Professional Documents
Culture Documents
And
Aircraft Flight Manual
Sections 0, 6, 7, 8 and 10 are not approved and are provided for information only.
.
Copyright © 2006, 2010 Viking Air Limited. No part of this work may be reproduced
or copied in any form or by any means without prior written permission from Viking
Air Limited. Permission is granted to DHC-6 Series 400 operators to distribute copies
within their company for pilot training purposes as long as no charge is made for
these copies. Permission is granted to DHC-6 Series 400 operators to use excerpts
from this manual in DHC-6 training materials and quick reference checklists.
Please cite the revision number of this manual anytime excerpts are reproduced in
training materials or quick reference checklists.
Viking Air Limited
1959 de Havilland Way
Sidney, BC
Canada V8L 5V5
May 10th, 2017
Telephone: (250) 656-7227
Fax: (250) 656-0673
USA & Canada Toll Free:
1-(800) 663-8444
Email: technical.publications
@vikingair.com
To: Distribution
2 Record the insertion of TA-30 into the Log of Temporary Amendments at the front
of the manual.
Email: technical.publications
@vikingair.com
To: Distribution
2 Record the insertion of TA-28 into the Log of Temporary Amendments at the front
of the manual.
Email: technical.publications
@vikingair.com
To: Distribution
Subject: PSM 1-64-1A, DHC-6 – Twin Otter Series 400 Flight Manual
Incorporate Temporary Amendments -25, -26 & -29, dated April 6, 2017
1 Incorporate Temporary Amendments (TAs) -25, -26 & -29 into the Series 400
AFM/POH, as directed in the placement instructions on the cover page of each TA.
2 Record the insertion of the attached TAs into the Log of Temporary Amendments
at the front of the manual.
To: Distribution
2 Record the insertion of TA-27 into the Log of Temporary Amendments at the front
of the manual.
Email: technical.publications
@vikingair.com
To: Distribution
1. Revision 3 is compiled of changed pages (identified with change bars) and any
page ripple caused by newly incorporated or amended data.
The main driver of this revision is the impact of Mod 6/2315 – Avionics Start
Battery as well as the incorporation of the following Temporary Amendments
(TAs):
TA 16 – Section 2 – Limitations
Page 1|2
PSM1-64-1A, Aircraft Flight Manual –Section 9 - Approved Supplements
The following Supplements have been updated to support changes to the main
body of the AFM at Revision 3:
Supplement 45 – Cabin Auxiliary Power Outlets
(S.O.O.s 6272, 6281, 6282 or 6283) – Issue 2
Supplement 50 – Phase 2 Avionics Upgrade – Issue 2
3. Using the LOEP for each section, remove and replace the pages for
PSM 1-64-1A and PSM 1-64-POH with the attached.
4. Update the Log of Temporary Amendments (TAs) and the Temporary Revision
(TR) Index at the front of the manual.
Page 2|2
Viking Air Limited
1959 de Havilland Way
Sidney, BC
Canada V8L 5V5
July 21st, 2016
Telephone: (250) 656-7227
Fax: (250) 656-0673
USA & Canada Toll Free:
1-(800) 663-8444
Email: technical.publications
@vikingair.com
To: Distribution
2 Record the insertion of TA-23 into the Log of Temporary Amendments at the front
of the manual.
Email: technical.publications
@vikingair.com
To: Distribution
1. Revision 2 is compiled of changed pages (identified with change bars) and any
page ripple caused by newly incorporated or amended data.
The main driver of this revision is the impact of Mod 6/2314 – Independent
Ground and Battery Switches, as well as the incorporation of the following
Temporary Amendments (TAs):
TAs 13, 19 & 20 – Section 2 – Limitations
TA 14 – Section 5 – Performance
Page 1| 2
PSM1-64-1A, Aircraft Flight Manual –Section 9 - Approved Supplements
The following Supplements have been updated to support changes to the main
body of the AFM at Revision 2:
Supplement 1 – De-Icing System (S.O.O.s 6004, 6202 & 6187) -
Iss 3
Supplement 8 – Auxiliary Wing Tanks (S.O.O. 6247) - Iss 4
Using the LOEP for each section, remove and replace the pages for
PSM 1-64-1A and PSM 1-64-POH with the attached.
Update the Log of Temporary Amendments (TAs) and the Temporary Revision
(TR) Index at the front of the manual.
Page 2| 2
Viking Air Limited
1959 De Havilland Way
Sidney, BC
Canada V8L 5V5
June 9, 2014
Telephone: (250) 656-7227
Fax: (250) 656-0673
USA & Canada Toll Free:
1-(800) 663-8444
Email: technical.publications
@vikingair.com
To: Distribution
Subject: DHC-6 Series 400 Twin Otter – Pilot Operating Handbook / Aircraft Flight
Manual (POH/AFM)
TA 05 – Section 2 - Limitations
Please Note: Section 5 has been rewritten in its entirety, therefore no change bars
have been applied.
PSM1-64-1A, Aircraft Flight Manual –Section 9 - Approved Supplements
The following Supplements have been updated to support changes to the main body of
the AFM at Revision 1:
3. Remove and replace the all pages for PSM 1-64-1A and PSM 1-64-POH with the
attached pages.
4. The updated Log of Temporary Amendments (TAs) and the Temporary Revision (TR)
Index have been included in the front matter of this revision, however, recording of future
TAs and TRs is the responsibility of the operator.
5. A Revision Index for POH Sections 0, 7, 8 & 10 has been supplied with Revision 1,
however, recording of future revisions to PSM 1-64-POH will be the responsibility of the
operator.
This handbook (Section 0 through 10 inclusive) forms the Pilot Operating Handbook
(POH); Viking Air Limited publication PSM1-64-POH.
PSM 1-64-POH also contains the approved Aircraft Flight Manual PSM 1-64-1A
(Sections 1 through 5 inclusive, and Section 9) plus an excerpt from the Weight and
Balance Manual PSM 1-64-8 (Section 6). This excerpt has been included in the POH
to enable the flight crew to easily refer to it. However, PSM 1-64-8 continues to be
produced in complete form as stand-alone publication, the content in this POH does
not replace this manual.
0 INTRODUCTION
1 GENERAL
2 LIMITATIONS
3 EMERGENCY AND ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
4 NORMAL PROCEDURES
5 PERFORMANCE
6 WEIGHT AND BALANCE
7 AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
8 HANDLING SERVICING AND MAINTENANCE
9 SUPPLEMENTS
10 SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL TIPS
LOG OF REVISIONS
Revisions are applicable to all Twin Otter Series 400 Flight Manuals. This Manual is
valid only when it incorporates all revisions issued. The revised portion of a given
page is indicated by a vertical black line in the margin. Transport Canada Approval
of each revision is recorded below.
Miscellaneous changes
throughout.
Page v To correct TA reference for
Section 5 from TA-04 to TA-03.
Pages 4-12,
4-18 to 4-20,
4-22, 4-23,
4-26, 4-27,
4-28, 4-30,
4-34, 4-42 &
4-48
Pages 5-48
& 5-49
Page 9-1-15
Page 9-8-10
Pages 4-45-9
& 4-45-10
Pages 9-50-66
& 9-50-67
This index is for recording PSM1-64-POH, Sections 0, 7, 8 & 10. The revised
portion of a given page is indicated by a vertical black line in the margin.
PAGE 1
PSM1-64-POH
REVISION INDEX
PAGE 2
PSM 1-64-1A
PAGE 1
PSM 1-64-1A
PAGE 2
PSM1-64-POH
PAGE 1
PSM1-64-POH
PAGE 2
PSM 1-64-1A
The following is a list of TCCA approved Supplements available for the Series 400
A/C. If you require any of the following Supplements for your A/C please contact
Viking Air Limited.
PAGE 1
PSM 1-64-1A
PAGE 2
SECTION 0
DHC-6 SERIES 400 INTRODUCTION
SECTION 0
INTRODUCTION
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
The POH contains two types of information: approved and unapproved. The approved
information is contained in the Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM). Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and
any supplements in Section 9 are all approved data.
Each page of the AFM portion of this POH page carries the notation “TC Approved”.
Because the aircraft is manufactured in Canada, Transport Canada is the regulatory
authority responsible for approving the contents of the AFM.
If an aircraft is registered in a country other than Canada, it is normal practice for the
regulatory authority of the State of registration to also add their approval (by way of
stamp, signature, cover letter, etc.) to the approval page of the AFM. Note that provision
has been made on the approval page to fill in the serial number and the registration of
the specific aircraft that this AFM applies to. AFMs are not generic, and they will differ
from aircraft to aircraft as a result of different supplements and/or amendments required
for equipment that has been fitted to the aircraft.
Each aircraft must be equipped with an AFM that has been customized (by way of adding
and removing supplements from Section 9, and in some cases, adding amendments
or temporary amendment to Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) to reflect the equipment that is
fitted to that particular serial number aircraft, and each approved AFM must be marked
with the serial number and registration of the aircraft to which it applies on the Approval
Page of the AFM. This customized binder then forms part of the basic equipment of
the aircraft and must be carried on board the aircraft at all times in a location easily
accessible to the pilot.
It is the responsibility of the owner or operator of the aircraft to maintain this POH in a
current status and to incorporate successive revisions.
The layout and content of the AFM is defined by the certification regulations that
applicable to the aircraft. The main body of the AFM consists of five sections:
General, Limitations, Emergency and Abnormal Procedures, Normal Procedures, and
Performance. These sections are numbered 1 to 5 respectively, and the contents of
these first 5 sections apply to DHC-6 aircraft serial numbers 845 and subsequent.
Section 9 contains approved AFM Supplements which describe optional equipment.
Page numbering within the first five sections of the AFM follows the format “a-b”,
where “a” represents the section number, and “b” represents the page number. Page
numbering within the AFM supplements (Section 9) follows the format “a-s-b”, where
“s” represents the supplement number.
There are two sections to the complete Weight and Balance Manual, which is available
as a stand-alone publication. The first section, General Weight and Balance Data, is
generic and is identical for all Series 400 aircraft. The contents of this first section have
been reproduced in Section 6 of this POH. The second section of PSM 1-64-8, Specific
Weight and Balance Data, is comprised of a detailed list of equipment fitted to each
individual aircraft and the actual current and historical aircraft weighing records.
The complete Weight and Balance Manual PSM 1-64-8 continues to be provided as a
stand-alone publication.
An approved AFM supplement is published for any optional equipment that changes
the Limitations, Emergency or Abnormal Procedures, Normal Operating Procedures,
or Performance characteristics of the aircraft. Optional equipment that does not affect
what is published in Sections 1 through 5 of this POH (for example, variations in cabin
furnishings) do not require an AFM supplement.
Only the AFM supplements that actually apply to the equipment fitted to an aircraft
should be included in the AFM for that aircraft. If additional equipment (for example,
aircraft tracking systems, etc.) is fitted after the aircraft leaves the factory, it is the
responsibility of the aircraft operator to ensure that a locally approved AFM supplement
is provided in this POH, and put into Section 9.
Approved AFM supplements provided by Viking Air Limited follow the same structure.
They are organized as if they were miniature flight manuals, with six sections: General,
Operating Limitations, Emergency and Abnormal Procedures, Normal Procedures,
Performance Data, and System Description. If an aircraft is fitted with equipment
described in an AFM supplement, the pilot must be familiar with the contents of
the supplement, and apply the procedures in the supplement(s) in addition to the
procedures set forth in the body text of the AFM.
Only supplements that describe equipment actually fitted to a specific aircraft should
be placed in Section 9.
Supplements describing Wipline Straight and Amphibious Floats and the R.W. Martin
Vapour Cycle Air Conditioner are examples of supplements published by others.
The Series 400 is the fourth production series of DHC-6 aircraft and received Transport
Canada Type Certification in 2010. Series 400 and variant aircraft can be identified by
PT6A-34 engines in place of the PT6A-20 or PT6A-27 engines used on earlier aircraft,
fitment of a four screen ‘glass cockpit’ using a Honeywell Primus Apex® avionics suite,
and a cabin complying to later safety standards.
If these aircraft are brought onto the civil register in the future, it is the responsibility of
new owner to bring the aircraft into compliance with the Type Certificate for the Series
400 aircraft.
0.5.1.1 Revisions
Revisions are changes which affect the Pilot Operating Handbooks of all aircraft.
They may consist of revised operating procedures, additional practices or procedures
affecting personnel, aircraft, or equipment safety; revised operating limitations or
performance data or corrections.
Future changes to the POH text or illustrations arising from revisions will be identified
by a vertical revision bar (black line) in the outside margin of the affected page, next to
the change.
Operators are requested to keep Viking Air Limited advised of their current postal
address and the serial numbers of DHC-6 aircraft that they operate. Contact information
for Viking Air Limited can be found on the last page of this section.
0.5.1.3 Amendments
Amendments introduce changes arising from the embodiment of modifications.
Amendments should be inserted only in handbooks of aircraft when such modifications
are fitted to that aircraft. Amendments are published on light green coloured sheets,
and these sheets are then inserted in the POH opposite the page that they modify. The
procedures published in the amendment then supersede and replace the procedures
published in the body text of the POH.
0.5.1.4 Supplements
Supplements contain procedures and performance data that pertain to optional or
special order equipment. Some supplements permit operations using alternative
procedures. Supplements should only be inserted in Pilot Operating Handbooks of
aircraft which have such installations or equipment incorporated. Supplements are filed
in Section 9 of this POH.
Examples of a Supplement:
0.5.1.6 Modifications
The term ‘Mod’ is commonly used as an abbreviation for modification. Viking Air Limited
identifies each change to the originally certified design of the aircraft with a uniquely
numbered modification. For the DHC-6 Series 400, modification numbers begin at
6/2000. When each new aircraft leaves the factory, it is supplied with a document that
lists what modifications were embodied into the aircraft during manufacture.
The MMEL itself cannot be used in its original format by pilots and engineers. While
the MMEL is applicable to all serial numbers and all versions of an aircraft type, the
operator-specific MEL, that is derived from the MMEL, is tailored to the air operator's
specific aircraft and operating environment, and may be dependent upon the route
structure, geographic location, the number of airports where spares and maintenance
capability are available, and the legislative requirements imposed by the state of registry
or state of operation of the aircraft.
It is beyond the scope of the introduction section of this AFM to describe the process
that operators are obliged to follow to develop their own individual operator or aircraft
specific MEL. The regulatory authority of the state of registration should be consulted
for guidance.
If a particular component is not listed in the MMEL – for example, the stall warning
system – then that component is considered essential and it must be operational for
flight. An operator MEL may not be less restrictive than the MMEL.
Notes follow information that has already been presented. Warnings and Cautions may,
depending on context, precede the information, procedure or technique to which they
apply.
NOTE: A note expands on information which has already been provided. Notes
are provided to assist the reader in comprehending and applying information that
has been presented in the AFM or to apply emphasis to an operating practice or
condition.
CAUTION: A CAUTION PROVIDES INFORMATION TO PREVENT MISUSE
OF SYSTEMS WHICH COULD DIRECTLY AFFECT THEIR FUNCTION OR
SERVICEABILITY. CAUTIONS ARE INTENDED TO ALERT THE READER TO
THE RISK OF DAMAGING THE AIRCRAFT OR EQUIPMENT IF A PROCEDURE
OR TECHNIQUE IS NOT CAREFULLY FOLLOWED.
0.5.1.10 Procedures
Section 3 of this POH provides operational procedures for reasonably foreseeable
emergency and abnormal operations. Section 4 provides operational procedures
for normal operations. An operational procedure is a step by step method used to
accomplish a specific task. Procedures are classified as follows:
Metric conversions have not been provided for values that are only expressed in a
single unit of measure by the aircraft indication system (e.g. torque, pressures in PSI).
Hot Start Hot Start is an engine start that results in any of the following
conditions:
Maximum Continuous Is the power setting approved for continuous usage. For
Power the PT6A-34 engine, Maximum Continuous Power and
Maximum Take-off Power are identical.
Maximum Power The command Maximum Power refers to the practice
of setting engine power by advancing the power and
propeller levers until the first redline (Torque, T5, or NG)
is reached. Setting power this way is not an approved power
setting; however, it is sometimes necessary to do this in an
emergency.
PSI (torque) Engine torque is measured in pounds per square inch, which
is abbreviated to PSI. To convert torque PSI indications for the
PT6A-34 engine to foot-pounds (ft-lbs), multiply PSI by 30.57.
Propeller RPM Propeller RPM is the rotational speed of the propeller
expressed in revolutions per minute. There is a 15:1
reduction gearing between the power turbine and the
propeller, resulting in a propeller RPM of 2200 and a power
turbine RPM of 33,000 for an NP of 100%. The calculation
to determine Propeller RPM is as follows: Propeller RPM =
(33,000 ÷ 15) x NP.
RPM Rotations (or revolutions) per minute.
Service Ceiling The maximum density altitude at which the aircraft can
maintain a climb rate of 100 feet per minute with both engines
operating at maximum continuous power.
Unusable Fuel Unusable Fuel is the quantity of fuel that is not available for
use in flight. In the case of the DHC-6, this is 23 lbs (10 kg)
of fuel, or about 1% of total fuel quantity.
Usable Fuel Usable Fuel is the other 99% of total fuel capacity that can
be burned by the engines during flight.
Weight The weight of the aircraft in pounds (lbs) or kilograms (kg).
Wet Runway A Wet Runway is covered with sufficient moisture to cause it
to appear reflective, but is not "contaminated". A runway with
greater than 0.125 of an inch (3 mm) of standing water on it
is deemed to be a contaminated runway.
Land as soon as possible – This means land without delay at the nearest aerodrome
that can safely be used after giving due consideration to the runway surface, runway
length, and prevailing weather conditions. This is the highest form of urgency.
Depending on the level of urgency, the pilot may wish to consider making an off-airport
(precautionary) landing.
Land as soon as practical – This means land at the next available aerodrome that can
safely be used after giving due consideration to passenger convenience after landing
and/or the possibility of having the aircraft serviced, as well as suitability of the runway
surface, runway length, and prevailing weather conditions. This describes a less urgent
condition than “land as soon as possible”.
GENERAL
STANDARD TO METRIC
METRIC TO STANDARD
Since 1983, Viking has held the exclusive rights to spare parts manufacturing and
distribution for the DHC-2 Beaver and the DHC-3 Single Otter aircraft and has been a
major supplier to Bombardier for the Twin Otter and DASH 7 Series product lines.
Viking acquired the Type Certificate and production rights to the DHC-6 aircraft from
Bombardier Aerospace in January of 2006. The transfer of the Type Certificates
completes a transaction first announced in May 2005, at which time Viking acquired
specific assets from Bombardier’s Commercial Service Centre (CSC) division, including
product support responsibilities for seven de Havilland heritage aircraft.
Since that time, Viking has successfully integrated the Bombardier CSC responsibilities,
expanded operations in Victoria, B.C., opened a warehousing, distribution and
new aircraft assembly facility in Calgary, Alberta. Viking now provides a complete
range of services for all of de Havilland’s out of production aircraft, including spare
parts manufacturing and distribution, sales and customer service, technical support,
maintenance, repair and overhaul, and engineering services.
Viking also owns the Type Certificates and provides support for the de Havilland
Canada DHC-1 Chipmunk, DHC-2 Beaver, DHC-2T Turbo Beaver, DHC-3 Otter, DHC-4
Caribou, DHC-5 Buffalo, and DHC-7 DASH 7.
In 2008, Viking began production of the new Series 400 DHC-6 aircraft in Calgary,
Alberta, Canada.
SECTION 1
GENERAL
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
1.1 General.................................................................................... 7
1.1 General
This section contains basic data and information of general interest to the pilot.
1.2 Scope
This Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) – PSM 1-64-1A, includes the material required to
be furnished by Transport Canada and additional information provided by the Type
Certificate Holder and constitutes the Transport Canada approved Aircraft Flight
Manual. It is the responsibility of the operator and flight crew to achieve maximum
utilization as an operating guide for the pilot.
1.3.2 Airframe
CONFIGURATION & CONSTRUCTION:
All-metal, high-wing monoplane with a fixed tricycle landing gear, equipped with
steerable nose wheel.
FLIGHT CONTROLS:
1.3.3 Dimensions
NOTE
Dimensions to ground line are approximate only and may vary
depending on aircraft configuration and loading conditions. (Refer to
Figure 1-1).
NOTE
Front Baggage compartment volume will be reduced if an air
conditioner and/or TCAS II is fitted.
1.4.2 Engines
TYPE: Two Pratt & Whitney Aircraft of Canada Limited, PT6A-34, single-stage, free
turbine engines.
1.5.1 Engine
DHC-6 Series 400 aircraft are fitted with two Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-34 engines
that have been flat rated to a maximum of 620 HP, which is equivalent to 50 PSI of
torque at 96% NP.
The PT6A series of engines are reverse flow, annular combustion, free turbine
engines. The ‘small’ series of PT6A engines, which includes the -34 version, contain
a compressor consisting of three axial stages and one centrifugal stage driven by a
single compressor turbine wheel. The power section consists of a single power turbine
driving the propeller via a 15:1 reduction gearbox. Engine limitations can be found in
Section 2 of this AFM, and additional descriptive information about the engine can be
found in Sections 7 and 10 of the POH.
1.5.2 Propeller
The standard propeller is made by Hartzell. It is hydraulically controlled, three blade,
constant speed, fully reversing and fully feathering. The hub is a HC-B3TN-3D. If the
propeller is equipped with blade latches for floatplane operation, the letter Y will be
present at the end of the hub model number. The primary propeller governor is a
Woodward type 8210-004, and the propeller overspeed governor is a Woodward type
210625. The propeller is 8 feet 6 inches (2.6 m) in diameter. At nominal aircraft weight,
the distance between the lowest portion of the propeller and the ground is 5 feet (1.5
m). This distance will decrease slightly during braking or deceleration of a fully loaded
aircraft.
Propeller blade angle measured at the 30 inch (76.2 cm) station of the blade will vary
between +87° when feathered to –15° at full reverse. Idle blade angle is +11°. Blade
angle in flight will vary between +20° and +35° depending on air density, selected
propeller speed, and power being delivered to the propeller.
1.5.3 Fuel
Specifications for fuel that may be used in the PT6A-34 engines are provided by Pratt
& Whitney Canada, and can be found in the most recent revision of Pratt & Whitney
Canada Engine Service Bulletin 1244. Additional information about acceptable fuels
can be found in Section 2 of this AFM.
The standard fuselage fuel tanks installed under the cabin floor of the DHC-6 have the
following usable capacities:
99% of the fuel is usable in flight. 23 lbs (10 kg) of fuel (approximately 3.5 US or 3
Imperial Gallons, or 12 litres) is unusable. An additional 12 lbs (5.5 kg) of fuel will
remain trapped in the plumbing system between the fuel tanks and the engines after
the fuel tanks have been drained. These 12 lbs are not considered part of the aircraft
fuel tank capacity, and are included in the basic weight of the aircraft.
1.5.4 Oil
Specifications for oil that may be used in the PT6A-34 engines are provided by Pratt
& Whitney Canada, and can be found in the most recent revision of Pratt & Whitney
Canada Engine Service Bulletin 1001.
The nose baggage door aperture is 29.7 inches (71 cm) wide, varying in height between
20.7 inches (52.5 cm) at the forward edge and 27.2 inches (64 cm) at the aft edge.
The rear baggage compartment door aperture is 25.7 inches wide and 35.7 inches
high (65 by 90 cm).
The door on the right rear side of the passenger cabin is 30 inches (76 cm) wide and
reaches a maximum height of 45.5 inches (115.5 cm) at the center of the door.
The display screens used for the Apex avionics system and the L3 Emergency Standby
Instrument System (ESIS) may not meet certification specifications for brightness and
ACTION:
In Section 1, ignore existing Para 1.5.5 Maximum Weights and insert revised , as
shown on Page 2 of this Temporary Amendment.
-Continued overleaf-
APPROVED____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
DATE_________________________
RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS:
Record this TEMPORARY AMENDMENT NO. and the relevant information in the
appropriate columns of the TEMPORARY AMENDMENT INDEX provided at the front
of the manual.
contrast when the screen display surface has been cold-soaked to temperatures below
–20°C (–4°F). If the display brightness and contrast is sufficient to allow the display to be
used for engine starting, engines may be started at temperatures below –20°C (–4°F),
but the display screens must be warmed up (using cabin heat) to a minimum screen
surface temperature greater than –20°C (–4°F) prior to taxi. If the display brightness
and contrast is insufficient to allow the display to be used for engine starting, the screen
surface temperature must be warmed up to a minimum screen surface temperature
greater than –20°C (–4°F) before engines are started. This may be accomplished
with a cabin heater (a hot air blower), a heating pad, or by applying a hot water bottle
wrapped in a soft towel to the face of the screen. The temperature of the hot air, heating
pad, or hot water bottle must not be greater than what could be used to warm a human
hand without discomfort.
SECTION 2
LIMITATIONS
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
ACTION:
In Section 2, remove Temporary Amendment (TA-21) and replace with Temporary
Amendment (TA-23).
-Continued overleaf-
APPROVED____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
DATE_________________________
RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS:
Record this TEMPORARY AMENDMENT NO. and the relevant information in the
appropriate columns of the TEMPORARY AMENDMENT INDEX provided at the front
of the manual.
The aircraft must be operated in accordance with the limitations in Section 2 and any
additional limitations in the Supplements contained in Section 9.
No person may operate this airplane after October 31, 2017, unless the engine
indications have been modified in accordance with the terms of Exemption No. 13042A.
The aircraft must be operated in accordance with the limitations in Section 2 and any
additional limitations in the Supplements contained in Section 9.
NOTE: Please see the TEMPORARY AMENDMENT that revises this page
SECTION 2 TC Approved
LIMITATIONS DHC-6 SERIES 400
2.2 Scope
Unless specified otherwise, the limitations provided in this section apply to aircraft
equipped with standard wheel gear. For aircraft equipped with other gear configurations
(floatplanes, skiplanes, amphibians or intermediate flotation gear), please refer to the
limitations section of the appropriate AFM supplement in Section 9.
Limitations associated with systems or equipment which require AFM supplements are
provided in the associated supplement in Section 9.
Maximum Operating Speed shall not be deliberately exceeded in any regime of flight
(climb, cruise, descent) except when a higher speed has been authorized for flight test
or pilot training purposes.
Airspeed limitations for aircraft equipped with standard wheels are listed in Table 2-1.
The airspeed limitations in Table 2-1 apply to all weights up to and including 12,500 lbs
gross weight.
In an emergency, power may be set to the first limit reached (for example, the torque,
T5, or NG redline). Other than in an emergency, Figure 2-1 must not be used for setting
engine power. Refer to Section 5 (Performance) of the AFM for power setting charts.
2 Maximum permissible sustained torque is 50 PSI at 96% NP, which is equal to 620
horsepower. This is an airframe restriction. Unintentional, momentary pilot errors
that result in torque settings between 50 and 61 PSI torque during two engine
operations, although undesirable, are not harmful to the engine and do not need to
be reported.
3 52% NG is the typical idle speed. Idle speed may increase with pressure altitude.
Speeds below 72% NG are deemed to be idle for the purpose of the limitations table.
4 Minimum oil pressure is 85 to 105 PSI at gas generator speeds above 72%. Oil
pressures between 40 and 85 PSI are acceptable when NG is below 72%.
5 At idle, if the T5 temperature approaches the 685°C idle limit, either increase NG
or reduce engine loads (for example, turn off the generator) to stay below the idle
temperature limit. If significant mechanical load is anticipated when a generator is
to be brought online at idle speed, increase NG appropriately prior to bringing the
generator online.
6 These values are time-limited to two seconds. These acceleration limits exist to
allow for rapid application of power during abnormalities or (for example) during a
balked landing or a go-around. The acceleration limits are based on the assumption
that the deviation above the normal limit is momentary and non-stabilized.
CAUTION
8 Temperatures as high as 925°C are acceptable without time limitation for the entire
duration of the start. Temperatures between 925°C and 980°C are acceptable
provided that the temperature decreases to below 925°C within 10 seconds.
Temperatures between 980°C and 1090°C are acceptable provided the temperature
decreases to below 980°C within 2 seconds. Starting temperatures above 850°C
are undesirable and should be reported and investigated for cause.
9 For increased oil service life, an oil temperature below 80°C is recommended.
12 CAS does not capture 10°C lower limit. Pilot to ensure oil temp at or above 10°C
prior to take-off or during continuous power settings.
Propeller RPM must be expressed as actual propeller RPM, not as a percentage. For
example, a calculation of shaft horsepower produced with the propeller RPM set to
96% and torque set to 50 PSI gives the following result:
WARNING
WARNING
NOTE
Propeller levers must be set to the MAX RPM (96% NP) position
no later than 500 feet above ground level (for visual approaches)
or 500 feet above decision height or minimum descent altitude (for
instrument approaches). This is essential to ensure that the pilot
has full control over propeller operation via the power lever during
the final phase of approach, and also essential to ensure that full
power will be immediately available if needed for a balked landing,
go-around, or low level windshear recovery.
Technical Specifications
The above list is not exhaustive. Detailed specifications describing the fuels that may
be used in the PT6A-34 engines is specified in the most recent revision of Pratt &
Whitney Canada Service Bulletin 1244.
1 Maximum fuel temperature and maximum ambient temperature for take-off when
using AVGAS is +25°C.
NOTE
All four boost pumps must be serviceable at all times when AVGAS
is being used. Take-off with an inoperative boost pump (primary or
standby) is prohibited.
CAUTION
For a list of approved lubricating oils refer to the most recent issue of Pratt & Whitney
Canada Service Bulletin No.1001.
The colour coding is dynamic and the thresholds at which the various colour cues
appear will change depending on the phase of flight. The Apex display system
recognizes five phases of flight for the purpose of selecting the appropriate engine
limitation table to govern the display of colours. Take-off, Climb and Cruise, and
Single Engine Flight limitations apply simultaneously to both engines. Idle and Starting
limitations apply to each engine individually when the appropriate criteria has been met.
The limitation table being used for each engine will be displayed in white text (for T/O,
S/E, and IDL) near the torque indicators, and in green text for START outboard of the
engine being started. When climb and cruise limits (the default limits) are being used,
no indication is provided.
Table 2-2
Indication (white text,
Phase of Flight outboard of torque Limitations Applied
indicators)
Take-off T/O Take-off
Climb and Cruise No indication (blank) Cruise
Single Engine Flight S/E Take-off
A detailed explanation of the logic used to select engine limitations based on phase of
flight and/or engine operating parameters is provided in Section 7, Aircraft and Systems
Description.
During Start
During Idle
Otherwise (default settings for climb and cruise, as well as engine not operating)
NOTE
When default engine limitations are being displayed during the climb
and cruise phases of flight, the amber radial mark at 740° indicates
the temperature limitation for normal Climb and Cruise operations,
and the red radial arc at 790° (equivalent to Take-off and Single
Engine Flight) indicates the temperature limitation for Maximum
Power (emergency power setting) operations.
to prevent caution and warning displays from appearing during momentary transient
conditions permitted by the acceleration limits.
A warning or caution CAS message will be displayed on the CAS list concurrent with
the change in background colour of the displayed value in the engine window. The
MASTER CAUTION or MASTER WARNING annunciators will also illuminate, and an
appropriate aural warning will be generated.
NOTE
To prolong generator life, engine RPM below 59% NG should be
avoided, especially at high OAT (>15°C), and high current generator
loads (>100 Amps). If extended engine operation at low RPM
is necessary under high current loads, either shed unnecessary
electrical loads, or, if operating conditions permit, switch off one or
both generators until RPM may be safely increased.
CAUTION
NOTE
Starter duty cycle limitations primarily affect maintenance activities
and unusual flight crew activities such as clearing an engine following
an unsuccessful start attempt. The above duty cycle limitations are
not intended to limit the pilot from taking any and all prudent actions
that may be necessary in the event of an emergency such as clearing
an engine fire.
2.6 Reserved
Service Ceiling: 24,380 feet (both engines operating at Maximum Climb Power,
Weight 12,500 lbs, atmospheric conditions ISA +15°C).
2.8.1 Take-Off
The maximum weight for take-off is 12,500 lbs (5,670 kg).
FORWARD 20% MAC (203.84 inches) at 11,600 lbs (5,262 kg) rising
linearly to 25% MAC (207.74 inches) at 12,500 lbs (5,670 kg).
AFT 36% MAC (216.32 inches) at all weights.
2.8.2 Landing
The maximum weight for landing is 12,300 lbs (5,580 kg).
FORWARD 20% MAC (203.84 inches) at 11,000 lbs (4,990 kg) rising
linearly to 25% MAC (207.74 inches) at 12,300 lbs (5,580 kg).
AFT 36% MAC (216.32 inches) at all weights.
ACTION:
In Section 2, ignore existing Para 2.8.1 Take-Off and insert revised , as shown
on Page 2 of this Temporary Amendment.
-Continued overleaf-
APPROVED____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
DATE_________________________
RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS:
Record this TEMPORARY AMENDMENT NO. and the relevant information in the
appropriate columns of the TEMPORARY AMENDMENT INDEX provided at the front
of the manual.
2.8.1 Take-Off
The maximum weight for take-off is 12,500 lbs (5,670 kg).
FORWARD 20% MAC (203.84 inches) at 11,600 lbs (5,262 kg) rising
linearly to 25% MAC (207.74 inches) at 12,500 lbs (5,670 kg).
AFT 36% MAC (216.32 inches) at all weights.
To allow for additional fuel to be carried for taxiing, system functional checks and
take-off clearance delay the maximum allowable ramp and taxi weight is 12,600
lbs (5,715 kg). The take-off must not be commenced until the aircraft weight has
been reduced to the maximum allowable weight for take-off.
Allowance (15 lbs, 7 kg) has been made for the weight of factory-installed weather
radar equipment.
Aft baggage compartment – 500 lbs (227 kg), which includes the 150 pound (68 kg)
limit on the extension shelf.
If oxygen cylinders are installed on the extension shelf, the aft baggage compartment
limitation is reduced to 410 lbs (186 kg), which includes the 60 pound limit on the
extension shelf.
Forward and rear baggage compartments – 100 pounds per square foot (488 kilograms
per square meter).
20° is considered normal for landing if runway lengths and conditions permit landing
with 20° flap. All the performance graphs in this manual give landing distances with
flaps set at 37° (full deployment of flaps). To calculate landing distance with flaps set at
20°, multiply the landing distance for flaps 37° by 1.3 – in other words, landing distance
with flaps 20° is 130% of the distance given in the charts.
To calculate landing distance with flaps set at 10°, multiply the landing distance for flaps
37° by 1.8 – in other words, landing distance with flaps 10° is 180% of the distance
given in the charts. Landing with flaps 10° is only permitted in icing conditions, or if
there is any possibility that ice may be present on any part of the aircraft. At outside air
temperatures above ISA, the groundspeeds encountered when landing with flaps 10°
may exceed the design speed of the nose wheel.
During certification testing, it was demonstrated that flaps could be fully extended or
fully retracted from any position (e.g. flaps 0° or flaps 37°) without compromising aircraft
control or generating excessive longitudinal control forces.
NOTE
When landing with Flaps 10° during or after flight in icing conditions,
after 10° landing flap has been extended, activate the TAWS FLAP
OVRD feature to prevent the TAWS Mode 2A “Too Low – Flaps”
warning from activating when the aircraft descends below 170 feet
radar altitude.
In-flight extension of flap greater than 20° is prohibited at aircraft weights less than
9,500 lbs (4,310 kg).
Aerobatics or even limited aerobatic maneuvers such as turns with an angle of bank
greater than 60°, spins, lazy eights and chandelles are not approved.
The type of operation is also limited according to the equipment installed. The standard
Twin Otter is equipped for Day and Night VFR operations. Optional equipment is
available to make the aircraft eligible for other types of operation such as IFR, flight
in icing conditions, commercial use, passenger transport, etc., as specified by the
applicable operating regulations.
Special purpose operations such as Short Take-off and Landing (STOL), water bombing,
agricultural spraying and dusting, and ferry flights with supplemental fuel tanks installed
are must be conducted within the limits specified by the appropriate Airworthiness
Authority.
The Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System Pilot Guide for the DHC-6
Series 400, Honeywell publication number D200810000022 must always be on board
the aircraft.
For L3 GH-3100 ESIS (Pre Mod 6/2170) equipped aircraft, the L3 GH-3100 ESIS Pilot
Guide publication number TP-560 at Revision F, or later revision, must always be on
board the aircraft.
For L3 GH-3900.2 ESIS (Post Mod 6/2170) equipped aircraft, the L3 GH-3900.2 ESIS
Pilot Guide publication number 0040-34400-01 at Revision E, or later revision, must
always be on board the aircraft.
The INAV map display and/or the electronic display of Jeppesen terminal and approach
charts on the Honeywell Primus Apex® display screens is not an approved substitute
for the conventional paper maps, charts, and books that are normally required to be
carried on board the aircraft for navigation purposes.
2.13.2.1 P-RNAV
JAA TGL 10, Rev 1.1, Airworthiness and Operational Approval for Precision RNAV
Operations in designated European Airspace.
2.13.2.2 B-RNAV
EASA AMC 20-4 Guidance Material on Airworthiness Approval and Operational Criteria
for the use of navigation systems in European Airspace designated for basic RNAV
Operations.
2.13.2.3 GNSS
EASA AMC 20-5 Guidance Material on Airworthiness Approval and Operational Criteria
for the use of the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS).
The GNSS (GPS) receivers do not support Satellite Based Augmentation Service
(SBAS). This capability will be provided in the future with a software upgrade.
The DHC-6 Series 400 with Apex FMS has satisfied only the airworthiness
requirements, this does not constitute an operational approval.
2 The Apex FMS is approved for FMS VFR approaches as a pilot aid only.
3 APP (approach active) mode must be annunciated at the Final Approach Fix.
Instrument approaches must be conducted in the approach mode and RAIM must
be available at the Final Approach Fix.
4 When using advisory VNAV, the altimeter on each pilot's instrument panel must
be used as the primary altitude reference for all operations. When the altimeter is
adjusted to display height above ground (QFE) rather than height above sea level,
VNAV must not be used. VNAV information is advisory only.
WARNING
6 The FMS can only be used for approach guidance if the reference coordinate datum
system for the instrument approach is WGS-84 or NAD-83.
7 The use of the FMS to perform RNAV operations in the designated European
airspace is limited as follows:
Given a GPS constellation of 23 satellites or less (22 or less when the FMS
incorporates automatic pressure altitude aiding) is projected to be operational,
the availability of RAIM must be confirmed for the intended flight (route and
time). Dispatch for RNAV must not be made in the event of predicted continuous
loss of RAIM of more than 5 minutes for any part of the intended flight. For RAIM
prediction the Honeywell Program “Pre-flight” or equivalent approved software
must be used.
8 Other approved navigational equipment (for example, VOR, ADF, etc.) may be
required for route navigation according to the operational approval granted by the
regulatory authority.
9 The FMS must be checked for accuracy prior to use as a means of supplemental
navigation following a period of position uncertainty, dead reckoning or when
crosscheck with other onboard approved equipment reveals an error greater than
2 nautical miles. The aircraft position should be verified by visual sighting ground
reference points and/or available VOR, DME, NDB equipment.
10 When flying a LNAV approach using the vertical guidance provided by the FMS,
the crew must never allow the aircraft to descend below the published LNAV MDA
unless the runway is in sight.
12 FMS flight planning parameters, including fuel display parameters and estimated
time enroute, are advisory only. The fuel quantity displayed in the fuel window
of the system display (the fuel quantity that is measured by the Fuel Quantity
Gauging System) must be used for fuel quantity determination range planning, and
decision-making.
13 The flight management system must utilize software version NZ7.1 or later FAA
approved revision. The MAU and DAU software installed in the aircraft must match
the software level referenced in the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics
System Pilot Guide for the DHC-6 Series 400, Honeywell publication number
D200810000022.
When the first waypoint or series of waypoints of the missed approach procedure
cannot be defined by latitude and longitude, and is thus not available for activation as
a DIRECT-TO on the FMS, the pilot must fly the initial portion of the missed approach
procedure using short range navigation (VOR, ILS, NDB, DME, heading, or vectors)
until such time as it is possible to select a FMS waypoint and navigate directly to that
waypoint using the FMS (long range navigation).
Engine start is prohibited if the Hydraulic Power Fail CAS message is present.
2.13.6 TCAS I
The flight crew must not use a TA on the PFD traffic display to initiate evasive
maneuvering. ATC procedures and visual acquisition of the intruder prior to initiation
of evasive maneuvers must continue to be the primary means of ensuring aircraft
separation. The TCAS I display lacks the resolution necessary for use in evasive
maneuvering.
If the flight crew is advised by Air Traffic Control to disable transponder altitude reporting,
the TCAS I system must be put in standby (STBY) mode or turned OFF.
2.13.7 TAWS
The display of TAWS terrain data on the Primary Flight Displays is intended to serve
only as a situational awareness tool. Navigation must not be based on TAWS terrain
data. TAWS terrain data may not provide the accuracy and/or fidelity on which to solely
base decisions and plan maneuvers to avoid terrain or obstacles.
To avoid unwanted alerts, the TAWS must be inhibited (by use of the TERR INHIB
button) when landing at airports that are not contained in the TAWS database.
Pilots are authorized to deviate from an ATC clearance when responding to terrain or
obstacle alerts generated by the TAWS.
2.13.8 Transponder
The transponder system complies with the criteria set out in ICAO document 7030/4
(Regional Supplementary Procedures) for operations where enhanced surveillance is
required.
2.13.9 ADAHRS
The system accuracy in areas where the horizontal magnetic field strength is less than
60 mGuass does not allow VOR, VOR/DME, or NDB non-precision approaches. The
flight crew must use (GPS) VOR, (GPS) VOR/DME or (GPS) NDB overlay approaches,
LNAV approaches, RNAV (GPS/GNSS) approaches, RNAV (RNP) approaches, or ILS
precision approaches instead.
Flights or portions of flights carried out in Zone 2 (Figure 2-3) must be planned based
on using track made good referenced to True or Magnetic North. For the purpose of this
limitation, the southern boundary of Zone 2 shall be interpreted as corresponding with
the boundary between Canadian Southern Domestic Airspace and Canadian Northern
Domestic Airspace.
In the Southern hemisphere, flights or portions of flights carried out south of S82°, and
south of S55° between E120° and E160°, must be planned based on using track made
good referenced to True North only.
Electronic checklists may be used for Normal procedures only. It is prohibited to use
the electronic checklist for abnormal and/or emergency procedures.
The position of the ‘own aircraft’ symbol overlaid on the chart is advisory only.
The pilot shall remain responsible for taxiing by external visual reference and airborne
navigation by use of the primary navigation instruments.
Electronic charts do not replace the published paper copies of the charts. Paper charts
must be available as a primary reference at all times. The electronic Jeppesen chart
display is considered a Class 3 EFB in accordance with FAA AC 120-76A.
WARNING
Topographic detail (lakes, roadways, terrain) displayed on the INAV map is advisory
and is provided to assist with situational awareness and spatial orientation only. The
position of the ‘own aircraft’ symbol overlaid on the INAV map is advisory only.
The INAV topographical map depiction of terrain shall not be used for navigation in IMC
or when operating IFR. The display of airspace on the INAV map shall not be used as
the sole means of reference for determination of airspace boundaries.
- Do not operate the weather radar system during aircraft refuelling or when any
refuelling operations are being carried out within 100 feet (30 m).
- Do not operate the weather radar system when personnel are standing forward of
the wings within 30 feet (10 m) of the aircraft.
1 VFR Day
2 VFR Night
- North of 65° North latitude between longitude 75° W and 120° W (Northern
Canada).
- South of 55° South latitude between longitude 120° E and 165° E. (Region south of
Australia and New Zealand).
Use of the ESIS as a primary aircraft heading reference when “DG” is annunciated is
prohibited.
For aircraft without airframe de-icing equipment which fly into icing conditions, flap
extension must not exceed 10° during or after flight in icing conditions.
ACTION:
In Section 2, ignore existing Page 2-45 and item A. Operating Instructions Placard
on Page 2-46 and insert revised as shown on Pages 3 and 4 of this Temporary
Amendment.
-Continued overleaf-
APPROVED____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
DATE_________________________
RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS:
Record this TEMPORARY AMENDMENT NO. and the relevant information in the
appropriate columns of the TEMPORARY AMENDMENT INDEX provided at the front
of the manual.
2.18 Placards
The following placards are installed in the flight compartment of the aircraft:
2.18 Placards
The following placards are installed in the flight compartment of the aircraft:
B. Flap Extension Placard – Aircraft Not Equipped for Flight in Known Icing
L. No Step Label
P. Zero Trust Stop and Start Label (with S.O.O. 6203 or S.O.O. 6237)
R. Manufacturer’s Plate
SECTION 3
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
3.1 Introduction
In the event of an abnormality or emergency that results in posting of numerous CAS
messages (for example, and engine failure, modular avionics unit failure, or data
acquisition unit failure), the crew should attempt to identify the root cause of the failure
and carry out the actions appropriate to the root cause.
VYSE Single Engine Best Rate of Climb Speed (Flaps 10°): 80 KIAS (all weights)
VMCA Minimum Control Speed – Air, One Engine Inoperative: 64 KIAS
VS0 Stall speed, landing configuration (Flaps 37°): 56 KIAS
VS1 Stall speed, take-off configuration (Flaps 10°): 66 KIAS
VS Stall speed, flaps up: 73 KIAS
VA Maneuvering Speed:
132 KIAS from sea level to 18,000 feet.
Limited by Maximum Operating Speed above 18,000 feet.
Glide Speed (both propellers feathered) for best range: 100 KIAS
Glide Speed (both propellers feathered) for best 77 KIAS
endurance:
PROBABLE CAUSE
Power levers have been advanced to greater than 20 PSI torque while the aircraft is on
ground, and the aircraft is not correctly configured for take-off.
ACTION
2 Ensure that flaps and trims are correctly set for take-off, and that the autofeather
system is selected on.
NOTE
The take-off configuration monitor considers the following variables:
1 Flaps must be within ±2° of the approved take-off setting (10° for
landplanes, 20° for floatplanes).
2 Elevator and rudder trims must be within the allowable range for
take-off.
ACTION
2 Brakes – APPLY
WARNING
INDICATION
ACTION
2 Land straight ahead, turn only to avoid obstacles using minimal bank angle.
NOTE
Be aware that after encountering an engine failure when airborne at
a speed below VMC, ‘straight ahead’ is unlikely to be the same as the
runway heading.
INDICATION
ACTION
Advance both power levers to the torque, T5, or NG limit, whichever is reached
first.
Ensure both PROP levers are at the MAX RPM position (96% NP).
b If the power loss is total and the propeller of the inoperative engine has
not automatically feathered:
Climb to a safe altitude (typically several thousand feet AGL). If turns are
necessary for obstacle clearance, limit bank angle to 15° during single engine
operations to avoid negative rates of climb caused by higher wing loading during
turns. When a safe altitude has been reached, carry out the following secondary
actions:
13 Check the generator load on the operative engine and reduce electrical consumption
if necessary to stay within the in-flight limitation of 200 amps.
14 Use fuel as necessary to stay within center of gravity limits for the remainder of the
flight.
NOTE
After this checklist has been completed, it is recommended that the
power lever of the inoperative engine be moved forward to match
the position of the power lever of the operative engine, and that the
two power levers then be kept together and moved together for the
remainder of the flight.
INDICATION
ACTION
Advance both power levers to the torque, T5, or NG limit, whichever is reached
first.
Ensure the PROP lever of the operating engine is at the MAX RPM position
(96% NP).
6 Trim aircraft as required. Flaps may be left retracted, or extended to 10° if necessary.
NOTE
At maximum take-off weight, the DHC-6 will maintain level flight with
flaps up at approximately 110 to 120 KIAS at altitudes below 10,000
feet when one engine is inoperative and feathered and the other
engine is set to maximum continuous power. If any attempt to climb
is made and airspeed drops below 103 KIAS, flaps 10° should be set
to configure the aircraft for best single engine climb performance.
13 Use fuel as necessary to stay within center of gravity limits for the remainder of the
flight.
NOTE
After this checklist has been completed, it is recommended that the
power lever of the inoperative engine be moved forward to match
the position of the power lever of the operative engine, and that the
two power levers then be kept together and moved together for the
remainder of the flight.
8 START switch – proceed in accordance with the normal procedures for starting an
engine, as follows:
b Allow the gas generator speed to stabilize. As soon as the gas generator speed
has stabilized, move the applicable engine FUEL lever to ON without further
delay.
c Light-up – Check that engine accelerates to idle RPM (typically 52% NG at ISA).
CAUTION
9 PROP lever – Move to minimum governing position until unfeathered, and then
select desired NP.
12 GENERATOR switch – ON
9 Evacuate aircraft. (May not always be appropriate for floatplanes unless at the
dock).
Consideration should be given to leaving the battery power, the aircraft cabin
and exterior lighting on at night after evacuation has been completed. This will
enable emergency response crews to more easily locate the aircraft and assist the
occupants.
Ensure the PROP lever of the unaffected engine is at the MAX RPM position
(96% NP).
8 Trim aircraft as required. Flaps may be left retracted, or extended to 10° if necessary.
NOTE
At maximum take-off weight, the DHC-6 will maintain level flight with
flaps up at approximately 110 to 120 KIAS at altitudes below 10,000
feet when one engine is inoperative and feathered and the other
engine is set to maximum continuous power. If any attempt to climb
is made and airspeed drops below 103 KIAS, flaps 10° should be set
to configure the aircraft for best single engine climb performance.
13 Use fuel as necessary to stay within center of gravity limits for the remainder of the
flight.
NOTE
After this checklist has been completed, it is recommended that the
power lever of the inoperative engine be moved forward to match
the position of the power lever of the operative engine, and that the
two power levers then be kept together and moved together for the
remainder of the flight.
WARNING
NOTE
If the PROP SPEED caution level (amber) CAS message appears,
adjust PROP lever(s) to maintain MAX RPM 96% NP to eliminate
CAS message.
NOTE
Primary flight displays may declutter when pitch attitude exceeds 20°
nose down. This is by design and is normal behaviour.
8 Exit severe icing conditions – turn back or change altitude as required to obtain an
outside air temperature that is less conducive to icing.
11 Airspeed – As required
1 Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) ENGINE FIRE CAS message, and;
PROBABLE CAUSE
Higher than acceptable temperature within the nacelle of the affected engine.
ACTION
Complete the ‘Engine Fire on Ground’ or ‘Engine Fire in Flight’ checklist Para 3.5, as
appropriate to the phase of flight.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Grossly higher than acceptable T5 temperature for the current phase of engine operation
(starting, idle, take-off, single engine, or climb/cruise).
ACTION
The action to take will vary depending on the phase of engine operation.
2 If T5 does not decrease shortly after NG is increased, shut down the affected engine.
3 START switch (affected engine) – continue to motor engine for 10 seconds after
shutting off fuel.
NOTE
Display of a warning level (red) ENGINE TEMP CAS message
indicates that temperature limitations have been exceeded, even after
making allowance for the acceleration limits. Display of a caution
level (amber) CAS message indicates that temperature limitations
have been exceeded, but the exceedence has been confined to the
time limits granted for acceleration transients.
PROBABLE CAUSE
NOTE
The trigger for the warning message has been set to greater than
50.5 PSI for more than 2 seconds, to avoid nuisance messages when
power is being set during and immediately following take-off. This
does not imply approval of power settings greater than 50 PSI.
ACTION
Retard power lever to reduce torque to within acceptable limits. If this does not reduce
torque sufficiently, shut down the affected engine.
Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) ENGINE NG warning level (red) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
1 NG greater than 101.6%, most likely as a result of fuel governor failure, or;
ACTION
Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) PROP OVERSPEED warning level (red) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
NP greater than 101.5%, most likely as a result of concurrent failure of both the primary
and overspeed governors.
ACTION
1 Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) PROP LOW PITCH CAS message, and;
NOTE
The aural warning will not specify left or right.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Propeller blade angle is less than what is permitted for flight or ground idle and the pilot
has not twisted the power lever grips to open the idle gate and select a blade angle
less than idle.
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
IF IN FLIGHT:
1 PROP levers (both) – move aft to minimum governing position (75% NP).
2 Power levers (both) – advance sufficiently to increase propeller speed to 75% NP.
This will transfer control of the propeller to the primary governor. The PROP LOW
PITCH CAS message should extinguish.
3 Carry out a normal approach and landing using standard procedures and speeds,
except: Do not move the PROP levers forward to MAX RPM for landing. Leave both
PROP levers at minimum governing (75% NP) until the landing has been completed.
4 During final approach and landing, maintain symmetric power on both engines,
and then reduce both power levers to IDLE at touchdown. Expect the PROP LOW
PITCH CAS message to appear again when NP decreases below 75%. This will be
accompanied by a controllable yaw towards the affected engine.
5 Reverse thrust will not be available during landing due to the mechanical interlock,
because the PROP levers will be in the minimum governing (75% NP) position.
6 After landing, the affected engine may be used for taxi if desired. The affected
engine may also be shut down if desired. Zero thrust or reverse may be used on
the opposite side (unaffected) engine.
WARNING
PROBABLE CAUSE
1 Oil pressure has exceeded the 105 PSI upper pressure limit during flight, or;
2 Oil pressure has been within the caution range of 40 to 85 PSI for more than 20
seconds, or;
ACTION
If it is safe to do so, shut down the affected engine. Complete the ‘Engine Shutdown in
Flight’ checklist Para 3.12.1.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
3 If this does not result in a prompt reduction of oil temperature, shut down the affected
engine.
IF IN FLIGHT:
If it is safe to do so, shut down the affected engine. Complete the ‘Engine Shutdown
in Flight’ checklist Para 3.12.1.
Do not start engine until it has been preheated to a temperature greater than –40°C.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The aircraft is in flight, and both generators have been off for more than 2 minutes.
ACTION
WARNING
Display of the HYDRAULIC POWER FAIL warning level (red) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
HYDRAULIC OIL PUMP circuit breaker (position C6) has been pulled out, or, for some
other reason, electrical power is not available to the hydraulic oil pump.
ACTION
WARNING
Display of the HYDRAULIC PRESS LOW warning level (red) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
System hydraulic pressure is less than 1,225 PSI when aircraft is on ground.
ACTION
2 HYDRAULIC OIL PUMP circuit breaker (position C6) – Check, reset if necessary.
5 Shut down engines without feathering propellers, tow aircraft to service facility.
PROBABLE CAUSE
One of the doors monitored by the DOORS UNLOCKED circuit is not secure and the
aircraft is in flight.
ACTION
NOTE
The DOORS UNLOCKED warning level (red) CAS message may be
inhibited (not displayed in the event of an insecure door) if the aircraft
is in the approach phase of flight. The approach phase of flight is
defined as flaps extended (flaps at any flap position other than fully
retracted), autofeather not selected ON, and radar altitude ≤ 800 feet.
Display of the FUEL LOW BOTH TANKS warning level (red) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Both the forward and aft fuel tanks have reached a low fuel state. The FUEL LOW
BOTH TANKS warning CAS message will appear when 200 lbs (90 kg) or less of fuel
remains in the forward tank and 200 lbs (90 kg) of fuel or less remains in the aft tank.
The level in one of the two tanks will likely be significantly lower than these thresholds
if either the FWD or AFT LOW FUEL caution level CAS message was present prior to
display of the FUEL LOW BOTH TANKS warning level CAS message .
ACTION
1 FUEL SELECTOR rotary switch – NORMAL (center position), unless fuel distribution
between the fore and aft tank is asymmetric. In such a case, select both engines to
the tank with the greater amount of fuel. Monitor fuel levels and select NORMAL as
soon as fuel levels are the same in both tanks.
2 If there is fuel present in one or both wing tanks, select the appropriate WING TANK
switch to the ENGINE position.
3 Land as soon as possible after illumination of the FUEL LOW BOTH TANKS warning
level (red) CAS message, using only the minimum power necessary to continue
flight.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Hardware and software not in agreement concerning what equipment is fitted to the
aircraft.
ACTION
Repair before flight. The aircraft may be operated on the ground without any restrictions;
however, correct function of avionics safety systems (TAWS, TCAS, transponder,
weather radar, cartographic displays, detection of air/ground status, etc.) and correct
display of engine limitations cannot be assured.
WARNING
4 Select Landing Flaps if desired. Single engine landings with flaps 37° are not
recommended.
5 Minimum VREF airspeed – 1.3 times stall speed for selected flap setting or VMC,
whichever is greater. Refer to Table 3-1.
NOTE
The use of reverse thrust during single engine landings is not
recommended.
Advance the unaffected engine power lever to the torque, T5, or NG limit, whichever
is reached first.
Ensure the PROP lever of the unaffected engine is at the MAX RPM position (96%
NP).
3 Maintain heading by applying rudder and, if necessary, lowering the wing on the
side of the operating engine up to 5°.
2 Touchdown on the main wheels, and keep the nose wheel off the ground as long
as possible by applying full aft movement to the control column.
4 Avoid the use of zero thrust or reverse thrust on soft or rough surfaces.
1 Refer to glide speed graphs (Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2) to determine appropriate
power off, propellers feathered glide speed.
4 Touchdown on the main wheels, and keep the nose wheel off the ground as long
as possible by applying full aft movement to the control column.
6 MASTER (Pre Mod 6/2314) switch – OFF after aircraft has come to a full stop.
BATTERY, EXTERNAL and GENERATOR (Post Mod 6/2314) switches – OFF after
aircraft has come to a full stop.
2 Touchdown in a wings-level attitude, and reduce weight on the affected main wheel
by applying aileron to lift the wing on the affected side. The aircraft will yaw towards
the flat mainwheel as soon as the affected wheel begins to bear weight.
3 Maintain directional control with rudder and, if necessary, aileron. Use nose wheel
steering only if full rudder and aileron deflection is insufficient to maintain directional
control.
4 Apply braking as required on the unaffected mainwheel only. Do not apply braking
to the wheel with the flat tire.
2 Touchdown on the main wheels, and keep the nose wheel off the ground as long
as possible by applying full aft movement to the control column. Continue to keep
elevator full aft until the aircraft comes to a full stop.
4 Avoid the use of nose wheel steering unless it is absolutely necessary to remain on
the runway.
WARNING
Landing distance required will be at least double the distance published for landing with
flap 37°.
1 Carry out a normal approach and landing, using the speeds in the VREF table for
flaps 0°.
2 Touch down on the main wheels, and keep the nose wheel off the ground until the
airspeed has decreased below 60 KIAS. Use rudder and, if necessary, aileron for
directional control above 60 KIAS.
3 Apply reverse thrust and maximum wheel braking immediately after touchdown.
NOTE
Reverse thrust is most effective at speeds greater than 60 KIAS.
1 Transponder – 7700
3 ELT – ON
4 Brief passengers:
Put life vests on, but do not inflate inside the aircraft.
Explain how to use the life vests (inflation, whistle, light).
Loosen neckwear, remove glasses and keep in pocket, remove sharp objects
from pockets.
Explain brace position.
Stow loose articles under the seats.
Explain how to open the emergency exits.
On final approach:
5 Flaps – 37°
6 Speed – 75 KIAS
Water contact:
Land parallel with the swell (major waves), if possible with a headwind. Touch down
as normal. Do not stall.
1 IGNITION circuit breaker (affected engine) (left is position C3, right is position D3)
– Pull out
4 START switch (affected engine) – Hold LEFT or RIGHT (as appropriate) for 10
seconds.
Shut down the opposite side engine if it is running, evacuate the aircraft, and apply the
portable fire extinguisher into the exhaust stub of the affected engine if necessary.
NOTE
At temperature and pressure conditions close to or less than ISA,
it may be necessary to unfeather the propeller of the engine being
started to permit the engine to accelerate to normal governed idle
speed.
If the T5 temperature approaches but does not exceed the starting limits during the
start procedure, as evidenced by appearance of the LEFT (or RIGHT) ENGINE TEMP
caution level (amber) CAS message, proceed as follows:
1 Consider the possibility that the battery may be discharged or the external power
source may be inadequate, and take appropriate action to address the problem
prior to starting another engine.
2 Record the appearance of the caution level (amber) ENGINE TEMP message in
the technical log, to enable it to be investigated for cause.
WARNING
If the GENERATOR OFF advisory CAS message of the engine being started fails to
appear when the start switch is released at the end of the start procedure, proceed as
follows:
If the GENERATOR OFF advisory CAS message of the affected engine illuminates,
this is the end of the procedure.
NOTE
Both the advisory level (cyan) and the caution level (amber)
GENERATOR OFF CAS messages have the same meaning and
same significance. When the aircraft is on the ground, an advisory
level (cyan) CAS message is presented for the first 90 seconds
following engine start to avoid nuisance illumination of the MASTER
CAUTION annunciator.
2 Attitude
WARNING
Advance both power levers to torque, T5, or NP limit, whichever is reached first.
Ensure both PROP levers are at the MAX RPM position (96% NP).
NOTE
If the aircraft pitch and roll attitudes at the time the stall (or stall
warning) is recognized are within the limits of normal flight operations,
step 2 and 3 of this procedure should be initiated at the same time. If
the aircraft is in an unusual pitch or roll attitude at the time the stall (or
stall warning) is recognized, step 2 should be initiated first, followed
by step 3.
If additional power is required from the operating engine, move the PROP
lever of the operating engine to the MAX RPM (96% NP) position.
2 Power lever (affected engine) – retard to 10 PSI torque (approximately the zero
thrust position)
NOTE
At maximum take-off weight, the DHC-6 will maintain level flight with
flaps up at approximately 10 to 120 KIAS at altitudes below 10,000
feet when one engine is inoperative and feathered and the other
engine is set to maximum continuous power. If any attempt to climb
is made and airspeed drops below 103 KIAS, flaps 10° should be set
to configure the aircraft for best single engine climb performance.
12 Use fuel as necessary to stay within center of gravity limits for the remainder of the
flight.
NOTE
After this checklist has been completed, it is recommended that the
power lever of the inoperative engine be moved forward to match
the position of the power lever of the operative engine, and that the
two power levers then be kept together and moved together for the
remainder of the flight.
If the cause of the flameout can be corrected (for example, if the flameout was caused
by improper fuel management or failure to extend the intake deflectors in conditions of
visible moisture at temperatures of +5°C or less), an airstart may be attempted. Refer
to the ‘Normal Air Start’ checklist Para 3.4.5.
Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) OIL PRESSURE caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
1 Oil pressure has been within the caution range of 60 to 85 PSI for more than 5
seconds and NG has been above idle (≥72%) during that same time, or;
2 Oil pressure has been within the caution range of 40 to 60 PSI for more than 5
seconds at any NG, or;
3 The low oil pressure discrete sensor indicates oil pressure is below 40 PSI, even
though the primary oil pressure measurement sensor indicates oil pressure greater
than 40 PSI.
ACTION
Continue to monitor the engine oil pressure indication. Be prepared for the possibility
of an engine shutdown if oil pressure continues to degrade and the amber caution level
message escalates to a red warning level message.
3.12.4 Left (or Right) Oil Temp Low (Caution Level, Amber)
INDICATION
Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) OIL TEMP caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Oil temperature is less than 0°C and engine speed is greater than 72% NG.
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
Reduce engine speed to idle until oil temperature increases above 0°C.
IF IN FLIGHT:
Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) ENGINE TEMP caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Engine temperature has reached the temperature limit established for that phase of
engine operation, but the exceedence has not yet exceeded the time limit permitted by
the acceleration limits established for engine temperature.
ACTION
The action to take will vary depending on the phase of engine operation.
1 Continue to monitor T5 trend, and if the amber caution level message escalates to
a red warning level message, move the FUEL lever to the OFF position.
2 If FUEL lever is moved to the OFF position, continue to motor engine for 10 seconds.
4 Trim aircraft as required. Flaps may be left retracted, or extended to 10° if necessary.
NOTE
At maximum take-off weight, the DHC-6 will maintain level flight with
flaps up at approximately 110 to 120 KIAS at altitudes below 10,000
feet when one engine is inoperative and feathered and the other
engine is set to maximum continuous power. If any attempt to climb
is made and airspeed drops below 103 KIAS, flaps 10° should be set
to configure the aircraft for best single engine climb performance.
If the affected engine operating parameters are within limits, an attempt may be
made to determine the cause of the uncommanded feathering. Proceed as follows:
7 If this does not resolve the problem, shut down the engine in accordance with the
instructions provided in the ‘Engine Shutdown in Flight’ checklist Para 3.12.1.
PROBABLE CAUSE
1 NP greater than 96% but not greater than 101.5%, most likely as a result of failure of
the primary governor accompanied by correct function of the overspeed governor,
or;
ACTION
1 Move opposite side (unaffected engine) PROP lever forward to MAX RPM (96%) to
reduce NP mismatch.
If the condition causing the low NP results from a deliberate pilot action (for example,
the propeller has been intentionally feathered by the pilot during flight for function test
or training purposes), the CAS message can be considered to be advisory in nature
and no further action is necessary.
If the condition causing the low NP does not result from a deliberate pilot action, refer
to the ‘Uncommanded Feathering’ checklist Para 3.13.1.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Propeller levers have not been moved forward to MAX RPM (96% NP) setting, and
airspeed is less than 87 KIAS.
ACTION
1 PROP levers – move forward to MAX RPM (96% NP) prior to take-off.
No action is necessary.
Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) GENERATOR OFF caution level (amber) CAS
message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
3 GENERATOR OFF caution level (amber) CAS message (affected engine) – Check
message has disappeared.
4 Check circuit breakers GEN CONTROL L and R (positions 2A and 2B) and
GENERATOR EXCITATION (position 1A)
6 GENERATOR OFF caution level (amber) CAS message (affected engine) – Check
message has disappeared.
Display of both the LEFT GENERATOR OFF and RIGHT GENERATOR OFF caution
level (amber) CAS messages at the same time.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
NOTE
If both the LEFT GENERATOR OFF and the RIGHT GENERATOR
OFF caution level (amber) CAS messages persist for more than
120 seconds while the aircraft is in flight, they will be replaced by a
single GENERATORS OFF warning level (red) CAS message. The
meaning of the plural message is the same as the meaning of both
individual messages.
WARNING
Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) GENERATOR VOLTS caution level (amber) CAS
message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The voltage output of the affected generator is above the acceptable range.
ACTION
IF PROBLEM REMAINS:
Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) GENERATOR AMPS caution level (amber) CAS
message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The electrical load on the affected generator has been above 200 amps for more than
30 seconds, or; above 160 amps for more than 60 seconds while the aircraft is on the
ground.
ACTION
NOTE
Individual generator load limitations are 160 amps or less while on
ground at temperatures greater than 7°C, or 200 amps at all other
times.
1 Display of the MAIN BATTERY VOLTS caution level (amber) CAS message.
2 Change of background colour behind the numeric display of battery volts to amber.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The voltage of the main battery is below 22 volts. This is an indication of a discharged
battery.
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
Investigate and rectify the battery voltage problem prior to starting engines.
IF IN FLIGHT:
Confirm that the POWER SOURCE switch is at the BATTERY position (Pre Mod
6/2314) or BATTERY switch is ON (Post Mod 6/2314), and confirm that the generators
are both operating properly.
1 Display of the MAIN BATTERY AMPS caution level (amber) CAS message.
2 Change of background colour behind the numeric display of battery amps to amber.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The current being drawn from the main battery is greater than 60 amperes.
ACTION
Either bring a generator online to provide electrical power, or, if it is safe to do so,
reduce electrical demand.
3 HF radio switch OFF (if installed – use knob on HF radio control head)
8 INSTRUMENT and FLOOD dimmers fully off (use knobs on lighting control panel)
– Only if instrument panel lighting is not needed
Group 2 items
(do this only if additional load shedding is needed during an in-flight emergency):
1 Pull PY TUBE HEATER circuit breakers (Main CB panel to left of Captain, A7 and
B7) – Only if OAT is greater than 0°C
2 Pull AVIONICS FAN circuit breaker (Avionics CB panel on center pedestal, E7, lower
left corner) – Only if OAT is less than 35°C
3 Pull AVIONICS STRT BATT CHARGE circuit breaker (Avionics CB panel on center
pedestal, M7) (Post Mod 6/2315).
4 Turn off right PFD (far right knob on reversion controller) – Only if operating single
pilot, do not turn it off during 2 crew operations
3 HF radio switch OFF (if installed – use knob on HF radio control head)
8 INSTRUMENT and FLOOD dimmers fully off (use knobs on lighting control panel)
– Only if instrument panel lighting is not needed
9 FLT COMP FANS, CABIN FAN STA 332 BULKHEAD and CABIN FANS STA 111
BULKHEAD switches OFF (if installed)
Group 2 items
(do this only if additional load shedding is needed during an in-flight emergency):
1 Pull PY TUBE HEATER circuit breakers (Main CB panel to left of Captain, A7 and
B7) – Only if OAT is greater than 0°C
2 Pull AVIONICS FAN circuit breaker (Avionics CB panel on center pedestal, E7, lower
left corner) – Only if OAT is less than 35°C
3 Pull AVIONICS STRT BATT CHARGE circuit breaker (Avionics CB panel on center
pedestal, M7) (Post Mod 6/2315).
4 Turn off right PFD (far right knob on reversion controller) – Only if operating single
pilot, do not turn it off during 2 crew operations
ACTION:
In Section 3, ignore existing Para 3.14.8 and insert new Para as shown on Page 2 of
this Temporary Amendment.
-Continued overleaf-
APPROVED____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
DATE_________________________
RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS:
Record this TEMPORARY AMENDMENT NO. and the relevant information in the
appropriate columns of the TEMPORARY AMENDMENT INDEX provided at the front
of the manual.
1 Display of the MAIN BATTERY OFF caution level (amber) CAS message.
2 Change of background colour behind the numeric display of battery volts to amber.
The POWER SOURCE switch is not selected to BATTERY, and external power is not
present.
Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) FUEL FLOW LOW caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Fuel flow less than 60 lbs (27 kg) per hour, most likely as a result of a flameout.
ACTION
No action is necessary to specifically address the low fuel flow condition. The action to
be taken will be based on the consequences of the loss of power from the engine.
NOTE
This CAS message is primarily intended to assist the pilot in correctly
identifying a failed engine.
Display of the PUMP 1 AFT (or FORWARD) PRESS caution level (amber) CAS
message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The affected pump has failed, or the output pressure of the affected pump is insufficient.
ACTION
BOOST PUMP 1 circuit breaker for affected pump (position A8 for FORWARD or
position A9 for AFT, as appropriate) – pull circuit breaker.
NOTE
If the PUMP 1 caution level (amber) CAS message appears, but the
PUMP 2 caution level (amber) CAS message does not appear, this
indicates that the automatic changeover system has functioned as
designed and has automatically energized PUMP 2 in the affected
tank. It is neither necessary or desirable to lift the PUMP 2 switch
on the affected side to the EMERGENCY position. It is normal for
the PUMP 2 CAS message to appear momentarily (for less than one
second) at the moment the changeover takes place.
Display of both the PUMP 1 and PUMP 2 AFT (or FORWARD) PRESS caution level
(amber) CAS messages for the same fuel tank at the same time.
NOTE
This procedure applies only to the appearance of both the PUMP 1
PRESS and PUMP 2 PRESS CAS messages for the same tank. It
does not apply to illumination of the two small PUMP 1 and PUMP
2 rectangles underneath the fuel quantity gauges. The two small
rectangles under the fuel quantity gauges operate in exactly the
same manner as DHC-6 Series 300 annunciator lights, and they
will normally appear underneath the deselected tank whenever the
FUEL SELECTOR rotary switch has been moved to BOTH ON AFT
or BOTH ON FORWARD.
PROBABLE CAUSE
PUMP 1 in the affected tank has failed, or the output pressure of PUMP 1 is insufficient,
and at the same time, the automatic changeover system has also failed.
ACTION
1 Confirm that the PUMP 1 switch for the affected tank is in the ON position.
3 BOOST PUMP 1 circuit breaker for affected pump (position A8 for FORWARD or
position A9 for AFT, as appropriate) – pull circuit breaker.
The PUMP 2 PRESS caution CAS message should disappear once step 2 has been
completed.
NOTE
CAS messages will disappear when opposite side (unaffected) tank
is selected because the boost pumps in the affected tank have been
switched off. This does not mean that the failure of the pumps in the
affected tank is no longer present.
5 For fuel planning purposes, consider the fuel in the affected tank to be unusable.
1 Display of the FUEL CROSSFEED FAIL caution level (amber) message, and;
2 Display of both the PUMP 2 AFT PRESS and PUMP 2 FORWARD PRESS caution
level (amber) messages, and;
3 Display of the CROSSFEED BOTH AFT and CROSSFEED BOTH FWD status level
(white) messages at the same time, and;
4 No CAS messages related to either the forward or aft PUMP 1 are present.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The FUEL CROSSFEED circuit breaker (position D7) is out. Because of the loss of
power to the control and monitoring circuit for the automatic changeover system and the
crossfeed valve, both of the PUMP 2 caution messages – which are normally inhibited
when output pressure is being provided by PUMP 1 – are no longer inhibited. The
crossfeed messages are spurious and should be disregarded.
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
IF IN FLIGHT:
1 Select the two PUMP 2 switches to EMERGENCY. This is not an urgent action or
memory item, it is done as a precaution because the automatic changeover system
will not longer operate in the event that a number 1 boost pump should fail in the
future.
2 Disregard the two fuel crossfeed status messages. The position of the fuel crossfeed
valve cannot be monitored. The fuel crossfeed valve will remain in whatever position
it was in at the time the messages appeared, and cannot be changed. The position
of the crossfeed valve can be determined by looking at the position of the FUEL
SELECTOR knob at the time the messages appeared.
3 Monitor fuel consumption from the two fuselage tanks. If the crossfeed valve was
open at the time the CAS messages appeared, fuel may not be consumed evenly
from the forward and aft tanks.
4 If fuel is being consumed unevenly from the fuselage tanks, land the aircraft before
fuel quantity in either tank decreases to less than 100 lbs.
Display of the AFT (or FWD) FUEL QTY LOW caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Low fuel quantity in the affected tank. The FWD FUEL QTY LOW caution CAS message
will appear when approximately 75 lbs (34 kg) of fuel remains in the forward tank. The
AFT FUEL QTY LOW caution CAS message will appear when approximately 110 lbs
(50 kg) of fuel remains in the aft tank.
If either FUEL QTY LOW caution CAS message appears and the corresponding fuel
indicator indicates 300 lbs (135 kg) or more of fuel in the affected tank, refer to the
procedure provided in Para 3.15.6 ‘Fuel Transfer Failure’.
ACTION
2 Continue flight and land as soon as practical with FUEL SELECTOR rotary switch
set to the unaffected tank.
3 For fuel planning purposes, consider the fuel in the affected tank to be unusable.
5 If there is fuel present in one or both wing tanks, select the appropriate WING TANK
switch to the ENGINE position.
6 Land as soon as possible, but in no case later than 15 minutes after illumination
of the FUEL LOW BOTH TANKS warning level (red) CAS message, using only the
minimum power necessary to continue flight.
7 Maintain as level an attitude as possible for the remainder of the flight to enable all
fuel to be consumed.
Display of an AFT (or FWD) FUEL QTY LOW caution level (amber) CAS message
in flight with 300 or more lbs (135 or more kg) of fuel remaining in the affected tank
indicates a probable failure of the fuel transfer system.
There is no CAS message that directly annunciates a fuel transfer failure. Fuel transfer
failure is inferred from the combination of a FUEL QTY LOW caution level (amber) CAS
message and the presence of 300 or more lbs (135 or more kg) of fuel in the affected
tank.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Numerous causes are possible, none of which can be directly addressed by the pilot.
ACTION
3 Continue flight and land as soon as practical with FUEL SELECTOR rotary switch
set to the unaffected tank.
4 For fuel planning purposes, consider the fuel in the affected tank to be unusable.
Display of the FUEL CROSSFEED FAIL caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Check FUEL CROSSFEED circuit breaker (position D7). If this circuit breaker
is out, and if PUMP 2 caution level messages appear, refer to and complete the
procedure Para 3.15.4, “Pump 2 Press CAS messages both present (FORWARD
and AFT tanks)”.
2 If the FUEL CROSSFEED FAIL message appears when the FUEL SELECTOR
knob is in NORMAL:
It is possible that fuel may be consumed at unequal rates from the forward and aft
fuel tanks. Monitor the fuel quantities as they decrease in each tank, and plan to
land before either tank decreases to 200 lbs (90 kg) total quantity. Consumption
of fuel from the tank with the greater quantity may be encouraged by selecting the
PUMP 2 switch of the tank with the greater quantity up to the EMERGENCY position.
3 If the FUEL CROSSFEED FAIL message appears when the FUEL SELECTOR
knob is in BOTH ON AFT or BOTH ON FWD:
Consumption of fuel by both engines from the selected tank cannot be assured.
A flameout of the engine that is normally fed from the deselected tank is possible.
Immediately lift the PUMP 2 switch of the deselected tank up to the EMERGENCY
position. Prior to taking any further action, observe the decrease in fuel quantities
in each tank that takes place over a 20 minute period.
Display of the FUEL QUANTITY FAULT caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Complete or partial failure of the Fuel Quantity Gauging System (FQGS) computer.
This may result in loss of display of aft fuselage and left wing tanks, or forward fuselage
and right wing tanks, or both, depending on whether one or both channels of the FQGS
have failed. The display of affected tanks in the fuel window will normally be replaced
by large white ‘X’ marks in place of the quantity display. The display of total fuel quantity
at the top of the fuel window will be inaccurate.
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
Repair before flight. Check circuit breakers FUEL QUANTITY L/AFT (position C9) and
FUEL QUANTITY R/FWD (position D9).
IF IN FLIGHT:
Display of fuel quantity in the affected tank(s) will not be available. Use manual
calculation (time and fuel flow indications) to estimate fuel quantity remaining. If there
is any uncertainty about fuel quantity remaining in the aircraft, land as soon as practical.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Affected WING TANK switch has been moved to the REFUEL position and the aircraft
is in flight.
ACTION
Move the affected WING TANK switch to the OFF or ENGINE position, as desired.
WARNING
PROBABLE CAUSE
Affected wing tank fuel pump pressure output is below acceptable limit. This could be
because the wing fuel tank is empty and there is no fuel remaining to be pumped, or it
could be because the pump has failed.
ACTION
1 Check the quantity of fuel in the affected tank. If the tank is empty, move the WING
PUMP switch to the OFF position.
2 If the wing tank is not empty, check the circuit breaker for the affected wing fuel
pump (position A13 for left and B13 for right, as appropriate). Do not reset the
circuit breaker in flight unless it is essential to do so.
3 If the circuit breaker is not popped out and the wing tank is not empty, pump failure
can be presumed. For fuel planning purposes, the fuel in the affected wing tank
is definitely unusable. Gravity feed from the wing tank is not possible. Select the
affected WING TANK switch to the OFF position.
Display of the HYDRAULIC PRESS LOW caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
System hydraulic pressure is less than 1,225 PSI and the aircraft is in flight.
ACTION
WARNING
2 Ensure that hydraulic system pressure is maintained at or above 1,500 PSI at all
times following flap extension. After landing, nose wheel steering should be used
with caution. Large movements of the nose wheel steering tiller may deplete the
hydraulic system pressure faster than the pilot can operate the pump.
3 HYDRAULIC OIL PUMP circuit breaker (position C6) – Check, but do not reset in
flight.
5 Prepare for:
Display of HYD PUMP OVER TEMP caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
IF IN FLIGHT:
WARNING
3 Ensure that hydraulic system pressure is maintained at or above 1,500 PSI at all
times following flap extension. After landing, nose wheel steering should be used
with caution. Large movements of the nose wheel steering tiller may deplete the
hydraulic system pressure faster than the pilot can operate the pump.
4 After landing, taxi with caution, maintaining hydraulic pressure with hand pump.
5 If it can be determined that one source of pitot pressure is reliable and the other is
not, press the ADAHRS button on the PFD controller of the PFD with the unreliable
source to enable data from the reliable (opposite side) ADAHRS channel to be
displayed on both PFDs.
Display of the LEFT (or RIGHT) PROBE FAIL caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
1 For “commuter configuration” (Part 121) aircraft only: The PITOT HEAT switch is
off, or;
2 For all aircraft: the heater element in the affected pitot tube (the ‘probe’) has failed.
ACTION
2 Avoid flight in icing conditions. If in icing conditions, exit icing conditions as soon
as possible.
3 If appropriate, press the ADAHRS button on the PFD controller of the PFD that is
normally supplied with airspeed data from the pitot tube with the failed heater, to
enable data from the pitot tube with the properly functioning heater (the opposite
side) ADAHRS to be displayed on both PFDs.
NOTE
The ESIS (Electronic Standby Instrument System) is permanently
connected to the right hand pitot tube.
Display of the ESIS ON BATT POWER caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The ESIS (Emergency Standby Instrument System) battery is not being supplied with
charging current from the aircraft electrical system.
ACTION
1 If the aircraft electrical system is otherwise operating normally, check the ESIS
BATTERY circuit breaker (position N5) and the ESIS INST circuit breaker (position
P5) on the avionics circuit breaker panel. Do not reset these circuit breakers in
flight unless the ESIS fails to operate when the ESIS POWER switch is in the ARM
position.
2 If other aircraft electrical system abnormalities are present (for example, loss of all
power on one or more DC busses), this message advises that the ESIS is now
operating on power from its own independent battery. No action is necessary.
Display of the PNEUMATIC PRESS LOW caution level (amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
If the PNEUMATIC PRESS LOW caution level (amber) CAS message appears during
flight in icing conditions:
PROBABLE CAUSE
The DUCT OVERHEAT caution level (amber) CAS message will appear when the air
temperature in the heating system plenum (directly below the floor between the two
pilot seats) exceeds a safe value. The cause is almost always a lack of outside air
flowing through the heating system.
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
3 VENT FAN – ON
PROBABLE CAUSE
One of the doors monitored by the DOORS UNLOCKED circuit is not secure and the
aircraft is on ground.
ACTION
3 If it is necessary to exit the aircraft to secure the door, shut down the engine on the
affected side before leaving the aircraft, and exit and re-enter the aircraft only from
the side with the inoperative engine.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Check position of the ELT switch (extreme right side of lower sub panel) and ensure
that the ELT has not been manually selected ON.
3 If necessary, turn the ELT off using the switch on the ELT itself, which is located in
the empennage, aft of the bulkhead at the rear of the baggage compartment shelf.
NOTE
The ELT is equipped with an aural warning device (a Sonalert,
or beeper). When the ELT is active, a loud beeping noise will be
heard from the empennage of the aircraft, aft of the rear baggage
compartment shelf extension at station 406.
If movement of the control column does not produce a corresponding change in pitch
attitude, longitudinal control can be managed by using the elevator trim. Engine power
should be used in controlling vertical speed and airspeed.
Application of power will usually result in a nose-up pitching moment, and reduction of
power will usually result in a nose-down pitching moment.
Extension of flap will usually result in a nose-up pitching moment, and retraction of flap
will usually result in a nose-down pitching moment.
New cyan (advisory level) messages are presented in inverse video text for 5 seconds.
At the end of this 5 second period, they automatically change to normal text display.
Advisory messages do not trigger either the MASTER CAUTION or the MASTER
WARNING annunciator.
Display of the LEFT or RIGHT AUTOFEATHER advisory level (cyan) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
NOTE
This message is provided to enhance situational awareness by
advising the crew that the autofeather system has deliberately
feathered a propeller.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Autofeather system has been armed. The word SELECT and the word ARMED will
appear in both autofeather system pushbuttons.
ACTION
PROBABLE CAUSE
Autofeather system has been selected on. The word SELECTED will appear in both
autofeather system pushbuttons.
ACTION
Display of the AVIONICS BATTERY LOW advisory level (cyan) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
For aircraft equipped with an avionics start battery (Post Mod 6/2315); the avionics
start battery voltage is less than 19 volts. This is an indication of a discharged avionics
start battery.
For aircraft not equipped with an avionics start battery (Pre Mod 6/2315); the voltage at
the MAU power input is below 19 volts. This is an indication of a very low aircraft voltage.
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
For aircraft equipped with an avionics start battery (Post Mod 6/2315); investigate and
rectify the avionics start battery voltage problem prior to starting engines, or consider
using a suitable ground power source for engine starts.
For aircraft not equipped with an avionics start battery (Pre Mod 6/2315); investigate
and rectify the low aircraft voltage problem prior to starting engines.
IF IN FLIGHT:
Confirm that:
Display of the AVIONICS FAN FAIL advisory level (cyan) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Air output from one or both of the supplemental avionics fans in the forward avionics
bay has fallen below the allowable threshold. The fans may or may not be operating.
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
IF IN FLIGHT:
If the outside air temperature is less than ISA, the probability of an undesirably warm
temperature developing within the forward avionics bay (between stations 44 and 60)
is very low and no further action needs to be taken. Repair before further flight.
If the outside air temperature is greater than ISA, there is a risk that an undesirably warm
temperature may develop in the forward avionics bay. The level of risk is proportionate
to the OAT. Airflow within the forward avionics bay can be enhanced by pulling both the
RAM AIR valve and the CABIN AIR valves fully out.
Report the condition in the aircraft technical log and investigate for cause before further
flight.
Display of the LEFT or RIGHT FIRE DETECT CB advisory level (cyan) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Affected FIRE DET FAULT IND circuit breaker (position C13 for left and D13 for right)
has popped out.
NOTE
If both engine FIRE PRESS TO DISCHARGE switch lights illuminate
and the aural warning for an engine fire sounds when the SYSTEM
TEST – FIRE WARNING switch is lifted, the fire detection and
indication system is operating (although in a reversionary mode) and
the aircraft may be dispatched. Report the condition in the aircraft
technical log and investigate for cause at the earliest opportunity.
If the fire detection and indication system does not test satisfactorily,
the aircraft may not be dispatched. Repair before flight.
Display of the LEFT or RIGHT GENERATOR OFF advisory level (cyan) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Engine has been running for less than 30 seconds and the generator has not yet been
switched on.
NOTE
The GENERATOR OFF message is presented as an advisory
level (cyan) message only during the first 30 seconds of engine
operation simply to avoid triggering the MASTER CAUTION advisory
immediately after engine start. Otherwise, the meaning of the
message is identical to that of the GENERATOR OFF caution level
(amber) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Altitude reporting has been selected OFF within the transponder detail window.
ACTION
2 Confirm with air traffic control that altitude reporting is functioning properly.
Display of the PNEUMATIC PRESS LOW advisory level (cyan) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
If the PNEUMATIC PRESS LOW advisory level (cyan) CAS message appears during
ground operations, and the crew wants full inflation and deflation of the de-ice boots
while on ground:
PROBABLE CAUSE
WARNING
1 Flaps must be within ±2° of the approved take-off setting (10° for
landplanes, 20° for floatplanes).
2 Elevator and rudder trims must be within the allowable range for
take-off.
Display of the LEFT or RIGHT WING REFUEL ON advisory level (cyan) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Aircraft is on ground and the left and/or right wing tanks are being refuelled from the
fuselage tanks.
New white (status level) messages are never presented in inverse video text. They
appear in normal text display only.
Status messages do not trigger either the MASTER CAUTION or the MASTER
WARNING annunciator.
Display of the ESIS BATTERY TEST PASS status level (white) CAS message.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ESIS switch has been moved to the TEST position, and the ESIS battery has passed
the test.
Display of various status level (white) CAS messages that contain the word GEAR or
ENGINES.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
The Apex system will display these messages at initial power-up to indicate what type
of landing gear and engine the avionics system is configured for. If the gear type and
engine type correspond to the physical configuration of the aircraft, no action is required.
If the gear type and engine type do not correspond with the physical configuration of
the aircraft, repair before engine start.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
The messages are presented in alphabetical order, exactly as they appear on the
CAS display. The following messages are unique to the Twin Otter. This table does
not include CAS messages that are generic to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Avionics
system.
The avionics system CAS messages that follow have been grouped by subject area.
3.24.1 Displays
PROBABLE CAUSE
Failure of an advanced graphic module (AGM). Failure of AGM will affect the display
units normally supplied from that AGM.
ACTION
2 If DU 1 and 2 are affected (left pilot and top middle), set Reversion Controller
DU 1 outer knob to AGM 2.
3 If DU 3 and 4 are affected (bottom middle and right pilot), set Reversion
Controller DU 4 outer knob to AGM 1.
4 Set affected DU control knob for the one remaining display with the large red
X to OFF/REV.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Turn dimmer control for affected display panel fully counterclockwise, past the OFF/REV
detent.
CHECK DU 1 or DU 2 or DU 3 or DU 4
CHECK DU 1+2 or 1+3 or 1+4, 2+3 or 2+4 or 3+4
CHECK DU 1+2+3 or 1+2+4 or 1+3+4 or 2+3+4
CHECK DU 1+2+3+4
PROBABLE CAUSE
Display wrap monitoring system has detected a difference between data sent to the
display panel and data presented on the display panel.
ACTION
2 Using the dimmer control on the reversion panel, turn the affected display completely
off (past the final detent), wait several seconds, then turn the display back on.
NOTE
If the CAS message disappears after carrying out the above step, no
further action, investigation, or reporting is necessary.
IF IT IS BLANK OR SUSPECT:
4 If necessary, use Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS) for flight guidance.
5 Lift EMERGENCY COM switch to select 121.5 MHz if radio control window not
visible.
DU 1 or DU 2 or DU 3 or DU 4 OVERHEAT
DU 1+2 or 1+3 or 1+4, 2+3 or 2+4 OVERHEAT
DU 1+2+3 or 1+2+4 OVERHEAT
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
2 Evaluate relevant display and treat as suspect, be prepared for display failure.
DU circuit breakers are located on the avionics Circuit Breaker panel and are
labelled as follows:
NOTE
If the MFD swap button is used for DU 2 or 3, the optional Jeppesen
charts can only be displayed on the upper DU 2.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
4 Land as soon as possible using minimum engine power to avoid exceeding engine
limits.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 RH PFD Controller – Push PFD button to enable control of left PFD display from
right side PFD controller.
NOTE
X PFD CTLR ACTIVE annunciation will be displayed in amber along
bottom right of the ADI on the pilot PFD. PFD CTLR INACTIVE will
be displayed on copilot PFD.
2 To control right side PFD, press RH PFD Controller PFD button again. The right
hand PFD controller can be ‘toggled’ back and forth between controlling the left or
right side PFD by repeatedly pressing the RH PFD Controller PFD button.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 LH PFD Controller – Push PFD button to enable control of right PFD display from
left side PFD controller.
NOTE
X PFD CTLR ACTIVE annunciation will be displayed in amber along
bottom right of the ADI on the co-pilot PFD. PFD CTLR INACTIVE
will be displayed on pilot PFD.
2 To control left side PFD, press LH PFD Controller PFD button again. The left hand
PFD controller can be ‘toggled’ back and forth between controlling the right or left
side PFD by repeatedly pressing the LH PFD Controller PFD button.
CAS caution level (amber) message: LH PFD CTLR FAIL and RH PFD CTLR FAIL
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
3 Altimeter setting may only be possible on the Electronic Standby Instrument System
(ESIS).
4 If control of track bar and bearing pointers is lost during IMC flight, declare an
emergency and request radar vectors.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
Use the DIRECT TO button, the alphanumeric keypad, and the ENT button to create
a leg to the next desired waypoint. This process will need to be repeated for each
waypoint along the route.
OR
Navigate using Short Range Navigation (SRN) sources only, and disregard FMS.
CAS caution level (amber) message: CHECK PILOT PFD DATA or CHECK COPILOT
PFD DATA
PROBABLE CAUSE
Display wrap monitoring system has detected a difference between data sent to the
display panel and data presented on the display panel.
Data being sent to left hand or right hand (as indicated) PFD may be suspect.
ACTION
1 Using dimmer control on the reversion panel, turn the affected display completely
off (past the final detent), wait several seconds, then turn the display back on.
NOTE
If the CAS message disappears after carrying out the above step, no
further action, investigation, or reporting is necessary.
2 Display – Cross check pilot PFD data with co-pilot PFD data, or with the Electronic
Standby Instrument System (ESIS).
If data on affected display appears satisfactory, continue to use the displayed data
(without initiating reversion), but continue to monitor left and right PFDs carefully as
long as the CAS message persists.
3 Reversion Controller –
If PILOT display affected: Set PILOT PFD reversion control knob to AGM 2.
If COPILOT display affected: Set COPILOT PFD reversion control knob to AGM 1.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Invalid or suspect information being supplied from attitude component of the Air Data,
Attitude and Heading Reference System (ADAHRS).
ACTION
1 To obtain pitch and roll data, use Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS).
2 Press ADHRS pushbutton on affected PFD Controller to bring the other ADAHRS
channel data onto the affected PFD.
HDG FAIL message displayed in red within horizontal situation indicator (HSI).
PROBABLE CAUSE
Invalid or suspect information being supplied from heading component of the Air Data,
Attitude and Heading Reference System (ADAHRS) or, TRACK SOURCE configuration
switch may not be in appropriate position.
ACTION
1 Use magnetic heading displayed on the bottom of the Electronic Standby Instrument
System (ESIS), and/or;
WARNING
3 Press the ADHRS pushbutton on the PFD Controller of the affected side to bring
the other ADAHRS channel heading data onto the affected PFD.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Invalid or suspect information being supplied from air data component of the Air Data,
Attitude and Heading Reference System (ADAHRS).
ACTION
2 Press ADHRS pushbutton on the affected PFD Controller to bring the other ADAHRS
channel Airspeed data onto the affected PFD.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Invalid or suspect information being supplied from air data component of the Air Data,
Attitude and Heading Reference System (ADAHRS).
ACTION
2 Press ADHRS pushbutton on the affected PFD Controller to bring the other ADAHRS
channel altitude data onto the affected PFD.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Invalid or suspect information being supplied from air data component of the Air Data,
Attitude and Heading Reference System (ADAHRS).
ACTION
1 To obtain vertical speed data, refer to Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS).
2 Press ADHRS pushbutton on the affected PFD Controller to bring the other ADAHRS
channel vertical speed data onto the affected PFD.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Display – Cross check pilot PFD data with co-pilot PFD data.
If engine window data on both PFD displays appears satisfactory, continue to use the
displayed data (without initiating reversion), but continue to monitor left and right engine
windows carefully as long as the CAS message persists.
NOTE
This message is intended to suggest that engine data presented on
one of the two PFDs may not be accurate. It does not suggest that
engine data on both of the PFDs is inaccurate.
PROBABLE CAUSE
WARNING
ACTION
NOTE
All ADAHRS data (attitude, heading, speed, altitude, vertical speed)
will be sourced from the opposite side ADAHRS when the ADAHRS
button is pressed.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Difference of greater than 200 feet between results of ADAHRS channels A and
ADAHRS channel B altitude computations. This may be caused by one of both of two
possible problems.
WARNING
ACTION
1 Check to ensure that the correct altimeter setting has been set on all three altimeters
(Left PFD, Right PFD, and ESIS).
2 Check to determine if the BARO SYNC setting (enable or disable), found on the
lower left 1/6th display of the SYSTEMS MFD, within the AVIONICS window, on
the PFD tab is correctly configured. A selection of ENABLE causes the altimeter
setting on both PFDs to be synchronized at all times. A setting of DISABLE allows
independent operation of the left and right PFD altimeter setting.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Heading – Cross check with Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS) and
Standby Compass. The ESIS provides a totally independent source of magnetic
heading. Ensure that windshield heat is switched OFF prior to using the Standby
Compass at the top center of the windshield.
NOTE
All ADAHRS data (attitude, heading, speed, altitude, vertical speed)
will be sourced from the opposite side ADAHRS when the ADAHRS
button is pressed.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Pitch – Compare Left PFD, Right PFD, and Electronic Standby Instrument System
(ESIS). The ESIS provides a totally independent source of pitch information.
2 After determining which PFD is displaying correct pitch data, press the ADHRS
pushbutton on the suspect side PFD Controller to bring the unaffected ADAHRS
channel pitch data onto the affected PFD.
NOTE
All ADAHRS data (attitude, heading, speed, altitude, vertical speed)
will be sourced from the opposite side ADAHRS when the ADHRS
button is pressed.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Roll – Compare Left PFD, Right PFD, and Electronic Standby Instrument System
(ESIS). The ESIS provides a totally independent source of roll information.
2 After determining which PFD is displaying correct roll data, press the ADHRS
pushbutton on the suspect side PFD Controller to bring the unaffected ADAHRS
channel roll data onto the affected PFD.
NOTE
All ADAHRS data (attitude, heading, speed, altitude, vertical speed)
will be sourced from the opposite side ADAHRS when the ADHRS
button is pressed.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Compare altitude display and value set for altimeter setting in Left PFD, Right PFD,
and Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS).
2 If appropriate, press the ADHRS pushbutton on the suspect side PFD Controller to
bring the unaffected ADAHRS channel altimeter display onto the affected PFD.
NOTE
All ADAHRS data (attitude, heading, speed, altitude, vertical speed)
will be sourced from the opposite side ADAHRS when the ADHRS
button is pressed.
Any of the following amber CAS caution level (amber) messages present when the
aircraft is on ground (these messages will never appear in flight):
PROBABLE CAUSE
Hardware and/or software validation failed. These messages are only likely to appear
following installation or replacement of an avionics component, change of aircraft
gear configuration, or loading of new system software (not navigation or cartography
software).
ACTION
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Display Reversion Control Panel – Set PILOTS PFD control knob to AGM 2
2 Display Reversion Control Panel – Set UPPER MFD control knob to OFF/REV
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Display Reversion Control Panel – Set COPILOTS PFD control knob to AGM 1
2 Display Reversion Control Panel – Set LOWER MFD control knob to OFF/REV
4 MAU 2A circuit breaker (position F1) – Open, wait 2 seconds and close
IF FAILURE REMAINS:
If MAU Channel B cannot be reset, all FMS and INAV map functions are unavailable
for the remainder of the flight. Select the SYSTEM screen to appear on the upper
(operating) MFD, and leave it visible for the remainder of the flight. Do not use the MFD
SWAP button to refer to the INAV map and/or FMS information on the FMS screen.
IF FAILURE CLEARS:
6 Display Reversion Control Panel – Set COPILOTS PFD control knob to NORM.
7 Display Reversion Control Panel – Turn LOWER MFD control knob clockwise to
enable use of DU 3.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
IF IN FLIGHT:
2 It will be necessary to manually switch off the weather radar and transponder after
landing.
3 Inappropriate CAS messages may appear during ground operations after landing.
PROBABLE CAUSE
1 AURAL 1 MUTE and AURAL 2 MUTE configuration switch is in mute position, or;
ACTION
WARNING
CAS caution level (amber) message: DME 1 FAIL, or DME 2 FAIL, or both messages
present.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
IF UNSUCCESSFUL:
1 CAS caution level (amber) message: RAD ALT 1 FAIL and/or RAD ALT 2 FAIL
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
WARNING
Loss of airspeed, altitude, and VSI information on one PFD CAS caution level (amber)
message: ADC A FAIL or ADC B FAIL
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Affected PFD Controller – Press ADHRS button to select opposite side (unaffected)
ADAHRS.
WARNING
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Use Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS) for altitude and airspeed
information.
NOTE
The following services will be inoperative: Overspeed, Altitude Alert
Monitor, and air data to other systems (transponder, TCAS, etc.).
WARNING
Loss of attitude and heading information on one PFD CAS caution level (amber)
message: AHRS A FAIL or AHRS B FAIL
PROBABLE CAUSE
Attitude and heading reference system portion of affected ADAHRS has failed.
ACTION
1 Affected PFD Controller – Press ADHRS button to select opposite side (unaffected)
ADAHRS.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Attitude and heading reference system portion of both ADAHRS channels has failed.
ACTION
NOTE
The INAV Map will be inoperative.
WARNING
If flight conditions and pilot workload permits, attempt to realign AHRS 1 and/or AHRS 2.
2 ADAHRS CH A circuit breaker (position K1) – Open, wait 5 seconds, then close.
IF SUCCESSFUL:
ADHRS CH B circuit breaker (position K2) – Open, wait 5 seconds, then close.
3 Fly strictly wings level and do not change pitch altitude for 1 minute.
IF REALIGNMENT IS SUCCESSFUL:
CAS caution level (amber) message: FLT CTLR CH A FAIL or FLT CTLR CH B FAIL
PROBABLE CAUSE
Electronics problem.
ACTION
PROBABLE CAUSE
Electronics problem.
ACTION
CAUTION
CAS caution level (amber) message: FMS-GPS1 POS MISC or FMS-GPS2 POS MISC
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 GPS vs. FMS position – Check manually using SRN (short range navigation) or by
visual reference to ground.
2 Failed GPS – Deselect failed GPS, select other GPS on SENSORS page, GPS tab.
NOTE
With a single GPS failure, no loss of position will occur.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The Flight Management System (FMS) cannot reconcile its position with either GPS
receiver 1 or GPS receiver 2.
ACTION
2 Revert to alternative navigation methods other than GPS (pilotage, VOR, NDB,
dead reckoning, ground mapping with weather radar, etc.).
3 Do not rely on INAV (the large map on upper MFD) for aircraft position.
CAUTION
LOST FUCTIONALITY:
PROBABLE CAUSE
IF ON GROUND:
Flight crew failure to initialize FMS using normal procedures, or degradation of GPS
signal, or GPS antenna view of satellites blocked by nearby buildings.
IF IN FLIGHT:
ACTION
IF ON GROUND:
1 If FMS has not yet been initialized, initialize FMS using normal preflight procedures.
2 If message appears after FMS has been initialized, check GPS signal strength and
status.
CAUTION
4 IN FLIGHT (enroute):
a FMS information – Cross check with VOR, DME and/or NDB information.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
IF COM, NAV AND ADF RADIOS ARE NOT AVAILABLE AND COMMUNICATION IS
REQUIRED:
3 EMERGENCY COM switch – Lift to 121.5 MHz and release. Attempt to transmit
and receive on 121.5 MHz.
NOTE
If both MMDR’s are not completely unserviceable, communication
may be possible 121.5 MHz only.
PROBABLE CAUSE
NOTE
MMDR transmit capability will be reduced when internal temperature
of unit is too high. MMDR may become fully operative again after a
period of time.
ACTION
2 If the outside air temperature is less than ISA, the probability of an undesirably
warm temperature developing within the forward avionics bay (between stations 44
and 60) is very low.
3 If the outside air temperature is greater than ISA, there is a risk that an undesirably
warm temperature may develop in the forward avionics bay. The level of risk is
proportionate to the OAT. Airflow within the forward avionics bay can be enhanced
by pulling both the RAM AIR valve and the CABIN AIR valves fully out.
PROBABLE CAUSE
NOTE
MMDR 1 and 2 transmit capability will be reduced when internal
temperature of the units is too high. MMDR 1 and 2 may become
fully operative again after a period of time.
ACTION
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
3 XPDR detail page – Press XPDR SEL bezel button to change to unaffected
transponder.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
WARNING
By evaluating the data presented on the PFD and MFD displays, the crew can determine
if the cause of the message is a single ASCB bus failure or dual ASCB bus failure.
1 PFD and MFD data continues to be displayed (Flight data looks normal).
PFD and MFD data Suspect (Loss of displayed data, or questionable integrity of
displayed data).
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
Use ESIS for primary flight guidance for the remainder of the flight.
Condition: The Primus Apex® system has switched the reference source for the HSI
from a magnetically corrected heading display to a magnetically corrected track based
display.
NOTE
The main difference is that the drift angle, i.e. the difference between
aircraft heading and track is not shown. The HSI shows actual track
(related to Magnetic North) being made good.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 Flight Guidance Control Panel Heading/Track selector (circular ring around HDG
select knob) – Switch to Track.
PROBABLE CAUSE
The Primus Apex® system has switched the reference source for the HSI from a
magnetically corrected heading display to a track based display that is referenced to a
true North.
NOTE
The main difference is that the drift angle, i.e. the difference between
aircraft heading and track is not shown. The HSI shows actual track
(related to True North) being made good.
ACTION
Flight Guidance Control Panel Heading/Track selector (circular ring around HDG select
knob) – Switch to Track.
DAU failures only affect indications, not function or control of systems monitored by the
DAU.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
No pilot action can be taken to resolve the problem; however, equivalent information
to that which has been lost from the electronic displays may sometimes be available
elsewhere within the aircraft.
The effect of the failure will depend on what channel of what DAU is affected:
DAU 1A FAIL
- Pitch trim electronic display – use the mechanical pointer beside trim wheel.
- Left oil temperature display.
- Cockpit temperature display – use cabin temperature display.
DAU 1B FAIL
- Rudder trim electronic display – use mechanical pointer beside rudder trim wheel.
- Brake hydraulic pressure display – use system hydraulic pressure display.
DAU 2A FAIL
DAU 2B FAIL
Warning level (red) CAS message HYDRAULIC PRESS LOW will appear due to loss of
system hydraulic pressure input to DAU, this may not reflect actual hydraulic pressure.
Brake hydraulic pressure indication will remain unaffected and may indicate hydraulic
pump operation.
CAS caution level (amber) messages DAU 1A FAIL and DAU 1B FAIL, or; DAU 2A FAIL
and DAU 2B FAIL
- Pitch trim electronic display – use the mechanical pointer beside trim wheel.
- Left oil temperature display.
- Cockpit temperature display – use cabin temperature display.
- Rudder trim electronic display – use mechanical pointer beside rudder trim wheel.
- Brake hydraulic pressure display – use system hydraulic pressure display.
Warning level (red) CAS message HYDRAULIC PRESS LOW will appear due to loss of
system hydraulic pressure input to DAU, this may not reflect actual hydraulic pressure.
Brake hydraulic pressure indication will remain unaffected and may indicate hydraulic
pump operation.
PROBABLE CAUSE
Failure of both channels of a single Data Acquisition Unit (DAU). DAU 1 monitors the
left engine, and DAU 2 monitors the right engine.
ACTION
Match power lever physical position for the remainder of the flight, using indications
from the engine with functional displays as a guide to operation of the engine without
indications.
Confirm correct operation of hydraulic oil pump (by listening for pump operation when
flaps are extended or when brake pedals are repeatedly pressed) prior to landing.
Be aware that the amber MONITOR FAULT CAS message (if DAU 1 has failed) or red
HYDRAULIC PRESS LOW CAS message (if DAU 2 has failed) are direct consequences
of the DAU failure, not indications of independent and unrelated failures.
The aircraft cannot be dispatched with two channels of the same DAU failed. If it is safe
and practical to do so, land at an aerodrome that has maintenance facilities.
Letters ‘MW’ (for ‘Monitor Warning’) displayed in amber square on left edge of CAS
window.
PROBABLE CAUSE
ACTION
1 CAS Window – Toggle the soft key (bezel button) beside the letters MW to see
alternatively Channel A or B of the CAS list to determine which message is
triggering the MW miscompare condition. The affected message will be missing, or
of a different severity level, on one of the two CAS list presentations.
2 Attempt to determine the reason for the miscompare flag and take appropriate
action, using the affected CAS message and Abnormal Procedures.
* These messages require maintenance action if they cannot be cleared before flight.
During flight, continue with remaining operational equipment and report on landing.
IF IN FLIGHT
SECTION 4
NORMAL PROCEDURES
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
4.1 Introduction
Operators are encouraged to develop their own ‘quick reference’ normal checklists
based on the procedures provided in this manual. The sequence of individual checklist
items should not be changed when operator-specific quick reference checklists are
developed. For example, turning off the autofeather system is listed as the last item in
the After Take-off checklist, and it should remain the last item in any operator-specific
‘quick reference’ After Take-off checklist.
The normal operating procedures in this section comply with the requirements of SFAR
23.
CAUTION
4.2 Scope
This section provides normal operating procedures. Normal procedures are used when
systems are functioning in their usual manner.
Because the focus of this manual is on providing technical guidance that is specific or
unique to the DHC-6, no attempt has been made to include in the checklists standard
‘airmanship’ practices that are applicable to any flight such as confirming that the area is
clear around the aircraft, observation of traffic, operation of exterior lighting required for
flight, operation of avionics equipment such as communication or navigation equipment,
or operation of safety systems such as TAWS, TCAS, weather radar, and so forth.
Visually check the exterior of the airplane for condition, security (particularly access
panels), and any sign of damage. Check for any liquids on the ground or on the airplane
that may indicate engine, hydraulic, fuel, or battery system failure or malfunction. A tall
ladder will be required to check wing tank fuel caps on aircraft equipped with wing fuel
tanks.
Nose wheel
3 Fairings – Check
Right Fuselage
Right Engine
7 Static Wicks and Bonding Straps – Check All are Present, Secure, Good Condition
Empennage
5 Static Wicks and Bonding Straps – Check All are Present, Secure, Good Condition
8 Beacon – Check
3 Fairings – Check
8 Static Wicks and Bonding Straps – Check All are Present, Secure, Good Condition
Left Engine
Left Fuselage
WARNING
Prior to any flight in temperatures below +5°C check that the pitot tubes and stall vanes
are warm after turning on the pitot heat for 30 seconds and then turning pitot heat off.
Make sure that the pitot covers are removed before turning pitot heat on.
1 Ensure that the aircraft is level fore and aft and side to side.
2 Allow sufficient time for the fuel levels in the individual fuel cells to stabilize. To obtain
the most accurate reading, the fuel quantity should be checked using the dipstick
after the aircraft has been parked overnight. If the aircraft has been refuelled, allow
15 minutes after completion of refuelling for individual cell contents to stabilize.
3 Insert the dipstick into the fuel cap filler neck so that the flange near the handle of
the dipstick contacts both the upper and lower surface of the circular ring that the
fuel cap attaches to.
4 Withdraw the dipstick and read the fuel level on the appropriate side of dipstick in
accordance with instruction on the dipstick. One side of the dipstick is marked for
forward fuel tank contents, the other side is marked for aft fuel tank contents.
3 Parking Brake – On
8 Circuit Breakers – All in (main panel, avionics panel, station 332 panel)
WARNING
ACTION:
In Section 3, ignore existing Para 4.4.5, Step 26 and insert new Step 26, as shown
on Page 2 of this Temporary Amendment.
-Continued overleaf-
APPROVED____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
DATE_________________________
RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS:
Record this TEMPORARY AMENDMENT NO. and the relevant information in the
appropriate columns of the TEMPORARY AMENDMENT INDEX provided at the front
of the manual.
26 CAUTION LIGHTS switch – TEST. Confirm that the STALL warning light on the
fuel selector panel illuminates, both MASTER CAUTION and MASTER WARNING
lights illuminate, the SELECTED [SELECT] and ARMED indications in both
AUTOFEATHER switchlights illuminate, and the engine FIRE warning lights
illuminate.
24 FIRE WARNING SYSTEM TEST switch – Lift up. Check that each of the two FIRE
– PUSH TO DISCHARGE switchlights illuminate, the word FIRE appears in the T5
engine indications, and the aural warning for fire is voiced.
26 CAUTION LIGHTS switch – TEST. Confirm that the STALL warning light on the
fuel selector panel illuminate, both MASTER CAUTION and MASTER WARNING
lights illuminate, and the SELECTED [SELECT] and ARMED indications in both
AUTOFEATHER switchlights illuminate.
28 Once every 24 hours (typically prior to the first flight of the day) complete the
following expanded system tests:
a Begin with all fuel pump switches in the NORMAL or OFF position, and the
FUEL SELECTOR knob in the NORMAL position. Complete fuel boost pump
and changeover system tests as follows:
(1) AFT PUMP 2 and FWD PUMP 2 switches – EMERGENCY. Check BOOST
PUMP 2 AFT PRESS and BOOST PUMP 2 FWD PRESS caution CAS
messages are not present.
(2) AFT PUMP 2 and FWD PUMP 2 switches – NORMAL. Check BOOST
PUMP 2 AFT PRESS and BOOT PUMP 2 FWD PRESS caution CAS
messages are present.
(3) AFT PUMP 1 and FWD PUMP 1 switches – TEST. Check BOOST PUMP
2 AFT PRESS and BOOST PUMP 2 FWD PRESS caution CAS messages
are not present.
(4) AFT PUMP 1 and FWD PUMP 1 switches – ON. Check BOOST PUMP 1
AFT PRESS and BOOST PUMP 2 AFT PRESS and BOOST PUMP 1 FWD
PRESS and BOOST PUMP 2 FWD PRESS caution CAS messages are not
present.
(5) Confirm that the fuel crossfeed annunciation in the fuel system window is
not present when the FUEL SELECTOR is at NORMAL, and that it appears
in green inverse video when the FUEL SELECTOR is at the BOTH ON AFT
or BOTH ON FWD position.
29 Confirm that the CAS messages that appear at initial power-on indicating engine
and gear fitment correspond to the engines and gear fitted to the aircraft.
7 All Interior Lights – Check for Proper Function (if required for night operations)
For aircraft with Mod 6/2308 Photoluminescent Cabin EXIT signs incorporated:
8 For night operations CABIN LIGHTS – BRIGHT for a minimum of 5 minutes prior to
take-off to sufficiently charge the EXIT signs for up to 5 hours.
For night flights in excess of 5 hours, periodic re-charging of the EXIT signs is
required. It is recommended that every 2 to 3 hours of night flight, the cabin lights
be switched on to BRIGHT for at least 5 minutes.
NOTE
The photoluminescent cabin EXIT signs are non-electric so they
cannot be turned on or off. The photo luminescence signs absorb
energy when exposed to light, and gradually release this energy.
It takes several minutes of exposure to cabin lighting to completely
charge the EXIT signs.
6 Hydraulic Pressures – Check that both are above 1,300 PSI (1,500 PSI is typical)
9 BEACON switch – ON
NOTE
The propeller levers should be placed in the full forward (MAX RPM)
position prior to engine start. This will reduce starting time and lower
peak T5 temperature during start.
CAUTION
4 START switch – Select LEFT or RIGHT as required. When external power is used
for starting, the right engine is normally started first to minimize propeller blast
directed to the ground crew on the left side of the aircraft.
CAUTION
5 Allow the gas generator speed to stabilize. As soon as the gas generator speed
has stabilized, move the applicable engine FUEL lever to ON without further delay.
6 Light-up – Check that engine accelerates to idle RPM (typically 52% NG at ISA) and
that the T5 temperature during the start process does not exceed the starting limits.
NOTE
When switching the POWER SOURCE from EXTERNAL to
BATTERY, pull the lever-lock switch out, then; rapidly and deliberately
move the switch lever fully downward to the BATTERY position.
The Apex avionics system will trip offline if it is without power for
longer than 200 milliseconds. Do not bring generators online prior to
moving the POWER SOURCE switch from EXTERNAL to BATTERY.
NOTE
Wait a few seconds for voltage to stabilize.
NOTE
It is neither necessary or desirable to recharge the battery between
engine starts unless the gas generator of the first engine started
stabilized below 16% NG.
Observe battery charge current until battery charge current is 40 amperes or less.
NOTE
Increasing NG to greater than 55% ensures that voltage stability
is maintained when one or both generators are operating under a
heavy load, such as recharging the battery following a battery start.
If NG is less than 55% and individual generator loads are greater
than approximately 50 amps, voltage may rise above 29 volts. This
is undesirable.
1 START switch – Select LEFT or RIGHT as desired, and engage starter for 5
seconds. Do not introduce fuel. Release switch after 5 seconds.
2 Wait approximately one minute, then start the engine using the normal battery start
procedures.
3 Allow the engine to idle until oil temperature reaches 0°C. Do not increase the
engine speed above idle until the oil temperature reaches 0°C.
CAUTION
8 Repeat steps 1 through 3 for the second engine, including the 5 second dry motoring
and one minute wait.
5 Transponder – Left portion of transponder window displaying GND (in small white
letters) and TA (in large white letters).
6 FMS – Alt/Speed and Fuel/Weight tabs completed. Confirm FMS fuel total matches
FQGS (Fuel Quantity Gauging System) fuel total. Press COMPUTE button, check
results.
NOTE
The ‘initial cruise altitude' on the Alt/Spd tab, and all the fields within
the ‘Fuel/Weight' tab of the ‘Aircraft on Ground' (setup) window of the
Flight Management Window must be completed, and the COMPUTE
button on the ‘Fuel/Weight' tab must be pressed if display of VNAV
information during climb, cruise, and approach is desired from the
FMS. It is recommended that the performance mode “current GS/FF”
be selected within the Alt/Spd tab.
7 Brakes – Off. Check operation of nose wheel steering and brakes, and correct
function of electrically operated hydraulic pump motor.
CAUTION
3 Reverse each propeller once. It is sufficient to momentarily move the power lever to
the zero thrust position, an increase in NG in reverse is not required. Return power
levers to IDLE.
4 Depress the AUTOFEATHER switchlight and confirm that the SELECTED [SELECT]
light in each switchlight illuminates, and the AUTOFEATHER SELECTED advisory
CAS message appears.
5 Advance the power levers until the ARMED light in the AUTOFEATHER switchlight
illuminates (approximately 25 to 30 PSI torque, will vary with temperature and
pressure altitude).
7 Quickly retard the left power lever to IDLE. Check that the ARMED light extinguishes,
and that the left propeller feathers approximately two seconds after the power lever
is retarded to IDLE. Check that the LEFT AUTOFEATHER advisory (cyan) CAS
message appears.
8 Retard the right power lever to IDLE. Confirm that the right propeller does not feather.
10 Repeat steps 5 through 9, transposing the left and right power levers to test
autofeathering of the right propeller. Check that the RIGHT AUTOFEATHER
advisory (cyan) CAS message appears.
11 Advance the left power lever to greater than 88% NG. Confirm that the ARMED light
in the AUTOFEATHER switchlight does not illuminate.
12 Advance the right power lever to greater than 88% NG. Confirm that the ARMED
light in the AUTOFEATHER switchlight illuminates.
13 Retard the left power lever to less than 88% NG. Confirm that the ARMED light in
the AUTOFEATHER switchlight extinguishes.
14 Retard the right power lever to less than 88% NG. Confirm that the ARMED light in
the AUTOFEATHER switchlight remains extinguished.
15 Depress the AUTOFEATHER switchlight and confirm that the SELECTED [SELECT]
light in each switchlight extinguishes.
The autofeather system test must be done once each week. Record completion of the
test in the aircraft log book.
CAUTION
The overspeed governor check must be done once every 24 hours (once per flying day).
2 Left power lever – Retard until the BETA annunciation appears, then return to IDLE.
3 Right power lever – Retard until the BETA annunciation appears, then return to IDLE.
4 Confirm that the beta range annunciation appears no later than when each power
lever has been moved one inch aft of the IDLE stop position.
2 Left PROP lever – Retard to MIN GOV. Check RESET PROPS annunciation
appears.
3 Both PROP levers – MAX RPM. Check RESET PROPS annunciation disappears.
NOTE
A minimum of 80% NG is required to extend the intake deflectors.
NOTE
To prevent spurious NO TAKEOFF warnings from appearing as the
aircraft accelerates and air loads begin to press the flaps upwards,
ensure that the flap position is set as accurately as possible to 10°.
8 BLEED AIR switches – ON if ice protection or cabin heat is required, otherwise OFF.
10 Altimeters – Set
11 Flight controls – Check elevator, ailerons and rudder are free and operate each
control through the full range of travel.
WARNING
4.10 Take-Off
1 Line up on the runway and slowly roll forward a short distance until certain that the
nose wheel is centered. Then, stop and apply brakes.
2 Advance the power levers until 85% NG is reached, then pause for at least 5 seconds
at this power setting until all engine indications – particularly the T5 temperature
indications – have stabilized.
NOTE
Pausing for at least five seconds at 85% NG allows time for the
engine compressor bleed valves to close and allows the pilot the
opportunity to confirm (by observing the engine temperatures) that
both compressor bleed valves have closed. This procedure also
establishes airflow over the vertical stabilizer and rudder prior to
brake release, which facilitates effective directional control of the
aircraft by rudder pedal input during the early stages of the take-off
roll.
WARNING
3 Power levers – Advance smoothly to the full calculated take-off power setting (refer
to Figure 5-7, Take-off Power Setting). Check that the autofeather ARMED light
illuminates.
If a maximum performance take-off is desired, do not release the brakes until full take-off
power has been set. It is not obligatory to set full calculated take-off power prior to brake
release if sufficient runway and clearway is available to allow for a gradual increase
in power from 85% NG to full calculated take-off power following brake release. As
airspeed increases, torque pressure will increase with a constant power lever setting.
Adjust the power levers as required to avoid exceeding the calculated take-off power
setting.
7 Climb to a minimum of 400 feet AGL at 80 KIAS (all weights) prior to retracting flaps.
8 Do not reduce power from the take-off power setting until flap retraction is complete.
WARNING
Follow the same procedures given for a normal take-off Para 4.10, except:
1 Rotation speed – 80 KIAS (all weights). Rotate gently, avoid a rapid rotation.
3 Climb to a minimum of 400 feet AGL at 90 KIAS (all weights) prior to retracting flaps.
When clear of obstacles and at least 400 feet above ground level:
1 Flaps – UP
2 Airspeed – transition to 100 KIAS for best rate of climb, or 87 KIAS for best angle
of climb.
CAUTION
3 Power – After flaps have fully retracted, set climb power when safe to do so. Lower
power settings than maximum calculated climb power may be selected if desired.
4 Nose wheel steering lever – Centered. Align with index marks if required.
4.12 Cruise
1 Airspeed – Allow aircraft to accelerate in level flight to desired cruise speed.
2 Power – Reduce to cruise power setting. Lower power settings than maximum
calculated cruise power may be selected if desired.
3 Fuel – Manage as required. If wing tank fuel is required to complete the flight, it
must be consumed prior to the point of no return.
2 Altimeters – Set
5 Nose wheel steering lever – Centered. Align with index marks if required.
7 Minimum initial approach airspeeds (valid for all weights at or below 12,300 lbs
(5,580 kg)):
Flap 0° – 94 KIAS
Flap 10° – 85 KIAS
NOTE
Do not select autofeather ON for approach or landing.
2 PROP levers – advance to MAX RPM immediately following flap extension, or when
the RESET PROPS caution CAS message appears, whichever occurs first.
Prop levers must be set to the MAX PRM position prior to reaching 500 feet AGL
(for visual approaches) or prior to reaching 500 feet above minima (for instrument
approaches).
4.15 Landing
1 Flaps – Select 20° or 37°
For all normal operations where landing distance permits, 20° flap is recommended.
To determine the landing distance required with flap set to 20°, multiply the landing
distance for flap 37° by 1.3.
Minimum VREF airspeed – 1.3 times stall speed as appropriate to flap angle and weight
according to the following chart.
Table 4-1 Landing (VREF) Speeds for Flaps 20° and 37°
FLAP 1.3 VS KNOTS IAS
ANGLE 12,300 lbs 11,500 lbs 10,500 lbs 9,500 lbs 8,500 lbs 7,500 lbs
(5,580 kg) (5,218 kg) (4,764 kg) (4,310 kg) (3,857 kg) (3,400 kg)
20° 80 77 73 70 66 64
37° 74 70 67 64 Not Authorized
2 PROP levers – Check MAX RPM (96% NP). Confirm RESET PROPS caution CAS
message is not present.
3 When crossing runway threshold at 50 feet AGL: Power levers – promptly move to
IDLE
WARNING
7 Nose wheel steering lever – Use as required. Coarse application of rudder should
be used as the primary control for heading until the aircraft has decelerated to taxi
speed.
NOTE
The shortest landing distances and the best quality landings are
achieved when the VREF in the table above is maintained with
precision and the power levers are brought sharply back to idle when
crossing the runway threshold at 50 feet AGL. Do not carry any power
into the flare as this will greatly increase both the touchdown speed
and the landing distance required.
The preferred crosswind technique requires that the upwind wing be lowered during the
approach with sufficient opposite rudder applied to align the aircraft with the runway.
As airspeed decreases during the flare and rollout, both of these control applications
must be increased. The nose wheel should be held on the ground during the ground
roll, along with “into wind” aileron. Directional control should be maintained with rudder
only unless it becomes absolutely necessary to use nose wheel steering.
1 Power levers – Advance to take-off setting. Ensure that the propellers are at the
MAX RPM position.
4 Flaps – Select 0°
WARNING
5 Airspeed – Increase to 87 KIAS (the best angle of climb speed for flaps 0°).
3 Flaps – UP
4.18 Shutdown
1 Parking brake – Apply
FOR AIRCRAFT WITH S.O.O. 6203 & S.O.O. 6237 (PROPELLER BLADE
LATCHES) INSTALLED:
If propeller blade latches are to be engaged, align power levers aft of zero thrust
reference lines prior to, or immediately following the selection of FUEL levers to OFF.
NOTE
The latches will not engage until the propeller RPM has decreased
below 30%.
CAUTION
17 Chocks, jury strut, propeller restraining straps, covers, and aircraft tie-down – as
required
4.19.1 General
WARNING
The airplane must not be flown into known or forecast icing conditions unless it is
equipped with approved means for de-icing. A list of the equipment required for flight
in known or forecast icing conditions is provided in the Section 10 of this manual and
in Section 9, Supplement 1.
WARNING
Therefore, after any inadvertent exposure to icing in flight (for aircraft not equipped with
de-icing equipment), or during approach and landing in icing conditions (for aircraft
equipped with de-icing equipment) flap angles must not exceed 10°, and approach
airspeed should be maintained at the value provided in Table 4-3 as appropriate to
weight.
The intake deflectors are normally left in the retracted (up) position due to the
possibility of a reduction in engine power (approximately 3% maximum) at temperatures
substantially above ISA when they are extended. However, for flight in icing conditions,
they must be extended to ensure continued engine operation.
In the event of a malfunction the deflectors will remain at their last selected position. If
a failure occurs that prevents extension of one or both of the deflectors, icing conditions
must be avoided.
A minimum of 80% NG is required to extend the intake deflectors. Intake deflectors will
normally retract at idle NG; however, if difficulty is encountered retracting the deflectors,
increasing NG to 80% before retracting the deflectors may assist with retraction.
SECTION 5
PERFORMANCE
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
5.1 General
Performance data in this section is presented to enable the pilot to know what to expect
from the aircraft under various conditions, and to enable planning of flights. Unless
noted in an individual chart, the performance data is unfactored.
Performance data can be divided into two types: certification data, which includes
supplemental certification data; and advisory data.
Certification data is used by the pilot, dispatcher, or operator to make planning and
operational decisions prior to dispatching the aircraft. Certification data defines the
most limiting regulatory condition. Other data, such as advisory data, may only be used
if it is more limiting than certification data.
Supplemental certification data is used in addition to, or in place of, certification data
contained in Section 5. For example, the pilot, dispatcher, or operator uses performance
data from an appropriate supplement to make planning and operational decisions prior
to dispatching an aircraft equipped with gear other than standard wheel gear.
Advisory data may be used by the pilot, dispatcher, or operator to assist in making
informed flight operations decisions after it has been determined that the flight can be
dispatched in compliance with the certification data. Advisory data may be used in
addition to, but not as a replacement for, certification data.
Advisory data is published in Section 10 of the POH, “Safety and Operational Tips.”
NOTE
No determination has been made by Transport Canada that the noise
levels of this airplane are or should be acceptable or unacceptable
for operation at, into, or out of any airport.
Only pressure altitude has been used whenever any reference to altitude is made in a
chart. Each chart will have an entry point that allows the pilot to adjust to the prevailing
temperature.
Distances presented with references to “Take-off Power” always assume that full
calculated take-off power is used. Landing distances presented always assume that
maximum wheel braking effort is used on a dry, hard, level surface. No credit has been
taken for use of zero thrust or reverse thrust in any chart.
An arrow (—>) is used to indicate the entry point to a chart, and also to indicate the
direction in which lines making up the calculation progress. An asterisk (*) is used on
examples to indicate the exit point from a chart.
The output of the engine has been limited to a flat rating of 620 SHP.
NOTE
620 SHP Take-off Power is available to 27°C at sea level.
5.2.1.4 Headwinds
For operation in headwinds exceeding 20 knots, the take-off and landing data
appropriate to 20 knots should be used.
5.2.1.5 Tailwinds
Landing or taking off with a tailwind component of greater than 10 knots is prohibited.
The effect of extending the engine intake deflectors at power settings of maximum
Take-off Power, Maximum Continuous Power, and Maximum Climb Power, when those
settings are calculated to be less than 50 PSI, is as follows:
To adjust the published landing distances for flaps 37° to suit other flap settings,
proceed as follows:
For landing with flaps 20°, multiply calculated distance by 1.3 (130%).
For landing with flaps 10°, multiply calculated distance by 1.8 (180%).
For landing with flaps 0°, multiply calculated distance by 2.3 (230%).
NOTE
Maximum cruise speed at sea level is limited by VMO. Refer to
Section 2 (Limitations) for VMO.
Payload may be less than above if optional equipment is fitted to the aircraft, thus
increasing the empty weight. Values given are based on an operational empty weight
of 7,320 lbs (3,320 kg), cruise at 10,000 feet at maximum cruise power, and fuel reserve
for 45 minutes at long range cruise power.
5.3.10 Ceiling
Both engines at maximum climb power (ISA, 12,500 lbs – 5,670 kg):
Service Ceiling (100 FPM rate of climb) 26,700 feet (refer to NOTE)
Absolute Ceiling (0 FPM rate of climb) 27,900 feet (refer to NOTE)
NOTE
Maximum altitude limitation is 25,000 feet.
One engine at maximum continuous power (ISA, 12,500 lbs – 5,670 kg):
Service Ceiling (100 FPM rate of climb) 11,600 feet
Absolute Ceiling (0 FPM rate of climb) 14,600 feet
ACTION:
In Section 5, ignore existing Para 5.4.1.1 Maximum Take-Off Weight and insert revised
, as shown on Page 2 of this Temporary Amendment.
-Continued overleaf-
APPROVED____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
DATE_________________________
RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS:
Record this TEMPORARY AMENDMENT NO. and the relevant information in the
appropriate columns of the TEMPORARY AMENDMENT INDEX provided at the front
of the manual.
1 STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS
The maximum structural gross weight for take-off is 12,500 lbs (5,670 kg).
2 CLIMB REQUIREMENTS
The chart ‘Maximum Take-off Weight – One Engine Inoperative with Propeller
Feathered’ may be consulted to quickly determine the maximum weight that will
permit compliance with the minimum enroute climb requirements.
If any obstacles are present beyond the runway, the single engine take-off gradient
of climb must be sufficient to enable meeting obstacle clearance requirements.
1 STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS
The structural weight limitation of 12,500 lbs (5,670 kg). Note that there is no
allowance for maximum ramp weight for the DHC-6. The maximum ramp weight is
also 12,500 lbs (5,670 kg).
2 CLIMB REQUIREMENTS
The chart ‘Maximum Take-off Weight – One Engine Inoperative with Propeller
Feathered’ may be consulted to quickly determine the maximum weight that will
permit compliance with the minimum enroute climb requirements.
If any obstacles are present beyond the runway, the single engine take-off gradient
of climb must be sufficient to enable meeting obstacle clearance requirements.
1 STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS
2 CLIMB REQUIREMENTS
The single engine take-off gradient of climb should also be considered, to enable
meeting obstacle clearance requirements if a single-engine missed approach is
carried out at the destination.
Sufficient runway to meet the ‘Landing Distance from 50 feet AGL to Full Stop’ must
be available at the destination.
This chart enables conversion of temperature from Fahrenheit to Celsius and vice-versa.
NOTE
To convert in the opposite direction, from Celsius to Fahrenheit, enter
the chart from the bottom (horizontal axis) and proceed upwards to
the reference line, then proceed left to exit at degrees Fahrenheit.
This chart enables conversion of reported wind speed and direction into headwind or
tailwind component and crosswind component.
The reported wind is 23 knots velocity from a direction that is 55° offset from the runway.
The headwind component is 13 knots and the crosswind component is 19 knots.
Both main wheels and the nose wheel are on ground. Flaps 10°, both engines at
take-off power.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart enables correction of the airspeed displayed on the airspeed indicator due
to errors caused by the location of the sources of pitot and static air pressure used by
the airspeed indicators.
This chart is only valid when the aircraft is being operated on the ground (e.g. take-off
roll) and flaps are set to 10°. For indicated airspeed error correction in flight, use the
chart “Airspeed Position Error Correction – Flight.”
At 60 knots indicated airspeed ground operations, negative one knot must be added to
the indicated airspeed (in other words, one knot must be subtracted from the indicated
airspeed) to correct for position error and yield a calibrated airspeed of 59 knots.
NOTE
During the ground roll, at all indicated speeds less than 83 knots, the
calibrated airspeed will be slightly less than the indicated airspeed.
Co-ordinated flight (no slip or skid). Power for level flight at selected speed.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart enables correction of altitude displayed on the pressure altimeter due to
errors caused by the location of the source of static air pressure used by the pressure
altimeters.
This chart is only valid when flaps are fully retracted. When flaps are extended any
amount, the maximum error in altimeter reading is 30 feet at any altitude.
At 130 knots indicated airspeed at an indicated altitude of 5,000 feet, 50 feet must be
added to the altimeter reading to yield a corrected altitude of 5,050 feet.
NOTE
This chart will only correct for errors caused by the position of the
static source. Other calculations that are not documented in this
AFM may be required to correct for errors caused by temperature
differences from ISA.
Co-ordinated flight (no slip or skid). This chart is valid for all gear configurations.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart enables correction of airspeed displayed on the airspeed indicator due to
errors caused by the location of the sources of pitot and static air pressure used by the
airspeed indicators. This chart is only valid when the aircraft is being operated in flight.
The chart is valid for all possible gear configurations (floats, skis, intermediate flotation
gear, etc.).
The vertical axis of the chart, marked Velocity (knots), represents the difference
between calibrated airspeed (CAS) and indicated airspeed (IAS). The triangle symbol
represents ‘difference’.
At 64 knots indicated airspeed with flaps 10° and power to maintain level flight, 2
knots must be added to the indicated airspeed to correct for position error and yield a
calibrated airspeed of 66 knots.
NOTE
In flight, indicated airspeed will always be lower than calibrated
airspeed. In other words, the airspeed indicator will always indicate
less than the actual airspeed. The amount of the error varies
between an average of 2 knots with flaps extended, to a maximum
of 4 knots with flaps retracted. The amount of error is slightly less at
lower aircraft weights.
Center of Gravity at forward limit (the most unfavourable condition for stalls).
Gear configurations produced by Viking Air Ltd (standard wheel gear, intermediate
flotation gear, wheel-skiplane).
Interpretive Guidance
This chart presents the stalling speed of the aircraft. It will only be accurate under
the conditions described above. During slow flight at high power settings, the stalling
speed will decrease due to propeller slipstream over the wing and horizontal stabilizer.
When the power levers are at the idle position and the propellers are not feathered,
the stalling speed will be higher than what is shown on the chart due to the turbulence
created by the windmilling propellers.
Refer to the airspeed position error correction (flight) chart to convert the CAS result
from this chart to IAS.
At 11,250 lbs (5,103 kg) weight and a flap setting of 10°, in a 35° coordinated banked
turn, the aircraft will stall at 71 knots CAS with both propellers feathered and the center
of gravity at the forward limit.
NOTE
Altitude loss during stall recovery can vary between 200 and 500 feet.
1 Propeller speed is always set to 96% NP (the maximum RPM position) for take-off.
2 T5 temperature must not exceed 790°C (the Take-off and Maximum Continuous
Limit).
Interpretive Guidance
This chart is used to calculate the Take-off Power that must be set for every take-off.
The chart is constructed to allow for the effect of intake deflectors extended and/or
bleed air extraction for cabin heat and de-ice turned on.
At +20°C OAT and 6,000 feet pressure altitude, with intake deflectors extended and
heater off (Rating 2), the engines must achieve 42 lbs torque at 0 knots airspeed in
order to achieve the aircraft performance shown.
NOTE
If either engine cannot produce full calculated take-off power, or, if
either engine reaches the T5 limit or the NG limit prior to reaching the
full calculated take-off power torque value, then the condition of the
engine has deteriorated and the problem must be investigated and
corrected before flight.
1 Propeller speed is always set to 96% NP (the maximum RPM position) when
Maximum Continuous Power is required.
2 T5 temperature must not exceed 790°C (the Take-off and Maximum Continuous
Limit).
Interpretive Guidance
This chart is used to calculate Maximum Continuous Power Setting, which is a power
setting available to the pilot for continuous usage. The chart is constructed to allow for
the effect of intake deflectors retracted and/or bleed air extraction for cabin heat and
de-ice turned on.
At –15°C OAT and 10,000 feet pressure altitude, with intake deflectors retracted and
heater on (Rating 3), at a calibrated airspeed of 100 knots, Maximum Continuous Power
Setting is 46 lbs torque.
1 Propeller speed 96% NP or less (normally less than 96% is used for climb).
Interpretive Guidance
This chart is used to calculate Maximum Climb Power. The T5 temperature limit is
lower than what is allowed for take-off.
The chart enables the effects of intake deflectors extended, bleed air extraction for
cabin heat and de-ice to be calculated. The chart also allows calculation of Maximum
Climb Power at any propeller speed between 75% NP and 96% NP to suit the prevailing
operational requirements.
A lower torque value than the maximum calculated may be used for climb if desired.
At +30°C OAT, commencing climb at 1,000 feet pressure altitude, with intake deflectors
retracted and heater off (Rating 1), at a calibrated airspeed of 100 knots and a propeller
speed of 84% NP, Maximum Climb Power is 49 lbs torque.
NOTE
It is not obligatory to use maximum calculated climb power. Any climb
power setting up to and including the maximum calculated value may
be used at the discretion of the pilot. The engine must be able to
produce maximum calculated climb power. If maximum calculated
climb power cannot be achieved without exceeding the 765°C climb
T5 temperature limit, the engine is not airworthy and the aircraft must
not be flown.
Interpretive Guidance
Note that 96% NP (Maximum Take-off Power) is always used for the take-off and initial
portion of the take-off climb prior to the completion of flap retraction.
At +15°C OAT, commencing climb or cruise at 2,000 feet pressure altitude, with intake
deflectors extended and heater off (Rating 2), at a calibrated airspeed of 100 knots and
a propeller speed of 91% NP, Maximum Normal Operating Power is 50 lbs of torque.
It is noteworthy that the flat rating torque limit of 50 PSI is what ultimately determined the
maximum power setting for this example. Whenever the final calculated value exceeds
the flat rating torque limit of 50 PSI, the result must be corrected by reducing it to 50 PSI.
1 Propeller speed 96% NP or less (normally 75% is used for cruise, although higher
NP settings are permitted if desired).
Interpretive Guidance
A lower torque value than the maximum calculated may be used for cruise if desired.
At –15°C OAT, cruising at 10,000 feet pressure altitude, with intake deflectors retracted
and heater on (Rating 3), at a calibrated airspeed of 130 knots and a propeller speed of
75% NP. Even though the torque value is computed to be 51 PSI, the maximum torque
must be set to 50 PSI because of engine gearbox torque limitation.
It is noteworthy that the flat rating torque limit of 50 PSI is what ultimately determined the
maximum power setting for this example. Whenever the final calculated value exceeds
the flat rating torque limit of 50 PSI, the result must be corrected by reducing it to 50 PSI.
NOTE
Any propeller speed may be used for cruise. 75% NP is normally
used for cruise because it provides optimum fuel consumption and
the lowest cabin noise level.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), one engine inoperative with the propeller feathered, the other engine
set to Take-off Power (refer to “Take-off Power Setting” chart), speed according to chart
inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart is used to determine the maximum allowable take-off weight for an aircraft
with one engine inoperative (OEI) and the propeller of that engine feathered. This chart
may only be used if the autofeather system is installed, operational, and selected ON
prior to take-off.
At an OAT of ISA +24°C and aerodrome pressure altitude of 10,000 feet, the maximum
allowable take-off weight to meet the single engine take-off climb requirements of SFAR
23 is 12,100 lbs (5,490 kg). Single engine rate of climb speed for that weight is 77 knots.
Figure 5-12 Maximum Take-Off Weight – One Engine Inoperative with Propeller
Feathered
Revision: 1 PSM 1-64-1A
30 May. 2014 Page 5-43
SECTION 5 TC Approved
PERFORMANCE DHC-6 SERIES 400
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), one engine inoperative with the propeller windmilling, the other engine
set to Take-off Power (refer to “Take-off Power Setting” chart).
Interpretive Guidance
This chart is used to determine the maximum allowable take-off weight at Take-off
Power for an aircraft with one engine inoperative (OEI) and the propeller windmilling.
This chart is used and is limiting if the autofeather system is inoperative.
At a pressure altitude of 5,000 feet and an air temperature of ISA +20°C (equal to a free
air temperature of +25°C at 5,000 feet pressure altitude), the maximum take-off weight
that would allow a positive rate of climb with one engine inoperative and the propeller
windmilling is 11,300 lbs (5,126 kg). Rate of climb speed is 75 knots.
WARNING
Figure 5-13 Maximum Take-Off Weight – One Engine Inoperative with Propeller
Windmilling
Revision: 1 PSM 1-64-1A
30 May. 2014 Page 5-45
SECTION 5 TC Approved
PERFORMANCE DHC-6 SERIES 400
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power prior to brake release, propeller
speed 96% (refer to “Take-off Power Setting” chart), speed according to chart inset; dry,
hard, level surface. Distances are for actual winds and are not factored.
Interpretive Guidance
The distances have been calculated using the procedure and technique specified in
SFAR 23 and are consistent with the procedures given for a maximum performance
take-off in Section 4 of this AFM. The distance calculated when using this chart will
only be achieved if full Take-off Power is set prior to brake release.
This chart may only be used if the autofeather system is installed, operational, and
selected ON prior to take-off.
For an ambient temperature of +18°C, pressure altitude of 2,000 feet, weight of 10,500
lbs (4,760 kg), and headwind component of 10 knots, the DHC-6 will require 900
feet (275 m) total distance from brake release to 50 feet above ground if a maximum
performance take-off is conducted in accordance with the instructions in Section 4 of
this AFM. V1 and V2 speeds are both 73 knots. VR is assumed to be equal to V1.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power prior to brake release, propeller
speed 96% (refer to “Take-off Power Setting” chart), liftoff speed according to chart
inset; dry, hard, level surface. Distances are for actual winds and are not factored.
Interpretive Guidance
The distances have been calculated using the procedure and technique specified in
SFAR 23 and are consistent with the procedures given for a maximum performance
take-off in Section 4 of this AFM. The distance calculated when using this chart will
only be achieved if full Take-off Power is set prior to brake release.
For an ambient temperature of +18°C, pressure altitude of 2,000 feet, weight of 10,500
lbs (4,763 kg), and headwind component of 10 knots, the DHC-6 will require 675 feet
(206 m) total ground roll from brake release to liftoff if a maximum performance take-off
is conducted in accordance with the instructions in Section 4 of this AFM. V1 and VLOF
are both 73 knots.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power prior to brake release, propeller
speed 96% (refer to “Take-off Power Setting” chart), V1 speed according to chart inset;
dry, hard, level surface. Engine failed at V1 and then goes into autofeather, remaining
engine reduced to idle power. Distances are for actual winds and are not factored.
Interpretive Guidance
The distances have been calculated using the procedure and technique specified in
SFAR 23 and are consistent with the procedures given for a maximum performance
take-off in Section 4 of this AFM.
This chart may only be used if the autofeather system is installed, operational, and
selected ON prior to take-off.
For an ambient temperature of +35°C, pressure altitude of 0 feet (sea level), weight of
10,500 lbs (4,760 kg), and tailwind component of –8 knots, 2,300 feet (701 m) total
accelerate-stop distance is needed if a maximum performance take-off is initiated in
accordance with the instructions in Section 4 of this AFM, and the take-off is then
rejected at V1 and maximum braking is applied. V1 speed is 73 knots.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted, both engines set to
Take-off Power prior to brake release, propeller speed 96% (refer to “Take-off Power
Setting” chart), speeds according to chart inset; dry, hard, level surface. Engine failed
at VEF and then goes into autofeather, functioning engine remains at Take-off Power
and take-off is continued. Rotation initiated at V1 and aircraft becomes airborne at
VLOF. Distances are for actual winds and are not factored.
Interpretive Guidance
The distances have been calculated using the procedure and technique specified in
SFAR 23 and are consistent with the procedures given for a maximum performance
take-off in Section 4 of this AFM.
This chart may only be used if the autofeather system is installed, operational, and
selected ON prior to take-off.
For an ambient temperature of +29°C, pressure altitude of 1,000 feet, weight of 12,500
lbs (5,670 kg), and headwind component of 6 knots, the DHC-6 will require 1,400 feet
(470 m) total take-off distance to liftoff speed. VLOF speed is 78 knots and V1 speed is
75 knots.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted, both engines set to
Take-off Power prior to brake release, propeller speed 96% (refer to “Take-off Power
Setting” chart), V1 speed according to chart inset; dry, hard, level surface. Engine failed
at VEF and then goes into autofeather, functioning engine remains at Take-off Power
and take-off is continued. Rotation initiated at V1 and aircraft becomes airborne at VLOF
and climbs to 35 feet at V2. Distances are for actual winds and are not factored.
Interpretive Guidance
The distances have been calculated using the procedure and technique specified in
SFAR 23 and are consistent with the procedures given for a maximum performance
take-off in Section 4 of this AFM.
This chart may only be used if the autofeather system is installed, operational, and
selected ON prior to take-off.
For an ambient temperature of +28°C, pressure altitude of 2,000 feet, weight of 12,500
lbs (5,670 kg), and tailwind component of 4 knots, the DHC-6 will require 3,600 feet
(1,097 m) to take-off and reach a height 35 feet AGL. VEF speed is 73 knots, V1 speed
is 75 knots, VLOF speed is 78 knots and V2 speed is 79 knots.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power, propeller speed 96% (refer to
“Take-off Power Setting” chart), climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides the initial gross take-off rate of climb in feet per minute when both
engines are set to Take-off Power and the aircraft speed is maintained at the value
determined from the inset chart.
At an air temperature of +13°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
10,700 lbs (4,850 kg), the take-off rate of climb will be 1,580 feet per minute at 73 knots.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power, propeller speed 96% (refer to
“Take-off Power Setting” chart), climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides initial gross take-off climb gradient when both engines are set to
Take-off Power and the aircraft speed is maintained at the value determined from the
inset chart.
At an air temperature of +13°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
10,700 lbs (4,850 kg), the take-off climb gradient will be 0.193 (19.3%) at 72 knots.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), one engine set to Take-off Power, propeller speed 96% (refer to “Take-off
Power Setting” chart), one engine inoperative with propeller feathered, climb speed
according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides initial gross rate of climb in feet per minute when one engine is set
to Take-off Power, the other engine is inoperative and feathered, and the aircraft speed
is maintained at the value determined from the inset chart.
This chart may only be used if the autofeather system is installed, operational, and
selected ON prior to take-off.
At an air temperature of +28°C, pressure altitude of 2,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
12,500 lbs (5,670 kg), the take-off rate of climb will be 290 feet per minute at 79 knots.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), one engine set to Take-off Power, propeller speed 96% (refer to “Take-off
Power Setting” chart), one engine inoperative with propeller feathered, climb speed
according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides initial gross climb gradient when one engine is set to Take-off Power,
the other engine is inoperative and feathered, and the aircraft speed is maintained at
the value determined from the inset chart.
This chart may only be used if the autofeather system is installed, operational, and
selected ON prior to take-off.
At an air temperature of +13°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
10,500 lbs (4,760 kg), the take-off climb gradient will be 0.05 (5%) at 74 knots.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), one engine set to Take-off Power, propeller speed 96% (refer to “Take-off
Power Setting” chart), one engine inoperative with propeller windmilling, climb speed
according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides initial gross rate of climb in feet per minute when one engine is set
to Take-off Power, the other engine is inoperative and propeller windmilling, and the
aircraft speed is maintained at the value determined from the inset chart.
At an air temperature of +18°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
11,400 lbs (5,170 kg), the take-off rate of climb will be 40 feet per minute at 76 knots.
WARNING
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), one engine set to Take-off Power, propeller speed 96% (refer to “Take-off
Power Setting” chart), one engine inoperative with propeller windmilling, climb speed
according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides initial gross climb gradient when one engine is set to Take-off
Power, the other engine is inoperative and propeller windmilling, and the aircraft speed
is maintained at the value determined from the inset chart.
At an air temperature of +34°C, pressure altitude of 5,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
11,800 lbs (5,350 kg), the initial take-off climb gradient will be –0.011 (–1.1%) at 77
knots.
WARNING
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), one engine set to Maximum Continuous Power (refer to “Maximum
Continuous Power Setting” chart), propeller speed 96%, one engine inoperative with
propeller feathered, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides enroute gross rate of climb in feet per minute when one engine is
set to Maximum Continuous Power, the other engine is inoperative and feathered, and
the aircraft speed is maintained at the value determined from the inset chart.
At an air temperature of +28°C, pressure altitude of 2,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
12,500 lbs (5,670 kg), the enroute rate of climb will be 295 feet per minute at 80 knots.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors
are extended), one engine set to Maximum Continuous Power (refer to “Maximum
Continuous Power Setting” chart), propeller speed 96%, one engine inoperative with
propeller feathered, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides enroute gross climb gradient when one engine is set to Maximum
Continuous Power, the other engine is inoperative and feathered, and the aircraft speed
is maintained at the value determined from the inset chart.
At an air temperature of +13°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
10,500 lbs (4,760 kg), the initial enroute climb gradient will be 0.051 (5%) at 72 knots.
The maximum landing weight for a landplane is 12,300 lbs (5,580 kg). This is a
structural limitation, not a performance limitation.
Flaps fully extended (37°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors are
extended), both engines set to Take-off Power, propeller speed 96% (refer to “Take-off
Power Setting” chart), climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides gross rate of climb information with the aircraft in the landing
configuration (flaps fully extended, propellers set to 96% NP).
At an air temperature of +13°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and 10,500 lbs (5,760
kg) landing weight, the initial rate of climb with flaps fully extended will be 1,120 feet
per minute, at a climb speed of 67 knots.
Flaps fully extended (37°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE if deflectors are
extended), both engines set to Take-off Power, propeller speed 96% (refer to “Take-off
Power Setting” chart), climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides gross climb gradient information with the aircraft in the landing
configuration (flaps fully extended, propellers set to 96% NP).
At an air temperature of +13°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and 10,500 lbs (4,760
kg) landing weight, the initial climb gradient with flaps fully extended will be 0.14 (14%),
at a climb speed of 67 knots.
Flaps fully extended (37°), intake deflectors retracted or extended, propeller speed 96%,
power as required to maintain a 3° approach angle to 50 feet, then power promptly
reduced to IDLE at 50 feet AGL. Speed at 50 feet according to inset chart. Dry, hard,
level surface. Retardation by brakes alone. Maximum brake effort used for stopping.
Interpretive Guidance
The distances have been calculated using the procedure and technique specified in
SFAR 23 and are consistent with the procedures given for a normal landing in Section
4 of this AFM.
At a temperature of +8°C, airfield pressure altitude of 4,000 feet, 10,500 lbs (4,760 kg)
landing weight, with a headwind component of 15 knots, the aircraft configured with full
flap extended and at a speed of 67 knots at 50 feet AGL, the total distance from 50 feet
AGL to a full stop on a dry, hard, level surface will be 1,050 feet (320 m) if maximum
braking is used.
SECTION 6
SECTION 1
GENERAL WEIGHT
AND BALANCE
DATA
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WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
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DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Page 1-4
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
1 Landplane – The take-off weight must not exceed 12,500 pounds (5,670 kg).
2 Floatplane – The take-off weight must not exceed 12,500 pounds (5,670 kg).
3 Wheel-Skiplane – The take-off weight must not exceed 12,500 pounds (5,670 kg).
2 Floatplane – The landing weight must not exceed 12,500 pounds (5,670 kg).
3 Wheel-Skiplane – The landing weight must not exceed 12,300 pounds (5,579 kg).
1.2.4 Payload
Payload consists only of passengers, baggage and cargo. The aircraft payload capabilities will obviously vary
with flight range requirements.
Page 1-5
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
All equipment changes to the aircraft should be recorded on the Basic Weight Change Record, so that an
up-to-date record of the weight is available at all times. Similarly if the configuration of the aircraft is altered at
any time, for example, changing from wheel landing gear to floats, such alterations must be recorded in the
Basic Weight Change Record. The obligation that all changes must be recorded applies also to modifications
of all types, for example, repair to damage suffered in service. In these cases all parts removed from or
added to the aircraft must be separately weighed and their locations measured so that the Basic Weight
Change Record can be correctly updated.
The Balance Diagram Figure 1-5 may be used to determine the approximate arms of any equipment, or
modifications not listed on the Equipment Check List. When Viking Air Ltd. modifications are incorporated, the
Weight & Balance Change will be found on the appropriate Modification Bulletin.
CAUTION IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT THAT A CONCENTRATED LOAD MAY EXCEED THE 200 POUNDS
PER SQUARE FOOT (975 KG/M2) LIMIT, THEN SHORING SHOULD BE USED.
Page 1-6
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
1 The basic weight condition is established with flaps up, controls locked in the neutral position, all doors and
hatches closed, full oil, trapped fuel only in the aircraft and the hydraulic system full.
2 The aircraft should be weighed with all fuel drained. Drain from the two tank drain points in the manifold
fairing at approximately Station 185 and 214, with the aircraft level. Drain the collector tanks by attaching a
one inch hose to the drain valves at Station 188 and 211 approximately.
3 The aircraft should NEVER be weighed with partially filled fuel tanks, since it is impossible to establish
an accurate weight for the fuel aboard.
4 If it is impossible for the aircraft to be drained, a weighing with full fuel is permissible (though this is not
advised). The tanks have been calibrated and their volume is known with some accuracy (Refer to Figure
1-13). If a weighing is made with full fuel then the specific gravity of the fuel must be measured at the time
of weighing so that, knowing the volume, an accurate weight of fuel aboard can be established.
Note Fuel Quantity Gauging System Indications are not accurate enough to be used when establishing
the Aircraft Basic Weight.
5 On piston engine aircraft full oil is not normally included as part of the basic weight. However, for turboprop
aircraft, the oil quantity is relatively small, and no appreciable amount is used during normal flights, thus
Page 1-7
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
loading calculations etc. can be simplified by always considering full oil as part of the Aircraft Basic
Weight for the Twin Otter.
6 For levelling the aircraft, prior to weighing, use an inclinometer and levelling bar laid on the extruded
floor channels. Work through the open door, ensuring that no load is inadvertently applied during the
levelling process. Aircraft attitude can be adjusted by varying nose and main tire pressures or nose gear
strut pressure, if platform scales are being used.
1 The Take-off Weight, less any fuel consumed for warm-up and taxi, does not exceed the limits stated for
the applicable configuration.
It is appreciated that for operational use this method though accurate is tedious, and loading trim sheets have
been devised to speed the process of checking the loading. The same sample loadings are also shown
on the trim sheets.
Page 1-8
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Sample Worksheet
Figure 1-1
Page 1-9
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Sample Worksheet
Figure 1-2
Page 1-10
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Sample Worksheet
Figure 1-3
Page 1-11
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Sample Worksheet
Figure 1-4
Page 1-12
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Balance Diagram
Figure 1-5
Page 1-13
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Cabin Seating Configurations
Figure 1-6
Page 1-14
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Page 1-15
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Combi Configuration Layouts
Figure 1-8 (Sheet 1 of 3)
Page 1-16
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Combi Configuration Layouts
Figure 1-8 (Sheet 2 of 3)
Page 1-17
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Combi Configuration Layouts
Figure 1-8 (Sheet 3 of 3)
Page 1-18
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Floor Loading and Tie-down Locations
Figure 1-9 (Sheet 1 of 3)
Page 1-19
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Page 1-20
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Page 1-21
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Page 1-22
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Page 1-23
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Page 1-24
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Page 1-25
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
CG Limits – Landplane
Figure 1-15
Page 1-26
PSM 1-64-8
WEIGHT & BALANCE
DHC-6 TWIN OTTER
Page 1-27
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SECTION 7
DHC-6 SERIES 400 AIRCRAFT AND SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION
SECTION 7
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
The Series 400 is an updated version of the Series 100, 200, and 300 Twin Otters.
As with previous series updates, changes made have been only to take advantage of
newer technologies that permit more reliable and more economical operations. Aircraft
dimensions, construction techniques, and primary structures have not changed. The
aircraft is manufactured at Viking Air Limited facilities in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. The
type certificate (A-82 from Transport Canada) is held by Viking Air Limited.
The most significant change made to the Series 400 has been the introduction of a
Honeywell Primus Apex® integrated avionics suite. In addition to providing flat panel
display of all flight instrumentation, the Apex suite also provides flat panel display of
all engine parameters, all aircraft system parameters, all radio frequencies, the active
flight plan, terrain and topography around the aircraft, weather radar, TCAS, and TAWS
status. Display of video input (from a low-vision camera system) and display of satellite
weather data is available by optional order.
The flight compartment layout has been modernized, and all switches have been moved
from the flight compartment roof to the sub-panels below each primary flight display.
Engines have been upgraded from the PT6A-27 to the PT6A-34. The engine continues
to be flat rated to 620 horsepower, and all take-off and landing distances remain
unchanged. Full flat rated take-off power from the PT6A-34 will be available to ISA
+27°C. Because of the significant flat rating limitation, reduced power take-offs (e.g.
taking off with 45 PSI torque at ISA conditions) are prohibited. Full calculated power
must be used for every take-off.
A lightweight commuter interior is fitted as standard. Almost all interior and exterior
lighting has been upgraded to LED or high intensity discharge (xenon). Cabin
ventilation, heating, and optional air conditioning systems have been modernized.
Viking offers the Series 400 aircraft factory equipped with conventional landing gear or
intermediate flotation gear, Wipline seaplane floats, or Wipline amphibious floats which
will be available via STC.
7.2 Structure
7.2.1 Overview
The fuselage primary structure is, except for the conical nose section, of all metal
conventional construction with frames, stringers, and skin of aluminum alloy. It
comprises five permanently attached sections: the nose section (stations 21 to 60); the
flight compartment (stations 60 to 111); the fuselage front cabin (stations 111 to 262);
the fuselage rear cabin (stations 262 to 332); and the rear fuselage (stations 332 to 535).
Lightning protection is provided in the form of bonding strips, connected to the radome
and grounded at the rear section forward frame to allow for electrical discharge.
Additional bonding strips are provided externally between the baggage compartment
access door hinge and sill, and the rear section frame. The upward and outward
opening nose baggage compartment access door, located on the left side of the nose
section, is equipped with a prop rod to hold the door open and two latches, the forward
of which can be locked externally by key.
The cabin section consists of floor, side and roof panel assemblies. The roof panels are
stiffened by longitudinal stringers, except for the center portion which is a honeycomb
core sandwich panel. Each side panel includes a door frame at the aft end. The left
rear cabin door frame is 50 inches high and 56 inches wide, the right rear cabin door
frame is 45.5 inches high and 30 inches wide. The left cabin entrance door is in two
sections, the aft section is a dual cargo door half, locked and unlocked from within,
and the forward half is a quickly detachable airstair door complete with handrails. The
airstair door can be locked and unlocked externally. Two plug-type emergency exits
are provided in the main cabin, one in each side panel at the forward end of the cabin.
Eight acrylic plastic windows are installed on the right side of the cabin; one in the
forward emergency exit, one in the right cabin door, and six in the side panel. Seven
similar windows are installed on the left side of the cabin; one in the forward emergency
exit, one in the rear cargo door, and five in the side panel.
The floor structure consists of eleven transverse frames, skins, and longitudinal
stringers, which form a grid with continuous flanges in the fore and aft direction. Eight
of the compartments formed by the transverse frames are cavities for fuel tanks. The
tops of the frames forming the tank cavities are skinned over with a light gauge clad
sheet, which forms a barrier between the tanks and the cabin. Three heavy extrusions
run the full length of the cabin section, attaching to the top cap of each transverse frame.
Two of the transverse frames are of a heavy construction to support the main landing
gear. The front heavy frame is also provided with a single-lug pick-up on each side
for the attachment of the left and right wing lift struts. The rearmost of these frames
is joined at floor level to a heavier frame. The floor and cabin side walls are fitted with
rails to accommodate passenger seats. The complete main cabin has a total usable
volume of approximately 384 cubic feet (10.9 m3).
7.3 Wings
The wing consists of the left and right mainplanes, rectangular in planform and of
constant section. Each mainplane is attached to the fuselage structure, at roof level,
by two bolts through fork and lug fittings at the front and rear spars, and is supported
by a lift strut having single bolt attachments at each end. A double-slotted, full-span
flap/aileron system is installed at each mainplane trailing edge.
The wing tips, which are removable for servicing and maintenance, have internal
lightning protection bonding strips which are secured to each wing structure to provide
a ground for electrical discharge. Electrical wiring to each wing tip is routed through
conduit tubing for protection.
7.3.2 Nacelles
The two tractor-type, normal rotation, turbo-propeller engines are installed in wing-
mounted nacelles, located forward and slightly below each mainplane. Each nacelle in
addition to enclosing the engine, its related components, engine and propeller controls,
provides sufficient space for the oil and fire extinguishing systems. The nacelles are
of a conventional skin/frame aluminum alloy construction except for the firewalls and
fire seals which are of titanium. The upper aft section of each nacelle forms the engine
support structure. Access to the nacelle components is provided by a forward top cowl
and a lower hinged cowl, both of which can be removed with ease. Access to the
engine oil tank filler, filter and controls is also provided in the rear section of the nacelle.
7.3.3 Cowlings
The upper and lower cowls fasten to each other and the nacelle structure with flush-
mounted, quarter-turn fasteners and latches. The upper cowl is equipped with a
rearward facing duct which provides an air outlet for engine compartment ventilation.
The lower cowl contains the intakes for the engine compressor and engine cooling air,
oil cooler and oil-cooler by-pass ducts, and air exit duct door. A cylindrical screen in
the air inlet throat prevents ingestion of all large foreign objects.
7.4 Cabin
7.4.1 General
A lightweight interior package is standard fitment to all aircraft. This upgraded commuter
interior complies with FAR 23.853 at amendment 23-49 flammability specifications.
The aft cabin bulkhead at station 332 consists of a solid interior wall panel. Ashtrays
are not provided, either in the passenger cabin or the flight compartment.
Nineteen upholstered seats are fitted as standard in the cabin. The 6th row consists
of only one single seat, providing a larger entry area at the airstair door. Shoulder
harnesses are standard for both pilots.
7.4.2 Doors
All doors are single-piece structures constructed of composite material. Composite
construction was chosen for the Series 400 doors because it permitted construction of
substantially lighter, single-piece doors.
The airstair door section of the double doors occupies the forward position and is hinged
to the sill so that it opens outward and downward. It is supported by two cables and
a post assembly on each side of the door, which also serve as the handrails. A latch
mechanism secures the door in its closed position which is operated by a handle on
the inside and outside of the door, the latter of which incorporates a key-operated lock.
A guard is installed over the internal handle to prevent inadvertent operation and is
appropriately labelled to indicate the location of the exit handle. Inspection windows are
provided both on the inside and outside of the door, beside the door handles through
which the security of the door, when closed, can be verified by means of witness marks
on the latch mechanism inside the door.
The aft section of the double doors is hinged at its aft edge and is secured in the closed
position by bolts at the top and bottom of the forward edge. In its fully-open position it lies
against the rear fuselage where it can be secured by an attached elastic cord restraint.
By special order an optional forward cargo door section can be installed in place of
the airstair door. It is hinged at its forward edge and latched by means of internal
and external door handles. The external door handle can be key locked. Inspection
windows for latch mechanism checking are provided, similar to those on the right cabin
door. The door is equipped with stowage for a passenger ladder and a door stay.
With a standard cabin interior fitted, no passageway is provided between the passenger
cabin and the rear baggage compartment at station 332. Restraint panels are
permanently attached to the aperture in station 332 to prevent forward movement of
baggage in the rear baggage compartment up to a loading of 9 g. The restraint panels
are installed against the aft face of the bulkhead, one above the other.
The forward baggage compartment door on the left side of the nose is hinged at its top
edge and opens upward and outward and can be supported in the open position by a
door stay. The door is secured in the closed position by two recessed latch assemblies.
The forward latch can be key-locked. This baggage compartment door is included in
the DOORS UNLOCKED annunciation circuit.
7.4.3 Seating
Each seat is equipped with a lap-type safety belt and a shoulder harness with inertia
reel. The inertia reel will lock automatically under a deceleration load of 2 to 3 g.
An eye height reference device is provided to ensure proper adjustment of the pilot
seats for optimum viewing of the avionics displays and the area forward of the aircraft.
The seating configuration can be adapted to suit a lesser number of cabin seats, or for
mixed passenger and cargo operation.
The front and rear baggage compartments have usable volumes of 36 and 88 cubic
feet (1.0 and 2.5 m3) respectively. A maximum load of 285 lbs (130 kg) can be carried
in the forward (nose) baggage compartment. This figure allows for the 15 lbs (7 kg)
weight of factory-installed weather radar equipment forward of station 44 but does not
include allowance for other equipment that may be installed forward of station 44. The
rear baggage compartment can carry up to 500 lbs (225 kg), of which a maximum of
150 lbs (68 kg) may be loaded on the rear baggage compartment aft shelf extension.
The nose baggage compartment cubic capacity has decreased from 38 cubic feet
(1.07 m3) on the Series 300 to 36 cubic feet (1.0 m3) on the Series 400. This is due
to the extension of the uppermost avionics rack from station 44 to station 38. This is
not foreseen to present any operational restrictions as the nose baggage compartment
normally reaches its weight capacity prior to reaching its cubic capacity.
The main cabin door (left rear door) aperture is 50 inches high and 56 inches wide.
A graph is provided that defines the length/width relationship of objects that can be
loaded into the cabin through this door.
The jury strut is not used on float-equipped aircraft, and is not supplied when an aircraft
is ordered with floats installed.
S.O.O. 6309 does not include life vests, these are to be acquired by the operator of
the aircraft. Only approved life vests, TSO–C13e or later Revision, are to be used with
S.O.O. 6309.
Forward of each seat row, mounted on the side wall is a ‘LIFE VEST UNDER SEAT’
placard (refer to Figure 7-8).
To remove the axe, grasp the pull lanyard and firmly pull forward to release the handle.
Using the axe handle, rotate the axe away from the side wall and lift the axe out from
the axe head holder.
7.5 Empennage
The tail group comprises horizontal stabilizer, elevator, vertical stabilizer, and rudder.
7.5.2 Elevator
The elevator consists of left and right-hand units, joined at the aircraft centerline by
bolted torque tubes. Each elevator unit is of a conventional all-metal construction,
comprising two spanwise spars with intersecting chordwise ribs, covered with swaged
skin panels to provide torsional strength. The elevator is aerodynamically and mass
balanced to meet flutter criteria, mass balancing being achieved by attaching lead
weights to the outboard horns. The left elevator unit incorporates a pilot-operated trim
tab, and the right elevator unit a wing flap/elevator interconnect tab.
7.5.4 Rudder
The rudder consists of a main spar and ribs covered with swaged skin panels (with
swages running fore and aft). Three hinge brackets are provided on the front face of the
spar for the attachment of the rudder to the vertical stabilizer rear spar and rear fuselage
structure. The leading edge of the rudder is faired with a symmetrical D-shaped nose.
The rudder is aerodynamically and mass balanced as required to meet control force
and flutter criteria, mass balancing being achieved by attaching lead weights to the rib
of the rudder horn. Two tabs are provided on the rudder trailing edge, the upper trim
tab being operated manually by the pilot, and the lower, a variable mechanically-geared
assist tab.
Details within the engine nacelles are primed with a fluid resistant chromated epoxy
primer which is resistant to synthetic turbine engine oils and turbine fuels.
Structurally bonded wing and tailplane skin panels are anodized before bonding. In
addition, the complete inside surface of the skin, together with the inside surface of the
skin panel corrugations , is primed with phenolic-nitrile base primer prior to bonding.
This primer not only protects the cleaned surfaces prior to bonding and forms part of
the bonding process, but affords corrosion protection to the unbonded surfaces of the
assembly. After bonding, chromated epoxy primer is applied to the exterior surfaces of
the corrugations. External machined details such as flap and aileron hinge arms are
epoxy primed over an anodized surface.
7.6.5 Magnesium
Only a very limited amount of magnesium is used in areas not normally subject to
corrosion. Details are dichromate treated, primed with a baked on polyester primer,
and painted.
Bushings of stainless or alloy steel are insulated from the aluminum housings and
installed by shrink fit in lieu of press fit, again to avoid damage to the anodized housing
bores. Attention is paid to the fit of bushings in aluminum parts in order to avoid high
residual stresses and possible stress-corrosion attack.
From the left and right DC buses, power is distributed through main circuit breakers
in the main distribution box located in the cabin roof to supply DC circuits through
individual system circuit breakers located on the main circuit breaker panel, to the left of
the pilot, and on the avionics circuit breaker panel, at the base of the center pedestal,
and on the lower two rows of the circuit breaker panel on the forward face of the station
332 bulkhead. Bus feed circuit breakers on auxiliary panels beside the main and
avionics circuit breaker panel provide additional circuit protection. The left generator is
connected to the left DC bus and the right generator to the right DC bus, but both buses
can be powered from either generator through a bus tie relay which is controlled by a
BUS TIE switch. An external power receptacle is provided for connection to a 28 volt
DC ground supply for engine starting and maintenance purposes.
7.7.2 Battery
The main battery is a 24 volt, 48 amp-hour lead acid type located beneath the floor of the
rear baggage compartment. The main battery supplies power to the electrical system
when the starter-generators inoperative. It also supplies power independently through a
hot battery bus to the entrance lights and forward and rear baggage compartment lights.
On Pre Mod 6/2314 aircraft, equipped with POWER SOURCE and MASTER switches,
battery power is applied when the MASTER switch is ON and the POWER SOURCE
switch is set to BATTERY.
On aircraft with Mod 6/2314 incorporated, equipped with separate BATTERY and
EXTERNAL switches, battery power is applied when the BATTERY switch is ON.
The battery is protected from excessive charge and discharge currents by three 150
amp current limiters that are installed at each end of the cables that connect the battery
to the main power distribution panel.
relay located in the forward avionics compartment, power isolation diodes located in the
center pedestal forward of the avionics circuit breakers, and a switch labeled AVIONICS
START BATTERY [OFF / AUTO] located in the overhead starter switch panel. Avionics
equipment supplied with supplemental power by the avionics start battery are indicated
on the avionics circuit breaker panel by round halos around some circuit breakers (refer
to Figure 7-20).
The avionics start battery is charged by the left bus via a 30-amp circuit breaker labeled
AVIONICS STRT BATT CHARGE, located in position M7 on the avionics circuit breaker
panel. Control power for the output relay is provided by the 2-amp AVIONICS STRT
BATT CTRL circuit breaker in position N7.
With main battery power ON and power on the left bus, just prior to operating the START
switch, set the AVIONICS START BATTERY to the AUTO position. This connects the
avionics start battery to the avionics equipment through power isolation diodes. When
an engine starter is engaged, the main battery voltage is pulled low and the avionics
start battery supplies supplementary power to the avionics so that engine indications
are maintained on the displays and a safe start can be completed.
Setting the AVIONICS START BATTERY switch to the OFF position disconnects the
avionics start battery from the avionics equipment. This is a useful capability when
on the ground and powering the aircraft on main battery, so that the avionics battery
doesn’t prematurely discharge.
The output voltage of the avionics start battery is monitored by the AVIONICS BATTERY
LOW advisory level CAS message. The CAS message is displayed when the avionics
start battery voltage is below 19 volts.
On Pre Mod 6/2314 aircraft, equipped with POWER SOURCE and MASTER switches,
setting the MASTER switch ON and the POWER SOURCE switch EXTERNAL will
energize the external power relay when external power is connected.
On aircraft with Mod 6/2314 incorporated, equipped with separate BATTERY and
EXTERNAL switches, setting the EXTERNAL switch to ON will energize the external
power relay when external power is connected.
The outboard (forward) of the two large pins on the external power receptacle is the
ground pin, the center pin is the positive pin. The small pin at the aft end of the
receptacle is used to provide polarity protection. The external power connector is
protected from excessive current demands by a single 500 amp current limiter in series
with the positive pin.
Circuit breakers in the middle and lower row of this station 332 panel are powered from
the left bus via a 50 amp CB located under the rear baggage compartment floor. They
are not supplied with power from the hot battery bus. They protect electrical loads
located in the aft portion of the aircraft.
bus, in conjunction with the POWER SOURCE switch and the BUS TIE switch; when
the MASTER switch is at OFF, no power is supplied to these buses regardless of the
position of the POWER SOURCE switch. At the ON position, the switch connects
power from an external power source or the battery, (as determined by the POWER
SOURCE switch position) to left and right buses or to the left bus only (as determined
by the BUS TIE switch position), or the generators to their respective buses.
7.7.7 Power Source and Starter Switch Panel (Post Mod 6/2314)
(Pre Mod 6/2315)
Four power source switches are arranged beside each other along the top edge of the
Power Source and Starter Switch Panel. Connecting external power to the external
power connector aft of the left hand passenger compartment door and setting the
EXTERNAL switch to ON, will energize the external power relay and apply power to all
busses in the airplane (if the BUS TIE switch is in the NORMAL position), except the
battery bus. Setting the BATTERY switch to the ON position will energize the battery
relay and apply battery power to all busses in the airplane (if the BUS TIE switch is in
the NORMAL position).
Figure 7-13 Power Source and Starter Switch Panel (Post Mod 6/2314) (Pre Mod
6/2315)
All power source switches (EXTERNAL, BATTERY, LEFT GENERATOR and RIGHT
GENERATOR) are arranged in a row so that all electrical power can be quickly switched
off with one hand.
When both EXTERNAL and BATTERY are ON, the power sources operate in parallel.
Check the electrical system window on the cockpit display to confirm battery current is
within limits. Positive battery AMPS indicates battery charge. Negative battery amps
indicate battery discharge. Battery amps in excess of ± 100 AMPS cause the numbers
to disappear.
7.7.8 Power Source and Starter Switch Panel (Post Mod 6/2315)
On aircraft with Mod 6/2315 incorporated, the Power Source and Starter Switch Panel
is the same as the Mod 6/2314 panel except for the addition of a two position switch
labeled AVIONICS START BATTERY [OFF / AUTO].
Figure 7-14 Power Source and Starter Switch Panel (Post Mod 6/2315)
In the OFF position, the avionics start battery is disconnected from the avionics
equipment.
In the AUTO position, the avionics start battery is connected to avionics equipment
through power isolation diodes. This will provide supplemental electrical power to
certain avionics equipment during low voltages, caused by operation of the engine
starters.
To prevent premature draining of the avionics start battery on the ground while powering
the aircraft with main battery, turn the switch to the OFF position. Set to the AUTO
position just prior to operating the engine START switch.
If the BUS TIE switch is in the OPEN position, this will be annunciated within the
electrical system window.
7.7.10 Starter-Generators
CAUTION
Generator excitation voltage is provided through and protected by circuit breaker A1.
The generator control circuits are protected by circuit breakers A2 and B2.
The left generator failure detection system is powered from the right DC bus and
protected by the GENERATOR FAIL L circuit breaker (position B3). The right
generator failure detection system is powered from the left DC bus and protected by an
GENERATOR FAIL R circuit breaker (position A3). Both of these circuit breakers are
on the main circuit breaker panel.
Figure 7-17 shows the electrical system window, which is normally displayed on the
lower multi-function display (MFD).
Provision has been made to support future retrofit of generator overheat detection
capability.
Load distribution between the left bus and right bus is as follows: Whenever two similar
loads exist (for example, left and right side pitot tube heater, left and right engine PY
tube heaters, etc.), one load has been assigned to the left bus and one to the right
bus. Single loads that are critical to flight safety (for example, the hydraulic pump) have
generally been assigned to the left bus. Single loads that are not critical to flight safety
(for example, the vent fan) have generally been assigned to the right bus.
When the aircraft is operating normally and the bus tie is in the normal (closed) position,
the electrical loads on both busses will be approximately equal. This can be observed
by referring to the GEN AMPS readings in the electrical system window. If the bus tie is
opened, the left bus will show a higher load than the right bus. This is due to the load
assignment practice explained in the previous paragraph.
The aircraft has very robust electrical generation capacity. Provided that the (optional)
air conditioning system is off, and that the battery is charged, it is impossible to exceed
the 200 amp per generator load limitations, even if one generator has been selected off
and every possible factory-installed electrical load is turned on.
With the exception of the START R (position D2), FIRE EXTINGUISHER R (position
D10), FIRE DETECTION R (position D11), and FIRE DET FAULT IND R (position D13)
circuit breakers in column D, which are all powered from the left bus, bus assignment
for the circuit breakers on the main panel is organized vertically. Columns A and C are
powered from the left bus, and column B and D are powered from the right bus.
Bus assignment for the horizontal rows of the avionics circuit breaker panel and the
station 332 circuit breaker panel is clearly marked on these panels.
Drawing
Common Name Location Function
Name
CBP-A Main CB Panel Outboard of left pilot Primary CB panel
CBP-B Avionics CB Panel Bottom of instrument Avionics loads and
panel ESIS bus
CBP-C Bus Feeder Panel Above left pilot door Forward end of CBP-E
power supply lines
CBP-D Hot Battery Bus Forward face of rear Hot battery bus and
cabin bulkhead some left bus loads
CBP-E Power Feeder Panel Starboard side of Supplies power to
cabin roof near row 2 both busses of CBP-A
and B
CBP-F Battery Compartment Port side of battery, Supply power to both
Panel under baggage busses of CBP-D
compartment floor
CBP-G Emergency Lighting Starboard side Single CB protecting
Panel of battery, cabin emergency
under baggage lighting battery output
compartment floor
7.8 Lighting
7.8.1 General
Wherever possible, LED high reliability lighting has been implemented.
With the exception of the landing lights, which are high intensity discharge (xenon) (Pre
Mod 6/2285), and the wing inspection lights, which are incandescent (Pre Mod 6/2140),
all interior and exterior lighting is provided by LED (light emitting diode) arrays. All LED
lamps are ‘high reliability’ specification, which means the failure of a single LED in an
array will not result in failure of the lamp unit.
Pulse lighting capability is built into the landing light controller assembly. Aircraft
equipped with TCAS I or optional TCAS II have a pulse light switch that enables manual
or automatic (in response to a traffic advisory) activation of the pulse light system.
Controls for all instrument panel lighting are mounted on the control yoke, immediately
forward of the reversion controller. There are two dimmers and two small toggle
switches. An illuminated eye height reference device is standard. A two position toggle
switch to turn the integral lighting of the eye height reference device on and off is
provided on the windshield centerpost, directly above the eye height reference device.
All lighting switches are located on the middle row (for external lighting) or the bottom
row (for internal lighting) of the lower left pilot sub-panel. There are no switches of any
kind on the overhead (roof) panel area.
The dome light is powered directly from the hot battery bus and will operate when
the LEFT and RIGHT busses are not powered. The dome light circuit is protected by
the CLOCK AND DOME LIGHT circuit breaker (position S1) on the station 332 circuit
breaker panel. The dome light consumes less than 1/3 of an amp of power.
the flood lighting LED arrays, and one dimmer control marked INSTRUMENT both
bezel lighting that is integral to avionics equipment and the four switch panel overlays
(left sub-panel, right sub-panel, fuel panel, and starter panel), all of which have integral
LED illumination.
A toggle switch marked FOOTWELL permits the pilot to turn off lighting of the pilot
footwells and the avionics circuit breaker panel to eliminate reflections from these
lights that may appear in the windshield. Footwell lighting intensity is controlled by the
FLOOD lighting dimmer. A similar toggle switch is fitted for the same purpose at the
rear of the flight control trim panel. This toggle switch permits the pilot to switch off
lighting within the elevator and rudder trim controls, the post lights on either side of the
flap selector, and the post lights on either side of the ESIS static source selector.
The bezel and switch panel overlay lights are powered from both the left and right
busses, and are protected by circuit breakers P6 and P7 at the base of the avionics
circuit breaker panel. The flood lighting, is protected by the FLOOD LIGHTS circuit
breaker at position Q7.
If the EMERGENCY LIGHTING switch on the instrument panel is selected to the upper
ARM position, the six cabin general lights will be automatically illuminated using power
from the emergency lighting battery if left DC bus power is lost. The emergency lighting
system can be tested by selecting the EMERGENCY LIGHTING switch to the lower
TEST position, or by moving the EMERGENCY LIGHTING switch to the upper ARM
position when the LEFT and RIGHT busses are not powered.
position switch labelled READING on the lower left pilot sub-panel. A switch beside
each light provides passenger control over individual lights. They are protected by the
READING LIGHTS circuit breaker at position D14.
The left switch under the LANDING LIGHTS group label is labelled STEADY and
controls steady illumination of the two landing lights. If this switch is moved downward
to the ON position, both landing lights will illuminate steadily, regardless of the position
of the PULSE switch. If the STEADY switch is moved upward to the OFF position,
control of the landing lights is transferred to the PULSE switch.
The right switch under the LANDING LIGHTS group label is labelled PULSE and
controls operation of the pulse light function, which is used to increase conspicuity of
the aircraft. Normally, the PULSE light switch is left in the upper TCAS position. In
this position, the pulse lights will automatically activate in response to a TCAS traffic
advisory (TA) or resolution advisory (RA, provided only when optional TCAS II is fitted).
If the PULSE switch is moved to the OFF position, the pulse lights will not operate.
Normally the switch is only placed in the OFF position if operation of the pulse lights
creates a distraction for the pilots, for example, in night IMC.
If the PULSE switch is placed in the lower PULSE position, the pulse lights will operate
continually. This position may be selected for take-off, landing, or circuit operations at
busy airports.
Four water drain valves are provided on the fuselage fuel gallery. Check valves are
installed in the sump plate of each collector cell to prevent fuel in the supply lines to
each engine from draining back into the fuselage tank when the engine is shut down.
All check valves are marked to identify direction of flow.
Fuel supply to the engines is controlled by fuel levers on the overhead console. Each
fuel lever actuates a fuel cut-off valve on the FCU. From the fuselage tank, fuel flows
up the delivery tube in the wing strut, through a fuel filter and strainer, through the
electrically operated emergency fuel cut-off valve, to the FCU, through a fuel flow
transmitter, and onwards to the flow divider on the bottom of the fuel nozzle manifold.
These amber inverse video blocks will illuminate and extinguish based on signals sent
from the boost pump changeover control box that is mounted on the aft face of station
60. It is normal for both “lights” on the de-selected side to be illuminated when the fuel
selector switch has been set to feed both engines from one tank.
7.9.2.4 Crossfeed
Normally the forward tank supplies the right engine and the aft tank supplies the left
engine, but crossfeeding is possible so that one tank can feed both engines and even
the opposite engine if the normally supplied engine is shut down. It is not possible to
transfer fuel between the two tanks. Crossfeeding takes place via a crossfeed valve
which is controlled by the fuel selector rotary switch in the flight compartment. The
crossfeed valve circuit is powered from the right DC bus and protected by a FUEL
CROSSFEED circuit breaker (position D7) on the main circuit breaker panel.
Failure of the fuel crossfeed valve under any circumstances (failure to open when it
should, or failure to close when it should) or uncertainty about valve position is indicated
by appearance of an amber inverse video rectangle containing the word CROSSFEED,
and by the amber warning level message Fuel Crossfeed Fail appearing in the CAS
list, accompanied by illumination of the MASTER CAUTION light and sounding of the
single chime.
The fuel quantity computer provides complete built-in self test (BIST) and fault detection
and exclusion (FDE) capability, and can be interrogated by the maintenance technician
to pinpoint the location of any fault in the fuel measuring system. The fuel quantity
computer is dual channel, with automatic reversion capability in the event of failure of a
single channel.
Fuel quantity and fuel system status is displayed on the fuel system window of the
multifunction display.
Fuel quantity on board the aircraft is measured gravimetrically (by weight), not
volumetrically. The Fuel Quantity Gauging System (FQGS) is calibrated to correctly
measure the mass of JET A or JET A1 fuel at +15°C, and assumes a nominal mass
of 6.716 lbs per US gallon (8.066 lbs per Imperial gallon, or 807.5 kg/m3) at +15°C. To
some extent, the physical properties of jet fuel are self-compensating for temperature
differences and fuel density. At extreme temperatures (–40°C or +70°C), an error of
approximately 2% will be present when JET A or JET A1 fuel is being used.
Denser fuels have a higher dielectric constant, which results in a higher fuel quantity
reading for a given volume. The opposite is also true. This effect is not exactly perfect,
so there will be some error for fuels other than the JET-A or Jet-A1 fuel for which the
system is optimized. This error will vary with fuel temperature. Avgas will present the
largest error; the probable error for Avgas is:
In level flight the low level trigger point is 75 lbs usable fuel remaining for the forward
tank and 110 lbs usable fuel remaining for the aft tank. The circuits are supplied through
two circuit breakers on the main circuit breaker panel labelled FUEL QUANTITY L/AFT
(position C9) and FUEL QUANTITY R/FWD (position D9).
When the fuel quantity in a tank drops below 200 lbs, or whenever the independent
float switch for the low fuel level sensing system activates, an amber rectangle will be
drawn around the affected tank, and a CAS message will be presented to the crew.
Figure 7-26 shows the fuel system window with all possible annunciations displayed.
In practice, such a cluttered presentation would not be possible. Note that the aft
tank is displaying a low level warning. This would be accompanied by an amber CAS
message, illumination of the master caution light, and a single chime.
A fuel dipstick (part number C6G1088-1) is available to physically check quantity in the
fuselage tanks. Prior to using the dipstick, the aircraft must be parked on a level surface
and a suitable period of time (not less than 15 minutes following refuelling, or, ideally 12
hours after boost pumps have been shut down if maximum accuracy is desired) must
have passed to allow fuel levels to equalize between the four cells that comprise a tank.
Under normal operating conditions each switch remains at NORMAL and is only moved
to OFF to shut off the engine fuel supply in certain emergency conditions.
Anti-icing additives are not required; however, if an anti-icing additive is used, it must
conform to MIL-1-27686, and be used in compliance with the directions provided in the
Pratt & Whitney maintenance documentation accompanying the engine.
50 PSI torque take-off power at 96% NP is available to ISA +27°C at sea level, and 50
PSI torque cruise power at 91% NP is available to ISA +13°C at sea level. Specific fuel
consumption (SFC) is approximately 1% higher than the -27 engine at a typical cruise
altitude of 9,500 feet, this due to the increased use of compressor output air to cool
the inlet vane ring. Baseline engine TBO is 4,000 hours, and ‘hard time’ between hot
section inspections is 2,000 hours.
A cable and pulley system and mechanical linkage connects each power lever to the
fuel control unit power shaft and to the fuel governing section of the propeller governor
(through the beta feedback linkage) on its related engine. To prevent inadvertent
selection of reverse, a mechanical stop mechanism is provided in each power lever
quadrant which is effective at the IDLE position; it is overridden by twisting the grip of
the power lever to disengage the stop, and then moving the lever into the reverse range.
A microswitch, operated by either power lever, is in circuit with the propeller beta
switches. A second microswitch, operated by the right power lever only, is connected
to the RESET PROPS annunciation logic circuit. An interlock mechanism, operated by
the propeller lever quadrants, prevents the power levers from being moved aft beyond
the idle stop if both propeller levers are positioned at less than 91% NP. Individual
movement of either propeller lever above 91% NP disengages the interlock mechanism.
When propeller blade latches are installed a reference line is marked on each power
lever and a similar line marked across the power lever quadrant facilitates exact
positioning of the power levers for zero thrust engine starting and stopping.
at the bottom of the combustion chamber which expels residual fuel after engine
shutdown.
A fuel governing mechanism in the propeller governor limits propeller speed to 91%
when the power levers are moved aft of the idle stop by reducing fuel flow at the fuel
control unit, and also limits NG in the event of failure of the propeller governor and the
overspeed governor. Control of the engine fuel control system is by pulley and cable
systems which connect the power, prop, and fuel levers to the fuel control unit, propeller
governor, and fuel shut-off valve on the FCU respectively.
Both igniters of each engine are energized simultaneously during engine start and both
igniters of both engines are energized simultaneously when continuous (MANUAL)
ignition is selected. The left and right engine spark igniters are powered through their
respective ignition relays. When dry motoring the left or right engine, the appropriate
circuit breaker IGNITION L or IGNITION R may be pulled, the same as the dry motoring
procedures for engines equipped with glow plugs.
The MANUAL position should be selected during flight in extreme turbulence or flight
in severe icing conditions. The left and right engine spark igniters are powered directly
from the auxiliary battery bus through their respective ignition relays. Both igniters of
each engine are energized simultaneously during engine start and when continuous
(MANUAL) ignition is selected.
The starter will not operate if the START switch is engaged and the ignition switch is in
the MANUAL position.
If the START switch is released during a start cycle, the starter system will be de-
energized and the engine will run down. The switch should not be operated again until
the rundown is complete.
medium for raising the temperature of the fuel prior to its delivery to the engine. This is
accomplished by piping oil through a fuel heater mounted on the engine upper casing.
For oil pressure indication a pressure transmitter is installed in the engine accessory
gearcase and supplies input for oil pressure measurement; a pressure switch that
operates at approximately 40 PSI is also installed in a line tapped into the accessory
gear case end and this provides a backup source of low oil pressure indication and
annunciation.
A resistance bulb is installed in the accessory gear case to support oil temperature
indication.
Each engine oil tank has a capacity of 1.9 Imperial (2.3 U.S.) gallons of which 1.3
Imperial (1.5 U.S.) gallons is usable. The oil tank filler neck is accessible at the engine
accessory gear case.
7.10.7 Propellers
The two Hartzell propellers are metal, counterweight, three-bladed, fully feathering,
reversible, and speed governed units. Each propeller is 8 feet 6 inches (2.6 m) in
diameter and has a blade angle range of –15° (full reverse) to +87° (feathered),
and a low pitch pickup setting of +17°. Each is controlled in the constant speed
range and when feathered by the propeller lever through a propeller governor on the
propeller reduction gearbox. The power lever is connected to the propeller reverse cam
mechanism for control of the propeller in the beta (+17° to –15°) range. Each propeller
system incorporates a propeller overspeed governor and an automatic feathering
system. Propeller blade latches (when installed) permit engine starting and stopping
with propeller blades at the zero thrust position.
The beta valve controls the propeller blade angle in the beta range. When the power
is being delivered to the propeller is not sufficient to rotate the propeller at the speed
which the pilot has selected using the propeller lever, the propeller governor reduces
blade angle in order to cause propeller speed to increase to the set point. There is a
practical limit to how fine the blade angle can be allowed to go during normal forward
thrust or idle power operations. That limit is set during the propeller rigging process at
+11° and is referred to as ‘idle blade angle’. As propeller blade angle decreases through
+17°, the beta valve slowly begins to close, and when blade angle reaches +11°, an
equilibrium is reached between oil flow through the beta valve and oil leakage out of
the propeller system. The propeller blade then ‘idles’ at +11°, and propeller blade angle
will not decrease further unless the pilot twists the power lever grips and moves the
power levers aft of the idle stop. The idle blade angle is the same regardless of whether
the aircraft is in flight or on the ground.
If the propeller speed observed on the NP display is the same as the propeller speed
that has been selected with the propeller levers (for example, 96% during take-off, or
75% during cruise), the propeller is operating in the constant speed range and is under
the control of the propeller governor. The propeller governor varies blade angle in order
to maintain a constant RPM.
If the propeller speed observed on the NP display is less than the speed that has been
selected with the propeller levers (for example, 44% at idle power on the ground, or
below 96% at the low power settings that are used during final approach after the
propeller levers have been moved forward to 96%), the propeller is operating in beta
range and is under the control of the beta valve. The beta valve varies blade angle in
response to movement of the power lever by the pilot.
The term ‘hydraulic low pitch stop’ refers to the beta reverse valve that is mounted on
the forward face of the propeller governor.
Should a propeller enter the ground fine range uncommanded: Move the propeller lever
to the minimum governing speed (75% NP) position, and add power. This will transfer
control of the propeller away from the beta system and back to the propeller governor
system.
with temperature and pressure altitude. This caution message indicates the need to
move the propeller levers forward to MAX RPM in order to put the propeller governor
into an underspeed condition and provide the pilot with direct control of propeller blade
angle via the power levers. The RESET PROPS message electrical circuit is energized
through two microswitches connected in series, one operated by the left propeller lever
and the other by the right power lever. The circuit is powered from the right DC bus and
is protected by the PROPELLER OVERSPEED GOVERNOR circuit breaker (position
D5) on the main circuit breaker panel.
When the power levers are twisted and moved aft of the idle stop, the NF governor
is reset to a significantly lower datum (5% less than selected propeller speed). This
prevents the propeller speed from exceeding 91% in the reverse range.
In order to ensure that the pilot always has direct control over propeller blade angle via
the power levers whenever the power levers have been moved into the reverse range,
it is essential to ensure that the propellers can never reach the speed to which the
propeller governor has been set. The mechanical interlock between the power levers
and the propeller levers ensures that the propeller levers must be set to 96% before
the power levers can be moved aft of the idle stop. By using the NF governor to reduce
fuel flow to the engine as the propeller speed approaches 96% less 5% (91%) when
the power levers are in the reverse range, it can be assured that the propeller speed in
reverse will never reach the propeller governor set point and the propellers will always
be underspeeding – and thus subject to control by the beta valve – whenever the power
levers have been twisted and moved aft of idle.
Pulling either or both power levers back below 86 - 88% NG (for example, in the event
of a rejected take-off) disarms the autofeather system. Two autofeather indicator lights
(one on each side of the instrument panel) illuminate to signify when the system is
selected on and when it is armed. An autofeather test switch is provided to permit
a ground check of the autofeather system. The autofeather system is powered from
the left DC bus and is protected by a PROPELLER AUTOFEATHER circuit breaker
(position C7) on the main circuit breaker panel.
A two-second delay between the detection of low torque and automatic feathering of
the propeller is provided. This allows propeller discing to be used in the event of a
rejected take-off due to a loss of torque. Dual circuitry is used on all autofeather sensors
and relays to reduce the probability of a single system failure causing an unwanted
autofeathering.
The two switches operate in the same manner as a household three-way switch system
that is found at the top and bottom of a flight of stairs. Pressing either switch once
changes the state of the system, from ON to OFF or from OFF to ON as appropriate.
The physical position of the switch (in or out) is not significant.
To comply with contemporary guidelines for the use of colour in switches and indications,
the SELECTED light is white and the ARMED light is green.
ACTION:
In Section 7, remove Temporary Revision (TR-24) and replace with Temporary Revision
(TR-26).
-Continued overleaf-
RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS:
Record this TEMPORARY REVISION NO. and the relevant information in the
appropriate columns of the TEMPORARY REVISION INDEX provided at the front of
the manual.
Operators of such aircraft are advised that the exemption allows the EFIS display
colours shown in Figure 7-24, Figure 7-25 and Figure 7-26 to be used. The FAA
requires the white arcs shown for the engine TRQ and T5 to be green and all numbers,
other than the OAT, to be green when in the normal range.
Figure 7-30 Primary Flight Display, showing engine indications (upper left)
Display of engine operating parameters is provided in the upper inboard 1/6 portion
of the primary flight displays. Torque and engine temperature are depicted with
pointer-type displays and integer values beneath each display. Other parameters are
depicted with integers only.
During normal operations, all integer values are displayed in white against a black
background, and gauge backgrounds are depicted in grey and black, to the left and
right of the pointer needle respectively.
When an engine parameter exceeds its limitation, the integer background will change
to amber or to red, depending on the severity of the exceedence. This will always be
accompanied by a CAS message, also in amber or red, and a single chime (for amber
messages) or triple chime (for warning messages).
The logic that drives the monitoring of engine limitations makes allowances for
acceleration limits that are granted during various phases of engine operation. Cautions
and warnings will not be generated provided that the exceedence is within both the
time and value parameters for the acceleration limit.
Five different sets of limitations are used for each engine, depending on the phase of
flight. These include starting, ground idle, take-off, climb and cruise, and single engine
operations. The appropriate set of limitations is automatically applied based on logic
inputs from other aircraft systems.
For example, if the starter switch is engaged, starting limits will be applied to the engine
being started. If the NG is below 72% and the aircraft is on the ground, idle limits will
be applied. If the autofeather system has been selected on, the take-off configuration
monitor indicates that the aircraft is configured for take-off, and power levers are
advanced for take-off, take-off limitations will be applied. If the aircraft is in flight and
one engine registers NG of less than 45%, single engine limitations (equivalent to
take-off limitations) will be applied. If single engine limitations have been applied in
flight due to shut down of one engine, they will continue to be applied for an additional
120 seconds following an in-flight start-up of engine that was shut down. This is to
allow adequate time for checklists to be completed prior to reverting to normal climb
and cruise engine limits.
The limitations presently being used at any given time are displayed in white text or, in
the case of start limitations, in green text. No annunciation is provided when the default
(climb and cruise) limitations are in use.
Figure 7-31 Engine Window showing torque exceedance and fire warning
Torque is displayed in PSI. 50 PSI torque is equal to 1,528.5 ft·lbs or 2,072.4 N·m torque.
NP, NG, Fuel Flow, Oil Pressure and Oil Temperature are all measured and continuously
calculated to one decimal point of precision; however, to avoid unwanted distraction to
the flight crew caused by frequently changing digits to the right of the decimal point, only
whole numbers are displayed in the engine window. If display of any of these values with
single decimal point precision is required (for example, for engine rigging purposes), an
ARINC 429 bus reader may be used to display the value with full available precision.
A single fire extinguisher bottle is installed in each nacelle. Each bottle, when operated,
discharges its contents (bromotriflouromethane, also known as Halon 1301 or CF3Br)
through a pipe into the engine accessories compartment. Indication of fire extinguisher
bottle discharge is provided in the form of two coloured discs on the inboard side of
each nacelle. The detecting units are powered from the left DC bus through FIRE
DETECTION L and R circuit breakers (positions C11 and D11, respectively), and the
extinguisher circuits from the same supply through FIRE EXTINGUISHER L and R
circuit breakers (positions C10 and D10, respectively).
accidental activation. When pushed, each button electrically triggers a detonator at the
flood valve of its corresponding extinguisher bottle and releases the agent instantly.
The pressure switch consists of a single switch that activates when pneumatic pressure
has decreased to 13-15 PSI. A CAS message is displayed to the crew when pneumatic
pressure falls below this level if the surface de-ice system has been selected on. This
message indicates that there is insufficient pressure to satisfactorily operate the de-ice
boots. The PNEUMATIC PRESS LOW message is advisory level (cyan) when the
aircraft is on the ground, and caution level (amber) when the aircraft is in flight. This
message is never displayed on aircraft that are not fitted with surface de-ice boots.
Controls for most ice and rain protection features, including functions that are provided
as standard equipment on every aircraft and for the optional heated windshield, are
located on the upper row of the left pilot sub-panel. Controls for the optional surface
de-ice boots and associated surface de-ice systems are located in the middle row of
the right pilot sub-panel when these options are fitted to the aircraft.
Each intake deflector is operated by two pneumatic actuators and compression return
springs mounted one on each side above the inlet duct and connected to the deflector
by turnbuckle type piston rods. Air pressure from the bleed/pneumatic system extends
the actuators to lower the deflector, and the return springs retract it when the imposed
air pressure is vented. The air pressure is admitted to and exhausted from the actuators
through an electrically operated air valve. Two spring-loaded lock levers lock the
deflector at its extended position while a solenoid-operated lever and rod mechanism
withdraws the lock levers to allow the deflector to retract due to the force exerted by the
door spring. A cable interconnecting the deflector operating mechanism with the exit
duct door, and door spring, provide for automatic operation of the exit duct door.
The system is powered from the right DC bus through a single INTAKE DEFLECTORS
circuit breaker (position B5) on the main circuit breaker panel.
Pitot heater elements are monitored for electrical continuity. Failure of an element will
be annunciated on the CAS with the text ‘Left (or Right) Probe Fail'.
Additional ducts deliver ram air to the cabin through individual passenger punkah
louvers located in the cove moulding ducts on each side of the cabin upper walls. A
fan is installed in the air intake duct for forced ram air ventilation when on ground. The
system provides for manual temperature control by means of a manually controlled
motorized hot air valve and manual control of both ram air inflow and cabin / flight
compartment air distribution balance. An exhaust vent is installed in the cabin roof.
Two gasper outlets with dedicated supply hoses are fitted to the instrument panel to
provide fresh air for the pilots.
A third dedicated supply hose connected to the fresh air intake plenum supplies outside
air to the main avionics bay forward of station 60 whenever the aircraft is in motion or
the vent fan is turned on. An air filter is installed in the avionics bay at the termination
of this air supply line.
Both the RAM AIR handle and the CABIN AIR handle incorporate ‘twist to lock'
functionality. Twisting the handle approximately 90° counterclockwise unlocks the
handle and allows the control to be pulled out or pushed in. Twisting the handle
clockwise locks the control in the selected position and prevents further fore and aft
movement.
When the vent fan is turned on, the white status CAS message VENT FAN ON will
appear in the CAS light. This message is triggered by operation of the vent fan switch,
actual function of the vent fan is not monitored.
When the MODE switch is placed in the ON position, temperature of the aircraft interior
can be governed by direct pilot control of the hot air valve (which admits bleed air to the
system) by means of the TEMP toggle switch beside the MODE switch.
The TEMP switch is a three-position switch, spring-loaded to the center position; the
upper and lower positions are labelled COOL, and WARM. The TEMP control switch
governs the position of the hot air valve and thereby regulates the inflow of hot air. When
moved to COOL, the hot air valve is motored in the closed direction consistent with the
length of time the switch is held at COOL. Similarly, when the switch is held at WARM
the hot air valve is motored in the open direction. Releasing the switch maintains the
valve at the position set. The hot air valve takes approximately 30 seconds to motor
from fully closed to fully open or vice versa.
The sensor for flight compartment temperature is a small round disc on the flight
compartment ceiling, just forward of the station 111 bulkhead, on the right side of the
flight compartment.
The sensor for cabin temperature is an identical disc in the center of the cabin ceiling,
abeam the airstair door.
ACTION:
In Section 7, ignore existing Page 7-101 and insert revised pages, as shown on Pages
2 and 3 of this Temporary Revision.
-Continued overleaf-
RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS:
Record this TEMPORARY REVISION NO. and the relevant information in the
appropriate columns of the TEMPORARY REVISION INDEX provided at the front of
the manual.
Power to both fans is routed from the FLT COMP FANS circuit breaker on the main CB
panel (refer to Figure 7-44), and is controlled from a switch labelled FLT COMP FANS
on the pulley bracket box located on the upper forward side of the station 111 bulkhead,
to the LH side of the bulkhead opening (refer to Figure 7-45).
Each fan can be adjusted to direct the airflow in any direction. A three-position toggle
switch is located on the back of each fan and may be used to control each fan’s speed
(LOW/OFF/HIGH).
Power to both fans is routed from the CABIN FANS circuit breaker on the main CB panel
(refer to Figure 7-46), and is controlled from a switch labelled CABIN FANS STA 111
BULKHEAD on the pulley bracket box located on the upper forward side of the station
111 bulkhead, to the LH side of the bulkhead opening (refer to Figure 7-45).
Each fan has a three-position toggle switch located in the fan base to control the fan
speed (LOW/OFF/HIGH).
Power to the fan is routed from the CABIN FANS circuit breaker on the main CB panel
(refer to Figure 7-46), and is controlled from a switch labelled CABIN FAN STA 332
BULKHEAD on the pulley bracket box located on the upper forward side of the station
111 bulkhead, to the LH side of the bulkhead opening (refer to Figure 7-45). The switch
controls the fan speed (LOW/OFF/HIGH).
Power to both fans is routed from the FLT COMP FANS circuit breaker (position B1) on
the main CB panel and is controlled from a switch labelled FLT COMP FANS on the
pulley bracket box located on the upper forward side of the station 111 bulkhead, to the
LH side of the bulkhead opening.
Each fan can be adjusted to direct the airflow in any direction. A three-position toggle
switch is located on the back of each fan and may be used to control each fan’s speed
(LOW/OFF/HIGH).
The system is pressurized by the motor-driven pump and pressure supply is retained
by the damping and brake accumulators. Pressure is immediately available from the
damping accumulator for operation of the flaps, nose wheel steering, and wheel brakes.
The brake accumulator supplements the damping accumulator in supplying the brakes,
and also maintains a reserve pressure for brake operation in the event of pressure loss
from the damping accumulator or failure of the motor-driven pump. The pressure switch
senses system pressure and regulates the operation of the motor-driven pump so that
a predetermined working pressure is always maintained by the two accumulators.
The emergency hand pump is provided for use in the event of failure of the motor-driven
pump. It may be used manually to pressurize the accumulators or to operate the wing
flaps and nose wheel steering directly. The two accumulators are precharged with
nitrogen, which is accomplished by a charging valve and a pressure gauge beside
each accumulator. The main power components of the hydraulic system (motor-driven
pump, reservoir, accumulators and their pressure gauges) are combined in a power
package mounted on the fuselage structure beneath the flight compartment floor. It is
accessible for servicing from both sides of the fuselage through access doors.
The HYDRAULIC OIL PUMP circuit breaker should not be pulled out except in the
event of an abnormality. It is neither necessary nor desirable to pull the HYDRAULIC
OIL PUMP circuit breaker to minimize electrical system demand prior to engine start.
Amber caution level CAS messages (in flight) or red warning level CAS messages (on
ground) are provided if the hydraulic pressure drops below 1,200 PSI. In addition, the
display of system and brake hydraulic pressure will change to an amber or red inverse
video background as appropriate. A red warning level CAS message is provided if the
HYDRAULIC OIL PUMP circuit breaker is open circuit at any time.
which controls the direction and amount of turn in response to steering lever up
or down movement. A spring-loaded latch retains the nose wheel in the centered
position in flight. For ground handling purposes, the nose gear leg torque links may be
disconnected by removing a pip pin so that the leg can caster freely.
Unnecessary pressure on the steering lever while airborne should be avoided in order
to prevent unnecessary loads on the steering lock mechanism.
A parking brake handle retains the brakes in the on condition when the pedals are
depressed. Less than full braking pressure is applied when the park brake is engaged,
and chocks should be used if the aircraft is not on a level surface. Brake pressure is
supplied from a brake accumulator which is pressurized by the hydraulic system electric
motor-driven pump or hand pump. Brake system hydraulic pressure is displayed on the
multifunction display.
Figure 7-48 Trim Tab, Flap Position, and Hydraulic Pressure System Window
A folding gust lock warning flag is mounted on the aileron and elevator gust lock hook
assembly, which covers the flight instruments when the gust lock is in place. The aileron
and elevator control lock assembly is stowed in a bracket and retainer strap under the
left pilot seat; the rudder vertical strut assembly is stowed behind the left pilot seatback.
Aileron trim position is not monitored by the take-off configuration warning system.
In flight, the three triangular indicators are displayed in white. in the event of a failure of
a flap or trim position sensor, the affected display will be replaced with an amber cross.
When on ground, the aircraft is monitored for Take-off Configuration by the Monitoring
Warning System (MWS). The MWS monitors the position of the elevator and rudder trim
tabs. If the tab positions do not correspond to the correct take-off position, a Take-off
Configuration advisory will be shown in the CAS window of the systems MFD. If the
two trim tab positions are not within the correct take-off range and the engine torque is
increased to more than 20 PSI with airspeed of less than 40 KIAS, the Flight Alerting
System (FAS) will initiate a NO TAKEOFF warning on the PFD and a No Take-off voice
callout will be heard.
The green bands indicating ‘take-off range' on the Apex system display of elevator
and rudder trim are fractionally larger than the corresponding white bands indicating
‘take-off range' that are adjacent to the mechanical pointers for elevator and rudder trim
position on the trim panel. This is deliberate, to avoid spurious activation of the take-off
configuration warning system if the pilot has set a trim tab to the extreme limit of range
according to the white markings on the trim panel.
This holder is designed to hold approach plates only. It is not intended to be used as a
writing surface.
It is recommended that the approach plate holder be removed and stowed when not in
use.
If the airspeed exceeds the limit applicable to current flap extension (no more than
103 KIAS with flap 10° extended, and no more than 93 KIAS with more than flap 10°
extended), the Flight Alerting System will initiate an “Overspeed” warning on the PFDs
and a “Speed” voice callout will be heard. A red V-constraint bar will be shown on the
right side of the PFD airspeed indicator tape, and the display of airspeed digits will
change to red.
When on ground, the aircraft is monitored for Take-off Configuration by the Monitoring
Warning System (MWS). The MWS monitors the position of the flaps. If the flap
position does not correspond to the correct take-off setting for the type of gear fitted to
the aircraft, a Take-off Configuration advisory will be shown in the CAS window of the
systems MFD. If the flap position is not at the correct take-off setting and the engine
torque is increased to more than 20 PSI with airspeed of less than 40 KIAS, the Flight
Alerting System (FAS) will initiate a NO TAKEOFF warning on the PFD and a No
Take-off voice callout will be heard.
When the aircraft is on the ground, the pointer of the flap position indicator will turn
green when the correct flap position for take-off has been selected. When the flaps are
retracted and the aircraft reaches cruise speed, the flap position indicator dims to grey
to reduce display clutter. In flight, the pointer symbol will appear in green when flap has
been selected to 10°, 20°, or 37°.
The Primus Apex® Software and all parts thereof installed in the aircraft are subject
to various Honeywell proprietary rights. The Software License Agreement covers
the aircraft owner/operator for the usage of the software installed in the aircraft and
any updates, but only the functionality the customer has paid for. By accepting the
License, Honeywell grants the aircraft owner/operator a nonexclusive license to use
one electronic copy of the Software, solely in conjunction with the installed avionics
equipment, to operate the specific aircraft identified at the time the License was granted
to the owner/operator. Any other uses, copying or distribution of the Software without
prior written approval are strictly prohibited. Honeywell retains all title and interest in
and to the Software.
7.18.1 Scope
Detailed instructions for operation of the Honeywell Primus Apex® avionics suite are
provided in the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System Pilot Guide for the
DHC-6 Series 400, Honeywell publication number D200810000022. The Honeywell
Pilot Guide is an appendix to Section 7 of this POH and must always be carried on
board the aircraft.
The description of the Honeywell avionics system and Honeywell components in the
following pages provides only a high level overview of the Apex system and is not
intended to substitute for or to replace the contents of the Honeywell Pilot Guide.
For L3 GH-3100 Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS) equipped aircraft (Pre
Mod 6/2170), detailed instructions for operation of the ESIS are provided in the L3
GH-3100 ESIS Pilot Guide publication number TP-560 at Revision F, or later revision.
The description of the L3 ESIS in the following pages provides only a high level overview
of the ESIS and is not intended to substitute for or replace the contents of the L3 Pilot
Guide.
The avionics suite is based on a four display unit layout, arranged in a T configuration.
All of the cockpit controls, switches, and displays are readily accessible to the pilot
for single pilot operation. There is a single overhead panel located directly above the
left pilot windshield that contains controls for engine starting, ignition, DC electrical,
and landing lights. Circuit breaker panels are located on the left wall of the flight
compartment and at the base of the instrument panel pedestal. All aircraft system
controls and switches are located on two sub-panels, directly below the two primary
flight displays.
The left display unit (DU) is the pilot’s primary flight display (PFD), the center upper DU
is normally used for the situational awareness multi function display (MFD), the lower
MFD is normally used for the systems MFD, and the right DU is the co-pilot’s PFD. The
presentation of information on the two MFD’s can be electronically swapped to display
systems on the upper MFD and situational awareness on the lower MFD.
These four display panels are installed in a single-piece, shock mounted instrument
panel.
To the right of the pilot’s PFD is the Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS), the
main function of which is to display altitude, attitude, heading, and airspeed in the event
of a total failure of the primary avionics system or a total electrical failure. The ESIS is
powered by a dedicated battery that is entirely independent of the main DC electrical
system.
A Thommen quartz chronometer is located inboard of the co-pilot’s PFD. The clock
occupies a 3 ATI standard space, and two additional 3 ATI spaces are provided below
the clock for optional equipment such as HF radio or satellite communications controls.
The KMA 2210 PFD and radio control panels are directly inboard of each PFD. The KMA
29 audio control panels are directly above each PFD. The KMC 9200 flight guidance
control panel is directly above the upper multifunction display.
Fuel system controls and switches are located directly below the ESIS, on the left side
of the instrument panel. Engine fire control switches are mounted outboard of the flight
guidance control panel.
The MFD controller, the display reversion control panel, and dimming control for the
instrument panel are located on the aft face of the center control yoke.
The lower sub-panel on the left side contains all switches for internal and external
lighting and for the most commonly used ice and rain protection controls. The lower right
sub-panel contains switches for heating and ventilation controls, certain emergency
and configuration functions, and for optional surface de-ice boots. Engine fire detection
indication and control switches are mounted outboard of the flight guidance control
panel, at the top center of the instrument panel. Dimming controls for instrument panel
lighting are mounted forward of the multifunction controller on the control yoke.
The Apex system connects to and controls the following stand-alone Honeywell
equipment:
The Apex system connects to and, in the case of the Stormscope, controls the following
stand-alone equipment provided by other companies:
L3 Stormscope (optional)
The MAU is installed on the upper of the three avionics racks between the nose
baggage compartment and the flight compartment. It consists of a cabinet/chassis
containing a backplane circuit card assembly, two cooling fans, and 12 user module
slots that host a variety of line replaceable modules. The MAU cabinet is divided into
two channels (A and B), and each channel is electrically isolated from the other with
its own power supply module, Network Interface Controller (NIC) module and data
communications backplane. The dual channel architecture of the MAU allows system
functions to be distributed between channels. All modules are field replaceable and
software updates can be loaded in the field. The modules communicate to the Avionics
Standard Communications Bus (ASCB) via the NIC modules.
The ASCB consists of two independent busses, the left and right busses corresponding
to pilot and co-pilot side primary data. Each NIC in the system reads and writes to the
onside primary bus, and reads from the cross-side primary bus.
The aircraft wiring interface to the MAU is segregated into two systems, MAU Channel
A to system 1 (left side aircraft wiring) and MAU Channel B to system 2 (right side
aircraft wiring).
The communication mechanism that Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) in the Apex system
use to communicate is called the Virtual Backplane. The Virtual Backplane concept
allows more than one physical MAU cabinet to be installed and for all MAU cabinets
on an aircraft to function as if they were a single cabinet. At present, only one MAU
cabinet is installed in the Series 400 Twin Otter. The Virtual Backplane comprises a
high integrity bus network called Avionics Standard Communication Bus (ASCB) and
the software and hardware mechanisms within the LRUs that communicate on ASCB.
In the DHC-6, only channels A and B of the MAU are directly connected to ASCB.
Line replaceable units (LRU) connected to ASCB use a common interface bus control
module called a Network Interface Controller (NIC). The NIC provides a high integrity
method for an LRU to interface with the ASCB.
A 10BASE2 thin Ethernet Local Area Network (LAN) connection using a BNC (Bayonet
Neill-Concelman) connector provides a general purpose method of transferring data
to any LRU in the APEX system. Typical use of the LAN is on-ground data transfer
(software installation) and maintenance data transfer (data collection). The LAN is
connected to each channel of the MAU, to the multifunction (MF) Controller, and to the
maintenance panel.
The Apex system includes two Monitor and Warning Function (MWF) systems
that independently calculate the logic for Crew Alerting System (CAS) messages.
Comparison monitors within the display system alert the pilot when there is difference
between the results generated from MWF system 1 and MWF system 2.
MWF system 1 displays DAU channel A CAS messages and MWF system 2 displays
DAU channel B CAS messages. Both channels of a DAU should always output the
same message but in the event of a malfunction the two DAU channels could disagree
and trigger the miscompare monitor.
In normal operation there should be no discrepancy between the calculations of the two
MWF systems. In the event of a fault in a DAU channel that results in different outputs
between DAU channels, the CAS miscompare monitor will activate. The pilot may
then toggle the CAS message window between MWF system 1 and MWF system 2 by
pressing the bezel button beside the small amber ‘MW' square to display and compare
output from each of the two MWF systems. By identifying the difference between
the CAS messages generated by the two MWF system, and then gathering further
information about the affected aircraft component from other sources (e.g. engine
indications, mechanical trim indications, visual observation of flap or control surface
positions, etc.), it should be possible to determine which MWF system is most credible.
Certain types of data such as navigation database updates may be uploaded to the
aircraft by using the SD (Secure Digital) card slot on the multifunction controller.
1 The Power Supply (PS) module. Each channel of the MAU has a dedicated,
independent power supply. Either power supply can operate both of the MAU
cabinet cooling fans. Each power supply receives power from both the left and
right busses. The PS modules contain no processing or backplane communication
capability.
2 The Network Interface Controller (NIC) modules provide a gateway for the MAU
modules to access the ASCB and the LAN. Two NIC modules are installed, one for
each channel of the MAU.
3 The Aircraft Personality Module (APM) is a memory storage device contained within
the MAU NIC backshell connectors. Two APM’s are installed, one for each channel
of the MAU. They contain Apex configuration data – typically, avionics system
identifier, aircraft type, aircraft serial number, installed configuration options and
system settings. The APM enables components such as individual cards within the
MAU to be removed and replaced quickly, without the need to reconfigure the card
for a specific aircraft.
4 The Advanced Graphics Module (AGM) is a single channel module and one
AGM is installed for each channel of the MAU. The AGM does general purpose
processing as well as display processing and graphics generation. The configuration
management function (CMS), flight management System (FMS), electronic display
of Jeppesen charts function and maintenance functions (CMC) are also hosted on
the AGM module. AGM 1 (MAU channel A) drives the pilot PFD and upper MFD
and AGM 2 (MAU channel B) drives the co-pilot PFD and lower MFD. A repeater
capability allows the Pilot PFD to be displayed on the co-pilot PFD (and vice-versa)
in the event of a single AGM failure. The display controllers, MF controller and
Display Reversion Control Panel (DRCP) connect to the AGMs. AGM integrity is
monitored by the Monitor Warning Function (MWF), which verifies that the data
selected by the AGM for display on the DUs has high integrity.
5 The Generic Input/Output (GIO) Module is a dual channel module. Each module
channel is connected to a different MAU backplane (channel A and B). The GIO
module translates aircraft I/O data onto and off of the ASCB via the MAU’s backplane.
The GIO also translates selected fuselage signals from analog to digital, and then
sends this digital data back to the Data Acquisition Units (DAU) for consolidation.
6 The Custom Input/Output (CSIO) Module is a dual channel module, each module
channel is connected to a different MAU backplane (channel A and B). The CSIO
module also translates aircraft I/O data onto and off of the ASCB similar to the
GIO module, but is more specialized to meet aircraft model-specific interface
requirements. The CSIO also translates selected fuselage signals from analog to
digital, and then sends this digital data back to the Data Acquisition Units (DAU) for
consolidation.
The Apex operational software for the MAU is installed in each aircraft during production
and subsequently may be re-installed in the field when software updates become
available. Apex operational software is distributed on a CD-ROM. Data loading from
the CD-ROM is accomplished by using a PC laptop connected to the Apex system
installed on the aircraft via a LAN connector located in the nose avionics bay.
The System Configuration and Data Loading window is a page selection on the
systems MFD lower left 1/6th window. This page is only available for display when the
aircraft is on the ground. The SYS CONFIG window displays 12 pages of configuration
information for all software and data bases installed in the MAU. It does not display
information about the software version loaded in the Data Acquisition Units (DAUs).
When the Data Loading window is displayed, the multi function controller joystick control
is used to select one of the four selections to start the Data Load process.
All non-avionic aircraft sensor data required to drive system pages, CAS messaging
and monitors and inhibit logic is fed to the DAU. An external signal connecting to the
DAU is brought in through a single set of pins on the connector, internally routed to two
sets of input-output (I/O) circuitry, processed redundantly by independent processors,
and transmitted redundantly onto the ARINC 429 busses to the MAU. Each DAU is a
dual channel device for most signals. A subset of lower criticality signals are single
channel on the A side and a subset of lower criticality signals are single channel on the
B side. These single channel signals are processed by one channel and communicated
to the other channel for further processing and transmission. The DAU channels are
powered by independent power supplies. The primary benefit of this architecture is
that no single point failure can cause the loss of I/O processing in both channels. A
secondary benefit is the ability to redundantly process I/O without having to externally
splice wires to more than one connector.
The ARINC 429 outputs to the MAU are a combination of graphics commands to drive
systems indications, CAS message triggers, monitors that trigger aural warnings and
PFD alerts, and phase of flight inhibit logic bits that are used by the MAU monitor and
warning function (MWF) to inhibit selected CAS messages during certain phases of
flight. The ARINC 429 data to the MAU also includes data required by the MAU to do
logic related to avionic systems.
Each ARINC 429 input to the MAU is split internally within the MAU and available to
both channels I/O modules. Each channel of the MAU reads the ARINC 429 data
independently and makes the data available to the ASCB bus. Once the data is placed
on the ASCB bus it is available to all applications within the MAU regardless of channel.
The relevant applications in each channel of the MAU use this data to drive displays
and alerts.
Numerous sensors have been added to the aircraft to detect conditions such as primary
and secondary control surface position, flap position, power lever angle, and hydraulic
pressures. Data from these sensors is either routed to the DAUs for processing or
supplied directly to I/O cards in the MAU. The data is then used to generate information
presented to the crew on the Apex display units, or converted into ARINC 717 format
for supply to the flight data recorder, or both.
Both DAUs operate continually, and process all signals independently using dual
channel architecture. Outputs from both channels are used and monitored for
consistency. A small avionics cooling fan is installed above the cabin roof panels.
The fan circulates air over the DAUs to disperse heat. The fan is controlled by a thermal
sensor mounted on the DAU maintenance panel (immediately forward of the DAUs)
and operates automatically when needed. The fan is supplied with power from CB U2
on the aft cabin CB panel.
message screen at power-on. If the two values do not match, a red warning level
configuration error message is displayed. Gear configuration settings may be changed
by a maintenance technician. The ADAHRS must also be configured for the gear
configuration fitted to the aircraft.
Each channel of the dual-channel MAU does its own independent monitoring of Air
/Ground status. The results are then compared for consistency. If the MAU determines
a disparity between the monitors by comparison monitoring, a correct determination
of the AIR/GND status is still possible as the suspect (invalid) monitor is disregarded
in the determination. If the MAU determines that all monitors disagree it results in an
invalid Air/Ground state. If the Air/Ground state is invalid an AIR/GND FAIL caution will
be shown on the Crew Alerting System (CAS).
When the AIR/GND FAIL caution is present the Air/Ground state defaults to AIR.
7.18.9 ADAHRS
7.18.9.1 General
The aircraft is equipped with one dual channel KSG 7200 Air Data and Attitude Heading
Reference System (ADAHRS). Each channel has a separate power supply, Channel A
from the left 28 Volt DC bus and Channel B from the right 28 Volt DC bus. The system
provides primary attitude, heading and air data parameters from each channel to the
Modular Avionics Unit (MAU). This design ensures that a single component failure will
not affect both channels.
7.18.9.2 Description
Each channel of the ADAHRS contains a solid-state micro-electro-mechanical systems
(MEMS) technology sensor block, which contains three rate sensors and three
accelerometers in an orthogonal triad configuration. The triad in Channel B is skewed
relative to Channel A. Each channel has a connection for an Outside Air Temperature
(OAT) probe, a magnetometer, and two isolated absolute pressure sensors (one for pitot
and one for static pressure). Channel A receives inputs from the left pitot tube, lower
static ports, one magnetometer and one channel of the temperature probe. Channel
B receives inputs from the right pitot tube, upper static ports, the other magnetometer
and the second channel of the temperature probe. Each channel of the ADAHRS has
a Central Processing Unit (CPU). The ADAHRS is installed in the nose avionics rack.
A Rosemount (Goodrich) dual element OAT sensor is mounted just forward and below
the ram air scoop on the left side of the fuselage to supply the ADAHRS with OAT data.
Two KMG 7010 magnetometers are mounted near the outboard end of the right wing
(Pre Mod 6/2171), or in the vertical stabilizer (Post Mod 6/2171), one for each channel
of the ADAHRS.
During normal operation, the left pilot’s PFD receives ADAHRS source data from
the left pitot tube and lower static ports and ADAHRS Channel A. The right pilot’s
PFD receives ADAHRS source data from the right pitot tube, upper static ports, and
ADAHRS Channel B.
7.18.9.3 Operation
Each ADAHRS channel CPU receives air data, temperature and heading information
from that channel’s sensor block and passes it to the other channel. Both CPUs then
compare the data to verify sensor integrity. Verified ADAHRS information is sent to
each channel of the MAU for display on the Apex system.
If the data from a sensor does not pass the verification check the data is discarded and
will not be used. A fault signal will be sent to the MAU and a caution will be posted on
the CAS. In this case the ADHRS button on the PFD Controller of the failed side can be
pressed to change the ADAHRS source channel to the opposite side. An amber text
message will appear in the HSI window when both PFDs are using the same ADAHRS
source channel.
7.18.9.4 Reversion
The left and right Primary Flight Display controllers each have an ADHRS button,
which can be used to change the PFD ADAHRS source channel. In the event of
failure or degradation of the signal from the channel normally used, the signal from the
opposite-side channel may be selected. ADAHRS source annunciations will be shown
in amber in the lower left region of PFD ADI window when the same source has been
selected on both left and right PFDs, otherwise, the source annunciation is displayed
in white.
7.18.9.5 Indication/Warning
The Crew Alerting system (CAS) window of the systems Multi Function Display (MFD)
displays the following Cautions and Advisory messages for the ADAHRS status.
ADC refers to the Air Data Computer (pitot, static, and temperature) portion of the
ADAHRS, and AHRS refers to the Attitude and Heading Reference System portion of
the ADAHRS. OAT refers to problems with the air temperature probe.
AMBER CAUTION
ADC A FAIL Loss of altitude and airspeed data from ADAHRS Channel A
ADC B FAIL Loss of altitude and airspeed data from ADAHRS Channel B
ADC A+B FAIL Loss of altitude and airspeed data from ADAHRS Channel A
and B
AHRS A FAIL Loss of attitude and heading data from ADAHRS Channel A
AHRS B FAIL Loss of attitude and heading data from ADAHRS Channel B
AHRS A+B FAIL Loss of attitude and heading data from ADAHRS Channel A
and B
CYAN ADVISORY
The DUs are simple, rugged, inexpensive 10 by 8 inch LCD displays with integral LED
backlighting, and do not contain any flight operational software. All four are identical
and fully interchangeable. They are driven by the AGMs installed in the MAU. DUs
1 and 2 are driven by AGM 1, and DUs 3 and 4 are driven by AGM 2. The DU area
of display is divided into 1/6 screen size sections. These sections can be combined
into larger sections to provide the required display functionality. These sections of the
displays are referred to as windows.
Data entry and operation of the interactive windows is accomplished by PFD or MFD
controllers and/or the DU bezel buttons. The KMC 2210 PFD controllers only control
the PFDs. The KMC 2220 MF controller can control both the PFDs and the MFDs. The
two PFD controllers are installed inboard of each PFD and the single MF controller is
installed on the aft face of the control yoke.
In the event of failure of a PFD controller, the opposite side controller may be used to
control both displays independently.
Attitude information is displayed on the electronic Attitude Direction Indicator (ADI) and
heading and course information on the electronic Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI).
The Avionics window on the systems MFD provides the pilot the capability to configure
display options on the ADI and HSI. The displayed data is compared by the comparison
monitors and if data is determined to be invalid or different between the right and left
PFD, warning, caution and miscompare annunciations are shown on the PFD. The
warning annunciators are shown in white on a red box or a red cross over the symbol
or tape. Some miscompare annunciators are shown in white on a red box and some
are shown in black on an amber box. The NO TAKEOFF and ATT FAIL annunciators
are shown in the same location on the ADI.
The following displays can be overlaid on the HSI in the partial compass (ARC) mode:
Traffic
Lightning Sensor (Stormscope)
Weather Radar
Terrain from TAWS
Display of terrain from the TAWS and display of Weather Radar on the HSI are mutually
exclusive. Only one of the two may be overlaid on the HSI at any one time. If a TAWS
alert is generated when the weather radar overlay is active, the TAWS overlay will
automatically replace the weather radar overlay.
This controller is fully described in the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics
System Pilot Guide for the DHC-6 Series 400.
The reversion control panel has potentiometers for the PILOTS PFD, UPPER MFD,
LOWER MFD and CO-PILOTS PFD. The four potentiometers are used to adjust the
individual DU brightness and, at their most counter-clockwise position, to switch
the displays to OFF/REV. A firm twist is required to move the knob to the fully
counterclockwise (OFF/REV) position. This is by design, to prevent inadvertent
activation of a reversion mode.
The right side PFD has no REV setting. Turning off the right side PFD simply turns off
the display, and does not affect the contents of the other three display units.
When the PILOTS PFD, UPPER MFD, or LOWER MFD potentiometers are moved to
the OFF/REV position, the selected DU goes blank and the information is moved to
another display.
In some reversion cases (typically when two DUs have been turned off) the PFD will
enter a composite mode. The PFD composite format shows the ADI/HSI, up to twelve
CAS messages, the Systems Summary and the Radio windows, all on a single screen.
Messages can be scrolled.
The two PFD controls also have a rotating switch surrounding their potentiometer that
can be used to select the opposite side Advanced Graphics Module in the event of a
failure of the AGM normally assigned to drive that PFD. When the right hand rotating
switch has been moved away from the NORM position and the co-pilot PFD is being
supplied with data from AGM 1, the engine instruments and radio window will appear
on the outboard side of the co-pilot's PFD.
Operation of the reversion control panel is fully explained in the Honeywell Primus
Apex® Integrated Avionics System Pilot Guide for the DHC-6 Series 400.
The lever-lock switch has two positions, a lower NORMAL position and an upper OPEN
position. The upper OPEN position is used to open the bus tie relay and electrically
isolate the left and right busses. Be aware that the right engine cannot be started if the
BUS TIE switch is in the OPEN position.
This lever-lock switch has two positions, a lower NORMAL position and an upper MUTE
position. The upper MUTE position is used to silence all aural warnings generated by
channel A of the aural warning system. This switch is provided for use in the unlikely
event that channel A begins to generate a repetitive and unwanted aural warning that
cannot be silenced in the normal manner.
This lever-lock switch has two positions, a lower NORMAL position and an upper MUTE
position. The upper MUTE position is used to silence all aural warnings generated by
channel B of the aural warning system. This switch is provided for use in the unlikely
event that channel B begins to generate a repetitive and unwanted aural warning that
cannot be silenced in the normal manner.
This switch has two positions, a lower NORMAL position and an upper 121.5 position.
The switch is spring-loaded to return to the NORMAL position when released. When
lifted, it sets 121.5 MHz as the active frequency in the number 1 VHF communications
radio. This switch is provided to enable the pilot to tune the VHF radio to the emergency
frequency should a catastrophic loss of Apex display capability take place resulting in
failure of the Apex system to display the radio control window. The switch may also
be used when the Apex system is operating normally, to quickly set 121.5 MHz as the
active frequency for the number 1 VHF communication radio.
The various caution and warning lights on the instrument panel (engine FIRE warning
lights, MASTER CAUTION and MASTER WARNING lights, autofeather SELECTED
and ARMED lights, and the STALL light below the ESIS) may be dimmed for night flight
by lifting the CAUTION LIGHTS switch on the left switch panel up to the DIM position.
Doing this sends a signal to a solid-state dimming device that adjusts the electrical
power sent to each caution light.
In the unlikely event of a failure of the solid-state dimming device that results in no
electrical power whatsoever being provided to one or more of the caution lights (as
evidenced by failure of the caution lights to illuminate when the CAUTION LIGHTS
switch on the left switch panel is pressed down to the spring-loaded TEST position, or;
failure of one or more of the caution lights to illuminate when it should during flight), the
solid-state dimming device may be bypassed by lifting the CAUTION LIGHTS DIMMING
switch on the right sub-panel up to the BYPASS position. When this is done, full power
will be supplied to all caution lights, regardless of whether the CAUTION LIGHTS switch
on the left switch panel is in the center BRIGHT position or the upper DIM position.
Note that the CAUTION LIGHTS switch on the left switch panel is the switch that
is normally used to select BRIGHT or DIM display of caution lights. The CAUTION
LIGHTS DIMMING switch on the right sub-panel is only used for reversion purposes,
in the event of failure of the caution lights to operate properly due to a failure in the
dimming circuit.
The Apex ADAHRS will automatically switch from magnetic heading mode (using
information derived from the two magnetometers) to GPS track mode (using information
derived from GPS system calculation of aircraft movement along a track) whenever the
aircraft is being operated near or in an area of compass unreliability. The automatic
switchover from magnetic heading mode (the default mode) to GPS track mode
takes place whenever strength of the earth's magnetic field, as sensed by the two
magnetometers, drops below 80 milligauss.
Under certain circumstances, such as when the aircraft is operating near the edge
of an area of compass unreliability and the pilot wishes to have a constant and
uninterrupted display of either magnetic heading or GPS track displayed on the aircraft
HSIs, the automatic switchover capability may be over-ridden by the pilot by placing
the TRACK SOURCE switch in either MAG (for magnetic heading) or GPS (for GPS
track). Operation of the TRACK SOURCE switch is explained in detail in the Honeywell
Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System Pilot Guide for the DHC-6 Series 400.
Be aware that the TRACK SOURCE switch only affects the Apex system. It does not
affect the display of magnetic heading on the ESIS. The ESIS is hard-wired to use
its own independent magnetometer, located near the left wingtip, and constantly uses
input from this magnetometer for heading display.
MINIMUMS The octagonal rotary knob adjusts the approach minima height/altitude,
referenced to either a target Radar Altitude or Barometric altitude respectively.
Clockwise or counterclockwise rotation when RA is active increases or decreases
the minimums value over a range of 0 to 2500 feet. Clockwise or counter-clockwise
rotation when BARO is active increases or decreases the minimums value over a range
of 20 to 16,000 feet. The knob adjusts the minimums value 10 feet per detent. The
rotary knob is also a momentary push-button PUSH RA/BARO to switch between a
minima referenced to radar altitude or minima referenced to barometric altitude.
HDG TRK This control is a dual concentric knob that allows selection between HDG
and TRK mode. The outer knob is a two-position rotary switch with a pointer. It
selects either heading or track on the HSI compass card. The inner knob increments
(clockwise) and decrements (counter-clockwise) the heading or track value by 1 degree
per detent. The dual concentric knob is also a momentary push-button PUSH SYNC for
synchronization of the selected Heading or Track to the current aircraft heading or track.
ALT Controls the altitude pre-select and alerting bug on the altitude tape of the PFD
displays. The control is a dual concentric knob. Clockwise rotation of the outer control
increments and counter-clockwise decrements the altitude pre-select value by 1,000
feet per detent. Clockwise rotation of the inner knob increments and counter-clockwise
decrements the altitude preselect value by 100 feet per detent.
All other buttons on the Flight Controller are inoperative. If an inoperative button is
pushed, the message “FUNCTION UNAVAILABLE” will be posted on the CAS display.
7.18.16 Indication/Warning
The Crew Alerting System (CAS) window on the systems MFD will show the following
Caution and Advisory messages for the APEX core system status:
AMBER CAUTION
MAU A FAIL Indicates Channel A or B of Modular Avionics Unit is
MAU B FAIL failed.
CHECK DU 1
CHECK DU 2
CHECK DU 3
CHECK DU 4
CHECK DU 1+2
CHECK DU 1+3
CHECK DU 1+4 Indicates one or more Display Units have failed.
CHECK DU 2+3
CHECK DU 2+4
CHECK DU 3+4
CHECK DU 1+2+3
CHECK DU 1+2+4
CHECK DU 1+2+3+4
DU 1 OVERHEAT
DU 2 OVERHEAT
DU 3 OVERHEAT
DU 4 OVERHEAT
Indicates one or more Display Units have overheated.
DU 1+2 OVERHEAT
DU 1+3 OVERHEAT
DU 1+4 OVERHEAT
DU 2+3 OVERHEAT
AMBER CAUTION
DU 2+4 OVERHEAT
DU 3+4 OVERHEAT
DU 1+2+3 OVERHEAT
Indicates one or more Display Units have overheated.
DU 1+3+4 OVERHEAT
DU 1+2+4 OVERHEAT
DU 1+2+3+4 OVERHEAT
CHECK PILOT PFD Indicates pilots PFD wrap monitor failed.
CHECK COPILOT PFD Indicates co-pilots PFD wrap monitor failed.
CHECK ENGINE DISPLAY Indicates pilot and co-pilot engine displays wrap monitor
failed.
LH PFD CTLR FAIL Indicates Pilot’s PFD Controller has failed (amber
message provided when on ground only).
RH PFD CTLR FAIL Indicates Co-pilot’s PFD Controller has failed (amber
message provided when on ground only).
LH+RH PFD CTLR FAIL Indicates Pilot’s and Co-pilot’s PFD Controllers have
failed (amber message provided when on ground only).
ASCB FAIL Indicates Avionics Standard Data Bus has failed.
APM 1 FAIL Indicates No.1, No. 2 or both Aircraft Personality
APM 2 FAIL Modules have failed (amber message provided when
APM 1+2 FAIL on ground only).
CMS 1+2 FAIL Indicates No.1 and No. 2 Configuration Management
System has failed (amber message provided when on
ground only).
SYSTEM CONFIG FAIL Indicates System Configuration Monitor detects a HW
or SW configuration error (amber message provided
when on ground only).
VALIDATE CONFIG Indicates System Configuration Monitor detects a
system part number change (amber message provided
when on ground only).
APM MISCOMPARE Indicates Aircraft Personality Modules disagree over
in-stalled systems configuration (amber message
provided when on ground only).
CYAN ADVISORY
AIOP A MODULE FAIL Indicates Actuator I/O Module Ch A or B has failed in
AIOP B MODULE FAIL the Modular Avionics Unit.
CSIO A FAIL
Indicates Custom I/O Module Ch A or B has failed in the
CSIO B FAIL
Modular Avionics Unit.
CSIO A+B FAIL
MAU A OVERHEAT
Indicates Modular Avionics Unit Channel A or B or both
MAU B OVERHEAT
channels have overheated.
MAU A+B OVERHEAT
MAU FAN FAIL Indicates a Modular Avionics Unit fan, or fans have
failed.
GIO A FAIL
Indicates Generic I/O Module Ch A or B or both have
GIO B FAIL
failed in the Modular Avionics Unit.
GIO A+B FAIL
AGM 1 FAIL Indicates Advanced Graphics Module Ch A or B has
AGM 2 FAIL failed in the Modular Avionics Unit. If both AGMs fail, it
will not be possible to display a message.
MF CTLR FAIL Indicates Multi Function Controller has failed.
LH PFD CTLR FAIL Indicates Pilot’s PFD Controller has failed (cyan
mes-sage provided when in flight only).
RH PFD CTLR FAIL Indicates Co-pilot’s PFD Controller has failed (cyan
message provided when in flight only).
LH+RH PFD CTLR FAIL Indicates Pilot’s and Co-pilot’s PFD Controllers have
failed (cyan message provided when in flight only).
CMS 1 FAIL Indicates Configuration Management System 1 has
failed.
CMS 2 FAIL Indicates Configuration Management System 2 has
failed.
Avionics Battery Low Pre Mod 6/2315: Power supply to the MAU is below 19
volts.
The audio control panel is used to make audio selections for all audio communications.
The audio control panel receives inputs from all audio communication channels and
aural warnings. Audio outputs from the panel are provided to the corresponding side
crew headset.
The audio panel supports up to five communication radios, one of which can be
configured as a telephone (full duplex, with no requirement to push to talk). It also
supports up to eight switched audio inputs (VHF navigation, ADF, DME, marker beacon,
and auxiliary) and up to four unswitched audio inputs (aural warnings, TAWS and TCAS
alerts, etc.). Up to four headset connections can be supported. The audio panel also
has the ability to support two stereo entertainment audio inputs; however, connections
to support this function are not factory installed on DHC-6 aircraft.
An audio control panel is installed above each PFD. Momentary push-buttons are used
to select the desired COM transceiver. Pressing a button turns on the associated
receiver and the green LED. The pilot can identify which receivers are selected by
noting which LEDs are on. Offside radio indication is user selectable. When the offside
indication is off, only the Mic select arrow for the KMA 29 position will be active. When
on, the pilot can see which radio the co-pilot has selected for transmit, and vice versa,
by noting which of the arrows is illuminated. To toggle the offside transmit selection
indication, press the right side of the “SPLIT” button three (3) times within one and a
half seconds (1 1/2). When the mode is activated, the NAV 1 indicator will blink once.
When the mode is toggled off, the NAV 1 indicator will blink twice. This mode selection
will remain in effect until changed by the user, including through power cycles. The left
and right audio panels and left and right crew headsets operate independently of each
other. Each pilot may transmit and receive at the same time, using different VHF or
other communication radios such as HF or satellite communications option.
A marker beacon receiver provides the necessary marker beacon signals to the PFD
and audio indications for an Instrument Landing System (ILS). The MKR push button
allows the MKR SENS button to be used to set either high or low sensitivity or mute the
marker beacon audio by pressing the MUTE button. The marker beacon can be tested
by pressing and holding the MKR MUTE/TEST button on the pilots panel for several
seconds. The marker beacon system may only be tested from the left audio panel. The
test function on the right side (co-pilot) audio panel is inoperative.
Each audio panel has a single-button emergency reversion function that allows the pilot
headset to be directly connected to the number 1 communications radio. This function
is activated by pushing inwards on the volume knob. The audio panel also supports
digital data communication between the two panels, and between the audio panels
and the CVR.
The circuit for both headsets noise cancelling function is protected by a circuit breakers
labelled HEADSETS, located on the avionics circuit breaker panel at position G6. The
headset microphone and ear speakers will still function if the circuit breaker is out.
The circuit breaker only provides power for the noise cancellation feature of the two
headsets.
There are no speakers in the flight compartment. Because critical aural warnings are
delivered to the crew via the headsets, a functional headset is obligatory at each crew
station. Standard jacks to accommodate use of a non-noise cancelling headset, in the
event of failure of the noise cancelling headset, are provided at each crew station. The
jacks are positioned such that it is not possible to install both a noise cancelling and a
non-noise cancelling headset at the same time.
When S.O.O. 6229 is installed, a fourth (standard, non noise-cancelling) headset may
be used by a passenger sitting in the aft row of passenger seats. The jacks are installed
on the aft R/H cabin sidewall.
Crew are advised that it is best to leave the radio volume controls (visible above each
radio in the radio window, and controlled by the VOLUME knob on the PFD controller)
set to default volume, and to then use the volume controls on each earcup of the
headset to reduce radio volume to a comfortable level. If the earcup volume controls
are turned fully up, and the radio volume controls are adjusted downward to provide
a comfortable radio volume, the volume of the altitude alert chime – which cannot
be independently adjusted – will be too high relative to com radio reception, and the
altitude alert chime will 'step on' communication radio reception.
With the exception of the glideslope receiver, all functions are waveform agile in the
sense that the VHF Comm receivers and transmitter are upgradeable in the future to
VDL mode 2, 3, 4. The VHF Nav receiver is upgradeable in the future to LAAS.
Primary controls for the MMDR are on the MF controller and the PF controllers,
with display of the selected information on the PFD screen. A momentary action
“EMERGENCY COMM” switch is installed on the lower right sub-panel to enable
instantaneous tuning of the number 1 VHF communications radio to 121.5 MHz. The
transmitter has stuck microphone protection and will cease transmitting if the transmit
function is active for more than 32 continuous seconds.
The KHF 1050 HF Communication System (also known as a Primus HF 1050) consists
of three individual units: a KAC 1052 Antenna Coupler, a KPA 1052 Power Amplifier,
and a KRX 1053 Receiver/Exciter. All three of these are installed in the aft avionics
racks, between stations 406 and 451.
Receiver and low level transmitter signals are located in the Receiver/Exciter. The
Receiver/Exciter employs a master oscillator, which requires a short warm-up period
when operating at cool temperatures.
The Power Amplifier amplifies the excitation signal from the Receiver/Exciter to 200
watts peak effective power, or 50 watts of carrier power in AM. The amplified signal
is then routed to the Antenna Coupler, which matches the various impedances of the
longwire antenna to the 50 ohm output of the transmitter. When in receive mode, the
signals from the antenna pass through the Antenna Coupler to the Receiver/Exciter via
the Power Amplifier.
The frequency of operation ranges between 2.0 and 29.9999 MHz with 100 Hz
resolution. Up to 99 user selected channels may be programmed. The radio supports
upper sideband voice (USB A3J), amplitude modulation (AME A3H), lower sideband
(LSB), reduced carrier (RC A3A), and both USB and LSB data modes. The radio
supports SELCAL, but this requires installation of a separate SELCAL decoder.
The DME detail window can be displayed in the radio tuning window by pressing the
DME button on the PFD Controller. An alternative means of accessing the DME window
is by using the DME Detail soft key in the NAV detail window. The DME detail window
contains soft keys ‘DME PAIR’ to select the association of the DME to NAV 1 or NAV 2,
and ‘DME HOLD’ to select DME hold ON or OFF. When the DME HOLD is selected to
ON, an H adjacent to the DME distance is displayed on the PFD HSI display.
7.19.7 Transponder
A KXP 2290 Mode S transponder is installed behind each pilot’s PFD controller. The
transponder provides Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS), Modes A, C,
and S, including capability for diversity and data link enhancements. The transponder
supports Comm A & Comm B Mode S data link protocols. A dedicated pair of upper
(directional) and lower (monopole) transponder antennas are installed to support
diversity logic for each transponder.
The basic transponder installation fully complies with Eurocontrol Mode S Enhanced
Surveillance requirements, by way of an extended (112-bits) squitter broadcast on
1,090 MHz. The KXP-2290 has the ability to transmit an 8 digit alphanumeric Flight
ID code. The flight crew may enter Flight ID information into the system via the bezel
buttons, PFD controller, or MF controller. If the Flight ID field is left blank, the aircraft
registration will automatically be transmitted.
The XPDR detail window is displayed in the radio tuning window by pressing the
adjacent bezel button or XPDR button on MF Controller and then pressing the DETAIL
button on either the PFD or MF Controller. The detail window of the transponder
contains soft keys for the selection of XPDR MODE, TCAS functionality and default
VFR CODE. A dual transponder installation will also have a XPDR SEL soft key for
active transponder selection. The non selected transponder will be in a standby mode.
The transponders receive input from the aircraft air ground monitor and use this input
to automatically switch from ground to flight mode and vice-versa. Prior to flight, the
pilot should ensure that the transponder is in GND (ground) mode, never in standby.
The transponder will automatically switch from ground mode to flight mode (and vice
versa) based on the status of the air ground monitoring function of the Apex system.
In the event of failure of the air-ground monitor, automatic switching of the transponder
will not be provided.
The transponders use ARINC 735A TCAS interface protocol to interface with the
(optional) TCAS II system. As a peripheral to the TCAS II processor, the transponder
receives and replies to short and long air to air surveillance and TCAS coordination
interrogations, and receives and replies to ground to air surveillance and Comm A
interrogations directed to TCAS.
The transponder contains BITE (Built In Test Equipment) to enable the operational
health of the unit to be constantly monitored. When a critical fault is detected, the
transponder will notify the Apex maintenance system, which will record the fault. The
transponder also stores detected failures in non volatile memory for later review. The
transponder has a temperature sensor and a timer so that faults can be time stamped
and temperature data can be collected and stored.
Provisions have been made to allow for future upgrades to support LAAS (Local Area
Augmentation Service) and SBAS (Satellite Based Augmentation Services).
The GPS data page can be accessed from the SENSORS page. The SENSORS page
can be accessed with the systems MFD lower left window in focus and selecting the
SENSORS page menu.
7.19.9 Indication/Warning
The Crew Alerting system (CAS) window of the systems Multi Function Display (MFD)
displays the following Cautions and Advisory messages for the communication and
navigation equipment status:
AMBER CAUTION
CYAN ADVISORY
The azimuth motor drives the antenna up to 50° left and right for a total maximum scan
angle of 100°, although in practice a 90° image is scanned. The scan rate is 25° per
second, providing 16.7 “looks per minute”.
The antenna pedestal elevation assembly permits the radar beam to be tilted up or
down 15°. Tilt may be controlled manually on the multifunction controller or may be
determined automatically. In the case of automatic tilt, the manual tilt control provides a
trim capability around the automatically set position. Stabilization capability of up to 30°
in pitch and roll is possible. Combined antenna stabilization plus tilt angle is functional
over a range of ±30°.
The system displays storm intensity levels in colour against a black background. Rainfall
intensity is presented in four colours: green, yellow, red, and magenta, with magenta
representing rainfall of the highest intensity.
The radar system can also be used for ground mapping (GMAP). In GMAP mode,
prominent landmarks are displayed which enable the pilot to identify coastlines, hilly
or mountainous regions, cities, or in some cases even large structures. GMAP mode
uses green, yellow and magenta colours to display the different reflectivities. Magenta
represents the most highly reflective target. Separate sensitivity timing control (STC)
compensation is used for weather and GMAP modes.
Weather radar information can be displayed as overlays on the Primary Flight Display
(PFDs) and the navigation map display of the Multi Function Display (MFD). The PFD
weather radar overlay can be assessed by pressing the soft key on the side of the HSI
display. The soft key identifier OVRLY then appears in white. Pressing the OVRLY soft
key displays the overlay selection menu. Selecting WX RDR will enable the weather
radar overlay to be displayed on the HSI if WX RDR display has been activated on the
left PFD. There is also an OFF section to remove the overlay.
The controls for the weather radar are located on the MF Controller. Refer to Figure
7-57. A WX RADAR dual concentric knob control with a push select function is used to
control the mode and the tilt, gain settings.
The outer control is a four position rotary knob with the positions OFF/STBY/TEST/WX.
The inner control is rotary click control knob and is pressed to modify the tilt or gain
setting.
Weather radar annunciations for ALERT, MODE and TILT are located on the left side of
the HSI. The ALERT annunciations are TX ON GND in amber when WX is selected on
the MF Controller and the aircraft is on the ground. TGT ALRT is given in amber when
there are potentially hazardous targets directly in front of the aircraft that are outside of
the selected range. Longer ranges should then be selected to view the questionable
target. TGT is given in white when WX is selected and the aircraft is in the air.
The MODE annunciation is that set by the WX RADAR outer control knob. The TILT
annunciation value is a three digit number preceded by an arrow, up for positive value
and down for negative value. Faults are annunciated WX FAULT in white on the right
lower part of the weather radar overlay and failures are annunciated WX FAIL in amber.
The Avionics window of the systems MFD contains WX/LX/TAWS setup pages. The
WX setup tab is selected via the page menu of the multi functional window.
The RDR 2000 Weather Radar, when installed in combination with the Honeywell
Primus Apex® integrated avionics suite, is not capable of displaying vertical depiction
of weather. Refer to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System for the
Viking Twin Otter Series 400 – Pilot Guide for complete information on the description
and operation of the weather radar system.
(approximately 55° North Latitude). The weather data is updated automatically and
stored until the pilot requests the data to be displayed on the MFD. The data received is
a delayed view of the weather condition and the weather images displayed are produced
on a cyclical period repeat. The delay is estimated to be a minimum of eight minutes.
The XM Satellite Weather System sends the received data to the Modular Avionics Unit
(MAU) Advanced Graphics Unit (AGU), which then displays the information as overlays
on the navigational map display on the MFD. The display consists of the following
components:
5 Storm tops
6 Lightning
7 Winds
10 METAR
12 Echo tops
Refer to the Honeywell Primus Apex Integrated Avionics System Viking Air Twin Otter
Series 400 - Pilot Guide for complete information and operation of the XM Satellite
Weather System.
The transceiver sends a signal to the transmit antenna and gets the return signal from
the receive antenna. The maximum operating height AGL used by the system is 2,500
feet.
The radar altimeter system measures the aircraft height Above Ground level (AGL)
electronically and sends the height AGL data to the Modular Avionics Unit (MAU) for
display in the ADI window of the left and right PFDs. For dual systems, the No. 1 radar
altimeter displays on left PFD and No. 2 radar altimeter displays on right PFD. The
digital readout for radio altitude is displayed in white text in a black box in the lower
center part of the attitude display on the PFD. The radar altitude display is removed at
altitudes greater than 2,500 feet. When altitude is less than 550 feet, the lower portion of
the PFD altitude tape will show a yellow cross hatched box to indicate ground proximity.
If the radar altitude data becomes invalid, the digital readout will be replaced with RAD
in black in an amber box. The radar altimeter data (in addition to indicated airspeed data
from the ADAHRS) is used by the aircraft air-ground monitor logic system to determine
on ground or in-flight status.
The radar altimeter No. 1 is an integral component of the Class A TAWS (Terrain
Awareness and Warning System) and must be installed in aircraft that are ordered with
TAWS.
7.20.2.1 Indication/Warning
The Crew Alerting system (CAS) window of the systems Multi Function Display (MFD)
displays the following Caution messages for the radar altimeter status:
AMBER CAUTION
RAD ALT 1 Fail Indicates No. 1 Radar Altimeter failed in both CSIO module
channels
RAD ALT 2 Fail Indicates No. 2 Radar Altimeter failed in both CSIO module
channels
7.20.3 TCAS
A KTA 910 TCAS I or TPU-67A TCAS II can be fitted. The TCAS display is integrated
into the Apex system, and TCAS alerts are voiced through the aural warning system.
Both TCAS systems use a processor, two directional antennas (upper and lower) and a
configuration module. Aural alerts are provided through the audio panel and from there
onward to the crew headsets.
TCAS I provides traffic advisories (TA), but does not provide resolution advisories (RA).
TCAS II provides both traffic advisories (TA) and resolution advisories (RA).
Refer to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System for the Twin Otter
Series 400 – Pilot Guide for complete information on the description and operation of
the TCAS I system. Refer to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System
for the Twin Otter Series 400 – Pilot Guide and the TCAS II AFM Supplement for
complete information on the description and operation of the TCAS II system.
7.20.3.1 Indication/Warning
The Crew Alerting System (CAS) window on the systems MFD will show the following
advisory messages for the TCAS I systems status:
CYAN ADVISORY
TRAFFIC FAIL Indicates traffic avoidance system data has become invalid
For TCAS II indications and warning, refer to the AFM supplement for TCAS II.
7.20.4 TAWS
CAUTION
Class A TAWS can be fitted. The TAWS display is integrated into the Apex system, and
TAWS alerts are voiced through the aural warning system.
The TAWS unit receives GPS position via the MAU for accurate position determination
in conjunction with a regional database. One of three databases may be installed in
the system (Atlantic, Americas or Pacific). The databases also contain the locations of
all runways longer than 2000 feet (600 m) that have a published instrument approach.
A visual depiction of the terrain proximate to the aircraft can be displayed on the PFD
and the MFD.
The terrain alerting algorithms continuously compute the terrain clearance envelopes
ahead of the aircraft. If the boundaries of these envelopes conflict with terrain elevation
data in the terrain database, then alerts are issued. Two envelopes are computed, one
corresponding to a terrain caution alert and the other to a terrain warning alert. Terrain
awareness caution and warning alerts are inhibited below 30 feet of radio altitude,
within 1 nautical mile of the runway, and below 30 knots groundspeed.
When the conditions exist to generate a terrain or obstacle caution alert, the terrain
image on the PFD TAWS Overlay is enhanced to highlight the threatening terrain as
solid yellow for caution threats and the appropriate aural alert is given. When the
required conditions have been met to generate a terrain or obstacle warning alert, the
display image on the PFD TAWS Overlay is enhanced to highlight the terrain as solid
red and the appropriate aural alert is given.
The TAWS sends aural alert messages, when necessary, to the audio control panel
and from there onward to the headsets. At the same time annunciations are displayed
on the PFD ADI in an amber box for GND PROX or red for PULL UP. The annunciations
flash in reverse video for 5 seconds and then remain on until the condition is no
longer detected. If the terrain overlay is not selected for display and a TAWS alert is
generated, the terrain overlay will be displayed (automatic pop-up) on the HSI in the
partial compass mode. The TAWS sends a suppression signal to the TCAS to inhibit
voice messages from the TCAS when the TAWS is generating voice messages.
Refer to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System for the Twin Otter
Series 400 – Pilot Guide for complete information on the description and operation of
the MK VI EGPWS (TAWS).
7.20.4.1 Indication/Warning
The Crew Alerting System (CAS) window on the systems MFD will show the following
advisory messages for the TAWS systems status:
CYAN ADVISORY
TAWS FAIL Indicates terrain avoidance system data has become invalid
TERR INHIB ACTIVE Indicates terrain alerting visual and aural are inhibited
TERR INHIB NOT AVAIL Indicates terrain alerting visual and aural inhibit is not
available
7.20.5 CVR
A four channel Honeywell AR 120 Cockpit Voice Recorder with 120 minute recording
capacity can be fitted. The CVR is integrated with the Apex system and captures radio
communication, intercom communication, and input from a flight compartment area
microphone that is mounted in the center of the flight compartment, directly below the
glareshield. The recorder includes provisions for future capture of data linked air traffic
control messages (ACARS) via a dedicated ARINC 429 input.
The CVR uses flash memory modules to record data, and has no moving parts. It is
equipped with an underwater location beacon. No pre-flight test routine is required,
because if a fault condition is detected by the CVR built-in self test system, a caution
level CAS message will be displayed to the crew. A 3 g impact switch automatically
shuts the recorder off in case of impact. There are no crew controls for the CVR.
7.20.6 FDR
A 256 word per second Honeywell AR-256 Flight Data Recorder (FDR) with 25 hour
recording capacity can be fitted. The FDR captures all 88 mandatory parameters
specified in regulatory requirements. Additional capacity beyond the maximum of
88 parameters mandated by certification requirements is used to capture Twin Otter
specific data such as autofeather status, autofeather activation, and all warning and
caution level CAS messages that are displayed by the Apex system.
The Apex MAU functions as the FDR data acquisition unit, and transmits data to the
FDR via ARINC 717 data bus. A stand-alone tri-axial accelerometer is installed to
support the FDR. A quick access recorder can be fitted in series with the FDR to
support FOQA and other data analysis programs.
The FDR uses flash memory modules to record data, and has no moving parts. It is
equipped with an underwater location beacon. No pre-flight test routine is required,
because if a fault condition is detected by the FDR built-in self test system, a caution
level CAS message will be displayed to the crew. There are no crew controls for the
FDR.
Normally, each ADAHRS supplies one primary flight display only – either the left or the
right. Switching of ADAHRS inputs between the left and right primary flight displays
is accomplished electronically. If there is any doubt about the accuracy of output from
one ADAHRS, a button can be pressed to provide data output from the other ADAHRS
to both the pilot and the co-pilot primary flight display, and to disqualify the suspect
ADAHRS.
7.21.1.1 Indication/Warning
The Crew Alerting system (CAS) window of the systems Multi Function Display (MFD)
displays the following Cautions for the pitot systems:
AMBER CAUTION
LEFT PROBE FAIL Indicates open circuit in the left pitot tube heater
RIGHT PROBE FAIL Indicates open circuit in the right pitot tube heater
Aircraft configured for operation in jurisdictions that require pitot heat to be turned on at
all times will display the above two messages whenever pitot heat is turned off and one
or more engines are running. The messages will clear when the PITOT HEAT switch is
moved to the ON position. If one or both of the messages do not clear when the PITOT
HEAT switch is moved to the ON position, failure of the heater element in the probe, or
an open circuit condition on the relevant PITOT HEAT circuit breaker (positions A6 and
A7) can be presumed.
7.21.2 Magnetometers
Two KMG 7010 magnetometers for the Apex system are mounted near the outboard
end of the right wing (Pre Mod 6/2171), or in the vertical stabilizer (Post Mod 6/2171).
A single L3 MAG 3000 magnetometer, to enable display of magnetic heading on the
ESIS, is installed at the outboard end of the left wing.
7.21.4 Clock
An illuminated Thommen model Q13 quartz chronometer is located on the instrument
panel, to the right of the upper multifunction display. A setting knob is provided beside
the clock face. The clock provides a standard 3 function, single pushbutton operation
of a 60 minute timer (a chronometer) using start/stop/reset-to-zero in a fixed, repeating
sequence. The 60 minute timer has its own minute hand (with a triangular pointer on
the end) and also uses the sweep second hand for the timer function.
The clock is internally illuminated and equipped with antireflective coated glass. Power
and control for illumination is provided from the same circuit that controls all other bezel
lights.
The quartz movement in the clock is powered from the hot battery bus via circuit
breaker position S1, CLOCK AND DOME LIGHT, on the station 332 circuit breaker
panel. Electrical power consumption is negligible; approximately 4 milliamps. The clock
has an integral backup battery to provide power in the event of a loss of power from the
hot battery bus. The backup battery will support operation of the clock (in the absence
of 28 volt hot battery bus power) for approximately one month of cumulative use.
The CLOCK AND DOME LIGHT circuit breaker must never be pulled out, except in
case of an electrical abnormality on that circuit. Pulling the circuit breaker will cause
premature failure of the backup battery in the clock, and may lead to eventual failure of
the clock itself.
7.21.7 Intercom
An intercom for communication between the pilots (and, if desired, an observer) is
standard. The intercom system is voice activated, and no transmit switch is provided
on the control wheel for the intercom.
Intercom volume can be adjusted using the inner knob of the VOLUME control on the
KMA 29 audio panel (for control of pilot to pilot intercom), or the outer knob of the
same VOLUME control (for control of passenger to pilots intercom). Intercom volumes
should be adjusted after the volume knobs on each individual headset earcup have
been adjusted to provide a comfortable communications radio volume.
7.21.8 ELT
An Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) is installed in the empennage. It is connected
to an antenna which is installed on the top of the fuselage just ahead of the vertical
stabilizer. The ELT will transmit on the international distress frequencies of 121.5, 243.0
and 406 MHz.
An Aircraft Personality Module (APM) is installed in the ELT wiring harness. The APM
is programmed with identity data (registration, etc.) unique to the aircraft. This allows
the ELT to be removed and replaced without the need to reprogram the ELT with aircraft
identity data.
A navigation interface module is installed adjacent to the ELT in the rear fuselage.
It receives DC power supply from the Hot Battery Bus and continually receives GPS
derived aircraft position information from the MAU. This navigation interface module is
connected to the ELT. If the ELT is activated, the ELT will transmit the last recorded
latitude and longitude of the aircraft in addition to data identifying the aircraft.
An ELT remote control switch is installed at the far right end of the instrument panel
sub-panel. This switch has positions ON, ARM and RESET/TEST, and an indicator
light. If the ELT is accidentally activated, either by g force or with the instrument panel
switch, an amber CAS message ‘ELT ACTIVE’ will be posted on the Apex CAS window.
The ELT is installed in the empennage of the aircraft with the control switch on the ELT
itself set at the ARM position. This makes the remote control switch on the instrument
panel active. The remote control switch on the instrument panel must always be left
be in the ARM position. When armed, the ELT will automatically activate and begin
transmitting when a specified g force is detected. This is accomplished by a g switch
integral to the ELT. The ELT will continuously transmit at 121.5 and 243.0 MHz for up
to 48 hours and it will also transmit a digital message on 406 MHz every 50 seconds
for the first 24 hours. The last known aircraft position is also transmitted as part of the
digital message on 406 MHz.
In an emergency the remote switch installed on the instrument panel can be selected to
the ON position. The ELT will then immediately start distress signal transmission. The
red indicator at the top of the remote switch on the instrument panel will come on, and
if the Apex system is operating, an amber CAS message ELT ACTIVE will be posted.
It is not necessary that the aircraft MASTER switch be ON or that the Apex system be
operating in order to activate the ELT using the instrument panel switch.
In the event of an accident or serious incident that triggers the ELT, if appropriate,
please remember to pull out the circuit breakers for the FDR (position M3) and the CVR
(position K3). Doing so will preserve the recordings of these two devices and prevent
them from being overwritten.
The ESIS is a 3-ATI size instrument with no moving parts. It utilizes flat panel, Active
Matrix Liquid Crystal Display (AMLCD) technology. The ESIS contains a 3 axis inertial
measurement sensor cluster that is used to compute attitude information. Airspeed and
altitude information is displayed on either side of the attitude display in a digital vertical
scale. Magnetic heading is displayed at the bottom. Airspeed and attitude information
are computed using an integrated air data computer module that is supplied with pitot
and static pressure from the right hand pitot tube and the upper set of static vents. The
design of the display has been customized to replicate as closely as possible the display
of information on the Apex PFD, to allow transition from primary to standby instrument
navigation to take place with minimal “learning” time for the crew in the event of a PFD
failure.
The ESIS uses a configuration module which contains sufficient non-volatile memory
to retain all the programming codes that describe the specific hardware and software
configuration of each installation, such as display format configuration and landing gear
specific VMO parameters. When the ESIS is removed from the aircraft, the configuration
module remains in the aircraft. This eliminates the need to reprogram a new ESIS if
the instrument is replaced.
The ESIS is controlled by a switch on the fuel control panel labelled ESIS POWER. The
switch has three positions, OFF, ARM, and TEST. The ARM position is selected prior
to each flight to turn the instrument on. The instrument requires up to 180 seconds to
become functional after the switch is moved to the ARM position. It is desirable that
the aircraft not be moving until the alignment process has completed. If the aircraft
is moved or moving during this alignment process, the ESIS will still satisfactorily
complete the alignment process, but it may take additional time to complete. The ESIS
contains algorithms to correct for the effect of periodic wave action (for floatplanes)
during start-up. If start-up is initiated when the aircraft is taxiing or in flight, it may be
necessary to use the manual FAST ERECT function (GH-3100, Pre Mod 6/2170) or
ALIGN MODE > INITIATE ALIGNMENT FUNCTION (GH-3900.2, Post Mod 6/2170)
function following the end of the alignment period to obtain satisfactory indication.
Whenever power is applied to the ESIS, a complete internal self test sequence is
carried out. Any faults found will be displayed on the ESIS screen. When the ESIS is
operating normally, the system continues to perform diagnostic self-tests to assure the
crew of accurate information. Errors detected during the background self-test will be
displayed until the problem is rectified.
NOTE
Faults found in the ESIS are not recorded on the Apex central
maintenance computer.
When the switch is held in the momentary TEST position, the ESIS backup battery
carries out a capacity test. If the backup battery capacity is greater than 50% after 5
seconds of holding the switch in the TEST position, the ESIS BATT TEST PASS status
CAS will appear. If the battery capacity test fails, the battery may need to be recharged.
A failure could also indicate a weak battery, or that the circuit breaker on the front face
of the battery is open.
No navigation information of any kind (FMS, VOR, DME, ILS) can be displayed on the
ESIS. It displays attitude, magnetic heading, altitude, airspeed, and vertical speed only.
The bezel M key and adjustment knob are illuminated by the aircraft dim bus; use the
INSTRUMENT dim knob to adjust the illumination.
For L3 GH-3100 Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS) equipped aircraft (Pre
Mod 6/2170), detailed instructions for operation of the ESIS are provided in the L3
GH-3100 ESIS Pilot Guide publication number TP-560 at Revision F, or later revision.
Figure 7-70 L3 GH-3100 Electronic Standby Instrument System (Pre Mod 6/2170)
Figure 7-71 L3 GH-3900.2 Electronic Standby Instrument System (Post Mod 6/2170)
A CAS message ESIS ON BATT POWER will be posted whenever the ESIS battery is
not being supplied with 28 volt charging power by the aircraft.
Many personal electronic devices, including some portable GPS navigators designed
for aviation use, will interfere with the correct function of avionics installed in the aircraft.
Unless the crew is certain that a specific device will not interfere with the avionics
installed in the aircraft, the convenience outlets should be used only for the purpose of
charging devices that are turned off.
The power transformer supply circuit is protected by a circuit breaker labelled 28V
INPUT (position M6), and the output of the transformer is protected by a circuit breaker
labelled 14V OUTPUT (position N6).
WARNING
7.21.12 Deleted.
CAS messages are posted in the lower left 1/6 window of the system window on the
multi-function display.
During critical phases of flight such as take-off and approach, less severe caution and
warning level messages are automatically inhibited for the duration of the take-off or
the approach. Generally speaking, the inhibit is applied from surface to 800 feet AGL
during take-off, and from 800 feet AGL until touchdown when landing.
CAS messages may have different importance levels depending on whether the aircraft
is in flight or on ground. For example, a PNEUMATIC LOW PRESSURE state will post
an ADVISORY message when the aircraft is on the ground and surface de-ice has
been selected ON, but it will post a CAUTION level message if the aircraft is in flight
and the surface de-ice has been selected ON. If the surface de-ice is switched OFF, no
PNEUMATIC LOW PRESSURE message will be posted at any time.
Global inhibits are intended to inhibit messages during specific phases of flight so the
posting or clearing of CAS messages will not distract the crew during these critical
phases of flight. If a message is present prior to the global inhibit becoming enabled,
the message remains displayed regardless of the state of the message logic. If a
message becomes active after the global inhibit becomes enabled, the message is
not posted until the global inhibit logic is disabled. An example of this is suppression
during all phases of flight of low-priority avionics system maintenance CAS messages
for which no remedial or corrective action by the flight crew is possible.
The following tables list warning, caution, advisory and status messages specific to
the DHC-6 that can be posted. Some of these messages will not be provided unless
the appropriate optional equipment that they monitor has been fitted. A considerable
number of additional CAS messages that are not aircraft specific but pertain directly to
the Apex avionics system can also be posted. These messages are not included in the
following list, but are described in Section 3.
The DIM and BRT positions provide alternative levels of lighting brilliance for
the MASTER CAUTION and MASTER WARNING lights, the autofeather system
SELECTED and ARMED indicator lights, and the stall warning light, the engine FIRE
warning lights, and if fitted, the wheel-ski position indicator lights. In the event of failure
of the control system used for caution light dimming, a reversionary, non-dimming
mode can be selected by moving the CAUTION LIGHTS DIMMING switch on the lower
right sub-panel from NORMAL to BYPASS.
The DIM and BRT positions provide alternative levels of lighting brilliance for
the MASTER CAUTION and MASTER WARNING lights, the autofeather system
SELECTED and ARMED indicator lights, and the stall warning light, the engine FIRE
warning lights, and if fitted, the wheel-ski position indicator lights. In the event of failure
of the control system used for caution light dimming, a reversionary, non-dimming
mode can be selected by moving the CAUTION LIGHTS DIMMING switch on the lower
right sub-panel from NORMAL to BYPASS.
Gear indication lights for aircraft fitted with amphibious floats are independent of the
CAUTION LT dimming and test switch. No indication or notifications about retractable
gear landing systems (wheel-skis or amphibious floats) are ever provided on the Apex
system. Retractable gear landing systems are totally independent from the Apex
system.
ACTION:
In Section 7, ignore existing Para 7.22.3 and insert revised Para, as shown on Page 2
of this Temporary Revision.
-Continued overleaf-
RECORDING INSTRUCTIONS:
Record this TEMPORARY REVISION NO. and the relevant information in the
appropriate columns of the TEMPORARY REVISION INDEX provided at the front of
the manual.
Gear indication lights for aircraft fitted with amphibious floats are independent of the
CAUTION LT dimming and test switch. No indication or notifications about retractable
gear landing systems (wheel-skis or amphibious floats) are ever provided on the Apex
system. Retractable gear landing systems are totally independent from the Apex
system.
The two vanes are set at slightly different levels in the wing leading edge to ensure
the complete effectiveness of the stall warning system at all flap settings and aircraft
attitudes. The lower vane is operative over the full flap range of 0° to 37.5°, but the
upper vane is effective only with flaps extended. From 0° to 12° (±2°) flap settings
the upper vane is rendered electrically inoperative by a microswitch actuated by the
flap mechanism. In operation, as a stall condition is approached, the stagnation point
moves from above of the affected vane to below it and causes it to deflect upward
sufficiently to actuate its switch and complete the circuit to the warning light.
The stall warning activates at 4 to 9 knots above stall speed. Correction of the near
stall condition by the pilot causes the vane to move in the opposite direction and
de-energize the electrical circuit. The stall warning system is activated by the lift
transducers supplying a ground signal to the data acquisition unit (DAU), therefore the
stall warning system does not require a circuit breaker. The detector vanes are heated
to prevent condensation; the heaters are controlled by the pitot heat switch and the
power to the heaters is protected by the PITOT HEAT L (position A6) circuit breaker.
The lift transducer heaters do not provide any de-ice or anti-ice protection to the stall
warning system.
Additional aural warnings will be added to the list when flight director and autopilot
functions are certified.
TAWS and TCAS aural warnings may or may not be mutable, depending on the severity
of the warning. Mutable TAWS warnings are muted by pressing the appropriate TAWS
control button on the multifunction controller.
Aural warnings are independently processed by both channels of the custom I/O board
in the MAU, then compared to ensure validity. In the event of a passive failure of one
channel, a CAS message advising of the failure will be displayed, but full aural warning
capability will continue to be available from the single remaining channel. In the event
of an active failure of one channel that results in unwanted sound coming from one of
the two channels, the pilot can silence the defective channel by selecting the AURAL 1
MUTE or AURAL 2 MUTE switch, as appropriate, to the upper MUTE position. If both
switches are placed in the MUTE position, no aural warnings will be heard.
The FMS uses two navigation databases which contain worldwide or regional data
housed in the Modular Avionics Unit (MAU), a custom database which contains flight
plans and pilot defined waypoints and an aircraft database consisting of aircraft specific
parameters used in FMS performance calculations.
The FMS uses information from the databases stored in memory and information
from the GPS and ADAHRS to calculate and display navigational and flight planning
information. Flight planning information can be entered by the pilot using the MF
Controller keyboard. The navigation database holds airport, navigation aid and
waypoint information, and is loaded when the aircraft is on the ground through the
LAN BUS connector on the Aircraft Maintenance Panel. This database is commercially
produced, updated and issued every 28 days. The custom database holds flight plans
and waypoints entered by the pilot.
The FMS shows information on the PFD and upper MFD for:
- Flight planning
- Navigation
- Situational awareness
- Flight performance data
The Viking Twin Otter Series 400 has not been evaluated or qualified for Reduced
Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) operations.
Refer to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System for the Twin Otter
Series 400 – Pilot Guide for complete information on the description and operation of
the FMS.
7.23.1 Indication/Warning
The Crew Alerting System (CAS) window on the systems MFD will show the following
caution, advisory and status messages for the FMS:
AMBER CAUTION
CYAN ADVISORY
WHITE STATUS
AGM 2/FMS 1 GFP Inop Indicates graphical flight planning function failed in AGM 2
AGM 1 DB Error Indicates database in AGM 1 has an error
AGM 2 DB Error Indicates database in AGM 2 has an error
AGM 1+2 DB Error Indicates database in AGM 1+2 have an error
AGM 1 DB Old Indicates database in AGM 1 is out of date
AGM 2 DB Old Indicates database in AGM 2 is out of date
AGM 1+2 DB Old Indicates database in AGM 1+2 are out of date
The following FMS annunciators will be shown on the INAV map, refer to the Honeywell
Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System – Pilot Guide for the explanations:
7.25 Autopilot
Reserved.
Certain optional items such as external paint will be called up by Aircraft Configuration
Drawing (ACD) rather than by S.O.O.
In some cases, the maximum cubic and or mass payload capacity of a baggage
compartment will be reduced by the volume and weight of the options located in that
compartment.
7.26.1 Airframe
S.O.O. 6150 External Break-in Markings
Includes timer system, automatic horizontal stabilizer activation with flap extension,
and annunciation of stabilizer boot inflation
or
S.O.O. 6187 Glass Electrically Heated Windshields (all A/C with de-icing requirements)
NOTE
All of the above options are required for ‘known ice’ certification.
Includes slightly shorter jury strut, deletes standard length jury strut.
S.O.O. 6286 LOPA Option 14 Passenger Single Seats (S.O.O. 6243 required)
S.O.O. 6297 Configuration for Custom Seat Arrangement (No Seat Option)
Left and Right Pilot Primary Flight Displays and PFD controllers
One Left Pilot KMA 29 Audio Panel
Both Upper and Lower Center MFD Displays (2 MFDs total)
Moving Map display on MFD, Engine Indications on PFD, Crew Alerting System,
Systems Displays
Flight Director panel
Single KGS 200 GPS installation
Single Channel Air Data and AHRS system
Single multi-mode digital radio (MMDR) – provides 1 VHF communications radio
and 1 VHF navigation radio (VOR / localizer)
MFD Controller, including keyboard
Display reversion control panel
Aural warning system (spoken warnings and annunciations)
Two David Clark noise cancelling headsets, airframe powered
One Thommen quartz chronometer with sweep second hand
One Magnetic Compass
Two ‘bundles’ are available to meet the needs of IFR operators and public commercial
operators. The IFR bundle provides the equipment necessary for day or night, VFR or
IFR certification. The public commercial bundle provides safety and recording systems
necessary for scheduled or charter operations.
Single ADF
ART 2000 Weather Radar (stabilized)
Dual KXP 2290 Mode S diversity (EHS) transponders
406 MHz ELT with navigation interface and remote switch
Dual KN-63 DME
L3 Emergency Standby Instrument System (ESIS) with battery backup and
navigation input Independent (third) Magnetometer for L3 ESIS – provides stabilized
magnetic heading display
Two 14 volt convenience outlets in flight compartment
The Public Commercial Operations Bundle provides the equipment most commonly
required for public commercial passenger carrying operations. The IFR bundle is a
prerequisite to order the public commercial bundle.
The following optional avionics equipment is available for ordering and, except as noted,
does not require any prerequisites.
S.O.O. 6211 – XM Aviation Weather display on MFD (suitable for use in the
continental USA only)
S.O.O. 6213 – Electronic Display of Normal Operations Checklists
S.O.O. 6214 – Electronic Display of Jeppesen Charts and Maps
S.O.O. 6215 – Complete KHF 1050 HF Radio installation with PS 440 Control Head
S.O.O. 6217 – Second ADF (prerequisite is IFR Bundle)
S.O.O. 6218 – Second KRA 405 Radar Altimeter (prerequisite is Public Commercial
Bundle)
S.O.O. 6219 – Upgrade TCAS I (TA only) to TCAS II with TA and RA (prerequisite
is Public Commercial Bundle)
7.26.8 Communication
S.O.O 6229 Fourth Crew Intercom Jack – Stn 332
This installation requires adaptation of the existing tank venting system to accommodate
the ferry fuel system.
Six different volume configurations (between 4 to 9 barrels) are available. Each drum
can be filled with approximately 44.6 Imperial gallons (202 litres, 0.202 m3) of fuel.
The ferry fuel system is fully described in E.O. 66596 and on drawings C6G1241.
Viking will provide documentation to the operator to assist in securing a ferry flight
permit. However, the responsibility and expense associated with obtaining ferry permits
and complying with all regulations is entirely that of the operator.
7.27.3 Description
The ferry fuel system consists of a minimum of four to a maximum of nine interconnected
steel drums mounted in wooden cradles and secured to cabin floor tie-down rings with
webbing straps. Fuel from the drums is delivered by gravity feed to the main tanks,
below the cabin floor, through shut-off valves.
The drums must be installed in the numerical order specified in Figure 7-74.
Regardless of the number of drums used, the fuel feed and vent piping arrangement
is the same. All drums are interconnected by a common filling and delivery fuel line
which carries fuel to all drums and delivers fuel to the aircraft main fuel tanks during
transfer operations.
Two manually-operated shut-off valves in the line control the delivery of fuel from the
drums to Cell No. 1 in the forward main tank and to Cell No. 8 in the aft main tank.
Fuel enters Cell No. 1 and Cell No. 8 through the existing aircraft system vent pipes.
The drums are filled through a filler neck assembly which is connected to the common
filling and delivery fuel line and is attached to drum No. 6 when 6, 7, 8, or 9 drums are
installed, or to drum No. 4 when 4 or 5 drums are installed. This always locates the
filler neck adjacent to the right emergency exit hatch for convenience when refueling.
In the installation a common vent line interconnects all drums and the filler neck with
the existing vent lines of all main tank cells except Cell No. 1 and Cell No. 8. All aircraft
system fuel cells contain two vents to ensure venting is possible at all times. Based on
42 usable Imperial gallons per drum, the total contents of the ferry fuel system can vary
between 168 Imperial (equivalent to 202 U.S.) gallons (1,378 lbs) with four drums and
378 Imperial (equivalent to 454 U.S.) gallons (3,100 lbs) with nine drums.
7.27.4 Operation
The system is capable of transferring into either aircraft main tank or both tanks at the
same time at rates in excess of engine fuel consumption.
In most cases, the center of gravity shifts forward as fuel is used from the ferry
system. The fuel contents may be roughly estimated by observing the fluid level on the
transparent filler pipe, but only when the aircraft is parked on the ground.
When the ferry tanks are full, fuel will transfer via the vent system into the rear fuselage
tank during sustained nose up attitudes. If the rear fuselage tank is also full, this will
give the impression that no fuel is being used from the rear fuselage tank. This is a
normal condition.
Operations must be conducted in accordance with the procedures and limitations set
out in PSM 1-64-POH Section 10, Para 10.11, Ferry Fuel System.
7.27.5 Limitations
The limitations set out in PSM 1-64-POH Section 10, Para 10.11, Ferry Fuel System,
must be observed.
The maximum capacity with 9 drums installed and all drums full is 378 Imperial gallons,
(1,718 litres), weighing approximately 3,100 lbs (1,406 kg); assuming a nominal fuel
density of 8.2 lbs per Imperial gallon (.82 kg/litre).
The weight of the ferry fuel system itself will vary depending on the number of drums
and the materials used. Drums weigh approximately 70 lbs (30 kg) each, depending on
the type of steel and the method of construction of the drum. The cradles and fittings
weigh approximately 9 lbs (4 kg) per drum. Each ferry system is individually weighed
prior to installation or the aircraft is reweighed after the empty ferry fuel system is
installed. Weight and balance regulations, for the State of Registry of the aircraft, must
be adhered to.
If GPS position is changing (> 10 kts) Wi-Fi data transmission cannot be enabled.
When S.O.O. 6288 is installed alone, GPS position is derived from an internal GPS
receiver.
7.28.2 Operation
There are no special in-flight operating procedures. When power is applied to the RH
bus and GPS position is changing, the IONode commences recording.
Post flight, data may be downloaded from the aircraft to a nearby personal computer
which must be equipped with Wi-Fi Base Station Software, (available from Latitude
Technologies Corp.). The data transfer is manually initiated while the aircraft is on
the ground, by holding the ECTM/FOQA Wi-Fi switch in the ON position for ten (10)
seconds.
After data is transferred to the Basestation PC, it is sent over the internet from to
Latitude Technologies for decoding and is then accessible via a Web browser.
When the IONode detects aircraft movement via changing GPS position, the Wi-Fi
transmitter is turned off.
The satellite communications system has no power switch. The system operate anytime
power is applied to the R/H bus, and will start transmitting position reports when the
GPS detects groundspeed.
As delivered, the SkyNode is set to the standard default settings. However, it is possible
to modify the configuration. Some settings, such as the GPS Interval (length of time
between the SkyNode’s processing and storing of a GPS position) and Connection
Interval (length of time between regularly scheduled transmissions of GPS data), can
be adjusted by the user from their Web SentinelTM account.
Other settings such as OOOI (Out, Off, On, In) reporting, and Latitude Messaging API
can be altered remotely by Latitude Technologies Corporation.
There are two LED indicators on the left. The top LED indications are:
7.29.2.2 Startup
On start up, the RC6000/A will display an animated cursor moving right and left on the
display’s bottom line, while the top line will alternate between displaying the following
two lines:
Where “#.##” is the firmware version currently installed on the RC6000/A. After the
SkyNode is fully initialized and communication is established with the RC6000/A, the
home screen will appear with TEL, MSG and SYS above select buttons S1, S2 and S3
respectively:
The home screen is the starting point for access to all other areas on the menu. From
any other screen, or during any functions operation, it is possible to return to the home
screen by pressing the HOME button.
1 Start in the Home Screen, then press “S3” (labeled “SYS”); to display the System
Menu.
3 Adjust the screen brightness by using soft keys “S2” and “S3” or the arrow keys.
NOTE
3 Emergency Tracking MAY DAY mode is not part of the emergency locator transmitter.
To activate Emergency Tracking mode, press the “MAY DAY” key. Once Emergency
Mode is initialized, the top line of the screen will display the flashing text:
7.29.2.6 Telephone
7.29.2.6.1 Main Telephone Screen
To use the satellite telephone features, start in the Home Screen then press “S1”
(labeled “TEL”); this will bring up the Main Telephone Screen.
7.29.2.6.2 Dialing
When dialing a phone number, remember that all calls placed form an Iridium telephone
are considered international calls and must begin with an international dialing code (for
example, “001” from North America).
From the Main Telephone Screen, use the number keys to dial a phone number. The
number you are entering will be displayed on the top line of the screen. Once you have
finished dialing, press “S1” (labeled “DIAL”) to initiate the call.
Where “#” is the key that was pressed (i.e. 1-9, #, *). You must wait until this text
disappears before pressing another key.
To answer the call select COM 5 Transmit on the audio panel and press “S2” (labeled
“ANS”) on the RC6000/A.
The aural “ringing” alert can only be heard if COM 5 audio is selected on the aircraft
audio panel.
7.29.2.6.6 Redial
From the Main Telephone Screen, press “S3” (labeled “RDL”) to place a call to the
number you dialed last. The RCR6000/A will ask for confirmation; press “S3” (labeled
“YES”) to place the call, or “S1” (labeled “NO”) to cancel and return to the Main
Telephone Screen.
7.29.2.6.7 Phonebook
To use the RC6000/A’s Phonebook, first navigate to the Main Telephone Screen and
then press “S2” (labeled “PBK”). The screen will display the first contact entry on
the top line (alternating between contact name and phone number), and the soft key
options on the bottom line.
Once you are finished adding contacts, press “S3” (labeled “EXIT”) to return to the
Phonebook’s main screen.
7.29.2.7 Messaging
To use the systems messaging features, start in the Home Screen, then press “S2”
(labeled “MSG”); to display the Main Messaging Screen.
To send a text message, first navigate to the Main Messaging Screen and then press
“S2” (labeled “NEW”). The screen will display the first of 9 canned messages on the
bottom line. Use the arrow keys to navigate to your desired message, then press return
to select the message.
There are two types of canned messages; Static and Hybrid. Canned messages are
configured remotely from a Web Sentinel administrator account.
Static Canned Messages are pre-configured messages that can be quickly transmitted
without having to enter any text. When a Static Canned Message is selected, you will
be prompted to confirm that you want to send the message (soft keys “S1” and “S3”
will be flashing “NO” and “YES”); simply press “YES” and the message will transmit
(pressing “NO” will return you to the Main Messaging Screen).
Hybrid Canned Messages are messages with a pre-configured portion, and an optional
free-form text portion. These messages are displayed with an asterisk (*) in front of
them. When a Hybrid Canned Message is selected, you will be prompted to enter
additional text using the alphanumeric keypad. After entering text (or if you do not
want to enter text), press return and you will be prompted to confirm that you want to
send the message (soft keys “S1” and “S3” will be flashing “NO” and “YES”); simply
press “YES” and the message will transmit (pressing “NO” will return you to the Main
Messaging Screen).
Navigate to the Inbox from the Main Messaging Screen by pressing “S3” (labeled “IBX”).
Using the arrow keys, navigate to the desired message, then press “S2” (labeled “REP”)
to be taken to the New Message Screen or “S3” (labeled “DEL”) to delete the message
(you will be prompted to confirm deletion).
A message is marked as read after being displayed for a few seconds or after one
complete scroll across the screen in the case of longer messages.
7.30.2 Description
The Parachute Anchor Line installation consists of a cable assembly that runs between
two anchor plates; a forward anchor plate at station 112.73 and aft anchor plate at
station 321.98, secured on the right hand and centre seat rails and a tie down for an
Emergency Static Line hook-up at station 301.19 located on the left hand seat rail.
The cable assembly is made from a 3/8 inch diameter 7x19 steel cable, with a turn
barrel for adjustments, and the required attachment fittings and hardware. The cable
assembly runs down the right hand side of the aircraft between stations 112.73 and
321.98.
7.30.3 Operation
Authorization by your local regulatory authority must be obtained before installation of
the Parachute Anchor Line, per PSM 1-64-2, Section 25-23-00 (Parachute Anchor Line
(S.O.O. 6291)), Para 3.B., and subsequent use in flight.
Electronic Standby
Instrument System
Model GH-3100
Software Version 1.x and 3.x
Document Precedence
This Pilot’s Guide provides general information about the operation
of the GH-3100. Refer to your FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual
(AFM) and its flight manual supplements for information specific to
your aircraft. If there is conflicting information between the AFM and
this guide, the AFM takes precedence over this guide.
Disclaimer
This Pilot’s Guide is subject to change without notice. The illustrations
in this guide are typical to the GH-3100, but may not exactly match
your configuration options.
Export Notice
This data is provided at no charge, or at cost, to the public and is
considered publicly available, No License Required (NLR) as defined
in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) Part 734.7-11.
Revision Note
Revision F improves the layout to accommodate binder holes, fix minor
font errors, update MAG-3000 illustrations.
A Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Introduction
Introduction
YOU HAVE AN IMAGE TO MAINTAIN!
WELCOME
Pilot’s Guide i
Table of Contents GH-3100
Table of Contents
Introduction............................................................................. i
Table of Contents .................................................................. ii
Purpose .................................................................................. 1
Equipment Description ......................................................... 2
Screen Features
Purpose
This Pilot’s Guide provides the flight crew with operation instructions,
quick reference troubleshooting assistance and typical display examples
so the cockpit crew can quickly and easily operate the GH-3100.
Actual appearance of display arrangements and colors are dependent
on the unit’s specific configuration as it is applied in specific aircraft
installations.
Pilot’s Guide 1
Purpose GH-3100
Equipment Description
Avionics Systems GH-3100 series ESIS’s are the only electronic
standby systems that include a Detachable Configuration Module
(DCM), which stores the display’s format configuration. The DCM
contains sufficient memory to retain information specific to the hardware
and software configuration for each installation, such as panel angle,
navigation interface, aircraft heading calibration, and display format.
When the GH-3100 is removed from the aircraft, the DCM remains in
the aircraft, attached to the aircraft wiring harness that mates with the
GH-3100, eliminating the need to re-configure a replaced GH-3100
Line Replaceable Unit (LRU).
2 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Purpose
Pilot’s Guide 3
Purpose GH-3100
The DCM-3100 is the memory device that stores the indicator’s display
configuration. The device remains in the aircraft to allow the removal
and replacement of the GH-3100 indicator unit, thus allowing automatic
configuration to the replacement unit.
4 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Screen Features
Screen Features
Menu Access
The Model GH-3100 ESIS, regardless of configuration, offers crew
members the ability to toggle, adjust and initiate various display
elements via a Menu.
To access the Menu, press the Menu Access Button located below the
Display Screen.
A menu listing will appear along the bottom portion of the Display
Screen with four line items visible at a time. Rotate the Adjustment
Knob, located below and to the right of the Display Screen, to scroll
through the Menu and highlight a Menu item.
Menu items that Toggle ON/OFF will indicate opposite the current
condition.
Menu Items that are followed by indicate that an associated
Sub-Menu will appear when selected.
Pilot’s Guide 5
Screen Features GH-3100
6 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Screen Features
NOTE: Menu item appearance is dependent on the unit’s specific configuration. The
last selected settings remain after power is cycled. FAST ERECT and FAST ALIGN
commands are similar to CAGING an electromechanical attitude indicator. Both
commands must be performed when the aircraft is stationary or in straight and level,
non-accelerated flight. FAST ALIGN will require straight and level, non-accelerated
flight sustained for 90 seconds. * Appears with loss of Magnetometer.
Pilot’s Guide 7
Screen Features GH-3100
Barometric Setting
Menu access will allow the flight crew to select barometric types as
Inches of Mercury (in), Hectopascals (hPa), or Millibars (mb).
See page 5.
8 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Screen Features
Attitude Information
Aircraft Attitude
Information is provided
in the center portion of
the Display Screen. Pitch
and roll data is generated
by internal sensors that
produce recognizable
attitude indications.
Pilot’s Guide 9
Screen Features GH-3100
The GH-3100 will self-correct for small Attitude errors, or the flight
crew may initiate a FAST ERECT from the Menu (see page 7) when
the aircraft has returned to straight and level, non-accelerated flight.
The GH-3100 will self-correct for minor Heading errors, or the flight
crew can use the Menu access (see page 7) to select “Set Heading...”
option to align the Heading Tape to the cockpit compass.
10 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Screen Features
Pilot’s Guide 11
Screen Features GH-3100
12 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Screen Features
Navigation Information
Navigation Information is displayed in the center portion of the Display
Screen, sharing space with the Attitude Information. Navigation
displays are designed to visually match the look and format of the
primary navigational systems in the cockpit.
Crew member inputs, i.e. frequency and station selections, are made at
the source navigational units, with exception to those Navigation items
configured for and available through the Menu access (see page 5).
Pilot’s Guide 13
Screen Features GH-3100
14 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Screen Features
Unit with 1.x software and configured for ARINC 710 ILS Receiver
will have the VOR/ILS NAV Mode replaced with ILS Mode in the
sub-menu.
Unit with 3.x software and configured for ARINC 710 ILS Receiver
will have the first VOR/ILS NAV Mode replaced with ILS Mode in the
sub-menu and the second VOR/ILS NAV Mode replaced with VOR
Mode in the sub-menu.
Pilot’s Guide 15
Screen Features GH-3100
Heading Information
When configured for Heading Information, the GH-3100 will display a
Heading Tape at the bottom-center portion of the Display Screen.
If the DG indication continues, use the Menu access to select the “Set
Heading...” option and align the Heading Tape to the cockpit reference
compass. See page 7.
The “To” arrow will point up on the Heading Tape at the selected
course setting.
The “From” arrow points down on the tape at 180° of the course
setting. See page 7 for “Set CRS” and “CRS Auto Center” Menu
options.
16 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Start-Up and Self Test
Identification Mode
If no failures were detected during the Power ON Self Test Mode, the
Identification Screen will appear.
Pilot’s Guide 17
Start-Up and Self Test GH-3100
NOTE: Use the provided Notes pages (see page 30) to record the date
and time and error message/code. Report the information to a Avionics
Systems authorized dealer or Avionics Systems Field Service.
18 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Start-Up and Self Test
Again, perform a
Power Reset. Repeated
unsuccessful resets confirm
that the unit requires service
and/or repair.
NOTE: Use the provided Notes page (see page 30) to record the date
and time and error message/code. Report the information to an Avionics
Systems authorized dealer or Avionics Systems Field Service.
Pilot’s Guide 19
Start-Up and Self Test GH-3100
NOTE: Use the provided Notes pages (see page 30) to record the date
and time and error message/code. Report the information to a Avionics
Systems authorized dealer or Avionics Systems Field Service as soon
as possible.
20 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Start-Up and Self Test
Pilot’s Guide 21
Start-Up and Self Test GH-3100
NOTE: Use the provided Notes pages (see page 30) to record the date
and time and error message/code. Report the information to a Avionics
Systems authorized dealer or Avionics Systems Field Service as soon
as possible.
22 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Start-Up and Self Test
NOTE: Use the provided Notes pages (see page 30) to record the date
and time and error message/code. Report the information to a Avionics
Systems authorized dealer or Avionics Systems Field Service as soon
as possible.
Pilot’s Guide 23
Start-Up and Self Test GH-3100
During normal
operation, a Red X may
momentarily appear
across the screen when the
GH-3100’s continuous
Background Self-test
detects and automatically
attempts to correct an
internal fault condition.
Intervention is not yet
needed.
If the continuous
background Self-test
diagnostics can not correct
the condition, the unit will
then display the “System
Test Failure” error message
combined with the Red X.
Repeated unsuccessful
resets confirms that the
unit requires service and/or
repair.
NOTE: Use the provided Notes pages (see page 30) to record the date
and time and error message/code. Report the information to a Avionics
Systems authorized dealer or Avionics Systems Field Service as soon
as possible.
24 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Start-Up and Self Test
NOTE: Use the provided Notes pages (see page 30) to record the date
and time and error message/code. Report the information to a Avionics
Systems authorized dealer or Avionics Systems Field Service as soon
as possible.
Pilot’s Guide 25
Start-Up and Self Test GH-3100
Troubleshooting
or
26 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Start-Up and Self Test
Troubleshooting (cont.)
Pilot’s Guide 27
Specifications GH-3100
Specifications
GH-3100 ESIS and DCM-3100 Detachable Configuration Module
TSO No.: C2d, C4c, C6d, C8d, C10b, C34e, C36e, C40c, C46a, C66c, C113,
C115b
MAG-3000 Magnetometer
TSO No.: C6d
28 Pilot’s Guide
GH-3100 Specifications
Specifications
DCM-3100 Detachable Configuration Module
Power 5.0 Vdc Regulated from GH-3100 via J2
Requirements: Connector.
Weight: 0.05 Lbs. (0.023 Kg) maximum.
Service Life: The Module has unlimited service life.
Repairability: Repairs will be performed at the factory.
Scheduled No scheduled maintenance interval applicable.
Maintenance
MAG-3000 Magnetometer
Power 1.5 watts maximum operating power at + 28.0
Requirements: Vdc. During power-on tests the maximum power
shall not exceed 2.5 watts.
Weight: Not to exceed 0.5 pounds (0.23 kg).
Dimensions: Magnetometer is approximately 2.30 inches (5.84
cm) in diameter by 2.12 inches (5.38 cm) high
with a 2.38 inch (6.05 cm) diameter mounting lip.
Connector (P1): P1 mates with JT01RE-10-35S (SR) Straight
JT06RE-10-35P(SR) Strain Relief or JT07RE-10-35S (SR) or
equivalent.
Service Life: The magnetometer has unlimited service.
Repairability: Repairs will be performed at factory.
Scheduled No scheduled maintenance interval applicable.
Maintenance
Pilot’s Guide 29
Notes
30 Pilot’s Guide
TP-560 Rev F (07-22-09)
Electronic Standby
Instrument System
Model GH-3900.2
Release 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, & 1.4
Avionics Systems
Flexible, Intuitive, Accurate
Designed by the leader in standby instrumentation, L-3 Avionics
Systems’ FAA TSO and ETSO (pending) GH-3900.2 offers maximum
flexibility to visually match the look and format of your aircraft’s primary
displays, while maintaining the accuracy of its GH predecessors.
GH-3900.2 Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS) combines vital
backup instrumentation with operational flexibility to meet the needs of
a wide range of Part 23/25 aircraft, and Part 27/29 rotorcraft.
GH-3900.2 Highlights:
• Vital cues – attitude, altitude, and airspeed – combined with optional
data like heading, navigation, vertical speed, slip skid, and metric
altitude.
• Flexible, operator-adjustable options.
• Lightweight and compact in design with a full-color active matrix
LCD, and dimmable LED backlighting.
Document Precedence
This Pilot’s Guide provides general information about the operation of
the GH-3900.2. Refer to your FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual
(AFM) and its flight manual supplements for information specific to
your aircraft. If there is conflicting information between the AFM and
this guide, the AFM takes precedence over this guide.
Disclaimer
This Pilot’s Guide provides the flight crew with operation instructions,
quick reference error and invalidity assistance, and pictorial examples
of how a typical GH-3900.2 display may look. Appearance of GH-
3900.2 display features and colors in this guide are representative and
may look different based on the unit’s hardware configuration, aircraft
configuration options chosen at installation, and display brightness
levels. This Pilot’s Guide is subject to change without notice.
Export Notice
This technical data is controlled under the Export Administration
Regulations (EAR) and may not be exported without proper authorization
by the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Revision E Highlights
Incorporate new functionality per software release 1.4 and new part
number 9200-34410-( ). Refer to the software release paragraph (pg.
1-4) for details.
A Pilot’s Guide
Electronic Standby
Instrument System
Model GH-3900.2
Pilot’s Guide
Release 1.0, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, & 1.4
Methods and apparatus disclosed and described herein have been
developed solely on company funds of L-3 Communications Avionics
Systems, Inc. No government or other contractual support or relationship
whatsoever has existed which in any way affects or mitigates proprietary
rights of L-3 Communications Avionics Systems, Inc. in these
developments. Methods and apparatus disclosed herein may be subject
to U.S. Patents existing or applied for. L-3 Communications Avionics
Systems, Inc. reserves the right to add, improve, modify, or withdraw
functions, design modifications, or products at any time without notice.
Distributed by:
L-3 Avionics Systems, Inc.
5353 52nd Street, S.E.
Grand Rapids, MI 49512 USA
Customer Support (800) 453-0288
International (616) 949-6600
FAX (616) 977-6898
Avionics Systems www.l-3avionics.com
Pilot’s Guide i
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: DESCRIPTION .................................................................................... 1-1
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1-1
GH-3900.2 SPECIFICATIONS ................................................................................... 1-2
SOFTWARE RELEASE .............................................................................................. 1-4
EQUIPMENT .............................................................................................................. 1-5
Configuration Module ......................................................................................... 1-5
Optional Equipment ............................................................................................ 1-6
Limitations .......................................................................................................... 1-6
ii Pilot’s Guide
TABLE OF CONTENT (continued)
Attitude (continued)
Pitch Ladder ....................................................................................................... 3-3
Pitch Chevrons ................................................................................................... 3-3
Roll Scale and Pointer ........................................................................................ 3-3
Slip Skid (Optional)............................................................................................. 3-4
Degraded Attitude............................................................................................... 3-4
AIRSPEED ................................................................................................................. 3-5
Airspeed Tape..................................................................................................... 3-6
Airspeed Digital Readout.................................................................................... 3-6
Mach Speed Digital Readout.............................................................................. 3-7
Airspeed Awareness Color Bar .......................................................................... 3-7
ALTITUDE ................................................................................................................ 3-11
Altitude Tape ..................................................................................................... 3-11
Altitude Digital Readout .................................................................................... 3-12
Barometric Pressure Digital Readout ............................................................... 3-12
Metric Altitude Digital Readout (Optional) ........................................................ 3-12
VERTICAL SPEED (OPTIONAL) ............................................................................. 3-13
NAVIGATION (OPTIONAL) ...................................................................................... 3-14
Menu Options ................................................................................................... 3-17
Navigation Display Features ............................................................................ 3-17
FMS Message (Optional) ......................................................................... 3-17
Groundspeed............................................................................................ 3-17
Bearing To Waypoint ................................................................................ 3-17
Distance To Station/Waypoint................................................................... 3-18
FMS Alerts (Optional) ............................................................................... 3-18
Selected Course ....................................................................................... 3-16
Lateral Deviation/Vertical (Left/Right) Deviation ....................................... 3-19
Marker Beacon ......................................................................................... 3-20
Navigation Source .................................................................................... 3-20
Time To Station......................................................................................... 3-20
To/From .................................................................................................... 3-20
HEADING (OPTIONAL)............................................................................................ 3-21
Heading Tape ................................................................................................... 3-21
Heading Digital Readout (Optional).................................................................. 3-22
Course Arrows .................................................................................................. 3-23
DG Mode (Optional) ......................................................................................... 3-23
PILOT MESSAGE (OPTIONAL) ............................................................................... 3-24
CHAPTER 1: DESCRIPTION
Figure 1-1A: GH-3900.2 One Button Bezel and Display Features ............................ 1-1
Figure 1-1B: GH-3900.2 Three Button Bezel and Display Features ......................... 1-2
Figure 1-2: Optional Equipment (Not To Scale) .......................................................... 1-5
iv Pilot’s Guide
LIST OF
TABLES
CHAPTER 1: DESCRIPTION
Pilot’s Guide v
GH-3900.2
CHAPTER 1
DESCRIPTION
INTRODUCTION
The GH-3900.2 ESIS (Electronic Standby Instrument System) provides
backup attitude (pitch and roll), airspeed, and altitude for Part 23 and
Part 25 aircraft and Part 27/29 rotorcraft. Based on aircraft configuration
at installation, the GH-3900.2 can also provide metric altitude,
navigation, slip skid, speed awareness cues, and vertical speed. When
configured to operate with a magnetometer or other external heading
source, the GH-3900.2 provides aircraft heading (figure 1-1).
NOTE
GH-3900.2 appearance and functionality is dependent on aircraft
configuration options chosen at installation.
GH-3900.2 SPECIFICATIONS
GENERAL
Part Numbers 9200-34400-( ) 9200-34410-( ) 99200-34500-( )
9200-34600-( ) 9200-34700-( )
9200-34800-( ) 9200-34900-( )
Configuration Module
The GH-3900.2 is configured at installation via a configuration
module often referred to as the Data Configuration Module (DCM).
An Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
(EEPROM), the configuration module contains sufficient memory to
retain information specific to the hardware and software configuration
for each installation, such as navigation interface, aircraft heading
calibration, display colors and features, and menu options.
The configuration module is permanently attached to the aircraft’s
wiring harness, eliminating the need to re-configure a replaced GH-
3900.2 Line Replaceable Unit (LRU).
MAG-3100
MAG-3000
ADC-4000
Figure 1-2: Optional Equipment (Not To Scale)
Limitations
When configured to operate with a magnetometer for heading reference
input, the use of heading is not authorized to operate in the following
polar regions due to magnetic field unsuitability:
• North of 70° N latitude
• South of 70° S latitude
• North of 65° N latitude between 75° W and 120° W longitude
(northern Canada)
• South of 55° S latitude between 120° E and 165° E longitude
(south of Australia and New Zealand)
It is recommended to remove heading input in these geographic
areas. Attitude and air data information is still usable within these
conditions.
When the GH-3900.2 is using a MAG-3000 or MAG-3100 and detects an
excessive dip in the magnetic field, the heading display will be removed
and replaced with a flag. Heading display returns when magnetic
conditions return to normal.
INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes GH-3900.2 basic operational procedures that
includes, but are not limited to, power on sequence, setting barometric
pressure, and adjusting display brightness. An explanation of menu
options, menu controls, adjustment knob, brightness adjustment buttons
(model specifc) and button functions are also included.
POWER ON
There is no power on/off switch on the GH-3900.2. Depending on the
aircraft, use either the battery switches or avionics master switch to apply
power. Once on, the unit cycles through the following sequence:
• Self Test
• Splash Screen with system identification
• Sensor Alignment
• Normal Operating Mode
Note–If the unit is powered on in-air, the unit transitions directly to sensor
alignment, showing attitude data (blue sky over brown ground).
SELF-TEST
Application of power begins the unit’s diagnostic of sensors, memory,
and circuitry. The self-test lasts for approximately 7 seconds, and during
this time the display remains blank. Once the self-test is complete, the
display transitions to the system identification splash screen.
SPLASH SCREEN
The system identification splash screen (figure 2-1) shows the following
information:
• System Name and L-3 Logo
• Aircraft Type
• Software Version
• Firmware Version
These errors halt the start-up process until the problem is corrected,
and the unit does not transition to normal operating mode. See Chapter
4, Errors & Invalidities.
NOTE
Use the provided Notes section (page B-2) to record the date, time,
and error message. Report the information to an Avionics Systems
authorized service center or Avionics Systems Customer Service
as soon as possible.
Error Message
Heading
Invalidity
Alignment
Message
Status Bar
Percentage
of Alignment
Completed
NOTE
Alignment accuracy depends on current flight conditions and the
ability to maintain straight and level flight throughout the alignment
process. During abnormal conditions, such as high turbulence, the
unit may not be able to align. The status bar may show negative
progress and/or hold at zero progress until conditions improve.
Knob Function
Label (Rel 1.3)
Configuration
Option
Knob Icon
Adjustable
Value
Selected
(cyan)
Unselected
(white)
Unselectable
(gray)
Configuration Options
• Menu items can show in all caps or in mixed case.
• Menu access can terminate automatically after 3, 8, or 15 seconds
of inactivity or the menu may require a manual exit.
• Knob Function Label available for Release 1.3 or greater.
Menu Operation
Use the following instructions to navigate the menu. Changes made to
menu items are applied immediately after selection.
Activate Menu
Press the menu button to activate the menu.
Move Up/Down
Rotate the knob to move through the list of menu items.
Navigate to the desired line, press the knob , then rotate the knob
to adjust the selected menu item’s value.
Exit Menu
Press the menu button to manually exit the menu.
Return to Menu
To return to the menu from the SYS STATUS or SYS ID pages, press
the menu button (“PREV”) or press the knob .
• SYS STATUS*
• SYS ID*
*Not available in air.
NOTE
Available menu items and options are dependent on GH-3900.2
model and aircraft configuration options chosen at installation.
NAV MODE
When configured for navigation input, this option provides a list of
available navigational modes including “OFF”. NAV MODE options
are dependant on aircraft installation configuration. See Navigation,
page 3-12.
A configuration option is available that disables the NAV Mode from
the pilot’s menu.
Note - Depending on configuration options when the NAV MODE is
set for OFF, then ILS data automatically displays on the screen when
data is detected.
SET CRS
When configured for VOR/ILS or TACAN, the set course menu option
provides course adjustment within a 001° to 360° range. Selected
course, located in the upper left portion of the attitude display area,
reflects the value chosen in the menu. Course arrows on the optional
heading tape also reflect current course. See Navigation, page 3-12
and Heading, page 3-19.
A configuration option is available that disables the Set CRS from the
pilot’s menu.
BACKCOURSE
When configured for navigation, the backcourse menu option provides
a toggle for normal or backcourse when in ILS mode.
If toggled “ON”, “B/C” (backcourse) shows in front of the selected course
value , located in the upper left portion of the attitude display area. If
toggled “OFF”, “CRS” (selected course) displays in front of the selected
course value. See Navigation, page 3-12.
Backcourse may be auto-detected or disabled based on aircraft
configuration options chosen at installation.
NAV DATA
When configured for navigation input, NAV DATA provides an on/off
display option for navigation information.
When navigation is in VOR/ILS mode NAV DATA is used to toggle ON
“DME” data or “OFF”.
When navigation is in TACAN mode (revision 1.2) NAV DATA is used
to toggle ON “TTG-GS” data or “OFF”.
When navigation is in FMS/GPS mode NAV DATA is used to toggle ON
“FMS BRG” data or “OFF”.
See Navigation, page 3-12.
BARO REF
To change the unit of measurement for the barometric digital readout,
located at the top, right-hand corner of the display, BARO REF
provides a toggle selection of barometric types: Inches of Mercury
(IN), Hectopascals (HPA), or Millibars (MB). See Barometric Pressure,
page 2-13.
A configuration option is available that disables the BARO Ref from
the pilot’s menu.
Return
to menu
SYS STATUS
Available for Release 1.0 only. The system status page contains
recorded failures/errors that have occurred during the current power
cycle and previous three power cycles (figure 2-9).
The page can be accessed when the aircraft is on the ground. To
return to the menu, press the menu button (“PREV”) or press
the adjustment knob .
Past Failure
(Gray)
Current Failure
(White)
Return
Indicates additional to menu
items listed below
NOTE
Use the provided Notes section (page B-2) to record the date, time,
and error message. Report the information to an Avionics Systems
authorized service center or Avionics Systems Customer Service
as soon as possible.
NOTE
Saved user-selected settings and defaults may or may not apply
depending on GH-3900.2 model, aircraft configuration options
chosen at installation, and the last selected menu options chosen
before powerdown.
Barometric Pressure
Digital Readout
Altitude
Tape
Baro Toggle
Unit Options
Menu
Option
Adjustment
Knob
Menu Button
Figure 2-12: Barometric Unit Menu Toggle
Menu Button
Figure 2-13: Adjust Display Brightness – Menu Button
Display brightness can also be adjusted using the SET BRT TRIM
option on the menu (figure 2-14).
To access the SET BRT TRIM menu option:
1. Press the menu button to access the menu.
2. Rotate the knob to navigate to SET BRT TRIM until the menu
item is highlighted.
Menu Button
Figure 2-14: Adjust Display Brightness – Menu
NOTE
If a dim bus is being used and an out of range voltage is detected,
the brightness level is set to 80%. SET BRT TRIM has limited
brightness level control based on configuration options chosen
at installation.
Dim Brighten
Button Button
Figure 2-15: Display Brightness Buttons
INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an explanation of the various GH-3900.2 display
features and variations based on individual aircraft configuration options
chosen at installation.
ATTITUDE
Aircraft attitude information is provided in the center portion of the
display and consists of a pitch ladder, roll scale, roll pointer, slip skid,
aircraft reference symbol, and a background of blue sky and brown
ground with a dividing horizon line (figure 3-1).
If the unit shows erroneous attitude, select the ALIGN MODE option on
the menu during straight and level flight or while stationary on ground.
See Menu, page 2-5.
Attitude features are based on aircraft configuration options chosen
at installation.
The display is decluttered by removing some display elements under
certain extreme pitch and roll conditions. Refer to general conditions
in table 4-4 for details.
Roll Scale
(45 degree triangles)
Zero Roll
Sky (solid)
Slip Skid
Horizon Line
(optional)
(inclinometer) Roll Pointer
Aircraft Reference
Chevrons Symbol (waterline)
Boresight
Ground
Dashed
Negative Pitch Lines
End Caps (optional)
(optional) Pitch Ladder
(+/- 16)
Figure 3-1: Attitude Features
AIRSPEED
Aircraft airspeed information is provided on the left-hand side of the
display and consists of an airspeed tape, airspeed digital readout,
airspeed awareness color bar and a mach speed digital readout (Figure
3-5).
Airspeed features are based on aircraft configuration options chosen
at installation.
Configuration Options
• Disable the display of air data. Release 1.1 or greater.
• Airspeed set for metric units. Release 1.3 or greater.
Semi-
Transparent Gray Black
Mach
Speed
Airspeed
Awareness
Color Bar
Airspeed
Digital
Readout
NOTE
If mach exceeds 0.999, the mach digital readout continues to show
“0.999” until the aircraft resumes a speed within range.
Low Normal
Range Operating Range
Mach Speed
Airspeed
Awareness
Color Bar
Airspeed
Digital Readout
(rolling digits)
Caution High
Range Speed
Altitude
Digital Readout
Metric Altitude
(optional)
Barometric Pressure
Vertical Speed
Digital Readout
Greater than +9,900 and less than -9,900 Ft/Min Remains at “9900”
Greater than +99.9 and less than -99.9 m/S Remains at “99.9”
NOTE
Navigation data is removed when the menu is active, when aligning
attitude, or if aircraft pitch has met or exceeded +30° or -20°, or
roll has met or exceeded +/- 65°.
Configuration Options
• Navigation descriptors and digits can be configured separately
as magenta, green, white, cyan, or set to the navigation source
color.
• Navigation descriptors and digits can show within a black box or
with a black outline.
Marker Beacon
Lateral
Deviation
(cross bar)
Deviation
Scale Dots
Marker Beacon
Vertical Deviation/
Glide Slope
(cross bar)
Lateral Deviation
(cross bar)
DME
Ground Speed
DME
Time To Station
FMS Receiver
Message
Desired Track
Vertical Deviation/
Glide Path
(cross bar)
Lateral Deviation
(cross bar)
FMS Alerts
Bearing to
Waypoint
Selected Course
Ground Speed
or Time To Go
Lateral
Deviation
(dot scale)
Time To Station
NOTES
Depending on aircraft configuration options, backcourse may be
a menu option requiring manual selection OR backcourse may be
automatically detected if current heading is more than 110° from
the selected course.
Based on ILS equipment options chosen at installation, the course
descriptor “CRS”, backcourse descriptor “B/C”, and selected course
value may not show.
Solid
Diamond
T-bar
Cross Bar
NOTE
Heading data is removed from the display when the menu is
active.
Course Heading
Arrow (To) Heading Index/ Digital
Lubber Line Readout
(optional)
Figure 3-15: Heading Tape Display Features
Heading Tape
The heading tape is a continuous 360° linear scale and scrolls left and
right to track aircraft direction. The tape’s 60° minimum span shows
minor tickmarks every 5° and major tickmarks every 10°.
Numerical values show below tickmarks at 30° intervals except where
“N” (360°), “S” (180°), “E” (90°), and “W” (270°) are marked. The
numerical values show the tens digit for 10° to 90° and the ten and
hundreds digits for 100° to 360°. The heading index (lubber line) is fixed
at the center of the heading tape indicating current heading.
The Configuration Options Heading tape background can be semi-
transparent, gray, or black.
True Magnetic
True Magnetic
DG Mode (Optional)
Available with Release 1.4. DG Mode provides heading information
when the normal heading input is invalid or missing. When DG Mode is
active a “DG” indicator is shown on the screen and heading information
is determined using an external ARINC input.
Configuration Options
• DG Mode indicator is shown either above the heading tape in place
of the heading digital readout or is located to the right of the digital
readout.
INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes potential errors, invalidities, and conditions
that could occur while using the GH-3900.2 including, but not limited
to, system identification splash screen messages, system status page
messages (release 1.0 only), invalidities, and display messages. A quick
reference for potential general display conditions is also provided.
It is recommended to crosscheck other cockpit displays/instruments
for errors and/or data inconsistency.
If problems persist, contact an Avionics Systems authorized service
center or Avionics Systems Customer Support at (800) 453-0288 noting
any error messages and flight conditions.
SPLASH SCREEN MESSAGES
If an error is detected at system start up, an error message may show
on the splash screen. Detected errors cease the start-up process until
the problem is corrected.
System Identification Splash Screen Messages:
• DCM Read Error
• DCM Compatibility Error
• DCM Configuration Error
• Configuration Validation Error
Record the error and report to an Avionics Systems authorized service
center or Avionics Systems Customer Support as soon as possible.
SYSTEM STATUS PAGE MESSAGES
For Release 1.0 access to the System Status page is available in the
pilot’s menu. For Release 1.1 or greater access to the System Status
page is available only in the Setup menu.
The system status page lists unit errors occurring during the last 3 power
cycles (shown as gray text preceded by a dash) and errors occurring
during the current power cycle (shown as white text). See table 4-1.
The system status page can be accessed only when on-ground using
the SYS STATUS menu option. See Menu, page 2-5 (release 1.0).
Record errors and report errors to an Avionics Systems authorized
service center or Avionics Systems Customer Service as soon as
possible.
CONDITION DESCRIPTION
MEMORY FAIL GH-3900.2 may be defective. Have
PROCESSOR FAIL GH-3900.2 checked by authorized
SENSOR FAIL service center.
SUPPLY FAIL
EXTERNAL SUPPLY FAIL Over-voltage condition detected.
Have GH-3900.2 and aircraft voltage
input checked by authorized service
center to determine if proper voltage
has been supplied.
MAG INSTALL REQ Magnetometer installation/
MAG SWING REQ calculation required. Have MAG
checked by authorized service
center.
CALIBRATION REQ GH-3900.2 installation/calculation
PANEL ANGLE INSTALL REQ required. Have GH-3900.2 checked
by authorized service center.
MAG FAIL Verify mag circuit breaker is closed.
Cycle power.
• No data received from the
magnetometer.
• Internal magnetometer BIT
failure.
• Dip angle has exceeded usable
limits. Typically only experienced
if the aircraft is flying in regions
listed in the limitation regions.
• Magnetometer or GH-3900.2
may be defective. Have MAG
and GH-3900.2 checked by
authorized service center.
AIRDATA 1 DATA ABSENT External data is not being received.
AIRDATA 2 DATA ABSENT Verify external equipment is
ATTITUDE DATA ABSENT operational. Cycle power to GH-
3900.2 and external unit.
ARINC710 ILS DATA ABSENT
DME DATA ABSENT Have external source checked by
authorized service center.
FMS/GPS1 DATA ABSENT
FMS/GPS2 DATA ABSENT NOTE
HEADING DATA ABSENT Messages apply to current
MAG DATA ABSENT power on cycle only.
VOR/ILS1 DATA ABSENT
VOR/ILS2 DATA ABSENT
TACAN1 DATA ABSENT
TACAN2 DATA ABSENT
CONDITION DESCRIPTION
“ALT” Loss of altitude data. All altitude data is removed
MESSAGE from the display including altitude tape, altitude digital
OR readout, vertical speed, and metric altitude digital
LARGE X readout. Message shows on the right side of the
display. Unit restart may be required.
NOTE
If the GH-3900.2 is configured for dual air data
sources, the ADC SRC (or ADS SRC) menu option
provides a toggle option to switch between air data
sources.
“ATT FAIL” All attitude data is removed from the display including
MESSAGE pitch tape, roll scale, roll pointer and slip/skid. Message
OR shows in the center of the display above the aircraft
LARGE X reference symbol.
1. Aircraft rate of motion has exceeded 100° per
second (in any axis).
When the aircraft returns to straight and level flight,
or while stationary on ground, align sensors by
selecting ALIGN MODE on the menu.
NOTE
Depending on aircraft configuration options, the
ALIGN MODE menu option may not be available.
CONDITION DESCRIPTION
“CROSS Unusual or degraded attitude conditions detected.
CHECK Indication shows in the center of the display above
ATTITUDE” the aircraft reference symbol. Indication flashes for 5
seconds and is then removed from the display (figure
4-4).
1. Aircraft is operating without valid air data for a
minimum of 3 minutes. (Airspeed, altitude, and
vertical speed data are removed from the display.)
2. Aircraft has exceeded the pitch or roll cut out angle
of 35° for a minimum of 3 minutes.
When the aircraft returns to straight and level flight,
or while stationary on ground, align sensors by
selecting ALIGN MODE on the menu.
RED OR Nav Source shows in fail color and deviations are
AMBER FAIL removed from the display.
COLORS Loss of source data.
SHOW
Nav descriptors (i.e. CRS, B/C, NM) show in fail colors.
Digits replaced by dashes or show in fail colors.
Loss of source data.
“HDG” Loss of heading data. All heading data is removed from
MESSAGE the display including heading tape, and heading digital
OR readout. Message shows at the bottom of the display.
LARGE X Internal sensors may have detected excessive dip
angles. Heading will return after dip angles return to
normal.
NOTE
During an attitude alignment, the heading invalidity
may show until alignment is complete.
“IAS” All airspeed data including airspeed tape, airspeed
MESSAGE digital readout, airspeed awareness bar, and mach
OR speed digital readout is removed from the display.
LARGE X Message shows on the left side of the display. Unit
restart may be required.
1. Loss of airspeed data.
2. Loss of Vmo data.
NOTE
If the GH-3900.2 is configured for dual air data
sources, the ADC SRC (ADS SRC) menu option
provides a toggle option to switch between air data
sources.
Pilot
Message
NOTE
Pilot messages are unique to each aircraft.
Consult your Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM) for
further instruction.
NOTE
Depending on aircraft configuration options, the ATT/
HDG SRC menu option may not be available.
NOTE
The “AHRS” indication does not show on the display
if aircraft pitch has met or exceeded +30° or -20°,
or roll has met or exceeded +/- 65° (or +/-47° if both
AHRS and ADREV indications are configured). Or
if air data has sourced back the primary source as
configured at installation.
° Degree
° Magnetic North
3-ATI 3” Air Transport Instrument
ADC Air Data Computer
ADS Air Data Sensor
AD REV Air Data Reversion
AFM Airplane Flight Manual
ALT Altitude
AMLCD Active Matrix Liquid Crystal Display
APR Runway Approach
ATT Attitude
B/C Backcourse
BARO REF Barometric Reference
BL VER Bootloader Version
BRG Bearing
BRT Bright
CRS Course
CSDB Commercial Standard Digital Bus
DCM Data Configuration Module
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
DN Down
DO- RTCA Document
EAR Export Administration Regulations
EEPROM Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only
Memory
ESIS Electronic Standby Instrument System
ETSO European Technical Standards Order
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
ft Feet
FPM Feet Per Minute
FR From
FW VER Firmware Version
H Hold
HDG Heading
HPA Hectopascals
IAS Indicated Airspeed
ID Identification
Dealer Information
Name
Address
City, State, Zip
Telephone
Equipment Information
Date of Purchase
Installation Date
Model Number
Part Number
Serial Number
Mod Letter
Software Release
Aircraft Information
Aircraft Make
Aircraft Model
Serial Number
N Number
SECTION 8
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
8.1 General.................................................................................... 7
8.1.1 Other Sources of Information Within the AFM/POH ........................... 7
8.1.2 Identification Plate .................................................................... 7
8.1 General
This section provides information of use to the flight crew concerning replenishment,
parking, and overnight storage of the aircraft. For more detailed information concerning
ground handling, refer to PSM 1-6-2T (Ground Support Manual).
NOTE
Maintenance tasks completed by the flight crew/operator are subject
to Local Airworthiness Authorities.
Refer to Section 9, Supplements, for dimensions and areas unique to float, ski, and
intermediate flotation gear aircraft.
8.2 Replenishing
8.2.1 Fuel
8.2.1.1 Fuelling
For fuel specifications, refer to the specifications provided in Section 2, Limitations.
8.2.1.2 Defuelling
Refer to the procedures contained in the Maintenance Manual, PSM 1-64-2.
8.2.1.3 Grounding
Fuel caps for the fuselage fuel tanks are located on the port side of the aircraft,
approximately 4 feet above ground level. Any nozzle with a maximum diameter of up to
3 inches (7.5 cm) may be used. Grounding receptacles conforming to ANSI 3117 are
provided above and slightly inboard of each fuel cap. These receptacles accept a MS
25384 plug (a standard male tip and ring phone plug, identical to the speaker portion
of a pilot headset). The male grounding plug should be wired so that both the tip and
ring are connected to the ground source.
It is less desirable to ground the aircraft by connecting an alligator clip to the main gear
or the main gear brake assemblies.
If the aircraft must be grounded using an alligator clip, a sacrificial bolt for this purpose
may be attached to the starboard side of the nose wheel fork, opposite the bolt on the
port side of the aircraft that retains the taxi light mounted on the nose wheel fork.
Do not allow open flame or smoking in the vicinity of the airplane while refueling.
Do not replenish the oxygen system (if installed) during refueling or defueling.
Remove external power, if connected. Make sure all aircraft electrical power (MASTER
and POWER SOURCE switches (Pre Mod 6/2314) or BATTERY, EXTERNAL and
GENERATOR switches (Post Mod 6/2314)) are OFF. Do not operate airplane electrical
or radio equipment while refueling.
High frequency pulse transmissions in the vicinity of the airplane may present a fire
hazard.
Be certain the fuel supplied is checked for type, grade and freedom from contamination.
Ground the refuelling vehicle or drum to the airplane (attach the vehicle or drum
grounding lead to the ground points provided on the port side of the fuselage). Ground
the refuelling nozzle in the same manner.
Secure the filler cap with the tab on the cap facing aft, in a manner that airflow will
flatten the tab.
The normal oil level in the engine is between the 1 and 2 mark on the dipstick. Each
engine will find its own ‘natural oil level'.
The hydraulic fluid specification is MIL-H-5606. A dipstick is integral to the cap of the
hydraulic fluid tank. The normal level is close to the FULL mark.
Tire pressures at ISA conditions for intermediate flotation gear are as follows:
Wheels are fitted with Schrader valve cores that comply with TRC-4 specifications.
Tires are normally and preferentially inflated with nitrogen but if it is not available,
compressed air may be used.
8.3 Towing
8.3.1 General
The nose gear torque links must be disconnected before the aircraft is towed.
Propeller restraint ties should be installed if there is any possibility of wind rotating the
propellers when the engine is shut down.
Covers and plugs (pitot tube covers, engine inlet and exhaust covers) should be fitted
at any time the airplane is parked unattended.
When tying the aircraft down, strong rope or chain should be used, and each tie-down
anchor should be capable of withstanding the force generated by the aircraft in all
possible wind conditions that may be encountered. Be aware that the aircraft wing will
generate enough lift to apply a combined total of 8,000 lbs force to the tie-down anchors
at wind speeds of approximately 40 knots.
To remove insect residue or bird droppings, first soak a cotton terrycloth towel (a bath
towel) in warm water, then place the warm soggy towel over the windshield for 15
minutes. This will re-hydrate any organic debris on the windshield and enable it to be
flushed off with running water.
Use bare clean hands, with no jewellery, to feel and dislodge any dirt or abrasive
materials.
Using a mild soap or detergent (such as dish washing liquid) in water, wash the surface.
Again, use only the bare hands to provide rubbing force. (A clean lint-free cloth may be
used to transfer the soap solution to the surface, but extreme care must be excised to
prevent scratching the surface).
Rinse the surface thoroughly with clean fresh water and dry with a clean cloth or damp
chamois leather.
To remove insect residue or bird droppings, first soak a cotton terrycloth towel (a bath
towel) in warm water, then place the warm soggy towel over the windshield for 15
minutes. This will rehydrate any organic debris on the windshield an enable it to be
flushed off with running water.
Wash the side windows using a soft sponge, warm water and soft soap solution. Rinse
with clean water and dry with a damp chamois leather.
Use an appropriate transparency cleaner to remove any grease, smears, etc., still
adhering to the side windows.
NOTE
Rubbing transparencies with a dry cloth will cause scratches and
the build-up of an electrostatic charge which attracts dust. Where
an electrostatic charge is present, gently pat the area with a damp
chamois leather to remove the charge and any accumulated dust.
Due to the nature of the anti-reflective coating used, the face of the display will pick up
fingerprints easily if it is touched. Pilots and maintenance technicians must be trained
to not touch the surface of the display.
The manufacturer of the display panels provides detailed care and cleaning instructions
in their Component Maintenance Manual for the KDU-1080, which is Barco publication
number K5920078-00. This Component Maintenance Manual must be read prior to
making any attempt to clean the surface of a display or the surrounding bezel.
1 First, make sure the display is in the power off mode. The aircraft MASTER switch
should be OFF (Pre Mod 6/2314) or BATTERY, EXTERNAL and GENERATOR
switches all OFF (Post Mod 6/2314).
2 Second, remove dust by cleaning the display with a soft, clean cloth such as a
Scotch-Brite™ high performance microfibre cloth (3M part number 2011-CC5B).
Do not use any paper products to clean the screen.
4 Stroke the microfiber cloth across the display in one direction only, moving from the
top of the display to the bottom.
5 Do not apply excessive pressure to the LCD screen. This may cause permanent
damage to the display.
6 Do not scratch or rub the screen with a hard object. This will damage the anti-
reflection coating and the optical filter surface. Rub the filter glass of the display
evenly with the dampened microfiber cloth.
8 To clean the bezel and the bezel buttons surrounding the display screen, use a
new, non-abrasive lint free cotton cloth humidified with a multipurpose detergent
containing no alcohol.
The FMS can hold two complete FMS navigation data loads at any given time, for
example, the current issue of a data load, and the upcoming (not yet effective) issue of
a data load.
SECTION 9
SUPPLEMENTS
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 1
DE-ICING SYSTEM
Sections 9-1.1, 9-1.2, 9-1.3, 9-1.4 and 9-1.5 are Transport Canada Civil Aviation
approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-1.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are not
approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-1.5 Performance......................................................................... 23
9-1-1 Indicated Airspeeds to Achieve 1.3 times the Power-off Stall Speed as
a Function of Weight .............................................................. 22
9-1-1 Operating in Icing Conditions Label (S.O.O. 6004, 6202, 6187 and
Mod 6/2228) ........................................................................ 10
9-1-2 De-icing Placard Locations ...................................................... 11
9-1-3 Weight – Altitude Icing Limitations ............................................. 17
9-1-4 Stabilizer Boot Inflation Annunciation .......................................... 27
9-1-5 Surface De-Ice Schematic ....................................................... 28
9-1.1 General
9-1.1.1 Scope
Airplanes with the required de-icing equipment are authorized to fly in icing conditions
when operation is in compliance with the operating limitations and procedures in this
supplement. Such airplanes are certificated with ice protection provisions in compliance
with 14 CFR, Part SFAR 23.
NOTE
Icing conditions exist when the static air temperature on the ground
and for take-off is +10°C or below, or static air temperature in flight
is +5°C or below, and visible moisture in any form is present (such
as clouds, fog with visibility one mile or less, rain, snow, sleet, or ice
crystals).
Icing conditions also exist when the static air temperature on the
ground and for take-off is +10°C or below when operating on ramps,
taxiways or runways where surface snow, ice, standing water, or slush
may be ingested by the engines or freeze on engines or nacelles.
WARNING
1 A yellow procedural placard on the aft face of the control column, suitable for aircraft
with de-ice equipment installed.
2 S.O.O. 6004 with Mod 6/2042 installed – Wing and Tail de-icing boots
3 S.O.O. 6202 or 6237 with Mod 6/2022 installed – Propeller (installation includes
valve heaters and PNEUMATIC LOW PRESS advisory and caution CAS messages)
The following equipment, which is standard on all DHC-6 aircraft, must be working
properly prior to entry into known or forecast icing conditions:
7 Windshield wipers
9-1.2 Limitations
9-1.2.1 Operating Limitations
1 All de-icing systems must be fully operative prior to entering known or probable
icing conditions.
2 If any icing condition has been encountered, the de-icer boots must be operated
prior to flap extension.
9-1.2.2 Placards
Airplanes with the required de-icing equipment must have the following placards
installed in the flight compartment of the aircraft:
Figure 9-1-1 Operating in Icing Conditions Label (S.O.O. 6004, 6202, 6187 and Mod
6/2228)
A. Operating Procedure in Icing Conditions Label (S.O.O. 6004 and Mod 6/1847)
WARNING
8 Exit severe icing conditions – turn back or change altitude as required to obtain an
outside air temperature that is less conducive to icing.
11 Airspeed – As required
5 BLEED AIR – LEFT switch – ON. Check PNEUMATIC LOW PRESS CAS message
disappears.
6 BLEED AIR – LEFT switch – OFF. Check PNEUMATIC LOW PRESS CAS message
reappears after approximately 7 seconds.
7 BLEED AIR – RIGHT switch – ON. Check PNEUMATIC LOW PRESS CAS message
disappears.
10 Confirm that the green LSTAB and RSTAB annunciations appear sequentially within
15 seconds.
17 BOOTS MANUAL – WING switch − Hold at WING INNER then WING OUTER and
check that wing boots operate.
18 BOOTS MANUAL – STABILIZER switch – Hold at LEFT STAB then RIGHT STAB
while ground crew verify that tailplane boots operate. Check that LEFT STAB and
RIGHT STAB annunciations in the electrical system window each illuminate within
two seconds of appropriate switch selection to LEFT STAB and RIGHT STAB, and
each light goes out almost immediately switch is released to OFF. Operation of
indicator lights should be consistent with each other.
WARNING
A slow cycle takes 180 seconds. Inflation time for each boot remains
the same; dwell time lasts 164 seconds.
20 Check that each stabilizer boot annunciation appears for at least 1 second in each
60 second cycle (or 180 second cycle), and at no time are both on simultaneously.
NOTE
If the LEFT indicator annunciation does not go out before the RIGHT
comes on, a malfunction is indicated and rectification must be carried
out before flight in icing conditions.
22 Flaps – Select 10 degrees, check LEFT STAB and RIGHT STAB DEICE PRESS
lights illuminate within a 12 second period in a sequence of right, left, right, left
stabilizer. Select greater than 15 degrees, check that another 12 second cycle
consisting of two alternating 3 second inflations occurs for each stabilizer boot.
1 BOOTS AUTO switch – FAST or SLOW depending on the rate of ice accumulation.
Check LEFT and RIGHT STAB DEICE PRESS lights illuminate.
NOTE
Monitor ice accumulation between boot cycles (use wing inspection
lights as required) to confirm that the FAST/SLOW selection is
appropriate.
WARNING
1 BOOTS AUTO switch − FAST. Check LEFT and RIGHT STAB DEICE PRESS lights
illuminate.
4 Minimum approach speeds appropriate to weight with 10° flap are as follows:
12,300 lbs 11,500 lbs 10,500 lbs 9,500 lbs 8,500 lbs 7,500 lbs
Weight
(5,580 kg) (5,220 kg) (4,760 kg) (4,310 kg) (3,860 kg) (3,400 kg)
KIAS 85 83 79 75 71 67
Landing distance with flaps 10° for all landing gear configurations is approximately
1.8 times the landing distance with flaps 37° obtained from AFM Section 5, Figure 29,
Landing Distance from 50 feet AGL to Full Stop; or skiplane landing distance graph
(refer to Figure 9-10-13), as appropriate.
1 BOOTS AUTO switch – Select FAST at least three minutes before flap extension.
2 Flap – Select desired settings and if any loss of control occurs retract to 10°.
Extension of flaps beyond 10° must only be made above 500 feet above ground
level.
3 If any part of the de-icer boot system was inoperative or if the aircraft behaved
abnormally during flight in icing conditions, approach and land as for APPROACH
AND LANDING PROCEDURES IN ICING CONDITIONS. Strictly observe
appropriate airspeed for 10° flap.
4 Do not use excessively high airspeeds with flaps extended after flight in icing
conditions. Airspeeds given in may be increased by 5 knots to offset conditions
of turbulence, but airspeeds in excess of those recommended for flap angle and
operating weight must be avoided.
Table 9-1-1 Indicated Airspeeds to Achieve 1.3 times the Power-off Stall Speed as a
Function of Weight
1.3 VS KIAS
FLAP
ANGLE 12,300 lbs 11,500 lbs 10,500 lbs 9,500 lbs 8,500 lbs 7,500 lbs
(5,580 kg) (5,220 kg) (4,760 kg) (4,310 kg) (3,860 kg) (3,400 kg)
10° 85 83 79 75 71 66
20° 80 77 73 70 66 64
37° 74 70 67 64 Not Authorized
5 An approach speed equal to 1.3 times the power-off stalling speed (VS) appropriate
to the prevailing weight and flap setting is recommended. These values are given
in the table above.
9-1.5 Performance
There is no change to the performance data provided in Section 5.
9-1.7 De-Icing
9-1.7.1 Surface De-Ice Systems
By special order, de-icing and anti-icing systems provide for wing, tail, and propeller
de-icing. Pneumatically operated boots are installed on the wing and tail leading edges
which break up formations of ice by inflation and deflation pulsations, which can be
automatically or manually controlled.
In the automatic mode, the air supply is controlled by the distributor valves and inflates
the de-icer boots in a sequence and speed governed by the electronic timer. The timer
has two operating speeds, SLOW and FAST, either of which can be selected by the
pilot dependent upon the severity of icing conditions. A fast cycle occurs every minute,
which comprises 5 seconds inflation time for inner wings, 5 seconds for outer wings, 3
seconds for left stabilizer and 3 seconds for the right stabilizer followed by 44 seconds
dwell (standby) period. A slow cycle occurs every 3 minutes. Inflation time for each
boot remains the same; however, the dwell time increases to 164 seconds.
Deflation of the boots in both automatic and manual modes is by suction induced by
ejector venturi action. Suction is automatically applied to the boots anytime one or both
of the BLEED AIR switches is placed in the ON position.
The wing and tail de-icer boot electrical circuits are powered from the left and right DC
buses and are protected by AIRFRAME DEICE AUTO (position C18) and AIRFRAME
DEICE MAN (position D18) circuit breakers on the main circuit breaker panel.
2 A WING manual mode switch to manually inflate the wing de-icer boots at the
discretion of the pilot. Alternative positions are marked INNER and WING.
3 A STABILIZER manual mode switch to manually inflate the tail deice boots at the
pilot's discretion. Alternative positions are marked LEFT and RIGHT.
9-1.7.4 Indication/Warning
To provide positive indication of tailplane stabilizer de-ice boot inflation, the words
L STAB and R STAB will appear in green inverse video blocks at the bottom of the
electrical and de-ice 1/6 size system window whenever a pressure sensing switch
detects that pressure is being sent to the stabilizer de-ice boots.
The Crew Alerting System (CAS) window on the Systems MFD will show the following
Caution and Advisory messages for the de-ice systems:
AMBER CAUTION
CYAN ADVISORY
The WINDSHIELD HEAT switch is located on the lower left sub-panel panel and has
positions marked ON and OFF. The left windshield glass panel is powered from the
left DC bus and the right windshield glass panel from the right DC bus. WINDSHIELD
HEAT L and R circuit breakers (position C1 and D1, respectively) on the main circuit
breaker panel protect the circuits.
The glass windshield is inherently bird-proof, and there is no requirement to turn the
heat on to increase impact resistance. Windshield heat greatly assists in de-misting
the inside of the windshield panels when descending into warm, humid air masses.
The windshield heater system is calibrated to maintain the glass windshield panels at
approximately 40°C (105°F).
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 5
S.O.O. 6048
Sections 9-5.1, 9-5.2, 9-5.3, 9-5.4 and 9-5.5 are Transport Canada Civil Aviation
approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-5.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are not
approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-5.1 General.................................................................................... 7
9-5.1.1 Certification Basis .................................................................... 7
9-5.1 General
Intermediate Flotation Gear (IFG) consists of three standard 11.00 x 12 wheels, fitted
with 15.00 by 12 tires. A special nose landing gear fork is installed to accommodate the
larger nose wheel. Dunlop tires may be fitted, the procedures and performance data
are identical for both. A modified nose wheel shimmy damper (Mod 6/1321, TAB 619/6
refers) may be installed on aircraft equipped with Intermediate Flotation Gear; however,
the presence or absence of this modified shimmy damper does not affect procedures
or performance.
9-5.2 Limitations
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the main body of the AFM apply when
Intermediate Flotation Gear is fitted.
Because of the flexibility of the large low-pressure tire casings, some lateral movement
of the airplane can be expected in crosswind take-offs and landings. Depending upon
the type of surface, consideration should be given to the possibility of lateral movement
when taking off or landing in crosswind conditions as discussed in Section 4.
A longer jury strut is available for use on aircraft fitted with Intermediate Flotation Gear.
Take-off and landing distances will vary considerably depending on airfield surface
characteristics. The take-off and landing distances published in Section 5 of the main
body of the AFM apply to aircraft fitted with Intermediate Flotation Gear, however,
it must be understood that all of these distances are based on dry, hard, level
surfaces. Operators who fit intermediate flotation gear to their aircraft generally do
so in anticipation of operating on surfaces that are not dry, hard, or level. Therefore, the
operator must consider and allow for degradation in take-off and landing performance
arising from the unique characteristics of each airfield at which operations are planned.
9-5.5.3 List of AFM Section 5 Charts that are not Applicable to IFG
The following charts from Section 5 of the main body of the AFM must not be used
when Intermediate Flotation Gear (IFG) is fitted because the data presented in these
charts is only applicable to aircraft with standard wheel gear.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors are extended), one engine inoperative with the propeller feathered, the other
engine set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, “Take-off Power Setting” chart).
Interpretive Guidance
This chart is used to determine the maximum allowable take-off weight permitted for an
aircraft with one engine inoperative (OEI) and the propeller of that engine feathered.
This chart may only be used if the autofeather system is installed, operational, and
selected on prior to take-off.
The structural limits for the maximum take-off and landing weights are given in Section
5 of the main body of the AFM.
One engine inoperative enroute climb requirements are met at the maximum structural
weight.
No example calculation is provided, because the chart shows that as long as pressure
altitude is equal to or less than 5,000 feet and ambient air temperature is less than
ISA +22.5°C, the maximum take-off weight is limited by a structural limitation, not by a
performance limitation.
Figure 9-5-1 Maximum Take-Off Weight – One Engine Inoperative Take-Off Climb with
Propeller Feathered
Issue 3 PSM 1-64-1A
30 May. 2014 Page 9-5-15
SECTION 9 5 TC Approved
INTERMEDIATE FLOTATION GEAR DHC-6 SERIES 400
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors extended), both engines set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, “Take-off
Power Setting” chart), propeller speed 96%, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides the initial gross take-off rate of climb in feet per minute when both
engines are set to Take-off Power and the aircraft speed is maintained at the value
determined from the inset chart.
At an air temperature of +13°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
11,000 lbs (4,990 kg), the take-off rate of climb will be 1,500 feet per minute at 74 KIAS.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors extended), both engines set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, “Take-off
Power Setting” chart), propeller speed 96%, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides initial gross take-off climb gradient when both engines are set to
Take-off Power and the aircraft speed is maintained at the value determined from the
inset chart. The gradient is expressed as a ratio of vertical distance gained to horizontal
distance travelled.
At an air temperature of +13°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
10,700 lbs (4,855 kg), the take-off climb gradient will be 0.18 (18%) at 73 KIAS. The
aircraft will climb 180 feet (59 m) for every 1,000 feet (305 m) of forward travel.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart
if deflectors extended), one engine set to Maximum Continuous Power (refer to Figure
5-8, “Maximum Continuous Power Setting” chart), propeller speed 96%, one engine
inoperative with propeller feathered, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides enroute gross rate of climb in feet per minute when one engine is
set to Maximum Continuous Power, the other engine is inoperative and feathered, and
the aircraft speed is maintained at the value determined from the inset chart.
At an air temperature of +13°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
10,500 lbs (4,765 kg), the take-off rate of climb will be 340 feet per minute at 72 KIAS.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart
if deflectors extended), one engine set to Maximum Continuous Power (refer to Figure
5-8, “Maximum Continuous Power Setting” chart), propeller speed 96%, one engine
inoperative with propeller feathered, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides enroute gross climb gradient when one engine is set to Maximum
Continuous Power, the other engine is inoperative and feathered, and the aircraft speed
is maintained at the value determined from the inset chart. The gradient is expressed
as a ratio of vertical distance gained to horizontal distance travelled.
At an air temperature of +13°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
10,700 lbs (4,855 kg), the initial enroute climb gradient will be 0.037 (3.7%) at 73 KIAS.
The aircraft will climb 37 feet (11 m) for every 1,000 feet (305 m) of forward travel.
Flaps fully extended (37°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7,
“Take-off Power Setting” chart), propeller speed 96%, climb speed according to chart
inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides gross rate of climb information with the aircraft in the landing
configuration (flaps fully extended, propellers set to 96% NP).
At +12°C air temperature, 6,000 foot pressure altitude, and 10,500 lbs (4,765 kg)
landing weight, the initial rate of climb with flaps fully extended will be 1,100 feet per
minute, at a climb speed of 68 KIAS.
Flaps fully extended (37°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7,
“Take-off Power Setting” chart), propeller speed 96%, climb speed according to chart
inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides gross climb gradient information with the aircraft in the landing
configuration (flaps fully extended, propellers set to 96% NP).
At +13°C air temperature, 6,000 foot pressure altitude, and 10,500 lbs (4,765 kg)
landing weight, the initial climb gradient with flaps fully extended will be 0.14 (14%), at
a climb speed of 68 KIAS. The aircraft will climb 140 feet (43 m) for every 1,000 feet
(305 m) of forward travel.
Flaps set at landing flap position (37°), power 2x MTOP (Maximum Take-off Power).
Interpretive Guidance
This chart is used to determine the maximum allowable landing weight for the aircraft,
equipped with Intermediate Flotation Gear.
At altitudes less than 5,000 feet and ambient air temperatures less than ISA +22.5°C,
the maximum landing weight is limited to the maximum structural weight limit of 12,300
lbs (5,580 kg).
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 8
S.O.O. 6247
Sections 9-8.1, 9-8.2, 9-8.3, 9-8.4 and 9-8.5 are Transport Canada Civil Aviation
approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-8.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are not
approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-8.1 General.................................................................................... 7
9-8.1.1 Scope ................................................................................... 7
9-8.1.2 Certification Basis .................................................................... 7
9-8.1 General
9-8.1.1 Scope
Auxiliary Wing Fuel Tanks (S.O.O. 6247) allow an additional 37 Imperial Gallons (44.5
U.S. Gallons, 168 litres) of fuel to be carried in each wing. This is equivalent to 300
pounds (136 kg) of Jet A or A1 in each wing tank at standard temperature and nominal
density, according to ASTM specification D1655.
9-8.2 Limitations
9-8.2.1 Operating Limitations
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the AFM apply when auxiliary wing
fuel tanks are fitted. The following additional limitations apply:
2 If the fuel contained in the auxiliary wing tanks is required for completion of the
flight, it must be used prior to the point of no return.
3 Wing fuel tank switches must be at OFF for take-off, climb, descent, and landing.
9-8.2.2 Placards
Aircraft with auxiliary wing fuel tanks fitted have the following placard installed in the
flight compartment of the aircraft:
For example, if the left engine has been shut down, and the pilot wishes to send fuel
from the left wing tank to the right engine, switch and fuel selector settings should be
set as follows.
The pilot must then monitor the contents of the two fuselage fuel tanks and the selected
wing tank to confirm that fuel is being consumed from the selected wing tank.
1 Appearance of the LEFT or RIGHT WING FUEL PUMP caution level (amber) CAS
message when the tank is not empty.
2 Observation of fuel gauges – with wing tank switch(es) selected to ENGINE the left
or right WING TANK indicators register no change in contents while the main tank
contents gradually decrease.
In this event the fuel in the tank with the defective pump should be considered unusable
and, if necessary, the flight plan should be adjusted accordingly.
WARNING
In addition to the normal over-wing refueling capability using the filler caps located on
the top of the wing tanks, the wing tanks may be refilled on the ground from the main
tank system as follows:
2 POWER SOURCE switch (Pre Mod 6/2314) – as desired (refer to NOTE below)
The forward fuselage tank will refill the right wing tank and the rear fuselage tank will
refill the left wing tank.
5 Observe that left WING TANK and right WING TANK indicators register gradual
increase in contents, and that AFT and FWD (main tank) fuel quantity indicators
register a corresponding decrease. When tank content indicators show no further
change, select wing fuel tank switch(es) and boost pump switch(es) to OFF.
NOTE
It takes approximately 15 to 20 minutes to completely fill a wing tank.
To avoid depleting the battery, it is recommended that a generator be
on line or that an external power source be connected.
2 After the engines have been started, select left and right WING TANK fuel switches
to ENGINE for approximately 30 seconds and then return both switches to OFF.
This will purge any air that may be in the wing tank fuel lines.
WARNING
3 Observe that the left and right WING TANK fuel quantity indicators register gradual
decrease in contents and that AFT and FWD (main tank) fuel quantity indicators
register no change in contents.
4 Monitor wing tank fuel quantity indicator to confirm fuel flow and when each denotes
tank empty and fuel flow from the main tanks is confirmed, select wing tank switches
OFF.
CAUTION
9-8.5 Performance
There is no change to the performance data provided in Section 5 when auxiliary wing
fuel tanks are fitted.
Contained in each tank is a level control valve, a strainer, a capacitance probe fuel
quantity transmitter, a vent pipe, and a filler cap. Mounted outside each tank on the
wing outboard nose rib is a fuel pump, a pressure switch, a fuel transfer valve and a
refuel shut-off valve. Two switches control the fuel supply from the wing tanks to the
engines, and when appropriately selected (with the fuel tank selector at NORMAL) the
left wing tank supplies the left engine and the right wing tank supplies the right engine.
The wing fuel system is operated from the left and the right and left DC buses through
WING FUEL CONTROL L and WING FUEL CONTROL R circuit breakers (positions
A13 and B13, respectively) on the main circuit breaker panel.
A drain valve for each wing tank is provided on the bottom each wing.
When the aircraft is fitted with spring skis or wheel skis and a landing on snow or ice is
planned, the wing tanks must be less than half full before landing on snow or ice. There
is no similar landing restriction for wheel or floatplanes. Because there is only one fuel
boost pump for each wing tank, wing tank fuel must be consumed prior to the point of
no return if completion of the flight is dependent on using the fuel in the wing tanks.
There are two lever-lock switches marked REFUEL at the down position, OFF at the
center lock position, and ENGINE at the up position. The OFF position de-energizes
the system and ENGINE positions energize the respective wing tank fuel pumps.
The REFUEL position of the switches opens the refuel shut-off valve. The main
(fuselage) boost pump switches must then be moved to the on (up) position in order to
pump fuel from the fuselage tanks to the wing tanks. If the fuselage tank fuel selector
is in the NORMAL position, the forward main tank will refill the right wing tank and the
rear main tank will refill the left wing tank. Refuelling of the wing tanks in this manner
must only be conducted when the aircraft is on the ground. When the fuselage boost
pumps are on and the WING TANK switch is in the REFUEL position, very little fuel will
be supplied to the ejector in the fuselage fuel system, and it is possible that the collector
cell will empty rapidly. The wing tanks must not be refuelled in flight. It is acceptable
to refuel wing tanks during taxi after landing, but it is not permitted to refuel wing tanks
during taxi prior to take-off.
It takes between 15 and 20 minutes to fill empty wing tanks by pumping fuel to them from
the fuselage tanks. An external power source should be connected, or alternatively, one
engine may be left running to provide electrical power during fuel transfer operations.
Wing tanks can also be conventionally refuelled through the filler caps located on the
top of each wing.
When a wing fuel tank switch is selected to the REFUEL position and the aircraft is on
ground, an inverse green XFER annunciation will appear directly underneath the fuel
quantity indication for that wing fuel tank, and a cyan (advisory level) CAS message
LEFT or RIGHT WING REFUEL ON will appear in the CAS message list.
If a wing fuel tank switch is selected to the REFUEL position and the aircraft is in flight,
an inverse amber XFER annunciation will appear directly underneath the fuel quantity
indication for that wing fuel tank, and a amber (caution level) CAS message LEFT or
RIGHT WING REFUEL ON will appear in the CAS message list.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 10
WHEEL-SKIPLANE OPERATION
S.O.O. 6001
Sections 9-10.1, 9-10.2, 9-10.3, 9-10.4 and 9-10.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-10.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are
not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-10.5 Performance......................................................................... 16
9-10.5.1 General ............................................................................. 16
9-10.5.2 Chart Differences ................................................................. 16
9-10.5.3 Wheel-Skiplane Performance Charts ......................................... 16
9-10.5.4 Flap Settings ....................................................................... 18
9-10.5.5 Landing and Take-off Distances .............................................. 18
9-10.5.6 Maximum Take-Off Weight – One Engine Inoperative Enroute Climb
with Propeller Feathered ........................................................ 19
9-10.5.7 Take-Off Distance to 50 Feet, Both Engines Operating ................... 21
9-10.5.8 Take-Off Rate of Climb, Both Engines Operating .......................... 23
9-10.5.9 Take-Off Gradient of Climb, Both Engines Operating ..................... 25
9-10.5.10 Enroute Gross Rate of Climb – One Engine Inoperative, Propeller
Feathered .......................................................................... 27
9-10.1 General
9-10.1.1 Scope
This supplement applies to the Wheel-Skiplane aircraft with S.O.O. 6001 incorporated.
9-10.2 Limitations
The limitations provided in this supplement supersede the equivalent limitations in
Section 2. All other limitations in Section 2 not specifically addressed in this supplement
remain valid.
KNOTS
CAS IAS
a. Minimum Control Speed (VMC) Flaps 10° 67 65
9-10.2.2 Placards
The following placards must be displayed in full view of pilot, in place of the similar
landplane placards.
Figure 9-10-3 Warning Placard – Do Not Apply Brakes During Ski Actuation
Issue 4 PSM 1-64-1A
07 Mar. 2017 Page 9-10-11
SECTION 9 10 TC Approved
WHEEL S IPLANE OPERATION DHC-6 SERIES 400
3 If asymmetric Wheel and Ski Condition exists, attempt to return the skis to
last symmetrical position. If asymmetry persists, plan a landing to maximize
controllability after touchdown. Consideration should be given to the following
issues:
Take-offs with asymmetric Wheel and Ski configuration are not authorized.
NOTE
If operation of manual hydraulic hand pump is required to pressurize
hydraulic system, at least 10 minutes of continuous pump operation
should be planned for full extension or retraction of the wheel-skis.
1 Any snow and/or ice should be removed from the top surface of the skis. Check
that neither wheels nor skis are frozen to the ground. If either are frozen in, break
or melt ice to free the airplane.
3 Check security of skis, shock units, and trim cables. Check hydraulic lines for
leakage.
9-10.4.2 Taxiing
When maneuvering on snow or ice, the airplane should be steered by nose wheel
steering and asymmetric thrust.
CAUTION
To extend or retract skis while on the ground, the airplane must be stopped and wheel
brakes must be off. The aircraft will move forward by approximately 12 inches (30 cm)
during the ski extension process, and aft by approximately 12 inches (30 cm) during
the ski retraction process.
9-10.4.3 Take-Off
The take-off procedure with skis retracted or extended is identical to that given for the
landplane. The take-off roll with skis down may be longer depending upon surface
conditions. Heavier than normal snow creates considerable friction on the skis as well
as packing ahead of the skis; consequently more backward pressure on the control
wheel may be necessary to attain the take-off attitude.
9-10.4.5.1 Extension
CAUTION
3 If CAS message occurred, confirm CAS message clears when Skis are full “DOWN”.
9-10.4.5.2 Retraction
1 Select Ski Position Selector Valve Lever – UP/LAND.
3 If CAS message occurred, confirm CAS message clears when Skis are full “UP”.
9-10.4.7 Landing
A normal landing approach should be made. In deep snow, the control column should
be held back after touchdown to relieve nose ski load.
KNOTS
CAS IAS
Recommended Approach Speed – Flaps 37° 76 74
When stopping for longer duration, a barrier of wooden boards or another available
material should be used to prevent the skis from contacting and freezing to the ground.
9-10.5 Performance
9-10.5.1 General
The performance data given in this section is consistent with the limitations set forth in
Section 2 of the AFM and Para 9-10.2 of this supplement.
The following performance charts, provided in this supplement, are unique to the
wheel-skiplane and should be used as direct replacements for charts provided in
Section 5.
The following figures (performance charts) from AFM Section 5 must not be used,
however, no equivalent replacement chart applicable to the wheel-skiplane has been
published.
Take-Off 10°
Take-Off climb (prior to 400 feet AGL or obstacle clearance,
whichever comes later) 10°
Enroute climb with one engine 0°
Landing 37°
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), one engine inoperative with the propeller feathered,
the other engine set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, Take-Off Power Setting
chart), Propeller 96% NP.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart is used to determine the maximum allowable take-off weight at pressure
altitudes equal to or less than 5,000 feet that will ensure a positive rate of climb enroute
for an aircraft with one engine inoperative (OEI) and the propeller of that engine
feathered.
Figure 9-10-4 Maximum Take-Off Weight – One Engine Inoperative Enroute Climb with
Propeller Feathered
PSM 1-64-1A Issue 4
Page 9-10-20 07 Mar. 2017
TC Approved SECTION 9-10
DHC-6 SERIES 400 WHEEL S IPLANE OPERATION
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), both engines set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure
5-7, Take-Off Power Setting chart), propeller speed 96%, intake deflectors retracted
(refer to NOTE on chart if deflectors are extended), speed according to chart inset; dry,
hard, level surface. Distances are for actual winds and are not factored.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart allows calculation of the total distance required to take-off from a dry, hard,
level surface and reach a height of 50 feet above the runway.
Operations on Snow
It should be noted that the distance will vary according to snow conditions which are
difficult to define. The following criteria, therefore, should be used as a guide:
(a) on “very slippery” snow, increase distance by 100 to 500 feet (30 to 150 m).
(b) on “normal” snow increase distance by 1,000 feet (305 m).
(c) on “sticky” snow or “doubtful” conditions increase distance by 2,000 to 3,000
feet (610 to 915 m) or more.
On a dry hard runway, an OAT of –10°C, pressure altitude 2,000 feet, a weight of 11,000
lbs (4,990 kg), and a headwind component of 10 KIAS, the wheel-skiplane will require
980 feet (299 m) total distance for take-off. Take-off speed at 50 feet is 74 KIAS.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, Take-Off
Power Setting chart), propeller speed 96%, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides the initial gross take-off rate of climb in feet per minute when both
engines are set to Take-off Power and the aircraft speed is maintained at the value
determined from the inset chart.
At an air temperature of –10°C, pressure altitude of 2,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
11,000 lbs (4,990 kg), the take-off rate of climb will be 1,620 feet per minute at 74 KIAS.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, Take-Off
Power Setting chart), propeller speed 96%, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides initial gross take-off climb gradient when both engines are set to
Take-off Power and the aircraft speed is maintained at the value determined from the
inset chart. The gradient is expressed as a ratio of vertical distance gained to horizontal
distance travelled.
At an air temperature of –10°C, pressure altitude of 2,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
11,000 lbs (4,990 kg), the take-off climb gradient will be 0.21 (21%) at 74 KIAS. The
aircraft will climb 210 feet (64 m) for every 1,000 feet (305 m) of forward travel.
Flaps set at (0°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if deflectors are
extended), one engine set to Maximum Continuous Power (refer to Figure 5-8, Maximum
Continuous Power Setting chart), propeller speed 96%, one engine inoperative with
propeller feathered, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides enroute gross rate of climb in feet per minute when one engine
is set to Take-off or Maximum Continuous Power, the other engine is inoperative and
feathered, and the aircraft speed is maintained at the value determined from the inset
chart.
At an air temperature of –10°C, pressure altitude of 2,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
11,000 lbs (4,990 kg), the enroute rate of climb will be 350 feet per minute, at speed of
80 KIAS.
Flaps set at (0°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if deflectors are
extended), one engine set to Maximum Continuous Power (refer to Figure 5-8, Maximum
Continuous Power Setting chart), propeller speed 96%, one engine inoperative with
propeller feathered, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides enroute gross climb gradient when one engine is set to Take-off or
Maximum Continuous Power, the other engine is inoperative and feathered, and the
aircraft speed is maintained at the value determined from the inset chart. The gradient
is expressed as a ratio of vertical distance gained to horizontal distance travelled.
At an air temperature of –10°C, pressure altitude of 2,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
11,000 lbs (4,990 kg), the initial single engine enroute climb gradient will be 0.041
(4.1%) at a speed of 80 KIAS. The aircraft will climb 41 feet (12.5 m) for every 1,000
feet (305 m) of forward travel.
Flaps fully extended (37°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, Take-Off
Power Setting chart), propeller speed 96%, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides gross rate of climb information with the aircraft in the landing
configuration (flaps fully extended, propellers set to 96% NP).
At –10°C air temperature, 2,000 feet pressure altitude, and 11,000 lbs (4,990 kg)
landing weight, the initial rate of climb with flaps fully extended will be 1,080 feet per
minute, at a speed of 68 KIAS.
Flaps fully extended (37°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors are extended), both engines set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, Take-Off
Power Setting chart), propeller speed 96%, climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides gross climb gradient information with the aircraft in the landing
configuration (flaps fully extended, propellers set to 96% NP).
At –10°C air temperature, 2,000 feet pressure altitude, and 11,000 lbs (4,990 kg)
landing weight, the initial climb gradient with flaps fully extended will be 0.153 (15.3%)
at a speed of 68 KIAS. The aircraft will climb 153 feet (47 m) for every 1,000 feet (305
m) of forward travel.
Flaps set at landing flap position (37°), power 2 x MTOP (Maximum Take-off Power).
Interpretive Guidance
This chart is used to determine the maximum allowable landing weight for the aircraft
equipped as a wheel-skiplane.
At altitudes less than 5,000 feet and ambient air temperatures less than ISA, the
maximum landing weight is limited to the maximum structural weight limit of 12,300 lbs
(5,580 kg).
Flaps fully extended (37°), intake deflectors retracted or extended, propeller speed
96%, speed according to chart inset, power as required to maintain a 3° approach
angle to 50 feet, then power promptly reduced to IDLE at 50 feet AGL. Wheel landing
at a dry, hard, level surface. Retardation by brakes alone. Maximum brake effort used
for stopping. Distances are for actual winds and are not factored.
Interpretive Guidance
The distances are consistent with those given for a normal landing in Section 4 of this
AFM.
Operation on Snow
It should be noted that the distance will vary according to snow conditions which are
difficult to define. The following criteria, therefore should be used as a guide.
2 On “dry” snow or favourable conditions increase distance by 500 to 1,500 feet (150
to 457 m).
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 19
Sections 9-19.1, 9-19.2, 9-19.3, 9-19.4 and 9-19.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-19.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are
not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-19.1 General.................................................................................... 7
9-19.1.1 Scope ................................................................................... 7
9-19.1.2 Purpose of Supplement ............................................................. 7
9-19.1.3 Certification Basis .................................................................... 7
9-19.1 General
9-19.1.1 Scope
This supplement provides procedures for flight when the autofeather system is
inoperative. It is valid for aircraft fitted with standard wheels only.
AFM Supplement 19, Operation with Inoperative Autofeather System, is only provided
to permit temporary continued operation of the aircraft in accordance with the relief
provided in the MMEL, until such time as the autofeather system can be repaired. The
MMEL lists the autofeather system as a ‘Category C’ item, which means that repairs
shall be carried out within ten (10) consecutive calendar days, excluding the day of
discovery. Individual operator MELs may impose more restrictive limitations.
Viking Air Limited does not and will not grant permission for routine (i.e. ongoing)
operation of any DHC-6 Series 400 aircraft in any configuration, for any purpose
(except when authorized for flight test or pilot training purposes), without use of the
autofeather system as set out in Section 4 of the AFM.
9-19.2 Limitations
9-19.2.1 General
This supplement is applicable to the DHC-6 Series 400 on standard wheels only.
NOTE
If partial or complete failure of the autofeather system exists,
operations are prohibited with the “PROPELLER AUTOFEATHER”
circuit breaker (C7 on main circuit panel) engaged.
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the POH/AFM and any other applicable,
approved supplements are not affected except as noted in the following.
NOTE
The minimum control speed (red horizontal line) at the bottom of the
airspeed tape is not appropriate for operations with an inoperative
autofeather system. The crew should consider the minimum control
speed marking to be at 68 KIAS.
9-19.2.4 Placards
An inoperative autofeather system requires a placard, reading “AUTOFEATHER INOP”
or equivalent, placed in full view of the pilot in vicinity of both AUTOFEATHER switch
annunciators.
A placard is required reading “VMC 68 KIAS”, in 1/2 inch lettering placed in full view of
Pilot, in vicinity of the two Primary Flight Displays.
9-19.4.3 Take-Off
1 AUTOFEATHER system – select ON as per Normal Procedures. (Section 4.9
Before Take-off).
NOTE
When the PROPELLER AUTOFEATHER circuit breaker is pulled,
the AUTOFEATHER system will be inoperative. All autofeather
related system indications can be ignored. “NO TAKEOFF” warning
will continue to function based on flaps and trims in the appropriate
take-off settings.
9-19.5 Performance
The performance data provided in Section 5 applies when the autofeather system is
inoperative, with the exceptions given below.
2 Add 15% to the distances determined from Figure 5-14 (Take-Off Distance to 50
Feet, Both Engines Operating), Figure 5-15 (Take-Off Ground Roll Distance (Two
Engines)) and Figure 5-16 (Accelerate-Stop Distance to 35 Knots).
WARNING
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart
if deflectors are extended), one engine inoperative with the propeller windmilling (not
feathered), the other engine set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, Take-off Power
Setting chart).
Interpretive Guidance
This chart is used to determine the maximum allowable take-off weight necessary
to ensure a positive rate of climb at Take-off Power for an aircraft with one engine
inoperative (OEI) and the propeller of that engine windmilling (not feathered). This
chart is used and is limiting if the autofeather system is inoperative.
At a pressure altitude of 5,000 feet and an air temperature of ISA +20°C (+25°C), the
maximum take-off weight that would allow a positive rate of climb with one engine
inoperative and the propeller windmilling is 11,400 lbs (5,170 kg). Climb speed is 75
knots.
Figure 9-19-1 Maximum Take-Off Weight – One Engine Inoperative Take-off Climb with
Propeller Windmilling
Issue 3 PSM 1-64-1A
30 May. 2014 Page 9-19-15
SECTION 9 19 TC Approved
OPERATION WITH INOPERATIVE AUTOFEATHER DHC-6 SERIES 400
SYSTEM
9-19.5.4 Take-Off Rate of Climb – One Engine Inoperative, Propeller
Windmilling
Conditions associated with this chart
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors are extended), one engine set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, Take-off
Power Setting chart), propeller speed 96%, one engine inoperative with propeller
windmilling (not feathered), climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides initial gross rate of climb in feet per minute when one engine is set
to Take-off Power, the other engine is inoperative and not feathered, and the aircraft
speed is maintained at the value determined from the inset chart.
At an air temperature of 18°C, pressure altitude of 6,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
11,400 lbs (5,170 kg), the take-off rate of climb will be 30 feet per minute at 75 knots.
Flaps set at take-off position (10°), intake deflectors retracted (refer to NOTE on chart if
deflectors are extended), one engine set to Take-off Power (refer to Figure 5-7, Take-off
Power Setting chart), propeller speed 96%, one engine inoperative with propeller
windmilling (not feathered), climb speed according to chart inset.
Interpretive Guidance
This chart provides initial gross climb gradient when one engine is set to Take-off Power,
the other engine is inoperative and not feathered, and the aircraft speed is maintained
at the value determined from the inset chart.
At an air temperature of +34°C, pressure altitude of 5,000 feet, and aircraft weight of
11,800 lbs (5,350 kg), the initial take-off climb gradient will be negative 0.01 (negative
1%) at 77 knots.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 38
S.O.O. 6271
Sections 9-38.1, 9-38.2, 9-38.3, 9-38.4 and 9-38.5 are Interstate Aviation
Committee Aviation Register (IAC AR) approved and constitute the approved
Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement. Compliance with Section 9-38.2, Limitations, is
mandatory. All other Sections are not approved and are provided for information
only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes when configured for and certified to the
standards of the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Approved:____________________
Jorge Canal
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-38.5 Performance......................................................................... 20
9-38.5.1 Cold Temperature Operations .................................................. 20
9-38.5.2 Crosswinds Operations .......................................................... 20
9-38.1 General
9-38.1.1 Introduction
This supplement has been developed for use on aircraft operating under the IAC AR
Type Certificate. Sections 9-38.1 through to 9-38.5 inclusive constitute the approved
Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement. Compliance with Section 9-38.2, Limitations, is
mandatory. All other Sections are not approved and are provided for information only.
In this document, unless otherwise noted, references to the DHC-6 Series 400 POH
/AFM refer to VAL document 1-64-POH (the Pilot Operating Handbook) including
Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) approved document PSM-1-64A (the TCCA
approved Aircraft Flight Manual).
9-38.1.2 Applicability
This Supplement is part of, and must be attached to, the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for aircraft configured for, and certified to, the standards of the
Commonwealth of Independent States in accordance with Viking Air Limited (VAL)
Standard Option Order (S.O.O. 6271).
This document supersedes and/or supplements the information and data contained in
the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) and approved Aircraft Flight Manual for the VAL
DHC-6 Series 400 (Twin Otter) in the areas listed therein. For limitations, procedures
and performance not contained in this document, refer to the POH, approved Aircraft
Flight Manual and other applicable approved Flight Manual Supplements.
During long term parking in outside ambient temperatures below –20°C, the aircraft
battery should be removed from the airplane and stored in a heated location.
9-38.2 Limitations
In addition to limitations in the basic aircraft POH/AFM and any applicable supplements,
the following limitations apply.
9-38.2.1 Fuel
In addition to approved fuels listed in the POH/AFM Section 2.4.4, the following fuels
can be used:
NOTE
Use of TS-1 fuel is subject to the restrictions specified in Pratt &
Whitney Canada Service Bulletin (SB) No. 1244.
NOTE
Flight durations of not more than 30 minutes above 10,000 feet (3050
meters) up to and including 12,000 feet (3650 meters) are permitted.
Unless an independent, approved third static source is installed, the maximum operating
altitude for IFR operations is 14,000 feet (4250 meters).
Extended over-water flights are permitted within the limitations prescribed by CIS
operational regulations.
The following is added to Section 2.14 (Kinds of Operation Limitations) of the POH/AFM:
The aircraft may be operated in CIS airspace on routes covered by АТС ground facilities
using RBS mode and VHF radio fields.
The Operating Instructions Placard (Figure 2-4) of Section 2.18 (Placards) of the
POH/AFM is replaced with the following:
NOTE
Including wheel-skis when operating on the wheels.
2 Intermediate Flotation Gear (Dunlop DR 18322T Tires with Inner Tube) – 2.4 kg/cm2
or greater.
These minimum surface hardness limitations have been demonstrated at the maximum
certificated gross weight of 12,500 pounds (take-off) and 12,300 pounds (landing).
NOTE
At surface hardness less than 5.1 kg/cm2 3.8 (Standard Wheels)
kg/cm2 (Intermediate Flotation Gear) surface damage of unpaved
runways is possible, and in such case, depth of wheel track may be
greater than 10 cm.
b For combi configurations with combined passenger seat(s) and cargo in the
same freight compartment zone:
(3) Maximum permissible floor loading values per Section 2.8.4.3 (Maximum
Permissible Floor Loading Values) in the POH/AFM are unchanged.
5 All cargo must be restrained by approved cargo nets per the following:
a Maximum cargo net static load capacity is 1,688 lbs (766 kg).
b Minimum required tie downs = (18 x Cargo Weight) / (Tie Down Load Rating).
6 Emergency exit access and aisle way width requirements for all combi configurations
(S.O.O. 6274) must be maintained in accordance with PSM 1-64-8, Figure 1-7.
7 Placards for emergency exits that are not useable due to cargo are to be covered.
A minimum of three crew members (Flight Crew and/or Attendants) are required when
a Single Stretcher is installed and four crew members (Flight Crew and/or Attendants)
are required when Two Stretchers are installed.
All crew members must be trained on the emergency evacuation procedures, refer to
Para 9-38.3.4.
After an emergency landing, remove the portable ELT located beneath the right-hand
(RH) crew seat and operate it as defined in the portable ELT instructions.
Remove the portable ELT located beneath the RH crew seat and operate it as defined
in the portable ELT instructions.
General
In the event of a flight control system abnormality, if warranted by the severity of the
abnormality, land at an airport which has lower levels of wind and turbulence.
Some flight control abnormalities may result in large control forces. Control forces are
alleviated at lower speeds, reduction of speed from cruising speeds to 110 KIAS or
below may significantly reduce control forces and facilitate control of the aircraft in the
event that high control forces as a result of a flight control abnormality are encountered.
3 Change flap settings slowly. Maximum recommended flap setting for landing is 20°.
NOTE
Under certain conditions, high control forces may result. Control
forces may be alleviated by minimizing speed and flap changes from
the trim conditions at which the failure occurred.
The following procedures are in addition to Section 3.20.1 (Aileron Trim Tab Runaway)
of the POH/AFM:
NOTE
The aircraft ailerons have sufficient control authority to overcome
aileron trim at the most adverse trim positions. Monitor aileron trim
position on Apex. Under certain conditions, significant aileron control
forces may result.
NOTE
The aircraft rudder has sufficient control authority to overcome rudder
trim at the most adverse trim positions. Monitor rudder trim on Apex.
Under some conditions, significant rudder control forces may result.
Slightly asymmetric, stabilized engine power settings may alleviate
rudder control forces.
The following procedures are in addition to Section 3.20.2 (Elevator Control Malfunction)
of the POH/AFM:
2 Once aircraft is stabilized, avoid pitch trim changes caused by flap position changes.
If the aircraft is not at Flaps 0°, and pitch control is difficult, a slow reduction of flap
to Flaps 0° may result in a configuration that is easier to control in pitch.
NOTE
Under some circumstances, pitch control may be facilitated by small
power changes, by small speed changes, and/or by flap position
changes.
3 In the event of a jammed elevator, attempt to free elevator with moderate application
of control force.
4 If elevator remains jammed, use small power changes, small speed changes
and/or flap position changes to establish a speed/flap configuration that results in a
controllable configuration for landing.
2 Once aircraft is stabilized, avoid abrupt maneuvering and flap position changes.
NOTE
Under some circumstances, bank angle excursions may be corrected
by small power changes, by small speed changes, and/or by flap
position changes. Avoid use of flaps over 10 degrees.
3 In the event of a jammed aileron, attempt to free aileron with moderate application
of control force.
4 If aileron remains jammed, use rudder to maintain bank angle control and establish
wings level flight. Determine a speed / flap configuration that results in a controllable
configuration for landing.
5 Use rudder and, if required, differential engine power to make heading changes, and
execute shallow banked turns, as required, to navigate or to complete an approach
for landing. Do not exceed 15 degrees of bank during turns.
1 If aircraft is in a banked turn, use aileron to bring the aircraft to wings level flight.
3 Once aircraft is stabilized, avoid abrupt maneuvering and flap position changes.
4 In the event of a jammed rudder, attempt to free rudder with moderate application
of control force.
5 If rudder remains jammed, turns will be uncoordinated, use aileron for bank angle
control. Small differential power changes may also assist in cancelling out any
adverse effects due to the jammed rudder.
NOTE
Complete power, speed and flap changes cautiously as required
to establish a controllable configuration. Check configuration
changes, particularly flaps and power at a safe altitude to establish a
controllable stable configuration for landing. Flaps settings above 10
degrees should not be used.
6 Use ailerons to control bank angle, and, if required, differential engine power to make
heading changes, and execute shallow banked turns, as required, to navigate or to
complete an approach for landing. Do not exceed 15 degrees of bank during turns.
NOTE
A rudder failure in combination with an engine failure, while
improbable, may result in uncontrollable yaw at higher power settings.
Single engine overshoot at go-around power with a failed rudder is
not recommended, loss of control of the aircraft may result.
(1) Once the flight crew instructs the passengers to evacuate the aircraft, the
attendant shall tell the passengers to open their nearest available exit or
escape hatch if the area outside the exit is deemed safe.
(2) The attendant shall instruct the passengers to exit the aircraft through their
nearest available exit.
(3) The attendant shall instruct the co-pilot on which door the stretcher will
be passed through. The co-pilot shall exit the aircraft through that door,
following the passengers.
(4) The stretcher shall be removed from the racks by the attendant and pilot.
(5) The stretcher is positioned beside the door and the attendant lowers the
stretcher to the floor so the attendant can exit the aircraft first.
(6) When outside, the attendant grabs the stretcher so the pilot can direct it out
the door.
(8) The pilot exits the aircraft and everyone moves a safe distance away.
(1) Once the flight crew instructs the passengers to evacuate the aircraft, the
rear attendant shall tell the passengers to open their nearest available exit
or escape hatch if the area outside the exit is deemed safe.
(2) The rear attendant shall instruct the passengers to exit the aircraft through
their nearest available exit.
(3) The rear attendant and co-pilot follow the passengers out the door that the
stretchers will be passed through.
(4) The aft stretcher shall be removed from the racks by the forward attendant
and pilot.
(5) The forward attendant and pilot shall move the stretcher to the door, where
the rear attendant and co-pilot remove the stretcher from the aircraft.
(6) The rear attendant and co-pilot shall deposit the stretcher a safe distance
from the aircraft and come back to receive the forward stretcher.
The forward stretcher shall be removed from the racks by the forward
attendant and pilot.
(7) The forward attendant and pilot shall move the forward stretcher to the door,
where the rear attendant and co-pilot remove the stretcher from the aircraft.
(8) The pilot and forward attendant exit the aircraft and everyone moves a safe
distance away.
9-38.5 Performance
No change except for the following:
The maximum demonstrated crosswind component for take-offs and landings are
shown in Section 4 Para 4.10.1 and Para 4.15.1. When runway surface conditions are
affected by water, snow, slush or ice the following must be considered:
Unpaved Runways
- for grass airfields and also for dry and wet runways 22 kt
- for compacted snow, including when covered with fresh snow 15 kt
- for runways with sodden top layer or covered with slush or wet snow 11 kt
Dual unit feet and meter altitudes are displayed for barometric altitude only. Dual units
or metric units are not displayed on the ESIS. Display of radar altimeter altitude is in
feet only.
Use of altitudes and barometric altimeter setting in metric units is subject to the
requirements of the CIS member states.
Primus Apex provides for annunciation and CAS messages related to the IPS consisting
of the following:
1 There is a caution CAS message “Pneumatic Press Low” that illuminates if the
overall pneumatic pressure is low and the aircraft is not on ground (POH/AFM,
Section 7.22.1.2 and Table 3-3, Section 3.23). Crew response to this CAS is per
POH/AFM, Section 3.18.1. The message can come on under low NG conditions, but
this is considered in the POH/AFM procedures and information, and in Supplement
1. There is also an advisory message which comes on when the aircraft is on
the ground (refer to POH/AFM, Section 3.21.8). In addition, there is information
on these CAS messages in Supplement 1, Section 9-1.7.4). Under normal flight
operations, this CAS message will only come on if there is inadequate pneumatic
pressure in the boot system which would be indicative of a boot system fault.
3 Each engine intake deflector is annunciated in the engine display pane when in the
snow / ice protection position. Failure of an individual intake deflector to move to
the correct position will be apparent to the flight crew because of the absence of
this annunciation.
In addition to the above annunciations and CAS messages, the following is additional
information on the IPS that will assist the flight crew in confirming proper function of all
elements of the system and in identifying any system problems or failures:
1 Failure of windshield heat will be apparent as frost / ice will accumulate on the
affected portion of the windshield. As well, a flight crew member can touch the
windshield to determine that heat is on and functioning. Some increase in current
draw is also apparent when windshield heat is turned on. It is also noted that the left
and right heating elements are independent and provide for a degree of redundancy
in the system.
2 Failure of prop de-ice will be apparent as ice will not shed from the prop or may
result in vibration if prop de-ice is only partially functioning. As well, aircraft electrical
loads can be monitored to determine that prop de-ice is on.
The DHC-6 Series 400 is a small aircraft. As such, accumulation of ice on the leading
edge of the wing struts, on the windshield or on the leading edge of the wing will be
apparent to the flight crew. Observation at night is facilitated by the wing inspection
lights.
Engine start is prohibited if the oil temperature is below –40°C. This is not an
ambient temperature operating limitation, engine pre-heat may be used to raise the oil
temperature to –40°C or higher prior to start.
The DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft has an extensive service history of operations in extreme
Arctic / Antarctic and tropical / desert environments with demonstrated operations in the
temperature range –55°C to +51.7°C. Cockpit pre-heat (for the display screens) may
be required prior to start-up and taxi at temperatures below –20°C (refer to Sections
1.5.7 [Extreme Temperature Operation] and 10.2.2 [Effect of Cold on Avionics Display
Screens] of the POH/ AFM).
For additional information on cold weather safety and operational considerations, refer
to Section 10.2 (Cold Weather Operations, Flight in Known Icing [FIKI]) of the POH/AFM
and its subsections.
For additional information on hot weather and desert operations, refer to Section 10.4
(Hot Weather and Desert Operation) of the POH/AFM and its subsections.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 42
Sections 9-42.1, 9-42.2, 9-42.3, 9-42.4 and 9-42.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-42.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are
not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-42.1 General.................................................................................... 7
9-42.1.1 Certification Basis .................................................................... 7
9-42.1 General
Cold Weather Operations Kit (S.O.O. 6276 or S.O.O. 6287) provides procedures for
preheating aircraft systems preflight. All other procedures for operating the aircraft are
detailed in PSM 1-64-1A, Section 3, Emergency and Abnormal Procedures and Section
4, Normal Procedures.
9-42.2 Limitations
The Preheat System installed on this aircraft does not operate in flight, is not connected
to or dependant on aircraft systems, and is only capable of operation when connected
to a ground based AC power source.
The aircraft is not to be fueled and engines are not to be operated while the system is
plugged in or connected to an extension cord.
The installation of the preheat system does not change existing environmental
restrictions. Before operating the aircraft under cold weather conditions, reference
appropriate Flight Manual and/or Flight Manual Supplements, and FAA Advisory
Circulars (AC), for specific instructions that apply to this aircraft regarding cold weather
operations and starting procedures.
Should a malfunction be detected, disconnect the system from power source, flag as
inoperable and inspect before flight. Repairs are to be conducted by an appropriately
rated and certified mechanic with airframe and power plant experience on this type of
aircraft.
Only operate the preheat system with aircraft engine oil quantity at operational levels.
The system may be operated as soon as practical following full engine shut down.
Refer to Para 9-42.2, Figure 9-42-1 and Figure 9-42-2 for power and extension cord
requirements.
3 When the system is connected to power, the system's red indicator light (located
adjacent to shore power plug) illuminates.
4 For the system to be of maximum benefit when temperatures are at or below 0°C
(32°F), it should be in continual use for a minimum of 6 hours before engine start.
5 When operating at –12°C (+10°F) and below, the use of insulated engine and
airframe cowl plugs and/or covers increases the efficiency of preheating operation,
retaining heat and acting as a windbreak.
1 Once the aircraft has been secured, open the plug door and plug in the system.
2 Verify system operation by checking to see that the indicator light is on.
3 If used, install engine and airframe, cowl plugs and/or covers per manufacturer's
instructions.
Preheating is a cold weather aviation procedure that reduces thermal stress and
spool-up times, and increases reliability and safety of operations.
Power outlet provided in cockpit for connection of operator supplied space heater to
heat interior of aircraft. Outlet is restricted to output of 10 amps as defined by placard.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 45
Sections 9-45.1, 9-45.2, 9-45.3, 9-45.4 and 9-45.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-45.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are
not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
.
SECTION 9 45 TC Approved
CABIN AU ILIARY POWER OUTLETS DHC-6 SERIES 400
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-45.5 Performance......................................................................... 12
9-45.1 General
9-45.1.1 Scope
This supplement applies to aircraft with any of the cabin auxiliary power outlets (S.O.O.
6272, S.O.O. 6281, S.O.O. 6282 or S.O.O. 6283) incorporated.
9-45.2 Limitations
9-45.2.1 General
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the AFM apply when S.O.O. 6272,
S.O.O. 6281, S.O.O. 6282 or S.O.O. 6283 are fitted. The following additional limitations
apply:
9-45.2.2 Placards
The following placards must be displayed in view of the pilot, and are typically located
as shown in Figure 9-45-1.
3 HF radio switch OFF (if installed – use knob on HF radio control head)
4 CABIN 14VDC OUTLETS switch OFF (if S.O.O. 6272, S.O.O. 6281, S.O.O. 6282
installed)
10 INSTRUMENT and FLOOD dimmers fully off (use knobs on lighting control panel)
– Only if instrument panel lighting is not needed
Group 2 items
(do this only if additional load shedding is needed during an in-flight emergency):
1 Pull PY TUBE HEATER circuit breakers (Main CB panel to left of Captain, A7 and
B7) – Only if OAT is greater than 10°C
2 Pull AVIONICS FAN circuit breaker (Avionics CB panel on center pedestal, E7, lower
left corner) – Only if OAT is less than 35°C
3 Pull AVIONICS STRT BATT CHARGE circuit breaker (Avionics CB panel on center
pedestal, M7) (Post Mod 6/2315).
4 Turn off right PFD (far right knob on reversion controller) – Only if operating single
pilot, do not turn it off during 2 crew operations
NOTE
As the exact configuration of an on board personal electronic device
(PED) cannot be anticipated, the possibility of interference with
aircraft systems cannot be avoided. Caution should be exercised
regarding all navigation information presented whiled PED’s and
Cabin Auxiliary Power Outlets are powered on.
9-45.4.2 Take-off
1 Pilot shall ensure cabin power outlet switch is in OFF position and PED’s are
powered OFF and stowed.
9-45.5 Performance
There is no change to the performance data provided in Section 5.
The pilot can turn off the power converter output with the switch labeled ‘CABIN 14VDC
OUTLETS’ located in the cockpit. (Refer to Figure 9-45-1).
The pilot can turn off the power outlet with the switch labeled ‘CABIN 28VDC OUTLETS’
located in the cockpit. (Refer to Figure 9-45-1).
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 46
S.O.O. 6295
Sections 9-46.1, 9-46.2, 9-46.3, 9-46.4 and 9-46.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-46.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are
not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-46.1 General.................................................................................... 7
9-46.1.1 Scope ................................................................................... 7
9-46.1.2 Certification Basis .................................................................... 7
9-46.1 General
9-46.1.1 Scope
This supplement applies to aircraft with a Float Mounted Depth Sounder (S.O.O. 6295)
installed on Wipaire 13000 amphibious or straight floats.
9-46.2 Limitations
9-46.2.1 General
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the POH/AFM apply with S.O.O. 6295
fitted. The following additional limitation applies:
9-46.2.2 Placards
The following placard must be displayed in view of the pilot, and is typically located as
shown in Figure 9-46-1.
9-46.4.2 Take-Off
1 Pilot shall ensure depth sounder control switch is in the OFF position.
9-46.5 Performance
There is no change to the performance data provided in Section 5 of the POH/AFM.
The pilot can turn off the depth sounder system with the switch labeled ‘DEPTH
SOUNDER’ located in the cockpit. (Refer to Figure 9-46-1).
NOTE
The depth sounder system should not be used as a navigational aid
to prevent collision, grounding or float damage.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 47
VHF-FM TRANSCEIVER
S.O.O. 6296
Sections 9-47.1, 9-47.2, 9-47.3, 9-47.4 and 9-47.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-47.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are
not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-47.1 General.................................................................................... 7
9-47.1.1 Scope ................................................................................... 7
9-47.1.2 Certification Basis .................................................................... 7
9-47.1 General
9-47.1.1 Scope
This supplement applies to aircraft with Technisonic TFM-138B VHF-FM Transceiver
installation (S.O.O. 6296).
9-47.2 Limitations
9-47.2.1 General
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the POH/AFM apply when S.O.O.
6296 is installed.
9-47.2.2 Placards
The following placards must be displayed in view of the pilot, and is typically located as
shown in Figure 9-47-1.
NOTE
The VHF-FM transceiver is connected to the pilot and co-pilot
audio panels. Depending on other optional communications radios
installed, the VHF-FM may be connected to the COM 3, COM 4, or
COM 5 selector buttons. A label is affixed to the instrument panel
adjacent to the VHF-FM transceiver.
9-47.5 Performance
There is no change to the performance data provided in Section 5 of the POH/AFM.
The VHF-FM transceiver provides 120 operator accessible memory positions, each of
which is capable of storing a transmit frequency, receive frequency, transmit frequency
Continuous Tone-Coded Squelch System (CTCSS) tone or Digital Private Line (DPL)
code, receive frequency CTCSS tone or DPL code, and an alphanumeric identifier
for each channel. Operating frequency and other related data are presented on a 48
character, two line LED matrix display.
Data entry and function control are done via a 12 button keypad on the front panel.
Preset channels may also be scrolled and scanned using the keypad.
Data may also be entered via a PC computer with the provided software and optional
PIB-100 programming interface box. Data loading is normally accomplished on a
service bench by a qualified service facility.
2 Select VHF-FM audio on the audio panel (COM 3, COM 4, or COM 5 depending
on the specific aircraft installation).
3 Control the audio level by adjusting the MAIN and GUARD volume knobs.
4 Pressing the squelch defeat button will open both receivers to confirm they work.
a The top line will indicate the memory selected followed by a “+” if the memory
position is included in a scan list, an alphanumeric message, and the frequency
of the main receiver.
b A small “n” before the frequency indicates 12.5 kHz narrowband channel spacing
is in effect on this memory position.
d Similarly, in the transmit mode either a “TT” or “TX” is shown after the frequency.
e The bottom line indicates similar information about the guard receiver.
6 TX CTCSS tones or TX DPL codes may be programmed for the guard receiver.
10 Select the desired memory by using the M.UP and M.DN buttons, or the RCL button
and a three digit number followed by ENTER.
11 To transmit DTMF tones, use the keyboard keys while holding the PTT button on the
microphone. The keyboard returns to its normal function when the PTT is released.
12 The display shows the status of both receivers and the transmitter. The light at the
left of the top and bottom line indicates which receiver is receiving. The display also
indicates the memory channel in use and the guard channel in use. A “TX” (no
TX tone/codes programmed) or “TT” (either TX tone or code programmed) on the
right side of the display indicates whether the guard or main channel is active when
transmitting.
13 The transmit frequency is also shown. In the receive mode the display shows “RX”
beside the receive frequency if no RX tone or DPL code is programmed and “RT” if
a CTCSS tone or DPL code is programmed.
1 Press the FUNC key. The display will show the function prompt.
2 Press the PROG key. The display will show the current receive frequency with a
flashing cursor on the second digit (the first digit is always a one “1”).
3 Enter the desired receive frequency. If you type in a frequency which is not a 2.5
kHz step, the nearest valid frequency will be automatically selected.
4 The cursor will return to the second digit. You can now retype the frequency if you
made an error or press ENTER to continue.
5 The transmit frequency will be displayed with the cursor on the second digit. Follow
the same methods as in Step 3 and Step 4.
6 The channel spacing increment of either 25.0 or 12.5 kHz is now displayed. Use the
M.UP and M.DN keys to elect the desired channel spacing for the memory position,
and then press ENTER.
7 The alphanumeric title is now displayed. Use the M.UP and M.DN keys to scroll
through the alphabet, numbers and symbols. When the desired character is
displayed, press ENTER to advance to the next character. To backspace, press “1”.
8 Keep repeating Step 7 until the last space is set. The display will show SCAN or
LOCKOUT to enable this memory position as part of the scan list or to lock it out
of the scan list. Use the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 keys to add the channel to the corresponding
scan list or press M.DN to clear the channel from all scan lists (for more details refer
to Para 9-47.7.4).
9 Once the desired condition has been selected, press ENTER. The transceiver’s
display will later show a “+” beside the memory channel number if scan is enabled.
10 The display will now show the current memory number. Type in a 3-digit number of
the memory you want to save to (if different from displayed one), and press ENTER.
11 You now have the option to program the guard frequencies by pressing FUNC, or
press ENTER to return to normal operating mode.
12 If you pressed FUNC to program the guards, Guard“1” transmit frequency will be
displayed with the flashing cursor on the second digit. Enter the frequencies for
Guard“1” receive/transmit and Guard”2” receive/transmit as in Step 3 and Step 4.
13 The alphanumeric label for Guard“1” and Guard“2” are entered the same as in
Step 7 and Step 8. When the last character is entered, the radio returns to normal
operating mode.
14 If the guard I to be programmed for 12.5 kHz narrowband operation, it can be quickly
coped to GD1 or GD2 memory positions. Refer to Para 9-47.7.10.
The priority memory channel is always memory position number 1. The priority memory
channel is scanned every other step (i.e. 121314151...), to ensure that no incoming
messages are missed. The priority channel can be locked out, which will result in the
normal scanning of the other memory positions.
Selective memory scanning allows the user to select which of the 120 memory channels
are to be scanned or locked out when the scan function is invoked. To use this feature,
follow the Programming Instructions in Para 9-47.7.3. When the screen displays SCAN
or LOCKOUT, use the 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 key to add the channel to the corresponding scan
list or lists. The M.DN key acts as a clear button removing the channel from all scan
lists and displaying LOCKOUT. Press ENTER when selections are complete. In normal
operating mode the display will later show a “+” beside the memory channel number if
it has been included in any of the 5 scan lists.
9-47.7.5 Scanning
To start scanning of the memory channels:
1 Press FUNC
2 Press SCAN
The radio will scan through all the preset memory positions in the selected scan list and
will stop at the first active channel in the scan sequence. It will remain on the channel
until the channel becomes inactive.
To exit the scan mode, press the SCAN key to revert back to the normal operating mode.
2 During communications, the 5 second timer is reset from the last RX or TX signal
experienced.
The radio resumes scanning once the RX or TX activity has ceased for more than 5
seconds. The SCAN key must be pressed to exit the scan mode.
1 Press FUNC
NOTE
After FUNC and “1” are entered, the LED display will show memory
channel “000” and then the remaining digits in the desired frequency
are shown as they are entered. No alphanumeric message can be
entered in this mode.
3 Operation on the new frequency is simplex (same frequency on both the transmitter
and the receiver), and no DPL or CRCSS codes are possible.
1 Press the UP or DN keys to increase or decrease the intensity of the LED display.
Once maximum intensity of the display is achieved, the UP key no longer functions.
Conversely, once minimum intensity is reached, the DN key ceases to function.
Press the FUNC then the M.UP key. Use the M.UP and M.DN keys to select 90 SEC,
which enables the feature, or NONE, which disables it.
1 Select the memory position whose contents you desire to download to a guard
memory.
The guard memory channel will now contain all the same information as the selected
memory position.
1 Use the M.UP and M.DN keys to elect the memory channel that you want to assign
a CTCSS tone or DPL code.
2 Press the FUNC key then the TONE key. The display will show “RX TONE:” and the
current tone number, as well as the tone frequency in Hz.
3 Use the M.UP and M.DN keys to select the tone number you require. Table 9-47-1
lists the available CTCSS tones.
NOTE
* indicates non-standard tones.
6 Press ENTER. “G2 TONE” appears on the display. Repeat Step 3 and press
ENTER.
7 The display will next show “RX DPL:” and the current 3-digit DPL code. If no DPL
code is required “000” should be entered. If a DPL code is to be programmed a
CTCSS tone should not be enabled.
8 Use the keypad to enter the required octal 3-digit DPL (Digital Coded Squelch or
DCS) code. Table 9-47-2 lists all usable and unique octal 3-digit DPL/DCS codes.
NOTE
* indicates GE Digital Coded Squelch (DCS) Code
11 Press ENTER. “G2 DPL” appears on the display. Repeat Step 8 and press ENTER.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 48
S.O.O. 6302
Sections 9-48.1, 9-48.2, 9-48.3, 9-48.4 and 9-48.5 are Civil Aviation Administration
of China (CAAC) approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual
Supplement. Compliance with Section 9-48.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other
Sections are not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Henry Wong
Regional Engineer
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-48.5 Performance......................................................................... 18
9-48.5.1 General ............................................................................. 18
9-48.1 General
9-48.1.1 Scope
This supplement has been developed for use on aircraft operating under the Civil
Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) Type Certificate, incorporating S.O.O. 6302.
It is valid only for aircraft registered under CAAC jurisdiction in the People’s Republic of
China.
9-48.2 Limitations
9-48.2.1 General
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the POH/AFM apply when S.O.O.
6302 is installed. The following additional limitations apply.
9-48.2.2 Fuel
In addition to the approved fuels listed in the POH/AFM Section 2.4.4 Fuel Specifications
and Limitations, the following fuels can be used:
NOTE
Use of No. 3 Jet Fuel is subject to the restrictions specified in Pratt &
Whitney Canada Service Bulletin (SB) No. 1244.
9-48.2.3 Placards
The following Chinese Placards replace the standard placards as shown in
Para 9-48.2.3.1 and Para 9-48.2.3.2.
E. Lift Label
F. Pull Label
G. Remove This Cover, Pull Handle Down, Push Window Out Label
E. No. 3 Jet Fuel Label (Wing Tip Tanks) with S.O.O. 6247
9-48.5 Performance
9-48.5.1 General
There is no change to the performance provided in Section 5 of the POH/AFM.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 50
PHASE 2 AVIONICS UPGRADE
Viking DHC-6 Series 400 (Twin Otter) aircraft (Serial Numbers 845 and subsequent) are
eligible for this supplement when modified with the following:
(1) MOD 6/2303 Honeywell Apex Avionics Upgrade (Phase 2A) consisting of
Integrated Primary Flight Displays (IPFD’s), Flight Director,
and 512 Word FDR ARINC 717 Apex outputs.
(2) MOD 6/2304 SBAS GPS Receivers.
(3) MOD 6/2354 ADS-B Out Transponder Upgrade.
(4) MOD 6/2332 512 Word FDR.
Sections 9-50.1, 9-50.2, 9-50.3, 9-50.4 and 9-50.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-50.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are
not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
.
TC Approved
DHC-6 SERIES 400
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-50.7.12.19 ON .............................................................................133
9-50.7.12.20 ALT (Altitude) ................................................................133
9-50.7.13 Flap 10 Normal Landing .....................................................134
9-50-13 Pitch Trim Disable Switch (located on Pilot’s Switch Panel) ..............110
9-50-14 Apex Visual and Aural Annunciation ..........................................111
9-50-15 Left Control Wheel AFCS Switches (Right Side Opposite) ...............118
9-50-16 PITCH TRIM Switch ..............................................................119
9-50-17 SVS (SmartView) PFD Presentation ..........................................120
9-50-18 Vertical Situation Display (VSD) ...............................................122
9-50-19 KXP 2290 / KXP 2290A XPDR Tuning Sub-Window ......................127
9-50-20 ADS-B OUT ON / OFF Control .................................................129
9-50-21 XPDR Detail Window with TCAS I or TCAS II...............................129
9-50-22 Traffic Detail Window with TCAS I .............................................130
9-50-23 Traffic Detail with TCAS II .......................................................130
9-50-24 KMC 2210 PFD Controller (Partial) ...........................................131
9-50-25 KDU 1080 Display Unit Bezel Soft Keys .....................................131
9-50-26 KMC 2220 Multi-Function Controller (MFC) .................................132
9-50.1 General
9-50.1.1 Introduction
In this document, any reference to the DHC-6 Series 400 Aircraft Flight Manual (AFM)
is intended to mean VAL document PSM 1-64-1A, Revision 2 (or later Transport
Canada Civil Aviation [TCCA] approved revision). Any reference to the Series 400
Pilots Operating Handbook (POH) is intended to mean VAL document PSM 1-64-POH,
Revision 2 (or later VAL released revision). Reference to these documents is intended
to include any applicable, approved Temporary Amendments to the TCCA approved
AFM and any applicable, approved Temporary Revisions to the POH.
This document is organized so that major sections in the document correspond to the
same major sections in the Series 400 POH/AFM.
Primus® and Apex are trademarks of Honeywell (whether registered or not, and whether
shown with ® or TM symbols) and are used with Honeywell’s permission for the purpose
of supporting the DHC-6 Series 400 Phase 2 Upgrade program.
LP Localizer Performance
LPV Localizer Performance with Vertical Guidance
LRU Line Replaceable Unit
LSA Low Speed Awareness
MAP Missed Approach Point
MAU Modular Avionics Unit
MAWP Missed Approach Waypoint
MEH Minimum Engage Height
MFD Multi-Function Display
MMDR Multi-Mode Digital Radio
MLS Microwave Landing System
MOD or Mod Modification
MSS Meggitt Safety System
MUH Minimum Use Height
NAV or Nav Navigation, Navigation Source or
Navigation Mode (Flight Director)
(Note: Depending on context)
NDB Non-Directional Beacon
OAT Outside Air Temperature
PFD Primary Flight Display
PIT Pitch Mode (Flight Director)
POH Pilot’s Operating Handbook
QNH Barometric pressure adjusted to sea level
QRH Quick Reference Handbook
RA Resolution Advisory
RAD ALT Radar Altimeter
RF Radius to Fix
RNAV Area Navigation
9-50.1.2 Scope
As part of Phase 2 Avionics Upgrade, VAL has introduced a number of avionics
functionality upgrades and improvements for the DHC-6 Series 400 (Twin Otter).
This Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) / Pilots Operating Handbook (POH)
Supplement is provided for the upgrades implemented as part of the initial Phase 2
certification. This AFM/POH supplement is to be used in conjunction with the following
Honeywell publications:
Viking DHC-6 Series 400 (Twin Otter) aircraft (Serial Numbers 845 and subsequent)
are eligible for the modifications described in this Flight Manual Supplement.
The following subsections provide additional brief descriptions of the avionics upgrades
covered by this supplement. Additional, more detailed systems level information is
provided in Para 9-50.7, System Description.
These improvements enhance the images presented on both PFD’s to provide a more
representative aspect ratio from the pilot’s eye point.
IPFD combines traditional PFD and HSI displays into one window, allowing the attitude
display to continue behind the HSI. The aspect ratio of the IPFD presents a pitch range
of approximately +15 to –20 degrees, relative to the aircraft’s current attitude.
9-50.1.4.5 TCAS II
The TCAS II is an on-board collision avoidance and traffic situation display system with
computer processing to identify and display potential and predicted collision targets,
and issue vertical resolution advisories (RA’s) on the pilot’s and co-pilot’s ADI. It is
considered a backup system to the “SEE AND AVOID” concept and ATC surveillance.
The TCAS II system can determine the relative altitude, range and bearing to any
Transponder Mode C or Mode S equipped aircraft with altitude reporting. With this
information the TCAS II system will determine the level of advisory as either a Traffic
Advisory (TA) or a Resolution Advisory (RA).
Phase 2 enables Resolution Advisory functionality for those operators that have
incorporated S.O.O. 6219. This provides the ability to present a resolution advisory
to pilots through aural and visual commands to avoid potential collision with another
aircraft.
Using the databases, along with GPS and ADAHRS information, the FMS calculates
and displays navigational and flight planning information to the flight crew. The
navigation database is commercially produced and updated on a 28 day cycle.
Phase 2 includes the option for a second Flight Management System (FMS), providing
dual FMS functionality.
Phase 2 includes provision for optional SBAS GPS approach capability to allow
SBAS-based GPS approaches such as LPV approaches. This capability is optional
and requires replacement of GPS receivers for aircraft without Mod 6/2304.
Phase 2 production aircraft are equipped with Honeywell Mode S transponders per
Mod 6/2354 that are upgraded for ADS-B out functionality. ADS-B out functionality,
however, is enabled through an option on Primus Apex per S.O.O. 6347.
Supplementary performance data associated with certain types of commuter and other
commercial operations is provided in Supplement 37, Supplemental Performance Data.
For such operations, compliance with the associated conditions, including flaps, under
which Supplement 37 landing distance is established continue to apply.
9-50.1.5 Compatibility
The following general compatibility statements are applicable to the Phase 2
modifications covered by this supplement (for specific configuration limitations, refer
to Para 9-50.2 Limitations):
1 The modifications are compatible for use with Phase 1 aircraft equipped with dual
Meggitt Safety Systems (MSS) Data Acquisition Units (DAU’s).
2 The modifications are compatible for use with aircraft incorporating the Alternate
Apex Engine Instrumentation Display Colours under S.O.O. 6280 (refer to
Supplement 53, Alternate Engine Display Colours).
3 Aircraft can have only one of TCAS I or TCAS II (S.O.O. 6219) installed.
4 Phase 1 aircraft are not eligible for any of the Phase 2 options unless Mod 6/2303
is installed.
5 The modifications are compatible with aircraft equipped with the standalone L-3
Avionics GH-3100 Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS) approved in Phase
1 or the new L-3 GH-3900.2 ESIS installed per Mod 6/2170 approved in parallel
with initial Phase 2 certification. Neither ESIS installation is eligible for navigation
interfacing with Apex at this time.
6 The gear configurations listed below are compatible with Flight Director (Mod
6/2303) and Autopilot (S.O.O. 6221) provided that the aircraft is operating up to
12,500 pounds and within the approved Weight and Balance envelope:
9-50.2 Limitations
Compliance with limitations is mandatory. The limitations contained in this supplement
supersede the Approved Flight Manual only in those areas listed. For limitations not
contained in this supplement consult the Approved Flight Manual or any other applicable
Flight Manual Supplements.
1 Phase 2 Mod 6/2303 must be incorporated and is a prerequisite for all Phase 2
modifications and options.
2 ADS-B Out Transponder Upgrade (Mod 6/2354) and installation of SBAS GPS
Receivers (Mod 6/2304) are prerequisites to enabling ADS-B functionality (S.O.O.
6347).
NOTE
Both installed GPS receivers must be SBAS receivers (Mod 6/2304).
5 Deleted
The Primus Apex system must utilize Software Load 4.4 indicated by Top Level System
Part Number EB60002734-0104 displayed in the System Config ID Window.
The following Honeywell Primus Apex Pilot Guides must be onboard the aircraft and
available to the flight crew:
1 Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System Common Build Loads 4.2, 4.4, 4.6 Pilot’s
Guide, Honeywell International Inc. Publication Number D201402000099, Revision
1, July 2015 or later applicable approved revision for Load 4.4.
2 Viking DHC-6 Twin Otter Series 400 (Load 4.4) Supplement to Primus Apex®
Integrated Avionics System Common Build Pilot’s Guide, Publication No. D2014020
00099 Pilot’s Guide, Honeywell International Inc. Publication No. D201101000016,
Revision 2, July 2015 or later applicable approved revision for Load 4.4.
1 FD operation is approved for Flaps 0, 10 and 20, and during transition between
these flap settings. FD operation at Flaps 37 is approved for enroute and terminal
operations. FD operation is prohibited for flap settings greater than 20 degrees on
approach.
2 AP operation is approved for Flaps 0 and 10 and for transitions between these flap
settings. AP operation at flap settings greater than 10 degrees is prohibited. YD
operation is approved for all flap settings.
4 The Minimum Engage Height (MEH) for the AP is 400 feet Above Ground Level
(AGL).
6 The Minimum Use Height (MUH) for the AP is 200 feet AGL during approach and
enroute operations.
7 During AP operations, one pilot must be seated in a flight crew seat at the flight
controls with seat belt and shoulder harness fastened.
9 During normal operations, overpowering the AP in the pitch and roll axes is
prohibited.
10 AP and YD are approved for Flight in Known Icing (FIKI) conditions that are within
the certified capabilities of the aircraft’s installed and serviceable ice protection
system (refer to Supplement 1, De-icing System). All Supplement 1 FIKI limitations
are applicable to FIKI with AP and YD engaged.
SVS function is not available unless the Honeywell MK VI EGPWS is installed and
operating.
A valid and compatible Honeywell Terrain DB (database) must be installed in the MAU.
The terrain, obstacle, and airport databases have the following areas of coverage:
1 The terrain database has an area of coverage limited to North 75 degrees latitude
to South 60 degrees latitude in all longitudes.
2 The worldwide obstacle database is limited to reported obstacles taller than 200
feet (approximately 100,000 obstacles). Newer and/or unreported obstacles may
not be contained in the currently loaded database.
3 The airport database has a worldwide area coverage limited to airports with runways
longer than 2,000 feet (approximately 8,600 airports and 30,000 runways).
Below transition altitude or level, the altimeter setting must be set to QNH for the use
of VSD.
VSD presentation is based on the current aircraft barometric altitude and is not
temperature compensated. As such, a current altimeter setting must be used and
indications will be subject to all traditional altimetry errors as well as VSD presentation
errors.
When FMS waypoints have been temperature compensated by the FMS Temperature
Compensation Function (refer to Para 9-50.4.6.3), the VSD displays the waypoints and
calculated flight path profile based on the temperature compensated waypoint altitudes.
9-50.2.3.5 TCAS II
The following limitations are applicable to aircraft with TCAS II installed and Resolution
Advisories (RA’s) enabled:
1 Pilots are authorized to deviate from their current ATC clearance only to the extent
necessary to comply with a TCAS II resolution advisory (RA).
2 Only RA’s configured to display on the Apex PFD’s utilizing ADI Pitch Target
Symbology are approved for use on the Series 400.
1 Aeronautical Databases:
Maximum predicted
RAIM outage is 5
minutes.
Missed approach is
required if GNSS
navigation becomes
unavailable.
Maximum predicted
RAIM outage is 5
minutes.
1 The DHC-6 Series 400 with single or dual FMS’s meets equipment and aircraft
level design / certification requirements for a variety of FMS / GPS – based enroute
and terminal navigation, and approaches, as noted in this supplement and in the
POH/AFM. This does not constitute an operational approval.
3 When flying an RNAV (GPS) approach with LPV minima and annunciation, “LPV”
must be annunciated on the PFD prior to the Final Approach Waypoint and no
navigation flags are visible.
4 The Apex FMS must incorporate the current update cycle. The pilot must verify
approach waypoints for accuracy by reference to current publications.
5 The Apex FMS is approved for FMS VFR approaches as a pilot aid only.
8 When using advisory VNAV, the altimeter on each pilot's instrument panel must
be used as the primary altitude reference for all operations. When the altimeter is
adjusted to display height above ground (QFE) rather than height above sea level,
VNAV must not be used. VNAV information is advisory only.
9 Accomplishment of the final approach segment of ILS, LOC, LOC-BC, LDA, and
SDF approaches using the FMS for guidance is prohibited.
WARNING
10 The FMS can only be used for approach guidance if the reference coordinate datum
system for the instrument approach is WGS-84 or NAD-83.
11 The use of the FMS to perform RNAV operations in the designated European
airspace is limited as follows:
12 Other approved navigational equipment (for example, VOR, ADF, etc.) must be
installed appropriate for the operational requirements.
13 The FMS must be checked for accuracy prior to use as a means of supplemental
navigation following a period of position uncertainty, dead reckoning or when
crosscheck with other onboard approved equipment reveals an error greater than
2 nautical miles. The aircraft position should be verified by visual sighting ground
reference points and/or available VOR, DME, NDB equipment.
14 When flying an FMS approach to MDA minimums the advisory vertical guidance
will not command a level off at minimums but will continue to direct a descent below
MDA. The pilot must anticipate the requirement to level off at MDA by commencing
the level off just prior to reaching MDA. The aircraft must not be permitted to descend
below MDA until the decision to land has been made.
15 FMS flight planning parameters, including fuel display parameters and estimated
time enroute, are advisory only. The fuel quantity displayed in the fuel window
of the system display (the fuel quantity that is measured by the Fuel Quantity
Gauging System) must be used for fuel quantity determination range planning, and
decision-making.
16 RNAV (GPS) approaches with Localizer Performance (LP) minima are prohibited.
Table 9-50-3 Required Equipment for Compliance with FAR 91.227 and AMC 20-24
Number Number
Interfaced Equipment
Installed Required
Air Data – Dual Channel ADAHRS 1 1
GPS SBAS Position Sources 2 1
Mode S Transponders 2 1
Apex with Load 4.4 or later software only complies with FAR 91.227 and AMC 20-24
for ADS-B Out when all required functions are operational. When the system is
not operational, the ADS-B Out status annunciator will indicate the failure on the
transponder tuning window.
A. Primary Control Servo Circuit Breaker (Avionics CB Panel, Position P1) and the Trim
System Circuit Breaker (Position N1)
For procedures that include a CB reset, if the system failure is not cleared after one
(1) CB reset attempt, consider the system unavailable for the remainder of flight until
maintenance actions can be carried out. If required, the system CB should be pulled to
remove erroneous indications.
Indications are explained for each Emergency and Abnormal scenarios in Section 3
of the POH/AFM that involves a power loss or failure resulting in engine shutdown.
Engine and propeller related emergencies and abnormalities include the following:
ACTION
2 Manually fly aircraft and follow applicable procedure(s) in Section 3 of the POH/AFM.
3 Re-trim as required.
NOTE
The autopilot has limited authority to counter the effects of asymmetric
power often associated with an engine or propeller related emergency
or abnormal condition. If there is any doubt as to the effectiveness
of the autopilot to adequately control the aircraft, the pilot shall
disengage the autopilot and fly the aircraft manually.
NOTE
Power changes during single engine flight will require pilot application
of rudder and yaw trim to maintain coordinated flight. Consider use
of Bank Limit (BL) Mode during single engine operation in ROL and
HDG FD modes.
NOTE
AP will not maintain the optimum single engine climb technique (3 to
5° bank towards live engine, 1/2 ball slip indication). Disengage AP
and YD and fly manually if optimal single engine climb performance
is required.
1 AP or YD disengagement, as desired.
ACTION
NOTE
All AP disconnects (except for GA and TCS button press) will trigger
Apex to sound persistent “Cavalry Charge” Aural Warning which must
be silenced by press of either AP DISC control wheel button after
approximately 1.5 seconds.
1 Press either AP DISC control wheel button (both AP and YD will disengage).
NOTE
Pressing the GA button will activate ROL and GA FD modes, and will
select FMS as the active NAV source for the PFD. Desired active and
armed FD Modes and NAV SEL source must be selected.
6 Press and hold the TCS button (AP servos will disengage temporarily, until release
of the TCS button).
9 Flight Controls – Actuate with force (AP Servo clutch forces permit manual override
in all control axes).
NOTE
The persistent “Cavalry Charge” aural warning must be
acknowledged by the flight crew after 1.5 seconds with a push of the
AP DISC button on the control wheel.
ACTION
2 After approximately 1.5 seconds, press either AP DISC control wheel button to
acknowledge the disconnect and to silence the aural.
3 Investigate cause of disconnect (determine if any CAS messages [e.g. -AP 1 Fail-]
open CB’s indicate system failures).
IF AP RE-ENGAGEMENT IS DESIRED:
7 Engage AP.
NOTE
Causes for AP automatic disengage include:
ACTION
1 Press either Green GA control wheel button (AP and YD will disconnect).
NOTE
Advance power lever to the torque, T5 or NG limit, whichever is
reached first.
NOTE
FD guidance will not command or maintain the optimum single
engine climb technique (3 to 5° bank towards live engine, 1/2 ball slip
indication). If optimal single engine climb performance is required,
the pilot must fly manually and disregard FD commands.
5 Follow One Engine Inoperative Missed Approach (Flap 10) procedure from Section
3.9.2 of the POH/AFM.
6 AP may be re-engaged above MEH (400 feet AGL) provided aircraft is trimmed for
one engine inoperative flight.
CAUTION
CAUTION
INDICATION
ACTION
1 Confirm valid data for the desired mode is available to the FD.
3 FD – Deactivate
CAUTION
CAUTION
Presentation of any of the ‘AP Hold’ CAS messages in Table 9-50-4 indicates that
AP disconnect may occur due to excessive servo torque, or other situations trending
beyond the capabilities of the AP.
NOTE
During periods of normal aircraft acceleration / deceleration and
/ or flap position change and / or during large power changes,
transient -AP Hold Nose UP- or -AP Hold Nose DN- messages
are presented (generally less than two [2] seconds). Under normal
operational conditions, the AP and the Automatic Pitch Trim System
will resolve the underlying conditions causing the CAS message and
the message will disappear.
ACTION
2 Disconnect AP utilizing either control wheel AP DISC button while holding control
inputs as per CAS message (e.g. if -AP Hold Nose UP- message is posted, pilot
should hold nose up pressure on the control yoke while disconnecting AP to avoid
a nose down aircraft response after servos disengage).
ACTION
NOTE
AP servo runaways will disengage the AP. AP should not be used
until problem can be diagnosed and rectified.
ACTION
INDICATION
ACTION
CAUTION
2 The rate of ice accretion is such that cruising speed at a constant power setting
is reduced by more than 10 KIAS with all installed and functioning de-ice systems
operating.
ACTION
1 AP – Disengage
NOTE
Use of AP may be resumed after icing conditions have been exited
and airframe is free of ice.
Use of the AP, YD, and electric pitch trim systems is beneficial
to reduce cockpit workload during abnormal and emergency
procedures.
At the pilot’s discretion, the AP, YD, and electrical pitch trim systems
may be turned off to offer slightly increased time available before the
main aircraft battery capacity is completely depleted.
The following procedure will turn off the AP, YD, and electric pitch trim when the flight
crew needs to further reduce the electrical power load for Group 2 Items in Section
3.14.8, Electrical Load Shedding Procedure, of the POH/AFM.
ACTION
3 Confirm on the Flight Controller that YD and AP annunciations are not illuminated.
4 PITCH TRIM switch – Select DISABLE to turn off the Electric Pitch Trim
5 Fly aircraft manually, control pitch trim through mechanical pitch trim wheel.
NOTE
If AP is installed and any power interruption has occurred prior to
completion of the MAU's internal self-test at initial power-up, -AP 1
Fail- may persist longer than 2 minutes. If this occurs, an OFF/ON
cycle of the master power is required to allow the MAU to reboot
without power interruptions.
NOTE
If AP is installed and any power interruption has occurred prior to
completion of the MAU's internal self-test at initial power-up, -YD 1
Fail- may persist longer than 2 minutes. If this occurs, an OFF/ON
cycle of the master power is required to allow the MAU to reboot
without power interruptions.
1 AP and FD normal functionality cannot be assured for the remainder of flight. Use
of AP and FD is at pilot’s discretion.
NOTE
SVS may require approximately two (2) minutes to recover after AGM
processor or valid interfaced data interruptions (e.g. GPS).
NOTE
Certain SVS failures may be temporary in nature due to failure or
reduced integrity of GPS information, Geometric Altitude input from
EGPWS failure, radar altimeter failure, display refresh rate issue,
PFD reversion (PFD composite mode) selected, etc.
ACTION
1 No action is required – SVS may remain selected for overlay on PFD and SVS
functionality may be automatically returned in a few minutes depending on the
source of the failure. While SVS failed, the PFD will automatically revert to the IPFD
presentation.
CAUTION
INDICATION
1 Abnormal or misleading VSD indications are presented that are inconsistent with
aircraft altitude and position determined by primary barometric altimeter and position
sources.
ACTION
1 -TCAS Fail- CAS message or TCAS FAIL annunciation on the PFD and MFD.
ACTION
1 Deselect and reselect TCAS display on the PFD and/or on the MFD.
2 Pull and reset the TCAS circuit breaker (position H5) to reset the TCAS processor.
3 Verify proper operation of all interfaced equipment required for TCAS operation and
resolve any failures (e.g. Transponder, ADAHRS or Radar Altimeter).
NOTE
A TCAS Fail will be presented when ADAHRS track source is GPS
and ground speed is less than 7 knots. When ground speed exceeds
7 knots the TCAS will automatically return to normal operation.
NOTE
Unless individual traffic targets indicated by TCAS system can be
visually confirmed as anomalous, all TA and RA information should
be treated as valid.
ACTION
1 Pull and reset TCAS circuit breaker (position H5) to reset the TCAS II processor
and clear the abnormalities.
3 Disable TCAS system by pulling circuit breaker (position H5) for remainder of flight.
ACTION
1 Press XPDR soft key on PFD or XPDR button on Multifunction Controller (MFC).
3 Press XPDR SEL soft key on PFD to select alternate XPDR for use.
ACTION
1 Select the functioning FMS as the navigation source for display on the affected PFD.
3 Verify flight plan and waypoints are complete and correct in functioning FMS.
ACTION
1 Select alternate means of navigation appropriate for the route and phase of flight.
2 CDI display remains white on uncoupled side when course is armed or active
instead of cyan and magenta respectively.
ACTION
2 Verify flight plan and waypoints are complete and correct in synchronized FMS’s.
3 Select alternate means of navigation appropriate for the route and phase of flight.
NOTE
When both FMS’s are operational the custom database is
automatically synchronized between the FMS’s. If changes
are made to the custom database when only one FMS is
operational or the FMS’s are unsynchronized, and the second FMS
subsequently becomes operational, the custom databases must
be manually synchronized. Refer to the Honeywell Primus Apex®
Integrated Avionics System Common Build Pilot’s Guide (refer to
Para 9-50.2.3.1) for additional information.
NOTE
Primus Apex is a GPS-based FMS. The FMS does not use blended
position sensor solutions for any operations. Rather, the GPS with
the best horizontal and vertical navigation solution is utilized as the
navigation source for any operations requiring FMS navigation and
approaches.
-DGRD- displayed on the attitude indicator and/or -UNABLE RNP- displayed in the FMS
message window when FMS accuracy cannot be assured due to the GPS Estimated
Position Uncertainty (EPU) being greater than the required RNP for that particular
phase of flight.
ACTION
When continuing to use FMS enroute navigation, position is to be verified every fifteen
minutes using another appropriate approved navigation system.
NOTE
GPS navigation accuracy can degrade for a number of reasons
related to the GPS satellites as well as to GPS receiver faults.
Refer to Table 9-50-7 in Section 4 and the Honeywell Primus Apex®
Integrated Avionics System Common Build Pilot’s Guide (refer to
Para 9-50.2.3.1) for additional information on integrity / degrade
annunciations.
-DR- is displayed on the attitude indicator when a valid GPS position solution is
unavailable. The FMS uses the GPS sensors to determine aircraft position. When
position information from the GPS sensors is lost during flight, the FMS reverts to using
heading and airspeed data from the ADAHRS to calculate position based on dead
reckoning from the last known GPS position.
ACTION
INDICATION
ACTION
INDICATION
1 -LPV UNVL- displays on PFD replacing -LPV- under the FD vertical mode display.
This has occurred after -APP- indication was displayed on the PFD within 2 NM of
the FAWP or FAF (but is no longer displayed).
2 The vertical and/or lateral deviation pointers are replaced with a red X, as shown in
Figure 9-50-3 and Figure 9-50-4.
ACTION
1 Do not descend.
NOTE
The red X continues to be displayed until a go-around is completed
or an alternate approach is reloaded.
INDICATION
-MS-LPV MISCOMPARE- – Displayed after transmitting the FAS DB for at most five
times and the GPS receiver is in SBAS PA mode but the FMS compares the FMS
Channel ID for the approach with the GPS Channel ID and are not a match.
-PREDICT LPV UNAVAIL- – Displayed if no alternate valid GPS sensor is available for
SBAS operations and the SBAS 5 minute look ahead predicts inadequate geometry to
complete the approach when the aircraft is within 3 NM of the FAWP or FAF.
-SBAS APPR LOAD FAIL- – When after transmitting the FAS DB for, at most, 5 times
and the GPS receiver signals the FAS DB did not load successfully.
-NO POSITION SENSORS- – Displayed when the following conditions are satisfied:
The aircraft is airborne; no sensors are being used as a position reference source (the
navigation mode is dead reckoning or no navigation); and Heading and/or TAS are
invalid (the last known position can no longer be integrated by the FMS).
ACTION
1 CAS Messages such as -XPDR 1 Fail-, -XPDR 2 Fail-, -ADC A Fail-, -ADC B Fail-,
-GPS 1 Fail-, -GPS 2 Fail- or -Unable FMS-GPS MON-.
2 The ADS-B Out status displayed in amber indicates ADS-B Out is failed.
3 When the ADS-B Out status is not displayed, ADS-B Out is disabled by Apex
configuration option, or the XPDR indicates ADS-B Out is selected off, or the XPDR
is failed.
NOTE
The loss of an interfaced input to the Honeywell KXP 2290A Mode S
transponder may cause the transponder to stop transmitting ADS-B
Out data. Depending on the nature of the fault or failure, the KXP
2290A may no longer be transmitting all of the required data in the
ADS-B Out messages.
ACTION
1 Confirm ADS-B Out is enabled on XPDR detail window for active transponder.
a Press XPDR soft key on PFD or XPDR button on Multifunction Controller (MFC).
2 Verify proper operation of all interfaced equipment and resolve any failures (e.g.
Transponder, ADAHRS or GPS).
a Press XPDR soft key on PFD or XPDR button on Multifunction Controller (MFC).
c Press XPDR SEL soft key on PFD to select alternate XPDR for use.
1 During approach to landing, the aural alert “Too Low Flaps” comes on.
ACTION
3 If TAWS is selected for PFD overlay, FLAP OVRD annunciation will also be displayed
to the left of the HSI.
NOTE
The TAWS Mode 4B aural alert “Too Low Flaps” is not annunciated
until penetration of an altitude below 170 feet AGL, which allows
insufficient time for flaps to travel to an increased setting prior to
landing.
references to the applicable section in the POH/AFM or this supplement are provided
in the “Actions or Remarks” column.
For other Apex CAS messages, refer to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated
Avionics System Common Build Pilot’s Guide and the Viking DHC-6 Twin Otter Series
400 Supplement to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System Common
Build Pilot’s Guide (refer to Para 9-50.2.3.1).
For a complete explanation of the system details affecting operational practices, refer to
Para 9-50.7 and to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System Common
Build Pilot’s Guide and the Viking DHC-6 Twin Otter Series 400 Supplement to the
Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System Common Build Pilot’s Guide (refer
to Para 9-50.2.3.1).
NOTE
For two-crew operations, the following checks apply to buttons on
both control wheels.
1 Pitch Trim switch – NORMAL, confirm -AP 1 Fail- CAS message not present.
2 Control wheel trim selector – Hold UP or DN (both halves), confirm trim wheel
travels appropriately.
5 Pitch Trim switch – Select DISABLE, confirm that trim wheel stops and -AP 1 Fail-
CAS message is displayed.
7 Pitch Trim switch – NORMAL, confirm -AP 1 Fail- CAS message disappears.
AP DISC check:
FD check:
2 Select FD – OFF
2 GA button – Press
NOTE
GA provides pitch target (+9°) and ROL mode for wings level.
Activation of GA mode will also automatically select FMS as the
navigation source on the coupled PFD.
3 NAV SEL – Select PFD navigation source as required for initial routing and/or
desired FD lateral mode on Flight Controller.
CAUTION
NOTE
Selections made on the Flight Controller do not guarantee activation
of a mode, confirmation of active and armed modes must be
accomplished by checking the PFD annunciations (e.g. pressing
SPD mode within 200 feet of selected altitude will not activate SPD
mode).
2 FD modes are armed and activated using buttons on the FC and control wheel.
Individual FD lateral and vertical modes can be used as appropriate for various
phases of flight.
NOTE
FD Modes listed above can be selected based on the needs of the
phase of flight.
CAUTION
1 Identify underlying cause of reversion. If reversion is due to invalid data source then
resolve problem prior to re-selecting affected modes on FC.
3 Confirm which active and armed Vertical and Lateral Modes are annunciated on
PFD.
4 Select Desired Vertical and Lateral Mode(s) on FC and confirm active/armed status
on PFD.
2 Manually control the aircraft to the desired attitude and flight path.
CAUTION
CAUTION
CAUTION
CAUTION
5 Upon reaching safe altitude select desired lateral and vertical modes.
Ensure the aircraft is properly in trim before engaging the autopilot. Rudder trim may
be adjusted during coupled flight.
To activate AP:
To deactivate AP:
2 Manually control the aircraft to the desired attitude and flight path.
To activate YD:
To deactivate YD:
The PITCH TRIM switch must be left in the NORMAL position for normal operations.
1 Both Halves of Control Wheel PITCH TRIM rocker switches – Press and hold (UP
or DN as required).
NOTE
Activation of the manual electric pitch trim system while AP is
engaged will disengage the AP.
NOTE
SVS is a track-based representation of the outside world. When
transitioning from IMC to VMC, it is important for complete pilot
situational awareness that the pilot be cognizant of the relationship
between the aircraft heading and the aircraft track as displayed on
the PFD independently of the SVS presentation in order to facilitate
the transition from IMC to VMC and the location of the runway out
the windshield. Factors that affect the difference between aircraft
track and aircraft heading, as displayed on the PFD, include higher
crosswinds and lower speeds at the time of transition. As well,
transition at lower altitudes may also require more rapid visual
adjustment than if the transition occurs at higher altitude. Refer to
Para 9-50.7.5 for more information.
CAUTION
9-50.4.5 TCAS II
3 Press XPDR soft key on PFD or XPDR button on Multifunction Controller (MFC).
7 The test takes approximately 8 seconds to complete. During the test, traffic targets
will be depicted on the traffic displays and a RA fly to pitch target displayed on the
ADI.
8 At the end of a successful self-test, an aural “TCAS SYSTEM TEST OK” will be
heard in the crew headsets.
1 Press XPDR soft key on PFD or XPDR button on Multifunction Controller (MFC).
4 Press XPDR TCAS soft key on PFD to cycle through modes to select TA/RA.
NOTE
Reverting from TA/RA to TA mode should only be used to prevent
unnecessary RAs when intentionally operating near other aircraft
such as closely spaced parallel runways (less than 1200 feet apart).
2 Aural RA instructions.
ACTION
NOTE
TCAS II resolution advisory (RA) should be followed as soon as
possible unless the pilot considers it unsafe to do so, or unless the
pilot has information about the cause of the RA and can maintain
safe separation for example visual acquisition of, and safe separation
from, a nearby aircraft on a parallel approach.
NOTE
After deviating from an ATC clearance or instruction in response to a
TCAS II RA, notify ATC of the deviation as soon as possible.
NOTE
If a stall warning occurs during a RA maneuver, immediately abandon
the RA and execute the stall recovery procedure.
NOTE
If a climb RA is issued with the aircraft in the landing configuration,
a normal go-around should be initiated including the appropriate
power increase and configuration changes. Initiating the go-around
procedure for a climb RA does not mandate a missed approach. It
is intended to assure that the airplane is properly configured for the
expected maneuver.
In most cases, the TCAS event will be resolved with only a minor
deviation to the intended flight path and sufficient time and altitude
will exist to recover safely to the desired flight path.
CAUTION
NOTE
TComp Cold mode provides compensation between –54 degrees
Celsius and ISA.
CAUTION
CAUTION
9-50.4.7.1 Operation
Normal operating procedures are provided in Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated
Avionics System Common Build Pilot’s Guide and the Viking DHC-6 Twin Otter Series
400 Supplement to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System Common
Build Pilot’s Guide (refer to Para 9-50.2.3.1).
3 SBAS identifier for the approach must be displayed to the right of the HSI.
5 The green APP mode annunciator (on the lower PFD’s) must be displayed within 2
NM before passing the FAWP.
4 A position input (e.g., GPS or ADAHRS) that differs from the FMS position by a
predetermined distance.
Table 9-50-7 describes the annunciations that are displayed on Apex depending on the
type of approach being flown (messages displayed only in the CAS window are noted
as such). The table also provides additional important information indicating how the
FMS handles different types of approaches (e.g. LPV, LNAV, LNAV / VNAV and how
the system fails down). For additional information, refer to the Honeywell Primus Apex®
Integrated Avionics System Common Build Pilot’s Guide (refer to Para 9-50.2.3.1).
Table 9-50-7 SBAS GPS Approach and Navigation System Annunciations, CAS Messages
and Related Information
Annunciation Colour Description
VNAV White VGP mode is a vertical mode that
provides approach guidance based on
FMS barometric VNAV information as
well as GPS VNAV information (for LPV
approaches). The VNAV and LPV vertical
deviation pointers are used to display
LPV White deviation information during operation
in VGP mode. The VNAV and LPV
vertical deviation pointers are shown in
the adjoining figures.
Table 9-50-7 SBAS GPS Approach and Navigation System Annunciations, CAS Messages
and Related Information (continued)
Annunciation Colour Description
VGP Green VGP Mode Active – When VGP mode is active, -VGP- is
displayed in the vertical mode active field on the ADI. The
VGP active mode is shown in the following figure:
LPV White -LPV- is displayed in white on the PFD when armed. This
indicates that the FAS data block has been loaded from
the FMS. However, the lateral and vertical deviations on
the PFD are still driven by the FMS (or linear-based GPS
deviation information).
Table 9-50-7 SBAS GPS Approach and Navigation System Annunciations, CAS Messages
and Related Information (continued)
Annunciation Colour Description
LPV Green -LPV- is displayed in green on the PFD when active. When
LPV status is active and the aircraft is within the approach
(as indicated by a green APP indication on the PFD), the
lateral and vertical deviation information presented on the
PFD are high integrity angular deviations derived from the
SBAS-capable GPS.
Table 9-50-7 SBAS GPS Approach and Navigation System Annunciations, CAS Messages
and Related Information (continued)
Annunciation Colour Description
N/A N/A The -RNAV Minima- dropdown box on the -STAR/Landing-
page permits selection of the approach minimums. When
an RNAV approach with LPV minimums is selected, the
-RNAV Minima- dropdown box defaults to -LPV-, when
available. When a RNAV approach does not include LPV
minimums is selected, the -RNAV Minima- dropdown box
defaults to -LNAV(/VNAV)-. The approach minimum is
applicable to both LNAV and LNAV/VNAV minimums.
Table 9-50-7 SBAS GPS Approach and Navigation System Annunciations, CAS Messages
and Related Information (continued)
Annunciation Colour Description
RNP / EPU Refer to The system provides the following RNP alerts and
Alerts and Description advisories in the FMS message window and the -MSG-
Advisory annunciator in the HSI is displayed.
Messages
The message -UNABLE RNP- is displayed in the FMS
message window when EPU is greater than RNP or when
horizontal integrity limit (HIL) is greater than the integrity
limit based on the following:
Table 9-50-7 SBAS GPS Approach and Navigation System Annunciations, CAS Messages
and Related Information (continued)
Annunciation Colour Description
FMS Refer to The FMS navigation mode is displayed to the right of the
Navigation Description lateral (Lat) mode label, below the FMS label. The possible
Mode FMS navigation modes are global positioning system
(GPS), dead reckoning (DR), and No Navigation. The -DR-
annunciation is shown in the following figure:
1 Press XPDR soft key on PFD or XPDR button on Multifunction Controller (MFC).
1 Press XPDR soft key on PFD or XPDR button on Multifunction Controller (MFC).
1 Press XPDR soft key on PFD or XPDR button on Multifunction Controller (MFC).
4 Press XPDR TCAS soft key on PFD to cycle through modes to select TA/RA.
CAUTION
9-50.4.9.2 Flight ID
The Mode S Transponder transmits the Flight ID (Flight Identification) entered into
Apex. The default Flight ID populated automatically during Apex power up is the aircraft
registration. If desired, the Flight ID can be manually changed at the beginning of a
flight when the flight is being carried out using an International Air Transport Association
(IATA) flight identification number.
1 The transponder must be in GND mode as indicated in the XPDR tuning sub-
window.
3 Flt ID Field – Enter the IATA Flight ID applicable to this one flight.
ACTION
1 Confirm adequate Flaps 10 landing distance is available for the prevailing conditions.
NOTE
All DHC-6 performance landing data is based on Flaps 37. When
allowed by runway length, Flaps 10 or 20 may also be used for
normal operations. Use of Flaps 10 for IFR approaches and landings
is desirable when runway length permits. Use landing distance
factors in Table 9-50-9 for appropriate landing flap configuration.
2 Flaps – Select 10
NOTE
When landing with flaps at 10, ‘FLAP OVRD’ mode must be selected
prior to descent below 170 ft to avoid TAWS ‘Too Low – Flaps’ aural
alert.
NOTE
If TAWS is selected for PFD overlay, FLAP OVRD annunciation will
also be displayed to the left of the HSI.
5 Minimum VREF airspeed – 1.3 times stall speed as appropriate to flap angle and
weight according to the data in Table 9-50-8. Linear interpolation may be used at
weights between the weights provided.
Table 9-50-8 VREF Speeds as a Function of Flap Setting and Aircraft Weight
1.3 VS KIAS
FLAPS 12,300 lbs 11,500 lbs 10,500 lbs 9,500 lbs 8,500 lbs 7,500 lbs
(5,580 kg) (5,218 kg) (4,764 kg) (4,310 kg) (3,875 kg) (3,400 kg)
10 85 83 79 75 71 67
20 80 77 73 70 66 64
37 74 70 67 64 Not Authorized
As a sample calculation, the VREF speed for a Flaps 10 landing at 11,900 pounds
is 84 KIAS.
6 PROP Levers – Check MAX RPM (96% NP). Confirm -Reset Props CAS- message
is not present.
7 When crossing runway threshold at 50 feet AGL: Power levers – promptly move to
IDLE.
WARNING
11 Nose wheel steering lever – Use as required. Coarse application of rudder should
be used as the primary control for heading until the aircraft has decelerated to taxi
speed.
9-50.5 Performance
The performance contained in this supplement supersede the Approved Flight Manual
only in those areas listed. For performance not contained in this supplement consult
the Approved Flight Manual or any other applicable Flight Manual Supplements.
All DHC–6 Series 400 performance landing data is based on Flaps 37 per Section 5
of the basic POH/AFM. When allowed by runway length, Flaps 20 or 10 may also be
used for normal landing operations. Use of Flaps 10 for IFR approaches and landings
is desirable when runway length permits.
Table 9-50-9 provides landing distance factors appropriate for landing flap configuration.
Use the landing distance for Flaps 37 from Section 5 of the basic POH/AFM and multiply
by the applicable factor to obtain the landing distance at Flaps 10 or Flaps 20.
Table 9-50-9 Landing Distance Factors for Flap Settings other than Flaps 37
Flap Setting Landing Distance Factor
Flaps 10 Multiply landing distance for Flaps 37 by 1.8
Flaps 20 Multiply landing distance for Flaps 37 by 1.3
NOTE
Certain types of commuter operations require supplementary
performance data as provided in Supplement 37. For such
operations, use the performance data in Supplement 37 and
associated conditions.
In summary, the DHC-6 Series 400 initial Phase 2A/2A+ design changes include the
following items:
Figure 9-50-9 Circuit Breaker for Primary and Trim Servos (Avionics CB Panel) (Sheet
1 of 2)
Figure 9-50-9 Circuit Breaker for Primary and Trim Servos (Avionics CB Panel) (Sheet
2 of 2)
PSM 1-64-1A Issue 2
Page 9-50-100 08 Feb. 2017
SECTION 9-50
DHC-6 SERIES 400 PHASE 2 AVIONICS UPGRADE
Table 9-50-11 summarizes the electrical power changes and the affected buses. (Refer
to Figure 9-50-9).
Transponder control,
including for the ADS-B
functionality, is through
Apex.
Table 9-50-11 Summary of Electric Power Changes for Phase 2 Modifications (continued)
Description Bus Circuit Breaker Size, Remarks
Location & Label
ADS-B Out Right 28 Avionics CB Panel CBP-B Refer to No. 1
Transponder VDC Position G4 Transponder remarks.
Upgrade
5 Amperes Each
No. 2 Transponder
Label: XPDR 2
L-3 Left 28 VDC Avionics CB Panel CBP-B Aircraft will be equipped
Communications Position M3 with either a 256 Word
FA2100 FDR 512 (Phase 1 certified) or
Word Flight Data 5 Amperes 512 Word FDR. Both
Recorder are powered through the
Label: FDR same aircraft circuit.
Honeywell KGS Left 28 VDC Avionics CB Panel CBP-B Non-SBAS Honeywell
200 GPS (SBAS Position J3 KGS 200 GPS receivers
Enabled) were approved in Phase
3 Amperes 1. Phase 2 brings in
No. 1 GPS upgraded SBAS enabled
Label: GPS 1 GPS receivers. CB size
and locations are not
affected.
Honeywell KGS Right 28 Avionics CB Panel CBP-B Refer to No. 1 GPS
200 GPS (SBAS VDC Position J4 remarks.
Enabled)
3 Amperes
No. 2 GPS
Label: GPS 2
L-3 Right 28 Avionics CB Panel CBP-B
Communications VDC Position M4
WX-500
Stormscope 3 Amperes
Table 9-50-11 Summary of Electric Power Changes for Phase 2 Modifications (continued)
Description Bus Circuit Breaker Size, Remarks
Location & Label
Honeywell CAS 67A Left 28 VDC Avionics CB Panel CBP-B Resolution advisory
TCAS II Position H5 (RA) functionality is
introduced in Phase 2.
5 Amperes This does not affect the
CB size or location.
Label: TCAS
Multi-Function Function- Functionality Through MFD Video Input is
Display (MFD) ality Apex planned for certification
Video Input (RIB Through after initial Phase 2
Video) Apex certification and is for the
Apex functionality only
excluding any required
video or interfacing
equipment. There is
no CB size or location
effect.
The AFCS consists of a Flight Director (FD) and an Autopilot (AP). The AFCS provides
flight guidance and AP control for vertical and lateral enroute and terminal navigation,
and for approaches. Navigation and approaches may be accomplished utilizing
short-range navigation (SRN) (such as VOR) and long-range navigation (LRN) (for
the Series 400 all LRN is based on the two GPS receivers). The FD and AP are also
capable of Category I (CAT I) approaches with an AP MUH of 200 feet AGL. The AFCS
includes an automatic pitch trim system and a Yaw Damper (YD). The AFCS functions
are integrated into Apex. The FD generates guidance commands both for PFD display
to the flight crew (during manual flight) as well as to the AP for coupled flight.
The AP only receives vertical and lateral steering commands from the FD. FD
commands are used to generate required control deflections that are actuated by
aileron, elevator and rudder servos, and automatic actuation of the electric pitch trim
system. The servos are connected to the MAU via dual Controller Area Network
(CAN) data buses. Commands received by the servo are processed within the servo
to check for agreement prior to servo action. Both servo channels must agree in their
monitoring of motor current, clutch solenoid engagement and motor position. The
servos incorporate internal electric clutch mechanisms that open when electrical power
is removed (CB open or power failure). The servo clutch settings have been configured
to allow the pilot to overpower them if required.
The AP controls the primary servos and pitch trim servo through the MAU. The FD
generates AP commands utilizing data from the dual-channel ADAHRS, two GPS
receivers, the Flight Management System, two MMDRs, a single Flight Controller,
engine data provided to Apex through two Data Acquisition Units (DAU’s), and the
aircraft’s stall warning system. Figure 9-50-10 details a functional block diagram of the
Apex AFCS as installed on the Series 400.
Key elements of the Series 400 AFCS installation consist of the following:
1 Single 12-Slot MAU – The Primus Apex 12-Slot MAU is a hardware cabinet which
has a backplane interface, multiple module mounting locations, and conditioned
power (via power supply modules) for the plug-in modules. These modules are
field-replaceable and field-loadable. The modules are linked to the Avionics
Standard Communication Bus, Version D (ASCB-D) via the Network Interface
Controller (NIC) module.
2 Two Actuator I/O Module with Processor (AIOP) – The Actuator I/O module provides
the primary interface to the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) related
functions and other functions that require dual lane module architecture.
3 Two Aircraft Personality Module (IM-950) – Apex has small solid-state Aircraft
Personality Modules (APM’s), also known as Configuration Modules, to retain
aircraft configuration information. The AP’s are hard wired to the timing NICs but
are installed such that the AP’s remain with the aircraft when the NIC’s are removed.
a System Identifier
b Aircraft Type
5 One KMC 9200 Flight Controller (FC) / Flight Control Panel (FCP)
a AP Disengage
The following configuration considerations and limitations are related to the Series 400
AFCS implementation:
2 AP installation is an option.
3 Electric pitch trim system is provided by VAL with AP option. When installed with
AP option, pitch trim system can be operated in manual electric (trim operation
through a split trim switch on the control wheel) or automatic modes.
5 Apex FLCH or speed mode is set to give altitude priority over speed.
6 The initial Phase 2 certification envelope for the FD is Flaps 0, 10, 20 and 37 and
for the AP is Flaps 0 and 10.
The AFCS architecture operates around two parallel channels (A and B) within the
Apex Modular Avionics Unit (MAU), both channels are required to be functional for
normal AFCS operation. An AP disengage occurs if a miscompare is detected between
AP channel commands.
HDG TRK – Dual concentric rotary knobs, including momentary push-button inner
knob. Rotation of the 2 position outer knob allows selection between HDG or TRK
navigation modes. Rotation of the inner knob adjusts the bug in HDG or TRK modes.
Pressing the inner knob (PUSH SYNC) synchronizes the bug to the current HDG/TRK.
ALT – Dual concentric rotary knobs controlling the Altitude Pre-Select and alerting bug
on the altitude tape of the PFD displays. Rotation of the outer knob adjusts in 1000 ft
increments, rotation of the inner knob adjusts in 100 ft increments.
L/R – Selects which PFD (Left or Right) is used for FD coupling. At power-up, the
default setting is Left.
FD, AP, YD – Engage or disengage the Flight Director (FD) and (if installed) Autopilot
AP / Yaw Damper YD.
HDG/T, NAV, BL, VS, SPD, ALT, VNAV, APR – Engage or disengage each associated
lateral and vertical mode of the FD.
9-50.7.3.2.6 Switches
Four AFCS control wheel switches are located on the outboard side of the pilot and
co-pilot control wheels (refer to Figure 9-50-12). To accommodate AFCS switches, the
radio XMIT switch has been relocated to the forward face of the hand wheel switch
housing utilizing a different switch type from the legacy design.
1 AP disconnect switch marked AP DISC (red) (installed with AP) is located top-
centre on the hand wheel switch cluster. AP DISC is a momentary switch which
disconnects autopilot, yaw damper and the trim servo when pressed. Autopilot,
yaw damper will remain disconnected after the AP DISC switch is released.
2 Go-around switch marked G/A (green) is located on the outboard side of the hand
wheel switch cluster. G/A is a momentary switch which commands the aircraft into
a wing up pitch attitude and disengages the autopilot.
3 Touch control steering switch marked TCS (black) is located on the inboard side of
the hand wheel switch cluster. TCS temporarily disconnects flight control servos
and trim servo from the control surfaces when pressed. The system will maintain
the aircraft flight condition (attitude, heading) when the switch is released.
4 Trim switch marked TRIM DN and TRIM UP (installed with AP) is located in the
centre of the hand wheel switch cluster. The trim switch manually controls the
elevator trim servo. The switch has split controls (refer to Figure 9-50-12), trim
engage and trim direction. Both controls must be engaged to actuate the trim servo.
Activation of the trim engage switch while autopilot is engaged will disengage
autopilot.
A pitch trim disable switch marked PITCH TRIM is located on the pilot’s switch panel,
refer to Figure 9-50-13. The switch has two positions DISABLE and NORMAL. The
switch must be in the NORMAL position (down) for the autopilot to function or for
manual electronic control of the elevator trim servo. Selecting DISABLE will disconnect
autopilot as well as disabling the manual electric pitch trim.
Figure 9-50-13 Pitch Trim Disable Switch (located on Pilot’s Switch Panel)
CAUTION
3 Degradation and/or switching of source data essential to any active FD mode (i.e.
ADHRS, FMS changes, NAV SEL, LOC frequency change, etc.).
Honeywell’s Primus Apex design philosophy triggers persistent visual and aural
annunciations for all commanded and uncommanded AP disconnects. The crew can
silence the persistent AP “Cavalry Charge” aural after approximately 1.5 seconds by
pressing the “AP DISC” control wheel button again to acknowledge and stop the aural.
The exception to the above is that for Go-Around (in consideration of pilot workload),
after pressing the GA button, an aircraft logic module with a time delay automatically
sends the AP DISC signal to Apex to silence the “Cavalry Charge” aural warning after
approximately 2.5 seconds.
When an armed FD mode captures, the new mode is annunciated on the PFD,
displacing the previously active mode and flashing in reverse video for five (5) seconds.
be armed, depending on phase of flight. Active and Armed FD modes (when valid) are
displayed on the upper middle portion of the PFDs (refer to Para 9-50.7.3.3.1).
Armed FD modes will only activate if their individual capture criteria have been met.
FD commands are displayed in magenta on the Primary Flight Displays (PFDs), using
one of 3 command bar presentations:
1 Single Cue
2 Cross Pointer
3 Flight Path Indicator (available only if SVS option is enabled and selected)
Heading Mode (HDG) or Track Mode (TRK) – Maintains the heading or track at the
bug setting.
Navigation Mode (NAV) – Intercept and follow the active lateral navigation source on
the selected PFD (VOR, LOC or FMS). If requirements for intercepting the active leg
have not been met upon initiation of NAV mode, HDG (or TRK) will become active, and
the ‘bug’ should be used to facilitate the intercept.
Bank Limit Mode (BL) – Limits bank to 17°. A magenta arc is displayed on both ADI
roll scales when selected. The BL mode is only available in HDG or TRK mode. BL
is not automatically activated within the Series 400’s flight envelope up to the certified
maximum operating altitude of 25,000 feet MSL.
CAUTION
When in Pitch Mode, priority is to maintain the commanded pitch attitude. Therefore,
power management is important in order to maintain safe airspeeds when Pitch Mode
is in use.
Vertical Speed Mode (VS) – This mode is used to maintain a target Vertical Speed
(VS). Initial VS target is established when engaging the VS mode and can be adjusted in
100 fpm increments using the Nose UP / Nose DN buttons or TCS functionality. This is
a “flight level change mode”, meaning that if the vertical flight path intersects an altitude
selected in the ALTSEL window, the FD will automatically transition through ASEL
mode to ALT mode. The Series 400 implementation gives priority to holding the target
altitude, therefore, power management is important in order to maintain safe airspeeds
when VS mode is in use and in transitioning from VS Mode to Altitude Hold Mode.
CAUTION
Speed Hold (SPD) Mode – This mode is used to maintain Indicated Airspeed on the
selected PFD. Initial SPD target is established when engaging the SPD mode and
can be adjusted in 1 Knot increments using the Nose UP / Nose DN buttons or TCS
functionality between 80 KIAS and VMO. As for VS Mode, this is a flight level change
mode, meaning that if the vertical flight path intersects an altitude selected in the
ALTSEL window, the FD will automatically transition through ASEL mode to ALT mode.
The Series 400 implementation gives priority altitude over airspeed, meaning, the AFCS
will not command a descent below the selected altitude to maintain target airspeed.
Therefore, power management is important in order to maintain safe airspeeds when
Speed Hold Mode is in use and in transitioning from SPD Mode to Altitude Hold Mode.
CAUTION
Altitude Select Mode (ASEL) – This is an automatic altitude capture mode, and is not
pilot selectable. If the vertical flight path commanded by another FD mode intersects
the altitude selected in the ALTSEL window, the FD will automatically transition through
ASEL mode to ALT mode.
Altitude Hold Mode (ALT) – This mode holds the current altitude.
CAUTION
Vertical Navigation Mode (VNAV) – This mode arms the VNAV FD modes, which
reference the vertical path defined in the active FMS flight plan. The FMS flight plan
must contain altitude targets for VNAV to function. With VNAV active the FMS will
automatically sequence the vertical flight modes to follow the vertical profile of the
active flight plan. FMS VNAV will continue until reaching the Altitude selected in the
preselect window.
Speed Protection Mode (MaxSPD) – This is an automatic mode and is not pilot
selectable. MaxSPD will issue FD commands to avoid exceeding VMO in VS, PIT, SPD
or VGP.
Approach Preview – Approach Preview may be used to display either a LOC or VOR
while the FMS is selected as the active NAV source. An appropriate frequency and
course may be set manually, selected and tuned using the INAV map, or auto-tuned
by the FMS to the LOC or VOR approach loaded into the flight plan. The previewed
approach can be armed using the APR button on the FC.
NOTE
Auto-tuning only affects the PFD coupled to the FD.
2 Enable GA vertical mode for initial climb guidance, with a fixed pitch target of +9°
during which nose UP/DN buttons are ignored (target adjusts to +4.5° if one engine
NG is below 60%).
b The aircraft is within 5 NM from the destination, with an approach loaded for
which no final approach fix exists (i.e. approach being flown in NAV).
GA mode activation will cause AP and YD (if installed) to be disconnected, and will
automatically silence the persistent “Cavalry Charge” aural alert.
NOTE
If go-around flight path will cross the altitude set in the ASEL window,
the aircraft will level at that altitude (provided the selected altitude
is greater than 400 ft above the altitude at which go-around was
pressed).
Releasing the TCS button will cause the FD to resume previously active modes. If any
of the modes listed in Table 9-50-13 are active, their targets will be modified to the
current flight condition at button release.
b Runaway
c Power interruption
The Yaw Damper is installed as part of the optional Autopilot. This system is engaged
and disengaged by pressing the YD button on the FC, and is engaged when turning
on the AP. This system can be operated independently to provide yaw damping of
momentary lateral accelerations and yawing motion, and operates integrally as part of
the AP to assist turn coordination. The YD must be functioning for the AP to engage.
The AP / YD installation on the Series 400 does not include any automatic rudder trim
capability. Upon activation, the YD establishes the current lateral acceleration value
as a target (indicated by the current position of the Slip/Skid indicator). For all flight
operations, rudder trim may be accomplished through the aircraft’s manual rudder trim
system.
The rudder servo clutch setting has been set low enough to allow pilot input using
rudder and rudder trim as required to counteract aircraft flight characteristics.
Due to the clutch settings and system architecture, some rudder force will be held after
changes in speed or attitude. For maximum passenger comfort, the aircraft should be
manually trimmed before engaging the AP and/or YD, and after any change to aircraft
speed or configuration that induces a yaw trim requirement.
CAUTION
9-50.7.3.5.3 AP Disconnect
AP Disconnect – Red button located on the outboard side of either control wheel that
sends a disconnect message to the AP and YD (if installed). A second press of the AP
Disc button is required to silence the persistent “Cavalry Charge” aural warning.
A green dot is displayed beside the digital pitch trim position indicator (typically located
on the lower MFD) while the AP is currently actuating the pitch trim servo.
Activation of the manual electric pitch trim by the flight crew while the AP is engaged
will disengage the AP.
The Electric Pitch Trim system is incorporated as a required part of the Autopilot.
This system uses a servo and bridle cables to actuate the aircraft’s existing manual
mechanical pitch trim system, including the pitch trim wheel and all cables leading to
the elevator trim tab.
The system is activated manually by moving both halves of the Nose UP / Nose DN
selectors located on either control wheel. Both halves must be actuated and functioning
to accomplish trim actuation. If the pilot’s and co-pilot’s switches are selected in opposite
directions, both inputs will be cancelled, resulting in no trim actuation.
Figure 9-50-15 Left Control Wheel AFCS Switches (Right Side Opposite)
This system is also actuated when required as part of the Autopilot functionality. As
such, this system must be functioning for operation of the AP.
Electric pitch trim is powered through the PITCH TRIM CB (position N1) and may
be interrupted temporarily by pressing and holding the AP DISC button, or disabled
permanently by selecting the red PITCH TRIM switch on the left sub-panel to DISABLE.
The SVS SmartView system consists of the KGS 200 GPS, the Honeywell Mark
VI EGPWS geometric altitude, terrain and obstacle databases (located within each
Advanced Graphics Module [AGM]), and the KSG 7200 ADAHRS.
The SVS system is based entirely on aircraft track as derived from GPS position. SVS
can provide a significant increase in situational awareness regarding terrain in the
aircraft’s environment by generating overlay images based on TAWS terrain data, flight
path and ground track.
Under certain flight conditions, the SVS will de-clutter to enhance readability of the
display. This will happen under scenarios such as the following:
Aircraft with the SVS option (SmartView) have additional control in Apex through
the MFD that allows the contrast of the SmartView presentation to be controlled
independently of the PFD display intensity. Access to this control is through the MFD
Controller and PFD interface, refer to the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics
System Common Pilot’s Guide (refer to Para 9-50.2.3.1).
The SVS terrain database is located within each Advanced Graphics Module (AGM).
Pilot awareness of drift angle and direction is necessary to determine the relative
position of the runway. This situation is most critical during the transition from IMC to
VMC on an approach during high crosswinds, particularly under conditions where there
is obstruction of the runway (such as blowing snow).
The SVS system draws a white ‘T’ indicating the aircraft's ground track at the centre of
the SVS Horizon.
Provided a valid magnetic heading is available, a white ‘V’ indicating the aircraft's
heading (or ‘Visual’ direction) is drawn in the appropriate lateral position on the SVS
horizon. This ‘V’, together with a properly set HSI NAV track bar, indicates the drift angle
resulting from the current crosswind situation. For example, if flying an approach with
a crosswind from the right, the ‘V’ will be depicted to the right of the approach path.
Regardless of drift, whenever the aircraft’s flight path is aligned with the runway
centerline, the SVS will display the runway in the centre of the PFD. This may be
misleading during crosswind approaches as the drift angle is not apparent when looking
only at the position of the SVS runway. The position of the ‘V’ and track bar must be
considered for a full situational awareness picture.
1 Excessive Crosswinds – The ‘V’ depicted on the horizon will indicate the aircraft’s
heading. An increasing crosswind will cause an increasing drift angle. When
crosswind conditions produce a drift angle greater than approximately 9 degrees,
the ‘V’ will be displayed in dashed lines and the angle from the ‘V’ to the aircraft's
track ‘T’ will not be correctly represented. For the Twin Otter, this is very important
as a 90 knot initial approach speed in a crosswind of 15 knots will result in a drift
angle of approximately 10 degrees.
2 Excessive Pitch Attitudes – The zero pitch reference line (or artificial horizon) is
normally displayed as a solid white line on the horizon. When excessive nose up
or down attitudes are encountered, this will change to dashed lines. Additionally,
the vertical aspect ratio of the PFD image will be compressed to accommodate the
extra vertical requirement.
In the Twin Otter, the nose down non-conformal presentation can be commonly
encountered during descent with flaps extended, and can be aggravated with relatively
high speeds (i.e. low power and IAS above VREF).
VSD presentation is based on the current aircraft barometric altitude and is not
temperature compensated. As such, a current altimeter setting must be used and
indications will be subject to all traditional altimetry errors as well as VSD presentation
errors.
When FMS waypoints have been temperature compensated by the FMS Temperature
Compensation Function (refer to Para 9-50.4.6.3 and Para 9-50.7.8.4), the VSD displays
the waypoints and calculated flight path profile based on the temperature compensated
waypoint altitudes.
VSD shows the aircraft’s vertical flight profile using two automatic modes as follows:
1 Terrain Under Flight Plan – This mode will be displayed when the aircraft is on the
ground, or in the air whenever Terrain Under Track is not being presented.
2 Terrain Under Track – This mode will show when aircraft track is more than 20°
away from desired FMS track or when the lateral deviation is greater than the
current level of RNP. This mode displays the terrain ahead along the actual track of
the aircraft.
9-50.7.7 TCAS II
For practical purposes, the traffic notification functions (TA functions) of TCAS I and
TCAS II are the same. TCAS II simply adds the resolution advisory (RA) function.
The TCAS II system is comprised of a Honeywell TPU CAS 67A TCAS Processor, dual
Honeywell KXP-2290 Mode S Transponders, dual top mounted Directional Antenna
and dual bottom mounted Omni-Directional Antenna. The TCAS system is controlled
by the Radio Tuning XPDR and Traffic Detail Windows.
TCAS II Resolution Advisories (RA’s) are available when TA/RA mode is active. An
RA is an automatic display indication recommending a maneuver to increase vertical
TCAS II Resolution Advisory mode (RA Mode) is inhibited when descending below 900
feet (radar altitude) or on climb-out prior to 1100 ft (radar altitude).
“Increase Descent” resolution advisories are inhibited below 1450 ft AGL (radar altitude).
Due to the performance characteristics of the DHC-6 Series 400, resolution advisories
involving a climb command are inhibited unless the aircraft is below 1450 ft AGL.
TCAS Avoidance Zones – A preventative RA will cause display of one or two red
trapezoid avoidance zones. The crew must not climb or descend into the red avoidance
zones.
TCAS Fly-To Zone – A corrective RA will add the display of a green fly-to zone. The
aircraft must be maneuvered in the direction of the fly-to zone to avoid the threat.
CAUTION
9-50.7.8.1 Description
Phase 2 enhances the FMS capabilities found in Phase 1 aircraft. For more information,
consult the Honeywell Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System Common Build Pilot’s
Guide and the Viking DHC-6 Twin Otter Series 400 Supplement to the Honeywell
Primus Apex® Integrated Avionics System Common Build Pilot’s Guide (refer to Para
9-50.2.3.1).
The FMS functions are provided by the two Advanced Graphics Modules (AGM) located
inside the Modular Avionics Unit (MAU) assembly.
2 Dual KGS 200 GPS Receivers or Dual KGS 200 SBAS GPS Receivers
3 KSG 7200 Dual Channel Air Data Attitude Reference System (ADAHRS)
The FMS navigation information is displayed on the PFD’s and provides lateral and
vertical control output to the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS).
FMS waypoints with Temperature Compensation applied will display a white TComp in
the waypoint list.
NOTE
When FMS waypoints have been temperature compensated by the
FMS Temperature Compensation Function (refer to Para 9-50.4.6.3),
the VSD displays the waypoints and calculated flight path profile
based on the temperature compensated waypoint altitudes.
Various GNSS systems around the world use a correction signal generated by ground
sensors, transmitted via geosynchronous satellites to SBAS capable GPS receivers.
This facilitates the conduct of more accurate GPS-based navigation and approaches.
If the annunciated Level of Service (LOS) is LPV then the FMS will use GPS altitude
for approach vertical guidance. If the annunciated Level of Service (LOS) is LNAV or
LNAV/VNAV, or there is a degraded LOS / GPS reduced integrity situation, the FMS
will use barometric altitude for approach vertical guidance.
Although the upgraded GPS receivers carry out transparent automatic internal checks
that negate the need for RAIM under certain circumstances, this does not satisfy
When flying an approach using SBAS to LPV minimums, the approach identifier must
be displayed to the right of the HSI, and NAV Preview must not be active.
When SBAS becomes unavailable during an LPV approach, a lower Level of Service
(LOS) may be available such as LNAV/VNAV or LNAV. At this point, the vertical guidance
is BARO only, and all altitudes require application of temperature compensation for
non-standard conditions.
Both the 256 Word FDR and the 512 Word FDR are eligible for installation on the
Series 400 Twin Otter. Review the aircraft equipment list to confirm which type of FDR
is installed on your aircraft.
9-50.7.11 ESIS
Phase 2 aircraft can have either the L-3 Avionics GH-3100 ESIS, as certified in Phase 1
or the GH-3900.2 ESIS. Both are installed as standalone instruments with independent
battery power supply that will power the instrument in the event of total aircraft electrical
power loss.
NOTE
There is no navigation interface to the ESIS.
9-50.7.12.1 General
Transponder Modes A, C, and S functionality including optional ADS-B Out functionality
is included in the dual KXP 2290A Mode S Transponder installation but is dependent
on signal inputs from external system interfaces. These include air data and heading
from the Dual Channel KSG 7200 ADAHRS and information from the Dual KGS 200
GPS SBAS Position Sources.
Provided the required system interfaces are fully functional, the installed KXP 2290A
Mode S Transponder installation has been shown to meet the following Mode S
Enhanced Surveillance requirements:
Provided the optional ADS-B Out system is enabled, the installed KXP 2290A Mode
S Transponder installation has been shown to also meet the ADS-B Out equipment
requirements of FAR 91.227 and AMC 20-24.
The ADS-B Out status annunciator is displayed in the transponder tuning window below
the ATC code (refer to Figure 9-50-19).
The ADS-B Out status displayed in white indicates normal ADS-B Out operation.
The ADS-B Out status displayed in amber indicates ADS-B Out is failed.
The ADS-B Out status not displayed at all indicates ADS-B Out is disabled by Apex
configuration option, or the XPDR indicates ADS-B Out is selected off, or the XPDR is
failed.
The XPDR modes and VFR code are shown in the detail window. TCAS mode and
TCAS Test are shown in the Traffic Detail window. The active mode/setting is indicated
by a green dot.
The XPDR selector allows the pilots to select the XPDR1 or XPDR2 as the selected
transponder. The non-selected transponder is put in STBY mode.
The Pilot can also select a pre-configured VFR code (1200) or select a custom VFR
code via the VFR code entry.
If a preset VFR code other than the factory-set is desired, a new code may be
programmed as follows:
2 Select the VFR soft key, which places a tuning cursor around the current VFR code.
3 Select the desired VFR code by rotating the Tuning Select knob inner and outer
knob on the PFD Controller.
The VFR code can also be entered using the MFC numeric keypad, followed by the
Enter (ENT) key.
Selection of modes from the MFC is accomplished using the SEL outer knob.
Setting the ATC code from the MFC is accomplished using the numeric keypad followed
by the Enter (ENT) key.
9-50.7.12.19 ON
The XPDR is able to reply to all valid Mode A, C and S interrogations. However, the
altitude information will not be transmitted.
Soft keys are also selectable from the MFC using the Joystick control followed by the
Enter (ENT) key.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 51
S.O.O. 6326
Sections 9-51.1, 9-51.2, 9-51.3, 9-51.4 and 9-51.5 are Japan Civil Aviation Bureau
(JCAB) approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-51.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are
not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-51.2 Limitations............................................................................. 8
9-51.2.1 General ............................................................................... 8
9-51.2.2 Placards .............................................................................. 8
9-51.2.2.1 Flight Compartment Placards ................................................. 8
9-51.2.2.2 Passenger Compartment Placards ......................................... 11
9-51.2.2.3 External Placards .............................................................. 15
9-51.5 Performance......................................................................... 19
9-51.5.1 General ............................................................................. 19
9-51.5.2 Noise Level ........................................................................ 19
9-51.5.3 Engine Emissions ................................................................ 21
9-51.5.3.1 Fuel Venting ..................................................................... 21
9-51.5.3.2 Exhaust Emissions ............................................................ 21
9-51.1 General
9-51.1.1 Scope
This supplement has been developed for use on aircraft operating under the JCAB Type
Certificate, incorporating S.O.O. 6326. It is valid for aircraft registered in Japan only.
9-51.2 Limitations
9-51.2.1 General
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the POH/AFM apply when S.O.O.
6326 is installed. The following additional limitations apply.
9-51.2.2 Placards
The following Japanese Placards replace the standard placards as shown in
Para 9-51.2.2.1, Para 9-51.2.2.3 and Para 9-51.2.2.3.
A. Operating Instructions Placard – Equipped for Icing (with S.O.O. 6004, 6187 and
6202 or 6237)
D. Lift Label
I. Pull Label
For night flights in excess of 5 hours, periodic re-charging of the EXIT signs is
required. It is recommended that every 2 to 3 hours of night flight, the cabin lights
be switched on to BRIGHT for at least 5 minutes.
NOTE
The photo luminescent cabin EXIT signs are non-electric so they
cannot be turned on or off. The photo luminescence signs absorb
energy when exposed to light, and gradually release this energy.
It takes several minutes of exposure to cabin lighting to completely
charge the EXIT signs.
9-51.5 Performance
9-51.5.1 General
The performance procedures detailed in Section 5 of the POH/AFM and other
applicable, approved supplements are not affected except as noted in the following.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 52
STRETCHER INSTALLATION
S.O.O. 6208
Sections 9-52.1, 9-52.2, 9-52.3, 9-52.4 and 9-52.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-52.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are
not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-52.5 Performance......................................................................... 11
9-52.1 General
9-52.1.1 Scope
This supplement applies to aircraft equipped with S.O.O. 6208 Stretcher Racks
Installation.
9-52.2 Limitations
9-52.2.1 General
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the POH/AFM and any other applicable
approved supplements apply when S.O.O. 6208 is fitted. The following additional
limitations apply:
2 Stretcher racks and stretchers must be located as shown in Figure 9-52-1 and
Figure 9-52-2.
4 Only Thunder Bay Aviation 915704–1 stretchers are approved for carriage.
6 One or two stretchers may be installed at one time, on the right hand side of the
fuselage only.
One stretcher: 15
Two stretchers: 12
4 A patient should be accepted for carriage without a qualified attendant only when
the saving of life is involved.
5 At least one attendant must remain on board as long as the patient is on board.
9-52.5 Performance
There is no change to the performance data provided in Section 5 of the POH/AFM.
For reconfiguration, remove double and single seat assemblies on the right hand side
of the aisle as necessary (rows 3 through 6 for one stretcher, rows 1 through 6 for two
stretchers), using weight and moment arms provided in PSM 1-64-8.
Weights and moment arms for added stretcher, fwd and aft support racks and patients
are given in Table 9-52-1 for Imperial and Table 9-52-2 for Metric.
NOTE
Stretchers may NOT be installed on the left hand side of the fuselage.
2 Place the outboard portion of the stretcher frame into the fwd and aft outboard
keepers on the racks ((1) in Figure 9-52-3).
NOTE
Make sure the aft legs of the stretcher bear against the inboard and
outboard keepers. (Refer to Figure 9-52-4).
3 Place the inboard portion of the stretcher frame into the fwd and aft inboard keepers
on the racks ((2) in Figure 9-52-3).
4 Close the fwd and aft inboard keepers over the stretcher frame ((3) in Figure 9-52-3).
5 Latch the fwd and aft inboard keepers using the pull action latch clamp provided
((4) in Figure 9-52-3).
NOTE
Adjust the latch clamp as required to provide positive latching.
2 The shoulder straps must be looped around the stretcher frame and secured
immediately aft of the wheel attachment as shown in Figure 9-52-5.
3 The chest straps must be looped around the stretcher frame and secured
immediately aft of the headboard hinges as shown in Figure 9-52-5.
4 The lap belt must be looped around the stretcher frame and secured in the center
fabric cut-out as shown in Figure 9-52-5.
5 The leg belt must be looped around the stretcher frame and secured in the aft fabric
cut out or at the foot-end as shown in Figure 9-52-5.
2 Open the fwd and aft inboard keepers (undo (3) in Figure 9-52-3).
3 Lift the stretcher out of the fwd and aft inboard keepers (undo (2) in Figure 9-52-3).
4 Slide the stretcher out of the outboard fwd and aft keepers (undo (1) in Figure
9-52-3).
5 Unload the stretcher through the aft, left hand cabin doors.
• Each projecting object of the stretcher that may injure the person occupying it,
or persons moving about the airplane in flight, must be padded.
• The patient restraint shall prevent unwanted movements of the patient during
turbulence or in an emergency landing, and apply the restraining loads over a
large area of the body. Some patients may be so injured that the restraint used
will be based on medical opinion.
• The preferred orientation is that the patient’s head is forward. Medical opinion
may dictate otherwise.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 53
ALTERNATE ENGINE
DISPLAY COLOURS
S.O.O. 6280
Sections 9-53.1, 9-53.2, 9-53.3, 9-53.4 and 9-53.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual Supplement.
Compliance with Section 9-53.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other Sections are
not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-53.5 Performance......................................................................... 14
9-53-1 ........................................................................................... 8
9-53-1 Primary Flight Display, showing engine indications (upper left) .......... 16
9-53-2 Engine Window ,showing torque exceedance and fire warning .......... 18
9-53-3 Engine Window, showing miscellaneous parameters ...................... 19
9-53.1 General
9-53.1.1 Scope
This supplement applies to aircraft equipped with S.O.O. 6280.
9-53.2 Limitations
S.O.O 6280 is mandatory for US-registered aircraft.
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the AFM apply with S.O.O. 6280
fitted. The following limitations replace Para 2.4.6, Engine Instrument Markings in the
POH/AFM.
The colour coding is dynamic and the thresholds at which the various colour cues
appear will change depending on the phase of flight. The Apex display system
recognizes five phases of flight for the purpose of selecting the appropriate engine
limitation table to govern the display of colours. Take-off, Climb and Cruise, and
Single Engine Flight limitations apply simultaneously to both engines. Idle and Starting
limitations apply to each engine individually when the appropriate criteria has been met.
The limitation table being used for each engine will be displayed in white text (for T/O,
S/E, and IDL) near the torque indicators, and in green text for START outboard of the
engine being started. When climb and cruise limits (the default limits) are being used,
no indication is provided.
Table 9-53-1
Indication (white text,
Phase of Flight outboard of torque Limitations Applied
indicators)
Take-off T/O Take-off
Climb and Cruise No indication (blank) Cruise
Single Engine Flight S/E Take-off
Idle (<72% NG) when on IDL Idle
ground
A detailed explanation of the logic used to select engine limitations based on phase of
flight and/or engine operating parameters is provided in Section 7, Aircraft and Systems
Description.
During Start
During Idle
Otherwise (default settings for climb and cruise, as well as engine not operating)
NOTE
When default engine limitations are being displayed during the climb
and cruise phases of flight, the amber radial mark at 740° indicates
the temperature limitation for normal Climb and Cruise operations,
and the red radial arc at 790° (equivalent to Take-off and Single
Engine Flight) indicates the temperature limitation for Maximum
Power (emergency power setting) operations.
to prevent caution and warning displays from appearing during momentary transient
conditions permitted by the acceleration limits.
A warning or caution CAS message will be displayed on the CAS list concurrent with
the change in background colour of the displayed value in the engine window. The
MASTER CAUTION or MASTER WARNING annunciators will also illuminate, and an
appropriate aural warning will be generated.
9-53.5 Performance
There is no change to the Performance provided in Section 5 of the POH/AFM.
During normal operations, engine related numeric values are displayed in green against
a black background, and gauge backgrounds are depicted in grey and black, to the left
and right of the pointer needle respectively.
Figure 9-53-1 Primary Flight Display, showing engine indications (upper left)
When an engine parameter exceeds its limitation, the integer background will change
to amber or to red, depending on the severity of the exceedence. This will always be
accompanied by a CAS message, also in amber or red, and a single chime (for amber
messages) or triple chime (for warning messages).
The logic that drives the monitoring of engine limitations makes allowances for
acceleration limits that are granted during various phases of engine operation. Cautions
and warnings will not be generated provided that the exceedence is within both the
time and value parameters for the acceleration limit.
Five different sets of limitations are used for each engine, depending on the phase of
flight. These include starting, ground idle, take-off, climb and cruise, and single engine
operations. The appropriate set of limitations is automatically applied based on logic
inputs from other aircraft systems.
For example, if the starter switch is engaged, starting limits will be applied to the engine
being started. If the NG is below 72% and the aircraft is selected on the ground, idle
limits will be applied. If the autofeather system has been selected on, the trims are set
to the appropriate take-off bands, the take-off configuration monitor indicates that the
aircraft is configured for take-off, and power levers are advanced for take-off, take-off
limitations will be applied. If the aircraft is in flight and one engine registers NG of less
than 45%, single engine limitations (equivalent to take-off limitations) will be applied. If
single engine limitations have been applied in flight due to shut down of one engine,
they will continue to be applied for an additional 120 seconds following an in-flight
start-up of engine that was shut down. This is to allow adequate time for checklists to
be completed prior to reverting to normal climb and cruise engine limits.
The limitations presently being used at any given time are displayed in green text or, in
the case of start limitations, in white text. No annunciation is provided when the default
(climb and cruise) limitations are in use.
Figure 9-53-2 Engine Window ,showing torque exceedance and fire warning
Torque is displayed in PSI. 50 PSI torque is equal to 1,528.5 ft·lbs or 2,072.4 N·m torque.
NP, NG, Fuel Flow, Oil Pressure and Oil Temperature are all measured and continuously
calculated to one decimal point of precision; however, to avoid unwanted distraction to
the flight crew caused by frequently changing digits to the right of the decimal point, only
whole numbers are displayed in the engine window. If display of any of these values with
single decimal point precision is required (for example, for engine rigging purposes), an
ARINC 429 bus reader may be used to display the value with full available precision.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 54
S.O.O. 6363
Sections 9-54.1, 9-54.2, 9-54.3, 9-54.4 and 9-54.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation (TCCA) approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual
Supplement. Compliance with Section 9-54.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other
Sections are not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-54.5 Performance......................................................................... 18
9-54.5.1 General ............................................................................. 18
9-54.5.2 Noise Levels ....................................................................... 18
9-54.1 General
9-54.1.1 Scope
This supplement has been developed for use on aircraft operating under the Brazilian
National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) Type Certificate, incorporating S.O.O. 6363. It
is valid for aircraft registered under ANAC jurisdiction in Brazil.
9-54.2 Limitations
9-54.2.1 General
The operating limitations detailed in Section 2 of the POH/AFM and any applicable,
approved supplements apply when S.O.O. 6363 is installed. The following additional
limitations apply.
9-54.2.2 GNSS
The SBAS functionality is not available in Brazil, therefore operations that require such
functionality, GPS RNP-APCH to LPV minimums, are prohibited in Brazilian airspace.
Baro altitude derived FMS procedures such as RNP-APCH to LNAV or LNAV/VNAV
minimums do not require SBAS and are not affected.
Use of GNSS/GPS is prohibited under IFR unless other means of navigation, suitable
and approved for the intended route, are installed and operational. It must be possible at
any point along the route, to navigate to the destination or alternate, using such means.
9-54.2.3 VHF-COMM
When operating the VHF-COMM system in Brazilian airspace, the selection of 8.33
kHz in the channels spacing can cause the loss of communication with the Air Traffic
Control (ATC) if the radio is tuned to the wrong frequency.
9-54.2.4 FMS
For all IFR Operations, the Apex FMS must incorporate the current update cycle.
9-54.2.5 Placards
The following Brazilian placards replace the standard placards as shown in Para 9-54.
2.5.1 and Para 9-54.2.5.2.
E. Lift Label
G. Remove this Cover Pull Handle Down Push Window Out Label
H. Pull Label
9-54.5 Performance
9-54.5.1 General
The performance data and procedures detailed in Section 5 of the POH/AFM and other
applicable, approved supplements are not affected except as noted in the following.
The following take-off noise level complies with ANAC RBHA 36 corresponding to ICAO
Annex 16 Volume 1 Chapter 10 Amendment 8.
NOTE
Landplane Configuration comprises the DHC-6 Series 400 aircraft
configured in one of the three operational gear configurations:
Standard Wheels, Intermediate Flotation Gear (IFG) (S.O.O. 6048)
and Wheel Skis (S.O.O. 6001).
No determination has been made by the National Civil Aviation Agency (ANAC) that the
noise levels of this aircraft are, or should be acceptable or unacceptable for operation
at, into, or out of, any airport.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 57
S.O.O. 6410
Sections 9-57.1, 9-57.2, 9-57.3, 9-57.4 and 9-57.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation (TCCA) approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual
Supplement. Compliance with Section 9-57.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other
Sections are not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-57.5 Performance......................................................................... 20
9-57.5.1 Cold Temperature Operations .................................................. 20
9-57.5.2 Crosswinds Operations .......................................................... 20
9-57.1 General
9-57.1.1 Introduction
This supplement has been developed for use on aircraft operating under the FATA Type
Certificate. Sections 9-57.1 through to 9-57.5 inclusive constitute the approved Aircraft
Flight Manual Supplement. Compliance with Section 9-57.2, Limitations, is mandatory.
All other Sections are not approved and are provided for information only.
In this document, unless otherwise noted, references to the DHC-6 Series 400
POH /AFM refer to VAL document 1-64-POH (the Pilot Operating Handbook)
including Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) approved document PSM-1-64 A
(the TCCA approved Aircraft Flight Manual).
9-57.1.2 Applicability
This Supplement is part of, and must be attached to, the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for aircraft configured for, and certified to, the standards of the
Federal Air Transport Agency of the Russian Federation (FATA) in accordance with
Viking Air Limited (VAL) Standard Option Order (S.O.O. 6410).
This document supersedes and/or supplements the information and data contained in
the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) and approved Aircraft Flight Manual for the VAL
DHC-6 Series 400 (Twin Otter) in the areas listed therein. For limitations, procedures
and performance not contained in this document, refer to the POH, approved Aircraft
Flight Manual and other applicable approved Flight Manual Supplements.
During long term parking in outside ambient temperatures below –20°C, the aircraft
battery should be removed from the airplane and stored in a heated location.
9-57.2 Limitations
In addition to limitations in the basic aircraft POH/AFM and any applicable supplements,
the following limitations apply.
9-57.2.1 Fuel
In addition to approved fuels listed in the POH/AFM Section 2.4.4, the following fuels
can be used:
NOTE
Use of TS-1 fuel is subject to the restrictions specified in Pratt &
Whitney Canada Service Bulletin (SB) No. 1244.
NOTE
Flight durations of not more than 30 minutes above 10,000 feet (3050
meters) up to and including 12,000 feet (3650 meters) are permitted.
Unless an independent, approved third static source is installed, the maximum operating
altitude for IFR operations is 14,000 feet (4250 meters).
Minimum Flight Crew (Ten (10) Passengers or More): Two (2) pilots.
Minimum Flight Crew (Nine (9) Passengers or Less): One (1) pilot.
Extended over-water flights are permitted within the limitations prescribed by Russian
Federation operational regulations.
The following is added to Section 2.14 (Kinds of Operation Limitations) of the POH/AFM:
The aircraft may be operated in Russian airspace on routes covered by АТС ground
facilities using RBS mode and VHF radio fields.
The Operating Instructions Placard (Figure 2-4) of Section 2.18 (Placards) of the
POH/AFM is replaced with the following:
NOTE
Including wheel-skis when operating on the wheels.
2 Intermediate Flotation Gear (Dunlop DR 18322T Tires with Inner Tube) – 2.4 kg/cm2
or greater.
These minimum surface hardness limitations have been demonstrated at the maximum
certificated gross weight of 12,500 pounds (take-off) and 12,300 pounds (landing).
NOTE
At surface hardness less than 5.1 kg/cm2 3.8 (Standard Wheels)
kg/cm2 (Intermediate Flotation Gear) surface damage of unpaved
runways is possible, and in such case, depth of wheel track may be
greater than 10 cm.
b For combi configurations with combined passenger seat(s) and cargo in the
same freight compartment zone:
(3) Maximum permissible floor loading values per Section 2.8.4.3 (Maximum
Permissible Floor Loading Values) in the POH/AFM are unchanged.
5 All cargo must be restrained by approved cargo nets per the following:
a Maximum cargo net static load capacity is 1,688 lbs (766 kg).
b Minimum required tie downs = (18 x Cargo Weight) / (Tie Down Load Rating).
6 Emergency exit access and aisle way width requirements for all combi configurations
(S.O.O. 6274) must be maintained in accordance with PSM 1-64-8, Figure 1-7.
7 Placards for emergency exits that are not useable due to cargo are to be covered.
A minimum of three crew members (Flight Crew and/or Attendants) are required when
a Single Stretcher is installed and four crew members (Flight Crew and/or Attendants)
are required when Two Stretchers are installed.
All crew members must be trained on the emergency evacuation procedures, refer to
Para 9-57.3.4.
After an emergency landing, remove the portable ELT located beneath the right-hand
(RH) crew seat and operate it as defined in the portable ELT instructions.
Remove the portable ELT located beneath the RH crew seat and operate it as defined
in the portable ELT instructions.
General
In the event of a flight control system abnormality, if warranted by the severity of the
abnormality, land at an airport which has lower levels of wind and turbulence.
Some flight control abnormalities may result in large control forces. Control forces are
alleviated at lower speeds, reduction of speed from cruising speeds to 110 KIAS or
below may significantly reduce control forces and facilitate control of the aircraft in the
event that high control forces as a result of a flight control abnormality are encountered.
3 Change flap settings slowly. Maximum recommended flap setting for landing is 20°.
NOTE
Under certain conditions, high control forces may result. Control
forces may be alleviated by minimizing speed and flap changes from
the trim conditions at which the failure occurred.
The following procedures are in addition to Section 3.20.1 (Aileron Trim Tab Runaway)
of the POH/AFM:
NOTE
The aircraft ailerons have sufficient control authority to overcome
aileron trim at the most adverse trim positions. Monitor aileron trim
position on Apex. Under certain conditions, significant aileron control
forces may result.
NOTE
The aircraft rudder has sufficient control authority to overcome rudder
trim at the most adverse trim positions. Monitor rudder trim on Apex.
Under some conditions, significant rudder control forces may result.
Slightly asymmetric, stabilized engine power settings may alleviate
rudder control forces.
The following procedures are in addition to Section 3.20.2 (Elevator Control Malfunction)
of the POH/AFM:
2 Once aircraft is stabilized, avoid pitch trim changes caused by flap position changes.
If the aircraft is not at Flaps 0°, and pitch control is difficult, a slow reduction of flap
to Flaps 0° may result in a configuration that is easier to control in pitch.
NOTE
Under some circumstances, pitch control may be facilitated by small
power changes, by small speed changes, and/or by flap position
changes.
3 In the event of a jammed elevator, attempt to free elevator with moderate application
of control force.
4 If elevator remains jammed, use small power changes, small speed changes
and/or flap position changes to establish a speed/flap configuration that results in a
controllable configuration for landing.
2 Once aircraft is stabilized, avoid abrupt maneuvering and flap position changes.
NOTE
Under some circumstances, bank angle excursions may be corrected
by small power changes, by small speed changes, and/or by flap
position changes. Avoid use of flaps over 10 degrees.
3 In the event of a jammed aileron, attempt to free aileron with moderate application
of control force.
4 If aileron remains jammed, use rudder to maintain bank angle control and establish
wings level flight. Determine a speed / flap configuration that results in a controllable
configuration for landing.
5 Use rudder and, if required, differential engine power to make heading changes, and
execute shallow banked turns, as required, to navigate or to complete an approach
for landing. Do not exceed 15 degrees of bank during turns.
1 If aircraft is in a banked turn, use aileron to bring the aircraft to wings level flight.
3 Once aircraft is stabilized, avoid abrupt maneuvering and flap position changes.
4 In the event of a jammed rudder, attempt to free rudder with moderate application
of control force.
5 If rudder remains jammed, turns will be uncoordinated, use aileron for bank angle
control. Small differential power changes may also assist in cancelling out any
adverse effects due to the jammed rudder.
NOTE
Complete power, speed and flap changes cautiously as required
to establish a controllable configuration. Check configuration
changes, particularly flaps and power at a safe altitude to establish a
controllable stable configuration for landing. Flaps settings above 10
degrees should not be used.
6 Use ailerons to control bank angle, and, if required, differential engine power to make
heading changes, and execute shallow banked turns, as required, to navigate or to
complete an approach for landing. Do not exceed 15 degrees of bank during turns.
NOTE
A rudder failure in combination with an engine failure, while
improbable, may result in uncontrollable yaw at higher power settings.
Single engine overshoot at go-around power with a failed rudder is
not recommended, loss of control of the aircraft may result.
(1) Once the flight crew instructs the passengers to evacuate the aircraft, the
attendant shall tell the passengers to open their nearest available exit or
escape hatch if the area outside the exit is deemed safe.
(2) The attendant shall instruct the passengers to exit the aircraft through their
nearest available exit.
(3) The attendant shall instruct the co-pilot on which door the stretcher will
be passed through. The co-pilot shall exit the aircraft through that door,
following the passengers.
(4) The stretcher shall be removed from the racks by the attendant and pilot.
(5) The stretcher is positioned beside the door and the attendant lowers the
stretcher to the floor so the attendant can exit the aircraft first.
(6) When outside, the attendant grabs the stretcher so the pilot can direct it out
the door.
(8) The pilot exits the aircraft and everyone moves a safe distance away.
(1) Once the flight crew instructs the passengers to evacuate the aircraft, the
rear attendant shall tell the passengers to open their nearest available exit
or escape hatch if the area outside the exit is deemed safe.
(2) The rear attendant shall instruct the passengers to exit the aircraft through
their nearest available exit.
(3) The rear attendant and co-pilot follow the passengers out the door that the
stretchers will be passed through.
(4) The aft stretcher shall be removed from the racks by the forward attendant
and pilot.
(5) The forward attendant and pilot shall move the stretcher to the door, where
the rear attendant and co-pilot remove the stretcher from the aircraft.
(6) The rear attendant and co-pilot shall deposit the stretcher a safe distance
from the aircraft and come back to receive the forward stretcher.
The forward stretcher shall be removed from the racks by the forward
attendant and pilot.
(7) The forward attendant and pilot shall move the forward stretcher to the door,
where the rear attendant and co-pilot remove the stretcher from the aircraft.
(8) The pilot and forward attendant exit the aircraft and everyone moves a safe
distance away.
9-57.5 Performance
No change except for the following:
The maximum demonstrated crosswind component for take-offs and landings are
shown in Section 4 Para 4.10.1 and Para 4.15.1. When runway surface conditions are
affected by water, snow, slush or ice the following must be considered:
Unpaved Runways
- for grass airfields and also for dry and wet runways 22 kt
- for compacted snow, including when covered with fresh snow 15 kt
- for runways with sodden top layer or covered with slush or wet snow 11 kt
Dual unit feet and meter altitudes are displayed for barometric altitude only. Dual units
or metric units are not displayed on the ESIS. Display of radar altimeter altitude is in
feet only.
Use of altitudes and barometric altimeter setting in metric units is subject to the
requirements of the Russian Federation.
Primus Apex provides for annunciation and CAS messages related to the IPS consisting
of the following:
1 There is a caution CAS message “Pneumatic Press Low” that illuminates if the
overall pneumatic pressure is low and the aircraft is not on ground (POH/AFM,
Section 7.22.1.2 and Table 3-3, Section 3.23). Crew response to this CAS is per
POH/AFM, Section 3.18.1. The message can come on under low NG conditions, but
this is considered in the POH/AFM procedures and information, and in Supplement
1. There is also an advisory message which comes on when the aircraft is on
the ground (refer to POH/AFM, Section 3.21. ). In addition, there is information
on these CAS messages in Supplement 1, Section 9-1.7.4). Under normal flight
operations, this CAS message will only come on if there is inadequate pneumatic
pressure in the boot system which would be indicative of a boot system fault.
3 Each engine intake deflector is annunciated in the engine display pane when in the
snow / ice protection position. Failure of an individual intake deflector to move to
the correct position will be apparent to the flight crew because of the absence of
this annunciation.
In addition to the above annunciations and CAS messages, the following is additional
information on the IPS that will assist the flight crew in confirming proper function of all
elements of the system and in identifying any system problems or failures:
1 Failure of windshield heat will be apparent as frost / ice will accumulate on the
affected portion of the windshield. As well, a flight crew member can touch the
windshield to determine that heat is on and functioning. Some increase in current
draw is also apparent when windshield heat is turned on. It is also noted that the left
and right heating elements are independent and provide for a degree of redundancy
in the system.
2 Failure of prop de-ice will be apparent as ice will not shed from the prop or may
result in vibration if prop de-ice is only partially functioning. As well, aircraft electrical
loads can be monitored to determine that prop de-ice is on.
The DHC-6 Series 400 is a small aircraft. As such, accumulation of ice on the leading
edge of the wing struts, on the windshield or on the leading edge of the wing will be
apparent to the flight crew. Observation at night is facilitated by the wing inspection
lights.
Engine start is prohibited if the oil temperature is below –40°C. This is not an
ambient temperature operating limitation, engine pre-heat may be used to raise the oil
temperature to –40°C or higher prior to start.
The DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft has an extensive service history of operations in extreme
Arctic / Antarctic and tropical / desert environments with demonstrated operations in the
temperature range –55°C to +51.7°C. Cockpit pre-heat (for the display screens) may
be required prior to start-up and taxi at temperatures below –20°C (refer to Sections
1.5.7 [Extreme Temperature Operation] and 10.2.2 [Effect of Cold on Avionics Display
Screens] of the POH/ AFM).
For additional information on cold weather safety and operational considerations, refer
to Section 10.2 (Cold Weather Operations, Flight in Known Icing [FIKI]) of the POH/AFM
and its subsections.
For additional information on hot weather and desert operations, refer to Section 10.4
(Hot Weather and Desert Operation) of the POH/AFM and its subsections.
SECTION 9 – SUPPLEMENT 59
Sections 9-59.1, 9-59.2, 9-59.3, 9-59.4 and 9-59.5 are Transport Canada Civil
Aviation (TCCA) approved and constitute the approved Aircraft Flight Manual
Supplement. Compliance with Section 9-59.2, Limitations, is mandatory. All other
Sections are not approved and are provided for information only.
This Supplement is part of and must be attached to the basic POH and approved
Aircraft Flight Manual for airplanes with the subject design change incorporated.
Approved:____________________
Chief, Flight Test
Transport Canada
Date:_______________________
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
9-59.5 Performance......................................................................... 11
9-59.1 General
9-59.1.1 Scope
This supplement is introduced to identify operating limitations associated with an
aircraft not equipped with a Flight Data Recorder per S.O.O. 6299, “Removal of FDR”.
Mod 6/2436 “Passenger Seating Limitations Placard for FDR Removal” is introduced
to S.O.O. 6299 to help operators meet compliance with Canadian Aviation Regulation
(CAR) 603.33 (1)(a) and Federal Aviation Regulation CFR 135.152 (a).
9-59.2 Limitations
9-59.2.1 General
The Operating Limitations detailed in Section 2 of the POH/AFM and any other
applicable approved supplements apply when S.O.O. 6299 is fitted. The following
addition limitations apply:
NOTE
Passenger seats must be mounted in approved locations and may
consists of any combination of single or double seats.
9-59.2.3 Placards
Airplanes operating without an FDR (S.O.O. 6299), must have the following placard
installed in the aircraft:
9-59.5 Performance
There is no change to the Performance Data provided in Section 5 of the POH/AFM.
SECTION 10
This list shows the effective pages in the section, with their latest revision date. An
asterisk (*) indicates pages added or replaced at the latest revision. Technical changes
to the content are indicated by a black vertical line next to the change or the paragraph
that contains the change.
10-22 Time, Distance & Fuel in Climb – Type II (Intermediate Speed) ISA
+20°C................................................................................134
10-23 Time, Distance & Fuel in Climb – Type III (Low Speed) ISA –20°C.....135
10-24 Time, Distance & Fuel in Climb – Type III (Low Speed) ISA .............136
10-25 Time, Distance & Fuel in Climb – Type III (Low Speed) ISA +10°C ....137
10-26 Time, Distance & Fuel in Climb – Type III (Low Speed) ISA +20°C ....138
10-27 Nautical Air Miles Per Pound of Fuel ISA –20°C............................140
10-28 Nautical Air Miles Per Pound of Fuel ISA ....................................141
10-29 Nautical Air Miles Per Pound of Fuel ISA +10°C ...........................142
10-30 Nautical Air Miles Per Pound of Fuel ISA +20°C ...........................143
10-31 Nautical Air Miles Per Pound of Fuel (One Engine Inoperative) .........144
10-32 Fuel Consumption at Maximum Endurance (Holding) Speed ............146
10-33 Time, Distance and Fuel in Descent – Type I (High Speed) ..............148
10-34 Time, Distance and Fuel in Descent – Type II (Intermediate Speed) ...149
10-35 Time, Distance and Fuel in Descent – Type III (Low Speed) .............150
10-36 Time, Distance and Fuel in Drift Down ISA –20°C .........................152
10-37 Time, Distance and Fuel in Drift Down ISA ..................................153
10-38 Time, Distance and Fuel in Drift Down ISA +10°C .........................154
10-39 Time, Distance and Fuel in Drift Down ISA +20°C .........................155
10-40 Block Fuel (Maximum Cruise Rating) (Distance 0 to 400 nm) ...........158
10-41 Block Fuel (Maximum Cruise Rating) (Distance 0 to 800 nm) ...........159
10-42 Block Time (Maximum Cruise Rating) (Distance 0 to 400 nm) ..........160
10-43 Block Time (Maximum Cruise Rating) (Distance 0 to 800 nm) ..........161
10-44 Block Fuel (Long Range Cruise) (Distance 0 to 400 nm) .................162
10-45 Block Fuel (Long Range Cruise) (Distance 0 to 800 nm) .................163
10-46 Block Time (Long Range Cruise) (Distance 0 to 400 nm) ................164
10-47 Block Time (Long Range Cruise) (Distance 0 to 800 nm) ................165
10-48 Minimum Block Time Technique ...............................................169
10-49 Minimum Block Fuel Technique ................................................170
10-50 Minimum Cost Technique .......................................................171
10-51 Enroute Rate of Climb ...........................................................173
10-52 Enroute Climb Gradient ..........................................................174
10-53 Absolute and Service Ceiling ...................................................176
10-54 Absolute and Service Ceiling – One Engine Inoperative .................177
10-55 Time, Distance and Fuel – Climb at 500 fpm ................................179
10-56 Time, Distance and Fuel – Climb at Maximum Climb Power .............181
10-57 Nautical Air Miles per Pound of Fuel – Sea Level ..........................183
10-58 Nautical Air Miles per Pound of Fuel – 5,000 ft .............................184
10-59 Nautical Air Miles per Pound of Fuel – 10,000 ft ............................185
NOTE
Maintenance tasks completed by the flight crew/operator are subject
to Local Airworthiness Authorities.
- hard landing
- any wheel or gear component striking an object while maneuvering
- nose wheel or main wheel becoming stuck in a soft surface, subsequently greater
than normal taxi power having been applied to free the wheel
- severe turbulence
- flap (VFE) or (VMO) overspeed
- high-energy stop such as a rejected take-off
- lightning strike
- operation in extreme dust such as a sandstorm or volcanic ash
- tail strike
- overweight landing
Additional events may also require maintenance inspection and should also be reported.
An example of such an event is an overly aggressive pitch up during a TCAS event or a
Terrain Avoidance maneuver that could cause structural damage. If in doubt, the best
course of action is to report it.
Brake kinetic energy limitations normally will not restrict stop and go landings because
the exposed brake assemblies will cool sufficiently during the time it takes to complete
a circuit. If a practice rejected take-off is planned for a training or checking flight,
consideration should be given to completing this maneuver last, after all flights have
been made, particularly if the aerodrome being used is above 5,000 feet pressure
altitude, if the runway has a downslope, or if there is any tailwind.
If there is any doubt about brake kinetic energy limitations following a rejected take-off
from a speed greater than 40 KIAS, wait 30 minutes, or wait until the brake discs are cool
enough to allow them to be touched without discomfort before making the next take-off.
WARNING
WARNING
It is strictly prohibited to twist the power lever grips and move the power levers aft of
the IDLE position unless the aircraft is on the ground or water surface.
The PT6A-34 engine used in the Series 400 Twin Otter has a higher idle T5 limit
than the -20 and -27 engines. The idle temperature limitation of 685° is automatically
applied whenever NG is below 72%, and an amber caution level CAS message will be
presented if this limitation is exceeded.
The generators used in the Series 400 aircraft are slightly different than those used
on legacy aircraft, and these generators may be prone to voltage fluctuation at engine
speeds of less than 55% NG if the amperage demand on an individual generator is
greater than approximately 80 amps. To ensure that generator voltage output remains
within the desirable range of 28.0 to 29.0 volts, it is recommended that the engine speed
be increased to 55% NG or greater prior to bringing a generator online if it is anticipated
that the initial amperage demand from that generator will be greater than 80 amps.
Engine speed may be reduced to idle once the amperage demand has decreased to
less than 40 to 50 amps per generator. If voltage outputs should subsequently rises
above 29 volts at idle, engine speed should be increased as necessary to maintain
voltage at or below 29 amps.
Normal electrical load on a Series 400 aircraft is between 40 and 50 amps total once
the battery has been fully charged. This does not include loads arising from de-ice
equipment or air conditioning.
To ensure rapid acceleration to governed idle speed, Series 400 aircraft should always
be started with the propeller levers in the full forward (MAX RPM) position.
The Zero Fuel Weight limitation of 12,300 lbs (5,579 kg) is not foreseen to have any
operational impact because the maximum landing weight in the landplane and skiplane
configuration is also 12,300 lbs (5,579 kg).
The prohibition of flap extension beyond 20° at weights below 9,500 lbs (4,309 kg) is
not foreseen to have any operational impact because at weights below 9,500 lbs (4,309
kg), the take-off distance required is greater than the flap 20° landing distance required.
The VMCG has been published to enable use of lower V1 speeds on contaminated
runways, in accordance with data provided in Flight Manual Supplement 37.
Crew will notice that the horizontal barber pole depicting VMO will begin to decrease
from 166 KIAS as the aircraft climbs above 6,700 feet pressure altitude.
FMS approaches are, by definition, GPS based approaches, because the FMS relies
exclusively on the GPS receivers to determine aircraft position. For this reason, the FMS
may only be used for non-precision approaches. Non-precision approaches that use a
localizer-type signal (LOC, LOC-BC, LDA, and SDF) must be carried out with reference
to the VHF ground-based signal, using Short Range Navigation (SRN), because the
ground based signal provides more precise guidance than the unaugmented GPS
signal used by the FMS Long Range Navigation (LRN) system.
LNAV/VNAV and LPV approaches are prohibited because at the time of first certification,
the GPS receivers do not support Satellite Based Augmentation Service (SBAS) such
as the North American WAAS or European EGNOS, and SBAS is a prerequisite for
LNAV/VNAV and LPV approaches.
A passenger may occupy the right pilot seat of the aircraft during single pilot operations;
however, that passenger must be provided with a fully functional headset. Passengers
who occupy the right pilot seat during single pilot operations are considered
‘passengers’ for the purpose of the limitation of 19 passengers on board.
Propeller speed is limited to 91% NP during climb and cruise. This limitation is
not intended to prevent the pilot from taking any and all prudent actions that may
be necessary in the event of an emergency such as an engine failure, windshear
encounter, or inadvertent flight into severe icing.
Weight and balance assumptions that may have worked for many years on Series 300
aircraft are not valid for use on the substantially lighter Series 400 aircraft.
During very cold weather a close check should be kept on the water content of fuel in
the tanks. Water separates from fuel more readily in low temperatures and descends to
the lowest point of its container, where it may freeze. This could result in restricted flow
or loss of fuel flow to the engines. It is important to check the fuel at the strainers and
tank drains for the presence of ice or water whenever the aircraft has been exposed to
low temperatures.
Engine starting during cold weather will be facilitated by the application of hot air to
each engine intake for a ten minute period. The normal operations section of the AFM
contains a special procedure that may be followed when starting engines in extreme
cold conditions.
Tires on an aircraft parked in the open during cold weather develop flat spots where
the tires contact the ground. This “set” in the tires is temporary and disappears quickly
when the aircraft is taxied.
A temperature inversion can occur while climbing, which may cause sudden and
complete frosting of the windshield if the windshield has not been pre-heated. If electric
windshield heat is not installed, instrument flying will be necessary until the windshield
clears. For this reason, it is recommended that windshield heat be turned on prior to
taxi if it will be needed during flight.
Mechanical flight instruments may be initially sluggish and unreliable; this is caused
by additional bearing friction due to congealed lubricants. Above 60° to 65° N and S
latitude a magnetic compass is usually unreliable; a gyroscopic instrument should be
used for steering.
If a de-icing system is not installed, or has become inoperative during the flight, and
icing conditions have been encountered, the landing must be carried out using a flap
setting no greater than 10°.
Leave the parking brake off if moisture is present. Brakes may freeze if the parking
brake is applied when the brakes are hot and moisture is present. Refuel as soon as
possible after landing to minimize condensation in fuel tanks. Finally, install all available
covers before leaving the aircraft outside.
If the display brightness and contrast is sufficient to allow the display to be used for
engine starting, engines may be started at temperatures below –20°C (–4°F), but the
display screens must be warmed up (using cabin heat) to a minimum screen surface
temperature that is greater than –20°C (–4°F) prior to taxi.
If the display brightness and contrast is insufficient to allow the display to be used for
engine starting, the screen surface must be warmed up to a minimum screen surface
temperature that is greater than –20°C (–4°F) before engines are started. This may be
accomplished with a cabin heater (a hot air blower), a heating pad, or by applying a hot
water bottle wrapped in a soft towel to the face of the screen. The temperature of the
hot air, heating pad, or hot water bottle must not be greater than what could be used
to warm a human hand without discomfort.
The entire display box does not need to be warmed up – only the face of the screen
itself, which is approximately ¼ of an inch (5 mm) thick, needs to be warmed up.
Visually confirm that the all 5 flat-panel displays (the 4 Apex screens and the L3 ESIS)
are properly functioning and easily readable prior to taxi. It may be necessary to wait
and warm up the flight compartment (using the aircraft heating system) prior to taxi.
WARNING
Determine and verify the existence or risk of icing conditions along the proposed route.
Obviously, flight into known or forecast icing conditions is prohibited unless the aircraft
is fitted with all required de-icing equipment, and all of that equipment is functional. Be
aware that ice may form in conditions of visible moisture at temperatures below +5°C.
Additional pre-flight checks to be carried out in cold weather if the aircraft has been
parked outside, before starting the engines, are as follows:
1 Check that all ice, snow, or frost has been removed from wings, tailplane, and all
control surfaces.
2 Ensure that prior to flight any snow or standing water is removed from the airplane
cabin.
3 Inspect all control surface hinges for removal of ice or packed snow likely to cause
jamming.
4 Check for water and ice in fuel at fuel strainers and tank drains.
6 Check that the windshield and windows are defrosted. De-icing fluid should be
used for defrosting as scraping scratches the surfaces of plastic panels.
7 Test all main and auxiliary controls to ensure their freedom of operation.
flight. Ice can also interfere with the movement of control surfaces or add significantly
to aircraft weight. There is no such thing as an insignificant amount of ice.
Wind tunnel and flight tests indicate that ice, frost, or snow formations on the leading
edge and upper surface of a wing, having a thickness and surface roughness similar
to medium or coarse sandpaper, can reduce wing lift by as much as 30% and increase
drag by 40%. This may negate take-off stall margins altogether on commuter type
aircraft. The only method currently known of positively ascertaining that an aircraft is
clean prior to take-off is by close inspection.
Ice and frost formation is not limited to northern latitudes. Frost often forms on
the horizontal surfaces of DHC-6 aircraft parked overnight in Africa when night-time
temperatures fall to +5°C (41°F) or less and skies are clear.
Ice can form even when the outside air temperature (OAT) is well above freezing. A
DHC-6 aircraft equipped with extended range wing fuel tanks may have fuel in these
tanks that is at a sufficiently low temperature that it lowers the wing skin temperature to
below the freezing point. This phenomenon is known as cold-soaking. This situation
can also occur when a Twin Otter fitted with extended range wing tanks has been
cruising at high altitude for a period of time and this is followed by a quick descent to
a landing in a humid environment. Any form of moisture that comes in contact with a
wing that is at a temperature below freezing will then freeze to the wing surfaces.
Cold-soaking can also be caused by fuelling Twin Otter extended range wing tanks
with cold fuel. If there is rain or high humidity present, ice can form on the cold-soaked
portions of the wing and accumulate over time. This ice can be invisible to the eye and
is often referred to as clear ice. This ice can be detected by doing a tactile inspection
or by using specially designed ice detecting systems such as a Ground Ice Detection
System (GIDS).
It is essential that all lift and control surfaces of the aircraft be completely clear of ice,
snow, or frost prior to take-off. At major airports, de-icing services may be available
from a contractor, or the aircraft can be put in a heated hangar until such time that all
ice, snow, or frost melts. At remote airports, manual methods of ice, snow, or frost
removal such as use of a broom, brush, or rope may be used. Using these devices to
remove contamination does not always mean that the lift or control surface is clean and
safe for flight. Every time a manual method (as opposed to application of hot de-icing
fluid, or parking the aircraft in a heated hangar) is used to remove contamination, a
tactile inspection shall be done. If any contamination is found adhering to a lift or control
surface, it must be removed prior to flight. All frost must be removed – even residual
‘polished’ frost is dangerous and must be removed.
If any doubt exists concerning the aerodynamic cleanliness of the aircraft, request
de-icing or proceed to a de-icing facility. NEVER assume that snow will blow off,
because there could be a layer of frost or ice under it. Do not underestimate the effect
of even a thin layer of frost or ice on wing surfaces.
Under no circumstances should ice or snow that has frozen and adhered to the aircraft
be ‘chipped’ off the aircraft. The allowable damage tolerances for dents in the aircraft
skin – particularly for dents or scratches in the upper surface of the wings and horizontal
stabilizer – is measured in thousandths of an inch. A few moments of carelessness
attempting to chip ice off a wing surface can easily cause damage that may cost
hundreds of thousands of dollars to repair. The cost of using heated Type I de-icing
fluid to remove ice or snow, or parking the aircraft in a heated hangar for a few hours to
remove ice or show is insignificant by comparison.
Pay particular attention to the static ports during the exterior inspection when the
airplane has been subjected to freezing precipitation. Clear ice on or around the static
ports can be difficult to detect visually. A tactile inspection should be made.
Type II and Type IV anti-icing fluids are designed to adhere to the surface of the aircraft
until speeds just below the typical rotation speed of large jets, in other words, to adhere
to the aircraft until speeds are well above 100 KIAS. If these fluids are used on a Twin
Otter, they will continue to adhere to the lift and control surfaces after the Twin Otter
has become airborne, and the anti-icing fluid itself will become a contaminant to the
lift or control surface. For this reason, Type II and Type IV anti-icing fluids must not be
applied to Twin Otter aircraft to provide residual anti-ice protection.
Type III anti-icing fluids are suitable for aircraft such as the Twin Otter that have take-off
rotation speeds between 60 and 100 KIAS. Type III fluids begin to flow off the wing at
approximately 30 KIAS and the wing is intended to be essentially clean at airspeeds of
typically 60 KIAS. Type III fluids may be applied to DHC-6 aircraft in accordance with
the instructions provided by the fluid manufacturer.
If anti-icing fluid is to be applied to a Twin Otter after it has been de-iced, considerable
care must be taken to ensure that the formulation of the fluid is such that it is suitable for
application to low speed aircraft. In practice, this means following a two-step process,
using only Type I fluid for ice, snow, and frost removal, and only Type III fluid if residual
anti-ice protection is required during the time between de-icing and take-off.
Some airports or de-ice service providers offer a one-step de-icing and anti-icing fluid
application using heated and diluted Type II fluid. This one-step procedure using Type
II fluid is not acceptable for Twin Otter aircraft.
- Apply fluid from the front of the aircraft so that the fluid flows in the same direction
as airflow when the aircraft is in flight. This will avoid fluid accumulation behind
wing and horizontal stabilizer rear spars, and prevent fluid from entering the cabin
and engine air vent outlets.
- Do not force ice and snow into openings around flight control surfaces during
removal procedures.
- Do not apply fluid directly to aircraft windows.
- Do not spray fluid in engine air intakes or exhaust pipes, or to the cabin air intake.
- Do not apply fluid directly to pitot tubes or static ports.
- Do not spray fluid directly onto the lift detector (stall warning sensor).
- Do not direct a solid stream of fluid perpendicular to airplane surfaces. A high
pressure stream of fluid can damage airplane surfaces.
- Both the right and left sides of the wing and the right and left sides of the horizontal
stabilizer must receive equal and complete de-icing and/or anti-icing treatment.
If possible, shut down the engines prior to applying fluid to the aircraft. If this is not
possible, ensure that the bleed air valves are closed prior to applying fluid to the aircraft.
If the pilot wishes to prevent the hydraulic pump from cycling prior to engine start, the
hydraulic hand pump may be used to pump up the hydraulic system to normal operating
pressure. Do not, under any circumstances, pull the hydraulic system circuit breaker
out prior to engine start. This practice is no longer permitted. Series 400 aircraft are
fitted with 48 amp-hour batteries that have more than sufficient energy, even during
very cold weather, to bring the hydraulic system pressure up to normal levels and then
start the engine.
Series 400 engines are always started with the propellers in the full forward position. If
operationally necessary, an exception can be made for a floatplane if the propeller pitch
lock(s) did not engage when the engine was previously shut down. In such a case the
engine NG should be increased to 55% prior to bringing a generator online.
10.2.9 Taxiing
During taxiing the following precautions should be observed:
1 Taxi slowly on slippery ground and use brakes and nose wheel steering with caution.
2 Do not stop the aircraft on slush; continue moving until dry snow is reached.
4 Switch on pitot heat and windshield heat to ensure that the pitot head is warm
before taking off.
When landing on unbroken snow, height should be judged by reference to trees, fences,
or other ground objects.
3 If conditions permit, conduct the initial climb to 400 feet AGL (or greater) at 90 KIAS,
instead of the normal initial climb speed of 80 KIAS.
Procedures for the cruise, descent, approach and landing phases of flight are not
affected by application of de-ice or anti-ice fluids.
1 A yellow procedural placard on the aft face of the control column, suitable for aircraft
with de-ice equipment installed.
2 S.O.O. 6004 with Mod 6/2042 installed – Wing and Tail de-icing boots
3 S.O.O. 6202 or 6237 with Mod 6/2022 installed – Propeller (installation includes
valve heaters and PNEUMATIC LOW PRESS advisory and caution CAS messages)
The following equipment, which is standard on all DHC-6 aircraft, must be working
properly prior to entry into known or forecast icing conditions:
7 Windshield wipers
A small heater behind the lift detectors (stall warning sensors) is energized when pitot
heat is selected on, however, this heater is primarily intended to dry out the lift detectors,
not to de-ice the lift detectors. The lift detectors (stall warning system) must not be
relied upon as the only source for advance warning of impending stall whenever the
aircraft is being operated in icing conditions.
Several generations of pilots operating aircraft with pneumatic de-icing boots have been
cautioned against the dangers of ice bridging. Pilots were advised against activation
of the de-icing boots before sufficient ice has built up on the leading edge – generally
between 0.25 and 1 inch – out of concern that the ice would form around the shape
of the inflated boot, resulting in the boot inflating and deflating under a shell of ice,
making de-icing impossible. Despite the widespread belief in this phenomenon within
the pilot community and its coverage in numerous technical publications, its existence
cannot be substantiated, either technically or anecdotally. The major manufacturers
of de-icing boots reported that they had been unable to reproduce ice bridging under
any laboratory/wind tunnel conditions, and that any operational report of ice bridging
investigated by them had been determined to be a report of residual ice.
Residual ice is the ice remaining on a boot surface after an inflation cycle. Wind tunnel
tests have shown that a higher percentage of the ice on a boot breaks away if the ice is
allowed to build up to 0.25 to 1 inch prior to boot activation. Even in this case, some ice
may adhere to the boot after inflation, and be removed after a subsequent boot cycle.
If, however, the boots are inflated with a thin layer of ice on the boot surface, as little as
40% of the ice may be removed during the inflation cycle. This is not ice bridging, but
residual ice. When pneumatic boots with an automatic cycle are selected "On" with a
thin layer of ice on the boots, typically some residual ice will remain on the boots after
the first and second inflation/deflation cycles, but be totally cleared following the third or
fourth cycle. If the boots are left on automatic, the clearing pattern will repeat every third
or fourth cycle. To repeat, the ice remaining on the boots under such circumstances is
not evidence of ice bridging; it is evidence of residual ice.
It is both unnecessary and unsafe to “wait until a certain amount of ice has developed”
before turning on the de-ice boots. All Twin Otter de-ice boots are of a newer design that
provides a rapid inflation whenever pressure is applied to the boot. Twin Otter de-ice
boots have short, segmented, small diameter tubes that are operated by relatively
high-pressure engine bleed air. Older boot designs (dating back to the 1930s) such as
those fitted to the DC-3 or Gulfstream 1 have long, unsegmented, large diameter tubes
that are typically operated by engine-driven pneumatic pumps at lower pressures. The
NASA Glenn Research Center has used a Twin Otter aircraft to conduct icing research
since the early 1990s, and have never reported evidence of “ice bridging” on their Twin
Otter.
In Advisory Circular (AC) 91-74A, the FAA states that “even a thin layer of ice at the
leading edge of a wing, especially if it is rough, can have a significant effect in increasing
stall speeds” and recommends that de-ice systems be activated at the first indication
of icing.
The MANUAL mode of operation of the surface de-ice boots is provided only to increase
dispatch reliability in the event of a failure of the automatic (SLOW – FAST) timer. The
MANUAL mode should not be used in flight except as a reversionary mode in the event
of timer failure.
In summary: Viking recommends that surface de-ice boots be turned on using either
AUTO-FAST or AUTO-SLOW, as appropriate to the rate of ice accretion, at the first
indication of ice formation, and operated continuously in the automatic mode at all
times while flying in icing conditions.
Cycle surface de-ice boots before commencing holding, approach, or landing, following
any flight in icing conditions (even if ice appears to be insignificant).
Do not assume that because there is no longer significant ice on parts of the aircraft
you can see, the same is true of parts you cannot see.
Use surface de-ice boots in the automatic (fast/slow) mode. The manual inflation mode
is provided as a back-up in case of failure of the timer.
Remember that an accumulation of ice on the wing may change stall characteristics,
stall speeds or stall warning margins and if unchecked, could ultimately negate stall
warning.
Anticipate ahead of time the need for windshield heat, engine anti-ice (intake deflector
extension), propeller anti-ice (propeller heat) and wing/tail surface de-ice at all times,
especially during low speed hold or approach in instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC) or through precipitation.
Always know “the way out” of icing conditions. This may be above, below, forward, or
behind the aircraft. DHC-6 aircraft equipped for flight in known icing are designed for
flight in light or moderate icing conditions. Intentional flight in severe icing conditions
is prohibited.
Failure to operate the boots before extending flaps beyond 10° after any exposure to
icing conditions can cause tailplane stall, producing uncommanded rapid nose down
pitch. As a result, the de-ice supplement instructions require boot operation prior to flap
extension greater than 10° any time following mere exposure to ice during that flight.
Description
Since the rate at which ice accumulates on an airfoil is related to the shape of the
airfoil, and thinner airfoils have a higher collection efficiency than thicker ones, ice may
accumulate on the horizontal stabilizer at a higher rate than on the wings. Ice has in
fact been reported on the tailplane with none at all visible on the wings.
Tailplane stall occurs when the critical AOA of the tailplane is exceeded. Because the
horizontal stabilizer produces a downward force to counter the nose down tendency
caused by the centre of lift on the wing, stall of the tailplane will lead to a rapid pitch
down. Application of flaps, which in the case of the Twin Otter will increase downwash
on the tailplane, can aggravate or initiate the stall. Pilots should therefore be very
cautious in lowering flaps if tailplane icing is suspected. Abrupt nose-down pitching
movements should also be avoided, since these increase the tailplane AOA and may
cause a contaminated tailplane to stall.
Tailplane stall can occur at relatively high speeds, well above the normal 1g stall speed.
The pitch down may occur without warning and be uncontrollable. It is more likely to
occur when the flaps are selected to the landing position, after a nose down pitching
maneuver, during airspeed changes following flap extension, or during flight through
wind gusts.
Recognition
NOTE
This may not be detected if the autopilot is engaged.
- Any other abnormal or unusual pitch anomalies (possibly leading to pilot induced
oscillations).
- Reduction or loss of elevator effectiveness.
NOTE
This may not be detected if the autopilot is engaged.
- Sudden change in elevator force (control would move nose down if not restrained).
- A sudden, uncommanded nose down pitch.
Corrective Actions
- Plan approaches in icing conditions with minimum flap settings for the conditions. In
the case of the Twin Otter, this means using flap 10° for both approach and landing.
Fly the approach "on speed" for the configuration.
- If symptoms occurred shortly after flap extension, immediately retract the flaps to
the previous setting.
- Increase airspeed as appropriate to the reduced flap setting.
- Apply sufficient power for the configuration and conditions.
- Make any nose down pitch changes slowly, even in gusting conditions, if
circumstances allow.
- If the aircraft is equipped with a surface de-ice boots, operate the boots through
several cycles to attempt to clear ice from the tailplane.
Once a tailplane stall is encountered, the stall condition tends to worsen with increased
airspeed and possibly may worsen with increased power settings at the same flap
setting. At any flap setting, airspeed in excess of the published VREF (1.3 times VS1) for
the configuration and environmental conditions, accompanied by uncleared ice on the
tailplane, may result in tailplane stall and an uncontrollable nose down pitch. Tailplane
stall may occur at speeds below Maximum Flap Extended Speed (VFE).
WARNING
Immediately after main wheel touchdown, lower the nose wheel to the runway to
enhance directional control.
Do not attempt to turn off the runway until speed has been reduced to a manageable
level.
If multiple approaches and/or stop and go landings in icing conditions must be carried
out, the aircraft must be fully visually inspected by a qualified ground observer prior to
each take-off, with particular attention paid to inspection of the upper surface of the
wings and horizontal stabilizers. If any contamination is found, it must be removed prior
to flight.
Blockage of flight controls has been reported by operators of MD-80, BA-146, and
Dash 8 aircraft. The cause of the blockage of flight controls was found to be rehydrated
residue from Type IV fluid.
The rehydration occurred after Type IV fluid was repeatedly applied to these aircraft in
dry conditions, either to prevent frost from forming overnight or for de-icing just before
flight. The fluid dried out either prior to or during flight, and fluid residue remained in
aerodynamically quiet areas such as balance bays and wing and stabilizer rear spars.
In such conditions, if the airplane later encounters rain on the ground or during climb,
the dry residue will absorb water and turn into a gel. The gel then swells to many times
its original size and can freeze during flight, potentially restricting the movement of flight
control surfaces.
As stated earlier, Type IV fluid should never be used on Twin Otter aircraft. It is
theoretically possible that residue may accumulate on DHC-6 aircraft if Type III fluid
is used for anti-ice purposes. Although Type III fluids have not been directly linked to
any events involving flight controls, the composition of these fluids makes them equally
susceptible to residue problems as the Type II and Type IV fluids. It is important to note
that Type III fluids have only been commercially available for a short time, and on a
limited distribution basis, which is possibly the reason why no residue problems have
been reported so far.
To guard against the possibility of residue problems arising from the use of anti-icing
fluids, the aircraft should be inspected on a scheduled basis by an appropriately trained
and licensed maintenance technician if anti-icing fluids have been used. Viking cannot
prescribe an inspection interval because of the significant differences in weather
conditions and operational environments affecting the worldwide fleet. At a minimum,
aircraft should be inspected at least once per month whenever anti-icing fluids are
being used. Each operator needs to develop their own inspection schedule based
on operational experience, and to revise that schedule periodically based on findings
arising from the inspections.
To carry out an inspection for dried anti-ice fluid residue, visually inspect the above-
mentioned areas for the presence of dry or rehydrated residue anywhere in these areas.
The residue may be very hard to see, especially if dry.
Type I fluids, which are not thickened fluids and which are used only for de-ice (ice, snow
and frost removal) purposes, do not present the same risk of residue accumulation. No
inspection program is required if only Type I fluids are used.
Areas to be inspected if anti-icing fluids are used include the wing rear spar area,
including the actuating components for the ailerons and flaps, the aileron trim tab, and
all control surface hinges and balance bays; the horizontal stabilizer rear spar, including
the actuating components for the elevators, the gap seals, both elevator tabs, and
the control surface hinges and balance bays; and the vertical stabilizer, including the
actuating components for the rudder, both rudder tabs, and the control surface hinges.
Dry residue will normally be a thin film that may be partially covered with dirt or grease.
Rehydrated residue will often be a gel-like substance of more visible thickness, very
similar in appearance and texture to wallpaper paste. It is typically clear to slightly
straw-coloured, and thus difficult to see unless it is well illuminated.
Spray all the above-noted areas with a fine mist of warm water to rehydrate any residue
that may be present and to make it easier to identify. In some cases, rehydration may
occur quickly, but the process may be slow, especially if residue has accumulated
from multiple applications over a long period of time. Wait at least 15 minutes to allow
rehydration to take place. Obviously, do not spray the controls with water when the
ambient temperature is below freezing unless the airplane is in a heated hangar.
Once identified, the residue should be removed by using warm water with rags and/or
soft brushes to hand clean the gel-like substances away. You may also use a low-
pressure stream of water or compressed air to rinse away the residue. Make sure the
water or compressed air does not cause the residue to enter crevice areas that are not
accessible.
Research and experience have shown that the use of Type I de-icing fluid, or a mixture
of water and Type I de-icing fluid, is also a good cleaning agent for removal of residue
left by Type II, III, or IV anti-icing fluids.
Relubrication
This cleaning process has the potential of removing lubricants from control system
bearings and fittings, and removing corrosion inhibiters from control cables. Care
should be taken to avoid spraying cleaning fluids onto bearings, fittings, control cables,
and electrical connectors.
The cleaning process also has the potential to wash the residue into other areas, where
it may deposit and create a future problem. Attention should be paid to the runoff from
the cleaning process into other areas of the airplane, and these areas should also be
flushed until the operator is confident that any de-icing/anti-icing fluid residues have
completely left the airplane.
Similar to the inspection phase, do not spray the controls with water when the ambient
temperature is below freezing unless the airplane is in a heated hangar. Doing so may
result in ice that impairs the flight controls.
If residue has been found and removed by cleaning, all bearings, fittings, and control
cables in the area that was cleaned should be relubricated in accordance with Aircraft
Maintenance Manual instructions.
Prevention
If only Type I de-icing fluid is used, residue will not develop. If two-step de-icing and
anti-icing procedures are used, the residue problem will be greatly reduced (but not
One-step de-ice and anti-ice procedures using Type II or Type IV fluid must not be
carried out on DHC-6 aircraft. Type III anti-ice fluid should not be applied to parked, dry
DHC-6 aircraft to prevent anticipated frost or ice formation unless an immediate take-off
is planned after application of the fluid.
When Type III fluid is applied to the aircraft to provide holdover protection, the spray
should only be directed from the front of the aircraft towards the back, in the same
direction as airflow in flight. This will prevent Type III fluid from being forced into areas
behind the rear spar of the wing and horizontal stabilizer.
Application of any anti-icing fluid (e.g. Type III fluid) must be recorded in the aircraft
technical log.
Loss of control and collision with objects on the ground because the hydraulic oil pump
circuit breaker has been pulled out has been the single largest cause of Twin Otter
accidents during the past 30 years.
There is no justifiable reason for flight crew or maintenance staff to pull out the hydraulic
oil pump circuit breaker except when directed to do so by an abnormal or emergency
checklist, or if maintenance work is to be carried out on the hydraulic power pack and/or
associated electrical circuits.
These two modifications are obligatory, and aircraft operating without these two
modifications embodied to the control lock are not airworthy. The warning flag must not
be removed from the control lock.
Flight control locks must always be removed and stowed prior to engine start. Flight
controls must always be checked for full and free movement prior to take-off.
The upper portion of the control lock (the portion that attaches to the control yoke and
has the metal flag attached to it) is not interchangeable between the Series 400 aircraft
and legacy Series 300 aircraft. The metal flag on Series 400 control locks has been
modified to prevent it from rotating forward and damaging the left pilot PFD screen. If a
Series 300 or earlier control lock is fitted to a Series 400 aircraft, the flag may contact
the display screen and damage it. The lower portion of the control lock (the stick that
fits into the floor) is identical on both Series 300 and Series 400 aircraft.
If the aircraft must be backed up, an outside observer should assist to ensure that the
area behind the aircraft remains clear. The use of brakes should be avoided when
backing up.
Avoid prolonged brake application to control taxi speed as this causes high brake
temperatures and increased wear of brakes. If taxi speed is too high, reduce speed by
selecting zero thrust with the power levers.
Under normal conditions, differential braking and braking while turning should be
avoided. Allow for decreased braking effectiveness on slippery surfaces. Avoid
following other airplanes too closely. Jet blast is a major cause of foreign object damage.
During taxi, the use of reverse thrust above zero thrust is not recommended due to the
possibility of foreign object damage and engine surge. Momentary use of reverse thrust
may be necessary on slippery surfaces for airplane control while taxiing. Consider
having the airplane towed rather than relying on extended use of reverse thrust for
airplane control if the surface is extremely slippery.
AFM Supplement 19, Operation with Inoperative Autofeather System, is only provided
to permit temporary continued operation of the aircraft in accordance with the relief
provided in the MEL until such time as the autofeather system can be repaired. The
MMEL lists the autofeather system as a ‘Category C’ item, which means that repairs
shall be carried out within ten (10) consecutive calendar days, excluding the day of
discovery. Individual operator MELs may impose more restrictive limitations.
The autofeather system must be selected on prior to each take-off, and should not be
selected off until completion of the after-take-off checklist. Selecting the autofeather
system off is the last item on the after-take-off checklist.
The autofeather system is not designed or intended for use during approach and
landing and must not be selected on during approach and landing.
The autofeather system should be tested once per week. Satisfactory completion of
the functional test should be recorded in the aircraft technical log.
If operation of the pulse lights creates a distraction to the crew (for example, in night IMC
conditions), the LANDING LIGHTS – PULSE switch may be moved to the OFF position.
The pulse lights will operate when the aircraft is on the ground if the TCAS detects
another aircraft in close proximity (in other words, an amber target is depicted on the
TCAS screen). This is normal and unavoidable.
If the LANDING LIGHTS – STEADY switch is in the ON position, the landing lights will
remain on, steadily, at all times, regardless of the position of the LANDING LIGHTS –
PULSE switch.
Cabin reading lights must not be turned on for extended periods of time (for example,
to illuminate the cabin during maintenance or cargo loading activities) when the aircraft
is on the ground. The 6 general cabin lights mounted in the center of the roof panel
should be used for passenger and cargo loading during night operations.
1 Park the aircraft in an area that is likely to be free of sand or dust blown by other
aircraft.
2 Maintain fuel tanks full to reduce the susceptibility of fuel to moisture contamination.
3 Maintain intake deflectors at the extended positions during engine start and ground
maneuvering in desert environments.
4 Use covers to prevent the entry of sand or dust into the engines and pitot heads.
5 Head the aircraft into wind during loading and unloading to minimize sand entry into
the cabin.
1 Check the fuel strainers and fuel tanks for condensate by draining off a small
amount of fuel for examination.
3 Check the engine intakes, pitot heads, and static vents for obstructions.
4 If the aircraft has been exposed to blowing sand, even with engine intake covers
installed, lower the engine cowlings before engine start and check for sand in the
air ducts. Even small accumulations of sand in the lower engine cowling can cause
considerable damage to the engine during start.
8 feet square) on the ground, centered under the propellers in the aircraft parking
position. These plates can then be swept clean with a broom before engine start.
If a stop is to be longer than 5 minutes shut down both engines; if 5 minutes or less shut
down the left engine and leave the right engine running with the propeller feathered.
Constantly monitor the oil temperature of the operating engine.
When the propeller is feathered, there is very little airflow through the engine oil cooler
and close attention must be paid to engine oil temperature, particularly if the intake
deflectors are extended. It is possible that the oil temperature of an engine running
with propeller feathered will rise above the maximum limit due to loss of airflow over
the oil cooler. Normal operating temperature will be regained as soon as airflow over
oil cooler is restored by unfeathering the propeller.
10.4.1.2 Taxiing
The following recommendations are made to alleviate the conditions associated with
taxiing in hot weather and on sand strips.
Use brakes as little as possible to avoid overheating them, but be aware that it is
far better to use brakes than it is to use reverse thrust when operating in desert
environments. Brake pads and discs can be replaced for only a fraction of the cost of
an engine overhaul. Use of beta range between idle and zero thrust is acceptable, but
use of reverse during taxi or landing is to be avoided unless it is absolutely necessary
for safety reasons.
While turning in soft sand maintain a taxi speed and radius of turn that is compatible
with conditions. A turn made at excessive speed using nose wheel steering may cause
the nose wheel to plow and dig in, and this may overstress the nose wheel mounting at
fuselage station 60, resulting in a very expensive and time-consuming repair.
Do not, under any circumstances, use reverse power for backing the aircraft on sand.
10.4.1.3 Take-Off
When taking off from sand strips and in high ambient temperatures the following
procedures are recommended:
1 Do not lower flaps to the take-off setting of 10° until the aircraft is lined up into wind.
2 Leave the engine intake deflectors in the extended position until in position and
ready for take-off. Then, advance the power levers to 85% NG, retract intake
deflectors, wait 5 seconds until all engine indications have stabilized, then proceed
with the take-off.
3 To facilitate unstick of nose wheel during take-off from soft sand, hold the control
column fully back to relieve the load on the nose wheel, then check forward as the
aircraft becomes airborne; this will allow the nose wheel to lift clear of ground and
thus reduce drag during ground roll.
4 Due to lower air density in hot temperatures, the take-off run will be longer than
normal and the rate of climb will be reduced. Greater allowances, therefore, should
be made for clearing obstacles.
The intake deflectors must be retracted (as described in step 2, above) prior to take-off
whenever the outside air temperature is higher than ISA +27°C. This is because at
temperatures above ISA +27°C, engine power is limited by the thermodynamic limitation
of the engine, rather than by the flat rating limitation. This means that less than 50 lbs
of torque will be available for take-off at temperatures above ISA +27°C. Extending the
intake deflectors will reduce available torque by 2 PSI whenever the engine is operating
against its thermodynamic limit.
When intake deflectors are used during winter operations to prevent snow from entering
the engine, available torque is always limited by the flat rating of the engine, thus the
loss of 2 PSI of torque arising from intake deflector deployment is not a concern – the
power levers can still be advanced until 50 PSI of torque is achieved. In hot weather
conditions, when operating against the engine thermodynamic limit, it is not possible
to advance the power levers to recover the torque lost as a result of intake deflector
deployment.
10.4.1.4 Landing
When landing the aircraft in high ambient temperatures and on soft sand, the following
recommendations are made:
1 Extend the intake deflectors before power is reduced below 80% NG at the beginning
of the approach.
2 Avoid using reverse power when landing. If, however, it is necessary to use reverse
power for safety reasons, select full reverse immediately after touchdown, pause
momentarily, then advance the power levers to the zero thrust position in time to
prevent engine gas generator speed from increasing in reverse range. This will
prevent sand or dust from being blown forward into the engine air intakes and into
the propeller blades.
3 After touchdown hold the control wheel fully back until elevator effectiveness is lost.
This will maximize aerodynamic braking and minimize the risk of the nose wheel
digging into soft sand.
4 Use normal braking during landing ground roll. Heavy braking may cause brakes
to overheat. However, as was mentioned before, keep in mind that it is far less
expensive to replace brakes than it is to overhaul an engine, therefore heavy braking
should be used in preference to reverse thrust if retardation is required.
5 Because of the low air density in hot environments, the true airspeed of the aircraft
will be greater than the indicated air speed and the landing run will be longer.
6 When landing in the desert, judgement of height during the flare may be affected
by heat shimmer which produces a water effect and loss of horizon. Under these
conditions a powered approach is recommended and the flare may be made with
reference to ground objects.
1 Apply the parking brake only after the brake calipers and discs have cooled.
4 Promptly install covers on pitot tubes, static ports, engine inlets, engine exhaust
stubs, and the ram air inlet scoop.
10.5 Take-Off
10.5.1 Directional Control During Take-Off
The nose wheel must be confirmed to be centered in the straight-ahead position prior
to commencing the take-off roll. After maneuvering to take-off position on the runway,
center the nose wheel using the tiller, then allow the aircraft to roll forward approximately
3 meters (10 feet) to confirm that the nose wheel is correctly centered.
Normal take-off procedures dictate that NG must be increased to approximately 85% and
held at that value for 5 seconds (with brakes applied) prior to commencing the take-off
roll. This requirement ensures that the compressor bleed valves at engine station
2.5 fully close prior to application of take-off power, and allows the pilot to confirm (by
observation of the sharp drop in T5 on both engines) that both bleed valves have closed.
Allowing the engines to stabilize at 85% NG for 5 seconds prior to brake release also
provides uniform engine acceleration when full take-off power is set, thus minimizing
directional control problems. This is particularly important if crosswinds exist or the
runway surface is slippery. Achieving an exact initial setting of 85% NG on both engines
is not as important as setting symmetrical torque when both engines are operating at
or above 85% NG.
Under normal circumstances, when the all of the above procedures are followed, nose
wheel steering should not be required at any time during the take-off run.
2 A downslope runway
3 A tailwind
Following any rejected take-off from a speed greater than 40 KIAS, consideration should
be given to allowing brakes to cool prior to the next take-off.
When operating in headwinds greater than 20 KIAS, take-off and landing performance
data appropriate to 20 KIAS headwind shall be used.
Proper initial runway alignment and take-off power application result in good crosswind
control capability during take-off. Partial aileron deflection – approximately 30% of total
aileron travel – should be applied into wind at the beginning of the take-off roll, with
aileron input gradually reduced as speed increases. Light forward pressure on the
control column during the initial phase of take-off roll (below approximately 50 KIAS)
increases the contribution the nose wheel provides to maintaining a straight path on
the runway centerline. Any deviation from the centerline during the take-off run should
be countered with immediate rudder pedal inputs.
When taking off with strong crosswinds, asymmetric application of engine power at the
very beginning of the take-off roll may assist in maintaining directional control.
Control forces are light throughout the take-off when the correct flap and trim settings
are used. The airplane accelerates rapidly and can be rotated to unstick at liftoff
speed. At all weights 12,500 lbs and below, the target V2 airspeed of 80 KIAS should
be achieved by 50 feet and maintained until no less than 400 feet AGL. Power must
not be reduced from the full calculated take-off power setting until the flaps have fully
retracted, and flap retraction must not be initiated until either above 400 feet AGL or
clear of all obstacles, whichever occurs last.
The PT6A-34 engine installed on Series 400 and aircraft has been flat rated to 620 SHP.
This is a 130 SHP reduction from the engine's full rated power of 750 SHP. Therefore, a
take-off during ISA conditions with 620 SHP set (equivalent to 50 PSI torque) is already
an 83% power take-off.
Many years of operational experience with PT-6A series engines has proven that
imposing a further reduction on take-off power does not increase engine TBO or
decrease TBO costs. If an additional reduction from full calculated take-off power
is applied, the take-off distance increases, the accelerate-stop distance increases,
directional control during take-off degrades, and the risk of an unsatisfactory outcome
in the event of a power loss during take-off greatly increases.
Conducting the initial climb at higher airspeeds offers no safety benefit, increases the
noise footprint of the aircraft, and increases the length of time required to reach 400
feet AGL.
The first indication of a power loss will be yaw. If the aircraft is airborne during the
take-off phase of flight and a power loss occurs, pitch attitude must be reduced promptly
in order to maintain V2, which is 80 KIAS at maximum take-off weight. Reducing pitch
attitude by approximately half (e.g. if normal two engine pitch attitude to maintain V2 is
approximately 10° nose up, reduce pitch attitude to 5° nose up following a power loss)
is normally sufficient to maintain V2. The reduction in pitch must be made promptly
following recognition of a power loss. Failure to promptly reduce pitch attitude will result
in airspeed decreasing below V2, and this is a most serious piloting error that will likely
have fatal consequences.
Maximum power should already have been set as part of the normal take-off power
setting procedure. If maximum calculated take-off power was less than 50 PSI, the
power levers must be advanced until the first redline (Torque, NG, or T5) is reached.
Power levers must NOT be slammed forward to the physical stops, because this may
result in torque greater than 50 PSI. If torque is set higher than 50 PSI during single
engine operations VMC will increase and directional control may be lost.
If the power loss occurs at an altitude less than 400 feet, flaps should already be set at
10°, which is the only approved take-off flap setting for a landplane.
Confirm that the affected engine has feathered. If the affected engine has feathered, no
further immediate actions are necessary. All attention should be given to maintaining
V2 speed, maintaining directional control, and continuing to climb to a safe altitude.
The propeller of the operating engine is normally left at the 96% NP (maximum RPM)
position at all times following an engine failure. This ensures that maximum power is
always immediately available from the operating engine.
Only the first four actions (the bold print actions) in Section 3.4.3, Engine Failure
Airborne, After VMC should be carried out immediately, from memory. All subsequent
actions in that checklist should be deferred until the aircraft has reached a safe altitude
(typically several thousand feet AGL), and the aircraft has been established and properly
trimmed in level cruise flight.
10.6.1 Climb
Once the flaps have been retracted and the aircraft has accelerated, any speed equal
to or greater than 100 KIAS may be used for enroute climb. 100 KIAS is the best rate
of climb speed when flaps are retracted. Higher climb speeds may be used if desired.
Best angle of climb with two engines operating is achieved at 87 KIAS with flaps fully
up. This configuration is rarely if ever used in day to day operations. If maximum climb
performance is required to clear a ‘close-in’ obstacle immediately after take-off, it is
best to leave maximum take-off power set, leave flaps set at 10°, and continue to climb
at 80 KIAS until a satisfactory altitude is reached. For ‘close-in’ obstacle clearance, the
performance penalty incurred during flap retraction and subsequent acceleration to 87
KIAS is far greater than the increase in angle of climb gained.
10.6.5 Spins
Intentional spins are prohibited. However, should an inadvertent spin develop, normal
(generic) recovery technique should be employed. This consists of full opposite rudder
followed by progressive forward movement of the control column. When the spin stops,
the rudder should be centralized and the airplane eased out of the ensuing dive.
10.6.6 Stalls
The 1 g stall characteristics are satisfactory with power on or off at all approved center
of gravity positions. At the stall, the airplane pitches nose down slowly. Recovery is
effected by moving the control column forward and applying engine power; height loss
during a practice power-off stall need not exceed 300 feet. Throughout the stall, the
controls remain positive. An artificial stall warning system consisting of a light and
warning horn is provided because with flaps fully extended, there is only a very small
margin between the ‘natural’ stall warning of the aircraft (a gentle buffet of the elevator)
and the stall.
It is not recommended that 1 g power on stalls above the certification power level (28
PSI torque and 90% propeller RPM) be practiced. At higher power settings than this, the
airspeed will be very low (in the range of 30 to 40 KIAS) before the stall occurs, and any
error in aircraft handling or stall recovery technique may result in a violent aircraft upset.
Accelerated stalls (also known as whip stalls) are strictly prohibited. An accelerated
stall is a stall with a g loading greater than 1 g.
Stalls should not be practiced when the aircraft is configured for simulated single engine
operations, because the aircraft will decelerate below VMC prior to stalling.
At all times handling of aircraft should be in a smooth, deliberate and positive manner.
Avoid increasing load factors until a minimum maneuvering speed – nominally VREF –
has been achieved. Airspeed should be increased to no less than the VREF (1.3 times
stall speed) applicable to the aircraft weight and flap configuration, plus any additional
factors (for example, an additional airspeed allowance for gusts) that may be applicable.
The flap configuration should not be changed until airspeed has been increased to
VREF.
During training or checking activities that address recovery from stall warnings, the
training or checking should encourage recovery at the first indication of an impending
stall (stall annunciation appears, stall warning is voiced, or stall buffet detected). At no
time should a goal of zero altitude loss be a criteria for successful demonstration of
recovery from the initial indications of a stall.
In a situation where the airplane pitch attitude is unintentionally more than 25 degrees
nose high and increasing, airspeed will be decreasing rapidly. Normally (but not always)
this will be accompanied by a stall warning (stall annunciation appears, stall warning
is voiced).
As airspeed decreases, the pilot's ability to maneuver the airplane also decreases. In
this situation the pilot should trade altitude for airspeed, and maneuver the airplane's
flight path back toward the horizon. This is accomplished with nose-down elevator
movement. A rapid and large elevator application should be avoided as it could result
in a negative g maneuver. However, the rate of and degree of nose down pitch must
be sufficient to achieve the desired airspeed.
Once pitch attitude has been reduced airspeed will increase, improving elevator and
aileron control effectiveness. After the pitch attitude and airspeed return to the desired
range the pilot can reduce angle of bank with normal lateral flight controls and return
the airplane to normal flight.
Refer to the ‘Windshear Recovery Procedures’ later in this section for additional
guidance concerning operations at, and recovery from, high angles of attack. In
particular, note the warning immediately following “Windshear In-Flight Recovery
Procedure”.
For all other single engine operation conditions, the aircraft should be trimmed for wings
level flight with the ball in the middle. This will result in a decrease of about 30 feet per
minute from the single engine rate of climb figures published in the performance charts,
however, pilot workload will be substantially reduced, particularly so during instrument
flight conditions.
During single engine level cruise flight with the flaps up, airspeed will stabilize
somewhere between 105 KIAS and 120 KIAS (depending on weight) at normal cruise
power settings. If the airspeed falls below 100 KIAS during single engine cruse, this
usually indicates that an attempt to climb is being made, and consideration should be
given to extending 10° of flap in order to configure the aircraft for best single engine
climb performance.
It must be emphasized that the Twin Otter aircraft must NOT be flown at stall warning
as a windshear recovery technique.
10.6.10.1 Background
Windshear is defined as a sudden change in air mass direction and speed lasting for
a measurable period of time (as opposed to simple turbulence). Knowledge of how
windshear affects aircraft performance is essential to the application of proper vertical
flight path control techniques during an inadvertent windshear encounter. While many
windshear encounters have been related to weather fronts, strong surface winds,
mountain waves, etc., the worst encounters have involved wet microburst/downburst
phenomena associated with thunderstorms.
A microburst or downburst is a shaft of high velocity air moving down from the core of a
convective cloud to the ground where it spreads out in a gustfront in all directions. The
wind component is mostly horizontal at altitudes below 500 feet.
windshear is suspected, avoid large power reductions and excessive trim changes in
response to sudden airspeed increases as these may be followed quickly by sudden
decreases. All events will not be in the classic mould of symmetrical outflows as
described above. In fact, they can vary to the extent that the first recognizable encounter
might be the decreasing performance tailwind shear. Crew actions are divided into
three areas: Avoidance, Precautions and Recovery.
Avoid areas of known severe windshear. If severe windshear is indicated, delay take-off
or do not continue an approach until conditions improve. All crews should broadcast
any instances of airspeed fluctuation when shear is encountered. One aircraft, upon
entering the outflow area of a downburst, may encounter airspeed fluctuations but no
significant control problems. Another aircraft on the same flight path a few minutes
later, may experience airspeed changes many times greater than the previous aircraft,
accompanied by marked performance degradation and handling difficulties.
Use the full length of the longest suitable runway, provided it is clear of areas of known
windshear.
Be alert for airspeed fluctuations during take-off and initial climb. Airspeed fluctuations
may be the first indication of windshear.
Rotate at the normal pitch rate to the normal take-off pitch attitude. Minimize reductions
from this initial attitude until terrain and obstacle clearance is assured. Crews should
develop an awareness of the normal values of airspeed, attitude, vertical speed and
acceleration. Vertical flight path instruments such as vertical speed indicators and
altimeters should be closely monitored.
The PNF (pilot not flying) should call out any deviations from normal. If the PF (pilot
flying) feels that vertical flight path control is marginal at any time the PF will call
"WINDSHEAR – MAX POWER" and carry out the in-flight recovery maneuver outlined
below.
NOTE
MAX POWER is achieved at the torque, T5 or NG limit, whichever is
reached first.
Select the minimum approach/landing flap position consistent with field length and
add an appropriate wind correction to approach airspeed (such correction is applied in
the same manner as gust correction). Avoid large power reductions or trim changes
in response to sudden airspeed increases as these may be followed by airspeed
decreases. Closely monitor the vertical flight path instruments, specifically vertical
speed, altimeters and glideslope indicators – increasing the normal cross check
between these instruments and the flight director commands.
Initial response:
1 Apply MAX POWER/target known go-around attitude. This provides a fixed pitch
target in turbulence.
b Increase pitch target sufficient to stop descent but do not allow airspeed to
decrease below SPEED AT 50 FEET (from landing data graphs) or BALKED
LANDING CLIMB SPEED (from balked landing charts).
7 Airspeed – 80 KIAS
WARNING
Circling approaches – single engine or two engine – should be flown with flaps extended
to 10°.
Once final approach has been commenced, the propeller levers must be set to the 96%
NP position no later than 500 feet AGL, or 500 feet above DH or MDA, or whenever
the RESET PROPS caution CAS message appears, whichever of the three conditions
occurs first. The RESET PROPS caution CAS message will appear if the propeller
levers are not fully forward whenever torque is less than 20 PSI and airspeed has
decreased to less than 87 KIAS.
10.7.2 Landing
All landing performance figures (total landing distance, ground roll distance) were
determined using the following technique: Airspeed at 1.3 times stall for the selected
flap configuration, propeller levers forward, power sufficient to maintain a 3° glide path
until 50 feet above airport elevation (in practice, this means until ‘crossing the fence’),
then power reduced sharply to idle at 50 feet above airport elevation. In all cases, the
touchdown speed was 1.05 times stall speed for the selected flap configuration.
When the aircraft is landed using this technique, the kinetic energy traded off between
‘power levers to idle’ at 130% of stall speed and touchdown at 105% of stall speed is
sufficient to permit a steady and gentle transition from a 3° descent profile at 50 feet
above airport elevation to level flight just a few inches above the runway moments prior
to touchdown.
If this recommended technique is accomplished with precision, the stall warning will
sound just prior to touchdown as the aircraft is decelerating in level flight a few inches
above the runway.
is the maximum crosswind experienced during crosswind trials and is not considered
limiting. Operators are encouraged to establish their own crosswind landing policies.
The recommended technique for crosswind landing is to approach and touchdown with
the upwind wing lowered, using rudder to align the aircraft with the runway. As airspeed
decreases in the flare to touchdown, lateral and directional control requirements will
increase.
Following touchdown, hold the nose wheel on the runway with the elevators and use the
ailerons to inhibit any upwind wing lifting. The rudder should be used to control aircraft
heading until deceleration to taxi speed is complete, at which point nose wheel steering
and brakes may be used. Early use of brakes or application of significant amounts of
reverse thrust may produce lateral skidding, making directional control more difficult. If
lateral skidding is encountered during a crosswind landing, brakes should be released
and the power levers should be moved out of reverse to either zero thrust or IDLE thrust.
When runway lengths permit, landing flap setting may be reduced to further improve
both controllability and tolerance to crosswind.
The DHC-6 can land on very short runways if full flap is used for landing, and it can also
land in strong crosswinds when less than full flap is used for landing. Attempting to land
in strong crosswinds with flaps fully extended is not recommended, simply because the
crosswind component (as a percentage of touchdown speed) becomes too great.
Exceptionally, flaps 10° must be used for landing if an aircraft equipped for flight in known
icing (FIKI) is landing during icing conditions, or if an aircraft not equipped for FIKI is
landing following inadvertent exposure to icing conditions at any time during the flight.
Flaps 37° should not be used for landing if strong crosswinds are present.
Normally, flaps are not extended beyond 10° in IMC until the runway is in sight and
the decision to land has been made. This ensures that the aircraft is configured for
maximum missed approach performance if a missed approach becomes necessary.
During approach in VMC, landing flap may be extended once the aircraft is established
on final. Landing flap should be selected with sufficient time remaining to allow the
aircraft to be fully trimmed and fully stabilized prior to reaching 50 feet AGL.
After any power lever movement aft of the IDLE stop is initiated, a full stop landing must
be made.
The pilot’s seat(s) and the rudder pedals should be adjusted so that it is possible to
apply maximum braking with full rudder deflection.
In a crosswind, apply into wind aileron to maintain a wings-level attitude. This will
increase directional control. Nose wheel steering should not be used until the aircraft
has decelerated to taxi speeds.
The second group of procedures within the emergency (red bordered) portion directly
address individual CAS warning level (red) messages, for example, HYDRAULIC
POWER FAIL or DOORS UNLOCKED. Procedural names within this second group of
procedures exactly match the CAS message displayed.
Advisory level (cyan) CAS messages are grouped together after the amber messages.
Status level (white) CAS messages are also grouped together, after the cyan messages.
CAS messages that are specific to the Apex avionics system (in other words, not
Twin Otter aircraft specific) are presented together in the last portion of the abnormal
procedures section under the heading “Honeywell Primus Apex® System CAS
Messages”.
If a switch or control is not labelled, or if the label on the switch or control is different
from the term that is commonly used to refer to that switch or control, the reference will
not be capitalized. For example:
The action to be carried out by the pilot on the switch or control is also capitalized if it
exactly matches the labelling of the switch or control being referenced. Thus, references
to operating the pitot heat switch will appear as follows:
The exact text of CAS messages is presented in ALL CAPITAL LETTERS within the
body of the checklist procedures to facilitate recognition of the CAS message text. The
exact text of CAS messages is not presented in all capital letters in the titles of the
checklists, nor is it presented in all capital letters when it appears on the display screen
of the aircraft.
The logic that drives the CAS messages and the checklist actions have been
constructed to address all reasonably foreseeable emergencies and abnormalities.
It is not possible to construct an aircraft checklist that addresses every possible
circumstance, particularly when a complex malfunction or a series of malfunctions
takes place.
Crew are advised that if a CAS message appears for a reason other than the ‘probable
cause’ described in the checklist, the recommended actions that follow may not be
appropriate in that circumstance. For example, a GENERATOR OFF caution CAS
message will appear if a generator trips offline, and the recommended actions address
this particular causal factor. The GENERATOR OFF caution CAS message will also
appear if an engine fails due to fuel exhaustion or catastrophic internal failure. In such
a case, the recommended actions for the GENERATOR OFF caution CAS message
would not be appropriate or beneficial.
If a procedure requires the pilot to “pull” a circuit breaker, this means to pull it out (open
it), and to leave it pulled out.
If a procedure requires the pilot to “check” a circuit breaker, this means to observe and
note the state of the circuit breaker only, and not to take any action.
- RED Warning messages which require immediate corrective action by the pilot.
- AMBER Caution messages which requires the pilot's attention but may not require
an immediate action.
- CYAN Advisory messages which indicate a system condition that requires pilot
awareness and may require action.
- WHITE Status messages which convey low priority information.
Standard practice calls for the pilot to acknowledge the caution or warning then press
the illuminated MASTER annunciation button to silence the chime and extinguish the
MASTER annunciation light when it is safe and convenient to do so. Silencing the
chime and extinguishing the MASTER annunciation light will also enable the CAS to
notify the crew of future warning or caution messages, should additional messages
appear whilst other cautions or warnings are still present.
To avoid repeating this obvious action at the beginning of every procedure that
generates a caution or warning CAS message, this need to acknowledge the MASTER
annunciation and silence the chime by pressing the appropriate MASTER annunciation
button is stated here and will not be repeated in the checklists that follow.
Prior to taking any action, confirm that the checklist action selected matches the correct
colour of the CAS message.
Once the aircraft enters the take-off phase of flight during the take-off ground roll (this
is defined by the autofeather system being selected on, groundspeed ≥ 25 knots, and
both engine torque PSI ≥20 PSI), all warning level and caution level CAS messages
that are not considered to be absolutely critical are inhibited (suppressed from display)
until the aircraft leaves the take-off phase of flight. Prior to all of the above conditions
being fulfilled, no CAS messages are inhibited. Refer to Section 3 for a detailed listing
of CAS message inhibits.
Therefore, take-off should be rejected if any warning or caution level CAS message –
as evidenced by the illumination of the MASTER WARNING or MASTER CAUTION
annunciator – appears at any time between brake release and V1. There is no need for
the pilot to distinguish between a ‘critical' and a ‘non-critical' CAS message during the
take-off phase of flight, because the aircraft does so automatically and will only present
‘critical' CAS messages.
There are only three flight alerting system messages. They are:
A cyan advisory message TAKEOFF CONFIG will be displayed on the CAS until the
aircraft has been configured to meet the required criteria. If power of both engines is
set to greater than 20 PSI torque whilst this message is present, a red NO TAKEOFF
annunciation will appear in the attitude indicators and the aural warning NO TAKEOFF
will be voiced. To avoid nuisance warnings when autofeather and propeller governor
system tests are carried out, the aircraft should be configured for take-off prior to
commencing the system test(s).
1 The NO TAKEOFF warning will become active when power is advanced at the
commencement of the take-off.
2 The NO TAKEOFF warning will persist for 2 seconds after the airspeed has
increased above 40 KIAS (40 KIAS being the threshold used for determination of
air or ground status).
3 The NO TAKEOFF warning will cease 2 seconds after the airspeed has increased
above 40 KIAS. The cyan TAKEOFF CONFIG CAS message will then reappear.
4 The cyan TAKEOFF CONFIG CAS message will disappear when the aircraft climbs
above 800 feet radar altitude.
5 Take-off (T/O) power limitations will not be automatically applied to the engine
instrument indications if the autofeather system has not been selected ON. Climb
and cruise limitations (indicated by the absence of any limitation text) will be applied.
Under most circumstances, this will not have any impact on operations; however,
an amber T5 temperature caution message will appear if T5 temperatures during
the take-off phase of flight exceed the climb and cruise limitation of 740°. The
crew should disregard this amber caution message. A red T5 warning message will
appear if T5 temperatures exceed the normal take-off limitation of 790°. After climb
power has been set, the CAS messages will provide normal notification of climb
and cruise power limitations.
Flaps should not be extended beyond 10° until the decision to land the aircraft has been
made. Likewise, airspeed should not be decreased below 80 KIAS until the decision
to land the aircraft has been made. Flap 20° may be selected for a single engine
landing if runway length permits. If the runway is so short that full flap (37°) is needed,
consideration should be given to selecting a different, longer runway.
Be prepared for greater than normal deceleration of the aircraft when flap is extended
during single engine operation. This will require a proportionately larger than normal
forward movement of the power lever to counteract it. If the aircraft has been properly
trimmed during the single engine approach, it will yaw towards the operating engine
when power is reduced to idle, so be prepared to adjust rudder trim during the flare.
Use of reverse thrust during single engine landings of landplanes and skiplanes is
not necessary and is discouraged; however, it is not prohibited. Use of single engine
reverse is prohibited when the aircraft is operating on floats.
The main gear of the DHC-6 is robust. The nose wheel is less robust, particularly if it
is not in the centered position. The objective during an off-airport landing is to keep the
nose wheel off the ground as until the lowest possible speed, and to avoid using nose
wheel steering when landing on soft or rough surfaces.
maximum aerodynamic braking will be accomplished and the risk of nose wheel
damage or collapse will be minimized.
The power off glide ratio of the Twin Otter, with both propellers feathered, is –8.18%.
This results in a power off glide range of approximately two nautical miles for every
1,000 feet of height lost if the aircraft is flown at the appropriate glide speed for maximum
range.
Graphs showing the appropriate speeds for glide (for maximum range, and for maximum
endurance) are presented in Section 3, Figures 3-1 and 3-2.
When landing with a flat nose wheel tire, the concepts and procedure are similar to
a precautionary or forced landing. The objective is to keep weight off the nose wheel
until the lowest possible speed, hence the recommendation to avoid using the wheel
brakes or reverse thrust, both of which will apply pressure to the nose wheel. Nose
wheel steering should not be used at any time except as a last resort to prevent the
aircraft from leaving the runway.
Carry out the initial portion of the approach at no less than 95 KIAS with a descent rate
of 300 to 400 feet per minute, then slow to no less than 1.3 times stall speed for the
aircraft weight during the last 500 feet of descent. Speed should be reduced below 95
KIAS only when landing has been assured. The target descent rate of 300 to 400 feet
per minute should be maintained with power until just before touchdown. If the power
levers are moved to the IDLE position too early (at too great a height above the runway)
the tail skid may strike the ground during the flare. Touchdown should be made on the
main wheels only.
If the aircraft begins to sink below a nominal 3° approach profile during the final 500
feet of descent once speed has been reduced below 95 KIAS, recovery will require
substantial application of power.
If a go-around is necessary, best rate of climb speed with flaps 0° is 100 KIAS.
After touchdown on the main wheels, the nose wheel should be kept off the ground
with application of aft elevator until airspeed decreases below 60 KIAS. This will avoid
possible nose wheel shimmy due to the high touchdown speed. If runway length
is minimal, apply reverse thrust and maximum wheel braking immediately following
touchdown on the main wheels, but be alert to the risk of unequal response from the
engines when reverse thrust is applied, and the possibility of nose wheel shimmy due
to the high nose wheel touchdown speed.
The total landing distance required is substantial, at least twice the total landing
distance published for a full flap landing under the same circumstances.
10.8.22 Ditching
Ditching should not be attempted unless it is absolutely unavoidable. No ditching trials
were conducted during certification testing of the DHC-6. Several Twin Otters have
been unintentionally ditched. Based upon experience gathered from these unintended
ditchings, the following recommendations – which are generic in nature for high wing
aircraft, and do not constitute a formal procedure – are offered.
The crew should be familiar with the use of emergency and survival equipment
contained in their airplane. The passengers should be briefed on ditching procedures.
Fuel should be consumed until only the minimum fuel required for several approaches
remains because empty fuel tanks will provide additional buoyancy. To maximize
buoyancy, all doors and escape exits should be left closed until the airplane has come
to a complete stop on the water.
In order to select a heading for ditching which will allow for an optimum touchdown,
the wind speed and direction should be determined and as many low passes as
circumstances permit should be made to assess water surface condition relative to the
wind direction. If swell conditions exist, they should be assessed to avoid touching the
water with a wingtip during or immediately after touchdown. If approaching across the
swell, avoid landing into the face of the swell because the impact could cause structural
failure or loss of control.
Do a power-on approach at the normal speed with a rate of descent of as low as possible
(maximum 200 feet per minute rate of descent). As the water surface is approached,
the nose should be raised in a normal flare, and power should be smoothly brought to
IDLE by the time the level attitude has been reached in the flare. The airplane should
be held off the water until the aft limit of the control wheel travel has been reached.
If you elect to use reverse thrust at or near touchdown to minimize nose down pitch be
aware that reverse thrust applied at altitudes above approximately 10 feet (AGL) may
result in a hard landing and structural damage to the airplane. The structural damage
may make it difficult to open doors for escape. Additionally, it may not be possible to
apply reverse thrust after contact with the water, owing to the “g” forces caused by rapid
deceleration of the airplane.
The control wheel should be held fully aft until the airplane has come to a complete
stop. Both the engine FUEL levers and the FUEL OFF emergency switches on the fire
panel should be used to shut off the engines.
Because the undercarriage is not retractable, the airplane will decelerate rapidly
following contact with the water, and will be subject to a strong nose-down pitching
motion. The airplane should be expected to initially float with one wing in the water.
The evacuation should be made from the high side of the aircraft, since opening doors
or escape hatches on the high side will admit less water. The plug-type escape hatches
near the wing in the passenger cabin do not reach the floor, and would not be expected
to admit water as readily as the doors in the crew or passenger compartments. The
top portion of the escape hatches must open before the retaining tabs in the bottom of
the escape hatch doors can come free of the fuselage. If it is necessary, kick or punch
the top half of the escape hatch plug-type door outwards after the release handle has
been pulled.
No data is available for estimating the floating duration of the DHC-6 airplane.
If a starting abnormality is encountered after fuel has been introduced to the engine, the
starter should be kept engaged for 10 seconds after the FUEL lever is moved to the OFF
position. This will aid in reducing engine internal temperatures and clearing unburned
fuel out of the engine. If a fire develops in an engine during start (as evidenced by
smoke or flames visible at the exhaust stub), move the FUEL lever to the OFF position
immediately, and continue to crank the engine with the starter to clear the fire. It may
be appropriate in such circumstances to exceed the normal 25 second starter operation
time limit.
During engine start (as evidenced by the annunciation “Start” in green text within the
engine window), engine limitations and gauge colour code markings are automatically
recalibrated to reflect the limitations that apply during starting conditions. The numeric
indication for any displayed engine parameter will appear in inverse video against an
amber or red background if a starting limitation is exceeded. As long as the numeric
indication of an engine parameter is presented in normal white text against a black or
grey background, the parameter is within limits for starting conditions.
When beginning the engine shutdown procedure, reduce torque on the problem engine
to 10 PSI torque – this is approximately equal to zero thrust. If the engine has failed
completely and is not producing any torque at all, retard the power lever of the problem
engine to the position that would normally produce 10 PSI torque – this is about one
inch forward of the idle stop. If the power lever is brought back all the way to the idle
stop before the propeller is feathered, excessive drag will be created (this as a result of
the beta reverse valve on the propeller governor being partially depressed) and this will
aggravate yaw, create directional control difficulties, and cause an unwanted reduction
in airspeed.
After retarding the power lever of the problem engine to about one inch forward of the
idle stop, feather the propeller of the problem engine. Finally, shut the problem engine
down by moving the fuel lever of the problem engine to the OFF position.
Once this is done, attention should be focused entirely on aircraft control, trim setting,
and aircraft performance. Calculate and, if necessary, set maximum continuous power
on the operating engine. The remainder of the checklist may be completed once the
aircraft is fully trimmed and satisfactorily under control.
After the inoperative engine has been shut down, the position of the power lever of the
inoperative engine should be brought forward and matched to the position of the power
lever for the operating engine, and the two power levers should be moved together for
the remainder of the flight. This will simplify engine control actions for the remainder of
the flight and eliminate any confusion about which power lever needs to be moved –
the pilot just moves both power levers together at the same time, same as he or she
would during two engine flight.
The practice of moving the power lever of the problem engine back to only one inch
forward of the idle stop (rather than moving it all the way back to the idle stop) applies
any time an engine needs to be shut down during flight for any reason.
When an engine is shut down by moving the FUEL lever aft from the ON position to the
OFF position, CAS messages about conditions that are normally associated with an
engine that is not running (for example, low oil pressure) are automatically suppressed
to avoid cluttering the engine display and CAS list with unnecessary information. If
an engine is shut down while the aircraft is in flight, most (but not all) CAS messages
associated with that engine will be cleared from the CAS list, and the engine limitations
applicable to the remaining operative engine will automatically be recalibrated to reflect
maximum continuous power limitations. This is indicated by the appearance of ‘S/E'
(indicating single engine limitations are in effect) in the upper outboard corner of the
engine window.
The primary propeller governor is calibrated to allow a maximum speed of 96% NP. If
the primary governor should fail, the propeller overspeed governor will limit maximum
propeller speed to 101.5%. If the primary governor fails and the overspeed governor
operates satisfactorily at 101.5%, the engine does not need to be shut down, and it may
be used through its full range of power output for the balance of the flight. A landing
should be made as soon as practical. To reduce the propeller speed mismatch between
engines, the PROP lever of the unaffected engine should be moved forward to the MAX
RPM position. This will reduce power lever stagger and minimize rudder trim change.
If NP exceeds 101.5%, the overspeed governor is not functioning correctly and the
engine should be shut down.
Uncommanded Feathering
A failure of the autofeather system, if selected on, could also cause a propeller to
feather, although the probability of this happening is rare. Selecting the autofeather
switch to the off position should cause the propeller to come out of feather. If this solves
the problem, the engine may be used for the remainder of the flight.
If none of these actions solve the problem, and all engine indications other NP than are
satisfactory, the engine may be left running at idle power if so desired in order to supply
electricity and bleed air for operation of the de-icing systems. The PROP lever of the
affected engine should be moved to the FEATHER position. If the affected engine is
not needed for electrical generation or bleed air purposes, it should be shut down.
Propeller Reversal
The actions to take for an in-flight propeller reversal depend on whether the aircraft
is equipped with propeller blade latches. Propeller blade latches are fitted to all
floatplanes, but are normally not fitted to aircraft used exclusively on wheels or skis.
If the propeller is not fitted with blade latches, the engine should be shut down. If the
propeller is fitted with blade latches, the power lever of the affected engine should be
brought to IDLE, and the engine left running.
During final approach, the RESET PROPS caution light serves as a reminder to the
pilot to put the two PROP levers forward to the MAX RPM position in order to force
the primary propeller governor into an underspeed condition and thus give the pilot
direct control of propeller blade angle via the power levers. To enhance control of the
aircraft and also to ensure that the pilot has full engine horsepower available during
final approach, the PROP levers must be moved forward to the MAX RPM position no
later than 500 feet AGL when making a visual approach, or 500 feet above decision
height or MDA when making an instrument approach.
Series 400 aircraft are equipped with current limiters. There is no reverse current circuit
breaker.
The BUS TIE switch should never be opened during electrical abnormalities unless it
is absolutely necessary to do so. There will be a significant loss of avionics and system
display functionality whenever one bus (left or right) is not powered. It is recommended
that this be demonstrated during pilot training, when the aircraft is parked on the ground,
securely chocked with both engines running at idle power. Note that the abnormal
procedures for resetting a failed generator on the Series 400 aircraft do not call for the
BUS TIE switch to be opened at any time.
In the event of a failure of both generators that cannot be resolved, the main aircraft
battery will support IFR operations for at least 30 minutes. Battery life may be prolonged
by shutting off unnecessary electrical services. Electrical services that use considerable
amounts of power, in approximate order from highest to lowest, include air conditioning,
windshield heat, propeller de-ice, the vent fan, valve heat, pitot heat, weather radar,
landing lights, and HF radios.
Series 400 aircraft are equipped with 48 amp-hour main batteries. A rough
approximation of battery life can be made by dividing electrical demand observed on
the battery loadmeter by the amp hour rating of the battery. If electrical demand is 60
amps, the battery will provide power for up to 48 minutes. This calculation should be
discounted by approximately 20% because the battery will not maintain full voltage
until total discharge is reached. Thus, 38 minutes of battery service could reasonably
be expected from a 48 amp-hour battery if the electrical demand is 60 amps.
Typical electrical current demand of the Series 400 aircraft, without de-ice or cabin
heating, cooling, or ventilation services operating, is 45 amps. The Apex avionics
system (the MAU) will shut down when voltage drops to 18 volts. Other avionics
components (e.g. transponders, weather radar) may shut down at higher voltage
thresholds. This Electronic Standby Instrument System (ESIS) is powered by its own
independent battery, and will normally operate for approximately 6 hours from this
battery.
If the aircraft is in flight and both generators are switched off, individual amber LEFT and
RIGHT GENERATOR OFF caution level CAS messages will post for each generator.
After two minutes flight time has elapsed with both generators off, these two messages
will be consolidated into a single red (warning level) CAS message GENERATORS
OFF. The two minute delay prior to consolidation of the two messages into the single
collector message is provided to allow abnormal procedures that call for both generators
to be momentarily turned off to be carried out without immediate posting of the warning
level collector message. The collector message will never post when the aircraft is on
the ground.
If the automatic changeover system works as designed and the BOOST PUMP 2 FAIL
caution CAS message for the affected tank is not present, do not lift up (turn on) the
BOOST PUMP 2 switch.
If the automatic changeover system does not work, as evidenced by posting of both the
BOOST PUMP 1 FAIL and BOOST PUMP 2 FAIL caution CAS message for the same
tank, lift up (turn on) the BOOST PUMP 2 switch for the affected tank. If the BOOST
PUMP 2 FAIL caution CAS message does not disappear, adjust the FUEL SELECTOR
rotary switch so that both engines are supplied from the opposite side (unaffected)
tank, and land with the FUEL SELECTOR switch in this position. Consider the fuel in
the affected tank to be unusable for fuel planning purposes.
It has been demonstrated that the engines will perform at low altitudes without the
fuselage fuel tank boost pumps operating. The altitude at which the fuel supply to the
engine may become inadequate varies with the fuel used and the temperature of the
fuel. Flights over 10,000 feet have been made using new engines, new engine-driven
fuel pumps, and cold JP4 fuel. If a double boost pump failure occurs at high altitudes
(above 8,000 feet pressure altitude at cruise power), an engine flameout is possible.
If this occurs, the engine may be re-started once fuel supply has been re-established.
In all of the above cases, the abnormal procedure provided in Section 3 will include
pulling the circuit breaker for the affected number 1 pump.
The FUEL LOW LEVEL caution CAS message will post when 75 lbs of fuel remains
in the forward tank and/or when 115 lbs of fuel remains in the aft tank. This is equal
to 12 minutes and 17 minutes, respectively, of flight at maximum continuous power. It
is unlikely that any pilot would choose to operate the engine at maximum continuous
power when a FUEL LOW LEVEL caution CAS message is illuminated. Be aware that
the FUEL LOW LEVEL caution CAS message on the Series 400 aircraft is driven by
either one of the following conditions:
2 The fuel quantity gauging system indicates that the fuel quantity in the tank has
reached the level at which the float switch should move downwards (75 lbs forward
tank, 115 lbs aft tank).
The basic principle to follow when a FUEL LOW LEVEL caution CAS message posts
is to adjust the FUEL SELECTOR rotary switch so that both engines are supplied from
the opposite side (unaffected) tank, and then land with the FUEL SELECTOR switch in
this position. The fuel in the tank with the FUEL LOW LEVEL caution CAS message
should be considered unusable for fuel planning purposes.
A FUEL LOW BOTH TANKS red warning level CAS message will post if a low level
condition is detected in both fuselage tanks. The red FUEL LOW BOTH TANKS
message replaces the two individual FUEL LOW LEVEL messages. In the event of
imminent fuel exhaustion, as indicated by posting of the FUEL LOW BOTH TANKS
red CAS message and correspondingly low fuel levels indicated on the fuel gauges,
virtually all the remaining fuel may be used down to the zero point on the fuel gauges,
but in order to use all of the usable fuel on board (in other words, in order to use the
last 100 lbs remaining in each tank), the aircraft pitch attitude must be kept as close to
level as possible. The FUEL SELECTOR rotary switch may be adjusted as necessary
to balance fuel tank levels so as to make use of all fuel on board. Obviously, a landing
must be made as soon as possible. This may require consideration of an off-aerodrome
precautionary landing. Minimum power necessary to sustain flight should be used in
order to conserve fuel.
In an emergency, 240 lbs per engine per hour (assuming no winds aloft and a pressure
altitude of 10,000 feet) may be used as a starting point while more precise calculations
are made to determine the appropriate power setting for best fuel range.
If a FUEL LOW LEVEL caution CAS message posts and the fuel gauge for the
corresponding tank indicates a quantity of 300 lbs or greater, it is probable that fuel
is not transferring correctly from the collector cells into the fuel tank cell that contains
the boost pumps and the fuel low level float switch. Lifting up (turning on) the BOOST
PUMP 2 switch for the affected tank may help with fuel transfer if the problem is
caused by reduced performance of the number 1 boost pump, but this may not help
if the problem is caused by a blockage in the fuel gallery under the tanks. The most
appropriate action is to adjust the FUEL SELECTOR rotary switch so that both engines
are supplied from the opposite side (unaffected) tank, then consider the fuel remaining
in the affected tank to be unusable for fuel planning purposes.
If fuel quantity becomes critical following a fuel transfer failure, almost all of the fuel
in the affected tank can be used provided that the aircraft is kept in an approximately
level pitch attitude. A slight nose-up attitude will facilitate gravity transfer of fuel if the
problem is in the forward tank, likewise, a slight nose down attitude will facilitate gravity
transfer of fuel if the problem is in the aft tank. Extreme pitch attitudes, or prolonged
nose-up or nose-down attitudes that do not favour gravity flow of fuel within the cells of
the affected tank should be avoided.
Be aware that when the BOOST PUMP 2 switch for either tank has been selected up
to the on position, the number 2 boost pump will continue to operate even when the
FUEL SELECTOR rotary switch has been rotated to selected the other (opposite side)
tank. This can be either advantageous or undesirable, depending on fuel tank levels
and fuel management objectives.
If the aircraft is equipped with optional extended range wing tanks, the boost pumps
for the wing tanks may be selected ON in order to take advantage of any fuel that may
be present in the wing tanks. Fuel will continue to flow from any one wing tank to the
engines when the FUEL SELECTOR rotary switch has been moved away from the
center (NORM) position, as long as fuel is present in the wing tank and the wing tank
boost pump is ON. This may be confirmed by observing the reduction in fuel quantity
in the wing tank over time, and the corresponding decrease in the rate of consumption
of fuel from the selected main tank over time.
The inverse video amber blocks beneath the fuel gauges within the fuel system window
that display ‘Pmp1' and ‘Pmp2' exactly mimic the behaviour of Series 300 Twin Otter
caution lights. These indications are provided to enhance commonality between
aircraft in a mixed fleet (300/400) environment and they are not considered to be
CAS messages. There are no procedures associated with these amber inverse video
indications. All of the fuel abnormality procedures are based on the messages that are
posted to the CAS list.
It is not possible to determine from observation alone whether lower than normal
hydraulic pressure is caused by a failure of the electric hydraulic pump or by a loss of
hydraulic system fluid. If the electric hydraulic pump runs continuously but pressure
does not rise, this suggests a loss of fluid.
If low hydraulic pressure is observed, the first action to take is to attempt to pump up
hydraulic pressure using the hand pump. If pressure rises, a failure of the electric
pump can be presumed, and the circuit breaker for the electric pump should be pulled.
Hydraulic pressures as low as zero PSI are acceptable in cruise flight because air
loads will keep the flaps in the fully retracted position, and wheel brakes and nose
wheel steering are not required in flight. Prior to reducing speed in preparation for flap
extension, hydraulic pressure should be pumped up to approximately 1,500 PSI.
Once flaps are extended, hydraulic pressure should be maintained at 1,500 PSI or
higher at all times. The pilot should plan to come to a full stop following landing. Flaps
should not be retracted until the aircraft has come to a full stop and the parking brake has
been set. Otherwise, a normal approach and landing may be carried out. Subsequent
taxiing of the aircraft should be carried out slowly and with considerable caution. Large
movements of the nose wheel tiller may deplete hydraulic system pressure faster than
the pilot can operate the pump.
If hydraulic pressure does not rise after 30 to 40 strokes of the hand pump, a loss of
hydraulic fluid can be presumed. If the leak is in the braking system, all fluid will be
lost. If the leak is not in the braking system, sufficient fluid may remain in the brake
accumulator to allow for 2 or 3 applications of brakes after landing. To conserve fluid, do
not press the brake pedals until the aircraft is on ground and wheel braking is needed.
In either case, if hydraulic fluid has been lost, flaps will not be available, and nose
wheel steering will not be available. A flapless landing will need to be made. Runway
requirements will be well in excess of twice the length published for a normal landing,
and a minimum 4,000 foot runway length at ISA conditions is recommended if there is
any doubt about availability of wheel brakes.
The recommended procedure for a flapless landing is provided in the abnormal checklist
for ‘Flapless Landing’. Additional guidance is for a flapless landing without wheel brakes
is as follows:
After touchdown, the nose wheel should be kept off the ground as long as possible
with application of aft elevator. Rudder should be used for directional control. Aileron
may also be used if a crosswind is present, to equalize the weight on the main wheels.
When the nose wheel eventually falls to the ground even though full aft elevator has
been applied (typically this will happen at approximately 30 KIAS), slow and cautious
application of zero thrust (not reverse thrust) will assist in stopping.
Be aware that engines may not spool up at equal rates of speed if reverse thrust is
used, and nose wheel steering will not be available. For this reason, use of reverse is
not recommended unless there is a risk of over-running the far end of the runway.
Once the aircraft has come to a stop on the runway, shut the engines down by moving
the fuel levers to the OFF position without feathering the propellers. Do not under any
circumstances attempt to taxi the aircraft after it has come to a full stop on the runway
following landing. The aircraft will need to be towed off the runway.
The operational checklists for a DOOR UNLOCKED CAS message are thus constructed
based on the lessons learned in these unfortunate accidents. It is difficult and
dangerous to attempt to exit the DHC-6 on ground via the flight compartment doors
unless the engine on the appropriate side has been shut down. At normal engine idle
speed, even a feathered propeller still rotates with sufficient force to kill a person on
contact.
Successful control of the DHC-6 has been demonstrated in flight with all doors opened.
During nose up climb attitudes, the nose baggage compartment door will open fully.
It is quite likely that the door will part from the nose baggage compartment structure
shortly after it opens if it becomes unlatched during a climb, and it will likely strike the left
propeller after it parts from the nose section. There is nothing that can be done to stop
this from happening; therefore all attention should be focused on normal control of the
aircraft during the climb. If the nose baggage door is still present at the top of climb, it
will move towards the closed position when the aircraft is levelled off. A full flap landing
should be made to minimize the likelihood of the door lifting again during the flare.
The flight compartment doors will open and trail several inches out at the aft edge due
to low pressure in the area of the door if they become unlocked during flight. Closing
and re-locking the door can be assisted by lowering the window of the opposite side
pilot door several inches and then making a forward slip towards the affected door. The
pilots should keep their seat belt and shoulder harness fastened at all times. If it is not
possible to easily close the door, simply disregard it.
If the main cabin doors (the double doors) become unlocked on an aircraft equipped
with cargo doors (dual sideways opening doors), the forward of the two doors will remain
almost fully closed due to airflow. The rear of the two doors may open fully and impact
the baggage compartment door handle. This may cause the baggage compartment
door to unlock, however, the baggage compartment door will not be able to open due
to the presence of the aft main door which will held against the baggage compartment
door by the airflow.
If the airstair door opens in flight, considerable rudder and aileron trim will be required
to compensate for the drag created by the door, but the aircraft will continue to be fully
controllable. The landing should be made in as level an attitude as possible to minimize
the possibility of the airstair door touching the ground during the flare and causing
directional control difficulties during the flare. No attempt of any kind should be made
to close the airstair door in flight.
If the right rear door becomes unlocked in flight, it will remain mostly closed due to air
flow.
The ESIS (Electronic Standby Instrument System) always receives pitot pressure from
the right side pitot tube. No provision for switching pitot pressure supply to the ESIS
is provided. The rationale for this is that during normal operations of the aircraft, the
left pilot will be looking at the left pitot tube pressure input on the primary flight display,
and right pitot tube pressure input on the ESIS. The ESIS normally receives static
information from the upper static ports – the same static ports that normally supply
the right side primary flight display. The rationale for this is the same – during normal
operations, the left pilot will be looking at lower static port information on the primary
flight display, and upper static port information on the ESIS.
If the upper static port information is known to be unreliable (for example, it is known that
the upper static ports are plugged), the source of static air for the ESIS can be switched
to the lower static ports by operating the valve on the center pedestal, between the
RAM AIR valve and the CABIN AIR valve. Note that on the Series 400 aircraft, this valve
only affects the ESIS static supply. Pitot and static data for the primary flight displays
can only be switched electronically, as explained in the second paragraph above.
As with any new (to an individual pilot) avionics system, the initial learning curve is
quite steep, but it is no more difficult than the initial learning curve associated with
similar integrated avionics system such as the Garmin 430 and 530 units, the Garmin
1000 integrated avionics system, or the Honeywell Primus Epic® avionics system. The
following suggestions are offered to assist the pilot:
1 Thoroughly review the Honeywell Pilot Guide for the Primus Apex® Integrated
Avionics Suite in the Series 400 Twin Otter. This pilot guide presents key concepts
such as windowing, focus, paging, and control. These concepts must be understood
before any attempt is made to operate the system.
2 Be aware that in most cases, there is more than one way to carry out a procedure,
and more than one way to accomplish a desired result. It is impossible to state
that “one way is better than another”; however, as experience is gained using the
system, each individual pilot will learn that for any given situation, one way may be
more efficient than another. Operating procedures should be carried out using the
method that is most appropriate for a particular situation.
3 After completion of initial classroom training that presents theory of operation and
explains basic concepts such as windowing, focus, cursor control, data entry,
paging, and reversion, the best possible learning environment is sitting in the actual
aircraft, with ground power connected.
the avionics system was last powered down, the self tests will be skipped and the
system will boot up somewhat faster.
Following normal start-up, the INAV map display will always show Phoenix Deer Valley
airport (the site of Honeywell's manufacturing facility) at the center of the map, and no
aircraft symbol will present. If the pilot pans the map to the known present position
of the aircraft, no aircraft symbol will be displayed. The Flight Management System
(FMS) must be always initialized by selecting and confirming the present position of the
aircraft, as explained in the Honeywell Pilot Guide. Until this is done, the amber CAS
message UNABLE FMS-GPS MON will be displayed.
If the pilot has not initialized the FMS and the aircraft subsequently enters flight mode,
the FMS will auto-initialize based on GPS position information.
If the weight calculation is completed, the FMS will compare fuel consumption recorded
by the fuel flow sensors against the reduction in fuel on board measured by the
fuel quantity gauging system (FQGS), and the FMS will generate an alert message
(displayed on the INAV map screen) if a difference of more than 4% exists between
FMS recorded fuel flow and FQGS measured fuel quantity.
For normal Twin Otter take-offs, V2 will always be 80 KIAS, and VT (target speed after
flap retraction) will always be 100 KIAS. These two speeds correspond to best rate of
climb with flaps 10° and best rate of climb with flaps 0°, respectively. For normal Twin
Otter landings, VGA (go-around speed) will always be 80 knots, and VT (target speed
after flap retraction) will always be 100 knots. The correlations are the same as those
given for take-offs.
In the event of a disagreement between the mechanical pointer and the electronic
indication, the mechanical pointer should be considered authoritative, unless a visual
inspection of the affected trim tab and comparison of the two indication systems
suggests otherwise.
1 Insert the destination airport into the flight plan if it is not already in the flight plan.
2 Place the cursor over the destination airport (within the flight plan list).
3 Press the enter button, the select “Change Destination” from the drop-down menu.
There are other methods of changing the destination airport; however, the procedure
provided above is generally the simplest and most straightforward method.
In general, this automatic decluttering is desirable and beneficial, but it can be both
confusing and frustrating for the pilot if the pilot does not fully comprehend the logic
that drives the automatic decluttering. The Honeywell Pilot Guide provides complete
elaboration and explanation of what data is removed under what circumstances.
Pilots are encouraged to connect the aircraft to ground power and to explore the
behaviour of different data overlay layers at different map display scales. Once the
basic principles are understood, the automatic decluttering makes sense.
1 Select the point of interest (an airport, navaid, or simply a location on the map)
using the cursor.
This can be confusing for pilots who are used to seeing a flag whenever the selected
navigation signal is invalid.
The Apex displays will only show a red X in place of the course deviation indicator or the
glideslope pointer in the event of a failure of the VHF receiver (a failure of the multi-mode
digital receiver within the aircraft). The red X symbol will not be displayed if the VHF
receiver is operating properly but no valid VHF navigation signal is being received.
The pilot can modify the descent angle used by selecting the TOD (top of descent)
waypoint in the waypoint list, and changing the descent angle manually within the
CROSS dialog box. A 2° angle will yield a 500 FPM rate of descent at VMO.
It is acceptable (and arguably desirable) to use FMS guidance for VOR and NDB
instrument approaches, provided that the approach has been approved for GPS overlay
use. It is not acceptable (and is prohibited in the limitations section of the AFM) to use
the FMS for guidance on any form of approach that uses a localizer type signal for final
approach guidance. This includes ILS and LOC approaches, and also includes back
course localizer, localizer directional aid (LDA) approaches, and surveillance radar
approaches (SRA). Unlike Garmin 430 and 530 navigators, the Apex system does
not provide a textual prompt reminding the pilot to switch from FMS guidance to VHF
(localizer) guidance.
To manually enter a latitude and longitude into the FMS (for example, for FMS
initialization in the absence of GPS reception, or to define a pilot waypoint), place the
cursor over the Latitude/Longitude text box to give it focus. This will be indicated by
a cyan rectangle around the text box. Enter the North or South latitude in degrees,
minutes, and seconds, beginning with either a N or S as appropriate. For example,
N5105.79 (without any spaces) is entered for North latitude of 51 degrees, 5.79 minutes.
No degree symbol is provided on the MFC keypad, therefore, it is not necessary (or
possible) to enter a degree symbol.
Note also that degrees, minutes, and seconds less than 10 are entered with a
leading zero, and that seconds are entered as a two digit number that represents
one hundredths of minutes.
Next, without entering a space after the latitude, enter the longitude in the same format
that the latitude was entered, preceded by a W or E as appropriate. For example,
N5105.79W11400.99 (note that there are no spaces of any kind in this entire entry),
then push ENT on the MFC to enter the position into the Latitude/Longitude field.
Finally, push the Apply button to commit the entry.
The same concept of ‘no spaces’ also applies to entry of date and time, if it should ever
be necessary to manually initialize the date and time stored in the Modular Avionics Unit.
OR;
If the crew have selected a specific runway at the destination airport using the ARRIVAL
tab of the Approach Phase of Flight (POF) portion of the Flight Management Window,
and the airport does have arrival transitions or approaches associated with it, but the
crew have not selected an arrival transition or an approach (in other words, the crew
have only selected a runway).
The following procedure must be followed if the crew wishes to subsequently change
to a different runway:
1 Press the DIRECT-TO button on the Multifunction Controller, then re-enter the
destination airport name.
3 Re-select the desired runway using the ARRIVAL tab of the Approach Phase of
Flight (POF) portion of the Flight Management Window.
1 Select either an arrival or an approach (or both) for the desired runway at the
destination airport using the ARRIVAL tab of the Approach Phase of Flight (POF)
portion of the Flight Management Window.
When the Twin Otter is on ground, the transponder will only respond to specifically
directed interrogations from other aircraft, ground vehicles, and ATC services if the
Twin Otter transponder is turned ON (in other words, not in standby [STBY] mode). It
is therefore essential that the crew ensure that the transponder is always selected ON
(typically, it should be selected to TA mode for TCAS equipped Twin Otters) when the
aircraft is on the ground.
flight unless there is a unique and specific temporary requirement – such as a request
from ATC – to operate in STBY mode.
The Twin Otter will automatically switch the transponder between air mode (broadcast
mode) and ground mode (response to specifically directed interrogations only) based
on the air-ground monitor status of the Twin Otter. This can be confirmed by noting the
presence of the indication GND in the left side of the transponder window when the Twin
Otter is on ground and the absence of the indication GND when the Twin Otter is in flight.
For example, no ‘generator off' notification will be provided if an engine is not running.
Likewise, no messages concerning engine limitation exceedence (except for high T5
temperature exceedence) will be presented if an engine is not running. The aircraft uses
the position of the fuel lever to determine if the engine is ‘desired to be running' or not.
The logic for the LOW PNEUMATIC PRESSURE message is constructed such that if
the surface de-ice boot switch is not in the FAST or SLOW position, no monitoring of
pneumatic pressure is provided. If the aircraft is on the ground and the surface de-ice
boot switch is in the FAST or SLOW position, and advisory level (blue) message will
be presented if pneumatic pressure is low. If a low pressure condition exists in flight, a
caution level (amber) message will be presented.
If the aircraft is not fitted with surface de-ice boots, this CAS message will never be
presented.
The same concept applies to other CAS messages. A GENERATOR OFF message
will be cyan (advisory level) on the ground for the first 90 seconds after the engine
has been started, to avoid nuisance illumination of the MASTER CAUTION light. If
the generator is not brought online within 90 seconds of starting the engine, the cyan
message will elevate to an amber caution message.
Some CAS message have a one second falling debounce applied to them to ensure
that the message remains visible for no less than one second after being posted,
even if the condition causing the message only lasted fractionally longer than 300
milliseconds. This is to ensure that the crew have adequate time to read the message.
Under certain conditions, this may give the impression that the CAS system is ‘slow' to
respond, because the falling debounce criteria will result in the message persisting for
one second after the condition causing the message has been cleared.
The take-off configuration warning system becomes active when torque on both engines
rises above 20 PSI. Prior to that, the cyan advisory message TAKEOFF CONFIG will
be presented if the aircraft is not properly configured for take-off.
This can be demonstrated during initial training – without the need to operate the engine
– by connecting the aircraft to external power and inserting the maintenance connector
that modifies DAU air-ground status into the receptacle on the avionics service panel
in the nose of the aircraft. The engine fuel levers can then be moved forward and aft,
from the ‘fuel on' position to the ‘fuel off' position.
Be aware that when this maintenance connector is used to simulate flight, only the DAUs
enter flight mode. The MAU and air data computers remain in ground mode. To fully
simulate flight mode when the aircraft is on the ground, it is necessary to hook up pitot
pressure test equipment and increase pitot pressure until airspeed indicates greater
than 40 knots. For training purposes, setting the airspeed to 80 knots is recommended.
Shutting the aircraft down in the normal manner (turning the MASTER switch OFF (Pre
Mod 6/2314) or BATTERY, EXTERNAL and GENERATOR switches all OFF (Post Mod
6/2314)) will have the same effect as pulling and resetting the DAU circuit breaker.
It is possible that the cause of the maintenance message is known to the maintenance
technician, and it is also possible that the display of this message is a result of a
failure of a sensor (for example, a flight control position sensor) that has been deferred
in accordance with an approved MEL. For this reason, it is permitted to dispatch the
aircraft with a cyan DAU MAINTENANCE message present; however, prior to dispatch,
the crew should know exactly what sensor on the aircraft is causing the maintenance
message to appear. Some sensors, such as primary flight control position sensors and
engine control position sensors, supply information only to the FDR and not to the crew.
Other sensors, such as engine and trim tab sensors, temperature sensors, and hydraulic
pressure sensors, supply information to both the FDR and to the Apex displays.
Be aware that it is normal (and fully expected) that a monitor warning system
miscompare icon will appear in the CAS list whenever a cyan maintenance message is
posted for a DAU. The monitor warning miscompare icon is a small amber square with
the letters MW displayed inside of it. This icon will appear at the left edge of the CAS
list. By pressing the bezel button beside the MW annunciation, the crew can compare
the results of MAU monitor warning system 1 and MAU monitor warning system 2. If a
DAU MAINTENANCE message is present, one MAU monitor warning system will post
a xA message (where x is the number of the DAU affected), and the other MAU monitor
warning system will post an xB warning message. The MW annunciation appears
because the letters corresponding to the DAU channels A and B are not identical. The
letters will never be identical, because one monitor warning system monitors the A
channels of each DAU, and the other monitor warning system monitors the B channels
of each DAU.
EGPWS provides all of the functionality of ‘classic' GPWS, which includes warning
modes 1 through 6 inclusive. GPWS warning modes 1 through 6 inclusive require only
information provided by the radar altimeter, glideslope receiver, and the barometric
altimeter.
EGPWS also provides additional terrain warning capability that retrieves information
provided by the terrain database within the device and compares this information to
the position of the aircraft as derived from the GPS navigation system. This is referred
to as Forward Looking Terrain Avoidance (FLTA). The aircraft must know where it is
(latitude/longitude) and where it is going (heading, rate of turn) in order to provide FLTA.
If a SD card is used, it must be formatted to the FAT (File Allocation Table) standard,
with a single partition of no larger than 2 gigabytes. Zipped files need to be unpacked
(extracted) but otherwise left in the same hierarchical folder order as they were received.
The SD card should not contain any other data than what is to be loaded into aircraft.
Standard, full size SD cards should be used; mini or micro size SD cards that are fitted
into a full size SD adapter are not reliable.
The aircraft can store two different sets of airspace, communication and navigation data
(the purple CD, distributed every 28 days). When a new CD is received, or when a new
data package is downloaded from the http://inds.epicinds.com website, the data may
be loaded immediately, and the aircraft will not use it until it becomes effective.
The aircraft can only store one version of the Jeppesen electronic approach charts (the
blue CD, distributed every 14 days); however, the approach chart data is organized so
that charts that are not yet effective will not be presented to the pilot until their effective
date. When a new CD is received, or when a new data package is downloaded, the
new data should be loaded immediately.
The HEADING bug will not be available when the TRACK SOURCE switch is in the GPS
position. Wind vectors may not be available when the TRACK SOURCE switch is in the
GPS position. Track and/or heading reference may change without CAS annunciation
to True North when the TRACK SOURCE switch is moved to the GPS, and may not
automatically revert to Magnetic North when the TRACK SOURCE switch is moved
back to the NORMAL position. This may require the crew to manually reconfigure
track and/or heading reference to Magnetic North by way of the AVIONICS page of the
System configuration window.
These procedures and the supporting performance data may be obtained by DHC-6
operators upon written application to Viking Air Limited – Technical Support.
For a description of the Ferry Fuel Tank System, refer to Section 7, Para 7.27 Ferry Fuel
Tank System.
NOTE
At weights in excess of 12,500 lbs do not extend flaps beyond 10°.
a. Take-off Weight. The maximum ferry fuel system take-off weight is 17,500 lbs for
the landplane or wheel-skiplane, unless limited by operating conditions such as
temperature, altitude, runway length, etc.
NOTE
Take-off at weight in excess of 12,500 lbs must be performed from
prepared runways.
When installed, auxiliary wing tanks must remain full when operating
at weights exceeding 12,500 lbs.
CAUTION
b. Landing Weight. The maximum weight authorized for landing is 12,300 lbs.
Emergency landings may be made safely up to 17,500 lbs, however, every
effort should be made to ensure that the touchdown is as gentle as possible.
After a heavy landing, before next flight, have qualified authorized personnel
to carry out inspection per PSM 1-6-7 Part 2, SP3 Operational Conditions, E.
Inspection after Heavy Landing.
c. CG Range – Landplane and Wheel-skiplane. The CG limits (Figure 10-2) are
as follows:
Forward Aft
d. Rear Baggage Compartment Load Limit. Refer to Figure 10-3 for the rear
baggage compartment load limit.
Figure 10-2 CG Limits – Landplane and Wheel-skiplane with Ferry Fuel System
a. It may not be possible to maintain altitude should an engine fail at high weights.
(Refer to Figure 10-6). A forced landing should be carried out using the power on
the live engine to maximum advantage.
b. Refer to Figure 10-6 for single engine climb speed.
c. Flaps may be extended beyond 10° for landing at gross weight, exceeding 12,500
lbs.
NOTE
If flaps have been extended beyond 10° for landing at gross
weight exceeding 12,500 lbs, before next flight, have qualified
authorized personnel to carry out inspection per PSM 1-6-7
Part 2, SP3 Operational Conditions, G.6 Wing Flaps and
Ailerons.
a. Ferry fuel drums shall always be filled to capacity with shut-off valves closed and
aircraft properly ground supported. Valves shall remain closed until flight. Cabin
shall be ventilated after filling.
b. On the ground, with the airplane static, check the fuel contents of the ferry
system as seen in the transparent filler neck. The transparent filler neck does
not indicate fuel level in the ferry system during flight.
CAUTION
d. Take-off and climb with ferry fuel system shut-off valves closed. During cruise,
use normal fuel system until fuel level drops to approximately 800 lbs per tank and
then transfer fuel from the ferry system by opening shut-off valves. In level flight
only, fuel shall be transferred in stages by opening shut-off valves periodically
to top up main tanks to 80%. This method allows a record to be maintained of
approximate quantities transferred by reference to the main tank fuel quantity
indicators. Transfer of fuel to either or both main tanks can be made as desired,
by operating the shut-off valves appropriately. Valves may only be left open when
drums are emptied.
CAUTION
Associated Conditions:
CG = Forward
Engine idling, propeller feathered
Associated Conditions:
Wing Flaps = 0°
Intake Deflectors = Retracted
Engines = Both at maximum climb power, prop rpm 96%
Speed = Refer to chart
Associated Conditions:
Associated Conditions:
Wing Flaps = 0°
Intake Deflectors = Retracted
Engines = Both at climb power, prop rpm 96%
10.12.1.1 General
The supplementary operating and performance data is for the Series 400 Landplane
and is not TCCA approved. The certificated performance data is contained in Section
5 of PSM 1-64-1A.
All airplane operating limitations and normal and emergency procedures specified in
PSM 1-64-1A must be observed.
10.12.1.2 Qualifications
All performance data is based on PT6A–27 engine power corrected for installation
losses and power absorbed by the accessories appropriate to the particular ambient
atmospheric and flight conditions.
Unless otherwise stated, all performance data are given with intake deflectors in the
retracted position and with bleeds for heating, ventilating and de-icing “off”.
Climb, cruise and descent fuel consumption data are based on the engine
manufacturer's new engine minimum estimated performance, with fuel having a
heating value of 18,400 BTU per pound.
Fuel consumption based on the engine manufacturer's new engine, average estimated
performance with a more typical fuel having a heating value of 18,600 BTU per pound, is
6.13% lower than the fuel consumption shown in Para 10.12, Supplementary Operating
and Performance Data.
For long-term average fuel usage planning the fuel consumption data may be reduced
by 5%.
Associated Conditions:
At an altitude of 6,000 ft, outside air temperature 13°C and weight 11,000 lbs, the rates
of climb are as follows:
Absolute ceiling is defined as the altitude at which the rate of climb is zero fpm.
Service ceiling is defined as the altitude at which the rate of climb is 100 fpm.
Associated Conditions:
At a gross weight of 12,100 lbs, temperature ISA +20°C, the service ceilings are as
follows:
Associated Conditions:
Wing Flaps = 0°
Speed = Type I (High Speed), Figure 10-15 inset
= Type II (Intermediate Speed), Figure 10-19 inset
= Type III (Low Speed) 90 KIAS
Power = Both engines at maximum climb power (91% prop RPM)
Intake Deflectors = Retracted
Engine Bleed = Off
Find time, distance and fuel used in a Type I (High Speed) climb at ISA +20°C, weight
12,000 lbs from an altitude of 8,000 ft to 18,000 ft.
Since the data in all climb charts is given from sea level, the time, distance and fuel
from 8,000 ft to 18,000 ft is determined as follows:
All data is given with intake deflectors in the retracted position and with engine bleed
for heating, ventilating and de-icing “off”. Maximum propeller RPM for cruise is 91%.
1 At a weight of 11,000 lbs, cruise altitude 12,000 ft, temperature ISA +10°C, find
nautical air miles per pound of fuel and TAS with both engines operating.
2 At a weight of 11,000 lbs, cruise altitude 4,000 ft, temperature ISA, find nautical
air miles per pound of fuel and TAS with one engine inoperative.
Find fuel consumption (pounds per hour) and speed for maximum endurance at a
weight of 11,000 lbs, altitude 8,000 ft, outside air temperature 14°C.
Associated Conditions:
Wing Flaps = 0°
Speed = Type I (High Speed), Figure 10-33
= Type II (Intermediate Speed), Figure 10-34
= Type III (Low Speed), Figure 10-35
Max Rate of Descent = 500 fpm
Power = Both engines operating, power as required to maintain
the maximum rate of descent, but not to exceed maximum
cruise power
Intake Deflectors = Retracted or extended
Engine Bleed = Off
Find time, distance and fuel in Type III (low speed) descent at +20°C, weight 12,000
lbs from an altitude of 20,000 ft to 10,000 ft.
Since the data in all descent charts commences at sea level, the time, distance and
fuel in descent from 20,000 ft to 10,000 ft is determined as follows:
Distance Fuel
n.m. lbs.
Descent from 20,000 ft to sea level 87 210
Descent from 10,000 ft to sea level 40 112
Therefore descent from 20,000 ft to 10,000 ft 47 98
Time in descent from 20,000 ft to 10,000 ft = Altitude interval in descent (ft)
Rate of descent (500 fpm)
= 20,000 – 10,000 = 20 min.
500
Associated Conditions:
Wing Flaps = 0°
Speed = Refer to Figure 10-36 inset
Power = One engine inoperative with its propeller feathered
Other engine at maximum continuous power
Intake Deflectors = Retracted or extended
Engine Bleed = Off
Find time, distance and fuel in driftdown at ISA, weight 11,000 lbs from an altitude of
22,000 ft to 16,600 ft.
Since the data in all driftdown charts commences at 25,000 ft, the time, distance and
fuel in driftdown from 22,000 ft to 16,600 ft is determined as follows:
10.12.5.1 Introduction
The block fuel and time performance data is shown in Figure 10-40 through Figure
10-47. Correction for weights, temperatures and wind speeds are given on the charts.
All data is given with intake deflectors in the retracted position, and with bleed for
heating, ventilating and de-icing “off”.
Block Time The time from the start of taxi for take-off to the end of taxi after
landing. It consists of:
Time for taxi-out, take-off, climb, cruise, descent, landing and
taxi-in.
Block Fuel The fuel used in the block time as defined above.
For a sector distance of 600 n.m., cruise altitude of 5,000 ft., temperature ISA +10°C,
take-off weight 10,000 lbs., and tailwind of 25 knots, find the block time and fuel.
Figure 10-40 Block Fuel (Maximum Cruise Rating) (Distance 0 to 400 nm)
PSM 1-64-POH Revision: 3
Page 10-158 08 Feb. 2017
SECTION 10
DHC-6 SERIES 400 SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL TIPS
Figure 10-41 Block Fuel (Maximum Cruise Rating) (Distance 0 to 800 nm)
Revision: 3 PSM 1-64-POH
08 Feb. 2017 Page 10-159
SECTION 10
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL TIPS DHC-6 SERIES 400
Figure 10-42 Block Time (Maximum Cruise Rating) (Distance 0 to 400 nm)
PSM 1-64-POH Revision: 3
Page 10-160 08 Feb. 2017
SECTION 10
DHC-6 SERIES 400 SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL TIPS
Figure 10-43 Block Time (Maximum Cruise Rating) (Distance 0 to 800 nm)
Revision: 3 PSM 1-64-POH
08 Feb. 2017 Page 10-161
SECTION 10
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL TIPS DHC-6 SERIES 400
Figure 10-44 Block Fuel (Long Range Cruise) (Distance 0 to 400 nm)
PSM 1-64-POH Revision: 3
Page 10-162 08 Feb. 2017
SECTION 10
DHC-6 SERIES 400 SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL TIPS
Figure 10-45 Block Fuel (Long Range Cruise) (Distance 0 to 800 nm)
Revision: 3 PSM 1-64-POH
08 Feb. 2017 Page 10-163
SECTION 10
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL TIPS DHC-6 SERIES 400
Figure 10-46 Block Time (Long Range Cruise) (Distance 0 to 400 nm)
PSM 1-64-POH Revision: 3
Page 10-164 08 Feb. 2017
SECTION 10
DHC-6 SERIES 400 SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL TIPS
Figure 10-47 Block Time (Long Range Cruise) (Distance 0 to 800 nm)
Revision: 3 PSM 1-64-POH
08 Feb. 2017 Page 10-165
SECTION 10
SAFETY AND OPERATIONAL TIPS DHC-6 SERIES 400
10.12.6.1 Introduction
This section presents the flight planning data which may be used to optimize the enroute
sector performance. Three categories of optimum performance have been considered.
3 Minimum cost
For each of the above categories the specified type of climb, cruise and descent
are suggested and optimum cruise altitudes are given for a series of sector distances,
take-off weights and outside air temperatures. All data is given with the intake deflectors
in the retracted position at zero wind condition, and with bleed for heating, ventilating
and de-icing “off”.
NOTE
For definitions of block time and fuel, refer to Para 10.12.5.1.
10.12.6.3 Results
The sector block time, fuel, and cost were calculated using the various climb, cruise and
descent techniques described in Para 10.12.6.2. The optimized data are presented in
tables on the subsequent pages. It should be noted that there is no single technique
which will achieve all of the three optimized goals, namely the minimum block time,
minimum block fuel and the minimum cost. In order to achieve the minimum fuel, block
time or cost, not only is a proper selection of climb/cruise/descent techniques required,
but the selection of the appropriate optimum cruise altitude is essential.
NOTE
The cost assumptions used in arriving at the minimum cost technique
are representative of North American practice. Therefore, it may
not be applicable to some operators whose depreciation and
maintenance policies, as well as fuel and crew costs are significantly
different from those of their North American counterparts.
10.12.6.4 Examples
Example 1:
Sector distance 200 n.m.
Take-off weight 12,500 lbs
Temperature ISA
Determine the block time and fuel data and optimum cruise altitudes with the three
techniques (minimum block time, minimum block fuel and minimum cost techniques).
Example 2:
If the choice of cruise altitude is restricted (A.T.C. clearance, etc) the block time and
fuel may be determined from the data presented in Para 10.12.5.
At Optimum
At Fixed Altitude
Cruise Altitude Increase
of 10,000 ft.
(Example 1)
Block time – min. 74.9/6,000 ft 75.5 (Figure 10-42) .8%
Block fuel – lbs. 646/19,000 ft 695 (Figure 10-44) 7.6%
10.12.7.1 Description
On special order, the aircraft can be equipped with Intermediate Flotation Gear to
facilitate “soft field” operation. The intermediate flotation gear consists of standard
11.00 x 12 wheels with 15.00 x 12 tires on the main landing gear and nose landing gear.
A special nose landing gear fork is installed to accommodate the large nose wheel.
Associated Conditions:
Ambient temperature 13°C, pressure altitude 6,000 ft, gross weight 11,000 lbs. The
rate of climb is 1,425 feet per min and the gradient of climb is 0.151.
NOTE
With intake deflectors extended, reduce rate of climb by 30 feet per
min and gradient of climb by .004 when engine torque is less than
50 psi.
Associated Conditions:
NOTE
With intake deflectors extended, reduce ceiling by 400 feet when
engine torque is less than 50 psi.
10.12.7.2.3 Time Distance and Fuel used in Climb at 500 Feet Per Minute
Time, distance and fuel used versus altitude are presented in Figure 10-55 for a climb
at a constant rate of climb of 500 feet per minute. This figure is applicable to all
temperatures and weights unless otherwise noted.
Associated Conditions:
With a gross weight of 12,500 lbs, the time distance and fuel used in a climb from sea
level to an altitude of 10,000 ft is 20 minutes, 53 nautical miles and 210 lbs respectively.
Associated Conditions:
With a gross weight of 12,500 lbs and an ambient temperature of ISA +20°C, find the
time, distance and fuel used in a climb from an altitude of 5,000 ft to an altitude of
15,000 ft.
Example:
Two engine cruise at 150 knots TAS (135 KIAS), at 5,000 ft, ISA at 12,500 lbs gross
weight.
NOTE
With intake deflectors extended, at a constant SHP, reduce speed by
4 knots and nautical air miles per pound of fuel by 1%.
Associated Conditions:
With a gross weight of 12,500 lbs and an ambient temperature of ISA +20°C, the time
distance and fuel used in descent from 10,000 feet to sea level is 20 min, 56 nautical
miles and 215 lbs respectively.
Associated Conditions:
With a gross weight of 12,500 lbs, find the time, distance and fuel used in descent from
15,000 ft to 5,000 ft.
10.12.8 Wheel-Skiplane
The following is support performance data for Section 9, Supplement 10 –
Wheel-Skiplane Operation.
Associated Conditions:
Ambient temperature –24°C, pressure altitude 6,000 ft, gross weight 11,000 lbs. The
rate of climb is 1,600 feet per min and the gradient of climb is 0.185.
NOTE
With intake deflectors extended, reduce rate of climb by 30 feet per
min and gradient of climb by 0.004 when engine torque is less than
50 psi.
Associated Conditions:
NOTE
With intake deflectors extended, reduce ceiling by 400 feet when
engine torque is less than 50 psi.
10.12.8.1.3 Time Distance and Fuel Used in Climb at 500 Feet Per Min
Time, distance and fuel used versus altitude are presented in Figure 10-69 for a climb
at a constant rate of climb of 500 feet per minute. This figure is applicable to all
temperatures and weights unless otherwise noted.
Associated Conditions:
With a gross weight of 12,500 lbs, the time, distance and fuel used in a climb from sea
level to an altitude of 10,000 ft is 20 minutes, 49 nautical miles and 250 lbs respectively.
10.12.8.1.4 Time, Distance and Fuel used in Climb at Max Climb Power
Time, distance and fuel used versus altitude are presented in Figure 10-70 for a climb
at max climb power and speeds to give maximum rate of climb.
Associated Conditions:
With a gross weight of 11,000 lbs and an ambient temperature of ISA –20°C, find the
time, distance and fuel used in a climb from an altitude of 5,000 ft to an altitude of
15,000 ft.
Example:
Two engine cruise at 150 knots TAS (144 KIAS), at 5,000 ft, ISA –30°C at 12,500 lbs
gross weight.
NOTE
With intake deflector extended, at a constant SHP, reduce speed by
4 knots and nautical air miles per pound of fuel by 1%.
Associated Conditions:
With a gross weight of 12,500 lbs and an ambient temperature of ISA –20°C the time
distance and fuel used in descent from 10,000 feet to sea level is 20 min, 54 nautical
miles and 215 lbs respectively.
Associated Conditions:
Wing Flaps = 0°
Intake Deflectors = Retracted
Engines = Idle power
Speed = Refer to chart
With a gross weight of 12,500 lbs, find the time, distance and fuel used in descent from
15,000 ft to 5,000 ft.