhism and other religious groups in order to
cultivate their trust, so that they do not feel discriminated against and
possibly develop antagonism towards the state. In sum, the state should
adopt a sensitive and all-encompassing policy to encourage religious synergy
among the various traditions within the Buddhist religion and in
collaborations across religions for the good of the humanity.
The above policy approaches are important for religious diversity and
harmony. As Marx said, “religion is the opiate of mankind” and so religion
shall stay in the psyche of the people, irrespective of their class and wealth
statuses. The flourishing of the various religious groups and traditions will
add more meaning and flavour to the social landscape of that community and
of the wider society. Religion and religious groups can be harnessed for the
social good, especially in the delivery of charity, educational, social and
welfare works. Both the Buddhist community and the Singapore state can
implement policies towards this end. Relevant state policies can further
encourage and reinforce this niche created by the Buddhist community. It is
also imperative that the various actors within the Buddhist community —
211

the lay Buddhists, lay Buddhist leaderships, members of the Sangha and the
state work hand-in-hand to maintain intra- and inter-religious harmony.
Notes
The author wishes to acknowledge partial funding from the Institute of Policy
Studies for this chapter’s research and to her research assistant Ng Pei Fuen for
assistance with this research. The author also wishes to acknowledge Marshall
Cavendish International for permission to use materials and reproduce sections from
her book published under the Eastern University Press imprint. All views expressed
herein are entirely those of the author.
1. For a discussion on the reproduction of Chinese syncretic religion in Singapore,
see Kuah-Pearce, State, Society and Religious Engineering: Towards a Reformist
Buddhism in Singapore, chapters 1 and 2.
2. For a discussion of the various universes, see Kuah-Pearce, ibid., pp. 21–35.
3. This section is adapted/reproduced from my book, State, Society and Religious
Engineering, pp. 246–60.
4. All figures cited in this discussion are from this survey unless otherwise stated.
5. This section is adapted and reproduced from my book State, Society and Religious
Engineering, pp. 218–25.
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The Sathya Sai Baba Movement in Singapore 215
THE SATHYA SAI BABA

MOVEMENT IN SINGAPORE
Its Service Mission and Philosophy
of Communal Identity Construction
Nagah Devi Ramasamy
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental observation in the sociological study of religion has been the
rise of new religious movements and cults. Many scholars have attributed this
phenomenon to the decline or the gradual secularization of traditional religions
like Christianity (Nelson 1987; Johnstone 1997). History may have envisaged
that religion has relentlessly come into focus as a struggle between the good
old forces of institutionalized churches and disorder-seeking sects and cults.
However, an intermediate ground-seeking innovation has been casting its
shadow whilst the writings of the dominant discourses inspired by religious
fervour continue. Carrying the popularly coined brand name of New Religious
Movements (NRMs), they have continued to exist for long despite minimal
writings on them. Beckford (1986) writes that “the idea of a religious movement
implies an organized attempt to introduce changes in religion” (p. x). Often
reformist in orientation, the term “movement” can be said to denote shifts in
people’s religious beliefs, ideas and conceptions which they were so used to in
the older organized religious orientations.
215
215

216 Nagah Devi Ramasamy
What necessarily sparks the interest in these spiritual movements?

Marshall (1994) points out that NRMs often tend to be syncretistic in
nature, borrowing elements from many different religious and philosophical
traditions. Sociologists in addition have made claims that such movements
satisfy the psychological and social needs of young and modern people
seeking a meaning in life, something they often fail to find easily within the
mainstream religious traditions.
The religious economy thesis has dominated the discursive field of
religion in the field of sociology with much success in the study and analysis
of religious and cult movements both in the United States and Canada (Stark
and Bainbridge 1985). However, it has been unable to account for the spread
of other spiritual movements such as the Sathya Sai Baba movement and its
global outreach. The religious economy thesis primarily lends itself to Christian
and Western discourses. What is implicitly evident here is the operation of a
Eurocentric bias with regards to Western exclusivist and religious conversion
(Pereira 2005, p. 1).
In a nutshell, the concept of the religious marketplace implies that the
conversion of an adherent requires the rejection of the parent religion, as is
evident in sects, or the radical departure from established religions as is often
characteristic of cults (Stark and Bainbridge 1985). Most of the literature on
NRMs support this claim by asserting that new religions “break with existing
religious traditions to create something that did not previously exist…,
mixing bits and pieces of various distinct traditions” (Hexham and Poewe
1997). However, Pereira (2005) observes that such a premise has been
ineffective in accounting for highly pluralistic new religions that have originated
in Eastern traditions such as the International Society for Krishna
Consciousness (ISKCON), Soka Gakkai International and Sri Sathya Sai
Baba movements. Tong (2007) contends that the popularity of new religious
movements such as the Sai Baba movement lies in an isomorphic fit between
traditions of the new movements and the prior religions of adherents. These
movements, while assimilating various distinct religious and traditional
artefacts, ultimately draw from traditions within the broader framework of an
existing parent religion.
Growth of Spiritual Movements in Independent Singapore

Singapore seems to be a fertile ground for the development of novel and
modern movements, both of local and imported origins, of a religious and
spiritual nature (Sinha 1985, p. 1). In spite of the dying trend noticed in cases
of a few new religious or spiritual movements, many others have survived
216

both the onslaught of proselytization from institutionalized religious traditions

as well as expulsion by the state. These movements (such as the Ramakrishna
Mission, Brahma Kumari Raja Yoga Centre, Sri Aurobindo Society, Sai Baba
movement and Radha Soami Satsang) have garnered for themselves a huge
following and recognition not only from the government but even from the
distinguished spiritual leaders representing the mainstream religious traditions.
The Inter-Religious Organization (IRO) of Singapore formed in 1949 for
instance, reported its intention to embrace spiritual movements such as the
Sai Baba movement under its umbrella body, in addition to its core of ten
religions — Hinduism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Taoism,
Christianity, Islam, Sikhism, Jainism and the Baha’i Faith (Straits Times,
16 February 2003).
The Singapore state is renowned for its tight surveillance and monitoring
of the developments and activities of various religious groups, especially of
the newly budding spiritual movements, to ensure that the ethno-religious
fabric does not get eroded by inter-religious conflict. The Religious Harmony
Act came into effect on March 1990 as a consequence of concerns raised
with regard to religious proselytization by evangelical religious Christian
groups. The act specifically seeks to control religious proselytizing behaviour
as well as contain the use of religion for pushing any political agenda. Sinha
(2003b, p. 172) notes the advice given by the state to religious groups from
the onset: “To make religious beliefs and ideology socially and politically
relevant, while at the same time discarding outmoded religious attitudes, so
as to align well with the contemporary needs”. From the state’s point of
view, excessive religious fervour, missionary zeal and religious assertiveness
(Sinha 2003b, p. 173) are not tolerated and handled with an iron grip.
When separatist leanings start to clash with nationalistic imperatives, societies
tend to face risk of official disbandment. In general, the government while
being interventionist in orientation, is committed to a secular multi-ethnic
state with the ideal of managing the citizenry according to its hegemonic
discourse. The Singapore state is a secular, religiously-neutral state and
therefore does not take the side of either majority or minority religions,
dealing with problems of a religious nature in a bureaucratic manner (Kuah
1998, p. 105).
BACKGROUND OF STUDY
Choice of Study
Whilst literature exists on established institutionalized religious traditions in
Singapore, there is a considerable lapse in the case of neo-Hindu, reform-
217

oriented spiritual movements. My initial interest to focus on the Sathya Sai

Baba movement was motivated by the observation of this deficit in academic
work on reformed Hinduism as practised in Singapore.1 This is despite the
fact that spiritual movements originating from India within the broader
framework of Hinduism have, in the recent past, travelled internationally and
established permanent bases in many countries including Singapore, and
have gained immense popularity and massive attraction amongst people.
Often such spiritual movements have been characterized as carrying neo-
Hindu religious identities or Hindu-oriented neo-reformed identities because
they tend to fulfil certain traits associated with religious or social reform
movements of their preceding parent religion, Hinduism.
The Sathya Sai Baba movement is one of the more successful among the
imported spiritual movements in establishing a permanent base in Singapore.
Officially registered in 1975, the movement grew quickly with an estimated
number of Sai devotee population of 15,000 in 1980 (Khoo 1980, p. 4). Early
detailed ethnographic studies on the movement’s structure and organization in
Singapore were undertaken by Menon (1983) and Khoo (1980). Comparative
contributions are also available from Malaysia (Lee 1982 and Kent 1999,
2005). Santhosh (1997) documented some structural changes and significant
expansions in the movement’s activities since Menon’s study in 1983, which
included the expansion of the centres from three to twelve around the island.
It was estimated there were several thousand Sai Baba followers in Singapore as
at 1995, according to the ex-vice president of one of the main centres. The ex-
president of the Sathya Sai Central Organization of Singapore (SSCOS)
mentioned in an interview with the Straits Times that there were approximately
10,000 members in the local scene in 1998 (Straits Times, 23 May 1998). To
date, there are fourteen Sai centres situated in various locations within Singapore.
These fourteen centres are overseen by SSCOS, the central coordinating body.
Many of these centres broke from the parent centre formed in the 1970s to
establish their own bases to ensure greater autonomy in operations as well as to
fulfil the needs of locale-specific membership. While many of the Sai centres
operate out of Hindu temples, a small number operate with some degree of
autonomy in different areas throughout the island. In particular, they have
managed to adapt their structural and organizational patterns to suit their local
environment especially in the realm of rituals, operation bases, membership
patterns and other socio-cultural practices.
The Study’s Focus

Largely drawing from the works of Menon, Lee and Kent, this study
focuses on two aspects of the Sathya Sai Baba movement in Singapore
218

which have yet to be researched sociologically: (1) its role as a neo-reform

oriented movement in charities, and (2) its multi-ethnic and multi-religious
membership. Such a case study can contribute to the larger understanding
of NRMs. The study was conducted during the period August 2004 to
April 2006. The methodology involved in-depth interviews and discussions
with members and devotees of the movement, often conducted in an
informal manner with a brief probe guide. In addition, naturalistic and
participant- observations were conducted at the field sites. Respondents
were largely forthcoming with their answers.
The charitable aspects of the Sai Baba and other spiritual movements
have rarely been explored sociologically. Most of their core objectives are the
attainment of individual self-development and spiritual realization. At the
same time, the notion of seva (Sanskrit term for “service”) to the community
is considered essential. This guiding philosophy, which translates itself locally
into pragmatic practices of a voluntary nature, logically raises two principal
questions. First, why do these spiritual movements devote so much resources
and efforts into seva2 if spiritual self-realization of the individual self is the
ultimate goal? Second, why have these spiritual movements been so successful
especially in urban modern societies, particularly in contrast to certain
mainstream institutionalized religions?
The Sathya Sai Baba movement in Singapore involves the participation
of a large proportion of Chinese and Indian devotees in most centres. In the
midst of seeking to understand the particular kinds of interfaith and interethnic
dialogues that might possibly arise from such active participation, the research
asked major questions regarding issues of identity. Certain taken-for-granted
identity markers such as “movement”, “Hindu-based” and “neo-Hindu” were
problematized, and ethnographic scrutiny of these terms in the practices of
the movement undertaken.
Objectives and Methodology

The objectives of the research were twofold: (1) to examine the role of the
Sathya Sai Baba spiritual reform-oriented movement in the sector of charities
and social service and to identify the drivers behind the organization’s
motivations in social service, and (2) to study the movement’s facility in
fostering multiethnic and multireligious identity amongst Singaporeans
through its philosophy of communal identity construction. Specific aspects
highlighted include the following: (1) history of the Sathya Sai Baba movement;
(2) documentation of the Sai Baba Organization in the arena of charities and
social services; (3) significant socio-religious inclinations in the promotion of
social services, and (4) representation of the intra-faith union between the
219

multi-ethnic and multi-religious memberships within the local movement.

Methodologically, in-depth interviews were conducted with ten out of the
total fourteen centres in Singapore, and data from these centres form the
backdrop of the discussion.3 This provides a comprehensive and qualitative
perspective into the pertinent issues concerned with qualitative data espousal.
Naturalistic and participant observations and in-depth interviews encompass
the main methodological tools.
HISTORY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

SATHYA SAI BABA MOVEMENT
The Founder and His Charisma
Sathya Sai Baba (1926– ) is extolled as one of the most popular saints in
India, where he originated, as well as globally. He is a male spiritual leader
(also known as guru, “the dispeller of darkness or heavy with wisdom”). A
small figure enveloped in a long-flowing orange garb and donning a
prominent Afro-hairstyle, he exudes a strong radiance. Known for his
appealing and practical sense-making spiritual teachings and intellectual
discourses, he is made famous by the very nature of his miracle-performing
actions. These include the spontaneous creation of vibuthi (sacred ash),
accessories (watches, chains, rings, books and photographs), consumptive
items (sweets, foods, fruits and flowers), and religious objects (talismans,
crucifixes, phallic lingam icons) with the casual wave of the hand. He seems
to have established for himself a superlative reputation as a renowned
miracle worker. He is also famed for miraculous cures and accomplishment
of surgeries from a distance with help from his materialized ashes, at times
even extending to cases of resurrection of the dead. He is said to have left
ash footprints in his devotees’ houses without ever having entered the
premises (Bowen 1997, p. 175). These very acts are envisaged by his
devotees as evidence of his divinity and his appeal factor. The god-man,
whose movement does not possess any strict formal boundaries or definite
membership lists, attracts a loose collection of mortals to his philosophy of
life. The trusts which exist in his name always receive large amounts of
donations which are used to establish devotional centres, publishing
of books and magazines, as well as Sathya Sai educational institutes all over
the globe. In addition, the trusts sponsor charitable activities which include
running homes and healthcare centres for the needy, providing educational
opportunities for poor children, feeding the poor and working as relief
agents during natural disasters.
Sathya Sai Baba was born Sathya Narayana Raju on 23 November 1926
to a Kshatriya (warrior) caste family. His birth was reported as being heralded
220

by mysterious sounds in the family home. A seer priest interpreted these as a

sign of a beneficent presence and foretold of an auspicious birth (Kent 2005,
p. 37). His official biographer Kasturi (1973–75) writes “the young Sai Baba
exhibited extraordinary powers from the time of his birth and he would
materialise objects for his friends and even locate possessions they had lost. In
addition, he showed unusual talents in the learning and performing arts of
drama, music, dance and writing” (ibid). In 1940, at the tender age of
fourteen,4 he had declared to his village men that he was Sathya Sai Baba (Sai
Baba of Truth),5 the reincarnation of an earlier version of a god-man and guru
known as Shirdi Sai Baba (1856–1918), also a miracle worker (Swallow
1982, p. 125) who had combined both Muslim and Hindu prayer modes of
expressions and garnered both Muslim and Hindu followers.6
Sathya Sai Baba made a second claim in 1963 that he was an incarnation
of Shiva the Hindu deity (one of the central figures of the Hindu Trinity and
one of the two main gods of devotional Hinduism). It is interesting to note
here that Sathya Sai Baba was practising autonomy and authority here
through his claims. As noted by Sharma (1986), the doctrine of incarnation
(taking on of avatars) did not exist in Saivism (unlike Vaishnavism’s specialty
of incarnations). Sathya Sai Baba was ultimately playing his cards well, for the
concept of incarnation went well with the Vaishnavite masses (Gonda 1970).7
By this means, he was connected to a renowned past and he sustained and
built upon the respectability and authority as accrued by the previous Sai
Baba. However, he still had to introduce some innovation in his form of
“practice” so as to distinguish himself from the previous one. He ultimately
dropped the Islamic associations and instead placed greater stress upon
elements adopted from the Hindu-based Saivite tradition. According to his
own testimony, he claims he will live to the age of 96 (until year 2022) and
thereafter reincarnate anew as Prema Sai Baba (Sai Baba of Love) who shall be
born in the Mandya district of Karnataka state of India. In 1966, “Prasanthi
Nilayam”, Sathya Sai Baba’s ashram (abode) was declared a legal township by
the Indian government. Literally translated as “Abode of Peace”, this ashram
is located at Sathya Sai Baba’s birthplace in Puttaparthi and serves as the
headquarters of his movement.
Sathya Sai Baba has been noted to be one of the most popular living
saints among the masses in Central India and his picture is found in shrines
throughout the land (White 1972, p. 868). There are also numerous temples
dedicated to him throughout India. He was an obscure religious figure until
the 1960s and 1970s when his fame spread through India and abroad (Lee
1982, p. 128). Prasanthi Nilayam is like a global community where devotees
of various nationalities such as Croatians, Britons, Italians, Australians,
Russians, Japanese, Americans and Asians gather to see their guru during
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darshans (darshan means to have a sight of the divine) and in doing so

experience a special form of communication.8 Lee writes that while there is
no discernible Muslim influence in Sathya Sai Baba’s movement, he continues
to preach about the unity of all religions. Sai Baba himself philosophizes that
“the easiest path to salvation is through bhakti (devotion)”. He is quoted as
having said: “If at all you want to label me, then call me Premaswarup (Love).
Love is the keynote of harmony” (New Straits Times, 4 May 1997).
Sathya Sai Baba has been a crowd winner for the masses of India because
he has not excluded anyone on the basis of caste, class, gender, race or
religion. While Hinduism in India is applauded for allowing greater freedom
of belief than in any other metaphysical system (Senghass 2002, p. 59), it,
however, undergrids the caste law system in which the karmic law prevails
and each person is ascribed into a caste from birth. Sathya Sai Baba’s teachings
come as a new movement which translates from the parent religion of
Hinduism, but rejects caste hierarchy and caste laws. Neither are women
excluded from the god-man’s planned agenda — an appealing approach at a
time when reforms for the uplifting of women are taking place. The Hindu
character of India is evident in his movement. He preaches tolerance — a
much desired trait Indians look up to as preached and practised by nationalist
figure Mahatma Gandhi. Sathya Sai Baba is noted to have made a connection
with the godhead, Shiva, because of the very fact that the latter is associated
with the status of “destroyer” and with influence over determining cosmic
changes. The Shiva identity entitles Sathya Sai Baba to make his presence felt
in a globalizing era where society is undergoing widespread and rapid social
change, in which he seems to connote the presence of a global authoritative
figure who is here to stay and introduce changes into the world. The Sathya
Sai Baba movement is regarded as being able to maintain contact with India’s
rich traditional heritage and at the same time face the modernity rapidly
taking over India.
Sathya Sai Baba uses the concept of kaliyuga to make his points. According
to the Hindu tradition of cosmology, humanity goes through four yugic (Age)
cycles, the last and most negative being the kaliyuga period (age of iron) when
the world comes to an end and righteousness has diminished and evils are
unleashed. The kaliyuga is characterized by a progressive breakdown of
civilization and morality, and this can only be remedied by a new divine
incarnation. Sathya Sai Baba asserts that he took on the current incarnation
so as to save people from these catastrophic times. Interestingly, his imagery
of worldly ascetism directly confronts the ideals of the cosmopolitan middle-
classes, for he claims these people are most in need of spiritual regeneration
if the world is to be reformed (Kent 2005, p. 39).
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Sathya Sai Baba’s followers and the organizations that he has founded are
involved in many service projects around the world, including schools, free
healthcare provided through state-of-the-art hospitals, and water projects
serving thousands in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. In
his home village of Puttaparthi itself, there is a medical university, a world
religious museum and a hospital. All services are being provided free of
charge. The Sathya Sai Baba movement, since its inception, has also grown
globally and taken on a transnational identity. While Sathya Sai Baba has
never left his abode in India except for one rare instance, his followers and
devotees have since established hundreds of centres in various countries. The
grandest ashram in Southern India is popular enough to warrant its own
airport (The Age, 2001). According to official statements, by 1979 alone, the
total number of followers was said to be over two million (Hummel 1985).
Currently, it is claimed there are over 1,000 Sai centres established in over
176 countries throughout the world (Hindustan Times, 23 November 2005).
Also, membership has been enhanced through the numerous websites which
have been devoted to the Sai Baba movement worldwide.
The Structure of the Organization

The structure of the non-political and non-profit Sathya Sai Organization
can be likened to a pyramid-shaped hierarchical model with many levels. At
the top level is the central organizational body at the Prasanthi Nilayam in
India comprising the central office, the all-India president and the international
chairman. At the second level there are nine zones and ninety-four regional
organizations under each of which are grouped several countries. Office
bearers hold short-term appointments (all office bearers will ordinarily not
hold office for more than two years, but are eligible for re-appointment for a
further extended period of two years). One or two coordinators appointed by
the international chairman are responsible for each region. At the third level
are the central councils and co-ordinating committees in every country (a
central council is set up where there are at least ten centres and a coordinating
committee where there are less than ten but more than three centres). The
chairman of every central council is to be appointed by the international
chairman on the recommendation of the central coordinator concerned. The
main duties of the central council are to promote the setting up of centres and
groups, to act as an over-steering body to guide and supervise the various
organizational activities of the centres/groups in their jurisdiction, and to
maintain liaison between the central coordinator and centres/groups. At
the fourth and final level are the local centres. Any group of devotees not
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numbering less than nine and desiring to engage themselves in activities

under at least two of the three wings of the organization, namely spiritual,
educational and service, may constitute themselves into a Sai centre and
apply for affiliation to the central council concerned. The ladies wing and
youth wing are two relatively new initiatives added to the existing three-
wing structures.
In Singapore, all the Sathya Sai Baba Centres are registered as required
by law under the Registrar of Societies (ROS) Act.9 According to the
Government Gazette of 2001, all centres were registered under the broader
category of “religion”. In the latest check from the ROS on-line system,
their categorization was not explicit. However, in my research, the distinction
between “religions” and “spiritual” often cropped up among my informants,
and respondents believed the centres are most probably registered under
either the “religion” or the “spiritual group” reference categories while a few
assumed they were categorized under “welfare”. The significance of this
difference becomes clear where the branding of the movement as a “religion”
is refuted as shown in a later part of this chapter.
The Teachings
The movement has a charter of its own and all centres are expected to follow
the rules and regulations that fall within it.10 Every member ought to undertake
sadhana (spiritual discipline) as an integral part of his daily life and abide by
the “nine codes of conduct”11 which include strong emphasis on daily
meditations and prayers (both at individual and mass prayer sessions),
participation in education programmes known as Educare conducted by the
organization for children and adults, and participation in community services.
Sathya Sai Baba preaches a foundation of five basic values: truth (sathya),
right conduct (dharma), peace (shanti), love (prema) and non-violence (ahmisa).
He emphasizes the unity of all major religions and advocates that all lead to
God. The organization undertakes activities that are spiritual (devotional
singing, study circles, public lectures, seminars, meditations, etc); educational
(such as balvikas which are Sai spiritual educational classes conducted for
young children of devotees, Education in Human Values programmes now
known as Educare, combined with character development for students in the
age group 6–15); and service-related (examples include medical check-up
camps, blood donation drives, visits to hospitals, old age homes, etc). In
addition, Sathya Sai Baba recognizes that man is a social animal and due to
his existence in society, has obligations to the state. He thus emphasizes ten
principles12 which include respecting all religions equally and practising
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charity while maintaining right conduct. These principles appear “secular”

yet at the same time are compatible with spiritual realization. Parallels betwen
moulding of “self ” and “nation” as well as respect for the larger community
are further drawn from these principles. Santhosh (1996) argues that these
secular acts are key to the understanding of the attractiveness and the growing
membership of the movement in Singapore.
The movement has two logos. The logo of the International Sai
Organization symbolizes the five core human values, and is depicted by a
central “world religions” Sarva Dharma stupa (sarva means “entire” and
dharma means “righteousness” and “morality”), with a lotus atop it. The lotus
is the movement’s signature logo. Its five petals originally symbolized the five
world religious traditions, namely the om sign of Hinduism, the sickle moon
and star of Islam, the Christian cross, the flames of Zoroastrianism and the
wheel of Buddhism. At the centre of the lotus flower emblem is an Indian oil
lamp (Kent 2005, p. 58). The central positioning of the Indian lamp seems
to suggest Baba’s deepest philosophy that at the core of all human experience
is an Indian formulation of enlightenment. But this became a problem in
Malaysia when the Malaysian Sai Organization attempted to register their
centres with the authorities and were turned down because including Islam
under the emblem was deemed unacceptable (ibid.). The organization then
decided to change the lotus emblem and include the five core principles
instead for the Malaysian case. This initiative was subsequently accepted by
the global Sai Baba organizations. During the 6th World Conference of the
Sathya Sai Baba Organization in 1995, the decision was made to adopt the
emblem with the five human values, and to include a sixth religion to the
original list — Judaism, represented by the Star of David.
Performance of Seva
Sathya Sai Baba’s devotees credit his ability to inspire millions of people all
over the world to the most fundamental of all positive human actions —
seva (service) to all, without any pretensions. The importance of charity in
Sai teachings is reiterated by slogans such as “Love All Serve All” and “The
hands that serve are holier than the lips that pray”. As pointed out by Kent
(2005, p. 67), charity offers a means of reformation that does not challenge
existing patterns of power distribution but instead spiritually empowers
actors within it.
As such, the Sai Baba movement worldwide is explicitly marked by the
proliferation of its social services and welfare activities (Menon 1983). It
organizes trips to homes, collects and distributes grain and clothing for the
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underprivileged (ibid.), and runs public programmes for moral and cultural
betterment such as charity activities in hospitals, children’s homes, the opening
of free medical clinics and blood donation drives. In India alone, the movement
has contributed to technical and medical colleges and provided drinking
water facilities to the Ananthpur district. Its Project Water in 1994 provided
drinking water to 731 villages in the district at a cost of Rs. 300 crores (The
Hindu, 2005).
In Singapore, with the rising number of Sai centres in the last decade,
additional welfare services have been organized (see Appendix 9.1 for details),
such as the opening of a free specialist outpatient medical clinic in 199613
(open to all needy people, not just Sai Baba followers) and blood donation
drives, in addition to the establishment of youth wings and youth classes. The
SSCOS formed in 1980 asserts that its main objective is to carry out charity
work, its main guiding tenet being “to give selfless service without seeking
fame or reward”. Its volunteers also help victims of natural disasters by
sending food parcels and other necessities. They have also set up homes such
as the Sun Love Nursing Home and the Swami Home.
Interviews conducted with selected centres revealed that all three wings
(spiritual, educational and service)14 are given paramount importance, but
provision of welfare services has been practised passionately by the movement
ever since the inception of the first centre. Following recommendations as
laid out in the charter, the Singapore movement has thus far been heavily
involved in hospital volunteer work, charity drives, help to orphanages,
homes for the handicapped, the destitute and elderly, and blood donation
drives. While most projects are the initiatives of individual centres, particular
projects are designated by the SSCOS and carried out at a national level.
These include large-scale blood donation drives, food distribution projects
such as the Sai Action for Family Relief of Needy (SAFFRON) project (an
initiative where selected needy households are recommended by voluntary
welfare organizations such as SINDA to the centres, which in turn adopt
them and provide them food provisions) and ad hoc services. During such
drives, information is disseminated to the various centres and volunteers are
sent to help carry out the large-scale projects. Individual intra-centre initiatives
include the adoption of homes (such as the Sun Love Home), counselling for
inmates at Changi Prison (on a weekly or monthly routine), service projects
and volunteer works at the Institute of Mental Health wards (monthly),
supply of food and clothes provisions for needy families, seva activities at
several homes which includes feeding, cleaning and entertaining the patients
on a monthly or bi-weekly basis (such as in the Sun Love Home, Tampines
Home, Jenaris Home, Meranti Home, Villa Francis Home, Bukit Batok
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Home and Moral Home), adoption of individual families called the Narayana
Seva, as well as big-scale dinner projects for the aged such as during Chinese
New Year. Within each centre, each committee is allowed to practise autonomy
on the use of available resources for philanthropic activities. It is to be
emphasized that funding for these events are never solicited, as this goes
against the Sathya Sai Baba’s charter and principles. Resources are pooled on
a voluntary basis and only if a planned activity meets the budget is it given the
directive to be carried out.
Socio-religious Inclinations
Why do individuals who join the Sathya Sai Baba movement for personal
spiritual guidance eventually move into the community sphere to deliver
social services for the welfare of others? Religious and ethical values have
always played a role in contributing to philanthropy, such as Christianity,
Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and Parsism (Hodgkinson and McCarthy 1992).
Tong (2007) surmises that “religious groups provide important social support
in a country whose leaders do not support state welfarism” (p. 241).
For the Sai Baba movement, embracing the social service aspect is a
potential reinforcement tool for its highly heterogenous membership. As
Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) pointed out, “religion” is society’s consciousness
of itself. This consciousness is manifested through “representations collectives”
— those ritual actions in which the whole of a human community assemble
to ratify, celebrate and reinforce their unity (Greeley 1982, p. 127). Likewise,
charity can be understood as one of the tools of religious bonding. Service to
man is seen to transcend everything else and uplifts both giver and receiver,
but most importantly it bonds society. The function of religion then, is to act
as a connecting force for people to integrate and function as a whole. When
engaged in seva, social distinctions evaporate. There is no more need for a
common language, a common religious affiliation nor a common set of
values for they trail off during the actual manifested activity of charity work.
This seva wing of the movement is thus seen to be ostensibly divorced from
all religious association. In my research, the commitment to social service
provision by the Sai Baba movement appears highly impressive. Informants
revealed personal dilemmas between family commitments and the movement’s
and their decision to choose the latter, and moving from the initial personal
spiritual journey towards community service. Even non-believers are aware of
the movement’s social work, while almost all ex-devotees interviewed gave
full support to Sai Baba’s charitable works even as they held different opinions
about his authenticity.
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In general, NRMs are increasingly popular because the communal bonding

they experience while engaged in seva addresses the effects of rapid social
change, the aftermath of modernization as well as cultural alienation suffered
in urban societies (Kent 2005). Ancient traditions that appear to be losing
relevance are most often updated and strengthened through service (Reader
1996). Juergensmeyer and McMahon (1998) note that in the case of seva, it
is a concept originating from a development in Hinduism known as dana
(the transfer of property according to sastric or classical text rites so as to reach
a fit recipient). An important religious mode of expressing love for the deity
or guru, the ideology translates itself into the accrual of karmic merit. Seva is
often seen as the key to achieving a higher spiritual plane, and soon becomes
an integral aspect of spirituality and undertaken to benefit society as whole
(Vivakanandan and Nagah Devi 2008).
A relatively late entry into Singapore, the involvement in social services
by the Sathya Sai Baba movement seems to supersede that of established older
religious traditions such as Hinduism. “[T]here is a general consensus that
Hindu temples ought to do more for charity … It was felt that some of the
Hindu spiritual organizations are doing excellent social services that could be
emulated by temples.” (Ibid.) The Sathya Sai Baba movement’s success in seva
can be attributed to the obligation factor: Seva is not an option but mandatory.
While not all starting initiates have entered the centres with the passion to
deliver in the community sphere, they gradually develop the passion to
translate the Sai teachings into pragmatic application such as through charity.
At the national level, welfare assistance from the Singapore Government
is provided only as a last resort. To reduce the welfare burden on the state and
to preserve funds for developmental purposes, the Singapore government has
adopted, since independence, a welfare policy that emphasizes the principles
of individual responsibility (Cheung 1992, p. 455). The Sathya Sai Social
Service (4S) Singapore is a voluntary welfare organization (VWO) and member
of the National Council of Social Services (NCSS). Born out of the parent
Sathya Sai Organization, this VWO is secular in nature, professionally
managed, well funded and centrally coordinated. While carrying the brand
name of the Sathya Sai Organization, the VWO has been able to deliver seva
to the community efficiently without amalgamating the spiritual or religious
sentiments in its delivery. “They are two sides of the same coin….” says a
committee member of the oldest centre, the Sri Sathya Sai Society of Singapore
from which the 4S initiative took place. He further mentions “both our
society and 4S are sister bodies. We provide an environment for spiritual
development. The natural progress ought to be towards the community
spheres. 4S provides new projects for volunteers such as ours from this
centre.” For the initiated, the whole process of gathering and communicating
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in the sphere of welfare helps to build up the shared meaning systems the
volunteer devotees introduce into their lives, once they make the decision to
follow the movement.
Identity Markers
The Movement as a Fluid Construct
The term “movement” is treated here as a fluid construct as most often the
New Age movements that arise in reaction to established traditional religious
institutions are considered free-flowing and flexible. These movements are
often characterized by a network of believers and practitioners who are
enjoined by somewhat similar beliefs and practices which they add on to
whichever formal parental religion they follow. When dissatisfied with what
the parents’ religious tradition has to offer, most people tend to yearn for a
personal, spiritual experience often through books, educational centres or
spiritual teachers. Most often a New Age movement is a boon for many, as
without clear demarcations such as membership lists, dogmas, holy text or
formal clergy, it is indeed a refreshing change for many who seek a personal
individual experience. Kent (2005) sees such movements as addressing social
change and cultural alienation in a modern nation state by providing a sense
of meaning and local belonging to the person. New religious movements also
tend to transcend nationalism by stressing universalism. They help to overcome
the disintegrating potential of geographical separation and create an “imagined
community” of limitless bounds (Anderson 1991).
Mass society theory (Kornhauser 1959) argues that social movements
occur in mass societies, especially industrialized societies that involve
bureaucratic organizational structures that create impersonal environments.
Such societies tend to lack social groups that provide people with a sense of
meaning to the community, leaving individuals feeling alienated, deprived
and marginalized. In the case of the global Sathya Sai Baba movement, it
creates a morally charged experience for many of its followers. Sai Baba is
turned to as a form of redress and escapism. In the crisis of modernity, a
modern god-man like Sai Baba emerges as a powerful centrifugal force of
redress, accommodating the modern world especially when faith becomes a
matter of personal preference.
An Inclusive Structure
As pointed by Kuah (1998, pp. 104–05), religion and religious affiliations in
multi-ethnic and multi-religious Singapore have been taken to coincide with
ethnicity, and thus for the sake of social and political stability, the Singapore
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government has adopted a policy of multi-racialism and multi-religiosity.

This has come about through the official mode of categorizing people into
the CMIEO15 model which implants the notion that every Singaporean
rightfully belongs to a particular race.16 The reality of this multi-racialism has
meant that the management of tensions has been precisely the management
of relations between the ethnic groups (Clammer 1998, p. 3). In the treatment
of various religions, the Singapore government’s declared policy is to be
accommodating or neutral (insofar as this is possible) (Thio 2001).
The structure of the Sathya Sai Baba congregation in the multi-ethnic
and multi-religious context of Singapore seems very inclusive. It not only
seems to practise and preach religious and ethnic inclusivism, but allows for
adherents to maintain their parent religious affiliations or current religion
and practices (for example, Christian adherents to the Sathya Sai Baba
movement can retain their Christian faith). They are, in fact, highly encouraged
to do so through teachings such as “if you are a Christian, be a better
Christian. If a Moslem, be a better Moslem. You don’t need to renounce your
faith”. This new movement neither demands rejection of previous religion
nor the adoption of radical new ideas as traditional religious concept of
conversion implies. A member of the movement effectively would not only
occupy a place in both his parent affiliated religion (old) and this new
spirituality (new), but makes conventional notions on religious membership
and practised rituals unproblematic (Pereira 2007). In Singapore, there is a
large presence of various sub-groups of various faiths within each ethnic
group (Christians, Roman Catholics, Protestants and Methodists among the
Chinese, for instance). Such sub-groups would not face any pressing issue
with the commonality they share under the Sai Baba identity. For this reason,
the Sai Baba movement tends to gain more acceptance amongst Singaporeans
compared to numerous other neo-Hindu religious or spiritual movements.
The “Hindu” Label as Problematic

Earlier scholarly literature labelled the Sathya Sai Baba movement as either
“Hindu-based” or “new religious movement” or even “neo-reform oriented
movement”. The first has been refuted by its members who insist assiduously
that their movement is in no way a religious or a Hindu-based movement,
unlike movements such as ISKCON and Transcendental Mediation (TM)
which are widely acclaimed as derivatives of popular Hinduism. While “Hindu”
in origin in its worship practices due to borrowed elements from Sanskritic
Hinduism (Menon 1983), the Sai Baba movement denies any specific
allegiances to Hinduism or to any institutionalized religion per se. Instead, it
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declares itself a movement which focuses on a mission leading to divine

conscience through respect of universal and spiritual teachings and preaching
of universal humanitarism. Hence, while remaining a Hindu control base in
India, the movement at the broad-spectrum level incorporates non-Hindu
and non-Indian members as devotees, thus giving the movement its multi-
ethnic, non-sectarian and syncretic identity.17
A Plural Community
The Sathya Sai Baba movement, while part of a pattern of innovations and
developments from early Hindu traditions, has managed to adapt its structural
and organizational patterns to its local environment such as in the arena of
rituals, multi-ethnic membership and other socio-cultural practices. In
Singapore, most of the centres’ presidents interviewed declared that “the Sai
organization is a non-religious, multi-racial worldwide organization dedicated
to promoting welfare services and human values”. The emphasis is on “non-
religious” and “welfare services”. The local centres also maintain that Sai Baba
is neither a Hindu nor an Indian guru for the Indian masses. Instead, they
regard him as a universal god for all, and while his origins and bases are in
India, he has become a transnational and global enigma. This in essence
allows for a common space to be constructed where people of different
ethnicities and religions can mingle and interact. Sai Baba, while recognized
as the spiritual guide, is forthright in relinquishing any sole proprietorship
over the discourses he preaches. This attitude holds an uncanny resemblance
to syncretic and inclusive Hinduism, and might be the key (the spiritual
plurality) to the appeal of his works in the global terrain. As expressed:
Every believer is allowed to believe in being on the right part. It is

however presumptuous, arrogant and blasphemous to believe that another
is on the wrong one. Believe and let believe, pray and let pray are
fundamental attitudes which animate the ecumenical spirit among the
world religions. This attitude itself is however not a religion; it conveys
to the mind a spirit of tolerance which ought to motivate, lead and guide
all religions. (Sri Sathya Sai Central Council of Malaysia Publications
(SSSCCM), ‘Year of Truth’ Publications, Malaysia, 1996).
Thus, while Sai Baba’s imagery and the style of worship adopted by his
devotees are often read as distinctly Hindu (Kent 2005, p. 42), he opens up
the possibility for all to participate using their own familiar religious and
cultural forms, and the clear distinction that exists between Hinduism and
monotheistic, exclusivist religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam is
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maintained by the movement. Additionally, the idea of religion being global

as related to the global movements of people and the transnational acceptance
of religious ideas (Juergensmeyer 2003) is particularly applicable to the
Sathya Sai Baba movement. In terms of practice, no hardcore, rigid laws or
rules exist for initiation into the Sai Baba movement. Even in the realm of
consumption, there is immense diversity in the practice of refraining from
meat. There are Hindus who eat meat and yet others who are vegetarians
(Senghass 2002, p. 57). Likewise, in the movement, vegetarianism is considered
a desired ideal but remains a personal choice rather than a mandatory
condition for initiation into the movement.
In Singapore, most centres congregate within Hindu spaces. The very
spatial occupation of the centres within Hindu temple grounds, the singing
of devotional songs largely in the Sanskritic medium during bhajans, dedication
of songs to Hindu godheads as well as performance of certain Hindu rituals
with the arathi (camphor flame) tends to give the impression to the non-
Indian public that it is a Hindu movement. It did not help either when Sai
Baba first made the claim that he was an incarnation of Shiva, the Hindu
deity. But most devotees (mainly the Indians) defend the usage of certain
Hindu-oriented ritualistic traditions during bhajan as the outcome of the
situation as practised back in India. Sai Baba further extends the bhakti
devotional tradition of Hinduism into his teaching philosophy. He claims he
is one with Krishna, Jesus Christ, Buddha, Prophet Muhammad and so forth.
At some Sai Baba centres, this is clearly depicted by the presence of various
religious symbols such as the Christian cross, the statue of Buddha and
figurines of Kuan Yin (Chinese Goddess of Mercy) and the Virgin Mary. The
god-man allows for the possibility to ratify a limitless number of specific
forms through their ultimate manifestation.
While many of the major Sai centres in Singapore operate out of Hindu
temples, a small number operate with some degree of autonomy in different
areas, serving different ethnic enclaves and adapting to their structural and
organizational patterns to the local environment. Melton (1995) asserts
that new religions often take on either a more traditional or pietistic variant
of a dominant religious perspective, using cultural and religious artefacts
that are known to them or have been predominant. These movements
utilize locally present elements with the new “artefacts” and develop newer
variants of their parent religious forms. In Singapore (and Malaysia), the
availability of a multiplicity of ethno-linguistic and religious resources has
indeed ensured that the Sai Baba movement has adopted different structural
and organizational forms in relation to the social ecology. This can be
noticed in the adoption of Chinese innovation within the framework of
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Hindu rituals in the bhajan rituals such as singing of Chinese/Mandarin

songs, positioning of Taoist deities at the altar and doing away with the
arathi at some centres where there is higher Chinese membership. Some
Chinese devotees are attempting to scale down the practice of Hindu-
oriented rituals by introducing more English songs as well as the mentioning
of other god names apart from that of Sai Baba.
The need to separate itself from a temple-oriented Hindu religion as well
as its branding as a ritualistic movement is pressing for the movement in
Singapore. One of the presidents of the centres stated:
Sathya Sai Baba movement has to adhere to its highly secular orientation
while spreading the spiritual faith across [to] the people. At the same
time they need to make attempts to conform to the cultural and
environmental specifics of the locales they travel to.
He explained that the reason why many centres started out their activities
within Hindu temples grounds was because of their lower rental costs in land-
scarce Singapore. Furthermore, as pointed out, Hinduism is open in terms of
acceptance of other religious forms. Cost and the land-scarcity aside, the
mere thought of renting a space in a Roman Catholic church or a mosque is
unthinkable. Also, since the movement originated in India, more Indians
would have at least heard of the name Sathya Sai Baba, compared to the non-
Indians, and it made sense for the centres to be situated within a Hindu
temple ground. The latter also allows for better exposure for the movement
and for its recruiting process. The fact that many of the current members
were introduced into the movement either through friends, relatives or
personal visits whilst attending prayers in the Hindu temples attests to this.
Nonetheless, there are crucial differences between the modes of worship
of Hinduism and the movement’s. For one, there is a lack of presence of an
immediate mediator in the movement, unlike the immanent presence of the
Hindu Brahmin priest found in Hindu temple worship. In the case of the
movement, it is a direct and personal connection to god that is encouraged.
This is attractive for many of the educated members who tend to look upon
ritualistic forms of worship with disdain. Also, there are no universal codified
forms of texts or scriptures (at least, not in the literate sense of the word as all
Vedic scripts are sanskritized in their original). The need to distance themselves
from a religious group, as discussed earlier, can be made sense of here. This
separation from Hinduism as a set of formal dogma and formalized worship
practices and rituals allows for the inclusion of non-Indians as well as spreads
the movement’s appeal through the “spiritual” label which is felt to be more
233

open, available and universalizing. The movement’s practical approach in

using English as a medium of communication is also more attractive to the
more educated.
A Middle Class Following

There are two main categories of membership for all centres in Singapore.
The formal membership form the first category and can be divided into two
groups. The first group is composed of the committed and associated personnel,
as determined by official statistics. The second group consists of each centre’s
affiliated devotees who are ordinary members. The second category is the
unofficial or loose membership which is much more difficult to estimate.
These nominal members may be in general agreement with the Sai Baba
movement’s beliefs and practices but maintain peripheral affiliations. There
are many Chinese and Indians who may acknowledge Sai Baba as divine and
powerful without necessarily worshipping him but just have a simple picture
of him in their home, and may not participate in the centre’s activities. These
followers may also attend bhajans and social service events all over the island.
The centres currently keep membership records at least to fulfil a requirement
by the Registrar of Societies Act. But even then, there are no confirmed
figures in certain centres. Batstone (2001) attributes this lack of clearly
defined community to the modern “network society” of the twenty-first
century, where traditional notions of community are offset by “transitional
sites that offer relationships, good[s] and services which appeal to a small part
of ourselves” (ibid., p. 22).
There seems to be an over-representation of the English-educated, middle-
class groups in the centres researched. While the movement endeavors to
transcend all social divisions — ethnic, religious and class — it is evident that
the working class, non-English educated Indians are largely absent from its
congregations, at least in terms of official membership. They are also relatively
absent from the leadership strata. The current presidents and leaders of the
various centres are, to a large extent, English-educated professional elites
from high socio-economic backgrounds. Some Chinese leaders head the
centres with largely Chinese membership. Whilst the bhajans are conducted
customarily in Sanskrit, the dominant form of interaction is in English. This
class membership, which has been documented in earlier academic work
done two decades ago, appears unchanged. This contrasts with membership
in India where the movement’s appeal pervades all classes and where
membership is predominantly of the working classes. Another reason for this
difference could be due to the backgrounds of those from the low-income
234

strata in Singapore who are used to ritualistic worship in Hindu temples. The
discourses of Sai Baba are interpreted largely as practical, sensible and scientific
and always translated into English, which tends to cut them out but which
are more attractive to the English-educated professional elites.
The Sai Family as a Global Entity

Sai Baba devotees actively employ kinship terminology in their everyday
relations with one another. This is of importance precisely because Indians
and non-Indians become conceptually united in one single family of brothers,
sisters, aunties and uncles. Devotees in addition utilize the Sai greeting “Sai
Ram” (Sai refers to the divine mother and Ram to the hero of the Hindu epic
Ramayana, also the epitome of male righteousness). Adoption of such symbolic
traits of identification through a common dress code (primarily all-white or
white and pink attire), adhering to a verbal address code system whereby
kinship and communal ties, such as the “brother-sister” vocabulary, are
established and mass meditations and bhajans all help to reinforce this unity.
Through the metaphor of the family, the movement recreates itself as a united
global community. Sai Baba is represented both as the divine father and
mother, as well as healer for his devotee offsprings all over the globe. This is
important because members of diasporic groups that are politically and
numerically weak in their adopted lands finally have an identity to hang on
to as an alternative.
Despite its universal identity, the Sai philosophy at the more localized
centres have a higher tendency to neglect any such concerns and lack
steadfast notions on universal membership, focussing predominantly on
servicing the needs of their local membership instead. For instance, while
the ritual types in India have to adhere to the followers there (largely Indian
Hindus), those in the Singapore setting are modified for the local movement’s
multi-ethnic followers.
Literature on NRMs thus far has dealt with their international travel but
little on how they proceed after the initial foothold has been established in
the host countries (Pereira 2005, p. 4). This is especially of interest when the
latter are highly plural, with socio-ethnic and linguistic enclaves and multi-
cultural cities, such as in Singapore’s case. Clarke (2000) noted that the
process of networking through places of worship of institutionalized religions
like Hinduism is an essential “period of quarantine” for NRMs. Individual
members are active agents involved in the process of “assimilation and digestion”
(White 1972). While they are attracted to the Sai Baba movement because of
its “universal appeal” (Sinha 1985) and consequently join it to meet certain
235

needs, their needs vary significantly because of members’ different ethnic and
religious backgrounds. A parallel development worthy of study is interfaith
relations and dialogue which have become a significant issue in the post-9/11
global environment. Local interfaith dialogue has most likely been transformed
in recent years yet little known. The Sathya Sai Baba movement in Singapore
offers an excellent site of investigation in this domain because of its multi-
ethnic and multi-religious membership within the larger multi-religious society.
CONCLUSION
The Sathya Sai Baba movement has a vast potential to promote understanding
and development as evidenced through its successful recruiting of devotees
and volunteers into its spiritual and welfare programmes. High-spirited,
motivated and dynamic members of each centre contribute to the strength of
the movement. The religious-spiritual climate as well as the founder’s
charismatic leadership has allowed the movement to grow in size as well as
enabled it to retain its hold on the devotees. The proportion of dropouts from
all centres seems rather insignificant compared with the number of new
devotees. The mobilization of devotees to expand their participation into the
social service arena is enabled by the collective effervescence of a communal
identity constructed over time through spiritual practice. There is a highly
vibrant and interactive relationship between members in each centre as they
work in unison towards common goals and agendas in social service delivery
and communal bonding. Collective consciousness has definitely attained a
high level within this local movement, especially at the intra-centre level, but
is difficult to conclude so at the inter-centre level as interaction between the
various centres is limited except during the major five national functions
held annually. The time and amount of commitment involved in organizing
small-scale activities within each centre does not allow much time for
organizing bigger activities together with other centres, as this requires
more coordination and inter-communication. Moreover, different centres
have different agendas and needs to fulfil. Seeking a common ground with
regard to planning of social service activities proves to be an arduous, uphill
task at times. However, Sai Baba’s teachings restated as “unity in diversity”
in Singapore’s context is manifested strongly as a whole and can still be
further developed between the centres, with the goal of achieving mutual
understanding so that more and better service and welfare-oriented projects
can be introduced to serve the needy.
A movement exudes centrifugal, organic energy which, when harnessed
by the right leadership, will maintain its course but when disrupted by weak
236

leadership can change drastically its flow. Many neo-reform oriented spiritual
movements have split up and lapsed soon after their establishment. The
Sathya Sai Baba movement ought to be credited for its successful growth
especially in two arenas: charity-mindedness as well as communal-spiritedness.
Accommodating and sensitive to the needs of the devotees (such as in issues
regarding conversion), this spiritual movement has contributed to the moral
condition of people. Assistance and support to the movement’s welfare projects
by private corporate organizations as well as state bodies will enable the
movement to further contribute to society. After all, the ability of religion or
spirituality to galvanize the community into action is enormous.
237

APPENDIX 9.1
238
238
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SATHYA SAI BABA CENTRES IN SINGAPORE
Official Date Year of Registered

Current Operating
Name of Society of Informal Seva Activities Membership
Venue(s)
238
Registration Initiation (Approximate)
Sathya Sai Mission 4.12.84
Sri Sathya Sai Baba 2.4.97 1985 Member’s House/ 1. Saffron Project (adopted 3 homes) 25
Centre (Bartley) Sathya Sai Baba Centre 2. Institute of Mental Health wards
Building (Moulmein) 3. Chai Chee tuition projects
Sri Sathya Sai Baba 18.7.97 Sree Ramar Temple 1. Counselling at Changi Prison 20
Centre (Changi) (Changi)
Sri Sathya Sai Baba 9.1.82 1982 20 Everton Road/ 1. Provisions for 120 needy families 60
Centre of Singapore Muneesvaran Temple 2. Dinner for senior citizens during
(Everton) (near Everton) Chinese New Year
Sri Sathya Sai Baba 18.7.95 Sai Kindergarten (Katong)/ 1. Seva activities at 3 homes Figures unavailable.
Centre (Katong) Sri Senpaga Vinayagar Temple (Sun Love Home, Tampines Executive
(Ceylon Road)/House Home & Moral Home) Committee: 10–12
Sri Sathya Sai Baba 17.11.97 1977 Sri Muneeswaran Temple 1. Counselling at Changi Prison 50–60
7/16/08, 9:50 AM
Centre (Queenstown) (Commonwealth) every Sunday
2. 3 families adopted under the
Narayana Seva
3. Visits to old folks’ homes during
Nagah Devi Ramasamy
June school holidays

Sri Sathya Sai Baba 19.11.84 1984 Sri Krishnan Temple 1. Social Service at Jenaris and 300
Service Centre (Waterloo Street) Meranti Homes once a month
2. 2 families adopted under
Saffron Project Initiative
3. Senior Citizens’ Night Dinner
for 2,000 aged old folks during
Chinese New Year period
Sathya Sai Centre 1.12.92
239
(Singapore)
(Moulmein Rise)
Sathya Sai Centre 22.8.95 1990 Sathya Sai Baba Centre 1. Visits to the Sun Love Home 50
(Singapore) (Selegie) Building (Moulmein)
Sri Sathya Sai 10.10.95
Prema Nilayam
The Sathya Sai Baba Movement in Singapore
Sathya Sai Seva 23.11.96 1996 Yoga Centre 1. 6 Families adopted under 25
Centre (the hall premise) Saffron Project
2. Tampines Home for the Aged
Sri Sathya Sai 8.11.75 1967 Sathya Sai Baba Centre 1. Seva at Sathya Sai Social Service 20 Committee
Society (Singapore). Building (Moulmein) (4S) VWO members
Shri Sathya Sai Seva 2. Food distribution to homes
Samithi (Singapore) monthly
3. Clinic (run under 4S)
7/16/08, 9:50 AM
4. Ad hoc Services (e.g. painting
of old folks’ homes)
5. Saffron Project
239
239
continued on next page

240
240
APPENDIX 9.1 — cont’d
Official Date Year of Registered

Current Operating
Name of Society of Informal Seva Activities Membership
Venue(s)
Registration Initiation (Approximate)
240
Sri Sathya Sai Centre 31.7.97 1991 Sri Arasakesari Sivan Temple 1. Saffron Project (1 family) 40–60
(Woodlands) (Sungei Kadut Avenue) 2. Narayana Seva (core membership),
3. Visits to various homes 130–150
(Narayana Mission, Villa Francis (registered and loose
Home, Bukit Batok Home) membership)
Sri Sathya Sai Society April 2006 1983 Sri Ruthra Kaliamman 1. Visits to homes 400–500
(Telok Blangah) Temple (Depot Road) (e.g. Adopted Sun Love Home)
Sathya Sai Central 23.11.93 20 Everton Road 14
Organization
(Singapore) SSCOS
National University 4.6.2002 2001 National University of 40
of Singapore Singapore
Students’ Sathya
7/16/08, 9:50 AM
Sai Society
Source: Research Data (2005–06).
Nagah Devi Ramasamy
Notes
I wish to thank the current and ex-committee members of the Sathya Sai Central
Organization of Singapore (SSCOS), executive committee members, devotees and
members of the various Sri Sathya Sai Baba Centres in Singapore for their enthusiasm
and convivial support and assistance in the completion of this project. I also extend
my appreciation to Associate Professor Vineeta Sinha for her invaluable guidance,
Mr Vivakanandan Sinniah for his constructive comments and Dr Lai Ah Eng for her
supportive assistance. All views expressed herein remain my sole responsibility.
1. Scholars have noted that Hinduism itself is an under-researched religion from
sociological and anthropological perspectives (Arumugam 2001; Tong 1989;
Wee 1989). Many of the studies of Hinduism in Singapore are dated and based
on ethnographic fieldwork. See, for example, Babb (1974, 1976), Rajah (1976),
Purushotam (1977), Manokara (1979) and Sinha (1987). More recent works
include those by Sinha (1989, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b).
Examples of the few recent studies of neo-Hindu and reformed Hindu movements
include those by Dhinagaran (1988), Khoo (1980), Menon (1983), Santhosh
(1996), and Sinha (1985). Most studies on Hinduism and neo-Hinduism are
unpublished academic exercises.
2. For instance, the sect of the Radha Soami Satsang as a whole does not participate
in any social service activities as this is related to the belief that one can best help
others by only helping oneself. It is also a “non-interfering” mode of consciousness,
in that a person is responsible for only his or her own karma (defined by Hindus
as the law of morality) and no one else’s (Sinha 1985, p. 40).
3. Refer to Appendix 9.1.
4. While various interpretations and accounts prevail, Kent (2005) points out that
in one version he was bitten by a scorpion while according to another, he
suffered an epileptic attack. He fell unconscious and remained so for several
hours. After awakening, his behaviour alternated between elation and depression
before he finally disclosed his divine identity. It was subsequently explained as
him having left his body to rescue a devotee elsewhere (Kent 2005, pp. 37–38).
5. “Sai” is a reference term for mother, “Baba” for father and “Sathya” for truth.
Santhosh (1996) writes that the word “Sai” was also used by the Bauls, a sect of
mendicant devotees of Vishnu to describe “a man of supreme perfection who
does not see any differentiation in the world” (Murphet 1982, p. 62). Also, “the
name signifies the true union of the male and female aspects of the universe”
(Bassuk 1987, p. 87) and a divine mother-father figure to his devotees (Murphet
1982, p. 62).
6. This historical person, a fakir (a term used to describe the Godhead) was revered
by many Hindus and Muslims as a saint (White 1972, p. 869). Shirdi Sai Baba
had declined to reveal his caste, religion or family history other than to reply
“Kabir” when asked what his religion was. Kabir is the name of a wandering
Hindu devotionalist saint of the fifteenth century who had professed sympathies
241

with the Islamic Sufi tradition and had promoted harmony between Hinduism
and Islam as well as other non-Hindu religions (Kent 2005, p. 39).
7. Why was Sathya Sai Baba making this claim of reincarnation? Swallow (1982)
notes that this “reincarnation status” enables Sathya Sai Baba to get access to a
heritage which derives from a number of saintly and ascetic religious traditions”
(Swallow 1982, p. 13). This gave him the much-needed publicity for which he
did not have to build from ground level up.
8. The Prasanthi guide states: “Darshan is a concentrated devotional experience
when you are given the chance to meet pure divinity face to face. Be receptive
to his message for you. Empty your mind of wavering worldly thoughts. When
Bhagavan Baba passes, fill your eyes with the Godly form. Be attentive to his
effect on you.” (New Straits Times, 4 May 1997).
9. A society is defined in the Societies Act as a club, company, partnership or
association of ten or more persons, whatever its nature or object, and not already
registered under any other law. There should be ten or more persons in the
society before it is liable for registration under the Societies Act–Registry of
Societies Electronic System (ROSES).
10. A Permanent Charter granted by Bhagawan Sri Sathya Sai Baba to the Sri Sathya
Sai Organizations, at the Third World Conference (The 1981 Charter of the
Sathya Sai Organization And Rules and Regulations booklet).
11. The nine codes of conduct are:
(1) Daily meditation and prayer.
(2) Devotional singing/prayer (bhajans) with members of his family once per
week.
(3) Participation in the educational programmes conducted by the organization
for children.
(4) Attendance at least once per month at group devotional programmes
conducted by the organization.
(5) Participation in community service and other programmes of the
organization.
(6) Regular study of Sai literature.
(7) Putting into practice the principles of “Ceiling on Desires” and utilize any
savings thereby generated for the service of mankind.
(8) Speaking softly and lovingly with everyone with whom he comes into
contact.
(9) Avoiding talking ill of others especially in their presence.
12. The ten principles (Santhosh 1996) are as follows:
(1) Treat as sacred the land in which you were born. Have patriotism to your
nation but do not criticize other nations or put down others.
(2) Respect all religions equally.
(3) Recognize the Brotherhood of Man and treat all as brothers. Love all.
(4) Keep your house and surroundings clean for this will promote hygiene and
health and help you.
242

(5) Practise charity, but do not encourage beggars by giving money. Provide
them with food, clothing and shelter. Help them in other ways but do not
encourage laziness.
(6) Never give a bribe or take a bribe. Do not yield to corruption.
(7) Curb envy and jealousy, expand your vision and outlook. Treat all equally
regardless of caste and creed.
(8) Do as much as possible by yourself though wealthy and having servants. Do
service to society in person.
(9) Have and cultivate love for God and fear of sin. Abhor sin.
(10) Never go against the laws of the land. Follow these diligently both in word
and spirit.
13. Catering to the poor, especially the elderly, the clinic is staffed by volunteer
specialists and funded by donations from devotees. Aside from a whole floor set
aside for its clinic, its facilities include accommodation for overseas visitors, a
library, a meditation room and a prayer hall. The clinic also has an operating
theatre for minor procedures (Straits Times, 4 October 1995).
14. The Ladies Wing and Youth Wing are two relatively new initiatives added to the
existing three-wing structures both in the local and global scene.
15. The CMIEO (Chinese, Malay, Indian, Eurasian and Others) model provides a
neat categorization for the administrative management of a plural Singapore
society. Classification by race is part of its baggage inherited from the British
colonial administration which determined race on the basis of place of origin,
language and physical characteristics such as skin colour, and which adopted the
system for the convenience of census taking and other bureaucratic exercises
(Purushotam 1995).
16. Terms such as “race”, “ethnicity” and “culture” are often used interchangeably in
political discourse (Benjamin 1976).
17. In the case of Malaysia, Lee’s study (1982) revealed that the Sathya Sai Baba
movement there showed an openness towards religious innovations and syncretism
amongst its multi-ethnic (mainly Indians and Chinese) devotees even as it
showed the presence of strong Hindu roots, and that the lower-class Indians had
difficulty in assimilating with the upper middle-class Indians within the
movement.
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———. “Multi-religiosity and the Secular State: A Note from Singapore”. In Emerging
Asia: Challenges for India and Singapore, edited by N. N. Vohra, pp. 169–76.
New Delhi: Manohar Publications. 2003b.
———. A New God in the Diaspora? Muneeswaran Worship in Contemporary Singapore.
Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005a.
———. “Theorizing Talk about Religious Pluralism and Religious Harmony in
Singapore”. Journal of Contemporary Religion 20, no. 1 (2005b): 25–41.
———. “Problematising Received Categories: Revisiting ‘Folk Hinduism’, ‘Popular
Hinduism’ and ‘Sanskritization’ ”. Special Issue of Current Sociology, edited by
Syed Farid Alatas, vol. 54, no. 1 (January 2006a): 98–111.
———. “Constructing and Contesting ‘Singaporean Hinduism’ ”. In Ethnic Identities
in Southeast Asia, Social Sciences in Asia, edited by Lian Kwen Fee, pp. 145–68.
Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2006b.
Stark, Rodney and William Sims Bainbridge. The Future of Religion: Secularization,
Revival and Cult Formation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985.
Stark, Rodney and Roger Finke. Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.
246

Swallow, D. A. “Ashes and Powers: Myth, Rite and Miracle in an Indian God- Man’s
Cult”. Modern Asian Studies 6, no. 10 (1982): 123–58.
Thio, Li Ann. “The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues Arising from
Colin Chan Vs Public Prosecutor”. In Singapore, edited by Garry Rodan.
Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001.
Tong, Chee Kiong. Religious Conversion and Revivalism: A Study of Christianity in
Singapore. Singapore: Ministry of Community Development, 1989.
———. Rationalising Religion: Religious Conversion, Revivalism and Competition in
Singapore Society. Leiden: Brill, 2007.
Vivakanandan, S. and Nagah Devi, R. “Hindu Temples in Charities and Social
Services”. In Religious Diversity in Singapore, edited by Lai Ah Eng. Singapore:
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1958.
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247

248 Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman
10
THE MUSLIM RELIGIOUS ELITE

OF SINGAPORE
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Muslim Religious Elite
It is generally understood that there is no clergy in Islam. What exists is a
body of religious elite called the ulama that provides leadership in matters
pertaining to religious belief and practices in the Muslim community. It is
maintained that their emergence is the result of social necessity as there is
hardly any system of belief that does not comprise a group of individuals
forming a class of the selected few whose task is to provide leadership in
that aspect.1
The ulama exercise considerable influence in Muslims’ religious and
cultural life. By virtue of their training in the religious sciences, they believe
that they are the spiritual and intellectual custodians of Islam. Hence they
define problems affecting the community which they regard as falling within
the ambit of the religion. They also attempt to provide solutions based on
what they consider as the divine law. Generally the Muslim community
perceives the ulama as pious and the authority on everything connected with
Islam. Many are revered for their devotion, concern for Muslim solidarity and
propagation of the virtues of Islamic teachings and values.
The ulama propagate their ideas and teachings through established
religious institutions such as the madrasah. They also conduct organized
religious classes, either in mosques or within the confines of private homes.
248
248

The Muslim Religious Elite of Singapore 249
Their thoughts are also disseminated via the mass media by way of regular
contributions to television and radio programmes and the Internet.2 Pages or
columns in the Malay daily also publish their writings at least twice a week.
Their sermons and writings on Islam are sold commercially in the form of
tapes and printed materials. Furthermore, they are often invited to speak at
religious forums and seminars organized for the Muslim public by various
Malay-Muslim organizations. Amongst them are leaders of tarikat (Arabic
meaning “way”) or religious orders. Individuals and groups including Malay
leaders and professionals encourage their participation in the Malay-Muslim
community’s affairs over issues ranging from education to the problems of the
Knowledge Based Economy (KBE).3 Moreover, they are consulted and their
advice sought by members of the community on numerous matters, including
family life and marital conflicts; parenting, various social problems like
delinquency, drug addiction, teenage pregnancies and marriage and illnesses
of sorts, to name a few.4 The ulama also provide fatwa (religious opinions) on
modern issues and problems confronting the community. It is pertinent to
note that the members of the religious elite are not only confined to the local
ulama. In fact, Indonesian and Malaysian religious teachers are just as popular,
if not more, judging by their appearances and participation in the various
talks, lectures and sermons on Islam organized in Singapore.
It is an over-generalization to suggest that the religious elite in the
Muslim community is a homogenous entity; individuals and groups differ in
some respects in their religious orientation, theological interpretations and
religious opinions. Nevertheless, they are characterized by certain common
factors. Essentially, they propagate a largely similar and continuous corpus of
religious knowledge which includes theology, law, metaphysics and history.
This is made possible by its perpetuation in the traditional religious institutions
which they attend. The places where they receive religious instruction are the
madrasah or theological schools and institutions of higher learning found in
Muslim countries, such as Al-Azhar in Egypt. Essentially, their style of
learning is characterized by the passing or transmission of knowledge through
repetition, memorization and access to texts through commentaries.5 On the
whole, they are not sufficiently exposed to or have sufficient grounding in
modern knowledge which is predominantly a Western product. Many amongst
them are also not well versed in the English language although they have a
command of Arabic. Their knowledge of the modern world is derived
essentially from works by Muslims themselves. They also rely heavily on
translation works from Arabic or from books written in Malay.6 Their main
source of livelihood is in the teaching and propagation of religion. Some
also serve as religious officials in the various mosques and the religious
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bureaucracy, while others are engaged in trades and businesses related to the
practice of religion such as the haj and umrah pilgrimages as well as halal
food and other consumer products. While variations exist in their styles of
thought and religious orientations, the influence of traditionalism is
dominant. The traits and manifestations of traditionalism and their impact
on the community’s adjustment to the demands and challenges of the
contemporary world will be examined.
TRADITIONALISM AMONG THE MUSLIM

RELIGIOUS ELITE
As a style of religious belief, traditionalism is characterized by a deep sense of
cherishment for religious traditions received from savants of the past. These
traditions, derived from a selection of the vast and rich diversity of sources are
deemed as the totality of traditions received. They are upheld and applied
without justification for the bases of their selection, to the exclusion of other
conflicting traditions on similar issues or differing constructions of similar
traditions. Being the product of pious savants of the past, the entire body of
these selected traditions are deemed complete, infallible and not to be
questioned. If any part of these traditions is doubted, it is as if the whole body
of it is at risk. Traditionalists cannot or do not care to justify what they
believe, their mode of thought distinguished by a strong sense of “obligation”
and of the “necessity of believing rather than what is believed” that has no
place for doubt. The cognitive style of the traditionalist is one of unquestioning
acceptance of authority, the implicit plea being that questions should not
only be asked but thrust away under the lock and key of a trustworthy
authority. Since the main concern is to keep the religious tradition intact,
traditionalism is characterized by opposition or reluctance to change and is
always on alert to press any attempt at innovation back into the established
mould.7 Hence, traditionalism is at odds with the emphasis on reason in the
search for truth and the maintenance of a critical and an inquiring spirit. It
is also characterized by the overriding tendency to attach significance to
literal expressions of religious teachings as developed in specific socio-historical
conditions of the past, at the expense of the absolute and eternal ethical
principles which underlie them.8
Traditionalism is thus perhaps one of the greatest limitations of the
dominant ulama who generally subscribe to the dogma that religious traditions
inherited from scholars of the past are, as a whole, absolute, immutable and
binding. Accompanying this belief is the notion that these sacred traditions
being complete, infallible and perfect must be guarded and preserved. But the
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preservation is not characterized by intellectual endeavour and reasoning. On

the contrary, they depict unquestioning acceptance of traditions which,
though regarded as complete, are actually a selective range within the vast and
diverse body of religious traditions. In this style of thought, there is no place
for attempts at distinguishing ideas or teachings which are the products of
specific socio-historical epochs and their underlying universal moral and
ethical principles. This conditions responses to problems which strongly
reflect a tendency to be bound by the letter of religious traditions, rather
than their impact on man. Given such orientation, one cannot therefore
expect to see in traditionalism a deliberate striving for reform or the
application of reform ideas. Because traditionalism breeds an attitude that
clings more to the past for solutions than the present, it has the effect of
fossilizing religious thought, rendering it incapable of adapting to the
demands and needs of contemporary society. This problem has been
highlighted long ago by prominent Muslim reformers. Shakib Arsalan, for
instance, in his work, Our Decline and Its Causes, lashed at the blind
dogmatism and obscurantism of religious traditionalists who insist on
hackneyed conventions. It is they, he maintained, who obstruct suitable
reforms for the improvement of society’s well-being. Because of their failure
to adapt Islamic teachings to the demands of the modern world, they
reduce it to a religion of other-worldly occupations and are thus responsible
for the poverty and indigence of the Muslims.9
Traditionalism and Organ Donation and Transplant

One stark illustration of traditionalism is reflected in the response of the
dominant religious elite towards the issue of organ donation and transplant
in Singapore via two fatwa passed by MUIS (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura,
the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore) in 1973 and 1988 respectively.
Though fatwa, unlike law, are non-binding, they nevertheless influence
thinking, behaviour and attitude of individuals. Organ donation is a novel
problem never encountered by Muslims in the past. Hence, the advice and
guidance of the religious elite were sought on its permissibility. The first fatwa
prohibited the donation of the organs of the dead to the living who required
them, whilst the second allowed for it on grounds of necessity (darura) but
subject to certain pre-conditions, namely, consent of the donor’s potential
beneficiaries (waris). It is pertinent to note that while the subsequent fatwa
lifted the prohibition on grounds of exigency, it did not abrogate the underlying
theological arguments that formed the basis for the first fatwa. This means
that the rationale which sanctioned prohibition in the first fatwa remains
251

unchanged. These responses reveal the traditionalists’ strong unwillingness to

depart from a highly selective construction of specific sources of religious
traditions used as justification for the fatwa. Inferring from certain selected
verses of the Qur’an, hadith and fiqh, the ulama pronounced the following
major grounds for prohibiting organ donation: donating one’s organ for
transplant is an act of self-destruction or the infliction of pain on oneself;
danger (caused by organ failures) cannot be eliminated by another danger
(surgery to remove one’s organ for donation); all the organs of man constitute
an amanah (responsibility) from God and therefore will be queried in the
hereafter. Donating one’s organ violates this trust and assumes that man
considers himself the master of them; a deceased Muslim has to be honoured
by burying his body intact, respectfully without tampering any part of it.10
Traditionalism is manifested not only in the refusal to consider divergent
interpretations of religious sources hinging on fundamental values of Islam,
such as the sacredness of life, charity, generosity, compassion and humanity
relevant to the issue, it is also revealed in the lack of concern for the moral
implications of the verdict. This mode of belief implies that law is the
prerogative of God and has nothing to do with the needs and problems of
human beings. Decisions were made by the theologians without the benefit
of adequate understanding of the facts about organ transplants and their
procedures and without the engagement of expert opinions on aspects that
were beyond their purview before passing the fatwa. Furthermore, the lack of
effective consideration for diverse religious opinions on the issue is a further
manifestation of the traits of traditionalism. Prior to the first fatwa passed by
MUIS, several Muslim societies had already permitted organ donation. Yet,
none of their arguments or rulings were consulted. The danger of this reactive
mode is also revealed in the negative impact of the fatwa on the representation
and image of the Muslim community within the context of a multi-cultural
and multi-religious society urging for organ donation on humanitarian
grounds. Apart from reducing the Muslims to being a passive community of
receivers of organs and not their donors, it also tarnishes the image of Islam
as a religion that fails to cherish essential humanitarian values and modern
science beneficial to mankind.11
Traditionalism is also evident in the pre-condition for waris (guardian)
and the perception of the lawful category of waris whose consent must first
be obtained by individuals wishing to pledge their organs for donation in the
second fatwa. This pre-condition reveals the attitude towards individual
judgement based on altruism and moral values prescribed in Islamic teachings.
While Islam respects and upholds the creative and spiritual vocation of the
human personality and empowers man with the authority and power over all
252

things in the universe subject to fundamental humanitarian principles, the

insistence on the consent of waris as the overriding factor in validating
individual decision in organ donation without justification in lieu of
opposing sources and traditions is clearly revealing of traditionalism.12
Furthermore, the category of waris deemed lawful, adapted essentially from
traditional Muslim law pertaining to family matters, such as marriage and
inheritance, further illustrates the problem of traditionalism in
contextualizing the issue and the priority accorded to literal application of
law. Though the most recent amendment to the fatwa has allowed for
MUIS to assume the role of waris thereby extending the category, it
remains a pre-condition for organ donation.
Traditionalism and Stem Cell Research

The above traits of traditionalism persist in yet another recent fatwa passed by
the Fatwa Committee of MUIS on the permissibility of the use of human
embryonic stem cells not more than two weeks old for purposes of research.
Made in relation to the request by the Singapore Bioethics Advisory Committee
for a response from the Muslim community on this permissibility, the fatwa
allowed the use of embryonic stem cells for purposes of research.
The basis for this fatwa is essentially theological, relying solely on two
sources, namely, a juristic opinion and a tradition ascribed to Abdullah bin
Mas’ud. The cited juristic opinion conveys the view that there is nothing in
the syariah that regulates human embryos except when it is implanted into
the womb, strongly suggesting that the matter is open ended. The cited
tradition provides a theological opinion on the stages of man’s creation.
According to this tradition, man is created in stages, first, in the womb of
the mother for forty days, consecutively developing into a clot of blood in
the next forty days, then into a piece of flesh at the end of the same period.
Upon the 120th day, an angel is sent with the divine mission of granting
the foetus a soul, and determining his destiny in terms of wealth, life span,
misfortune or happiness. Inferring from these authorities, the Fatwa
Committee ruled that a foetus less than four months old, whether existing
inside or outside the womb, has not begun “life” though it survives in its
specific stage of physical growth.13
These justifications reveal the traits of traditionalism that strongly
condition the tendency to apply traditions of the past to resolve a contemporary
novel issue without adequate consideration for all its ramifications. The
tradition and juristic opinion selected in this case cannot be said to provide
clarity of values for guidance strongly grounded in fundamental religious
253

sources. It is a theological construction which strongly implies that life begins

only upon the 120th day of conception. More pertinently, the traditionalist
orientation is clearly reflected in the oblivion to contemporary ethical problems
and dilemmas in the discourse on human embryonic stem cells confronting
modern man.14 Equally pertinent, the traditionalist mode is manifested in the
lack of consideration for the implications of the fatwa. The fatwa in effect
positively sanctions human embryonic stem cell research for Muslims for a
period that far exceeds what many other religious, secular or humanistic
groups would permit, that is, not more than fourteen days, not to mention
those who completely denounce such research on the grounds that life begins
at the very point of fertilization. This means that while others would completely
object to, or exercise an extremely cautious attitude towards such novel
experimental research, the reasoning exemplified by the Fatwa Committee
goes well beyond generally accepted limitations.
Religious versus Secular Knowledge

The attitude of the ulama towards knowledge, characterized by a strong
tendency to dichotomize it, based on a distinction between the profane, or
what is commonly referred to as secular knowledge on the one hand, and
religious knowledge on the other, is another illustration of traditionalism.15
Muslims are thus constantly urged to strike a balance between the two types
of knowledge. Yet this dichotomy is itself a construct, as has been highlighted
by Muslim reformers calling for a rightful interpretation of the idea of
knowledge more than a century ago. Attacking the perception of the
traditionalists, they have pointed out that for those who have studied the
Koranic verses it should be obvious that the words corresponding to knowledge
and wisdom occurring therein have the same sense in which they are commonly
used to denote worldly knowledge as well. In fact verses of the Qur’an on this
subject are more numerous than those relating to prayer and other acts of
piety. Also, those with knowledge and wisdom do not refer only to people
learned in subjects like prayer and fasting, but also of the rains, plants,
mountains, living beings and the principles underlying their creation.16
This dichotomy is also accompanied by the attempt to rank or prioritize
“spiritual” knowledge as having a more important status than “worldly” or
“secular” knowledge — an opinion based on an unquestioning acceptance of
selective interpretation of scholars of the past. By virtue of this belief, not
only is a fundamental distinction made between knowledge of this world and
that which grants man salvation in the Hereafter, traditions accorded to the
254

Prophet Muhammad are often cited to convey this hierarchy. An example is

provided by one in which the prophet is believed to have proclaimed that
“those whom Allah wants to bless will be given knowledge of religious
matters.”17 Such knowledge is understood as referring to “spiritual” knowledge
per se. Furthermore, the dominant interpretation of the term alim (learned)
to refer only to the ulama who are versed in the religious sciences is consistent
with the attitude towards other types of knowledge.18
Thus, it is constantly reiterated that the fundamental knowledge which
Muslims must seek is knowledge of God and his attributes, the problem of
predestination, ethical principles that ought to guide his life and deeds, and
the system of comprehensive laws that covers all aspects of life, that is,
man’s relationship with God as well as man’s relationship with man. This
knowledge is considered complete and binding and contributes towards the
making of good Muslims. That which falls outside this sphere is deemed
secular or worldly knowledge which, according to some, must be accepted
with caution. Examples of knowledge regarded as secular include ideas and
thoughts that relate to modernism, individualism, rationalism, pragmatism
and socialism. Muslims are even told that these knowledge and ideologies
are in conflict with Islam and should not be pursued since they will mislead
them from the Truth.19
This hierarchy of knowledge has unhealthy implications for the Malay/
Muslim community. It creates ambivalences towards the assimilation and
absorption of modern knowledge and hampers mastery of knowledge of
man and society. It also leads to an over-emphasis on pietism and the after-
life which, as one scholar noted, has inundated the minds of the Muslims
out of proportion to science, technology, economics and other aspects of
modern civilization.20
The dichotomization and ranking of knowledge by prioritizing “spiritual”
knowledge conditions the preoccupation of the religious elite with matters of
the after-life. Sermons reveal grave concern with the theme of death and
man’s preparation for the hereafter. Muslims are constantly reminded that
they must seek knowledge of the hereafter if they wish to ensure their
personal salvation. Such often reiterated perceptions are effectively captured
in the following views of one prominent ulama:
Knowledge which man possesses is taught by God whether it is knowledge

of this world or the other world. Man is certainly advanced in this
worldly knowledge but for the Muslims they must also possess knowledge
of the afterlife in order to salvage them in the Hereafter.21
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A recent forum organized by a mosque entitled “Is it Easier for Females

to Enter Heaven?” is another illustration of this fixation. Sometime in 2005,
another forum with the emphasis on divine retribution was organized for the
general Muslim community on the theme of “Punishment Meted to the
Inmates in Hell”. Furthermore, the theme of life after death, particularly the
question of the Last Day (kiamat akhirat) and issues related to it, such as
divine retribution, commonly recur in the columns of the local press. An
ustaz (teacher) who contributes frequently to the press even ranked life after
death into several stages. He asserted that belief in life in the grave after death
is an integral aspect of faith in the unseen and it is just as fundamental as the
obligation of believing in heaven and hell, the angels and Judgement Day. For
those who do not believe, punishment meted to them in their burial hole will
indeed be so grievous that their violent screams can be heard by all creation
except man.22 Some of these ulama also maintain in their sermons that it is
the neglect of the questions of heaven and hell which has made the Muslims
backward. Hence they lash at Muslims who fear or are more concerned with
physical suffering, illiteracy, attrition, famine, poverty and material
impoverishment rather than the question of Hell. The theme of the
temporariness of this world as opposed to eternity, which also recurs
consistently in religious sermons, is a further manifestation of this fixation.23
An extension of the theme of preparation for the hereafter constantly
reiterated by the traditionalistic religious elite is the need to acquire knowledge
for one’s spiritual development. This obligation has been interpreted to mean
knowledge of religious injunctions, sin and blessings (dosa/pahala), the
permissible and prohibited (haram/halal) and rituals, the performance of
which marks one’s piety and devotion and ensures one’s personal salvation.
Thus the overriding concern in discussions on modern issues such as partaking
in investments or insurance schemes is sin and damnation in the hereafter.24
Similarly the problem of interest is often tackled as a theological issue, rather
than as ethical issues of exploitation or oppression and whether or how these
manifest in the operation of modern financial institutions. Religious sermons
and writings reveal a constant preoccupation and over-emphasis on rituals.
Newspaper columns and sermons particularly during the month of Ramadan
remind Muslims to perform certain rituals which would multiply God’s
blessings on them.25 To obtain a bigger share of the divine grace, certain types
of rituals are encouraged to be performed on particular days and times of the
year. The community is also inundated with a proliferation of religious classes
intended to refine and purify the performance of rituals which have intensified
in recent times. Hence such ceramah (talks) on themes such as “Sembahyang
secara Rasullullah” (prayers according to the Prophet Muhammad) which
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means not merely prayers (which many Muslims are acquainted with), but its
refinement according to the way in which it is believed to have been performed
by Prophet Muhammad. Similarly, numerous classes are held to teach potential
pilgrims the rituals associated with the haj and umrah which also emphasize
a great deal of memorization of prayers. The emphasis on rituals is also
manifested in the emergence of religious institutions created to train Muslims
to become hafiz or, one who can memorize the Qur’an.26
Traditionalism and Reason

Traditionalism is often accompanied by a general attitude of ambivalence and
at times scepticism towards reason as manifested in writings touching on
reason as a tool for understanding and applying religious teachings. While
acknowledging the fact that akal or reason is God-given, aspersions are often
cast on reason which is considered a double edged sword. For instance, in the
attacks by the Fatwa Committee against Alatas for advocating the use of
reason in determining new problems faced by the community in the context
of the discourse on organ donation, the members of the Committee maintained
that if reason was used, then all matters prohibited by religion would inevitably
be allowed because reason can be used (or rather abused) by Man to justify
any practice.27 Yet, while reason can be misused for negative, harmful or
destructive purposes, to mistrust reason because of the possibility of its
misuse by certain individuals or groups is absurd. It connotes that reason
cannot be used as a basis by man to adapt his religious understanding to new
or novel situations that confront him, which inevitably limits the role of
religion in life.
Coupled with this view is the argument constantly reiterated that
Man must therefore accept religious traditions passed down to him
unquestioningly, for everything that has been decided in the past is complete
and infallible. Thus, in discussions on reason, the recurring message is that
reason is to be applied for the purpose of remembering God and
acknowledging His superiority. To the traditionalist, remembrance of God
means accepting traditions and knowledge as passed down without question
and that only those who do so will be granted divine blessings. This is
couched in statements such as the following related by a popular ulama in
his weekly column in the Malay Daily:
Islam is not a dogmatic religion. All the teachings of the past can still be
applied today. It is a religion relevant to all. It is consistent with reason
and Allah has revealed that it is a religion which has been propagated by
257

the earlier prophets…. By referring to the Traditions, Muslims will be

saved from error and blessed with divine blessings.28
Hence he cautions Muslims not to adopt the attitude of berpandai-pandai

(trying to be smart).29
Such assertions promote an orientation that hardly leaves any scope for
critical thinking. They convey the perception that Islam reveals all truth,
and knowledge of this truth takes the form of a “completed tradition” to
which there could not be any meaningful addition. In this way, the claim
of the Qur’an that Islam is complete is taken to mean in fact the completion
of all truth. Thus, any such attempt to interpret Islamic teachings to novel
situations or ideas is seen to be a deviation from the right path, or a heresy.
In this way, knowledge becomes perceived not as advancement from the
known to the unknown. In fact, the traditionalistic mould as illustrated in
the above comments assumes that there is nothing new in the modern
world which has not been already anticipated in the past. It is as if society
is a closed system in which anything novel can be tackled by referring to
determinations in the past.30
It is also implied in the reasoning that new ideas or thought cannot
bring about betterment of society because the knowledge of the illustrious
scholars of the past is perfect. It then becomes the duty of all right-minded
persons to resist these innovations. This identification of the use of reason
to deal with novel situations, which is seen as potentially harmful to God-
given knowledge, seems to be a natural result of the illusion of finality. Man
is therefore not to contextualize his religion in light of the problems of his
age. This attitude is woven into the belief of the “hierarchy of authority”
found amongst the religious elite. By virtue of this dogma, the scholars and
religious personalities of the past are always regarded as superior in terms of
their knowledge and understanding of religion compared to those of the
present. For the traditionalistic religious elite, this means a continuous
regression back into their glorious history in which constant mention is
made of theologians and philosophers like Al Ghazali or Ibn Taimiyyah.
The contributions of these scholars are undoubted. However with
traditionalism, this regard for past legacy is out of proportion to the
appreciation of contemporary scholars who have contributed in their diverse
fields towards the advancement of humanity. This impedes efforts at
nurturing and developing contemporary thinkers and philosophers grounded
in modern knowledge relevant to contemporary problems.31
Though perhaps unintended, such constant alluding to these constructs
undermines the role of reason and experience from the world of man. It
258

obstructs a Muslim’s ability to understand his religion and his creator better.
Doubts cast upon reason will open the door to fanaticism, unquestioning
loyalty to authority and irrationality. As one scholar maintains:
It is reason which seeks to apply religion in a historical context taking

into consideration various actual demands and concrete problems.
Without the use of reason, man would be limiting his wisdom and
application of religion. When religion is kept out of many important
areas of life, through abandonment of reason, the vacuum is quickly
filled by other types of thinking inimical to unity and harmony. It is due
to the failure of man to effectively incorporate religious values and
thinking into his social organization and institutions that the field is left
open to philosophies conducive to violence and radicalism. When religion
fails to influence society in its social life, individualism, nihilism, relativism
and unbridled materialism will take root. Without the influence of
religion man’s mental equilibrium is upset and he is quick to transfer his
loyalties to destructive forces in society.32
The neglect of reason can thus bring about the disastrous consequence of not
only a shrinking of the intellectual horizon of the community but also the
impoverishment of its spiritual life.
With its insistence on the unquestioning approach to religion,
traditionalism is at odds with the conception of man as a rational and morally
responsible being with a value by himself. Passages in the Qur’an that deal
with the human situation describe the ultimate dignity of man as the vicegerent
of God. The Qur’anic vision of man encourages him to use his reason as an
instrument of self liberation and self realization.33 These elements of religious
humanism based on reason surrounding the notion of man are, however, not
shared by the traditionalists whose dominant view of man as portrayed in
their writings is one who is a weak victim of his natural surroundings,
constantly threatened by his passion, temptations and pleasures of the flesh.
His worst enemy, so says a prominent religious leader, is Satan, whose sole
aim is to weaken man and lead him astray, thus constantly plaguing him with
evil desires that seek to deviate him from the right path.34 Sermons focus on
his weaknesses giving rise to disobedience, destructive tendencies,
ungratefulness and arrogance in human history.35 This notion of the limitation
of man is reinforced by comparing him to other creations. For instance, one
prominent ulama whose thoughts are regularly featured in newspaper columns
maintains that man is “such an insignificant being who can hardly feel the
earth’s constant rotation and movement”. As a creation of the Almighty he is
extremely weak and is compared to that of “an ant below the foot of an
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elephant”. Furthermore, the acknowledgement of man’s dynamism is often

equated with belittling the omnipotence of God. Thus man is constantly
reminded to use his reason to acknowledge God’s greatness at all times.36
Such consistently repeated messages have the effect of clouding the
significance and dynamism of the individual. One can hardly expect serious
reform ideas to arise if such perceptions of man and reason are often espoused
to reinforce the completeness and infallibility of tradition. It also breeds the
negative effect of minimizing the importance of developing the individual
personality as a force in the process of socio-historical development. It is not
doubted that every change in society is preceded by individuals or groups of
people who embody and assimilate the ideal values which they desire to
develop, whether in the realm of morality or in other spheres of the
development of society. However, the constant negative devaluation of man
at the expense of emphasizing his positive attributes hampers the cultivation
of this progressive spirit.
TRADITIONALISM AND PROBLEMS OF

THE MODERN WORLD
More recently, the dominant ulama have attempted to deal with issues which
fall outside the traditional matters of their concern such as ethics, rituals,
morality and devotion.37 They have proceeded to tackle problems of the
modern world, including economic and political systems as well as modern
knowledge and social problems. One reason that accounts for this extension
of focus is possibly the expectation and demand for their guidance and
direction on modern issues and problems confronting the community. For
example, in economic matters, prominent members of the religious elite have
been appointed to committees and boards that provide advice pertaining to
the legitimacy of modern investments and economic schemes for the growing
number of Malay investors who wish to partake in or manage such ventures.
However, even in dealing with these novel issues, the solutions they offer
reveal the predominance of traditionalism. Such solutions are mainly
characterized by the consistent attempts at regressing into the past to confront
the developments of the modern world. For instance, in response to the issue
of KBE, a very prominent ustaz wrote to the Malay press asserting that
Muslims already possess a more comprehensive and spiritually superior system,
which he calls the “Islamic Based Economy” (IBE). He maintains that KBE
is not only a small part of IBE, it may also not be totally compatible with it.
In his opinion, IBE which had been established since the founding of Islam,
is developing slowly for lack of opportunities due to the secular nature of the
260

state. He also urged the community to look into IBE as the way to
development, citing that Islamic insurance or takaful and Islamic banking are
compatible with IBE.38 Sharing this view was another prominent religious
leader who maintained that KBE is not novel since Islam consistently
emphasized the importance of seeking knowledge. He also cautioned Muslims
not to confuse KBE with the attainment of economic goals per se. The
Muslims, he maintained, must view it as a programme for the development
of the character of man according to his fitrah (nature). Failure to recognize
this would lead to decadence that corrupts society, such as the glorification of
materialism as exemplified by Western culture.39
Such understanding of contemporary economics as manifested in the
above reactions reveal a more fundamental and pervasive limitation, namely,
the unfamiliarity of these ulama with Western or modern knowledge. This
handicap deprives them of a good grasp of contemporary thought and
experiences that are taking place in the world today. It also impedes them
from accessing and assimilating the contributions of modern knowledge and
the broad currents of contemporary ideas pertaining to the problems of the
modern world. Furthermore, the difficulties in capturing the variety of
opinions expressed on a particular issue or problem on various subjects found
in the thought and scholarship of contemporary thinkers reinforce the problem.
The problem arises when they attempt to diagnose the issues of the modern
world which extends beyond their traditional areas of their expertise.
The New Muslim Traditionalists

The problem is aggravated when these ulama consume ideas of the new breed
of Muslims traditionalists who assume expertise in both Islam and modern
knowledge. They write on topics as diverse as government and politics,
modern economy, globalization, poverty and development, all according to
their notion of an Islamic perspective. Their concerns and perspectives on
modernity and its impact impress some quarters as relevant to the cultural life
and progress of the Muslim community. Included within this group are
academics, graduate students, journalists and activists who are the products
of Western-styled universities where they pursue Islamic studies as well as
disciplines such as economics and political science. Some examples of the
institutions of learning where they are trained include international Islamic
universities in the region as well as in the West. They do not possess the
religious influence and legitimacy of the traditional ulama, nor are they
exposed to or trained in traditional religious sciences like law (fiqh) or
theology. In these areas, they generally share the opinions and authority of the
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traditional ulama. However, they write and deliver lectures on themes which
differ fundamentally from the latter. These include what they call the Islamic
economic system, Islamic investment and banking, Islamization of knowledge,
Islamic government and politics or siyasa, and secularism. The thrust of their
thinking is that modern knowledge and systems differ fundamentally from
what they perceive as Islamic ones, thereby establishing dichotomies and even
conflicts between the two. Their concerns and perspective echo the views of
a larger movement of Muslim academics and activists who are sceptical of
Westernization, secularism and science in the name of Islam and whose works
are characterized by the belief in the lost utopia, a golden past superior to
other epochs of history.40 The fact that their writings are given space in the
media and that they are invited to speak at forums, workshops or lectures
organized by the various Malay-Muslim organizations point to their growing
popularity. Unlike the dominant traditionalist religious elite however, this
group does not command broad-based support and following here. However,
the ulama’s lack of familiarity with Western thought and modern knowledge
results in the tendency to acknowledge the ideas of this emerging group as the
beacon for guidance on issues of Islam and the modern world.
Although the new group deals with modern issues, their thinking reveals
a variant of traditionalism. In their attempt to refer to the past for solutions
to present problems, they share a similar orientation with the ulama. However,
unlike the latter, they utilize the labels and terminologies of modern systems
or concepts, interweaving them into their construction of an Islamic past
with the overriding aim of demonstrating that not only was a concept,
principle, knowledge or institution found back then, they are also more
superior to the present. However, far from being intellectual in terms of their
insights, reasoning and perspective, their arguments are generally rhetorical.
Apart from the simplistic and selective attempt to create fundamental
differences or dichotomies between what they perceive as the Western secular
systems and Islam, this group also evaluate the former to be devoid of
spirituality while the latter is considered morally and ethically superior.
Illustrations of their views are found in the regular contributions to the Malay
press in which they allege that an Islamic state had emerged during the era of
the Prophet Muhammad, governed by a comprehensive system of laws and
many other matters pertaining to government and politics. In all these
contributions, the overriding intention is also to show that these laws and
institutions are superior to existing ones based on the Western model in terms
of their humanitarian ideals and values. That the West is seen to be a late-
comer to arbitration or mediation in the settlement of disputes and that the
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principles underlying the United Nations Charter, for instance, have been
predated by the principles found in the Medina “Constitution”, are some
instances of the type of evaluation found in these writings.41
This group also dabbles in Islamizing knowledge, economics and systems.
Their writings deal with issues which they maintain have been spearheaded
and worked out clearly and comprehensively 1,400 years ago. These include
the question of price determination, principles underlying insurance (takaful)
and contract, the concepts of productivity and value add, research and
development, and as a recent addition to this long list of economic themes,
globalization. They discuss these issues rhetorically, weaving into them the
questions of man’s spiritual nature and moral reform. Writing in the local
Malay daily, they invoke tenth century Muslim philosophers and theologians
such as al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah for which they transpose modern
economic terminologies. They even evaluate their opinions as being superior
to modern economic principles and theories, since not only the material
aspects of development but also the spiritual needs of man are taken into
consideration. Their overriding intention is to prove that Islam has provided
a system that is perfect and applicable for all times, and that the whole body
of knowledge called modern economics, for instance, is inadequate, faulty
and limited in terms of its goals.42
This preoccupation with the past shrouds the sense of relevance of issues
that renders these writers’ discourse ahistorical. For instance, we find littered
in their present day discourse, theological debates pertaining to the
permissibility of residing in a non-Muslim country, holding positions in a
non-Islamic government and working with a “non-pious” government. On
such issues, they dabble at length into traditions, verses of the Qur’an and
historical examples which they select and apply as if these historical problems
and choices that confronted the early believers of the seventh century Muslims
are applicable to the Singaporean Muslim community today regardless of its
cultural and historical experiences. Thus Muslims, whose religious life in
Singapore have been characterized by its long history of adaptation to and
acceptance of the institutions of the state and society, are urged to opt for
peace and tolerance as the bases of relations with others, as these are the
“original basis of relationship” with non-Muslims in Islamic history. Similarly,
they delve into juristic classifications of countries into Darul Islam, Darul
Harbi (territory of war or inhabited by non-Muslims and governed by those
who have declared war on Muslims) and Darul Aman (territory with peace
accord with an Islamic state) found in the tenth century or earlier period of
Islamic history, dabbling in conflicting juristic views and resolutions for
263

Singapore’s Muslims since they claim these issues “may shape how Muslims
evaluate and relate to the countries where they are staying”. Although they
themselves do not subscribe to these classifications, they nevertheless import
them at length and take pains at explaining them away by offering justifications,
including theological ones.43 The fact that these issues are irrelevant to the
Muslim community of Singapore, who have originated from this region and
who have all along accepted the sovereignty of the state and its institutions,
are hardly considered in the discourse.
In consuming the views churned out by this new group of Muslims, the
religious elite reinforce their own traditionalistic outlook. This is illustrated,
for instance, in an article by a prominent religious leader on the topic of the
differences between Western government and Islam.44 Here, Machiavelli is
taken to represent Western political thought. Based on their reading of his
thought, the ulama concluded that in Western political thought the sole aim
of politics is to establish and entrench power and ideological interests.
Furthermore, any means including fabrication or deception can be employed
to justify that goal. This form of politics is said to be in conflict with Islamic
political thought which is based on the belief in God and ethical principles,
such as consensus, justice and the appointment of good rulers distinguished
by their sound knowledge, temperance and faith. Coming from an ulama, the
reference to Machiavelli and perceptions of the modern political system is
indeed novel and is revealing of its source.45
This scepticism towards modern institutions and the strong tendency to
transpose Muslims back to the past has serious implications for the community.
It ignores the complexities of society spanning several centuries and man’s
contributions to it in terms of the evolution of concepts, ideas and institutions
in dealing with the problems of his age. In short, it obliterates completely the
different periods of historical time and man’s life struggles and contributions
within these. The result is not only an erroneous understanding of problems
but also a sense of indifference to history and society. While the past is
reconstructed in a highly selective manner, the present contributions of man
are not only misunderstood or ignored; they are also devalued. The influence
of such ideas can breed an attitude of distrust and scepticism towards existing
ideas and institutions, and creates ambivalences and contradictions towards
the assimilation of contemporary ideas and constructive works. It conditions
Muslims to take a back seat or, worse still, regress into the past while other
societies are at the forefront of development. For after all, why should
Muslims participate in developing this world by seriously engaging in
constructive reforms when the past has shed clearer light and universal
solutions relevant for all times to overcome man’s existential problems?
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Traditionalism and Politics

It is pertinent to note that even though utopian mentality hinged on the
superiority of the golden past with all its ideal institutions is, in some
instances, accompanied by activist ideology aimed at transforming the actual
world so as to cure it of its ills, this trend is absent in the local context. There
is no indication of such orientation with specific political goals or strategies
devised to take power and authority away from the state amongst the religious
elite or those they refer to for ideas on the modern world. In this context, the
new traditionalists with a passion for the golden past are devoid of that
machinery or objective. Those who echo the claims of an Islamic state or
economic system are not in the pursuit of establishing an alternative divine
order on earth. They do not seek to wrest control or contest for political
power within the state, nor is it in their agenda to espouse a radical
transformation of existing society for an alternative based on Islam, as is the
case with some Islamist parties or movements in the Muslim world. On the
whole, they are content to confine their influence to traditional religious
institutions within the state.46
Their perception of the rights and position of Muslims within the
context of Singapore is a clear illustration of their apolitical stance. They
perceive their role largely as ensuring the creation of responsible Muslim
leadership to administer and manage the religious life of the community. This
is confined to teaching religious rituals, administering charity (helping the
weak and indigent), managing wakaf (endowments), zakat, (charity), baitulmal
(common fund), haj matters, determining the beginning of fasting and Hari
Raya and other religious obligations of the Muslims. Their standpoint as
reflected in their writings is that so long as Muslims can practice their faith
freely without having to compromise their belief in the fundamentals of
Islam, they are content.47
This stance is also clearly reflected in the thought of the Singapore
Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association (PERGAS) on issues
such as secularism, the Islamic state and the application and implementation
of the syariah. Though views on these issues posit radical rhetorical differences
between existing institutions and Islamic ones, and though they maintain
that Islam is a “comprehensive religion” touching all aspects of life —
government and the people, the state and land, justice and law, knowledge,
production of wealth, morals, ideology, ibadah (worship) (which implies that
Muslims must necessarily reject in principle the secular state) — they
nevertheless utilize theological justification for exemption (rukhsah). According
to them, given the non-ideal situations confronted by Muslims as a minority
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which renders the practice of “Islam in totality” impossible, acceptance of the

status quo is advocated. This is particularly so since, in their opinion, “freedom
of religion is guaranteed” in Singapore and “secularism is in the form of a
neutral government that does not take the side of any religion in order to
ensure inter-racial harmony”. Similarly, while they rhetorically essentialise
the “Islamic state”, they accept the notion that the “Islamic state” differs
little from the modern system of governance prevalent today. Furthermore,
though they assert that “democracy” differs from “syura” (consensus) in
terms of the extent of powers given to the people (in the latter system,
people can only make laws that have not been determined and not in
contradiction to the Qur’an and traditions), they nevertheless accept
parliamentary democracy since it fulfils the conditions of “consensus”.
Moreover, while upholding hudud (laws on punishment) and its
implementation as religious obligations and hence compulsory for Muslims,
they subscribe to the view that being a minority in Singapore, Islam
excludes them from this obligation. Their stance on these various issues
reveals traits of traditionalism in the sense that they dogmatically rely on
selective religious opinions of pious savants of the past and assume finality
of their views in principle. They uphold these authorities of the past but
abstain from applying them due to political realities.48
The response of traditional religious elites to the issue of wearing the
tudung (headscarf ) in schools is another clear example of their apolitical
stance. The fatwa passed by MUIS is clear on the point that wearing the
tudung is a matter of religious obligation for girls who have attained puberty,
but seeking knowledge and education is a fundamental obligation and should
a conflict arise, the priority of the Muslim is towards the latter. The fact that
tudung for girls in schools has never been an issue for contention amongst
Muslims all these years renders support to their stance although they subscribe
to the belief that the tudung is wajib or obligatory for Muslim girls.49 Clearly,
members of the dominant religious elite were not in support of a
confrontational approach on the issue.
That the religious elite embrace support for and cooperation with
political leadership is also obvious in their recent response to the arrests of
the suspects of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). In fact, PERGAS and other
religious groups, in condemning terrorist activities in the name of Islam,
have expressed unanimous support to the call by Malay leaders for greater
supervision and checks over religious teachers. MUIS’ objective of devising
and planning a system of appointment and recognition of religious teachers
towards this end is met with their strong approval and support.50 Such a
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response is yet another manifestation of the long-standing close cooperation

and non-confrontational relationship which characterizes the religious elites’
relationship with political authority.
While there is clearly acceptance of the sovereignty of the state and its
institutions, the constant emphasis on the implicit dichotomy between
“Islamic” systems and institutions and existing “secular” ones can breed an
attitude of ambivalence towards the latter. Reiterating demarcations and
differences between these is not completely conducive towards promoting a
positive stake in existing institutions and collaborating towards their
development that is beneficial to all. For instance, insisting that theologically
hudud, though compulsory for Muslims to implement, can take a back seat
in view of political realities, not only belies an attitude that punishment
legalized by the state is not consistent with Islamic principles of justice, it also
conditions a passive attitude towards these laws. Such attitude can hinder
Muslims not only from being at ease with existing institutions but from
contributing effectively to their development.
LEGITIMIZATION OF TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS ELITES

While the above examples show that the religious elite in Singapore is
apolitical, it is maintained that their overriding ideological quest is
recognition as the experts and authority on Islam and, more recently, on
modern issues and knowledge affecting the Muslim community.51 Within
these areas, they consciously protect their interest as the guardians of Islam
vis-à-vis other groups within the Muslim community. Utilizing traditions
of the Prophet Muhammad, such as the one that proclaims that “the ulama
are the heirs of the prophets”, the religious elite confer upon themselves the
status of guardians of religion. Insulting or belittling the ulama is tantamount
to “insulting or belittling the Prophet Muhammad”.52
Their response to the call by the government for moderates within the
Muslim community to speak up against terrorism provides another window
for traditional elites’ conscious attempt to protect and guard their status as
the spokesman for Islam. Hence, members identify themselves as “moderates”
and also maintain that only they can represent the authentic Islam and
protect it against the onslaught of potent contemporary challenges, namely
the influence of “alien” ideologies and worldviews harmful to it. Heuristically,
this is conveyed by lashing at the “insignificant” impact made by others
outside their circle in alleviating this challenge, as conveyed by the following
assertion of PERGAS:
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Thus far efforts to counteract such false understanding (of Islam) did
not have significant impact, because they were made by individuals
whom certain detesting parties do not accept as representing a unified
stand from Muslim groups. This is especially so when the efforts do not
come from the scholars and religious elite. (PERGAS, 2004, p. xxix)
Those outside the group who attempt to speak about Islam are criticized as
“voices that may lack proper knowledge of Islam”.53 Because they have been
celebrated instead as a proponent of the true teachings of Islam,
misrepresentations of the religion remain rife.
The emphasis on the overriding necessity for collective opinion on
matters of Islam over views expressed individually provides yet another example.
It is intended that within this collectivity, their status as guardians of truth is
reinforced as it is they the ulama who will assume the role as spokesman on
Islam. In this respect, their selection and construction of traditions pertaining
to the significance of jemaah (community of believers), has the effect of
conferring upon them authority on Islam, since the jemaah is perceived by
them, to refer to the ulama whom, as they maintained, “Allah has guaranteed
will not all collaborate to engage in error”. Hence, they insist on “moulding
an integrated community and yet preserve diversity of views” through a
collective articulation of Islam. Religious traditions are selectively utilized to
convey the importance of unity of the community of believers (jemaah) and
the present moment for the Muslim ummah (community) to live as in a
jemaah, since they argue that the biggest problems and misfortune of the
Muslim ummah is disunity, which accounts for Muslims’ low social, economic
and political standing.54
This selection and construction of traditions that denounces individualism
and the unwillingness to accept or deal with diversity of views expressed by
individuals in their own right is consistent with the traits of traditionalism.
Insistence on the overriding importance of collective opinion through a
selective interpretation of the jemaah traditions is taken as representing the
Islamic position, without need for justification or reference to other religious
sources that emphasise principles of individual morality and accountability
for one’s own thought, deeds and actions.
Response to changes perceived as threatening their interest provides
further evidence of the traditional elites’ concern to guard their position as
custodians of religion. The protest over the appointment of a Western-trained
judge as the president of the Shariah Court sometime in 1992 is illustrative
of this view. Utilizing the Malay media and the mosque, a prominent religious
leader expressed his unreserved grievance, arguing vehemently that the Shariah
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Court as a religious institution which administers God’s laws should not be

headed by one who has neither the expertise nor knowledge of the syariah
(Laws). Verses from the Qur’an and hadith were invoked as warning to the
community that misfortune will befall on those who are led by the ignorant,
that is, those without knowledge of the laws and the religion.55
Recent issues pertaining to the madrasah and compulsory education and
the wearing of the tudung in schools also offer stark examples. The religious
elite’s reaction was to some extent precipitated by what they perceived as the
interference of Malay political leaders in their traditional domain of authority.
In other words, Malay political leaders were viewed as attempting to usurp
their role as the key advisors to the government on matters pertaining to the
religious life of the community which they consider themselves the custodians
of. Thus, in the statement on their stand on the tudung issue, PERGAS
stressed that whatever statements relating to religious rulings concerning the
Muslim community should only be made by those qualified in this field.56 By
implication, PERGAS is of the view that only religious leaders have the right
to speak on Islam. Outside this domain, they have never challenged or
contested the Malay political leaders’ opinions or authority.
On the issue of madrasah and compulsory education,57 the dominant
religious elite did not challenge the government’s concern for compulsory
education and national integration. The emotional outbursts directed against
the Malay political leaders who had spearheaded the discussion and suggested
possible alternatives to the madrasah were more likely to have been motivated
by what is perceived as an attempt to override the ulama’s role. This explains
the accusations directed at the Malay political leaders who were criticized for
speaking on an area of Islamic education of which they have no expertise in.
The remarks made by religious officials to the then Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong are also telling of their wish to be the ones who should be
consulted on this matter. As a prominent religious leader from PERGAS
asserted:
On hindsight we sympathize with Mr. Goh for being disadvantaged in

not getting the full and clear picture of the madrasah issue directly from
us and other Islamic organizations. With his suggestion of setting some
kind of standard, it now becomes the duty of this Muslim community to
discuss the future of the madrasah rationally and responsibly.58
In fact, from the very beginning PERGAS had maintained that it was
committed to work with the government on the issue. It even suggested the
possibility of twinning the madrasah with nearby government schools for
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common subjects to prevent closure of the institutions. It was clear that when
they were subsequently consulted, dissatisfaction and grievances eased. Thus,
though the decision of the government was to allow only those madrasah that
satisfied the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) benchmark to
continue to exist (which clearly implied the possibility of closure of some of
them), the religious elite was agreeable and expressed their satisfaction with
the decision. Their reaction reveals attempts at retaining their traditional
authority, even if it meant making fundamental changes to the madrasah
which have long served as a base for the perpetuation of the religious elite’s
influence and authority within the Muslim community.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has examined traditionalism as a dominant style of religious
belief of the Muslim religious elite in Singapore. It is not intended to be an
exhaustive appraisal of the ulama’s ideas and views or the diversity of
orientations amongst them which is certainly beyond the scope of the chapter.
Probing into the style and aspects of religious belief in concrete issues allows
us to understand the selection and persistence of certain ideas and issues that
engage the Muslim religious elite, and how these condition their responses to
the challenges of the modern world.
Notes
All views expressed herein remain the sole responsibility of the author.
1. Alatas (1954). “Some Problems of Leadership in Islamic Societies”.
2. See, for instance, <ceramah.com.sg>.
3. For instance, at the Knowledge Based Convention in 1999, the ulamas were
invited to join in all except one working committee and to provide
recommendations.
4. See, for instance, a prominent religious teacher’s advice to Muslim counsellors in
Berita Harian, 20 April 2001.
5. Some of the problems of the mode of traditional learning in religious schools
have been highlighted by Hoodbhoy (1992, pp. 123–26). Refer also to Azhar
Ibrahim’s article in Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng (2006,
Ch. 4).
6. Some of these traits have been highlighted by Alatas (1954) and which remains
applicable today.
7. Towler (1984, Ch. 2).
8. These traits opposed to traditionalism are consistent with modernization discussed
by Alatas (1972, Ch. 2).
9. Arsalan (1944, pp. 68–69).
10. Alatas (1974, pp. 10–14).
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11. For a good discussion of contrary views, refer to Alatas (1974, p. 37) and
Moulavi M. H. Babu Sahib (1991).
12. For a discussion on the right of the individual in organ donation, refer to
Moulavi MH Babu Sahib (1999, pp. 32–35).
13. MUIS fatwa.
14. Some of these ethical concerns and issues are discussed in Transcripts of the
Presidential Council on Bioethics in <http://www.bioethics.gov>.
15. A good example of this dichotomy is found in MUIS, Friday Sermon: Islam the
Official Religion of Allah, 29 June 2001.
16. Arsalan (1944, pp. 85–89). Refer also to Alatas (1976, pp. 63–67).
17. MUIS, Friday Sermon, 29 June 2001.
18. Harun Din (1977, pp. 147–48). Refer to the criticism of this view of the term
alim by S. H. Alatas in Berita Minggu, 23 June 2002.
19. See, for instance, the views of Harun Din (1977, pp. 167–58).
20. Alatas (1977, p. 83)
21. Berita Minggu, 23 June 2002.
22. Berita Harian, 13 July 2001.
23. The Muhammadiyah Association. Friday Sermon: A Balanced Islamic Community,
13 September 2002. Also see MUIS, Friday Sermon: Balancing Duniya and the
Akhirat, 28 December 2001.
24. Berita Minggu, 30 June 2002.
25. Berita Harian, 1 December 2001.
26. See the report in Berita Harian, 30 April 1999, 2 January 2000.
27. Alatas (1974, p. 40).
28. Berita Harian, 21 March 1999, 23 June 2002.
29. Ibid.
30. See, for instance, the argument of Khundmiri, Alam (2001, p. 48).
31. Alatas (1979, pp. 86–89).
32. Maaruf (1980, pp. 52–58).
33. See the discussion on this theme by Khundmiri (2001, pp. 58–59). Refer also to
Rahman (1989, Ch. 2).
34. Berita Harian, 4 January 2002.
35. MUIS, Friday Sermon: From Strength to Weakness: The Cycle of Life, 18 May
2001.
36. Berita Harian, 21 March 1999.
37. Some of their major concerns are surmised in MUIS, Friday Sermon: The
Characteristics of A Successful Person, 24 August 2001.
38. Berita Harian, 5 March 1999.
39. Berita Harian, 28 February 1999. Refer also to article on 5 August 1999.
40. For a substantive discussion of such writings, refer to Tibi (1998). For a portrayal
of some of this style of thought, refer to Maaruf (2001, Ch. 6).
41. Berita Harian, 3 May 2002; 19 April 2002; 10 May 2002; 6 July 2002; 23 and
30 August 2002; 6 and 13 September 2002.
42. For some examples, refer to Berita Harian, 12 October 2001; 2 November 2001;
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4, 11, 18 and 25 January 2002; 1 February 2002; 8, 15, 22 March 2002; 5 April
2002; 3, 17 and 31 May 2002; 7 and 14 June 2002; and 28 September 2002.
43. PERGAS (2004, pp. 185–257).
44. Berita Harian, 26 January 2001.
45. See, for instance, the view of Mutalib (2001).
46. PERGAS (2004, pp. 91–179). See also MUIS, Friday Sermon, 18 October 2002.
47. Refer, for instance, the article by Semait (1991, pp. 10–14).
48. PERGAS (2004, pp. 104–28).
49. See, for instance, the position of PERGAS in <www.pergas.org.sg>. 8 January
2002.
50. <www.pergas.org.sg>. 22 January 2002.
51. MUIS. Friday Sermon, 21 April 2000.
52. MUIS. Friday Sermon, 31 August 2001.
53. PERGAS (2004, p. xxix).
54. PERGAS (2004, p. 292).
55. Berita Harian, 6 November 1992.
56. PERGAS (2004, p. 347).
57. For details, see various chapters in Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng,
eds., Secularism and Spirituality.
58. See Straits Times, 6 May 2000.
References
Alatas, Syed Hussein. Biarkan Buta Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1974.
———. Intellectuals in Developing Societies. London: Frank Cass, 1977.
———. Kita Dengan Islam. Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1976.
———. Modernisation and Social Change. Sydney: Angus and Robertson,1972.
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———. “Tingkat Amal Ibadah”. 1 December 2001.

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The Evolution of the Sikh Identity in Singapore 275
11
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SIKH

IDENTITY IN SINGAPORE
Arunajeet Kaur
INTRODUCTION
Sikhs are a minority ethnic community in Singapore, making up 7,000–
12,000 out of the four million total population of Singapore.1 They are a
visible community in Singapore due to their unique physical appearance and
established places of Sikh worship known as gurdwaras. However, like many
other Sikh communities within the larger Sikh diaspora, the Sikhs in Singapore
are in constant negotiation between their identity as Sikhs and their integration
into the social cultural mainstream of Singapore.
The label “Sikh” is a religious one. It denotes a people who originated
from Punjab and who adhere to the spiritual teachings of the Sikh gurus. The
Sikhs portray a sense of homogeneity as a community because of their unique
appearance in which the men wear turbans by requirement and because of the
institutionalization of their religious practices. The Sikhs adhere to established
standards of an ideal Sikh, which are encoded in rules regarding conduct
known as Rehat Meryadas. These codes of conduct are upheld by religious
authorities in Amritsar, Punjab, such as the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak
Committee (SGPC) that advises and attempts to represent the accepted
consensus on Sikh religious practices and the management of Sikh places of
worship worldwide. However, in the actual practice of Sikhism, particularly
amongst the Sikhs residing outside of Punjab, there is a great divergence from
the ideals proselytized by the Sikh religious authorities in the Punjab. This
275
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276 Arunajeet Kaur
divergence reveals the Sikhs to be far from homogenous and as a community

that is fraught with divisions. Although the Sikhs who endeavour to maintain
the ideals as promulgated by the seats of religious authority in the Punjab may
be in control of gurdwara management committees and main Sikh
organizations, they tend to be in the minority in the case of Singapore.
This chapter aims to analyse the gap between the prescribed Sikh
identity as advocated by the seats of Sikh religious authorities in the Punjab
and disseminated by local Sikh institutions in Singapore and the actual
reality in the practice of the Sikh faith. It seeks to answer two questions:
(1) How do those who identify themselves as Sikhs relate to the religion as
it is practised in the gurdwaras in Singapore? (2) To what extent are Sikhs
in Singapore able to practise Sikhism as advocated by the Sikh religious
authorities in Punjab?
RESEARCH ON SIKHS IN SINGAPORE

The Sikhs in Singapore have been actively researched and documented.
Soam Datt, in his work, A Sikh Community in Singapore, highlights that
despite the egalitarian ideals of the Sikh faith, the Singaporean Sikh
community is divided along caste and class lines which were a reflection of
the hierarchical structures inherited as part of an original Punjabi cultural
identity.2 Bibijan Ibrahim further explores these caste, class and factional
divisions, in particular, the sharp division between the Jats (land owning
Sikhs) and the Mazhabis or Chura (similar to the untouchable caste).
Another notable source of the divide amongst the Sikhs was the rivalry
amongst the Majha, Malwa and Doaba Sikhs. This phenomenon occurred
as result of the tendencies of the early Sikh migrants to congregate with
kinsmen from specific geographical locations in the Punjab, who were from
the Majha, Malwa and the Doab regions.3
Seva Singh Gandharab documents the history of the early Sikh pioneers.4
Tan Tai Yong’s Singapore Khalsa Association5 as well as Iqbal Singh Sevea’s
research The Evolution of the Sikh Religious Institutions of Singapore both
provide detailed narratives of the development of Sikh institutions of Singapore.
Iqbal Singh Sevea6 describes the establishment and development of Sikh
gurdwaras along the lines of caste and factional differentiations and analyses
the reasons behind the emergence of seven gurdwaras in Singapore catering to
the needs of a population of only 12,000. This situation was a result of
rivalries amongst the various Sikh factions that caused the initial Sikh
organizations and places of worship to splinter, leading to the creation of the
276

current seven venues of worship. Satvinder Singh expands on this in his

research, Sikh Organizations and Sikh Identity in Singapore,7 and explores the
evolution of the Sikh identity in Singapore by examining the origins, goals
and development of Sikh institutions since 1900.
Though prior research has documented some aspects of the history and
development of the Sikh communities in Singapore, there is an absence of the
voices of ordinary practising Sikhs in the historical narratives. This research
aims to fill that void by relating their experiences and perceptions of the Sikh
institutions and the Sikh faith.
Approach and Methodology

Three methods were adopted to obtain information and views: a survey,
in-depth interviews and a forum. The survey was designed and conducted to
determine the depth of understanding of Sikh religious beliefs and practices
amongst the Singaporean Sikhs (See Appendix 11.1). Simple questions were
asked if they knew what the SGPC represented or what the significance of
certain rituals was during regular mass prayers. The survey was distributed at
the Central Sikh Gurudwara langgar (free food) hall during the Besakhi
celebrations held in April 2005 with the hope that it would draw a wide range
of responses, since this was the main annual festival Sikhs celebrated that
attracted crowds who would not normally frequent the Sikh place of worship.8
However, the survey was of limited success as many participants took to
asking their friends and relatives for the “right” answer to questions that
required personal responses.
The second method adopted was in-depth interviews using a set of
interview guidelines (see Appendix 11.2). Such interviews were conducted
with 213 Sikhs over the period of a year in 2004. Sikhs from all walks of life
and ages were involved, including Sikhs in gurdwara committees and
organizations. This method proved fruitful as the interviewees were candid
and spoke openly of their personal experiences. They also revealed common
sentiments about aspects of religious practice which will be explained later.
However, most interviewees chose to remain anonymous as they did not
want to face any possible repercussions from members of community for
their honesty.
The third method was the organization of a youth forum on 23 April
2005, in collaboration with a local Sikh youth group the Sikh Sewaks
Singapore. The youths who attended were asked to express their sentiments
on being a Sikh in Singapore.
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278 Arunajeet Kaur
WHO IS A SIKH?
A convenient starting point on the evolution of Sikh identity is history. The
Sikhs’ original homeland is the land of Punjab — home to the ten gurus from
whom Sikhs attained their creed and to whom they devote their allegiance.9
The first guru, Nanak, initiated a pacifist movement preaching the need to
reform Hindu practices of his time and promote peaceful co-existence between
Hindus and Muslims. The movement took on a rebellious stance when the
Mughal authorities persecuted the fifth guru. The sixth guru installed himself
as the sacha padshah (the true emperor) in defiance of the Mughal emperor
and carried two swords at his waist (Miri, Piri) marking spiritual and temporal
authority.10 This militancy was taken further with the initiatives of the tenth
guru, Gobind Rai (Singh). During the lifetime of the tenth Sikh guru, Sikhs
faced the animosity of the Mughal government and Hindu hill rajas. To
ensure their survival as a community, Guru Gobind Singh ordained a
brotherhood of the khalsa (pure) that partook in the amrit (baptism) and was
distinguished by the donning of the five kakars (5 Ks) emblems,11 which
consisted of a kirpan (dagger), kach (drawers), kanga (comb), kesh (unshorn
hair) and kerah (a steel bangle). All Sikhs who partook in this amrit were
considered to be Amrit Dhari and the pure (Khalsa) Sikhs of the guru.
Since it was the Khalsa Sikhs who occupied centre stage throughout the
late seventeenth and eighteeenth centuries, the danger exists that “Sikh
history is Khalsa history”.12 However, to equate the Sikh with Khalsa would
ignore the majority of Sikhs consisting of the Sahaj Dhari (slow adopter),
Nam Dhari (Sikh sect that believes in the continuation of a line of gurus
beyond Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth guru), Nirankari (Sikh sect started by
Baba Boota Singh in 1929) and RadhaSoami Satsang (Sikh sect started by
Baba Jaimal Singh in 1891).13 Scholars such as Harjot Singh Oberoi believe
that in the Punjab up till the nineteenth century, “the boundaries between the
center and periphery of Sikh tradition were extremely blurred and that there
was no single source of authority within the tradition, there were several
competing definitions of a Sikh.”14 He asserts that social and ritual practices
were largely governed by village and clan cultures and not so much by the
framework of a single religious community.15 Oberoi also points out that
besides the Khalsa tradition, Sikhs had other options which were rooted in
Indic culture. Examples of these would be Sanatan Dharma,16 which was
considered to be an elitist version that combined Puranic and Sanskritic
literature with the teachings of the ten gurus, and popular religion which
entailed believing in superstition, witchcraft, memorials, astrology, visitations
to shrines and devotion to village saints (pirs).17 McLeod affirms that Sikhism
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probably started out advocating a reformed way of life already in existence

and was not an exclusive one. He substantiates this by pointing out that Guru
Nanak was not preaching a distinct doctrine but was merely giving “clear and
attractive expression to doctrines and ideals which had developed within the
sant tradition of Northern India”.18 McLeod views the Sikhs as a product of
an evolving identity that was shaped by the historical and cultural circumstances
that gave rise to the tradition of the Khalsa, but doubts that the boundaries
of defining a Sikh could simply be limited to this code.
The crystallization of the dominant Sikh identity as the Khalsa, can be
attributed to the work of the Singh Sabha reformation movement of the
nineteenth century, particularly to its Tat Khalsa sector.19 The Tat Khalsa
reformers were scholars such as Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha, Bhai Vir Singh and
M. A. Macauliffe, who produced writing that was responsible “for moulding
and recording a version of the Sikh tradition which remains dominant in
intellectual circles to the present day”.20 Their message was to “recognize that
the Guru created a separate community, free from superstition and true to the
doctrine of the divine Name and that all who seek membership in the Guru’s
community must accept the Guru’s Rehat (Code of Conduct) and that each
must accordingly become a Sikh of the Khalsa”. Any other variation was
portrayed as a degenerate form of the religion. Oberoi maintains that the Tat
Khalsa, made up of the educated elite, was influenced by Western ideals of
monotheism and the need for clearly defined categories.
The political, economic and cultural changes unleashed by the British
administration of Punjab in the 1880s started a rivalry for jobs in the
administration amongst urban professionals and “religious ideology provided
a useful means of elbowing out those who were perceived as adversaries”.21
The Muslims and the Hindus were undergoing similar transformations
through the efforts of the Aligarh movement and the Arya Samaj, and the
Sikhs “did not wish to lag behind”.22 The Tat Khalsa were extremely
successful in propagating their version of Sikh identity through building
schools, colleges, orphanages, compiling archives, founding journals and
historical societies, publishing popular material in the form of handbills
and newspapers, as well as homilies delivered by priests, preachers and
missionaries who were members of the various Singh Sabhas.23 The Tat
Khalsa’s ultimate victory was as an outcome of the 1925 Gurdwara Reform
Movement which led to the British authorities conceding that the principal
gurdwaras should be transferred from their hereditary incumbents (mahants)24
to elected members of the community. This precipitated the emergence of
the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee (SGPC), an organization
set up to manage the gurdwaras, and its political wing, the Akali Dal. Since
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280 Arunajeet Kaur
both bodies adhered to the Tat Khalsa school of thought, it marked the
institutionalization of the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari identity over a more plural
understanding of Sikhs and their identity.
WHO IS A SIKH IN SINGAPORE?

In Singapore, the role of gurdwaras and issues of identity among the Sikhs
have evolved ever since their immigration to Singapore in the nineteenth
century.
There are seven gurdwaras in Singapore today. The Central Sikh
Gurdwara Board (CSGB) Singapore is in charge of the the Central Sikh
Gurdwara and the Silat Road Gurdwara. These gurdwaras draw Sikhs who
are non-partisan in the practice of their faith. The CSGB is a gazetted
statutory board recognized by the Government of Singapore. The CSGB’s
official website <www.sikhs.org.sg> states that its objectives include creating
awareness and inculcating the practice of the Sikh way of life and to lead
the Sangat (the congregation of the Sikh gurus) to become and remain
Amrit Dhari (those who partake in the baptism of the tenth guru, believe
in the brotherhood of the Khalsa and maintain the five kakars). Although
none of the Sikhs in control of the gurdwara management committees
could clearly explain or maintain a consensus as to what was meant by “a
Sikh way of life”, it is quite clear that the CSGB encourages Sikhs to
become Amrit Dhari in accordance with the ideals that were originally
propagated by the SGPC to uphold the Khalsa identity.
Sikhs are generally differentiated as Amrit Dharis or Sahaj Dharis (the
slow adopters). In Singapore, the latter category can be sub-divided into three
groups, depending on the level of divergence from the Sikh Rehat Meryada
that was institutionalized and propagated by the SGPC. The first group
includes those who maintain the physical appearance of an Amrit Dhari Sikh
but are unable to achieve the rigours of the necessary daily prayers and the
donning of all five kakars. The second group would refer to those who keep
up only a semblance of the physical appearance of the Amrit Dhari Sikh. For
example, men may wear turbans but trim their facial hair and the ladies may
wear their hair long but still trim and remove bodily hair. The third group,
especially with reference to the men, are known as the “cropped”. They
believe in the Sikh scriptures but are totally clean-shaven and they do not
wear turbans but may choose to wear the kerah.
The Amrit Dharis are rare in Singapore. This is evident through the very
few numbers who sign up for the annual baptism during the Besakhi festival
in April and the relative difficulty of locating an Amrit Dhari (who is
280

relatively easy to identify due to the obvious physical appearance) at mass

prayers. Besides the Sikh priests from the Punjab, even the Sikhs in the
gurdwara management committees admit to not being Amrit Dhari. Although
the CSGB may advocate the Amrit Dhari lifestyle, the reality in Singapore is
that the majority are Sahaj Dhari and the numbers of those who are “cropped”
and who trim their hair are increasing. This is a reflection of the Sikh identity
that has been evolving away from the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari ideal since Singapore’s
independence from the British and that has been facing new challenges
resulting in different lifestyle choices.
Sikh Identity in Singapore under British Rule

The first Sikh immigrants who arrived in significant numbers in Singapore in
the early twentieth century were part of the colonial policing structure.25 In
the early 1880s, they made up the Sikh Police Contingent stationed at Pearl’s
Hill and were also part of the Tanjong Pagar Dock Police Force. Those who
could not get recruited into the police forces were employed as watchmen.
Sikhs were valued by the British for their employment in the police force as
they were recognized as one of the “martial races” of India. The British were
aware that what endowed the Sikhs with a martial spirit was not some
inherent ability but the Khalsa ideal as founded by the tenth Sikh guru, and
made it compulsory for Sikhs recruited into the police force to take the
baptism of the tenth guru and become Amrit Dhari, as part of the police
regiment’s discipline. The rehat meryada (code of conduct) of the Amrit Dhari
was then enforced and maintained by the British officers during regular
inspection. This helped the early Sikh migrants, who were largely part of the
colonial security forces, to maintain a Khalsa version of the Sikh identity.
Other Sikhs who came as fare-paying passengers to Singapore established
themselves in entrepreneurial pursuits such as by becoming merchants,
moneylenders, shopkeepers and textile merchants.
The first-generation Sikh immigrants were from Punjab and came at a
time when the Singh Sabha reformation movement and the efforts of the
Tat Khalsa in the Punjab were at its peak. They were influenced by the
rhetoric of the Singh Sabha reformation movement and sought to establish
similar organizations in Malaya and Singapore. Besides, it was common for
most migrants in Singapore at that time to maintain a greater affiliation
with their land of origin, Punjab, as Singapore was only a place to eke out
a living and they might decide to return to their homeland. It was
understandable then that the early Sikhs retained as much of their religious
and cultural beliefs and practices.
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282 Arunajeet Kaur
As the Sikh population in Singapore grew, Sikhs began to build their

places of worship, gurdwaras, in various parts of Singapore, based on regional,
caste and class affiliations.26 The level of understanding of the Sikh religion
among early immigrants was, however, relatively limited. They were aware of
the rituals associated with Sikh worship but were uninformed of the significance
of the Sikh scriptures. Punjabi was the lingua franca of the early Sikhs but the
Sikh scriptures were written and recited in GurMukhi. They thus relied on
gurdwara gianis (priests) as mediators of the religion. Most of these priests
were schooled in the Tat Khalsa tradition and therefore imparted the doctrines
of Punjab’s Singh Sabha reformation movement and later the SGPC, thereby
perpetuating the Khalsa ideal of Sikhism.
Religion played a central role in the lives of the early immigrants. There
were few alternative activities to occupy them, and going to a gurdwara and
being accepted in its social setting was important to them. The early Sikh
community was also relatively small in number but the opportunity for
interaction was relatively high. Shaving and the cutting of hair was taboo,
even if one was not able to maintain the routine of daily prayers. The tight
social circle exerted communal pressures on the Sikhs to maintain their
physical manifestations of religiosity and identity, making it difficult for
them to deviate from any the Sikh ideals as propagated by the Punjab
religious authorities.
Sikh Identity in Singapore in the Early Independence Period

As the grip and influences of the British era waned and society in Singapore
began to cope with challenges of nation-building and economic survival in
the post-independence period, Sikh identity began to move away from the
ideals maintained by the respective religious authorities in Punjab. Kernial
Singh Sandhu, in his address to the Sikh community at the Seminar on Sikh
Youth and Nation Building on 19 March 1989 organized by the Sikh
Advisory Board, aptly summarized the Sikhs as a society in transition with the
following comment:
… the Sikhs in Singapore, like many of their brethren elsewhere, are a

community undergoing serious erosion of traditional values and spiritual
life, and in the danger of slipping into cultural anomie if the current
trend of the largely mindless change among them persists.27
This early independence period was marked by certain major changes for the
Sikhs in Singapore. First, the British disbanded the Sikh Police Contingent.
282

The prominence given to Sikhs in the policing of Singapore diminished,

together with other elements of the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari identity. Second,
employment prospects in Singapore were to evolve beyond traditional ethnic
niches and this necessitated the Sikhs to compete for jobs with ethnic others
and to work in environments where they were a minority. These changes
had tremendous impact on the local Sikh identity. As Sikhs were exposed to
various career opportunities, their patterns of social interaction were no
longer limited to their own ethnic community. As a minority, Sikhs were
naturally keen to gain social acceptance by other ethnic communities. Many
Sikhs, especially the turbaned men, found this a challenge. Although attaining
employment was easy, Sikh men found it difficult to mix with their colleagues
due to their different appearance. They were the butt of teasing and sometimes
felt alienated from peers and colleagues. Sikh individuals encountered a high
level of ignorance with regard to Sikh religious practices and even as to who
Sikhs actually were. They were mistakenly labelled as Bengali or Mangali
from Bengal (Bengali). In the 1960s and 1970s, the traditional association of
Sikhs as being fearsome and therefore suitable for the policing of Singapore
was still fresh in the minds of other ethnic communities and this did not help
their social image. As a result, a noticeable number of Sikh men took to either
being clean-shaven or “grooming” by trimming their facial hair for a more
“presentable” appearance. Many interviewees of the age group affected by the
social challenges of the 1960s and 1970s admitted that even if they did
manage to endure these challenges without resorting to these measures, they
did so out of familial pressure to “remain Sikh” or out of respect for their
elderly first-generation immigrant parents rather than out of a sense of
religious obligation.
Among Sikh women, particularly those of the second and subsequent
generations, many had attained sufficient education to enable them to join
the workforce. In fact, Sikh families were keen that the women became
wage earners so as to contribute to family incomes. Encountering a multi-
ethnic workforce led to certain transformations in the psychological and
the social aspects of the lives of these Sikh women. They adapted their
traditional fashion sense to their working environment, setting a trend of
discarding their traditional salwar kameez (Punjabi suit) for skirts and
blouses. Sikh women removed body hair and shaped their eyebrows to
reflect feminine grooming standards of the day. The adoption of shorter
hair lengths and hairstyles was a gradual move for Sikh women, as short
hair was associated with less desirable moral standards. On the whole, with
financial independence, Sikh women gradually began to assert their own
lifestyle choices.
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284 Arunajeet Kaur
For married and working Sikh couples, their joint incomes made it
possible for them to purchase HDB (Housing and Development Board) flats
under the government’s public housing scheme. This had the larger effect of
dispersing traditional Sikh ethnic enclaves (for example around the Silat
Road Gurdwara) as well as reconfiguring extended family units to nuclear
ones. This was significant as there was now less opportunity for the enforcement
and inheritance of traditions and values from grandparents and other older
family members. During the 1960s and 1970s, it was common for both
parents in a Sikh family to be involved in their careers and hence not to focus
much on a Khalsa/Amrit Dhari way of life. Living away from the direct
influence of older family members diminished opportunities for social
interaction with kin who could have maintained an environment suitable for
the maintenance of traditions such as keeping one’s hair, the recitation of
daily Sikh prayers and understanding Sikh values. It disrupted the continuance
of familial, cultural or religious values. Working parents in nuclear families
found it extremely inconvenient to maintain children’s long hair which
involved hygienic requirements and constant grooming entailing the tying of
thresh knots for the male child and long plaits for the female child. Many
parents themselves had diverged from the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari appearance by
becoming clean-shaven and were reluctant to maintain a hirsute physical
appearance for their children.
Socially, the conditions and hence the priorities of second-generation
Sikhs were vastly different from the first-generation immigrant Sikhs. They
attended ethnically mixed schools and worked in similarly mixed settings.
Their social interactions began to extend beyond the Sikh community. As
they were the minority if not the rarity, they had to understand and adapt to
the lives and cultures of other ethnic groups. Their worldview was to shift
away from being a Khalsa/Amrit Dhari or even Punjabi-centric one. This is
not to say that there was total assimilation but that the priorities of the Sikhs
began to shift away from religion and centre on pragmatic concerns such as
career success, leading materially comfortable lives and getting along with
others in Singapore. As their ties with Punjab and the significance of
maintaining cultural and religious values that would have gained them social
acceptability there diminished and their destinies became tied up with
Singapore, so too the emphasis on adhering to Sikh ideals.
Apart from their unique physical appearances, Sikhs in Singapore
understood their religion to have very little divergence from other religions in
terms of its values. Sikh values such as truthful living, humility and service are
all doctrines that are considered universal. When second-generation Sikhs in
Singapore were asked if they were failing to transmit Sikh values to their
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children by not frequenting the gurdwara and teaching them the recitation
of Sikh prayers, the reply was often that it sufficed to ensure that their
children grew up as “good” people, stayed out of trouble with the law and
hopefully achieved a financially comfortable and fulfilling life. Many
associated frequent visitations to the gurdwara and the ability to recite
prayers or sing Sikh hymns as an “extra’ or “bonus”, if one could afford the
time. The language of the scriptures was considered poetical and difficult to
understand and it required effort to study or recite them. For the majority
of the Sikhs interviewed, the study of Sikh scriptures and religious doctrine
was a task for priests who offered prayers and made supplications on their
behalf. The gurdwara increasingly became a place just to fulfil one’s rites of
passage in life, such as birth, marriage and death ceremonies. Some
interviewees admitted that they visited the gurdwara only if they had
problems or wanted a wish fulfilled. Even then, their attendance at the
regular congregational prayers was not required.
Increasing standards of living enabled Sikhs to be able to afford televisions,
tickets to the cinema, radios, later VCRs and currently, cable and the Internet.
Popular media, as expected, had a tremendous effect in weakening the
tenacity with which Sikhs could practice their religion. In the late 1970s and
1980s, the Sikh community in Singapore was beginning to be affected
particularly by American media and Hindustani movies. The gap in the
transmission of Sikh familial, traditional and religious values in nuclear
families was often filled by the lifestyles, values and culture offered by the
media. This trend was to escalate as modes of entertainment became more
sophisticated and exposure to global cultures more varied. It was realized that
the “hero”-type persona in popular media was very seldom, if ever, an Amrit
Dhari with a turban. As media began to play a significant role in shaping
society, the image of the Amrit Dhari, or even the ordinary Sikh who
maintained a turban or his or her hair was not found to be appealing. There
emerged an understanding amongst Sikhs that the youth who did retain their
hirsute physical experience did so either because they came from “traditional”
families that kept up the pressure to maintain the physical appearance or they
had been really “touched by the hand of God” and were pursuing an absolute
adherence to the tenets of the tenth guru — this being an exceptional case.
The lack of appeal of the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari identity since the 1960s
was to precipitate psychological expectations and social patterns of behaviours
with regard to dating and attraction to the opposite sex. Male interviewees
admitted that they stood to lose out to the “cropped” Sikhs in their appeal
to the opposite sex if they maintained their turbans. “Cropped” Sikhs were,
and are still, envied in being attractive to the opposite sex not only within
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286 Arunajeet Kaur
the Sikh community but also among other ethnic groups. This was a key
reason many of the male interviewees gave, in explaining why they gave up
on keeping their hair during their teenage years. The Sikhs in the gurdwara
management committees also admitted that those who gave up their turbans
rarely did so in their adult life. Instead, they usually made this decision in
their teens when they were becoming more socially aware of their appeal to
the opposite sex. The pressure to depart from the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari
identity usually grew in the late teens when Sikh males were given more
liberty to explore their social lives. This opportunity took them into
environments such as nightclubs and pubs, making it important for their
social esteem to appear appealing according to standards propagated by the
popular media and popular notions of modernity.
Increased standards of living therefore allowed Sikhs to afford lifestyles
evolving around entertainment, activities and social interaction which drew
them away from religious centres of the gurdwara. As Sikhs stopped
frequenting the gurdwara, they were increasingly able to distance themselves
from its required religious etiquette since the societal gaze and hence
pressure to retain a Khalsa/Amrit Dhari ideal was gradually lifted as there
was now little opportunity for interaction and hence potential objections
from Sikhs who frequented the gurdwara. Sikhs took to coming to the
gurdwara only during special occasions or upon the invitation of relatives in
which case their presence was usually appreciated, whatever their appearance
or religious outlook.
By the mid-1970s, Sikh leaders in control of the Sikh organizations and
gurdwara management committees were aware of the growing inability of
their organizations to encourage Sikhs in Singapore to subscribe to the
religious ideals that were propagated from Punjab. Leaders of these
organizations took every opportunity to address and ameliorate the declining
awareness of the waning Khalsa/Amrit Dhari image. In a 1978 article, “Wither
Singapore Sikhs?”, Mehervan Singh addressed the issues that had begun to
challenge the Sikhs, such as drug addiction and the perceived increase in
juvenile delinquency amongst Sikh youths. 28 More importantly, he highlighted
the inability of the gurdwara and its management committees to sustain
Sikh religious ideals:
up to the present day only two main objectives appear to have been
pursued with zeal by the Sikh community — mandir banaune and
langar pakaune (construction of temples and preparation of food). There
is ample evidence of kirtan (hymn singing), patth (reading of scriptures),
katha (exposition of scriptures), vyakhian (sermons) and lectures on Sikh
286

history and religion … many boys and girls between the age of fifteen
and twenty-five do not go to the institutions at all. Sikh leadership
appears to give no thought to the reasons for this state of affairs.
Obviously the kirtan, patth, katha and lectures are not understood by the
youth… A radical change is needed from an undue emphasis on preparing
food, to moral and spiritual uplift of the Sikh youth. Of what use will all
the beautiful temples and kitchen services [be] if the majority of the Sikh
youth drift away from them? The management[s] of all Sikh institutions
have to tighten their belts, to put in more efforts to hold the interest of
the youth in the language they understand and at the level they are.
Other individuals such as Bhajan Singh, a retired school principal, felt

that the reason for the declining ability of the community to retain its socio-
religious heritage was because Sikh youths had lost touch with the Punjabi
language. It was realized as early as the 1960s that all Sikhs born in Singapore
were enrolled in English-medium schools.29 They were also exposed to the
various media and contexts of social interaction that promoted the usage of
the English language. There were no provisions for the young Sikhs to learn
their mother tongue, Punjabi, as a second language within the Singapore
education system. This had led most Sikhs to opt for learning Malay as a
second language. The consequences of this was a lack of understanding
among Sikh youths of their own identity and to underperform academically,
since they found Malay difficult to learn as it is not their mother tongue.
Sikh Identity in the 1980s

By the 1980s, Sikh identity issues had become the main concern of the
community. In a bid to manage this “identity crisis”, a Sikh resource panel led
by Bhajan Singh was organized in the late 1980s to address these issues. The
resource panel consisted of twelve professionals who made presentations to
the Sikh community and the government .The panel felt that “Sikhs did not
identify with their community and its institutions; they knew little about
their heritage; they were not learning Punjabi, the ancestral language and the
language of the Sikh scriptures.”30
The outcome of the panel’s efforts were two specific initiatives that were
significant in redressing the lack of understanding and practice of the Sikh
ideals amongst the Sikhs in Singapore. The first initiative was taken during
1983–89 when the Sikh Advisory Board worked to persuade the Ministry of
Education to include Sikh Studies as part of the Religious Studies programme
in schools. The Sikh Advisory Board was keen to ensure that Sikh Studies was
offered as an option in the Religious Studies curriculum even if they had to
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288 Arunajeet Kaur
prepare the teaching material, train the teachers and pay the costs of running
the Sikh Studies option themselves.31
The second initiative of mooting and enforcing Punjabi as a second
language to be recognized at all levels within the Singapore school education
system was projected as a community effort. On 30 December 1990, the Sikh
Education Foundation was launched in late 1989 to steer the government’s
approval of Punjabi as a second language. The government had given its
approval based on the understanding that the Sikhs were to produce their
own teaching materials, organize the classes, train the teachers and absorb the
costs of the entire programme.32 In September 1991, the Sikh Education
Foundation updated on the progress of the programme by stating that:
… from the very beginning, professionalism has been the hallmark of

the Punjabi Language Programme. Surveys were conducted to find out
how many children were interested in learning Punjabi … teachers
were interviewed and only those who met the stringent requirements
set by the Sikh Advisory Board were selected … much has been
achieved over the past one year. However we cannot afford to rest on
our laurels. There is more work to be done if we want our programme
to flourish…. However we have no doubt that, with the grace of God
and cooperation of one and all from the community, we will be able to
develop a Punjabi Language Programme that the Singapore Sikh
Community can be proud of.33
Apart from the efforts of the Sikh Advisory Board and the Sikh Education
Foundation, there were also notable attempts by small groups of youths to
organize Sikh religious activities such as samelans (youth camps) and
inspirational sessions. One such youth group was the Sikh Sewaks formed in
the late 1970s. In the late 1990s, certain gurdwara management committees
also encouraged the establishment of youth wings such as the Singh Sabha
Youth Wing and the youth wing of the gurdwara located at Katong. In the
1990s, the efforts of an inspiring Sikh priest (giani) Nirmal Singh, to teach
gatka (ancient Sikh martial art), paid off as he was able to draw a talented
pool of youths eager to attend his classes. At the same time, Sikh organizations
constantly organized activities and events to showcase the Sikh cultural and
religious heritage.
Sikh Identity in Singapore since the Late 1990s

Despite the attempts of some Sikhs involved in local Sikh organizations to
revive amongst Sikhs in Singapore the passion to learn about and practise
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Sikh ideals, a sense of apathy remains. Those interviewed understood that the
Sikhism proselytized by the Sikh leaders was only one particular interpretation
of Sikhism. Interviewees had no reservations about being shaven and not
being as well-versed or informed about the Sikh scriptures, yet considered
themselves as Sikhs. They were content with their approach to Sikhism as
long there was a spiritual avenue to facilitate their daily lives. On the whole,
they gave several reasons as to why they remained uninspired to maintain the
Khalsa/Amrit Dhari way of life.
The Role of Religion

The most common reason given by the Sikhs interviewed is that life is too
fast-paced and rigorous in Singapore to pause and reflect on how they could
become “better” Sikhs. Living in Singapore and coping with the challenges of
the education system as well as achieving success at careers and jobs preoccupy
most Sikhs. They prefer to indulge in leisurely activities that offer them
relaxation and help improve the quality of their lives, instead of subjecting
themselves to the discipline of maintaining a unique physical appearance and
regime of prayers. Many are drawn to New Age inspirational methods such
as meditation, yoga and reading on the Internet and through books about not
only Sikhism but other religions as well. The interviewees felt that they are
more learned and sophisticated in their worldview in comparison to their
forefathers who did not enjoy the level of exposure and self-help that is
currently available. They felt that their forefathers had no other avenues for
their spiritual, psychological and emotional needs besides subscribing to the
authority of the Sikh religious organizations. However, they did admit that
they still believe in the divinity of the Sikh scriptures (Sri Guru Granth Sahib)
and would not choose conversion as this was the religion they were born into.
This combination of adherence to the Sikh scriptures and seeking self-help
from other sources reveal that the practice of the religion is becoming a
personal affair which entails personal fulfilment rather than communal
approval. This has loosened the hold of gurdwara management committees in
managing and influencing the lives of Sikhs in Singapore, much less shaping
their religious identity.
The Diminishing Importance of the Gurdwara in Imparting

Sikh Religious Doctrine
Sikh interviewees from different generations revealed a common distaste
for the management committees of the Sikh organizations, with a range of
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290 Arunajeet Kaur
views offered. It was alleged that certain individuals in the committees were
holding positions to assert a sense of self-importance rather than to serve
the community while some others were considered to be of doubtful moral
standards even though they maintained the physical appearance of an ideal
Khalsa/Amrit Dhari. Specific cases of management committee leaders and
members engaged in the very vices that they preached against were even
cited. It was also pointed out that the gurdwara committees were made up
of older members who were reluctant to allow younger members of the
community to actively contribute. Furthermore, they reflected male
dominance. Women were absent in these management committees despite
the availability of qualified Sikh women.
The management committees of these gurdwaras are generally not admired
and this has contributed to the lack of involvement and ownership the
ordinary Sikhs might have towards the gurdwaras. Some youths interviewed
also felt that the management committees of the Sikh organizations did not
reflect the contemporary values of society but a conservative and orthodox
approach to Sikhism instead, which they did not wish to associate with. In
this, the role of the gianis (priests) is particularly problematic.
The gianis are hired by the local gurdwara management committees to
attend to the recitation of daily prayers in the gurdwaras, singing of Sikh
hymns (kirtan), conducting relevant ceremonies during mass prayers and
preaching (kattha). They thus play an integral role in presenting and mediating
the religion to the masses. However, most of the Sikhs in Singapore do not
relate to these gianis who are Amrit Dharis and who are all hired from India.
These gianis are not able to express themselves comfortably in any other
language other than Punjabi, while most Sikhs in Singapore speak English.
The gianis are hired on a contractual basis and when the contract expires,
they usually return to India or elsewhere within the Sikh diaspora. These
gianis usually do not make an effort to integrate with the locals as they feel
their time here is limited. This makes the execution of their duties very
impersonal. Furthermore, these gianis are not accorded the respect that
priests of other religions usually receive. They are not considered to be more
learned in the religion or capable in imparting the wisdom of the Sikh gurus.
It is reputed that children in India who were not capable in their academic
studies usually enrolled themselves into religious training to become gianis.
Furthermore, these gianis are usually from the villages of Punjab and are
perceived to have a limited understanding of contemporary urban life. Besides
gianis, parcharaks (preachers) trained at specific derahs/taksals (Sikh religious
academies) tour gurdwaras to relate the wisdom of the Sikh scriptures. However,
their language of communication and use of anecdotes are difficult for
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ordinary Singaporean Sikhs to relate to. Due to this gap between these
religious mediators and the general Sikh population, the Sikh religious
institutions are unable to influence the practice of Sikhism among Sikhs in
Singapore. Furthermore, Sikh youths who do maintain an interest in their
heritage choose to rely on the Internet, take private tours to Punjab and
conduct their own research as they are keen to arrive at their own answers.
The strong reliance and respect the early Sikh immigrants had for the
gurdwaras, which empowered these Sikh organizations to represent and
determine Sikh identity, no longer hold true for Sikhs in Singapore today.
The Limited Success of the Punjabi Language Programme

and Youth Groups to Inspire a Religious Renaissance
The efforts of the Sikh Education Foundation to organize and sustain a
Punjabi Language Programme have been massive and admirable. However, it
is doubtful if they have succeeded in re-inculcating the prescribed Sikh values
and heritage. A survey of the students in these Punjabi classes showed that
only 20–30 per cent of the students kept their hair. The majority was
“cropped” despite the constant reiteration during curriculum time to emphasize
the importance of keeping one’s hair as a Sikh. An interviewee revealed that
instead of witnessing a readiness amongst the young Sikhs attending Punjabi
classes to keep their physical form, the reverse had actually happened. The
“cropped” students had been more successful in influencing their turbaned
friends to cut their hair.
It is debatable whether the noble objective of reviving the usage of
Punjabi amongst Sikhs has been successful. Punjabi language teachers
interviewed admitted that it was an uphill task to compete with the usage
of English, which by 1989 had already become the language spoken by
Sikhs in homes, schools and at work. Instructions to written assignments
were written in English. Passages were recited in Punjabi and then explained
in English. Students interviewed admitted that even during Punjabi classes,
they made no serious attempt to speak the language. However, they could
now understand their grandparents and the usage of the language in popular
entertainment but still found it difficult to understand the Sikh scriptures.
Further steps have been taken to inculcate Sikh values during the Punjabi
language classes through the “Sikhi” programme. However, the response to
this programme has been apathy due to the students’ reluctance to learn
more about Sikh religion and heritage. The common response given by
interviewees was that it was informative to find out about the lives of the
Sikh gurus and Sikh history but they could not relate it to their lives in
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292 Arunajeet Kaur
Singapore. When parents were asked why they had opted for their children
to take Punjabi as a second language, many admitted that they thought it
would be easier for their children to cope academically with Punjabi
compared to Malay or Chinese, and not because they felt it was a medium
for the transmission of culture and heritage.
Likewise, youth wings and youths in the Sikh Sewaks face limited success
at their religious camps and activities. Attendances at religious camps seldom
exceed a hundred. The Sikh Sewaks admit that they have to be innovative to
“market” their camps as outdoor adventure experiences so as to entice youths
to attend. This is because youths have “better” things to do than spend their
time learning about religion and are preoccupied with schoolwork and pursuing
their hobbies and extra-curricular activities. Most Sikh youths interviewed
claimed that they led sufficiently fulfilling lives. Those drawn to the religious
camps admitted that they attended the camps to interact and spend time with
their Sikh friends than to learn about the religion.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Sikhs in Singapore associate themselves with the religion because they are
born into Punjabi/Sikh families. It suffices for them to have a place of
worship, to seek blessings or solace and to carry out traditional events such as
births, marriages and death ceremonies. Sikhs have a very pragmatic, flexible
and open approach to religion. They agree that the Amrit Dhari path of being
a Sikh is ideal but feel it is not realistic within the context of Singapore to
adhere to such an ideal. Many “cropped” interviewees do not feel any less of
a Sikh than others who wear turbans as they feel that it is more important to
have a sound moral character.
Sikhs no longer feel the need to subject themselves to communal approval
should they fail to achieve the ideals deemed as not essential to their daily
lives. Furthermore, Singapore society has become more sophisticated and
educated with rising educational standards and greater exposure to the media.
Sikhs who do not adhere to the physical forms of the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari
ideal do not fear being marginalized by religious authorities who have little
influence over their lives. Gurdwara management committees need to adopt
a more pragmatic and liberal perspective to the religion that accommodates
the needs of the Sikhs in Singapore instead of adopting a sense of exclusivity.
If they continue to rigidly propagate Sikh ideals that are far removed from the
realities of life of Sikhs in Singapore, the gap between ordinary Sikhs’ self
perceptions and group identity and the ideals upheld by the religious authorities
will only widen.
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Gianis have a special role to play. Attempts should be made to sponsor

the education of local Sikhs to become gianis. They should be given a
respectable salary and allowed greater interaction with the Sikh congregation.
Their image would also improve if they were more highly educated and they
would be admired for the wisdom on Sikh values, instead of being regarded
as mere mechanical executors of duties.
The image of the Sikh religion as it is currently being practised and
propagated is not appealing to Sikh youths. The management committees of
Sikh organizations should liberalize to be more representative of the Sikh
population in Singapore. Instead of remaining exclusive, they should encourage
the participation of individuals who are not only qualified to manage the
execution of relevant duties but are also passionate about the heritage of the
religion regardless of gender, age, familial connections and physical appearance.
This will encourage Sikhs to develop a sense of ownership and personal
involvement in representing Sikhs and their community, instead of adopting
an apathetic stance. It will also encourage the community to want to learn
about Sikh values and to appreciate their own heritage instead of feeling
daunted by it.
APPENDIX 11.1
SURVEY ON SIKH IDENTITY IN SINGAPORE
1. Can you explain what is the significance of Baisakhi?
2. Do you know about the SGPC (Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee)

in Amritsar? If yes, could you explain what you know about this organization?
3. Could you list the name of the ten Sikh Gurus?
4. How often do you come to the Gurdwara?
5. Why/When do you come to the Gurdwara?
6. Do you know who is represented in the gurdwara management committees?
7. Do you take an interest in the election of members of the gurdwara management

committees? (Please give a short explanation for your answer)
8. Do you think gianis play an important role in understanding Sikhism? (Please

give a short explanation for your answer)
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294 Arunajeet Kaur
9. Do you understand the significance of Ardas?
10. Are you able to understand when the gianis recite from the Sikh scriptures or
sing kirtan?
11. Who do you turn to when you need spiritual guidance?
Thank You
APPENDIX 11.2
INTERVIEW GUIDELINES
1. Who do you think is a good Sikh?
2. How do you respect and live within the Sikh faith?
3. How important is the gurdwara in your life? Why do you come to a gurdwara?
4. How do you relate with the gianis in the gurdwara?
5. Could you give me a brief about your religious ideals and ideas as a Sikh in
Singapore?
6. What do you feel of the gurdwara management committees?
7. If you were interested in finding out more about Sikhism, where or who would
you approach?
8. If you needed solace in facing life’s challenges, where do you go?
9. How do you relate to God?
10. Do you understand and recite Sikh scriptures?
11. Do you know who/what is the SGPC?
12. Do you know what is the Amrit?
13. Do you think it is important to take the Amrit?
14. What is the Khalsa?

294

15. Do you participate in the Sikh community’s activities?
16. What do you feel about the activities organized by the Gurdwara Committees
or youth Groups?
17. Do you know about the Sikh Advisory Board and its role? What do you think
about it?
18. Do your children/you attend Punjabi classes as organized by the Sikh Education
Foundation?
19. What is your experience of Punjabi classes?
20. Do you think that keeping your hair is important to being a good Sikh?
21. What is the role of women in Sikh organizations in Singapore and what do you
feel about it?
Notes
The author would like to thank the “ordinary” Singapore Sikhs who freely gave of
their time and candid opinions to help her derive her conclusions for this chapter.
Among the 213 Sikhs interviewed, she would like to especially thank the following
prominent members of the Sikh community for their time and contribution to this
research: Jagjeet Singh Sehgal, J. S. Bandal Singh, Bhajan Singh, Dr Berinderjeet
Kaur, Balbeer Mangat, Karpal Singh Malhi, Jarmal Singh, Jagjit Singh Sekhon,
NavinPal Singh, Surjit Singh and Professor Kirpal Singh. Views expressed herein are
entirely the author’s.
1. There is no official consensus as to how large the number of Sikhs is in
Singapore. This is a rough estimate put up by the Sikh community. For official
purposes they should be classified as Indians. However many opt to be classified
under “Others”. There are a number who have also classified themselves as Sikhs
under the category of race.
2. Datt, A Sikh Community in Singapore.
3. Ibrahim, Study of Sikh Community in Singapore.
4. Ghandharab, Early Sikh Pioneers of Singapore.
5. Tan, Singapore Khalsa Association.
6. Sevea, The Evolution of Sikh Religious Institutions in Singapore.
7. Satvinder Singh, Sikh Organizations and Sikh Identity in Singapore.
8. Free food kitchen.
9. The ten Gurus in succession being, Nanak (1469–1539), Angad (1504–1552),
Amar Das (1479–1574), Ram Das (1534–1581), Arjun (1563–1606),
HarGobind (1595 –1644), Har Rai (1630–1661), Hari Kishen (1656–1664),
Tegh Bahadur (1621–1675), Gobind Singh (1666–1708).
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296 Arunajeet Kaur
10. Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs.

11. McLeod, The Evolution of the Sikh Community: Five Essays, p. 84.
12. McLeod, Who is a Sikh?, p. 46.
13. Ibid., p. 113.
14. Oberoi, The Construction of Religious Boundaries, p. 419.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., p. 101.
17. Ibid., p. 140.
19. This began with the formation of the first Sabha in 1873 in Amritsar. It was
initially made up of titled gentry, affluent landowners and noted landowners.
Subsequently, hundreds of these Sabhas were to spring up throughout the
Punjab. The Tat Khalsa sector emerged out of the Lahore Singh Sabha.
21. Oberoi, op. cit., p. 423.
22. Ibid., p. 424.
23. Fenech, Martyrdom in the Sikh Tradition, Playing the Game of Love, p. 15.
24. Mahants are individuals who were considered administrators as well as priests of
the temple and who adhere to practices that seem largely Hindu to the Tat
Khalsa sector of the Singh Sabha movement.
25. The first Sikhs to arrive in Singapore were convicts of the British Empire, the
most prominent of them being political prisoners Nihal Singh (popularly known
as the Sikh holy man, Bhai Maharaj Singh, whose revered shrine is in the Silat
Road Sikh Temple) and his attendant, Kharak Singh. Nihal Singh and Kharak
Singh were brought to Singapore in July 1850 and interned at the Outram Road
Jail. The “convict era” came to an end in 1860 due to protests by resident
Europeans in the Straits Settlements.
26. The first gurdwara was actually built by the British for the Sikh Police
Contingent at their Pearl’s Hill Barracks to fulfil their spiritual needs and
contingent ceremonies. As the Sikh civilian population expanded, the Central
Sikh Temple was established at Queen Street in 1912. Gurdwara Sahib Sri
Guru Singh Sabha at Wilkie Road, established in 1918, eventually was to be
dominated by Sikhs from the Manjha region in the Punjab. Gurdwara Khalsa
Dharmak Sabha at Niven Road witnessed a congregation of Sikhs from the
Malwa region while in 1927, 50 Sikhs from the Doaba region set up the
Gurdwara Pardesi Khalsa Dharmak Diwan. In 1924, the Sikh policemen built
the Silat Road Sikh Temple, which still exists till today at its original site. In
1953, the Sikhs of the business community initiated the Gurdwara Sri Guru
Nanak Satsang Sabha at Katong. The current gurdwara at Yishun is an
amalgamation of two earlier gurdwaras: the gurdwara at Sembawang, traceable
back to 1925 and associated with the Sikh police and employees of the Naval
Base, and the gurdwara at Jalan Kayu, established in the 1930s by Sikh
employees at the Seletar Air Base.
296

27. Seminar Report on Sikh Youth and Nation Building, 19 March 1989, at the
Regional English Language Centre, organized by the Sikh Advisory Board.
28. Mehervan Singh, “Wither Singapore Sikhs?” (Unpublished article, 1978).
29. Verne A. Dusenbery, “Socializing Sikhs in Singapore: Soliciting the State’s
Support”. In The Transmission of Sikh Heritage in the Diaspora, edited by
Singh Pashaura and N. Gerald Barrier. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers &
Distributors, 1996, p. 118.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. The Singapore Sikh, September 1991.
References
Dusenbery, Verne A. “Socializing Sikhs in Singapore: Soliciting the State’s Support”.
In The Transmission of Sikh Heritage in the Diaspora, edited by Singh Pashaura
and N. Gerald Barrier. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1996.
Datt, Soam. A Sikh Community in Singapore: A Study of the Life of a Residential Group
of Sikh Families, Their Structure of the Social History of the Individual Members,
Their Interrelationship with One Another and with Outside Families, The Influence
of Caste and Class in Their Lives. Academic Exercise: Department of Sociology,
Fenech, Louis E. Martyrdom in the Sikh Tradition, Playing The Game of Love. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Ghandharab, Seva Singh. Early Sikh Pioneers of Singapore. Singapore Khalsa Association,
1986.
Ibrahim, Bibijan. Study of Sikh Community in Singapore. Academic Exercise:
Department of Sociology, National University Singapore, 1982.
McLeod, W. H. Who is a Sikh?: The Problem of Sikh Identity. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989.
McLeod, W. H. The Evolution of the Sikh Community: Five Essays. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1976.
Oberoi, Harjot. The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity, and Diversity
in the Sikh Tradition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Sevea, Iqbal Singh. The Evolution of Sikh Religious Institutions in Singapore. Academic
Exercise: Department of History, National University of Singapore, 1999.
Singh, Satvinder. Sikh Organizations and Sikh Identity in Singapore. Academic Exercise,
Department of Sociology, National University Singapore 1994.
Singh, Khushwant. A History of the Sikhs. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1991.
Singh, Mehervan. “Wither Singapore Sikhs?” Unpublished article, 1978.
Tan, Tai Yong. Singapore Khalsa Association. Published for The Singapore Khalsa
Association by Times Books International, 1988.
The Singapore Sikh, September 1991.
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12
RELIGIOUS PROCESSIONS
Urban Politics and Poetics
Lily Kong
INTRODUCTION
Processions have traditionally been an integral part of religious life. They are
often among the most visible of religious activities in public spaces and, to
that extent, have the greatest opportunity for contact with secular activities
and religious practices of other faiths. Because they tend towards the
“spectacular” and symbolic, the potential for conflict is heightened. As events
which attract crowds, the possibility of violence and aggression is real, as the
experience in many countries reminds us. The politics of such events must be
understood to avoid the troubles apparent in different parts of the world. At
the same time, to understand the politics of processions, it is imperative to
understand the meanings and values invested in such events — in short, the
poetics — not least because it enables policy-makers and enforcement agencies
to become aware of what sacred meanings are negotiable and what should
remain fixed values.
Much of the geographical literature on processions addresses secular
processions, including national parades (Kong and Yeoh 1997), and community
parades such as the Carnival in London (Jackson 1988; Lewis and Pile 1996),
the Rose Parade and the Doo Dah Parade in Pasadena, California (Lawrence
1982). The literature which is closest to the subject matter on religious
processions deals with pilgrimages (see Kong 1990, 2001). Indeed, there are
many similarities between the nature and experience of processions and
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Religious Processions 299
pilgrimages, though the latter is at a larger scale, often traversing greater

distances, involving greater commitment of time and possibly enduring more
privations. Insights drawn from existing literatures therefore, are from the
literature on both secular processions and religious pilgrimages.
How has modern society and its many secular influences impacted on the
practice of processions? Campo (1998, p. 42) forcefully argues that
… the modern nation-state, the world capitalist system, steel, plastic,

the telephone, the locomotive, the automobile, the airplane, the television,
and — yes — the computer are making it possible for greater numbers
of people in more cultures to learn about, travel to, and see more sacred
places faster than at any other time in human history. A significant result
of this has been that the number and variety of sacred places have also
increased dramatically.
Following this observation, it would appear that processions and

pilgrimages continue to be a significant aspect of religious experience in the
contemporary world. What, though, is the nature of this experience? In
particular, in modern cities where functionalist urban planning may come up
against sacred pilgrim sites, and where Hindu, Jew, Buddhist, Christian and
Muslim may live cheek by jowl, what sorts of conflicts have to be negotiated
in the continued performance of such religious practice? This question is
explored using the multi-cultural, multi-religious case of Singapore, a modern
city and officially secular state where all the major world religions are
represented and where many more new variant religions are emerging. This
analysis may be characterized as a focus on the micro-politics of urban life
and its conflicts, and is pursued on the basis that such micro-politics is
constitutive of the macro-politics of religious conflicts, manifested in
religiously-based wars and unrest, such as in Palestine, Northern Ireland,
South Asia and so forth. Such macro-politics, I would argue, have historical
roots, but are also daily constituted and reinforced through a micro-politics
of friction that often appear less dramatic, less serious, less pressing than the
drama and spectacle of macro-politics, but which nevertheless are very real
and influential for their role in the warp and woof of everyday life.
PROCESSIONS AND PILGRIMAGES: SOME APPROACHES

As indicated earlier, there is a literature on the phenomena of religious
pilgrimages and one on secular processions. These two sets of writings offer
inspiration and insights to my analysis.
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Pilgrimage is a “social construction and, inevitably, a cultural product”

(Graham and Murray 1997, p. 389), in the same way that the sacred is
imagined and articulated within cultural practice. The cultural product must,
in turn, be understood in relation to its social, political and historical contexts.
The multi-disciplinary literature on pilgrimage recognize this social and
cultural construction, and in so doing, also acknowledge how social relations
are (re)enacted or challenged during pilgrimages, resulting occasionally in
conflict but also in the reinforcement of community and identity.
Due to the influence of anthropologist Victor Turner (1974), pilgrimages
are thought to temporarily bring together individuals disparate in age,
occupation, gender, ethnicity, social class, power and wealth. Pilgrimages
bond together, “however transiently, at a certain level of social life, large
numbers of men and women who would otherwise never have come into
contact” (Turner 1974, p. 178). Pilgrimages therefore function “as occasions
on which communitas is experienced and as journeys toward a sacred source
of communitas which is also seen as a source of healing and renewal” (Eade
and Sallnow 1991, p. 203). Pilgrimage, in this sense, is a liminal experience,
involving abrogation of secular social structure. For example, Dalbert (1991)
describes how, during Catholic pilgrimages to Lourdes, well persons in the
groups treat those who are ill like saints, inversing some of the social relations
observable in everyday life. Similarly, Young (1993) argues, on the haj, social
relations depart from that in daily life in that women are not secluded, are not
subject to the authority of men (other than that of the neutered aghawat, that
is, chieftains), and are not less involved in commerce than men. The inversion
of everyday social relations is also evidenced in symbolic terms, as when the
hierarchy of the church is turned upside down in the case of Medjugorje. The
Catholic church is such that the authorities lead and teach lay persons and the
authorities are invariably adult, male clergy. At Medjugorje, the visionaries
are young, predominantly female and lay persons — those who “traditionally
have little voice in the church” (Jurkovich and Gesler, 1997, p. 460).
On the other hand, scholars such as John Eade and Michael Sallnow
(1991) argue that pilgrimage is a pluralist experience, a realm in which
there are competing religious and secular discourses, leading to the
reinforcement of social boundaries and distinctions rather than their
dissolution. Graham and Murray (1997) are well persuaded by this argument,
and illustrate how it is the case through a study of the Christian pilgrimage
to Santiago in northwest Spain. The Camino, as it is popularly known, is
appropriated differentially by different groups, investing diverse meanings
that are sometimes conflicting with one another. First, the Catholic church
continues to attempt to stamp its papal authority and the importance of the
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spiritual over secular values. Second, the Council of Europe calls upon
Santiago to remind people of the ideals of European integration, designating
it the European Capital of Culture in the year 2000. The motif symbolizing
the Camino — the pilgrimage route — is designed to represent the roads of
Europe symbolically joining and leading to Santiago, no longer a ceremonial
centre of Spanish nationalism. Third, governments of the regions through
which the pilgrimage route passes have sought to market it, engaging in a
process of image production and material practices. This represents the
“economic commodification of heritage” (Graham and Murray 1997,
p. 399). Beyond these official discourses, there is also a “vigorously disputed
set of non-official social distinctions” (Graham and Murray 1997, p. 404)
regarding what constitutes a “true pilgrim”, from those who see it as
personal privation, from a puritan perspective to the liberal/humanist view
that “correct” attitudes towards pilgrimage are sufficient without the need
to heighten suffering (Graham and Murray 1997, pp. 402–405).
The multiple meanings of the pilgrimage route give rise to tensions and
conflicts, as the authors argue in another paper (Murray and Graham, 1997).
In particular, the modification of religious meanings as a result of tourism
reveals the conflicting motivations and demands of pilgrims and tourists.
Thus, Santiago de Compostela’s dominant religious meaning as a pilgrimage
destination became modified into a city of culture; the Cathedral of Santiago
from a place of prayer and worship to a heritage attraction; the Feast Day of
St James from ritual to special event tourism; relic touching from devotion to
good luck/the wishing well; the Compostela from expiation to certification of
achievement; pilgrim ways from penance/punishment to self-renewal and
off-road adventure trails and so forth. Pilgrimage routes and sites even
become embellished, as when a new site is introduced along the route to
attract tourists, such as the dinosaur footprints mythically linked to the hoof
marks of St James’ horse! Such commercialization is also apparent in the
famous Catholic site, Medjugorje. Shopkeepers set up their wares near the
church grounds to capitalize on the presence of pilgrims, producing unofficial
religious articles which has created tensions with local church officials. Warring
ethnic groups have emblems which have also been commercialized (for
example, badges and pins with their symbols) and sold alongside rosaries and
Madonna statues. New cafes, bars and pizzerias have been introduced, resulting
in the “look and feel of a beach resort”, creating placelessness and inauthenticity
(Jurkovich and Gesler 1997, pp. 462–63).
These studies illustrate the multiple meanings and pluralist experiences
associated with pilgrimage routes and sites, at times co-existent in peaceful if
uneasy parallel, at other times conflicting in both discursive and material
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realms. Religious processions, at a scale smaller than pilgrimages, nevertheless

encapsulate many of the issues confronted in pilgrimage analysis, and indeed,
are not unlike the experience of secular processions, of which analyses exist of
pageants, parades and carnivals. Drawing from a range of studies, it may be
said that parades and processions “[serve] as a means to focus attention of
private people on their collective life and the values they [espouse] through it”
(Goheen 1993, p. 128). Their performance in public streets turn them into
“a particular space, a landscape that could be exploited effectively through the
collective performance of particular rituals to communicate, legitimate, and
politicize values” (Goheen 1993, p. 128). Not only do they mark out space,
such “civic rituals” also represent “time apart”, for they are “time separated
from the normal activities” (Goheen 1993, p. 128). These rituals also stress
shared values and reinforce group cohesion by emphasizing belonging. Further,
“parades and other forms of mass public ritual [may be] characterized as
demonstrations of community power and solidarity and serve as complex
commentaries on the political economy or urban-industrial social relations”
(Marston 1989, p. 255). As Kaplan (1984, p. 189) explains:
Civic rituals, closely associated with a sense of community in cities such
as Barcelona, often cut across class lines. Whether organized for religious,
folkloric, or political reasons, urban pageants carried with them a measure
of solidarity that surpassed the elements of ritual content.
On the other hand, these events may also reflect the spatial constitution
of symbolic resistance, achieved through the symbolic reversal of social status
(Jackson, 1988). They offer a temporary respite from normal relations of
subordination and domination, and thus, offer a potential platform for
protest, opposition and resistance (Jackson 1988, p. 222). In the case of
Notting Hill Carnivals in London, authorities strive to keep the carnival to
the road because of its potential as a threat to the social order (Jackson 1988,
p. 223), reflecting the spatial strategy associated with power and control. Yet,
as Jackson (1988, p. 216) points out, the symbolic reversal of social status
during a carnival should not be confused with subversion because it only
serves to reaffirm the permanence of the social hierarchy. What the carnival
offers is a temporary respite from normal relations. In this way, the carnival
is a “social leveller”, allowing for “a harmless release of tension, and a force for
social integration” (Jackson 1988, p. 215).
Fieldwork Context
Thaipusam is celebrated in many parts of the world by ethnic communities
hailing from South India, such as Fiji, Mauritius, Trinidad, Durban in South
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Africa, Toronto in Canada, Malaysia and Singapore. In places like Chennai

(formerly Madras) in India and Jaffna in Sri Lanka, the event is an important
celebration for Tamil communities. The festival marks the birthday of Lord
Subramaniam, one of the sons of Shiva. The spectacle of the event revolves
around a device called a kavadi carried by many of the participants along a
processional route. Some participants may even pierce themselves with skewers
or attach hooks to their bodies. The processions are generally accompanied by
music and chanting. Some participants also enter a religious trance during
the procession. Generally, those who take part in the procession do so as a
form of thanksgiving for prayers answered.
In Singapore, Thaipusam is a colourful annual event which has evolved
over the years, as has the state’s management of this public event. Religious
processions in Singapore are carefully monitored and managed, a caution
rooted in an unfortunate historical episode. On 21 July 1964, during a
procession celebrating the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, riots broke out
as the Malay-Muslim procession passed through Kallang, a predominantly
Chinese populated area. Different accounts exist on how the riots started.
One account suggests that someone threw a bottle at the participants. Another
suggests that someone jeered the participants, leading to a fight. Yet another
has it that the riots were politically motivated (National Archives website:
<http://www.knowledgenet.com.sg/singapore/ index.asp?title=NR/
NR.html&hdr=NR>. Whatever the cause, given this historical precedent, a
range of measures has been put in place to manage public processions,
including Thaipusam.
Two Hindu community leaders closely associated with the Thaipusam
festival shared many insights into the organization of the kavadi procession.
Annually, two to three months before Thaipusam, an application has to be
made by the Hindu Endowments Board (HEB) on behalf of the two temples
involved (each marking the starting and ending point of the procession
respectively) and participating devotees, to the police to obtain a permit to
hold the procession. Additionally, along the processional route are usually
tents set up by Hindu devotees, serving either water or milk to those
participating in the procession. Tent owners also have to apply to the police
for permits after seeking endorsement from the HEB. Following these
applications, the police will convene a meeting with the HEB and
representatives from the two temples to discuss the ground rules and the
problems encountered during the last festival, with a view to proposing ways
of addressing the problems. Almost 10,000 participants can be expected
annually, with more than 8,000 carrying milk pots, and more than 1,000
carrying kavadi. Additionally, there are many more who set up tentage, and
others who help the devotees. With this scale of events, the temples have a
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huge logistical task. The two temples thus issue “Rules, Regulations and
Conditions Governing Thaipusam” which are constructed to observe state
rules pertaining to assemblies and processions (encapsulated in the
Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance Act and its related
subsidiary legislation), and to help the temples manage the event. Individual
kavadi carriers have to buy tickets from the temples to participate in the
procession and pay a fee to defray the cost of organizing the event and
handling the logistics. Big kavadi carriers pay more because they “take up the
most space and need the most supervision” (Straits Times, 23 December
1999). Kavadi carriers have to inform the temples of the size and weight of
their kavadis, which should not exceed certain limits (4 metres from the
ground up and 2.9 metres in diameter), so as to ensure that they will not pose
safety hazards, either to traffic or street wires. Devotees carrying milk pots
may leave the Perumal Temple from 2.00 a.m. onwards on Thaipusam Day
but kavadi and ratham (shrines on wheels) have between 7.00 a.m. and 7.30
p.m. to leave the Perumal temple. At the other end, the doors of the
Thendayuthapani Temple will be closed at 10.00 p.m. When tickets are
issued at point of payment, devotees are given specific times when they
should assemble at the starting point, in order that the crowds may be
managed. Further, all forms of musical instruments (traditional or otherwise)
and recorded music/songs are not allowed along the processional route, and
only holy music is allowed within the temples’ premises. The temples’ rules
end with a warning that any infringement of the rules by devotees and/or
supporters will be subject to prosecution by the police and the devotees being
barred from participating in future Thaipusam festivals.
From the perspective of the Hindu Endowments Board (HEB), as
expressed by one of its officers: “We try to follow the rules and regulations as
closely as possible because we do not want to lose this privilege like what
happened to the Mohammad procession” (personal interview, 27 June 2001).
Historical precedence — the 1964 procession celebrating Prophet
Muhammad’s birthday which erupted into riot and led to its subsequent
discontinuation — becomes the basis on which the Hindu leadership submits
to contemporary state regulatory forces.
Over a number of years from 1999, this writer has been an observer of
Thaipusam festivals, and have interviewed participants and observers about a
range of issues, from their experience of the procession to their reactions to
some of the strictures introduced over time. Participants ranged from those
who carried kavadis and milk pots to those who helped organize the event to
those who assisted their friends and family members. Observers included
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both Hindus and non-Hindus along the processional route. Pseudonyms are
used below where verbatim quotes are shared.
Religious Processions and the Making of Social Relations

Susan Davis’ (1986, p. 6) description of nineteenth century Philadelphia
parades as “public dramas of social relations” provides an apt perspective for
examining the Thaipusam procession in Singapore. Just as the nineteenth
century parades “define who can be a social actor”, Thaipusam is both an
occasion for boundary-making and one for reinforcing social ties, in particular,
religious community, family and friendship ties.
As an occasion for boundary-making, observations of Thaipusam remind
us that a community is not devoid of internal tensions, and is not always
characterized by homogeneous or even consensual traits, experiences and
views. Thus, boundaries are both internal to the Hindu community as they
are between the Hindu and other communities in multi-religious Singapore.
The procession brought to surface conflicts and tensions within the community,
which are evident in two main ways. The first is the latent discontent with a
prominent foreign worker population in Singapore. In this particular instance,
the foreign Indian worker population, foregrounded in a public performance
such as Thaipusam, is attributed with crowdedness and disorderliness. One
interviewee complained that the procession had become very protracted, with
many delays, because of the increase in the number of kavadi carriers, and the
larger crowds. He attributed this to the increase in the number of foreign
workers participating. Another intimated that “Thaipusam has been spoilt”
because of the intrusion and rowdiness of “foreign elements”. Not all
interviewees, however, blamed the foreign workers. Many pointed fingers at
“the younger generation” instead. Like several other interviewees, Kalpana, a
clerk in her late 30s, blamed the “youngsters”, “the way they dance, the way
they cheer, the way they change those movie songs to God songs”. Boundary-
making thus drew on age, class and nationality as divisive factors.
Second, the consciousness of “self ” and “other” was also evident through
repeated references to boundaries between the Hindu community and other
communities. These references revealed awareness of the power of this very
public display of Hinduism to shape public perceptions about the Hindu
community, and also offered the occasion for the “other” to show an
understanding of and sensitivity towards the Hindu community. In the
former instance, Hindu interviewees referred again to the unruly behaviour
of some young Hindu boys in the processions, and expressed deep regret that
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“you have other races watching you, so when all these happen, it gets wrong
ideas into people’s heads about us” (Selva, aged 40). In the latter instance,
some interviewees expressed disappointment at the lack of understanding and
respect by other communities of the sacredness of the event:
Frankly speaking, it is okay for them to watch but I think there are
members of the public who are not dressed properly and who don’t
behave well. I think this is kind of a distraction. We feel very offended
when we are participating, you know. It is something that you don’t like
to see during the processions. We like somebody to be more pleasant,
more properly attired rather than like coming all the way as though you
are going for a show, going for a disco. I think in my case, I don’t like it
(Shamala, late 30s).
Inasmuch as the procession foregrounded occasions of internal and external

boundary making, it was also an opportunity for the reinforcement of family
and friendship ties and the reaffirmation of community identity. At the most
fundamental level, the commitment to Thaipusam was viewed as a total
family obligation, from pre-festival joint fasting and cleansing, to the provision
of help and support during the procession itself. The most pronounced
assertion of the role of the family was expressed by Mano, who has participated
annually in Thaipusam for twenty-seven years. He says:
I have seen cases where people take it just for granted. Ah, everybody
carrying, I also can carry and everything. After they start walking, they
just collapse. Just cannot fulfil the route. And some of them, you can see,
when you’re piercing, you can see them pinching because it’s painful. It’s
hurting them and everything so. I wouldn’t really say whether they did
fast properly or not, but I know there’s something wrong. Something is
not right. Something is wrong in the family. Maybe they did not fast.
Maybe in the house, in the family, something is wrong. When I want to
carry the kavadi, the whole family joins in. We all fast together.
Like him, Mohan, also a frequent participant in Thaipusam, talks about how
his son fasts with him prior to the event:
My son also tries not to bring back chicken rice or something and eat
there. He knows we have the house clean for this festival. He said, “I will
join my father, be a vegetarian”.
This family involvement has the effect of bringing the family together, as
Rama, a 41-year-old participant points out:
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Usually, there is family involvement. Normally when we are involved,

the family also has to follow the fast so that the house is kept clean and
the prayers are done. It is a discipline, so it is not like, this only has to
do with my family member, so I just don’t bother. So it is, like I say, it
brings the family together and I think also brings them spiritually
together because everybody is helping each other.
Such family participation extends to the day of the procession itself,

during which family and friends provide both practical and moral support.
Practically, Mohan shares insights into the physical difficulties that one might
encounter during the procession, and the need for help:
Just say for example, this big chariot which I carried, which I’m carrying.
For some reason, if I can’t pull it, somebody can help me to push. And
if this big kavadi I’m carrying, for some reason I cannot carry, balance
myself, the people all round, four of them, could hold me and you
know…[help to] adjust it or just carry. And in the worst case, if you
really cannot walk, they can dismantle it and bring you to the temple in
whatever way they could help. Yes you need them to help because you
will never know. While you’re walking, the kavadi is about three metres
high. All of a sudden, a strong wind may come. The whole thing can
just…you may just fall out. When I’m pulling a chariot, you may find
a small stone on the road and it will get stuck on the wheel. I can’t come
and lift it up you know, so I need friends and family to be around me to
help me …That’s why it’s not just you yourself. I may be in the
procession, but everybody is helping, also participating in this holy
festival. And they are getting themselves involved in it one way or
another.
Spiritually and emotionally, Rama acknowledges the need for support when
the journey gets long and delayed:
The procession is about four kilometres and at some point of time, there
would be a jam, and we have to wait for two-and-a-half, three hours.
During that period, family is there or friends or relations to give you the
moral boost. So it is a group of friends.
But the strengthening of social relations is not confined to pre-existing

family and friendship ties. The sense of community among participants and
well-wishers is enhanced through the cheerful support given to participants
completing the thanksgiving journey. As 23-year-old Vani shares:
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Usually what happens is that after you are done with your procession,
let’s say you have already reached the temple, then it is when…that
means you have finished your task already, right. So then, it doesn’t have
to be someone that you know. You can also carry on and cheer, cheer
along with everybody else, even if it is strangers. It does not have to be
someone you know. We cheer other participants along, to encourage
them to the finish.
When probed, Vani and others were clearly conscious of myriad sub-
groups, such as the boisterous youths and burgeoning foreign workers, and
indeed expressed their annoyance and disapproval. Yet, their enthusiasm and
support for participants, particularly when nearing the destination, co-existed
with their awareness of social differences. They would not admit to a sense of
egalitarian association, of sameness that spells the abrogation of social structure,
after the manner of Turner’s (1974) communitas. Rather, it was a sense of
support for those who have made sacrifices and bore the privations of the
journey, not unlike support for sportspersons on the track or field. This did
not amount to a numbing heap of emotions that culminates in “carnivalistic
misalliances” where the lofty is combined with the low, the great with the
insignificant, the wise with the stupid (Folch-Serra 1990, p. 265), offering
“temporary liberation from the prevailing truth …” (Bakhtin, 1968, p. 10).
The experience of communitas, long accepted in many anthropological writings
about pilgrimage, did not replicate itself in the context of the Thaipusam
procession in Singapore. This may suggest that pilgrimages and processions,
because of the differences articulated above, are not directly comparable, but
it may also suggest that the sense of sameness and egalitarian association may
be a somewhat romanticized interpretation of the pilgrim experience.
RELIGIOUS PROCESSIONS AND

THE NEGOTIATION OF POETICS AND POLITICS
The making of social relations aside, religious processions also exist at the
nexus of “poetic” performance and public politics, the negotiation of which
forms the analysis in this section. Conceptually, the material is framed in
terms of the negotiation of soundscapes, timescapes and landscapes, reflecting
the multiple dimensions of the processional phenomena.
Negotiating Aural Space

That Thaipusam occupies aural space and derives significant meaning from
the manufacture and consumption of sound may not have been so apparent
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if that aspect of the event did not become subject to policy and policing. No
interviewee failed to discuss the significance of music and/or chanting to the
creation of the appropriate atmosphere, and as an integral part of the ceremony.
Many took pains to explain the place of music in religion and in this
particular public performance. All spoke of the value of music in relation to
its enforced absence in the context of Singapore’s Thaipusam. Pany, an
organizer of the event, shares this perspective:
Music is part of religion. If you notice, the drums, the long pipes played
during prayers…traditionally, music, dances, language were performed
in the temples, where culture was propagated. For the kavadi carriers,
the music is to let them forget the pain and let them concentrate and to
fulfil their mission, which is to carry the kavadi and milk offered to
the deities.
However, over the years, restrictions have been placed on the noise level
generated at public events, and as highlighted earlier, music and songs are
disallowed along the processional route. This reflects a larger policy in
Singapore which is translated and experienced in a variety of contexts. For
example, the traditional call to prayer in rural settings and small Muslim
communities used to be made through a loudspeaker in the local mosque.
This became regulated because population growth and urbanization in
Singapore, with its new social set-up, had caused such sound production to
sometimes be regarded as intrusive by those who are not co-religionists or
involved in the particular events (Lee 1999). State regulations on “noise
pollution” were therefore introduced, including turning the loudspeakers
inwards towards the mosque rather than outwards, specifying acceptable
noise levels for events such as Chinese operas, funeral processions, church
bells, music during weddings, in record shops and places of entertainment.
Even state-endorsed and state-encouraged nation-building activities, such
as the recitation of pledges in schools, were subject to these rules. Thus, the
injunction on “noise” production during the procession may be understood
within this context.
As a consequence, the desired “poetic” value of music as expressed by
participants is curtailed and has become embedded in a quest for aural space
in religious activity. This politics of sound and space is in turn expressed in a
variety of ways, from the most supportive to actions which attempt to
circumvent the intent of the law. Elaborations below will demonstrate the
range of reactions. At one end of the spectrum, Vani expresses full support for
the regulations:
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I fully support the government doing this … because teenagers especially

tend to take advantage if there are no rules, so they made the whole
procession look like a hooligan get-together because they would dress in
black and they end up taking garbage cans and turning them upside
down like playing drums. So what happens was that it led to unnecessary
fights because you have a lot of gangs here and a lot of gangs there and
compete who can make more louder noise and stuff like that. So these
were all unnecessary and you can find policemen arresting people. This
is not supposed to be done when you are doing something sacred going
on there. So after the restrictions were imposed, you can’t find things like
that now and it looks more festive.
Others accept but without the same sense of support, such as Rama, who
points to Singapore’s perceived political culture of compliance:
I think we just learn… you know we Singaporeans are so obedient. Okay

I mean, as long as we feel that government says we obey, you know. So
I think that’s no problem. We may complain, we may complain but
ultimately we still follow the rules.
Yet others hope for change, emphasizing the religious value of music and
song, believing that “singing those holy songs” help the kavadi carrier to
concentrate his attention on God, because “the moment the music stops, his
mind will wander” (Selva). Two kavadi carriers share their experience thus:
You see when I walk in the procession without any music, I feel frustrated.
Very. But when you hear the music, there is somebody singing about the
Lord with the beautiful words and everything, and you automatically
forget everything around you and you just gracefully dance with the
music and I think that’s the best thing to do (Mohan).
On that day, from my personal experience, you hear the group singing
with the music and they are singing religious hymns. You feel in touch
with it physically and spiritually and also you don’t think of the weight,
you don’t think of the pain or whatever. You are very focused because the
atmosphere, the environment, the music, the air, the sound, they will
give you spiritual upliftment. And then some people get into a trance
because probably they get carried away by the music and are so deep in
concentration that they get carried away and they start dancing (Rama).
While Selva believes the effect is “more psychological”, Shamala believes it is

spiritual, for “we believe that when we chant and call the Lord, the Lord will
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take away his pain”. Kalpana, in turn, highlights the performative element of
the procession as “an offering to the god”.
In contrast, others are quite vituperative in their response. Mano, a vocal
participant with clearly strong views, offers a strong critique, and reveals the
appeals that have transpired:
We asked the temple and everything. They said no, they said it’s against
the law. Most of them, some of them, even myself, sometimes I say
walking like that, it’s just like attending a funeral with no music and all.
Makes us feel like that. Sometimes I should say with so many regulations
and everything, so after a while you’re fulfilling the vows and everything,
you should do it happily. Wholeheartedly. Not with the thinking, cursing
somebody. There’s not music or anything so I hope the government will
consider all these people’s request. We have written in to the temple and
asked them. As you can see, people are behaving better nowadays, some
of the people, maybe slowly they will give you music or they can even
put a music round maybe 100 metres because it’s quite a religious day
and it’s recognized in the world as well. Everybody knows that Thaipusam
is a very grand thing so maybe we should think of something, compromise
somewhere and then make everybody happy. I hope something will
work out.
For some, the appeal is built on the logic that if there are those misbehaving,
action should be taken against them rather than to have a blanket ban on
music, thus calling on the authorities to be more discriminatory in their
strategies of management.
Finally, in a fairly circular way, some interviewees point out that it is
because musical instruments are banned that there are those who circumvent
that by using empty tin cans and dustbins for improvization, thus resisting
sanctions in symbolic ways:
These guys use dustbins. So when they see the police officer, they just
put it down. After that they just pick it up again (Shamala).
…previously you were allowed to carry drums and all that so when they
banned the drums and all that some of them started taking empty tins
and knocking because it still makes the music you see. It’s because if you
confiscate the drum, they lose the drum. But if you want to confiscate
the tin, they say, take the tin, feel free. Because it’s just an empty tin,
because they wanted the music, and there was no music (Mohan).
Thus, the ban on music led to the creation of improvised sound, which in
turn led to the perception amongst other participants and observers of a
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312 Lily Kong
lack of respect and religious values, thus ironically prompting their support
of the ban.
Negotiating Sacred Time

Inasmuch as the poetics and politics of soundscapes are negotiated in the
construction of an aurally defined sacred space, so too has the bracketing of
time come to shape the practice of religion. In the history of religion, days
and times of the day have traditionally been set aside for religious practice,
what Eliade (1959) has referred to as “sacred time”. Sacred time is thus that
time during which religion is foregrounded, and is to be set apart from
secular time. In contemporary society, the time that is marked out as sacred
is again a negotiated outcome between secular and religious agents. This is
evident at two levels in the context of Thaipusam in Singapore: (1) in the
official appointment of public holidays tied to religious festivals and (2) in
the allocation of time for religious activity in the public sphere. Indeed, apart
from the choice of the day, other aspects of managing that time are much
more guided by pragmatic secular considerations than religious ones.
In the official Singapore calendar, a series of public holidays are identified,
corresponding to religious and cultural festivals: Vesak Day (Buddhist), Hari
Raya Puasa Aidilfitri and Hari Raya Haji (Muslim), Deepavali (Hindu),
Good Friday and Christmas (Christian), and New Year’s Day and Chinese
New Year. There are, additionally, the secular public holidays, Labour Day
and National Day. While clearly acknowledging the multi-religious profile of
the Singapore population, the choice of religious festivals that deserve public
holiday status in many ways defines the extent of religious activity and
participation that is facilitated for particular religious groups. Thus, several
interviewees commented on how the lack of a public holiday for Thaipusam
created difficulties for them. Shamala, for example, explains the inconveniences
as she was not able to take time off work, and therefore had to participate in
the procession very early in the morning or late in the evening. This in turn
posed other problems — the extra cost of transportation in the early hours of
the morning, recalling that milk pot bearers could start at 2 a.m. (“you have
to pay double charges unless you have people to help you”), and the congestion
in the post-work rush hour (“tempers flare for those in the traffic jam held up
by us”). This is echoed by Pany who recounts as follows:
It is not a public holiday so everybody does it early morning …they get

ready and start the first journey at 2 a.m. and hopefully they can get back
by 5 and they can report to work, you see. Or they do it in the evening
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and when they do it in the evening, it ends very late. It can end as late
as 12 or 1 a.m., causing a congestion and traffic jam at the entrance of
the other temple so these are the inconveniences. I think because there
is no public holiday, and the working people would try to finish it in the
morning. I believe that if it is a holiday, then there is a free flow in the
morning around 9 to 11, there will be people participating. But because
of these restrictions, there is heavy traffic. There is heavy traffic early in
the morning and heavy traffic late in the evening.
While the sacred day is not marked out in the secular calendar as a public
holiday, the bracketing of time within the day itself is guided by temple
regulations based on pragmatic considerations of crowd control and safety, as
well as by self “regulation”, again based on the pragmatics of tropical, urban
living. Temple regulations stipulate that those carrying milk pots may start at
2.00 a.m. though kavadis and rathams may only begin at 7.00 a.m., with the
last participant beginning at 7.30 p.m. This bracketing of time is based
essentially on pragmatic considerations, to spread out the activities over as
many hours as possible to avoid congestion, and to have those with the bigger
paraphernalia of kavadis and rathams out on the streets only after the break of
light. Additionally, participants further bracket the time in view of the hot
afternoon sun in tropical Singapore, so that few take to the streets during the
afternoon hours. Whereas scholars of religion have written abundantly about
sacred time as set apart from ordinary time, during which religious activities
are propitious, in the context of Thaipusam processions, apart from the
identification of a sacred day, which hours of the day particularly attract
religious activity and which represent “down time” is more guided by pragmatic
considerations than by religious ones.
Negotiating Sacred Pathways

The processional route, as indicated earlier, begins from Sri Srinivasa Perumal
in Serangoon Road and ends in Sri Thendayuthapani in Tank Road, a
journey of some four kilometres. The former is in the heart of Singapore’s
Little India district, and the journey brings participants past a number of
temples in that district. Previously, the route was symbolically significant
because participants would wind past the Kaliaman Temple1 (known as the
“mother’s temple”), and the Sivan Temple (known as the “father’s temple”) in
Dhoby Ghaut. Devotees passing these temples would therefore pay homage
to the “mother” and “father”. However, the Sivan temple was relocated from
the Dhoby Ghaut area to a temporary site next to Sri Srinivasa Perumal in
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314 Lily Kong
1984 and then to a permanent site in Geylang East in 1993. This move
occurred because of the construction of a mass rapid transit station where it
stood and, despite appeals to the contrary, was relocated.
Since 1993, the deity Siva has been brought annually to the Perumal
Temple on the eve of Thaipusam, staying there until the night of Thaipusam.
This allows devotees to pay homage to the “father” from the start of the
procession, before passing by the “mother” en route to Sri Thendayuthapani.
In short, despite the community’s investment of symbolic meaning in the
Sivan Temple and its location, secular priorities prevailed, and ritual
adjustments were introduced to manage secular changes that impact on
religious practice.
This might be contrasted to observations of the value of symbolic meaning
over pragmatic considerations in some other contexts. For example, Berger
(1968, quoted in Davis 1985, p. 266), highlights that the routes that public
processions take are symbolically important because they “[signify] a ‘capturing’
or taking over of various parts of the city”, the outcome of the sheer numbers
of marchers “transform[ing] the areas through which they march into a
‘temporary stage’ on which they dramatize the power they still lack”. In this
account of Thaipusam, however, the state’s control of the processional route
and the resultant modifications to religious practice suggest that significant
priority is given to secular needs over the symbolic meanings invested by a
religious community. That the “capture” of space is neither symbolic nor real
but prescribed and regulated tampers the “crowd power” that the processional
literature presents.
CONCLUSION
Since 1964 when the procession celebrating Prophet Mohammad’s birthday
erupted into a riot, Singapore has been carefully managing public expressions
of religion, and indeed, other processions involving assemblies of people and
public displays of spectacle. This is understandable, particularly given how
the preceding analysis endorses the view that processions are arenas for
competing religious and secular discourses, and are multi-vocal, of social and
political significance.
In focusing on the social and political dimensions of procession, this
chapter has illustrated how social relations (including family, friendship, and
inter- and intra-community ties) are reinforced, challenged or watched over
through participation in the event. It has also demonstrated how belief in
egalitarian association on account of common participation in the event and
mutual support among participants is misplaced. It is concluded therefore,
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that the traditional concept of communitas associated with pilgrimages and

the notion of solidarity, belonging and group cohesion in processions perhaps
remain relevant in some ways, but may have been over-extended in a somewhat
romanticized notion of egalitarianism and bounded community.
Politically, the processions are occasions when meanings are balanced
and negotiated by state, temple and individual. These meanings may revolve
around the significance of sound in religious experience and the associated
symbolic resistance to state prohibitions and temple regulations. They may be
about the secular acknowledgement of religious time through suitable
bracketing out of that time in the secular calendar. They may involve the
ritual adjustments made to accommodate state modifications of sacred
pathways. In all of this, the politics at work is not that of overt confrontation
or party politics or grand strategy, but one of everyday negotiations and local
level “tactics” (de Certeau 1984). Given Singapore’s freedom of worship
policy, time and space have been available for adherents to participate in the
procession (despite some inconvenience). Participants have also been able to
re-negotiate meanings and values, finding ways to make music and pay
homage to the “father” god. As a consequence, one of the conditions for the
violence and aggression sometimes associated with religion in general and
such events in particular, is removed.
However, the seeds of some dispirited and sometimes exasperated
disappointment are present, directed at the constraints on religious music-
making, the perverse and unintended encouragement it gives to rowdy noise-
makers on the pretext of creating an aurally-defined sacred atmosphere for
participants, the crowdedness of the event which lends itself to a channelling
of frustrations towards “foreigners” and “youngsters”, and the absence of an
acknowledgement of this religious event on the secular calendar, which is
deemed to further contribute to early morning pre-workday crowdedness.
Together, they have not seemed sufficient to constitute severe discontent.
Nevertheless, it is imperative that these sources of irritation and discontent
are recognized, with potential adjustments made to policy as circumstances
change, for example, when the number of participants and observers grow or
when the profile of participants change.
Finally, that religious experience is a multi-faceted one bears emphasis
here. The geographer of religion is therefore required to go beyond a focus on
the religious landscape of churches, temples, mosques, synagogues and so
forth, which has hitherto been the primary focus. Certainly, sacred space is
defined visually and materially through landscapes, but it is also constituted
of soundscapes and timescapes, as the aural and temporal also contribute to
the marking out of sacred space. Religion, to that extent, is an integrative
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316 Lily Kong
institution, and religious experience may be best understood as a wholly

integrated one, of sight, sound, emotion, and time. It is only with this
understanding that secular rules and regulations may be crafted to achieve
pragmatic secular ends, particularly in multi-religious urban contexts, while
respecting religious imperatives.
Note
Earlier verions of this paper are available as Kong (2005, 2006).
1. Kaliaman is the consort of Siva.
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De Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life. Steven F. Rendail (trans.). Berkeley:
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Eade, John and Michael J. Sallnow, eds. Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of
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(trans.). San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1959.
Folch-Serra, Michael. “Place, Voice, Space: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Dialogical-Landscape”.
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Goheen, P. G. “The Ritual of the Streets in Mid-19th-century Toronto”. Environment
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———. “Religious Processions: Urban Politics and Poetics”. Temenos, Finnish Journal
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318

From Moral Values to Citizenship Education 319
PART II
Religion in Schools and

Among the Young
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320 Charlene Tan
320

13
FROM MORAL VALUES TO

CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
The Teaching of Religion in
Singapore Schools
Charlene Tan
INTRODUCTION
To many people, “religion” is an emotive word. It is therefore not surprising
that the teaching of religion in schools elicits strong responses from people.
For example, Kazepides avers that religious beliefs do not and cannot aim
at enriching and developing the human mind; instead they lead to people
living “under an absolute, palpable tyranny” (1983, p. 264). On the other
hand, policymakers in England and Wales, in making religious education
compulsory in state schools, see it as morally educative and socially beneficial
for students (Hand and White 2004). Given the fact that Singapore is a
multi-religious society and that some form of religious teaching exists in the
schools, it is intriguing and pertinent to explore the teaching of religion in
Singapore schools. This chapter discusses the attempts by the government
to teach religious beliefs and practices in Singapore schools for the purpose
of inculcating moral values and promoting citizenship education. It points
out the shortcomings of the current approach used in the teaching of
religion in schools, and explores Spiritual Education (SE) as a possible
alternative.
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322 Charlene Tan
THE CONTEXT
It has been argued that the Singapore government has adopted a secular
stance towards religious institutions, and expects all religions to adjust to
the state ideology (for example, see Ling 1987; Ackermann 1999). A
number of researchers have also pointed out that religion is taught in
Singapore schools with the aims of promoting moral values, social cohesion
and national unity (for example, see Tan 1994; Chew 1998; Tan 2000; Tan
and Chew 2004). Religious studies were formally introduced to all secondary
schools as a compulsory subject known as Religious Knowledge (RK) in
the 1980s.
To understand why RK was introduced in 1984, it is important to know
the challenges and needs during that period. The bold measure to introduce
RK was due to both push and pull factors. Under the “push” factors, there
was an expressed concern that the young in Singapore were susceptible to
what was perceived to be negative Western moral values. Government leaders
at that time believed that industrialization, urbanization and modernization
had led to increasing social problems and the abandonment of traditional
values (Gopinathan 1980; Tan 2000).
A second push factor was the general dissatisfaction with the way moral
education was being taught in the schools. A number of criticisms were
levelled against the teaching of moral education in the “Report on Moral
Education” published in 1979. In terms of content, the report found the
presentations in the Civics textbooks “generally dull and somewhat factual
and dogmatic” (Ong 1979, p. 5). It criticized the teaching of moral values as
too didactic, with many do’s and don’ts without adequate justification for
these injunctions. There was also insufficient explanation and illustration of
the moral values and attitudes to be inculcated. Even when stories of great
historical and religious leaders were used, the report noted that it was “just a
narrative of historical events with factual biographical information on the
personages in question” (ibid., p. 5). To aggravate the problem, the report
found that both teachers and students did not treat moral education lessons
seriously because they were not examination subjects.
Similar concerns were raised in another report by a team of educators led
by Dr Eng Soo Peck, then the Head of the School of Professional Studies at
the Institute of Education. It noted that the lessons were teacher-dominated
where the students were unable to discuss and provide meaningful feedback,
and further hampered by the psychological cultural barrier of articulating
one’s feelings to others. The recommendation was for the content to relate to
the students’ experiences and interests. The report also highlighted the lack of
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a clear-cut reference point or theoretical framework to make the teaching of

moral values coherent and convincing:
Most of the programmes lack a conceptual framework to provide a basis
to organise the concepts and guide the selection of content. The result is
a conglomerate of values or concepts that are strung loosely together
without any attempt to organise them in sequence or order (Eng 1981,
p. 45).
The above set the background for the “pull” factors towards RK where
the spotlight was on the role of religion in moral education. In contrast to the
unfavourable review of moral education taught in secular schools, the 1979
report spoke favourably of moral education programmes in mission schools.
Arguing that religious studies helped to reinforce the teaching of moral
values, it concluded that the teachers in mission schools were able to teach
more persuasively because of their strong religious background. Subsequently,
Bible Knowledge and Islamic Religious Knowledge were accepted as
examination subjects for upper secondary students in 1979. Three committees
were also set up to introduce Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist Studies to schools
(Tan 2000). In 1982, the government formally announced the introduction
of RK to all upper secondary students (Secondary Three, Four and Five) with
effect from 1984.
RELIGION AND MORAL VALUES

RK was taught in all secondary schools from 1984 to 1989. Students had a
total of six options: Bible Knowledge (in English), Islamic Religious Knowledge
(in English and Malay), Buddhist Studies (in Chinese and English), Confucian
Ethics (in Chinese and English), Hindu Studies (in English), and Sikh
Studies (in English). Parents were allowed to freely choose one of these six RK
subjects for their children to study from Secondary three onwards. All students
had to continue with the subject when they progressed to Secondary Four
(for Express course students) or Secondary Five (for Normal course students),
and could offer it as an elective subject at the GCE “O” Level Examinations
and use the grade obtained to gain admission to pre-university classes (CPD
1988). The government was in charge of the curriculum design, staff training
and assessment of RK, although various religious organizations were consulted
in the preparation of the teaching materials. It is also important to point out
that as the study of religions was potentially sensitive, the government stated
from the beginning that there should be no attempt by RK teachers to
preach, proselytize or engage in religious activities.
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324 Charlene Tan
Given that RK was meant to support the moral values the government
wanted to inculcate in the young, there was a strong emphasis on RK’s moral
aspects. For example, the Ministry of Education (MOE) stated that Buddhist
Studies aimed to help students “acquire the qualities of moral awareness,
social responsibility and psychological maturity” (CPD 1988, p. 14). For
Confucian Ethics, it was pointed out that pupils should know “the importance
of self-cultivation, the different Confucian forms of life and the network of
human relatedness”, while students taking Hindu Studies are expected to
“acquire some basic moral precepts” (ibid., p. 14). Similarly, the studying of
Islamic Religious Knowledge aimed to help students “acquire right values
that will lead to moral uprightness and meaningful living”, while the studying
of Sikh Studies aimed to help students “acquire desirable moral values and
codes of behaviour” (ibid., p. 15). The only exception, interestingly, was Bible
Knowledge where there was no mention of any moral component. Instead,
the course outline stated that the subject aimed to help students “understand
and appreciate the significance of the life and teachings of Jesus Christ
through the study of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles” (ibid., p. 14).
The reason for this exception was that Bible Knowledge, which was already
introduced in 1979 as an optional subject in schools, was set by the Cambridge
Examinations Syndicate in England and not by the Ministry of Education in
Singapore (ibid., p. 10).
However, RK was withdrawn after 1989 due to several reasons. The
government explained that the exclusive study of one religion by students
had emphasized religious differences and led to proselytization (Remaking
Singapore Committee 2004). The teaching of RK also coincided with the
broader trend of religious revivalism and shifts in the 1980s. The concern
by the government that RK may have contributed to this trend of religious
zeal was confirmed by studies conducted by Kuo, Quah and Tong (1988).
They reported that the introduction of RK, especially Buddhist Studies and
Bible Knowledge, had unintentionally attracted the young to these religions
(also see Tong 1989). By highlighting the more rational aspects of these
religions in RK, they appealed more to young people who were willing to
give up what they perceived to be “illogical” and “superstitious” traditional
Chinese religions (Tong 2004).
RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

RK was subsequently replaced by a new Civics and Moral Education (CME)
programme in 1992. Some religious beliefs and practices were also included
in National Education (NE) which was launched in 1997. Unlike RK, CME
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is not an examination subject although it is compulsory for the students. The

focus of CME is citizenship education where students are inculcated national
values for economic and political socialization (Chew 1998; Tan and Chew
2004). One of the modules for CME is Community Spirit which has the aim
of “fostering a greater sense of belonging to and care for the community, as
well as cultural and religious appreciation” (CPDD 2001).
To promote religious appreciation, key religious beliefs and practices are
taught in the CME textbook. Students are instructed in the Secondary Three
CME book that it is important to know about the beliefs and customs of
others so that they can help to promote and maintain racial and religious
understanding and harmony (ibid., p. 15). They are introduced to the basic
beliefs and practices of the various religions through interesting and fun
activities such as completing crossword puzzles, filling in the blanks and
drawing pictures and symbols. To ensure that students will not be judgemental
or negative towards other religions, the book asks students to identify and
write down some of the common values taught in the major systems of beliefs
in Singapore. The learning point is spelt out thus: “Each system of beliefs
may be based on different fundamental beliefs and practices, but ALL
emphasise universal values” (ibid., p. 21). The main religious festivals of the
different religions are also mentioned: Baisakji, Christmas, Deepavali, Hari
Raya Puasa, Qing Ming, Vesak, Zhong Yuan Jie. That the focus is on the
promotion of religious harmony rather than an exploration of the religious
teachings is seen in the exercise where students are asked the following
question: Think of a festival that you celebrated with a friend of a different
racial or religious background. Reflect on how this celebration has helped you
to know your friend better and complete the exercise below (ibid., p. 26). To
help students put their religious knowledge into practice, they are given an
etiquette guide relating to certain important religious customs and rules of
behaviour. This includes guidelines on diets, meal etiquette, offering of gifts,
and appropriate behaviour and dress codes at weddings, funerals and places
of worship. However, the guidelines are brief and do not explain the rationale
behind the dos and don’ts. Students are also asked how they can be sensitive
to the needs and feelings of people of other religions, and how this helps to
foster better relations.
Factual knowledge of the religions previously covered in RK is incorporated
into the CME syllabus, although in a less detailed and potentially less divisive
manner (Chew 1998). In alignment with the government’s policy not to
impart religious beliefs or induce religious experience, various religious
teachings are presented in a historical, objective and detached manner. Exclusive
and controversial claims are omitted, and potentially offensive words and
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326 Charlene Tan
issues like hell, condemnation and the fate of those who subscribe to other
religions are left out. For example, the notes on Christianity explain that Jesus
Christ “came as man to show mankind what God is like and what God wants
from them, and to bring salvation to all” (ibid., p. 44). But there is little
elaboration on why mankind needs salvation — a topic that is unavoidably
linked to the Christian doctrines of sin, hell and redemption. The notes also
stress on the need for Christians to love God and others through acts of love.
But what is omitted is that Christians are commanded to love non-Christians
by sharing their faith with them in the hope of converting them. The topic
of religious conversion, of course, is highly sensitive in multi-religious
Singapore, and is understandably omitted from the notes. But how then can
a Singaporean Christian balance his or her religious duty to evangelize on the
one hand, and his or her civic duty to preserve religious harmony on the
other? This and other thorny but real issues and dilemmas faced by adherents
of different religions are not addressed in the course notes. The notes also do
not discuss, clarify or dispel any misconceptions the public may have of
certain religions.
The importance of religious understanding and harmony is also
highlighted in NE. Launched in 1997, NE aims to develop in all Singaporeans
national cohesion, the instinct for survival, and confidence in the future. One
of six messages of NE is the preservation of racial and religious harmony. The
government hopes to achieve this by infusing NE across subjects in the
curriculum, and subjects such as Social Studies, CME, History, Geography
and General Paper are identified as particularly suitable for the infusion of
NE. Special days such as Racial Harmony Day (21 July) and International
Friendship Day (third working Friday of Term Two) are also celebrated in
schools. To preserve religious harmony, the NE website includes write-ups of
different religious festivals such as Ramadan, Hari Raya Puasa, the Hungry
Ghosts Festival, Easter, and Deepavali. Different religious festivals are briefly
and descriptively presented in the form of “what”, “who”, “where”, “why” and
“how”. For example, in the description of Vesak Day, the website explains the
“what” (it commemorates three major events in the life of Siddharta Gautama
Shakyamuni Buddha: his birth, enlightenment and Nirvana), “when” (it falls
on the full moon of the fourth lunar month of the Indian calendar), “who”
(the Buddhist community in Singapore is made up of various sects), and
“how” (general rites and rituals practised on that day include the chanting of
mantras and the pouring of perfumed water over the Buddha’s statue as a sign
of respect and devotion, etc.). Neither the metaphysical meaning of
“enlightenment” and “Nirvana”, nor the religious significance of chanting the
mantra or pouring perfumed water over the Buddha’s statue, is elaborated. It
326

is therefore difficult to see how the study of various religions is effective in

helping students to have a sufficiently accurate understanding of any
particular religion.
REFLECTIONS ON THE TEACHING OF RELIGION IN

SINGAPORE SCHOOLS
Two observations can be made about the government’s use of religion in
education. The first is its assumption that there is a direct correlation between
religion and morality. The government withdrew RK due to contingent
reasons which prevailed at that time, and not due to its repudiation of the
philosophical justification of religious education. In fact, then Senior Minister
Lee Kuan Yew stated that the government still believed in the rationale of
reinforcing the moral education that students had received in their earlier
years through a major religion (Parliamentary Debates, 54, 6 October 1989,
cols. 579, pp. 622–25, quoted in Tan 2000, p. 93).
A number of writers have pointed out how religion(s) can help a person
to think and act morally. Moulavi avers that “it is a fact that moral education
cannot succeed without religious education, because morality has its foundation
and root in religion” (1987, p. 8). Haydon (1997) argues that religion beliefs
provide the wider framework of meaning for moral demands to be experienced.
Jesuit priest Dr (Rev) Robert Balhetchet, who was involved in preparing the
secular moral education programme in Singapore, explains that there is an
added dimension for Christians to be moral as they believe that goodness
comes from God (Straits Times, 22 October 2002). By underscoring things
that are metaphysical and transcendent, most religions also promote “less
pragmatic and utilitarian attitudes and dispositions [such] as faith, hope,
charity, forgiveness, chastity and so forth” (Carr 1995, p. 95). Some parents
also share the belief that religious knowledge is salubrious for their children’s
moral development. It is reported that non-religious Chinese parents in
Hong Kong are keen to send their children to religious schools because they
perceive that these schools have more effective moral education (Cheng
2004). In their empirical research, Taris and Semin (1997) also conclude that
the religious faith of mothers helps in the transmission of moral values to
their children. They note that widely shared and objectively important core
values such as caring, honesty and fairness are passed down from the mothers
to their children.
However, it is important to note that the mere teaching of religious
knowledge does not automatically translate into greater moral commitment.
The positive effect of religion on morality depends on other factors such as
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328 Charlene Tan
religious orientation and level of education. In an empirical study on how

religiosity affects moral development, Ji (2004) concludes that the degree of
devout commitment to traditional religious doctrines and beliefs is conversely
related to the likelihood that Christians act at the principled-level of moral
reasoning. This means that a fervent believer who holds dogmatically to
teachings from his or her religious leaders is less likely to reason morally and
act independently. This can be potentially dangerous if the religious beliefs
are not shared by others in the society, or worse, are detrimental to society
at large.1
The second observation on the government’s use of religion in education
concerns its approach adopted in the teaching of religion in schools. There
are two main approaches in religious education: teaching for commitment,
and teaching about commitment.2 The first approach, “teaching for
commitment” or the confessional approach is traditionally used in ancient
churches to encourage the learners to embrace the faith. Such an approach
has been criticized as being unscientific and indoctrinative, making the
learners uncritical and dogmatic (Kazepides 1983; Carr 1996). This approach
is also inconsistent with the demands of a knowledge-based economy where
students are expected to be critical and creative thinkers.3 The rejection of the
confessional approach has given rise to the “teaching about commitment”
approach. This approach concentrates on different social and cultural
expressions of spirituality, rather than induction into substantial spiritual
beliefs (Carr 1996).
The “teaching about commitment” approach is the approach adopted by
the Singapore government. In taking this approach, the government has
explicitly distinguished “religious knowledge” from “religious instruction”,
and clarified that the former aims to inform the students “about the religion,
its founder or its origins, and the universal moral teachings and main beliefs
of the religion” (Parliamentary Debates, 41, 3 March 1982, col. 373; quoted
in Tan 2000, p. 86). As pointed out earlier, various religions were discussed
in the materials for RK, CME and NE in a historical, objective and detached
manner (Hill and Lian 1995; Kuah 1991; Gopinanthan 1999; Tan 2000).
This “teaching about commitment” approach has, however, met with a
number of objections. The most common criticism is that it does not
represent the true character of religion in its Herculean quest to avoid any
religious point of view. By being predominantly informational, the result is
that a truncated version of the religion is presented (Carr 1996). Moran
(1994) adds that this approach is neither possible nor desirable since one
cannot fully understand religion without a minimum level of personal interest
328

in it. Consequently, it distances children from directly apprehending the

religious experience. Indeed, the multi-faith approach may lead to “a position
of extreme relativism in which all belief systems are included in a value free
hotch-potch” (Cox, quoted in Bates 1996, p. 96). This approach also does
not ensure that the teacher will not teach the religion in a prescriptive and
biased manner. Bartkowiak points out that “a teacher could, deliberately or
inadvertently, teach comparative and historical material on religions in a
manner that amounts to the teaching of a particular religion” (1999, p. 199).
Overall, this approach makes it difficult for the students to acquire sufficient
religious knowledge for them to appreciate the major religions in Singapore,
and to imbibe the moral teachings propounded by these religions.
EXPLORING THE OPTIONS

Multireligious Education
If the descriptive, objective and sanitized version of belief systems under the
“teaching about commitment” approach is eschewed, how then can the same
materials be presented in a lively, powerful, and yet acceptable way? One
possibility is to introduce a multi-religious subject where students learn about
the various religions from a prescribed textbook in schools. This option was
considered back in the 1980s and was suggested again in recent years (for
example, Remarking Singapore Committee 2004; P. Tan 2005). But it was
rejected by the Government in 1989 due to practical constraints which still
exist today. As Dr Tony Tan, then Minister for Education explained in a
speech in Parliament on 20 March 1989:
[T]here was disagreement among the various religious bodies as to

which religions should be included … Once settled on the religions, the
Ministry found that no one could agree on which aspects of which
religion should be included for study … Indeed, the Ministry could not
find any academic, either in Singapore or overseas, who was brave
enough to try and write a textbook on this subject which should be
simple enough to be understood by secondary school students. The final
blow came when the Ministry realized that, even if the syllabus could be
agreed and materials developed, there was no possibility of finding
teachers who would be sufficiently conversant with the main principles
of five or six religions to the extent that they could confidently present
a fair and unbiased picture to their students (quoted in Remaking
Singapore Committee 2004, p. 2).
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330 Charlene Tan
The challenges mentioned remain. To illustrate the difficulty of

producing a textbook generally acceptable to adherents of all religions, it is
useful to look at the materials produced by the Inter-Religious Organization
(IRO). The IRO’s materials are not used as textbooks but they give us a
glimpse of what a book to promote religious understanding and harmony
may look like. One of its publications is Religions in Singapore where nine
religions (Baha’i Faith, Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism,
Islam, Sikhism, Taoism, and Zoroastrianism) are included. Essays on each
of the nine religions were drafted by IRO members who are adherents of
the respective religions (Inter-Religious Organization 1999, p. 3). The
strength of the book is that it goes beyond the mere description of the
various religions to elaborate on various religious concepts. For example,
there is a clear exposition of the Buddhist teaching of suffering. The reader
is introduced to a systematic treatment of the cause of suffering, the six
realms in which one may be reborn, the four unavoidable physical sufferings
— birth, old age, sickness and death — and three forms of mental
suffering — separation from the people one loves, contact with people
one dislikes, and the frustration of desires. The IRO book is also instructive
in addressing key issues of concern and controversy as viewed by a
particular religion. For example, the section on “War and Peace, Code of
Ethics” for Islam explains:
It is therefore shocking that some quarters of the media are trumpeting

that Jihad means Holy War. Jihad is any all-out but legitimate effort to
remove any kind of evil whether it is corruption, ignorance, superstition
or the enemy occupying one’s country’s territory. To propagate the
teachings of the Quran peacefully is a Jihad, while the Greater Jihad is to
fight one’s evil desire, the ego within (Inter-Religious Organization
1999, p. 135).
However, giving more liberty to the subscribers of various religions to

promote their religions may give rise to some unintended negative
consequences. For example, different writers can make a number of competing
claims in praise of their own religions which may not go down well with
adherents of other religions. For example, the writer for Zoroastrianism in the
IRO book writes: “Zoroastrians are world famous for their honesty, integrity,
compassion and charity. It is very difficult to equal the charitable spirit of
Zoroastrians” (ibid., p. 63). There is also the use of emotive words and value
judgements in the section on Christianity which may cast the religion in a
bad light:
330

A tragedy of Christian history is that the one church of Jesus Christ is

fragmented into many churches. Today there is wounded unity in the
body of Christ. Undoubtedly this happened because Christians preached
their own message instead of heeding the gospel call to repentance and
service (ibid., p. 121).
The readers, particularly the Christians, may prefer a less controversial and
objective account. In another example, the textbook for CME describes the
existence of different Christian denominations as follows:
Today, there are many denominations of Christians such as the Anglicans,

Catholics, Lutherans, Methodists and Presbyterians. All of them basically
believe in Jesus Christ but their interpretations and emphases are different
in certain aspects (CPDD 2001, p. 45).
Some Christians and Catholics may also disagree with the book’s classification
of the Roman Catholic church as a “denomination”.
In writing a book that is generally acceptable to adherents of all religions,
there appears to be a tendency to minimize or overlook the fundamental
differences among the religions in the attempt to emphasize their
commonalities. For example, another publication by the IRO reports a
religious representative at one IRO meeting praying as follows: “Oh Lord, the
different paths which men take through different tendencies, various though
they may be, various though they may appear, crooked or straight, all lead to
Thee” (quoted in Inter-Religious Organization 1987, p. 28). In the opening
address at the IRO meeting, another representative said:
Many are the names of God and infinite the forms that help us to know
Him. By whatever name and form you desire to know Him, in that very
form and under that name you will see Him. Different creeds are but
different paths to reach the one God (quoted in Inter-Religious
Organization 1987, p. 5).
While some religions may indeed teach that there are different paths to reach
the one God, there are other religions, supported by their sacred texts, which
strongly believe that their way is the only way to salvation. For a multi-
religious textbook to be acceptable by all religions, it should accurately reflect
the teachings of the various religions, including the exclusive claims, while
promoting religious appreciation and harmony at the same time. Clearly, this
is a daunting task for any textbook writer and teacher of religious education
in schools.
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332 Charlene Tan
Spiritual Education (SE)

Another option is Spiritual Education (SE). The common association of
Religious Education (RE) with the “teaching for commitment” or confessional
approaches has led some writers to favour SE over RE. The distinction
between SE and RE, of course, depends on what one means by “religion” and
“spirituality”. The common understanding of religion is that it consists of “a
set of ethics, doctrines, organizational hierarchies, and the history of any
particular religion” (Minney 1991, p. 388). On the other hand, spirituality is
understood as “a function of appreciation or reflection upon ideals or goals
which are both apt for positive moral evaluation and concerned with those
aspects of human experience which attempt to reach beyond the mundane
and the material towards what is transcendent and eternal” (Carr 1995,
p. 90).4 It is a distinctive capacity for the individual to make sense of oneself
within a wider framework of meaning and see oneself as part of some larger
whole (Hill 1989; Minney 1991; Haydon 1997).
SE aims to help students acquire insights into their personal existence
which are of enduring worth, attribute meaning to their life experiences, and
value a non-material and transcendental dimension to life (NCC 1993;
OFSTED 1994). Key aspects of spiritual development include a sense of awe,
wonder and mystery, feelings of transcendence, search for meaning and
purpose, and self-knowledge (Erricker 2000). Spiritual development may
include but is not confined to any set of religious beliefs, institutionalized
belief system, or any realm of worship. Although the term “spirituality” is
popularly associated with certain religions and trends such as the Kabbalah
and the New Age movement, there is no necessary connection between SE
and these religious manifestations.
Schools can promote SE through all areas of their curriculum, ethos and
climate (OFSTED 1994). Spiritual development could take place in various
subjects across the curriculum, especially the arts — literature, poetry, drama,
painting and music. Carr avers that the arts “have a key part to play in
communicating or explicating the sense of a connection between the temporal
and the eternal, the finite and the infinite, the material world and the world
of the soul, in human affairs” (Carr 1995, p. 95). Universal themes and values
from both religious and non-religious sources may be introduced to encourage
students to reflect on, internalize and apply the moral values learnt. For
example, the poems of English Romantics such as Wordsworth and Coleridge,
or those of local poets such as Edwin Thumboo could be used to help
students explore the themes of love, self-fulfilment and worship. Spirituality
can be promoted in the students when appropriate feelings are aroused by,
332

and desired values are inculcated through, natural or man-made disasters and
tragedies (Robson and Lonsdale 1987). For instance, a sensitive discussion of
the Ethiopian famine, the Asia tsunami tragedy or the Bali bombings could
prompt students to reflect on concepts and values such as human nature,
justice, compassion and social responsibility.
What then is the place of religion in SE? There is a close relationship
between SE and religion as the search for a wider framework of meaning for
SE usually leads one to explore religious beliefs and practices. SE could
include religious understanding and appreciation, albeit in a less formal and
structured way. Instead of teaching religions in their institutionalized form,
religious beliefs and practices are presented with the aim to develop an
empathetic awareness of and reflective approach towards the various religions.
This is in line with the survey result of 1,025 Singaporeans by Community
Development Feedback Group (Straits Times, 17 January 2004). It shows that
there is a need for more informal approaches towards religious understanding
that would exploit natural points of congregation. More dialogue among
adherents of different religions to clear any misconceptions and deepen one’s
understanding of other religions is also encouraged. This has already been
carried out by some organizations to promote racial and religious harmony.
For instance, a group of non-Muslim students learnt first-hand about the
Muslim way of life by visiting mosques during Hari Raya Haji, learning the
meaning of halal, and witnessing how sheep were humanely sacrificed
during the ritual called the Korban (Straits Times, 24 February 2002). Being
in an authentic setting rather than learning from the textbook helped them
to appreciate why that religious festival is important to Muslims. In another
event, 216 youths attended a three-day Ramadan camp organized by the
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) and the Southeast
Community Development Council (Straits Times, 30 November 2000).
The camp allowed the participants to interact informally with Muslim
leaders and provided the opportunity to ask questions and clarify any
misconceptions they may have about Islam.
There are a few reasons why SE may be a viable option for schools in
Singapore. The most obvious advantage is that SE avoids the problems and
challenges associated with a multi-religious subject, as mentioned earlier.
Secondly, there is also less concern that SE will accentuate religious differences
and contribute towards religious tensions and conflicts. SE is also more
palatable to those who are agnostic or atheistic. A survey by Kuo and Quah
in 1988 shows that 23.7 per cent of Singaporeans claimed to have no religion
while the 1990 census reports the figure to be 14.5 per cent (Tong 2004).
Another advantage for introducing SE to schools lies in the close relationship
333

334 Charlene Tan
between SE and moral values. Spiritual development is characterized by

reflection, attribution of meaning to experience, and an emphasis on a non-
material dimension to life and intimations of an enduring reality (OFSTED
1994). Such an approach which helps students to transcend “the fashionable
utilitarian values of the everyday” (Minney 1991) is particularly relevant in
the Singapore context in which the dominant ideology and the approach
towards moral education have been described by several researchers as
functionalist or utilitarian (for example, see Gopinathan 1980; Vasil 1984;
Chua 1985; Tan 1994; Chew 1998; C. Tan 2005). Commenting on the
teaching of moral values in Singapore schools, Gopinathan (1980) writes:
Without exception the stress is on how useful the set of prescribed values
would be to the nation, how the individual needs these values to be a
useful member of his society, and how adherence to these values guarantees
survival for him and his nation. … Nothing is heard in the Singapore
context of the humanising effect of moral education for the individual,
its integral place in a conception of education as a liberating and self-
fulfiling process (Gopinathan 1980, p. 178).
SE in schools may help fulfil the need for spiritual development as seen
in the trend among Singaporeans to go beyond material pursuits to find
deeper meaning in life. This is exemplified in the Singapore 21 Survey which
revealed that “having a happy family” was the most popular definition of
success among young people. This was followed by “doing well in one’s job
or studies” and “being knowledgeable and well-informed” (quoted in Teo
1998). It was also reported that more well-educated and young Singaporeans
are opting out of well-paying careers to go into full-time Buddhist, Taoist,
Muslim, Christian and Catholic ministries (Straits Times, 14 May 2005).
If SE is incorporated into the school curriculum, it may also help to iron
out the inconsistency currently existing in the CME syllabus. Tan and Chew
(2004) note that the CME syllabus for primary and even lower secondary
levels help students to progress from Kohlberg’s Level One to Two of moral
development.5 This is achieved by helping students to move away from solely
self-regarding motives towards greater awareness of communal interests. But
there is no progression to the next level which is characterized by authentic
moral motivation and reasoning where the motive is morally intrinsic. In
fact, Tan and Chew argue that the CME’s emphasis on pragmatism and
relativism entails the sliding back to Kohlberg’s Level One of acting on self-
regarding motivation. SE could rectify this by encouraging students to aim
towards more Kantian considerations where one acts morally because of
intrinsic reasons, and not purely because of utilitarian reasons stipulated by
334

the state. At the same time, SE may help to address the shortcomings of the
moral education programme highlighted in the 1979 and 1981 Reports. As
mentioned earlier, the content used in moral education then was found to be
too factual, dogmatic, without a theoretical framework, uninteresting and
irrelevant to the students. The pedagogical approach was also criticized as too
teacher-centred and didactic. In contrast, SE is student-centred — it focuses
on the student’s own construction of meaning in his or her life through
personal reflection, experience, and exploration of both religious and non-
religious phenomena. Through a liberating and self-fulfilling process, SE
could provide the humanizing effect of moral education and citizenship
education for the individual.
To argue for the introduction of SE in schools is not to deny that there
may be practical challenges involved. For example, it may not be easy for
schools to promote SE consistently through their curriculum, ethos and
climate, and to infuse SE into various subjects across the curriculum. Time
and effort are also needed to prepare suitable materials for SE, and to train
teachers to teach SE. But since SE does not require a systematic study of the
various religions in Singapore, it avoids the problems of deciding which
religions to be included in the teaching materials, which aspects of which
religion to be included for study, and finding teachers who could confidently
teach the religions in a fair and unbiased way.
CONCLUSION
Religious understanding and appreciation are of utmost importance in multi-
religious Singapore. In a rapidly changing world, it is increasingly difficult for
Singaporeans to confine religion to the private sphere. A recent survey shows
that a majority of people in Singapore — six out of ten — wants the
government to consider religious beliefs when making policy (Low 2005).
This is because national policies and debates on issues such as stem cell
research, organ donation and casinos are intricately linked to moral and
religious considerations (Lim 2005). This chapter has shown that religious
beliefs and practices are taught in an informational, historical and truncated
fashion in Singapore schools. It is argued that the “religious knowledge” or
“teaching about commitment” approach makes it difficult for the students to
imbibe the moral teachings propounded by various religions and to acquire
religious appreciation needed in citizenship education. The advantage of the
“teaching about commitment” approach is that it ensures that religion does
not, to use Kazepides’ word (1983), “tyrannize”, so there is little worry that
religious teaching will accentuate religious differences or cause inter-religious
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336 Charlene Tan
problems in Singapore. But such an approach is also ineffective in making

religion morally educative and socially beneficial for students in Singapore.
With the rise of extremist groups using religion to further their terrorist
agendas, it is heartening to note that there have been some frank discussions
on the rise of religiosity among Muslims and other religious groups, and on
ways to keep the various religious communities together (Fernandez 2005).
But more needs to be done to maintain religious harmony and to dispel any
religious prejudices and animosity. A case in point is the recent incident
where two men who posted inflammatory remarks against a particular religion
were convicted under the Seditious Act. What is disturbing is that although
they are young Singaporeans who have learnt about moral values in schools
and have friends who subscribe to that religion (Chong 2005; Nadarajan
2005), they remain so extreme and misguided in their views towards that
religion. How can students be equipped with the ability to reflect on their
own spiritual and religious inclinations, discuss these issues in a critical yet
matured manner, and uphold religious harmony in Singapore? The
introduction of SE to Singapore schools — where students are encouraged to
be spiritually, morally and religiously reflective and sensitive — may be a step
towards achieving this goal.
Notes
The author would like to thank Dr Lai Ah Eng, Dr Jason Tan and the Institute of
Policy Studies for their support, and participants at the IPS workshop for their
helpful comments. Views expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the author.
1. For further discussions on the relationship between religious and moral education,
see Wright 1983; Greer 1983; Cox 1983; Sealey 1983; Theron 1984; Callan
1989; Kunzman 2003a; 2003b; Nucci 2003.
2. This does not mean that there are only two approaches in the teaching of
Religious Education (RE). Different writers have used different terms to categorize
the different approaches. For example, Sealey (1985) identifies four main
approaches: (1) Confessional RE (2) Neo-confessional RE (3) Hidden-confessional
RE and (4) Implicit RE. The Schools Council Working Paper no. 36 in England
identifies three approaches: (1) Dogmatic or confessional approach (2) Anti-
dogmatic approach and (3) Undogmatic or Smart’s phenomenological approach
(Bates 1996). Thiessen (1993) refers to three main approaches: (1) Teaching for
commitment (2) Teaching about commitment and (3) Teaching from
commitment. In his survey of the current pedagogies of religious education,
Grimmit (2001) identifies seven types of pedagogical models: (1) Liberal Christian
Theological, Experiential, Implicit Models (2) A Phenomenological, Undogmatic,
Explicit Model (3) Integrative Experiential and Phenomenological Models
336

(4) Human Development, Instrumental, Learning About, Learning from Models

(5) An Ethnographic, Interpretive, Multi-faith Model (6) A Revelation-centred,
Concept-cracking, Trinitarian Christian Realist Model and (7) A Literacy-centred,
Critical Realist Model.
3. It should be pointed out that although the confessional approach was traditionally
associated with religious institutions, this does not mean that that it is the only
way for a person to be committed to a religion. In fact, critical understanding is
compatible with religious commitment, at least for the major religions in the
world today. For example, a Christian needs to personally understand the tenets
of the Christian faith and enjoys a living relationship with God, rather than
blindly accepts the religious teachings from the leaders without any personal
devotion to God. To quote from Laura and Leahy, “an authentic faith is an
autonomous faith” (1989, p. 259).
4. For more discussions on SE and its relationship with RE, see Carr 1995, 1996,
1999; Mackenzie 1998.
5. According to Kohlberg (1981, 1984), there are three levels of moral development:
the pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional. Each level has two
stages. Level One is the pre-conventional level where the person thinks and acts
from solely self-regarding motives, motivated by the fear of punishment and the
desire for rewards. At Level Two, the conventional level, the person goes beyond
the self to consider the good of community and preserve the rules of society. The
last level is the post-conventional level where the person progresses towards
authentic moral motivation and reasoning, guided by abstract ideals rather than
societal rules.
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Ji, Chang-Ho C. “Religious Orientations in Moral Development”. Journal of Psychology
and Christianity 23, no. 1 (2004): 22–30.
Kazepides, Tasos. “Is Religious Education Possible? A Rejoinder to W. D. Hudson”.
Journal of Philosophy of Education 17 (1983) 259–65.
Kohlberg, Lawrence. Essays on Moral Development, I: The Philosophy of Moral
Development: Moral Stages and The Idea of Justice. San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1981.
———. Essays on Moral Development, II: The Psychology of Moral Development. San
Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984.
Kuah, Khun Eng. “State and Religion: Buddhism and Nation-building in Singapore”.
Kunzman, Robert. “Religion, Ethics and the Implications for Moral Education: A
Critique of Nucci’s Morality and Religious Rules”. Journal of Moral Education 32,
no. 3 (2003a): 251-261.
———. “Rejoinder to Nucci’s ‘Morality, Religion and Public Education in Pluralist
Democracies’ ”. Journal of Moral Education 32, no. 3 (2003b): 271–73.
Kuo, Eddie C. Y., Jon S. T. Quah and Tong Chee Kiong. Religion and Religious
Revivalism in Singapore. Report prepared for Ministry of Community
Development, October 1988.
Laura, S. Ronald and Michael Leahy. “Religious Upbringing and Rational Autonomy”.
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Ling, Trevor O. Buddhism, Confucianism and the Secular State in Singapore. Working
Papers no. 79. Singapore: Department of Sociology, National University of
Singapore, 1987.
Low, Aaron. “6 in 10 Want Religious Input in Policy-making”. Straits Times,
16 July 2005.
Mackenzie, Jim. “David Carr on Religious Knowledge and Spiritual Education”.
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Minney, Robin. “What is Spirituality in an Educational Context?”. British Journal of
Educational Studies 39, no. 4 (1991): 386–97.
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Christian Education: A Reader on the Aims, Principles and Philosophy of Christian
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Herefordshire: Gracewing Fowler Wright, 1994.
Moulavi, M.H.B.S. “The Islamic View”. In Harmony Among Religions. Addresses given
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Nucci, Larry. “Morality, Religion and Public Education in Pluralist Democracies”.

Journal of Moral Education 32, no. 3 (2003): 264–70.
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———. Religious Education: Philosophical Perspectives. London: George Allen &
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———. “Learning First Hand the Muslim Way of Life”. 24 February 2002.
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342 Sa’eda Buang
14
RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AS
LOCUS OF CURRICULUM
A Brief Inquiry into Madrasah
Curriculum in Singapore
Sa’eda Buang
INTRODUCTION
In the context of Singapore, the madrasah has been understood as a religious
school or religious educational institution, be it at the preparatory
(kindergarten) stage, primary, secondary or post-secondary levels. The madrasah
has therefore been expected to offer a curriculum which focuses on religious
subjects to stay true to its sanctity as a religious institution. Such curricular
content for the madrasah has been construed by many Muslims to be sound
and logical to producing Muslim religious elites and its key educational
objective. However, the issue of curriculum content of madrasahs in Singapore
has been receiving public and national leaders’ attention since the 1980s as a
result of their less than satisfactory academic performance compared to that
of national schools in the annual national examinations.
There has been a growing concern over the madrasah’s peripheral position
in the overall scheme of national development and economic progress. Scores
of public forums and discourses took place within and amongst the madrasah
fraternity, religious elites, interested individuals and organizations on the
future and survival of madrasahs, particularly soon after the political leaders’
342
342

Religious Education as Locus of Curriculum 343
announcement of the introduction of compulsory education for the six

madrasahs. Out of such flurry of opinionated exchanges and public
engagements are demands for more reforms along the line of national schools’
curriculum, much to the traditionalists’ discontent. The traditional camp
argues that such reforms could blur the very basis of madrasah’s existence as
the repository of religious education and erode its religious character. The
articulations between contending parties, including those who are neutral but
whose interest lies in the continued existence of madrasahs in whatever form,
posit varied concerns. These range from the quality of teaching and learning
in madrasahs, infrastructures and support structure or the lack of it and
archaic pedagogy, to alleged socio-political engineering that could lead to the
madrasahs’ exit from the Singapore educational landscape. Putting all the
pieces of arguments and articulations together as one whole, one realizes that
the curriculum of the madrasah becomes the focal point of interest. While
much effort is on the way to reformulate the madrasah curriculum in the
context of the ever-changing and borderless world, there is a need to understand
the underlying philosophical and socio-religious make-up of the early
curriculum planners and the social context of their planning. Essentially, the
Muslims’ very defence of the traditional or classical curriculum has its roots
in the ideation of curriculum formulation in the socio-historical past.
An investigation of the tradition of curriculum inquiry forms the major
focus of this chapter. The discussion looks at the madrasah curriculum at both
philosophical and operational levels. The perspective of operational curriculum
here is eclectic in both the static and dynamic nature of curriculum.1 However,
due to space consideration, it is not possible to present details of syllabus
contents in this chapter; hence, only selected examples will be included.
The curriculum, as a field for study and action, consists of three main
dimensions: purpose, substance, and practice (Foshay 1987, 1988). The
intent to accomplish something (a purpose), by offering some experiences,
skills and knowledge (the substance), and by fitting the learning method or
pedagogy to actual students (educational practice) as well as the interactions
among these three dimensions, make a curriculum. The identification of
purpose logically precedes the provision of substance to render a curriculum
relevant and meaningful to the needs of the individual, group or community.
Curriculum purpose, substance and practice will be frequently used in this
discussion. Curriculum inquiry is concerned with answering specific questions
related to any of the domains of curriculum practice (curriculum policy-
making and evaluation, curriculum programme development, and curriculum
change and enactment) about which knowledge and understanding is sought
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344 Sa’eda Buang
(Short 1991, pp. 7–8). This discussion seeks to understand religious curriculum
development of the madrasah and its challenges, over the course of time in
Singapore. It is acknowledged that to comprehend curriculum development
and factors affecting such development as a complete and unified whole, a
single form of inquiry is far from sufficient. Multiple forms of inquiry are
therefore attempted. In cognizance of space limitation, selective and relevant
forms of inquiry, integrative, critical, historical, normative and philosophical,
are adapted often concurrently and at times singly where appropriate. While
curriculum development involves composite changes, including the resistance
of and acceleration for changes, inherent in the inquiry here is the quest to
uncover stumbling blocks for religious curriculum reforms.
CLASSICAL CURRICULUM AND CULTURAL

REPRODUCTION
Classical theory of curriculum, sometimes called the Old Humanists,2 promotes
the transmission and conservation of cultural heritage, which is made up of
pure (rather than applied) knowledge in traditional forms. This form of
curriculum values knowledge for its own sake, emphasizing its purity and
aesthetics as opposed to utilitarian knowledge, which is viewed as inferior.
Such traits are evident in the early madrasah’s curriculum purpose and rationale.
The formulation of curriculum purpose or educational goal of the early
madrasahs or other earlier religious educational institutions such as the pondok
(literary means hut, derived from the Arabic funduq which means an inn or
hotel, and here referring to Muslim boarding schools) or pesantren (also
loosely defined as Muslim boarding schools prevalent in Indonesia) was
relatively homogenous throughout the Malay archipelago for various reasons.
Many researchers point to the purpose of producing individuals who are
subservient to God and knowledgeable in Islam and who will ultimately
become Muslim clerics or religious teachers — as the curriculum purpose or
educational goal commonly held by many early religious schools in Southeast
Asian countries.3 Epistemologically, that Islam is a religion that confers the
seeking of knowledge as obligatory of every Muslim is undeniably the basis
for the formulation of such educational goal. Knowledge in Islam has been
referred to the “recognition of the proper places of things in the order of
creation, such that it leads to the recognition of the proper place of God in
the order of being and existence” (Al-Attas 1980, pp. 17–19). Inherent in the
concept are order and proper sequencing of things so that they are placed in
their proper position, reflecting their worthiness for that position. It has been
argued that this need to position types and branches of knowledge is without
344

exception. Moreover, although time is infinite, physical space and physical

and financial resources for education are otherwise. Due to this consideration,
knowledge to be learned in religious schools had therefore been categorized
and prioritized, and syllabus planned for ideological and educational
development and practical reasons.
In ascertaining the domains of knowledge and its hierarchy, in term of
importance and therefore sequence for instruction, Muslims in this region
were generally very much influenced by the taxonomy of knowledge
promulgated by classical Muslim scholars such as Ibn Sina, Al-Arabi, Ibn
Khaldun and particularly the twelfth century Muslim scholar of Baghdad,
Al-Ghazali.4 In his taxonomy, Al-Ghazali distinguishes knowledge into two
bodies: religious sciences or sacred knowledge and non-religious sciences or
profane knowledge. Al-Ghazali epitomizes syariah or religious sciences,
particularly on tauhid (articles of faith) which includes the essence and
attributes of God, at the apex of the strata or fardhu ain (compulsory rituals
and theology that must be learned and practised by every individual), whilst
other sciences such as usul fiqh or principles of jurisprudence, arithmetic and
natural sciences are regarded as praiseworthy or profane knowledge. A few
others such as magic and talismanic sciences are considered undesirable or
blame-worthy and therefore not regarded as curriculum. At the macro level,
Al-Ghazali’s division of knowledge merges to achieve a picture of totality
where the two bodies of knowledge meet because they require each other to
be complete, meaningful and practical.
The early madrasah however, emphasized the micro aspect of the taxonomy
where the division was taken to be final in essence and structure, with one
branch of knowledge considered inferior and therefore omitted. The taxonomy
failed to be seen as a complete whole; each division strengthening each other.
This misconception impaired curriculum soundness of the early madrasahs in
the region, in terms of substance and practice. A number of studies have
concluded that this misconception was entrenched deeply even in the present
madrasah curriculum and led to the latter’s reductionism in the scope of
knowledge.5 Consequently, the pedagogical aspect of the curriculum had also
been reduced to the level of memorization and blind acceptance, contrary to
the use of rational and inquisitive mind celebrated by the intellectual tradition
of classical Muslim scientists and scholars up to twelfth century.6
Al-Ghazali had further proposed that, while the seeking of knowledge is
important, the teaching of religious knowledge is superior and a vocation that
receives divine blessings.7 Such a high regard for the position of the teaching
and learning of religious knowledge is not problematic in itself. However, the
conception of knowledge becomes problematic when the body of profane
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346 Sa’eda Buang
knowledge is inferred as less superior. This dichotomy of knowledge — of the

sacred and profane — has remained central in Muslims’ conception of
knowledge and reinforced further by the processes of socialization. Madrasah
curriculum, in this instance, had served as a vehicle for such cultural
reproduction and dichotomy of knowledge.
Socio-historically, the preservation and promotion of the common purpose
of madrasah education to producing religious elites was also possible due to
a number of factors. One was the transnational profile of the students in
religious classes, pondoks or madrasahs which were usually led by well-known
religious scholars who mostly had received further education at the Grand
Mosque of Mecca or Masjidil Haram. More often than not, these teachers
were also leaders of numerous tarikat (which means the spiritual path,
representing the inner dimension of Islam) that had gained popular in the
early twentieth century.8 It was therefore not an unfamiliar scene to see many
Siamese males studying Islam in popular centres of Islamic education such as
Kelantan or Trengganu, or Kelantanese males in Palembang or Patani and
vice versa. After completing their studies, these graduates would establish a
school in their home land, replicating their alma mater to the last detail in the
areas of purpose, substance and practice. Should curriculum adjustments be
introduced, they were in the areas of substance and practice, and only to a
slight degree. These common traits in curriculum substance are evident in the
use of kitab kuning (literally means yellow scriptures), which refers to a body
of classical religious canons, throughout the region including Singapore. This
aspect will be discussed in much detail later.
The second factor was that religious education was seen as the last
bastion against the religious and political encroachment of the colonials.9 The
need to strengthen Muslims’ faith through religious education gained
tremendous momentum with the introduction of English and vernacular
schools which were construed as threatening the fundamental belief, socio-
psychological make-up and way of life of Muslims. To defend the purpose
and substance of religious education against the colonials’ onslaught had
never been more urgent and the madrasah served this function effectively.
The process of replicating the prevalent madrasah prototype served as a
pattern which was repeated throughout the region until post-colonialism or
the onset of each country’s independence when progress and national
integration through a national education system became the main socio-
political and economic thrusts of each nation. The formation of the earlier
madrasahs in Singapore in terms of purpose, substance and practice, was
fashioned in the same way. One specific instance was the establishment of
346

Madrasah Bustanul Arifin in Coronation Road in the 1940s by Ahmad

Sonhaji Mohammad, replicating the educational purpose, substance and
practice of Perguruan Agama Islam Rengat (Rengat Islamic Religious Teaching
College) in Rengat, Indonesia.10 In addition, the emergence of Singapore as
a centre for religious learning in the early twentieth century had attracted
many to study or establish their madrasahs here. Madrasah Assibyan, formed
in 1901 and believed to be the first madrasah in Singapore,11 is said to possess
the characteristics, in terms of substance and practice, of the prevailing
madrasahs12 in the region, to infer replication. Student profile includes locals
and those from various states of Malaysia. Inadvertently, the curriculum
purpose of producing a continuous supply of religious clerics to protect the
religion and to guide the Muslim community had led to the establishment of
more than fifty privately or community-funded madrasahs or religious schools,
both formal and informal, up to early 1970s.13 However, except for a handful,
almost all of these madrasahs are now defunct.
CURRICULUM FOR SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION

The unquestionable value of specific “religious” knowledge as justified by the
elaborations above, characterizes the classical or traditional curriculum of
madrasahs. Such emphasis on this specific knowledge, owing to its long-held
traditional “value” and importance and the negation towards “other”
knowledge, remained unchallenged until the spread of Pan-Islamism in the
region and the establishment of Madrasah Al-Iqbal in 1907 by Muslim
reformists such as Syed Sheikh Al-Hadi. The early twentieth century onwards
witnessed the revival and flourishing of Muslim reformists’ ideology in
Singapore and Malaya but one which was seen by the traditional religious
elite as a challenge to the religious institution of learning, customs and
traditions and, most importantly, to the traditional elites’ status quo. Proposed
reforms for religious education curriculum by the reformists were construed
by the traditional religious elite as religious decadence. The reformists’ refusal
to submit to the well-established classical curriculum practice sparked the
long drawn polemic between the Kaum Tua (the traditionalists) and Kaum
Muda (the reformists).14
To the reformists, the classical curriculum’s purpose and practice were
static and unresponsive to its social context. Despite fierce retaliation from
the traditional religious elite at the societal and personal levels, the Pan-
Islamic reformist ideology greatly influenced the thinking of some religious
scholars and led to a shift in the statement of purpose which consequently
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348 Sa’eda Buang
influenced the substance of the new curriculum. In a departure from the

classical curriculum, the reformists posited curriculum as a potent agent of
social change and social reconstruction. The group aspired to establish an
educational institution that would emphasize the importance of knowledge
and offer balanced education and the application of rational thinking, with
the hope of producing students who would be life-long learners, loyal to the
country and dedicated to serve humanity. Such curriculum reform initiated
by Madrasah Al-Iqbal15 was based on its philosophy of education:
Education is the doorway to one’s faith, and knowledge is the ‘sun’ that
covers darkness. This is the secret that only the wise can comprehend.
Knowledge is the weapon to achieve one’s success amidst one’s continuous
struggles in life; it is the prerequisite that enables man to achieve his goal
to proclaiming victory and excellence. Knowledge is the treasury of truth
and pool of wisdom; it is the true path that leads us to perfection. It is
the light that will illuminate the whole country if it fills man’s heart and
intelligence.16
The departure of the reformist curriculum statement of purpose from

that of the classical depicted the urgency to reconstruct the Muslim community
towards political independence, progressive socio-economic and religious
outlook through the use of reasoning and the courage to exercise independent
thinking. Such educational purpose endeavoured to effect reformation in all
areas of Muslims’ lives, from the mundane aspects to the extent of re-
evaluating and revalidating the religious norms and opinions of the day, based
on reasoning and reference-analysis on authentic sources of knowledge, in
this case the Qur’an, the tradition of the Prophet, ijma ulama’ or scholars’
consensus, while taking into account the social context within which an
opinion is formed. The traditional religious elite’s dominance in curriculum
design and unresponsiveness to the backwardness of the Muslims in the
cognitive, socio-economic and political spheres were critically analysed and
subsequently rejected by the reformists.
A progressive curriculum content or substance was consequently designed
to respond to the critical needs of the community. The new curriculum
content was much in contrast to the fixed and long-established curriculum of
Qur’anic reading and the teaching of fardhu ain, as practised by most religious
classes in Singapore and the region. Madrasah Al-Iqbal radically included
non-religious subjects such as arithmetic, geography, Malay language, English
language, town planning and general science into the madrasah curriculum to
propagate the idea of the unity of knowledge and balanced education. This
was a far cry from the subjects and syllabus offered at Madrasah Assibyan,
348

established earlier in 1901, which offered the reading of the Qur’an, lughah
(Arabic grammar), tauhid (pertaining to basic Islamic faith to affirm the
Oneness of Allah), and mahfudzat (a body/codex of the Muslim scholars’
traditions), wirid or chants and verses for supplication — a curriculum
substance that could be considered as the prototype for Muslim religious
schools or institutions in Singapore in the pre and early twentieth century.
The heavy concentration on the study of theology, rituals and the teaching
of fiqh which was devoid of practical consideration of the current socio-
economic and political contexts, had rendered this curriculum prototype less
able to equip the Muslims with skills and knowledge to be progressive. This
had led to the call for reform, but as has been mentioned earlier, the Madrasah
Al-Iqbal was short-lived. The interplay between the threatened status quo of
the religious elite (Roff 1967) and the Muslim community’s reluctance to
effect normative change for reform led to Madrasah Al-Iqbal’s downfall after
one year of its inception in Singapore. Another deciding factor was the lack
of financial support for the madrasah. The same fate also befell Madrasah
Al-Hadi, founded in 1917 in Malacca by the same reformist, Syed Syeikh
Al-Hadi. Again, under the traditional community’s pressure, it had to be
closed down after operating for only two years. Nevertheless, Madrasah
Al-Iqbal’s spirit of reform has remained as the guiding principle for the latter-
day madrasahs, and this continued struggle for reform can be traced in the
latter-day madrasahs’ curriculum which will be discussed later.
The above discussion highlights the impact of determinants and
principles of curriculum development as two pillars decisively affected the
degree of success or failure of a madrasah curriculum.17 For example,
manpower requirement for the effective implementation and preservation
of classical curriculum was relatively less problematic. Religious teaching as
a vocation assumed great respect from the community and had ensured a
steady pool of religious teachers as manpower resources. Similarly, the
demand for religious education remained high. However as the case of
Madrasah Al-Iqbal showed, the reformist educational purpose to achieve
socio-religious reconstruction can be thwarted by the principle of cultural
reproduction as a tool for maintaining the traditional religious elites’
dominance. Thus, even as the demand for religious education remained
constant and manpower requirement was steady, the issue of curriculum
principles continued to be unresolved. Indeed, even after independence,
the madrasah curriculum remained largely out of touch with the socio-
economic challenges of industrialization and growing complexity of
urbanization, adhering instead to the long-held curriculum’s purpose,
substance and practice. Since then, coercion and/or self-responsiveness to
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350 Sa’eda Buang
rapidly changing socio-economic and political environments have led to

the curriculum of the present-day madrasahs undergoing changes. The
interplay of social context and the underlying philosophy of education that
affect the present madrasah’s changing curriculum will be discussed next,
but prior to this, the curriculum’s substance in the pre-Independence period
as a tool for cultural reproduction will be briefly discussed.
THE TEXTS FOR CULTURAL REPRODUCTION

As pointed out earlier, the process of replication expedited the application of
a classical curriculum in the Southeast Asian region. The prevalent interpolation
between schools of thoughts such as the Sunni-Shiite and Mu’tazilat-Sha’ari-
Jabariah-Qadariyah elsewhere in the region had little impact on the selection
of curriculum content of the early madrasahs in Singapore. The decision to
select, include and develop “what” subjects and syllabus was in the hands of
individual religious clerics or teachers who mostly conformed to the prominent
school of thought, the Shafie doctrine. The curriculum prototype from
around the region, namely Indonesia, Patani and Malaya, was abundant and
highly regarded by the madrasahs in Singapore. As pointed out earlier, these
clerics were mostly products of the pondoks or religious schools in one of these
countries, hence the adoption and replication of their curriculum substance
and practice in Singapore.
Although records of an early religious curriculum in Singapore are few,
scattered and still heavily reliant on oral history, these accounts throw some
light on the nature of the early religious curriculum in terms of its philosophy,
pedagogy or teaching and learning practices. While non-exhaustive, Ahmad
Sonhaji Mohammad’s (Abdul Samad Haji Junied 1999, pp. 297–99) listing
of 22 religious texts18 predominantly used in religious classes and madrasahs
in early Singapore until independence not only depicts the scope, width and
depth of religious syllabus. It also underscores the strong influence of Patani
(Thailand), Aceh and Banjar (Indonesia) Muslim scholars’ religious thoughts
on the Muslims’ religious education and practices in Singapore. For instance,
fifteen of the texts (68 per cent) used in Singapore up to late 1980s were Kitab
Kuning (literally meaning yellow scriptures) which were also called as Kitab
Jawi (Jawi scriptures).19 These kitabs were written by Muslim scholars of the
said areas as early as 163420 but mostly in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Kitab Jawi, written in the classical Malay language using Arabic
characters, functioned as a major source of Islamic knowledge in the Malay
Archipelago. The selected texts used in Singapore’s formal religious schools
350

and non-formal religious classes covered six main components of religious

knowledge such as the Qur’an, hadith (the Prophet’s traditions), tauhid
(theology), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), mahfudzat and lughah. At least two
similar texts on theology, Kitab Usul al-Din (The Source of Religion) written
by Muhammad Mukhtar b. Atarid al-Jawi al-Batawi of Bogor, Indonesia in
1905 and Kitab Faridat al-Fara’id penned by Ahmad b. Muhammad Zayn
al-Fatani, a renowned Muslim scholar from Patani, Thailand, widely used as
canons in the pondoks in Kelantan from 1910 to 1957 (Che Awang bin Che
Harun 1995, pp. 53–54) were also used by Singapore madrasahs.
Early religious teaching in madrasahs was mainly based on the Shafie
doctrine, the school of thought predominantly adhered to by the Muslims
in the archipelago up till the present. The study of tauhid, aqidah (belief ),
or ilmu sifat (knowledge on the attributes of God) as espoused by the school
of Ash’ari21 (935 A.D.) formed the locus of interest and characterized the
way religion was mainly taught and learned. Integral to the subject of
tauhid were the attributes and essence of God and His messengers, jinns22
and angels. Elaborations on the creation of the universe, the world and
man, including the character and position of man vis-à-vis the world and
the Creator were studied as part of the body of tauhid. To know, memorize
and be able to recite the twenty attributes of God was expected of every
learner of Islam. Although thoughts on social, political and economic
aspects of life were offered in the study of fiqh, hadith and mahfudzat, they
were presented from the social context of Muslim society as one homogenous
entity. Almost absent in the content of early religious teaching were the
complexities and realities of living in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic
societies, as were the demands of modernization. Living under colonial
political hegemony also gave Muslims little impetus to correct the imbalances
of socio-economic and political power through the educational machinery
of the madrasahs. The colonial policy of non-interference in religion and
customs provided the Muslim community with a false sense of security even
though the traditional elite’s real political power had been effectively stripped
by the colonial rule. Furthermore, as cultural reproduction was the main
aim of religious schooling, what was inherited from the past was passed on
with solemn obligation. In this case, the maintenance and continuation of
socio-religious order and hierarchy through the domain of knowledge was
strongly put in place in the madrasah by the traditional religious elite, and
this greatly influenced the madrasahs’ curriculum content. It is also important
to remember here that one of the curriculum’s educational objectives was
the creation of a desirable man in the professions of the Muslim cleric and
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352 Sa’eda Buang
religious teacher. This aspiration was held in reverence amongst the Muslims
in Singapore,and until 1973, a record of fifty-two madrasahs were set up in
Singapore, either privately by wealthy individuals or by religious organizations
or the Muslim community.23
At the same time, it is important to remember that the idea to reform the
curriculum was attempted by a number of madrasahs, particularly after post-
Independence in 1965. This attempt was reflected in the madrasah’s curriculum
content. For example, Madrasah Aljunied offered eighteen subjects, such as
fiqh, hadith, mastalah al-hadith (science of methodology of the hadith), tafsir,
tarikh (Islamic history), dianah (religion), tahzib, qira’ah (the reading of
Qur’an), nahu (Arabic grammar), saraf, Qur’an, tajwid, tauhid, lughah,
mahfuzat, mutala’ah, and two non-religious subjects, viz., geography and
arithmetic. The now defunct Madrasah Bustanul Islamiah24 offered eleven
subjects, viz., fiqh, saraf, tauhid, tarikh Islam, Qur’an, tajwid, hadith, and four
non-religious subjects, geography, reading, history and arithmetic. The
geography syllabi covered the Malay Peninsula, while the history syllabi
encompassed the Malay world. Besides Arabic, Malay language was offered.
At the same time, both madrasahs used at least five similar religious texts.25
On the whole, although the curriculum content has undergone changes
particularly in recent years, the classical curriculum’s purpose has nonetheless
remained largely unchanged, and its conscious preservation has led to the
continuation and promotion of cultural reproduction.
TECHNOCRATIC UNDERCURRENTS OF
MADRASAH CURRICULUM
In recent years, the curriculum’s purpose of the six remaining full-time
madrasahs in Singapore has been reformulated to inject dynamism into them
and to be responsive to larger economic and socio-political transformations.
Madrasah Al-Ma’arif Al-Islamiah, for example, pronounces its philosophy of
education as:
To provide an education that is balanced and synchronises, dynamic and

flexible, based on Al-Quran, Assunah and Al-Ijma, including field research
development and development of ijtihad in Islamic laws so that the
students will become relevant to any community they are in.26
Based on its vision to produce excellent students in accordance with Islamic

perspectives, the madrasah outlined its curriculum purpose(s), viz., to produce
students who are pious muslimahs, appreciative of Islamic values, who are
352

moral, possess love for knowledge and learning, proactive, productive towards
themselves, families, community and country, and able to achieve excellent
results in major examinations such as the Primary School Leaving Examination
(PSLE), Thanawi 4, General Certificate of Education (GCE) ‘Ordinary’ and
‘Advance’ Level examinations. The madrasah’s philosophy of education
underscores the premier position of rationality and therefore, ijtihad (the use
of one’s independent reasoning on a point of law not explicitly covered by the
Qur’an or the sunna) in its curriculum design. Balanced education, both in
terms of religious and non-religious subjects, is offered to producing excellent
students in terms of academic performance and moral character. The
curriculum purpose clearly indicates its goal to producing individuals who
can function as sources of knowledge and Islamic legal advisors,who will be
able to meet and overcome the challenges of the modern world, and be at par
with other communities in the labour market.
Such a curriculum purpose is a far cry from the classical curriculum of
the earlier madrasah. Religious elitism is redefined and expanded to include
not only the religious scholars but also any professional who is well-versed
in Islam and hence able to implement ijtihad in religious matters. The
madrasah attempts to be wholesome in its curriculum, detailing every
specific goal, in terms of intelligence, academic performance, religious
development, moral character, personal skills, and social function, of its
subject (students). One may also notice the madrasah’s strong tendency to
be pragmatic, forward looking and socially conscious, in the statement of
purpose. In short, the curriculum purpose reflects its technocratic character
by taking into account the functional needs of the nation, particularly of
economic and technological progress. It acknowledges and conforms to the
meritocratic hierarchy of Singapore society and its values of utilitarianism,
pragmatism and technological development. The same could be said of
other madrasahs’ present-day curriculum.
Having identified the undercurrent in the present madrasah’s curriculum
purpose as being technocratic-pragmatic, one may ask what is left of
religious education and the need to enrich the spiritual domain of students?
Madrasah Al-Ma’arif asserts that religious education remains important as
the main business of madrasahs, although overtly the number of religious
curriculum hours has been reduced to cater for the inclusion of non-
religious subjects such as mathematics, English language, Malay language,
Malay literature, geography, social studies, additional mathematics, general
paper and science. The teaching of tauhid, fiqh, akhlak, hadith, sirah (Islamic
history), tafsir, Qur’an, usuluddin (theology) and syariah continues to be
offered although in a compressed form, in terms of content and time, under
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354 Sa’eda Buang
the umbrella of religious study. In the case of Madrasah Al-junied, the

modular system has recently been introduced as a solution to the problem
of curriculum time allocation.27 For instance, tauhid and fiqh are offered in
Semester One while sirah and akhlak are offered in Semester Two of the
primary level curriculum. Such an innovative strategy is taken to ensure the
number of hours apportioned for non-religious subjects are equivalent to
the allocation in national schools, a factor that the madrasah believes to be
crucial in its effort to achieve the target passing rate in the national
examinations.28 Once again, pragmatism drives the madrasah to be conscious
of factors such as substance and practice to achieve its curriculum purpose,
and more importantly, its survival. At the same time as pragmatism and
utilitarian seem to be the order of the day, religious education is assured of
its presence in the madrasah education system. Two more madrasahs,
Madrasah Al-Ma’arif and Madrasah Wak Tanjung, have in 2004 gained
accreditation from the premier Al-Azhar University in Cairo, besides
Madrasah Al-Junied. A religious education track is also now being offered
up to post-secondary level in the three madrasahs, to cater to students with
aptitude in Arabic language and religious education. Besides Al-Azhar,
students on the religious track may pursue basic degrees in other Islamic
universities in Malaysia and the Middle Eastern countries.
How different is the teaching pedagogy for religious subjects to non-
religious ones? This question is imbued with the implicit assumption that
there are differences in terms of methodology and quality of teaching and
learning, or are they? Many discussions on the madrasah have revolved
around the concern over the dominant use of memorization and rote learning
even in the latter-day madrasah. This concern is not without valid reason. For
instance, memorization of the Qur’an is carried out in madrasahs from
Secondary One to Secondary Four levels. However, the issue that is more
pertinent than memorization per se is the function of such a teaching method
and its relevance in a strategy of creative learning and teaching. Some madrasah
religious teachers acknowledge the constraint of delivering subjects like tauhid
(the unity of God), by using role play as an example of a creative teaching
strategy. In this instance, an equally creative strategy such as experiential
learning by observing nature and its phenomena is considered more appropriate
and effective.29 The subject nature of fiqh, on the other hand, gives madrasah
teachers a lot of room to role-play so that the complexity of Islamic law could
be comprehended in its simplified and practical version.30 The use of the
Internet and electronic devices in the teaching and learning of religious
education is also becoming more evident. What remains certain is whether
354

these innovative examples and practices will become the norm, consistently
applied across all madrasahs and at all levels, or be the exception.
When translated at the level of curriculum substance, the current madrasah
curriculum demands an equitable apportion of time, space, infrastructure
and attention for both religious and non-religious subjects. Inherently, it
further demands relevant teaching pedagogy that supports rational thinking,
an inquisitive mind and creativity to render the curriculum purpose and
content meaningful and achievable. These are the challenges that the madrasah
needs to address effectively, lest the curriculum purpose remains a statement
of non-operationalized goals. Judging from the responses of one principal,31
the madrasah looks set to meet these challenges head-on with various
intervention and coping strategies despite the lack of finance and school
infrastructure to harness effective teaching and learning opportunities.
CONCLUSION
Madrasah curriculum development has not been linear, as evident from the
socio-historical narration and analysis of this chapter. It is also evident that a
set of curriculum may thrive and another be abolished due to power assertion
of elite groups and public opinion. The combination of these two factors had
directly stunted the growth and progress of early madrasah education and
subsequently, even though the community was in dire need for socio-economic
reform. The failure of Madrasah Al-Iqbal to survive illustrates the failure of
an educational institution to effect changes in the religious and social outlook
of its community through relevant strategies despite the call for curriculum
reform. The symbiotic relationship between the madrasah and the community
to influence and educate each other has failed to take place due to lack of
effective strategies, including the power of persuasion. The example also
underscores the argument that structural and physical change is relatively less
problematic than the normative shift in one’s mentality. This can be a lesson
for madrasah curriculum planners.
Challenges faced by the madrasahs in Singapore are multi-faceted. The
formulation of an all encompassing and yet achievable curriculum purpose
requires a sound philosophy of man and education, mental dexterity,
pragmatism, vision, as well as a strong sense of humanity. To galvanize
support for such a curriculum is a challenge that must be faced and
overcome. The bigger challenge is to ensure the realization of such a
curriculum in terms of curriculum content and practice, lest it remains just
an ideation that cannot be concretized. The madrasah must deliver on this.
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356 Sa’eda Buang
Finally, whether the role of the madrasah curriculum is to maintain cultural

reproduction, to promote social reconstruction or to pragmatically expedite
socio-economic progress and academic excellence, it is evident that religious
education remains its locus.
Notes
1. The static curriculum is the planned and written syllabus and activities in
classrooms, while the dynamic nature of curriculum is the result of the interaction
of developed plans for school study with the backgrounds, personalities, and
capacities of students in a transactional environment created by teachers and
schools for the benefit of students as well as for the better implementation of the
plan (Longstreet and Shane 1993).
2. Ernest, “Education, Philosophy and Science”. Oxford Reference Online.
<http://oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=main&entry=
t210.e30> (accessed on 4 April 2006).
3. To cite a few, see Khoo, Malay Society and Hasan Madmarn, The Pondok and
Madrasah in Patani.
4. Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali (died in 505 A.H./1111 A.D.) is regarded
as the reformer (mujaddid ) of the fifth century of the Islamic era. Endowed with
encyclopaedic knowledge and a saintly character, Al-Ghazali extended his
accomplishments over various fields or learning such as ethics, logic, dogmatic
theology, and Islamic jurisprudence. The creative part of his life can be broadly
divided into an early period, and a later period when he became a mystic. Most
of his later works are exclusively ethical in nature, and deal with that morality
which will ensure ultimate happiness. For further reading, refer to Muhammad
Abul Quasem, The Ethics of Al-Ghazali: A Composite Ethics in Islam.
5. See Syed Farid Al-Atas, “Knowledge and Education in Islam”, pp. 176–77.
6. See Syed Khairudin and Dayang Siti Aishah, “Estranged From the Ideal Past:
Historical Evaluation of Madrasahs in Singapore”, pp. 249–60.
7. Al-Ghazali, The Book of Knowledge, p. 20.
8. Most popular tarikat practised in early Singapore till 1980s were Tariqah ‘Alawiyah,
Tariqah Al-Qadiriyyah Wal-Naqshabandiyyah, followed by other tarikat such as
Ash-Shaziliyyah, Al-Idrisiyyah, As-Saman, Ad-Darqawiyyah and Ar-Rifa’iyyah.
See Abdullah Alwi Haji Hassan “Islam di Singapura: Satu Pengenalan”. A
number of these tarikats were popular in Kelantan in the second half of the
nineteenth century, for example Tareqat Ahmadiyyah, Nakhsyabandiyyah,
Syatariah, Syazzaliyyah. See Nik Abdul Aziz bin Haji Nik Hassan “Islam dan
Masyarakat Kota Bharu di antara Tahun 1900–1933”, pp. 29–30.
9. Ahmad Sonhadji bin Mohammad Milatu. He narrates the role of the madrasah
in injecting the spirit of nationalism and anti-colonialism during World War II
and the British Occupation.
356

10. Suratman, Menyongsong Arus, pp. 40–44.

11. Researchers such as Abdul Samad bin Haji Junied (1995), Abdullah Alwi Haji
Hassan (1981) and Muhd Nor bin Hasbun (undated) conferred Madrasah
As-Sibyan as the first privately registered religious school or madrasah in Singapore.
In his research on religious institutions in pre-Independence Singapore, Muhd.
Nor bin Hasbun related the establishment of Madrasah Assibyan in 1901 by
Ustaz Mohamad bin Mohamad Said in his home, which is opposite the Sultan
Mosque. Although the religious class was home-based, Muhd Nor opined that
the establishment could still be considered as madrasah due to the very nature of
the curriculum contents which were similar to those run by later madrasahs. See
Muhd Nor bin Hasbun, Pengajaran Agama Islam di Singapura, pp. 11–12.
12. Muhd Nor Hasbun, ibid., p. 12.
13. Ibid., pp. 16–19.
14. For further discussion on the conflict and religious polemic between the “Young
Faction” or Kaum Muda and “Old Faction” or Kaum Tua see Roff, The Origins
of Malay Nationalism, pp. 66–67.
15. Besides Syed Sheikh Al-Hadi, co-founders and teachers of the school were Tuan
Haji Abas Mohamad Taha, Raja Mohamad Said bin Mohamad Tahir and Syed
Mohamad Bin Aqil bin Yahua, who was believed to be a Sufi-mystical leader
(tarikat). See Muhd Nor bin Hasbun (undated), op. cit., p. 13.
16. Quoted from Abu Bakar Hamzah, Al-Imam: Its Role in Malay Society 1906–
1908. Translation is mine.
17. The determinants are manpower requirement, the demand for education and
the learners; principles which refer to situation-analysis, objectives, learning
experiences, learning content, learning opportunities and evaluation.
18. See Abdul Samad bin Haji Junied, Perkembangan Pendidikan Islam di Singapura,
Satu Kajian Kes Madrasah Al-Junied Al-Islamiyyah (1970–1990), pp. 297–99.
19. See Mohd Nor Ngah (1982, p. vii).
20. Assiratul Mustaqim (The Straight Path) was written in 1634 by Sheikh Nuruddin
Muhammad Jailani bin Ali Hasan Ji bin Muhammad Humaid Ar-Raniri, a
renowned Muslim scholar from Aceh. Ibid., p. 5. Ahmad Sonhaji Mohammad
(1987) opined that the text was written earlier, in 1597. Many similar classical
texts have also been and are currently widely used in madrasahs and pondoks in
Southern Thailand. See Hassan Madmarn (1999), op. cit., p. 43.
21. Founded by al-Syaikh Abu Hasan al-Ash’ari and Abu Mansur al-Maturidi.
22. The root-verb is janna, which means “he or it concealed” or “covered with
darkness”. In the usage of the Qur’an, which is different from the usage of
primitive folklore, the term jinn has several distinct meanings. The most
commonly encountered is that of spiritual forces or beings, which precisely
because they have no corporeal existence, are beyond the perception of our
corporeal senses: a connotation which includes “Satans” and “satanic forces” as
well as “angels” and “angelic forces”, since all of them are “concealed from our
senses”. See Muhammad Asad, trans., The Message of the Quran, pp. 994–95.
357

358 Sa’eda Buang
23. See Muhd Nor Hasbun, op. cit., pp. 16–19.

24. Madrasah Bustanul Islamiah was set up by one religious teacher, Ustaz Ishak,
in 1946 at Jalan Alsagoff, Geylang Serai. See Muhd Nor Hasbun, ibid., pp.
23–26.
25. Al-Ghayah Wattakrib for fiqh, Hadith Arbain (40 hadith) for hadith, Noor
Al-Yaqin (Light of Conviction) for tarikh al-Islam, Hidayah al-Mustafid for tajwid
and Tauhid al-Khaliq (Believe in the Creator) for tauhid. Factors such as lack of
suitable texts, the popularity of the chosen texts or the desire to replicate a more
established madrasah such as Madrasah Aljunied, have probably led to the use of
similar texts. Interestingly, kitab jawi such as Al-Ghayah Wattakrib by Sheikh
Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Mustafa al-Fatani and Abdullah al-Fatani, and
‘Umdah As-Salik were still being used by the madrasahs until the late 1970s,
highlighting the strong influence of the regional Muslim scholars’ religious
thoughts in Singapore’s madrasah education.
26. Madrasah Al-Ma’arif Al-Islamiyah, <http://www.madrasah.edu.sg/almaarif/
vision.html> (accessed on 4 April 2006 and 1 August 2006).
27. Source from Madrasah Aljunied. Interview on 6 July 2006. See also Madrasah
Aljunied Al-Islamiah, Student’s Handbook, p. 27.
28. Compulsory Education was enacted in 2000 and implemented in January 2003,
requiring Singapore citizens of school going age and residing in Singapore to
attend and complete their education in national schools for a duration of six
years (from Primary One to Primary Six). After much discussion between the
government and madrasah officials, madrasahs had been conditionally exempted
from this Act. However the madrasahs were given eight years, until 2008, to
achieve the minimum passing standard in the core subjects such as Science,
English and Mathematics in the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE),
failing which madrasahs will no longer be allowed to teach these subjects and
their students will no longer be exempted from compulsory attendance in
national schools. See Mukhlis Abu Bakar, “Between State Interests and Citizens
Rights: Whither the Madrasah?”, pp. 37–39.
29. Source from Madrasah Al-Ma’arif, interview on 20 July 2006.
30. Ibid.
31. Interview with the Madrasah Al-Ma’arif ’s principal on 20 July 2006.
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361

362 Robbie B. H. Goh
15
MISSION SCHOOLS
IN SINGAPORE
Religious Harmony, Social
Identities, and the Negotiation of
Evangelical Cultures
Robbie B. H. Goh
INTRODUCTION
This paper briefly traces the historical role and development of mission
schools in Singapore, to ascertain the means by which they achieved a
reputation for excellence and maintained that reputation even after Singapore’s
independence and the creation of a national school system. Although mission
schools have had to negotiate their distinctive character in the light of
national educational imperatives and currents — including the Religious
Knowledge curriculum in the 1980s and the racial-religious climate which
surrounded it — the quality of a distinctive school “spirit” and its “moral”
benefits have persisted throughout the history of mission schools. This, to
judge from the large body of responses on the role of mission schools (ranging
from ministerial comments to the responses of teachers and alumni of the
schools themselves), has largely been effected through non-curricular or
structural means which permit such non-curricular influences to be
communicated. The result is a distinctive character of mission schools which
has been broadly acknowledged to play a significant part in the Singapore
362
362

Mission Schools in Singapore 363
educational landscape, not only or primarily in academic terms, but more in

terms of the “moral” training for which mission schools are held in high
regard. The superior efficacy of moral influence (which arises from the
inherently Christian nature of the mission schools), over a Religious Knowledge
curricular approach (in which this Christian nature has to give way to a
multi-religious, pluralistic curriculum inculcated through abstract classroom
dictates), argues for an enhancement of the structural leeway given to mission
schools to carry out their project of Christian moral influence. Clearly, a
number of safeguards have to be set in place to protect the religious sensibilities
of non-Christian students. With these safeguards in place, however, the
implications of the socio-historical development of mission schools in
Singapore would appear to argue for a policy allowing such schools to
structure an enhanced Christian influence into their modus operandi, even as
schools from other religious traditions (such as the Buddhist schools) be
similarly allowed to enhance their religious aspects, with an eye to the moral
development of students.
MISSION SCHOOLS IN COLONIAL SINGAPORE

Mission schools played a central role in the educational landscape of colonial
Singapore from the latter part of the nineteenth century onwards. Before this,
the colonial government did little to establish a broad educational system.
Raffles himself thought that there should be “an Institution of the nature of
a Native College” teaching native students in their “mother tongue” — this
was the basis of the “Singapore Institution” that was established in 1823 and
later renamed Raffles Institution (Chelliah 1947, pp. 12–16). Yet the colonial
government deemed that “the native inhabitants of Singapore” were not of
“that state of civilisation and knowledge which would qualify them to derive
advantage from the enlarged system of education” which the Singapore
Institute represented (Crawford, cited in Chelliah 1947, p. 19). Caught
between the distant apathy of the Calcutta administration and an uncertain
educational policy in Singapore, colonial educational initiatives in the Straits
Settlement in the 1830s and 1840s could at best be described as desultory.
Matters improved after 1867, when the Straits Settlements (Singapore,
Malacca and Penang) became colonies directly under the colonial office,
rather than coming under the control of the colonial government in Calcutta,
and more money was invested in a broad-based system of schooling. Although
the emphasis was still on the teaching of vernacular languages, by 1875 a
number of “branch English schools” (whose expenses were entirely defrayed
by the government) were teaching in a combination of English and vernacular
363

languages. After 1900, a new model of government schools was followed, in

which vernacular education was gradually relegated to the lower levels, and
instruction directly in English came to the fore (Chelliah 1947, pp. 54–57).
Struggling to provide adequate school facilities for the growing demand
among native children, the colonial government was only too happy to allow
mission societies to set up schools. The roots of mission education in Singapore
are found in the work of the Anglican London Missionary Society (LMS),
which operated a number of small schools from the time of Singapore’s
founding in 1819. However, the “weak beginnings” of these earliest mission
schools, together with the fact that the Anglicans were very much focused on
China rather than Straits Settlement missions, saw the closing down of the
LMS schools in 1847 (Kong et al. 1994, p. 3). It was only in the latter part
of the nineteenth century, when the size and strategic importance of the
settlement of Singapore became clearer, that concerted educational missions
came to be established. Earlier mission schools operating in the latter part of
the nineteenth century include the Anglican St Margaret’s School (established
in 1842, and one of the few of the original Anglican schools to survive) and
St Andrew’s School (1862); the Catholic St Joseph’s Institution (SJI) (1852),
Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus (CHIJ) (1854), and St Anthony’s Canossian
School (1894); the Methodist Anglo-Chinese School (ACS) (1886), Methodist
Girls’ School (MGS) (1887) and Fairfield Methodist School (1888), and
others. All started in very humble premises (usually rented shophouses in the
Chinatown area), with very small initial enrolments (MGS initially had nine
students, ACS thirteen students, CHIJ thirty-nine students), and all were the
result of missionaries collaborating with and enlisting the aid of native
philanthropists and community leaders.
The missionary societies were unabashedly evangelical in their intentions
for these schools. Although the schools were often advertised to the community
as educational opportunities without mention of any religious element, it was
certainly clear in the minds of the missionaries themselves that their purpose
was to exert a Christian influence upon their charges. ACS, for example, arose
when Methodist missionary William Oldham happened to chance upon the
Celestial Reasoning Association established by Chinese businessman Tan
Keong Saik, for the purpose of improving speaking and debating skills in
English. This ultimately led to a proposal that Oldham teach the sons of these
businessmen, and the new school was announced by the following handbill
distributed in Chinatown:
The Anglo-Chinese School is to be opened in Amoy Street, No. 70, on

1st March 1886. Chinese will be taught from 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. and
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English from 1.30 p.m. to 4 p.m. Apply to the superintendent W. F.

Oldham, care of Lim Kong Wan and Son, 21, Malacca Street.
(Lau and Teo 2003, p. 10)
Yet, although academic goals (particularly the acquisition of competence in

English) were the means of Oldham’s interaction with this group of Chinese
businessmen and were clearly foregrounded in the advertisement for the
school, Oldham in his own mind was absolutely clear about the “underlying
Christian character” of the school he had founded, and conducted “daily
chapel service and Bible lessons which all pupils attended” (Lau and Teo
2003, p. 16). Oldham’s wife Marie, in a magazine article of 1907, elaborates
on the importance of evangelism in the life and work of the school when she
says that “there ought not to be any discrimination between evangelistic and
educational work; each can be as educational or as evangelistic as the one in
charge chooses to make it” (cited in Lau and Teo 2003, p. 15). This
Christianizing influence seems to have been held in common, to varying
degrees, by all the early mission schools; certainly the Catholic schools were
very much concerned with “spreading the Catholic faith”. Indeed, in the early
decades of the CHIJ, “the emphasis was very much on moral and domestic
rather than academic education” (Kong et al. 1994, pp. x and 64). While the
missionaries might have been sensibly strategic (to varying degrees, according
to the individual and to the circumstances) in not throwing their evangelical
aims in the faces of their clientele, they were certainly consistent in maintaining
that evangelism was the bedrock of their educational projects.
Obviously, the element of religious conversion and the cultural
deracination and loss this might be associated with in the minds of certain
sectors of the native population, were sensitive topics which the mission
schools had to negotiate quite carefully. It would appear that as a general
principle, the schools and their leaders avoided any declaration of their
evangelical aims which might come across as provocative or be taken out of
the context of their educational project as a whole, while nevertheless making
that evangelical dimension as transparent as possible in their day-to-day
operations. Certainly the public perception of the mission schools was that
their goal was as much the moral transformation of their pupils as the
academic one, if not more so, as can be seen by the remarks of one of a group
of journalists who toured the ACS in 1888:
the lads not only gain a commercial education calculated to fit them for
English business, but are brought under a moral influence that is far
more important and of inestimable value; and none the less real, because
it is unobtrusive in its action (reprinted in ACS 1929, p. 6).
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Even the governor, Sir Cecil Smith, at an 1890 prize-giving ceremony,

commended ACS on its “what might be called, for want of a better word,
moral teaching” (Lau and Teo 2003, p. 16). This Christian moral influence
exerted by mission schools on its students continued to be registered in the
public consciousness many decades into the life and work of the schools. A
1935 Straits Times editorial, for example, singles out and commends mission
education for the fact that
it has upheld and is still upholding moral standards at a time when

Confucius is rejected by the younger generation of China, when domestic
and social conditions are becoming steadily weaker among all Asiatic
communities, and when subtle influences such as the cinema are playing
upon adolescent minds. Those influences are not necessarily bad, but
youth needs to be taught how to evaluate them, and in that instruction
it may fairly be said that the Christian missions are playing an admirable
and necessary part. (cited in Ho 1964, p. 53)
It does appear, nevertheless, that the Chinese community who formed

the largest part of the student body of the mission schools, may not have fully
understood the ramifications of a mission school education. The “Isaiah
episode” that confronted ACS in 1896 would suggest as much: a letter
published in the local newspapers by one “Isaiah” called attention to the
“proselytizing” work done by the school, and accused the school of breaching
(what the author saw as) the original understanding between Oldham and his
Chinese supporters (Teo and Lau 2003, p. 16). Although the controversy was
bitter enough to cause a fall in the school’s enrolment, this was of a fairly
small magnitude (from 624 to 515 students), and did not stop the school’s
rapid growth in the following years (ACS 1937, p. 30).
The generally pragmatic attitude among the Chinese community in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may have been summed up by
the Chinese writer of a letter to the Straits Chinese Magazine in 1897, who
believed that “a good English education is no doubt the best legacy a Chinese
or any other parent in the British Empire can leave to his children” (cited in
Loh 1975, p. 55). To this inherently Westernizing influence of Anglophone
education, the religious influence of the mission schools did not appear to
add an especially odious dimension. Song (1984, p. 292) indeed argues that
Isaiah did not speak for the majority of the Chinese families whose sons were
studying in ACS, since “the average non-Christian Chinese parent” was
“perfectly indifferent as to what his children were taught in school”. While
this may perhaps be putting it a little too strongly, the manner in which ACS
bounced back from the “Isaiah episode”, and its subsequent rapid growth
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(even after the spectre of proselytization was thrust to the fore) lend some
weight to the claim that Chinese parents were actually fairly tolerant of the
moral project of the mission schools and the Christian religion with which
that project was inextricably intertwined.
It is worth reiterating that the mission schools did not see their moral
function as a separate, separable and ancillary aspect of their academic
project, but as being part and parcel of the same project. In the words of then-
Conference Secretary of the 1957 Commission on Christian Education, T. R.
Doraisamy, “we teach religion because it makes education complete” (cited in
Ho 1964, p. 137). Doraisamy, who had a long involvement with education
in Singapore and specifically with religious education, and who later became
Bishop of the Methodist Church in Singapore, observes that “the earliest
mottos of religious education propounded were ‘To put education into
religion and religion into religion’ and ‘The soul of education is the education
of the soul’ ” (Doraisamy 2004, p. 192). In many instances, religious instruction
in mission school during the colonial period was not an adjunct or option,
but structured into the everyday life and curriculum of the schools. At ACS,
chapels lasting twenty to thirty minutes were held every day, the sessions
consisting of hymn-singing, reading and explanation of the Bible, and prayer.
All students were expected to be present, except for “the boys who object, and
whose parents object” (Ho 1964, p. 138). This excuse clause for students
with serious objections (or whose parents had) to Christian activities was in
a very real sense an integral part of the mission school culture. While the
schools had to consider their Christian influence as a vital part of school life
and thus to be applied to the student population in general as an overall part
of school culture, this could only be sustained if there was a corresponding
respect for students’ or parents’ objections. Christian influence would be
nugatory without choice, even if that choice had to be exercised as a deliberate
exclusion on the part of certain individuals from activities (such as chapel)
which the school as a whole undertook.
The manner and extent to which religious instruction of this sort was
carried out seemed to vary from school to school. At the CHIJ, it was decided
that “no public funds should be used for the purpose of proselytizing”, and so
the fact that the school received government aid meant that “religious
instruction was possible only before and after official school hours” (Kong
et al. 1994, p. 72). Notwithstanding this, “religion pervaded the school’s
atmosphere”, with daily prayers in the mornings and afternoons and before
each class, although catechism was confined to Catholic students (Meyers
2004, p. 58). Individual schools may have gone through periods of difficulty
in reconciling religious and academic life. St Andrew’s School, for example,
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struggled against “secularization” in the early decades of the twentieth

century, when the decline of the Anglican mission control over the school
meant increased pressure to foreground secular education. Nevertheless, the
continued agency of the school chaplain and religious activities during
“out-of-school hours” indicated the school’s continued commitment to
bring its students to the “valuable knowledge … of Our Lord Jesus Christ”
(Kovilpillai 1963, p. 16).
Much of the religious impact of the mission schools, moreover, goes far
beyond the more formal institutions of chapel and Bible instruction, and
pervades the schools through the personal conduct, beliefs and inter-personal
relationships of the Christian staff of these schools. The recurring note
which sounds through most if not all of the historical records and
reminiscences of the mission schools is of the memorable and life-changing
influence exerted by the personal conduct and beliefs of the mission school
teachers. Thus Meyers (2004, p. 59) describes the nuns of CHIJ as “exemplars
of discipline” who
could always be seen working, teaching or praying in the chapel. Their

physical presence, their gentle but firm leadership and their dedication
to their mission created a religious atmosphere and imposed a sense of
discipline.
At the opening address of the 1977 Seminar on Moral Education in Catholic

Schools, Senior Minister of State for Education Mr Chai Chong Yii remarked
that “our ultimate success in attaining our national goals will rest…on the
moral quality of our people,” and that “a great deal of this process [of moral
education] takes place informally and sometimes even incidentally through
all the contacts and inter-relationships which the children have with adults in
the course of their every day lives” (Chai 1977). In the Catholic tradition of
mission education, much of the distinctive moral atmosphere lies in the
personal lives and work of the “religious” (nuns and priests) who made such
a great impact on their students. In the words of Joseph McNally, long-time
educator in the Christian Brothers’ schools in Singapore, “most of all [the old
boys] recall their wonderful teachers and the love that bound them all
together” (McNally 1980, p.76).
While the Protestant mission schools may have had less of a culture of the
“religious” as teacher, they similarly noted the fundamental role played in
moral education by the general atmosphere of school life, and the role played
by Christian teachers in creating this atmosphere. In an article in the Methodist
periodical, the Malaya Message of 1930, Ho Seng Ong, the then principal of
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ACS Malacca, speaks against the “numbers” mentality of measuring school

output, and asks instead that we “inquire into the number of Christ-like
teachers, if we must have our numbers” (Ho 1930, p.14). Since “changing
men’s and women’s lives is a very slow process”, the emphasis in considering
moral education (and mission schools in general) should not be on quick
curricular “results”, but on the “religious person” of the mission school
teacher (Ho 1930, p. 14). Other non-curricular means of imparting a
specifically Christian and often Biblically-derived set of values included the
mechanisms of the boarding house (which, because it catered to the whole
lives of its boarders, had more leeway to assert a Christian influence without
the constraints faced in the classroom alone); the use of communal discourses
such as was found in school magazines, songs and speeches, which could
insert Christianized moralizing elements within the aegis of an articulation of
a corporate school spirit or tradition; and of course the individual acts of
(Christian-inflected) counselling, advice and moral influence which stand at
the interstices of formal religious instruction and informal personal interaction
(Kovilpillai 1963, p. 45; Kong et al. 1994, p. 79; Goh 2001; Meyers 2004,
pp. 73, 85).
MISSION SCHOOLS AFTER INDEPENDENCE: THEIR PLACE

IN SINGAPORE’S MODERNIZING PROJECT
Significantly, this sense of the distinctive nature of the mission school “spirit”
and its resulting effect on the moral life of its students in general, persists long
after Singapore’s independence and through various national educational
policies and initiatives. After achieving independence from the British in the
1957 Federation of Malaya Act, Singapore (which remained a part of Malaysia
until separation in 1965) embarked on a process of educational expansion in
the 1950s and 1960s, creating more schools to meet the rising need for
elementary education (H. C. Chai 1977, pp. 15, 30). The creation of a large
number of government schools not only threatened to reduce the relative
significance of mission schools in the Singapore educational landscape overall,
it also put pressure on mission schools to conform to a national education
agenda which was very much dictated by the requirements of nation-building,
and to which the government schools naturally conformed very closely:
the national education system is intimately involved in nation-building

and the evolution of a Singaporean identity. Schools are mandated to
implement educational policies formulated to achieve national political,
cultural and economic goals and priorities. (Chew 1997, p. 75)
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Yip et al. (1997) categorize the first few decades of educational

development in Singapore into several phases. The initial phase was in the
late 1950s and 1960s, in which Singapore’s transition to independence
necessitated the responsibility for providing broad-based education as a “basic
human right”. A second period saw “qualitative consolidation” in the 1960s
and 1970s, in which the educational agenda, in addition to consolidating
earlier changes, also had to serve the goals of strengthening technical education
and “building a socially-disciplined cohesive Singaporean society”. The third
period, during 1979–84, was one of “refinements and new strides” marked by
the new language policy at one end and the creation of the Gifted Education
programme on the other. Following this, the move “towards excellence in
education” in 1985–90, aimed at the development of the “whole person”, and
included measures such as the move to single-session schools starting in
1986, the implementation of pastoral care in 1988, and the introduction of
independent schools since 1988.
Within these broad educational phases and national agendas, Singapore
schools were also called upon to fulfil particular tasks of social regulation, of
which the Religious Education programme was perhaps one of the most
complex and demanding, given Singapore’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious
context and the inherent need to preserve order and harmony. Gopinathan
(1995) traces the evolution of religious education in Singapore schools from
its origins in the perceived need to enhance “social cohesion, political identity
and loyalty to the state”, through the “Education for Living” programme
introduced in 1974, the “Being and Becoming” programme introduced in
1981, and the “Religious Knowledge curriculum” which ran from 1984 to
1989. Gopinathan (1995, pp. 20, 23) notes that although the Religious
Knowledge curriculum — which involved the classroom teaching of select
specific religions plus a “World Religions” option for those students who did
not want to choose a specific religion, and a policy in which any school had
to offer an option if at least twenty students requested it — was initially
implemented to forestall an “incipient moral crisis” among Singapore’s youth.
However, it was withdrawn in 1989 due to a new “heightened consciousness
of religious differences and a new fervour in the propagation of religious
beliefs”, to which it was believed the Religious Curriculum had contributed.
The 1987 Marxist Conspiracy, in which its alleged mastermind Vincent
Cheng and other “plotters” took shelter “under the cover of para-church
organizations affiliated to the Catholic church”, also raised the spectre of a
politicized religious sentiment emerging out of a climate of inter-religious
competition and zeal (Lee 1989).
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These variegated stages and manifestations of religious education posed

several problems to schools, including (and perhaps especially) the mission
schools. Tan (1997, p. 101) sums up some of these problems: in terms of
material, it was difficult to separate religion from the teaching of religion,
with a “prescriptive” element “glorifying” particular religions tending to
insert itself in the material; teachers with strong religious convictions had
difficulty teaching other religions; on the other hand, some teachers tended
to teach their own religions with a zeal which was often perceived as
proselytizing; and religious bodies on their part objected to what they perceived
as the inadequate training received by teachers, and thus the inappropriate
ways in which their religions were taught. From the point of view of the
mission schools, it could easily be seen that the Religious Knowledge curriculum
was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gave a curricular aspect to the
Christianizing influence which was always part of their raison d’être. On the
other hand, not only did the new curriculum necessitate the teaching of other
religions in mission schools (whenever there was a demand for these), it also
put the work of Christian evangelism at risk, by formalizing and intensifying
a kind of intra-curricular competition with other religions.
Ironically, the role and perception of mission schools in the development
of modern Singapore would appear to suggest the unsuitability of a curricular
approach for the schools’ main task of moral influence. In many ways, the
work and structures of mission schools in post-independence Singapore
continue from the situation of the schools in the colonial period: their
distinctive brand of Christian morality, where effective, was largely carried
out through the personal and informal agency of dedicated Christian teachers,
rather than through any explicit curricular teaching and influence. The extent
to which Christian elements were an important part of the corporate life of
the school — in the boarding-house routines, assemblies, chapels, talks,
counselling and prayers — varied from school to school, and always had to
take cognizance of the plural religious sensitivities represented by their student
bodies, particularly after the passing of the Religious Harmony Act of 1990
which (in a deliberately broad articulation intended to have a cautionary
effect) made it an offence “to cause ill-feelings between different religious
groups” (MITA 1992, p. 1). Mission schools had to be ready to excuse from
any kind of Christian activity students from other religions who expressed
objections, but this was in various ways and to various extents true of the
mission schools in the colonial era as well.
Perhaps the biggest difference in the life and work of the mission schools
in modern Singapore, when contrasted to colonial times, was the general
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decline in the numbers of “Christ-like teachers”, in the words of Ho Seng

Onn (1930, p. 14), and the effect this had on the general level of spiritual
commitment and Christianizing influence in the mission schools as a whole.
With the early phases of infrastructural development and “qualitative
consolidation” in the Singapore education system in the 1960s and 1970s,
the priority fell on producing good-quality education in a large number of
government schools. The result was the gradual decline in the necessity for
Christian educational missionaries whose lives were given in response to a
social need. While the mission schools in the colonial period were bolstered
by the presence of educational missionaries (from England, America, Australia
and elsewhere) who had dedicated their lives to the Christian influence of
young men and women through education, this practice effectively ceased
after independence. The introduction of school rankings in 1992, which was
only the confirmation of a larger trend to emphasize academic results at the
expense of most other non-curricular aspects of student life, also served to
discourage and dissuade “religious” teachers who saw their primary purpose
as lying precisely in these other non-curricular parts of the educational
process. The relatively limited prospects for career advancement and related
perquisites in mission schools, when compared to the increasingly expanding
sector of government schools, also posed a stumbling block to teachers
thinking of a career in mission schools (ACS 1986, pp. 144–45, 181, 189;
Kong et al. 1994: 187; Ang 2004).
It is significant that this aspect of interpersonal moral influence and its
abiding importance in the mission school project over the years, is not just
the rhetoric of the schools themselves (in which case sentimentalism and self-
propagandizing might naturally be suspected), but also of key government
leaders closely concerned with the education project in the decades after
independence. While there were certainly attempts to make the mission
schools toe the national line of promoting “the widest common area of
understanding” and “jelling the various ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups
into a uniform distinctiveness” (then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 1968),
there was also repeated recognition of the distinctive “spirit” of the mission
schools, which was one that was not reducible to aspects of their curriculum
or formal rituals and structures, and yet was seen as highly effective in
shaping the moral character of many generations of students. The prime
minister himself noted that “senior masters and principals of mission schools
are men moved by deep religious convictions….They care for the pupils
under their care, as if they were their own children” (Lee 1970). The then
Senior Minister of State for Education Tony Tan, himself an alumnus of a
mission school (SJI), acknowledged that “the government has long recognized
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the positive role that the mission schools can play in the education of our
youth,” to “inculcate Christian values in the children under their charge”
(Tan 1980). Addressing the ACS community, Dr Tan went so far as to say
that “it is your responsibility to cultivate in your students the ambition to live
a decent life, to be unselfish, to uphold Christian ideals and in general to
recognize their responsibility to their fellowmen and to the nation” (Tan
1980). On another occasion, he commended the Catholic Christian Brothers’
schools for “that education of the spirit”, the “moral education, religious
education” which are “very much in the forefront at these schools”, and
which “give our children the moral compass which will guide them through
life” (Tan 1984).
While it might be objected that these comments are to a certain extent
inspired or necessitated by their context (they are often made while addressing
mission school alumni and communities), the very fact that Singapore’s
political leaders repeatedly go on the record with such comments, particularly
in Singapore’s carefully objective political culture and the government’s constant
eye on religious harmony, is already significant. Moreover, it is not merely the
generally positive effect of mission schools on the Singapore landscape which
is highlighted (although that is part of the import), but specifically the
mission school brand of moral influence which comes (to the minds of these
politicians) precisely from the characteristic “spirit” of these schools, rather
than in any separable content or programmes.
In this distinctive Christian moral influence, the general perspective of
government leaders agrees with that of the mission school leaders in placing
the overwhelming emphasis on the personal qualities of teachers themselves.
As then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew said in a slightly different context (of
education in general), “the most important person is the man who is in
charge of the boy” (Lee 1966). Other government leaders over the years have
applied this to the role of mission schools in particular, insisting that
the character of a school, the attitudes which are formed in its students,
the values which they absorb are all dependent on the type of teachers
who teach in the school. This is, to my mind, the key which sets the
mission schools apart and makes them different from other schools.
(Tan 1980)
Teachers in mission schools make a distinctive impact not so much (or

not merely) through their curricular contributions, but through their personal
qualities. Thus, for Dr Tan, one of the chief qualities of inspirational ACS
teacher H. M. Hoisington (who taught there from 1919 to 1939) was the
fact that “he inspired his pupils in the noble desire to live aright” (Tan 1980).
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Dr Tay Eng Soon (Minister of Education) felt that moral education was
acquired “by unconscious assimilation” and “emulation”; while insisting that
“there is definitely a place for systematic and orderly learning” in the classroom,
he also maintained that “much can be achieved through informal activities to
inculcate good attitudes and habits” (Tay 1981). These informal activities not
only include the “character development” that was derived through formal
extra-curricular activities (such as uniformed groups and student leadership
activities), but also “the teacher’s interest and care for his or her pupils’ work
or problems”, which “can teach untold lessons on human relationships,
respect and concern to the pupils” (Tay 1981). Dr Tay went as far as to say,
reiterating a now-familiar tenet in government attitudes to moral education
in schools, that “the moral tone of any school is set by the principal and his
teachers” (Tay 1981).
Thus government attitudes to mission schools in the era of educational
modernization and nation-building consistently recognize the distinctively
“Christian” quality of mission school education and the moral legacy they
effectively impart to their students. It was the “distinctly Christian
Institution” which was well-placed to “provide boys with good moral and
good habits”. There was not only a recognition that this distinguished
(although this stopped short of an explicit claim that this made mission
schools superior) the mission school from others, but also that the
Christianizing element was inevitable, and an inextricable part of the
mission schools’ process of moral training:
If at the same time, boys are influenced by the example of their Christian
teachers to want to become Christians themselves, so much the
better….This aim of the pioneers of ACS is as valid today as it was a 100
years ago….If ACS ever loses this missionary vision, then ACS would be
no different from any good secular school. That would be a loss indeed.
(Tay 1986)
This Christianizing moral influence, both the Christian educationists and

political leaders agree, is pervasive, not confined to or specifically inculcated
through curricular and formal extra-curricular means but in large part conveyed
through a kind of spiritual character or atmosphere permeating the school as
a whole. Inasmuch as it could ever be pinned down, it resided in a range of
“informal and ad hoc activities” in which students and teachers interacted,
and in which the distinctive element was the “dedicated Christian teacher”
(Tay 1981; Tay 1986).
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY

The historical experience and evolution of the mission schools, the (at best)
limited success of formal religious knowledge training in schools, the abiding
need for moral training of some sort or other in Singapore society — all
these suggest the need for a policy which mixes laissez-faire freedom (within
broad parameters and with certain clearly-defined limits) on the one hand,
and a basic curricular framework on the other. The very complexities and
sensitivities of religious education in a multi-religious society and the
problematic nature of moral influence as a whole, pose daunting problems
to any policy position. This is all the more an argument for a policy with
a light touch, which builds on proven and acknowledged methods of moral
influence as exemplified by the history of the mission schools, while avoiding
a prescriptive enforcement which can only tend towards religious
fractiousness and controversy. While this chapter has drawn on the historical
lessons of Christian mission schools specifically, it would appear that the
general lessons to be learnt could also be applied to any well-run mission
school from any of the main religious traditions.
The basic tenet of such a policy would be to recognize the efficacy of
the moral influence and “spirit” imparted in mission schools (whatever
their religious affiliation), which derives precisely from their specific religious
base, and to permit and indeed encourage schools to enhance this influence.
Such encouragement might take the form of priority postings which match
teachers of a certain religious persuasion with appropriate mission schools
through certain mechanisms (interviews, the evidence of written statements
of teaching purpose and philosophy, a probationary period if necessary) to
ensure the matching is more real than accidental or apparent. A priority
policy need not, of course, preclude teachers of other religious affiliations
(or none whatsoever) from joining a mission school if places are available,
although it does mean that such schools are empowered and encouraged to
fill the majority of its staffing positions firstly with suitable teachers of the
appropriate religious background.
A partial return to and encouragement of the spirit of the “religious” (in
Catholic schools) or the dedicated missionary-teacher (in Protestant ones)
could take the form of the creation of official posts of spiritual counsellors.
These would be full-time Christian workers of appropriate spiritual and
psychological training and who would exert a moral influence in the situations
requiring more formal counselling, as well as in the important but less formal
situations of everyday school life. This form of living, practical and personal
375

moral influence, if the historical examples drawn from mission schools are to
be believed, has the potential to exert a lasting impact in ways that outlast the
abstract lessons of formal instruction alone. While such work is still carried
out by dedicated, caring and spiritually-motivated teachers (and a handful of
Christian workers) in mission schools today, the generally heavy academic
workload and scarcity of resources (including funds and workers) mean that
many opportunities for exerting a living and personal moral influence on
students go begging.
Other means of a religious-based moral influence — the daily life and
interactions of the boarding school, assemblies in the nature of chapel services,
corporate prayer and hymn-singing, corporate discourses in the form of
school magazines, speeches and talks — are already in place and practised to
various extents in different mission schools today. These, if they are encouraged
together with the other proposed measures, would create a very pervasive and
clearly-defined “religious atmosphere” in mission schools. While this would
prevent “receptive” students (those in need of moral instruction and guidance,
and who would not object to the religious bases of such interventions) from
falling through the cracks, it would also place considerably more religious
influence on certain students who would not welcome it. This would seem to
be the inevitable consequence of an effective moral atmosphere in schools.
While unreceptive students can still opt out of formal religious sessions in the
classroom and corporate rituals, it would be increasingly difficult for them to
do so in the wide variety of informal settings in such religiously-empowered
mission schools. It seems to be an inevitable corollary of effective moral
education that even students who might not be receptive to the influence of
a particular religion would still be exposed to it to a certain extent, and indeed
this is probably the case in most mission schools as things stand at present. In
the words of Tan Hye San, one-time Principal of St Anthony’s Boys’ School,
parents thinking of sending their children to a mission school “must know
that we teach religion and if they wish to send their children to us they must
accept our schools as such” (1977, p. 31). Students who (or whose parents)
find this enhanced religious atmosphere unacceptable, would probably be
best advised to enrol elsewhere from the very beginning (that is, when the
child enters primary one), and should if necessary be permitted to transfer to
a suitable government school.
The experiences of the religious knowledge programmes would seem to
suggest that formal religious instruction poses more problems than it is
worth, particularly in the matter of religions being taught by teachers who do
not subscribe to that religion, or hold strongly to other religious beliefs. This
consideration, together with the limited enrolments of mission schools (and
376

thus the limited numbers of students falling under their moral influence),
would seem to necessitate a basic non-religious ethical or moral training
programme in all schools. As a supplement, and in the same spirit, a basic
“religious diversity” module might also be incorporated which would present
information on the different major religions in as neutrally-weighted and
objective a manner as possible, and which would call attention to similarities
between religions as the basis for a moral theory as well as for religious
harmony in a multi-religious society such as Singapore’s. As Tan (1997,
p. 104) says, “allowing religious awareness to develop informally away from
the context of school moral education might prove advantageous” as “the
practice of teaching religion in the name of moral education could send the
misleading message that religion is reducible to secular morality”. This is not
only prompted by the need to avoid “zealous evangelization”, but also by the
need to instil a wide-reaching moral influence in young Singaporeans. If the
historical lessons from the mission schools are to be believed, this will be of
much less enduring impact than the religiously-inspired formal and informal
influence. Nevertheless, it will serve to provide at least a basic ethical template
or guide for the majority of students. Again, if the testimony of mission
schools is anything to go by, then the enhancement of their religious brief will
only increase their popularity and demand among those parents who value
their distinctive brand of moral training. If this proves to be true, then a
judicious expansion of the popular mission schools over time, with the
support of government funding, would also increase the moral output in a
manner driven to a certain extent by religiously-neutral market-like factors.
Indeed, this is already happening, as evidenced by the recent set-up of ACS
(International) and the proposed SJI (International) within the larger economic
aim of making Singapore an international education hub.
At the same time, any possibility of over-zealous evangelism in schools
could be proscribed in certain ways. First, a corresponding enhancement of
the opting-out rights (at least as far as formal religious sessions are concerned)
of students with other religious beliefs — even to the extent of disciplinary
and punitive measures levelled on teachers and school workers who wilfully
and repeatedly transgress by failing to heed those rights — would set very
clear limits to the extent of evangelical activities. The enhancement of the
religious atmosphere of all mission schools, regardless of their religious
affiliations, would level the playing field at least in terms of policy and
developmental potential, and help to forestall a climate of religious contention
and politicization. Policies facilitating the transfer of disaffected students and
even staff members from mission schools wherein they encounter repeated
problems would help remove the tension points of cross-religious encounters,
377

and make for a generally more open and non-confrontational dialogical

religious climate. Also, the general shift in emphasis from curricular to non-
curricular (personal, living, practical) moral influence, would mean the effective
channelling of much of religious influence to the less volatile (or at least less
widespread) area of personal and informal inter-relations, instead of the more
contentious realm of classroom teaching and the curriculum. While it cannot
be proven until it is tried and the results become clear, it does seem that
clearer demarcation and liberalization of religious zones in the respective
enhanced mission schools might actually alleviate competitive and politicized
evangelism in schools. In this way, mission schools, called upon to declare
their religious intents and practices in open ways, and resting their popularity
in significant part on their ability to effect a lasting moral influence that is
noted and consumed by the public, would find their main calling in the
refinement of moral service and influence and reach the majority of receptive
students. This path of “least resistance” should also steer schools away from
the contentious, troublesome and costly “proselytization” or “zealous
evangelization” of students with other religious convictions, within the larger
religious landscape of Singapore.
References
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———. Singapore: Anglo-Chinese School, 1937.
Hearts, Hopes and Aims: The Spirit of the Anglo-Chinese School. Singapore: Times
Books, 1986.
Ang, Glenn. “Challenges Facing Mission Schools in Singapore: An Interview
with Brother Paul Rogers FSC”. <http://theprompt.faithweb.com/
BroPaulInterview1.htm> (accessed 1 August 2005).
Chai, Chong Yii. “Opening Address”. Delivered at the Seminar on Moral Education
in Catholic Schools, Singapore; Catholic Schools’ Council and Catholic Teachers’
Movement, 9–10 July 1977.
Chai, Hon-Chan. Education and Nation-building in Plural Societies: The West Malaysian
Experience. Canberra: Australian National University, 1977.
Chelliah, D. D. A History of the Education Policy of the Straits Settlements with
Recommendations for a New System Based on Vernaculars. Kuala Lumpur: The
Government Press, 1947.
Chew, Joy Oon Ai. “Schooling for Singaporeans: The Interaction of Singapore
Culture and Values in the School”. Education in Singapore: A Book of Readings,
edited by Jason Tan, S. Gopinathan, and Ho Wah Kam, pp. 75–91. Singapore:
Prentice Hall/Simon and Schuster, 1997.
Doraisamy, Theodore R. My Cup Runneth Over: An Autobiography. Singapore: Select
Publishing, 2004.
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Goh, Robbie B. H. “Composing the Modern Nation: Mission School Magazines,

Narrative Models and Cultural Typologies in Colonial Singapore”. Journal of
Commonwealth Literature 36, no. 1 (2001): 59–73.
Gopinathan, S. “Religious Education in a Secular State: The Singapore Experience”.
Asian Journal of Political Science 3, no. 2 (1995): 15–27.
Ho, Seng Ong. “Our Schools — Their Purpose and Problems”. Malaya Message. June
1930.
———. Methodist Schools in Malaya: Their Record and History. Petaling Jaya: Board
of Education of the Malaya Annual Conference, 1964.
Kong, Lily, Low Soon Ai, and Jacqueline Yip. Convent Chronicles: History of a Pioneer
Mission School for Girls in Singapore. Singapore: Armour Publishing, 1994.
Kovilpillai, Daniel. A Short History of St Andrew’s School: 1862–1962. Singapore:
S.N., 1963.
Lau, Earnest and Peter Teo, eds. The ACS Story. Singapore: Concordia
Communications, 2003.
Lee, Hsien Loong. “Speech at the Inauguration of the Parliament of Religions
Organised by the Ramakrishna Mission, 30 April 1989”. National Archives
Singapore.
Lee, Kuan Yew. “Speech at a Meeting with Principals of Schools at the Victoria
Theatre on 29 August 1966”. National Archives Singapore.
———. “Speech at the Reunion Dinner of St Andrew’s Old Boys’ Association,
7 September 1968”. National Archives Singapore.
———. “Address at the Christian Brothers Old Boys’ Association Annual Dinner,
Celebrating the 118th Anniversary of the Founding of St Joseph’s Institution,
6 June 1970”. National Archives Singapore.
Loh, Philip. Fook Seng. Seeds of Separatism: Education Policy in Malaya 1874–1940.
Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975.
McNally, Joseph. “The Brothers’ Influence on Education in Singapore”. A Sign of
Faith: La Salle Brothers’ 300 Years 1680–1980. Singapore: De La Salle Brothers,
1980.
Meyers, Elaine. Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus: 150 Years in Singapore. Penang,
Malaysia: The Lady Superior, 2004.
Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA). The Need for the Maintenance of
Religious Harmony Act. Singapore: MITA, 1992.
Song, Ong Siang. One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore. Singapore:
Tan, Hye San. “The Expectation of the Church, Parents and Catholic Schools’
Principals, of Catholic Education in Singapore”. Delivered at the Seminar on
Moral Education in Catholic Schools, 9–10 July 1977, Singapore; Catholic
Schools’ Council and Catholic Teachers’ Movement.
Tan, Tan Wei. “Moral Education in Singapore: A Critical Appraisal”. In Education in
Singapore: A Book of Readings, edited by Jason Tan, S. Gopinathan, and Ho Wah
Kam, pp. 93–104. Singapore: Prentice Hall/Simon and Schuster, 1997.
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Tan, Tony Keng Yam. “Speech at the ACS Founder’s Day Dinner, 1 March 1980”.
National Archives Singapore.
———. “Speech at the Christian Brothers’ Old Boys’ Association Annual Dinner at
the Shangri-La Hotel, 15 May 1984”. National Archives Singapore.
Tay, Eng Soon. Speech to Velts Seminar at Merlin Hotel, 29 May 1981. National
Archives Singapore.
———. Speech at the Anglo-Chinese School Centennial Dinner at the World Trade
Centre, 1 March 1986. National Archives Singapore.
Yip, John S. K., Eng Soo Peck, and Jay Ye Chin Yap. “25 Years of Educational
Reform.” In Education in Singapore: A Book of Readings, edited by Jason Tan,
S. Gopinathan and Ho Wah Kam, pp. 4–31. Singapore: Prentice Hall/Simon
and Schuster, 1997.
380

Religious Switching and Knowledge among Adolescents 381
16
RELIGIOUS SWITCHING AND

KNOWLEDGE AMONG
ADOLESCENTS IN SINGAPORE
Phyllis Ghim-Lian Chew
INTRODUCTION
A study of religion in adolescence is important because today’s youths are the
adults of tomorrow — their behaviour, attitudes and beliefs affect the political,
economic and social future of a nation. Adolescence is characterized by many
biological, cognitive and social changes which constitute a transition into
adult life. Growth can spur changes in how adolescents are viewed and
treated by their parents and peers as well as changes in how adolescents view
themselves and are viewed and treated by their parents, peers and others. It
is a period when they not only encounter society’s expectations of them, but
also have a strong need to find intimacy and friends. Religion or more
generally, religiosity begins to play a large part upon how these potential
adults view the world. Important questions pertaining to identity and
meaning begin to surface. However, research on religious development in
adolescence is a much neglected area, as can be observed by the lack of
research and surveys available until recently.
Tong (2002) has documented anthropological and sociological studies
on Hinduism, Christianity, Hinduism and Chinese religion in Singapore
written in English in the last 150 years. These studies have mostly focused on
more apparent aspects such as rituals or festivals. Although Christianity is
381
381

382 Phyllis Ghim-Lian Chew
practised by only 14.6 per cent (Leow 2001) of the population, more research
has been undertaken on it than on other religions. However, these studies
have been more of religious sociology rather than the sociology of religion. In
all these, very few systematic surveys or studies were undertaken and as far as
this writer is aware, no research on religious switching among the adolescent
school-going population has been documented. There has been however,
some research of religious conversion among students in tertiary institutions,
but mostly on Christianity and Buddhism (for example, Tamney and Hassan
1987). Hence, this study appears to be the first such study and is thus
important although preliminary and exploratory in nature. A reason for the
scarcity of research on this area is because studies of switching or conversion
have received little respect from scholars since they are often assumed to be a
supernatural phenomenon. Also, when someone says that he has “switched”,
whether this is an authentic or inauthentic conversion as it is difficult to
distinguish between the two. While the study is aware of this problem, it will
accept all declarations of switching as authentic and sincere.
Background of Study
Objectives and Definitions
There are two broad goals in this study. The first is to understand the
nature of religious switching by adolescents. It uncovers the conditions
existing prior to conversion that seemed meaningfully related to the change,
in the sense that these conditions constituted a problem that switching or
conversion was meant to solve. What was the basis of choice of an adolescent’s
religious ideology? Accordingly, the more specific objectives relating to this
broad goal are:
• How and why do adolescents switch and to which religion?

• Did this switch encounter any opposition from family members?
• Is there a correlation between a dominant language at home that influenced
religious switching?
• How do switchers describe themselves?
• Are there significant variations in response between age groups 13–14,
15–16, and 17–18?
The second goal is to investigate how much adolescents know about religions
in Singapore. The specific objectives are:
382

• What and how much does an adolescent know about religions in

Singapore?
• How much does a switcher know about his “new” and “old” religion?
• Are there significant variations in responses between age groups 13–14,
15–16, 17–18?
In this study, the term “switching” is preferred to the more commonly

used term “conversion”. “Switching” is defined as the leaving of a religious
organization for another. It means a “turning about”, a definite change of
front, a passing from one state of being to another altogether different one,
as a definite or specific activity. On the other hand, “conversion” is a more
heavily loaded term. Conversion also connotes a dramatic event or a gradual
and growing conviction in one’s mind that life’s meaning and purpose lie in
a particular direction. “Switching”, on the other hand, connotes a more
sociological phenomenon rather than a religious experience. It refers to a
more haphazard, quicker process, somewhat akin to the “switching” of schools
or jobs.
Methodology
To ensure that there is a sufficient basis for valid general conclusions, data was
collected from different sources. Four research tools were utilized:
(1) quantitative questionnaire analysis; (2) qualitative case study of switchers;
(3) participant observation; and (4) focus group discussion.
A three-page questionnaire (see Appendix 16.1) was administered to
2,801 students of ages 12 to 18 from six secondary schools (four government
and two government-aided), so as to allow for statistical generalizations. Out
of the 2,801 questionnaires, 22 were void — being illegible or blank, leaving
2,779 returned questionnaires. The questionnaire was designed in such a way
so that it would not be too lengthy as to be tedious for the respondents yet
not too short as to be inadequate for the research purposes. The following key
information was solicited from the first part of the questionnaire:
1. Respondent’s background information

2. Use of languages at home and in their daily lives
3. Religious affiliations of respondents and their family members, and
reasons for switch of religion if any. (Respondents are deemed to have
“switched” if their religions differ from any one of their parents).
4. Questions on Civics and Moral Education (CME).
383

The second part of the questionnaire required students to write as much

as they knew on the nine main religions of Singapore, listed alphabetically.
Students were instructed to write on any aspect of the religion, including
main teachings and principles, for example, festivals, ceremonies, administrative
structure and any stories associated with that religion. Respondents were
asked to leave the spaces blank if they knew nothing about the particular
religion. The data was then computed and its collation organized according
to age group rather than the institutions concerned, so as to maintain the
latter’s confidentiality.
The Case Study Interviews

During the week that the questionnaire was administered, the researcher gave
an audio-visual presentation to the entire school cohort during the assembly
period on the societal contributions that major religions have made to the
people of Singapore. At the end of the presentation, the researcher referred to
the study she was undertaking as well as the questionnaire which she would
be implementing in the respective classes during the CME period. She
announced that students who would like to share knowledge of their new
faiths with the researchers could give their names to their respective CME
teachers during the CME period. In this way, we were able to obtain interviews
with a total of eighty-nine switchers from the six schools. Interviews were
scheduled in the weeks following the implementation of the questionnaire.
Interviewers were briefed on the study’s objectives and reassured of their
anonymity. They were also counselled to maximize possible benefits and
minimize potential harm in the topics they spoke about. The interviews were
tape-recorded and the findings transcribed.
Interviewers were given a guideline of the following three types of questions
to cover in the course of the interview (See Appendix 16.2):
1. Warming-up questions
2. General questions
3. “Switch” questions
Warming up questions such as “Describe yourself ” and “What makes you

happy?” helped begin the interview in a personable and friendly manner.
They also provided the necessary backdrop for the interpretation of each
individual’s data. General questions established the “religious” framework of
the interview and also tested adolescents once again on their knowledge of
the religions of Singapore, reinforcing the information already gathered in
384

the second written part of the questionnaire. “Switch” questions find out the
context behind adolescents’ religious switching.
In analysing the transcripts and listening to the taped voices, this author
was concerned not just with what was said but also with questions such as:
“What are the voices in the text?”, “Who are the various speakers?”, “How
directly do they speak?”, “Which ones are paraphrased, or anonymous?”,
“Who speaks for whom?” In other words, the concern was with the chains of
reasoning in a discourse and how the implementation of specific linguistic
choices operates to bring about a specific interpretation. Often, interviewees
were unable to express all that they mean in a fully explicit way and most of
the assumptions they expected their readers to share with them were left
implicit. Hence, in interpreting the data, the redundancy and repetitiveness
in the text were also looked at as a way to discover themes and the relation
between themes.
Participant Observation and Focus Group Discussion

To establish the socio-historical framework for the interpretation of the data,
the heads of departments and principals of each school were interviewed with
regard to its policy and culture. These discussions were important to get some
sense of the insiders’ points of view, as well as to keep a check on the danger
of reading too much into the questionnaire or the tape script. Publications on
the school and those produced by the school, for example, the school annual
and the students’ newsletter, were also read, as were few lunches eaten at the
school canteen so as to imbibe the atmosphere of the school. Last but not
least, the author also managed to speak to a few teachers in each school. A
focus group discussion was subsequently held with two CME teachers from
two participating institutions. Some samples of the interview data (especially
those found problematic) were shared from which some conclusions regarding
the phenomenon of religious switching among adolescents could be reached.
FINDINGS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Religious Backgrounds and Religious Switching
Table 16.1 shows the percentage of respondents by age group and religion.
There were a total of 2,779 respondents, with 881, 914 and 980 in the age
groups 13–14, 15–16, 17–18 respectively. Of the 2,779 respondents, only
158 (5.7 per cent) have actually switched religion. Switching occurs throughout
adolescence, although the most number of switching occurs in age group
385

TABLE 16.1
Number and Percentage of Respondents and Switchers
by Age Group and Type of School
Age 13–14 15–16 17–18

Type of school Govt Govt- Aided Govt Govt-Aided Govt Govt-Aided
No. of respondents 451 430 433 481 980 0
Percentage of respondents 16.2 15.5 15.6 17.3 35.3 0
Total no of respondents 881 914 980
No. of switchers 19 20 32 38 45 0
% of switchers 4.2 4.7 7.4 7.9 4.6 0
Total number of respondents: 2,779
15–16, with 7.4 per cent and 7.9 per cent of switchers in government and
government-aided schools respectively. One hypothesis is that the type of
school may play a part in the social conditioning. However, the rate of
switching in government-aided schools is not significantly different from that
of government schools in our sample, so this hypothesis is not supported.
Table 16.2 shows the percentage of respondents by age group and
religion. Religiosity appears alive and well as almost 82 per cent of adolescents
believe in some sort of deity. Most of the respondents defined themselves as
Buddhists (34.93 per cent), Christians (19.4 per cent) and Muslims (14.5
per cent). Adolescents who defined themselves as Taoists were a surprisingly
low 8.4 per cent. The lower figures for Hindus and Sikhs (3.7 per cent and
0.3 per cent respectively) correlate respectively with the racial composition
in Singapore. There were no respondents in our sample from the Jewish,
Baha’i and Zoroastrian faiths. A note of explanation is needed on the higher
percentage of Buddhists — while many adolescents may define themselves
as “Buddhists” (usually after their parents), case study interviews reveal that
they are more often than not “syncreticists” usually of the Mahayana
variety, which is a form of folk religion in the sense that it contains many
elements and deities that are not strictly Buddhist at all. This is not
surprising as previous studies on Buddhism in Singapore have shown a
disparity between the Buddhism in literature and that practised by the
Chinese — which is a range of beliefs related to Buddhism, Taoism,
Confucianism, ancestor worship and folk beliefs.
Comparing Table 16.2 with comparable figures from the Singapore
Census of 1980, 1990 and 2000 (Table 16.3), one finds that Buddhism and
Christianity have been on the increase in the last three decades while there has
386

TABLE 16.2
Percentage of Respondents by Age Group and Religion
Age Group
Religion
13–14 15–16 17–18 Average
Buddhist Faith 36.3 34.0 34.3 34.9
Taoism 8.4 8.9 7.5 8.3
Christian Faith 18.0 20.1 20.1 19.4
Islam 15.0 14.2 14.4 14.5
Hindu Faith 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.7
Sikh Faith 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.3
Jewish Faith 0 0 0 0
Baha’i Faith 0 0 0 0
Zoroastrian Faith 0 0 0 0
No religion 18.0 18.9 19.8 18.9
TABLE 16.3
Percentage Comparison of Data Sample
with Singapore Census 1980, 1990 and 2000
Adolescent sample, Population Aged 15 and over

Religion aged 13–18 (cf Leow 2000, p. 33)
2004 study 2000 1990 1980
Buddhist Faith 34.9 42.5 31.2 27.0
Taoism 8.3 8.5 22.4 30.0
Christian Faith 19.4 14.6 12.7 10.1
Islam 14.5 14.9 15.3 15.7
Hindu Faith 3.7 4.0 3.7 3.6
No Religion 18.9 14.8 14.1 13.0
Others 0.3 0.7 0.6 0.6
been a corresponding decline in Taoism. This may therefore account for the
relatively low number of adolescents who define themselves as Taoists (8.3
per cent). However, relative to the census figures, there are fewer adolescents
in our sample who are Buddhists (34.9 per cent versus 42.5 per cent) while
there are more adolescents who are Christians (19.4 per cent versus 14.6 per
cent). This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that respondents used in
the census are aged 15 and over, while respondents from this particular study
are in the age group 13–18. We can therefore surmise that there are significantly
more Buddhists and Christians among the adolescent population than the
387

adult population of Singapore, and that Buddhist and Christian faiths are
significantly more popular among the Chinese youths than Taoism.
Table 16.4 shows the percentage of grandparents, parents and respondents
by religion. Across three generations within a family, one discerns a marked
decline in the numbers of Buddhists and Taoists. Older members of a family
are more likely to be Taoists, than younger ones. While Kuo, Quah and Tong
(1988) have observed that the decline in Taoism corresponds to an increase
in Christianity, in the research sample, however, it corresponds to an increase
TABLE 16.4
Percentage of Grandparents, Parents and Respondents by Religion
Grandparents
Buddhist Taoism Christian Islam Hindu Free- Others
Faith Faith Faith Thinker
Total 1376 542 222 403 83 153 0
% 49.5 19.5 8 14.5 3 4.5 0
Parents
Total 1084 364 408 403 111 392 17
% 39 13.1 14.7 14.5 4 14.1 0.6
Respondents
Total 970 231 539 404 103 525 8
% 34.9 8.3 19.4 14.5 3.7 18.9 0.3
in both Christianity and Buddhism. The sample also shows an increase across
three generations in the number of Christians and free-thinkers. The figures
for Islam and Hinduism remain relatively constant, presumably because these
are minority religions, and Islam in particular is considered the religion of the
Malays. Hence, religious switching has by and large been confined to the
Chinese and Indian populations of Singapore.
Main Trends in Religious Switching by Respondents

Table 16.5 shows the percentage of switchers from one religion to another.
Buddhism/Taoism are conflated as one category where switchers are concerned.
This is because, as previously explained, although the switchers usually
388

TABLE 16.5
Percentage of Switchers by Religion
From Religion To Religion Number Percentage

Buddhism/Taoism Christianity 95 60.1
Buddhism (Soka) 9 5.7
Others (Wicca) 5 3.2
Free-Thinker 29 18.4
Christianity Buddhism 2 1.3

Free Thinker 9 5.7
Hinduism Christianity 2 1.3

Free-Thinker 2 1.3
Free-Thinker Status Christianity 4 2.5

Buddhism 1 0.6
Total 158 100
Total: 158 (5.7% of sample)
identify themselves as “Buddhists”; closer examination during the interviews

discloses that they are actually syncreticists.
Adolescent switchers fall within only three religions: Buddhism/Taoism,
Christianity and free-thinkers. Most of the switchers came from the Buddhism/
Taoist category. They either switched to Christianity (60.1 per cent) — the
most popular choice — or to being free-thinkers (18.4 per cent). Another 5.7
per cent of them had switched to Soka Buddhism and 3.2 per cent had
switched to “Wicca”, a religion unfamiliar to the researcher at that time.
Subsequent research found Wicca to be a form of popular witchcraft. However,
the five who had switched to Wicca were all from the same school and
therefore this choice of switch is likely to be a localized one within a certain
educational institution, rather than generalized across Singapore educational
institutions. There were also switchers who were originally Christians and
free-thinkers. Another 1.3 per cent of switchers had switched from Christianity
to Buddhism and 5.7 per cent from Christianity to free-thinker status. In
addition 2.5 per cent of free-thinkers had switched to Christianity and 0.6
per cent to Buddhism.
One notes that the shift is always from Taoism, Buddhism and/or
Hinduism to Christianity, and not the other way round. This may be because
Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism are basically not proselytizing religions.
Similarly, there is a shift from Taoism to Buddhism and not the other way
389

round. When Christians and Hindus switch, however, they tend to switch to
free-thinker status rather than to the other faiths, something which indicate
a disillusionment of religion in general. A free-thinker can also switch to any
of the religions but usually it is to Christianity and Buddhism. One also notes
that Malays do not switch religions. Islam is an “inherent” part of Malay
culture. Hence, the greatest number of switchers comes from the Chinese and
Indians whose cultures do not link race to religion.
Table 16.6 shows the percentage of switchers in terms of “dominant
language/dialect spoken at home”: 26.8 per cent spoke only English, 26.8 per
cent spoke predominantly Mandarin, 33.1 per cent spoke English/Mandarin
equally (more commonly known as code switching) and 10.1 per cent spoke
dialects. In contrast, in the category “language used most often by yourself ”,
66.7 per cent listed English, 3 per cent listed Mandarin and 10 per cent
practised code switching. These figures appear to herald the death of dialects
as an inter-generational language as well as point to a dismal future for
Taoism/Buddhism, which are often conducted in dialects or Mandarin. In
contrast, Christian groups conduct their activities predominantly in English.
The conversion from syncretistic Buddhism/Taoism to the Soka religion can
also be explained in terms of language since the latter conducts services in
English for their youths. Soka Buddhism has also romanized chanting for
adherents who are unable to read Pali.
Religious Knowledge
Table 16.7 shows the percentage of respondents by level of knowledge of
Singapore religions. For statistical purposes, every respondent’s comments
TABLE 16.6
Percentage of Switchers in Terms of Language Used
Predominantly Predominantly Predominantly Equal use of

English Mandarin dialects English/ Others
(%) (%) (%) Mandarin (%) (%)
Dominant language
used at home 26.8 26.8 10.1 33.1 3.2
Language use most
often by yourself 66.7 3.0 0 30 0.3
Total number of switchers: 158
Note: The situation is actually more complicated than that displayed above because different languages or
varieties are used with different members of the family.
390

TABLE 16.7
Percentage of Respondents by Level of Knowledge on Religions in Singapore
Respondents 881 914 984

Age group 12–14 15–16 17–18
Number % Number % Number %
Buddhism
General Comments 415 47.1 511 55.9 550 55.9
Specific Comments 53 6 120 13.1 129 13.1
No comments 423 48 283 31 305 31
Taoism
General Comments 175 19.9 218 23.9 304 20.9
Specific Comments 45 5.1 56 6.1 80 8.1
No Comments 661 75 640 70 600 61
Christianity
General Comments 485 55.1 512 56 669 68
Specific Comments 123 14 137 15 128 13
No Comments 273 31 265 29 187 19
Islam
General Comments 432 49 475 52 581 59
Specific Comments 114 12.9 165 18.1 157 16
No Comments 335 38 274 30 246 25
Sikhism
General Comments 35 4 55 6 167 17
Specific Comments 9 1 9 1 0 0
No Comments 837 95 850 93 817 83
Jewish Faith
Gave a comment 79 9 119 13 138 14
Left blank 802 91 795 87 846 86
Zoroastrianism
Gave comment 44 5 18 2 30 3.1
Left blank 837 95 896 98 954 96.9
Baha’i Faith
Gave comment 9 1 9 1 10 1
Left blank 872 99 905 99 974 99
391

under each religious category were individually identified and re-categorized

into three analytical categories: “general comments”, “specific comments”
and “no comments”.
“General comments” were so classified if they referred to relatively
superficial aspects of the religion such as a description of forms and dress.
Respondents’ general comments on religion were often confused with
“culture” and “race”. In addition, some comments may not be factually
accurate. Some typical comments on religions under this category include
the following:
• Buddhism — “believe in Buddha”; “it is about filial piety”; “Buddha is a

prince from India and Buddha is their God”; “most are Chinese” and “it
is associated with monks”.
• Islam — “celebrate Hari Raya”; “eat halal food”; “cannot eat pork”; “they
go to mosques”; “their marriages take place in the void deck”; and “some
of them are terrorists”.
• Christianity — “they believe in Jesus”; “they go to church and sing
hymns”; “they celebrate Christmas”; and “they speak English”.
“Specific comments” were more in-depth. Comments were classified as

specific if they refer to some distinguishing features of the faith, for example,
the naming of the prophet-founder of the religion; the narration of some
principles or practices pertaining to the religion or the recounting of some
socio-historical comment not too commonly known. These comments are
often accurate. Some typical specific comments on religions include:
• Buddhism — “Man under the tree got enlightenment… became a

Buddha and founded a religion”; “Asoka spread it”; “deals with peace,
karma and sacrifice”; and “believe in reincarnation”.
• Christianity — “they pray to the Lord Jesus Christ and believe that only
through him they will reach heaven”; “They believe in the Holy Trinity,
Good Friday, Christmas and Easter”; and “They marry in church and
follow the Ten Commandments”.
• Islam — “They read the Qur’an and worship Allah”; “They must go to
Mecca once in a life-time” and “They pray five times a day”.
Under the category “No comments”, respondents do not give any

comments and have not written anything in the space allotted to the
particular religion. The comments were grouped into one of the three age
groups and then statistically counted. The results were then tabulated in
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Table 16.7 as a means to analyse the level of knowledge possessed by

adolescents on Singapore religions.
Table 16.7 shows that the average adolescent in Singapore knows very
little about religions in Singapore. This is despite their learning of religions
during the CME period. Most of what they have written have been classified
under “general comments” or “no comments”. Even where respondents have
given “specific comments”, most of them appear to have been regurgitated
from textbooks, for example, “Gautama Siddhartha started this religion. He
found peace and stability while sitting under the Bo tree. He asked everyone
to follow him.” Under “specific comments”, there is a tendency to give highly
factual details, such as those relating to place of origin, size and those
overlapping with race. One student even drew a column of comparative
religion with its respective icons and festivals, much like a textbook layout.
Most of the comments were related to festivals and symbols. Some of the
specific comments were related to doctrinal repetitions rather than a more
neutral account. The following are some examples:
• “Christianity believes in Holy Trinity — Father, Son and Holy Ghost.

Father sent son to earth to wash away sins. Those who believe will be
saved. Those who haven’t accepted may be converted. What to do to be
saved? Pray, read Bible, do quiet time, believe in Jesus.”
• “Jesus Christ came down to earth to die for our sins and rose again on
the third day.”
Of all the religions, Islam, Christianity and Buddhism are the better
known with more specific comments on them (an average of 15.6 per cent,
14 per cent and 10.3 per cent respectively). However, most students who gave
specific comments of their own religion gave only general comments or no
comments of other religions, showing a lack of knowledge or of disinterest in
religions besides their own. Free-thinkers on the other hand, left most of the
sections blank.
Age-wise, although those in the 17–18 age group gave more comments,
those in the 15–16 age group gave more specific comments and which were
knowledgeable ones, compared to their younger and older counterparts. One
reason here could be that there is a chapter on religious diversity in the
Secondary Three (average age 15) textbook. The assessment for CME is also
not as important as the other subjects and is not taken as seriously as other
school subjects. In the case of older adolescents (ages 17–18), it is likely that
they have forgotten most of what they learnt from the CME at lower
secondary levels.
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Where the minority Jewish, Zoroastrian and Baha’i Faiths were concerned,
the responses were tabulated into two analytical categories, that is, “gave a
comment” or “left blank”. This was because most of the respondents did not
fill anything in these sections. Of the minority religions, there is a comparable
amount of knowledge on the Jewish Faith where specific comments are
concerned (12 per cent). The very low percentages of “specific comments” for
the Zoroastrian and Baha’i Faiths (3.3 per cent and 1 per cent respectively)
could be because these faiths do not appear in their CME textbooks. Comments
for these minority religions differed startlingly in their “quality” of knowledge.
The following are some examples:
• Baha’i Faith — “it is the youngest independent world religion. The

important laws are individual discipline and development of daily prayers”.
• Zoroastrianism — “the basic tenets of this religion are ‘good thoughts,
good deeds and good words’ ”.
• Judaism — “Star of David”; “still waiting for the Messiah to come and
believe he will come as a King”; “Believe they are God’s chosen people”;
and “they go to the synagogue to pray”.
Some of those comments classified as poor in quality are:
• Baha’ism — “mixture of Christianity and other faiths”; and “sounds like

the Dalai Lama people”.
• Zoroastrianism — “new age occult”; “faith healing”, “sign of Zorro”, and
“they pray to the sun and the stars”.
• Judaism — “Shylock”, “Jews hate Christians”, and “killed by Nazis
during the war”.
There appears to be an attempt to “guess” with regard to the lesser known

faiths even if the guesses do sound rather far-fetched. This could be because
some of the CME teachers had advised them that the researcher wanted to
assess, through the questionnaire, how much their particular school knew
about the religions in Singapore.
FINDINGS FROM THE INTERVIEWS

Self-Description, Happiness and Free Time
The first set of questions was warm-up questions about the adolescents
themselves. When asked to describe themselves, adolescents did so mainly in
terms of appearance, for example, “I am a boy and I am very tall.” However,
394

by the time they reached the ages 17–18, they described themselves in a
variety of ways. About 40 per cent of them defined themselves either by race
or religion, for example. “I am not religious but I have morals”; and “I am a
Chinese Christian”. Some 30 per cent defined themselves by qualities or
characteristics such as “I am easy-going, open-minded, an average guy” and
“I am cute and bubbly, fun-loving”. Another 5 per cent of them did so by
gender, such as “I am a girl, and I study at xxxx”; 5 per cent by their school,
such as “I am a xxxx school student and I love my school”; and the remaining
10 per cent by psychological interpretation, such as “I am usually stressed out
by the exam” and “I have very little self-confidence but I can be very
enthusiastic at times.”
As to “what makes them happy” and “what they do during their free
time”, most adolescents confided that they really appreciate “a bunch of
trustable friends”. It is crucial for them to be accepted. They confess to a
liking for excursions with friends, such as watching movies and eating fast
food at the Orchard Cineplex. “Happy activities” usually include shopping
for teenage clothes and accessories, such as at the Heeren Plaza. “Hanging out
and laughing together” is also important. Boys in particular love playing or
watching sports. Both sexes confess to dabbling with electronic games, especially
those on the Internet. The Internet is also a resource for downloading movies
and music they like. Many of them participate in on-line diaries (blogging)
on the Web. <Friendster.com> was named as one such site which adolescents
frequent and which is used as a preferred way to keep in touch with friends
and finding out about people who share similar interests. Indeed, a typical
answer to “What makes you happy?” might appear as “Someone being there
for me — when I’m happy they share, and when I am sad, they comfort me.”
Knowledge and Perceptions of Religions in Singapore

The second set of questions consists of “general” questions which were
designed to discover the depth of adolescents’ perceptions and knowledge of
religions in Singapore. The lack of knowledge of religions in Singapore,
beyond the superficial characteristics, found in the survey was confirmed in
the case study interviews. When asked how many religions there were in
Singapore, 91 per cent of them listed four and named them as Christianity,
Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. It is likely that the respondents were thinking
here of the four main races of Singapore and their corresponding overlaps
with the four main religions. The remainder (9 per cent) said there were
either five or six religions, and they included Sikhism and Taoism to the list.
Zoroastrianism, Jewish Faith and Baha’i Faith appear to be too unfamiliar
395

and esoteric for them. In addition, when the interviewer asked whether they
had heard about the Inter-Religious Organization (IRO), all of them gave a
resounding “No”.
The question “Have you or your friend ever mentioned that any religion
is not a good one?” was designed to gauge the level of religious tolerance
amongst adolescents. It was found that Singapore adolescents generally possess
a high level of religious tolerance. A majority of 76 per cent said that they do
not ever talk about religion and stressed that it was very important to be
tolerant of other religions:
• “We don’t talk about religion. It is sensitive. We talk about other matters.”
• “Me and my friends, we respect all religions.”
• “We try not to talk bad about other religions although we are critical.”
It is interesting to note here that “tolerance” here is construed as not

“talking about it” — which is a way of avoiding possible causes of conflict.
Tolerance did not mean sincere respect, understanding or knowing something
of each other’s religion so that common grounds can be found. Instead, in
responding to this question, many adolescents made the effort to go beyond
the thrust of the question or a single statement reply, and to include explanatory
or sometimes “defensive” responses such as:
• “My best friend is Malay and she taught me about halal food. We enjoy
each other very much.”
• “In primary school I used to go for Christian fellowship and there will be
pastor talk, singing, games, activities. But it is not compulsory to join the
Christian club in my school. So there is no forcing!”
• “In CME, we already learn about races and religion! Therefore, we don’t
need to talk about such things since the textbook already teaches us this.”
This implies that adolescents are somewhat cognizant of the overlap of race-
religion constructs, and the interview sees them responding beyond the call
of the question. Singapore adolescents also reveal a keen sense that religious
experiences are personal and not to be shared publicly. One may conclude
that the CME component in secondary school has been influential here, as
adolescents are in general cognizant of the need to show respect to sentiments
concerning race and religion.
However, it must be noted that a sizeable 24 per cent of the sample
admitted that their friends have mentioned that some religions are “not
good”. When asked to elaborate, we found that most of the “not good”
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perceptions referred mainly to Christianity, Buddhism/Taoism, Islam and

Hinduism, and not so much to the Sikh, Jewish, Zoroastrian and Baha’i
Faiths — probably because the latter group of religions are less well-known
and have relatively fewer followers.
Switchers, while protective and optimistic of their new faiths, had some
reservations regarding other faiths. For example, a switcher to Buddhism
(from free-thinker status) had this to say about Christianity: “Buddhism is a
peaceful religion and not aggressive. No need to be embarrassed about not
giving. Christians always collecting money … have to donate a part of your
salary. Annoying talk to you when you are shopping. However, although they
annoying they are polite.” Occasionally, responses against other faiths are
emphatic, quite emotional and less clear, and the interviewee is unable to go
into the details, probably because of the lack of suitable words to describe the
emotion. For example, “We hate Christians! Don’t ever invite me to church!”
Switchers are also prone to having a negative perception of their former
faiths. A switcher to Christianity had this to say about Buddhism (her former
religion): “Very scary. God goes into your body when you are in a trance and
things like that” and “I don’t like to go to temple because there, you have to
do everything yourself.” Once again, comments such as “God goes into your
body” shows that this respondent is characteristically unable to distinguish
between the practices of syncretism and Buddhism. The second quotation
also shows an alienation from the temple since one has “to do everything
yourself ”, implying perhaps that in the alternative faith (Christianity?), things
are done for them or done in a group.
The “not good” comments pertaining to Hinduism include “Hinduism
— skewers”; and “Hindu — Tamil gangster — very ugly, I try to change my
thinking because I know it’s not right to be prejudiced.” For Islam, the
popular association of terrorism with it also surfaced: “Muslims — they may
be terrorists or friends of terrorists.” Also, particularly noticeable was the fact
that many comments were directed against the other denominations of their
own (new or minority) faiths. Newer denominations such as the X Church,
Y Church and the Z Church collected the bulk of the criticisms, such as:
“X Church has an underground church and manipulates people”; “Y Church
— child sacrifices”; and “Z Church is more like a convenience club”. In one
government-aided school, the divide between the Catholics and Protestants
came up noticeably: “This is a Catholic school — they disapprove of Christians
— they tell me sarcastically ‘Oh, enjoy your Bible study!’ They believe
Mother Mary can save us but we believe in Jesus. I prefer to be a Christian.”
Some switchers to Soka Buddhism (5.7 per cent) refer to the fact that: “Soka
talk bad about Nicheiren and vice versa.” On the other hand, a syncreticist
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Buddhist youth admits hearing that “Soka is Japanese and you know the
Japanese conquered Singapore.”
As to the question on whether they would like to find out about other
religions, 92 per cent answered in the affirmative with 8 per cent in the
negative. Adolescents showed that they were open, curious in nature and
loved to experience new things. When asked how they would like to go about
finding out other religions, 64 per cent said they would do so from the
Internet, 28 per cent from friends, 4 per cent from visiting places of worship
and 1 per cent through other means. The Internet appears to be an important
source of information for adolescents because of its ease of accessibility and
the privacy available in the receiving of the information (see Table 16.8).
TABLE 16.8
Ways of Finding out about Other Religions
How would you find out about other religions? %

From the Internet 64
From friends 28
Visiting places of worship 4
Others 4
Reasons for Switching Religion

The switch questions in Appendix 16.2 centre on the assumption that
switching always has a context — possibly a “pull” or “push” factor. The
Christian faith seems to be the overwhelming choice for adolescents to switch
to (See Table 16.5). The case study interviews found inter-personal influences,
in particular peer group support and “fellowship”, as the primary “pull” factor
behind the switch. These “pulls” include Christian friends bringing them to
church, Christian friends in organizations such as the Boys Brigade and
worship services in schools, and reflect the importance of friendship and the
need for company for adolescents. The study also corroborates Kau et al.’s
(2004) study on the values, lifestyles and aspirations of Singaporeans, which
showed that “warm relationship with others” has the highest value for those
aged 15–24. The following are examples from the study reflecting the value
and need for warm relationships:
We have a Christmas party, welcoming party, youth fellowship — pastor

tells us what to learn and we can make friends there. Otherwise, at home
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I am tightly controlled, studies at home, no going out with peers — so

this is my opportunity.
xxx church — I am so scared and embarrassed but they are so friendly.

They ask “do you find this nice?” “Don’t be scared if we speak in
tongues.” “They put words across in a nice manner — well spoken and
like ordinary people. Very friendly. They tell me what is going on in
church, I don’t even have to ask. Pastor xxxx is strict but very caring and
loving. He looks after us like we are children. Makes us feel at home.
First time I was awkward but everybody there makes me feel I belong. I
treat xxxx church as my home and when I go down there to study, sit in
caffi, take study materials, revise, eat and drink. With my cell group
members, I play games, praise and worship, sermons, testimonials of
what God has done for us since we last met and refreshments.
The problem of “embarrassment”, “being scared”, or “being lonely” is a

recurring theme in the interviews. It is a state where they desire to meet peers
but are unable to do so because they are shy, withdrawn or introverted.
Loneliness appears to be quite a widespread phenomenon among adolescents.
Weekends and holidays are the loneliest time for the students and these
periods find adolescents on the phone chatting up friends. As one adolescent
put it when asked why she had switched, “There’s no special teaching I like.
It’s like a personal one-to-one. Special relationship: like a best friend
relationship.”
A second “pull” factor is the need to solve a stressful situation. The
adolescents may face a threatening or fearful situation, or has a problem to
be solved, and this is managed by making an alliance with supernatural
forces. “I see my brother healed”, says a new adherent to Christianity.
Miracles of healing, good luck for the examinations and other answered
prayers are benefits which are attractive, most referred to the lack of a God
or “good” God or teaching good values in Taoism/Buddhism: “I believe in
God”; “Teaches us about God and values”; and “I have a sweet feeling.
Every time I go, I understand what is God. God teaches you to become
good people, don’t tell lies, don’t do bad thing.” They also dislike certain
rites and practices which they describe as “meaningless”, “illogical” and
“irrational”: “They (Taoists) want to become rich, buy lottery ticket, my
father always does that” and “Buddhist rites which I have to do — Chinese
New Year — have to go to temple to pray, refrain from eating beef, ghost
festival — burn incense, until, luckily, my house renovated, then my
parents threw out the idols.” There is also a lack of information given to
children brought up in a Taoist/Buddhist home: One respondent said, “I
399

am a free-thinker because nobody has talked to me about religion, including

my parents who are Buddhists.”
Despite such common perceptions of Taoism, all religions in reality do
foster an alliance with God or the supernatural. It is obvious then that in the
homes where the switchers came from, there was a failure of caretakers to
convey this to their children. It does appear that the church, much more than
the temple, is interested in youths as complete people and a distinctive group
and treats them as such. There are cell groups in churches which prioritize the
building of relationships. There is also the teaching of a God who is personal
and caring like a friend. Compared to a temple, the church offers a liturgical
experience, communion and mission involvement. Youths are often drawn to
dynamism and charisma and to youth-centred and needs-oriented activities
where they can find people who are open, attentive, caring and friendly. In
contrast, Taoist/Buddhist parents, many of whom are lowly educated or semi-
literate, do not know much about their own religion and hence are unable to
explain the main tenets of their beliefs to their children. There is also the “do-
it-yourself ” attitude in Taoism/Buddhism. The lack of written canonical
scriptures also does not help the situation as syncretistic practices depend
much on oral tradition.
A minority (3.1 per cent) of switchers have converted to free-thinker
status from Christianity and Buddhism (see Table 16.5). Reasons for the
switch are quite different from those in the opposite direction and they
include the following comments: “I don’t believe in all that stuff ”; “I don’t
want to be tied down”; “I believe in science, not superstition”; and “As long
as I believe in myself, I am alright.”
Free-thinker status is associated with “independence”, “hardwork” and
“self-reliance”, inferring perhaps a belief that adherents of religions are not so
inclined, having to rely on a supernatural deity. It is associated with rationality
and being “scientific”. In our interviews, we also found that free-thinkers
tend to have independent views of themselves as coming from “strong” even
if “poor” families. It is interesting that comments mention “poor” — does
this imply that religionists (the Christians?) are materially richer and therefore
can afford the “indulgence” of belief? They also mention “strong” — does this
imply that people who believe in a religion are “weak”? Free-thinkers also
have a less humble, more ambitious vision — many of them wanting to join
professions such as law, medicine and psychology: “I learn to be independent
because my family don’t help me much as we are poor… I learn to be strong”;
“I study hard, I come from a poor family. I cannot afford to take up religion”;
and “As free-thinker I don’t think God exists and I have never seen God. But
I respect all religions.”
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There are also switchers from syncretistic backgrounds to Soka Buddhism

(5.7 per cent). Soka practices social welfare similar to those adopted by the
Catholic church. It produces and disseminates apologetic literature in English.
It has a bookshop, a Buddhist library, clubs in university campuses and has
adopted some Christian practices, such as having a board of directors outside
of the temple, listing services (chanting and meditation) on Sunday, and
provision of a hymn book. The reason given for the switch is not so much the
need for friends but the need to solve a problem. According to some switchers:
I used to cry every night. It is always very dark. I am always alone.

Chanting is good for all kinds of problems … especially in the night.
When I talk to Gohonsong, I feel so much better. I’m peaceful now. I am
not afraid of night time.
I see that my friend has so much success in her study and everything in
her life went smoothly. I ask her to help me. She introduced me to
prayers, chanting and meditation which help her. It helps me also. I have
so many problems but now I feel much better. I can go to school now —
before I always absent.
The sample also saw a small 3.2 per cent of adolescents switching to
Wicca (see Table 16.5). The researcher was initially not aware of such a
practice. On further investigation, the researcher learnt that this is a
reconstruction of pre-Christian traditions in Ireland, Scotland and Wales,
and comprises mainly of witchcraft and spells. In a focused group discussion
with the teacher of these five cases, we concluded that since these switches
came from only one school in a working-class area, it is more likely to be an
isolated phenomenon. It is also likely a case of one student with a group of
close friends in the school practising their new-found faith or a spillover from
the popular Harry Potter book and movie series.
Sources of Religious Initiation among Religious Switchers

We found that the majority of switchers (63.3 per cent) first learnt of their
new faiths from peers (see Table 16.9) who are either classmates or
schoolmates (46.3 per cent) or family members and friends (17 per cent).
Often, the school friend happens to be someone close to them, or someone
who accompanies them to the school canteen or school co-curricular activities
(CCA) regularly. In one government-aided school, there was also the added
phenomenon of a youth pastor in the school or the teacher counsellor who
introduced religion to them. Adolescent switchers from this school
401

TABLE 16.9
Percentage of Interviewees in Relation to Their Introducers
Introducer % of interviewees
Classmate or schoolmate 46.3
Other friends e.g. family friend, tutor 17
Family or relative 31.7
Teacher, school counselor, etc. 7.3
Total 100
Total number of interviewees: 89
mentioned the influence of the daily prayers during assembly as well as the
weekly mass. Two switchers recalled that they found the Christian faith
through the school counsellor.
Family members and friends were also influential. 31.7 per cent switched
after being influenced by family members (a brother or sister) or a relative
(aunties, uncles, cousins) (See Table 16.9). Family “friends” may include
tutors or a friend of their sibling as well as their Filipino domestic helper. A
significant proportion reported that during the holidays, the cousins would
get together and that they would be invited to attend church services.
Subsequently, they felt very comfortable with the service and decided to be
baptised. On other occasions, a Christian aunt would visit, take them shopping
and stop by her church along the way.
Switches usually occur within the first three months (37.5 per cent) or
immediately after acquaintance with the new religion (25 per cent) (See Table
TABLE 16.10
Percentage of Interviewees in Relation to Switching Time
Time % of interviewees
Within a month 25
1–3 months 37.5
3–12 months 12.5
Over a year 25
Total 100
Number of interviewees: 89
402

16.10). For those who took over a year (25 per cent) to switch, it was usually
a case of having first learnt of the faith in primary school, resulting in a
fleeting or lasting impression that would be later rekindled by a peer during
adolescence.
Most adolescents needed to feel comfortable emotionally (rather than
intellectually) before they switched. Once they liked “the feeling”, they would
almost always switch. One switcher described her experience thus:
As for the time factor, first time I went to xxxx church to check it out —
they were all so self-centered so I get a bad impression — offensive —
the pastor puts the message very loudly, impulsive and very firm. Not a
good feeling. Second time I went, I felt much better. Things began to
make sense. I continue the service and then I became the first in my
family to become a Christian.
Parental Opposition to Switching

When we asked the switchers whether they encountered opposition from
their parents, about half of them said they encountered reprimand or
disapproval, such as in the following cases: “xxxx church — yes, immediately
I got a big scolding from Mum when I went to church”; “My mother minded
me going to church and when she sees me reading the Bible she is very
unhappy because it takes away time from my studies”; and “She wants me to
be a Taoist but I don’t know why — they never explain. Funny… but they
were the ones who sent me to the Christian school because they know it has
a better standard and they have heard about it.”
However, about half of those who admitted to opposition from their
elders also recounted that after a period of time, their parents would normally
relent. Acceptance came usually after a passage of time, or a noticeable
improvement in the switcher’s character or grades. Two respondents said:
In the beginning Mum objected but I showed her testimonies of miracles

happening to me e.g. I lost my wallet left it in a cab — but I prayed and
the taxi driver bought it back to me! This miracle impressed me! Another
time, I have a headache, my heart compressed, I was in pain, I started to
pray, the pain went away. And then there was my results — I study hard
under the grace of God, I get good results.
At first they are not happy but when they see my character really change
— I was more polite and less moody — they also don’t say much
anymore.
403

Singaporean parents often have no real theological reasons against the

faith of the new religion, as they are likely to know as little about the new
religion as their children. The reason for their objections is usually a practical
one, that is, fear of the loss of time, which might impede the child’s future
educational opportunities. Two respondents shared thus: “My mother always
say: it’s a waste of time going to church, better to study” and “Father not
willing — refused my baptism — did not allow me to spend time with my
religion — he said I must have a balance between education and religion.” At
the same time, the adolescents themselves are extremely cognizant of the
importance of studies and schooling, and they reveal indirectly that these
factors must be properly addressed before the switching can be acceptable to
their families and themselves. “As long as I continue to pass my exams, they
don’t really care” is the common comment.
There is also the accompanying fear among parents of a loss of filial
piety (mutual care between generations) should the switch to Christianity
bring with it a discontinuation of ancestor worship and death rituals.
However, if this is resolved and if the switcher still visits the temple with
siblings and parents, and does the daily rites, parents are often
accommodating. “As long as I do the Buddhist rites, they really don’t
mind”, said one adolescent.
The other half of the switchers did not encounter any opposition from
their parents. From this, we may conclude that Singapore parents are by
and large religiously tolerant. This tolerance could be because religion for
the Chinese is not a part of ethnic identity. In addition, Taoism is also not
a definitive or proselytizing religion and there is a tendency to be
accommodating and inclusive. Said one adolescent: “I asked my father
many times about Taoism. He doesn’t say much but he says it’s something
like ‘Christian’ and I can go to church as long as I don’t get baptised.” A
lack of parental opposition can also be attributed to “familiarity” and
“comfort zones” as reflected by this remark: “No, because all my siblings are
Christian or we have relatives who are Christians and so being a Christian
is no big deal.”
It must be noted that the lack of opposition may be on the high side
because some adolescents chose to keep their new faiths from their parents.
When asked why they kept it a secret, the answer was usually a fear of
disapproval or a matter of indifference and non-communication with their
parents: “I am afraid they will scold me as they don’t like anything new”
and “My parents leave me to myself — they don’t even know I am
a Christian”.
404

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is a notable characteristic of religious identification in adolescent life,
with 82 per cent of adolescents surveyed identifying themselves as belonging
to a religion, having been brought up by parents who define themselves as
such. Most adolescents identify themselves as Buddhists, Christians or
Muslims, especially so if the parental-child relationship is close. Data from
interviews tells us that for many (63 per cent), their parents are the
significant other. The need to study and get good grades is very important
to Singapore youth, as is the desire to please parents whenever possible. We
may surmise that parental influence on religious choice is the single strongest
factor in religious development in adolescents since only 5.7 per cent has
switched religion by age eighteen.
Adolescents’ knowledge of religions in Singapore has been found to be
poor, being mainly superficial and sketchy. Nevertheless, they are remarkably
tolerant of religions in Singapore and careful not to cause offence. However,
their tolerance is based on ignorance and fear rather than a world-embracing
knowledge of the different faiths in Singapore. This is a potentially unstable
situation, and it might be productive here to rethink the CME religious
component as one that could teach similarities between different world
faiths, rather than the current teaching of religions in adjunct with racial or
national sensitivities and civic duties.
In addition, the IRO does not appear to be fulfilling its potential where
Singapore youths are concerned. For one, none of our interviewees have
heard of it. In this respect, the IRO, in cooperation with relevant government
ministries, should initiate or promote publicity work among the youths or
within the educational system, to promote a more balanced multi-faith
culture, based on actual knowledge.
Adolescents describe themselves as “fun-loving”, “energetic”, “lonely”
and “sensitive”. Being with friends and having a “sense of belonging” is very
important. Youths are open to religious ideas and keen to learn more. However,
most are at a loss as to the ways and means of discovering the similarities and
differences between religions. The Internet is cited as their major resource,
especially the chat-rooms. Peer groups ranks second as a source of information.
The government and relevant organizations need to look into creating more
social activities for youths to interact and feel at home, as well as to be aware
of the powerful influence of the Web in the propagation of religious ideas.
Switchers comprised 5.7 per cent of the cohort and they come from three
of the nine main religions in Singapore, namely Buddhism/Taoism, Christianity
and Hinduism. There is also a minority of youths from free-thinker families
405

who adopt a religion. The popular choices for a switch are Christianity,
Buddhism and free-thinker status. The study found that there are significantly
more adolescents who are Buddhists or Christians than has been revealed in
the 2000 Census. When youths switch to Christianity, it is also to one which
is youth-focused in its mission and which preaches a this-worldly Gospel of
care, good cheer and prosperity. It must be noted that the seemingly
conservative figure of 5.7 per cent may, if placed on a geometrical scale for ten
years, grow to an absolute number that will become significant. Already at
only 5.7 per cent, the syncretistic Taoist/Buddhist segment of Singapore is a
“threatened species” and a change in the religious landscape is imminent. The
percentage of switching is also likely to be a percentage or two higher. For
one, this study has only counted numbers of actual switchers, and not those
close to switching or those who chose not to reveal highly personal information,
for fear of drawing reprimand or attention to themselves. For another, the
questionnaire has not been able to capture data on whole-family switching
or on one-parent-cum-child switching. For example, two cases where the
father is a Taoist but the mother and adolescent (in this case, the adolescent)
have both become Soka Buddhists or Christians were not captured in the
data. This is because the study only defined adolescent switchers as those
whose religion differ from either one of their parents (see questions 8–11,
Appendix 16.1).
The highest proportion of switchers comes from the Buddhist/Taoist
faith. The “push” factors here are disenchantment with the practice of rites/
rituals and the lack of knowledge on these faiths either from the temple or
their parents. It has also to do with operating in the language that youth
themselves have confessed that they are most comfortable in — English and
Mandarin (Chew 2006). To stem the tide of adherents moving to greener
pastures elsewhere, the Taoist/Buddhist groups need to accelerate their move
towards a more canonical context by stripping away the more superstitious
elements of their faiths. The putting up of Internet sites, formation of clubs
in schools, use of music and chanting and the use of English in their services,
would certainly appeal to youths. It is recommended that the Taoist population
rationalize its operations and conduct them in either Mandarin or English for
youths so as to retain them.
Adolescents switch not because they have commenced on a personal
quest for truth but usually because of peer-group influences, emotional
support received and the need to solve “a problem”. Switching allows a rapid
integration into a network of relationships. The time taken to switch is often
short — within the first three months. The switching is almost always an
“emotional” rather than an “intellectual” one. It is seldom that a switcher can
explain theosophically or theoretically why they have chosen a particular faith
406

over that of another. Not a single switcher referred to the holy writings or
scripture as the reason for their switch, although some did say they liked the
inspiring stories in the scripture. Adolescence is a period when the quest for
self-esteem and self-confidence is uppermost. It can also be a period of
confusion — a time of “identity crisis”. The self-centred need to be “saved”
is a psychologically appealing one. A gospel of prosperity rather than one of
sacrifice is attractive to Singapore adolescents, many of whom are trying to
find out who they really are. Any religious organization which recognizes this
important transitional phase and which structures their activities according
to the needs of their adolescent clients will fare well in attracting and keeping
them. The study also found that the most common time to switch is between
the ages of 15–16, a period that could lead to either a solidification of their
faith or a departure from it. Bearing this in mind, state authorities could
ensure regular counselling and promotion of activities catering to youths’
emotional and intellectual needs.
Why do Singapore adolescents choose to switch to Christianity over
that of other faiths? Obvious reasons such as instrumental rewards or useful
economic contacts have been proposed (for example, Tamney and Hassan
1987), but these reasons pertain more to older youths rather than to
adolescents. The study found that peer group influence and crisis
management help effect a switch, especially in mid and late adolescence,
where parental monitoring and control is lessened. However, there can be
other relevant reasons, other than those given by the switchers themselves,
as to why Christianity is their prime choice. The first has to do with the
missionary or proselytizing nature of the Christian faith. Second, Christianity
has been transplanted so often that it now appears to be an acultural
religion and therefore the most obviously “modern” and “global” choice.
Relative to the other faiths, Christianity appears to be the best organized
and has networks which allow youths to develop personal relationships
with unusual speed. Further studies should be undertaken on the implications
of the rise of “modern” Christianity and Buddhism at the expense of
traditional Chinese religion.
This study has been at best preliminary and limited by time and space
constraints. Future research can look more in-depth at the connection between
language and religion. This chapter has mentioned the correlation between
the language used most often (English) and the rise in the switching from
Taoism (a dialect-based religion) to Christianity (which is predominantly
English-based). In addition, more in-depth case studies, especially longitudinal
ones, will be beneficial in clarifying the often hazy context behind adolescent
religious switching. It has been found that adolescents change their answers
according to the phrasing of the question, the place of the interview, or to a
407

change of interviewers. Biological and psychological changes during this

period also mean that switching can occur not once but a number of times,
or even to and fro from one religion to another. Certainly, research questions
geared toward identifying key trends, dimensions and issues relevant to
national, inter-religious and intra-religious levels should be of priority.
APPENDIX 16.1
THE QUESTIONNAIRE
(Note: Actual questionnaire layout provides more lined spaces for filling in)
CIVICS AND MORAL EDUCATION SURVEY
1. Class 2. Race
3. Age 4. Sex
5. Language/dialect spoken at home
6. Language/dialect used most often
7. Grandparents’ religion or denomination (e.g. Taoist, Buddhist, Catholic, etc.)
8. Father’s religion or denomination
9. Mother’s religion or denomination
10. Your religion or denomination
11. If your religion or denomination is different from that of your father or

mother, write a little about why you have switched religion:
12. Do you like CME as a subject?

If yes, give reasons
If no, give reasons
13. Name two values learnt in CME
408

How much do you know of these religions? Write as much as you can in the space
below. (You may leave a blank if you do not know anything about it). You can include
things such as main teachings, main practices e.g. festivals, ceremonies, administrative
structure and stories associated with religion, etc.
Baha’i Faith
Buddhism
Christianity
Hinduism
Islam
Jewish Faith
Sikh Faith
Taoism
Zoroastrianism
APPENDIX 16.2
GUIDELINES TO INTERVIEWERS
Warming-up Questions:
1. Describe yourself. What makes you happy? How do you spend your free-time?
General Questions:
2. How many religions are there in Singapore? What do you think of the work of
the Inter-Religious Organisation (IRO) in Singapore? Do you or your friends
ever mention that any religion is not a good one? If so, which one? What are
their reasons? Would you like to find out more about other religions? How will
you go about it?
Switch Questions:
1. Describe the first meeting of your new religion. Who brought you there? Are
you the first in your family to become …… (name of new religion)? How old
409

were you? Did you encounter parental opposition from your parents? What
was your first impression of your new religion? How long did it take for you
from the time you heard of the new religion to switch? What do you like
particularly of your new religion?
Note
This study was undertaken in 2004. The author would like to thank her two research
assistants for their help in the transcriptions and statistics; the two focused group
discussion members for their help in the analysis of the data; and the principals of the
six schools, who gave permission to collect the data. Views expressed in this chapter
are entirely the author’s.
References
Leow, Bee Geok. “Religion, Educational Attainment and Use of English at Home
Table 18.6”. Census of Population. Advanced Data Release No 2. Singapore:
Department of Statistics, 2001.
Chew, Phyllis Ghim-Lian. “Language Use and Religious Practice: The Case of
Singapore.” In Explorations in the Sociology of Language and Religion, edited by
Tope Omoniyi et al. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2006.
Kau, Ah Keng et al., eds. Understanding Singaporeans: Values, Lifestyles, Aspirations
and Consumption Behaviour. Singapore: World Scientific, 2004.
Kuo, Eddie, C. Y., Jon Quah, and Tong Chee Kiong. Religion and Religious Revivalism
in Singapore. Singapore: Ministry of Community Development, 1988.
Tamney, Joseph and Riaz Hassan. “An Analysis of the Decline of Allegiance of
Chinese Religions: A Comparison of University Students and Their Parents”. In
Analysis of an Asian Society, edited by R. Hassan and J. B. Tamney, Unpublished
chapter, 2005.
Tamney, Joseph. Religious Switching in Singapore: A Study of Religious Mobility.
Singapore: Select Books, 1987.
Tong, Chee Kiong. Dangerous Blood, Refined Souls: Death Rituals Among the Chinese
in Singapore. Cornell University: Ph.D. dissertation, 1987.
———. “Religion”. In The Making of Singapore Sociology, Society and State, edited by
Tong, C. K., and Lian Kwee Fen. Singapore: Times Media Pte Ltd., 2002.
410

Religious Reasons in a Secular Public Sphere 411
PART III
Religion in the Media
411

412 Kenneth Paul Tan
412

17
RELIGIOUS REASONS IN
A SECULAR PUBLIC SPHERE
Debates in the Media about
Homosexuality
Kenneth Paul Tan
INTRODUCTION
A secular public sphere is neither in practice nor in theory a straightforward
arrangement. For one, the distinction between the religious and the secular
is a false one. Secularism has religion-like qualities, even dogmas, rituals,
cults of personality and leaps of faith; just as religions can be, and have been
in history, tolerant, inclusive, self-reflective, self-critical, adaptable,
philosophically rigorous and even radical. Instituting strict formal secularism
can have the effect of distorting free and open communication in the public
sphere, by excluding legitimate religious reasons and thereby eliciting a
defensive and even fundamentalist reaction from religious communities. A
conceptually false dichotomy in this way turns into a battle line, preventing
real discussion and debate. An insistence on formal secularism is therefore
at least partly responsible for a distorted public sphere that is defensive,
dogmatic and disengaged.
The formal secular public sphere in Singapore cannot be understood
without considering the mass media. With its long-standing role as a key
nation-building tool of the government, the media has the power to shape
what can be said in the public sphere, determine how and when it is said, and
413
413

decide who gets to say what, all according to the parameters laid out by the
state. This chapter examines the role of the national media in admitting
religious reasons and arguments into the secular public sphere, looking
closely at the way that it stage-managed public debate in 2003 over the
question of non-discriminatory hiring policies in the Singapore civil service
with respect to homosexuals. This was an issue that the then prime minister
(PM) had raised in the international Time magazine in an interview probably
meant more for the attention of prospective foreign talent hesitant about
working in sterile Singapore, but turned into an issue that sparked some
heated reactions from Singaporeans.
This sympathetic acknowledgement (though by no means the de-
criminalization) of homosexuals by the government in 2003 signalled increased
levels of openness perceived by some religious communities as moral
degeneration and even a betrayal of the government’s moral basis of authority.
Anglican Bishop John Chew told his Singaporean congregation in their
newsletter (also archived online):
Singapore has to be a “fun” city attractive to its own and open to the
world, so they argue, albeit with moderation but evolution as time and
tide of society norms change. In order to be globally attractive and
competitive, society has to loosen up and be in tune and in line with the
progressives, the so call “mature”, so they say. In the midst of all these,
for God’s faithful people, Paul’s sentinel call should be voiced and heard
clearly once again: “Do all things without grumbling or questioning,
that you may be blameless and innocent, children of God, without
blemish in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, among
whom you shine as lights in the world, holding fast the word of life…”
(Phil 2.14–16; also 2 Tim 4.1–4). But don’t get Paul wrong! He is
challenging us to build up extra robust capacity over the childish level of
debate and controversy, and it could not be more timely and urgent.1
The claim here is essentially that this generation in Singapore has become
“crooked and perverse” because the government initiated a “childish level of
debate and controversy” in favour of the “progressives” but has excluded the
views of the religious communities because of formal secularism. This jeremiad
— one of several that were preached from pulpits and published in the press
— can have the effect of summoning a level of conservatism that goes beyond
what is normally held by well-meaning and “right-thinking” individuals,
leading to a conservative backlash by “God’s faithful people” that may have
significant electoral consequences. It is also costly for the government to lose
the general support of religious organizations since they have taken the lead
414

in charities and voluntary welfare work, and have in this way freed up
government resources. Religious organizations, if provoked, could argue for a
stronger public voice that seems more commensurate with their significant
public contributions. These are considerations that would certainly enter into
the government’s calculations as it manages the processes of social change
and, in particular, what can be seen as gradual liberalization.
This chapter discusses the impact that secularization and religious responses
to it has had on the nature of public debates about liberalization in general,
and homosexuality in particular, as they appear in the media.
HIRING HOMOSEXUALS IN SINGAPORE’S CIVIL SERVICE:

THE START OF THE DEBATE
In June 2003, Time magazine carried a lead story that quoted the then PM
Goh Chok Tong as saying that the Singapore Civil Service would hire openly
gay people, even for sensitive positions.2 In many ways, this was a significant
moment in Singapore’s public sphere. For the first time, a government
minister, no less than the PM himself, actually initiated discussion of a topic
traditionally regarded as taboo. While it is possible that Goh had
unintentionally blurted out the topic, it is more probable that it was strategically
broached as a reply to the interviewer’s suggestion that foreigners may not
want to work in Singapore because of the perception that it is a boring place.
Significant also was Goh’s sympathetic view of homosexuals as people who
are “born that way”, and therefore incapable of choosing their sexual
“orientation”. This view clearly contradicts the position that homosexuality is
a question of choice, a position that has been argued fiercely by anti-
homosexuality organs of many Christian churches. Goh had also expressed
hope that Singaporeans would be tolerant of everyone regardless of their
sexual orientation.
The Time article raised the hopes of members of the homosexual
community in Singapore who had been opposing homophobia in the form of
a conservatism that has denied homosexuals full equality before the law.
Nevertheless, a number of limitations in Goh’s pronouncements raised the
level of scepticism. First, homosexual acts, even between consenting adults in
the privacy of their own homes, remain illegal, and censorship of homosexual
themes and characters (including, ironically, those that are positive and
educationally oriented) remains tight. A second limitation is the way Goh
continued to insist that Singaporeans are conservative and therefore not ready
for change, identifying in particular the Muslim community as the main
conservative objectors. This has been the most frequent argument used by the
415

government against liberalization, but it is somewhat flawed when one considers

how its nation-building efforts have really only been successful because of its
capacity and will to lead as an initiator of necessary change. In other words,
the government cannot wait for the people to change before it acts, but
should instead take the lead in helping to change mindsets if, indeed, change
is what it really wants in the first place. An indiscriminate policy of censoring
homosexuality, in fact, does the reverse and contributes to widespread and
habitual prejudices against homosexuals.
Many Singaporeans were also sceptical about Goh’s progressive view of
homosexuality, as they felt that it was really performed for the purposes of
attracting foreign talent and a response to economist Richard Florida’s
famous arguments that link openness and diversity with creative capital and
economic success. Only a year earlier, the Straits Times had run a story
which reported how
[Richard] Florida is not impressed by cities that emphasise only the

needs of traditional nuclear families. He notes that the leaders of many
cities want to cater exclusively to married couples with stable family lives
in the middle and upper-income brackets. But this is not the way to
build a great city, because “a successful city needs a range of options to
suit all kinds of people”, most importantly young talent.3
Some Singaporeans even believed that Goh’s words were yet another
example of how the government treats foreigners better than its own citizens,
and will in fact bend over backwards to court them.4 Some members of
conservative religious communities articulated concerns that materialism
would completely overtake morality, while other more progressive Singaporeans
lamented that the prospect of equality for homosexuals depended on economics
rather than any fundamental respect for homosexuals as human beings. Gay
activist Alex Au, a leading figure in the gay group, People Like Us, and the
webmaster of Yawning Bread,5 takes an even more sceptical view of Goh’s
hints at liberalization:
The Government wanted to create the aura of a more tolerant and open-
minded society, so that the hoped-for knowledge economy could get
enough knowledge workers on board to give Singapore a bit more
oomph. The Time magazine episode was like a “wayang show”. No real
substance; just tarting up the exterior appeal. Like a prostitute changing
the colour of her lipstick from last year’s shade to hook a few more
passing johns, but enter her boudoir and she’s as frigid as ever.6
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Nevertheless, the situation suggested clear strategies for gaining

acceptance in society, including the strategy of speaking the language of
economics when making any kind of claim for the homosexual community.
For instance, gay rights advocates can highlight the importance of the pink
dollar (and, connected with this, the pink vote). They can also show how
the law, by excluding homosexuals from spousal and other benefits, may
turn an ageing community of sexual minorities into future dependents on
state welfare.7 But just as gay activists were developing strategies for gaining
acceptance, the anti-gay lobby also took the opportunity to evolve strategies
of its own. Both of these were reflected in the mass media’s responses and
letters to the press following the PM’s interview.
MEDIA RESPONSES AND LETTERS TO THE PRESS

Generally, the Singapore media responded to Goh’s remarks with what seemed
like surprisingly gay-positive messages. An editorial in the Straits Times, for
example, argued that “it is as ‘natural’ to be a heterosexual as it is to be a
homosexual” and that “ ‘[b]laming’ someone for being homosexual is equivalent
to faulting that person for simply existing”.8 However, the same article went
on to caution that
[m]any religions — or more precisely, segments of many religions —
explicitly prohibit homosexuality. These views are sincerely held, and no
society, not even avowedly secular ones like the US, can ignore them. If
Western Europe, Canada and Australia are any indication, attitudes
towards homosexuality will change in the long term. But the process
cannot be forced.
Even the New Paper tabloid reported sympathetically about a Singaporean

gay couple wanting to get married in Canada.9 In the same issue, the paper
also quoted the organizer of (now, ironically, disallowed) Nation03, an annual
gay party that attracted people from all over the world, as saying that the
party was a sign that Singapore “as a country has moved towards being a
society highly tolerant of diversity… [and Singaporeans] are a lot more
tolerant than we give them credit for”.10 Also in the same issue, the paper
presented the results of a poll that showed 31 out of 60 Singaporeans
approving of gay marriages (although the headline “Firm ‘No’ To Gay
Marriages: Poll” was misleading).11
Most significant of all were two television programmes: a Mandarin
programme OK, No Problem on Channel U, and a Malay programme Detik
417

on Suria Channel, both presented on the same evening of 30 August 2003.

Adopting popular sit-com and talk-show formats and recorded in a food
court in Ang Mo Kio (a public housing estate in the Singapore heartlands),
the Mandarin programme sought to dispel myths about homosexuality and
homosexuals. The programme ended with an emotional interview with an
adult male who described the struggles and difficulties that he and other
Singaporeans faced “coming out”.12 The Malay programme presented a very
balanced range of views on homosexuality in Singapore, even revealing that
there were “more than 300 web pages specially for homosexual Muslims
[whose] aim is to give support and space for communicating. Furthermore,
most of these pages assure that the homosexual lifestyle is not necessarily in
conflict with Islam”.13
The Singapore media, particularly the English language media, also
published a large number of letters following their own reports on the Time
article. These letters mostly articulated clearly pro-gay or (often religiously
inflected) anti-gay arguments. It would appear that the media managed the
debate in a balanced way, always presenting letters from both sides of the
argument and even taking care to present the views of people from the four
official racial groups of Chinese, Malays, Indians and Others. Typical of the
pro-gay contributors was the Straits Times reader Alan Lau who wrote that
“we should treat people who are different from us with the same degree of
humanity and respect, even if we don’t agree with their point of view. What
exactly is so immoral about that?”14
These sorts of open-minded viewpoints were also balanced by very
vigorous anti-gay letters. Fifty-five year-old Chinese physician Lim Han Nan
wrote that homosexuality “defies human nature. If people of the same sex
want to be friends, that’s fine. But not if they become lovers. We should not
encourage them by legalising homosexual acts”.15 The Straits Times reader
Phiroze Abdul Rahman assumed that homosexuality is a departure from
basic, religiously determined gender roles, and is a negative influence from
other countries that should not be mistakenly accepted as part of Singapore’s
progress. He urged
gays to rethink the way they live, being man or woman. Getting back to
religion or the basics of sex is the right thing to do. And, hopefully, they
would realize that they have to change. They should not allow themselves
to be blinded by other parts of the world where the gay community is
accepted, nor jump onto the bandwagon on the pretext of evolution of
a country or people’s maturity.16
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Another reader, George Lim, wrote in to the Straits Times to say:
[w]e also believe in a God who loves both the heterosexual and the gay,
but He hates the sin of immorality… Our society, including religious
groups, has been bending backwards towards tolerance of immoral
behaviour. A government that does not appease the wishes of its people
may not last long. On the other hand, many people still expect our
Government to take sound and responsible action to protect young
citizens from the corrupting influence of immoral behaviour. I am
concerned about the consequences of the Government’s action. Firstly,
the Government has shown quite clearly by its action that it has lost its
moral authority… I am surprised that leaders of religions like Islam and
Christianity have not voiced their disagreement openly. These two
religions have very strong views about the right behaviours where human
sexuality is concerned. Religions play an important role in society and it
is most ironical and sad that religious leaders are refraining from making
their stand known publicly in matters of sexual morality.17
Lim adopted a familiar strategy of presenting a compassionate God who loves

the sinner but hates the sin; and so homosexuals must “choose” a moral
lifestyle. But of greater significance was the veiled threat that he made to the
government, insinuating that faith communities have almost reached the
limit of their tolerance for the immoral ways allowed by the government, and
as the government loses its moral authority, it might also lose its electoral
support from the people. Lim also presented a veiled threat to religious
leaders whose moral authority will similarly be eroded if they continue to take
a passive approach to the spread of immorality in Singapore.
HOMOPHOBIA AND RELIGIOUS RESPONSES IN

SINGAPORE
“Homophobia” has been a dominant way of interpreting any resistance to
policy shifts that appear to favour the homosexual community. In Singapore,
homophobia rarely takes the form of physical violence. At least in public,
homophobic expressions usually do not directly victimize the people who
are homosexual. Instead, homophobic expressions usually appear as
communitarian arguments and justifications for containing homosexuality as
an unnatural, mistaken or dangerous lifestyle choice that is harmful for the
homosexual as well as society at large. In Singapore, typical examples of this
include arguments that connect homosexuality with non-procreative sexuality,
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and therefore with threats to a population’s capacity to reproduce itself.

These threats can easily be yoked onto the existing discourse of low fertility
in Singapore that says low birth rates lead to a reduction in the size of the
future workforce and defence force, and this in turn has devastating
consequences for the future economy and security of Singapore.18 According
to such arguments, the heterosexual family is valued not only for its
procreative function but also because the family is imagined to be a key
Asian value, and it is in fact one of the five national shared values codified
in Singapore in the late 1980s. Conservative sections of religious communities
often insist that homosexuality is a choice and one of many bad choices
available to individuals who value their liberal autonomy. Homosexuality is
also often linked to a kind of decadence associated with the liberal West and
the negative influences of globalization in general. As such, the argument
can very readily turn into one about homosexuality as a threat to the
nation’s future, its culture, and its value system.
It is often very difficult to understand why some conservative sections of
religious communities appear to be so obsessed with homosexuality as if there
were nothing else more “evil” in this world to militate against. Can it be
understood as an over-compensation in a time of systemic gender-insecurity?
Is this obsessive response some kind of return of the repressed? Is homosexuality
just the right kind of deviance that helps to define more clearly, and thereby
re-inscribe, the structures of patriarchy? Or is it a way of targeting convenient
enemies to strengthen the moral authority of religious leaders, as a kind of
moral scapegoating to ensure solidarity and obedience? Just as the government’s
public attitude towards homosexuals will depend on political motivations
that balance the need for openness in the new creative economy and electoral
pressures from a perceived conservative majority, it is likely that the attitudes
of some conservative religious community leaders towards homosexuals are
also politically motivated.
While many anti-gay letters published in the newspapers were written by
ordinary Singaporeans with religious convictions, a number of letters originated
from people considered to be recognized authorities within the various faith
communities. The following are a few significant examples.
Islam
In the interview that PM Goh gave for the Time article, only the Muslim
community in Singapore, oddly, was identified as the conservative objectors
to homosexuality. On the contrary, three years before that, a long article in
the Straits Times of 27 May 2000 on homosexuals in Singapore featured the
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response of authorities from the three major religions of Islam, Buddhism

and Christianity. In that article, Ustaz Murat Mohd Aris, manager of the
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore’s Office of the Mufti, was quoted as
saying that:
Islam views homosexual behaviour as a sinful act, which is a symptom of

the decadence of society. It is a perverted means of satisfying natural
urges. Homosexuality degrades a person and is a most unnatural way of
life… Homosexuality is contrary to every natural law of human life. It
runs counter to the morals, purposes and institutions of a procreative
society. Individuals with homosexual behaviour require psychological or
medical treatment.19
In the same article, Masagos Zulkifli, president of Perdaus (Association

of Adult Islamic Religious Students), was quoted as saying that homosexuality
is certainly a real issue that must be addressed, but not by way of

officially recognising that to lead a homosexual life is acceptable… it
destroys the traditional family unit. It also goes against the policy to
encourage Singaporeans to have more children.
As such, Masagos argued, homosexuality is inconsistent with Singapore’s

official vision of the family as a basic institution of society and, as an
“anything goes” lifestyle, will undermine society’s basic structure. He warned
that the government should not “be seen to promote social practices that are
not acceptable by the religious groups here”.
The episode on homosexuality in the Malay programme Detik mentioned
earlier included a segment with Fatris Bakaram, Assistant Mufti and Head
of the Mufti Office. He began by echoing Islam’s total opposition to
homosexuality, ending with another assertion that homosexuality is a sickness:
There are no theologians who differ or give a different view about the
unlawfulness of the matter… To expand reproduction and continue the
line of mankind in a legitimate way in a situation of purity. But when the
sexual contact, or same-sex contact occurs in an environment which
cannot produce offspring, then in the face of Islam, it is considered as
something which breaches the heavenly duty, something which cannot
be accepted… an illness which must be cured, medicated.20
However, reminding viewers that “the Prophet never taught us to ridicule”,

he went on to take a more balanced approach, which the Straits Times
reported as
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[calling] on Muslims to take the middle road, between condemning gays

and taking the attitude that “what will be, will be, it’s their choice”… It’s
the best way for the community to tackle problems without alienating
itself from the changes affecting Singapore.21
Similarly, in a sermon prepared by the Islamic Religious Council of

Singapore (MUIS) and read by religious leaders during the Friday lunch-time
prayers at mosques, MUIS declared that:
a Muslim cannot look down onto others or feel proud and arrogant of
himself. Instead he should be looking at others with mercy and kindness,
with the intention of guiding him back to the right path… While it is
true that this [homosexual] act and lifestyle is not acceptable in Islam,
our duty towards them is not to curse and insult them but to get close
to them and to give them advise and encouragement so that they will
leave this unhealthy and unacceptable lifestyle so as to attain Allah’s
acceptance and forgiveness. It is true that leaving behind such a lifestyle
is a great challenge and of grave difficulty, however, it is not entirely
impossible so long as there is still faith and belief in Allah s.w.t.22
The Straits Times described this message as practically identical to an

official statement issued by the Christian churches at about the same time,
reporting how
Muslim religious leaders yesterday spoke out against homosexuality,

saying it is a sin in Islam. They urged Muslims, in a sermon prepared by
the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), not to humiliate
and ostracise gays in their community, but to reach out and coax them
to give up their lifestyle. The position is similar to that of the National
Council of Churches of Singapore, which gave essentially the same
message to Anglicans, Methodists and Presbyterians, among others.23
Buddhism
In 2000, the Venerable Shi Ming Yi, secretary-general of the Singapore
Buddhist Federation, was quoted in the same article in the Straits Times of
27 May 2000 as saying that he had never discussed homosexuality since
“there is nothing on the matter under the five Buddhist precepts”.24 However,
three years after, in response to the Time article, Shi was quoted as saying “[o]f
course, as a religion, we do not think that homosexuality is right… But we
should still respect [homosexuals] and try to help them as much as possible.
We would extend them a hand of compassion”.25
422

In an effort to make sense of this contradiction, Alex Au led a group to

meet with Shi for an exchange of ideas. In his reflections on the dialogue
session, as published on the Yawning Bread website, Au recalled how Shi
immediately confirmed that Buddhist scriptures did say nothing about
homosexuality, but went on to explain that he said his religion did not think
that homosexuality was right “because he was reflecting the general opinion
of Buddhists in Singapore, who were mostly Chinese-speaking and who felt
that homosexuality was somehow unacceptable. Parents would not look
kindly upon their children being gay”. According to Au, Shi explained that:
it was not realistic to move an entire body — the Buddhist congregation

— except by tiny little steps. If he had put out a radical, purist, gay-
friendly one, he would have been shunned by other monks and Buddhist
opinion leaders. More hardline ones would have disavowed his statement
and issued sterner ones. And he would lose what leverage he had to
gently move Singapore Buddhists to a better understanding of
the issue.26
Shi’s strategy, it would seem, was motivated by an assumption that

most Buddhists are culturally conservative Chinese Singaporeans, rather
than by the Buddhist capacity to be neutral towards and therefore tolerant
of homosexuality. However, more “theological” (rather than cultural or
political) reflections on homosexuality and Buddhism can be found on a
website called Heartland that describes itself as “a Buddhist Fellowship…
for gay people in Singapore” whose main aim is “(1) To help each other
relate Buddhist teachings to our lives and to being gay, (2) To encourage
each other to practice the Dharma actively, (3) To help each other improve
the understanding of the Dharma, through practising together”.27 Initiating
a range of cyber-discussion topics such as the Buddhist view of sexual desire
in homosexuality and heterosexuality, the webmaster of Heartland makes
an appeal to his audience:
Just as Buddha had, in the Kalama Sutra, invited us not to accept societal
norms, traditions, values and teachings blindly, without first testing and
experiencing them yourself for its beneficial qualities, I would like to
invite you to do so here too.28
Roman Catholicism and Protestant Christianity

Generally, some segments of Christian communities have provided the most
developed anti-gay arguments and strategies. Most of these arguments tend
423

to be based on literal interpretations of scripture, particularly the references

made by St Paul. According to these interpretations, homosexuality is sinful
because the Bible directly says so, even though it was written in a very
different historical, cultural, literary and intellectual context from today’s.
The arguments also try to refute claims that homosexuals are born that way
and therefore refute the argument that God cannot condemn what he has
made in his own image. Stressing that homosexuality is a choice rather than
something people are born with, the anti-gay arguments sometimes attempt
to disprove the existence of a “gay gene” by drawing selectively from what is
really an inconclusive body of scientific research.29 Sometimes the arguments
focus on the notion that being homosexual (even if it is accepted as a natural
biological condition or orientation) is not the problem, but practising gay sex
(a choice of action or behaviour) is. These arguments open the way to
suggesting that the publicly visible spread of homosexual lifestyles can influence
innocent young people to become homosexual, a preventative claim. These
arguments also open the way to reassuring homosexuals that Christians are
asked to love the sinner but hate the sin, and then convince (and provide
community support for) homosexuals to choose a heterosexual lifestyle in
line with the notion of humanity’s fall from grace and the redemption that
can return him or her to a true purpose,30 that is, a curative claim. Often, it
is argued that homosexuality, in particular the notion of gay marriages and
households, degrades the sanctity of the heterosexual family and of procreative
sexuality both of which are imagined to be essential values of Christianity.
These are also often articulated with an alarmist vision of a society in decline.
Generally, Goh’s announcement in the Time article did not appear to
provoke a forceful public response among Roman Catholic authorities in
Singapore, although the Catholic Church has taken a clear line towards
homosexuality in the wider society, in particular with regard to the institution
of marriage. A 2004 report by the Vatican Council for the Family was
extracted and reproduced in Catholic News, distributed mainly to the Roman
Catholic parishioners in Singapore, in which the council asserted in the
section on homosexuality that:
[two] people of the same sex are not capable of conceiving and adopting
a child, nor are they in a psychic condition to approach the meaning of
conjugal love or ensure the symbolic parental function from a human
viewpoint, much less be a reference point in children’s education. In
these situations some valid principles are wiped away, such as the higher
good of the child, and subjected to possible dangers. It is necessary to
present in a more in-depth way the truth and the clear reasons that lead
424

to disapproving of de facto couples, as well as those of the same sex, and

the presumption to adopt children, and reaffirm that homosexuality is a
tendency, not a sexual identity, and so it cannot take part in the foundation
of the social bond that the couple and the family represent.31
Local Catholic authorities have regularly denounced homosexual marriage

and non-procreative sexuality. In 2000, an article in the Straits Times on
homosexuality in Singapore quoted Redemptorist priest Father Bernard Teo’s
explanation that:
[t]he Catholic Church doesn’t accept homosexual activities as a right

because sexual activity has a special procreative meaning attached to it.
But people with gay orientation are to be respected as persons in their
own right…. We will never recognize homosexual marriages, but how
far society can tolerate, that’s a subject for debate.32
Also very clear in the Catholic approach is the insistence that homosexuals be
respected first as human beings. In a Channel NewsAsia programme,
educationist Brother Michael Broughton articulated a humane concern for
homosexuals who often end up hating themselves:
As part of education, we try to tell our boys not to prejudge people…

your homosexual friend could be the one in the rugby team, your rugby
captain could be a homosexual, and you do not know … so you’ve got
to prepare and open their minds to consider… but for the boys who
have such a sexual orientation, it’s always a problem, because they are
always a minority group, and you got to salvage them from self-loathing
or self-hate…. non-acceptance of themselves, of who they are.33
Similarly, Father Teo, recognizing that many homosexuals do lead

“respectable lives” and have contributed greatly to church and community,
explained the need “to educate people that [homosexuals] have rights to their
dignity… because a lot of people suffer when things are not clarified”.34
Protestant Christian churches seemed to respond more forcefully towards
the Time article. One of the more hard-line responses came from retired
Methodist pastor George Wan who compared homosexuality with drug
addiction and accused the government of ignoring religious groups and
distorting morality by accepting the unnatural behaviour of homosexuals:
What kind of morality are we inculcating in Singapore when we implicitly

condone homosexuality? What kind of signals is the Government sending
425

to its citizens? Being in a multi-religious society, shouldn’t the authorities

heed the moral teachings and reservations of religious groups? I am not
condemning homosexuals and lesbians. We should sympathize with
them and help them, as we do with drug addicts. But we must never
condone their unnatural behaviour.35
In what seemed like an effort to prevent a Christian anti-gay campaign

from going out of control, the National Council of Churches of Singapore
(NCCS) representing about 150 Anglican, Methodist, and Presbyterian
churches issued a formal statement on homosexuality that would serve as a
rational and authoritative beacon for practical Christian morality. The NCCS
addressed its concerns not only to its Christian congregations but also, “as
concerned citizens, to the society in which we belong”. Here, it is important
to note that Christians see themselves as witnesses to the (pagan, secular)
world, and so it is their duty as Christians to speak their truth more widely,
in this case, as concerned citizens. In this regard, it is not surprising that the
statement, reported in the Straits Times and the Today newspaper, continued
to transgress the secularist thesis by re-asserting that the NCCS is “committed
to serving our nation by helping to preserve and promote wholesome values
and lifestyles that will contribute to the well-being of our society”.
The NCSS’ overall approach was quite typical. It based its total opposition
to the sin of homosexuality on Biblical standards but distanced itself from
homophobia by defining this as a rejection or hatred of homosexual people
and by reaffirming homosexuals as “persons of worth and dignity”. It then
presented the Christian church as a “caring community and a sanctuary”
where people struggling with homosexual desire may receive God’s forgiveness
and grace, and be transformed by him. The NCCS then dismissed any
attempts to prove scientifically that homosexuality has a biological basis.
Agreeing that homosexuals should not be discriminated against in terms of
employment, the NCCS nevertheless would not accept that:
society should be re-ordered or allowed to evolve to the extent that

eventually homosexual practice is endorsed, permitted or encouraged as
an alternative lifestyle. In this regard, we urge our government to maintain:
(a) current legislation concerning homosexuality; (b) its policy of not
permitting the registration of homosexual societies or clubs; (c) its policy
of not allowing the promotion of homosexual lifestyle and activities.36
Although the statement by NCCS, particularly its anti-discrimination

stance, was generally interpreted as a positive public attempt to control the
426

burst of thoroughly homophobic and militant responses from a few Christian

churches, it still contained arguments that pro-gay activists are considered to
be dangerous and regressive. In a reply that was sent to the various media but
not published, Eileena Lee, Kelvin Wong and Alex Au argued that by “asking
a secular State to frame its laws and policies in accordance with its [religious]
beliefs”, the statement “breaches the separation of Church and State, is an
attempt to impose Christian values upon non-Christians, and is interference
in our politics”. As such, it threatened to “damage the tolerance and harmony
we have built up over the decades, and are still trying to enhance and deepen
as we move forward”.37
Similarly, homosexual support group Safehaven published its rebuttal on
gay website Fridae.com, arguing that:
…the Christian faith is but one of many faiths in our nation, which
clearly lays down the principle of the separation of church and state. To
call upon the state to legislate private morality runs against this
fundamental principle that has stood the test of time not only in
Singapore but elsewhere. As a secular state, Singapore needs to take into
account all factors that will contribute to the continued viability of
Singapore as a socio-economic entity. The need to embrace diversity and
tolerance is now becoming an urgent matter of national interest if
Singapore is to continue succeeding in the new millennium…. It is time
for segments of the Singaporean Christian community to drop the gay
bogeyman so that Singapore can catch up with the rest of the developed
world…. In associating acceptance with a “re-ordering” of society, the
NCCS statement ignores the fact that gay Singaporeans have contributed,
are contributing and will continue to contribute to the wellbeing of their
families, their faith communities as well as their nation.38
What is especially important to note here is that Safehaven is a Christian-

based homosexual support group. Like many other Christian homosexual
support groups in Singapore, Safehaven demonstrates clearly that not all
Christians share the anti-gay beliefs and strategies that seem to dominate the
public image of Christian faith communities. In the same rebuttal, Safehaven
argues that:
there are many Christians and an increasing number of denominations

globally including segments of the Methodist and Anglican
denominations who disagree with the position of the NCCS regarding
homosexuality. These individuals and churches having read the
Scriptures carefully bearing in mind the Spirit of Christ, believe that
427

the Christian faith can and does affirm that gay Christians may live
fully as Christians and as gay people. For these Christians and for us,
there is no theological or spiritual conflict. We call upon the NCCS to
recognize the existence of this diversity even within global Christianity…
The affirmation of the human dignity of the gay person means that the
NCCS must also affirm the right and obligation for each person, gay
or otherwise, to work through their own moral position based on their
understanding of the Bible.39
In fact, there are even mainstream Christian authorities with no formal

affiliation to homosexual organizations, such as former Methodist bishop
Reverend Dr Yap Kim Hao, who disagree with the hard-line position on
homosexuality expressed in the NCCS statement. In a letter published in the
Straits Times, Reverend Yap described homosexuals as “normal human beings”.
Citing a range of studies by professional mental health organizations, he
argued against attempts to convert homosexuals into heterosexuals since
these methods have not been proven to be effective but they instead cause
tremendous psychological harm. He believed that it is much more important
to help homosexuals “become comfortable with their sexual orientation and
understand the societal response to it”. In the same letter, Yap quoted
Singaporean Seow Choon Leong, a professor of Old Testament Language and
Literature at Princeton Theological Seminary, as saying:
I also used to believe homosexual acts are always wrong. Listening to gay
and lesbian students and friends, however, I have had to rethink my
position and reread the Scriptures. Seeing how gay and lesbian people
suffer discrimination, face the rejection of family and friends, risk losing
their jobs, and live in fear of being humiliated and bashed, I cannot see
how anyone would prefer to live that way. I do not understand it all, but
I am persuaded that it is not a matter of choice… I have reconsidered my
views, I was wrong.40
Closing the Debate

After more than a month of intense debate in the public sphere over Goh’s
comments about hiring homosexuals in the civil service, the discussions
quickly subsided with the annual National Day Rally speech in which Goh
distanced himself from any gay cause, warned gay activists not to incur the
wrath of conservative Singaporeans, reassured the faith communities and
complimented them on their responsible input on the matter, and urged
Singaporeans to move on to more important matters:
428

As for my comments on gays, they do not signal any change in policy

that would erode the moral standards of Singapore, or our family values.
In every society, there are gay people. We should accept those in our
midst as fellow human beings, and as fellow Singaporeans. If the public
sector refuses to employ gays, the private sector might also refuse. But
gays too, need to make a living. That said, let me stress that I do not
encourage or endorse a gay lifestyle. Singapore is still a traditional and
conservative Asian society. Gays must know that the more they lobby for
public space, the bigger the backlash they will provoke from the
conservative mainstream. Their public space may then be reduced./I am
glad that conservative Singaporeans and religious leaders have made
known their views on the matter, clearly but responsibly. I hope we will
now move on and focus on more urgent challenges.41
CONCLUSION
This case study reveals that faith communities in Singapore often have much
in common when they respond to what they see as an instance of formal
secularism threatening to swing Singapore to a materialist and pragmatic
extreme, and to a degenerate place where there is no room for any kind of
public morality at all. In fact, it would seem as if the main fault-lines lie not
between religious communities (usually thought to be the main source of
inter-religious conflict and violence that has prompted the theory and practice
of secularism), but rather, between the religious and the secular.
On the other hand, formalizing a public secularism that excludes all
religious reasons from the public sphere can effectively distort the capacity for
more open public dialogue motivated by a collective pursuit of higher-order
knowledge of what is good. A strict and formal secularism can have the effect
of demonizing religious reasons and transforming them into a defensive
discourse. Complexity, subtlety, variety and engagement are distorted into
simple “us” versus “them” modes of reasoning. In the case study, it is clear that
religious people and even authorities can have a range of views that are
anything from conservative to the most liberal. However, a siege mentality
reduces discussion into a battlefield of rigid notions of good and evil and
right and wrong, all marked by suspicion and hostility between the forces of
religion and secularism. The capacity to step into “other people’s shoes”, that
is, to think with empathy and an enlarged mentality, is severely diminished.
As statistics continue to reveal high levels of religiosity in Singapore,42 religious
communities become, unfortunately, cast as a rigid and conservative moral
mainstream, even though conservatism per se is not necessarily inherent in
these religious traditions, theologies, and practices. Indeed, as indicated
429

above, there is even in practice much evidence of common ground, at least

where according homosexuals the human dignity that they fully deserve is
concerned. It is politics that often deeply polarizes arguments in such a way
as to destroy the common ground on which better arguments might be built.
The case study also shows how the media has tried to stage-manage the
debates between pro-gay and anti-gay voices to achieve a peaceful outcome
and progress towards open-mindedness, while containing the indignation of
more conservative sections of religious communities. Managing this balance
is a thoroughly complex responsibility and one that should include producing
and admitting a more complex range of voices that do not merely fall into
“pro” and “anti” camps. Otherwise, discussion will remain partisan, and the
same partisan arguments are likely to be re-articulated should another “gay
issue” be raised in the near future. The media can play a more strategic role
in stage-managing future public debates to produce and admit more nuanced
arguments that destabilize simple “pro” and “anti” modes of discussion. For
a start, removing the religious/secular distinction in the public sphere (and
the prejudices and fears that undergird it) may have the beneficial effect of
freeing up discussion, removing suspicion and increasing good faith in one
another as well-meaning and intelligent citizens.
Notes
The author wishes to thank the Institute of Policy Studies for its support, and also
Gary Lee Jack Jin for his research assistance. Views expressed in this chapter are
entirely those of the author.
1. Chew, “Shaping of Maturity”, Diocesan Digest, September 2003, <http://www.
anglican.org.sg/bishopchew_message_sep03.html> (accessed 14 August 2005).
2. Elegant, “The Lion in Winter”, Time Asia, 30 June 2003.
3. Ibrahim, “‘Making Room for the Three Ts”, Sunday Times, 14 July 2002.
4. Yeo, “Local Gays, Foreign Gays”, Today, 5 July 2003.
5. Yawning Bread is a masterfully designed website that carries Au’s socially and
politically critical writings on issues mostly related to the gay community.
Through his meticulous, lucid and vivid arguments, Au takes pains to point out
rhetorical contradictions, illogical arguments and hypocritical positions in the
public sphere, drawing from a wealth of examples from history and other
countries. By taking official rhetoric at face value, Au seizes on contradictions
between rhetoric and practice and within rhetoric itself, in order to effect
changes. The website serves as an effective public educational platform. In the
context of a surprisingly large number of Singapore gay community on-line
discussion groups (at last count, there were almost thirty such groups under
Yahoo alone), its leading role in gay activism is not insignificant. The website
also maintains a comprehensive archive of news reports and letters to the press
430

(with the webmaster’s annotations), a resource that has proved to be most

helpful in the research for this chapter.
6. Au, “Gay Civil Servants Redux”.
7. See, for example, discussions in Lo and Huang, eds. People Like Us.
8. Straits Times, “Editorial: About Gay Tolerance”, 5 July 2003.
9. Joyce Lim, “With This Ring, I Thee Wed…”, New Paper, 6 July 2003.
10. Calvin Low, “No Mardi Gras, Says PM”, New Paper, 6 July 2003.
11. Aaron Low and Marcel Lee Pereira, “Firm “No” To Gay Marriages: Poll”,
New Paper, 6 July 2003.
12. Petrus Tan, “Gay Tutorial on Chinese TV”.
13. Au, “Gay Tutorial on Malay TV”.
14. Alan Lau, “Gays Are Still People”, Straits Times, 9 July 2003.
15. Li, “Employing Gays in Civil Service: A ‘Tiny Step Forward’ ”, Sunday Times,
6 July 2003.
16. Phiroze Abdul Rahman, “I Am Disturbed By Just The Thought That Gays Are
Ordinary People”, Straits Times, 15 July 2003.
17. George Lim, “Government Should Rethink Hiring of Gays”, Straits Times,
15 July 2003.
18. Amy Tan, “Singapore Gays Find Tacit Acceptance but Some Seek More”,
Reuters, 1 July 2001.
19. Ng, “Do Gays Have A Place In Singapore”, Straits Times, 27 May 2000.
20. Au, “Gay Tutorial on Malay TV”, op. cit.
21. Straits Times, “MUIS Spells Out Its Stand On Gay Issue”, 1 August 2003.
22. “Belief and Practice”, Islamic Religious Council of Singapore website, 1 August
2003, <http://www.muis.gov.sg/rservices/oom_files/K1122.doc> (accessed
14 August 2005).
23. Straits Times, “MUIS Spells Out Its Stand On Gay Issue”, 1 August 2003.
24. Ng, op. cit.
25. Li, op. cit.
26. Au, “Reflections on a Meeting with the Venerable Shi Ming Yi”, Yawning Bread.
27. <http://www.geocities.com/heartland_sg/>.
28. Ibid.
29. Au, “Playing Fast and Loose with Science”, Yawning Bread.
30. Tan Kim Huat, “Christianity and Homosexuality”.
31. Vatican Council for the Family, “Conclusions of the XVI Plenary Assembly,
18–20 November 2004”, p. 16.
32. Ng, op. cit.
33. Au, “CNA Special Assignment: Homosexuality; Transcript of Homosexuality
Segment”, Yawning Bread.
34. Ng, op. cit.
35. Wan, “Don’t Condone Unnatural Behaviour”, Straits Times, 18 July 2003.
36. National Council of Churches of Singapore, “Statement on Homosexuality”,
29 July 2003.
431

37. Lee, Wong, and Au, “NCC’s ‘Statement on Homosexuality’ Breaches the
Separation of Church and State”.
38. Safehaven, “Statement in Response to National Council of Churches’ Statement
on Homosexuality”.
39. Ibid.
40. Yap, “No Reason to Condemn Gays”, Straits Times, 18 July 2003.
41. Goh, “From the Valley to the Highlands”, National Day Rally Speech,
17 August 2003.
42. Lim and Low, “Nation of Believers”, Straits Times, 16 July 2005, Saturday
Special Report, pp. 2–3.
References
Au, Alex. “CNA Special Assignment: Homosexuality; Transcript of Homosexuality
Segment”. Yawning Bread, September 1999. <http://www.yawningbread.org/>
(accessed 14 August 2005).
———. “Gay Tutorial on Malay TV”. Yawning Bread, July 2003. <http://
www.yawningbread.org/ (accessed 14 August 2005).
———. “Playing Fast and Loose with Science”. Yawning Bread, July 2003. <http://
www.yawningbread.org/> (accessed 14 August 2005).
———. “Reflections on a Meeting with the Venerable Shi Ming Yi”. Yawning Bread,
August 2003. <http://www.yawningbread.org/> (accessed 14 August 2005).
———. “Gay Civil Servants Redux”. Yawning Bread, July 2005. <http://
Channel U. OK, No Problem (30 July 2003).
Chew, John. “Shaping of Maturity”. Diocesan Digest, September 2003. <http://
www.anglican.org.sg/bishopchew_message_sep03.html> (accessed 14 August
2005).
Elegant, Simon. “The Lion in Winter”. Time Asia, 30 June 2003. <http://www.time.
com/time/asia/covers/501030707/sea_singapore.html> (accessed 14 August
2005).
Goh, Chok Tong. “From the Valley to the Highlands”. National Day Rally speech,
17 August 2003.
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore. “Knowledge, Belief and Practice”. 1 August
2003. <http://www.muis.gov.sg/rservices/oom_files/K1122.doc> (accessed
14 August 2005).
Lau, Alan. “Gays Are Still People”. Straits Times, 9 July 2003.
Lee, Eileena, Kelvin Wong, and Alex Au. “NCCS’s ‘Statement on Homosexuality’
Breaches the Separation of Church and State”. Reproduced in Yawning Bread,
30 July 2003. <http://www.yawningbread.org/> (accessed 14 August 2005).
Li, Xueying. “Employing Gays in Civil Service a ‘Tiny Step Forward’ ”. Sunday
Times, 6 July 2003.
432

Lim, George. “Government Should Rethink Hiring of Gays”. Straits Times,

15 July 2003.
Lim, Joyce. “With This Ring, I Thee Wed…”. New Paper, 6 July 2003.
Lim, Lydia and Aaron Low. “Nation of Believers”. Straits Times, 16 July 2005,
Saturday Special Report, pp. 2–3.
Lo, Joseph and Huang Guoqin, eds. People Like Us. Singapore: Select Publishing,
2003.
Low, Aaron and Marcel Lee Pereira. “Firm ‘No’ to Gay Marriages: Poll”. New Paper,
6 July 2003.
Low, Calvin. “No Mardi Gras, says PM”. New Paper, 6 July 2003.
National Council of Churches of Singapore. “Statement on Homosexuality”, 29 July
2003. <http://www.anglican.org.sg/nccs_homosexuality.html> (accessed
14 August 2005).
Ng, Irene. “Do Gays Have a Place in Singapore”. Straits Times, 27 May 2000.
Phiroze Abdul Rahman. “I Am Disturbed by Just the Thought that Gays are
Ordinary People”. Straits Times, 15 July 2003.
Safehaven. “Statement in Response to National Council of Churches’ Statement
on Homosexuality”. Reproduced in Yawning Bread, 29 July 2003. <http://
Straits Times. “Editorial: About Gay Tolerance”. 5 July 2003.
———. “MUIS Spells Out its Stand on Gay Issue”. 1 August 2003.
Suria Channel. Detik, 30 July 2003.
Tan, Amy. “Singapore Gays Find Tacit Acceptance but Some Seek More”. Reuters,
1 July 2001.
Tan, Kim Huat. “Christianity and Homosexuality”. In People Like Us, edited by
Joseph Lo and Huang Guoqin, pp. 48–51. Singapore: Select Publishing, 2003.
Tan, Petrus. “Gay Tutorial on Chinese TV”, Yawning Bread, July 2003. <http://
Vatican Council for the Family. “Conclusions of the XVI Plenary Assembly,
18–20 November 2004”. Extracted in Catholic News, 7 August 2005, p. 16.
Wan, George. “Don’t Condone Unnatural Behaviour”. Straits Times, 18 July 2003.
Yap, Kim Hao. “No Reason to Condemn Gays”. Straits Times, 18 July 2003.
Yeo, Elisia. “Local Gays, Foreign Gays”. Today, 5 July 2003.
Zuraidah Ibrahim. “Making Room for the Three Ts”. Sunday Times, 14 July 2002.
433

434 Randolph Kluver et al.
18
THE INTERNET AND RELIGIOUS

HARMONY IN SINGAPORE
Randolph Kluver, Benjamin H. Detenber,

Lee Waipeng, Shahiraa Sahul Hameed,
Chen Yanli, and Pauline Hope Cheong
INTRODUCTION
Since its development in the mid-1990s, the Internet has become a truly
global medium, reaching most nations around the world and providing
unprecedented opportunities for global interaction and information gathering
for the masses. Singapore has one of the highest levels of Internet penetration
in the world, where in 2002, 60.2 per cent of Singaporeans were Internet
users (Kuo et al. 2002). From 2000–2005, the number of Internet users has
climbed even higher, reaching 77.9 per cent (Internetworldstats 2005). Based
on these figures, Singapore has the second highest Internet penetration rate in
Asia, after South Korea, and much higher levels of penetration than many
developed nations, including the United States (68.8 per cent) and Sweden
(74.3 per cent). Moreover, the government has embarked on a number of
initiatives to extend Internet penetration and use by Singaporeans, suggesting
that the number of Internet users is likely to increase further. This is entirely
in keeping with Singapore’s status as one of the world’s most globalized
nations in various economic, political and cultural dimensions.
At the same time, religious faith remains an important component of
social life in Singapore (Khun 1998), as in many other areas of the world.
Singapore does not have one dominant faith, but is rather multi-ethnic and
434
434

The Internet and Religious Harmony in Singapore 435
multi-religious. According to the 2000 government census, 85 per cent of

Singaporeans stated that they had religious affiliations to Buddhism, Taoism,
Christianity, Islam, Hinduism or other religions (Yearbook of Statistics
Singapore 2000). Government policy towards religious faith is based upon
secularism while valuing both religious and racial harmony as necessary
preconditions for political and economic stability (Hong 2005). Within the
Singaporean context, issues of religion and race are inextricably entwined,
and it is generally acknowledged by the government that religion is an
important tool in ensuring the continuity of traditional and cultural values.
Furthermore, Singapore’s constitution highlights that although Singaporeans
have the right to religious freedom and practice, they are prohibited from
engaging in acts that are “contrary to any general law relating to public order,
public health or mortality”, thus placing restrictions on the type of religious
activities allowed (Hong 2005).
On-line religious activity has been identified as a popular and important
activity in some Western countries, including the United States. According to
the results of the Pew Internet and American Life Project study on “cyber-
faith”, 64 per cent of “wired Americans” have used the Internet for various
religious purposes, including activities such as seeking and giving religious
information/advice online, downloading religious music, and purchasing
religious items (Hoover et al. 2004). As the Internet has grown as a global
medium for communication and information, many religious institutions
and believers have embraced the technology as a means of expressing their
faith, to reach out to non-believers, and of building stronger community ties
among believers (Campbell 2005a, 2005b; Larsen 2001). An earlier report
from the Singapore Internet Project (SIP) suggests that the Internet may be
similarly important for the religious and social lives of Singaporeans. While
most adult users indicated that the Internet did not alter their interaction
with those of a common faith, almost a quarter reported that Internet use had
increased their religious contacts (Kuo et al. 2002).
Within a multi-cultural, multi-religious, “wired” society such as
Singapore, the use of the Internet for religious purposes has potentially
important implications for inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations, policy
making and education. Furthermore, the Internet has, over the past decade,
provided a new platform for religious groups as a new approach and avenue
for proclamation, communication and interaction, with both members and
non-members of their faiths. Moreover, the global nature of the Internet
suggests that it could greatly increase the entry of international influences
on how Singaporeans understand their faiths, as well as the faiths of others.
Within the local context, “on-line religion” allows Singaporeans to have free
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access to religious information from all over the world, widening the
possibilities for encountering religious ideas, symbols, practices and traditions
beyond that which is locally available. The rise of politically charged and
extremist religious movements around the world, such as the Al-Qaeda,
also points to the potential threats to the delicate balance involved in
maintaining religious harmony in Singapore, mainly due to the increase in
the ease of accessing information and communicating with members of
these radical groups (Lindlof 2002).
The purposes of this study, then, are to examine: (1) the ways in which
Singaporeans use the Internet for religious purposes, (2) the attitudes of
religious leaders in Singapore towards Internet use for religious purposes, and
(3) the potential impact on religious practice and religious harmony in
Singapore. The study involved two primary methodologies: a national survey
of religious use of the Internet, and interviews with religious leaders that
could contribute to our understanding of on-line religious practice.
This chapter will be organized as follows. First, some of the relevant
literature concerning the Internet and religious practice will be reviewed,
examining both “religion on-line”, which focuses on institutional responses
to the Internet, and “on-line religion”, which focuses on how grassroots
groups use the Internet for religious purposes (Helland 2000). Second, the
findings of a national survey concerning the religious use of the Internet by
Singaporeans and a series of interviews with religious leaders will be
presented. Finally, possible implications of these findings both for public
policy as well as for a better understanding of religion in the Singaporean
context are discussed.
RELIGION ONLINE AND ON-LINE RELIGION:

THE INTERNET AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT
There is an emerging literature on the ways in which the Internet intersects
with religious faith, with many scholars postulating that the Internet may
have potential significance in altering the conception and the practices of
religious faith. For example, some have argued that the advent of the Internet
invites changes comparable to the political and social changes arising from
the invention of the printing press and the Protestant Reformation (Murley
2005). Others have argued that the Internet introduces a “modernizing” and
“decentralizing” element in fundamentalist religions which could potentially
undermine them (Barzilai-Nahon and Barzilai 2005), while yet others argue
that the Internet will lead to a greater secularization, ultimately minimizing
religious differences altogether (Armfield and Holbert 2003). We will focus
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our attention on those studies which have the most relevance to the issue at
hand: the Internet as a platform for either religious harmony or conflict.
Within religious communities, responses to the Internet have been largely
but certainly not universally positive. Advocates claim that the Internet is a
place of renewal for religious institutions (Dixon 1997; Cobb 1998). Critics,
on the other hand, claim that while the Internet is a useful technology, it also
threatens both “real” community and communication (Veith and Stamper
2000). Others reject the technology altogether, arguing that it is part and
parcel of Westernization, and thus alien to religious values (Barzilai-Nahon
and Barzilai 2005).
Only a few studies have directly engaged the question of religious conflict
or harmony on the Internet, but a number have examined the extent to
which people use the Internet to find out about other faiths. The Pew studies
in the United States, for example, found that 26 per cent of the “on-line
faithful” had used the Internet to find out about the religious beliefs and
traditions other than their own, both out of curiosity and for their own
spiritual growth. Evangelicals are more likely than those from other spiritual
profiles to seek information about other faiths (Hoover et al. 2004, p. 20).
Not surprisingly, another study by the Pew organization found that Americans
turned heavily to the Internet to find out about Islam after the 9/11 attacks
in the United States, and that many diverse religious bodies provided
information about Islam at that time (Rainie, Fox and Madden 2002).
Although much earlier analysis of the role of the Internet argued that
it would create a greater understanding of others and even lead to an “end
of nationalism”, more recent studies indicate that, in addition to the potential
for greater openness to diversity, the Internet also creates a potential for
schism and fragmentation as it allows individuals to retreat from their off-
line community into smaller communities defined solely by individual
interests (Shapiro 1999). Past research in this area has suggested that some
religions deal with dangers from the “outside” by intensifying group
distinctions which clearly differentiate between “us” and “them”, encouraging
believers to make their religious identity their main source of identity, and
portraying non-believers as “evil” or “Satanic”, resulting in a compromise of
other sorts of communal identity (Barker 2005). The global and largely
uncensored nature of the Internet means that local points of reference
could easily be bypassed by foreign religious teachers or groups. On the
other hand, the Internet as well as other forms of communication
technologies are forms of empowerment for “traditional voices” that have
been marginalized by the process of globalization (Campbell 2005a). As the
Internet increasingly becomes more popular among the religiously oriented,
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it is expected that there will be shifts in “congregational power structures”

as formerly discounted “techies” find themselves in new leadership roles
(Campbell 2005b). In the Islamic world in particular, Bunt (2003) argues
that the Internet raises new questions of authority through phenomena
such as “cyber-fatwas” (Islamic edicts and pronouncements made through
cyberspace) and the reconfiguring of religious authority.
These studies all demonstrate that the Internet embodies the potential
for increased religious strife even as there is also tremendous potential in
using the Internet for purposes of religious harmony. Indeed, some argue that
on-line religious sites, such as forums, are places of hostility or antagonism
towards those of other faiths. For example, Selvan (2003) argues that among
on-line Hindu newsgroups, 21 per cent of the messages were engaged in a
“flame war” between Hindus and Muslims. Specifically, in the Hindu forums
reviewed, there were sustained attacks on Hinduism, presumably from
Muslims. The author speculates that messages with similar contents would be
posted by Hindus on Islam-focused forums. Likewise, Bunt (2003) argues
that the Internet offers tremendous potential for destructive activities such as
“cyber-jihad” (holy war in cyberspace) by some Muslims against others.
Mayer (2000) goes further to argue that the Internet is a compelling
battleground for “cyberspace propaganda wars”, and that it is a particularly
effective communication medium for adversaries to attack religions, sometimes
to the point of shaking the faith of those under attack (p. 250). Mayer argues
that the Internet has not demonstrated tremendous utility in attracting new
members; on the contrary, it has been effective in mobilizing attacks,
particularly against cults or non-mainstream faiths and new religious
movements. For example, a “virtual church” in Britain known as the “Church
of Fools”, which came on-line in 2004, had to implement a stringent policy
of moderation after it opened, as participants used their entry to disrupt
the on-line services, through actions such as claiming to be Satan and
the extensive use of profanity <http://churchoffools.com/got-questions/
satan.html>. At times, these groups have successfully mounted Internet-
based counter-attacks, particularly by creating strong web presences, with
multiple pages and credible information. Introvigne (2005) concurs with
Mayer, arguing that the religious battles on-line amount to “information
terrorism” or, less strongly, “offensive information warfare” and that the
Internet can be viewed as a “privileged source” that can be used to spread
malicious information aimed at damaging or destroying a particular organism.
As pointed out earlier, there are counter-arguments that the Internet can
promote inter-religious understanding and harmony. The Pew studies cited
earlier all indicate willingness among cyber-believers to learn about other
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faiths, with a significant number believing that such cyber-information gathered

would enrich their own faith. There are Muslim websites which promote
more contemporary and moderate forms of Islam that stand in sharp contrast
to the more extreme and radical views of Islam portrayed in the media
(Robinson 2000). However, the extent to which these sites successfully
promote inter-religious understanding has yet to be determined.
It is clear from this brief review that the Internet offers both possibilities
for religious conflict and religious understanding. However, as the growing
literature on the social impact of the Internet demonstrates, the potential that
is offered by the technology for conflict or harmony is often not fully
understood because precisely how human actors make use of the technology
is often not anticipated. Therefore, it is necessary to ground our understanding
of the social impact of the Internet on actual behaviours.
METHODOLOGY
This study takes an observational analytical approach to understanding the
Internet’s influence on religious harmony in Singapore. It is based on two
stages of data collection, combining both quantitative and qualitative research
methods. In the first stage, the authors conducted a representative, national
survey aimed at understanding how Singaporeans use the Internet for
religious purposes. A total of 711 Singaporean citizens and permanent
residents (aged 18 years and above) participated in this survey. The purpose
of the survey was to find out how Singaporeans use the Internet for
religious purposes, how they perceive religious content in the Internet, and
their attitudes towards regulation of religious content on-line. In the second
stage, eighteen religious leaders from the main religious groups in Singapore
were interviewed. The purpose of these interviews was to determine how
religious leaders in Singapore viewed the Internet, and what attitudes
towards the Internet technology they were most likely to communicate to
members of their various faith communities. These interviews also provide
greater depth and background to our understanding of the role of the
Internet for religious conflict in Singapore.
National Phone Survey

Sample and Procedure
The survey was conducted from 21 to 26 November 2004 using a Computer
Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system, with interviews conducted
in English. Respondents were screened for both citizenship and Internet use.
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A probability sample was obtained by generating random numbers, and then

randomizing respondents within each household. At least eight attempts were
made to complete an interview at every household that was included in the
sample. Respondents who refused to participate were re-contacted a maximum
of two more times to persuade them to complete the interview. Calls were
made from 4 p.m. to 10 p.m. over six days by trained interviewers. This
procedure produced a response rate of 56.8 per cent and resulted in 711
completed surveys.
Variables and Measures

The survey instrument was developed using existing scales and questions
from various sources including the Internet and American Life Project on
Internet use for religious purposes. These questions were then adapted in
order to better reflect the multi-religious context of Singapore. Additional
questions related to on-line religious activity within the Singaporean context
were also developed and included in the survey instrument. (For a full list of
questions, please refer to Appendix 18.1.)
The survey covered the following:
1. Internet and Religious Perception. Respondents were asked to rate both
their positive and negative perceptions of the Internet’s impact on religion
based on a seven-point Likert scale that measured their level of agreement
with each statement as they were read out to them.
2. Internet use for own versus other religions. Three separate questions were
asked to ascertain respondents’ use of the Internet for activities related to
their own religion. Another three questions were asked to ascertain
respondents’ use of the Internet for activities related to other religions in
terms of searching for religious information, communication and religious
purchases on-line.
3. Other measures. Two separate questions were asked relating to respondents’
use of foreign or local sites when searching for religious information and
seeking their opinion on whether religious content on-line should be
regulated. Two other questions aimed at assessing respondents’ level of
commitment to their faith, and the effect of the Internet (if any) on their
religious commitment were also included.
In-depth Interviews
The second stage of the study involved conducting qualitative, in-depth
interviews with religious leaders from the five main religious groups in
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Singapore — the Buddhists, Taoists, Christians (Protestants and Catholics),

Hindus and Muslims. The interview questions were developed based on the
findings of the national level survey.
In total, eighteen interviews were conducted with each interview lasting
approximately one hour. Respondents were recruited by identifying central
offices of the religious organizations, asking to speak to top-level leaders or a
designate, and by identifying organizational leaders who were responsible for
technology ventures. Although most of the interviews were conducted in
English, some were conducted in Mandarin or Malay when the respondent
was more comfortable speaking in that language.
RESULTS OF SURVEY
For ease of analysis, the results of the survey and the interviews will be
reported separately. The national survey data will be presented first, followed
by the results from the interviews and an overall discussion of both sets
of findings.
Demographics of Singaporean Internet Users

The survey targeted only Internet users so there were numerous differences
between the sample and the general population. For example, Internet users
tended to be younger than the population at large. Specifically, the sample
had a much larger number of respondents in the 18–24 age range (30.7 per
cent) compared to that of the same age group in the 2000 Census (12 per
cent) and a much smaller number of respondents in the aged 65 and above
category (1.3 per cent) compared to the Census results (7.3 per cent). There
were also more male respondents in the sample (52.4 per cent) than in the
general population of Singapore (50 per cent). In terms of race, there were
more Chinese respondents (79.7 per cent) and those from “Other” races in
the sample (4.5 per cent) than in the population census (76.8 per cent and
1.4 per cent respectively). The sample also had fewer Malays (11.4 per cent)
and Indians (4.3 per cent) than the general population (13.9 per cent and 7.9
per cent respectively). These demographic differences reflect yet other aspects
of the digital divide that has been discussed extensively elsewhere (Eastin and
LaRose 2000; Nie and Erbing 2001).
Screening for Internet use also produced differences in religion between
the sample and general population. The largest religious group in our sample
was the Buddhists (29.4 per cent), followed by Christians (25 per cent) and
free-thinkers (22.8 per cent). Significantly smaller numbers of respondents
441

reported having other religions and these proportions differed dramatically

from the general population as can be seen in Table 18.1.
TABLE 18.1
Comparison of the Religion of Internet Users
and the General Population in Singapore
(In percentages)
Religion Internet Users General Population

Buddhist 29.4 42.5
Christian 25.0 14.6
Free-thinker 22.8 14.8
Muslim 11.0 14.9
Hindu 5.6 4.0
Taoist 2.7 8.5
Other religion 3.4 0.2
A comparison of the religious affiliation of Internet users with that of the

general population revealed differences for the Chinese, but not for Malays
and Indians. That is, fewer Chinese respondents in our sample of Internet
users identified themselves as Buddhists (36.9 per cent) than in the general
population (53.6 per cent), and more identified themselves as Christians
(29 per cent versus 16.5 per cent) and free-thinkers (28 per cent versus 18.6).
In contrast, the religious affiliation of Malay and Hindu Internet users closely
matched the trends of the general population. Specifically, virtually all Malays
identified themselves as Muslim (96.4 per cent among Internet users; 99.6
per cent in the general population), and most Indians were Hindus (61.6 per
cent among Internet users; 55.2 per cent in Singapore). Because of the small
sample sizes of Taoists, Hindus and those subscribing to other faiths, only
four main religious groups were included for further analysis: Christians,
Buddhists, Muslims and free-thinkers. Overall, Muslims used the Internet
less than the other religious groups. On average, Muslims used the Internet
one to two days per week whereas the average amount of Internet usage for
the free-thinkers, Buddhists and Christians was closer to three to five days per
week.
Overall, two thirds of the respondents in this study had somewhat strong
to very strong commitment to their religious faith (51.4 per cent) based on
the self-report measures, while nearly half (44.9 per cent) felt that they did
not have a strong commitment to their religious faith, and the remaining 3.7
per cent did not know how strong their religious commitment was. While the
442

vast majority agreed that the Internet had not made a big difference to their
commitment to their faith (88.6 per cent), 8.1 per cent felt that it had made
them more committed to their religion or faith, and only 3.3 per cent of
respondents felt that it had made them less committed.
The Internet and Religious Harmony

Most respondents believed that the Internet presented a potential threat to
religious harmony. A majority of 69.9 per cent agreed that the Internet makes
it easy for people to insult the religions of others and 40.5 per cent felt that
too much religious information online could be sacrilegious or harmful to
religion. However, 42.4 per cent of Singaporean Internet users agreed that
religious information on-line encourages religious tolerance, while only 24.5
per cent of them disagreed.
Despite their concerns, it seems that Internet users in Singapore do not
believe that the threat of religious conflict is actually exacerbated by the
Internet. Only 27 per cent of the respondents agreed that the availability of
religious information on-line is disruptive
FIGURE 1to religious harmony, while 45.6
per cent disagreed. Differences among the four primary religious groups of
our sample are illustrated in Figure 18.1. As the figure shows, the Muslims are
Responses to the statement “The availability of religious material
on the Internet is disruptive to religious harmony” (%)
FIGURE 18.1
Responses to the Statement “The Availability of Religious Material
on the Internet is Disruptive to Religious Harmony”
60
50
% of agreementt
40
30
20
10
0
Agree Neutral Disagree
Agreement with statement
Buddhist Christians Overall Muslims Free-thinkers
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the group that is most concerned about the negative impact the Internet may
have on religious harmony. Even so, more Muslims disagreed that the Internet
was a disruptive influence than those who agreed, indicating that overall,
Singaporean Internet users do not think the Internet will bring about strife
among the religious communities.
Internet Use for Religious Purposes

In general, the respondents reported that the use of the Internet for religious
activities was relatively modest, yet the survey yielded some interesting
demographic and religious differences. For example, Buddhists were least
likely to search for religious places of worship on-line (7.7 per cent) and
Muslims were most likely to do so (29.1 per cent). (See Table 18.2 for a
comparison of on-line activities by religion.)
On the whole, the use of the Internet for religious activities was positively
related to education. For example, those with undergraduate university
qualifications were most likely to use the internet for religious purposes,
while those who had not completed primary education were least likely to do
so. This relationship held true for less dramatic differences in educational
level as well. For example, respondents who had only completed some
secondary education were much less likely to use e-mail to make prayer
requests compared to those with A-level qualifications. These differences are
not surprising given that similar results have been found in other research
focusing on the digital divide. Irrespective of educational differences, it
appears that Christians and Muslims are much more actively engaged in
using the Internet for religious purposes than Buddhists.
The survey revealed that, in general, Singaporeans use the Internet more
to find out about their own religion than to learn about other religions. As
illustrated in Figures 18.2 and 18.3, Singaporean Muslims and Christians
were the most likely to engage in on-line activities (information seeking,
communicating with others and making on-line purchases) related to both
their own and others’ religions.
Although Christians were more likely to use the Internet to communicate
with other Christians, and to purchase goods and services related to
Christianity, Muslims were slightly more likely to search for information
related to Islam (see Figure 18.2). Unsurprisingly, free-thinkers were the least
likely group to engage in religious on-line activities.
Muslims and Christians were also most likely to use the Internet for on-
line activities related to other religions. However, the pattern differs slightly
here as Singaporean Muslims were slightly more likely to engage in all three
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TABLE 18.2
Comparison of Engagement in Different On-line Religious Activities by Religion
Percentage using the Internet

Online activity
Buddhist Christian Muslim Free-thinker
Participated in faith-oriented
chat-rooms 6.7 5.6 15.2 6.2
Found a new temple/ church/
mosque/worship group 7.2 10.7 29.1 5.6
Participated in on-line worship
services 2.4 7.9 3.8 0.6
Subscribed to a faith-oriented
listserv or email service 12.0 23.2 21.5 6.8
Used the Internet to give or receive
faith-oriented guidance or support 9.2 23.9 17.7 5.0
Used email to seek religious guidance 5.8 16.9 15.4 1.9
Used email to give religious guidance 3.3 24.3 13.9 1.2
Used email to plan religious activities 5.7 29.4 10.1 1.3
Used email to make a prayer request 1.4 31.1 3.8 1.3
Used the Internet to take an on-line
religious course 2.9 3.4 10.1 0.0
Used the Internet to play or
download religious computer games 2.9 1.7 5.1 1.3
Used the Internet to participate in
religious matchmaking or dating
services 0.5 2.2 3.8 0.0
Used the Internet to download or
listen to religious music 13.0 36.7 19.0 11.8
Used the Internet to download or
listen to religious sermons or
instruction 3.3 23.6 13.9 0.6
Used the Internet to buy religious
items on-line 1.9 11.2 10.1 0.6
Recommended a religious website to
a friend or relative 11.1 35.6 22.8 6.2
activities (searching for information on another religion, communicating

with someone of another faith, and purchasing goods and services related to
another faith on-line) than Christians (see Figure 18.3). Overall, free-thinkers
were again the least likely group to engage in on-line activities related to other
religions, but their information seeking activity was slightly higher than for
their “own religion”.
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FIGURE 18.2
On-line Activities Related to One’s Own Religion by Religion
80
70
% of engagement in online activity
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Buddhist Christian Muslim Freethinkers
Religious affiliation
Information seeking Communication Purchasing of goods and services
FIGURE 18.3
On-line Activities Related to Others’ Religion by Religion
80
70
% of engagement in online activity
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Buddhist Christian Muslim Freethinkers
Religious affiliation
Information seeking Communication Purchasing of goods and services
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Based on these two figures it can be seen that, on the whole, Singaporeans
were more likely to engage in on-line activities related to their own religion
than they were to engage in activities related to other religions. This suggests
that Singaporeans were more likely to communicate with people who share
their religion and to purchase products related to their own religion on-line.
These suggest that Internet use for religious purposes need not necessarily
lead to a better understanding of other faiths.
Global influences on how Singaporeans understand their faith were also
investigated. Within Singapore, the government encourages religious bodies
to respect the customs and sensibilities of other religions in an attempt to
minimize religious conflict. On-line foreign influences however, are beyond
the control of the Singapore government but are likely to affect how
Singaporeans practise their faith. Thus, where Internet users find religious
information on-line is of direct relevance to this study.
On the whole, there were no significant differences among the four main
religious groups’ use of local or foreign sites. Singaporeans were more likely to
use local sites (33.5 per cent) for religious purposes than foreign sites (29.7
per cent). Seventeen per cent of Singaporeans stated that they used an equal
number of foreign and local sites, and the remaining sample did not visit any
religious sites.
Government Regulation of On-line Religious Content

Singaporeans were also asked about their views on government regulation of
religious content on the Internet, given the potential for inter-religious
conflict in the multi-religious island nation. Perhaps not surprisingly, there
was firm support for regulation, with a majority (54.7 per cent) believing in
some extent of government regulation (and 4.8 per cent saying that the
government should completely regulate the Internet). Less than a fifth (19.6
per cent) felt that it should not be regulated at all. This is quite comparable
to the 1999 survey by the Singapore Internet Project (SIP) which found that
52.1 per cent of Internet users were concerned about uncensored religious
content, and almost 64 per cent felt that the government should take a
primary role in Internet regulations (Kuo et al. 2002, pp. 54–57).
Overall, the results of this survey seem to indicate an abiding concern
among Singaporeans that the Internet could contribute towards religious
conflict. However, based on how Singaporeans actually use the Internet, it
was also found that the medium in fact brought about greater exposure,
selective though it may be. Next, we present findings from the interviews
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with religious leaders to understand how people within their own faith
communities viewed the potential of the Internet, both for enriching their
own religious faith as well as for helping to maintain religious harmony.
FINDINGS FROM THE INTERVIEWS

Generally speaking, the religious leaders interviewed said that the Internet
was a helpful medium for users to learn both about their own, and about
other religions, and that they would encourage it. The religious leaders
believed that the Internet provided a powerful medium to explain their faith,
teach doctrines and encourage believers.
One exception was a Buddhist leader who specifically stated that he
would not encourage his disciples to use the Internet to learn about other
faiths, mainly because he felt it would cause confusion, especially if they did
not already have a deep understanding of Buddhism. These thoughts were
echoed by other Buddhists who had a conviction that the essential truths of
the faith could not be communicated on-line but needed to be learned
directly from a master. Most religious leaders, however, felt that the Internet
could be used as a good starting point to learn about their particular faiths,
but that ultimately, one had to find out about the religion in a more personal
context, with someone who had more in-depth knowledge of the faith. One
of the main reasons for these reservations was related to issues of trust and
authenticity. The Internet was, however, seen as a useful tool to “plant the
seed” of curiosity about the religion.
Several leaders also believed that the Internet provided an easy context for
religious conflict, in that uninformed or antagonistic persons could post
harmful materials on-line that would insult members of a faith community.
However, interviewees also stated that the “Internet is just a tool” and that its
effects on society are largely dependent on the individual. Although it is
possible for religions to be misrepresented or slandered on-line, the Internet
is only one arena for doing so and that there are many other off-line alternatives
available for the same actions. One particular example came from the interviews
with leaders from both the Hindu and Christian communities. In an open
on-line forum, a Christian had posted comments about Hinduism which
some Hindus found objectionable. The Hindus complained to the Inter-
Religious Organization (IRO), which then brought the posting to the attention
of the church responsible for the forum, which in turn removed the comment
from the forum. This incident illustrates some of the danger of unintentional
offence, in that the Christians felt that what had been said was purely
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legitimate from within the Christian context. Taken out of that context into
the inter-religious arena, however, it was offensive to the Hindu community.
One of the main concerns of religious leaders interviewed concerns the
authenticity of religious information on-line that may potentially mislead or
confuse Internet users who do not possess adequate knowledge on the subject.
For example, most of the religious leaders said that although they had not
encountered sites that misrepresented their individual religions, nearly all of
them were concerned about slanderous content related to their religions.
Although none of the leaders were able to provide URLs for these sites, a
novice surfer who uses a regular search engine such as Google to search for
relevant sites is likely to come across at least a few sites that contain misleading
information or “hate speech” targeted towards other religions. The problem
is further exacerbated when the surfer has little knowledge of the religion or
is unable to differentiate between sites that are generally regarded as
authoritative by a religious community and those that are not.
Most of the religious leaders interviewed agreed that the Internet did
help promote religious harmony among Singaporeans. However, they also
stressed that it was useful only if used wisely, and at the end of the day the
“onus is on the user”. Many interviewees suggested that one potentially useful
way to get around this issue would be to visit official sites (for example, sites
ending with the domain name “.gov”) or sites that were recommended by an
expert in the area and to the follow links from those sites.
The religious leaders all clearly indicated that it was important to not
cede cyberspace to opponents of their faith, and many of them had well
thought-out plans for establishing their Internet presence, so as not to be
caught as unwitting victims. For example, representatives of the Catholic
church had a plan to purchase all the domain names ending with domain
name “catholic.org.sg” in an attempt to deny a group they considered schismatic
from being able to confuse potential surfers. Of all the religious leaders
interviewed, only the Taoists did not have their own website, mainly due to
a lack of funds, but they said that they would develop a website once funds
were made available.
The main purpose of a website for most religious organizations was
information dissemination about their organizations and their religious
faiths, as well as keeping the community informed of activities organized by
their institutions. Several, especially Protestant Christians, believed that
their websites had helped draw attention to their places of worship to an
international audience, and had attracted foreigners and tourists. The sites
representing these institutions were linked to other organizations and sites
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that had related information. At the same time, these institutions were
careful about the sites they linked to, largely due to issues of trust and
authenticity of information on-line.
We also found that the religious leaders felt that, generally speaking,
overseas sites had better content representing their faiths. Of course, the
particular location of overseas religious information varied by religion. Muslims
were most likely to visit sites based in Southeast Asia (Malaysia and Indonesia),
Europe (Switzerland and the United Kingdom), the United States, and the
Middle East, while Buddhists were most likely to visit sites based in East Asia.
Hindus were most likely to visit sites based in India, Australia and Indonesia,
while Christians were most likely to visit sites based in the West, like the
United States or the United Kingdom. A common sentiment was that local
sites were sufficient for general explanations of the faith or its teachings, but
that overseas sites tended to be more comprehensive and authoritative. For
example, Muslim leaders agreed that if the query was related to “Muslim laws
and practices”, they were likely to direct them to a local site. However, if the
question was more theological in nature, they were likely to direct them to
foreign sites instead, as local sites were “under-developed”. Some also stated
that due to the “borderless nature” of the Internet, there was no distinction
between local and foreign sites. On the whole, most religious leaders were
more likely to recommend foreign sites as they felt that these provided more
information and were “more developed” than local sites.
Many religious leaders seemed to agree with the opinion of most
Singaporeans about the necessity for some form of censorship or control over
religious material available on-line. Their arguments for censorship were that
without some form of control over religious information, religions could be
misrepresented online, leading to confusion, insults or unfair criticisms,
which could lead to religious conflict. However, they were hesitant to give
this authority to the government, and suggested non-government organizations
(NGOs) as the appropriate regulators.
DISCUSSION
Overall, the results of this study suggest that, in line with global trends, the
Internet has become a more important source for religious information and
activity in Singapore. Moreover, Singaporeans believe that the Internet can be
useful in promoting religious harmony and tolerance among Singaporeans.
However, they are at the same time mindful that the end effects of the
Internet on religious harmony may not always be positive, and are concerned
about the use of the Internet to attack religions and religious communities.
450

Both the survey and the interviews suggest that Singaporeans and
Singapore-based religious leaders intend to use the Internet primarily to
bolster their own religious communities and to provide accurate and
meaningful information. Of course, what seems innocent to members of
one community might be perceived as insulting to the members of another.
Clearly, religions have different teachings, and most religious believers find
it meaningless to deny that these teachings differ or to deny that these
differences matter. For many religious believers, one part of their religious
belief it is that their religion is “true” and that, by implication, teachings
that differ are “wrong” or “untrue”. This is especially so for the monotheistic
faiths, although it clearly does not necessarily lead to violence or hatred of
the other (Stark 2001).
However, the nature of the Internet as a medium that blurs the existing
boundaries between private and public spheres means that private conversations
among members of one community can be easily made public to a much
larger audience, creating a greater potential for offence. Moreover, the Internet
allows individuals without authority or official sanction from a religious
organization to post material on-line that might insult or offend others. An
example is the previously cited posting which angered members of the Hindu
community, and incidents like this will undoubtedly happen again. Religious
leaders, however, can be encouraged to understand how members of Singapore’s
religious communities use and view the Internet, and to engage in good-faith
efforts to make sure that offensive or potentially harmful materials are not
placed on officially sponsored websites or forums.
It is possible to develop Internet-based activities to help promote religious
harmony, but this would have to be carefully designed and implemented.
One such effort is that of the Inter Religious Organization (IRO), which
maintains a website designed to help promote religious harmony <http://
www.iro.org.sg/website/>. This site primarily provides information about the
organization and a brief statement of the primary teachings of each particular
religion. Moreover, at the time of this writing, the “upcoming events” portion
of the site listed nothing other than events that had happened several years
previously. An attempt like this also illustrates the potentially volatile situation
of trying to define who is the “official” representative of each religion. The
“contact Christianity” page, for example, which is meant to provide a means
of contacting a representative of that faith, lists a Catholic convent and a
Methodist church as potential contacts, with a phone number provided for
the convent, but not the Methodist church. The website given is the official
Catholic website for the Singapore diocese, which many Protestants would
probably object to. Although this is likely because Protestant churches have
451

not joined the IRO, it still makes the point that representation of a given
religion can be highly controversial. The e-mail addresses provided are generic,
and give no hint of who the e-mail would go to. As a good faith effort to
demonstrate harmony, the website achieves its purpose. But as an engaging
website that would actively draw in surfers and encourage them to learn more
about other faiths, it fails.
The difficulty is not just in developing a content-rich site, but thinking
through how people actually use the Internet. Internet surfers are typically
drawn to websites that provide more information about a current interest,
and are unlikely to visit those which they view is irrelevant to their own
interests or, in this case, their own faith. Thus, efforts to use the Internet to
increase religious harmony should focus on sites where people are already
engaged, such as popular portals and chat-rooms, rather than creating new
websites that are unlikely to get public attention.
The results of this study suggest that most Singaporeans and Singaporean
religious leaders would support somewhat more stringent monitoring and
oversight of the Internet where religious issues are involved. It is not clear
from this study, however, that the government should take on that role.
Singapore’s regulatory code governing the Internet states that information
which may be potentially damaging to religious and racial harmony is
specifically banned from being published on-line, as it is off-line. The
government’s reaction to potentially offensive material concerning religion is
quite clear. A recent study by the Open Net Initiative at Harvard University
(2005) on Singapore’s censorship practices found only one religious website
blocked, while dozens of other potentially disruptive websites were not. More
recently, however, three bloggers who posted negative material about Muslims
were arrested and charged under the Sedition Act for their actions, indicating
that the government has no intention of allowing the Internet to become a
place for religious conflict.
In addition to regulation, careful attention to Internet trends and
content monitoring by religious organizations are also effective means of
helping to maintain religious harmony. This suggests that Singaporean
religious leaders and organizations should further develop their websites to
be more “content-rich” and engaging, in order to present better information
about their communities, beliefs and practices. This could potentially pre-
empt Singaporeans from developing their sense of religious identity from
other parts of the world, which may detract from building religious harmony
in Singapore.
Finally, it is clear that the widespread dissemination of information and
communication technologies presents new challenges and opportunities for
452

religious communities, in terms of outreach and mobilization of believers. As

new technologies are integrated into societies, religious organizations, modes
of practice, systems of authority, and modes of interaction are all likely to be
challenged. A proactive stance which seeks to understand how the technology
can be utilized for positive purposes, is likely to be more meaningful than one
which seeks solely to limit potential harm.
APPENDIX 18.1
INTERNET’S INFLUENCE ON RELIGIOUS HARMONY IN SINGAPORE
Internet and Religious Perception

(7-point scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”)
1. The Internet has greatly improved your religious life.
2. The Internet has had a mostly negative influence on how people practise their
religion.
3. The availability of religious material on the Internet encourages religious

tolerance.
4. The Internet helps people find others who share their religious beliefs.
5. There is too much material on the Internet that is sacrilegious or harmful to

religion. [IF ASKED: Sacrilegious means “disrepectful”]
6. The Internet promotes religious understanding.
7. It is too easy for people to use the Internet to insult the religion of others.
8. The availability of religious material on the Internet is disruptive to religious

harmony.
Internet Use to Find Out About Respondents’ Own Religion

(5-point scale ranging from “never” to “all the time”)
1. On average, how often do you use the Internet to search for information about
your own religion?
2. On average, how often do you use the Internet to communicate with people
about your own religion, for example using email, chat group, or ICQ?
453

3. On average, how often do you use the Internet to purchase goods and services
related to your own religion?
Internet Use to Find Out About Other Religions

(5-point scale ranging from “never” to “all the time”)
1. On average, how often do you use the Internet to search for information about
other religions?
2. On average, how often do you use the Internet to communicate with people
about other religions, for example using email, chat group, or ICQ?
3. On average, how often do you use the Internet to purchase goods and services
related to other religions?
Other Measures
1. To what extent should governments regulate religious content online? Would

you say governments should not regulate at all, regulate very little, regulate to
some extent, regulate to a great extent, or regulate completely?
2. When you use the Internet for religious purposes, are you more likely to use
local sites or foreign sites?
3. How would you describe your commitment to your religious faith? Would you
say it is very strong, somewhat strong, not too strong, or not strong at all?
4. In general, has using the Internet made you more committed to your religion
or faith, less committed, or no difference?
Demographic Questions
1. What is your highest level of education completed?
2. What is your marital status?
3. What is your race?
4. May I know your total gross family income each month? Just stop me when I
get to the right level.
5. What is your religion?
454

Note
Responsibility for all views expressed in this chapter rests solely with the authors.
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456

Muslim Organizations and Mosques as Social Service Providers 457
PART IV
Religious Organizations in
Social Services
457

458 Enon Mansor and Nur Amali Ibrahim
458

19
MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS AND

MOSQUES AS SOCIAL SERVICE
PROVIDERS
Enon Mansor and Nur Amali Ibrahim
INTRODUCTION
Muslim groups providing various social services that address a range of needs
have existed in Singapore since the nineteenth century.1 But it was only from
the early twentieth century onwards that they evolved into formal organizations.
Religious motivations as well as the spirit of gotong royong (cooperation and
helping one another) for which the Malay-Muslim community is well known
inform and underpin many of these provisions. Equally significant, these
Muslim organizations do not exist in isolation but are often interacting with
their counterparts from other religious and secular backgrounds.
Broadly, the social services provided by Muslim groups fall within two
categories: those provided by Muslim organizations (MOs) and those by
mosques.2 This study focuses on the social services provided by both types of
organizations in Singapore, along the following main themes:
(1) their history and development,

(2) the major activities and services offered,
(3) the motivations and factors underlying the provision of social services,
(4) external relationships and collaborations with state agencies and other
459
459

organizations (both faith-based and secular) and principles and factors

underlying these collaborations, and
(5) issues, problems and challenges encountered in social service provision.
Correspondingly, this chapter is presented in two distinct parts: social services
provided by Muslim agencies, and social services provided by mosques.
PART 1: PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES BY MUSLIM

ORGANIZATIONS
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES:

FROM GOTONG-ROYONG TO FORMAL HELP
The Muslim community is well known for its spirit of gotong-royong
(Mendaki 2002, p. 103; MUIS 1994, p. 82; Li 1990, p. 132 and Lee 1991,
pp. 256–59). Gotong-royong is the spirit of shared effort to lighten the
burdens faced by an individual or a small group within the community, and
entails members pitching in to help and to ensure that a task or event is a
success. All involved do their part with minimal fuss. In the context of the
larger community, the spirit of gotong-royong has been the driving force
behind many Muslim organizations in Singapore for generations (MUIS
1994, p. 82).3 Many of these bodies were initially set up by groups which
felt that there was a need to be self-reliant and proactive in improving the
conditions of the community. These organizations started with little
money but much enthusiasm. Today they provide a wide range of services
for the community4 (also see Appendix 19.1 for a time-line of the formation
of MOs).
Colonial Times to 1945

The Muslim Trust Fund Association (MTFA) was the first formally established
MO and was set up in 1904. It focused on providing for the maintenance,
care and education of Muslim male and female orphans and other unprotected
and indigent Muslim children, and currently manages two orphanages.5
During the early colonial period, the establishment of MOs took place at
a very slow pace. It was twenty-eight years later in 1932, after MTFA’s
formation, that Jamiyah (Muslim Missionary Society of Singapore) was set
up. Jamiyah was founded by Maulana Hafiz Abdul Aleem Siddique,6 the
roving ambassador from Merut, India (MUIS 1994, p. 92). In the early years,
Jamiyah focused on providing for the social and religious educational need of
460

the community. Just before the Japanese Occupation, Singapore Tenkasi

Muslim Welfare Society (STMWS) and Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim
League (SKML) were established in 1940 and 1941 respectively. These
groups were self-initiated by immigrants based on the communal ties that
existed in India. They mainly catered to the social and welfare needs of
Indian-Muslim immigrants.
1946 to 1964
Seven organizations (4PM, PPIS, Pergas, BAPA, Muhammadiyah Association,
Taman Bacaan, and PERDAUS) were set up in the period just after the war
and before independence in 1965. In their early years, 4PM (Malay Youth
Literary Association) and Taman Bacaan catered to the social and educational
needs of the community and provided training and youth leadership
progammes. PPIS (Young Women Muslim Association) had similar objectives
targeted at Muslim women. Muhammadiyah Association, started as a
missionary organization with the aim of reviving “the true teachings of Islam”
(MUIS 2002, p. 21), was approved and registered as a welfare organization in
June 1989. PERGAS (Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers
Association) was founded by a group of well-known religious teachers and
aimed to establish a group of religious elite that would provide for the
religious education of the community. BAPA (Religious and Educational
League of Radin Mas) was established in 1957 with the objective of uplifting
the education and economic status of the residents of Radin Mas through the
provision of an access to religious and academic education (MUIS 2002,
p. 15). Today, it has a niche in providing for the needs of disabled Muslims.
PERDAUS (Adult Religious Students’ Association) was set up in 1964 as an
Islamic, educational and social organization, against a backdrop of a community
striving to practise Islam through the rapid setup of religious classes for
adults. Its main objective was to uphold the teachings of Islam and support
other like-minded organizations. In 1993, it embarked on a new phase to
ensure that it remains relevant to the developments of the Muslim community
and Singapore.
During this period, MOs programmes and services seemed generic and
developmental in nature, with an emphasis on education and welfare and
services were targeted at specific clientele groups. For example, PPIS focused
on women, 4PM and Taman Bacaan on youths and SKML and STMWS
on their “clan” and ethnic groups. The establishment of these organizations
was a reflection of self-initiated attempts to address problems facing the
community at that time, which were mainly poverty and low educational
461

achievements. BAPA can be considered an early prototype of a

neighbourhood and community model that was subsequently used by the
People’s Association (PA).7
Independence to 1980
Between 1965 and 1980, five new organizations were established, including
Majlis Pusat, a coordinating body for Muslim social-cultural organizations.
The trend of providing services for specific target groups was continued. For
example, LBKM (Lembaga Biasiswa Kenangan Maulud) formed in 1966
focused on providing education bursaries for needy students. MCS-SANA
(SANA Muslim Counselling Service) was formed under SANA (Singapore
Anti-Narcotics Association) in 1977 as a response to problems of drug abuse
among Muslims.8 Throughout this period, religious-based organizations had
also begun to make their presence felt. In 1979, Darul Arqam was established.
Started by a group of saudara baru (a term used to refer to those who convert
to Islam), it focused on sharing Islam with both Muslims and non-Muslims,
as well as looking into the welfare of the converts.
A major milestone in the administration of the needs of the Muslim
community was the establishment of MUIS (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura,
the Islamic Council of Singapore) in 1968. MUIS came into effect with the
statutory provision under the Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA)
1966 which is “an Act to repeal and re-enact the laws relating to Muslims and
to make provision for regulating religious affairs and to constitute a Council
to advice on matters relating to the Muslim religion in Singapore” (Republic
of Singapore 1966, p. 369). As a statutory board, it oversees the varied
interests of the Malay community (MUIS 2002, p. 17).
1980s Onwards
Within a span of ten years, two self-help groups were formed in the Malay-
Muslim community. Mendaki was set up in 1982, and later in 1991, the
AMP (Association of Malay Professionals) was established. Mendaki is
considered a pioneer self-help group which became a model for the
development of other ethnic-based self-help groups such as the CDAC
(Chinese Development Assistance Council) and SINDA (Singapore Indian
Development Association).
The 1990s was a busy time for the MOs. They expanded their services
and programmes and worked closely with various government bodies (for
example, Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports, Ministry
of Health and Ministry of Home Affairs). Pertapis was the first Muslim
462

organization to respond to the call by the Ministry of Home Affairs to

manage a halfway house in 1989. It also started a senior citizens’ home in
1984, a centre for women and girls in 1990 and a childrens’ welfare home in
1991. In 1989, Muhammadiyah took the initiative to run a welfare home for
children. It is also the first Muslim organization to undertake a remedial
residential home from the then Ministry of Social Affairs. Jamiyah also
expanded its services and collaboration with government bodies. It started a
childrens’ home in 1993, a halfway house in 1996, a home for the aged in
1997 and a nursing home in 2002. Taman Bacaan, with the support of the
Ministry of Home Affairs, started the Taman Bacaan Halfway House for
women. Today, it also manages the Taman Bacaan–North East CDC Family
Service Centre.
This same period also saw the set up of the first Malay-Muslim Family
Service Centre (FSC).9 The YWMA-PPIS FSC was set up in 1991 as a
collaborative project between Mendaki and PPIS. Mendaki later collaborated
with two other agencies (Malay Youth Literary Association and
Muhammadiyah Association) to set up another two FSCs. However, Mendaki
withdrew its involvement in family services in 2003, as it wanted to refocus
on providing for the educational needs of the community.10
The later part of the 1990s saw the establishment of a new prototype
of services and programmes by two MOs. This prototype went beyond the
conventional services and programmes that were the norm in the 1990s.
AMP established two subsidiaries, RIMA (Research on Islamic and Malay
Affairs) in 1998 and Mercu Learning Point in 1999. The former focuses on
research to support the provision of services as well as promotes intellectual
discourse on issues and developments concerning the Malay/Muslim
community. The latter aims to develop and implement high-quality
programmes in education, workers’ training and human resource
development (AMP 2004, p. 5). In 2001, PERDAUS established Mercy
Relief in response to human tragedies as a result of natural and man-made
disasters. It aims to promote a civil life of compassion, care and volunteerism,
and extends humanitarian aid regardless of country, culture or creed. It was
officially launched as an independent humanitarian organization with charity
status in 2003.11
Overall, five distinct patterns in the evolution of the MOs can be
discerned. First, there are those “status quo” organizations which have largely
retained their original functions since their formation, such as LBKM and
MTFA. Second, the majority of the MOs have evolved and expanded their
services and programmes in line with the social services sector and the
changing needs of the Muslim community. However, while new services and
programmes have been undertaken, they remained consistent with the mission,
463

vision and objectives of their organizations. Examples of such MOs are

Jamiyah, Pertapis, Muhammadiyah, PPIS and Taman Bacaan. Third, there
are those services which were started or expanded but subsequently closed
down mainly due to refocusing and streamlining of activities. For example
and as mentioned earlier, Mendaki collaborated with two MOs to establish
two FSCs but these were later closed down. MUIS too started family
development centres at selected mosques but later stopped the programme.
Fourth, some MOs have also ventured into new, non-social welfare services.
For example, AMP set up Mercu Learning Centre and RIMA, while Jamiyah
opened the Jamiyah Business School.12 Fifth, some MOs’ services became
independent of their original set-ups. For example, Mercy Relief was initially
formed under PERDAUS but, due to practical and socio-political
considerations, became an independent organization.
Today, services provided by MOs can be categorized broadly under social
services, humanitarian aid and research.13 Inspired by Muslim and social
ideals of service and help, they cover a wide range to meet the needs of various
categories of clientele (see Appendix 19.1). What is also significant is that,
while their motivations and identities are clearly inspired by Islam and the
majority of their clients are Muslim, they also collaborate actively with non-
Muslim organizations and state organizations. This basically reflects the
status of Muslims as a minority group in Singapore and the necessity for them
to actively interact with others. The rest of this section focuses on these
interactions and collaborations.
COLLABORATIONS WITH NON-MUSLIM

ORGANIZATIONS
This section is based on the findings of a small-scale qualitative research
which focuses on the organizations’ rationale, guiding principles and
perceptions in the interactions and collaborations between MOs and non-
Muslim organizations. Focused interviews were conducted in June and July
2005 with leaders and staff of six MOs that are active in providing social
services and programmes, namely Mendaki, AMP, Jamiyah, Pertapis, PPIS
Jurong Family Service Centre and Mercy Relief (all referred to anonymously
as A to F below). The respondents were interviewed using a semi-structured
in-depth interview guide which covered five broad topics: (1) historical
background of the organization, (2) relationship with non-Muslim
organizations, (3) reasons for collaborations with non-Muslim organizations,
(4) benefits and challenges encountered in collaboration, and (5) the
organization’s future plans.
464

“Colour Blind” Organizations

Contrary to the common perception that MOs are mainly utilized by Muslims
clients, the research reveals a little-known but important dimension of social
services offered by MOs: they are open to all Singaporean regardless of race
and religion and serve non-Muslim clients. Indeed, two organizations revealed
that 30–40 per cent of their clients are non-Muslims. One of them even sets
aside 10 per cent of its budget for non-Muslims.
That the MOs’ services are open to non-Muslims and that they are
flexible in catering to their needs is informed by a philosophical viewpoint
that accepts differences and is inclusive of the practices of others. Indeed,
“colour blind” is a term that was used by one of the organizations in the
study: “…we are a community-based organization and we are clear when we
set up it is meant to be a ‘colour blind organisation’, … regardless of country,
regardless of culture and regardless of whatever races”. Thus, practical solutions
are tried out so that multiethnic practices can be accommodated within the
organization’s Muslim environment. For example, one organization shared
how different religious practices can be accommodated in a pre-school context:
There is this social education component that says that as Muslims we‘ll
do this. What happens is we also have parents who are Christians and
sometimes also say their prayers. So they say their prayers in English, the
Muslims would say in Arabic and English. Basically they are thanking
God for the food, ya, so that is how we educate them. The way you
preach is different, but at the end of the day, you are basically saying the
same thing. (MO: D)
Furthermore, MOs do not appear to encounter any major difficulty serving

non-Muslim clients. One organization shared how a non-Muslim family had
responded positively to some of the hygiene practices of Muslims:
In fact, some of them are very glad, you see, that instead of withdrawing
their children, they are now putting in their siblings because many of
these practices are positive influences on the community. So they felt
that fine, I would want because it would be good to clean with water,
rather than just paper, you see. (MO: D)
Another organization shared that some non-Muslim clients preferred to use

the services of the Muslim organization instead of one that served their own
ethnic group so as to “save face”. The organization shared that about 1 per
cent of their clients in counselling are non-Muslim.
It is also important to point out that even as MOs are Muslim in their
motivation and approach, they do not see conversion as the main objective,
465

but rather the provision of services. Nevertheless, if clients were receptive or

interested to learn about Islam, they were more than willing to share:
We are not … our organisation is not going out to convert people. If
people feel that they are comfortable with our religion, they are most
welcome, but we are not calling you to join our religion. But we have to
tell you the beauty of our religion — what our religion means, what to
do and so on and so forth. That’s our duty. (MO: C)
Inviting others to Islam, commonly referred to as dakwah, is not restricted to
religious lectures, preaching and celebrating major festivals. One organization
views dakwah as not only reaching out to meet the spiritual needs but also
developmental needs that facilitates people to lead a life of dignity and self-
respect, thus its move into providing social and welfare services for the
community (Saleem 2004, p. 152).
Why Collaborate with Non-Muslim Organizations?

The study reveals three types of collaborative efforts between MOs and non-
Muslim organizations: (1) cooperative or joint ventures in which both provide
more or less equal resources, expertise and manpower; (2) projects involving
the exchange of resources and expertise whereby there is a mutual exchange;
and (3) projects in which the MOs receive and benefit from resources and
services from non-Muslim organizations. The MOs collaborate with diverse
non-Muslim groups. These include the Ministry of Community Development
Youth and Sports, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry
of Defence, Residents’ Committees, Community Development Councils,
Hindu Endowment Fund, Buddhist Lodge, Catholic Welfare, Raffles Country
Club, Little India Shop Association, Parsi-Zoroastrian Association of Singapore,
SOKA Association and Lee Foundation.
Collaborations with non-Muslim organizations seem to be part and
parcel of the work of the MOs. Such collaborations are perceived to be a
practical necessity and reality in a multi-ethnic society and one in which
Muslims are a minority that must adjust to the larger diverse environment.
One MO did not even see collaboration in terms of “Muslims and non-
Muslims” working together but at the resources and benefits of such
cooperation. The main reasons for collaboration are well captured in the
following comments:
In Singapore, we live in a multi-racial society, various religions, if we
want to live in peace, we must have this “feeling” of cooperation, helping
one another; exchanging experience is very important. We need to mix
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with them, know their religions and cultures more…. Exchange of views
and experience is important and very good. It helps us to established
friendship and enables us to cooperate at all levels for the benefit of the
community and country. This is the main reason why we must mix at all
levels, non-Muslims, so that we can understand one another. (MO: C)
The reality of the fact is, we are living cheek-by-jowl with others, so
unless we want to live like an ostrich and stick our heads in the ground
and say “no”, we have to. And I think part of the ability of the Malay
community to survive, adjust semua [all make adjustments] and be
better, I would say, is our understanding of how the other communities
work. (MO: E)
People must accept us and we must accept them for what they are.
(MO: D)
Collaborative efforts are also seen as important in strengthening the relationship

with other organizations:
All these activities (working together) bring you a strong bonding, by

working together and consultation and respect each other…. Like a
family, a lot of people-to-people bonding… you know. (MO: C)
Common and social good aside, there are also pragmatic reasons for
collaborations with non-Muslim organizations, as they have the expertise and
resources, especially in terms of funding:
As a welfare organization, we have a big expenditure. If we isolate

ourselves as Malay-Muslim, we will not know what is happening out
there. More importantly, we can share from the resources available and
this will minimize our expenses and lighten our fund-raising activities.
(MO: F)
At the same time as the resources of others are a draw, MOs are mindful
that collaborative efforts should benefit from both sides. Collectively, the
following are some of the guiding principles for collaborations.
1. The collaboration is of mutual benefit

As one organization (MO: B) put it: “there must be mutual benefit. First
priority, the beneficiary must benefit”. Another (MO: D) sees the first
guiding principle as that of benefiting the Malay-Muslim community and
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second as that of benefiting Singapore in general. The organizations interviewed

also seem mindful of dispelling the perception that Muslims are always at the
receiving end of resources or help.
I think that is the wrong perception. The perception that the Malay
Muslim organisations, that the only way we are going to work with the
other races is when they have something to give you, commission or
whatever. Let’s take that away, let’s change the mind set. We can do
more. (MO: B)
One MO even shared that getting 100% funding would not be the ideal:
We don’t do that with other organisations. Because as an organisation
myself, I also feel I do not want to feel short-changed. So I try not to do
that to other organisation. The best is 50–50. (MO: A)
2. Transfer of knowledge and expertise

In collaborative ventures, the MOs are guided by the principle that the
transfer of knowledge and expertise is mutual even if different. In particular,
MOs are conscious that they are not just at the receiving end but would also
be able to contribute something to the collaborators:
Where we have the expertise, we would share with them. But normally
when we collaborate with them especially in areas where we lack expertise
and knowledge is such that by the end of the collaboration, we would be
equally equipped or would have sufficient knowledge and expertise to
run our own series of programmes than having always to go back. That
would be something that we would say upfront so it will not be a forever
hanging on, you see. Where possible, there is this knowledge transfer for
us to move on. (MO: D)
When we leave that organisation, they have learnt something from us.
And that they can do things on their own… the transfer of knowledge.
(MO: A)
3. Preserving the good name of the organization

A third principle for collaboration is that the good Muslim name and
reputation of the organization should not be not jeopardized in the collaborative
effort. Thus for example, MOs do not accept sponsorships from brewery
companies as Islam is against the consumption of intoxicants.
We must not be jeopardized, “kita kena jaga nama” [we should safeguard
our good name]. For example, we have never worked with Tiger Beer,
although we have been approached. We don’t take that. (MO: B)
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Problems in Collaboration
All the organizations interviewed shared that they do not have any major
problems working with non-Muslim organizations. There are difficulties and
challenges but these are perceived as manageable. The coping approach is to
“normalize” the differences. For example,
So what we do is, we focus more on the tasks at hand and the reasons for
collaboration, rather than on the differences, because in collaboration,
you cannot run away from the fact that we are all very different. Our
backgrounds are different in terms of strength, resources, we are all
different. There would be one binding point why we are collaborating in
the first place, so when we have conflicts/differences, we go back to that.
(MO: D)
Passion and commitment for the cause further provide the organization
with the motivation to manage any difficulty they may encounter. If a
difficulty cannot be resolved, then the organization may have to think of
alternatives and move on, as the most important consideration is the
beneficiary.
We just have to move on our own. We have to move. The beneficiaries

are there waiting already. At that point we have to make a decision.
How? Or you want to wait? How long do we have to wait is uncertain.
Sorry we can’t wait and we are a non-government organisation. Not that
we “besar kepala” [arrogant]. Our main focus is the beneficiary. The
beneficiary must be helped. (MO: B)
But when collaboration fails or needs to stop, we will need to come up

with alternatives. Because at the end of the day, the community must
benefit, because that is the reason why we are into collaboration. And if
we stop collaboration this means that the community would be neglected.
(MO: D)
Another MO strategizes for success in collaboration by taking some pre-

emptive measures. It shares some of its guidelines:
So we have to be very choosy in a sense, in terms of how we collaborate

and what we collaborate in. And I look at track record. Track record
meaning have we collaborated with them before. What were the weakness
and feedback from that collaboration. Very importantly their openness
to learn. Because we want to make the collaboration something
educational. (MO: A)
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As a whole the organizations interviewed do not have any major difficulty

working with non-Muslim organizations, or perceive differences or difficulties
as unmanageable. It is also interesting to note that all the organizations
interviewed shared that it was more challenging working with Muslim
organizations as they needed to observe and manage protocols of social
interactions, position and hierarchy when dealing with them. Female officers
also have to be sensitive and observe boundary and protocol, such as observing
the Islamic code of dressing, not raising their voices and speaking only when
spoken to.
CONCLUDING REMARKS ON SOCIAL SERVICE

PROVISION BY MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS
This study of MOs reveals that even though they are Muslim-based, this does
not prevent them from providing services to all, regardless of race and
religion, and to consider the “common good”. As one MO (MO: C)
commented: “There is more of commonness rather than differences. We have
common objectives. That everybody works towards the well-being of fellow
Singaporeans.” Dealing and working with non-Muslim organizations also
appear to be part and parcel of the experience of Muslim organizations, and
is perceived as a practical necessity in a multicultural society in which
Muslims are a minority.
This study further highlights the fact that interethnic cooperation between
MOs and non-Muslim organizations is very much alive and active. At the
same time, as much as the non-Muslim organisations are perceived as a
resource, there is also a need to ensure that collaboration benefits both
parties. Also, beyond practical issues, the MOs follow Islamic-guided principles
in their collaborative efforts with non-Muslim organizations. Finally, it should
be pointed out that Muslims as a minority group have more opportunities
and face a greater need to mix with the majority. The onus is as much on the
majority group to make a conscious effort to mix with the minority groups.14
PART 2: PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES BY MOSQUES

This section examines the role that mosques in Singapore play as providers
of social services. Among the issues covered are the different types of social
services programmes available in mosques, and the various issues,
considerations and problems faced in organizing these programmes. The
main point is that mosques are not merely places where Muslims go to for
prayers, but that they also function as an important institution which
addresses social problems in the community. The findings are based on the
experiences of four mosques: Al-Falah, An-Nur, Ba’alwie and Kampung
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Siglap — in organizing and implementing social services programmes.

These four mosques were chosen because they attract worshippers of different
demographic groups, which would thus enable us to: (1) show the diversity
of social services programmes in mosques, and (2) compare and contrast
the experiences of different mosques.
The definition of social services adopted here follows the one given by
the National Council of Social Services (NCSS): “The goal of social services
in Singapore is to promote the well-being of people and communities. It
seeks to help individuals to be self-sufficient and less dependent, and to
restore individuals, families or communities to successfully function in the
society” (NCSS website <www.ncss.org.sg> 2005). NCSS further categorizes
social services programmes into four different types: (a) children, youth and
family services, (b) community health services, (c) disability services, (d)
elderly services. As shall be explicated later, although the mosques featured in
this survey offer a wide range of social services programmes, they do not
provide all the four different types of social services programmes due to
limitations of expertise, infrastructure and funding.
It should be first pointed out that the role of mosques in delivering social
services is not something new, as mosques have always functioned as a place
where Muslims can turn to when in need of help. For instance, according to
the imam of Ba’alwie Mosque, Habib Hassan, the mosque has always provided
various forms of assistance, particularly where people are seeking advice or
financial aid, since its founding in 1952. While the delivery of social services
is not a new function for mosques, it is only relatively recently that the
rethinking on how to formalize mosques’ social services function has taken
place. One such milestone was the 2000 Mosque Seminar organized by
MUIS, where it was asserted that a vision for the Muslim community was to
be a self-help community, and a step in this direction was for mosques to
become a key social services provider in the community. This came about in
the context of the acknowledgment of the diverse needs of Muslims, ranging
from the pious and privileged to those who are troubled by social problems
and the understanding that mosques cannot merely cater only to the former.
Thus, when examining the delivery of social services by mosques, it is
important to bear in mind both the historical continuity of the important
role that mosques play in the community, and the changes due to evolving
social, political and economic circumstances.
TYPES OF PROGRAMMES
The social services programmes provided by the mosques surveyed fall under
four main categories: financial, rehabilitative, educational/developmental and
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counselling/advice. Examples from each category will be discussed later. The

most important point to note here is that discourses of religiosity are very
strongly present in the delivery of social services. What this means is that the
delivery of social services is often understood and justified in terms of
religious parlance or language. The different types of discourses of religiosity
include the following: (1) the idea that the provision of social services is a
religious act that accrues merit, (2) “religion” and “charity” are discrete
domains which can be separated; in other words, they belong to the sacred
and secular realms respectively, and (3) aid seekers should be given guidance
in spiritual matters in addition to the actual aid (for example, financial
assistance) they were seeking; otherwise the “aid package” would not be
complete. It is crucial to examine these different discourses of religiosity
because they enable us to understand the various attitudes that religious
institutions and leaders have towards social services.
Financial Assistance
The following are the various types and examples of financial assistance
provided by all four mosques:
Food Vouchers
The distribution of food vouchers to needy families residing in the vicinity of
a mosque is a common type of social services programme. For An-Nur Mosque,
about 120 households are currently supported by this programme. Eligibility
for this scheme is usually determined by the combined income of the members
of each household and, in many cases, the breadwinners of the household are
unemployed. The households on the food voucher scheme each receives a
monthly voucher of $30 which can be used to purchase necessities such as
rice at a designated neighbourhood grocery store. A variation of this programme
is that of essential food supplies (instead of food vouchers) given to the needy,
such as that offered by Kampung Siglap Mosque, which currently has about
eighty households supported by this programme.
Small Amounts of Monetary Aid

All four mosques give some form of ad-hoc monetary aid in small amounts for
various purposes, for instance, to pay utilities bills, school fees and Hari Raya
expenditure. To receive such assistance, aid seekers usually need to show some
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proof of documentation (such as bills and pay slips), and the mosques operate
on the understanding that that such financial assistance are given “in good
faith” because there is no system in place to ascertain if the aid-seekers are
indeed genuinely in dire straits.
Long Term Financial Solutions

Mosque leaders realize that the types of financial assistance discussed above
are short-term solutions meant to tide over a period of difficulty, for example,
temporary unemployment. The more desirable forms of financial assistance
are therefore long-term in nature, which would enable the aid seekers to be
financially independent in the long run. One such programme organized by
An-Nur Mosque teaches people who have been retrenched the skills required
to run a small home business (for example, selling food items). It should be
noted that such programmes emerged relatively recently, in the context of an
increase in the number of workers retrenched in the past few years. Not all
mosques, however, have the capacity to run such courses, and those who do
not usually refer aid seekers to relevant organizations such as the Community
Development Councils (CDCs) for skills retraining.
Some of the mosque leaders interviewed feel that those who receive
financial aid must also be given some form of religious guidance. This
sentiment is based on the perception that Muslims in the lower income group
tend to be less versed in religious matters. These mosques use various strategies
to get these aid seekers to attend religious classes: for example, the disbursement
of financial aid takes place only at the end of a religious class which is
compulsory for the aid seekers to attend. Welfare, therefore, is seen as the
improvement of the lives of aid seekers in both material and spiritual — and
by extension, secular and sacred — matters. However, these compulsory
religious classes are not necessarily embraced by the aid seekers. Mosque
leaders report that there are many instances where aid seekers give excuses so
as to avoid the classes. Given such resistance, it might be worthwhile to
rethink both the coercive strategy to get aid seekers to attend religious classes
and the kinds of religious lessons that are offered to them. In other words,
some key questions which need to be deliberated upon are: do aid seekers
avoid the classes because they cannot identify with the content of the classes?
Do the religious classes address issues which are directly relevant to the socio-
economic reality of the aid seekers’ lives? How are aid seekers treated in the
classes? Can classes be devised such that aid seekers can recognize the potential
benefits and therefore voluntarily attend?
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Rehabilitation Programmes
Rehabilitation programmes offered by mosques have the primary aim of
reforming delinquents or criminal offenders. A systematic approach in dealing
with delinquency or criminality is a relatively new intervention, given the
increasing recognition of the important role that religion and religious
organizations can play in rehabilitation.
One example of such programmes is the counselling sessions and religious
classes conducted for inmates about to finish serving their prison sentences.
The Kampung Siglap Mosque runs this programme together with the
Darussalam Mosque, at the Darul Islah Halfway House. According to the
imam of Kampung Siglap Mosque, Ustaz Azmi Abdul Samad, his contribution
to this programme is to conduct a bi-weekly religious class for the inmates.
Another example is that organized by Al-Falah Mosque in mid-2005 in
collaboration with the Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports (MCYS),
which is targeted at youth probationers. Its purpose is to ensure that the
youths serve their probation sentences in productive ways and are taught a set
of life skills that would be beneficial to them both during the probation
period and after. According to the imams of Al-Falah Mosque, Ustaz Md
Khair Rahmat and Ustaz Md Yusri Yubhi, the approach taken in running this
programme is not a “purely religious” one, which means that the emphasis is
not solely on religious knowledge and practices. Rather, the emphasis is on
“non-religious” elements such as martial arts lessons, sessions on building
self-esteem and motivational talks. Such an approach was adopted because
the imams felt that taking an overtly religious approach would alienate the
youths. Thus, the imams also eschewed making comments about, for example,
the tattoos which the male youths have or the refusal of female youths to don
headscarves. It should be added here that Al-Falah Mosque’s approach in
treating the youth probationers also resonate in their overall approach in
attracting youths to the mosques (Berita Harian, 29 July 2005). Given Al-
Falah Mosque’s recognition that youths are staying away from mosques in
general, a strategy that they have adopted is to be less dogmatic and more
tolerant of youths’ sartorial preferences.
Counselling and Advice

According to all the four mosques surveyed, people come to the mosque to
seek advice on not just religious matters but also other concerns and
uncertainties, such as marital problems and parent-child conflicts. Counselling
sessions are conducted in various ways. Since both the imams at Al-Falah
Mosque are trained para-counsellors, the mosque is therefore able to hold
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counselling sessions on their own. In other mosques (such as An-Nur Mosque)

where no such expertise is available, professional counsellors may be hired to
conduct counselling sessions. In most cases, people either contact the mosques
directly to arrange for a counselling session, or they may be referred to the
mosque by other agencies such as Family Service Centres (FSCs) which are
unable to give counselling on matters involving religious matters, for example,
issues pertaining to divorce.
Apart from private counselling sessions, mosques make use of other
platforms to dispense advice pertaining to social issues. For instance, the
Kampung Siglap Mosque has, on occasion, invited officers from the Ministry
of Health to give talks on healthcare as part of the mosque’s lectures on
religious issues. This is a good strategy for disseminating messages on healthcare,
given that mosque lectures tend to attract a substantial audience.
Educational Programmes
Educational programmes take various forms. One example is small bursaries
usually given to students from needy families. These grants are usually not
publicized and are given out to those who approach the mosques for assistance
on paying school bills and purchasing school supplies. Apart from monetary
aid, mosques also hold tuition sessions for students. The Ba’alwie Mosque,
for instance, organizes free-of-charge tuition sessions in mathematics for
primary school, secondary school, junior college and polytechnic students.
These tuition sessions are mostly conducted by engineering graduates who
are part of the mosque’s team of volunteers.
Additionally, there are programmes organized to boost the self-esteem
and confidence of students. One such programme held by An-Nur Mosque
in 2005 was targeted specifically at students from low-income families. In
fact, most students who attend An-Nur Mosque’s programme come from
families who are already accepting the mosque’s food vouchers. Thus, taking
this programme and retraining classes that An-Nur Mosque organizes for
retrenched workers, it can be said that the mosque takes a multi-pronged
approach to help low income families.
ASSESSMENT
Mosques provide a wide diversity of social services programmes. This range
of programmes reflect the Muslim community’s diversity, contrary to
common perceptions that it is homogeneous or monolithic, and therefore
faces different problems and has very different needs within it. Additionally,
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the fact that mosques are actively involved in the delivery of social services
also tell us that mosques are not merely places where Muslims go to
perform prayers, but that they also serve as an important institution which
addresses social issues in the community.
Key Factors in the Delivery of Social Services Programmes

There are two sets of key factors which influence the kinds of social services
programmes organised by mosques: internal factors which are existing within
the mosque; and external factors existing outside the mosque’s realm and
control. Rather than seeing the internal and external factors as being separate
from one another, it is more important to see how both sets of factors work
together in affecting the kinds of social services programmes available.
Internal Factors
Types of Mosque Leadership
Mosques in Singapore are governed by different types of leadership systems.
In 2005, the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) announced
that it had appointed executive mosque chairmen for six mosques in
Singapore (Berita Harian, 26 July 2005). Other mosques without executive
mosque chairmen,are managed by volunteer chairmen. Because the position
of executive mosque chairman is a full-time one, mosques with such
leadership are theoretically more capable of running more social services
programmes, compared to mosques with volunteer chairmen, who administer
the mosques on a part-time basis and technically have less time to plan and
implement programmes.
Available Expertise and Manpower

The types of programmes planned are heavily dependent upon the expertise
and skills of the mosque staff. For instance, because the imams in Al-Falah
Mosque are certified para-counsellors who are also relatively young in age and
able to empathize with youths, Al-Falah Mosque is therefore well-positioned
to run social services programmes for youths. In addition, Al-Falah Mosque
also has an active youth committee that assists in these programmes. Al-Falah
Mosque’s capability to run programmes for youths is also enhanced by other
factors such as its attractive location in the Orchard Road area and, as shown
below, crucial funding sources.
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Funding
Without adequate financial sources, mosques would certainly not be able to
implement its social services programmes. A mosque’s funding comes from
various sources. One source is the donations received from people who come
to the mosque, for instance, during Friday prayers. MUIS also provides an
important source of funding, usually at the beginning of each financial year
when each mosque presents its corporate plans for the year. Mosques also
receive funding from various corporate sponsors, usually for specific events.
Mosques sometimes receive sponsorship from non-Muslim organizations as
well. For instance, Al-Falah Mosque previously received funding from Buddhist
Lodge for its youth-related activities. However, mosques in general will
eschew funders which promote activities that are not permissible under
Muslim tenets; thus financial support from beer and betting companies, for
instance, would be declined.
Needs of Congregants
Because of the interplay of various factors such as geographical location,
mosque reputation and facilities available in the mosque, different mosques
tend to attract different types of congregants. For instance, Al-Falah Mosque
attracts many youths, Ba’alwie Mosque attracts many middle class professionals
and Kampung Siglap Mosque attracts many taxi drivers (Berita Harian,
22 July 2005). These mosques would then plan social services programmes
which suit the needs of the particular groups which they attract. In addition,
mosques also enlist the assistance of these groups of congregants when
organizing their social services programmes. For example, the taxi drivers at
Kampung Siglap Mosque help to deliver food supplies to needy families in
the nearby Marine Parade neighbourhood.
Mindset and Religious Orientation

The people that make up the leadership of mosques are diverse in terms of
their religious orientation. This implies that mosque leaders approach social
problems differently and advocate varying solutions to these problems,
depending on the values they hold to be important. The following example
illustrates this.
The imams and ustazs in mosques are frequently consulted by people
who are plagued by ailments and believe that evil spirits are the cause of
their illnesses and the religious leaders’ responses to these complaints vary.
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In one instance several years ago in An-Nur Mosque, an ustaz decided to

conduct an exorcism class so that people who believed they were affected by
demons could learn how to drive away these evil spirits. Such an approach
affirms people’s beliefs that demons and other supernatural beings were the
causes of illnesses.
In contrast, the imam of Ba’alwie Mosque would dispense some holy
water as a placebo for people with similar self-diagnosis of their illnesses. At
the same time, the imam would emphasize to them that they needed to see a
doctor for diagnosis and treatment. In other words, because beliefs in the
supernatural are sometimes deeply held that it would be difficult to convince
the person otherwise, it is strategic for the imam to give the holy water in
order to psychologically placate the ill person so that the real message about
visiting the doctor would be more easily accepted. To be outrightly dismissive
about the person’s beliefs in the supernatural would be not only discouraging
and disempowering to the person, but would also undermine the efficacy
of the advice.
Corporatization of Mosques
A trend which has emerged recently is that many mosques have adopted the
corporate planning process and are being run like corporations. This new
development affects the way social services programmes are planned and
organized. For example, mosques have to plan their social services programmes
at the beginning of the corporate financial year, so that budget estimates can
be submitted to MUIS in order to receive the necessary funding. Because the
corporatization of mosques is a relatively new development, it is important to
deliberate further on the positive and negative effects of this trend. Among
the benefits are that it streamlines the planning process and helps in the
maximization of limited resources. However, the corporatization process can
also sometimes be limited to corporate sloganeering and corporate branding,
without much benefits or substance being accrued at the ground level.
External Factors
Political Boundaries
Following the division of geographical locations into political constituencies,
some mosques have been designated as “constituency mosques”. What this
entails is that such mosques work closely with other social services agencies
within the same constituency, such as FSCs and CDCs, in order to assist the
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constituency’s residents with their problems. For example, a mosque might

refer an unemployed person who needs job retraining to the CDC, and the
FSC might refer cases of family disputes to mosques when there are religious
sensitivities involved. Thus, many of the social services programmes organized
by constituency mosques would be collaborative in nature.
Sociopolitical Circumstances
Significant events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 and the Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) arrests in 2002 have motivated mosques to organize activities
which would improve inter-religious understanding. For instance, there are
now more efforts to encourage non-Muslims to visit mosques in order to
enable them to have a better understanding of Islam. An Islamic Heritage
Centre will also be built in the new An-Nahdhah Mosque in Bishan, where
non-Muslims who would like to know more about Islam can visit (Mosque
Convention 2005). Additionally, many mosque leaders are also participating
in inter-religious dialogues, such as the ones organized by the local Inter-
racial Confidence Circles. Mosques like the Ba’alwie Mosque also publish
pamphlets that are distributed to interested members of the public for
purposes of promoting inter-religious understanding. Examples of these
pamphlets, which are personally authored by its imam, Habib Hassan, are
“Non-Muslims among Muslims” and “Religion of Peace and Moderation”.
While such programmes have traditionally been catered for Muslims,
there have been recent efforts to include more non-Muslim beneficiaries. For
example, MUIS launched the Rahmatan Lil Alamin Fund in 2005 which
donates money to a wide range of humanitarian causes, regardless of whether
the recipients are Muslims or non-Muslims. Among the fund’s recipients are
victims of the 2004 tsunami, people whose homes have been destroyed by
fires and activists who are working on environmental projects. Apart from the
desire to promote greater inter-religious understanding, one possible reason
for implementing schemes such as the Rahmatan Lil Alamin Fund is to
change the perception that in inter-religious interaction, members of the
Muslim community are largely only the recipients of assistance from other
communities but do not reciprocate this relationship by providing assistance
to members of other communities. The introduction of such new schemes
could also be intended to send a clear signal that the Muslim community is
indeed well placed to help solve some of the problems faced by non-Muslims
as well. Nevertheless, while these new schemes represent positive and desirable
steps in promoting greater inter-religious interaction, mosques need not be
apologetic that their social services programmes cater mostly to Muslims.
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After all, Muslims are members of the wider Singaporean society, which
means that mosques’ social services programmes help to alleviate some of the
social problems experienced at the national level, and are effective because of
their religious and culturally sensitive ways.
Challenges Encountered by Mosques

Mosques face various challenges in the planning and organizing of social
services programmes.
Disagreements
Because of its diversity, not all members of a mosque’s leadership can agree,
at times, with the way social services programmes are run. Disagreements
can come about because of their different religious orientations and values. At
Al-Falah Mosque, for example, some member-staff do not agree with the “less
emphasis on religion” approach in the social services programmes for youths
and in the general strategy to attract more youths to the mosque. When some
form of consensus can be reached among the disagreeing parties, the social
services programmes can proceed; otherwise, the programmes may have to be
abandoned for alternative ones or modified.
Lack of Funding
Without adequate funding, mosques face limitations in terms of the kinds of
programmes they can organize. For example, Family Development Centres,
which provided assistance to people with family-related problems, were set
up in six mosques in 1999, but the project came to an end not long after due
to a lack of funding to sustain it. Mosque leaders in all the four mosques
surveyed concurred that there are limited funds for social services. At the
same time, they found it feasible to work creatively within the constraints of
available finances to run their programmes.
Hindrances in Collaboration
While mosques’ collaboration with other agencies can lead to more and
efficient planning of social services programmes, there may be hindrances to
collaborations when there are gaps or differences in expectations and approaches
between the parties. For example, while it was possible for Al-Falah Mosque
to collaborate with the MCYS in planning the programmes for youth
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probationers, it might be more complex for other mosques to establish

similar collaborations with MCYS because the latter, as a state organization,
prefers to work with organizations which do not take an overtly religious
approach in its programmes.
Limited Expertise and Infrastructure

Although some mosque leaders are trained in fundamental skills (for example,
para-counselling) which enable them to carry out social services programmes,
they are not professional social workers who adequately possess the necessary
expertise to handle various types of social services. Mosque leaders sometimes
solve this problem by turning to volunteers who possess the pertinent skills
that they do not have, but this is not always possible. According to the four
different categories of social services programmes defined by NCSS, mosques
also do not provide disability services because this requires expertise and time
commitment which mosque staff and their volunteers are unable to fulfil.
Apart from a lack of necessary skills, mosques also face constraints in terms
of physical space which limits the kinds of social services programmes that
can be organized. For instance, where there are inadequate classrooms, only
a limited number of tuition classes can be held.
What is a Mosque’s Role?

In general, mosques are grappling with the need to find a balance between
understanding that mosques are not social services organizations and do not
have the capabilities of such organizations in addressing certain social problems,
and the recognition that mosques need to provide social services programmes
because of the critical role they play in addressing social concerns. A negotiation
between the two requires a constant evaluation of the most relevant types of
social services programmes to organize in order to intervene most effectively
in social problems.
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS ON SOCIAL SERVICE

PROVISION BY MOSQUES
The mosque is not just a place where Muslims go to perform their prayers but
is an important institution which addresses social issues. The mosque is able
to perform the role as a provider of social services because it has traditionally
been a place which is central in the lives of Muslim communities, which
enables it to empathize with and act on grassroots problems. Mosques offer
481

a wide range of social services programmes. The important point to note is

that the diversity of programmes reflects the diversity of the Muslim population
and the varying needs of each particular population segment (age group,
income bracket and other classificatory types). However, despite the breadth
of programmes offered by mosques, many other social services programmes
lie beyond their purview given the lack of certain types of expertise,
infrastructure and other capabilities. Thus, collaboration with other social
service agencies is a key aspect of mosques’ delivery of social services. Even
though most social services programmes in mosques are targeted mainly at
Muslims, there are also spaces where inter-religious interaction takes place.
Mosque face several common challenges and considerations in the delivery
of social services programmes. In light of these factors, some preliminary
suggestions for the further improvement of the delivery of social services by
mosques can be made in their collaborations with other agencies and in their
prioritization of problems to be tackled.
Given that resources in the social services sector are limited, mosques
should press on with their current strategy of collaborating with other agencies
for a more efficient delivery of social services programmes. This could help
mosques to avoid duplicating the services offered by other organizations and
to leave the tackling of particular problems to agencies that are better positioned
to do so. In addition, mosques should also explore new avenues of collaboration
which have been untapped previously. An example of this is the newly-forged
collaboration between Al-Falah Mosque and MCYS. Levels of comfort can be
worked at and achieved between mosques and MCYS for similar collaborations
in the future. This can potentially enable them to jointly address social issues
which have previously not be addressed adequately. Another area of
collaboration is that between mosques. Mosques should grow and sustain
their ongoing cooperation with one another. Because different mosques have
different strengths and capabilities, collaboration between them can be better
ensure that particular social problems are tackled by those mosques which
have the greatest leverage in dealing with them.
Another important way of dealing with the limited resources available
for social services programmes is for mosques to prioritize the problems
that they wish to tackle. One way of prioritizing is to examine the impact
that particular social problems have on the community, and focus on the
most pressing issues. Examples of questions that mosques need to ask when
prioritizing are: where funding is limited, should mosques focus on short-
term or long-term financial assistance, or find some balance between the
two? Given limited classroom space, which should take greater priority and
why; courses on exorcism or tuition classes? It should also be emphasized
482

that the process of prioritization is not only about the ranking of social
problems, but also entails the questioning and evaluation of religious
orientations and values. For example, should mosque leaders indulge in
people’s beliefs in the supernatural, dismiss such beliefs or attempt to
undermine them slowly? Should activities be categorized or separated as
secular or religious? Should charity be seen as separate from religious acts
such as prayers, or should there be a rethinking of what “acts of worship”
mean? It is crucial to reconsider existing religious values and orientations
because they affect mosque leaders’ perceptions on what counts as urgent
social problems, and how to go about tackling these problems.
APPENDIX 19.1
TIMELINE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM

SOCIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS IN SINGAPORE
Year Organizations Services and Remarks

1904 Muslim Trust Fund Association (MTFA) Orphanage home
1932 Muslim Missionary Society of Singapore Social welfare
(JAMIYAH)
1940 Singapore Tenkasi Muslim Welfare Society Social welfare
1941 Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim League Social welfare
(SKML)
1948 Malay Youth Literary Association (4PM) Social welfare and youth
services
Co-managed an FSC until
December 2003
1952 Young Women Muslim Association (PPIS) Social welfare/women focus
1957 Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Association for religious
Teachers Association (PERGAS) teachers/ and education
1957 Religious and Educational League of Catered to Radin Mas
Radin Mas (BAPA) residents in the early years.
Now its niche is in
providing for needs of
disabled Muslims.
1958 Muhammadiyah Association Co-managed an FSC until
December 2003
483

Year Organizations Services and Remarks

1959 Singapore Malay Youth Association Social welfare
(Taman Bacaan)
1964 Adult Religious Students’ Association Social welfare and education
(PERDAUS)
1966 Lembaga Biasiswa Kenangan Maulud Bursary
(LBKM)
1968 Islamic Religious council of Singapore Statutory board
(MUIS)
1969 Islamic Theological Association of Social welfare
Singapore (Pertapis)
1977 SANA Muslim Counselling Service Drug abuse and
(MCDS-SANA) rehabilitation
1980 The Muslim Converts’ Association of Missionary activities and
Singapore (Darul Arqam) welfare
1982 Council for the Development of Muslim Self-help
Community (Yayasan Mendaki)
1988 YWMA (PPIS) Single Parent Family Social welfare
Service Centre, renamed As-Salaam-
YWMA Family Support Centre in 2000
1991 Association of Muslim Professional (AMP) Self-help/social welfare
1991 Mendaki-PPIS FSC Social welfare
Mendaki withdrew from
management in 2004.
Renamed PPIS Jurong FSC
in January 2004, with PPIS
as parent body.
1994 SAFF (formed by PERDAUS) Youth-based
1997 4PM-Mendaki Family Service Centre Renamed Moral FSC —
Bukit Panjang in early Jan
2004, with Thye Hua Kwan
Moral Society (THKMS) as
the parent body. THKMS
took over the FSC’s
management when
Mendaki withdrew its
involvement from family
services to refocus on
educational programmes.
1997 Family Development Department was set Ceased operation in June
up under MUIS (which set up mosque- 2004
based family development centres in
7 mosques)
484

1998 Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs Think-tank and research

(RIMA) (set up by AMP) centre
1999 Taman Bacaan — North East Family Social welfare
Service Centre
2000 Muhammadiyah-Mendaki FSC Renamed Moral FSC —
Bedok North in early Jan
2004, with Thye Hua Kwan
Moral Society (THKMS) as
the parent body. THKMS
took over the FSC’s
management when
Mendaki withdrew its
involvement from family
services to refocus on
educational programmes.
2001 Mercy Relief (formed by PERDAUS) Humanitarian aid
Became independent in 2003
Notes
Enon Mansor is the author of the section on social services provided by Muslim
organizations while Nur Amali Ibrahim is the author of the section on social services
provided by mosques.
Enon Mansor wishes to express her thanks to Dr Lai Ah Eng, Dr Noor Aisha
Abdul Rahman, Ruhaiah Sedik, Soria Salleh and Maisarah Mohamed, and to the
following organizations: AMP, Jamiyah, Mendaki, Pertapis, PPIS Jurong Family
Service Centre and Mercy Relief.
Nur Amali Ibrahim would like to express his utmost gratitude to the following
informants for their time, assistance and generosity: Habib Hassan al-Attas of
Ba’alwie Mosque, Mr Razak Mohd Lazim of Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, Ms
Maheran Mamat of An-Nur Mosque, Ustaz Azmi Abdul Samad of Kampung Siglap
Mosque, and Ustaz Md Khair Rahmat and Ustaz Md Yusri Yubhi M. Yusoff of
Al-Falah Mosque.
Responsibility for views expressed herein are entirely those of the authors.
1. For example, during the nineteenth century the Arabs were known to be active
in charitable and welfare work, such as the building of hospitals and mosques
(MUIS 1994, p. 20).
2. Although we recognize the significant roles of cultural, literary and sports
organizations in providing developmental programmes, the focus of this research
will be on organizations providing social welfare services. “Khairat kematian”
(a common self-help entity in the local Muslim community that serves to defray
the financial costs of funeral arrangement) is also excluded.
3. Chan (2002, p. 21) shared that “A strong sense of racial or religious group
identity is to be distinguished from racial and religious extremism that would
485

threaten Singapore’s racial and religious harmony. Rather than using the sense of
race and religion and religious group identity per se as indices of social cohesion,
it would be more appropriate to focus on inter-racial and inter-religious group
relations and the emphasis on national interests vis-à-vis racial or religious group
interests.”
4. See MUIS (1994) for a brief write-up of key Muslim Organizations (MOs) and
MUIS (2002) for a listing and short introduction of the MOs.
5. Darul Ihsan Lilbanin is for Muslim boys and Darul Ihsan Libanat is for Muslim
girls.
6. He was also the initiator of the Inter-Religious Organization.
7. PA was formed in 1 July 1960. It manages twenty-eight neighbourhood-
based PA community centres, “History” <http://www.pa.gov.sg/aboutpa/
About%20Us.htm> (accessed 25 October 2005).
8. SANA also mobilized other religious groups through the SANA Religious and
Secular Aftercare (Counselling) Services in 1977 (SANA, undated, p. 13).
9. A FSC is a neighbourhood-based focal point of family resources which any
resident, regardless of age, race or religion, can approach on family-related
matters. It is the FSC’s mission to promote and improve the social well-being of
every individual in the family, at every stage of life. For more information,
refer to the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports website
<http://www.mcys.gov.sg>.
10. Also see article “Mendaki streamlines to focus on community needs” in Sunday
Times, 2 June 2002. In streamlining its activities, Mendaki withdrew from
FSC-based family services to refocus on educational programmes.
11. <http://www.mercyrelief.org/the_hands.html> (accessed 8 December 2005).
12. Jamiyah Business School offers a series of accredited certificate and diploma
courses for youths and working adults in business studies, accounting, marketing
and information technology. It provides a valuable “second chance” for those
who had not done well academically in school or had dropped out of school
earlier.
13. Besides social welfare services, many other Muslim organizations also provide
for cultural-sports-literary activities. Cultural-sports-literary groups include
Sriwana (cultural dance group), Bawean Putra (sepak takraw) and PERKAMUS
(a literary group).
14. Also see article “Majority Chinese may Need to Mingle More” in Straits Times,
31 October 2005 and Tan (2004, p. 194). Tan argues that “As a work-in-
progress society, Singapore has to move beyond mere tolerance and seek greater
understanding of the different races, religious and cultures with an appreciation
of our diversity. And the dominant majority ethnic Chinese should take the
lead as a confidence-building gesture of their commitment to genuine multi-
culturalism.”
486

References
References for Part I on Social Service Provision by Muslim Organizations
Association of Muslim Professionals Singapore. Annual Report 2004. Singapore:
AMP, 2004.
Chan, David. Survey on Social Attitudes of Singaporean (SAS). Singapore: Ministry of
Community Development and Sports, 2002.
Friedlander, Walter A. Introduction to Social Welfare. 3rd revision. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968.
Lee, Edwin. “Community, Family and Household”. In A History of Singapore, edited
by Ernest C. T. Chew and Edwin Lee, pp. 242–67. Singapore: Oxford University
Press, 1991.
Li, Tania. Malays in Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Osman Sidek, “Majority Chinese May Need to Mingle More”. Straits Times,
31 October 2005, H8.
Mendaki. In Quest of Excellence: A Story of Singapore Malay. Singapore: Mendaki,
2002.
Merton, Robert K., Marjorie Fiske and Patricia L. Kendall. The Focused Interview.
Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1956.
Miller, Wlliam L. and Benjamin F. Crabtree. “Depth Interview”. In Doing Qualitative
Research, edited by Benjamin F. Crabtree and Miller William L. 2nd ed., pp. 89–
107. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc., 1999.
Ministry of Community Development, Youths and Sports. The Family Service Centre
Directory 2005. Singapore: Ministry of Community Development, Youths and
Sports, 2004.
MUIS. Muslims in Singapore: A Shared Vision. Singapore: MUIS, 1994.
MUIS. The Beam: Directory of Social Services. Singapore: MUIS, 2002.
Patton, Michael Quinn. Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. 2nd ed. Newbury
Park, CA: Sage, 1990.
People’s Association. “History”. <http://www.pa.gov.sg/aboutpa/About%20Us.htm>
Perdaus. “History”. <http://www.perdaus.org.sg/perdaus%20file/about
perdaus.swf> (accessed 26 October 2005).
Republic of Singapore. Government Gazette Acts Supplement No. 441. Singapore:
Government of Singapore, 1966.
Saleem, H. M. “Modern Method of Da’wah: A Case Study of Jamiyah Singapore”.
Three-Day Seminar on the Role of Muslim Organizations in Promoting
Development and Human Fellowship in Muslim Minority Countries in Asia.
Organized by Jamiyah Singapore in Cooperation with The Islamic Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) and the Ministry of Awqaf,
Kuwait. 24–26 September 2004.
487

Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association (SANA). Basic Training Course Handbook.

Singapore. n.d.
Sunday Times. “Mendaki Streamlines to Focus on Community Needs”. 2 June 2002,
p. 4.
Tan, Eugene. “The Majority’s Sacrifices and Yearnings”. In Ethnic Relations and
Nation Building in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ethnic Chinese, edited by Leo
Suryadinata, pp. 168–206. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
2004.
References for Part 2 on Mosques

Berita Harian. “Ke Arah Masjid Yang Lebih Bersifat Mesra Belia”. 29 July 2005.
———. “Usaha Tingkat Peranan Masjid Diperluas”. 26 July 2005.
———. “Pada Mulanya, Sangat Berat Ke Masjid”. 28 July 2005.
———. “Masjid Kg Siglap Jadi ‘Port’ Pemandu Teksi”. 22 July 2005.
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura website <http://www.muis.gov.sg>.
Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura. Mosque Seminar 2000. Singapore: Majlis Ugama
Islam Singapura. 2000.
———. Mosque Convention 2005. Singapore: Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura. 2005.
National Council on Social Services website <http://www.ncss.org.sg>.
Portal for Mosques in Singapore. <http://www.mosque.org.sg>.
488

Hindu Temples in Charities and Social Services 489
20
HINDU TEMPLES IN CHARITIES

AND SOCIAL SERVICES
Sinniah Vivakanandan and

Nagah Devi Ramasamy
INTRODUCTION
Only in times of crisis does the world tend to build visions of advancement
and cry out for agencies of change to negotiate the imbalances seeping
through the environment. The eulogizing of religious institutions as apt
agents of potential change in this new millennium is not novel. Religion has
since bygone days spread its influential tentacles across the many spheres of
the mundane human life. This includes the provision of services to the poor
and the needy. For centuries, faith institutions have played a pivotal role in
providing services to the poor, and in working to overcome the underlying
roots of poverty (Marshall 2003, p. vi).
In Hinduism, the code of conduct or the Hindu Dharma is noted as a set
of regulations for orienting proper conduct of life on earth. Dharma is
considered the pivotal foundation for the welfare of humanity (Singapore
Hindus Religious and Cultural Seminar 1971, p. 102). As charity and
compassion are two of the prime virtues laid down by Dharma, temples as the
abodes of the higher beings have been considered to fulfil practical social and
charitable functions, apart from ritualistic and spiritual duties. However, in
the fast-paced modern condition of today, there is a need to examine if
temples have been able to handle successfully both social and religious duties.
489
489

490 Sinniah Vivakanandan and Nagah Devi Ramasamy
Background
There are about 100,000 Hindus in Singapore.1 There is no available data on
the number of practising Hindus and little has been researched and written
about Hindus and their organizations. This small study looks at the role of
Hindu temples and Hindu-related organizations in social services in Singapore.
Based on primary research, it hopes to help fill this gap in knowledge and
understanding, as well as to spark the interest of new and existing Hindu
organizations to do more in the area of social services.
Methodology
Methodologically, data was mainly gathered through fieldwork interviews
and a small case study of the Sri Mariamman Temple during 2005. Both
qualitative in-depth interviews and a quantitative survey were undertaken so
as to provide a balanced insight. Semi-structured Interviews with a basic
probe guide were conducted with selected current and former executive
committee members of Sri Mariamman Temple. A basic survey questionnaire
on kinds of services offered was disseminated to all twenty-four Hindu
temples in Singapore. The data collection efforts were carried out during the
period May to August 2005. All interview respondents and temples were very
forthcoming in granting their consent for the interviews and surveys. Secondary
data sources in the form of existing academic literature (journal articles,
academic books and seminar papers) were consulted over the longer duration
of January to October of 2005.
Definitions
Temples refer to both formal and informal structures. Formal temples refer to
those that have been “endorsed”’ by the authorities and are normally built
with public funds on land leased directly from the government. These temples
are registered under the Registries of Societies (ROS) Act and managed each
by an elected management committee. Informal structures such as shrines
may not be recognized officially as places of worship but are regarded as
temples by devotees.
The terms “social” and “charitable services” are used interchangeably,
following local usage. They include activities or programmes that are aimed
at providing remedial or developmental assistance, such as educational
programmes, counselling services and food assistance programmes. However
cultural programmes like dance classes and religious classes are excluded in
this study.
490

A BRIEF HISTORY OF HINDUISM AND

HINDU TEMPLES IN SINGAPORE
There is no consensus on when Hindus first arrived in the Malayan Peninsula.
By the thirteenth century, there must have been a strong Hindu presence in
Southeast Asia as the dominant powers in this region then were the Hindu
empires of Mataram and Majapahit located in eastern Java and Sri Vijaya, the
earliest Hindu kingdom at Palembang in Sumatra.
In Singapore, the advent of Hinduism can be traced to the early
nineteenth century with the arrival of migrant workers from South India
(Sinha 2005, p. 2). Tong (2002) writes that Hinduism was brought into
Singapore by Indian immigrants since 1819. The building of temples in a
swift manner since their coming lends support to the rapid spread of the
religion in the nation-state island. Tong also points out that “given that
about 80 per cent of the early Indian immigrants into Malaya were Tamils,
it follows that Hinduism in Singapore is largely of a South Indian variety,
with the remaining 20 per cent of migrants from India being Muslims,
Sikhs and Christians (ibid., p. 373).
Role of Early Hindu Temples

Besides obviously being a centre for worship, the temples became significant
focal points for the early Hindu migrant workers. The temples provided a safe
haven for newly arrived immigrants in an alien land. Subsequently temples
became meeting and gathering points for the workers, where they could
celebrate their festivals and also interact with their brethren. The temples,
such as the Sri Mariamman Temple, also provided shelter and food for those
who became displaced. The Mariamman Temple was also a site for the
Registry of Marriages for Hindus.
However, by the early 1960s, the scenario of Hindu temples doing
charity appears to have changed. In a series of seminars held between 1969
and 1970, the role of Hinduism in community service and nation-building
was discussed (Sinha 1987, p. 159). The Singapore Hindus Religious and
Cultural Seminar (1971) held in May 1969 openly acknowledged that the
temples had become too self-centred and acted only as places of worship
(ibid., p. 14).2 It was also put forth that the Hindu temples spent “immense
time and finance dedicated to intricate rituals performed in the Sanskrit
language, often un-understandable by the masses”.3 The need to cut down on
the money and time dedicated to ceremonies so as to suit present day
practical conditions was suggested. The need to position an organized body
491

akin to the “Christian Councils”, so as to officiate over the efficient running

of the various Hindu temples, was also recommended (ibid., p. 15).
The impact of the 1970 seminar was at best muted. In the first Asia-
Pacific Hindu Conference held in 1988 it was again lamented that very few
Hindu temples in Singapore were actively engaging themselves in service and
charity. The charge that resources seemed to be largely devoted to the fulfilment
of intricate Vedic rituals was again levied. One of the reasons suggested for this
state of affairs was that, by and large, the twenty-four temples and fourteen
Hindu-related organizations did not seem to possess the know-how and the
right personnel to organize educational or service activities to the public. A
recommendation was made to form a coordinating body to provide support
for the temples to carry out social services. By the late 1980s, there were clear
calls that Hindu temples and related organizations should do more for charity
and social services. In essence, the seminars in the 1970s and the 1988
conference suggest that some segments of the Hindu community were
concerned about the role of Hindu temples and what appeared to be an
undue focus on ritualistic and spiritual aspects and less on charitable services.
It would be wrong, however, to think that social services undertaken by
the early Hindu temples were an outcome of unique historical circumstances
and thus became obsolete as Singapore developed. Charity or seva is a core
concept in Hinduism. It thus is not an option for Hindu temples, it is
mandatory. The Ramakrishna Mission’s dictum captures the nexus between
service to man and Hinduism as: “man is divine and service to him is thus
service to God”. The head of the Ramakrishna Mission in Singapore Swami
Muktirupananda (2001, p. 15) says that, above all, service to man is a sure
way to achieve a higher spiritual plane. He elaborates that service helps one
to transcend the self. The love of God ought to be expressed through love of
mankind. Furthermore, service need not be interpreted only in monetary
terms or material terms. Transmission of knowledge, sharing of one’s time
and labour and not escaping from responsibility are just some of the intangible
means of giving. The sacred Hindu text Bhagavad-Gita explains the need for
seva thus: “When a person responds to the joys and sorrows of others as if
they were his own, he has attained the highest state of spiritual union.”4 By
doing service one accumulates karmic credit, which Hindus believe will pave
their way for attaining a higher spiritual status.5 The concept of seva or service
thus is a core tenet of Hinduism.
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES IN HINDU TEMPLES

Data from fieldwork interviews surface a general consensus that Hindu
temples ought to do more charity. The view that charity by Hindu temples
492

should also include non-Hindus was also voiced. Respondents thought that
some Hindu spiritual organizations are doing excellent social services that
could be emulated by temples.
The relatively more intense involvement of Hindu spiritual movements
in charity as compared to the temples is a result of the founding gurus of
spiritual movements, such as Swami Vivekananda, the founder of the
Ramakrishna Mission. Swami Vivekananda championed the concept of karma
yoga that emphasized action and service to mankind. Other examples of
movements where the teachings of the founder guru have reinforced the idea
that seva is the key for achieving a higher spiritual plane include the Amriteswari
Society, Centre for Enlightenment, Sree Narayana Mission and Sri Sathya Sai
Baba movement. The guiding hand of a founding guru is however, missing in
Hindu temples. But this alone cannot explain why some temples do not do
charity. To understand this requires looking into the development of post-
independent Singapore.
Post-1965 Changes
The period after Singapore’s independence in 1965 saw massive changes in
Singapore’s social, economic and geographical landscapes with dramatic and
visible effects on all communities. The Hindu temples were no exception.
First there was a redistribution of the Hindu population due to housing
resettlement and its paring down due to emigration that arose out of the
British pull-out from Singapore. This resulted in the breaking down of the
large concentrations of Hindu communities in several parts of Singapore.6
The movements of Hindus sapped the support base of Hindu temples and
shrines which were located within these communities and which depended
on these constituents for funds and volunteers. Second, the need for land for
industrial and housing purposes meant that some temples had to give way.
During this period, there was a process of the “merger” of temples and
“resettlement” of religious shrines (Sinha 2003, p. 466).7 Third, the onset of
industrialization saw an upsurge in Indian female employment and this could
have furthermore shifted the traditional pattern of temple visits and support
by Hindu women.8 Fourth, as the country developed, the provision of social
services to the needy also improved. With government funding, more voluntary
welfare organizations (VWOs) were formed. Temples were no longer seen as
the site or primary service provider for the needy.
The combined effects of the factors listed above resulted in a drastic shift
of the temples’ focus. There was a need first to concentrate on survival issues.
Fund-raising became a priority. Social services were an expense that many of
the temples could ill afford. The relocation also meant there was no immediate
493

constituency that the temples needed to worry about serving, that is, there
was little pressure on the temples to provide social services. This thinking
dictates some management boards of temples even today. As a leader of one
Hindu temple puts it, “We are totally consumed by the one or two large
events a year. We don’t have the time to do social services. It is not that we do
not want to do charitable work.”
Contemporary Scene
The limited but growing social services offered by Hindu temples can be
grouped into three types: institutional services, regular services and ad hoc
services. Institutional services include the three kindergartens (as run by the
Hindu Endowments Board (HEB), Dharma Muneeswaran Temple and the
Ramakrishna Mission), before and after School Care (run by the Sri
Muneeswaran temple), and the halfway home for ex-drug addicts (run by
HEB). Regular services include health screening and free clinic; Social
Development Unit for free matchmaking services (SDU); food rations
programme, bursaries and legal counselling. Ad hoc services include youth
talks and seminars; career talks and seva at homes for the aged (Sri
Mariamman Temple).
While services are growing, those interviewed felt that Hindu temples are
capable of doing more, and pointed out that at present not all temples are
providing social services. Our survey of twenty-four Hindu temples (see
Appendix 20.1) showed that only six of them are engaged in social services.
When several of the temples were contacted, they said that they were planning
to undertake social services. This new trend is a result of a number of factors.
First is the pressure from more informed and educated devotees. These
devotees are not satisfied with only rituals and prayers. They are well aware of
seva as the route to attaining a higher spiritual plane, and look upon the
temples to facilitate their voluntary work.
Second, there is greater awareness of the role of religion as a coalescing
force in the larger society. All Hindu temples for instance, are part of the
Inter-Racial Confidence Circles (IRCCs) formed by the government for the
purpose of fostering inter-racial and inter-religious harmony. Through this,
there is greater appreciation of the need for the temples to play a role in the
larger community.
Third is the conversion of Hindus to other religions. It was expressed by
some interviewees that these conversions were a result of the fact that temples
are not able to satisfy the spiritual needs of Hindus, especially the youths.
494

They also suggested that seva can be a magnet for the youth who may not
identify with the rituals and rites conducted in the temples.
Fourth, there is pressure from the examples set by other religious bodies
such as the Christian and Buddhist missions that are active in social services.
Fifth, there is a need to satisfy the authorities that the land provided for
temples as religious sites is used optimally to meet the needs of the community.
Temples are encouraged to focus on the social, educational and welfare needs
of the community to reflect a certain notion of what a “real and useful”
temple should be like (Sinha 2003, p. 486). From the point of view of the
authorities, when temples act exclusively as “places of worship”, they become
irrelevant to contemporary conditions and to the multi-faceted needs of
Hindus in Singapore (ibid.).
Sixth, there is pressure within Hinduism from neo-spiritual movements
and more enlightened temples. New religious and spiritual movements have
blossomed in Asia (and elsewhere) over the past century and particularly in
recent decades, can be seen to meet a variety of needs. They address social
change and cultural alienation by providing a sense of meaning and local
belonging (Kent 2005, p. 2) and reinforce community and morality in the
face of socially disintegrative forces (Shamsul 1994), and at times even re-
asserting ethnic and other forms of identity. Ancient traditions that appear to
be losing relevance are often updated and strengthened through these
movements (Reader 1996). Many of these neo-spiritual movements are engaged
actively in social services, such as the food-aid service and free clinic run by
the Sathya Sai Baba Society.
Finally, there is persuasion from community leaders who are continually
exhorting temples to move into social services:
Hindu temples should also be opened up for social work. Hindu temples
ought to follow the example of other religious groups and do more for
social work. Traditionally temples are seen only as places of worship. In
India, the social support system is outside the temple. It is regarded
mainly as a place of worship. But the scene ought to change in Singapore.
(1)They can run programmes to help dysfunctional families, the needy
and drug abusers. (2) Open these programmes to other races as the
whole idea of community work is to help the needy and (3) Follow the
example of the Hindu Endowments Board, which runs four Hindu
temples and kindergartens
— MP for Sembawang GRC (K. Shanmugam)

Straits Times, 23 April 1996
495

The combined effect of these factors is gradually bringing about changes

in the way temples approach the concept of social services. Temples’
managements are coming to realize that seva is a core area of concern for a
temple. The changes that have come about in the temples can be best seen
through the case study of the Sri Mariamman Temple.
Case Study: Sri Mariamman Temple

The Sri Mariamman Temple is the first Hindu temple in Singapore, founded
in 1819 and is devoted to the Goddess Mariamman. It has been selected for
the study as it is a pace-setter in the successful deliverance of social services.
It has had significant impact on the lives of Singapore Hindus ever since the
early colonial days. It was the abode for new immigrants till the time they
found a job or new accommodation. Most importantly it was a focal point
for community activities; it acted as a mediator when disputes arose, and also
acted as the Registry of Marriages for Hindus.
The Sri Mariamman Temple’s deep rooted tradition of serving the
community has continued up to today. Some of its comprehensive types of
social services include the following:
(1) Medical Services

A free Medical Counselling Service (MCS) for the needy is initiated in June
1987. A panel of medical doctors and nurses are at hand to provide free
medical check-ups and where necessary make referrals. The service is offered
to all, regardless of race or religion. Free dental and medical screenings were
also extended to students of the Saraswathy Kindergarten. As from 1992, this
service additionally provided parents with counselling and comprehensive
check-ups for students with health problems and referrals. However, the
service was ceased in 2002 due to lack of interest and diminishing support
shown by parents.
The MCS has coordinated and conducted several health programmes,
public medical forums, general health screening and counselling sessions.
These projects’ objectives are to focus on health and medical issues affecting
the Indian community. In meeting these objectives, the MCS works closely
with government and private organizations such as the Singapore Heart
Foundation, National Heart Centre, Breast Cancer Foundation, Singapore
Cancer Society, Health Promotion Board, Institute of Health, Singapore
National Stroke Association, National Kidney Foundation, the Diabetic
Society of Singapore, National Healthcare Group, SingHealth Group as well
as grassroots clubs, community centres and schools. Currently, the MCS
496

volunteers comprise 28 doctors, 45 nurses and 10 others. Most of their

activities are funded by HEB, though the respective organizing temples will
fund the logistic needs of major religious events.
One example of the MCS’ health programmes is the Health Fair.
Organized in conjunction with the Tamil New Year, the annual Health Fair
started as a bi-monthly event in 1988. Due to overwhelming response, it
became an annual event from 1994 onwards, with themes often suggested by
the World Health Organization or those focused on prevalent health and
medical issues affecting the Indian community at large. Another example is
the Diabetic Support Group for the Tamil speaking, launched in March 2002
in collaboration with the Diabetic Society of Singapore. Bi-monthly sessions
are held at Sri Mariamman Temple, with numbers increasing from an original
sixteen to the current forty-five. Paediatricians, dieticians, pharmacologists
and nurse practitioners involve patients in controlling the disease process as
well as in educating them.
(2) Charity Drives

The SMT Uthavum Karangal (SMTUK) formed in October 2001 by some
women volunteers aim to initiate and coordinate charity drives to help the
less fortunate. The SMTUK had since organized and completed seven such
drives. In the last four drives, ration items collected were sent to the
Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA) which in turn helped
to distribute the rations to the needy families. In March 2004, with the
support and encouragement of the temple’s management, the food rations
were collected and distributed personally by members of SMTUK to
about 130 families within the temple premises. Details of recipients were
furnished by SINDA, Delta family Centre and Sri Ruthra Kaliamman
Sathya Sai Centre for Educare. Future plans include increasing the number
of drives from half yearly to quarterly.
(3) Programmes for the Elderly Poor

The temple has adopted the Sun Love Home for the disabled and elderly
destitute in 1999. Members of the Sanctum Group, one of the volunteer
groups of the Mariamman Temple visit the Sun Love Home regularly, serving
food for 240 residents and entertaining them. Food is catered from authorized
caterers for the home’s residents, while food rations are also distributed.
Members also take turns to visit the residents occasionally when help is
required. Other than such community services, the Sanctum Group also
organizes its own Family Day and outings for family members. In 2005, a
Chinese New Year Reunion Dinner was organized for residents of two welfare
497

homes. The main objective of the dinner is to promote goodwill and inter-
religious harmony.
The Mariamman Temple is a fine example of how successive enlightened
temple management committees have focused on social services and are
making a difference. No doubt the financial strength of the Mariamman
Temple and the support of its parent body, the Hindu Endowments Board,
is a key factor in ensuring the growth and sustained involvement in social
services. However, underlying all its efforts in social services is the conviction
of the temple’s management that one of temple’s core functions is to
undertake seva.
CONCLUSION
The era of temple management committees focusing only on running the
temples is long past. The new social landscape demands that Hindu temples
engage more actively in social services. More temples will have to follow the
path of Mariamman Temple and several other temples which have struck a
balance between running a temple and engaging in social services. However,
amidst the increasing calls for Hindu temples to be more involved in social
work, it is important to bear in mind the key factors that may prevent
temples from venturing into social services: finance, volunteers and expertise.
Smaller temples especially have limited resources. Many temples also do not
have access to volunteers or have the know-how to plan and execute social
services. There is also an urgent need to look at how to facilitate their
involvement of temples into social services. Here, more dialogue is needed
between temples to understand, help one another and even to collaborate
in joint social service activities. The time has also come for the organizing
of another Hindu religious conference akin to the 1969 religious seminar,
tapping on similar enthusiasm and fervour to reflect and refocus on the role
of Hindu temples.
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APPENDIX 20.1
SURVEY ON SERVICES PROVIDED BY HINDU TEMPLES
No. of temples
Services offered by temples Remarks (if any)
offering services
Archana — banana & coconut 23
Prasadam prayers 23
Offering of ornamental prayers 23 Offering of gold/silver items
Mudikanikkai (offering of 2 Only on occasions, e.g.
one’s hair) Thaipusam
Sahasarranama Archana 23
Prayers for the Navagrahas 14 Prayers offered to the deities
of the nine planets
Mudikayiru 23 Wrist thread ceremony
Prayers for new vehicles 23
Kattu Thaali 23 Simple wedding (with the
Registry of Marriages Services 4 marriage pendant tying rite)
4 temples of HEB are
currently doing so. The other
temples solemnise weddings
on request.
30th day prayers for new born 23
Kulanthai Thatham 23 Child adoption
Namakaranam 4 4 temples of HEB are
currently doing so. The other
temples perform on request.
Annaprasanam (first feed 4 4 temples of HEB are
for child) currently doing. The other
temples perform on request.
Ear piercing (rental of temple 23
facilities/hall)
Hall for weddings 8
Outdoor Catering (sweets and 21
savory items)
Outdoor food catering 22
Sale of flowers 6
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No. of temples
Services offered by temples Remarks (if any)
offering services
Sale of milk 6 On special occasions, other
temples also sell milk.
Consultation of priest for 23
auspicious timings
Astrology 23
No. of temples
Outdoor services of priests Remarks (if any)
offering services
Wedding 22
Engagement 22
House warming 22 Transport to be provided
House “cleansing” 22 by clients needing
Prayers for the deceased 3 the service
3rd day ash collection 2
16th day prayers at home 22
Outdoor services of
temple musicians
Wedding 22 Transport to be provided
Engagement 22 by clients needing
House warming 22 the service
Outdoor services
Thavil (Drum class) 3
Natheswaram 2
Vocal 1
Vocal (by external party ) 2
Music (by external party) 5
Devaram 7
Sloka Class 1
Bhakthi classes (under HEB) 8
Bagavath Gita 2
Krishna our guide 1
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Outdoor services
Sathya Sai Educare classes 3
Tamil classes 1
Yoga (by external party) 5
Social Development Unit
activities 1
Mediation 1
Family counselling 1
Legal clinic 2
Youth services 1
Food rations 2
Bursaries for students 2
Visit to old folks’ homes 4
Medical screening 2
Kindergartens (HEB) 2
Before and After School Care 1
Notes
The authors wish to thank the past and current committee members of Sri Mariamman
Temple, the Hindu Centre and Ramakrishna Mission for their enthusiasm and
assistance in all manners possible in the completion of this chapter. The authors also
wish to thank Dr Lai Ah Eng for her invaluable assistance and Mr G. Kalimuthu for
assisting in the compilation of the other services provided by the Hindu temples.
Responsibility for all views expressed in this chapter remains the sole responsibility of
the authors.
1. Census of Population 2000.
2. Among the main resolutions (after going over the summary of the workshop
discussions), passed at the seminar were:
(i) Temples ought to be not merely places of worship but places of social service
to the community as well. This was, however, not a new recommendation
since in the past, temples used to be centres of social and cultural activities of
the community they served apart from being an abode for prayers (Singapore
Hindus Religious and Cultural Seminar, 1971 (Part I: First Seminar. Theme:
Unity in Nation Building, 23, 24 and 25 May 1969, p. 14).
(ii) A mutual understanding of what “social service” meant was to be adopted:
(i) as providing facilities for religious education of children such as organizing
religious classes, religious libraries, conducting discourses on religion, etc.;
(ii) catering for youth participation in religious and social activities; (iii)
donation of blood to the blood bank; (iv) catering to the needs of the
community living in and around the vicinity of the temple; and (v) assistance
501

to the poor and needy. The aim was to merge with organizations that have
facilities to carry out social services.
(iii) It was acknowledged that even though smaller temples were not in a position
to carry out the above recommendations owing to financial limitations, they
could focus on recruiting volunteers to move at least some projects (Singapore
Hindus Religious and Cultural Seminar, 1971 (Part II: Second Seminar.
Theme: Religion and Community Service, 27 and 28 June 1970, pp. 95–99).
3. Ibid., p. 15.
4. Bhagavad-Gita, 6: 32. (Translated by Eknath Eswaran).
5. The concept of seva had been the recipient of much academic discussions.
Juergensmeyer and McMahon (1988) document seva as a concept originating
from a development in Hinduism, known as dana (that is, the transfer of
property according to sastric or classical text rites so as to reach a fit recipient).
This assumed shape through the practice of giving time and menial tasks to the
maintenance of temple deities. This activity known as seva was the expression of
bhakti (devotional love) and was essentially an important form of religious
expression during the medieval period. Gifts to gods (the main recipients), was
the main transaction of acts of love. As Bhakti Hinduism gradually took shape
and expressed itself in the public space, a wholly new form of experiencing
devotional love came into emergence. Acts of kindness and the generosity
extended to other selves counted as seva to the guru or deity. This concept of seva
is denoted to have accumulated into karmic merit. Seva soon became the
predominant form of worship in spiritual movements, in modern India. Apart
from being directed towards menial duties to the guru, it evolved into large-scale
social service projects undertaken to benefit society as a whole. These members
who provide their time and finance to honourable causes, became known as
sevadals (providers of service).
6. See A. Mani, “Indians in Singapore Society”, in Indian Communities in Southeast
Asia, edited by K. S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 788–809 (Singapore: ISEAS and
Times Academic Press, 1993). According to Mani, after 1920, Singapore was
developed as a British military base because of its strategic position. The British,
in anticipation of further Japanese military expansion, developed the northern
part of the island as a naval base, and built a military base in Sembawang and an
airbase in Changi. Civilian workers were needed for the construction and
maintenance of such bases and this led to an inflow of people into the area.
Here, the workers moved to the villages near their place of work. Hence many
Indians came to live in Chong Pang, Jalan Kayu, Nee Soon, and Yew Tee villages
near the military establishments in 1962. The ratio of Indian to Chinese
population in these areas was higher than that of the total population.
From the early 1960s and especially after 1968, when Singapore was faced
with tremendous political, social and economic changes, the settlement pattern
of the Singapore Indians was slightly altered. With more youths coming of
marriageable age and with increasing economic opportunities, new areas were
502

sought after. Here, the element of ethnicity was replaced by the ability to pay for
the housing. The Housing and Development Board estates became the new
areas of settlement. However, more Indians have tended to buy apartments in
estates nearest their original homes. Thus Ang Mo Kio, Toa Payoh, Queenstown,
Macpherson, and Woodlands became focal points for Indian families to settle in
the 1960s and 1970s.
7. There are no records on how many temples/religious shrines were merged,
resettled or “closed down”. Sinha (2003) writes that most of the “shack temples”
never became an issue until the 1960s and 1970s when they started coming in
the way of urban developmental projects. Most of the sites (of all religious
traditions) remained outside the purview of administrative and political concerns
and were in fact almost invisible (Ibid., p. 462). The continued existence of these
sites and practices has been crucial for enabling a particular, animistic form of
religiosity in the island (Wee 1989).
8. See Cheng (1980), Recent Trends in Female Labour Force Participation in Singapore.
The female labour force participation among Indian women increased from 6.1
per cent in 1966 to 28.8 per cent in 1978.
References
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Mountain Centre of Meditation, 1985.
Beckford, James A. Religion and Advanced Industrial Society. London: Unwin Hyman,
1989.
Cheng, Siok Hwa. “Recent Trends in Female Labour Force Participation in Singapore”.
Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 8, nos. 1–2 (1980): 31–32.
Dharmarathnam. “Charity the Most Urgent Need”. In The Hindu Centre: Singapore:
1st Asia-Pacific Hindu Conference, 1–3 April 1988, pp. 56–57. Singapore: The
Hindu Centre, 1988.
Greely, Andrew M. Unsecular Man: The Persistence of Religion. Delta Book, 1982.
Kent, Alexandra. Divinity and Diversity: A Hindu Revitalization Movement in Malaysia.
Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2005.
Leow, Bee Geok. Census of Population 2000. Demographic Characteristics. Singapore:
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Juergensmeyer, Mark and Darrin M. McMahon. “Hindu Philanthropy and Civil
Society”. In Philanthropy in the World’s Traditions, edited by Warren F. Ilchman,
Stanley N. Katz and Edward L. Queen II, pp. 263–78. Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 1998.
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Reader, Ian. A Poisonous Cocktail? Aum Shinrikyo’s Path to Violence. Copenhagen:
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Books, 1996.
Shamsul, Amri Baharuddin. “Religion and Ethnic Politics in Malaysia: The Significance
of the Islamic Resurgence Phenomenon.” In Asian Visions of Authority: Religion
and the Modern States of East and Southeast Asia, edited by C. F. Keyes, Laurel
Kendall and Helen Hardacre, pp. 99–116. Honolulu: University of Hawaii
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Delivering Welfare Services 505
21
DELIVERING WELFARE SERVICES

IN SINGAPORE
A Strategic Partnership between
Buddhism and the State1
INTRODUCTION
The Buddhist temple is now considered an important provider of welfare
services. The cultural politics of religion is such that while the temple sees its
welfare roles as strictly belonging to the moral dictum of its teachings, the
state sees the temple as a legitimate space where the group of temple-goers can
be convinced to take on welfare roles. Through a series of Land Law and
planning policies, the state has indirectly transformed the role of the temple
into an important welfare provider. In this sense, a religious space is partially
turned into a secular space for the less privileged groups of people within
Singapore society. The temple can thus been seen as a champion of the
underclass, assuming moral authority over the citizenry albeit under the
directive of the Singapore state.
This chapter explores the relationship between Buddhism and state in
the delivery of welfare services in contemporary Singapore. It examines the
intersection between the Singapore state’s ideology and Buddhist ideology to
produce a philanthropic Buddhist landscape that encourages Buddhist
organizations and individuals to become actively involved in charity works.
505
505

In particular, they undertake to provide social and welfare services to the

socially disadvantaged groups.
The development of the temple as a provider of welfare coincides with
the varying strategies implemented by the Chinese community to cope with
economic and social changes within Singapore society. The strategies taken
by both the temple and the Sangha (Buddhist order of monks and nuns) have
therefore to be seen within this wider context.
The relationship between religion and charity has always been an intimate
one. The Buddhist Sangha has, since its formation, taken on the role of a
provider of charity and welfare for the less fortunate public. Much of its work
in this area, because of its small scale, has generally gone unnoticed and
unacknowledged by the general public, except for those who have been at the
recipient end. In recent years, the Sangha and temples have formalized their
work on charity works, and their work in this area is now increasingly
recognized by the general public and the state.
The state has consciously encouraged religious institutions to play active
roles in the provision of welfare facilities. The Singapore government does not
subscribe to the theory of a welfare state; only in dire situations would it assist
those in hardship. The result is that only those in abject poverty are given
welfare handouts of money. As part of the state ideology of self-reliance, the
government channels its resources to education, training, housing, public
works and other ends which are social investments and of long-term benefit
to individuals and the community.
In the 1980s, this ideology of self-reliance was intensified as the state
encouraged institutions, groups and individuals to assist the less privileged
groups. The roles of community organizations in charity and welfare work
have been enshrined in the White Paper titled, “Shared Values”, which
states that:
We are seeking a balance between the community and the individual,

not promoting one to the exclusion of the other … The need for the
community to support the individual, and especially show compassion
to the less fortunate, surfaced repeatedly in the discussions on Shared
Values.
One way Singaporeans can put society above self and show concern for
others is by participating personally in this effort. Many Singaporeans
volunteer to do community work. Many more contribute to community
and welfare programmes. Such community efforts not only help in a
practical way to solve the problems of the poor, but also strengthen the
506

sense of togetherness, cohesion, and self-reliance of the society. (Shared

Values 1991, p. 7)
The roles to be played by the communities were further highlighted:
The Chinese clan associations are good example of community support.

In the colonial period, they played a large role helping new arrivals to
establish themselves, providing education for the children, looking after
the sick, and even burying dead members who had no families here. It
was not as though the individual members had any automatic rights to
welfare, but the clan, and particularly those members who had done
well, felt a strong social responsibility to help their brethren.
The Malays too have a similar tradition of “gotong royong”, or mutual

help. This is the way the community undertakes projects for the general
good, or helps out particular individuals who are in need of support.
Even today, many Malays still practise this “kampung spirit” in the
housing estates, by forming welfare committees or Muslim benevolent
organizations.
The Indians, like the Chinese, are organized in sub-ethnic groups: the
Tamils Representative Council, the Singapore Ceylon Tamils’ Association,
the Singapore Kerala Association (for Malayalees), and the Singapore
Khalsa Association (for Sikhs). More recently, the Singapore Indian
Development Association (SINDA) has been formed to provide
comprehensive social services to all Indian groups.
Such community support for individuals will keep Singapore a humane

society. At the same time, it helps us avoid the dependent mentality and
severe social problems of a welfare state as experienced in many developed
countries (Shared Values: 7).
The vision outlined by the then Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, was to
develop a more compassionate society under the directive of the Ministry of
Community Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS) together with civic,
ethnic, voluntary and community organizations.
For religious organizations in Singapore, the challenge is to find a niche
where they can justify their existence in a modern and competitive society. To
a certain extent, the finding of a new niche is necessary, as new generations
of Singaporeans are presently questioning the value of religion in modern
Singapore society. Within the Chinese community, there is a high level of
dissatisfaction and scepticism of Chinese religious syncretism. This has
507

prompted the Buddhist temples and Sangha to search for new roles to
legitimize their existence. This, together with the encouragement of the state,
has resulted in the formalization of the Buddhist religious institution as a
provider of welfare and charity.
THE TEMPLE AS A WELFARE SPACE

Religious institutions have traditionally been the avenues of charity and
welfare work. It thus comes as no surprise that they have taken on a renewed
interest and expanded the scope of their welfare activities in response to
modern demands. Within a Weberian framework, this is a “rational adjustment
to the world”. Since its early days, the Buddhist Sangha has been involved in
various welfare projects. It is possible to divide this involvement into three
phases. Phase One stretched from the post-World War II to post-independence
years, coinciding with the economic and social restructuring of the Singapore
nation-state. Phase Two stretched from the early 1970s to the 1980s, when
rapid industrialization and development took place. Phase Three started from
the 1990s as Singapore becomes one of the newly industrialized nations.
During Phase One, it was not uncommon for the temple to provide food
and sometimes temporary living space for those in need. This was particularly
so if the temple became separated from clan associations and functioned as an
independent entity. Members of the Sangha, especially the monks, also
provided some form of counselling to those in need of a sympathetic ear. This
was especially important in an immigrant society where there was an absence
of facilities for this. In this, the Sangha, as a neutral party, served an important
role. To a certain degree, the temple and the Sangha can be seen as the
predecessor of the modern-day Chinese welfare system in Singapore.
The Chinese temple also served as a kind of “tea house” where the poor,
the destitute and the social misfits could be assured of some kind of material
support. The temple rarely turned away anyone who needed a bowl of rice or
a cup of tea. Right up to the 1970s, there was a sizeable number of beggars
with no kin, home or means of meeting their basic needs as they were too old
to work. They often relied on temples for food and sometimes for shelter as
well. With economic restructuring and strong state discouragement of begging,
the physically fit beggars were forced into productive employment, while the
elderly and handicapped were sent to welfare homes. Today there is virtually
no begging in the streets in Singapore, although there is a small number of
beggars and a handful of physically disabled, all elderly men and women in
their sixties and seventies, who station themselves in several big temples. On
religious occasions, they line the temple entrances and beg for cash from the
508

devotees. The temples provide them with food, and they use public facilities
for bathing and cleaning and may sleep within the temple premises. Although
several large temples have homes for the elderly, these beggars do not fulfil the
criteria set by the government and cannot be admitted to the homes. Having
no other alternative homes and not being able to sleep in the streets, the
temples have allowed them to “live” within their compounds. If a beggar dies,
the temple performs the death rites.
Apart from this, the temple and Sangha also provide food and drink for
the general public. During the early years, when poverty was the major
problem, there were many instances when workers and pedestrians could not
afford drink or food during their course of travel from one part of town to the
next. It was not an uncommon sight for temples to open their doors and
provide refreshments to these needy people. Women especially benefited
from this gesture, as virtuous women continued to be regarded as those who
did not “expose” themselves in public places, thus psychologically preventing
them from entering coffee shops on their own. Visiting a temple for worship
and accepting some refreshment there, however, was different. Women would
often be seen in temples in twos or threes. Apart from worship, they also
engaged in social interaction among themselves, chatting and exchanging
news. This takes place even today, as the temple continues to be seen as a
gathering ground for social interaction among women, and as it continues to
be an accepted norm that they accept offers of drink or light refreshment
from the temple.
During the early years, temples also set up tea stands outside the temple
gates and provided tea for passers-by who needed a drink. Often, a big pot of
Chinese tea and several teacups would be placed on the tea stand. There
would also be a basin of water to rinse cups. Since the 1980s, this facility has
been discontinued. Today, people no longer use this facility for a number of
reasons. The improved economic environment and the subsequent rise in
living standards mean that people can afford to buy their own drinks.
Furthermore, the rise of the coffee shop culture means that more men
and also women patronize coffee shops for social interaction. To a certain
extent, the coffee shop has replaced the temple as a place of social
interaction, especially for men. While women increasingly patronize coffee
shops, the temple continues to be an important place for them, especially
the older women.
The temple also provides relief aid in emergency situations. This was
especially so during the immediate post-independence years. From 1950s to
early 1970s, the temples and the Sangha were involved in emergency work,
providing funds, food, clothing and shelter to victims of natural disasters,
509

especially floods and fires. Prior to the construction of a comprehensive

drainage system in the 1970s, flooding was a frequent occurrence especially
during the monsoon season. Many families, in both rural and urban areas
were affected. Fire was the other major hazard. As late as the 1960s, residential
buildings, especially those in rural villages, were built primarily of wood and
palm leaves. It was not uncommon that a whole village burned to the ground
as a result of fire. In the urban centres, badly connected electrical circuits of
old pre-war shophouses were the main cause of fire, and it was a frequent
sight that rows of shophouses were set ablaze because of these faulty
connections. Flood and fire victims needed relief aid to help them through
their difficult moments. While the state provided some kinds of emergency
relief for them, it was insufficient. Much relief was left to private organizations.
Here, the temple played its role by rounding up its supporters and helping
these victims. The temple and the Sangha rarely offered cash, which was often
given by the state or large charitable institutions. Instead, they coordinated
the devotees of the temple and prepared communal meals for the victims.
Sometimes its devotees would help collect used clothing and food items from
the public and distribute them to the victims. Likewise, temples were also
used as temporary shelters, along with schools and community centres.
The temple and the Sangha have shown themselves to be true to the
Buddhist notion of compassion through their ready assistance in relief work.
The monks regard one of their primary responsibilities to be assisting others.
Their Bodhisattva ideal of compassion and willingness to help others is
expressed in various ways: “it is only natural that we help in whatever small
ways we can”; “we exist for such purposes”; “we cannot isolate ourselves from
the rest of the community”; “it was never the Mahayana Buddhist tradition
to only shut ourselves away from the community and xiu-xin” ( ྭྒྷ ),
literally spiritual cultivation, and “how can we xiu-xin at ease when we know
that there are so many who are crying out for help?”
The general public also responded positively to these relief efforts. Not
only did Shenists and Buddhists felt that it was right that the Sangha came out
openly to assist the victims, they also felt that public donations were important
as relief funds provided by the state were insufficient. While the temples and the
Sangha were not wealthy, they became rallying points where the public could
place their donations, in cash and kind, and these reached the victims rapidly.
They also felt that it was important that the Chinese community expressed a
united sense of communalism and that the different dialect groups and clan
associations gathered together for a good cause. The temple thus reinforced
Chinese identity and helped them to locate themselves within the wider
community. By bringing the various groups of Chinese together, the temple
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cut across dialect and clan boundaries and allowed the different groups to
interact with one another. It enabled the Chinese to go beyond their private
social networks and engage in wider social relationships and causes.
The Temple as a Benevolence Hall (shan-tang)

Another important provision of the Buddhist temple and its Sangha members
in the early years was the establishment of the shan-tang ( ഃบ ), literally
benevolence hall. When the early Chinese migrants arrived, they also brought
along their understanding of the Chinese medical and health system, of
illnesses and diseases, and their knowledge of herbal medicines and cures,
heat therapy and acupuncture. The Chinese have continued to depend
greatly on this knowledge in their treatment of a wide range of new tropical
illnesses and diseases.
The benevolence hall functioned as a clinic where the Chinese physicians
treated and dispensed herbal medicine. Some Sangha members were also
trained as physicians. The benevolence hall is known as shan-tang because its
aim is charity. Patients were treated by a trained physician who could be a
Buddhist monk, a Taoist priest or a lay person. In temples where the monks
were qualified physicians, treatment was undertaken by them. Otherwise, a
trained Taoist priest or a lay person would be invited to treat patients on a
voluntary basis. In this case, they received no payment but it was the accepted
norm that patients gave small donations to the physician, often in the form
of a red packet containing a small sum of money. During the early years,
many patients were extremely poor and the amount they contributed was
only a few cents. This contribution to the physician was separate from their
contribution to the temple which was payment for incense for the gods, and
was a gesture of appreciation and gratitude shown by grateful patients. While
the monetary economy was beginning to take root within the immigrant
community, there were also many social actions that did not demand payment
in direct monetary form. Money was considered an important medium for
exchanges of goods and services but it was culturally incorrect to offer money
as appreciation for virtuous acts. Virtuous acts had to be repaid with “gratitude
and feelings from the heart”. However, money was indirectly offered through
the patients’ red packets. After consultation, the physician would write out a
herbal remedy for the illness and the patients would then buy the remedy
from a herbal shop. During the early years, when the shan-tang within the
temple was also a herbal shop with a wide range of herbs, patients usually
purchased the herbs there. At present, most herbal remedies have to be
purchased from a traditional herbal shop (yao-cai-dian ဴҏ‫)׏‬.
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The shan-tang fulfilled its functions during the earlier years when the
Chinese community was undergoing tremendous social and economic
transformations. But it has now become an extinct institution. Some have
disappeared along with the smaller temples that were victims of the urban
renewal or development programmes of the 1970s. Others have shut down
because of dwindling demand and competition from other forms of medical
institutions and services. As a benevolence hall, its role was limited primarily
to the poor, but as Singapore society has progressed and individual Chinese
have experienced a rise in living standards, there has been less need to rely on
welfare. Most people are now able to pay for medical services.
Buddhist Free Clinics

One significant development is the metamorphosis of the benevolence hall
into the modern Buddhist free clinic which continues to treat patients
using traditional Chinese medicine. These clinics, with their bureaucratic
organization, employ updated technological knowledge, use modern
equipment and have expanded services. They now provide alternative
healthcare treatment to Singaporeans. For the future, the Sangha desires to
establish a hospital based on the Chinese medical system of healthcare and
treatment, which uses natural cures and medicines, in accordance with
present global trends towards alternative medicine, herbal medicine,
acupuncture, naturopathy and homeopathy. In as early as the 1960s there
were already plans to establish free clinics to provide medical treatment
according to the Chinese medical system. One monk, Venerable Siong
Khye who was trained in Chinese medicine, felt a need to provide such
services to certain sectors of the Chinese population, especially the elderly
who, in the 1950s and 1960s, had very little knowledge of Western medicine
and did not trust pills. They did not know what pills were, and many felt
that after taking them, their illnesses worsened, so they continued to rely on
herbal remedies, and sometimes took both Western pills and herbal remedies
at the same time.
The first Buddhist free clinic was established in 1969 as an extension of
the shan-tang concept, within one of the earliest Chinese temples, the Pu Toh
See Temple, which was located amidst a large Chinese population. A new
wing was constructed to house the clinic, the primary reason being to cut on
costs. Another consideration was to locate the clinic in a densely populated
Chinese district to facilitate people going to the clinic.
The shift from shan-tang to free clinic indicates a move from an informal
to a formal structure as dictated by the bureaucratic requirement set down in
legislation and the expanding needs of the population. As a non-profit
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charitable institution, the free clinic has to formally register with the Registrar
of Companies. As such, it is required to have a constitution spelling out its
objectives and its trusteeship, executive council and administrative structure.
Its primary objective is to “work for the welfare of the poor and sick. Patients,
irrespective of sex, race and creed, who are in strained financial conditions,
may be given Chinese medicine and treatment free of charge”. In line with
Buddhist morality, the clinics do “not treat patients with venereal or infectious
diseases or patients injured or wounded because of fighting” (Buddhist
Federation Free Clinic Constitution).
During the early days, patients were given free treatment, and the needy
were given free medicine as well. Today, patients are charged a nominal
registration fee of $1 with fee waivers for those who request for it. Likewise,
a nominal charge is levied for the medicine with a waiver upon request. Over
the years, the number of patients using this clinic has increased tremendously
from a mere 2,510 in 1969 to over 200,000 in 1974 and to over 400,000
patients in 1982. This increase has been viewed as a positive indication of the
need to provide alternative medical care to the general population. The high
demand has prompted the Singapore Buddhist Free Clinics to open up more
branches. Today, the Singapore Buddhist Free Clinic has six branches (five
clinics and one rehabilitation centre) under its central management. Since its
formation till today (from November 1965 till December 2005), it has
provided over fifteen million patients with acupuncture treatment as well as
traditional Chinese medicine (<http:www.sbfc.org.sg>).
Structurally, the Singapore Buddhist Clinic consists of its management
board, the President, who is a monk, and a team of lay people who assist him
to look after the daily operation of the Singapore Buddhist Free Clinic. They
include his deputy, secretary, treasurer, medical superintendent and several
committee members. Two auditors audit the finances of the Free Clinic. The
monk heads the presidency because he is the paters familias and his advice is
sought on most decisions. In reality, it is the lay members who wield most
power and take charge of the daily operation and management. As a formal
non-profit institution, it is accountable to the state and its members for its
operations and activities. Both the state and its members can voice their
satisfaction or discontent through various channels open to them. The state,
through its Registrar of Companies and the Ministry of Culture and
Communications, can prevent “undesirable activities” from taking place within
the clinics by giving warning if it sees the clinic straying from its objectives.
As a last resort, it can refuse the clinic a licence to operate. The lay community
can also cast a vote of no confidence on the executive and branch committees
if they view the latter as not performing their tasks. Likewise, they can also
register their dissatisfaction by withdrawing their financial support.
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Because of the need for public accountability, the state has systematically
encouraged the formalization of institutional structures among voluntary,
benevolent, welfare and religious institutions. All Buddhist temples and the
Sangha Council are now public institutions. Buddhist monks and nuns are
often consulted for religious and moral matters. They can also practise as
physicians if they are trained and qualified. However, today, they are not
involved in temple administration, in contrast to the early years when monks
were decisive in the management of the shan-tang. This check on the influence,
strength and power of the Sangha is deliberate, as the state regards religion a
sensitive area and is cautious about its roles and activities. In encouraging
religious institutions to provide welfare facilities and charity to the less
privileged, the state is careful to ensure that the powers of the religious
institutions are confined within a stipulated boundary.
At the same time, the state provides incentives in its encouragement of
private and religious institutions to contribute to charity and welfare. The
Charities Act of 1982 provides fiscal privileges. An institution registered as
a charitable organization under the Societies Act (cao 262) before 1 January
1983 is entitled to tax exemption, including property tax as well as
government subsidy.
Financially, the clinics, as non-profit charities, operate on private funds
generated mostly from public donations, and individual temples, monks and
nuns often appeal to their adherents for donations. A handful of wealthy
philanthropists are often counted to give large donations to worthy causes.
However, small sums ($5 to $200) usually form a constant pool of ready
resources for operating and maintaining these clinics. Most temples organize
an annual drive for donations for the clinics. Lay people also help to raise
funds through personal ties and social networks with friends, colleagues and
employers. Apart from this, the Singapore Buddhist Free Clinic raises funds
from events such as walkathons, anniversary banquets and other celebrations.
They also issue charity vouchers and these can be used as presents or
condolences in place of cash or wreath <http://www.sbfc.org.sg>. In 1997,
the Singapore Buddhist Free Clinic became a member of the Health Endowment
Fund under the Ministry of Health, and has since then been entitled to
generous grants from the government to help run its welfare projects.
The clinic’s funds are divided into two categories of use: individuals and
groups can donate to either category. The first is for the purchase of medicine
and medical equipment; the second is for general use. In the early 1970s,
there was a shortage of money and the clinics could barely afford to provide
free medical treatment and medicine. Instead of levying a fee, they appealed
directly to the public for donations to buy medicine. Since then, the division
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of funds into both categories has worked well for the clinics and has ensured
them a constant pool of money.
Philanthropy in Singapore has become a way for wealthy Chinese to gain
social recognition and an elevation in status and it is a common practice for
welfare institutions to acknowledge large contributions by naming rooms and
buildings after the donors. The Buddhist Federation recognizes those who
contribute more than $5,000 annually as life members, while those who
donate over $100 are ordinary members. These two categories of donors have
voting rights. However, the Sangha has fears that vested interests from a few
individuals might tarnish the names of the clinics and the federation, and
that the welfare aspects of the clinics might be subordinated to the economic
interests of large donors. They thus prefer small donors who would not have
a controlling influence.
Provision of Welfare Homes and Services

The provision of welfare homes has become an important function of the
temples. This is particularly so since the 1980s when the state openly
encouraged different religions in Singapore to provide welfare homes for the
destitute and the less privileged. This is in line with the government’s policy
of encouraging “corporate welfarism” in the private sector to provide
accommodation to less privileged persons for a fee paid by their families
(Chua 1982, pp. 326–28). The immediate family is also taken to task for not
looking after aged parents, culminating with the introduction of the
Maintenance of the Elderly Parents Act, which makes it obligatory for
children to look after their elderly parents (Straits Times, 26 August 1991).
Confining its assistance to counselling and encouraging certain activities, the
government’s policy towards helping senior citizens is outlined thus:
Elderly Singaporeans aged 60 years and above will increase from the
present nine percent of the population to 11 percent in 2000, and to 26
percent in 2030. Senior citizens should continue to be an active and
valued part of the community. We will encourage more Senior Citizens’
Activity Centres, Senior Citizens’ Clubs and other family-oriented
programmes to be set up to help senior citizens remain active in the
community.
We will work with community and voluntary welfare organizations to

provide community-based day-care, respite and residential care facilities
for the frail aged. Over the next five years, 11 new homes will be built,
increasing the number of residential places by 50 percent. (Goh Chok
Tong 1992, p. 31).
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The eleven new welfare homes built by the government from 1993–
97 had a capacity to house a total number of 1,500 aged and destitute.
Criteria for admission were stringent and few gained admission. But this
was inadequate. In addition, there are now over forty residential homes
run by voluntary groups. Given the shortage, the government has thus
encouraged temples to build and run welfare homes not only for the aged
but also for disabled children. In an attempt to streamline welfare policies,
some temple-based welfare homes now work in collaboration with the
MCYS, only taking in recommended inmates. These temples are provided
with a subsidy by the state.
Several Chinese Buddhist temples have established welfare homes for the
aged. They include the Tai Pei Old Folks’ Home attached to Tai Pei Temple,
Evergreen Old Folks’ Home, attached to Phor Khar See Temple (the largest
temple in Singapore), and Singapore Buddhist Welfare Services Old Folks’
Home. All three admit elderly men and women on the recommendation of
the MCYS and do not take in any inmates on their own. These welfare homes
conform to the Ministry’s guidelines for voluntary welfare homes. The homes
provide spacious accommodation (four to a room), and are equipped with a
gymnasium and/or a recreation room. A trained nurse is on service on a daily
basis. The homes also organize handicraft sessions to help inmates utilize
their time productively. Religious services are conducted to cater to their
spiritual development and the elderly are encouraged to attend and participate
in prayer services. At the Tai Pei Old Folks’ Home there is an in-house clinic
to take care of general medical needs. For the other two, voluntary medical
practitioners make weekly rounds to check on inmates. Those who are in
need of specialist services are brought to hospital. Likewise, qualified nurses,
doctors, physiotherapists and teachers are recruited to help with the elderly
and disabled children in the homes and centres run by the Metta Welfare
Associations operated by the Golden Pagoda Temple.
Since the 1990s, many Buddhist organizations have formalized their role
as providers of various types of welfare facilities and services to the general
public. Today, there are sixty such Buddhist organizations. Their welfare
facilities and services can be broadly divided into three main types. The first
includes community homes and centres that provide home and care facilities
for the elderly and needy. These consist of homes for the aged; home and
social services for the socially marginalized groups in the community, such as
drop-in centres for recovered and recovering drug addicts; and residential
homes and help services for the sick elderly, the aged and destitute female
elderly and the needy. The second type of facilities and services include the
provision of centres and services in health services and education, such as
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dialysis centres for kidney patients and day activity centres for the intellectually
disabled. Some centres provide counselling, rehabilitation services,
physiotherapy, occupational therapy services and support for patients affected
by an array of illnesses including stroke, arthritis and other diseases, as well as
the chronically ill. They also provide loan of medical equipment for patients
from low-income groups. The third type includes the provision of educational
facilities and services to the general community such as childcare and
studentcare centres in various housing estates as part of Buddhist involvement
in community care.
One of the key characteristics of present Buddhist organizations in their
role as welfare provider is that each one is involved in the provision of a
variety of welfare services. This is in contrast to the earlier Buddhist
organizations which generally only provided one type of welfare service. An
example is the Golden Pagoda Temple which operates the Metta Welfare
Association (MWA). Under the umbrella of the MWA, there are nine affiliated
centres which provide an array of services and facilities. In 1995, it established
the Metta Day Care Activity Centre for the Intellectually Disabled. In 1998,
it established the Metta Day Rehabilitation Centre for the Elderly and a
neighbourhood Yu Neng Metta Student Care Centre One for the South East
District. In 2000, it established the Metta Home for the intellectually disabled
and Metta Hospice Care. In 2001, it further established Metta School for
students with learning disabilities and another neighbourhood Metta Student
Care Centre in the North East district. In 2002, a second Yu Neng Metta
Student Care Centre Two was established.
In 2001, the MWA had 136 staff with an annual expenditure of $4.3
million, funded primarily by government grants, sponsorships and donations
(Metta Welfare Association Annual Report 2001). Apart from this, the
association, in conjunction with the temple, organized fund-raising activities
such as the sale of Chinese New Year cakes, mooncakes and Christmas cakes;
the Metta Charity Walk and Charity Draw; and the I-Charity golf and
charity banquets. A second example is the Foo Hai Ch’an Monastery which,
since 1994, established and operates the Ren Ci Hospital, the first hospital
operated by the Buddhist community in Singapore. The monastery also
established the Foo Hai Buddhist Cultural and Welfare Association which
manages four welfare centres and facilities: the Aspiration Child Care Centre
in Tampines, The Foo Hai Elderly Daycare Centre in Marine Parade, a
childcare and studentcare centre in Bedok North and the Wan Qing Lodge
Day Centre for the Elderly.
What motivates Buddhist organizations to expand their delivery of welfare
services and facilities and becoming all-encompassing in reaching out to the
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socially less privileged and marginalized population is the vision of the

monastic leaders and their interpretation of religious doctrine. The abbot of
the Foo Hai Ch’an Monastery, Venerable Shi Ming Yi put it:
…Buddhism talks about compassion, and compassion should not just
be a theoretical thing but it should be put into practice. So putting it
into practice through doing some social work, I believe, is also a way for
people to get to know Buddhism and to cultivate compassion in us.
A second characteristic of present Buddhist organizations involved in the

welfare sector is their move towards transnational welfare works. In the early
years, some of the wealthier Buddhist organizations would provide financial
assistance to overseas Buddhist organizations and poverty-stricken or natural
disaster-stricken countries on an ad hoc or needs basis. Today, some of these
Buddhist organizations have formalized their welfare roles on a transnational
basis. For example, the Foo Hai Ch’an Monastery has extended its religious
compassion to Sri Lanka. It is in the process of building a welfare home called
the “Village of Compassion” and training Sri Lankans as care and management
people. Venerable Shi Ming Yi has also started Buddhist counselling services
in Hong Kong. Likewise, the abbot of the Golden Pagoda Temple, Venerable
Shi Fazhao has also been actively involved in transnational charity and welfare
works and helped with temple rebuilding in Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia,
China, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
A third characteristic is that many of these welfare homes and facilities
are accessible to people and children from different ethnic and social
background. This is in contrast to the earlier welfare homes that generally
admitted only the Chinese. At the same time, their workers and volunteers
also come from different ethnic backgrounds. For example, in the Metta
Welfare Association, the supervisor of the Metta Hospice Care and a senior
staff nurse of the Metta Home are Muslims. Likewise the principal of the
Metta School is a Christian and the vice principal is a Muslim. This fits neatly
into the government’s push for a multi-religious and multi-cultural framework
for work and social life in Singapore.
A STRATEGIC STATE — RELIGION PARTNERSHIP

While the proliferation of welfare facilities and services organized by the
Buddhist organizations can be attributed to the Buddhist understanding
of compassion, it can also be argued that the actions of the state have
facilitated their formalization and expansion. Through the years, the state
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and religious organizations have developed a strategic partnership in the

delivery of welfare services and facilities to the general public. The
Singapore government has mapped out areas where welfare services and
facilities are required and encouraged the religious institutions to take up
the role as welfare providers. At the same time, it has laid out guidelines
to ensure that homes and facilities set up meet state requirements which
protect the interests of the elderly, the children and the socially
disadvantaged Singaporeans under the organization’s care. For example,
Metta School operates under the Ministry of Education (MOE) Special
Education guidelines, with a proper school management committee and
its curriculum needs to be approved by MOE.
Both human and financial resources are required to establish welfare
homes and facilities. While it is often easy to encourage volunteers to perform
community works, welfare home and services require both full-time work
personnel as well as sizeable financial resources. There are a very small
number of wealthy Buddhist organizations and temples, but most religious
organizations on their own find it hard to have sufficient financial resources
to start up and maintain these services. Given the fact that the state has
actively encouraged these institutions to provide welfare facilities and services,
it has established legislation to provide financial assistance to these organizations
to help them in their welfare work.
Such religious organizations can apply for an annual grant from the
government to help defray the running costs of these homes and centres, with
the amount of grant given varying from institution to institution. One
example is the Metta School for the intellectually disabled where a part of
their funding comes from the MOE and another part from the National
Council of Social Services (NCSS). Likewise, the NCSS provides grants to
many welfare homes run by the religious organizations that are its members.
Membership of the NCSS provides these organizations with legitimacy in the
eyes of the state and facilitates their application for financial grants. At the
same time, it legitimizes their activities in the eyes of the general public. As
such, many of these Buddhist organizations have become affiliated to this
state bureaucracy, facilitating a workable state-religion partnership.
This state-religion partnership has both advantages and disadvantages.
The key advantage is that the strict guidelines laid down by the government
will ensure quality assurance in the delivery of care and prevent mistreatment
and exploitation of the young, elderly and intellectually-disabled people.
This is very important to ease the anxiety of their parents and relatives.
However, one of the drawbacks is that these religious-based welfare centres
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and homes have to observe the tight guidelines laid down by the NSCC or
the relevant government authorities. For example, the religious-based dialysis
centres for kidney patients cannot accept patients above the age of sixty as
it is the guidelines laid down by the National Kidney Foundation (NKF).
As a result, elderly patients are known to have been rejected from such
services and had to incur huge bills for their dialysis treatment in private
clinics or government hospitals.
Apart from grants given to run homes and centres, the government also
leases land at nominal prices to those religious institutions which want to
build welfare homes and service centres; however, religious institutions need
to raise their own funds to cover construction costs and internal furnishings.
Likewise, the government also charges nominal rents in housing estates for
the various centres run by these religious institutions as part of their community
care projects. Depending on the size and scale of each home constructed by
the religious institution, the overall cost can be a hefty sum of over several
million dollars. Fund-raising by these institutions becomes a crucial and
major activity to ensure the fruition of these building projects, which can sap
the limited energies and resources of their organizations and steer their main
attentions away from their welfare activities.
Policy Implications
Several viable recommendations can be made to ensure that the continuation
of the above strategic partnership between the Singapore state and the
religious institutions:
(1) The state’s encouragement and support for the religious institutions in
their efforts to focus and expand the provision of welfare facilities and
services need to be continued. This can be done by providing land for
such purposes free of charge, so as to reduce the financial burden of these
religious institutions, many of which do not have endowments but
depend primarily on donations from their adherents and the public for
such purposes.
(2) These centres should be allowed more autonomy in running the welfare
facilities and services.
(3) There is a need for quality control but this can be achieved through an
independent body and not necessarily through government-related
institutions.
(4) The government can provide financial and other incentives, to encourage
520

these centres to become even more multi-cultural and multi-ethnic in

nature, given that all of them provide services to Singaporeans irrespective
of ethnic background as a matter of principle.
(5) Given the growing transnational approach to the delivery of welfare
services, the government might want to consider matching funds for
such services for their effective delivery. This is particularly so as such
religious organizations also act as goodwill ambassadors that enhance the
image not only of the religious organizations themselves but also Singapore
as a caring and compassionate country in the global setting.
CONCLUSION
By participating in the process of religious modernization, Buddhism has
consciously chosen a welfare niche for itself. In so doing, it establishes social
legitimacy through its compassion for the population. This welfare niche is
also carefully nurtured by the state. Thus, what we have today is a multi-
functional Buddhist temple, with its existence intricately tied to the needs of
the Singapore state and its people, and simultaneously serving as a sacred
space and a welfare space.
It is thus possible to argue that the Singapore state and religious institutions,
each with its own agenda, are able to forge a strategic partnership over the
provision of welfare facilities and services for the benefit of the socially and
economically less-privileged sectors of the Singapore population. Given that
Buddhist institutions are searching for new roles in an increasingly globalized
Singapore and the world, it is likely that Buddhist compassion as articulated
in the provision of welfare facilities and services will take centre stage in years
to come.
Notes
The author wishes to acknowledge partial funding assistance from the Institute of
Policy Studies for the research for this chapter and to her research assistant Ng Pei
Fuen for her assistance. All views expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the
author.
1. The first part of this chapter is reproduced with minor editorial changes from
Chapter 5 of my book, State, Society and Religious Engineering: Towards a
Reformist Buddhism in Singapore, 2003, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press,
pp. 175–88. The author wishes to acknowledge Marshall Cavendish
International for permission to reproduce the relevant section. The second
part consists of new information collected during the period December 2004
to March 2005.
521

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524 Mathew Mathews
22
SAVING THE CITY THROUGH

GOOD WORKS
Christian Involvement in
Social Services
Mathew Mathews
INTRODUCTION
Since the early stages of Christian missionary activity in Singapore, Western
missionaries had already merged the provision of social services with their
evangelistic endeavours, a pattern which they had mastered in several Asian
societies (Chi 2005; Kim 2001). The prominence accorded to social service
provision followed the increasingly popular discourse within Western
theological circles in the late nineteenth century which emphasized that the
missiological enterprise had to first demonstrate the love of Christ through
Christian charity before it broached the preaching of the “wrath of God”
(Magnusson 1977; Ferre 1988).
As ministers from the developed world, Western missionaries were acutely
aware of various gaps in social service provision among the populations that
they sought to serve. This led them to embark on various initiatives. Methodist
and Anglican missionaries who arrived in Singapore recognized the numbers
of orphaned children and the many girls who did not receive an education,
and set up orphanages and boarding schools catering to these disadvantaged
populations (Ow 2005). The lack of healthcare for women and children led
medical doctor Dr Charlotte Ferguson (the wife of the then Anglican bishop)
524
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Saving the City through Good Works 525
to initiate the setting up of the St Andrew’s Mission Hospital in 1913

(St Andrew’s Community Hospital 1998–2005), while the lack of educational
opportunities for handicapped persons led the American Baptist missionary
Alice Shae to set up Christian Outreach to the Handicapped (Christian
Outreach to the Handicapped, 2006). Similarly, theological educators at
Trinity Theological College, recognizing the social upheavals caused by
modernization in the 1960s, initiated the Churches Counselling Centre to
provide counselling help (Yeo 1993). In these efforts the missionaries recognized
that moving the hearts of a people foreign to the Christian gospel required
various “sweeteners”. Thus much of the social service endeavours worked to
“soften hearts” to the Christian faith.
The success of many of these and other social service endeavours were
partly related to the ability of Western missionaries to identify pertinent
needs in the community and to mobilize resources both in terms of finances
and expertise from their international mission agencies in the establishment
and upkeep of these social services. The presence of an ideological stance
promoting Christian involvement in social service and the potential that
mission agencies saw for developing their churches through social service
delivery further motivated such an involvement.
Although the days of Western missionary involvement are over, the
Singaporean Christian community continues to involve itself in social service
delivery in no small way. Its sheer scope of involvement, not representative of
its small share in terms of its population size, certainly merits careful academic
consideration. The focus here is on the Singaporean Christian community
and how it involves itself in social service delivery. The chapter attempts to
explain its prominence and success within the social service landscape of
Singapore, by analysing Christian-related social services, documenting the
extent of Christian involvement in social services and the motivations for
such involvement.
To understand the relative success of these Christian social service agencies
key ideas from the resource mobilization perspective (McCarthy and Zald
1977) are used, which has been applied to explain not only the success of new
religious and other social movements (Bromley and Shupe 1980; Hunt 2002;
McCarty and Wolfson 1996) but also the survival of corporate businesses
(Davis and Thompson 1994; Swaminathan and Wade 2000). This perspective
argues that the success of a movement or organization is attributable to its
ability to mobilise necessary resources from its internal environment. These
resources include mostly finances, manpower and property but also include
ideological resources which are used to mobilize and motivate individuals
(Snow 1986). However these theorists have largely confined their attention to
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526 Mathew Mathews
the strategies that these organizations use to mobilize needed resources and
have not examined how they interact with their social environment (Wuthnow
1988, p. 478). Shupe (1990) using a resource mobilization perspective argues
that how resources are mobilized from the environment is crucial in that
when the methods used conflict with the norms of that environment,
unnecessary tension is created which may have a negative effect on the
movement’s development. Other scholars have broadly looked at social
adaptation and examined how the ability of the movement or organization to
negotiate its external environment relates to organizational success (Harper
and LeBeau 1993; Minkoff 1999).
Based on this paradigm it is argued here that the success of Christian-
related social service agencies is at least partly related to their ability to
mobilize resources from both the tradition and institution of Christianity and
the motivations for such involvement. It is also argued that these Christian-
related social services are able to adapt to the secular and multi-religious
contexts of Singapore but still accomplish their ultimate mission, which
involves the expansion of a Christian presence in the local religious economy.
Methodology
In the absence of any other major study examining Christian involvement in
social services, multiple methods were utilized to collect data for this study
which was conducted in Novermber and December 2006. In order to
understand the prominence of Christian-related social services, a count was
made of the number of such Christian agencies in the local social service
scene, using the listing of Voluntary Welfare Organizations provided by
the National Council of Social Services (NCSS) on its website <http:www.
ncss.org.sg/ncss/social_services/contact_list/vwocontact.pdf> since this
information is the most updated, superseding even the Directory of Social
Services. Only full NCSS members were considered since only those that
provide direct social services are eligible to be included in this category after
a careful inspection by the council.1 However, since no breakdown of religious
affiliation is provided through official sources, each agency was examined
individually and classified according to their religious affiliations if they have
such connections. Prominent clues as to their religious affiliations include
statements pointing to such on their websites or other publicity material,
including listings in the Directory of Social Services where the objectives,
mission and vision statements of the agencies are listed. Agencies which do
not have explicit statements of religious affiliations in either of these sources
526

and are not apparently secular (for example, National Kidney Foundation)
were contacted through telephone. Administrators of these agencies were
asked whether their agency had any links with either religious institutions or
classified itself as being related to a religion.
A survey (see Appendix 22.1) was conducted among a representative
number of social service agencies which had religious affiliation. Parts of the
survey (sections D–F) were modified from a published instrument used to
appraise the religious character of social service organizations in the United
States (Ebaugh et al. 2003). These questions addressed the extent of religious
influence on the operation of the agencies by examining, among other things,
the importance of scriptural teaching, religious leaders and the affiliated
religious organizations to the hiring of key personnel in these agencies and
the way programmes were identified and run. Several other questions included
in the survey provided approximations of the involvement of affiliated religious
organizations in terms of monetary, leadership and volunteer support as well
as the possible motivation for such involvement.
Agencies identified were chosen using a random sampling technique
where every other agency was selected. Protestant Christian-related social
services were over-sampled because they constituted the main part of this
study. The other agencies were included to provide necessary comparisons
where appropriate. Agencies were contacted through e-mail and telephone
and asked for their agreement to participate in the survey. Eighteen centres
which had Christian affiliation completed the surveys. While this constitutes
less than half of the total seventy-four Christian-related agencies, it should
be taken into account that four of these surveys were completed by
directors of agencies which were representing the views of their multiple
centres, so the survey data actually covered the responses of twenty-seven
agencies. The agencies which responded to the survey were also representative
of the different types of social service provision including establishments for
the aged, institutions for the handicapped, family and child services and
halfway houses.
Further data was obtained through interviews with seven executive
directors, three chairpersons of the boards of Christian related social service
agencies, and interviews with clergy in an earlier study on inter-religious
harmony which were conducted between late 2004 and early 2006.2 Finally,
since many of these social service agencies have websites to communicate
their activities to volunteers and beneficiaries and annual reports of their
activities, these resources were carefully perused as they contained valuable
data on the characteristics of the different centres.
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528 Mathew Mathews
INVOLVEMENT OF CHRISTIAN TRADITION AND

INSTITUTION IN CHRISTIAN SOCIAL SERVICE
Out of 188 social service agencies which are full members of the National
Council of Social Services, 76 are best described as Protestant Christian-
related social service. This is either based on their affiliation with Christian
organizations or their expressed identity as a Christian-related organization.
This constituted 41 per cent of the total number of social service agencies in
Singapore, making Protestant Christian-related social service the largest block
in the local social service landscape.3
Out of the 76 Christian-related social services, 48 are directly linked to
a particular denomination or church. For instance the Methodist Welfare
Services, with its many centres such as Tampines Family Service Centre, is
linked to the Methodist Church in Singapore, while Cornerstone Community
Services is the social arm of the independent Cornerstone Community Church.
The smaller number of agencies which are not directly linked to a church or
denomination often described themselves as inter-denominational. Often
they were founded, as in the case of Care Corner, by committed Christians
who were serving in various churches but felt the important need to link
together on a social cause which they identified as a ministry.
The services offered by the different Christian-related social services were
broad and spanned help for families and youth, which had the greatest
concentration of Christian-related social services, halfway houses, eldercare
facilities including hospitals and institutional homes for children and youth,
and programmes for those with disabilities.4
The extent of Christian involvement in these faith-related social service
agencies was operationalized by examining three features: the mobilization
of ideological resources in terms of Christian beliefs and values in the
operation of these social services, the mobilization of spiritual resources,
and the mobilization of material resources represented in manpower,
leadership and finances.
Mobilization of Ideological Resources

Christian-related social services mobilize their religious beliefs and values to
different degrees in directing their operations. This can be observed in the
vision statements used by these agencies. For example, the Methodist Welfare
Services, in describing its vision in its annual report for the year 2004/05,
mentions that:
Our Vision is to be a God-honouring organization in community services.
The statement denotes an attitude of the whole organization that is
528

expressed in its actions that are just and merciful, borne out of a heart
that is humble, compassionate and God-fearing (Methodist Welfare
Services 2006, p. 2).
Similarly the Presbyterian Community Services (PCS), which is the

social arm of the Presbyterian Church in Singapore, describes its vision as
“that we will honour and magnify the name of our Lord through the services
of PCS” (Presbyterian Community Services 2006: Our mission).
These vision statements amplify that the ultimate goals of these faith-
related agencies has to resonate with their theological beliefs of what would
“honour and magnify” God. Oftentimes this required that they provide care
not only for the physical, emotional and mental well-being of the individual,
but also to address the needs of the spirit. This is often described by these
agencies as “holistic care”. The Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA)
provides a good example of such an attempt to provide holistic care. Its
website lists its mission as “developing the body, mind and spirit” pointing to
its emphasis on holism (YMCA 2006: The Y Identity). While catering to a
variety of social and community needs ranging from help for the disabled,
and community provision of education and recreation, it also has a Christian
emphasis committee which looks into promoting its religious activities.
For these Christian-related agencies, the Christian beliefs of the value of
the soul and spirit (the immaterial aspect of the human being) take precedence
and are an important area for care. This at times then influences the helping
process. As an executive director of a church related agency which has various
programmes aimed at the elderly mentioned, “Ultimately many needs are
spiritual in nature. We can’t just try to address other things and leave this out.
We need to address this [the spiritual] too.”
Beyond the emphasis on holism which ultimately meant addressing
spiritual needs, religious beliefs are often mobilized in directing and shaping
the programmes offered by these Christian-related agencies. Based on the
survey results, all the agencies that responded indicated that religious beliefs
have moderate to nearly complete influence in how programmes are run.
Besides this, twelve out of the eighteen agencies remarked that scripture and
religious authorities are of moderate influence in directing programmes. One
clear example of how Christian beliefs are influential in shaping programmes
pertains to how these agencies conduct sex education talks to school audiences.
It is notable that they tend to stress abstinence, which is congruent with
Christian beliefs that emphasize chastity prior to marriage. However, there is
some attempt to remould this to the context of youth culture of schools
where, as one director mentioned,
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530 Mathew Mathews
we have to teach safe sex as well since sometimes the students are too
young to really make good moral choices, or sometimes they are just
overcome by their emotions and too weak, and the least they can do is
to be responsible in practising safe sex.
Nonetheless, it is clear that teaching abstinence is the priority as he was quick

to reiterate the importance of this religious tenet.
In many ways Christian’s beliefs and values are mobilized subtly and
seldom openly in the public presentation of social service provision. While a
Christian-related social service might use religious beliefs to decide what
constitutes inappropriate approaches (for example, teaching safe sex without
discussing abstinence), the overall presentation of their programmes do not
portray a religious character or refer to religious teachings and is similar with
social service provision provided by many secular agencies. However, when a
Christian-related social service is provided in an institutional setting such as
elderly homes, community hospitals, drug rehabilitation centres, and youth
and child hostels, this religious character of the programme is more evident.
Christian Outreach to the Handicapped, which runs a programme for
mentally disabled persons, states openly in its publicity material that its
programmes have a religious component:
We work within the framework of biblical principles for reaching out to

people with disabilities and their family members, and providing for
their needs. (Christian Outreach to the Handicapped 2006: About
COH)
In a FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions) section about its programme, it

provides greater detail about the Biblical principles involved. In a question
querying whether a child has to be a Christian before enrolling in the daycare
programme, the centre replies:
No, you need not be Christians. We take in clients regardless of their

religious backgrounds and beliefs. However, our curriculum contains
Bible principles and teachings, thus you must be willing for your child/
ward to be exposed to our Christian emphasis. One of our fundamental
beliefs is that people with disabilities are precious to God. We teach our
clients that God accepts and loves them as much as other individuals.
Each and every one of us, including people with disabilities, have unique
God-given
a. worth that needs to be recognized and appreciated, and
b. potential that can be identified and developed.
530

But we have this treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellence of the
power may be of God and not of us [2 Cor 4:7, New King James
version] (Christian Outreach to the Handicapped 2006: FAQs).
In this case, Christian beliefs fundamental to its programme are clearly spelt
out. Such open statements of Christian ideology are even more evident in
many of the Christian related drug rehabilitation programmes which mobilize
explicit religious themes. This can be noted in the following statement from
High Point, a Christian-related social service which caters to those who were
previously involved in drug-related problems:
Eating the Fruit of the Land

A foretaste of the great banquet in heaven is experienced by the brothers
of High Point after the Lord did a transforming work in their lives. From
the land of slavery to the land of milk and honey, it is time to eat the
fruit of the land the Lord has given us. “It is for freedom that Christ has
set us free. Stand firm, then, and do not let yourselves be burdened again
by a yoke of slavery”.
[Galatians 5:1]
(High Point Community Services 2006: High Point Drug Ministry).
The mobilization of Christian themes in describing recovery and the new life
is evident in the operation of this and other Christian drug rehabilitation
programmes.
Mobilization of Spiritual Resources

Apart from ideological resources, spiritual resources are also often used to
mobilize Christian-related social services. This is evident in three ways.
First, spiritual resources such as prayer have become important hallmarks
of Christian social service agencies. Based on survey responses, all of the
agencies mentioned that prayer is common at board meetings and staff
devotions. Prayer is also seen as a medium to receive divine direction as to the
course that the agency is to take, at least occasionally, for most agencies.5 Two
executive directors shared how, through prayer, they had received clear
directions from God about areas that their agency was to address. The
importance of prayer to these Christian-related social services stressed that
these agencies hope to mobilize divine strength and direction.
Second, spiritual resources are mobilized in the helping process itself. In
fifteen out of the eighteen surveys, directors acknowledged that prayer with
clients was undertaken at least occasionally with client’s consent. Directors
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532 Mathew Mathews
and board chairpersons who were interviewed mentioned that prayer is

crucial and sometimes important to clients who believed that divine help is
fundamental to the resolution of their crisis. This is particularly the case when
dealing with the elderly and those in need of institutional care.
Counselling and befriending are also often sites where spirituality or
religion6 are engaged. In fact as an executive director of a prominent counselling
centre remarked, “Spirituality is something that counsellors must not be
afraid to be involved in as clients come with spiritual needs or need spiritual
resources to deal with their problem”. He of course carefully noted that it was
important not to proselytize or preach to clients about his particular religion,
as this is generally antithetical to counselling which requires facilitation and
not compulsion.
All the agency directors interviewed discussed how, with the client’s
consent, counsellors in their agencies would discuss spiritual issues of concern
to the client. Moreover, as one director remarked, it was important for
counsellors, when needed, to share the spiritual resources which they themselves
use to cope with problems as this can offer encouragement to clients. In this
regard, an earlier study this author conducted on a representative population
of local counsellors and social workers indicated that the majority of those
who were Christian by religious affiliation were positive and saw no ethical
problem to the use of spiritual resources such as prayer or meditation when
providing counselling (Mathew 2006). In fact various spiritual resources such
as worship is viewed by counsellors as fundamental to the recovery of
individuals such as those with drug-related problems. A statement from High
Point, a drug rehabilitation centre, is instructive of this point:
The worship ministry in High Point is the source of our daily strength
to live another day. Everyday, without fail, we come together and worship
the Lord. We also go out to various meetings and functions to lead
worship and worship together with others. (High Point Community
Services 2006: High Point Drug Ministry)
Third, spiritual resources are important to the volunteers and staff of

Christian-related agencies. In most of these agencies there are weekly
devotionals which attempt to strengthen the spiritual resources of the helpers.
This stems from the perception that such resources have efficacy as can be
seen in the following statement by an executive director of a large agency:
When I came in I realized that our counsellors are always so burdened.

You see they help so many people and soon the people’s problems
become their own…. So as I prayed the Lord told me to get them into
532

the Word. So I started weekly Bible studies. After a few months I notice
that they are much better and they can cope with the stress.
Mobilization of Material Resources

The involvement of Christianity in social services is also noticeable in how
churches and Christians are important resources to facilitate their operations.
Four major resources — financial, manpower, leadership and volunteers —
are examined as they are particularly instrumental in the successful operation
of social service agencies.
Financial Resources
Church and denominationally related social services are substantially funded
by their respective religious organizations. Based on the survey data, sixteen
out of the eighteen agencies reported direct funding of between 20 per cent–
50 per cent of their total general expenditures. This amount does not include
the funding provided by individual Christians who are targeted through
donation drives in religious communities. Invariably many Christian
organizations appeal to churches to support their social service programmes
and individual Christians are drawn to support these noble causes.
Beyond the churches’ direct financial contributions, fund raising activities
run by these social service agencies often utilize the social connections of
church members. Church members who are managers, owners and executives
in various corporations are approached and sometimes volunteer themselves
to solicit sponsorship and donations from their companies. Such financial
resources can be a substantial portion of the agencies’ funding.
Leadership
Seventeen out of the eighteen organizations which responded to the survey
indicated that at least 50 per cent of their board members are from supporting
churches. In most cases, board members of church-related social service
agencies are entirely from supporting Christian organizations. In the case of
Christian-related agencies which are not church based, it is still ensured that
nearly all their board members are Christians who are actively serving in
different churches.
In many church-related social service agencies, key appointment holders
are clergy or prominent representatives of their respective denominations. For
example, the Singapore Anglican Community Services which has under its
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534 Mathew Mathews
wings a rehabilitation hospital and several other family- and child-related

services, is led by the bishop of the Anglican church. In the case of the
prominent agency Touch, it is presided by the senior pastor of the Faith
Community Baptist Church to which the agency is affiliated. The close
relationship and overlapping membership between an agency’s board and its
affiliated Christian organization is to ensure that the direction undertaken by
the agency is congruent with church interests. This also ensures, as one
executive director put it, that there is a “safety net, so in case any financial
difficulties creep up with the agency, the church leadership [affiliated to the
agency] can bail it out using church funds”.
Manpower
Twelve out of the eighteen agencies surveyed mentioned that at least 50 per
cent of their full-time staff are from affiliated religious institutions. The
remaining six agencies often mentioned that these would include Christians
from other denominations. For some Christian staff, service in these church-
related agencies is essentially direct service to God. As described in an article
in the official publication of the Methodist Welfare Services on the career
choice of one of its staff members:
Martin chose to embark on a different career path compared to his
contemporaries (honours graduates in Economics). He chose to follow
God’s calling over the many choices offered in the corporate world. “I
chose to be a social worker. This decision is to me, an expression of
loving God.” (Methodist Welfare Services 2005, p. 6)
The close connection between serving God and serving the community
through social service work is an important motivator for several highly
successful individuals who have taken on senior appointments in Christian-
related social service agencies in recent years. For these individuals their
appointment in these social service agencies is seen as obedience to a divine
calling to serve God.
Volunteers
Volunteers are an absolutely important resource needed to run social service
agencies. Based on the survey of eighteen agencies, fifteen of them mentioned
that at least 50 per cent of their volunteers are from supporting Christian
churches. Often this includes the bulk of adult helpers, while the other
helpers are normally school students fulfilling their Community Involvement
534

Project (CIP) requirements. Here again, the embeddedness of the Christian-

related social service allows it to utilize a pool of ready helpers. In the case
of many big projects which require substantial manpower, church members
become very helpful volunteers who can be mobilized quickly through
church structures which emphasize helping and charity as Christians. Many
of these helpers would have been unlikely to volunteer in non-Christian
social service initiatives.
As Park and Smith (2000) argue in the United States case and certainly
true among the more conservative portion of Singaporean Christians, there is
often an interest among volunteers from churches to help with social service
agencies which are church-related, since such an involvement could be
categorized in their minds as a “ministry”. Moreover, there is the belief that
the structure and programmes of such agencies would be based on principles
which are congruent with their own.
MOTIVATIONS FOR CHRISTIAN INVOLVEMENT IN

SOCIAL SERVICES
Integrating Faith and Works
Among the powerful motivations for Christian involvement in social service
are scriptural precedents which emphasize the importance of good works,
particularly in relation to faith. As Jeavons (1994, pp. 47–48) points out,
scriptural teaching “commands the integration of faith and works”. In his
careful analysis of Biblical passages he highlights a passage from the Epistle of
James where the writer addresses his fellow believers:
What good is it my brethren if a man or woman claims to have faith but

has no deeds? Can such a faith save him or her? Suppose a brother or
sister is without clothes and daily food. If one of you says to him or her,
“Go, I wish you well; keep warm and well fed,” but does nothing about
his or her physical needs, what good is it? In the same way, faith by itself,
if it is not accompanied by action, is dead.
But someone will say, “You have faith; I have deeds,” Show me your faith
without deeds, and I will show you my faith by what I do. (James 2, pp.
14–18 as quoted in Jeavons 1994, pp. 48–49).
The passage, as Jeavons argues, asserts that one’s Christian belief, “unless
accompanied by matching behaviour is of marginal credibility”. In the local
context, an analysis of the message by the bishop of the Methodist church,
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536 Mathew Mathews
patron of the Methodist Welfare Services (MWS), writing in the annual

report of the MWS, articulates this important connection between true
Christian faith and social action:
From the beginning, the Methodist movement focused on serving the

needs of society and on helping the poor and disadvantaged. This habit
of reaching out with compassion to help those in need is part and parcel
of Christian discipleship. The Lord Jesus told the well-known story of
the Good Samaritan in answer to the question, “Who is my neighbour?”
(Luke 10:25-37). A man lay half-dead on the road. People passed by him
without helping him. Even religious people did not care, or perhaps they
were filled with fear or their feet and hands were too busy with their own
work. Then came the good Samaritan who, with great compassion, lent
a practical helping hand to the poor victim. After ensuring that His
questioner knew who the hero of the story was [(the Good Samaritan)],
Jesus told him, “You go, and do likewise.” (Methodist Welfare Services
2006, p. 16)
The mention that “even religious people did not care” amplified the
point that mere Christian piety shown through attendance at religious services
is insufficient. Care for one’s neighbour as practised by the Good Samaritan
was essential for the true believer and disciple. This is a practice the Christian
is expected to emulate, and which has continued to be the maxim of many
subsequent church reformers, such as Wesley, the founder of Methodism:
Do all the good you can

By all the means you can
In all the ways you can
In all the places you can
At all the times you can
To all the people you can
As long as ever you can
(Wesley as quoted by Solomon 2003, p. 3)
The notion of God’s love is also commonly used to discuss the motivation
for social service. Care Corner, a faith-based social service which has several
centres and a large number of beneficiaries, refers to this in its objectives:
As a Christian organization we are concerned to meet human needs as

they are felt, enable people to face life’s challenges and foster enjoyment
of and reverence for life. In the discharge of these roles our sole motivation
is the love of God (Care Corner 2006 Corporate Profile).
536

The Care Corner’s website further references Matthew 25:35–36:
For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat, I was thirsty and
you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you invited me in,
I needed clothes and you clothed me, I was sick and you looked after me,
I was in prison and you came to visit me (Care Corner 2006, Corporate
Profile).
Here again the injunction is for Christians who have the love for God to
display this love in practical ways by serving fellow human beings. In doing
charitable deeds they are then actually showing their love for God. The theme
of God’s love as being the compelling point for Christian service is further
emphasized by the Adventist Nursing and Rehabilitation Centre which affirms
that the love of God “constrains us to love and care for the sick and the
incapacitated and to love and care for all patients regardless of race, language
religion or economic status” (Adventist Nursing and Rehabilitation Centre
2004, Adventist Rehab). The love of God then, as evidenced in this mission
statement, is the force that drives the Christian to show care beyond his own
parochial community. This love which stems from God is seen as the very
force that allows members to reach out to their community is also mentioned
in the mission statement of another Christian-related social service, Life
Community Services Society (LCCS):
The Logo of LCSS has a CROSS within the outlined heart to depict the
LOVE from God who gives us LIFE so that we can reach out to the
COMMUNITY spontaneously and with dynamism [capitalization in
original] (Life Community Services Society 2005).
It is clear from the many mission statements and publicity material of

Christian-related social services that this ethic to love and to follow
foundational teachings of scripture which required the integration of faith
and works, is an important motivator for the church’s engagement in social
service endeavours. In fact, responses to the survey question: “In your
opinion, how does your social service agency benefit its supporting religious
organizations?” invariably included statements such as “putting faith into
action” and “finding the chance to love the community”. While Christian
groups present their involvement in social service as a response of faith,
there are possibly other instrumentalist and pragmatic motivations which
promote social service involvement.
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538 Mathew Mathews
Obtaining Institutional Legitimacy with the State

One of the important motivators for Christian churches to engage in social
services is probably the attempt to obtain institutional legitimacy. This seeking
of legitimacy is vital especially for organizations which sense potential threat
or competition from their external environment, which certainly is the case
for Christian churches in Singapore. Religious institutions in the Singapore
state are seen as legitimate when they perform activities conducive for nation-
building (Hill and Lian 1995; Kuah 1998), providing charity and social
services being one such activity.7 In such a context, churches which need to
maintain their legitimacy and usefulness in the state’s eyes attempt to fill in
the gaps of social service delivery. This view was possibly hinted at by the
bishop of the Anglican church in his yearly synodal address where he tried to
explain why many churches are getting involved in social service projects. As
he reasoned, “It could be argued that sometimes it seems to be more a matter
of pragmatic survival as the secular state frowns upon public evangelism”
(Chew, Diocesan Digest December 2003). Clergymen spoken to often echoed
the view that the state is keen on their charitable involvement, and that the
more they involved themselves in such activity, the less the state would
interfere with their evangelistic activities.
Obtaining Legitimacy with the Community

Besides gaining legitimacy in the state’s eyes, churches deem that doing
social service increases their legitimacy among Singaporeans. As one pastor
explained, “People ask sometimes, what do your Christians do? They say we
(Buddhists) build old folks homes and do lots of charity.” This came in
response to the pastor’s statements that non-Christians perceived Christians
as engaged in evangelistic activity but seldom doing much to alleviate
human suffering. In the lay person’s perception, religion is essentially about
doing good and, as such, demonstrations of these good works are vital. In
fact, some pastors mentioned that their own church members felt more
comfortable reporting to their non-Christians friends about their church’s
community involvement as this enhanced the church’s legitimacy in the
eyes of their non-Christian friends.
Gaining legitimacy in the larger community is often expressed by
church leaders in theologically compatible terms as a “corporate witness of
their faith”. This notion of a corporate witness stems from a Biblical passage
where Jesus admonished his disciples to “Let your good works be seen by all
so that men will praise God at your good deeds” (Matthew 5:16). As one
538

pastor suggested, “Nobody cares whether it is New Creation or Old Creation

[i.e it doesn’t matter which church it is] that helped them with kidney
dialysis, all they know is that some church people cared.” The importance
of this corporate witness can be seen for instance in the mission statement
of the Presbyterian church’s community arm which reads, “To meet challenges
and needs of the community in Christian witness to touch lives” (Presbyterian
Community Services 2006: Our mission). In fact, all the agencies who
responded to the survey showed moderate to strong agreement to the
survey statement “My agency hopes that people who benefit from our
services will have a positive impression of our supporting religious
organizations.”8 This amplifies the churches’ hope that their social service
provision will lead to a better impression of Christianity as a religion that,
as a clergyman mentioned, “is interested to engage the community and
finds ways to meets its many needs”.
Avenues for Involvement

Another possible motivation for church involvement in social service is the
presence of a portion of the church membership which thrives on
volunteering. Churches are keen on keeping their members involved in
church-related activities as it is generally recognized that those who are
committed to a church’s causes will continue to remain its faithful and
active members of the church. However, churches are aware that a section
of their church membership is not attracted to serving in conventional
church-related ministries such as worship or Christian education
programmes, but are more interested in engaging in social service type of
activities which focus on meeting community needs. Moreover, with a
substantial proportion of helping professionals among Singaporeans being
Christian (Mathew 2006), there is a draw for these Christians to engage in
community-related work in collaboration with their churches.
While it is church members who want opportunities to serve in social
service capacities in individual cases, in some churches it is the leadership
itself that wants to get church members involved in social service activity.
This is for two reasons. The first is to get them out of their comfort zones.
Some church leaders described this involvement as eye-opening for members
who are often self-contained in their comfortable middle-class lifestyles and
are not exposed to the real problems faced by others in their communities.
Social service activities would, as mentioned by Reach Community Services,
the social arm of Grace Assembly of God, “Help the members to see the
need to contribute their time, talents and treasures to help the less fortunate
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540 Mathew Mathews
in the community” (Reach Community Services 2001, Approach &

Objectives).
Moreover involvement in community projects is seen as an excellent
platform for Christians to become better disciples. As stated by the bishop of
the Anglican church in his synodal address:
We need to go beyond the four walls of our churches and be seen as the
ambassadors of the love and truth of Christ. This will provide the
framework for interactive learning and growing in Christian discipleship,
which is so much needed today. Discipleship is not learnt primarily in
seminars and conferences but in active service of God and mankind
(Chew, Diocesan Digest December 2003).
Evangelism
In the survey, no social service agency reported evangelism as an important
agenda for Christian-related social service, except the Salvation Army. This
establishment, an interesting anomaly since it operates both as a Christian
church and a social service at the same time, clearly expresses its evangelistic
intentions in its vision statement “We have a vision of an Army whose
programmes and services reach out to the disadvantaged in our society,
alleviating their suffering and leading them to faith in Christ” (Bringans
2005). Leading others to faith in Christ, however, is a process its founder
William Booth repeatedly mentioned that first involves the “demonstration
of love, care and concern”. In his own words as quoted by Bringans (2005),
“No one ever got saved on an empty stomach.”
A discussion of this connection between caring for the physical, mental
and emotional needs of people and their ultimate spiritual need is addressed
in an article from the Salvation Army’s periodical, War Cry:
Evangelism and social responsibility, looking after man’s spiritual needs

on the one hand and his physical and social needs on the other, link
together the Great Commandment — Love your neighbour as yourself
(Matthew 22:39) with the Great Commission — Therefore go and
make disciples (Matthew 28:19). They are seen as two parts of the whole
Gospel for the total human personality. Faith and works should travel
side by side, like the legs of men walking. William Booth said, “First
faith and then works; then faith again and works again — until you can
scarcely distinguish which is one and which is the other.” (Bringans
2005)
540

The author Bringans, in challenging the members of the Salvation Army,

reminds them…that although much of the social service of the organization
is professionally run,
This does not absolve the soldiers in the Army from practising the Great
Commandment and Great Commission partnership. We all have
neighbours and there are unlimited ways by which we can show the love
of Christ to those without faith” (Bringans 2005).
While all the other Christian social service providers steer clear of reporting
an evangelistic motivation in establishing their programmes, it can certainly
be deduced that it is a factor. Several directors spoken to admitted that it is
their hope that through their social services people would come to embrace
the Christian faith. They are however careful to clarify, in the words of one
director that, “When we provide care and love to those who are needy, we do
it with no strings attached, whether they finally come to Christ or not, we do
not show any less or more love.” He went on to say later, “but we don’t
apologize for this, being Christians we feel we want others to experience the
good things that come from knowing Christ!”
The above sentiment is also expressed by a volunteer at an elderly care
home in an article in the annual report of the Presbyterian Community
Services,
When I first started a handicraft/sewing group for Evergreen Circle (EC)
in 2001, my intention was to spend some time with the elderly and
make friends with them by doing something together. As a Christian,
my hope was to share the love of God with these dear elderly friends. I
wanted to help them do something creative to pass their time, so that
they would still feel useful through their own “blessed hands” (A Blessed
Hands volunteer 2006).
While maintaining her joy at being able to help the elderly utilize their
blessed hands, she later recounted the story of one of the members of the
group and remarked,“My greatest fulfilment is seeing that she had become
one with us in the family of God about half a year before her demise” (ibid.).
As can be seen, while the volunteer was content to share the love of Christ by
teaching the elderly friends how to use their blessed hands, her greatest
fulfilment was in knowing that the elderly person prior to her demise had
embraced the Christian faith.
Several directors interviewed mentioned that their supporting churches
(and often they themselves) do not merely want to do social service without
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542 Mathew Mathews
allowing people to be exposed to the Christian gospel. In fact, my personal

observations in the field reveal that at least in the case of one social service
agency, there were some tussles between the agency’s executives and the
supporting church, as the church was hoping that the agency would do more
to allow a more prominent Christian witness to be displayed through its
operations. However, Christian-related social service agencies are generally
clear that none of their activities are to be evangelistic in nature where
preaching of any sort would be allowed. Based on the interviews and personal
observations, this policy is strictly adhered to since social service agencies are
cognizant of the negative outcome of any such overt evangelistic attempts. In
fact, agency directors told me how they explicitly reminded churches who
volunteered in various projects with them to keep clear of any preaching of
the Gospel during their social service activities.
Despite some of these measures, directors of Christian-related agencies
mentioned that among some populations there is the perception that these
church-run social service programmes are actually fronts for proselytization.
One director of a centre which engages in studentcare mentioned that when
residents in the neighbourhood made these queries, he would always invite
them to come unannounced to the centre to observe for themselves whether
such evangelism was taking place. Even in the case of the Salvation Army
with its explicit mention of evangelism as a goal, there are controls to ensure
that most programmes are run without any Gospel preaching. It is only in its
various residential and long-term programmes, such as its youth hostel, that
Gospel preaching is included and even so, explicit consent for this is obtained
from parents before they admit their children into the programme.
While careful not to engage in evangelistic activity, Christian-related
social services recognized that their display of love and care to their beneficiaries
are powerful testimonies of Christian faith which can potentially touch them.
As a centre director revealed:
When the elderly folks sometimes notice how the centre staff attend to
them in ways that their families would never do like cleaning them up
when they make a mess, they are drawn by that love. We tell them that
that love is in us because of Christ…they then are curious about finding
out about the church.
Essentially, as he pointed out, his social service agencies are a “bridge between
the church and the community”. The church can reach out to the community
through this service in ways which would not be possible if it were to do so
on its religious platform. In fact, as another director remarked:
542

The church can build relationships through these social service set ups
and if they make a good impression with people they serve, then they are
sowing an important seed. It is God who ultimately waters and brings
people to salvation.
Further support of the fact that social service provision actually aids the
church’s overall evangelistic mandate can be seen in that community members
are more willing to approach a church to find out about the Christian
message or to have their children attend Sunday school as a result of the
community programmes. As one pastor noted:
When we go into the community and do good deeds, and people get to
know us, they know we are genuine and relevant and they find it
beneficial to either come to our church or send their children here.
ADAPTING TO THE SECULAR STATE AND

MULTI-RELIGIOUS SOCIETY
It is apparent in the preceding discussion that Christian-related social services
in Singapore is distinctively Christian in that it mobilizes the institution and
tradition of Christianity to accomplish its aims, and have motivations which
are essentially spiritually focused. While the religious involvement is evident
in these operations, this does not necessarily mean that Christian-related
social service agencies presented themselves as agencies with a religious
character. In fact, Christian-related social service agencies increasingly mask
their religious identity substantially, apart from at times using part of the
name of its supporting religious body such as the case of River Life Community
Services, which derives its name from River Life Community Church. This
and similar names used do not necessarily conjure up images of a religious
identity for these agencies. Moreover many of these agencies utilize emblems
and insignias which have little religious significance.
This non-religious public image of Christian-related agencies can be
clearly seen in that only fourteen of the twenty-seven community service
agenciesi which have websites mentioned any connection with a church or
Christianity in its portal. In fact when telephone calls were made to ask
whether there was any connection, centre staff would often be hesitant
and asked the purpose of the enquiry. Only when they were reassured that
the enquiry was to showcase the contribution of religion to social services
in Singapore did they disclose their Christian connection. Even when an
agency is clearly affiliated to a church, it is observable that there are
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544 Mathew Mathews
prominent indicators reflecting the parameters of its involvement. For

example, the Woodlands Social Centre, in its write-up in the National
Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre’s Directory of non-profit organizations
(2004), maintains that “The Woodlands Social Centre is a voluntary
organization registered with the Registry of Societies (ROS) and
independent from Woodlands Evangelical Free Church (EFC).” At the
same time, as it is important to state its independence, it notes that, “We
maintain close working ties and encourage both church members and the
public to serve the community through the Social Centre.” Similarly, for
the Lakeside Family Service Centre which is affiliated with Faith Methodist
Church, an additional statement is made in its mission statement that
although it is a Christian-linked service, it is in harmony with other
institutions: “We at Lakeside fulfil our Christian responsibility to the
society by caring for the community. We work in harmony with our
neighbours, the community and the government” (Lakeside Family Centre
2006: About Us).
One of the main reasons for agencies downplaying their religious affliction
and identification is the need to adapt to various sensitivities of operating in
a secular state and multi-religious social setting. One executive director who
manages a family service centre related how, when his agency approached a
Community Centre to collaborate on a programme to benefit residents in the
community, received a firm refusal to have its programme implemented in
the area. The reason was purely because the centre’s brochure had the affiliation
of its larger parent body which is Christian even though there were no other
markers of religious affinity and even the name of the centre is clearly non-
religious. The Community Centre staff mentioned that if the agency could
remove the logo of its parent body, then there would be no problem
collaborating since it would present the centre as a secular agency. The
leadership in the Community Centre felt that some of the non-Christian
residents would be unhappy if they knew that the programme was offered by
a Christian-related agency.
However, other directors interviewed mentioned that the need to mask
the agencies religious identity is often a formality. Many secular institutions
such as Community Centres, Residents’ Committees and government schools
are by now comfortable working with a Christian-related agency even when
they know the agency is affiliated with a church, and even often refer to the
agency as being part of the church. However, these secular bodies always
prefer that the Christian-related social service agencies present themselves as
non-religious or even secular as far as possible to ensure that there are no
concerns raised by community members about proselytizing activity.
544

CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted to show, using the theoretical lenses of resource
mobilization theory, that the success of Christian-related social services is due
to its ability to mobilize various resources from Christian traditions and
institutions, its unique motivations and its ability to adapt to its environment.
By mobilizing Christian ideology and spiritual resources, Christian-related
social service agencies ensure that they fit squarely within the broader purpose
of the Christian church. As such these social service agencies are recognized
as bona fide Christian ministries. In this capacity they then have the much
needed “ideological inducement” required to enact mass participation in
their cause (Snow 1987, p. 163). This is evident in their ability to mobilize
other important resources from the Christian community, ranging from
leadership to manpower, finances and volunteers.
Christian-related social services are also well able to adapt to the larger
secular and multi-religious contexts by presenting themselves in ways which
are acceptable or palatable to those of other faiths. However, adapting and
presenting themselves as secular entities, they do not lose their spiritual
agenda which is greatly motivated by the Biblical mandate to obey both the
Great Commission and the Great Commandment. The fact that they
endeavour to do God’s work also results in their Christian volunteers and staff
pursuing the purposes of the agencies with an evangelistic fervour not through
the direct propagation of the Gospel but by displaying good works, which
many of them ultimately hope will “save” their city!
APPENDIX 22.1
SURVEY OF CHRISTIAN-RELATED SERVICES*

(*Note: Layout and spacing in this reproduced survey form may not correspond to
that in the original which provided space for answers to every question)
In the following survey there are several open and close ended questions. Feel free to
add comments or other information regardless of the type of question.
A Here are several questions examining the involvement of supporting religious
organizations (i.e. religious organizations which are of the same faith as your
agency). Based on the best approximations you can make,
1. What percentage of your agency’s budget is derived from supporting religious
organizations?
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546 Mathew Mathews
2. What percentage of your volunteers are from supporting religious

organizations?
3. What percentage of your board members are from supporting religious
organizations?
4. What percentage of your paid (full time and part time) staff are from
supporting religious organizations?
5. Are there any other ways that supporting religious organizations are involved
in your particular organization? (e.g. performances at yearly fund raising
events, etc.)
B. In your opinion, how does your social service agency benefit its supporting
religious organizations? (e.g. gives them a chance to serve the community
beyond teaching spiritual matters)
C. How much influence do the supporting religious organizations affiliated to your

agency have in the following areas? Please tick the appropriate box.
Nearly no A little Moderate Nearly

influence influence amount of complete
influence influence
Hiring of director(s)
Policies on staff hiring
Who is on the board
Kinds of programmes
that are run
How money is
proportioned for activities
D. To what extent do the factors below influence how you run programmes in your
agency? Please tick the appropriate box.

influence influence
Religious beliefs
Holy texts, scripture
Religious authorities
546


influence influence
Divine direction through
prayer etc.
Humanitarian values
State regulations
Nonreligious advisors
or consultants
Professional reports
Client needs obtained
through observation
and interaction
E. Please indicate the frequency with which the following practices are performed
in your agency. Please tick the appropriate box.
Never Once Quite Very

or in a often often
nearly while
never
Distribute religious materials to clients
Prayer involving clients one on one
(if they are agreeable)
In interactions with clients, refer to
common values that are religiously based
Refer to religious principles in conversation
with clients
Prayer/religious rituals involving staff
members or volunteers
Asking clients about their religious beliefs
in counselling
Invitation to clients to attend religious
services
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548 Mathew Mathews
Never Once Quite Very

or in a often often
nearly while
never
Prayer at board meetings
Display religious images representing a
particular faith
Display religious material/brochures/
pamphlets in the waiting area or
common areas
Promote religious festivals/meetings/
seminars through notice board displays etc.
Invitation to religious leaders to offer
seminars/talks at your agency
F. To what extent do you agree with the following statements? Please tick the
appropriate box.
Strongly Moderately Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
My agency prefers to receive
resources from sources that will not
compromise its religious character.
Donors support the organization
because of its religious orientation.
Our agency has lost potential donors
because we are not religious enough.
Our agency uses religious images/
texts/ideas when appealing to donors
from religious organizations.
While I think this agency was rather
religiously minded in the past, it is
really very secular now.
548

Strongly Moderately Moderately Strongly

Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
My agency hopes that people who
benefit from our services will have a
positive impression of our supporting
religious organization.
Actually our service users are very
comfortable with our religious
affiliation.
G. Here are some quick questions to profile your agency.

a. How many staff do you have in your agency?
Full time
Part time
b. What was the approximate annual budget (expenditure) last year?
c. What is the religious denomination that your agency is affiliated with? (e.g.
Christian-Independent-Pentecostals)
d. How long have you been in operation?
H. Do you have any comments about religious involvement in social service

provision?
Thank you so much for taking time to complete this survey. I would like to send you
a small token in appreciation. Please email me your contact address or include it here.
Notes
1. Names of full members are listed in the NCSS Annual Report found on
<http://www.ncss.org.sg/ncss/about_ncss/annual_report.html>.
2. See my chapter on “Negotiating Christianity with Other Religions: The Views
of Christian Clergymen in Singapore” in this same volume.
3. The next greatest proportion of social service agencies are best described as
secular institutions, followed by those which are Buddhist, Roman Catholic,
Muslim and Hindu.
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550 Mathew Mathews
4. Providing a precise breakdown of the number of centres performing different

functions was difficult since, apart from halfway houses, a number of agencies
have multiple types of services under the banner of a single parent body.
5. This did not mean that spiritual directions are the only important criteria for the
choice of programmes. The responding agencies in the survey also noted that
state regulations, professional reports and especially client needs obtained through
observation and interaction are important to shaping how they conducted their
programmes.
6. While the literature at times tries to separate spirituality and religion, referring
the former positively compared to the latter, this distinction is often problematic
since for many who were religious, spirituality is understood in terms of their
religious beliefs.
7. The importance of religion contributing to community bonding is often
mentioned in ministerial speeches addressing religion as can be seen in the
following statement made by the then minister of community development
when delivering the keynote address at the World Religion Day, “But apart from
these questions which each religion will have to resolve separately, there are also
other issues which we can, perhaps, address together. For instance how do we,
given our different faiths, contribute to community bonding and community
development?” (Tarmugi 1998).That the state’s view of religion’s place in society
can clearly be seen in the comments in the same speech where the minister
compares the good that religion does in terms of welfare organizations and the
bad which is possible through religiously incited violence.
8. This view is significantly different from the several Buddhist organizations that
responded to the survey. One in particular annotated beside the statement, “We
do not engage in community help for any other purpose but to really help.”
9. I used only twenty-seven agencies which are involved in community service
provision. Agencies such as hospitals, elder care homes and drug rehabilitation
centres generally portray themselves as religiously based institutions.
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Religious Diversity, Toleration and Interaction 555
PART V
Interfaith Issues and

Interaction
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556

23
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY,
TOLERATION, AND INTERACTION
Ten Chin Liew
INTRODUCTION: MANAGING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

It is a fact that many contemporary societies are diverse in many respects,
including matters of religion. A central issue of politics is therefore how to
manage such diversity. But there are many who are still not prepared to accept
this starting point, and to acknowledge the existence of diversity as a more or
less permanent feature. Some believe that the current diversity, although it is
real and deep, is not lasting and that our social life will eventually converge
on a comprehensive set of fundamental values and perspectives. The idea that
reasonable people would agree, when the distorting features of social life are
removed, remains the perennial, and sometimes dangerous, dream of some
social reformers. It can be dangerous if sustained attempts to secure rational
agreement fail, and continued disagreement is then attributed to perversity
and a stubborn refusal to acknowledge what one must know to be the single
truth. The suppression of those who know that they are in error may then be
seen as justified.
Rejecting Exclusivism
There are others who think that while religious diversity exists, it is merely
superficial and conceals a fundamental agreement deep down about important
matters. Among some cosmopolitan religious thinkers, there is a strong
557
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558 Ten Chin Liew
conviction that any form of exclusion is undesirable. They seek a central core
of shared convictions by ignoring the details of doctrinal differences, focusing
instead on the highest and most abstract common denominator — the belief
in God. But even when reduced to this bare minimum, not all religions are
in agreement because not all religions believe in God. Replacing God with
something more nebulous, some ultimate, transcendent reality, will not solve
the problem, for there is disagreement about the nature of this reality, for
example, with respect to whether human beings survive death or the form of
such survival. Again, some specific matters of detail, such as the divinity of
Christ, are central to one religion, but rejected by others. In any case, even if
all the traditional religions can be shown to share a fundamental set of
doctrines, the programme of rejecting exclusivism remains unattainable because
it leaves out agnostics and atheists. It is astonishing that well-meaning religious
thinkers, who are so preoccupied with the rejection of exclusivism, are
nonetheless happy to leave out the high proportion of human beings who
lack religious convictions. It is a form of intellectual and moral parochialism
that treats the differences between various religions as non-fundamental and
of less significance than those between religious and non-religious people.
Ethical Non-exclusivism
Another basis for denying fundamental religious diversity is to reduce or even
eliminate the doctrinal content of religions, and to identify religions in terms
of their practices and the way of life associated with them. One radical
approach in this direction is the view that the essence of religion is the
acknowledgement of our common humanity and the acceptance of altruism
and loving relationships as fundamental. The various religious expressions of
these fundamental ethical values may be different but, according to this view,
the difference is only in the metaphors and the historical and cultural
formulations of the same ethical commitments. This reduction of the religious
to a set of ethical values is broad enough to embrace agnostics and atheists in
the same ethical community.
At one level, there is much to be said for this ethical approach. It shows
that there are, or can be, important shared values among religious and non-
religious people. One of the aims of those who reject religious exclusivism is
to show that there are different routes to salvation, and no single religion can
claim to have the monopoly. It is easier to achieve this aim if the requirements
of salvation are spelt out not in subscription to certain metaphysical beliefs
about the nature of reality, but in terms of leading a morally good life. It is
558

then arguable that the good life is various. For example, one could lead a good
life as a celibate priest, devoted to the service of God, but one could also
satisfy the requirements of the good by being a prolific and loving parent.
Each way of life precludes the other, but each equally embodies goodness.
However, many religious people would regard it as a travesty of their
religion if it were reduced to a set of ethical values whose ultimate source is
independent of the will of God. For them, the metaphysical commitments
are crucial to the distinctiveness and richness of their religion. A problem for
the ethical non-exclusivist is to explain why he or she remains a member of
a particular religion if the essence of that religion does not require any
doctrinal commitments over and above certain abstract ethical values shared
by all. Why then be a Christian, rather than a Hindu, Muslim, or Buddhist?
Indeed, why not join the ranks of the atheist? There could be a plausible
explanation in terms of historical and social circumstances, but this does not
provide any justification for the truth of the claims of the religion to which
one is attached and would not give up. For many Christians, to be a Christian
is precisely to have beliefs which Christians do not share with others. These
are the animating forces of their religious lives. To be cut off from them is to
give up some of their central commitments, around which their lives have
been shaped. Nor can we establish a community on a purely relativistic basis,
acknowledging differences but claiming that there is no single truth and that
different beliefs are equally correct. This makes no sense when the beliefs are
not only different, but conflicting and mutually incompatible.
Ethical non-exclusivism is unpersuasive because different religions present
rival accounts of reality and of the significance of life and death. Even if we
remain at the ethical level, there are major disagreements about such issues as
abortion, euthanasia and sexual morality. Scientific and technological
developments provide further sources of disagreement over human cloning
and genetic manipulation.
TOLERATION
So we must take as our starting point the existence of genuine, and sometimes
conflicting and incompatible, beliefs about religious matters, such as the
meaning of life, the origin of the universe, the existence of God, the after-life,
reincarnation and ideas of the sacred. Under what conditions, and on what
basis, should people with such differences live together harmoniously and
cooperate with one another? The first step is to establish proper grounds for
religious toleration. Of course a flourishing community would need to have
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more active forms of engagement among its different members than is

required by mutual toleration. But unless they can at least tolerate one
another, they would not even constitute or survive as a community.
Toleration and Interpretation

It is sometimes suggested that toleration can be based on our fallibility and
the limitations of our knowledge. Although conflicting religious views cannot
all be true, we do not know where the truth lies. Toleration is thus needed in
order to ensure that the truth will emerge from our clashing fallible convictions.
There is value in this claim, but it would need to be more carefully formulated
if we are to capture the real significance of the connection between toleration
and the truth of our convictions.
First, the argument linking our fallibility with toleration of diversity
carries little weight with those believers whose religious views rest on the
dictates of an infallible holy text, rather than on their own acknowledged
limited capacities to discover truth. So the argument needs to be reformulated
in terms of the importance of acquiring not just true beliefs, but also a
deeper understanding of the beliefs around which we build our lives. Even
if our beliefs are true, without a proper understanding of their significance
and the grounds for them, they would, as Mill pointed out, descend into
dead dogmas.1
We see in the conduct of indoctrinated people an inability to respond
and adapt to new circumstances. A holy text might give us the correct answers
to certain typical situations. But in a rapidly changing world the context and
circumstances of choice are novel, and we have to re-apply our fundamental
principles to unfamiliar and previously unanticipated situations. For example,
no holy text would have anticipated the new biotechnology and the ethical
issues it generates. Principles and their applications do not necessarily proceed
in one direction, with the principles simply dictating the specific applications
in certain circumstances. New applications force us to rethink and reformulate
our principles. Sometimes it is the shock of having our deepest convictions
challenged in fresh circumstances which makes us think through the full
significance and scope of our commitments. Those who take their principles
blindly from a holy text will be lost in a changed world, or they will simply
rely on a rigid application of the literal meaning of the text to get an answer,
however inappropriate that may be to the spirit of the text. It is in the lively
atmosphere in which even deeply held beliefs are not put beyond criticism
that we are likely to be pushed to acquire a true understanding of the basis of
those beliefs and the alternatives to them.
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It has been said that even true believers do not fully understand their
beliefs until they are confronted with the passionate atheist. Even religious
scholars, who think that the basis of all social cooperation with others is to be
determined entirely by the requirements of their holy text, have to interpret
the text in order to determine the correct attitudes to be adopted towards
those who do not acknowledge the authority of the text. The acceptance of
a single holy text as embodying all religious truths does not therefore preclude
interpretative disagreements about the dictates of that text. Even within one
religion, there is typically a plurality of traditions and interpretations, and not
just about holy texts but also about aspects of fundamental beliefs. For
example, Muslim scholars themselves are calling for reinterpretations of the
Qur’an in order to make it more relevant to modern conditions. Traditional
interpretations of women’s role are being challenged. Again, Amartya Sen has
pointed out that Hinduism is characterized by a plurality of religious beliefs
and traditions. He illustrates this with the different attitudes to Rama, in
whose name the mosque in Ayodhya, supposedly built on his birthplace, was
demolished by some of his followers. In north and west India, Rama is God
incarnate, but elsewhere he is just the heroic king of the epic Ramayana,
rather than a divine person.2
Toleration and Internal Dissent

The internal debate among a group of religious believers is likely to be
affected by external events or the views of outsiders. Toleration of other
religious views and practices will enhance the prospects of obtaining an
informed opinion of the alternatives, and of what is at stake with different
religious commitments. Those members of a religion who are intolerant of
the members of other religions are also likely to be intolerant of their
dissenting co-religionists. Indeed, the intolerant are sometimes more intolerant
of internal dissidents. Thus it was in part because the writer Salman Rushdie
was regarded as a lapsed Muslim that Ayatollah Khomeini tried to hunt him
down with a deadly fatwa. In an atmosphere of general intolerance, the only
safe beliefs are those of the current orthodoxy of the dominant religion.
Neither the truth, nor certainly the understanding and proper application of
even a true belief, can be sustained in such an environment.
One of the reasons why some religious leaders seek to keep their followers
from mixing with those of different persuasions is the fear that the contagion
of contact will make the followers question a specific, and often self-serving,
interpretation of a religious text or belief. Recently it was reported by The
Australian newspaper that fatwas, written in Arabic and originating from the
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Middle East, have been distributed in Sydney forbidding Muslim women

from studying at university.3 No doubt this is because educated Muslim
women, exposed to more egalitarian ideas and ways of life, are less likely to
accept the inequality and inferior status imposed on them by some of their
leaders in the name of their religion.
It is sometimes said that toleration is the essence of all religions. Certainly,
each religion has some members who think that this is true of their respective
religions. But equally, within each religion there are members who believe
that those in error have no rights, that infidels are to be punished, and that
the free mixing of people from various religions will undermine the true faith.
The ongoing debates between the tolerant and the intolerant members of the
same religion will determine the future direction of that religion and its
relationship with other religions.
At the level of public policy however, the fate of religious toleration must
not be allowed to rest on the intolerant view that may prevail within any one
particular religion. Instead, it should depend on more general considerations
accessible to people of goodwill in all religions. Of course the tolerant and
enlightened members of a religion cannot afford to avoid engagement with
the intolerant about the true nature of their shared religion. To do otherwise
is to surrender to dark forces. There will be some obvious limitations to the
internal debate. It will have a tendency to become rather esoteric, with
different passages from holy texts cited, and their meanings and contexts
disputed. Given the ambiguities and complexities of some of these passages,
there may be no decisive victory. Some of the intolerant would be quite
comfortable with the nature of the debate because they are clerics and
scholars whose profession is to study holy texts. But the ordinary believer will
feel disenfranchised and helplessly unable to contribute.
Toleration and the Ordinary Believer

While trying to hold their own at the level of theological scholarship, the
tolerant must also seek to broaden the terms of the debate to include the
ordinary believer. This can be done by interpreting the texts, not in
the narrowness of their literal meanings, but in the richness of the best
practices of the religion. Those practices sustain flourishing lives in this
world, and do not justify cruelty, unnecessary suffering, despair, injustice and
alienation from the modern world for the sake of eternal bliss. There is a need
to cling on to our ordinary notions of morality and decency as standards for
God or the gods as well. So if a religious scholar points to a passage in a holy
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text which shows that God has licensed the murder of infidels and the
innocent, we must respond that no good and just God will permit that, and
hence the passage must be reinterpreted. When Mill confronted the view that
the goodness of God was beyond our comprehension, he responded that he
could not call God good if such a God would perform acts which, when done
by humans, would be regarded as evil. He added, in admirable defiance, that
if such a God would send him to Hell, then “to hell I’ll go”!4
In confronting fanatics who justify murder and other barbaric acts in the
name of their God and religion, the ordinary believer and the rest of us could
do no worse than endorse the Millian defiance. In this manner, even those
who are not members of the favoured religious group can meaningfully
participate in the interpretation of a holy text. When religious fanatics insist
not only that their own lives should be directed by their interpretation of the
holy text, but that the lives of all, including non-believers and the followers
of other religions, should also be so directed, they inevitably expose these
directions to the check of justice. Any being whose commands are unjust has
no moral authority to rule over us, even if, through sheer power, it can impose
its will on all.
This approach to interpretation is not very far in spirit from the
remarkable view of Pierre Bayle, published in 1686, a few years before the
publication of Locke’s famous A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). Bayle
considered Christ’s remark, “Go out into the highways and hedges and
compel them to come in, that my house may be filled.” This had been used
to justify persecution of non-Christians. But as J.B. Schneewind had recently
pointed out, Bayle rejected such an interpretation of Christ’s words, invoking
the principle, “Any literal interpretation which carries an obligation to
commit iniquity is false.”5 Christ could not have condoned the evil of using
physical threats and violence on unbelievers. So what he must have meant
is that they “should be given arguments and evidence that would compel
them on rational grounds to assent to the truth”.6 Bayle believed that the
principles of morality are known through reason, and in order to know
whether an alleged revelation comes from God, we have to subject it to the
test of a common morality.
The Limits of Pragmatic Toleration

Pragmatic justifications for religious toleration, which appeal to prudential
interests by simply focusing on the bad effects of intolerance on all groups,
are quite common. Thus Locke argued that intolerance and persecution
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would sow “a seed of discord and war”, and be a powerful “provocation to

endless hatreds, rapines, and slaughters”.7 The argument, based on lessons
learnt from the ravages of religious wars in Europe, has great force in many
situations. But its strength is limited by context and circumstances, and it
does not provide a general case for religious toleration, strong and broad
enough to protect all individuals and particularly vulnerable and weak groups.
So long as the major religious groups in a society can come to some agreement,
the desired peace and stability will be secured.
But this could sometimes be done by sacrificing the interests of some
individuals who are not allowed to move out of the religious group in which
they were brought up. Some religious leaders and their followers have fiercely
resisted the right of any member to leave the group, and have reacted
violently even to peaceful and moderate proselytizing by members of other
groups. In 1999, in the Indian state of Orissa, a Hindu mob murdered an
Australian Christian missionary and his two sons, aged ten and six, by setting
fire to the jeep where they had been sleeping. Although it is said that the
missionary never set out to convert people, his exemplary life, including his
leprosy work, and his message impressed many. Apparently in the village
where he died, thirty-five of the two hundred families had converted to
Christianity.8 More recently in Malaysia, some Muslim authorities have
proclaimed that no Muslim should be allowed to renounce his or her faith. It
was reported that “Four Muslims from Kota Baru who declared that they had
left Islam of their own accord were charged in the Syariah Court”.9 If religious
toleration is intended simply to secure social peace and the avoidance of
group conflicts, then these aims can sometimes be achieved by placating such
religious leaders and unjustly imprisoning individuals within the religious
groups with which they no longer wish to be associated.
Again, a purely pragmatic justification of toleration is hostage to
circumstances and leaves weak groups unprotected. Groups strong enough to
cause one another trouble would have reason to enter into some treaty of
toleration. A strong group might also have some prudential interest in
tolerating a weak group which can muster support and sympathy from
powerful external friends. But the pragmatic case for such toleration would
rest too much on the contingencies of shifting political alliances and too little
on considerations of equity and fair play. If the strong are told that they
should tolerate the weak for fear of antagonizing the weak’s powerful friends,
then no moral reason is given for toleration. The appeal to enlightened self-
interest is only as strong as the perception of where that self-interest lies. It
may, at the crucial moment, not depend on tolerating the weak.
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Toleration, the Golden Rule and the Fanatic

There is a cluster of different considerations, built on ideals of fairness,
which support religious toleration. For example, the Golden Rule of human
contact, in its negative form, urges us not to do unto others what we do not
want them to do to us. The rule appeals to more than mere consistency of
behaviour. A member of a dominant religion can consistently discriminate
against the members of a minority religion without fairly acknowledging
that they are equally justified in discriminating against him when the roles
are reversed. The rule requires that we imaginatively put ourselves in the
place of our intended victims, and exchange positions or roles with them.
We are then led to understand the suffering and injustice of religious
persecution and intolerance.
The religious fanatic, however, remains unmoved. He would try to build
the justification for intolerance, not on the imposition of the dominant
religion on the minority, but rather on the imposition of the true religion,
which of course he identifies with his own religion. Thus when the dominant
religion is another religion incompatible with his, it is false, and it may not
therefore be imposed on others. The fanatic holds the principle that the true
religion may be imposed on all. But the fact is that people disagree about
which religion is true, and each believer is convinced of the truth of his own
religion. The fanatic has no means of getting all to agree that his religion is
the one true religion. The social implementation of a principle cannot rely on
distinctions which cannot be seen to be correct, and which cannot be sustained
in the messiness of social life. So while it is true that there is a theoretically
coherent distinction between a religion that is in fact true and one that is
merely believed to be true, it is quite another matter to show that this can be
used to justify the enforcement of the values of only one religion. If a policy
of imposing the true religion is socially accepted, then this will result in the
imposition of the religion that the policymakers sincerely believe to be true.
When the fanatic’s own religion is a minority religion, the social
implementation of the policy he has endorsed would be seen by others to
justify the imposition of the dominant religion at his expense.
Toleration and Respect

The undeniable fact of religious disagreement provides a basis for toleration
as involving respect for sincere believers of all kinds, including those who are
atheists and agnostics. Each person is committed to his or her own set of
beliefs, and each has a strong desire to lead his or her life in accordance with
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566 Ten Chin Liew
his or her own fundamental values. Religious toleration allows people, if they
so choose, to take responsibility for shaping their own lives.10 Others may
disagree with a person’s values, but there is no common basis for believing
that all reasonable people must agree about the ultimate ends of human life.
It would be unfair to force people to act against their own deepest convictions
and in accordance with our contrary beliefs, when we could not show them
that they are wrong, and their conduct does not prevent us from following
our own convictions in our personal lives. We would not thereby be showing
them respect as persons equally capable of forming their own views about
what is right and acting on them. We would be giving ourselves an unjustified
superior status.
Showing respect for others, therefore, is not endorsing the values by
which they live, but merely acknowledging that they have the same right as
we have of leading their lives in accordance with their own convictions, so
long as their conduct does not harm others. The qualification about the
avoidance of harm is needed as part of the commonly accepted rules regulating
the mutual interaction of people living in the same society. But these rules
would have to be independent of the intrinsic requirements of any particular
religion in a religiously plural society. There are notions of harm, such as
those inflicted by physical violence, disruptions of public order, and invasions
of personal liberty, which all can acknowledge. But the mere violation of
specific religious standards cannot be universally accepted as constituting a
kind of harm. A commitment to religious toleration means that we cannot
regard as harmful the mere failure to conform to one set of religious values,
where such failure does not result in independent, socially undesirable
consequences. A distinction should therefore be made between conduct that
violates purely religious values or conceptions of intrinsic wrongness adopted
by one group, on the one hand, and conduct that adversely affects or
outrightly harms others, independent of their religious views or conceptions
of intrinsic wrongness, on the other hand.
TOLERATION AND THE SECULAR STATE

The above distinction in fact provides the basis for the difference between a
theocratic state and a secular state. The political goals of a secular society in
which there is a great deal of religious diversity are shaped by the framework
of values, including religious toleration, which regulate the relationships
between different groups. These goals cannot therefore be defined in terms of
the distinctive doctrines of any particular religion. Instead, they allow, at the
level of personal behaviour, for a variety of forms of conduct expressing very
566

different and incompatible values. But at the political level, there are common
rules appealing to standards accessible to all and protecting shared interests.
By contrast, in a theocratic state, all areas of life are regulated by the favoured
religious values, and any space left for the expression of individual diversity is
entirely dependent on how far these values and their standards reach. Even
styles of dress and personal preferences may not be matters of individual
choice or discretion.
The exclusion of purely religious considerations from the political demands
made by a secular state does not mean that the state is opposed to religion or
that religion has no place in social life. The opposition is not to religion, but
to the theocratic state and the imposition of religious demands on all. The
secular state takes no side on religious differences which continue to define
the lives and activities of various groups in society. The French interpret their
secular tradition as ruling out the conspicuous displays of religious symbols
in public places. But it is debatable whether secularism requires this policy.
Few things are more conspicuously religious than ornate mosques, churches
and temples, but few people would object to them. Exceptions would be
the Talebans who destroyed ancient Buddhist statues, the Hindus who
demolished a mosque in the name of Rama, and other fanatics which every
religion seems to attract. Perhaps the French policy is justified in terms of
more reasonable secular goals, such as that of promoting integration among
various groups. Sometimes these goals may be best served by playing down
religious differences in certain contexts, just as a common school uniform
removes the competitive pressures to flaunt one’s wealth in distinctive dress
at the expense of solidarity with one’s schoolmates. But the religious and
the secular are not necessarily opposed. To think otherwise is to confuse
different levels of social identity and interaction.
If different religions flourish in a secular state, this should be a matter
of pride. But no religious identity can be the basis of a secular political
identity in the manner in which, for example, some Hindus in secular India
have tried to identify an Indian with a Hindu. Muslims, although a minority
in India, share the same Indian political identity as Hindus. One basis for
the political identity of a secular state is the shared value of religious
toleration. The strength of religious toleration is that it can be acknowledged
by all religious groups without giving up the distinctive religious convictions
and practices which direct so much of their personal lives and confer them
with profound meanings. But the weakness of mere toleration is that the
minimalism of its requirements might not generate strong enough bonds to
forge a sustainable political identity among different religious groups.
Toleration rules out coercive interference with the non-harmful conduct of
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others, but it does not require active engagement with them. Mutually
tolerant religious groups could still live compartmentalized lives without
any dialogue or interaction with one another.
Toleration, Meritocracy and Interaction

In Singapore, several other social ingredients have been added to avoid
toleration without interaction, and to strengthen the political identity of
being “Singaporean”. These include housing and educational policies which
encourage the mingling of various ethnic and religious groups, and the
implementation of a meritocratic policy which provides equal opportunities
for all. Many have noted that equal opportunities do not mean equality of
results. But some may have observed, that too great a difference in results
could, over time, reduce or even undermine, equality of opportunity, as some
embittered parents of poorly-performing children may deprive them of the
physical, emotional and intellectual resources to help them to take advantage
of available opportunities. Supporters of a meritocratic society may find this
difficult to understand, but the remarks of a British socialist writer, Anthony
Crosland, may be instructive. Crosland maintains that a meritocratic society
“actually increases the envy and resentment at the success of others”:
When opportunities are known to be unequal, and the selection criteria
clearly biased towards wealth and lineage, people can comfort themselves
for failure by saying that they never had a proper chance — the system
was unfair, the scales too heavily weighed against them. But if selection
is obviously by merit, this source of comfort disappears, and failure
induces a total sense of inferiority, with no excuse or consolation…11
Whether Crosland is right depends on many factors, including the range
of criteria used for identifying winners and losers, and the general attitude of
society towards success or failure. One of Crosland’s concerns is that merit is
based on a small number of desirable human traits, with “no marks” being
given for “saintliness, generosity, compassion, humour, beauty, assiduity,
continence, or artistic ability”.12 This raises several issues about the general
character of the society in which a meritocratic policy is in place. A well-
balanced society would give public recognition to a wide range of abilities,
even if it cannot confer the same kinds of material rewards on equal success
in different areas. But the great merit of the meritocratic society is that it
provides opportunities for social mobility and allows people with similar
interests and talents, although coming from different cultural and religious
backgrounds, to mix freely and to attain the same public recognition. It
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thereby avoids locking people into the positions of their parents, such as that
which prevails in caste societies. Social identities are fluid across generations,
and can criss-cross. At the religious level, you would identify with one group,
but at the professional level or in your leisure activities, you might identify
with different groups, including members from other religions. In that way,
divisions across religions need not coincide with, and be amplified by, other
social divisions. A religious identity therefore need not be all-consuming.
CONCLUSION
The opportunities available in a meritocratic society, combined with the
generally sympathetic social attitude towards the weak, the vulnerable, and
the unfortunate, will thus help to generate multiple identities in a secular
society. But the opportunities are sometimes not taken when religious leaders
discourage or prohibit their followers from interacting with others. The
followers are then destined to remain on the fringes of their society, with no
sense of solidarity except with their co-religionists everywhere. There is little
then, to hold them back from being willing foot-soldiers working against the
society in which they have found little community, and serving instead, the
interests of their wider religiously-constructed international community.
Notes
Views expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the author.
1. Mill, On Liberty, Ch. 2.
2. Sen, The Argumentative Indian, p. 310.
3. The Australian, 21 July 2005.
4. See Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill, p. 444. Mill made this comment in his
An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, first published in 1865, in
response to the views of Henry Mansel.
5. Schneewind, “Bayle, Locke, and the Concept of Toleration”, p. 6.
6. Ibid., p. 7.
7. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 27. The Letter was originally published
in 1689.
8. The Australian, 26 January 1999.
9. Straits Times, 17 April 2001.
10. John Rawls’s famous “political liberalism” is built on the idea that there are
reasonable disagreements about conceptions of the good life. See Rawls, Political
Liberalism.
11. Crosland, The Future of Socialism, p. 167.
12. Ibid., p. 168.
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References
Crosland, Anthony. The Future of Socialism. London: Jonathan Cape, 1964.
Locke, John. A Letter Concerning Toleration. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955.
Mill, J.S. On Liberty. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
Packe, Michael St John. The Life of John Stuart Mill. London: Secker and Warburg,
1954.
Rawls, John. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Schneewind, J. B. “Bayle, Locke, and the Concept of Toleration”. In Philosophy,
Religion, and the Question of Tolerance, edited by Mehdi Amin Razavi and David
Ambuel, pp. 3–15. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997.
Sen, Amartya. The Argumentative Indian. London: Allen Lane, 2005.
Ten, Chin Liew. A Conception of Toleration. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic,
2004.
———. Multiculturalism and the Value of Diversity. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish
Academic, 2004.
570

Negotiating Christianity with Other Religions 571
24
NEGOTIATING CHRISTIANITY
WITH OTHER RELIGIONS
The Views of Christian Clergymen
in Singapore
Mathew Mathews
INTRODUCTION
Christianity has steadily increased its presence in Singapore in the last few
decades, currently accounting for approximately 14 per cent of the population
(Leow 2001). Much of the growth has been within the Pentecostal, Charismatic
and evangelistically oriented branches of the Christian church (Mathews
1999; Tong 1989). This more fervent branch of the Singapore church has, to
a great extent, been influenced by the growth of American Conservative
Protestantism which has spread its reaches into much of Asia, Africa and
Latin America (Cox 1995; Walls 1996).
Conservative Protestantism has earmarked itself with its high view of
Biblical literalism, as opposed to the more subjective reading of fast-declining
liberal Christianity (Hunter 1987; Marsden 1980; Woodberry and Smith
1998). This fundamental epistemological position which seeks to speak
“truth”, sometimes in absolute terms, has often been interpreted as a tendency
towards intolerance (Kirkpatrick 1993). While research is inconclusive, there
has been substantial research that suggests that conservative groups of Christians
are generally more intolerant of selective groups, especially those with different
571
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572 Mathew Mathews
sexual orientations or from different religious traditions (Gay and Ellison

1993; Smith 1996). It is thus not surprising why many religious groups
within multi-religious Singapore are concerned with the growing Christian
church since it leans towards a conservative position.1
This research project aims to examine Christianity and how it relates to
other religions in this multi-religious nation-state. It focuses on the views of
Christian clergymen since they represent “authorities of delimitation”2 who
frame the discourse for their church going members (Foucault 1972). The
views of these clergymen on four areas are shown here: inter-religious
dialogue and inter-religious relations which are potential sites for developing
religious harmony; and evangelism practices and the non-participation of
Christians in non-Christian rituals which are possible sites of inter-religious
tension. In dealing with these clergymen’s views, I attempt to detail the
diversity of opinions and examine underlying factors which could motivate
their different viewpoints.
METHODOLOGY
Data for this project was obtained through a combination of in-depth
interviews and self-administered surveys conducted with clergymen from a
variety of denominations and independent churches. The survey and
interviews covered the following four broad areas: the acceptability of inter-
religious dialogue; collaborative decisions with other religious groups;
evangelistic practices; and participation in non-Christian rituals (see
Appendix 24.1 for details). To obtain indepth interview contacts, all the
main-line denominations listed in the Singapore Church Directory and the
Roman Catholic Church were contacted through official letters to their
denominational leaders. When approval was received, interviews were set
up with clergymen from the denomination. At times the names of suitable
clergymen were furnished by their respective denominations, though some
denominations allowed the random selection of clergymen. Attempt was
made to obtain clergymen who represented different age cohorts and had
differing theological positions. Efforts to obtain a random sample of non-
affiliated (independent) church pastors were difficult as they refused to be
interviewed. Instead a snow-balling technique was used to speak to a variety
of such independent church ministers. Altogether, fifty-seven in-depth
interviews lasting one to one-and-a-half hours each were conducted. On
the whole, ministers interviewed were forthcoming in discussing the issues
raised and provided their views candidly. The fact that this author was
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theologically trained and was a church minister himself3 helped put many
respondents at ease and provided them the assurance that their statements
would not be misinterpreted.
For the survey, questionnaires were sent by postal mail to clergymen in
the different denominations and independent churches. A population frame
was made using all clergymen who were recognized as being comfortable in
using the English language. This was because the survey instrument required
some competency in the English language. A random list of 380 Protestant
clergymen was generated from the Singapore Church Directory for 2004–
2005 (National Council of Christian Churches 2003) and they were mailed
questionnaires.4 Of the 380 surveys, twelve were returned due to the movement
of the clergymen or their being away for an extended period of time. Altogether
167 surveys were returned which represented a response rate of just under 50
per cent. This was after they were mailed a reminder letter and an email each.
Some of the clergymen responded by explaining their lack of time to complete
the survey. A few were concerned about the confidentiality of the study and
despite assurances, preferred not to complete the survey. Among the clergymen
contacted for the survey were fifty Roman Catholic priests randomly selected
from an available listing of Roman Catholic parish priests found at the
Catholic church’s website <www.veritas.org.sg>. Of these fifty, only sixteen
responded to the survey.5 The data for the Roman Catholic group thus needs
to be taken with some caution. On the other hand, the data for the Protestant
clergymen are of reasonable representativeness.
The specific questions in the survey will be mentioned when data in
subsequent sections are presented. Besides these questions a set of other
questions which measured demographic variables6 and attitudinal factors
ranging from theological orthodoxy7 to charismatic beliefs8 and conservative
beliefs were also used in the survey.9
INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE
Inter-religious dialogue has increasingly been popularized as a means of
bridging the gap between the religious leaders of different faiths. Fundamental
in this effort is the belief that when parties with divergent beliefs meet and
exchange views with one another, they ultimately learn from one another and
enrich themselves (Bollinger 1986; Jelen and Wilcox 1991). However, it is
argued that religious leaders who hold onto more conservative truth claims of
a religion might view that there is little to be gained, and in fact it is
detrimental to be involved in such dialogue with those who hold “un-
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574 Mathew Mathews
Biblical” ideas, as this may result in confusion and corruption of religious

beliefs rather than enlightening participants (Ellison and Musick 1993; Wilcox
and Jelen 1990).
The survey data showed over 70 per cent of respondents reporting that
inter-religious dialogue can be fruitful, at least to some degree (see Table
24.1). Although the largest group was made up of those who showed merely
mild agreement to the proposition, the proportion of those who showed
moderate to strong agreement was substantial. When fence-sitters were removed
from the analysis and the remaining data regrouped into two categories for
better analysis, there were no factors that were significantly important in
predicting clergymen who would view dialogue as fruitful.
TABLE 24.1
Agreement to Statement
“Inter-Religious Dialogue between Religious Leaders Can Be Fruitful”
Protestant and
Protestant clergymen
Roman Catholic clergymen
Number % Number %
Disagree strongly 10 5.5 10 6.0
Disagree moderately 13 7.1 13 7.8
Disagree mildly 23 12.6 23 13.8
Agree mildly 64 35.0 62 37.1
Agree moderately 46 25.1 40 24.0
Agree strongly 27 14.8 19 11.4
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
Interview data suggest that clergymen agreed that dialogue is helpful to

maintain harmony and to strengthen civil society. One minister from an
established denominational church remarked, “I always teach that the
evangelistic mandate of the church is only possible when there is an atmosphere
of peace…dialogue helps maintain this peace.” Here, it is clear that the
minister was able to understand dialogue as significant because it ultimately
enhances the church’s mission by fostering a peaceful religious climate.
Ministers further understood that dialogue helps with the resolution of
inter-religious tension. An independent minister suggested, “When you
start talking to clear things up, you stop imagining the worst”. This minister
pointed to various religious practices and beliefs, both in Christianity and
other religions, which sometimes raised concern among all and which can
be greatly reduced if there is dialogue over these matters. In fact, at least
574

half of the interviewees recognized that “hearing stuff from the horse’s
mouth” was better in understanding another religion and its practices on
its own terms.
While inter-religious dialogue is seen as an appropriate site for the
clarification and better understanding of theological and doctrinal differences,
most clergymen were opposed to what is normally entailed in inter-religious
dialogue as practised in the West. The main project there is to find
commonalities between religious traditions by discussing theological beliefs
in a comparative fashion. Protestant clergymen overwhelmingly recognized
such endeavours as representing a liberal form of Christianity which they
were wary of. Moreover, such an exercise was seen as being unproductive
since the fundamental aim of such inter-religious dialogue is to present
different religions as equal. As such, participants were to experience change
by thinking of their religious beliefs in new ways as an outcome of their
dialogue with other faiths. This was not an acceptable option for the generally
conservative Protestant clergy population. As one clergyman aptly mentioned,
“We hold on to absolute truth claims about our faith and we do not want to
be in a position to dilute them.”10
Clergymen however concurred that inter-religious dialogue which can be
practised locally need to engage practical issues where religionists of different
faiths who have common concerns can have dialogues on these issues together.
One clergyman even told his parishioners that Christians have more in
common with religious adherents of other faiths than with secularists, and
should thus engage them to address common moral issues and dilemmas
faced in contemporary Singapore. In this regard, several ministers reasoned
that inter-religious dialogue in the local space should examine issues such as
the building of the integrated resorts (which include casinos) and
homosexuality, which has recently gained prominence in discussions in the
public sphere. As such, inter-religious dialogue can be a means to the practical
end of strengthening civil society11 and offering a site for religious leaders to
formulate agendas and recommendations for political leaders and policymakers.
There was a significant positive relationship between Protestant clergymen
who reckoned that dialogue can be fruitful and their willingness to engage in
dialogue if they had the opportunity (rho = 0.782, N=167, p<0.001). In fact,
40 per cent of Protestant clergymen and nearly 70 per cent of the Roman
Catholic respondents showed moderate to strong agreement to dialogue if
they had the opportunity (see Table 24.2). However, while the majority of
ministers were agreeable on the need for inter-religious dialogue and accepted
the possible fruitfulness of such attempts, this does not necessarily mean that
they will prioritize these encounters. There are other challenges to dialogue.
One minister remarked:
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576 Mathew Mathews
TABLE 24.2
“I Would Have Dialogue with Leaders of Other Faiths if I Had the Opportunity”
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Agree mildly 63 34.4 58 34.7
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
We don’t even have dialogue between our own churches or with other
denominations when we have different beliefs and they come into
tension points, how likely is it for us to get into dialogue with other
religions. We are really encapsulated in our own world.
The reality of being “encapsulated in their own world” is evident with

ministers emphasizing their very busy schedule and the lack of time to spend
on working on broader issues.
There is thus a tendency to relegate inter-religious dialogue to
denominational executives and leaders (see Table 24.3). Based on the survey,
over half of the Protestant clergymen favoured this. There was no significant
difference between clergymen from different types of denominations (that is,
clergymen from denominations with more centralized control and those with
loose representative systems) in this regard (χ2=0.08, df=2, p=.996). Clergymen
reasoned that denominational executives would represent them amply and
could provide a better delivery for the issues at hand. There was, however,
concern that such deliberations should ultimately reach the clergymen. In the
interviews with clergymen, it was noticed that a proportion of them, even
when they had come from organizations which had deliberated on matters
such as inter-religious dialogue, did not have much knowledge of the various
resolutions made.12
At the same time, some clergymen perceived that much of the dialogue
which has occurred often seem to be merely “forced relationships” instituted
by various state-affiliated bodies. They found such encounters stifling and felt
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TABLE 24.3
“It Would Be Best for Inter-religious Dialogue to be Conducted by
Denominational Leaders and not the Average Church Pastor”
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Missing data 3 1.6 3 1.8
Agree mildly 28 15.3 22 13.2
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
that it would dampen whole-hearted participation which is needed for sincere

attempts at religious harmony.
Some clergymen felt that there are not enough real tensions to warrant
inter-religious dialogue. One minister remarked:
Sometimes we as ministers wonder why there is a push for inter-religious

harmony, we don’t really see too much tension in this area; there are
more critical issues such as racial harmony which really needs to be
worked on.
But another minister who was involved with dialogue, on being told about
such a response, retorted:
If we do not engage in dialogue when it is peaceful, there is no way we

can do it when things are tense. The fact that I have built ties with XXX
[name of another religious leader] means that … let’s say sometimes goes
wrong, I can pick up the phone and arrange to meet and dialogue about
the matter.
Based on the survey data, it is apparent that 15 per cent of Protestant

respondents had moderate to strong objections to participation in inter-
religious dialogue and did not see these efforts as useful. This group of
clergymen was no different from those who showed moderate to high levels
of interest in participating in dialogue based on a variety of attitudinal and
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578 Mathew Mathews
demographic variables, including levels of Christian fundamentalist beliefs.

One pastor used strong words when he was posed questions on inter-religious
dialogue: “Dialogue? What use do I have to dialogue with the representatives
of Satan?” While his was the strongest of reactions, others who were not open
to such dialogue mentioned the scriptural teaching that “light and darkness
do not mix together in communion”. In their opinion, dialogue really smacked
of attempts to bring unity among religions, an agenda foreign to conservative
Biblical interpretation. One clergyman who occupies a senior leadership
position in his denomination remarked: “We do understand the need for
national solidarity to participate [in inter-religious dialogue] but we need to
be careful about our kingdom’s values.”
For this group of ministers, inter-religious dialogue in Singapore is
orchestrated by the state and, as such, those who participated within it are
really in forced relationships. While the minister quoted above and others like
him reasoned that all religions were equal as far as the state was concerned,
this was not the case according to conservative Christian tradition. Thus,
dialogue, as they argued, has a way of subsequently diluting religious uniqueness
and convictions.
The survey data once again highlights that nearly 30 per cent of Protestant
ministers and nearly the same number of Roman Catholic clergymen had
moderate to high agreement to the statement that they had fears that inter-
religious dialogue could lead to compromising religious convictions (see
Table 24.4). When the Protestant set of these ministers were compared to
TABLE 24.4
“I Have Fears that Inter-religious Dialogue can Lead
to Compromising Religious Convictions”
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Agree mildly 36 19.7 35 21.0
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
578

their colleagues who showed moderate to strong disagreement to this statement,

there were no significant differences on a range of categories except for two.
Clergymen who were older (U=817.00, N(1)=46, N(2)=47, p=0.028) and
had a stronger belief in the inerrancy of the scriptures (U=942.50 N(1)=46,
N(2)=47, p=0.048), were more likely to have fears pertaining to dialogue.
This is probably understandable since this group of ministers is more likely to
feel that they are the defenders of an uncompromising faith and so are bound
to be more concerned about the possibility of diluting Christian truth with
secular wisdom.
INTER-RELIGIOUS COLLABORATION
While dialogue is often the beginning of the quest towards better relations
between different religious faiths, proponents of religious harmony also
advocate other means to forge ties between religions. These include neighbourly
reciprocity with acts of kindness, collaboration in projects and possibly inter-
religious worship (Batumalai 1990; Vendley 2005). The survey included
questions dealing with all the above markers of religious harmony, the findings
of which are reported below.
Goodwill Gestures
Reciprocal relationships and exchanges have been known to strengthen
relationships between organizations (Koeszegi 2004). However within the
local religious scene the author has been alerted to occasions when Christian
clergymen rejected the goodwill gestures from other religious bodies, which
have given rise to some unpleasant sentiments. Clergymen in general are
divided on how to handle gifts from non-Christian religious bodies. Data
from the survey which asked clergymen on their agreement to the question,
“I find it difficult to receive donations (without any strings attached) from a
non-Christian religious group for an activity of my church” revealed that over
40 per cent among Protestant clergymen surveyed had moderate to strong
concerns (see Table 24.5). In contrast, only three out of the sixteen Roman
Catholic priests surveyed had such concerns. When Protestant clergymen
who held opposite views were compared, the only significant difference from
a variety of attitudinal and demographic variables was on a statement with
regards to their belief in the continued operation of charismatic gifts in the
current church age13 (U=1196.00, N(1)=57, N(2)=68, p=0.024). This can
possibly be attributed to the fact that some clergymen who are very opposed
to charismatic practices (which are seen as a modern form of Christianity as
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580 Mathew Mathews
TABLE 24.5
“I Find It Difficult to Receive Donations
(without Any Strings Attached) from a Non-Christian Religious Group
for Any Activity of My Church”
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Agree mildly 29 15.8 26 15.6
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
opposed to the historically orthodox faith) are also adamant about keeping
the church from possible influences of non-Christian religions.
Clergymen interviewed did, however, recognize the need for sensitivity
to the good intentions of their neighbours, but at the same time elaborated
their concern that such acceptance of gifts may put them in a position of
obligation. They expressed that while no intention of an obligation may be
made at the time the gift was offered, over time there might be the implicit
expectation that the church make some kind of concessions to the giver’s
beliefs or practices. One clergyman provided the following scenario:
Suppose if we receive a substantial gift from the temple and years later
they come to us rather unhappy that members from their temple are
now no longer with them but with the church and they ask us about
it … it will make us feel bad but we can’t stop reaching out to those
people.
The potential to feel obligated to another religious group was something that
clergymen preferred to avoid since they had no intention of diluting their
conservative Christian truth claims. However, in one case a clergyman described
how the cordial ties between his church and the nearby mosque were
strengthened when the church sent dates to the latter during the fasting
month of Ramadan. Members accepted the gifts with gratitude, as a token of
friendship. Possibly the relatively simple act could be interpreted as a sign of
goodwill which was unlikely to be attached to a hidden agenda.
580

Cooperating on Humanitarian Projects

Theories on inter-group relationships often suggest that collaborative activity
between polarized groups results in a marked improvement of relationships
and a corresponding reduction in prejudice (Pettigrew 1998). While several
attempts have been made by various other religious organizations to collaborate
on projects, particularly those of a humanitarian mission, Protestant Christians
have seldom been involved in them. The acceptability of such collaboration
was assessed based on the survey question: “It will be difficult for me to
cooperate with another non-Christian religious leader for a charity drive in
my community.”
Survey data showed that slightly more than 30 per cent of Protestant
clergymen had moderate to strong agreement that it would be difficult to
cooperate with a non-Christian religious leader, while no Roman Catholic
priest had a similar concern (see Table 24.6). When Protestant clergymen
who held opposing views were compared, belief in the authoritative nature of
the scripture for all of life and not only matters of faith (U=1248.00,
n(1)=55, n(2)=53, p=0.037) and the belief that the Scripture was inerrant
(U=1293.50, n(1)=55, n(2)=53, p=0.045) were significant differences. Possibly,
a more fundamentalist orientation to the scripture predisposes some clergymen
to fears that such cooperation might go against literalist reading of various
scripture portions.14 One clergyman represented the sentiments of quite a few
who were not willing to make such collaborative efforts when he remarked
TABLE 24.6
“It Will Be Difficult for Me to Cooperate with Another Non-Christian Religious
Leader for a Charity Drive in My Community”
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Agree mildly 23 12.6 18 10.8
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
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582 Mathew Mathews
that, “joint projects with others (non-Christian religions) is difficult because

of the implicit propaganda that all religions are equal.” Some pastors also
often echoed their fears that the media was bound to pick up on such
collaborative projects and report them in a way that would project Christianity
as a religion “just like any other”.
Where clergymen were able to accept the possibility of such
collaboration, they had to frame such possibilities with sufficient theological
justification. One clergyman reported that his understanding of the parable
of the good Samaritan helped him to come to the conclusion that helping
others regardless of their theological position and cooperating with others
to achieve this aim is good. Some used the Lutheran two-kingdom
perspective, which sees the right hand of God in gospel proclamation and
the left hand in loving one’s neighbour, as the needed justification to
collaborate. Such clergymen were also able to provide possible concrete
areas for such collaboration in the local scene. One clergyman from a large
Pentecostal church mentioned the situation in Geylang with its many sex
workers there and the constant concern of possible AIDS transmission. He
noted that the many religious groups there could pool together to address
some of these concerns.
Inter-religious Worship
Inter-religious worship and prayer sessions, while popular in many inter-
religious organizations, have seldom involved conservative Christian
participation, especially in the local scene (Van Lin 2002). Based on responses
to the question on the survey, “I would find it ethically difficult to lead in
prayer in a gathering of religious leaders where each leader will lead in prayer
following his religious tradition” (see Table 24.7), it was evident that nearly
half of the Protestant clergymen had moderate to strong agreement to this
statement. No Roman Catholic priest, on the other hand displayed any
moderate concern to being involved in inter-religious prayer. Statistical tests
on the data from Protestant clergymen showed no significant differences
between clergymen who agreed or disagreed with the proposition.
Many of the Protestant clergymen interviewed had difficulties accepting
such inter-religious prayer, even when they were positive on inter-religious
dialogue or collaborative efforts. Most of them noted that such prayer
sessions were a form of spiritual communion which amplified the unity of
all religions, something they strongly opposed. Moreover there were strong
theological objections to such worship which many said smacked of
syncretism. On the other hand, a Protestant clergyman interviewed who
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TABLE 24.7
Agreement to Statement “I Would Find It Ethically Difficult to Lead in Prayer in
a Gathering of Religious Leaders Where Each Leader Will Lead in Prayer
Following His Religious Tradition”
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Agree mildly 26 14.2 24 14.4
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
was comfortable in such settings, explained that when he prayed in such

settings he was always mindful that he was praying in Jesus’ name and
representing the Christian faith, not praying according to any other religious
tradition. He felt that he was actually then becoming a witness for Christ
in a community of non-Christians.
Roman Catholic priests are by far much more comfortable to inter-
religious prayer, despite the fact that some among their laity have expressed
concerns. In a letter to the editor of the Catholic News, a publication
circulated among Roman Catholics, a young Catholic expressed her shock
at seeing a photograph in the local newspaper depicting Catholic nuns and
priests praying at a Hindu temple alongside Hindu devotees on the occasion
of the death of Mother Theresa. Having been asked by her Christian
(evidently Protestant) friends about the beliefs of Catholics with regard to
other religions, she remarks:
I truly wonder what kind of witness we Catholics are giving by

compromising our beliefs in order to please others. The Hindus may
have been honored by your presence and the fact that they were offering
prayers to their idols for Mother Teresa, but my conscience tells me that
God was clearly dishonored by being placed on par with idols that have
eyes but see not, that have ears but hear not and that have mouths but
speak not” (Catholic News, 2 November 1997).
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584 Mathew Mathews
In response, one of the priests who was present at the ceremony defended the
church’s participation in the event with a quote from Mother Teresa:
There is only one God and he is God to all’ …. I’ve always said we
should help a Hindu become a better Hindu, a Muslim become a better
Muslim, a Catholic become a better Catholic (Catholic News, 2 November
1997).
This was used by the priest to reinforce the fact that the Roman Catholic
Church places emphasis in its attempt to have dialogue with and relate to
people of other faiths as equal partners, and as such needed to accord them
respect in their worship practices.
Evidently, as the case of the Roman Catholic clergymen suggests, there is
probably some link between attitudes towards other religions and collaborative
efforts. Various Roman Catholic declarations such as Vatican II and the
numerous documents of the late Pope John Paul II have brought about a
change among Roman Catholic clergymen worldwide in how they relate to
other faiths (Plaiss 2001).This link, at least theoretically, becomes even more
apparent when we consider evangelism, discussed in the next section.
EVANGELISM AND VIEWS ON OTHER RELIGIONS

The Buddhist nun Chodron (2000) mentions that her Buddhist members in
Singapore admit that they are afraid of revealing their status as practising
Buddhists because of their fears of their fervent Christian colleagues in their
workplace. Apparently, these Christian colleagues would pressurize non-
Christians to attend church services and insist that they read various Christian
literature. She remarks that such evangelistic activity is antithetical to religious
harmony. This view is shared by a number of scholars (Newman 1982) and
is partly responsible for the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill (1990)15
(Sinha 2005).
Some have suggested that the passionate zeal for evangelism observed in
some Christian groups stems from their theological beliefs. Three broad
categories have been popularly used to categorize different Christian views of
the salvational properties of non-Christian religions and non-Christians. The
pluralists view that the many different conceptions of the divine or religious
are all ultimately various culturally and historically conditioned images of the
same divine reality. Thus, no religion is superior since truth is relative. Jesus
Christ is then rightly one of the possible paths to salvation which can be
rightfully found in many other religious traditions (Knitter 1985).
584

The inclusivists take a more Christ-centric view and understand salvation

as made possible through the sacrificial death of Jesus Christ and the individual’s
acceptance of his free gift. Within this group, there are some who take a more
universalistic approach and argue that since God is omnipotent and full of
grace and mercy, He will find a way to achieve his goal, even apart from the
individual’s personal response to the Christian faith (Newbingin 1989).
Various Christian theologians in this camp have argued for the “anonymous
Christian”, one who in many ways resembles the Christian in life and
thought but does not identify himself as one, for various cultural reasons
(D’Costa 1986).
The third stance is described as exclusivism which insists that Christianity
is the only way to eternal salvation made by a personal profession of faith in
Jesus Christ during one’s life-time (Morrison 1999). All who do not make
such a decision are condemned to everlasting separation from God. Others
within this camp, placing themselves in the middle between an exclusivist
and an inclusivist model, argue that there is a possibility that God will
provide another opportunity for repentance and redemption after death since
there is little scriptural teaching that excludes this possibility (Covell 1993).
Since there is no research that has attempted to deal with the different
theological beliefs of clergymen in the Singapore context, particularly with
reference to their salvational properties, this is examined before dealing with
the evangelistic methods endorsed by these religious leaders. The discussion
will be mostly confined to Protestant Christianity since the Roman Catholic
position articulated by Vatican II has been officially embraced by Roman
Catholic clergymen in Singapore.16
None of the respondents interviewed adopted a pluralist model to
understand Christianity and its place with other religions. The climate of the
Protestant churches in Singapore, which generally espouses a conservative
stance, has been well wary of this approach and has labelled this as a “liberal”
persuasion. In fact some senior clergymen told of how this form of Christianity
was held by some of the earlier missionary theological educators, but which
left with them when they departed. Theological colleges since then have
adopted a historically conservative Christian stance.
The majority of my respondents used a traditional exclusivist model
where they viewed salvation only through Christ, and eternal punishment to
those who do not accept him. However, even among this group, several of
them acknowledged that there is always a dilemma whenever they attended
the funeral of someone who was recognized as good or who may have had
little chance to hear the Gospel. At these instances there was always the hope
that these individuals would have a second chance at salvation.
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586 Mathew Mathews
A small population of clergymen argued for a soteriological17 position

that recognizes that there is no way to know the state of those who had not
followed Christ. Several of them discussed their journey from a more traditional
exclusivist model to a more inclusivist position as they wrestled with the
various theologies that they had been exposed to, often through their exposure
to training overseas or through missionary contacts.
Regardless of their soteriological position, most clergymen acknowledged
that they viewed other religions as having facets of truth, and often framed
this as general revelation.18 Pastors who had been exposed to comparative
religion tended to view other religionists as seekers, although stating that they
still needed to be pointed to the right direction which is ultimately to Christ.
As one independent pastor mentioned, “All these religions are good and they
teach good principles, but only Christianity allows a relationship with God.”
These pastors also celebrated some of the teachings of sages from other
religions and provided insights through the observation of their worship
practices. One pastor, for instance, mentioned how he saw great lessons
through observing the respect Muslims accorded to their religious services,
which was missing in contemporary Christian churches.
However, even among ministers who celebrated the teachings of other
religious traditions (when they were compatible with Christian truth claims),
they made a distinction when it came to many religious practices. This
particularly occurred when they observed popular Buddhist and Taoist practices
which they argued had elements of the “demonic” present within them. In
fact some of the pastors discussed how some of these popular religious
practices were characterized by fear among their practitioners and, in their
words, “put people in bondage”. This had led to the practice among a
significant number of churches, particularly those that have adopted a
Charismatic slant, to emphasize “spiritual warfare” at some of the sites where
worship to such spirits are conducted. The practice of spiritual warfare
usually involves members discreetly praying and commanding demonic forces
which enslave people to be evicted.19
The interview data revealed that Protestant clergymen were to a large
extent conservative when it came to their views on other religion and the
possibility of obtaining salvation as an adherent of non-Christian religious
traditions. While independent and Charismatic-type clergymen were more
pronounced in the traditional exclusive position and defended it,
denominational clergymen were equally traditional in espousing an exclusivist
orientation. This has partly to do with the influence that conservatism has
among a broad spectrum of Singaporean Christianity.
586

Although conservative in their theologies, Christian leaders were, however,

varied in how they conducted their evangelistic efforts. As a pastor from an
established denomination acknowledged: “Yes it’s a life and death thing but
what extent are we going to save them… oftentimes it’s people with
confrontational personalities who go beyond the limits.”
Another clergyman echoed the statement with the following: “Look at
the parable of the sower, only some seed fall on good group. Salvation
ultimately is the Lord’s and he will save those he finally chooses. My job is to
do what I can to proclaim the message.”
These pastors and others similarly argued that their exclusivist position
did not necessarily influence how they conducted evangelism. They had
constructed a theology which included the possibility that some would be
saved and others lost. These pastors recognized that confrontational
personalities were probably more the cause of insensitive evangelism, than an
exclusivist theology.
Clergymen who felt that it was their duty to preach messages which dealt
with the reality of heaven and hell often discussed how they made efforts to
do this with sensitivity, but at the same time, were cautious not to dilute the
need for a personal faith in Christ for salvation. In the process they endeavoured
to skirt the issue of the fate of those who follow other religious paths. One
clergyman put it this way: “I will not mention other religions in my preaching
but I certainly will declare that the only way, truth and life is in Jesus, I can
reinforce my points without provoking other faiths.”
Preaching about future salvation, however, was not the main concern of
many pastors and was not deemed an important technique of evangelistic
preaching. One clergyman echoed this well:
I don’t care to deal too much with issues of hell and heaven in my
preaching. I want people to experience life with God. I want them to
meet God and become connected to him. There are too many things to
bother right here on earth before heaven.
Dealing with issues of this world then, serves as the focus in many
evangelistic methods. Clergymen often advocate what is often called within
Christian circles, “friendship evangelism” in which parishioners intentionally
make efforts to develop friendships with others, including colleagues, families
and friends. They are challenged to be approachable, caring and, whenever
possible, show gestures of kindness. In this way, they become well trusted
friends. Members are also encouraged to be sensitive to the needs of their
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588 Mathew Mathews
friends and, whenever possible, offer Christ and the church to help them with
their needs. As one clergyman reiterated:
Jesus is the answer to the many problems people have and we offer that
as much as we can. Many are seeking for solutions with their many
problems, physical, emotional, and even spiritual and we position ourselves
to offer Christ.
Church members are also encouraged to accompany their friends to a

variety of programmes run by the church, many of which cater to non-
Christians who are interested in exploring the Christian faith. One such
programme is the Alpha course which provides a non-threatening platform
for individuals who are interested in discovering the truth claims of Christianity
without being pressured to convert into Christianity. In more Charismatic-
type churches, various evangelistic services where there were displays of
miraculous healings or other divine manifestations have become popular
events to invite non-Christian friends.
In recent years however, a more institutionalized form of evangelism has
grown in prominence. The Community Penetration Project, as it is commonly
called, involves Christian churches making their influence known in various
communities. For some, these are communities within the vicinity of the
church, while among other churches these communities represent
neighbourhoods with high non-Christian populations. This new direction
that many churches have taken came about with the recognition that friendship
evangelism, though effective, has its limits. As a clergyman explained, “There
is only so much you can do to present the Gospel to your friends.” The
Community Penetration Project provides new avenues for evangelism.
Along with the Community Penetration initiative, churches have also set
up agencies which are often referred to as community services. The author
was introduced by Protestant clergymen to a range of activities that form the
community service arms of these churches. These include the customary
provision of social services such as counselling, studentcare facilities, childcare
centres and even the organization of social events for the community. For
example, some churches actively organize dinners for the community, which
sometimes run up to 1,000 guests; entertain residents though cultural and
variety shows and fun fairs; and facilitate excursions to various places. At
times the churches’ community services team up with Residents’ Committees
and other neighbourhood bodies to provide their programmes. The fact that
these are popular with the community was attested to by the fact that
clergymen interviewed often referred to the expansion of the scale of their
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activities. One of them mentioned, “The community knows that if it is the

[name] Community Services that is organizing, they are bound to get a good
deal.” This is no wonder since the church has been able to mobilize a range
of talents to organize many of its events. The purpose of these community
events then, “is to open doors for people. Christianity is sometimes so foreign
to them that we want them to know that we are really genuine people.”
As the same pastor observed, this is particularly important to the
residential heartlands whose population have always associated Christianity
with a Western religion and with the English-educated middle and upper
classes. The emphasis of these community programmes then shows that
Christians are willing and interested in engaging and befriending the non-
English-educated heartland population.
While church-based community services generally operate outside the
church compound, invitations are extended to the community to attend
events in the church at times, particularly for Easter and Christmas celebrations.
In fact at times these celebrations are endorsed by Residents Committees as
part of the broader agenda to foster better inter-religious and inter-ethnic
ties. These events held within the church premises are, however, non-
evangelistic. This is no loss to the church. As one clergyman mentioned,
“Then we don’t evangelize, we want them to know that stepping into a
church building is not tantamount to conversion.” The aim of these community
services is bridge-building, to cultivate long-term friendship with residents
and to give Christians the opportunity to do good works to their non-
Christian community, which is seen ultimately as a way to increase non-
Christians’ receptivity to the Christian faith.
Pastors did make special mention that they were conscious not to engage
in any evangelistic activity in the process of their community activities. In
fact, at times they had to hold back members who were overly zealous and
who were wondering why they were not going beyond good works. One
pastor mentioned that if someone showed interest in attending the church
itself as a result of their exposure to the community service, the staff of the
community service agency would contact someone from the church to attend
to the person’s queries. In this way, the church hopes to make a clear
separation between church and community services, the latter of which are
attempts to do good works and not actively preach.20 On the other hand,
most clergymen interviewed also noticed that the communities that they
were involved in synonymously associated the church-based community
programmes with the respective church.
This new trend in evangelism, using community outreach methods and
a generally soft sell approach, rather than more aggressive methods such as
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street preaching, should not be seen as any effort by Protestant clergymen to

dilute their exclusivist Christian stance. Rather, it is an example of how
religious groups have adapted themselves to new cultural realities (Stevens
2004). Clergymen who used to pursue more aggressive methods of evangelism
revealed that over the years they realized that there were dwindling results.
Their pragmatic interests to increase church membership then resulted in
newer approaches to evangelizing which recognized that, as a clergyman
expressed, “You need to earn their right to share the Gospel so you must really
work on how you present yourself to them.”21 Thus, these newer forms of
evangelism which use a less threatening approach attempt to be congruent
with soft-sell marketing techniques that are perceived to be necessary with
populations that are cautious about Christianity.
PARTICIPATION IN NON-CHRISTIAN RITUALS

This section examines the views of clergymen on the acceptability of Christian
participation in non-Christian religious activities and rituals. The lack of
such participation, at least based on anecdotal evidence, has received some
interest and has been implicated for inter-religious tension especially within
the family. With the increasing rates of conversion to Christianity among
younger Singaporeans, parents and relatives are left distressed at their children’s
lack of participation in religious rituals which, according to their beliefs, is
disrespectful to the gods or ancestors and can result in various disastrous
consequences. Clergymen, as representatives of the church, are often implicated
by family members as being unreasonable in not allowing their children or
relatives to participate in these rituals. To them, the ceremonies are simple
ones which do not require much effort or cost, and thus do not understand
why Christians object to such participation.
The survey dealt with several of these different practices and asked
clergymen their opinion of what practices they would be willing to accept if
there was need to maintain some peace in the family. It concentrated on
rituals which are more commonly associated with Chinese/Buddhist religious
practices, and to a lesser extent with Hindu rites. These included:
1. The acceptability of following a procession around a coffin led by a

Chinese medium/ Buddhist monk;
2. Bowing to a deceased family member in a coffin during a Chinese/
Buddhist/Hindu funeral;
3. Eating food which has been offered by family members to an idol22 at an
altar;
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4. Holding joss sticks/other religious objects in a non-Christian funeral rite

with a clear conscience that one is not engaged in any worship but merely
following along with others; and
5. Placing flowers at a non-Christian altar table in honour of one’s ancestors.
From the data (see Tables 24.8–24.13), it is evident that a considerable

number of clergymen did not find many non-Christian religious practices
acceptable, with the highest percentages finding the use of joss sticks or
religious artifacts unacceptable (87 per cent among all interviewed and 93 per
cent among Protestant clergymen). Roman Catholic clergymen, however,
were much more accommodating, with eleven out of sixteen priests accepting
the use of joss sticks. Bowing to the dead and eating food offered to an idol
at altars received more acceptance from Protestant clergymen, with
approximately 27 per cent each.
TABLE 24.8
Acceptance of Practice —
Following a Procession around a Coffin
Led by a Chinese Medium/Buddhist Monk
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Not acceptable 154 84.2 146 87.4
Acceptable 29 15.8 21 12.6
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
TABLE 24.9
Bowing to a Coffin of a Deceased Family Member
during a Chinese/Buddhist/Hindu Funeral
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Acceptable 59 32.2 45 26.9
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
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592 Mathew Mathews
TABLE 24.10
Eating Food Which Has Been Offered by Family Members to an Idol
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Acceptable 52 28.4 46 27.5
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
TABLE 24.11
Holding Joss-Sticks/Other Religious Objects in a Non-Christian Funeral Rite with
a Clear Conscience That One Is Not Engaged in Any Worship
but Merely Following along with Others
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Acceptable 23 12.6 11 6.6
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
TABLE 24.12
Placing Flowers at a Non-Christian Altar Table
in Honour of One’s Ancestors
Protestant and
Number % Number %
Acceptable 124 67.8 113 67.7
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
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TABLE 24.13
Agreement to the Statements —
None of the Above Are Acceptable Options
Protestant and
Number % Number %
No 139 76.0 123 73.7
Yes 44 24.0 44 26.3
Total 183 100.0 167 100.0
When a scale was constructed, computed on the number of items pastors

were willing to accept, there was a significant negative correlation between
increasing acceptance of these religious practices and the belief that the
Pentateuch was written by Moses and not later authors (rho=-.246, N=167,
p<0.001). This statement represents the position held by those with higher
levels of theological conservatism who are averse to the modernist theological
understanding which claims that the Pentateuch was a product of a series of
later redactors and not Moses himself. It is arguable that those with greater
conservative beliefs, especially those beliefs related to the authenticity of the
scripture, were less accepting of participation in various non-Christian practices
following strict literal interpretations of the scripture.
The pastors interviewed were well aware of the tensions that occurred in
the families of their members as a result of conversion, though several noted
that there had been lesser tension over the years, primarily because of the
increasing acceptability of Christianity among Singaporean families. Some of
the ministers had first-hand insights of these tensions, having been first-
generation Christians themselves, in families whose members were opposed
to their conversion. In a few cases, clergymen expressed how, upon their
conversion, they had been subjected to considerable pressure, ostracization
and made scapegoats because of their lack of participation in religious rites.
Some of these clergymen shared how it had taken many years to restore their
relationships with their family of origin.
Many pastors explained that they educate their members to be open and
public about their Christian faith at the onset of their conversion. This is to
prepare family members to the fact that they would not be taking part in
certain rituals because of their conviction in their new-found faith. At the
same time, as one pastor mentioned: “We teach our members to be filial
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sons…so families know that we are not robbing them of their children…we
even encourage our members to give financially to their parents.”
Another pastor, in reference to the relationship between being filial and
following religious rituals, remarked:
In fact, some people do all the elaborate rituals but don’t do anything
else to care for their families while the parent is living… it seems to me
that they are just easing their conscience [by performing the rites]… here
we teach children to take care of elders and show filial piety while they
are living.
Clergymen interviewed acknowledged that they were often asked to offer

insights to their members on the acceptable level of participation during non-
Christian religious rituals. Conservative pastors generally tried to make a
distinction between what was religious or had such overtones, and what
could be properly addressed as cultural symbols. They generally encouraged
wholehearted participation in cultural expressions but advocated that Christians
should refrain from religious practices. As one denominational leader explained:
“We emphasize the need to be loyal to Christ. We need to think about what
we do in these situations. How do others read it? We need to represent
exclusive Christianity without being judgemental.”
In a similar vein, another clergyman mentioned: “While the Bible says
we need to be at peace with all men, in the same breath it says we must be
holy. We cannot compromise on that. We need to maintain our testimony.”
As can be seen from these statements, non-participation of Christians in
religious rituals is primarily to maintain in a public way that the individual is
a Christian, and as such would only show spiritual loyalty to the God he
worships. This then reinforces the belief that Christianity is exclusive in
its claims.
In some denominations and churches, there has been some consensus or
official position taken as to what would be acceptable as cultural practices. In
fact, a Christian clergyman, Daniel Tong, has even written a book A Biblical
Approach to Chinese Traditions and Beliefs which attempts to deal with individual
practices, providing opinions on what is cultural and what is religious.
However, the perception is that there is in fact little consensus. A few pastors
mentioned that this lack of consensus is often problematic to members
because non-Christian families often ask why some clergymen condoned
participation in religious rituals while others objected.
The level of participation that Christians can engage in also depends
on the meanings imbued to particular ceremonies at a given time. One
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theological educator pointed out that since ceremonies change over time
with the associated public perception of the event, it is important that
Christian clergymen find out from non-Christian religious leaders about
how they view particular rituals. If there is a clear sense that a certain
activity is deemed as incurring religious meaning, then Christians should
continue to abstain from these practices, but if they have now become
cultural expressions, there might be more reason to embrace these practices.
A pastor gave an example, common in many Chinese households, of
various food items which are placed at the altar table. According to him, if
the family views it as purely a symbol of respect, there is little concern about
participating in eating the food. On the other hand, if there are religious
beliefs associated with placing food at the altar, such as beliefs that the dead
ancestor’s spirit first participated in the meal, then there is a good reason for
Christians to abstain from eating the food.
The pastors interviewed also felt that other religionists should tolerate
the lack of Christian participation in what was religious in nature. They
argued that they themselves would not pressure non-Christians to perform
Christian rituals either. At the same time, they acknowledged that increasingly
Taoist and Buddhist monks were helpful in informing families that the
Christian members need not participate in some of the religious rituals.
As to how Christian members should present themselves at these
ceremonies where non-Christian rites are being performed, the pastors
mentioned that they instructed Christians not to be stand-offish or be
judgemental but to remain respectful. Some noted that in the past, some
Christians would completely excuse themselves from these ceremonies or
when present, be antagonistic. Currently, clergymen encourage church
members to be involved in these ceremonies, particular those marking life
transitions, by engaging in the many other duties that these occasions accorded.
These include providing hospitality to guests, handling of finances and
administering the various segments of the ceremony. The clergymen at times
encourage their members to perform alternative symbolic acts and to provide
the needed explanations to family members about this. Most conservative
Protestant pastors (see Table 24.11) were not open to their members holding
joss sticks or incense in non-Christian rites because these are associated with
worship.23 At the same time they encouraged members to work out alternative
means of showing their respect to the deceased or the ancestors through using
flowers or placing other tokens in memory of the deceased. As can be seen in
Table 24.13, there was 67 per cent acceptance for this practice among
Protestant clergymen.
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596 Mathew Mathews
According to the majority of clergymen interviewed, the advice that they

provided to church members with regard to abstaining from religious rituals
is never forced on members. At times, clergymen showed their support to
members who may have decided to participate in these rituals by physically
being present at the occasion and reassuring the member of God’s forgiveness.
One pastor clarified his belief that participating in some of these rituals was
no different from other sins and thus the member should not be made to feel
overly guilty.
However, in the case of several ministers, their concern about the
participation of members in non-Christian rituals was not merely based on
the loss of a Christian witness. In their experience, church members who had
participated in some ritual practices allowed themselves to “come under
Satanic attack”. Some pastors, even those who did not espouse a Charismatic
theology which popularized this notion of demonic oppression, pointed out
that they had noticed some Christians who had participated in non-Christian
religious activity, such as entering temples or engaging in other religious
activity, exhibited strange maladies which they understood as demonic
oppression. These maladies could be expressed in bouts of depression,
hallucinations and were remedied when the Christian sought deliverance —
a practice similar to exorcism where demonic forces are renounced and
commanded to leave the individual. The pastors felt that it would be most
advisable to refrain from these rituals which could result in dire consequence
for the Christian.
CONCLUSION
In discussing the views of clergymen, this chapter has highlighted how they,
especially Protestant ministers, have to negotiate the tensions created by their
exclusivist view of Christianity and the need to co-exist peacefully in a multi-
religious nation-state that treats breaches of inter-religious harmony with
legislature (Sinha 2005). Often, these tension points have to be negotiated
with theological rationalizations, as undertaken by many religious groups
which encounter changing environments (Ammermann 1997). However,
this is never done at the expense of diluting the exclusivity of the Christian
faith. This overwhelming need to preserve the essential difference between
Christianity and other religions can be understood sociologically as an attempt
to draw symbolic boundaries between itself and other out-groups, creating
the needed tension with its environment (Smith et al. 1996). Failing to do
this, conservative Christianity in Singapore loses its vitality in a competitive
religious economy.
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Bearing in mind the real and potential tensions created by conservative

and exclusivist Christainity in Singapore’s multi-religious setting, the following
policy guidelines are suggested.
1. Inter-religious groups and organizations (IROs) need to expand their
outreach to conservative Protestant Christianity which is under-represented
in such organizations. Such representation is vital as conservative
Christianity is likely to grow. However, to obtain participation from this
group, inter-religious organizations may have to redefine their purpose
and activities and to avoid those which may appear to dilute the exclusivist
stance that conservative Protestant Christianity adopts.
2. Inter-religious dialogue activities within the Singaporean social space
should focus on pragmatic concerns. This will greatly increase the
possibility of incorporating Christian clergymen especially if there is state
endorsement that such dialogue activities can function as the moral
conscience of Singapore society.
3. Funding priorities could be made for social services or charitable activities
where religious leaders from different religious groups collaborate. Such
collaboration will further foster good neighbourly relationships and
possibly reduce inter-religious prejudice.
4. Christian training institutions such as seminaries and Bible colleges
which train clergy for Christian ministry should consider offering more
exposure to their students in the beliefs and practices of other religions.
Courses in Asian religions frequently offered in seminaries here could be
supplemented with exposure to religious leaders of other faiths.
5. Christian churches should be encouraged to self police their evangelistic
methods to ensure that they present to the community a Christian
witness that does not damage the overall reputation of Christianity in a
largely non-Christian population.
6. Media representatives should be made aware of the concerns of churches
that they are fairly portrayed should they collaborate with non-Christian
religions. Attempts to show that these religions are all essentially the same
may act in a negative manner to continued collaborative efforts.
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APPENDIX 24.1
SURVEY BACKGROUND AND QUESTIONS
A. Views on aspects of inter-religious harmony and participation were asked through

the following questions. Respondents were asked the extent of their agreement
to the following statements. A six-point Likert Scale with “1” coded as “Disagree
strongly” and “6” coded as “Agree strongly” was used to rate agreement.
1. Inter-religious dialogue between religious leaders can be fruitful.
2. I would have dialogue with leaders of other faiths if I had the opportunity.
3. It will be difficult for me to cooperate with another non-Christian religious

leader for a charity drive in my community.
4. I have fears that inter-religious dialogue can lead to compromising religious

convictions.
5. It would be best for inter-religious dialogue to be conducted by

denominational leaders and not the average church pastor.
6. I find it difficult to receive donations (without any strings attached) from a

non-Christian religious group for an activity of my church.
7. I would find it ethically difficult to lead in prayer in a gathering of religious

leaders where each leader will lead in prayer following his religious tradition.
B. Views on the acceptance of participation in aspects of non-Christian worship

was asked using the following question:
The following are some practices which are commonly practised by non-Christian
religions. Which of them would you feel is permissible for a Christian believer
to participate in if there was a need to maintain peace in the family? (Choose as
many options as you would like)
❑ Following a procession around a coffin led by a Chinese Medium/Buddhist

monk.
❑ Bowing to a coffin of a deceased family member during a Chinese/Buddhist/
Hindu funeral.
❑ Eating food which has been offered by family members to an idol.
❑ Holding joss sticks/other religious objects in a non-Christian funeral rite
with a clear conscience that one is not engaged in any worship but merely
following along with others.
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❑ placing flowers at a non-Christian altar table in honour of one’s ancestors.

❑ none of the above are acceptable options.
C. Conservative theological beliefs (also known as a fundamentalist Christian

position) were measured through respondents’ agreement to the following
statements. These were measured on a Likert scale with “1” coded as “Disagree
strongly” and “6” coded as “Agree strongly”.
1. The Bible is the inerrant word of God.
2. The Bible is authoritative in all areas of life and not only in areas of faith.
3. The miracles recorded in the Bible were actual events.
4. The Pentateuch was written by Moses and not a product of later authors.
D. Endorsement of Charismatic beliefs were measured through a single item measured

using a Likert scale as mentioned above. The statement read as:
Spiritual gifts such as prophesy, word of wisdom and healing are still
operational in the church today.
E. Demographic variables asked in the survey include:

1. Denominational affiliation
2. Congregational size
3. Congregational ethnic composition
4. Ecclesiastical position
5. Secular educational attainment
6. Theological educational attainment
7. Age
8. Years of service in ministry
9. Gender
Notes
The author thanks the many denominational executives who allowed him to interview
clergy within their denominations. Notable thanks to Msg Nicholas Chia of the
Roman Catholic Church, Rt Rev Dr Robert Solomon and the President of the
English, Chinese and Tamil Conferences of the Methodist Church, Rt Rev Dr John
Chew and Ven Rennis Ponniah of the Anglican Church, Bishop John Tan of the
Lutheran Church, the Synod of the Presbyterian Church, and executive board
members of the Assemblies of God. Views expressed in this chapter are entirely those
of the author.
1. There appears to be a relationship between religious fundamentalism and Christian
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orthodoxy (Kirkpatrick 1993). Even a cursory look at the Singaporean Protestant

church indicates orthodoxy in its beliefs.
2. In the course of this chapter, I have used various words which are synonymous
to clergymen — pastors, ministers and priests at times when dealing with the
Roman Catholic clergy. There is no intention to represent a different type of
minister, since these terms are oftentimes interchangeable in the local scene.
3. I am pastor of Alive Community Church, an independent Pentecostal church.
4. These questionnaires were part of another study the author was conducting
entitled “Clergy and Counsellors: Mental Healthcare in Singapore”. This study
examined clergymen and their counselling ministry. Respondents were given a
token of $10 in the form of a food voucher as a token of appreciation for
participation.
5. Around the time of the survey, a Roman Catholic priest was being tried in court
for the misappropriation of church funds and donations. The case was highly
publicized and this may have put some Catholic priests off responding to the
study due to concerns that any information they provide to external sources may
be misused.
6. Demographic variables included age, years of service in the ministry, denomination
affiliation, congregation size, and education both secular and theological.
7. Likert scale questions asked for their belief in the inerrancy of the Bible, the
authority of the Bible in all aspects of life, the veracity of the miracles in the Bible
and the belief that the Pentateuch was written by Moses and not a later author.
8. Likert scale questions asked for their agreement to the continued presence of
spiritual gifts such as word of knowledge and prophecy, the applicability of
deliverance ministry to help with people’s emotional needs, and the belief that
ministers can receive a word from the Lord to help others with their problems.
9. Likert scale questions asked for agreement that divorce should only be allowed
for adultery and that psychological knowledge represented worldly wisdom and
not real change.
10. This was in stark contrast to Roman Catholic clergymen. An authority on inter-
religious dialogue among the Roman Catholics in Singapore remarked that
dialogue was probably the most useful vehicle that the church had to evangelize
among other faiths. By evangelism however, he was stressing the Christian
message, which was embodied in God’s message of love and not the messenger,
Jesus Christ.
11. Chia (2003), a local theologian writing in a local Christian journal, on discussing
inter-faith relations, highlights four areas of possible cooperation with religious
leaders of non-Christian faiths: nation-building, civil society, public welfare and
a quest for peace. This resonated with the views of clergy I interviewed who
generally saw dialogue as means to deal with common concerns in the Singapore.
12. The National Council of Churches of Singapore (NCCS) had put out a tract
discussing some of the common issues on maintaining relationships with other
religions (Guide to Common Issues in Inter-Religious Relations). The contents of
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this tract is found in the organization’s website <http://www.nccs.org.sg/

commonissue.html>. However, many clergymen were not aware of the tracts or
the various efforts made by the NCCS to address issues on inter-faith relationships.
13. The survey question used asked for respondents agreement on the statement,
“Spiritual gifts such as prophesy, word of wisdom and healing are still operational
in the church today.” Historically, a broad section of Christianity has agreed that
these spiritual gifts (or charismatic gifts, as they are sometimes referred to) ceased
with the end of the Apostolic age (around 100 A.D.). These supernatural signs
were to primarily demonstrate the veracity of truth claims propounded by
Christianity in its formative years. With the rapid spread and acceptance of
Christianity in the Roman Empire, these signs were no longer necessary. The
Pentecostal movement which began at the turn of the last century, however, has
argued that spiritual gifts including speaking in tongues and prophesy are
relevant to the current church period. Accordingly these gifts have been
demonstrated sporadically throughout church history.
14. One common verse which could have been important in determining is Paul’s
injunction of not being unequally yoked with unbelievers. For some literalists,
this would involve all kinds of cooperation including business ventures and
marriage partners.
15. There are several instances discussed in the Annex of the White Paper on the
Maintenance of Religious Harmony presented to Parliament in 1989 which
clearly demonstrate examples of insensitive Christian evangelism.
16. Mark Plaiss (2001), quoting Vatican documents, points out the words of the
Nostra Aetate, “The Catholic church rejects nothing of what is true and holy in
these religions. She has a high regard for the manner of life, the precepts and
doctrines which…often reflect a ray of that truth which enlightens all
men…Furthermore, the Council admonishes Christians that through sincere
and patient dialogue they themselves might learn of the riches which a generous
God has distributed among the nations.”
A further statement in a 1990 encyclical of John Paul II conveys the
universal availability of salvation to include those who may not have explicitly
believed in Christ. “The universality of salvation means that it is granted not
only to those who explicitly believe in Christ and have entered the church. Since
salvation is offered to all, it must be concretely available to all.”
17. Soteriology is the Christian doctrine of salvation.
18. Christian theologians differentiate between general and special revelation. The
former refers to the revelation of God through the witness of creation, which can
be apprehended through human intellect and reason, while the latter refers to
God’s self disclosure through his dealings with his covenant people such as
Moses and Paul. These special dealings have been recorded into the scripture.
19. Spiritual warfare prayer is not restricted to worship practices deemed demonic.
They also extend to places of immoral activity and entertainment. Several
clergymen qualified their prayer efforts by stating that they emphasize to people
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that they are not to hate those who practise these activities (be it the worship or
immoral activity) but to love them. Their militancy is to be focused on the
demonic spirits that oppress the people.
20. The community services and other programmes however did offer opportunities
for the residents to be exposed to Christian meetings. At times invitations to
various programmes offered by the church would be made to those who follow
community events.
21. Ministers often mentioned that because of confrontational forms of evangelism
in the past, some sections within the Singaporean population are resistant to
Christianity.
22. With the benefit of hindsight, this question could have read “Eating food which
has been offered by family members on an altar”. This change would have been
more inclusive to include offerings made both to an ancestor or deceased family
member/relative or a deity. Nonetheless within Christian usage, the notion of
food offered to idols includes both offerings to ancestors or deities as is
demonstrated in a popular Christian resource book on dealing with Chinese
traditions (c.f. Tong 2003, p. 155).
23. While the sinologist, Lin Yutang, clarified several decades ago, that joss sticks are
to the Chinese what flowers are to Westerners, most clergymen did not see joss
sticks in this regard. Protestant clergymen often highlighted that their observation
of Chinese religious culture in Singapore clearly demonstrated to them that joss
sticks were still considered items used primarily for worship practice among lay
religious practitioners. One theologian acknowledged that over time when joss
sticks were no longer viewed by a broad section of the population as associated
with worship practices, there would be little problem for Christians to use them
as cultural items.
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Effect?” Social Forces 72, no. 2 (1993): 379–99.
Finke, Roger and Roger Stark. “Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious
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———. “How the Upstart Sects Won America: 1776–1850”. Journal for the Scientific
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311–32.
Hunter, James Davison. Evangelicalism: the Coming Generation. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1987.
Jelen, Ted G. and Clyde Wilcox. “Religious Dogmatism Among White Christians:
Causes and Effects”. Review of Religious Research 33 (1991): 32–46.
Kirkpatrick, Lee A. “Fundamentalism, Christian Orthodoxy, and Intrinsic Religious
Orientation as Predictors of Discriminatory Attitudes”. Journal for the Scientific
Study of Religion 32 (1993): 258–68.
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Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism 1870–1925. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1980.
Mathews, Mathew. Organizing for Growth in Singaporean Charismatic Churches.
Unpublished Academic Exercise: National University Singapore, 1999.
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Religious Relations) <http://www.nccs.org.sg/commonissue.html>.
———. A Guide to Church and Christian Organizations 2004–2005. Singapore:
National Council of Churches of Singapore, 2003.
Newbigin, Leslie. The Gospel in a Pluralist Society Grand Rapids. William B. Eerdman’s
Publishing, 1989.
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Newman, Jay. Foundations of Religious Tolerance. Toronto: University of Toronto

Press, 1982.
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(1998): 65–85.
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Harmony’ ”. Singapore Journal of Contemporary Religion 20, no. 1 (2005): 25–
40.
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Smith, Tom W. A Survey of the Religious Right: Views on Politics, Society, Jews and
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The Inter-Religious Organization of Singapore 605
25
THE INTER-RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATION OF SINGAPORE
Lai Ah Eng
INTRODUCTION
Religious diversity, with its various forms, expressions and values of individual
religions, inevitably raises aspects and issues of inter-religious interaction and
relations and the formal and informal structures and processes through which
these are conducted and negotiated. While exclusivism, separatism, avoidance
or mere tolerance may be the approaches adopted by some individuals and
groups to manage religious diversity, others see the promotion of inter-
religious understanding, dialogue and collaboration as desirable and the joint
resolution of any religious tension and conflict that might arise as necessary
for peace, accommodation and integration. While some focus on religious
differences and their separatist or divisive tendencies, others emphasize
similarities and commonalities and their unifying features and values.
In Singapore’s history and social life, the inter-religious arena has on
occasion surfaced overtly as a significant dimension and at other times
remained latent as background context in ordinary and everyday life. At the
broadest level, the state has defined religion (as well as race) as a sensitive area
in which any religious expression, interpretation and manipulation that it
views as causing inter-religious tensions and threatening social harmony can
be considered seditious and subject to its strong sanction. At the micro level,
particularly for individuals, the “inter-religious” can be a direct and active
experience, such as through proselytization, conversion, deliberative dialogue
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and selective influences; indirect encounters in daily social life such as within
a residential locality, workplace or public space; or largely absent through
deliberate avoidance or lifestyle choice. On the whole, beyond the gradual
and selective processes of hybridization and syncretization in specific religions,
such as in Chinese religions, and the deliberate attempts of proselytization
and conversion, such as by some evangelical Christian groups, any “inter-
religious” activity, particularly of an organized form, has been largely limited;
exclusivism, separatism, avoidance and tolerance largely characterise Singapore’s
multi-religious landscape.
The Inter-Religious Organization of Singapore (IRO) is an exceptional
structure within that landscape. It is an expression of the belief held by
individuals, representatives and constituencies of various faiths that the
“inter-religious” is a necessary field of interaction and which requires ongoing
joint attention, and that commonality is the basis for joint action. Set up in
1949, it has a long history of efforts at inter-religious activities. Seen against
Singapore’s background of developments and events in the years soon
before and after independence, growing religious diversity since the mid-
1970s and specific post-September 11 concerns over inter-religious tensions
and desires for dialogue, its role and significance is worthy of closer
examination. An understanding of the organization can also provide us
with useful insights into the necessity, strengths and limitations of interfaith
structures and efforts in multireligious societies. This chapter traces the
IRO’s historical development and major activities, examines some major
issues raised and problems encountered within the organization and from
external influences in its negotiation of religious diversity and difference;
and assesses its contributions and challenges.1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Set up officially on 18 March 1949 at a time of imminent independence from
British colonial rule, the IRO claims to be one of the oldest interfaith
organizations in the world (<http://www.iro.org.sg>, accessed 31 July 2007).
Originally named the Inter-Religious Organization of Singapore and Johor
Bahru, it was renamed the Inter-Religious Organization of Singapore in
1961. Its founding and early years had the support of several religious leaders
and religious organizations, political leaders, public figures and the British
colonial administration. Among the religious leaders were Reverend Dr Hobart
Baumann Amstutz (then Bishop of the Methodist Church of Malaya which
then included Singapore) who also became the IRO’s first President, and
Maulana Abdul Aleem Siddique, an eminent Mendicant Sufi missionary who
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travelled extensively to set up missionary associations ( jamiyah) in India,

Malaya, South Africa and Mauritius and who is generally acknowledged to be
a key initiator of the IRO’s formation. Other first and early community and
political leaders who supported the IRO in the 1950s and 1960s were Dato
Syed Ibrahim Omar Alsagoff (President, Muslim Missionary Society Singapore
[Jamiyah Singapore]), V. Pakirisamy Pillai (Indian philanthropist and Sri
Krishnan Hindu temple leader), David Marshall (Labour Party politician and
Singapore’s first-elected Chief Minister), Francis Thomas (Labour Party
politician and Anglican), Rev Dr D. D. Chelliah (Archdeacon, St. Andrew’s
Cathedral), Rt Rev Monsignor M. Olcomendy (Catholic Bishop of Malacca),
Dr Ahmad Ibrahim (Jamiyah Singapore), Haji Mohd Khan (businessman),
Professor George G. Thomson (senior civil servant and Presbyterian), Swami
Siddharmananda (Head, Ramakrishna Mission Singapore), Rabbi Jacob
Shababo (Rabbi of the Jewish Congregation, Singapore), Ven Sek Hong
Choon (Head, Bright Hill Buddhist Temple), Behram Vakil (Head, Zoroastrian
Community of Singapore), Mehervan Singh (senior member of the Sikh
community) and Willie Tay (member of the Singapore Buddhist Federation).
It is significant that a wide range of religious and political leaders in
Malaya recognized the importance of inter-religious solidarity and had the
foresight to form an inter-religious organization — this was a time of political
upheaval and uncertainty in the immediate post-World War II period and
amidst growing anti-colonial sentiments and independence movements across
the colonized world. In 1947, India had declared independence from the
British but was partitioned along religious lines for the formation of Pakistan.
In Malaya itself, the Emergency had been declared in 1948 by the British
Administration against anti-colonial guerrillas who were mainly of Chinese
origin2 and as forces for independence built up along ethnic lines to some
extent. It was evident that the soon-to-be independent Malaya, which consisted
of an indigenous (largely Malay-Muslim) majority and immigrant minority
populations of different cultures and religions could be fractious and divided,
unless there were unifying organizations, arrangements and goals. Not
surprisingly, the first IRO President Reverend Amstutz, at the official
declaration of its formation and its first public meeting in 1949, referred to
possible “Muslim-Christian misunderstanding” and expressed the belief that
“we, through this organisation are no longer strangers and enemies but
pilgrims on a common road seeking common goals”. The then British
Commissioner General for Southeast Asia, Sir Malcolm Macdonald, described
the organization’s official launch as “most hopeful”. The meeting itself, attended
by more than 2,000 people and leaders of various religious backgrounds, was
themed “The Contribution of Religion to Peace” and saw various leaders give
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speeches on the roles of their respective religions to peace. As one IRO

member put it: “Those were grand ideas and it was soon after the war. With
all the uncertainties, they felt the need to come together.”
The early IRO’s aims and mission were stated as (1) to inculcate the spirit
of friendship and cooperation among the leaders and followers of different
religions for the good of mankind, and (2) to give mutual respect, assistance
and protection among the adherents of different religions. Membership was
opened to priests, ministers and imams in charge of churches, mosques,
synagogues, temples and other places of worship; leaders of organized and
established religious schools; chairpersons and trustees of temples, mosques
and other religious institutions, and any persons elected by the IRO Council.
The Council itself would comprise eighteen representatives of various religious
backgrounds in the following ratio of five Muslims, two Protestants, two
Roman Catholics, two Buddhists, two Hindus, one Confucianist, one Sikh,
one Jew and two “miscellaneous”,3 while ordinary members make up the
General Assembly. The six religions “represented” among its founding members
included Hinduism, Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam and Sikhism,
and later expanded to include Zoroastrianism in 1961 and, after a long lapse,
Taoism and the Baha’i Faith in 1996, and Jainism in 2006. Mindful of issues
that could arise from any claims of official representation of religions, the
IRO was careful to clarify that it was not a federation or council of various
religious institutions; instead, its membership regulation permitted only
membership of individuals in their personal capacities. Nonetheless, the
membership and involvement of individual senior leaders and heads of
religions and religious organizations has, over the years, led to the public
perception that religions are officially represented in the IRO. This perception
has been problematic, as will be discussed later.
The IRO’s public activities were sporadic in the 1950s after its grand
opening. It did not have a permanent office nor received any government
support by way of funding, and its own funds were limited to donations and
subscriptions of a limited number of members. Members met at each other’s
homes and offices or at religious venues such as Jamiyah Singapore, Po Kark
See Temple and Ramakrishna Mission. At one point, IRO member and
Jamiyah Singapore President Syed Ibrahim Omar Alsagoff was credited with
saving the organization from a “natural death” through the use of his office
premises and home for meetings. According to one member interviewed, the
IRO was virtually moribund by the 1980s, and had to be redirected towards
more interfaith work. A pattern of sporadic involvement in public issues
appears to have been a characteristic throughout its existence. Besides limited
funding and human resources, internal differences among Council members
over important issues and inherent difficulties of interfaith dialogue and
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collaboration, as will be elaborated later, largely explain for this sporadic

involvement and periods of inactivity. Yet, that it has not died a natural death
after half a century attests to the continued relevance of inter-religious
solidarity and dialogue and the need for such an organization, as well as to the
commitment of believers.
EVENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE IRO SINCE 1949

An examination of available records4 of the IRO’s activities reveals some
important local as well as international events and issues undertaken throughout
its existence (see Appendixes 25.1 and 25.2 for a summary but incomplete
list). Its involvement in international events appears to be limited and involved
largely the organization and attendance of international conferences on religion
and peace.5 Involvement in other regional and global events were related to
the Vietnam War when the organization held prayers for peace (1971) and
organized a Boat People Project (1976–77) which attended to the welfare of
550 Vietnamese refugees on two ships; welfare care for Indochinese refugees
(1979); attainment of its NGO affiliation to the UN and UNESCO (1981);
its resolution on the desecration of Amritsar Temple, sent to the Ministry of
Culture (1984); and humanitarian relief for famine-stricken and war-torn
Ethiopia (1985). In more recent years after 11 September 2001 when extremists
attacked the Twin Towers in New York City and several thousands of people
were killed and which led to the U.S.-declared “war on terror”, the IRO’s
involvement with global events were mainly related to peace.
Local activities and events (see Appendix 25.2) have been the IRO’s
major concern. These activities may broadly be categorized as relating to the
following: religious education in schools, morality issues, life issues,
proselytization, public portrayal, representation and referencing of religions
and religious “others”, conflict and traumatic events, public education and
promotion of inter-religious harmony, and public performance of joint religious
prayers. In these, the IRO’s scope varies from the one-off issuance of press
statements and of symbolic public representation to more sustained and
substantive involvement.
Religious Education in Schools

Religious education in schools was an early concern of the IRO, given its
belief that religion and therefore religious education can bring about peace
and understanding. Throughout the 1950s, it promoted religious education
in schools, working with the Ministry of Education (MOE). In 1957, IRO
members sat on a MOE Committee on religion and ethics in schools and
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subsequently contributed passages for reading at school assemblies. In the

wake of a larger push towards making religious education compulsory in the
late 1970s on grounds of religions’ promotion of strong moral values and its
own favourable stand towards that, the IRO sent a circular on “the vital need
for moral and religious instruction in our schools” to the MOE in 1979, and
in 1982 helped write the curriculum on “World Religions” for the Religious
Knowledge subject in secondary schools which was made compulsory in
1987. However, due to allegations that the study of individual religions led to
emphasis on religious differences and to religious proselytization, the
compulsory Religious Knowledge subject was scrapped in 1989 and replaced
by Civics and Moral Education in 1992. The subject of religious education
in schools has since then receded into the background and surfaced only in
the immediate post-September 11 period during which the teaching of
“world religions” for inter-religious understanding and peace was suggested at
some public and closed-door forums.6 However, this idea has not been
pursued seriously by the IRO, MOE or any other organization.7
Morality Issues
In its early years, the IRO occasionally took up issues related to morality and
moral behaviour, especially in the public media. For example, in 1958, it sent
a letter to the Chief Minister seeking stricter government control of crime
films and literature as well as “obscene” magazines to “forestall growth of
youth delinquency”. In 1963, it issued a memorandum on the effects of
films, television, radio and literature on youths’ morals, particularly against
“foreign patterns of love-making” and “sexy” songs, and called for the censure
of love scenes and for moderate and decent entertainment. Since then,
morality issues in the public media seem to have faded from the IRO’s
concern. In 2005 when the government proposed the building of “integrated
resorts” which would include casinos, the IRO did not make any public
statement despite common grounds among various religions against gambling;
instead, it was individual religious organizations (Muslim, Catholic, Protestant)
that voiced reservations, mainly through individual press statements, that
casinos would worsen gambling addiction and its negative social consequences
on individuals, families and society.
Life Issues
The IRO has been vocal and active on important issues directly affecting
human life where individual religions’ teachings have established doctrinal
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positions and interpretations some of which are also common to each other.
In 1967, it sent a memorandum of concern to the Prime Minister and
Ministry of Health over the legalization of abortion. On the other hand, it
has lent support to the government on other life issues, and the government
itself has also selectively involved the IRO to push certain proposals and to
legitimate certain policies. At the opening of the first dialysis centre for
kidney problem patients in 1982, the IRO gave its support for organ donation
to the government, noting that no religion was against organ donation to
help sufferers. In 1986, it was approached by the Ministry of Health for its
support of the proposed Human Organ Transplant Act (HOTA, passed in
1987) under which a person between the ages of 21 and 60 is presumed to
have agreed to donate his kidneys, heart, liver and corneas when he dies,
unless he has opted out, with the exception of Muslims who had to opt in to
donate their organs. Its Muslim members, as well as other Muslim leaders,
have also been active in persuading Muslims to donate their organs.8 The
IRO’s most recent involvement with life issues was in 2004 when it was
invited to consultations with the National Bioethics Advisory Committee on
stem cell research, offering religious views on the matter.
Proselytization
One of the most challenging issues raised by the IRO has been that of
proselytization which has invoked tensions in inter-religious relations. The
issue of insensitive, aggressive and unethical evangelization has been a
persistent one over the years, with the main lines of tension between some
evangelical Christians on one side and various religions on the other among
whom Muslims, Hindus, Taoists and Buddhists have been the main vocal
objectors. In 1965, the IRO endorsed a statement by Christian leaders that
“while there should be freedom of religious belief and practices, there
should be no unfair or unethical methods used in the propagation of
religion”. This partly arose from an allegation by some Muslims that
Christians had been using “money and beautiful girls” to lure Muslim
youths into conversion. The matter was settled when four prominent
Muslim leaders put their names to the IRO statement. Soon after in 1967,
it held several meetings with the Prime Minister after which it issued a
resolution on the mutual tolerance of religions and made the assertion that
religious practices should not be offensive to others.
The issue of unethical, aggressive and insensitive proselytization by
evangelical Christians has grown more serious since the late 1970s. In 1978,
during a period of intense religious proselytization, especially through door-
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to-door and personal approaches in streets and workplaces, the IRO issued a
circular titled “An Appeal for Tolerance in the Propagation of Religious
Beliefs” in which it stated that it was against “high pressure religious
salesmanship”. The appeal was sent to the Methodist Church, the Seventh
Day Adventists and local organizers of the Billy Graham Crusade.9 In 1989,
IRO members Anne Johnson (Presbyterian) and the Mufti of Singapore gave
oral and written submissions in the drawing up of the Maintenance of
Religious Harmony Act, which was passed in 1990 by the government in
response to inter-religious tensions arising from proselytization. This issue of
insensitive, aggressive and unethical proselytization has not ceased, although
it has not been raised by the IRO since the Act was passed.
Conflict and Traumatic Events

The IRO has had to rise to the occasion on the occurrence of conflicts with
direct ethnic and religious implications and to traumatic disaster events. One
such major conflict was the ethnic riots of 1964 during which thirty-six
people were killed and hundreds were injured.10 IRO members visited the
injured in hospitals, issued a press statement exhorting peace and harmony
and the elimination of fear and distrust in the “spirit of unity and universal
brotherhood”, appeared in a televised forum of religious speakers to promote
harmony, and gave weekly speeches on different religions. A second was the
September 11 event. At a memorial service held at the National Stadium
attended by representatives of various countries, religious and civic
organizations and individuals, the IRO led prayers for the deceased and for
peace. Its other activities in the immediate September 11 period included
workshops and conferences related to inter-religious peace and understanding
and joint events of religious and cultural significance (which are elaborated in
a later section on its public education programme).
The IRO has also been called upon to offer multireligious memorial
services for the victims of traumatic events such as the SilkAir crash in
Palembang (1997) and the SQ006 crash in Taipei (2000). Similarly, at a
public memorial service for the tens of thousands who perished in the
tsunami that hit the Indian Ocean on 26 December 2004, the IRO led
prayers for the deceased.
Public Portrayal, Representation and Referencing of

Religions and “Others”
The IRO has been inevitably drawn into the inter-religious realm of the
portrayal, representation and referencing of religions and religious “others”,
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both proactively in its mission to promote inter-religious peace and

understanding and in response to events and developments particularly that
of proselytization. Early in 1964, it observed that it was “happy” to note that
non-Christians are no longer referred to as “heathens” and non-Muslims as
“infidels” by religious representatives (although these references have persisted
and resurfaced among some Christians and Muslims in recent times).11 In
1982, IRO Muslim members objected to Sri Sathya Sai Seva Samithi
Singapore’s commemorative programme on Bhagwa Sri Sathya Sai Baba’s
fifty-seventh birthday, in which the symbol of the crescent moon and the
phrase “The Muslims call Him Allah” that appeared were deemed
inappropriately used. In 1986, during a period of intense evangelical
proselytization, it drew the attention of the Ministry of Community
Development to the “insensitivities” of the Pentecostal Church of
Singapore for its distribution of pamphlets in which Hinduism and
Buddhism were derided.
Also watchful of media portrayals of religions in its early years, the IRO
called for the censoring or banning of films considered offensive to religions
(such as The Twin Swords in 1965, The Great Buddha in 1967, and Shaolin
Temple in 1982).12 In 1982 it even undertook the stand that all films with
religious themes should first be vetted by the IRO. Since then, issues of
religious sensitivity in the public media, like morality issues as discussed
earlier, seem to have faded from its concern; religious sensitivity in films (for
example, Jesus Christ Superstar and The Da Vinci Code) has, on occasion, been
raised by individual religious organizations instead.
Public Education and Promotion of Inter-religious Harmony

The IRO has maintained a more or less consistent even if infrequent public
education and interfaith programme and activities over the years, sometimes
as part of its responses to specific events, such as the 1964 riots and the
September 11 attack, as well as to issues such as proselytization and
misrepresentation of religions whenever these have arisen. Its public education
activities range from lectures and talks to publications and exhibitions which
broadly focused on building knowledge and understanding of various religions
as well as on inter-religious dialogue and activities.
The IRO’s first public lecture at its official set-up in 1949 was aptly on
“The Contribution of Religion to Peace”. Other lectures that followed included
“The Place of Religion in Modern Times” (1955), “Is Religion Necessary”
(1974), “Science and Morality” (1980), and “Religion and Justice” (1980),
while lectures on specific religions were carried out occasionally. Early lectures
and talks also focused on youth, such as “Youth and Decency” (1953),
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“Religion and Problems of Youth” (1972), and “Modern Youth’s Role in

Religion and Culture” (1975). In 1965, soon after the 1964 riots, the IRO
produced a film on “Religions in Singapore” and a book of the same title in
1967 (of which the third edition was issued in 2001). In 1969, on the
occasion of the 150th anniversary of the founding of modern Singapore in
1819, it held an exhibition on places of worship in early Singapore. In 1973,
it published “The Value of the Human Person” which emphasized common
values on the subject among religions, while an Inter-religious Rally was
organized in 1975. In the same year, it created a non-denominational
invocation for its meetings and public events.13 In 1979, in response to
growing tourism in which places of worship were drawn into tourist maps for
visits, it drew up some guidelines on etiquette and practices in religious
institutions which were forwarded to the Singapore Tourism Board. In 1998,
it took over the responsibility for the annual observance of World Religion
Day from the Singapore Baha’i community, which had organized the event
from 1995 to 1997, an event which, besides its own IRO Day, is observed for
greater awareness of each other’s faiths and for interfaith peace. Since 1996,
the IRO has also organized annual National Day observances. On its fiftieth
anniversary in 1999, it celebrated the occasion with an exhibition of histories,
sacred scriptures, artefacts, architecture and art of nine religions, with the
support of the National Heritage Board and the MOE. In the UN Year of
Dialogue among Civilizations in 2001, it held an “Intercivilisation Dialogue”
jointly with the Centre for Contemporary Islamic Studies.
As pointed out earlier, the IRO’s public education profile as well as
symbolic representation of religious harmony took on a renewed significance
in the immediate years after the attack of September 11. Numerous joint
events and interfaith dialogue sessions, conferences and talks were held to
counter any possible fallout from the attack on inter-religious relations and
security in Singapore as well as to promote inter-religious peace, respect
and understanding (see Appendix 25.3 for an example). Public joint events
included prayers for peace, dinners and festival celebrations and visits to
places of worship. Particularly significant was the historically unprecedented
joint celebration of Hari Raya Puasa at the end of the Ramadan and
Christmas in 2005. Among its members, a “3-Ds” fellowship of devotion,
dining and dialogue was set up.14 IRO’s 2002 anniversary celebration theme
was “Towards One Nation” with a focus on social cohesion and inter-racial
and inter-religious harmony. In 2004, it held a Peace March, followed by
Peace Carnival (2005) and a conference on “Enhancing Interfaith and
Multiracial Harmony” (2005), while an occasional series of study courses
on various religions was started (2005). Some of its members were also
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drawn into the National Steering Committee on Inter-racial and Inter-

religious Confidence Circles (IRCCs) set up by the government under the
People’s Association in 2002 in response to any possible terrorist attack and
its impact on ethno-religious relations and social cohesion. A revamp of this
Committee’s membership in 2006 to consist largely of government and
senior religious and community leaders also include some IRO members
who are at the same time representatives of their respective religious faiths
and communities.
Public Performance of Joint Religious Prayers

The IRO’s public performance of joint religious prayers form perhaps the
most evident, regular and symbolic expression of its inter-religious activities
and role. Its religious and multi-religious image and symbolic power has
meant that it has been invited to various kinds of national, public, commercial
and memorial ceremonies and at specific events to appease, comfort, cleanse
and bless through prayers and observance services. Some of its earliest public
duties were at national and public ceremonies, such as prayers to celebrate
self-government and National Loyalty Week (1959) and at the inauguration
of the National Memorial (1963) for massacre victims during the Japanese
Occupation of 1939–42. From 1967 onwards, its multifaith services at the
Singapore Armed Forces Training Institute’s commissioning ceremonies
replaced the colonial Anglican service. Its prayers were sought at the breaking
ground ceremony and inauguration of the Singapore mass rapid transit
(MRT) system in 1983, while earlier in 1963 it offered prayers at the start of
the construction of the Shangri-la Hotel.15 Other regular occasions at which
its prayer and observance services are offered are special days such as National
Day, Remembrance Day, World Religion Day and IRO Day. As described
earlier, its memorial services and prayers for peace in particular are offered in
times of conflict and traumatic events.
Overall, it appears that the IRO’s history has been one that has varied
between intermittent activeness and moribund status. Notwithstanding this
however, several important areas and issues that the IRO has pursued stand
out which are a reflection of the dynamic interplay of religious forces and
inter-religious relations in multireligious Singapore: religious education in
schools, morality issues, life issues, proselytization, conflict and traumatic
events, public portrayal, representation and referencing of religions and religious
“others”, public education and promotion of inter-religious harmony, and
public performance of joint religious rites. Some of these issues have come
and gone as one-off occurrences, such as the portrayal of religions in specific
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films and traumatic and conflict events, with minor or major consequences.
Others remain part and parcel of the landscape and become significant in
light of specific events and developments, such as religious education in
schools, the referencing of religious others and proselytization. Yet others
have become an established part of the IRO and accepted by some but
frowned upon and even contested by others, such as its public education and
public performance of joint religious rites and the very idea of interfaith
dialogue itself. Some of these recurrent themes and contested issues are
examined in the contexts of the negotiation of religious diversity and difference
in the next section.
Organizationally, it has taken some time for initial but fundamental
issues of structure, rules, terms of membership and representation, and
processes of collaboration to be ironed out or to evolve gradually. The
integrity of individual religions was one of the first principles to be recognized
and emphasized. It was agreed that the religions represented would be listed
according to the “age” of each faith, with the oldest faiths listed first (thus
Hinduism is listed first and the Baha’i Faith last). This line-up of religions
represented needed to be agreed on as it was symbolically important even if
it appeared petty. It was also agreed that the IRO presidency would be on a
yearly rotation basis. At public functions, it was agreed that representation
would be on the basis of “all religions or nothing” representation, while
volunteers should be sought from across all the religions represented. As one
member put it aptly:
In the IRO we have nine religions [now ten]. And it is a daily challenge
for us because when we organize anything, we have to consult all nine.
So you can imagine our level of understanding, we have to give way.
Whenever we organize a function, we make sure that all the nine are
happy. So this is a real challenge. We always send the message that we are
not here to campaign for our own religion, we are here to look at the
common areas where we can work together. We are not here to tell that
you’re not good, we are better.
Symbolically, the site of IRO’s location was also important. In 1977,

Muslim council members objected to the IRO being headquartered for free
in the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial, despite the persistent problem of a more
permanent office space and premises and lack of funds. This problem of
location has remained unresolved and the IRO has either used a post office
mailbox or the address of Jamiyah Singapore through its Muslim members.
Meetings continue to be held at various locations, including homes, offices
and places of worship. Creating a non-denominational invocation for its
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public events also took some time and effort, and it was not until 1975 that
it was agreed on. It was not until the late 1980s that the IRO reached an
agreement to have a World Religion Day based on the originally Baha’i
initiative. Other new organizational issues may present themselves in the
future, such as the membership of new religious movements or sects of parent
religions, its effectiveness and even its very own future in the face of other
recent inter-religious initiatives which will be discussed later.
The negotiations among members about the organization’s structure and
fundamentals have sometimes been protracted and arduous, and reflect the
complexities of negotiating religious diversity and difference among so many
religions. In general, the more ritualistic and symbolic aspects of interfaith
representation and interaction have been developed and agreed upon over
time, even though these remain open to question by religious others from
outside the organization. It is the complex issues of representation and of the
theological and social justifications for interfaith dialogue and activities that
are deeply contested.
ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

Even as the IRO’s objectives are to spread inter-religious goodwill and
understanding through shared values drawn from their respective religious
traditions and led by religious leaders, it has inevitably encountered some
issues and problems that appear to be inherent in negotiating religious
diversity and difference and in inter-religious dialogue, relations and
collaboration. These pertain to four realms: its own structure and leadership;
membership and representation of religions; its relations with the state; and
its relations with a multireligious public and followers of respective religions.
IRO Structure and Leadership

According to the IRO’s minutes of meetings, the organization in its early
years in the 1950s and 1960s was dogged by frequent absences of busy leaders
among some of whom also turned out to be inefficient. During much of the
1950s, member Syed Alsagoff offered his Jamiyah Singapore office for meetings
to “save” the organization from “a natural death”. The organization’s early
years were also marked by points of contention over money matters such as
subscriptions and expenses, such as for the Asian Conference on Religions
and Peace. In 1979, some members also made the criticism that the IRO’s
services for private organizations “encourage capitalist activities” to which the
swift counter-reply was that “man does not live by spirit alone”.
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Religious leaders also had their shortcomings and differences, including

inter-religious and personality differences and could even consider each
other insensitive. In the early years for example, in 1961 the Anglican
Archdeacon Chelliah threatened to resign from the IRO if meetings were
held on a Sunday. Another complained that meetings started too early on
Sundays and disturbed his sleep. Around the same time, a curt message at
one IRO meeting announced the cessation of one A. K. Isaac’s membership
(reason unstated).
One main structural problem has been the organization’s presidency.
Rotated among religions on an annual basis for fair representation — an
arrangement that has persisted throughout its existence — it has been
inherently limiting and weak, as little could be achieved under such a short
tenure of leadership before plans and emphasis might be changed under the
next President. It has also been alleged that some Presidents were more
interested in promoting their own religions or their own reputations during
their tenure than of the organization’s objectives.
Membership and Representation of Religions

As pointed out earlier, amidst the diversity and differences among members,
the IRO was able to establish and agree on some fundamental rules and terms
of representation and engagement. However, other differences — the
acceptability of certain religions or religious denominations and religious
practices — were more serious and remain ongoing issues. While membership
was open to all on an individual basis in principle, larger religious differences
and divides manifested themselves through membership and representation
issues within the organization in reality.
The Baha’is, Buddhists and Taoists

One of the most major and protracted issue of membership and representation
was over that of individuals of the Baha’i Faith, which had been sought as
early as 1961 and again in 1976 but had been consistently opposed by
Muslim members who considered the Baha’i Faith a heresy against Islam. The
issue was not resolved until 1996 when Baha’i membership into the IRO was
accepted on the basis of a majority vote instead of a unanimous one, with the
outcome being one vote against and the rest for. The Muslim member
withdrew from active participation in the IRO for a while when the Baha’i
member was accepted. In another instance in 1985, the Ramakrishna Mission
threatened to break links with the IRO as it had constitutional restrictions of
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Ramakrishna Mission swamjis holding office but this was averted when the
restrictions were removed later.
Membership of various denominations and new religions or religious
movements may be expected to pose similar problems of eligibility and
representation in future. Internally, the IRO structure cannot accommodate
these diversities easily. For example, present Buddhist members of the IRO
include only those from the Buddhist Federation, this membership being a
continuation from the IRO founding days. Indeed, Buddhists sought to
increase their representation in 1981, and their number in the council was
increased from one to four in 1984. However, the Buddhist Federation in
reality is not a federation of Buddhist temples, even though some temple
monks are in it, but a welfare society. Furthermore, the Buddhist religious
landscape has changed but Buddhist membership in the IRO has not. For
example, the Singapore Soka Gakai Association, is now an active Buddhist
denomination16 but it has not sought membership in the IRO. Similarly,
Taoist representation can be problematic. The Taoist Mission Group and the
Taoist Federation are two separate organizations — the former emerged out
of another body of Taoism while the latter comprises lay people coordinating
the Taoist temples. So, who represents Taoism — monks or laypersons — can
be a problem.
The Protestant Christians

The membership and representation of Christians and Christianity in the
IRO has been and remains a complex issue. At the IRO’s founding and up
till the early 1980s, several Christians from various denominations were
presented, including Methodists, Catholics and Presbyterians and Anglicans.
Indeed, Methodist bishops were prominent in the IRO until the early
1980s: the first IRO President was Bishop Amstutz while Bishop T. R.
Doraisamy served in the IRO Executive Council in the 1970s followed by
Bishop Yap Kim Hao who has been in the IRO since the 1980s. The
participation of Presbyterian Professor George G. Thomson (an IRO
founding member) was followed by that of Rev Dr Frank Balchin in the
1970s and Dr Anne Johnson in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, through
Protestant Christians’ participation, the IRO collaborated with Trinity
Theological College, Singapore and the Institute for Study of Religions and
Society in Singapore and Malaysia on the organization of forums and
dialogues. Anglican Francis Thomas (IRO founding member) was active in
the 1960s while Dr D. D. Chelliah, Archdeacon of St Andrew’s Cathedral,
was President of the IRO in 1976.
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Over the years however, Anglicans and Methodists have gradually distanced
and dissociated themselves from the organization and their churches’ leaders
have stayed away from it. As early as 1968, a letter was received by the IRO
from the Anglican Church’s Bishop of Singapore and Malaya clarifying that
Anglican members of the IRO did not officially represent Anglican interests
and that the government should not consider the IRO as the paramount
representative despite its name. One Anglican leader commented in private in
2005 that his Church should not be seen to be represented alongside the
Taoist priest with “all his costumes and rituals” during joint prayers or even
be involved in joint prayers. Although the IRO’s first president was the then
Methodist Bishop of Malaya, the Methodist Church has not been active in
the IRO and indeed has dissociated itself from the organization. There are
currently no Anglicans or Methodists in the IRO’s council, although there are
a few individual members who are guarded about being known by their own
churches that they are IRO members and that they believed in interfaith
dialogue and collaboration.17
At the core of this is whether and how Christians should relate to those
of other religions in an inter-religious organization and the interpretation of
salvation. As pointed out by one former council member of the IRO and a
Protestant Christian leader, these Christian Churches have increasingly grown
away from their more liberal traditions, and become more conservative and
evangelical and are therefore generally wary of inter-religious dialogue and
interaction. While there is variation in response to dialogue and interaction
among Christian individuals, present leadership in many churches are
concerned with building their own churches and organizations, including
evangelization and conversion within a particular theological interpretation
that salvation is possible only through Jesus Christ. This interpretation
effectively shuts the door to dialoguing with those of other religious faiths.
The Catholics
Catholics, on the other hand, have been increasingly involved in the IRO’s
activities although they came on board on a slow and delayed start. Archbishop
Michael Olcomendy was present at the launch of the IRO in 1949 but did
not become a member of IRO. It is probable that he was personally supportive
of the IRO’s mission but could not officially join in his capacity as a Catholic
archbishop as the Church at that time was not open to interfaith dialogue
and was indeed “still talking about the conversion of all pagans” according to
one Catholic member interviewed in 2005. It was only after Vatican Council
II in 1963, when the Catholic Church declared itself open to interfaith
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dialogue through the promulgation of the landmark church document Nostra

Aetate which recognizes all the major religions of the world, that it became
increasingly engaged in the IRO. Archbishop Olcomendy first sent Father
Noel Goh and then Father Rozario to replace himself in the IRO where the
latter sat in the Council from 1965 until his death nearly thirty years later in
1994. In 1979, the Archbishop Gregory Yong was approached by the IRO on
the possibility of the Catholic Church being represented in the IRO Executive
Council, but he did not respond until 1991. This was despite the fact that
earlier in 1982, Pope Paul VI’s apostolic delegate Archbishop Jean Jadot18
gave his word of cooperation to the IRO, to fulfil Pope Paul VI’s desire for
dialogue with non-Catholics. In 2004, Sister Theresa Seow of the Canossian
Sisters Order, who had become an IRO member since 1994 and initiated
interfaith dialogues with IRO Muslim members, became (the first woman)
President of the IRO (and later the Consultor in the Pontifical Council for
Inter-religious Dialogue in Rome).
Under Sister Seow’s Presidency which came in the immediate post-
September 11 years, several major interfaith events were organized to
demonstrate the need for and to promote interfaith dialogue and
understanding at institutional and everyday life settings, such as the
observation and participation in each others’ celebrations and rituals, joint
prayers for peace, visits to religious institutions, and breaking of fast with
Muslims during Ramadan. One of the most public and historically
unprecedented joint activities were the joint Hari Raya Aidilfitri and
Christmas celebration in 2001 during which the exchange of gifts, a powerful
symbolic gesture of goodwill and alliance, was made between the Archbishop
of the Catholic Church of Singapore, the President of Majlis Ugama Islam
Singapura (MUIS) and the Mufti of Singapore. Other significant activities
were a Peace March (2004) and Peace Carnival. At present, Catholic Brother
Michael Broughton is active in the IRO, particularly in promoting interfaith
dialogue among youths. Overall therefore, it is that not surprising that
Catholics are among the Christians most involved in inter-religious dialogue
with Muslims and others.
The Muslims
Besides Maulana Mohamed Abdul Aleem Siddique and leaders from Johor
involved in IRO’s founding, Muslim participation in the IRO has been
more or less constant and consistently active in general since its founding
days. Muslim leaders in the IRO included founding member and Jamiyah
Singapore President Dato Syed Ibrahim Alsagoff; Dr Ahmad Mohamed
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Ibrahim, Singapore’s Attorney-General (1965–67) who drafted the IRO

constitution; and the Mufti of Singapore Syed Isa Mohd Semait and Jamiyah
Singapre President Abu Bakar Maidin, both of whom have served as IRO
Council member and President respectively. Jamiyah Singapore, founded
by Maulana Aleem Siddique, has also been consistently supportive of the
IRO through its presidents, staff and members, in the provision of premises,
facilities and human resources for conferences, dialogues, workshops, lectures
and exhibitions.19
In the post-September 11 environment, Muslim initiatives and
participation in IRO activities and in activities of other Muslim organizations
such as MUIS and the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) have been
all the more so as Muslims have felt themselves to be singled out for negative
attention and misinterpretation as being prone to militancy and violence in
Islam’s theological orientation. As mentioned above, some of these included
public lectures, dialogues, conferences on religion and peace, a peace carnival
and peace march, joint celebrations, some of these undertaken as joint
projects with other religious and social organizations.
Inter-religious Dialogue and Collaboration

While the IRO’s set-up long predates recent tensions, the idea of promoting
interfaith dialogue and collaboration that it has attempted to promote has
become more prominent in light of these tensions. One line of tension is
between Muslims and Christians, besides historical conflict and baggage, for
reasons of their exclusivist and proselytizing stances particularly since the
1970s, Christian proselytization among Muslims in particular, and in recent
years due to post-September 11 developments. Another is between Christians
and those of other religions because of the evangelical and proselytizing
approaches among some Christian groups since the 1970s. Hence the
recognition of the need to take the lead in interfaith understanding and
dialogues in general and between specific groups in particular, such as between
Christians and Muslims, and between Christians and Hindus, Buddhists and
Taoists, by individuals in IRO as well as by leaders of some religious faiths in
Singapore. Yet, the very idea of interfaith dialogue is contested by others, and
who really participates and what are the ethics, processes and contents of
dialogue are major issues in themselves.
In general, some sceptics of dialogue are of the view that dialogue cannot
truly happen because of theological differences or that dialogue is bound to
have to involve and sort out theological differences. Others are of the view
that dialogue should not or need not start with theological issues but with
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some other common issues, such as poverty or human suffering, nor have to
resolve theological differences when dialogues about them do take place. In
the view of one former IRO council member, the IRO has had a history of
dialogue from its very beginning, and that this continual dialogue among its
members over the years has led to a level of arrangement, comfort and
understanding in which differences are easier to handle as members are more
open to discussion, compromise and acceptance. The view is also that they
have even reached the point of recognizing that there is no need to resolve
differences but to agree to recognize and respect differences and to focus on
working together for a “more humane community based on care and
compassion”. “These are the levels at which we can operate and you can still
retain your individual religious identity.”
Over the years, the IRO has established the following principles particularly
when theological differences are involved: the maintenance of the integrity of
individual religions; no pre-judgement, criticism and condemnation of
religions; and no proselytization. Besides the non-denomination invocation
drawn up in 1975 for use at Council meetings, it was agreed in 1984 that
council members will visit various places of worship by rotation. It was also
agreed that members would negotiate regularly at establishing norms acceptable
to all and to tap on commonalities based on common values, common
concerns and compromises. The principle of compromise, for example, led to
the agreement to serve only vegetarian food at IRO gatherings. However, in
this member’s assessment, there is much personal friendship and relationship
building but little in-depth interfaith discussion. He also recognized that
there are those whose theological orientation and interpretation are such that
they would feel they are “dealing with the devil” if they engaged in dialogue
and would not even step into the house of worship of another religion. Thus,
in the case of some Protestant Christian churches, they have withdrawn from
participation in the IRO and resisted attempts to be drawn into interfaith
dialogue or interfaith activity.
It took external events to show up some of the intrinsic problems of
interfaith dialogue and collaboration and of the IRO’s image among some
non-members. When the September 11 attacks took place, the IRO invited
all religious leaders to a common prayer event it organized for the deceased
and for peace but some Protestant Christian leaders declined. However, upon
being asked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they attended a similar state
event at the National Stadium during which the IRO conducted joint prayer
rites, and also participated in other subsequent events and set-ups aimed at
inter-religious peace and harmony organized by the Ministry of Community
Development. A separate dialogue was initiated between the Protestant
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National Council of Churches of Singapore (NCCS) and MUIS. On the

whole, the NCCS is viewed by some IRO members to be not serious about
interfaith dialogue even though it has to be seen to be nominally engaged in
dialogue in the aftermath of September 11. Thus, in an example pointed out
by one Christian IRO member, only the secretary of the NCSS attended the
joint Hari Raya Puasa and Christmas celebration to represent the Council.
IRO — State Relations

The IRO began as an organization set up by religious and political elites with
the strong support of the colonial government, and has remained non-
governmental with no power by law. Instead, it draws its strength and
legitimacy from the built-up symbolic power and religious–moral authority
of members from ten religions many of whom are senior religious leaders, as
well as from its interfaith activities over the years. As an inter-religious
organization, its relationship with the secular state is a complex and varied
one. In general, it shares the state’s concern with nation-building, social
cohesion and religious harmony, and therefore works with it towards these
social goals and on specific issues that contribute towards these goals. It has
also lent its support on other specific issues that are consistent with common
religious values and teachings. Yet on others, it has differed, and its members
have voiced their opinions accordingly. On the part of the state, it recognizes
and taps on the IRO’s inter-religious background, symbolic power and
religious-moral authority in a multi-religious society and has, on specific
issues and instances, roped it in to lend legitimacy and support.
Thus, as illustrated earlier on through some of its activities in its early
years, the IRO worked closely with the state while the latter sought legitimacy
and support from the IRO for its own agendas. In 1961, the IRO urged the
people to foster “respect, tolerance and understanding” in aid of the
government’s effort to create a Malayan Union; it supported the government’s
anti-spitting drive in the early 1960s; helped publicly to curb violence in the
1963 riots; advocated and worked with the MOE on religious education in
schools (1950s to 1980s); and supported the government’s organ donation
drive (1982) and the Human Organ Transplant Act in 1985. One issue in
which the IRO disagreed with state policy on was abortion, and it sent a
memorandum to the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Health stating
religious objections (1967).
On the part of the state, it included IRO members in various consultations
and hearings, such as in the drawing up of the Maintenance of Religious
Harmony Act 1990 and the Declaration of Religious Harmony (2003) and
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on stem cell research by the National Bioethics Advisory Committee (2004).

State-organized events and new set-ups following September 11, which have
brought religious and community leaders to the table and common platforms
in the interests of religious harmony, social cohesion and national security,
have included IRO members some of whom also participate as religious
representatives. These set-ups include the IRCCs and the IRCC National
Steering Committee (2002); the Inter-Religious Harmony Circle (IRHC,
2003), and the Community Education Programme (CEP, 2006) in which
ethnic and religious organizations are clustered together under the Ministry
of Community Development and Sports.20
It should be pointed out here that IRO leaders, like those from other
religious organizations, have not necessarily agreed with the top-down
processes by which they have been drawn into state interventions involving
religion, or with the state’s separation of politics and religion and the
distinctions secularism and religiosity in state and society. Nor did they fail
to notice the political implications and consequences, intended or otherwise,
of the state’s all-encompassing control and dictates. Two clear examples
pertain to the drawing up of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act
and the Declaration on Religious Harmony. One major point of contention
in the discussions and consultations in the drawing up of the Act was over
the separation of politics and religion, with several religious leaders arguing
that this separation did not exist in their religions.21 In the case of the
Declaration it was first drafted by state authorities rather than by religious
authorities, and various religious groups and individuals were then asked to
respond and refine it. In the process, the issue of the distinction between a
secular state and religious society arose as the state had initially failed to do
and it took religious and community leaders to emphasis the multireligious
nature of Singapore society. On the other hand, one IRO Council member
recognized the dilemma that had the state not undertaken the task of first
drafting the Declaration and then getting religious authorities to respond
and refine it but had left them to do so, “nothing would have come out of
it as existing religious authorities do not have sufficient shared experience
with working and agreeing with each other”.
The IRO’s historical record in its relations with the state thus far has been
one of mostly working with the government, on specific events and issues of
common or larger national interests such as the 1964 riots and the
September 11 fallout, which also have direct impact on inter-religious and
interethnic harmony. In both instances, both sides mutually lend each other
credibility and legitimacy and would have been less effective without each
other. Indeed, the IRO’s own objectives of promoting inter-religious harmony,
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understanding and dialogue overlaps strongly with state interests in maintaining

social harmony and social cohesion, and have been given renewed emphasis
through recent state attention and organization. For example, the state-
initiated Declaration on Religious Harmony,22 drawn up in 2003 after much
protracted discussion with religious and community leaders, lends a direct
boost to the IRO’s objectives and is even posted on its otherwise bare website.
While the IRO shares the state’s interests in maintaining religious harmony
and even supports or partners it, it recognizes its special role in inter-religious
life and matters that the secular state is unable or unwilling to enter into
because of its secular status. While the Presidential Council for Religious
Harmony (PCRH) deals with legal issues regarding religious disharmony, the
IRO sees itself as the promoter of religious harmony and as an independent
party in mediation and conciliation efforts when needed. It also recognizes
that the maintenance of religious harmony is not the same as its promotion.
As one former IRO president said:
I realize that the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act itself would

not really help to foster religious harmony. It is only a tool. If people do
not really abide by it, you can put in place some law and if someone
breaks the law, he faces the penalty. But I realize the real importance is
the conversions of hearts. That if we really want to work for inter-
religious harmony, we really have to work at getting people to look from
not the point of what the law says but what are the religions really
teaching.
Concern that the IRO might be replaced by the IRCCs if it did not
remain relevant and do enough for inter-religious harmony and
understanding was also expressed by the then IRO President in 2003.
However, this has thus far proven to be an unfounded fear, as the two have
been kept distinct. The IRCCs are being developed and promoted as
government-initiated grassroots organizations (previously managed under
the People’s Association, then moved to come under the Ministry of
Community Development and Sports), while the IRO maintains its own
identity as a non-government inter-religious organization, even as the two
may cooperate closely in state-sponsored events.
Relations with the Public and Symbolic Representation

The IRO’s public image appears to be a mixed and ambiguous one. At one
level, it is regarded as symbolic and representative of Singapore’s multi-
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religious character and of its main religions by the state and by specific
organizations, hence its appearances at public and social events and even
commercial ones to provide religious representation, leadership and sustenance.
In particular, state recognition and use of it for legitimation and support of
state policies enhances this image. Its members’ own representation of their
respective religions through the use of the dress and rituals of each religious
tradition, further add to this image. This is even though it remains an
organization of interested individuals rather than as representatives of their
religious institutions and without mass support or statutory authority.
As mentioned earlier, it is “rejected” by some religious bodies that are
uncomfortable with interfaith activities. Indeed, given the constantly evolving
religious landscape, it still needs to constantly grow recognition and acceptance,
both as an organization and for its interfaith objectives, with the general
public and even with ordinary lay members of religious faiths whose prominent
and top leaders are IRO members.
Examples best illustrate and explain the sensitivity and potential
controversy of inter-religious activities and the IRO’s representation of religions
in public. The following incident was related by one former IRO president:
On the Taoists’ day, every year’s a big celebration, and they always invite
the nine religions to come together and to pray for world peace. The first
year when this was held, in the open, the nine religious leaders were
made to face the altar. Now, I think most of the other religious leaders
have not questioned because we are clear that we are there to offer our
world peace and it’s not praying to the deity that is set before them. But
the Muslim, I remember the Mufti called me up and said that when the
picture appeared in the Straits Times, he had difficulty answering queries
from Muslims. Why was the Iman standing in front of the Taoist altar
and offering prayers? For me, despite the fact that we are praying for
world peace, a question has come from one specific group but I think
even that view has to be taken into consideration. It’s a valid question.
So when the second year came I raised this to the organizing committee.
I said it is a very sensitive issue. The rest have not raised the question but
if one person has brought it up it might also be an issue with some others
but they are ready to oblige, they will not raise it, sometimes out of
courtesy. So in the second year we were made to face the front, with the
deity behind, but when the picture came out you find that the deity is
still behind, it made no difference, see?
The IRO President went on to offer a way out of this dilemma of joint
celebration or rites in public without being misunderstood by religious
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followers, based on “neutrality” and awareness of the very public role of IRO
leaders as representatives of their religions in such situations:
So for me when we are talking about differences like these then we have
to really take into views and ask, “Is there an alternative where we can
provide something more neutral for everybody else?” Because when it
comes to worship then this is the sensitive issue … This is the IRO and
for me this is where the religious leaders also have the duty not to raise
scandals among their people. And especially for religious leaders we
cannot say, “well, this is my personal view that it is okay” [to pray in
front of a Taoist deity].
He also went on further to say that as a Christian he would not hold joss
sticks at a public religious function even though he would at a private one
such as a funeral “because that [public and private] is the difference”.
Another self-explanatory example given involved Christians of different
denominations:
Among us Christians, we know about this Eucharist being the most

sensitive between Catholics and Protestants. I remember when I was
invited once to a church dedication by my friend who was a pastor. Not
only Canossians were there but other religious representatives were there
too. And just before communion, she made the announcement and said,
“Regardless of whatever traditions that you are coming from all of you
are invited to come forward to join us for the communion service.” I
think all of the other religious people were looking at the three of us who
are Canossians and probably to see what my response will be. I did not
make a move. I would really love to come forward to join you in the
communion to express my solidarity. Yet the reality is that this solidarity
has to be worked out first.
Awareness of the very public role of IRO leaders as representatives of

their religions and hence prior understanding and arrangements to avoid
public controversy or misunderstanding was offered by the IRO member who
cited the above example:
This example of worship is that religious leaders have to be really careful

in what we are doing in public, you know? Among us we can always
dialogue. With the public there is no possibility of explaining why you
are doing what you are doing. So you have to work these things out
before you appear in public for those symbolic and other functions
where you are not seen as an individual but you are seen as members of
your religion.
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Controversies such as the above notwithstanding, the IRO is the only

interfaith structure within a multireligious environment in which various
religious organizations and their followers very much operate within their
own self-contained and sometimes exclusivist religious worlds. For IRO
members, joint public prayers and activities have been worked out over time,
sometimes through trial and error and only with the benefit of hindsight, and
are therefore considered the most acceptable and effective ways to accommodate
each other’s beliefs, traditions and practices. But for others, joint activity is
best avoided or to be treaded with extreme caution, mainly for fear of
religious confusion, dilution or pollution. In pursuing its objectives of inter-
religious activities, the IRO needs to be continually nuanced and sensitive in
its public appearance and representation, as this is most visible and open to
scrutiny and contestation.
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

The IRO has seen important events and activities as well periods of lull and
inactivity in its nearly sixty years of history. That it was set up at a time of
imminent independence from colonial rule and the formation of the new
independent nation-state of Malaya (then including Singapore) reflected the
foresight of religious and political elites to anticipate the implications of a
multiethnic and multireligious society on nation-building and to set up a
structure that would facilitate inter-religious understanding. It began with a
multireligious leadership and political support. For those from “minority”
religions whose members may also make up minority populations, it was
clearly in their interests to be represented, and indeed, mainstream minority
religions are mostly represented in the IRO. Acting mainly as a channel for
communication at leadership levels, it has also been the main platform on
which leaders of various religions have engaged each other and worked
together, sometimes on contentious issues between them, such as between
Christians and others and between Muslims and Christians. It has also been
a public organization for the education and discussion of religions and
religion-related issues, and on occasion, for advocacy and conciliation. It has
mostly worked in cooperation with the secular state, given their overlapping
concern with religious harmony and social cohesion and sensitivity of inter-
religious matters. The secular state is also well aware of its own limitations
beyond setting the broad parameters and specific state structures for regulating
matters pertaining to religion, and taps the IRO for its multireligious symbolic
power and moral-religious authority as and when necessary to obtain legitimacy
and support for its policies and actions.
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By all appearances, the IRO is not a strong organization despite its lofty
ideals. Structurally, it consists of individuals some of whom are senior leaders
of their respective religions but whom together still do not constitute a
council of religious organizations. Such a council would also be difficult to
establish and there is no evidence to suggest any attempts to form one. Its
resources and organizational abilities are extremely limited and it can only
issue statements and voice opinions much of the time. Its status remains
ambiguous — it is recognized and accepted by the state, segments of the
public and some religious groups as representative of their respective religions
but not by some others.
Yet, the IRO is the only formal inter-religious group in existence in
multireligious Singapore, and which has, over time, accumulated some
degree of symbolic power and religious–moral authority. Amidst the many
religious boundaries which tend to be clearly defined or even rigid, it has
also managed to iron out some differences and evolve modes of
representation, communication and collaboration that bring members of
various religious faiths together in joint rituals and activities yet respect the
integrity of each religion. In religion, rituals and symbols are important.
The “3-D” approach of shared dining, devotion and dialogue, the visits to
each other’s houses of worship, the symbolic joint celebration of religious
events and joint prayers for world peace should not be made light of as
being superficial, as many others in Singapore and in many other parts of
the world do not practise such sharing or are even against it even as they
share the same social spaces. Indeed in a world where few from different
religions pray together, the common invocation and joint prayers developed
over the years by the IRO for the context of multireligious Singapore is
significant and unique and not to be underestimated. Such modes of
sharing, as pointed out by one former President of the IRO, “is not even
just about working relationship or friendship; it is about knowing how to
live, accept and respect our different religious traditions, truly in our
hearts”. Going beyond mere tolerance, common values and the golden rule
in each religion underlie the joint practices evolved and the coming together
of individuals from different faiths as an organization.
Recent and current IRO leadership generally recognizes that the
organization has the potential and the urgent need to do more in many areas
involving leadership, membership and activities in order to stay relevant in
the face of present issues and other interfaith organizations being established
such as the IRCC and the Harmony Centre. Leadership itself needs to be
knowledgeable enough across religions and to possess nuanced understanding
630

of local, regional and global developments pertaining to religions. Leaders

also need to draw their flocks to participate more in interfaith dialogue, lest
they be speaking to the converted. There is the constant challenge to grow
membership, especially among youths who currently are few in the IRO, and
to develop youth interfaith dialogues/collaborations and youth leadership as
well as resolve hierarchical and inter-generational differences between youth
and senior members within the IRO.23
Dialogue and collaboration continually need to be developed. As a field,
the ethics, principles, ground rules and skills of dialoguing need to be firmly
established among different groups of participants. For lay persons, attention
needs to be paid to the preparation for interfaith dialogue due to its sensitive
nature, including the formation of skilled interlocutors and facilitators of
dialogue. The types and range of dialogue — life/everyday, action/issues,
intellectual and theological — and their structures and settings also need to
be developed. There could also be more in-depth interfaith dialogues which
even some leaders fight shy of.24
Common issues and concerns need to be identified for dialogue and
collaboration. A constant area of concern and challenge remains stereotyping
of religious others. References to “infidels”, the “satanic” and their equivalents,
raised by the IRO as early as in the 1960s, remain and has become serious
enough for it to make a resolution against their use “for those who are not of
one’s religion or culture” in 2004 (see Appendix 25.3). Proselytization, especially
as among youth, elderly and sick or dying, can be expected to remain an issue
when those involved in proselytization do not want to enter into dialogue on
the ethics of proselytization and mission. An emerging area that presents a
new issue for interfaith dialogue and resolution pertains to the “huge
psychological, emotional and other problems faced by mixed marriages and
conversions which carried out without proper preparation for cultural shock,
conflict of laws, etc.” (see Appendix 25.3) — which can be expected to grow
in light of rapidly increasing rates of mixed and transnational marriages.
In an increasingly diverse world of intercultural and inter-religious
encounters amidst growing religiosity, religious competition and even
rigidity of religious boundaries and exclusivism, it is increasingly recognized
that there is a need to have more inter-religious dialogue, organizations
and activities. The IRO, being the first such organization and that has
lasted nearly sixty years in multireligious Singapore, is an instructive
example that captures well the difficulties and dangers of diversity that
must be faced as well as the possibilities and potentialities that inter-
religious organization brings.
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632 Lai Ah Eng
APPENDIX 25.1
MAJOR INTERNATIONAL EVENTS AND
PARTICIPATION BY THE IRO
1970 Attended World Conference on Religions and Peace (Kyoto).
1971 Held prayers for peace in Vietnam (Vietnam War).
1973 Organized meeting of key groups of Christian and Muslim leaders to foster
regional level dialogue (through the World Council of Churches).
1974 Attended World Conference on Religion and Peace (Leuven).
1976 IRO/Singapore hosted 1st Asian Conference on Religions and Peace.
1976 Organized a Boat People Project (550 Vietnamese refugees on 2 ships).
1978 Inter-religious Consultation for Peace (Bangkok).
1979 Helped organize “Parliament of Religions” in Singapore.
1979 Attended World Conference on Religion and Peace (Princeton).
1980 Helped International Council of Religions organize Conference of World

Religious Leaders.
1981 Obtained affiliation to the UN and UNESCO as an NGO.
1984 Drew up a resolution on the desecration of Amritsar Temple, sent to the

Ministry of Culture.
2004 Organized a regional seminar on religious harmony.
2005 Participated in interfaith dialogues organized by the Asia-Europe Meeting.
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APPENDIX 25.2
MAJOR LOCAL ACTIVITIES, EVENTS AND ISSUES
UNDERTAKEN BY THE IRO
1949 Officially formed and inaugural lecture given.
1953 Invited to study possible religious and moral teaching for students of
University of Malaya.
1953 Mooted the idea of compulsory religious education in government schools.
1955 Formed a subcommittee on religious education in schools, sent a

memorandum to Chief Minister arguing for compulsory religious education
in schools.
1957 IRO members sat on a Ministry of Education Committee on religion and

ethics in schools; contributed passages for reading at school assemblies.
1958 Sent a letter to the Chief Minister on stricter control of crime films and
literature and on obscene magazines to forestall growth of youth delinquency.
1959 Helped Ministry of Education produce booklets for readings at school

assemblies.
1963 Issued a memorandum on effects of films, television, radio and literature on

youths’ morals and calling for censorship and for moderate and decent
entertainment.
1964 Visited the injured in hospitals after the riots; issued a press statement
exhorting peace and harmony and elimination of fear; appeared in a televised
forum of religious speakers to promote harmony; gave weekly speeches on
different religions.
1964 Observed that the IRO is “happy” to note that non-Christians are no longer
referred to as “heathens” and non-Muslims as “infidels”.
1965 Produced a film entitled Religions in Singapore.
1965 Recommended that the Censorship Board ban the film The Twin Swords.
1965 Endorsed a statement by Christian leaders on fair and ethical propagation

of religion.
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634 Lai Ah Eng
1967 Published the book Religions in Singapore.
1967 Recommended that the Censorship Board ban the film The Great Buddha.
1967 Sent memorandum of concern to the Prime Minister and Ministry of

Health over legalized abortion.
1967 Held meetings with the Prime Minister and issued a resolution on mutual
tolerance of religions and assurance that religious practices will not be
offensive to others.
1969 Held an exhibition on places of worship in early Singapore (on the occasion
of the 150th anniversary of the “founding” of modern Singapore in 1819).
1971 Approached Ministry of Education for more coverage on moral issues in

school forums.
1973 Published The Value of the Human Person.
1975 Organized Inter-Religious Rally.
1975 Created a non-denominational invocation.
1978 Sent circular titled “An appeal for tolerance in the propagation of religious
beliefs” to the Methodist Church, Seventh Day Adventists and the Billy
Graham Crusade.
1979 Sent guidelines on tourists’ etiquette and practices to the Singapore Tourism
Board.
1979 Sent a circular on “The vital need for moral and religious instruction in our
schools” to Ministry of Education.
1979 Held Parliament of Religions at Ramakrishna Mission, Singapore.
1982 Noted that no religion is against organ donation to help sufferer, on the
opening of the first dialysis centre for kidney problem patients.
1982 Helped write curriculum on “World Religions” for compulsory Religious

Knowledge subject in secondary schools.
1982 Gave its word of cooperation to Catholic Archbishop Jean Jadot to fulfil
Pope Paul VI’s desire for dialogue with non-Catholics.
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1982 Took the stand that all films with religious themes should first be vetted by
IRO.
1982 Called for censoring of the film Shaolin Temple.
1982 Objected (by Muslim IRO members) to reference to Islam in Sri Sathya Sai
Seva Samithi Singapore’s programme in commemoration of Bhagwa Sri
Sathya Sai Baba’s 57th birthday.
1983 Held ground-breaking ceremony of the inauguration of the Mass Rapid

Transit.
1986 Drew Ministry of Community Development’s attention to insensitivities of

the Pentecostal Church of Singapore in its distribution of the Church’s
pamphlet deriding Hinduism and Buddhism.
1986 Approached by Ministry of Health for support of the government’s proposed

Human Organ Transplant Bill.
1989 Gave oral and written submissions in the consultations for the Maintenance
of Religious Harmony Act.
1999 Celebrated IRO’s 50th anniversary with an exhibition of histories, sacred

scriptures, artefacts, architecture and art of nine religions (supported by the
National Heritage Board and the Ministry of Education).
2002 Celebrated Anniversary with the theme “Towards One Nation” which
focused on repairing post-9/11 fallout.
2002 Held an Inter-civilizations Dialogue.
2002 Held several interfaith events (joint dinners and shared meals, festival
celebrations, visits to places of worship, public events).
2004 Held consultation with Bioethics Committee on stem cell research.
2004 Held conference on “Enhancing Interfaith and Multiracial Harmony”,

organized Peace March and Peace Carnival.
2005 Conducted Interfaith study courses.
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636 Lai Ah Eng
APPENDIX 25.3
THE 2004 IRO CONFERENCE:
ENRICHING INTERFAITH AND MULTIRACIAL HARMONY
The IRO Conference 2004 “Enriching Inter-Faith and Multi-Racial Harmony” held
from 8 to 10 October 2004 at Islamic Centre Jamiyah and Jamiyah Business School
was officiated by the Mr Chan Soo Sen, Minister of State, Ministry of Education.
The welcome speech was given by Haji Abu Bakar Maidin, the President of the Inter-
Religious Organization, Singapore.
Contributions in the form of papers and talks were given by the following:
1. Mr Rajan Menon of Amriteswari Society, Managing Partner of Khattar, Wong
& Partners, for his talk on “Don’t Take Religious Harmony for Granted; The
Singapore Experience — Legal and Other Perspectives”,
2. Professor Tham Seong Chee, President of the United Nations Association of
Singapore and former Dean of the Department of Malay Studies, National
University of Singapore,
3. Brother Michael Broughton of the Christian Brothers of La Salle on “Inter-Faith
and Multi-Racial Harmony; Everyone’s Business”,
4. Professor Syed Hussain Al-Attas of University Putra Malaysia, on “Religion and
the Development of National Harmony”,
5. Mr Pua Yeow Khoon, Director of Dharma Propagation, Kong Meng San, Bright
Hill Temple, Singapore,
6. Professor Aziz Nather of National University Hospital on “Community Service
as Effective Tool in Promoting Inter-Religious and Multi-Racial Harmony”,
7. Dr Farid Al-Attas of the National University of Singapore on “Islam”,
8. Swami Abaychatanya of Chinmaya Siva Centre , Singapore on “Hinduism”,
9. Ms Tan Zhi Xia of the Taoist Mission, Singapore on “Taoism”,
10. Mr Choo Heng Thong of the Mahakaruna Buddhist Society on “Buddhism”,
11. Mr Harbans Singh on “Sikhism”, and
12. LTC (Rtd) Yeo Yew Hock of Bahai Spiritual Assembly on “Baha’i Faith”.
The IRO also duly acknowledged the role of Mayor Zainul Abidin Rasheed, Minister
of State, Foreign Affairs in galvanizing the support of the People’s Association, the
Inter-Racial Confidence Circles, and Community Centres/Clubs; and the cooperation
and support of the Hindu Endowments Board, the Parsi-Zoroastrian Association of
Singapore, the Jamiyah Singapore, the Baha’i Spiritual Assembly, the Singapore
Catholic Archdiocese, the Central Sikh Gurdwara, the Taoist Mission of Singapore,
and the Jewish Welfare Board.
The following resolutions were passed:
1. That illustrative stories, particularly local ones, weaving around and elaborating
on the universal values which are the basis of human civilization and which are
the “water” of the vessels of different religions, be used as a means of disseminating
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global ethics as part of life-long education, beginning from the level of pre-
school education.
2. That community services regardless of race, language or religion particularly for
the less fortunate, the less knowledgeable, and children with special needs
should be enhanced and accepted also as an impactful means for enhancing and
enriching interfaith and multiracial harmony.
3. That the values, philosophies, traditions and conventions of the different religions
and cultures, with the cooperation of traditional and modernist scholars, be
explained in contemporary language, taking into account the plural and difficult
nature of society and the world today and the challenges and prospects ahead.
4. That the flowering or enhancement of interfaith, multiracial work by organizations
and NGOs, such as the Singapore Buddhist Lodge, Jamiyah Singapore, the
Inter-Religious Organization, Singapore, the Inter-Racial Confidence Circles,
the Hindu Endowments Board, the Central Sikh Gurdwara, the Singapore
Catholic Archdiocese and the Taoist Mission be encouraged and supported as a
crucial and necessary conduit for the empowerment of interfaith efforts and
peace entrepreneurship.
5. That terms such as “infidel” and the equivalent terms in other religions or
cultures should not be used, in general, for those who are not of one’s religion
or culture.
6. That workers for multiracial and interfaith harmony consider the huge
psychological, emotional and other problems faced by mixed marriages and
conversions which are carried out without proper preparation for cultural shock,
conflict of laws, etc.
7. That intra-community dialogue on such issues be supported and that such
workers be involved in on-going dialogue between members of religious and
racial majority and minority communities.
8. Last but not least, we recognize the developmental benefits of the wholesome
secularism of Singapore, its laws and its constitution, which among other things
allow religious freedom or freedom of worship, does not support any one
particular religion or race, and at the same time does not denigrate any.
Notes
The author wishes to thank several IRO Council and ordinary members for sharing
their experiences and views on the organization and on religion and inter-religious
issues in Singapore; participants of the Institute of Policy Studies Workshop on
Religious Diversity and Harmony in Singapore (1–2 September 2005) for their
comments and suggestions on the draft version of this chapter; and Ms Wendy Tng
(research officer at IPS, 2005) and Ms Ting Jieyun (research intern at IPS, 2005) for
their research assistance. All views expressed herein are entirely those of the author’s.
1. Primary data in this chapter was obtained mainly from personal interviews with
various past and present Council and ordinary members of the IRO; observations
at some IRO functions during the period 2003–2006; records (incomplete) of
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638 Lai Ah Eng
mainly IRO monthly meetings kept by some committee members, and news
reports. It appears that the IRO did not keep full and complete records of all its
events and proceedings. It is also the general case that inter-religious dimensions
in Singapore have hardly been researched and documented, while negotiations
of any inter-religious issues and tensions have taken place behind closed doors
and not reported. As such, this chapter is best treated as a preliminary investigation
on the IRO and on some aspects and issues of inter-religious life in Singapore.
For confidentiality reasons, interviewees and respondents are not named.
2. Vendettas also took place in the immediate post-war months, mainly by anti-
Japanese guerrillas most of whom were Chinese against perceived collaborators
many of whom were Malays.
3. I have been unable to establish how this distribution of Council members by
religious background came to be agreed upon at the time of IRO’s formation. It
is reasonable to suggest that the number of Muslims and Christians permitted in
its Council is a result of the strength of the IRO’s initiators.
4. Most events and details in this section on the international and local activities of
the IRO have been culled from the minutes of IRO meetings from 1970 to
1986. I have not been able to access records after 1986 despite several attempts.
5. At the 1979 World Conference on Religion and Peace, the IRO sent five
delegates (one Buddhist, one Christian, one Muslim, one Sikh and one Hindu),
after much discussion. The representation of religions, the number of delegates
from each country and the religious composition of each country team were
main issues behind the conference’s organization, and among the final number
of delegates (245) nearly half were Christians (103), while Buddhists (38) and
Muslims (41) made up about one-sixth each. Hindus (26) comprised the largest
number of remaining delegates of other religious backgrounds, while Judaism,
Shintoism, Sikhism and indigenous religions were represented by seven delegates
(one for each) and Confucianism and Jainism by three for each.
6. See, for example, the Institute of Policy Studies’ intercultural dialogues which
were attended by religious and community leaders, academics and educationists
(Lai 2005).
7. The only secondary school that has implemented a compulsory Religious and
Moral Education (RME) Programme on its own accord is the independent Saint
Joseph’s Institution whose director Brother Michael Broughton is a firm believer
of interfaith dialogue especially among youths and who is also a member of the
IRO driving its programme of youth interfaith dialogue. The Programme
introduces its students to world religions as well as focus on current moral issues
and family life, and seeks to help in each student the beginnings of a personal
spirituality.
8. With effect from 1 August 2008 Muslims will be included under the Act.
9. Since the late 1970s, individual religious leaders have also voiced concerns
privately and in close-door discussions about aggressive and unethical
proselytization by evangelical Christians and the divisive tensions within families
and between religious communities brought about by conversion. The tensions
638

among family members are felt particularly in Chinese families when some
members who have converted have destroyed their family’s cultural-religious
items or heirlooms and refused to partake in some family rites and rituals
according to traditional manners such as at the funerals of parents.
10. Interestingly, there are no references in IRO records on the Maria Hertogh riots
which took place in 1950, a year after its formation. In these riots which took
on an ethno-religious turn between Muslims and Christians, violence was mostly
directed by Muslims against Europeans and Eurasians and eighteen people died.
In the ethnically-inspired 1964 riots which occurred on two occasions (July and
September), mainly between Chinese (including Chinese secret society members)
and Malays (mainly Muslims), about 36 people were killed, hundreds were
injured and hundreds detained. These riots need to be viewed against the larger
turbulent political landscape and electoral politics within the Malaysian Federation
of which Singapore was part of (but soon to separate from due to political
leadership differences) at that time.
11. Some Christians no longer refer to others as “heathen” and “pagans” but as “pre-
Christians”, while some Muslims refer to non-Muslims as “infidels” and “kafirs”.
12. Details are unavailable as to why the first two films were considered offensive; in
the case of The Shaolin Temple, Buddhist monks were depicted as eating dog
meat and drinking wine, both of which are taboo in Buddhism.
13. The invocation goes thus: O Lord, increase in us understanding and knowledge
and set us free from the bondage of greed, hatred and ignorance, so that we may
awake, arise and advance until the goal is reached, giving our bodies to work and
our minds to the Lord. May we work vigorously keeping within spiritual
discipline to bring peace in our hearts, in our families, peace in our cities, peace
in our planetary homes, the world. May we master ourselves, sublimate our
combative energies into creative channels, and freely ourselves in the service of
our fellowmen, and our Lord. Help us, O Lord, to ever strive to keep on these
lines to promote peace on earth and goodwill among men. By Thy grace, may
we all prosper.
14. The IRO has encouraged its members to take turns to organize fellowships to
promote understanding for peace and harmony. For example, the Christian
Fellowship on 10 December 2005, led by the Catholic representatives, invited
all the IRO and their contacts to a fellowship at the Church of the Holy Trinity
on the occasion of the Catholic Church’s celebration of the fortieth anniversary
of the promulgation of the landmark church document Nostra Aetate. This
document is considered probably the first official Christian document in history
to recognize the good present in all the major religions of the world and of the
Catholic Church’s own recognition of the world’s major religions. The programme
included a prayer for peace, a presentation on the main tenets of Catholicism,
and a tour of the parish church.
15. It also performed cleansing rites on Pulau Tekong, reputedly haunted grounds,
where National Servicemen undertake regular training.
16. The Singapore Soka Association also has an exceptional public profile during
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640 Lai Ah Eng
National Day celebrations in which it is the only religious organization that

participates in the official state National Day celebrations. How this came to be
remains a mystery but an informant whose mother was a leader in the Association
said it was given the special opportunity after its members prayed for the
recovery of the present Prime Minister when he was undergoing treatment for
cancer and the recovery was successful.
17. The former Methodist Bishop of Singapore Yap Kim Hao feels that he has been
ostracized somewhat by his church for being a member of the IRO and for
participating in interfaith dialogues and activities.
18. Archbishop Jadot was appointed Apostolic Delegate to the United States in
1973 by Pope Paul VI with instructions to search out more pastoral bishops who
would implement the reforms of Vatican Council II (1962–65). He is known to
have did so with great success.
19. For example, the IRO’s Multifaith Study Programme, instituted in 2006 is held
at the Jamiyah Business School premises.
20. The Inter-religious and Interracial Circles, (IRCCs; previously known as the
Interracial Confidence Circles) were set up at local “grassroots” levels to build
trust and understanding across ethnic-religious communities and to serve as
mechanisms for ethno-religious conflict avoidance and resolution. The IRCC
National Steering Committee under the chairmanship of the Minister of
Community Development, Youth and Sports comprised a cross-section of religious
leaders, lay persons and members of civic organizations in its earlier committees.
In 2006, the committee was reconstituted to include mainly top religious and
community leaders, probably out of security concerns by the government over
terrorist attacks (which have taken place elsewhere globally and in the region
since the events of September 11) and the need for it to mobilize religious
leaders to guide their followers. The IRHC was formed out of the national
bodies which were consulted on the Declaration on Religious Harmony, as a
consultative forum and to propagate the Declaration. Other CEP clusters involve
educational institutions (under the Ministry of Education), media and the arts
(under the Ministry of Information and the Arts), business unions (under the
Ministry of Manpower) and grassroots organizations (under the People’s
Associations).
21. The Act has often been interpreted as being passed by the state to exercise
control over religion used for political mobilization, in the face of the 1987
arrests of alleged Marxists, some of them of Catholic backgrounds, for involvement
in a conspiracy to overthrow the state sometime in the future. This interpretation
overlooks the fact that the arrests took place during the same time period as
aggressive religious proselytization and that the Act was aimed primarily at
dealing with disharmony and tensions between religions brought about by this
proselytization.
22. The Declaration, which is recited by school children on Racial Harmony Day
observed in schools, goes thus: We, the people in Singapore, declare that
religious harmony is vital for peace, progress and prosperity in our multi-racial
640

and multi-religious Nation. We resolve to strengthen religious harmony through

tolerance, confidence, respect and understanding. We shall always recognize the
secular nature of our State, promote cohesion within our society, respect each
other’s freedom of religion, grow our common space while respecting our
diversity, foster inter-religious communications, and thereby ensure that religion
will not be abused to create conflict and disharmony in Singapore.
23. A Youth Interfaith Summit was organized in 2007 by the National Youth
Council, the renewed attention on youth in religion and in interfaith dialogue
in part arising from concern at youth radicalization in terrorist and suicide
attacks elsewhere. The Soka Gakkai Association organized a Youth for Peace
Interfaith Symposium on 16 March 2008.
24. According to one Catholic member of the IRO, Catholicism’s four forms of
dialogue are the dialogues of witness of life, humanitarian aid and religious
experience for lay persons, and theological dialogue for leaders. One experience of
dialogue on the theological was tried out among Catholic and Muslim leaders in
the IRO once every three months around 2003–2005. Initial meetings were just
to get to know each other. Then gradually they moved onto topics such as peace
in the Islamic traditions and the Christian traditions, and Jesus in the Qur’an and
Jesus in the Bible. In this dialogue on Jesus, it was found that while Jesus is one
person there are two religious traditions with two different approaches as to who
Jesus is — a prophet as revealed by God to Muslims, and as the son of God as
revealed to Christians. According to this Catholic participant, “if this is the way
that Jesus is being revealed by God in the Qur’an then I have to respect that …”
References
Inter-religious Organization, Singapore. Minutes of Meetings 1970–1986.
———. Religions in Singapore, 3rd ed., 2001. Singapore: Inter-religious Organization,
2003.
———. <http://www.iro.org.sg>, accessed 31 July 2007.
Lai, Ah Eng, ed. Facing Faiths, Crossing Cultures: Key Trends and Issues in a Multicultural
Word. Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies, 2005.
Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports. <http://www.mcys.gov.sg>,
accessed 31 July 2007.
See, Guat Kwee. “History of Christian-Muslim Relations in Singapore Since Country’s
Independence in 1965”. Unpublished MA Thesis, Hartford Seminary,
Connecticut, USA, July 2007.
Sinha, Vineeta. “Scrutinizing the Themes of ‘Sameness’ and ‘Difference’ in the
Discourse on Multireligiosity and Religious Encounters in Singapore”. In Asian
Interfaith Dialogue: Perspectives on Religion, Education and Social Cohesion, edited
by Syed Farid Alatas, Lim Teck Ghee and Kazuhide Kuroda. Singapore: Centre
for Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs (RIMA) and The World Bank, 2003.
Yap, Kim Hao. Doing Theology in a Pluralistic World. Singapore: The Methodist
Centre, 1990.
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642 Charles Phua Chao Rong, Anita Hui and Yap Ching Wi
26
INTERACTIONS AMONG YOUTH

LEADERS OF DIFFERENT FAITHS
Realities from the Ground and
Lessons Learnt
Charles Phua Chao Rong, Anita Hui and

Yap Ching Wi
INTRODUCTION
The post 9/11 rise of global terrorism has raised the awareness and the
potential social threat of religious extremism. Battling such terrorism head-
on results in a tragic scenario of “violence begets violence”. Conflicts like
terrorism require bottom-up approaches and solutions. Interfaith youth
engagement is one such approach. It potentially educates youths from
different faiths on their commonality. Only by such gradual education can
interfaith understanding advance beyond mere tolerance into true respect
from understanding. Mere tolerance can be quite fragile in the face of social
mistrust resulting from terrorism.
On the social cohesion front, Singapore’s forty years of nation-building
has been based on a contract of mutual tolerance between the different
faiths and racial communities, with the government as a paternal moderator.
However, in the face of rapid globalization, the rapid spread of diverse ideas
through info-communication technology and changing global politico-
social dynamics have made it necessary to re-examine the current social
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Interactions among Youth Leaders of Different Faiths 643
contract of interfaith engagements, particularly those amongst youths.

Preparations must be made for youths to inherit the responsibility of
upholding multiracial and multi-religious respect, and to continue and
advance effective interfaith engagement. This chapter examines the
ground realities of interfaith youth engagement and suggests policy
recommendations, including social actions that will equip all stakeholders
to move from mutual tolerance to a coherent and in-depth interfaith
engagement, thereby strengthening social cohesion.
What is Interfaith?
Due to its sensitivity and tendency for misunderstandings, it is worthwhile to
define the intended scope and role of “interfaith” in Singapore. Interfaith is
not about uniting faiths to form a universal religion. Rather, as the prefix
“inter” implies, it involves an understanding amongst different religions of
their common social purposes. In Singapore, faith and ethnicity can be highly
intertwined. By induction therefore, multiracial and interfaith harmony enjoy
a parallel relationship with each other. In context, they are thus vital elements
of Singapore’s nation-building. In this study, the terms “faith” and “religion”
are understood as synonymous and will be used interchangeably.
Currently, the consensual and official direction of interfaith harmony, as
spelt out under the Declaration on Religious Harmony (2003), lies in achieving
religious harmony through “mutual tolerance, confidence, respect and
understanding”. The action plan is to “recognise the secular nature of our
State; promote cohesion with our society; respect each other’s freedom of
religion; grow our common space while respecting our diversity; and foster
inter-religious communication”. However, in the face of possible terrorist
attacks, mutual respect can be threatened and suspicions against certain
religions heightened with potentially harmful consequences on the social
fabric of society. This will also test the limits that cannot be equated with
harmonious acceptance or understanding.
There is a need to rethink the fundamental scope of interfaith harmony
and engagement. The proposal is to elevate the scope of interfaith harmony
to one of “harmony beyond tolerance”, specifically to be one of harmony
arising from an accurate and positive understanding combined with social
action among the various religions and their practitioners and followers. It is
only through such understanding and combined social action, that we can
obtain an accurate and positive view of the role and place of various religions
in society. With that, mutual respect will be truly deeper and wider.
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BACKGROUND OF STUDY
Aim
This chapter surveys the ground realities of interfaith youth engagement in
order to propose policy recommendations. It provides a baseline assessment
of the interfaith youth scene in Singapore, and seeks to analyse the actual and
potential obstacles experienced. It also considers the constraints and
considerations of various agencies and recommends some proposals for policy
reforms. The recommendations are intended to be holistic and incremental
for maximum practicality and utility to policymakers.
Methodology
The nature of interfaith youth engagement in Singapore requires a broad-
based survey of its current scene, in which the approach has to be emic to
prevent any inherent bias at the onset. As interfaith engagement is action-
based, it would be largely unproductive to do a quantitative study. Nor is a
longitudinal study appropriate due to the limited active players available. At
the same time, the acknowledged infancy of interfaith development in
Singapore limits the usage of in-depth case studies. Furthermore, due to the
specificity of the Singapore interfaith youth scene, the literature available in
print and electronic media that have been surveyed are assessed to be largely
limited in scope and potentially irrelevant to Singapore’s cultural and national
context. Thus, their reference and usage are minimal in this study.
In our limited qualitative survey, twenty-one interfaith youth leaders
from various civil society and religious organizations were selected to complete
a questionnaire which was e-mailed to them (see Appendix 26.1). The
questions were deliberately left open-ended to avoid the subjectivity of an
emic approach.
THE STATE OF CURRENT INTERFAITH YOUTH

ENGAGEMENT
Based on the ground survey of opinions from various youth leaders, it can be
generally concluded that there is much room for development and
improvement. Some interfaith projects have been conducted but they remain
largely uncoordinated and sporadic in frequency. This section describes the
various stakeholders’ contributions based on the returns submitted and their
appreciation of the interfaith scene as a whole.
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Views of Youth Leaders Active in Interfaith Work

In general, the youth leaders interviewed call for a more in-depth appreciation
and implementation of interfaith work in two areas. (Also see Appendix 26.1
for sample views and recommendations by selected youth leaders interviewed).
One is that of community but that goes beyond “merely task-oriented
relationships” and “breaking down barriers, and making headway with the
focus on alleviating human suffering”. As one respondent proposed:
There is a need for more public discourse about ethics and community.
For the religious and non-religious, there is still a need for greater
understanding of each other’s viewpoints, ethics, approaches to right
living, “the good life” and other fundamentals of religious teaching.
The other area is that of acquiring an informed appreciation of religious

differences for better comprehension of the need for interfaith engagement
and linking such engagements at the formal and everyday life platforms,
thereby harnessing understanding and bonding at various levels of relationships.
The following insights from one youth leader illuminate the current state
of interfaith youth engagement and its realities:
As a youth, who experiences working relationships with fellow youths

from different faiths, the issue of discussing faiths is limited to religious
rituals and practices. For example, frequent questions posted to me are:
How many times do Muslims pray? Why? Why do you have to wear the
tudung, etc… Hence, I question the definition of interfaith. Is it
engagement of people from various religious practices or belief, as the
former is easier and safer to discuss and debate? Based on that definition,
yes. The current interfaith engagement among the youths in Singapore
is beginning to be more comfortable and “usual”, as youths are curious
by what they see.
I haven’t heard of many programmes (that is, camps, workshops, fun

activities) attended by youths to promote solely on interfaith interaction.
However, I have heard of religious-affiliated student societies, such as
National University of Singapore Muslim Society, who engaged their
counterparts in debates and forums. Yet again, this kind of programme
attracts certain portions of the community. If promoting interfaith
among youth is essential in building a cohesive community, more
programmes and activities must be developed… Another programme
that I would like to share is the Ramadan Camp, organized by MUIS in
2003. Held in the fasting month, the non-Muslim participants were
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invited to fast together with their team mates and, at the same time,
being involved in the outdoor games and activities. Although the
programme may focus on ritual and religious practice, but, it can be a
start to a deeper understanding of a religion.
In terms of the current or projected issues and challenges faced, the

youths brought up several limitations. One prominent concern is the lack of
know-how in the techniques, objectives and terms of interaction and
engagement. Another common concern is how youths of different faiths
establish consensus and trust, particularly in the areas of religious proselytization
and the agenda of various religious groups. The following responses from
youths throw up some of the intricate negotiations they have to undertake, as
well as the learning points reaped from their experiences.
While engaging, often times, we have difficulties defining ourselves, how

much of sharing is enough. Essentially, the fear of being looked upon as
“preachy” discourages excess information sharing with fellow youth of
different faith.
I believe, this obstacle can be overcome if we know the skills of engaging.

Building good rapport with fellow youths of different faiths is important.
Allowing questions before explaining and sharing also helps in explaining
our faith. If there are no questions, stop deliberating.
In the initiatives I have participated in, one obstacle encountered [is]

individuals who engage in inter-religious discussions to find “faults” in
others. Some may still want to focus on weeding out differences between
different faiths as proof that theirs is the best. Some may participate in
national debates without proper knowledge of the nuances and
complexities of their problems and by seeking solution only within their
inherited theology. For the latter, mastering secular knowledge of the
social sciences and other humanities disciplines can help. However, these
are only a handful of initiatives. Therefore, it is imperative that people
establish the focus and aims of such initiatives. It is important not to be
confined to theological discussions because differences in theology exist
no matter what, even within the same faith. It is more fruitful to think
of concrete solutions to real problems. It is important that religious
activists be equipped with the necessary social and psychological
knowledge before taking part in such an initiative.
Singaporeans tend to have a MYOB [mind your own business] approach

to life and civic affairs. ‘If the government isn’t doing it, then it is
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probably not important’ seems to be a dominant mindset. I don’t think

there’s an interest in really asking the questions about what we share
because it leads into questions about what makes us different. Coupled
with the MYOB mindset is a pathological fear of conflict and people
tend to avoid issues of ‘race and religion’ like the plague. Having had
those two areas cast as areas of potential contention and hence needing
“control” (that is, proscription) by the government, this has only served
to further reinforce its untouchable status. In addition, there is a lack of
integration in informal spaces — family gatherings, school playgrounds,
workplaces — there seems to be a racial clumping and not integration
amongst many groups. It seems to be more prevalent within the younger
Chinese-speaking populations. Why? All sorts of reasons, I suppose,
related to “comfort zones”, familiarity, family-borne stereotypes and
prejudices.
Having “walked the talk” of promoting interfaith engagement, these youth

leaders have gathered significant insights and evolved preliminary
methodologies for effective interfaith youth engagements. Hence, even though
few interfaith events are being organized, these pioneering activists are laying
the foundation for future interfaith engagements. Their passion and wisdom
are evident in their responses:
• People unwilling to participate. Therefore, go with the willing.

• People fearful of engagement. Therefore ensure that no one is trying to
persuade or convert anyone else. Put fears out on table, first.
• Government feels it’s too sensitive. Can the project appeal? Its concept
reworked?
• While many believe that the virtues of interfaith work, when it comes to
the crunch of doing it, not many will come forward. The reasons vary,
from genuine lack of time (since they must first commit to their own
religions) to not wanting to take the lead (because of the burden of
responsibility). It is a pity but that is the reality of the situation. I,
however, will remain committed to interfaith work.
• I have yet to experience an interfaith activity that is so successful. However,
allow me to share what’s my definition of a successful interfaith activity.
At the end of the activity:
• I know in-depth about others’ religion and faith, its philosophy and
fundamentals;
• I’m able to share my faith with others. Faith means more than just
rituals and practices;
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• We’re able to come to a plan, or at least an agreement, on how to

spread this understanding of each others’ faith to more people;
• We develop friendship that respects our uniqueness and diversity. A
friendship so developed that we are able to remind one another of
our obligations towards our different faiths.
A vital next step is to bring these activists together so that efforts can synergize
from the increasing trust that has been built up. Before proceeding to a
discussion on policy recommendations, it is important to survey the various
positions and the value added by the various stakeholders in the Singapore
interfaith youth scene.
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
The official ministry that has thus far been involved in interfaith work is the
Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports (MCYS). Other relevant bodies
for future work can include the National Youth Council (NYC) and NEXUS,
the latter which drives and coordinates National Education initiatives
undertaken by various ministries and agencies.
Religion can be a sensitive sphere of life especially in a multi-religious
setting. The official approach is to avoid direct discussion of religions and
inter-religious issues, and to achieve interfaith harmony indirectly through
national unity and social cohesion. The logic behind this latter approach is
that if every Singaporean feels a “homely Singapore” spirit, racial and
interfaith harmony is achieved because Singapore comprises multi-racial
and multifaith communities. On the ground, this is achieved through
creating common spaces and programmes, such as through schools,
community centres and youth organizations where youths and students
partake in activities and events to bond as a community and nation. Where
racial harmony is assumed to encompass interfaith harmony, the National
Education and Racial Harmony programmes are commendable efforts,
further boosted by a common English language.
However, at a deeper level, the issue of interfaith harmony is more
sidelined than being encompassed within racial harmony. In modern Singapore,
the free flow of information and religious freedom complicate the linear
relationship between faiths and ethnicities. In particular, the Chinese need
not be Buddhists or Taoists nor are all the Indians Hindus. The only exception
is the Malays who are predominantly Muslims. Due to religious freedom,
conversions across ethnic groups take place, reflecting the dynamic relationship
between religion and ethnicity.
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In principle, MCYS and NYC would encourage but not initiate interfaith
dialogue and joint activities. Rather than creating artificial “top-down”
platforms, they seek to empower collaborative efforts by other agencies that
are driven by shared interests. The empowerment efforts in interfaith work
are, however, weak as aforementioned. In view of possible security issues and
their social ramifications, there is no clear government encouragement for
grassroots interfaith youth work. In practice, both MCYS and NYC facilitate
youths in projects of mutual interest and that are mostly non-religious in
nature. Its open policy seeks to encourage ground initiatives from youths to
work on common causes. An example is the <Youth.sg> portal, which is a
MCYS on-line resource portal to facilitate youth community participation.
Another example is the Young Changemakers scheme which is a seed-funding
scheme that highlights the opportunities and platforms MCYS and NYC
provide for socially engaged youths. It is apparent that youths are engaged by
MCYS and NYC for a shared purpose across their diverse backgrounds and
beliefs. This indirectly promotes the mutual respect and appreciation for each
other’s beliefs and religions. This is in contrast to a direct approach of
working specifically towards interfaith harmony. Therefore, in directly avoiding
faith issues, interfaith work is normatively encouraged and pursued through
grassroots initiatives. MCYS and NYC are not likely to hinder these initiatives
unless they jeopardises social harmony. Indeed, they are open to collaboration,
although they will not initiate cooperation in areas of interfaith.
THE INTER-RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION

The Inter-Religious Organization (IRO) is the only non-government
organization (NGO) in Singapore dedicated solely to interfaith work. It was
formed in 1949 in the hope of improving understanding amongst different
faiths in Singapore. It is, however, not youth specific. It functions like a loose
federation that tries to garner support for its relatively “top-down” initiatives.
Due to both religious sensitivity and a lack of understanding behind the
purpose of interfaith work, support for the IRO tends to be lukewarm and
event-driven. For example, a delegation headed by Mrs Yu-Foo Yee Shoon
(Minister of State, MCYS) to Bali to attend an interfaith conference and to
spread the goodwill of Singapore in August 2005, in the aftermath of the July
2005 London terrorist bombings, included representatives from the IRO.
Earlier on in January 2004, the IRO had held a huge public interfaith peace
prayer for the December 2004 tsunami victims. These reflect its success when
there are strong events to act as a catalyst or major incidents for it to act upon.
On the other hand, without such catalysts, regular support is relatively weak.
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For instance, the much anticipated IRO National Day Youth Camp 2005,
meant to be conducted during the National Day Week in August, failed to
materialize due to the lack of consensus on the programme and support from
the ground. The camp was delayed and only took place later (between 26 and
29 November 2005).
The IRO also inherits some of the problems of and their consequences
from its member faith-based organizations. Some of these faith-based
organizations are not strong internally. Within some faiths, there are various
sects and denominations which might not report directly to their “national”
faith-based organizations in a hierarchical manner. This results in problematic
information dissemination procedures and increases the tendencies of
miscommunication, apart from issues of authority, representation and
theological interpretation. Specific to interfaith youth work, there is no
equivalent faith-based youth networks committed to interfaith work in the
IRO. Generally, not all faith-based organizations have active youth wings.
Those with strong youth wings might have them remain autonomous from
their adult wings, presenting another dimension to the communication
problem complex. Equally significant is the youth wing’s roles and vision to
enhance loyalty to their own faiths. Therefore, it is understandable why there
is little interaction and networking between faith-based youth organizations.
The overall result of the lack of coordination and centralization of
information and resource is the sporadic nature of grassroots initiated interfaith
events. While this approach reflects well on grassroots’ initiatives in organizing
activities, it also highlights the danger of the lack of quality control especially
when sensitive religious issues, such as proselytization, are involved.
FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS AND TWO RECENT

GRASSROOTS INTERFAITH YOUTH EVENTS
Based on the feedback from various grassroots organizations, there is no
strong impetus from the ground driving towards interfaith engagement. It is
an established and understandable fact that every faith is preoccupied with
their individual propagation programmes. There are, however, some notable
exceptions. Matched by NYC, the SAFF-PERDAUS (Youth Wing of
Pergerakan Dakwah Singapura [Singapore Da’wah Movement]) collaborated
with the Singapore SOKA Association (SSA) to organize the Night Explorer
which brought Muslims and non-Muslims together to better understand the
significance of Prophet Muhammad’s journey. In grassroots initiatives towards
interfaith engagement, special mention should be given to the Singapore
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Buddhist Federation (SBF), which initiated the Inter Religious Youth Forum
in May 2004 through a working group comprising Buddhist, Muslim and
Hindu youths, and to the Youth Committee of the Central Council of Malay
Cultural Organizations Singapore (Majlis Pusat) which organized the Interfaith
Youth Camp in June 2004 (see Appendix 26.2 for details of both events).
The Inter Religious Youth Forum attracted more than fifty participants
with speakers from Muslim, Catholic, Hindu and Buddhist backgrounds.
The diversity of issues discussed captured the challenges of living in and
growing up in a multi-racial and multifaith society: the challenges and
successes of youths’ daily life engagement; handling interfaith familial
relationships; achieving understanding beyond labelling; evangelism; the place
of youths with no religions in interfaith engagement; and taking stock of
tolerance and moving beyond. In order to encourage continuous interaction
and friendship, each participant was given a booklet containing a compilation
of “Faith, Food and Friendship”, describing the food requirements of the four
faiths and contacts of faith-based organizations as well as other books on the
four faiths. The organizing committee was very clear about encouraging an
informal, relaxed and real exchange amongst the youths, away from the
seriousness and ceremonious burden of having to speak as authorities
representing their faiths. The camp organized by Majlis Pusat attracted the
participation of more than fifty youths from five faiths. After much effort, it
was able to achieve the setting up of an Interfaith Youth Corps and a second
camp. The main achievement of both camps was the friendship built among
the youth participants of different faiths.
A common challenge faced by the organizers of both events was the
difficult process of inviting participation. While the camp focused solely on
organizations, the forum engaged individuals and organizations and leveraged
on existing networks and contacts. Two key like-minded community leaders
brought in partners from their respective faiths and, through the process of
joint facilitation, formed a working group comprising youths from the Hindu,
Muslim and Buddhist faiths. This working group has the expressed aim of
gathering like-minded youth leaders to brainstorm on the relevant topics and
approaches for an inter-religious youth forum that would not replicate the
“official” views of their respective religions, but rather the views and experiences
of youths themselves.
Lessons gathered from both the Youth Forum and the Interfaith Youth
Camp events also point towards the importance of detailed communication,
a clear focus, rigorous documentation, building an open engagement process
focused on shared values, and the passion and commitment of gatekeepers,
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that is, individuals or organizations who are able to keep in touch with their
counterparts from other faiths and mobilize like-minded partners from their
faiths (such as through the writing of this chapter) which has sustained
significant friendships and galvanized individuals and organizations committed
to interfaith youth work.
Considered together, the ground realities described above reflect larger
issues of concern. Politically, the secular government has valid reasons to
avoid dealing directly with matters of faith. Between the faith organizations,
power politics and practical considerations reflect the reality of interfaith
work. Structurally, current interfaith work by individual organizations lacks
coordination and a proper organizational framework that could better maximize
resource utility and stretch the limited dollar spent. Given the existing strong
influence of the state, the approaches taken by the government in promoting
inter-racial harmony and interfaith engagement, albeit in an indirect and
lesser extent for the latter, discourage interfaith empowerment to NGOs and
youths. This, coupled with the infancy of interfaith youth work, leads to a
lack of focus in discussions and sustained programmes.
At the ground level, initiatives thus far seem ad hoc and laden with
challenges. There is a lack of both organizers and participants. Faith-based
organizations have to focus on their faith work to justify the funding received
from their followers. They need to be continually “self-strengthened” by
winning over converts and increasing the loyalty of existing followers, especially
the spiritually “vulnerable” and untrained youths. Interfaith work is therefore
not a priority and instead may be understood as an obstacle to their faith
work. Hence, procrastination (“talk but no action”) is an understandable
phenomenon. Furthermore, given the inherent politics and other limitations
within each religious organization, the few individuals and organizations
committed to interfaith youth work run the risk of burn-out. One of the
outcomes is that interfaith youth events are unable to achieve in-depth
breakthroughs, while the lack of focus impedes the long-term development of
interfaith work.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is easy to recommend normative policies that have high ideals but are
impractical to implement. Good and workable policy recommendations
require a sense of practicality; therefore a balance between status quo inaction
and revolutionary breakthrough needs to be maintained. The following are
the main considerations that underlie the proposed recommendations.
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Sensitivity of Interfaith Engagement and Approach

Interfaith engagement is a sensitive issue that, when ill-maintained, can reap
unhealthy social consequences. While national security considerations and
the goal of greater social harmony partly depend on it, religious sensitivities
need to be accounted for a healthy communication between various religions
and participating agencies.
There is a need to cater for each religion’s current comfort zone and to
consider the exposure of youths to the concept of interfaith engagement
when their commitment to their own faith is weak. Youths should be well
trained in the teachings of their own faiths and in the techniques of
facilitation and group work; and establish understanding and support with
their religious elders, before being exposed to interfaith work. The training,
however, should not portray their religion as the absolute truth and hence,
cut off opportunities for future interfaith dialogue. Optimally, youths
should capture the essence and magnanimity of their own religions — this
is the foundation for any higher-level exchanges and mutual understanding.
During interfaith exchanges, faith-based organizations should adhere to an
etiquette that respects the bases of other religions. Specifically, interfaith
events should not be exploited to proselytize any specific religion. Otherwise,
this would tarnish the integrity of the interfaith movement and hinder any
future development. For a start, intellectual exchanges should steer clear
from pure theological discussions until the movement reaches some maturity.
Learning is most productive and best internalized by experience. Therefore,
social action and active learning are effective tools towards gradual
performance breakthrough in this sensitive endeavour.
Threshold of Government Policy

Understandably, Singapore’s past experience of racial riots affects the
government’s threshold on interfaith engagement. The government adopts
a passive, neutral and yet open policy, whereby no explicit and active
support is rendered to interfaith projects. However, promising youth projects
that indirectly promote the value of interfaith harmony are supported in
good faith. This direction provides for a status quo to its hitherto stable
interfaith relations. Therefore, tangible and substantial benefits need to be
reaped for the interfaith relations to justify any attempts to change this
status quo. However, weighing the potential fruits of interfaith dialogue
and harmony in the context of the new security situation, incremental
changes should be proposed. Unlike other social issues, interfaith engagement
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has very few successful theoretical models, and thus a trial-and-error method
is essential. In “testing out” these methods, the threshold needs to be
modest to prevent harmful risk-taking that jeopardizes social security instead
of strengthening it. A model worth adopting for a phase-by-phase evaluation
of progress is the four phases of interfaith engagement: friendship, social
action, mutual study and intellectual exchange. Government agencies need
to work out and continuously review its role as the programmes are
implemented and lessons learnt. There needs to be a balance and gradual
progress along this model.
Broad-based and Flexible Approach towards a Public Good

Balanced against the government’s threshold and an incremental approach is
the fact that interfaith engagement is a public good. Like education, market
forces have little tangible incentive to handle this aspect of social life and
social good. Without governmental intervention, sole reliance on non-
governmental organizations to provide this good is slow and unproductive at
best and, at worst, is counter-productive or may even spiral out of control.
However, a sole reliance on the government to provide for this good reduces
the value and citizen ownership of interfaith harmony. A delicate balance
between governmental direction and support, and non-governmental
(grassroots) initiative would be an ideal and practical approach.
Inter-generational Bonding
Interfaith harmony would require successful communication of ideas and
division of labour between youths and seniors, based on a mutual
understanding of trust, respect and continuity. Some current efforts of youth
engagement involve the seniors running activities they “think” would cater to
youth needs. The resultant sporadic and weak youth participation speaks for
itself. Riding on the success of NYC’s youth empowerment, youths should be
empowered by their seniors to design and conduct interfaith activities in their
own manner for maximum youth ownership and effectiveness, without
contradicting religious doctrine and hierarchy. This would reduce the inevitable
clash of inter-generational communication and build up inter-generational
bonding along the way. This would also strengthen the motivation of a
bottom-up youth empowerment strategy (checked by seniors’ facilitation and
advice) that allows the flexibility for youths of specific age ranges to take lead
in their own activities. Here, it serves well to caution that a uniform policy for
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all youths, whose ages range widely between fifteen and thirty-five years, is
potentially problematic and even counter-productive.
Policy Recommendations
The prerequisite to any successful interfaith engagement is that the social
taboo of interfaith, as a sensitive subject and therefore to be avoided in public
discussions, needs to be reviewed. Interfaith is a double-edged sword, which
can either be highly damaging, if not well managed, or do wonders to
Singapore’s social defence, if engaged in a constructive manner.
Overall, for good coordination and optimal resource allocation, it is
recommended that the government or a credible non-government organization
(such as the IRO) act as the central monitor of progress, regulator of interfaith
conduct and coordinator of updated information and development of
methodology. With such information, interested grassroots organizations can
better contribute to the entire interfaith endeavour without fear of overlaps
and/or strategic clashes. At the same time, we need to bear in mind that
Singapore’s youth interfaith scene is in its infancy and is highly uneven in its
coverage of the areas and stages of engagement. Thus, conceptually the main
recommendation here is the model of four incremental phases of interfaith
engagement — friendship, social action, mutual study and intellectual exchange
— as expounded by Brother Michael Broughton, member of the IRO.
Four Phases of Interfaith Engagement: Friendship, Social

Action, Mutual Study and Intellectual Exchange
Overall, “friendship” involves befriending and communal activities across
faiths. The Ministries of Defence, National Development and Education,
through policies such as National Service, the HDB (Housing and
Development Board) racial quotas, the national schools and national
education respectively have tackled this aspect satisfactorily. “Social action”
involves community service projects and socially targeted activities. This
area, however, suffers from irregularity of its joint events and the tendency
to be crisis or event driven. “Mutual study” and “intellectual exchange”
suffer from a heavy deficit in supply. As a result, the sporadic “top-down”’
intellectual exchange, in the form of forums and dialogues, appear incoherent
and out of place, due to the lack of a systematic build-up of ground interest,
and intellectual capacity and conducive climate necessary for a productive
and constructive exchange.
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Friendship
Friendship is the basis of any interfaith engagement. The multi-racial harmony
projects conducted by the MOE, HDB and NEXUS, amongst other
government polices, have laid a foundation in creating a working understanding
of different races. The next step is to build on this friendship by creating a
better working understanding of the different religions.
At the structural level, this study calls for the re-introduction of religious
studies in secondary schools as was implemented in the 1980s. It further
proposes an interfaith educational package for all secondary schools. In a
similar fashion as racial harmony programmes, the aim of this package is to
allow students to respect each other’s faith via understanding and actual
experience. This package is highly intertwined with racial harmony and can
thus share resources in this aspect. The Religious Moral Education (RME)
programme at St Joseph’s Institution presents a credible model. It systemically
introduces students to different levels of interfaith exposure based on their
level of study, and emphasizes exposure and experimental aspects of learning
rather than the theoretical/doctrinal aspects of religions.
When transplanted to the national context, this programme can come
under National Education or a joint project with the IRO, and adopt an
indirect approach towards interfaith engagement. The only difference is that
the content will touch on the features of various faiths and students learn
about and come into contact with religious faiths, for example, via their
classmate’s introduction in an interfaith friendly atmosphere. The programme
does not constrain teachers to literally teach religions, against their own will,
which was a problem faced in the MOE’s Religious Knowledge module in the
1980s. At the community level, facilitation and mediation skills could be
taught to community and grassroots leaders to strengthen interfaith friendships
taking place organically between neighbours, colleagues, constituencies,
voluntary welfare organizations, schools and other public spaces.
Social Action
Interfaith engagement can act as an important cornerstone, based on common
values such as compassion and service to others. This is also the juncture
where religions overlap with community service and civil societies providing
opportunities for greater collaboration.
The religious organizations and civil society organizations lack the political
will to collaborate. This prevents a strong umbrella or coordinating
infrastructure to coordinate community service projects and thus results in
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sporadic joint projects. Religious organizations carry out many social projects,
but these are only supported by their own religious followers. The commonality
based on doctrinal parallels is not demonstrated in action. To the uninformed
public, the differences between religions become exaggeratedly enlarged because
of this. The only exception is perhaps during crisis, when religious communities
collaborate to aid the victims. Such a commendable social role should be
continued and enlarged without the impetus of a crisis.
At the operational level, the IRO needs to assume stronger leadership in
encouraging faith organizations to initiate joint interfaith social projects and
in coordinating collaborative efforts with like-minded civil society organizations
based on common interests. Fervour cannot be built overnight; the friendship
component acts as an integral stepping-stone to break the ice towards greater
action. Realistically, the IRO could provide a platform for exchange of ideas,
networking and training of like-minded interfaith youth leaders.
Mutual Study
Mutual study is an interim training phase before any mature interfaith
engagement can be carried out on a mass scale. It refers to an advanced
learning package for students and interested interfaith youth leaders.
Knowledge should be free and this is no different for religious knowledge.
However, if left unregulated, youths can be susceptible to the extremist
religious teachings propagated via media channels, especially the Internet.
Therefore, to ensure that accurate and deep understandings of religious faiths
and interfaith issues could defend Singapore’s social fabric, an educational
initiative is required to act as a quality check.
Riding on the friendship phase, post-secondary students (including
Institutes of Technical Education (ITE), polytechnics and universities) should
have the elective of an interfaith appreciation course (for example, the National
University of Singapore has recently created a minor in Religious Studies for
Arts and Social Sciences undergraduates). This religious appreciation will
instil interest in this aspect of society. In the long term, the policy of mutual
study can also potentially encourage the pioneering of research on religious
and interfaith studies and further build Singapore into an intellectual/
educational hub for inter-religious studies and exchanges.
From the bottom-up approach, the IRO and faith-based organizations
need to cooperate and train interfaith youth leaders. These leaders should
master their own faith’s teachings to a competent level and act as a bridge
between their religious leaders and religious youth followers. In order to
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bridge interfaith differences, they need to equip themselves with a strong

working knowledge of other faiths’ teachings. In addition, they would be
trained in the leadership and diplomatic aspects of interfaith work, in order
to operationalize their roles as agents of interfaith engagement. Only when
there is a pool of such interfaith youth leaders can the interfaith engagement
proceed to one of intellectual exchange in a progressive and peaceful manner.
Intellectual Exchange
The final phase of the model involves exchanges, forums and conferences led
by the interfaith youth leaders who will educate the public on higher levels
and deeper aspects of interfaith work. These can range from simple aspects of
raising public awareness of the basic commonalities across faiths to deeper
thought-provoking aspects of why their faiths differ from one another.
However, a code of practice needs to be drawn up with adequate enforcement
measures in order to regulate and check the quality of interfaith exchanges,
particularly over specific religious issues and differences. A top-down initiative
may serve to prevent any breaches of sensitivity. This phase would largely
depend on a small group of interfaith elites, who are more intellectually
informed and inclined towards interfaith engagement. Their training should
be an extension of the aforementioned interfaith appreciation course. It
should include world philosophical, religious, interfaith and related
psychological studies and should ideally lead to tertiary and/or higher
qualifications as a form of quality assurance to the public. With such ample
training of the elites, these exchanges will be where wisdom and morality of
the various religions are applied to current and concrete issues. The public
would then be able to observe the commonality and wisdom of interfaith
work and thus better appreciate the entire process of interfaith engagement.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Singapore’s interfaith engagement is still in its infancy, achieving only some
success in building friendship among youths sporadically engaged in interfaith
work. The other three aspects of social action, mutual study and intellectual
exchange have been inadequate in the face of the challenges brought by
religious extremism and terrorism. More has to be done now. The taboo of
interfaith as a sensitive subject and therefore to be avoided in public discussions,
needs to be reviewed; it needs to be recognized and addressed as a distinct
658

albeit intertwined focus area from inter-racial engagement. A successful

interfaith engagement strategy would require no less than full cooperation
between government and non-governmental sectors and a comprehensive
educational package that increases citizen’s understanding and confidence in
interfaith work. A trial-and-error method is essential and incremental changes
are needed. To ensure good coordination and optimal resource allocation, the
government or a credible non-governmental organization such as the IRO
can act as central monitor of progress, regulator of interfaith conduct and
coordinator of updated information and development of methodology. IRO
can also work with various faiths to resolve the issues of intra-faith disagreement
over “official” representation and balancing their youth wings’ efforts in
propagation and interfaith engagement.
Youths need to be empowered and trusted by their seniors. Youths’
interfaith engagements need to go beyond task-oriented relationships that
will break down theological barriers, and link interfaith engagements to the
formal and everyday life platforms. Technology and techniques must be
developed and youth leaders trained for effective engagement. A code of
conduct must be drawn up, particularly in areas of proselytizing; “finding
fault” with other faiths; achieving sufficient understanding of one’s faith
and that of others before engagement; and establishing clear communication
on the common goals. Current initiatives must be documented so that a
sound methodology can be developed, given the hitherto few successful
theoretical models.
The four phases of interfaith engagement — friendship, social action,
mutual study and intellectual exchange — is recommended as a starting
point of engagement. Friendship involves the befriending and communal
activities across faiths that can be achieved through the re-introduction of
religious studies in secondary schools and introducing an interfaith educational
package for all secondary schools. At the community level, facilitation and
mediation skills can be developed among community and grassroots leaders.
Social action, based on shared values of compassion and service, is a juncture
where religions overlap with community service and civil societies. Current
social welfare projects by religious organizations exaggerate differences between
religions as they are supported only by their own religious followers. The IRO
needs to take its leadership in encouraging faith organizations to initiate joint
interfaith social projects and in coordinating collaborative efforts between
like-minded civil society organizations based on common interests and national
issues. The focus should not be only on tolerance and universality as they are
now, but also on how religious groups can, through discussion and mutual
659

understanding, contribute positively to national issues and concerns. Mutual

study is an interim training phase comprising an advanced learning package
for students and youth leaders before any mature interfaith engagement can
be carried out. The final phase of the model involves exchanges, forums and
conferences led by the interfaith youth leaders who have been further trained
in philosophical, religious, interfaith and related psychological studies and
who will then educate the public on higher levels and deeper aspects of
interfaith work.
As the Taoist saying goes: “A journey of a thousand miles starts from
where one stands1 — with the single step.” This chapter seeks to contribute
to that single step in this colossal project towards interfaith harmony in
Singapore.
660

TABLE 26.1
General Household Survey 2005 — Resident Population by Age Group, Ethnic Group and Sex
Age Group Total Chinese Malays Indians Others

(Years) Total Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females Total Males Females
661
Total 3,553,498 1,764,742 1,788,756 2,684,936 1,326,170 1,358,766 484,639 242,354 242,285 309,265 160,458 148,807 74,658 35,760 38,898
0–4 196,035 100,914 95,121 131,640 67,694 63,946 35,238 18,249 16,989 22,863 11,731 11,132 6,294 3,240 3,054
5–9 239,320 123,389 115,931 165,049 85,364 79,685 43,226 22,333 20,893 24,389 12,424 11,965 6,656 3,268 3,388
10–14 263,633 135,575 128,058 185,256 95,445 89,811 49,013 25,302 23,711 23,971 12,134 11,837 5,393 2,694 2,699
15–19 238,053 122,317 115,736 168,652 87,081 81,571 44,723 22,854 21,869 20,598 10,416 10,182 4,080 1,966 2,114
20–24 222,422 112,243 110,179 162,759 82,575 80,184 37,206 18,953 18,253 18,796 9,060 9,736 3,661 1,655 2,006
25–29 253,710 120,844 132,866 197,456 95,075 102,381 29,258 14,389 14,869 22,485 9,655 12,830 4,511 1,725 2,786
30–34 303,587 145,707 157,880 232,358 110,693 121,665 33,343 16,319 17,024 29,892 15,417 14,475 7,994 3,278 4,716
35–39 310,093 152,150 157,943 232,433 112,598 119,835 38,563 18,806 19,757 30,126 16,650 13,476 8,971 4,096 4,875
40–44 331,244 166,766 164,478 249,601 125,250 124,351 45,467 22,635 22,832 28,315 15,052 13,263 7,861 3,829 4,032
Interactions among Youth Leaders of Different Faiths
45–49 314,470 158,829 155,641 245,374 123,454 121,920 39,145 19,628 19,517 24,075 12,749 11,326 5,876 2,998 2,878
50–54 260,456 131,464 128,992 209,547 105,980 103,567 28,821 14,160 14,661 17,934 9,058 8,876 4,154 2,266 1,888
55–59 202,772 101,243 101,529 166,185 83,063 83,122 19,870 9,648 10,222 13,534 6,760 6,774 3,183 1,772 1,411
60–64 120,799 59,084 61,715 100,399 49,070 51,329 10,808 4,926 5,882 7,926 4,147 3,779 1,666 941 725
65–69 104,281 49,977 54,304 85,255 40,822 44,433 10,469 4,943 5,526 7,177 3,536 3,641 1,380 676 704
70–74 79,660 36,815 42,845 63,201 28,566 34,635 8,857 3,882 4,975 6,492 3,844 2,648 1,110 523 587
75–79 56,244 24,838 31,406 43,783 17,620 26,163 5,980 2,903 3,077 5,597 3,914 1,683 884 401 483
7/16/08, 9:58 AM
80–84 30,921 13,117 17,804 24,287 9,014 15,273 3,087 1,602 1,485 2,988 2,233 755 559 268 291
85 & Over 25,798 9,470 16,328 21,701 6,806 14,895 1,565 822 743 2,107 1,678 429 425 164 261
661
661
APPENDIX 26.1
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
Personal details (for our reference ONLY):
Name: Age:
Organization: Occupation:
Email contact: Telephone contact:
Underline any of the following that appropriately describes you and your organization:
Nature of religious involvement:

Full-time Part-time
Practitioner1 Administrative/Management2
Paid Voluntary
Age range of organization: Youth (post-tertiary)3 Tertiary/Student4
Extent of religious knowledge: Competent5 Fair6 Sophomore7
Scope of organization’s activities: Purely religious Includes interfaith activities
Any other details:
Research questionnaire
As leaders involved in the religious community,
A. On Interfaith Interaction between Youth Leaders
1. What are your views towards

a. The current interfaith engagement among the youths in Singapore?
b. Is there a need? — Benefits of interfaith.
c. How can interfaith activities help towards peace building and
community cohesion?
d. Are we doing enough? If not, why?
1
Personal practice of sufficient competence to teach others. E.g. cell group leader.
2
Main activity revolves around leadership and management of activities instead of
direct imparting of religious knowledge. E.g. Student Club President.
3
Refers to registered religious youth organizations (civil society). E.g. Mendaki.
4
Includes all students from above the age of thirteen years old.
5
Confidence in imparting religious knowledge to intermediates and above.
6
Enough religious knowledge to teach true beginners.
7
Modest understanding of one’s religion.
662

2. For those of us not doing engagement, why do we not see the need?
3. For those of us doing engagement, what are the obstacles encountered?
What are the critical success factors?
4. Are there any best practices your organization can share? Please also elaborate
any other successful interfaith activities you have personally experienced
(a reference is much appreciated).
5. What do you envision the future of Singapore’s interfaith engagement? Any
common agenda possible?
6. How can we (the collective of religious communities) achieve it? E.g. The
kinds of activities, approaches. Please elaborate.
7. What are the projected issues and obstacles? Please outline and explain.
8. How can governmental policy facilitate the process? Please also elaborate on
the potential facilitating roles of business, media, civil society (non-religious
NGOs, including International NGOs) and other governmental agencies
(non-Ministerial).
B. Understanding Your Views about “Interfaith”
9. What does “interfaith” mean to you?

10. If you do not think positively about interfaith cooperation, please explain
why?
C. Understanding Your Community
11. Does your religious community face any particular conflict and how could
other religious communities or interfaith organizations help you?
Sample Views and Policy Recommendations by Selected Youth Leaders Interviewed
Ms A, 33 years old, consultant and activist in youth leadership and community initiatives:
1. Design a process for self-organizing groups to dialogue on matters of common
importance and to which they have a common commitment, e.g. youth,
environment, Singapore’s future.
2. Engage willing and interested groups on a large scale, interaction using public
engagement strategies that focus on personal transformations.
3. Set basic rules of engagement to promote inter-religious dialogue and engagement.
4. Show various and different expressions of interfaith engagement and invite
responses
5. Develop among groups a broad consensus of what faithful and ethical living is
about — in concrete terms, recognizing that different eschatologies may have
different emphases.
6. Develop an ongoing process of engagement and enable groups to address areas
of greatest/deepest interest, commitment and concern.
663

Mr B, 24 years old, student and member of Young Sikh Association:

1. The problem is where each should be introduced, that is, does government take
the lead or should NGOs. Resource allocation and motivation are factors to
think about.
Mr C, 29-year old male, managing editor of a Muslim magazine:

1. Engaging national issues/concerns is the way to go for Singapore’s institutional
interfaith engagement. I think platforms organized by religious groups should
no longer be marketed as “interfaith”, but as national projects which involve
participants from various faith-based groups as well as non faith-based groups.
The focus should not be on tolerance and universality like they are now but also
on how religious groups can together discuss how they can contribute positively
to national issues.
2. Another point is the lack of intra-faith discourses to bridge differences existing
within the same faith.
3. In terms of achieving interfaith engagement, I think the discussion on the casino
issue was a good start, although some individuals were still trapped in theological
reasoning. Therefore, it is important that religious activists be equipped with the
necessary social and psychological knowledge before taking part in such an
initiative.
4. Governmental policy can facilitate by ensuring that educational curriculum
should encompass a module that introduces the basics of religions. In thinking
up such a module, the focus should not be merely based on theology but on
values. This will help build a generation that understands that all religions teach
good, and can play a positive role in nation-building.
5. We must also think of those who do not subscribe to any religion. It is not fair
to say that they are not spiritual. I think when faith communities initiate
positive discussions on solving universal concerns, then more people will see
the need.
664

APPENDIX 26.2
TWO EXAMPLES OF INTERFAITH YOUTH EVENTS
AND LESSONS LEARNT
1. Interfaith Youth Camp 2004
Date/Duration 11 to 13 June 2004

Theme Face to Face/Faith to Faith
Venue Downtown East
Organizer the Youth Committee of the Central Council of Malay
Cultural Organizations Singapore (Majlis Pusat)
Sponsors Northeast CDC; Southwest CDC; The Tan Foundation;
Singapore Power; and The Grace, Chua and Jacob Ballas
Charitable Trust
Supporter The Advocate Group
Participation 56 participants
Faiths Baha’i, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism
Represented
Selected • Presentation by each faith on:
Programme – Holy rites and rituals
– Holy books and days
– How religion is relevant to my community
– How does it make a difference to our way of life
– Where was it yesterday
– Where is it now
– Where it will be tomorrow
• Visits to selected places of worship
• Talk by Idris Rashid Khan Surattee, Head Librarian,
Information Resource Centre, SPH
• Open Dialogue moderated by Mr Darryn Johnston
• Discussion on forming an Interfaith Youth Corps Initiative,
Resolution and Closing
Organizer’s “We rate it as a success because we understood the difficulties
Evaluation and challenges in organizing such an event, so to have
representatives from Buddhism, Baha’i, Islam, Hinduism,
Sikhism under one roof, integrating and exchanging
information in a friendly environment is an accomplishment.
Friendship has been built and a better understanding of other
faiths outside their own, was created.”
665

Difficulties “The galvanization of the key drivers posed as the greatest

Faced in challenge in materializing the resolutions agreed during the
Moving youth camp. There was an attempt by the participants to
Forward organize the next one with us just as advisers. But the effort
soon gave way. Much as I expected, coordinating a multi-faith
event is not easy.
Part of the objective is to form IYC or the Interfaith Youth

Corps. We have the logo and the consensus but the
implementation requires a little more push and help. I rather
not dominate the whole process because this is supposed to be
an interfaith project, not manage and piloted by volunteers
from one faith only.”
2. Inter-Religion Youth Forum 2004 “Dealing with Religious Diversity”
Theme: Dealing with religious diversity

Chairperson: Dr Mohd Maliki bin Osman, Department of Social
Work & Psychology, NUS; MP, Sembawang GRC
Speakers: Ms Iva Aminuddin, Mendaki Club
Mr Jai Simman, Sri Krishna Mandir
Ms Charlene Chua, St Vincent de Paul
(Yio Chu Kang)
Dr Teoh Ren Shang, Buddhist Fellowship
Date: 30 May 2004 (Sunday)
Venue: Singapore Expo Conference Hall K
Time: 3p.m.–5p.m.
Target audience: Youths between the ages of 17–30 from different
religious organizations
Audience size: more than 50 persons
Main Organizer: Singapore Buddhist Federation (SBF)
Organizing Workgroup: Members from Mendaki Club, 4PM, SAFF
PERDAUS, Sri Krishna Mandir and Kong Meng
San Phor Kark See Monastery’s Youth Ministry
Objective of forum:
1. To provide youths with an informal and relaxed platform to talk about their
religious values and concerns and from there, to align the different religious
youths with each other based on their shared concerns and issues.
2. To facilitate friendships.
Significance of forum for main organizer:

Held in conjunction with SBF Vesak celebrations, it reminded Buddhist youths that
666

as they celebrated the most important day in Buddhism, it was also a time to
continue understanding and appreciating the other religious groups that we live with.
Significance of forum for the organizing workgroup:

We thought it is really important that such dialogue can take place in the younger
generation without the seriousness and burden of having to speak with authority, but
rather to speak from a young person’s interpretation and living application of the
religion.
Approach:
– Started by inviting and meeting up with friends to organize this event.
– Over discussion and brainstorming for possible sensitivities, the theme and
different areas of preparation was distributed.
Highlights:
– Speakers were young adults between 21 and 30 years old.
– Youths from different religions attended the SBF Vesak concert and Fair in the
evening for a cultural exchange experience.
Lessons Learnt:
Given a clear focus and strong facilitation skill of the chairperson, topics discussed
were open and frank. The process of youths from the organizing workgroup working
together brought a lot of joy and created friendships. The thorough documentation
enabled lessons to be shared and learnt. The transcript of the forum is yet to be
published.
Notes
The authors would like to thank the youth leaders interviewed, Ministry of
Community, Youth and Sports (MCYS), National Youth Council (NYC), Institute
of Policy Studies (IPS), Brother Michael Broughton of the Inter-Religious Organization
(IRO) and all who have assisted us. This chapter would not have been possible
without their support. All data and views expressed in this chapter are solely the
responsibility of the authors.
1. Quoted from Lao Tzu, Chapter 64 as cited in Chan, A Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy, p. 170.
References
Chan, Wing-Tsit. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1963.
667

668 See Guat Kwee
27
BUILDING BRIDGES BETWEEN

CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS
A Personal Journey
See Guat Kwee
INTRODUCTION
It has been over four years since I visited Israel and the refugee camps in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. The faces of the people and the experience have
remained with me. It has led me to reach out and befriend Muslims, and to
volunteer to support the needs of their community in Singapore. It has also
led me to make the decision to leave Singapore, sell my apartment to fund my
education, and embark on a master’s degree programme in Islamic Studies
and Christian-Muslim relations at Hartford Seminary, USA.
I have had to deal with my ignorance of the history of Christianity and
Islam, its often-turbulent relationship and the issues that face the Muslim
world today. In this process, I examined my own beliefs, the sources of my
misconceptions and have come to understand myself on a much deeper
level. I started as a Christian with an exclusive view; I am now a Christian
with a pluralistic view. I no longer insist that only I have “the truth”. I am
learning to not just tolerate the “Other” but also “accept and embrace”
them.1 It has been an ongoing process of self-discovery and pushing my
own boundaries.
668
668

Building Bridges between Christians and Muslims 669
THE BURDEN FOR INTERFAITH RELATIONS

In January 2001, I visited the Holy Land as a tourist with a group of
Christians and then extended my stay with my friend Grace as volunteers in
an old folks’ daycare centre for the elderly. The Intifada had begun several
months earlier, and we witnessed the sadness and tears of the very old, who
watched the television footage of the carnage of suicide bombing incidents. It
was the first time we had come close to violence of any nature. We were
bewildered at what was happening in this beautiful land. In a conversation
with the Jewish manager of this centre, he suggested that we visit the West
Bank and Gaza Strip to understand the situation better.
We took his advice seriously. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, we
undertook food distribution to needy Palestinian families, and began to see
the human faces of those suffering. We experienced what the Palestinians
experienced when they went through Israeli checkpoints and travelled on
countryside back ways to towns that were under blockade. We met Palestinian
mothers and grandmothers worried about the future of their children and
grandchildren. We met young children on the streets with nowhere to go, and
we saw young men with no jobs struggling to continue with their lives,
searching for hope amidst the despair.
What if it had been us living in the refugee camps, we wondered? What
would it have been like if we had grown up under such conditions of poor
sanitation, cramped conditions with many sharing a single small room,
sleeping on floor mattresses and living in an environment of fear and violence,
with little hope of a peaceful future? We thought of the comfort, safety and
abundance in Singapore, the homes that we owned, and the jobs we had
taken for granted. I still remember how my heart was touched when a
Palestinian woman hugged us with tears welling in her eyes. She welcomed
us, knowing that we were Christians from a faraway land called Singapore.
Here was somebody who cared about them and their situation. Sometimes,
we just held hands with these women with no words to express the emotions
and empathy we felt.
In Israel, we met Jewish grandmothers who, like the Palestinian
grandmothers, wondered what kind of future their grandchildren would
have. Our hearts were heavy. Our minds filled with questions: Why had God
put Jews, Christians and Muslims, people who shared the Abrahamic traditions,
together in this land where each claimed ownership? Was God so cruel as to
wish that only one group of people survived, and condemned the other?
669

670 See Guat Kwee
What was God trying to teach the people living in the Holy Land? And what
did God want two Christians from Singapore to learn?
As we walked the dirt tracks of Rafah visiting the sites of demolished
homes and saw children living in houses with walls riddled with bullet holes,
we realized how blessed we were in Singapore. We had lived for over thirty-
five years since independence in religious and racial harmony, well aware of
our racial and religious differences, yet understanding that this tiny island
nation was all we had. Its very existence was dependent on our healthy respect
for each other and for these differences. In the early years, there had been
racial riots, but its leaders had chosen the way of peace, to work together as
a people, uniting the different communities “to build a democratic society
based on justice and equality to achieve happiness, prosperity and progress for
our nation”, as written in the Singapore pledge. It was this memory of being
a child in school and learning about Ah Mei, the Chinese girl, Ahmad, the
Malay (Muslim) boy and Kumar, the Indian (Hindu) boy in the textbooks.
This was all part of home. Singaporeans were Chinese, Malay, Indians and
other races too, but we were all Singaporeans, regardless of religion, language
or creed.
This was a turning point for us. We became convinced that people of
different faiths, cultures and traditions were meant to live together. The
people of the Holy Land — Jews, Muslims and Christians — belonged to the
same Abrahamic family. They worshipped the same Creator God. They too
were meant to live in peace and harmony. We left Israel and Palestine with
this burden to build relations between people of the different faiths and that
in some small way, we could build peace within the Abrahamic family.
During our ten-week stay in Israel, we met Jewish interfaith educator
Yehezkel Landau, who was also co-founder of Open House, a centre for peace
and co-existence among Israeli Arabs and Jews in the mixed city of Ramle. It
was our first meeting with someone who had dedicated his whole life to the
pursuit of peace. It was a very enlightening experience to hear texts from the
Hebrew Scriptures, Christian Bible and Muslim Quran being read aloud and
to share the Passover Seder meal with Jews, Christians and Muslims. It was an
experience for us to learn and accommodate the customs and traditions of
Muslims and Jews on issues such as observing the Sabbath and dietary
requirements. Through Yehezkel, we met Rabbi Dr Ron Kronish, Director of
the Inter-religious Coordinating Council in Israel (ICCI), an umbrella
organization of over seventy Jewish, Muslim and Christian institutions actively
working towards inter-religious and inter-cultural understanding in Israel
and the region.
670

On our return to Singapore, we hosted Yehezkel and other representatives

from the ICCI (three Jews, three Muslims and three Christians) on a six-day
visit to study how Singapore maintained its religious and racial harmony.
With the help of the Inter-Religious Organization, Singapore (IRO), they
visited temples, mosques, churches, synagogues and other religious institutions,
and met with representatives from the different religions, that is, Judaism,
Christianity, Islam, Zoroastrianism, Baha’i Faith, Hinduism, Sikhism, Taoism
and Buddhism.2 At the Thian Hock Keng Temple, we met a Taoist Master
who shared with us his unhappiness when Christians insisted on visiting his
members to share the Gospel. He felt that Christians were disrespectful of
Taoists, as they knew that a red altar at the entrance of a home meant that
Taoists lived there. As Christians, we were taught to share the good news in
love. Yet, to this Taoist Master and his flock, Christians had shown disrespect.
Their good intentions had been perceived negatively by the recipient. We
began to appreciate the work of the IRO in promoting understanding, peace
and harmony between people of different faiths.
I found myself drawn to the Muslim community and soon became
friends with a number of Muslims. I began to volunteer with some community
help groups which were concerned with improving the academic achievements
of Malay-Muslim children and issues of drug rehabilitation. I provided
administrative and secretarial support for their meetings. I stood outside
mosques on Fridays to collect donations for drug rehabilitation centres run
by Malay organizations. I visited the homes of Muslims and got to know their
families. They become my friends and we celebrated National Day, Chinese
New Year, Hari Raya Puasa, Hari Raya Haji and Christmas together. I even
helped with a friend’s wedding preparations.
Post 9/11: Comments from Muslim Scholars and

Interfaith Representatives
In November 2002, with the aid of Mr Abu Bakar Maidin, President, Islamic
Centre Jamiyah Singapore and Mr Zainuddin Mohamed, Executive Director-
Special Duties, Jamiyah Singapore, I arranged to visit members of the interfaith
and Muslim community in Britain. Accompanied by my friend, Capt Ahmed
Makhdoom, a Muslim and member of the IRO, we met Dr M. A. Zaki
Badawi, President, The Muslim College, London; Dr Manazhir Ahsan,
Director-General, Islamic Foundation, Leicester; Faiyazuddin Ahmad,
President and Director, Leicester Council of Faiths, Leicester; Dr Jabal M.
Buaben; Director, Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim
671

672 See Guat Kwee
Relations, Department of Theology, University of Birmingham; and Dr

Chris Hewer, Interfaith Advisor to the Bishop of Birmingham.
In my interviews with them,3 I sought answers to the following questions:
• What was their assessment of the current situation after 9/11?
• In light of their assessment, what could Muslims and non-Muslims do
and what roles could not-for-profit (NFP) organizations undertake?
Dr Zaki Badawi felt that after 9/11, the situation for Islam was “tragic”
and very dangerous for Muslims, as they were being viewed throughout the
world as a “potential danger”. Muslims were feeling “isolated” and
“beleaguered”. The situation for Muslim minorities in most countries was
not a happy one except in Britain, which treated Muslims far better than did
most countries. Not only did non-Muslims need to be informed about Islam
but, he added, that they “should also look at Islam not through the eyes of
hostile propaganda, but look at Islam as it is”. His advice was to read the
Quranic text and look at the history of Islam in its actions and deeds. The
history of Islam, he felt, was one of “glory and humanity”.
NFP organizations, he felt, could sponsor the research and publication of
materials and books to inform Muslims and non-Muslims, work with the
media to sponsor and put the message of Islam across to the public, be
involved in interfaith dialogue on a large scale, and “send or sponsor students
to study Islam in proper institutions to prepare the proper scholars and
leaders in the Muslim community” as “we lack desperately well-trained
Muslim scholars.”
Dr Manazhir Ahsan felt that the situation for Muslims and Islam in the
West had become “very difficult” and “problematic”. He shared with us the
efforts of the Islamic Foundation in bridge-building and strengthening
relationships with the church and interfaith groups, members of the British
Parliament and European Union, and the public. The Islamic Foundation
had also focused on working with Muslim youths to re-channel their energies
to communicating Islam to non-Muslims and educating themselves about
Islam. He believed that discussion and dialogue was the way to solve problems
and that the Islamic Foundation’s sustained work of over thirty years in the
interfaith area had given it credibility with the government and the community.
Faiyazuddin Ahmad felt that the perpetrators of the terror had been
“indoctrinated in the wrong way so that they could do whatever they did to
malign Islam”. He added that they were “no friends of Islam, Muslims or for
that matter civilization”. Ahmad believed that the world was a place that we
all had to share and that we each had to do our part. His call was for people
to build up an understanding to do good jointly for society, as we all shared
many values and issues in common.
672

Dr Jabal Buaben noted the lack of understanding between the West

and the Muslim world, but he was optimistic about the situation by virtue
of the fact that he was having such a conversation with a Christian. There
had been an upsurge of interest in Islam following 9/11. Courses such as
“Understanding Islam” conducted by Dr Chris Hewer, a Christian with a
Ph.D. in Islamic Studies, for church leaders, workers, ministers and people
in the Birmingham community had been over-subscribed. Buaben hoped
that more Muslims would seek to learn about other religions too. He saw
the need for each side to make room for the other and to bring people
together to attend courses or seminars together or to work jointly on
practical projects. As for NFP organizations, their “autonomous” and neutral
nature, he felt, could help to foster understanding between Christians and
Muslims who were often “polarized” and afraid of each other. They could
act as “bridge” for joint projects.
Dr Chris Hewer reflected that Europe had dealt with differences in
religion in the past by segregating communities and adopting “tribal
identities”. He cited the divide between Catholics and Protestants during
the Christian Reformation and European anti-Semitism. Europe’s
demographics, he observed, was changing as its immigrant communities
grew in numbers. This was a new challenge for Europe, that is, how to
begin to deal with people who are different, who hold different faiths and
who come from different cultures? In Birmingham, for instance, white
people would be minorities by year 2020, with Christians as a fairly small
minority and possibly 20 per cent of the population would be Muslim. He
wondered how the city could avoid being segregated on the basis of race,
colour and economics. Hewer viewed religions as “tools of social reform”,
and that a paradigm shift was needed for religious communities. Instead of
focusing on how to build one’s own community and establish one’s self in
the city, there was a need to look at how one’s religion could contribute to
the common good of all human beings. He shared the example of how
Birmingham was developed with the help of great industrial families of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who were Quakers. These Christians,
such as the Cadbury family, believed that they were to use their money for
the benefit of the whole society. They built community centres, libraries,
schools and public amenities of all sorts for the good of the community.
THE HARTFORD SEMINARY EXPERIENCE

In 2003, I visited Hartford Seminary, CT, USA where Yehezkel Landau was
now a Faculty Associate in Interfaith Relations. He was deeply involved in
building Abrahamic partnerships and Jewish-Christian-Muslim dialogue. As
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I spent time in this intriguing subject, I found myself deeply connected to it

some way. I must confess that I had come with some scepticism in my heart.
I had participated in interfaith dialogues and had been disappointed, sometimes
frustrated, as I watched participants talking past each other with little or no
concrete outcomes.
I spent that summer exploring the seminary. After much debate and
thought, I made the decision to enrol as a full-time student in the Master of
Arts degree programme in Islamic Studies and Christian-Muslim Relations. I
flew back to Singapore to settle my personal affairs, sold my apartment to
fund my education and within a month, I was packed and ready to leave. I
was at Changi Airport at four o’clock in the morning saying farewell to my
relatives when I was pleasantly surprised by Zainuddin Muhammad and his
wife, Zaiton accompanied by Sister Theresa Seow, then President of the IRO.
It was Ramadan and Zaiton had prepared my favourite meal as a farewell for
me. As we shared this delicious meal together — Muslim and Christian, I was
deeply touched by their sacrifice, support and warm fellowship.
So what has been my experience at Hartford Seminary? We study, side-
by-side as fellow Christians and Muslims reading each other’s texts, histories,
philosophies and thoughts, sharing and clarifying our own thinking and
understanding of each other. We are each on a journey of discovery, one
which has brought friendship, understanding, and trust. Most importantly, I
have uncovered my own perceptions and assumptions of others and become
more sensitive to them.
In the Islamic Theology class under Professor Ingrid Mattson, for example,
we watched a movie entitled The Colour of Paradise, written and directed by
Majid Majidi, an Iranian filmmaker. I was moved by the character of the
blind boy Muhammad, who was shunned by his father for his handicap.
Muhammad showed us that far from being handicapped he was in tune with
God’s creation. He could climb a tree to restore a baby bird to its nest from
which it had fallen. But his father could only view his blindness as a curse
from God and sought to rid himself of his son. In one scene, when the boy
was abandoned by his father to stay with a blind carpenter, Muhammad cries
to God that everyone including his father, and grandmother did not love
him. We realize that it is his father who is “blind”, blind to his son’s love for
him, blind as he could not see that his son had risen above his disability and
could even read in Braille faster than normal children can read writing. In the
end, Muhammad drowns when he falls into the rapid river waters. His father,
upon seeing his dead son wails at his loss, finally recognizing that he truly
loves his son. We see Muhammad’s hand moving as if he was still reading
Braille, and his hand glows. My tears flowed at the loss of such a precious
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child and I believe there was not a dry eye amongst us. Our discussion about
the film revolved around the topic of evil and suffering. As we shared the pain
and the joys of Muhammad’s experiences, I was connected to my Muslim
classmates for a moment in time. We were looking at the same page of life’s
experience instead of being on opposite sides of the fence. I was also surprised
by the beautiful lush and green scenery of the Iranian countryside. The
women and children wore colourful dresses and headscarves. Perhaps I was
expecting oppressed women dressed in black, covered from head to toe, in a
dry desert in dreary and dull Iran. What constructs I had knowingly or
unknowingly carried about that country and its people proved to be wrong.
I was faced with my ignorance and admitted later to my Iranian American
friend, Ayat that I had fallen into the trap of stereotyping.
According to Mohammed Abu-Nimer, an expert on conflict resolution
and dialogue for peace, any form of learning, be it new information or skills,
requires the person to undertake some risks of setting aside or suspending
current knowledge and attitudes towards the other. When participants are
threatened, uncomfortable, or unready to explore differences, their behaviours
are based on their preconceived notions and stereotypes of the other.4 So what
prevents Muslim-Christian dialogue from bearing more fruit?
Jean Claude Basset’s hypothesis is that the real issue is about the plurality
of religions, that is, about how one can be faithful to one’s religious heritage
and faith community, while still recognizing not simply the mere existence
but also the legitimacy of religious diversity, that is, the dignity of other
religions. Christians and Muslims, he believes, have developed strategies
consciously or unconsciously to avoid recognizing religious plurality.5
For Mahmoud Ayoub, the main obstacle to true Christian-Muslim
dialogue is the unwillingness of both parties to “truly admit that God’s love
and providence extends equally to all human beings, regardless of religious
identity”. He questions whether we are denying that “God could and in fact
did reveal His will in Hebrew, Greek, and Arabic and in every sacred
language of the world.” The ultimate goal of all interfaith dialogue, he
believes, is “for women and men of faith to listen and obey the voice of God
as it speaks to all communities through their own faith-traditions and to
humbly listen to this same voice which speaks to the individuals through
their own faith-tradition.”6
As a Christian, I had believed that my role was to share the Gospel and
“save” others, as other religions were not of God. I had prayed for their
salvation and been actively involved in evangelism and missions. When I
became a Christian in 1991, my friends had, over time, narrowed to a small
circle of mainly Christians. I could hardly name any Muslim a close friend
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before 2001. They had been business colleagues or acquaintances and I knew
little about Muslims and Islam. They had in a sense become the “Other”. The
focus on my career, long working hours and involvement in church activities
had in some way isolated me from people of other faiths. Today, I am a more
balanced and mature Christian, accepting that there is a place for different
religions in the world.
What is important for me as a Christian is that I love God and that I
demonstrate this love by loving my neighbour and those different from me as
I would love myself. I choose to accept them as they are and leave God to
decide who is to be saved. The World Council of Churches Office on Inter-
religious Relations describes it this way:
God wills love of neighbour inseparably from the love of God, which is
shown in human action through love of others (Luke10:27; Romans
14:9–10; Galatians 5:15; John 4:20–1). Christ’s teachings of love included
all those we view as friends and those with whom we may feel enmity for
any reason.7
In the past, I had avoided setting foot in a temple. I had also refused to
accompany my elderly cousins to the columbarium during the seventh lunar
month of the Hungry Ghosts to pay respects to my deceased mother and
relatives by praying with joss sticks and burning paper money. They had
needed my help and I had hurt them in my refusal. I came to realize that I
could accompany and drive them to their destination, and help carry what
they needed. I could say my own prayers in my own Christian way and let
them carry on with their rituals. What was important was that I demonstrated
my love for them and for the deceased.
Reading the Trialogue of the Abrahamic Faiths edited by Ismail al-Faruqi,
led me to write the following poem “If I could see the world through God’s
eyes” as a reflection:
If I could see the world through God’s eyes,

I wonder what I would see.
A Jew standing in greatness of pride,
With a strong sense of his history as chosen of God
“You have a right to exist,” he says to the Other
“If you would but follow the Noahide commands.”

A Christian who claims in humility
That Others know not they are following the Way.
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“They have some right to be exist,” he claims,

“Anonymous Christians they be.”

A Muslim who prays in deep devotion
Who claims that only they have God’s Word?
“We accept you, Jew and Christian
But only as God has revealed you to us.”
I wonder what God would say to His people today,

That they may see and perceive.
That He spoke to all of them,
At different times, and revealed Himself in different ways,
That they may know Him as their own.
He might sigh that each is proclaiming
“Only I have the WORD.”
He might laugh when each says
“Only I have the TRUTH.”
But He gave each a piece of the truth,
Not the whole, so that they could not claim
One above the Other.
If only we would see with our eyes.

If only we would hear with our ears.
If only we would listen with our hearts.
That He laments at all of His people.
Be they Jew, Christian or Muslim.
“What of my people?” He asks.
“The lost, alone, broken, and deprived,”
“The widows, orphans, and oppressed.”
If only we would see with our eyes.

If only we would hear with our ears.
If only we would listen with our hearts.
That if the Jew, Christian and Muslim,
Could show the love of God to each other.
Each would see God’s hand on the Other.
And God’s truth in their Ways.
OVERCOMING HISTORY
John Esposito’s Islam: The Straight Path forced me to face the myths of the
Crusades, that is, that the Crusades were “simply motivated by a religious
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desire to liberate Jerusalem”, and that “Christendom ultimately triumphed”.

There had been five centuries of peaceful co-existence between Muslims and
Christians prior to the Crusades. It was fear of Muslim domination by the
Byzantine emperor Alexius I, and the wish to gain recognition of papal
authority by Pope Urban II, which led to the Crusades. These, mixed with
political and military ambitions, and the promises of economic and commercial
rewards with the establishment of a Latin Christian kingdom in the Middle
East, motivated the “defence of Jerusalem”. Esposito quotes Roger Savory’s
conclusion that the “ironical and undeniable result of the Crusades was the
deterioration of the position of Christian minorities in the Holy Land” where
“formerly these minorities had been accorded rights and privileges under
Muslim rule, but after the establishment of the Latin Kingdom, they found
themselves treated as ‘loathsome schismatics’.” Esposito compared the military
conduct of the two dominant figures of the Crusades, Saladin and Richard
the Lion Heart, and wrote that the “chivalrous Muslim” Saladin was “faithful
to his word and compassionate to non-combatants” whilst Richard, who
accepted the surrender of Acre, “proceeded to massacre all its inhabitants
including women and children, despite promises to the contrary”.8 It is this
picture of a Saladin “faithful to his word and compassionate to non-
combatants” which I will remember because it carries the essence of Islam at
its best, an evolving tradition in which Muslim men and women seek to be
obedient to God’s will.
But overcoming history does not mean forgetting it or sweeping it aside.
Munawar Ahmad Anees reminds us that for Muslims “to forget the past is
tantamount to denying their identity and obliterating their history,” as the
Muslim revolutionary spirit is seeking to regain its “lost cultural identity”,
and to “remove the colonial influence”.9 Hamza Yusuf writes about the need
to understand the “anguish” and pain which relates to the real conditions
experienced in the Muslim world. It results, he adds, from the realization that
“those you put your trust in have failed you; from colonialists to politicians
and government, and that the Middle East was configured by the imperialists
so that peace would not be achieved.”10 Edward Said describes how Orientalists
perceived the Orient as a “decrepit canvas awaiting…restorative efforts” and
as a place in which Westerners “dominate” and Orientals must be “dominated”.
Islam was described as “civilization’s (Europe’s) enemy, systematically favourable
to ignorance” by Francois-Rene de Chateaubriand. The “theme of Europe
teaching the Orient the meaning of liberty” recurs often, Said wrote, and it
still does today.11 What is Said’s message for us today, as students, scholars,
and decision-makers? For me, it is to open my heart and mind to see things
anew; to judge not from superiority but with humility; to honour others with
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respect; and to appreciate beauty from the view of the beholder and not
condemn easily.
We were challenged to “overcome history” and to deal with historical
tensions closer to home in Southeast Asia in a direct way in our class. My
fellow classmates have included two Indonesian pastors from Poso, Sulawesi
and Ambon, Moluccas — places where Christians and Muslims have
experienced “deadly clashes”.12 Their churches and homes had been burnt
and their families and parishioners were at risk. I saw their inward struggles
to overcome past experiences, and build new bridges with Muslims even as
underlying tensions remained at home. What gave me hope was that they
tried. We often fellowshipped together over meals with our Muslim classmates
and as we gathered for their farewell meal, we were all sad to part as we had
come to treasure each other.
Acknowledging Past Wounds and Hurts

Last summer, I attended a nine-day full-time course on “Building Abrahamic
Partnerships” with some twenty-six Jews, Christians and Muslims. In class,
some Jewish classmates told us that they were uncomfortable at being viewed
as objects of conversion by Christians. Another shared her fears of meeting
Christians. She had been attacked by Christian children as a child and called
a Christ killer. Fellow Singaporean Jessica Liew and I were horrified. Although
we had not done this terrible deed, we felt that we needed to respond and
empathize with her pain and the pain of others who had experienced the
negative actions of ignorant Christians. So we penned an apology “A Letter
to Jews and Muslims from two Christians” to our Jewish and Muslim
classmates and read it in class the next morning:
To our brothers and sisters of the Abrahamic family,
The Jews and Muslims.
We ask for your forgiveness as Christians,

For the way Christians in the past and today
Have treated you, and caused you hurt and despair,
Our view of you as the ‘other’, the ‘evil’, the ‘different’,
Our actions of war, and persecution,
And when we stood by and let your people be killed.
We stand here aware of this shared history,

That these deep wounds still hurt,
That words of attack remain in the human consciousness,
And of actions that bring death and not life.
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We extend our hand of friendship to you,

Our love that you are part of our family,
The family of Abraham,
That when you hurt and are wounded in any way,
We are hurt and wounded too.
That God loves each Jew and each Muslim
As much as a Christian.
And most of all, He chooses to bless all….
The Jew, the Muslim and the Christian.
There were different responses to the apology. An American Muslim classmate

shared that it helped assuage the hurt she had experienced when her
Christian and Jewish friends avoided her when she started putting on her
hijab. Another felt that it was a way to empathize with the others’ pain.
Others felt it was unnecessary as we were not responsible for others’ bad
deeds. It helped open the way to ease underlying tensions in class and move
our conversation to a deeper level. I had apologized to my Jewish friend the
day before, and as I did so I realized that the pain had remained with her
even after so many years.
According to Abu-Nimer, a transforming phase occurs during dialogue
when members of conflicting groups mutually acknowledge their side’s
collective wrong against the other. This can only happen when there is
enough security and trust so that the group is able to walk through the
parties’ histories and critically examine each other’s responsibility in creating
such histories. Rituals of forgiveness and healing can set participants on the
path to reconciliation.13 Once opponents meet, Abu-Nimer believes, they
will change their assumptions, that is, views and perceptions of the conflict
and their enemy. He says that the powerful turning point in the dialogue
process happens when participants realize, acknowledge, and understand
their mutual fears and concerns. When what he calls the “bridge” is constructed
between two sides, it results in a powerful connection, one that “separates
dialoguer from non-dialoguers”. After the dialogue experience, participants
become more sensitive to languages of hatred, exclusion and prejudice.
Others become involved in community actions.14
Unity of Heart and Mind

The inner dialogue which a person has with his or her inner self is as
important as the external dialogue with others. According to Diana Eck,
dialogue with the other is as much a dialogue with oneself and this inner
dialogue is essential in all dialogue situations. It is invisible and silent.
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Without this internal conversation with one’s self, all dialogue would be mere
posturing and position taking.15 Eck believes that “the mind that is not
involved in such inner dialogue is the totalitarian mind. The heart that is not
engaged in such inner dialogue is the hardened heart. The spirit that is not
engaged in such inner dialogue is the fundamentalist spirit.”16
Unless we choose to ponder and reflect on our own thoughts and actions,
we will not be able to cross the dialogue bridge and experience the “Other”
as he or she is, not as what we think they are or want them to be. The heart
and mind must be one in its openness and intent to have dialogue and to
work with others. Otherwise, dialogue is only a mental exercise and we
remain the same as we came. The message will be heard but the words not
received. Only when the heart is touched, and a connection is made, then the
“eyes” of the mind can open to receive.
It is in actions, big or small, that we affirm our thoughts as our “fruits”,
deeds and actions test the unity of our heart and mind. Such actions of
kindness, comfort, understanding, care, and assistance help to build the
“bridge” and establish relationships beyond words. Takim believes that we
need to go “beyond tolerating or understanding the other” to “embracing the
other”. This suggests a different function of dialogue, “one that can bring the
hearts, rather than just the minds of people together”.17
Moving from Dialogue to Action

At Hartford Seminary, we are learning to not only “make space within
oneself for the other”18 but also to make physical space for each other. The
“chapel” is where Christian, Muslim and Jewish members of the seminary’s
community gather on Monday mornings. It was in the chapel that I first
heard the ninety-nine names of Allah being read aloud in Arabic by a
Muslim and in English by a Christian. Such simple efforts to bridge and
find unity brought us to a greater understanding of God, His greatness and
power and how incomprehensible He is. Muslims pray their daily prayers as
well as attend Friday prayers in this room. The seminary also co-hosts an
Iftar during Ramadan.
It was in a class on “Major Themes in the Qur’an and Bible” that I heard
the Qur’an read in Arabic by a Christian, Jane Smith, Professor in Islamic
Studies and Christian-Muslim Relations, for the first time. As she read and
discussed the Qur’an, we could feel her deep respect for the words of the
Qur’an, her appreciation of its beauty and its sheer wonder. She bridged for
us what our minds could not imagine. She made it possible for a Muslim to
see that a Christian could fully respect and appreciate the Qur’an, and for me,
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a Christian, she demonstrated that one could study and embrace another’s
religious text without fear of losing one’s faith. Having engaged with my
Muslim classmates, I am now a stronger Christian and they too affirm that
their faiths have been strengthened as well.
While classroom experiences provide the formal dialogue experience,
informal dialogue is experienced in daily living together — along the
corridors, library and on campus. My housemates, both Muslims and
Christians from Moroccan, Turkey, Germany and the United States have
enriched my life tremendously. We have cooked together and fellowshipped
over meals. My housemates have taken care of me when I was sick, and I of
them. They have grieved with me over the death of my friend Zainuddin’s
father in Singapore and read the Al-Fatiha19 as a prayer for him. It was my
classmate Rizal from Indonesia who patiently guided me through the
intricacies of driving in Connecticut and loaned me his car to take the
driving test. These friends have become like my sisters and brothers. Muslim
and Christian have become my “family” away from home. I remember too
our excitement as we waited for my classmates’ sons, Arif and Akbar to be
born, and how the children brought us all closer. They treat us all alike, be
we Christian, Muslim or Jew. In sharing our love for these children in the
community, we are bound in an intangible way to making this world a
more peaceful and better place: little Arif, William and Akbar, and the
Zainabs, Yasmins, Lukes and Henrys of this world.
IMPLICATIONS FOR SINGAPORE

I have come to realize that being a Chinese living in a majority Chinese
population, and being a Christian from a country that has had tremendous
economic success and which embraces much of the Westernization process,
has given me certain perceptions that cause me to be insensitive to the
plight and issues of Muslims, people of other faiths, and other minorities/
marginalized people.
For dialogue between Christians and Muslims and those of other faiths
to deepen, we need to understand the whole context of the history between
them. Ibrahim Abu-Rabi‘ reminds us that:
It is quite impossible to understand the position of Islam without

having a clear understanding of such terms as nationalism, secularism,
industrialization and modernity. Modern Islamic ideas and forces have
been the product of not just the past tradition, but the intellectual,
social, political, and economic transformations of the modern world as
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well. Once we understand these important facts, we will be able to

conduct interreligious dialogue on the basis of both theology and
modern facts.20
Today, past tolerances are being tested and though multi-religious

Singapore has had a relatively peaceful history of inter-religious harmony,
old stereotypes can be revived and intolerance can occur even amongst the
most tolerant during difficult situations. We are also living in Southeast
Asia, which has large Muslim populations; thus, dialogue between Christians
and Muslims, and those of other faiths needs to be strengthened, deepened
and participation from the respective religious communities widened across
all ages.
In the short term, my wish is that we:
• Create “neutral” and “safe” spaces for in-depth joint study and
scholarship of the religions
We need to engage in in-depth joint study and scholarship of Christianity
and Islam: their historiographies, theologies, societal issues and ethics,
etc. in a dialogical environment that is neutral, safe, non-judgemental
and without fear of proselytization. Participants are engaged in joint
discovery of each other’s beliefs and not a comparative study from one
faith’s perspective. At the same time, those engaged need to be guided by
qualified, experienced practitioners of respective faiths who are also
knowledgeable of other faiths and skilled in dialogue and conflict
resolution.
• Develop a pool of interfaith professionals to facilitate the process

To deepen dialogue and widen participation, there needs to be a pool of
dedicated interfaith professionals to further this effort on a full-time
basis. They would need to be equipped with the necessary skills for
relationship- and bridge-building, facilitation, conflict resolution and
have in-depth knowledge of their related historiographies. They can then
support NFP interfaith organizations, religious institutions, governments
and private bodies by undertaking projects and thus strengthening
interfaith relations.
• Encourage the establishment of Interfaith NFP organizations

NFP organizations can be valuable neutral vehicles to help build interfaith
relations between communities. They can focus on education, joint
studies, scholarship as well as facilitate joint projects with religious
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communities for the good of the larger community. They can help
encourage participation at all levels in schools, tertiary institutions, religious
bodies, governmental institutions and private organizations.
• Widen support from religious leaders and their communities

Since 9/11, efforts in Christian-Muslim dialogue have increased but the
level of communication needs to “deepen” and “participation within each
faith community enlarged so that it will lead to ‘real change’ ”.21
Participation needs to include not only mainstream religious leaders, but
children, youths, adults and the elderly. Respective religious communities
need to provide leadership, relate their own theologies for interfaith
engagement and educate their members.
In the longer term, my wish for Singapore is:
1. The establishment of a Centre for Dialogue and Study of World

Religions
The Centre for Dialogue and Study of World Religions is envisioned as
a complex with three integrated centres which support each other’s
functions to build peace among people of different faiths through
education, dialogue, relationship-building and joint projects. These three
centres would be:
• Centre for Dialogue and the Study of World Religions. This centre is to
enable people of different faiths to come together to undertake
dialogue through joint study and scholarship and to attend seminars
and conferences on religions in a neutral, safe, non-judgemental and
non-proselytizing atmosphere.
• Discovery Centre for World Religions. This would be for the education
of children and members of the public about different religions, their
historiographies, teachings and beliefs and practices, contributions
to society, the lessons learned from past actions which can benefit the
community, and how peace can be promoted between people of
different faiths.
• Residential Spiritual Retreat and Prayer Centre. This complex would
house spaces for spiritual retreat and prayer rooms for people of
different faiths to come together to seek divine guidance and
understanding. It would also have residential facilities and a cafeteria
which will cater to the different dietary requirements of the traditions
such as halal, kosher, to vegan food, etc.
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2. Create “Sister City” relationships to engage Singaporeans of different

faiths and traditions of all ages to work together to help communities in
need, build one-to-one friendships and contribute towards building peace
in the world.
The “Sister City” International Movement began in 1956, after
World War II and the Korean War, as human desire for peace sought
ways to prevent war. Urged by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, “an
international people-to-people concept was born to overcome ignorance
and suspicion” and “to promote peace through mutual respect,
understanding and cooperation — one individual, one community at a
time”.22 Sister City agreements are formalized when two communities
from different nations join together to develop a “friendly and meaningful”
relationship in which there is an exchange of people, ideas, culture,
education and technology.
CONCLUSION
In her reflections on a Christian-Muslim-Jewish dialogue group in Denver
that met for nearly seven years, Jane Smith observed “signs of promise” when
sustained dialogue over a period of time allowed opportunities for members
of different religious traditions to know each other in deep and personal ways
such that they care and be able to call the other “friend”. Though the dialogue
group disbanded because of their political differences and different expectations
could not be bridged, they “became real people to each other, not simply
‘representatives’ of certain religious traditions”. Bonds of friendship were
made, and were tested during difficult times, and the dialogue group members
and the Denver community benefited substantially from the group’s efforts.23
The stranger or enemy had become a friend or at least, a real person. Indeed,
there is such a need to persevere in this effort.
I close with the following poem When a Square Meets a Circle which I
wrote during the 32nd International Student Conference of Jews, Christians
and Muslims in Europe, 7–14 March 2005, Germany.
I came across a circle, so beautiful it was
All colours and stripes in harmonious song.
The circle keeps its nature, belonging to its own

Enclosed in its tightness in a beauty of its own.
The square can’t enter the circle, no matter how it tries

It listens to their song but cannot sing along.
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There is warmth and love in the circle, but the square can only see it afar
The welcome is spoken, yet the square remains alone.
How can a square enter the circle?

How can it breach the impenetrable wall?
It sits outside the circle, alone, rejected, forlorn.
Only what lies in the circle can bring the square in

Only if the circle can see and unchain what locks it in
It lies within the links to open up its gate

Only the circle can bring the square in.
All of us belong to circles which make harmonious song

In each circle lies its own beauty; in each lies its song.
But when squares come upon us, they look like they don’t belong
Yet each square was created to be part of the song.
Notes
The author wishes to thank Jane Smith, Ibrahim Abu-Rabi and Yehezkel Landau for
their encouragement and support and Valerie Vick for help on my first draft. Views
expressed in this chapter are entirely mine.
1. Takim, “From Conversion to Conversation: Interfaith Dialogue in Post 9-11
America”, p. 347.
2. The Jews, Muslims and Christians were Daniel Rossing, Rabbi Levi Weimann-
Kelman, Yehezkel Landau, Issa and Amal Jaber, Dr Mithkal Natour, Fr Dr
George and Amal Khoury and Michail Fanous, respectively.
3. See Guat Kwee See, “Unpublished Interviews”, in Visit to Britain: Conversations
with Members of the Muslim/Interfaith Community in Britain 19 Nov – 6 Dec
2002 (2003). Details of interviews as elaborated here are drawn from these
notes.
4. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, “The Miracle of Transformation through Interfaith
Dialogue: Are You a Believer?” In Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebulding, edited by
David Smock. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2002, p. 25.
5. Basset, “Has Christian-Muslim Dialogue Already Begun?”, pp. 285–86.
6. Ayoub, “Christian-Muslim Dialogue: Goals and Obstacles”, p. 318.
7. World Council of Churches Office on Interreligious Relations, “Striving Together
in Dialogue”, p. 486.
8. Esposito, Islam, pp. 58–59.
9. Anees, “Christian-Muslim Dialogue: Myth or Reality?”, p. 112.
10. Yusuf, “Seeing through Muslim Eyes”, pp. 108–09.
11. Said, Orientalism, pp. 36, 170 and 172.
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12. Basset, “Has Christian-Muslim Dialogue Already Begun?”, p. 280. “On the geo-
political scene, Christians and Muslims have experienced more deadly clashes
than peaceful agreements. We need only think of the ethnic purification in
Bosnia and the Balkans, or the civil war in Lebanon with the religious militia …
the Moro rebellion in the Philippines, the tragedy endured by Southern Sudanese,
the tensions in Nigeria between Muslims and Christians.”
13. Abu-Nimer, “Miracle of Transformation”, p. 25.
14. According to Jean Claude Basset, dialogue is “more than word and official
gatherings” and it fails sooner or later if it does not lead to some sort of action.
15. Eck, “What do We Mean by Dialogue?”, pp. 14–15.
16. Ibid., p. 15.
17. Takim, “From Conversion to Conversation”, p. 347.
18. Ibid., p. 348.
19. Sura Al-Fatiha “The Opening” is the first chapter of the Qur’an. Its seven verses
are a prayer for Allah’s guidance and stress the lordship and mercy of Allah.
20. Ibrahim Abu-Rabi‘, “Faculty Profile”, Hartford Seminary, <http://www.
hartsem.edu/faculty/aburabi.htm> (accessed 27 June 2005).
21. Basset, “Has Christian-Muslim Dialogue Already Begun?”, p. 90.
22. “Sister Cities International Mission Statement and Goals”. Sister Cities
International, <http://www.sister-cities.org/sci/aboutsci/mission> (accessed 25 July
2005).
23. Smith, “Christian-Muslim-Jewish Dialogue in Denver, Colorado”, pp. 253–55.
References
Abu-Nimer, Mohammed. “The Miracle of Transformation through Interfaith
Dialogue: Are You a Believer?” In Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebulding, edited by
David Smock. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2002, pp. 15–32.
Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim. “Faculty Profile.” Hartford Seminary. <http://www.hartsem.edu/
faculty/aburabi.htm> (accessed 27 June 27, 2005).
Alan Chambers. “Learn How a Local Government Official’s Perspective on Sister
City Programmes Changed”. Sister City International Newsletter Summer 2005,
p. 14.
Anees, Munawar Ahmad. “Christian-Muslim Dialogue: Myth or Reality?”. Islam and
the Modern Age 23 (1987): 107–18.
Ayoub, Mahmoud. “Christian-Muslim Dialogue: Goals and Obstacles”. In The
Muslim World. A Special Issue on Christian-Muslim Dialogue in North America,
edited by Jane I. Smith. Vol. 94 no. 3 (July 2004): 313–19.
Basset, Jean Claude. “Has Christian-Muslim Dialogue Already Begun?”. In Muslim-
Christian Perceptions of Dialogue Today. Experiences and Expectations, edited by
Jacques Waardenburg. Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2000, pp. 277–91.
Eck, Diana. “What do We Mean by Dialogue?”. Current Dialogue, 11 December
1986: 5–15.
687

688 See Guat Kwee
Esposito, John. Islam: The Straight Path. Oxford: Oxford Press, 1998.
Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
Sister Cities International. “Sister Cities International Mission Statement and Goals”.
<http://www.sister-cities.org/sci/aboutsci/mission> (accessed 25 July 2005.)
Smith, Jane I. “Christian-Muslim-Jewish Dialogue in Denver, Colorado”. In Muslim-
Christian Dialogue: Promise and Problems, edited by M. Darroll Bryant and S. A.
Ali, pp. 253–61. Minnesota: Paragon House, 1998.
Takim, Liyakatali. “From Conversion to Conversation: Interfaith Dialogue in
Post 9-11 America”. In The Muslim World. A Special Issue on Christian-Muslim
Dialogue in North America, edited by Jane I. Smith. Vol. 94 no. 3 (July 2004):
342–55.
World Council of Churches Office on Interreligious Relations. “Striving Together in
Dialogue: A Muslim-Christian Call to Reflection and Action”. Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations 12, no, 4 (October 2001): 481–88.
Yusuf, Hamza. “Seeing through Muslim Eyes”. In The Empire and the Crescent. Global
Implications for a New American Century, edited by Aftab Ahmad Malik, pp.
107–11. Bristol: Amal Press, 2003.
688

Conclusion 689
28
CONCLUSION
Some Remarks on Religious
Diversity in Singapore
Lai Ah Eng
The chapters in this book vary tremendously in focus and emphasis. At the
same time, each chapter writer has identified some key trends and issues
within his/her research topic as well as offered insights and drawn conclusions,
and some have even made recommendations for policy and practice towards
better inter-religious understanding and management. But even at a
voluminous twenty-seven chapters, this book does not offer a comprehensive
overview of religious diversity in Singapore as there remains huge and important
gaps. As such, only some general remarks can be made here in place of firm
conclusions or easily made motherhood statements about religious diversity
and harmony.
First is that there are huge and important gaps in knowledge and
understanding about Singapore’s religious landscape which need to be filled.
They include:
(1) the impact of globalization, development and modernity on religion and

religious life in Singapore, including global and regional impulses and
influences, and secular-religious distinctions and issues;
(2) various religions, movements, communities and groups, examples of
which are Jainism, Chinese folk religions, “New Age” religions and new
689
689

690 Lai Ah Eng
spiritual movements, “free thinkers”, immigrants, non-religionists and

secularists, and histories of religious communities and their religious lives;
(3) religious trends, processes and issues, including proselytization, conversion
and religious switching; religious syncretism and hybridization; everyday
life religiosity; religious socialization in families, among youths and in
schools and religious institutions; and religious representation in public
and private spheres;
(4) gender and religion issues;
(5) state and religion, such as issues pertaining to the secular state-religious
society relationship, and collaborations and collisions between state and
religious organizations;
(6) interfaith issues and interactions in various domains, such as within
families, schools, workplaces, neighbourhood localities and public spaces;
by various agencies and actors such as organizations, leaders, colleagues,
parents and students; local histories of inter-religious issues and
interactions; and interfaith dialogue initiatives and challenges; and
(7) religious responses to specific political, economic, social, scientific and
environmental issues.
That some of these gaps are not examined in this book is likely to lead to
questions being raised about representation and representativeness. However,
it needs to be remembered that the project was at the mercy of larger and
long-standing forces, mainly religious oversensitivity and political correctness
which have adversely affected intellectual research interest on religion despite
abundant anecdotal evidence and popular knowledge of ground realities.
That this book has surfaced some of these gaps is, perhaps, a contribution in
itself and provides a good start to serious examination and management of
challenging issues at hand.
Second, as the chapters in this book collectively show, the meanings of
multireligiosity are manifold and multi-layered. Religious diversity in Singapore
span an entire spectrum within a dynamic and fast-evolving landscape: the
society as a whole, global and regional impulses and impacts, the state’s
management of religion, the secular and the sacred, public and private
religion, individuals and their religions, individual religions and intra-religious
aspects, and inter-religious dimensions. Broadly, the book’s chapters speak of
the strength of religiosity and religion’s many positive contributions to society
and the lives of individuals and groups. At the same time, they point to some
complex and difficult challenges posed by religious diversity, especially for
state-society and interfaith relations: growing binary worldviews and artificial
and antagonistic distinctions made between secularism and religiosity, religious
690

Conclusion 691
expressions in public spaces, religious proselytization and conversion, external

religious influences and impacts on local communities and their orientations,
political mobilization by religion and its management by the state, and inter-
religious issues.
Third and arising from the difficult challenges pointed out is the
consequent need to clarify and balance diversity and unity. It is generally
accepted that diversity is such that all, religionists and non-religionists alike,
should be able to practise their beliefs, maintain their attachments and
identities to their religious/other communities as well as participate effectively
in the shared multireligious and multicultural nation-state, including in the
definition and attainment of social goals affecting all. At the same time, unity
is to be held uppermost by all, failing which fracturing and divisions along
religious and other lines threaten the nation-state and society itself. Religious
and other identities would have to sit comfortably with the larger interests of
social cohesion, national unity and the common good of society.
Fourth, the balance between diversity and unity needs to be sensitively
managed within an “always under construction and in dialogue” approach.
The scope and meanings of “diversity” and “unity” will need to be regularly
reviewed, clarified and nuanced. Here, who dialogues, manages and
constructs with whom and by what mechanisms and processes are important.
Various chapters in this book show how, thus far, some major challenges
and particularly tensions have been managed through a range of mechanisms
and processes, such as using state power, experiential learning, and dialogue,
debate and negotiation.
The role of the state in particular, since it is the key player, needs to be
carefully considered and managed in seeking the diversity-unity balance. In
academic and intellectual discourses on Singapore’s cultural diversity, much
focus has been placed on the hegemonic role of the state in social control and
management. This is understandable as the state has historically set the larger
institutional and legal frameworks for social-cultural policies and practices
and been strongly interventionist in its political approach to issues. On
religion, it maintains a clear stand on Singapore being a secular state and a
distinction between political and social religion. It also claims the maintenance
of religious harmony as one of its primary roles, and will no doubt respond
strong and hard on any perceived organized threats to its political authority
and to security and social stability. After the 9/11 and other attacks elsewhere
and arrests of local Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) supporters, the state set up a
national steering committee, currently consisting of top echelon religious
leaders, and locally-based inter-religious and inter-racial confidence circles
(IRCCs) to promote religious harmony and in anticipation of security threats
691

692 Lai Ah Eng
from terrorists misusing Islam. It recently also raised the idea of turning
Singapore into an “interfaith hub” in which Singapore can serve as an
international centre for inter-religious dialogue. On specific issues, its decision
has predominated in the name of economic development (and secularism),
such as in the debate in 2005 on the proposal to build resorts with casinos,
over and above the strong objections made by all major religious and public
representations that casinos would increase gambling addiction, prostitution
and their negative social consequences.
Religions and religious communities, however, have their own worlds
and realities which offer motivations, fulfilments, meanings and lives over
which the state cannot or would hesitate to enter into without being perceived
as hegemonic and anti-religion. Religion appeals to people in ways that no
amount of state power exercised can have complete control over or deliverables
that the state offers can substitute for. The contents of this book show that
while the state is a major player, the religious landscape is shaped by many
other influential forces and agencies. In the delicate balance between unity
and diversity, the state’s part has to be sensitively managed. Too much
intervention by the state and its emphasis on unity and the result can be
hegemony and religious repression.
On the other hand, too much diversity without sufficient unity can result
in the society being fractured and divided. Dealing with diversity can be
especially difficult when there is a history of serious inter-religious conflict or
when religions come into play in aggressively competitive, exclusivist and/or
literalist forms or are interpreted without sufficient contextualisation and
sensitisation into local multireligious conditions. Harm or harmony, conflict
or peace, and a “us” versus “them” or inclusive approach in religious discourse
and interaction are equally strong possibilities and outcomes. In Singapore,
diversity is broadly viewed and lived by people as a condition to be tolerated
and even appreciated ritually and culturally for its enriching qualities, but
feared socially and politically for its divisive potentialities. Singapore’s history
and record thus far is not one strewn with frequent occurrences of open and
violent conflict, but this book points to some potential areas of inter-religious
tensions that reiterates the need for sensitive management.
Fifth and finally, interfaith education, dialogue and collaboration, despite
their inherent difficulties, are likely to become an important mechanism and
process in the ongoing construction of religious harmony and in seeking the
unity-diversity balance. Aside from the recent top-down state moves at
promoting religious harmony and interfaith dialogue, much is left to religious
organizations, groups and individuals themselves to initiate and participate in
interfaith dialogue and collaboration. It should be remembered that it is
692

Conclusion 693
possible to have a multireligious society but not much inter-religious

interaction, and that interfaith dialogue and collaboration may be considered
desirable by some but are refrained from others for fear of inter-religious
tension or faith pollution and dilution. Indeed, the conditions for dialogue or
resistance to it can be as difficult to manage as the scope of the dialogue itself,
and both ought to be better assessed. Starting but not being stuck with the
converted, going beyond the first important levels of visiting each other’s
places of religious worship or sharing a meal, getting the reluctant on board,
how and what to dialogue and collaborate about – these are some issues that
Singaporeans are encountering in current interfaith initiatives. How sustained,
extensive and deep interfaith dialogue and collaboration will go, beyond elite
and top leadership involvement, remains a guess. While not an engagement
that all will want to participate in or can be forced into, those with belief,
interest and passion can tap into dialogue and collaboration and take the lead
to set the example of how to make peace and achieve harmonious living
without resorting to harmful means to settle conflicts.
In the rising tide of religiosity and spirituality that is accompanying the
forces of globalization, modernization and secularization, the religious and
overlapping social and cultural landscapes in Singapore can only grow more
diverse. Putting in place strong security arrangements and turning to “crisis
healing” from religion only when conflict and misunderstanding is imminent
or has already taken place are not enough or too late. This book attests to
the need, among others, for empirically-grounded research and higher
order social knowledge and insights into this largely unexplored landscape,
towards better social understanding and management of religion for the
common good of all living in a multireligious yet shared environment and
nation-state.
693

694 Lai Ah Eng
694

Index 695
INDEX
A Ahmad Ibrahim (Dr), 607, 621, 622

Abdalla, Ulil-Abshar, 93, 104 Ahmad Sonhaji Mohammad, 347,
Abdul Aleem Siddique, 460 350, 356
Abdul Munir Mulkhan, 93 Ahmad Wahib, 93
Abdullah bin Mas’ud, 253 Ahsan, Manazahir, 672
abortion, 19 Akali Dal
abstract common denominator, 558 political wing of SGPC, 279
Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali, al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naguib,
356 87, 93, 94
Abu Bakar Maidin, 671 Al-Azhar, 249
Abu-Nimer, Mohammed, 675, 680 Al-Falah mosque, 470
Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim, 682 collaboration with MCYS, 482
activism, 116 programme for youth probationers,
AD2000 Prayer Track, 133 474
administration of charity, 265 al-Faruqi, Ismail, 676
Administration of Muslim Law Act Al-Ghazali, 258, 263, 345
(AMLA), 62, 462 Al-Qaeda, 436
adolescents Alatas, Syed Hussein, 99
identity crisis, 407 alim
knowledge of religions, 405 definition, 255
switching religions, 381–410 Alive Community Church, 600
Adult Religious Students’ Association Alpha course, 121
(PERDAUS), 461, 484 Alsagoff, Syed Ibrahim Omar, 607
Advance Medical Directive (AMD), altruism
19 acceptance of, 558
Adventist Nursing and Rehabilitation American Conservative Protestantism,
Centre, 537 571
Afghanistan, 11 American Life Project, 435
aghawat, 300 American religious right, 13
Ahmad, Faiyazuddin, 672 Amity Printing Company, 126
695
695
29 ReligiousDiversity Index 695 7/16/08, 9:59 AM

696 Index
Amma’s Society, 147, 149, 156 Association of Muslim Professionals

Amran Kasimin, 94 (AMP), 69, 107, 462, 484
amrit, 278 Au, Alex, 416, 423
Amrit Dharis, 278 aural space, negotiation of, 308–12
difference with Sahaj Dharis, 290 Ayodhya, 16
Amritsar Temple demolishment of a mosque, 561
desecration of, 609 Ayoub, Mahmoud, 675
Amstutz, Hobart Baumann (Reverend Azhar Ibrahim, xlvi, 103
Dr), 606, 619
An-Nahdhah Mosque, 479 B
An-Nur, 470 Ba’alwie mosque, 470, 471, 479
ancestor worship, 386 Babri mosque, 16
An’Naim, Abdullahi, 100 Badawi, Zaki, 671, 672
Anees, Munawar Ahmad, 678 Baha’i Centre, 176
Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia Baha’i Faith, 167–93, 394
(ABIM), 88 attraction to particular sectors of
leadership of, 92 society, 184
Anglican Bishop John Chew, 414 case studies, 170, 177–84
Anglican Cathedral, 136 conversions into, 177–84
Anglican Church, 14, 534 first impressions, 175
Anglicans, 121 first meeting of survey respondents,
Anglo-Chinese elite, 122 175, 176
Anglo-Chinese School, 364 investigation of the faith, 176
Anglophone education, 366 investigators of religious truth, 174,
anonymous religion, 31 175
anti-gay lobby, 417 Local Spiritual Assembly, 167
aqidah, 85 place of declaration as Baha’is, 184
Arab-Islamic heartland principle of Progressive Revelation,
fragmentation of, 11 183
Art of Living Centre, 147 progressive revelation, 175
Arya Samaj, 143, 145, 146 questionnaire survey, 169–70
asatizahs, 101 religious status of survey
Ascetic Protestantism, 200 respondents, 174
Asia Evangelistic Fellowship, 121 research methodology, 169–71
Asia-Middle East Dialogue, 75 Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of
Asia-Pacific Hindu Conference, 492 Singapore, 168
Asian Conference on Religions and survey questionnaire for research,
Peace, 617 186–93
Asian Cross-Cultural Training survey respondents, 171–77
Institute, 121 three basic principles, 185
Asian tsunami, 333 Universal Consciousness, 180
Aspiration Child Care Centre, 517 universal fellowship, 180
Association of Baha’i Studies, 168 Baisakji, 325
696

Index 697
baitulmal, 265 Brahmins, 4

Baiyuan Guan, 128 Brahmo Samaj, 145
Balhetchet, Robert, 327 Brahmo Samaj movements, 144
Bali bombings, 333 Breast Cancer Foundation, 496
Basset, Jean Claude, 675 Brethren Bethesda Pasir Ris Mission
Bawean Putra, 486 Church, 121
Bayle, Pierre, 563 Brethren to the Methodists, 121
benevolence hall Broughton, Michael, 425, 638
functioning as a clinic, 511 Buaben, Jabal, 673
Berger, 314 Buddhism, 5, 392, 393
Besakhi celebrations, 277 1990 to 2000, 37
Besakhi festival, 280 choice for religious switchers, 406
Beyond Movement, 135 conversion to, 24
Beyond United Prayer Track, 136 engaged, see Engaged Buddhism
Bhagavad-Gita, 492 interpretation of death and ancestor
Bhagwan Sri Sathya Sai Baba worship, 209
Permanent Charter grant to Sai reformist, see Reformist Buddhism
organizations, 242 revitalization of, 57
bhajan rituals, 233 shift away from, 389
bhakti devotional tradition, 232 syncretic, 195–96
Bharatiya Janata Party, 16 Theravada, see Theravada Buddhism
Bible views on homosexuality, 422–23
diverse interpretation of, 7 Buddhist community, 211, 212
Bible Knowledge, 72, 323 emerging reformism, 202–207
Bible Presbyterians, 121 Buddhist free clinics, 512–15
Bible Study Fellowship International, Buddhist lay organizations, 201
127 Buddhist Lodge
biblicism, 116, 127 collaboration with Muslim
Billy Graham Crusade, 119 organizations, 466
birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, 303 Buddhist monks, 595
riots during, 314 Buddhist organizations, 201
Bishop of Anglican Church delivery of welfare services, 505–21
synodal address, 540 policy implications in providing
Bloom, 29 welfare services, 520–21
Boat People Project, 609 Buddhist practices
Bodhisattva, 510 views held by Christian clergy, 586
Bodhisattva Alvalokeitsvara, 206 Buddhist Sangha, 506, 508
Booth, William, 540 preparation of communal meals,
Bosnia, 11 510
Boxer Rebellion, 51 provider of food and drinks for
Brahma Kumari, 149 general public, 509
Brahma Kumari Raja Yoga Centre, Buddhist Soka Gakai, 8
147, 217 Buddhist states, 15
697

698 Index
Buddhist Studies, 72, 323, 324 Catholic Church activists, 65

Buddhist temples Catholic Church of Singapore, 621
benevolence hall (shan-tang), 511 Catholic clergy, 15
provision of relief aid in Catholic News, 424
emergencies, 509, 510 Catholic pilgrimages, 300
role as welfare provider, 505 Catholicism, conversion to, 34
welfare space, as, 508–11 Catholics
public institutions, 514 issue of abortion, 19
Buddhists, 386 views on homosexuality, 423
conversion into Baha’i Faith, 182– censorship, 67
84 Central Sikh Gurdwara Board
Internet visits, 450 (CSGB), 67, 280
use of Internet, 444 Central Sikh Gurudwara
varieties of, 196–202 langgar, 277
Building Abrahamic Partnerships, 679 Centre for Dialogue and Study of
World Religions, proposal for,
C 684
Calcutta, 363 census (1980)
caliphs, 10 data on “no religion”, 36
Calvin, John, 5 Census of Population (2000), 171,
Cambridge Examination Syndicate, 172, 501
324 ceramahs, 90
Campus Crusade for Christ, 130 Chan, Simon (Professor), 138
campus Changi Prison
usrah, 89 counselling at, 226
Canada charismatic Christian movements, 24
study of religious and cult leaders of, 126
movements, 216 power evangelism, 137
Canossian School, 264 Charismatic slant
capitalism spiritual warfare, 586
Christianity, impact on, 12–15 charismatic churches, 120, 131
driving force of, 7 Charismatic-type clergymen, 586
impact on religion, 9–16 charitable services
world religions, impact on, 15 definition, 490
Care Corner, 528 Charities Act, 514
website, 537 Charter of the Sathya Sai
casino gaming, 70 Organization, 242
Cathedral of Santiago, 301 Chelliah, D. D. (Dr.), 607
Catholic Christian Brother’s schools, Cheng Beng Buddhist Temple, 197
373 Cheng, Vincent, 370
Celestial Reasoning Association, Chew, Phyllis, lii
364 China Christian Council, 126
Catholic church, 7, 29 China Inland Mission, 121
698

Index 699
Chinese Christian churches, 119 beliefs on demonic oppression, 596

Chinese clan associations, 507 methodology of study on views of,
Chinese community, 366 572–73
strategies to cope with changes, survey background and questions,
506 598–99
Chinese Development Assistance views on eating food previously
Council (CDAC), 69, 462 offered to an idol, 592
Chinese families views on inter-religious
religious diversity, 23 collaboration, 579–84
Chinese folk religions, 23, 31, 689 views on inter-religious worship,
Chinese medicine 582–84
dispensation by Buddhist Free views on joss sticks, 592
Clinic, 513 views on participation in non-
Chinese migrants Christian rituals, 590–96
from Guangdong and Fujian, 195 views on placing flowers on non-
Chinese migration, 51 Christian altar table, 592
Chinese New Year, 132, 312 views on receipt of donations from
Chinese New Year Reunion, 497 non-Christian religious groups,
Chinese religion, 31 580
Chinese Sai Baba devotees, 159 views on relationship with other
Chinese Singaporeans, 33 religions, 571–602
Buddhists, 18 Christian culture, 116–39
no religion, proportion with, 40 Christian education missionaries, 372
religious affiliation, 22 Christian evangelism, 15
Taoists, 18 Christian fundamentalist beliefs, 578
Chinese syncretic religion, 203 Christian influence, 369
Chinese temple, 29 Christian leaders
Chinmaya Seva Centre, 149, 164 views on evangelistic efforts, 587
Choan-Seng Song, 117 Christian mission schools, li
Christ-centric views, 585 Christian missionaries, 35
Christian activism, 128 evangelical, 98
Christian anti-gay campaign, 426 setting up of orphanages and
Christian Assembly, 119 boarding schools, 524
Christian Brothers’ schools, 368 Christian missionary activities, 524
Christian Conference of Asia, 77 Christian organizations
Christian Churches financial resources, 533
move towards conservatism and leadership, 533
evangelism, 620 manpower, 534
Christian clergy volunteers, 534, 535
areas covered in survey and Christian Outreach to the
interviews, 572 Handicapped, 530
belief that Christianity only way to Christian pilgrimage
eternal salvation, 585 Santiago, 300
699

700 Index
Christian Reformation, 673 mobilization of spiritual resources,

Christian school system, 118 531–33
Christian social service agencies, 525, motivation for involvement in social
526 services, 535–43
Christian theologians, 601 responses to local cultures, 131–33
Christian tradition use of Internet, 445
involvement with Christian social Christmas, 312, 325
service, 528–35 Chua, Lawrence (Pastor), 126
Christian workers, 375 Chura, 276
Christian-related agencies, 532 Church of Fools
Christian-related services virtual church, 438
survey, 545 Church of Singapore, 119
Christianity, 33, 392, 393 churches
attraction of new members, 38 charismatic, 120
choice for religious switchers, 406 early, 118–19
conversion to, 24 post-independence period, 119–20
evangelical, 116 Churches Counselling Centre, 525
exclusivist, 597 Citizen’s Consultative Committees,
globalization, 122 73
growth of, 35 City Harvest Church, 120, 122, 131
overtaking Taoism, 40 Civics and Moral Education (CME), l,
rate of conversion to, 23 72, 324, 326, 610
Christians civil service, 21
accommodation to Chinese culture, hiring of homosexuals, 414–17
132 CMIEO model, 230, 243
active proselytization, 36 Coleridge, 332
adapting to multi-religious society, 543 colonial Singapore, Singapore
adapting to secular state, 543 Institution, 364
born-again converts, 57 “colour blind” organizations, 466
building bridges with Muslims, Commission on Christian Education,
668–87 367
conversion into Baha’ism, 179–80 communistic-socialistic ideology, 7
educational stream, 48 communitas, concept of, 315
evangelical, 117 Community Baptist Church, 534
evangelists, 61 community centres, 544
higher educational attainment, 46 Community Development Feedback
increase in proportion of, 37 Group, 333
involvement in social services, 524 Community Education Programme,
larger HDB residence, 57 625
mobilization of ideological Community Engagement Programme,
resources, 528–31 75
mobilization of material resources, Community Involvement Project, 534
533–35 Community Outreach, 126
700

Index 701
Community Penetration Project, 588 curriculum formation

community programmes madrasahs, 343
Christians reaching out to heartland curriculum for social reconstruction,
population, 589 347–50
community-based organizations, 465 cyber-faith, 435
compulsory education, 269, 358 cyber-fatwas, 438
Computer Assisted Telephone cyber-jihad, 438
Interviewing (CATI) system, 439 cyberspace propaganda wars, 438
Confucian Ethics, 72, 324
Confucian teachings, 18 D
Confucianism, 16, 22, 31, 386 Dabagong, 29
moral-ethical philosophy, 5 dakwah, 98
conservatism activism, 89
Singaporean Christianity, 586 endeavour, 90
Constitution of Singapore, 62, 129 movement, 88
conversion, definition, 169 phenomenon, 87, 92
conversionism, 116 propagation, 86
cross-cultural evangelism, 125–26 various methods of, 466
crucicentrism, 116 dana, 228
freedom of religion, 129 Dar al-Ahd, 9
substantive content of freedom of Dar al-Harb, 9, 12
religion, 62–63 Dar al-Islam, 9
Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus, 364 Darul Aman, 263
conversion, issue of, 22 Darul Arqam, 88, 100, 462
Cornerstone Community Church, 528 Darul Harbi, 263
Cornerstone Community Services, 528 Darul Ihsan Libanat, 486
Council for the Development of Darul Ihsan Lilbanin, 486
Muslim Community (Yayasan Darul Islah Halfway House, 474
Mendaki), 484 Darul Islam, 263
Council of Europe, 301 darurat, 90
counselling sessions Darussalam Mosque
Christian organizations, 532 counselling sessions for inmates, 474
mosques, 474 Datt, Soam, 276
Counter Reformation, 5 de Chateaubriand, Francois, 678
Court of Appeal, 63 de-secularization protest, form of, 24
Creationism, 13 DeBernardi, Jean, xlvii
Crosland, Anthony, 568 Declaration of Religious Harmony, 59,
cross-ethnicity, 33 72, 73, 129, 624, 640, 643
Crusades, myth of, 677 Declaration of Principles, 73
cultural alienation, 228 Deedat, Ahmad, 89, 98
cultural reproduction Deepavali, 312, 325, 326
classical curriculum, 344–47 definitions
texts, 350–52 conversion, 169, 383
701

702 Index
interfaith, 643 religious affiliation by stream of

pilgrimages, 300 education, 48
social services, 471, 490 Education for Living, 370
switching of religions, 383 educational expansion, 369
temple, 490 educational programmes
demonization of youth, 86 run by mosques, 475
Department of Malay Studies, 103 Effendy, Bahtiar, 108
Descartes, 6 El Fadl, Khaled Abou, 107
delinquents El-Muhammady, Muhammad, 93
reformation of, 474 Emergency, 607
deviations, 12 Eng Soo Peck, 322
Dharma Muneeswaran Temple, 494 Engaged Buddhism, 203, 211
dhimmi, 11 Engineer, Asghar Ali, 100
Dhoby Ghaut, 313 English educated, 50
Diabetic Society of Singapore, 496 English Romantics, 332
Diabetic Support Group for the English schools, 363
Tamil-speaking, 497 Enon Mansor, liv
Directory of Social Services, 526 Esposito, John
diversity myths of the Crusades, 677
enhancing, 207–209 ethics, 323
diversity and unity Ethics Committee, 20
clarification and balancing of, 691 Ethiopian famine, 333
Divine Light Mission, 144, 146, 149, ethical approach, 558
158 ethical non-exclusivism, 558, 559
divinity of Christ, 558 ethnic minorities
dogmatism, 251 equality of access to public goods,
Doraisamy, T. R. (Bishop), 619 18
dukkha, 204 ethnic riots, 612
Dutch missionaries, 118 ethnicity
Durkheim, 23, 227 tie up with religious affiliation, 33
Eurasian Association, 69
E Eurasian population, 34, 35
Eade, John, 300 Euro-American universities, 100
East India Company, 118 European anti-Semitism, 673
Easter, 326 Evangelical Christian churches, 124–
Eastern University Press, 212 25
Eck, Diana, 680, 781 evangelical Christians, 61
Eckankar Satsang, 149, 156 evangelical Christianity
Educare, 224 contemporary forms of, 122–27
education historical overview, 117–21
factor in religion, 45 Evangelical Fellowship of Singapore,
qualitative consolidation, 370 121
702

Index 703
evangelical strategies, 127–33 Focus on Family group, 13

social and legislative settings, 127–29 folk beliefs, 386
evangelicals, use of Internet, 437 Foo Check Woo, xlviii
evangelism Foo Hai Ch’an Monastery, 518
community outreach, 126 foreign Indian workers, 305
prayer, 126, 127 formal secular public sphere, 413
views on other religions, 584–90 Fort Canning, 29
evangelization Fount journals, The, 89
aggressive, 58 Fozdar, Shirin, 167, 168
unethical, 611 free thinkers, 389
zealous, 377 association with independence and
Evergreen Old Folks’ Home, 516 hard work, 400
extremist religious movements, 436 choice for religious switchers, 406
conversion into Baha’i Faith, 180–
F 81
Fairfield Methodist School, 364 freedom of worship policy, 315
Faith Community Baptist Church, friendship evangelism, 587
122, 124, 135 Fujians, 29
Faith Methodist Church, 544 Fukien, 51
Far East Broadcasting Associates, 121 Fukuyama, Francis, 9
fardhu ain, 345 Full Gospel Christian Businessmen’s
Farish A. Noor, 94 Fellowship, 119
Fatris Bakaram
views on homosexuality, 421 G
fatwa, 561 gambling, 21
organ donation and transplantation, Gandharab, Seva Singh, 276
251–53 Gautama Siddharta, 393
prohibiting Muslim women form gay gene, 424
studying at gay groups, 416
university, 562 gay rights,
Fatwa Committee, MUIS, 257 advocates, 417
Feast Day of St James, 301 taboo subject, 21
Federation of Malaya Act, 369 gays, employment of, 21
Federation of Malaysia, 19 Gaza Strip, 669
filial piety General Certificate of Education, 353
fear of loss of, 404 general household survey
financial assistance resident population, 661
food vouchers, 472 General Paper, 326
long-term financial solutions, 473 Geography, 326
monetary aid, 472, 473 Geylang East, 314
flame war on Internet, 438 gianis, 290
Florida, Richard, 416 role, 293
703

704 Index
Gifted Education programme, 370 government schools, 544

global Christian culture Grace Assembly of God, 539
biblicism, 127 Grand Master of the System, 164
lay leadership, 127 Grand Mosque of Mecca, 346
prayers and deliverance, 135–37 grassroots approach, 72–73
Global Conference on Intercession, grassroots problems
Spiritual Warfare, and Evangelism, empathy by mosques, 481
Guatemala City, 135, 138 Great Commission, 123
Global Corruption Barometer, 76 gurdwara management committees,
global influences 276, 277, 292
Singaporeans’ understanding of inability to sustain Sikh religious
religion, 447 beliefs, 286
global links, xliii Gurdwara Reform Movement (1925),
global perspective 279
religion and politics in, 7–9 Gurdwaras, 275
global tensions, Muslims and diminishing importance of, 289–91
Christians, 17 number in Singapore, 280
globalization, 3, 8
GurMukhi, 282
impact of, 689
guru bhakti tradition, 162
pluralism, 25
Guru Nanak, 278
globalized Christianity, 122
guru-founder, 150–51
glossolalia, 24
Gym, A. A., 98
Goddess of Mercy, 133
GoForth Missions Conference, 120
Goh Chok Tong, 415, 507 H
Godless ideologies, 7 Habib Hassan, imam of Ba’alwie
Goethe, 6 mosque, 471
Goh, Noel (Father), 621 hadith, 351
Goh, Robbie, li Hagin, Kenny, 121
Golden Age, 15 haj, 300
Golden Pagoda Temple, 516, 517, 518 haj matters, 265
Golden Rule of human contact, 565 Hare Krishna, 144
Goo Hai Buddhist Cultural and Hare Krishna movement, 158
Welfare Association, 517 Hari Raya Aidilfitri, 312, 621
Good Friday, 312 Hari Raya Haji, 312, 333
gotong royong, 459 Hari Raya Puasa, 325, 614
governance Harmony Centre, 630
secularization of, 19 Haron Din, 93, 94
government Hartford Seminary, 681, 668, 673
consultative form of, 70 Harun Nasution, 93
secular nature of, 66 Harvard University, 452
government policy harvest time, 36
secularism, based on, 435 Hasyim Muzadi, 97
704

Index 705
Head of the School of Professional Hindus

Studies, 322 conversion into Baha’i Faith, 181–82
Health and Welfare gospel, 121 destruction of mosque in Ayodhya,
Health Fair, 497 567
Health Promotion Board, 496 Internet visits, 450
Heartland, website, 423 population in Singapore, 490
Hengshan Ting, 29 HIV Aids, 21
Hewer, Chris, 673 Ho Seng Ong, 368, 372
hierarchy of knowledge, 255 Hoisington, H. M., 373
High Point Holy Spirit Association for the
Christian-related social service, 531 Unification of World
drug rehabilitation centre, 532 Christianity, 77
Himpunan Belia Islam (HBI), 92 Holy Trinity Brompton, 124
Hindu Advisory Board, 67 homophobia
Hindu Centre, 158, 163 definition, 419
Hindu Dharma, 489 homosexuals
Hindu Endowment Board, 67, 158, working in civil service, 414–17
303, 304, 494, 498 homosexuality, 413–32
Hindu Endowment Fund Buddhism’s views on homosexuality,
collaboration with Muslim 422–23
organizations, 466 Catholics and Protestant Christians’
Hindu newsgroups view on, 423
online, 438 fundamentalist reaction from
Hindu Religious and Cultural religious communities, 413–32
Seminar, 489 indiscrimate policy of censoring, 416
Hindu Studies, 72, 323 Islam’s views on, 420–22
Hindu temples, 228 media responses, 417–19
development of social services, 492– need for inter-religious dialogue,
98 575
post-1965 changes, 493, 494 religious responses, 419–29
provision of social services, 489– support group, 427
503 Housing Development Board, 128
role of, 491 hudud, 96, 97
services provided by, 499–501 Hui, Anita, lvii
Hindu-related movements, 144 human embryonic cell research, 254
Hinduism, 16, 30, 40 Human Organs Transplant Act
brief history of, 491 (HOTA), 20, 611, 62
classical, 4 Hume, David, 6
early history, 4 Hungry Ghosts Festival, 326
institutionalized, 161
inter-religious and inter-ethnic I
dimensions, 156–58 Ibn Khaldun, 345
Singaporean brand of, 147 Ibn Sina, 345
705

706 Index
Ibn Taymiyyah, 258, 263 Institute of Mental Health, 496

Ibrahim, Bibijan, 276 volunteers at, 226
Imbert, M. Laurent Marie Joseph Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), xliv,
(Reverend), 29 138, 336, 521
Imperial Court, 15 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Imran Hoessein, 98 (ISEAS), 86
inclusive structure, 229–30 Institutes of Technical Education, 657
India integrated resorts, 20
demarcation of, 16 need for inter-religious dialogue,
relationship between Hinduism and 575
Islam, 16 integration
India-derived movements, 142–64 broad-based and flexible approach,
appeal of, 159–60 654
backgroud and scope of research, intellectual Islamization, 90–95
148–50 intellectualization
characteristics, 150–55 Buddhism, revitalization of, 57
claims to being de-ritualized, 152 inter-cultural evangelism, 125–26
claims to possess logical and inter-ethnic cooperation, 470
modernist stance, 152 inter-faith dialogue, 211
claims to universalism, 151 inter-generational bonding, 654–55
diverse backgrounds of followers, 155 policy recommendations, 655–58
emphasis on Seva, 154 Inter-Racial Confidence Circles
local and global connections, 156 (IRCC), 72, 130, 479, 494, 691
membership, 151–52 IRCC National Steering
social services, 160–61 Committee, 625
sociological insights, 155 Inter-Religious and Interracial Circles,
transcending religious boundaries, 640
153–54 inter-religious collaboration
Indian community cooperation on humanitarian
religion, 39 projects, 581
Indian population goodwill gestures, 579–80
Christians, 40 Inter-religious Coordinating Council
heterogeneous, 40 in Israel (ICCI), 670
Indian Singaporeans inter-religious dialogue
diversity of migrants, 33 clergy’s willingness to have dialogue
Hindus, 18 with other faiths, 576
Indonesian Islam, 102 common issues, 575
Industrial Revolution, 4, 6 delegation to denominational
Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN), executives and leaders, 576
92 fear of diluting religious uniqueness
Institute for Study of Religions and and convictions, 578
Society in Singapore and need for, 597
Malaysia, 619 views of Christian clergy, 573–79
706

Index 707
West, as practised in, 575 Inter-Religious Youth Forum, 651

whether fruitful, 574 Inter-School Christian Fellowship, 36,
inter-religious groups and 130
organizations interaction among youth leaders,
need for expanding outreach, 597 research questionnaire, 662–64
inter-religious harmony, 22 interfaith
potential threats to, 18 definition of, 643
Inter-Religious Organization (IRO), interfaith engagement
67, 168, 217, 330, 396, 448–50, four phases, 659
451, 486, 605–41, 648–50 interfaith relations
affiliation to UN and UNESCO, 609 burden for, 669
Catholics, 620–21 Interfaith Youth Corps, 651
Conference (2004), 636–37 interfaith youth events, 665–67
conflict and traumatic events, 612 Internal Security Act, 17, 59, 64, 65
events and activities, 609–17 Internal Security Department, 65
first public lecture, 613 International Friendship Day, 326
historical background, 606–609 International Institute of Islamic
inter-religious dialogue, 622–24 Thought and Civilization
IRO Day, 615 (ISTAC), 92
issues and problems International Institute of Islamic
Baha’is, Buddhists and Taoists, Thought (IIIT), 91
618–19 International Islamic University
membership and representation Malaysia (IIUM), 92
of religions, 618 International Sai Organization, 225
Protestant Christians, 619–20 International Society for Krishna
structure and leadership, 617–18 Consciousness (ISKCON), 146,
joint religious prayers, 615–17 216, 230
life issues, 610–11 International Student Conference of
major international events, 632 Jews, Christians and Muslims,
major local activities, 633–35 685
morality issues, 610 international trends, current, 3
Muslims, 621–22 Internet, 291
non-fulfillment of potential, 405 availability of religious material, 443
promotion of inter-religious decentralizing element, 436
harmony, 613–15 demographic of users, 441–43
proselytization, 611–12 effect on religious harmony, 434–55
public education, 613–15 finding more on own religion, 453,
public potrayal, 612–13 454
publications, 330, 331 influence on religious harmony, 453
relations with public, 626–29 institutional responses, 436
relations with the state, 624–26 medium, as a, 451
religious education in schools, 609, methodology of study on, 439–41
610 modernizing element, 436
707

708 Index
promotion of inter-religious sermons and writing, dissemination

understanding, 438 of, 249
promotion of religious tolerance, 443 stem cell research, 253–54
religion of users, 442–43 Southeast Asia, 83–108
religious conflict, 436–39 theme of preparation of the
religious harmony, 443–44 hereafter, 256
religious perception, 440, 453 traditionalism, 10, 259
Singapore’s regulatory code, 452 views on homosexuality, 420–22
source of information on religion, Islamic banking, 96
398, 405 Islamic Based Ecnonomy (IBE), 260
transnational element of religion, 61 Islamic community
use for own versus other religion, unification of, 15
440 Islamic democracy, 90
use for religious purposes, 444–47 Islamic discourse
use to find other religions, 454 organ donation, 99
Intifada, 669 scholarship and intellectual
Iraq, 11 challenge in, 99–101
Isaiah episode, 366 Islamic economics, 90
Islam, 392, 393 Islamic Foundation, 672
1990 to 2000, 37 Islamic framework, 87
20th century revivalists, 10 Islamic Heritage Centre, 479
bibliography, 99 Islamic inheritance laws, 86
ceramah, 256 Islamic knowledge
conversion to, 29, 52 Malay Archipelago, 350
early history, 4 Islamic moderation, 74
engagement of asatizahs, 101 stress on, 60
focus of sermons, 259 Islamic perspectives, 96
Indonesian connection, 9–94 Islamic Religious Council of Singapore
intellectualism, 89 (MUIS), 333, 421, 484
Malaysian connection, 92–94 Friday sermon, 422
marriage, 52 Islamic Religious Knowledge, 72, 323,
militant form, 74 324
moderate and mediocre ideas, 95– Islamic revivalism, 74
99 Islamic state
moderation, 95 issues on, 265, 266
organ donation and transplantation, Islamic Studies, 674
251–53 Hartford Seminary, 668
radical and militant, 58 Islamic Sufi tradition, 242
recent interest in, 84–85 Islamic system, 267
revivalism, 87 Islamic Theological Association of
rise in Internet searches on, 437 Singapore (Pertapis), 484
role of preacher, 97–99 Islamic worldview
secularism, vehemence against, 94 authentic (tasawur), 95
708

Index 709
Islamists’ discourse kavadis, 303, 313

creation of an Islamic state, 85 kesh, 278
Islamization, 85, 90–95 Khairat kematian, 485
Ismail Kamus, 94 khalsa, 278, 233, 579
Italy, 5 Khalsa Dhari
lack of appeal of, 285
J Khomeini, Ayatollah, 561
Jadot (Archbishop), 640 Khong, Lawrence, 122
Jainism, 689 Kimball, 22
Jamiyah (Muslim Missionary Society kirpan, 278
of Singapore), 100, 460 Kitab Jawi, 350
expansion of services, 463 kitab kuning, 346, 350
Jamiyah Business School, 464, 486 Kluver, Randolph, liii
Jaringan Islam Liberal, 104 Knowledge Based Convention, 270
Jats, 276 Kohlberg’s Levels
Javanese mysticism (kebatinan), 12 moral development, of, 334
Jehovah Witnesses, 77, 129, 635 Komeita Party, 15
jemaah Kong, Lily, l
significance of, 268 Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF), 107
Jemaah Islamiyah, 65, 266, 691 Korea, 16
arrest of members, 61 Korean Reformed Church of Reverend
Jenkins, Jerry B., 123 Sun Myung Moon, 8
Jewish faith, 394 Krishna Our Guide, 163
jihad, 11 Kshatriayas, 4
jihadists, 11 Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng, xlviii
Johnson, Anne, 619 Kwantung, 51
Johnstone, Patrick, 126
Judaism, 225 L
Jurong Family Service Centre, 464 Labour Day, 312
LaHaye, Tim, 123
K Lai Ah Eng, lvii
Kabbalah, 332 Lakeside Family Service Centre, 544
kach, 278 land, allocation of, 18
kakars emblems, 278 Landau, Yehezkel, 670, 673
Kalama Sutra, 423 Laos, 15
kaliyuga, 222 Laskar Jihad, 16
Kampung Siglap Mosque, 471 Last Temptation of Christ, 67
counselling sessions for inmates, 474 leadership vacuum, 88
kanga, 278 Lee Foundation
Kant, 6 collaboration with Muslim
Kaur, Arunajeet, xlviii organizations, 466
kavadi carriers, 304, 310 Lee Kuan Yew, 61, 327, 372, 373
increase in numbers, 305 Lee Zhiwang, 138
709

710 Index
Leibniz, 6 madrasah curriculum

Lembaga Biasiswa Kenangan Maulud problems to be addressed, 355
(LBKM)), 462, 484 technocratic undercurrents, 352–55
liberal democracy technocratic-pragmatic, 353
Christianity, impact on, 13–15 madrasah education
impact on religion, 9–16 preservation and promotion of the
Islam, impact on, 9–13 common purpose, 346
world religions, impact on, 15 madrasahs, 75, 85, 248, 249
liberalization challenges faced by, 355
issue of homosexuality, 415 classical curriculum, 344–47
Life Community Services Society cultural reproduction, 344–47
(LCCS), 537 curriculum, 342–58
Lim Han Nan, 418 curriculum formulation, 343
Lin Yutang demand for reforms, 343
clarification on joss sticks, 602 departure of reformist curriculum,
Little India, 313 348
Little India Shop Association, 466 issue of compulsory education, 269
Locke, 6 lack of financial support, 349
London, 302, 332 operational curriculum, 343
London Missionary Society position in scheme of national
Ultra-Ganges Mission, 118 development, 342
Lourdes pragmatism of, 353
pilgrimages to, 300 subjects, 348, 349
LoveSingapore network, 136 Mahabodhisattva Kistagarbha, 206
Lowe, Chuck, 134 Mahatma Gandhi Memorial, 616
Luckmann, 199, 208 Mahayan Reformist Buddhists, 200
lughah, 351 Mahayana Buddhism, 32
Luther, Martin, 5 Mahayana Buddhist tradition, 510
Mahayana Buddhists, 197, 198–99
M Chinese, 198
Macauliffe, M. A., 279 Maintenance of Religious Harmony
Macdonald, Malcolm, 607 Act, 59, 65, 129, 612, 624
madrasah education system, 88 Annex of White Paper, 601
see also madrasahs Maintenance of Religious Harmony
Madrasah Al-Iqbal, 347, 348, 349, Bill, 584
355 Maintenance of the Elderly Patents
Madrasah Al-Ma’arif Al-Islamiah Act, 515
philosophy of education, 352 Majapahit, 491
Madrasah Aljunied, 352, 354 Majidi, Majid, 674
Madrasah As-Sibyan, 357 Majlis Pusat, 651
Madrasah Assibyan, 347, 348, 349 Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura
Madrasah Bustanul Arifin, 347 (MUIS), 67, 462
Madrasah Bustanul Islamiah, 352, 358 Fatwa committee, 253
710

Index 711
fatwa regarding organ donation and Marxist Conspiracy, 370

transplantation, 251 Masagos Zulkifli, 421
fatwa on tudung, 266 Masjidil Haram, 346
system of appointments of religious mass society theory, 229
teachers, 266 Mataram, 491
Ten Desired Attributes of the Mathews, Mathew, lv, lvi
Singaporean Muslim Mattson, Ingrid, 674
Community of Excellence, 75 Maududi, Abdul Ala’, 105
Makhdoom, Ahmed, 671 Mazhabis, 276
Malay Daily, 257 McNally, Joseph, 368
Malay political leaders MCS-SANA (SANA Muslim
outburst against, 269 Counselling Service), 462
Malay Singaporeans Medical Counselling Service, 496
homogeneity among age groups, 43 Medina Constitution, 263
Muslims, 18 Medjugorje, 300, 301
Malay Youth Literary Association Mendaki, 69, 462, 484
(4PM), 461, 483 see also Council for the
Malay-Muslim community, problems Development of Muslim
of, 60 Community
Malay-Muslim exclusiveness Mercu Learning Point, 463
perception of, 73–75 Mercy Relief, 463, 464, 485
Malay-Muslim Family Service Centre metaphysical commitments, 559
(FSC), 463 Methodist Girls’ School, 364
Malay-Muslim NGOs, 100 Methodist Missions Society, 120
Malay-Singaporean Methodist Welfare Services, 528, 536
Islamic identity, 60 Methodist Youth Fellowship, 180
Malaya Message, 368 Metta Charity Walk, 517
Malays Metta Day Rehabilitation Centre for
concept of gotong royong, 507 the Elderly, 517
no switching of religion, 390 Metta School, 519
religious homogenity, 38 Metta Welfare Association (MWA), 517
Malaysian traditionalist, 102 Middle East, 56
management of religion finance from, 8
constitutional setting, 62 Milton, Samuel, 30
legislative framework, 64–66 Ministry of Community
Mandarin Development, Youth and Sports,
language of Taoist and Buddhists, 462, 648
58 Ministry of Education (MOE), 324
Mangala Vihara Buddhist Temple, 197 inclusion of Sikh studies, 287
Maria Hertogh riots, 59 Ministry of Social Affairs, 463
Mariamman, 30 Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order
Marshall, David, 607 and Nuisance) Act, 304
Marx, 211 Mission Schools, 362–78
711

712 Index
after independence, 369–74 limited expertise and infrastructure,

Christian influence, 363 481
Christianizing moral influence, 374 mindset and religious orientation,
colonial Singapore, 364–69 477
culture, 367 need of congregation, 477
government’s attitude, 374 political boundaries of, 478
non-Christian students, 363 provision of social services, 470–75
path of least resistance, 378 rehabilitation programmes, 474
religious instructions in, 367 role of, 481
structure of, 371 social service providers, as, 459–86
missionary groups, 34 sociopolitical circumstances, 479–80
modern capitalism types of programmes, 471–75
Islam, impact on, 9 visiting of, 333
Modernist Islamic ideas, 56 Moss, Sonia, 76
modernization, 88 Mother Teresa, 584
Moeslim Abdurahman, 93 Moulavi, 327
Mohd Faisal Othman, 94 Mufti of Singapore, 621
Mohd Nasir Omar, 94 Muhammad Hamidullah, 89
Mohd Nor Manuty, 93 Muhammad Haniff Hassan, 95
Mooncake Festival, 132 Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahab, 10
moral development Muhammad Kamal Hassan, 93
three levels of, 337 Muhammadiyah Association, 461,
moral education programmes, 323 463, 483
moral influence MUIS (Islamic Religious Council of
efficacy of, 375 Singapore), 333, 421, 484
Mosque Seminar (2000), 471 see also Majlis Ugama Islam
mosques Singapura
assessment of social services Friday sermon, 422
provided by, 475–81 mujahidin, 11, 12
availability of expertise and multi-racialism policy, 230
manpower, 476 multi-religiosity
challenges encountered by, 480–81 multi-layered meaning, 690
corporatization of, 478 multi-religious memorial services, 612
counselling and advice, provision of, multi-religious society, 321, 377
474–75 music
educational programmes, 475 poetic value of, 309
financial assistance, provision of, Muslim community
472–73 views on homosexuality, 415
funding, 477 Muslim Community of Excellence, 75
hindrances in collaboration, 480 Muslim Converts’ Association of
lack of funding, 480 Singapore (Darul Arqam), 484
leadership, 476 Muslim intelligentsia, 84
712

Index 713
Muslim Malay fisher folk, 29 Muslim scholars

Muslim missionary groups, 8 call for reinterpretation of Qur’an, 561
Muslim Missionary Society of taxonomy of knowledge, 345
Singapore (Jamiyah), 483 Muslim Singaporeans
see also Jamiyah dominant and peripheral thinking,
Muslim organizations 85–95
collaboration with non-Muslim moderation, 74
organizations, 464–70 needs of, 83
collaboration to preserve good promotion of piety, 85–87
name, 468 religious traditionalism, 85–87
collaboration where mutual benefit, Muslim students
467 flexibilities for, 68
development of, 483–85 Muslim traditional religious elite
development of social services, 460– legitimization of, 267–70
70 Muslim traditionalists
problems in collaboration, 469–70 new breed of, 261, 261–64
service providers, as, 460–70 reinforcement of outlook, 264
social services (1946 to 1964), 461–
scepticism towards modern
62
institutions, 264
social services (1980s onwards),
Muslim Trust Fund Association
462–64
(MTFA), 460, 483
social services during colonial time
Muslim ummah, global, 60
to (1945), 460, 461
Muslim Youth Assembly (HBI), 89
social services (independence to
1980), 462 Muslims
transfer of knowledge and expertise donation of organs, 611
during collaboration, 468 first generation, 10
venture into non-social welfare fundamentalists, 11
services, 464 Internet visits, 450
Muslim religious elite, 248–72 issue of abortion, 19
acceptance of parliamentary need to strengthen faith, 346
democracy, 266 radical minority, 11
apolitical stance, 265 Shafie school, 30
background, 248–50 support of HOTA, 20
hiearchy of authority, 258 traditional call to prayer, 309
issue of Jemaah Islamiyah, 266 use of Internet, 444
perceived roles, 265 Muzaffar, Chandra, 100, 103
prioritization of spiritual Myanmar, 15
knowledge, 254
traditionalism, 250–60 N
traditionalism and problems of Nabha, Bhai Kahn Singh, 279
modern world, 260–67 Nahdlatul Ulama, 97
713

714 Index
Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of National Service, 61, 63, 77

Technical Education, 63 National Stadium
Narayana Seva, 227 memorial service for September 11
Nation03, 417 event, 612
National Bioethics Advisory National Steering Committee on
Committee, 611, 625 Inter-racial and Inter-religious
National Council of Churches in Confidence Circles (IRCCs), 615
Singapore, 121, 426, 600, 624 National University of Singapore, 657
National Council of Social Services Muslim Society, 645
(NCSS), 228, 519, 526 National Volunteer Philanthropy
anti-discrimination stance, 426 Centre, 58
definition of social services, 471 National Youth Council, 641, 648
National Day, 312, 615 Navigators, 130
National Day Festival of Praise, 136 neo-reform oriented spiritual
National Day Parade movements, 237
participation of Nichiren Shoshu neo-Hindu, 144
Buddhists, 202 New Age inspirational methods, 189
National Day Rally New Age movement, 229
Goh distancing from gay cause, 428 New Age religions, 689
National Day Week, 650 New Creation Church, 124
National Day Youth Camp, 650 new religions
National Education (NE), 324, 648 flowering of, 23
national education policies new religious movements, 142, 144
effect on mission schools, 369 coming to Singapore, 145–48
National Healthcare Group, 496 Sathya Sai Baba Movement, 215–
National Heart Centre, 496 43
National Heritage Board, 614 New Year’s Day, 312
national identity, 18 Newspaper and Printing Presses Act,
national interest 17
priority of, 70 Newton, 6
National Kidney Foundation (NKF), NEXUS, 648
496, 520 Ng Pei Fuen, 212, 521
National Loyalty Week, 615 Nichiren Shoshu Buddhists, 202
National Memorial no religion
inauguration of, 615 as a category, 50
national phone survey, 439–41 non-conformist Christians, 117
demographic questions, 454, 456 non-government organizations
findings from interviews, 448–50 (NGOs)
in-depth interviews, 440–41 Malay-Muslim, 100
results, 441-448 proposed Internet regulators, 450
variables and measures, 440 non-interference
national schools colonial policy, 351
common spaces, 68 non-residential missionaries, 125
714

Index 715
noise pollution Palestinians, 11

state regulations on, 309 Pali language, 199
Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, xlix, 102 Pan-Islamic reformist ideology, 347
North Indian Hindu communities, Paramadina circle, 92
146 parents
Notting Hill Carnivals, 302 fear of loss of filial piety, 404
Nur Amali Ibrahim, liv religious tolerance, 404
Nurcholish Madjid, 93 Parliamentary Debates Singapore
Official Report, 76
O Parsi-Zoroastrian Association of
offensive information warfare, 438 Singapore
Oldham, William, 364 collaboration with Muslim
wife, 365 organizations, 466
online activities Paul Yongyi Cho, 119
related to other’s religions, 446 Penal Code, 17, 64
related to own religion, 446 Pentacostal practices, 119
online influences, foreign, 447 People Like Us, 416
online religion, 435, 436 people power, 14
comparison of activities between Per studies, United States, 437
religions, 445 Perdaus
government regulation over content views on homosexuality, 421
of, 447–48 PERGAS, 77, 94, 2004
Open Net Initiative, 452 Perguruan Agama Islam Rengat
Operation World, 125 (Rengat Islamic Religious
Orang Laut, 28 Teaching College), 347
organ donation PERKAMUS, 486
fatwa ruling council, 99 Pertapis, 462
Islam’s views, 251–53 Perumal temple, 304, 314
Orthodox Church, 14 pesantren, 344
Osteen, Joel, 124 Pew Internet, 435
Otis, George, 133, 135 Philippines, 14
Otis Jr., George, 126 Phor Kark See Temple, 197
Ottoman empire, 11 Phor Khar See Temple, 516
outreach programmes, diverse, 129–31 Phua Chao Rong, lvii
Overseas Chinese Baptist Church, 118 pilgrimages, definition, 300
Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 36 pluralism, 25
Overseas Missionary Fellowship plurality, advocation of, 84
International, 121 pondok, 344–45
population
P 10 years and over by religion, 42
Pakistan 15 years and over by religion, 43
establishment of, 16 aged 15 and over, 47, 57
Palembang, 491 aged 15 years and over, 49
715

716 Index
aged 15 and over according to Protestant sects, 6

religion, 37 Protestants
Chinese aged 10 years and over, 45 involvement in foreign missions, 117
Indians aged 10 years and over, 44 Pu Toh See Temple, 512
Malays aged 10 years and over, 44 Public Entertainments and Meetings
no religion, 40 Act, 77
working aged 15 years and over, 49 Public Entertainments and Meetings
pragmatism, 19 (Speaker’s Corner) (Exemption)
Prasanthi guide, 242 Order, 77
Prasanthi Nilayam, 221, 223 public donations
prayer evangelism importance of, 510
(1990s), 133–37 public policy discourse, role of
spiritual warfare, 133, 134 religion, 69
Prema Sai baba, 221 public secularism
Presbyterian Community Services formalizing of, 429
(PCS), 529, 541 Punjab, 275, 278
Presbyterians, 121 Punjabi language, 282
Presidential Council of Minority as a second language, 288
Rights (PCMR), 17, 62 Punjabi Language Programme, 291
Presidential Council for Religious
Harmony (PCRH), 62 Q
Price, Joseph, 124 Qardawi, 107
Primary School Leaving Examination Qing Ming, 325
(PSLE), 353 quasi-botom-up approach, 72–73
benchmark for madrasahs, 270 Qur’an, 11
processions and pilgrimages,
approaches, 299–308 R
Prophet Muhammad’s Birthday, 59 racial harmony since independence, 55
Prophet Muhammad Radha Soami, 149, 152, 154
prayers according to, 256 Radha Soami Satsang, 147, 156, 217
utilizing traditions of, 267 Raffles, Sir Stamford, 28
Prophetic Traditions, 86 Rahmatan Lil Alamin Fund, 479
prostitution Raja Yoga, 149
issue of, 21 Ram, birth place of, 16
Protestant Christian-related social Rama Krishna Mission, 217, 492, 493
services, 527 Ramadan, Tariq, 100
Protestant Christianity Ramakrishna Mission, 144, 146, 147,
conversion to, 34 158
Protestant Christians, 449 Ramasamy, Nagah Devi, lv
views on homosexuality, 423 Reach Community Services, 539
Protestant churches, 5, 7 recognition, xliv
Protestant missionaries, 118 redemptionist-evangelical theology,
Protestant Reformation, 436 123
716

Index 717
Reformation, 5, 6 rise of, 22–25

Reformist Buddhism, 195–212 rising tide of, 693
avoiding pitfalls of fundamentalism, Religious and Educational League of
210 Radin Mas (BAPA), 461, 483
central tenets, 204–207 religious classes
compassion and humanity, 206 conducted by mosques, 474
doctrine of causation, 204 religious communities
eight-fold path, 207 responses to homosexuality, 420
morality and ethics, 205, 206 religious conversion, 365
policy implications towards, 209–12 tertiary students, 382
theory of Karma and Rebirth, 204, Religious Curriculum, 370
205 religious diversity, 16–19
work ethic, 206 religious devotionalism, 87
Reformist Buddhists, 200–202 Religious Education programme, 370
reformists religious elitism, redefinition of, 353
early Muslim (salaffiyah), 90 religious extremism, spectre of, 73–75
Chinese-speaking, 201 religious groups, 30–32
non-sectarian, 203 religious harmony, 55
Regent College, 127 Internet’s influence, 453
Registrar of Companies, 513 Religious Harmony Act, 217, 371
Registrar of Societies, 148, 224 religious identity, 18
Registrar of Societies Act, 234, 490 adolescent life, 405
religion religious institutions
and age, 41–45 encouragement to provide welfare
and education, 45–48 services, 506
and ethnicity, 38–41 Religious Knowledge (RK), l
and gender, 41 Religious Knowledge, 71, 390–94
and socio-economic status, 48–49 Religious Knowledge curriculum, 362,
and state, 363, 371
contentious issues, 19–21 religious orders, 249
form of communal action, 66 religious organizations
management, 55–78 views on homosexuality, 415
nation-building, role in, 70–72 religious pluralism
privatization of, 208 backdrop of, 56–58
of the masses, 31 religious renewals, 24
transnational characteristics of, 76 religious sciences, 101
religion, population distribution, 32 religious state of play
religion online, 436 overview of, 58–61
religions religious switchers
knowledge and perceptions, 395–98 profile of, 405, 406
religions of experience, rise of, 8 sources of religious initiation, 401–403
religiosity religious switching
high level of, 429 adolescent Singaporeans, by, 381–410
717

718 Index
background of studies, 382–85 Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs

case study interviews, 384–85 (RIMA), 463, 485
civics and moral education survey, Research Project on Religious
408–409 Diversity and Harmony in
correlation between language used, Singapore, xliv
407 residents’ committees, 544
findings from interviews, 394–404 revivalism, Islam, 87
from syncretistic backgrounds to Risalah, 94
Soka Buddhism, 401 River Life Community, 543
guidelines to interviewers, 409 Robert Crown Library, 76
implications and recommendations, Rousseau, 6
405–408 Rushdie, Salman, 67
main trends, 388–90 Russian Federation, 14
methodology of study, 383–84
parental objection, 403–404 S
participant observation and focus sacred canopy, 25
group discussion, 385 religion as, 4
pull factors, 399 Saddam Hussein, 11
rapid integration into a network, Sa’eda Buang, li, 103
406 SAFF, 484
reasons for, 398–401 Safehaven, homosexual support group,
religious backgrounds of switchers, 427
385–88 Sahaj Marg, 163
respondents’ level of religious Sai Action for Family Relief of Needy
knowledge, 391 (SAFFRON), 226
switchers by religion, 389 Sai Baba, 149
religious tradition, xliii Sai Baba group, 156
religious trends, 28–52 Sai Baba movement, 144, 147, 152,
(1849) to (1949), 32–35 155, 158
(1950) to (1979), 35 Sai bhajans, 158
(1980) to (1990), 36–37 Sai centres, 226
(1990) to (2000), 37–38 at Hindu temples, 232
early religious landscape, 28–32 Sai family as a global entity, 235–36
major, xlv Sai Ram, greetings, 235
religious-based moral influence, 376 Said, Edward, 678
Ren Ci Hospital, 517 Saint Luke’s Hospital for the Elderly,
Renaissance, 5, 6, 14 124
renewers (mujaddid), 12 St Andrew’s Mission Hospital, 525
renunciation, issue of, 22 St Andrew’s School, 364
Research Institute of Malay Affairs and St Anthony’s Boys’ School, 376
Centre of Contemporary Islamic St Joseph’s Institution, 364
Studies, 103 St Margaret’s School, 364
718

Index 719
St Paul sea people, 51

references to homosexuality made sectarianism, 31
by, 424 secular framework, 149
salaf, 10 secular institutions, 544
salaffiyah, 90 secular sciences, 101
Salvation Army, 540, 542 secular state policy, 16–19
SANA Muslim Counselling Service, secularism, 14, 18
484 deepening, 22
Sangha, 203 denouncement of, 84
tensions within, 207 government policy towards religion,
Sangha Council 435
public institutions, 514 putative Singapore model of, 66–70
Sanskrit, conduct of bhajans, 234 secularization, 6
Samadhi, 162 Sedition Act, 17, 64, 452
Satanic Verses, 67 See Guat Kwee, lviii
Sathya Sai Baba long-term goals, 684, 685
biographer (Kasturi), 221 personal short-term proposals, 683
teachings, 224–25 self-help evangelism, 124
Sathya Sai Baba Centres, 224 self-help group, 462
activities, 238–40 Seminar on Moral Education in
Sathya Sai Baba Movement, 215–43 Catholic Schools, 368
collective consciousness, 236 Sen, Amartya, 561
Education in Human Values Senior Citizens’ Activity Centres, 515
programme, 224 Seow Choon Leong, 428
Educare, 224 September 11 events, 691
founder, 220–23 service projects, 223
history and development, 220–23 seva, 219, 228
Ladies Wing and Youth Wing, 243 Shae, Alice
middle class following, 234–35 setting up Christian Outreach to
nine codes of conduct, 224, 242 the Handicapped, 525
objectives and methodology of Shafie doctrine, 350
study, 219–20 Shaharuddin Maaruf, 103, 104
official registration, 218 Shakib Arsalan, 251
performance of seva, 225–27 Shared Values, 55, 71, 506
plural community, 231–34 Shariah Court, appointment of judge,
Sathya Sai Baba Society, 495 268
Sathya Sai Central Organization of shenism, 31
Singapore (SSCOS), 218, 241 Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana Buddhists,
Sathya Sai Social Service (4S) 197–98, 208
Singapore, 228 Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana ritualism,
Saudi Arabia, 8 207
Muslim puritan movement, 10 Shirdi Sai Baba Sansthan, 154, 163
719

720 Index
Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Singapore Internet Project (SIP), 435

Committee (SGPC), xlix Singapore Islamic Scholars and
Shiva, 222 Religious Teachers Association
Shri Krishna Mandir, 149 (PERGAS), 265, 461, 483
Shri Ram Chandra, 164 Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim
Shri Ram Chandra Mission, 163 League (SKML), 461, 483
Shuntian Gong, 29 Singapore Khalsa Association, 507
Sidek Baba, 105 Singapore Kindness Movement, 130
Sidek Fadil, 93 Singapore Malay Youth Association,
Siddique, Sharon, 103 484
Signs and Wonders movement, 120 Singapore National Stroke Association,
Sikh Advisory Board, 67 496
Sikh Studies, 72 Singapore Religious Scholar’s
Sikhism, 155 Association (PERGAS), 87
Singapore Singapore revivalists, 89
Antioch of Asia, 120–21 Singapore Tenkasi Muslim Welfare
nation of believers, 24 Society (STMWS), 461, 483
regulatory code governing Internet, Singapore-based religious leaders
452 use of Internet, 451
religious diversity, concluding Singaporean Singhalese, 199
remarks, 689–93 Singaporean-Muslim autochthonous
Singapore Armed Forces practice, 74
integration of Malay/Muslims in, 60 Singapore’s model of, 56
Singapore Bible College, 121 vehemence against, 94–95
Singapore Bioethics Advisory SingHealth Group, 496
Committee, 253 Single Parent Family Centre, 484
Singapore Buddha Sasana Society, 197 Sinha, Vineeta, xlvii, 241
Singapore Buddha Yana Organization, Sister City relationships, engagement
197 of Singapore, 685
Singapore Buddhist Federation, 422 Sisters in Islam, 104
Singapore Buddhist Free Clinic, 513 Smith, Adam, 6
Singapore Buddhist Welfare Services Smith, Cecil, 366
Old Folks’ Home, 516 Smith, Jane (Professor), reading of the
Singapore Cancer Society, 496 Quran, 681
Singapore Centre for Evangelism and SMT Uthavum Karangal (SMTUK),
Mission, 120, 121 497
Singapore Ceylon Tamils’ Association, Social Development Unit, 494
507 Social Science and Humanities
Singapore Heart Foundation, 496 Research Council of Canada, 138
Singapore Indian Development Social Service, 124–25
Association (SINDA), 69, 462, social services
507 assessment of, 475–81
720

Index 721
avenues for involvement, 539 Sri Lanka, 15

Christian involvement, 526 Sri Mariamman Temple, 490, 491,
definition of, 471, 490 498
evangelism, 540–43 case study, 496
institutional legitimacy with state, Sri Samayapuram Muriamman
538 Pillaigal, 163
integrating faith and works, 535–37 Sriwana, 486
key factors in delivery of, 476–80 Stanford Law School, 76
legitimacy with community, 538–39 state, role of, 691
provision by Christian state–religion partnership, 518–21
organizations, 524–50 stem cell research, 20
provision by Hindu templers, 489– theological construction, 254
503 Straits Chinese Theravada Buddhists,
provision by mosques, 471–75 199
Societe des Mission Etrangeres, 29 Straits Settlements, 363
Societies Act, 17, 64, 129, 146, 148, structure of organization, 223–24
242, 514 Sudras, outcasts, 4
society, mapping of, 4 Suez Canal, 11
socio-religious inclinations, 227–29 Sufis
Soka Association, 32 role in Islamization of Southeast
SOKA Association Asia, 12
collaboration with Muslim Sufism, 12
organizations, 466 Sun Love Home, 497
Soka Buddhism, 397 Sun Love Nursing Home, 226
Soka Gakkai International, 216 Sun Yat Sen, 51
Solomon Asch Centre for the Study of Sung, John, 119
Ethnopolitical Conflict, 76 sunnah, 11
Solomon, Robert, 120 Sunni
Speaker’s Corner, 68 mazhab, efficacy of, 86
speaking in tongues (glossolalia), 24 survey, HDB households, 46
Spiritual Education (SE), l Survey on Social Attitudes of
spiritual knowledge Singaporeans, 59
prioritization of, 253 Swami Home, 226
spiritual movements Swami Vivekananda, 493
growth in Singapore, 216–17 syariah, 4, 9, 15, 89, 96, 345
spiritual power points, 135 Syarif Hidayatullah, 92
spiritual strongholds, 134 Syed Qutb, 105
spiritual warfare, 133, 134, 135 Syed Sheikh Al-Hadi, Muslim
spiritual warfare movement, 121 reformist, 347
Sree Narayana Mission, 164 syncretic Buddhism, reinvention of,
Sri Aurobindo, 144 195–96
Sri Aurobindo Society, 147, 158, 217 syncretic Chinese religion, 52
721

722 Index
syncretic practices, 400 Tianhou temple, 29

syncreticists, 386 Tong Chee Kiong, xlv
syncretism, 397 Touch Community Services, 124
syura, 266 trades
related to practice of religion, 250
T traditional Chinese religion, 40
Taliban government, 11 traditionalism, 85
Taman Bacaan influence, 250
services, 463 politics, and, 265–67
Tan, Charlene, l traditionally accepted boundaries, 50
Tan, Eugene, xlvi Transcendental Meditation, 144, 146,
Tan Hye Sun, 376 149, 156
Tan, Kenneth Paul, liii Hindu label as problematic, 230–31
Tan, Tony, 372, 373 Trinity Theological College, 121, 126,
Tan Zhixia, 138 525
Tai Pei Temple, 516 tsunami, 333
Taiping Rebellion, 51 tudung controversy, 68
Talaq, 67 tudung, issue of, 269
Tamils Representative Council, 507
Tampines Family Service Centre, 528 U
Taoism, 5, 15 ulama, 10, 248–72
decline in, 387 attitude towards knowledge, 254
shift away from, 389 influence on religious and cultural
Taoists, 177–79 life, 248
tariqat, 12, 249, 356 lack of familiarity with Western
tauhid, 351 thought, 262
tauhidic (doctrinal affirmation), 91 views via mass media, 249
Tay Eng Soon, 374 UN Universal Declaration of Human
temple Rights, 17
definition, 490 Unification Church, 129
Ten Chin Liew, lvi Union Theological Seminary, 119
Teo, Bernard, 425 Unitarian (Muwahhidun), 10
Teochews, 29 United Bible Societies, 125
terrorism United Kingdom, 14
threat of, 74 United Nations Charter, 263
Thailand, 15 United States
Tham Seong Chee, xlv, 103 Per studies, 437
Thanawi, 4, 353 service organizations, 527
Theravada Buddhism, 196 study of religious and cult
Theravada Buddhists, 197, 199–200 movements, 216
Thomas, Lynette, xlviii University of Alberta Humanity, 138
Thomsen, Claudius H., 30 urban societies, 228
Theosophical Society, 144 urbanization, 88
722

Index 723
usrahs, 90 wired Americans, 435

Ustaz Murat Mohd Aris, 421 witchcraft, 389
usul fiqh, 345 Woodlands Evangelical Free Church,
Uttar Pradesh, 164 544
Woodlands Social Centre
V National Volunteer and
Vaisayas, 4 Philanthropy Centre, 544
Varsity Christian Fellowship, 36, 130 World Conference of the Sathya Sai
Vatican, 14 Baba Organization, 225
Vatican Council, 424 World Kindess Day, 130
Vedic rituals, 492 World Health Organization, 497
Venerable Shi Ming Yi, 422, 518 World Trade Centre, 129
Venerable Siong Khye, 512 World War II, 87
Vietnam, 16
virtual church, 438 Y
Vishnu, incarnation of, 16 Yap Ching Wi, lvii
Vivakananda, Sinniah, lv Yap Kim Hao (Reverend Dr), 428
Voltaire, 6
Yawning Bread, 416, 430
voluntary welfare organisations
Yayasan Mendaki, 484
(VWOs), 69, 526
see also Mendaki
yellow culture, 86
W
Yeu, Victor, 138
Wagner, Peter, 120, 121, 127, 133,
Yong Pung How, 77
134
Wahhabism, 10 Young Men’s Christian Association
wakaf (YMCA), 529
management of, 265 Young Women Muslim Association
Wan, George (Pastor), 425 (PPIS), 461, 483
Wan Mohd Noor, 106 Youth for Christ, 36, 130
War Cry, 540 youths
waris, 252, 253 demonization of, 86
Warren, Rick, 123 Yu Neng Metta Student Care Centre
Weber, Max, 6, 153, 198 One for the South East District,
concept of exemplary prophet, 151 517
welfare homes Yuan Shih Kai, 51
provision by Buddhist Yuehaiqing Miao, 29
organizations, 515 Yunnan Friendship Award, 125
Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research, 138 Z
Western relativism, 91 Zainah Anwar, 104
White Paper, Shared Values, 506 zakat, 265
Wicca, 389, 401 Zoroastrian, 394
Wimber, John, 120, 121 Zoroastrianism, 225
723

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Religious Diversity

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous

00 ReligiousDiversity Prelims 2 7/16/08, 9:46 AM

National University of Singapore

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

© 2008 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Religious diversity in Singapore / edited by Lai Ah Eng.

ISBN 978-981-230-753-8 (soft cover)

Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd

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List of Figures and Tables ix

I THE LANDSCAPE OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

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4 Discourses on Islam in Southeast Asia and Their Impact

5 Global Christian Culture and the Antioch of Asia 116

6 “Religiously-inspired”, “India-derived” Movements in Singapore 142

7 Baha’is in Singapore: Patterns of Conversion 167

8 Diversities and Unities: Towards a Reformist Buddhism

9 The Sathya Sai Baba Movement in Singapore: Its Service

10 The Muslim Religious Elite of Singapore 248

11 The Evolution of the Sikh Identity in Singapore 275

12 Religious Processions: Urban Politics and Poetics 298

II RELIGION IN SCHOOLS AND AMONG THE YOUNG

13 From Moral Values to Citizenship Education:

14 Religious Education as Locus of Curriculum:

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15 Mission Schools in Singapore: Religious Harmony,

16 Religious Switching and Knowledge among Adolescents

III RELIGION IN THE MEDIA

17 Religious Reasons in a Secular Public Sphere:

18 The Internet and Religious Harmony in Singapore 434

IV RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIAL SERVICES

19 Muslim Organizations and Mosques as Social Service Providers 459

20 Hindu Temples in Charities and Social Services 489

21 Delivering Welfare Services in Singapore:

22 Saving the City through Good Works:

V INTERFAITH ISSUES AND INTERACTION

23 Religious Diversity, Toleration and Interaction 557

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24 Negotiating Christianity with Other Religions:

25 The Inter-Religious Organization of Singapore 605

26 Interactions among Youth Leaders of Different Faiths:

27 Building Bridges between Christians and Muslims:

28 Conclusion: Some Remarks on Religious Diversity

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3.1 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Above by Religion 57

6.1 “Religiously-inspired”, “India-derived Movements”

16.1 Number and Percentage of Respondents and Switchers by

18.1 Comparison of the Religion of Internet Users and the

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26.1 General Household Survey 2005 — Resident Population by

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7.1 Survey Questionnaire for Research Project with the

9.1 Background Information and Activities of the

11.1 Survey on Sikh Identity in Singapore 293

16.1 The Questionnaire 408

18.1 Internet’s Influence on Religious Harmony in Singapore 453

19.1 Timeline of the Development of Muslim Social Service

20.1 Survey on Services Provided by Hindu Temples 499

22.1 Survey of Christian-related Services 545

24.1 Survey Background and Questions 598