Filing # 186685875 E-Filed 11/22/2023 12:43:43 PM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA

FELONY DIVISION X
CASE NO. 50-2023-CF-006326-AXXX-MB
STATE OF FLORIDA,

vs.

DANIEL HEATH SNIDER

Defendant.

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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S AMENDED OMNIBUS MOTION TO DISMISS
COUNT 1

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on October 30, 2023 regarding the Defendant’s

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Amended Omnibus Motion to Dismiss Count 1 of the State’s Information. At the hearing, Joseph
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Kadis, Esq. appeared for the State and Leonard Feuer, Esq. appeared for the Defendant. In just a
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few short months since the filing of the first information, the State has subsequently filed two
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amended informations, currently citing the Defendant with F.S. 39.201(1)(5), and 39.205(1).

These amended informations were filed after Defense filed it’s Motion to Dismiss, a separate
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Motion for Statement of Particulars, and after the court at the August 24, 2023 hearing inquired
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of the State as to why Fla. Statute 39.201 was removed from the State’s 1st amended information
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(after it had been included in the original information.)

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The State has charged the Defendant with violating the mandatory reporter statute, Florida
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Statute 39.201(1),(5) and also 39.205(1). Pursuant to Florida Statute 39.201(1)(a)2., a “person who

knows or has reasonable cause to suspect, that a child is the victim of sexual abuse or juvenile

abuse shall report such knowledge or suspicion to the central abuse hotline.” Section 39.205

follows up that “[a] person who knowingly and willfully fails to report to the central abuse hotline

known or suspected child abuse, abandonment, or neglect, or who knowingly prevents another

FILED: PALM BEACH COUNTY, FL, JOSEPH ABRUZZO, CLERK, 11/22/2023 12:43:43 PM
person from doing so, commit a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082,

s. 775.80, or s. 775.084.”

Additionally, it is important to note that the State conceded at the hearing that the applicable

jury instruction which should ultimately be read to the jury is 16.13 that reads in pertinent part as

follows:

To prove the crime of Failure to Report Child Abuse, the State must prove the following

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elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

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1. Defendant knew or suspected abuse occurred.

2. Defendant knowingly or willful failed to report such information to the central

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abuse hotline of the Department of Children and Families. (DCF)
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At the outset of the hearing both sides agreed that there would be no issue if the mandatory
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reporting statute essentially required the recipient of any and all accusations of sexual abuse of a
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child be forwarded to DCF, no matter whether the accusation had any merit at all; however the

mandatory reporter statute, Section 39. 201(1) Florida Statutes essentially requires the recipient
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of a report of sexual abuse or juvenile sexual abuse to be a fact finder of sorts, filtering out

accusations that may fall below the known or reasonable cause to suspect threshold (unless the
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recipient actually knows the abuse occurred).

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Despite the State’s position, the court concludes that no material facts are in dispute. The
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undisputed facts are as follows:

Defendant is the father of R.S. and the assistant principal in 2021. On April 2, 2021, R.S.

went to the beach with A.K. R.S. and A.K. sent text messages to each other and engaged in

consensual physical and sexual contact at the beach. It is alleged by the State that later sexual and

physical contact on April 2, 2021 between R.S. and A.K. was not consensual.

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 Text messages sent in the evening of April 2, 2021 state as follows:

R.S.: Thanks for letting me do what I did

A.K.: I enjoyed it 

R.S.: Me too

Several more suggestive and explicit messages were exchanged between A.K. and R.S. on

April 2, 2021. On April 3, 2021, A.K sent several text messages to R.S. with no response. On April

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4, 2021 the following exchange took place:

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A.K.: Dude idek if you’re reading these or not but please text me back cause I

honestly don’t know if I should be concerned, or mad, or sad, or what

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R.S.: [Confidential]- This is [R.S]’s mom. He is not available and won’t be for quite

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The State did not refute the statements made by A.K. in her texts to R.S., which is

what the Defendant knew before receiving S.A.’s statement.

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On August 16, 2021, another student at the school where the Defendant was
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employed as an assistant principal, S.A., told the Defendant that his son committed a sexual

assault. In response, the Defendant provided S.A. with a form to complete a report. For
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purposes of this motion only, the Defendant conceded the fact that he read the statement
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which provided in pertinent part that A.K. told S.A. she was sexually assaulted/harassed in
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April by R.S. Defendant informed S.A. that he would provide the information to Principal
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Edgecomb. The Defendant subsequently provided the information to Principal Edgecomb.

Both sides agree that Principal Edgecomb requested the Defendant take no further action.

As both counsel agree, if the statute called for strict liability, this case would be

different. However, in F.S. 39. 201(1) the legislature essentially required the recipient of a

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report of sexual abuse or juvenile sexual abuse a duty to filter out accusations that fall

below the known or reasonable cause to suspect threshold. In light of the plain language of

the statute as applied only to these limited undisputed material facts as to Defendant Snider,

the Court does find that dismissal is warranted.

The State admits that the law requires Defendant, not the person relating the

information, have reasonable cause, i.e. probable cause, to suspect or have reason to believe

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that sexual abuse of A.K. occurred during the April incident to require a report. [State

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Response, page 3]. The State also admits that the statement of S.A. as provided to the

Defendant is not enough to charge R.S. with sexual battery. [State Response, page 3].

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Although intent is generally a jury question, there must be some substantial
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competent evidence for the jury to reasonably infer the intent. State v. Stenza, 453 So. 2d
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169 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Here, by the State’s own admission, S.A.’s statement alone,
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which for Defendant Snider is the only fact supporting the necessity of a report, is not

enough to arrest and charge R.S. Despite the standard for arrest being probable cause and
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the standard to require a report being probable cause, the State contends that a report should

still have been made. Based on these circumstances alone, the Court does not find there to
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be substantial competent evidence for the jury to reasonably infer intent. The State in its
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arguments and responses did not establish competent substantial evidence that the recipient
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of the accusation, the Defendant, would have suspected or reasonably should have
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suspected A.K. was abused by his son.

As discussed above, this case would be completely different if the legislature made

the decision to elect a different standard for reporting. The State fails to make a prima facie

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case that Defendant Snider knew or had reasonable cause to suspect A.K. was the victim

of sexual abuse or juvenile sexual abuse stemming from the April incident.

Accordingly, it is hereby:

ORDERED Defendant’s Amended Omnibus Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, Florida.

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Copies To:

Name Address Email

401 N DIXIE HWY WEST JKADIS@SA15.ORG,
JOSEPH KADIS
PALM BEACH, FL 33401 FELDIVX@sa15.org
500 S AUSTRALIAN
AVENUE SUITE 500 LFEUER@FEUERLAWFIRM.COM,
LEONARD FEUER
WEST PALM BEACH, FL info@feuerlawfirm.com

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33401
STATE ATTORNEY'S
n/a FELPCU@sa15.org
OFFICE, PCU

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