Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00034-022-02079-3

Resilient Control-Based Fault Estimation for Networked

Control Systems with Jumping Parameters and Deception
Attacks

R. Sakthivel1 · H. Divya1 · S. A. Karthick2 · F. Kong3

Received: 20 July 2021 / Revised: 26 May 2022 / Accepted: 27 May 2022 /

Published online: 6 July 2022
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2022

Abstract
This paper studies a resilient control-based fault estimation problem for a class of
networked control systems subject to jumping parameters and deception attacks. In
particular, a fault estimator is developed under an observer-based framework to esti-
mate the faults and system states concurrently, and procure better estimation accuracy.
Next, the closed-loop error system is constructed with major factors like gain fluctua-
tions and cyber attacks that may damage the network security. In accordance with the
Lyapunov stability approach, a set of adequate criteria in the configuration of linear
matrix inequalities is derived to confirm the stochastic boundedness of the resulting
system. Further, the considered resilient controller and the observer gain matrices are
calculated from the established linear matrix inequality constraints. The validity of the
developed schemes and performance of the obtained results is consummated through
two numerical examples, which include a high alpha research vehicle model.

Keywords Networked control systems · Intermediate estimator · Deception attacks ·

Markov jumping parameters

B R. Sakthivel
krsakthivel@yahoo.com
H. Divya
divyadivya177@gmail.com
S. A. Karthick
sakarthick.gasc@gmail.com
F. Kong
fanchaokong88@yahoo.com

1 Department of Applied Mathematics, Bharathiar University, Coimbatore 641046, India

2 Department of Mathematics, Anna University Regional Campus, Coimbatore 641046, India
3 School of Mathematics and Statistics, Anhui Normal University, Wuhu 241000, Anhui, China
Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006 5991

1 Introduction

Networked control systems (NCSs) are basically spatially distributed systems that
are composed of control elements (sensors, actuators, a central station) which have
received considerable attention due to their privileges, like minimized wiring, low
cost, convenient installation, resource sharing, flexibility and easy maintenance [13].
As a consequence, NCSs have been extensively applied in special forces and industrial
control applications, such as spacecraft, automobiles, aircraft, tele-robotic, manufac-
turing plants, and uncrewed aerial vehicles [4]. However, the appearance of networks
will face some challenging problems such as time delays, packet dropout and packet
disorder, which leads to performance deterioration of the NCSs, even destabilize the
system [23]. In the recent past, the stability and performance analyses of NCSs have
received considerable attention and some interesting progress has been made [15,
25]. On the other hand, Markov jumping systems have been extensively discussed in
recent decades because practical systems, such as NCSs and manufacturing systems
with abrupt variations, have been modeled effectively by using Markov jumping sys-
tems. Hence, NCSs with Markov jumping parameters have made some progress [1,
2].
From a practical standpoint, control systems consistently suffer by undesirable
faults, which may drastically degrade the system behavior or even destabilize it [12].
Thus, the system’s reliability and security have become a serious factor in the control
systems. Hence, these faults have been tackled using fault estimation strategy and a
variety of significant works based on observer technique have been investigated [3,
5, 10, 11, 28], in particular intermediate variable observer [12], iterative observers
[3], robust observers [10], adaptive observers [11] and descriptor observers [5]. Gen-
erally, observer states are necessary requirement for each and every fault estimation
problem. But, it is somewhat difficult to construct observer states for many practical
engineering systems. Therefore, a novel fault estimation technique called intermedi-
ate estimator is employed for suppressing these difficulties in [9, 12, 22]. Specifically,
based on the intermediate variable observer, the authors in [12] addressed the fault
estimation problem for the nonlinear stochastic system under fault-tolerant control.
The authors in [9] studied non-fragile scheme-based tracking control problem for
multi-agent systems, whereas the fault estimation is achieved with the aid of an inter-
mediate observer. In reality, a small parameter drift or deviations in the controller may
degrade the stability of the system. This phenomenon is often referred to as fragility,
that is, the pre-designed controller is more sensitive to digital rounding errors, inherent
inaccuracies and random perturbation [14]. In this situation, a sophisticated control
strategy needs to deal with gain variations or uncertainties to enhance the system sta-
bility with high accuracy and robustness. Such sort of controller is stated as resilient or
non-fragile controller [8, 26]. Hence, a substantial amount of research on the resilient
control strategy for NCSs has been addressed in recent years [17, 19, 21]. Very recent,
resilient-based fault-tolerant control for NCSs with denial-of-service jamming attacks
has been investigated in [17] under the event-triggered mechanism.
Generally, cyber attacks are characterized as a denial of service, deception and
repeated attacks. Among them, deception attacks are considered to be most important
one due to their behaviors like intercepting data, tampering with content and destroy-
5992 Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006

ing software. Moreover, the existence of deception attacks causes a negative effect
on steering stability. Due to this, research on NCSs with deception attack has been
increased extensively in recent decades (for instance see [21, 24, 27]). In particular, a
resilient-based memory controller is developed for NCSs subject to randomly occur-
ring deception attack [21], where the asymptotic stability is guaranteed with linear
matrix inequalities (LMIs).
The rapid growth of technology led to integrate many embedded systems through
wired and/or wireless networking facilities. Besides the occurrence of physical failures,
the safety and security of these networks are threatened by an adversary’s actions.
Based on some security analysis, techniques and tools available in the control theory
make use of estimation frameworks in order to estimate the system states and diagnose
cyber-attacks. Further, with the arrival of new technologies and availability of more
powerful sensors have paved the way for identifying faults and cyber-attacks. However,
the fault estimation with resilient control strategy for NCSs with jumping parameters
and deception attacks has not been investigated yet, which motivate us to commit the
current study.
Stipulated from the above considerations, the present study spotlights on fault
estimation-based resilient control for a class of NCSs with jumping parameters and
deception attacks. Specifically, the stochastic faulty intermediate estimator is adopted
for resolving the aforementioned problem with the assistance of Lyapunov stability
theory and linear matrix inequality (LMI) approach. The prominent features of this
study lie in the following aspects:
1. A resilient control-based fault estimation problem for NCSs with jumping param-
eter and deception attacks is developed.
2. A novel stochastic intermediate estimator is considered for the fault estimation
strategy. This scheme does not depend on observer matching constraint; hence, it
reduces the possible conservatism.
3. The stochastic boundedness criterion of the developed NCSs has been achieved
with the help of Lyapunov stability theory and LMIs.
4. The fruitfulness of the developed results is validated through two numerical exam-
ples which inholds high alpha research vehicle model.
Besides the introductory part, residual part of this paper is scheduled in the following
aspect: Sect. 2 provides system description with preliminary definitions. The developed
control scheme is presented in Sect. 3. Numerical simulation results are reported in
Sect. 4 to validate the efficiency of the main results. In Sect. 5, the conclusion of this
paper is set out with a brief note.

2 System Description

In this section, let us consider the continuous-time NCS with jumping parameters and
fault signals in the following configuration:

ẋ(t) = A( p(t))x(t) + B( p(t))u(t) + D( p(t))w(t) + F( p(t)) f (t),

z(t) = C( p(t))x(t),
Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006 5993

y(t) = E( p(t))x(t),
yd (t) = y(t) + φ(y(t)), (1)

where x(t) ∈ Ry , u(t) ∈ Rm , w(t) ∈ L 2 [0, ∞), f (t) ∈ R f , z(t) ∈ Rn , y(t) ∈ R p

and yd (t) represent the state vector, control input, external disturbances, fault signal,
control output, measured output and measured output vector coupled with deception
attacks, respectively; φ(y(t)) is a malicious attack input signals sent by adversaries;
The system matrices A( p(t)), B( p(t)), D( p(t)), F( p(t)), C( p(t)) and E( p(t)) are the
real constant matrices with appropriate dimensions. The function p(t), t ≥ 0 specifies
the Markov process and takes the values on finite set N = {1, 2, . . . , N }. Further, the
transition probabilities are stated as

Γsn t + o(t), s = n,
Pr { p(t + ) = n| p(t) = s} =
1 + Γss t + o(t), s = n,

where t > 0 denotes the infinitesimal transition time interval with lim (o(t)/t)
t→0
= 0 and Γsn is the transition
rate from mode s at time t to mode n at time t + t and
N
satisfies Γsn ≥ 0, ∀s = n, n=1 Γsn = 0, ∀s ∈ N .
To ease the representation, let us denote p(t) = s. Thus, the system (1) can be
rewritten as follows:

ẋ(t) = As x(t) + Bs u(t) + Ds w(t) + Fs f (t),

z(t) = Cs x(t),
y(t) = E s x(t),
yd (t) = E s x(t) + φ(y(t)). (2)

Here, from the estimates of stochastic faulty intermediate estimator, a reliable-

based resilient control protocol that incorporates gain fluctuations has been compatibly
modeled as follows:

u(t) = (K s + K s (t))x̂(t) − Bs∗ Fs fˆ(t), (3)

where K s is the resilient gain matrix which will be computed later; K s (t) is the
variation in controller gain and claims the structure as K s (t) = Ms ∇s (t)Ns , where
Ms and Ns are constant matrices with appropriate dimensions and ∇sT (t)∇s (t) < I ;
Bs∗ is any matrix with appropriate dimension, such that (I − Bs Bs∗ )Fs = 0.
Now, by incorporating (3) in (2), the resulting closed-loop system has been gener-
ated by the following framework:

ẋ(t) = As x(t) + Bs (K s + K s (t))x̂(t) + Ds w(t) + Fs e f (t),

z(t) = Cs x(t),
yd (t) = E s x(t) + φ(y(t)). (4)
5994 Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006

Now, an observer system needs to be proposed for the estimation of magnitude

of the fault vector and the system states, simultaneously. Hence, a fault estimation
observer is presented as follows:

˙ = As x̂(t) + Bs u(t) + Fs fˆ(t) + L s (yd (t) − ŷ(t)),

x̂(t)
f˙ˆ(t) = Θ −1 G (y (t) − ŷ(t)),
s s d
ŷ(t) = E s x̂(t), (5)

where x̂(t) ∈ Ry represents the observer state; ŷ(t) ∈ R p is the observer output;
fˆ(t) ∈ R f is an estimate of fault f (t); Θs is an unknown symmetric matrix for
each fault estimator; L s and G s are the observer and estimator gain matrices to be
determined.
Let the error vectors be computed by ex (t) = x(t) − x̂(t), e y (t) = y(t) − ŷ(t) and
e f (t) = f (t) − fˆ(t). Hence, the error dynamics can be delineated as follows:

ėx (t) = (As − L s E s )ex (t) + Fs e f (t) + Ds w(t) − L s φ(y(t)), (6)

ė f (t) = f˙(t) − Θs−1 G s E s ex (t) − Θs−1 G s φ(y(t)). (7)

The following assumptions considered are useful for deriving the subsequent the-
oretical results.
Assumption 1 The considered nonlinear function φ(y(t)) is assumed to be continuous
and bounded in the interval [H1 , H2 ], which satisfies the following inequality:

φ(y(t)) − H1 yd (t) T
φ(y(t)) − H2 yd (t) ≤ 0,

where H1 > 0 and H2 > 0 are real matrices of appropriate dimensions with H2 > H1
and H = H2 − H1 . Moreover, the nonlinear function φ(y(t)) describing the malicious
attack input sent by the adversaries can be linearized as follows:

φ(y(t)) T
φ(y(t)) − H yd (t) ≤ 0.

Assumption 2 The pair (As , E s ) is observable and (As , Bs ) is controllable, then

rank(Bs , E s ) = rank(Bs ) = m, for each s ∈ N .
Assumption 3 The derivative f (t) represents the fault vector with || f˙(t)|| ≤ f¯, where
f¯ > 0.
Lemma 1 [7] For the given function V (x, t, p(t)) ∈ C1,2 (R+ × R n × S), the weak
infinitesimal operator of V (x, t, p(t)) at the specified mode s subject to (1) is given
as follows:

N
LV (x, t, s) = Vt (x, t, s) + Vx (x, t, s)ẋ(t) + Γsn V (x, t, s),
n=1
∂ V (x,t,s) ∂ V (x,t,s)
where Vt (x, t, s) = ∂t , Vx (x, t, s) = ∂x .
Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006 5995

3 Main Results

We pay our consideration toward the fault estimation problem for NCS (1) with jump-
ing parameters and deception attacks in this section. Preciously, a resilient controller
is designed in accordance with stochastic faulty intermediate estimator to ensure the
boundedness criterion of the resulting error dynamic systems (6) and (7). For ease
the representation, first we establish some adequate conditions to authenticate the
above consideration with the control design (3) in the absence of gain fluctuations,
i.e., K s (t) = 0. Following this, the results will be further enlarged with control
protocol (3) in the presence of gain fluctuations. Notably, the above stated results will
be derived with respects to LMI constraints.

Theorem 1 Let us consider the system (1) under Assumptions 1–3. Then, for a given
positive scalar γ and known gain matrices K s , L s and G s , the error dynamics (6) and
(7) is stochastically bounded under H∞ performance attenuation, if there exists posi-
tive definite matrices Ps , Q s , Rs and Θs (s ∈ N ), such that the following constraints
hold:
⎡ ⎤
Ψ5×5
s Ξ1 Ξ3 Ξ4 Ξ5
⎢ ∗ Ξ2 0 0 0⎥
⎢ ⎥
Ωs = ⎢
⎢ ∗ ∗ Ξ6 0 0⎥ ⎥ < 0, (8)
⎣ ∗ ∗ ∗ Ξ7 0⎦
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ Ξ8
FsT Q s =G s E s , (9)

where the parameters of Ω s are listed below:

Ψ1,1
s
= Ps As + AsT Ps + Ps Bs K s + K sT BsT Ps + Γss Ps ,
Ψ1,2
s
= −Ps Bs K s , Ψ1,3
s
= Ps Fs ,
Ψ1,4
s
= Ps Ds , Ψ1,5
s
= E sT H ,
Ψ2,2
s
= Q s As − Q s L s E s + AsT Q s − E sT L sT Q s + Γss Q s ,
Ψ2,4
s
= Q s Ds , Ψ2,5
s
= −Q s L s , Ψ3,3
s
= Rs − γ 2 I + Γss Φs ,
Ψ3,5
s
= −G s , Ψ4,4
s
= −γ 2 I ,
Ψ5,5
s
= −(I − H ), Ξ1 = [Cs 0 0 0 0]T , Ξ2 = −I ,
Ξ3 = [ Γs,1 Ps , . . . , Γs,s−1 , Ps , Γs,s+1 Ps , . . . , Γs,N Ps ]T ,
Ξ4 = [ Γs,1 Q s , . . . , Γs,s−1 Q s , Γs,s+1 Q s , . . . , Γs,N Q s ]T ,
Ξ5 = [ Γs,1 Φs , Γs,s+1 Φs , . . . , Γs,N Φs ]T ,
Ξ6 = diag{−P1−1 , . . . , −Ps−1
−1 −1
, −Ps+1 , . . . , −PN−1−1 },
Ξ7 = diag{−Q −1 −1 −1 −1
1 , . . . , −Q s−1 , −Q s+1 , . . . , −Q N −1 },
Ξ8 = diag{−Φ1−1 , . . . , −Φs−1
−1 −1
, −Φs+1 , . . . , −Φ N−1−1 }
5996 Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006

and remaining parameters are zero.

Proof To attain the stochastic boundedness criterion, we frame the Lyapunov function
for the systems (4), (6) and (7) in the following compact form:

V (t, s) = x T (t)Ps x(t) + exT (t)Q s ex (t) + e Tf (t)Θs e f (t). (10)

By deploying weak infinitesimal operator L as in Lemma 1 in (10) and taking

mathematical expectation, we get

E LV (t, s) = E x T (t)Ps ẋ(t) + ẋ T (t)Ps x(t)

N
+ x T (t)Γsn Pn x(t) + exT (t)Q s ėx (t)
n=1

N
+ ėxT (t)Q s ex (t) + exT (t)Γsn Q n ex (t)
n=1
+ ė f (t)Θs e f (t) + e Tf (t)Θs ė f (t)
T


N
+ e Tf (t)Γsn Θn e f (t),
n=1
= 2x (t)Ps [As x(t) + Bs (K s + K s (t))(x(t) − ex (t))
T

+ Ds w(t) + Fs e f (t)] + 2exT (t)Q s [(As − L s E s )ex (t)

+ Fs e f (t) + Ds w(t) − L s φ(y(t))]
+ 2e Tf (t)Θs [ f˙(t) − Θs−1 G s (E s ex (t) + φ(y(t)))]

N
+ x T (t)Γsn Pn x(t)
n=1


N 
N
+ exT (t)Γsn Q n ex (t) + e Tf (t)Γsn Θn e f (t) . (11)
n=1 n=1

The term −2e Tf (t)G s E s ex (t) in (11) can be equivalently rephrased as −2e Tf (t)FsT Q s
ex (t). Further, using Assumption 3, we can get

2e Tf (t)Θs f˙(t) ≤ e Tf (t)Rs e f (t) + f˙T (t)ΘsT Rs−1 Θs f˙(t)

≤ e Tf (t)Rs e f (t) + Λmax (Θs Rs−1 Θs ) f¯2 ,
T
(12)

where Rs is the positive definite matrix and Λmax (·) is the maximum eigen value.
Now, by adding H∞ performance attenuation to V (t, s) and associating (10)–(12),
it is easy to obtain that

E{LV (t, s) + z T (t)z(t) − γ 2 νeT (t)νe (t)} ≤ ξ T (t)[Ψ5×5

s
]ξ(t) + δo , (13)
Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006 5997

where νe (t) = [e Tf (t) w T (t)]T , ξ T (t) = [x T (t) exT (t) e Tf (t) w T (t) φ T (y(t))]T ,
s = P A + P B K + AT P + K T B T P + C T C +  N Γ P , Ψ s =
Ψ1,1 s s s s s s s s s s s s n=1 ss n 1,2
−Ps Bs K s , Ψ1,3 s = Ps Fs , Ψ1,4s = Ps Ds , Ψ1,5s = E sT H , Ψ2,2 s = Q s (As −
N
L s E s ) + (As − L s E s )T Q s + n=1 Γss Q n , Ψ2,4
s = Q D , Ψ s = −Q L , Ψ s =
s s 2,5 s s 3,3
 N
Rs − γ I + n=1 Γss Θn , Ψ3,5 = −G s , Ψ4,4 = −γ I , Ψ5,5 = −(I − H ) and
2 s s 2 s

δo = Λmax (Θs Rs−1 Θs ) f¯2 .

T

Moreover, it is obvious that E{LV (t, s)+z T (t)z(t)−γ 2 νeT (t)νe (t)} ≤ −σo ||ξ(t)||2
+δo , where σo = λmin (−Ψ s ). Thus, E{LV (t, s) + z T (t)z(t) −  α 2 νeT (t)νe (t)} < 0 for


||ξ(t)||2 > σδ0o , which means that ξ(t) converges to a set D = ξ(t)||ξ(t)||2 ≤ σδ0o .
Moreover, from inequality (13), it follows that E{LV (t, s)+z T (t)z(t)−γ 2 νeT (t)νe (t)}
≤ 0, if ξ(t) ∈ D̃, where D̃ is the supplementary set of D. Further, by utilizing Schur
complement, the inequality (13) can be equivalently viewed as (8). Hence, the resulting
systems (4), (6) and (7) are stochastically bounded under H∞ performance attenuation
γ and converges at a rate greater than e−σo t . This completes the proof.

Remark 1 It is obvious that the equality like FsT Q s = G s E s cannot be solved with
the aid of LMI toolbox. Therefore, we have to convert the equality constraint into an
optimization problem. Hence, for a small scalar ρ, such that the following equality
holds:

Minimize ρ subject to
 
ρ I FsT Q s − G s E s
> 0.
∗ ρI

Remark 2 It should be noted that the cyber attack is considered to be state-dependent

and satisfies restrictions of boundedness. However, the proposed method is limited to
some kind of state-independent attacks.

The above said theorem proposed with control protocol without the effect of gain
fluctuations. Hence, in the upcoming theorem, we incorporate the gain fluctuations in
the control protocol and the corresponding controller gains are determined.
Theorem 2 Let Assumptions 1–3 hold. Then, for given positive scalar γ , ρ1 and ρ2 ,
the resulting error systems (6) and (7) with unknown gain matrices is stochastically
bounded under H∞ performance index γ , if there exist positive definite matrices
Ps , Q s , Rs , Φs , X s (s ∈ N ), any suitable dimensioned matrices Ys and Js and
positive scalars z (z = 1, 2), such that the relations attained below are satisfied:

Ω̂ s = [Ψ̃ s ]13×13 < 0, (14)

 
−ρ1 I G s E s − FsT Q s
< 0, (15)
∗ −ρ1 I
 
−ρ2 I Bs X s − Ps Bs
< 0, (16)
∗ −ρ2 I
5998 Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006

where

Ψ̃1,1
s
= Ps As + AsT Ps + Bs Ys + YsT BsT + Γss Pn , Ψ̃1,2
s
= −Bs Ys , Ψ̃1,3
s
= Ps Fs ,
Ψ̃1,4
s
= Ps Ds , Ψ̃1,5
s
= E sT H , Ψ̃1,6
s
= Ξ̃1 , Ψ̃1,7
s
= Ξ̃3 , Ψ̃1,8
s
= Ξ̃4 , Ψ̃1,9
s
= Ξ̃5 ,
Ψ̃1,10
s
= 1 Σ1 , Ψ̃1,11
s
= ζ1 , Ψ̃1,12
s
= 2 Σ2 , Ψ̃2,2
s
= Q s As + AsT Q s − Js E s
− E sT JsT + Γss Q n , Ψ̃2,4
s
= Q s Ds , Ψ̃2,5
s
= −Js , Ψ̃2,13
s
= ζ2 , Ψ̃3,3
s
= Rs
− γ 2 I + Γss Φn ,
Ψ̃3,5
s
= −G s , Ψ̃4,4
s
= −γ 2 I , Ψ̃5,5
s
= −(I − H ), Ψ̃6,6
s
= Ξ̃2 , Ψ̃7,7
s
= Ξ̃6 ,
Ψ̃8,8
s
= Ξ̃7 , Ψ̃9,9
s
= Ξ̃8 , Ψ̃10,10
s
= −1 , Ψ̃11,11
s
= −1 , Ψ̃12,12
s
= −2 ,
Ψ̃13,13
s
= −2 , Ξ̃1 = [Cs 0 0 0 0]T , Ξ̃2 = −I , Ξ3 = [ Γs,1 Ps , . . . , Γs,s−1 Ps ,
× Γs,s+1 Ps , . . . , × Γs,N Ps ]T ,
Ξ4 = [ Γs,1 Q s , . . . , Γs,s−1 Q s , × Γs,s+1 Q s , . . . , Γs,N Q s ]T ,
Ξ5 = [ Γs,1 Φs , . . . , Γs,s−1 Φs , Γs,s+1 Φs , . . . , Γs,N Φs ]T ,
Ξ6 = diag{−P1−1 . . . , −Ps−1
−1 −1
, −Ps+1 , . . . , −PN−1−1 },
Ξ7 = diag{−Q −1 −1 −1 −1
1 , . . . , −Q s−1 , −Q s+1 , . . . , −Q N −1 },
Ξ8 = diag{−Φ1−1 , . . . , −Φs−1
−1 −1
, −Φs+1 , . . . , −Φ N−1−1 },
Σ1 = Σ2 = Bs X s Ms , ζ1 = ζ2 = NsT

and remaining parameters are zero. Furthermore, the desired controller and observer
gains are computed by the relation K s = X s−1 Ys and L s = Q −1
s Js .

Proof The proof of this theorem emerges directly from Theorem 1 by replacing K s
by K s + K s (t) and ensuring similar steps in Theorem 1, we have

E{LV (t, s) + z T (t)z(t) − γ 2 νeT (t)νe (t)}

≤ Ω s + Σ1 Mζ1 + ζ1T MT Σ1T + Σ2 Mζ2 + ζ2T MT Σ2T . (17)

By using Schur complement, the above inequality can be phrased as

E{LV (t, s) + z T (t)z(t) − γ 2 νeT (t)νe (t)}

≤ Ω s + 1 Σ1T Σ1 + 1−1 ζ1T ζ1 + 2 Σ2T Σ2 + 2−1 ζ2T ζ2 . (18)

Further, we denote Ps Bs = Bs X s , Ys = X s K s and Js = Q s L s . Since, the equality

constraint Ps Bs = Bs X s cannot be solved using MATLAB LMI toolbox so that
Ps Bs = Bs X s can be equivalently transformed into (15) and (16) with small positive
scalar ρ. Hence, we can easily transform LMI (18) as (14) by using Schur complement.
As, the relations (14)–(16) are feasible, then the resulting systems (4), (6) and (7) are
stochastically bounded under H∞ performance attenuation γ . Hence, the proof of this
theorem is completed.

Remark 3 To ensure the security of NCSs and avoid any undesired situation, it is
important to differentiate between attack signals and faults. The random faults are
Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006 5999

usually experienced by the system, whereas the attacks are injected by the adversaries
to corrupt the information. The available fault detection techniques may not be suffi-
cient to diagnose cyber attacks. Thus, it is essential to adopt a secure control design
for NCSs under consideration.

Remark 4 The authors in [27] addresses NCSs subject to deception attack, whereas
the stability issue for NCSs under deception attack is discussed in [6]. The problem
of resilient control-based NCSs has been investigated in [18]. Also, the issue of fault
estimation for NCSs has been investigated in [16]. In the above said works, the resilient
control strategy, fault estimation issue and deception attack are analyzed individually
for NCSs. However, in our present study, we have considered resilient control strat-
egy, fault estimation issue and deception attack for NCSs in a single framework with
jumping parameters and fault signals. Moreover, compared with [16], the fault estima-
tion criterion has been achieved even in the presence of gain fluctuation and attacking
signal, which is of vital significance.

4 Numerical Examples

Two numerical examples including one real application-based model are provided
in this section to delineate the viability and effectiveness of the proposed stochastic
faulty intermediate estimator-based resilient control protocol. Notably, the simulation
results are conducted with the help of MATLAB LMI toolbox.
Example 1 For the sake of brevity, two jumping mode-based continuous-time NCS
in the frame of (2) is considered in this example. Then, the system parameters are
selected by
       
−2 1 −4 3 0.6 1.4
A1 = , A2 = , B1 = , B2 = ,
2 −1 3 −2 1.2 0.7
   
3 3
C1T = , C2T = ,
3 3
         
0.1 0.2 1 1 9
D1 = , D2 = , E 1T = , E 2T = , F1 = ,
0.1 0.2 1 1 9
 
9
F2 = , H1 = 1.2,
9
H2 = 0.6, H = 0.6.
 
−0.7 0.7
For the Markov process, the transition rate matrix is taken as Γsn = .
0.3 −0.3
Here,
 the  are chosen as M1 = 0.3, M2 = 0.2, N1 =
 gain fluctuations

0.1 0.1 , N2 = 0.1 0.1 with ∇a (t) = sin(t), a = 1, 2. Further, the fault to
⎧
⎪
⎨0.35 sin(0.23π t), 5 ≤ t < 25
be estimated is assumed by f (t) = 0.5, 25 ≤ t < 40 and the exter-
⎪
⎩
0, otherwise.
6000 Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006

(a) (b)
Fig. 1 State estimation

nal disturbance is chosen as w(t) = 0.2 sin(0.25π t) with performance attenuation

γ = 0.5. Moreover, the nonlinear function Φ(y(t)) injected by the adversaries is
taken as 0.1 cos(x(t)) + 0.9 sin(x(t)). The scalar values involved in the feasibility
analysis are assumed as ρ1 = 0.3 and ρ2 = 0.6. By solving the relations (14)–(16),
the feasibility can be attained and the required gain matrices of the resilient controller
and the observer-based intermediate estimator are computed as
   
K 1 = −26.5185 − 31.7804 , K 2 = −29.2843 − 27.8784 ,
   
L 1T = 0.6540 1.1306 and L 2T = 3.3326 4.6009 .

In addition, the estimator gain matrices are obtained as G 1 = 0.4062 and G 2 =

0.3700.
Further, the simulation results are formulated with the aforementioned gain values
subject to the initial values of system and observer states x(0) = x̂(0) = [40 −40] and
fˆ = 0.35. Figure 1 portrays the estimation curve of the system states with observer
based on a stochastic faulty intermediate estimator. Moreover, the unknown fault signal
with its estimates is displayed in Fig. 2. In addition, the malicious input curve and the
jumping mode are showcased in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively. Thus, the simulated graphs
clearly reveal that the estimated states and faults track the actual value accurately within
a short period. This certifies that the developed observer resilient controller-based
stochastic faulty intermediate estimator produces satisfactory estimation performance
even in the presence of deception attacks.

Example 2 In this example, we consider a high alpha research vehicle model taken
from [20], which is characterized in the following equation:

ẋ(t) = As x(t) + Bs u(t) + Ds w(t) + Fs f (t),

z(t) = Cs x(t),
y(t) = E s x(t), (19)
Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006 6001

Fig. 2 Fault estimation

Fig. 3 Malicious input

Fig. 4 Jumping mode

6002 Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006

(a) (b)

(c)
Fig. 5 State estimation

where x(t) = [x1 (t) x2 (t) x3 (t)]T in which x1 (t), x2 (t) and x3 (t) denote the side-slip
angle (deg), the roll rate (deg/s) and the yaw rate (deg/s). The system parameters of
the considered model are composed with two jumping modes ( p = 1, 2) as
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
−0.166 0.629 −0.9971 0.2 0.28
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
A1 = A2 = ⎣−12.97 −1.761 0.5083 ⎦ , B1 = B2 = ⎣−0.6⎦ , C1T = C2T = ⎣ 0 ⎦ ,
3.191 −0.1417 −0.1529 0.3 0.28
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
0.8 0.1 1.9
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
D1 = D2 = ⎣0.5⎦ , E 1T = E 2T = ⎣0.1⎦ , F1 = F2 = ⎣1.9⎦ , H1 = 1.2, H2 = 0.6,
0.1 0.1 1.9
H = 0.6.

⎧
⎪
⎨2.3 sin(0.11π t), 20 ≤ t < 45
Further, the fault signal is chosen as f (t) = 3, 45 ≤ t < 80 .
⎪
⎩
0, otherwise.
Also, the nonlinear function Φ(y(t)) injected by the adversaries is stated as
0.85 sin(x1 (t)) + 0.6 tan h(x2 (t)). Furthermore, the external disturbance is taken as
Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006 6003

Fig. 6 Fault estimation

Fig. 7 Malicious input

Fig. 8 Jumping mode

6004 Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006

w(t) = 0.2 sin(0.5π t) with attenuation index γ = 3. The rest of the parameters that
took part in the feasibility test are taken same as in Example 1. By resolving the LMI
conditions (14)–(16) attained in Theorem (2), the desired controller and observer gain
matrices are calculated and listed as follows:

   
K 1 = −10.8708 4.0673 − 6.5828 , K 2 = −11.5450 5.3231 − 5.3327 ,
   
L 1T = 0.0683 − 0.3707 0.1130 and L 2T = 0.0581 − 0.2876 0.0785 .

Furthermore, the estimator gain matrices are obtained as G 1 = 0.6432 and G 2 =

0.7490. For simulating graphs, the initial values for the system, observer states and
intermediate fault estimator are considered as x(0) = x̂(0) = [60 −60 60] and fˆ = 3.
Based on the computed values, the corresponding numerical simulation results are
plotted in Figs. 5, 6, 7 and 8. Figure 5 portrays the estimation curve of the system states
with stochastic faulty intermediate estimator-based observer. Moreover, the unknown
fault signal with its estimates is displayed in Fig. 6. Additionally, the malicious input
curve and the jumping mode are plotted in Figs. 7 and 8, respectively. Hence, the
simulation results portrayed here clearly demonstrate that the developed intermediate-
based observer has the capability of estimating the states of high alpha research vehicle
model.

5 Conclusion

Under the observer-based framework, the resilient control-based fault estimation issue
for NCSs with jumping parameters and deception attacks has been examined in this
study. In particular, an innovative fault estimator has been proposed, wherein the sys-
tem state and the faults are estimated under the observer technique. Preciously, the
closed-loop error system has been well-established even in the presence of cyber
attacks and gain fluctuations and sets out the desired estimation accuracy. More-
over, the stochastic boundedness of the considered system state has been explored
through the utility of Lyapunov stability theory and the linear matrix inequality tech-
nique. Eventually, two numerical example, which includes one real model called high
alpha research vehicle, has portrayed the applicability of the proposed fault estima-
tion strategy. In future, hybrid-triggered mechanism-based fault estimation for NCSs
with malicious attack and mismatched quantization can be investigated as a potential
research direction.

Acknowledgements The work of R. Sakthivel was financially supported by Tamilnadu State Council for
Higher Education Research Grant Project (TANSCHE-RGP), Sanction No. RGP/2019-20/BU/HECP-0087.

Data Availability Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in
this study.
Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing (2022) 41:5990–6006 6005

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