International Affairs by Dr. Safdar Mahmood

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
By
Dr. Safdar Mahmood

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JANG PUBLISHERS
13-Sir Agha Khan Road, Lahore. Phone 6367480-83, 6307804
Twenty Thrid Edition 2005-6
© Copy Rights Reserved
2005-6
Publisher: JANG PUBLISHERS, Lahore
Editor in charge: Muzaffar Muhammad AH
Assistant Production: Muhammad Azeem
Title by: Anees Yaqub
Printers- Jang Publishers Press, Lahore
Price: Rs. 400
PREFACE
The need of such a book as many acquaint the reader with the background of current affairs has always
been felt. It is my belief that to understand current affairs, we must study them in perspective. So far little
work has been done in the field of International Affairs in Pakistan.
This book has been written with the intention of providing a background knowledge of current affairs. I
have tried to analyze the main historical forces operating in the contemporary world, so that the reader may
understand what is going on in different countries and regions. The chapters on Asia, Africa, Middle East,
South-East Asia and China not only cover the historical background of these regions but also discuss their
current critical problems. A separate chapter captioned: ”Hot Spots” regarding current international
problems like Kashmir, Vietnam, Cyprus, Rhodesia, South-West Africa and Germany which are
threatening world peace, has also been included. A separate chapter on Pakistan’s foreign policy has also
been included.
I am greatly indebted to my friends, Mufti Lutuf-Ullah, CSP and Mr. Touqir Hussain, P.F.S. for their
valuable assistance without which the book might not have seen the light of day. I am also thankful to Prof.
Rafi Anwar and Prof. Muhammad Munawwer for their encouragement. I also owe gratitude to my friends,
Ch. Akhtar Hussain, PCS, Mr. Asad Ezdi, Mr. Javid Akhtar and Mr. Ilyas Mehdi for providing me
necessary material.
Lahore
1967
SAFDAR MAHMOOD
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIKS
PREFACE TO THE TWELFTH EDITION
Since the publication of the previous edition, the International system has undergone whole sale structural
changes to the extent that the concepts and terms in vogue only a few years back have lost currency in
understanding the nature and dynamics of International Affairs. While the issues like Cold War, Nuclear
Deterrence, Containment etc. have become relics of the past, new terms and notions such as New World
Order, Structural Adjustments, Regionalism, Environment Debate, Narcotics, NonProliferation and Human
Rights etc. have emerged as the new foci of attention for scholars as well as students of International
Relations. These shifting trends hold paramount significance because the future pattern of international
system will largely be a synthesis culminating out of this transitional phase in which old values and
concepts are struggling to come to terms with the pace of change.
In the wake of these qualitative changes in the international system, the subject matter of the book, in the
present addition, has been thoroughly revised. With a view to establish a correlation between the defunct
frameworks of analysis and an evolving new paradigm to study the International Affairs, more emphasis
has been on providing an analytical and issue-oriented perspective to the readers. I hope the readers will
find this edition even more useful in getting a handy orientation to the core issues involved in international
politics today.
I owe my gratitude to Mr. Sajjad Ahmad for extending me valuable assistance in revising and up-dating
this book.
February 7, 1994, Lahore
DR. SAFDAR MAHMOOD
12-Golf Road, GOR-1, Lahore
PREFACE TO THE 2005 EDITION
The book has been thoroughly revised and updated. It is hoped that
readers would now find it more useful. My Thanks are due to Syed
Hasnat Shah for His Assistance.
DR. SAFDAR MAHMOOD
Lahore
April 4, 2005.
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
CONTENTS
PART- I
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 12
BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS
Rise of the left in Europe
PART-II
TOWARDS INTERNATIONLISM:
THE UNITED NATIONS

20
(0
Introduction
(in)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)
(x)
(xi)
(xii)
(xiii)
(xiv)
(xv)
The Main Organs: The Security Council, The General Assembly, The Economic and Social Council, The
Trusteeship Council, The International Court of Justice, Jurisdiction of the Court, Procedure of the Court,
The Secretariat.
The Specialized Agencies: IMF, IBRD, H.O. UNESCO, WHO, FAO.
United Nations and International Security.
United Nations In the Post-Cold War Era.
Why the UN Fails?
Future of the United Nations.
Suggestions to Improve The United Nations.
UN and the Third Millennium.
UN and Challenges of a new disorderly world.
New Challenges to the UN Credibility,
Restructuring of UN is inevitable
UN and Human Rights
UN Conference on Racism
World Summit on Sustainable Development

Chapter 3 THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS
Chapter 6
56
Evolution, Structure, Re- entry of Pakistan Economic Functions, Commonwealth in World Affairs,
Withdrawal of Pakistan and Re-Entry,Commonwealth’s manipulation by India and Pakistan’s suspension.
Chapter 4 THE COLD WAR DEFENCE TREATIES
66
NATO, Is NATO Obsolete ? NATO Expansion and its New Strategies, From Clinton to Bush, Common
goals, Dealing with Russia, Warsaw Pact, SEATO, CENTO.
Chapter 5 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
87
Background, The European Common Market, European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), Other
Institutional Arrangements, The Maastricht Treaty, The Program, The EMU, The EPU, The European
Commission, Towards European Integration, Advent of Euro Currency, Helmut Kohl’s exit in Germany,
Debate on EU Constitution. Eu Enlargement , EU Future Strategy.
PART-III
RISE OF NATIONALISM: ASIA AND THE WEST
116
Introduction, China, Japan, Ascendancy of Japan, Pakistan and India, Indonesia, Struggle for
Independence, Rise of Soekamo, The Coup and its Aftermath, risis and Turmoil In Indonesia. The
Federation of Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines opposed the Federation, Mahatir’s Election
Triumph. The Anwer Episode A shock to Mahatir’s Supermacy, Burma (Myanmar).
Chapter 7 EMERGENCE OF AFRICA
143
Rise of Africa, Nationalist Movement, Functional cooperation and its Limitations, Crisis at the
Continental
Level, Crisis in Nigeria , Algeria’s never ending Ordeal. Crisis in Sudan, Independence of Eriteria, Elusive
Peace in Angola, Africa: An Economically Downtrodden Region, Ethnic Crisis in Africa, Africa in the new
millennium.
Chapter 8 MIDDLE EAST
171
Importance of the Asia, Recent History, The Creation of Israel, The Suez Crisis, The June 1967 War, The
1973 Arab Israel War, The Sinai Agreement, Weapon of Oil, Camp David Accord, Peace Treaty, Egypt
after Saadat, The Intefadah, The Middle East Peace Process, The Oslo Accord, Wye River Peace Accord,
Sharam-el-Sheikh Accord, Elections in Saudi Arab, Recent Development in the Middle East, 2005
Palestine Presidential Election, Resolving the Crisis, The Roadmap for Middle East Peace, The Geneva
Proposal, Middle East Crisis and United States, Persian Gulf: End of American Holiday, A grim politico-
economic Outlook , The Middle East quagmire (2002).
PART-IV
Chapter 9 THE AMERICAN CONTINENTS
235
North America, The Birth of a Nation, The American System of Government, Post War Politics, From
Truman to Nixon: A Brief Review, Watergate Scandal and Impeachment Of Nixon, The Reagan Era,
Presidency under George Bush.The Clinton Administration, Rejection of CTBT by US Senate, US foreign
policy challenges, US, China and Japan’s Role in Asia, September 11, US no more invincible, US
Unilateralism under George W. Bush, quitting the ABM, US Stance on the ICC Treaty, Bush Doctrine of
Pre-emption, A Wise Decision, Bush’s Re- election, Latin America, Major Issues in American Politics,
Cuba, US-Cuba Relations, Crisis in 1962, Nicaragua, Latin Americas Economic Woes.
Chapter 11
PART-V
Chapter 10 IRAN
279
Iranian Revolution, Formation of Islamic Government, The Hostage Crisis, Tussle for Power, The New
Form of Government, The Method of Government: Islamic Interpretation, Leadership of Justice
Seeking Theologians, Economy as a Means not as Objective, The Army of Ideology, The Judiciary in
the Constitution, The Executive, The Constitution, The Economy, Elections, Iran after Khomeini’s
Death, Iran and its growing global Importance, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, Iran’s Nuclear
Programme and the US concerns.
DISINTEGRATION OF THE USSR AND RE-EMERGENCE OF RUSSIA
302
Historical Background: From Russian to Soviet Union, Post-War Foreign Policy, Soviet Foreign Policy in
1970s and 1980s, Internal Developments (Rise of Gorbachev), Gorbachev’s Reforms, Politics, Soviet
Elections, Disintegration of Soviet Union and its Implications, Causes, Implications for South Asia, Crimes
and Turmoil in Russia, Russia’s Chechan Ulcer, Yelstin’s exit and Putin’s entry, Orange Revolution,
Russia & the evolving NATO situation, US Russia Relations, End of Cold War, Economic aid, New US-
Russia detente.
Chapter 12 CHINA
339
Emergence of Communist China, Admission of China to The United Nations, Why US opposed? Attitude
of the United States, The Sino-Soviet Rivalry, Sino-Soviet Thaw, TheCultural Revolution,
Admission into UNO, Post Mao Setup, Rise of Deng and his Policies, ProDemocracy Demonstration and
After Post-Deng Era, President Bill Clinton’s visit and China’s Economic Interests, China: Super power
of the next Century? China as Emerging Economic Giant, China’s membership of WTO, China’s Nuclear
agenda and US, China’s war
r
heads and US worries, China and South Asia.Anti Secession law.
Chapter 13 CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 384

The Kashmir Dispute, History of Kashmir. Factors leading to the Resurgence of Struggle, The Legacy of
Kashmir Intefadah, Respective Policies of India and Pakistan. Re-Introduction of the International Facotrs,
Kashmir-Possible Solution, Kashmir loosing the knot. The Agra Summit, Kashmir Issue after 09/11
Ceasefire and Resumption of Dialogue, Cyprus, Cyprus and ’ • Turkey’s Bid for EU. Situation in Lebanon,
Cedar
Revolution, Afghanistan, Geneva Talks for Soviet Withdrawal. The Geneva Accord, Symmetry, Geneva
Accord: Main Points, The Peshawar Accord, The Islamabad Accord, Rise of Taliban and / Subsequent
Developments, Plan hijacking and Taliban, Taliban’s destruction of Buddha statues, Winds of change in
Afghanistan, 09/11: Consequences for Afghanistan, The Bonn Accord, Prospects for peace in Afghanistan,
Transitional Government in Afghanistan, Reconstruction of Afghanistan, The new Constitution for
Afghanistan, Afghan Election, Bangladesh, Reunification of Germany, Partition Towards Unification,
Implications, The Gulf War 1991, Prelude to Invasion, Reason of the US and International Community,
Operation ”Desert Storm”, Post-war Security Arrangements, The Second Gulf War
2003, Iraq Election ,New World Order, New World Order and Third World, Economic Cooperation
Organization (ECO), Background, The Emergence of ECO, The future of ECO, Role of Pakistan, Evolving
Sino-US Relations, Transitions in South Africa, The Reforms and Transition, South Africa after the
Elections, The new constitution of ’ South Africa, Bosinia Herzegovina, Independence and War, ’ Efforts
Towards Peace, The Dayton Peace Agreement, Sino-India Rapprochernent and its Implications for South
Asia. How did this improvement did came about? The Territorial Dispute, in the East, In the West,
Towards the Rapprochement, Implications for
• South Asia, Sino-India Detente:The Present Situation,
• Russian Attack on Chechnya, New Developments In Chechnya, Libya and the Lockerbie Affairs, South
Asia on the eve of the 21s1 Century, CTBT: Western Move to Blunt Third World Initiative,New Phase of
Smo-Russian
10
11
entente, Independence of East Timor, Indonesia and the Aceh problem, Indian Nuclear Doctrine, WTO
Summit at Seattle, WTO Summit at Cancun, Post Sept 11, global dynamics, Explaining Muslim hate
towards the US. Role of OIC in Coping with the Challenges facing the Muslim World. North Korea
Nuclear Crisis.
Chapter 14 THE END OF COLD WAR
545
Cold War Politics, A Review, The End of Cold War Implication of the End of Cold War.
Chapter 15 DISARMAMENT AND

NUCLEARPROLIFERATION
555
Talks on Conventional Weapons, Nuclear NonProliferation, NPT, Nuclear Technology, NPT and Pakistan,
CTBT and South Asia, SALT, SALT II, The Reykjavik Summit, Towards START Treaties, START, The
future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia, CTBT sign or not to sign, Nuclear weapons, - the Fear
Factor.
India relations deteriorated, Pakistan’s Foreign PolicyNew Challenges, Whether Pakistan should recognize
Israel or not.
Chapter 17 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA 679
India Nuclear Explosion and its Implications, Inception of, Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme. The US
Response and Subsequent Policies, Respective Positions of India and Pakistan, India and Pakistan Nuclear
Tests 1998, International Reaction to Tests, Regional Effects, South Asia’s future, CTBT: Western Move to
Blunt Third World Initiative, Strobe Talbott’s Nuclear Diplomacy, Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture, CTBT - The
Options. Nuclear Controversy in Pakistan.
Chapter 18 SAARC
705
Formation and Objectives, Achievements, Hurdles in the Way of SAARC. The Uncertain Future of
SAARC. Islamabad Summit of SAARC 2004. Recent developments.
Chapter 16 FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN
579
Foreign Policy in 1950 and 1960, September 1965 War, Foreign Policy in 1970s. The Muslim Summit,
Relations with Muslim Countries, Foreign Policy in 1980, Developments in South Asia, Muslim World,
Pak-US Relations, Convergence of Interests, Pak-Soviet Uneasy Relations, Pak-Afghan Relations and
Geneva Accord, Pak China Relations, Launching of the SAARC, Relations with the Muslim World,
Foreign Policy in 1990s, Pakistan and Persian Gulf, Jamah’s visit to Gulf Countries. The Growing
Importance of South-East Asia and ASEAN. Towards Indo-Pak Reconciliation. MFN Status to India, Pak-
US Relations and Nawaz’ Sharif s visit to Washington-December 1998, Pak-US new Strains. PakUS
Relations after 9/11, President Musharafs visit to Camp David, Pakistan’s Stance on Iraqi crisis, US
interests in South Asia, finding a way out in Kashmir, Pak-India relations on the eve of the 21st Century,
Pak-
12
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HET\\ KEN I HE I\VO \\OKLI) \\ARS
INTERN VnONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE. TMOWORU) \\ARS ]3
PARTI
CHAPTER 1
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO WORLD

WARS
To maintain the status quo, as dictated by the terms of Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations was set up.
Its object, above all, was the disarmament of Germany. Although formulated in a war-weary mood with
idealistic trends, the League of Nations in fact turned out to be an instrument of policy in the hands of the
victors, till Hitler finally put an end to it by his attack on Poland in 1939. But it was not before the League
had already received blow after blow since its inception, and was, for all practical purposes, dead long ago.
The victors were not only dishonest but also lacked all statesmanlike qualities. The Big Powers did not care
for the new republic set up by the Germans. It was not allowed to settle down. Set up by the democratic
elements in Germany, who reacted to the earlier warmongering despotic regimes of their country, the new
regime was shown nothing but hostility. The arduous task of reparations, the imposition of war-guilt, and
complete military and territorial humiliation, weakened the foundations of democratic government in
Germany, and reactionary nationalism was raising its head to hit back. The regime, which was associated
with the humiliation of the Germans at Versailles, was attacked both from the right and the left. The
Germans having strong traditions of autocracy, were anxiously looking forward to some leader who could
harness and channelize their smouldering nationalism. The injured pride, the hypocrisy of the victors in
disarming themselves and the renewed attempts by France and her allies to tear away German territories,
reached a point of no return. The occupation of the Ruhr Valley in 1923 by France and the appalling
economic difficulties of Germany precipitated the matters, and the votes began to flow towards the
Nazi Party. Above all, the Germans wanted a strong man who could heal the injury to their might and
vanity. It has been pointed out that t\vo men united the German people - Bismarck in 1870 and Pomcare in
1923. Poincare (the French President) had his o\vn anxieties. He had not forgotten that Germany had twice
attacked France during the past 40 years and inflicted serious damage each time. For France, there was but
one question and that was France. There was only one enemy, and that was Germany. There was only one
policy and that was security. This was the French psychology, and to understand their inter-war policy, it is
necessary to understand that psychology. It is rightly said that the geographical position of a nation is the
principal factor conditioning its foreign policy ~ in fact, the principal reason why it must have a foreign
policy at all. France had hoped that Britain and America would guarantee its security after the Peace
Treaty, but as both retired into their shells and adopted a policy of isolation, France felt itself insecure
rather more acutely. So France, left all alone, started entering into separate treaties with powers encircling
Germany. The need for security was mutual. The following mutual security treaties were entered into by
France in the years after the Treaty of Versailles:
1. 1920 Belgium.
2. 1921 Poland.
3. 1924 Czechoslovakia.
4. 1926 Romania.
5. 1927 Yugoslavia
There were obvious differences between France and Britain as on the German question, Britain wanted to
normalize relations with Germany and did not want to recover a heavy war-indemnity. Its purpose was the
reestablishment of trade relations with Germany, which had so much importance for Britain in pre-war
days. But France persisted in its illogical demand for recovering whatever it could from Germany.
Occupation of the Ruhr Valley was a step in this direction. This hastened its economic collapse. It was
against the spirit of the Reparations Commission’s recommendations, which envisaged Germany’s
economic recovery only after the restoration of its vitally important territories of mineral wealth.
To respond to the French clamours for security, Britain entered into what is called Locarno Pact. This pact
started the so-called Trace of Locamo and there prevailed comparative peace in Europe for the next two
years. But Locarno is by no means the brightest spot in the diplomatic history of Europe in the 1920’s.
While it guarded the Western frontiers, it left the question of the Eastern frontiers undecided. By not
guaranteeing security to Germany’s Eastern frontiers it admitted the injustice done to it by the Versailles
Treaty. By providing surety through Locarno Pact, it was
14
established that the treaty provisions had to be voluntarily accepted before they could be of any value. By
neglecting the Eastern frontiers it was amply demonstrated that the area which was not of direct concern to
Western Powers was not given guarantee of security. So the Pact was not idealistic in spirit. It did not aim
at a total European peace. It calmed down temporarily the German and French fears of each other and also
served British interest in holding the balance of power by raising Germany to a position of defending itself
against France. In the ultimate analysis, it turned out to be a British device to curb French expansionist
tendencies. It was under this pact that the Ruhr was evacuated.
The Locarno Pact had shifted the emphasis from the League of Nations to a small concert of European
powers dominated by Britain. This damaged the League considerably, because policies of entrants to
Locarno Pact were wholly based on their respective national interests. It suited all of them, and behind it
there were no altruistic motives of promoting world peace. But soon after France felt itself dwarfed by
British guardianship. It was not prepared to play second fiddle to Britain. Strangely enough similar feelings
prevailed in Britain about their own lack of independence of action. The result was that the truce did not
last more than two years. The French having felt insecure sought American help. The result was the signing
of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It again shifted the emphasis away from the League, thus seriously
undermining its position. It gave a feeling that the League was not so important as the individual initiative
outside it. But there was nothing substantial for the pact to do. It was merely a resolution, but can
resolutions be effective in abolishing wars? The only effect it could have was psychological and that too
was shortlived. Three years after its signing in 1931, Japan had captured Manchuria.
As to the disarmament efforts under the League, nothing came out of them. For the great Powers, it only
meant that no power should disturb the status quo effected by Versailles Treaty, and the peace enforced by
that treaty should be maintained. The Great Powers had their colonies all over the world, and they were not
going to reduce their armies and thus pave the way for the death of imperialism. Whenever they came to
the conference table for disarmament, they had their national interests in mind and were determined to
safeguard them through ”diplomatic juggleries.” The disarmament under the League had to deal with two
difficult problems: the French question of security, and the German question of equality of rights. Either
Germany should be allowed to rearm and gain equality, or all the rest should disarm to German level. This
was the German demand and quite a legitimate one. The Great Powers would not disarm, so the result was
that Germany armed itself to whatever extent it pleased. There was no moral prohibition.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE T\U) WORLD \\ \RS
r
15
As to the problem of collective security, again national interests guided the policy of these big Powers. The
way the question of Eastern frontiers was excluded from the Locarno Pact, clearly manifested the Great
Powers’ lack of concern for security of those areas not of any direct concern to them. Moreover, the big
powers had their colonies spread all over the world, and they had a tacit compromise over these territories.
Why should u; *ake military action against a power and thus lose its goodwill and ndetstanding which were
so relevant to keeping the colonies among icmselves? If Japan attacked Manchuria, it was absolutely
necessary that ritain should keep quiet. Why? Because it had its own interests in the Far ast and South East
Asia. So why should it offend Japan by taking military ction against it. And then what would be the
justification for holding on to ndia - giving only one instance - if Britain had condemned Japanese
mperiahsm in Manchuria. Italy had occupied Ethiopia. Why should France >ppose it, when Italy had given
its assurance of help against a possible Jerman attack? And if Britain clamoured about it, it was not because
of >eaceful intentions but because Italian influence in the Mediterranean was ngero as to British colonial
interests.
I Whatever disarmament efforts took place outside the League, were
•meant to reach compromise as to the limitation of arms, and not to reducing f thcoi so as to reach an
eventual disarmament. There was, in fact, mutual urn lerstanding to reduce defence expenditure. In
Washington, the 1921 conference of the interested parties reached an agreement about China (Nine-Power
Compact). Their Four-Power Pacific Treaty (US, UK, Japan, France) secured a compromise safeguarding
each other’s possessions in the Pacific. The Five-Power Naval Disarmament Agreement was meant to fix
relative naval strengths. This was a diplomatic move to impose a ceiling on French and Italian naval
strength and it also gave a boost to Japan by bringing its naval strength to the level of 60% of those of US
and UK, so that its goodwill might be obtained in keeping the status quo in China and the Pacific. At the
next Naval Disarmament Conferences at Geneva and London, France and Italy could not submit to any
limitations. As a result, only Japan, US and UK could sign the London Naval Treaty (1930). When Jap&n
finally set out on the course of conquests in the Far East, it no longer found itself obliged to honour its
earlier naval treaties with US and UK, and they were scrapped by it at the 1935 London Naval Conference,
where Japan had asked for parity with the United States and United Kingdom, but was refused.
Meanwhile, in Europe events were shaping and reshaping themselves in quick succession. The days of
Locarno were over, KelloggBriand Pact proved only a mirage, no disarmament had taken place under
i
16
the League, and it had disillusioned all those purblind idealists who hail pinned their hopes on it as a
system of collective security. In Germany, the Nazis were embarking on an adventure of militant
nationalism and were rearming to replace themselves on the pedestal from which they had most
humiliatingly fallen. In Italy, Fascism was gaining ground and Italy was feverishly building itself up as a
great naval and colonial power. It was greatly inspired by the Japanese aggression in Manchuria. The
League merely looked on and this was a signal for Italy to go ahead with its militarism. The result was the
Ethiopian annexation. This had considerably satisfied Italy’s thirst for territories, which was left
unquenched by the terms of Versailles Treaty. It was not given the promised territories of its ’due’ share for
allying itself with the victors. This naked aggression by Italy and the impotency shown by the League of
Nations, was a clarion call for Hitler, who was already looking for opportunities. France and Britain hurried
to meet this impending danger, but each in its own way. While France depended upon its individual efforts
to enter into bilateral mutual security pacts, Britain entered a course of gamble which in the diplomatic
history of Europe, is known as a ”policy of appeasement”. Hitler was busy in arming, but he gave an ample
proof of his peaceful intentions by entering into pacts with other powers.
- In 1934, he entered into a non-aggression pact with Poland for

10 years. This weakened the position of France vis-a-vis Germany, because Poland had been an ally of
France since 1920.
- In 1934, a revolt occurred in Austria under the Nazi Party. The revolt failed. Hitler denied any complicity
in it.
- In 1935, a plebiscite was held in the Saar. The Saar voted for Germany, and it thus added considerably to
the resources of that country.
- 1935 saw an open denunciation of the military clauses of Versailles Treaty, and conscription was ordered
in Germany.
- 1935 Hitler entered into a naval agreement with Great Britain. Hitler was allowed to raise Germany’s
naval strength to 35% of the British strength. This was an open violation .of Versailles Treaty. Moreover
Italy and Britain had opposed a joint front against Nazi Germany. Thus France felt particularly deserted and
unnerved.
For the Western democracies between the two world wars, there were two alternative courses:
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BF.TWEEN THF. TWO WOR
1.
To make friends with the Fascists and the Nazis.
To make friends with Russia and thus allow the spread of Socialism into Western Europe.
They followed the first course but increasingly felt dominated by the Nazis and the Fascists who, instead of
turning against Russia, as the Western Powers had hoped and intended through their policy of appeasement
were now pressing on Britain and France themselves. So this policy of appeasement had backfired and the
gamble did not pay.
Turning of the Fascists to the side of Germany was a stroke of expert diplomacy. Italy had one object -
like all others - that of advancement of its national interests. Her interests lay in expanding towards Africa
and to secure the Mediterranean. Before proceeding with that aim, it wanted to make secure its frontier with
Austria, which was being annexed by Germany. Italy resisted this latter move. Stressa Conference was an
important step in Italian diplomacy. But when Britain resented the Italian expansionist policy and was
almost on the verge of going to war with Italy over the Mediterranean and Abyssinia, Italy found German
friendship desirable. When the League failed to take any action against Japanese aggression in Manchuria
and Italian expansion in Africa, it considerably emboldened them and sent them under the direct patronage
of Hitler who was yet preparing and looking for excuses to start his own full-scale offensive. Italy and
Japan with their tails up, thus entered with Germany into what is called the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. All
were ready to condone each other’s military adventurism and so found themselves in congenial company.
While Italy and Germany were to co-operate in Europe. Japan would be hammering their enemies in Asia.
It would be a menace to Russia in the Far East and to Britain in South and South-East Asia. The only aim
of Japan in entering this Axis was to get a free hand in Asia and Germany would willingly allow it as it was
itself opposed to Communist Russia and Britain. Russian engagement in the Far East and British
engagement in India and elsewhere would greatly benefit Hitler’s policy in Europe.
In Europe, after having secured her Eastern frontiers by an agreement with Poland, Germany slowly moved
to Southern Europe. After devouring Austria and Czechoslovakia, Hitler advanced into Poland, making a
mockery of its non-aggression Pact of 1934 with them. This finally convinced Britain and France of the
nature of stopgap arrangement of the pact with Poland and they awakened overnight to this new critical
situation they were in.
Chamberlain, the author of ”The Policy of Appeasement”, said in March 1939: ”The possible aim of
German government is the domination of the whole Europe.” While the fall of Prague came as a
tremendous shock to
18
the appeasers, subsequent events soon made them realize the gravity, and Britain drew very close to and
made some frantic efforts towards wooing Soviet Russia. Russia which had faced a very hostile time at the
hands of the appeasers of Fascism, the Nazis and France, was now a hard nut to crack. It could only come
to their help on its own terms. At the same time Germany was also in the run to win over Russia. But the
West, which had spared no effort to dislodge the Communists through helping the internal opposition, non-
recognition of the regime, policy of keeping it away from the League, policy of appeasing Hitler, and non-
intervention in Spain, was again demonstrating its indifference to Russian national interest while
negotiating a treaty with it. It would ask for co-operation so far as Eastern Europe and Central Europe were
concerned, but was not willing to give a reciprocal guarantee of help in the case of the Baltic States, the
security of which was so vital to Russia. Molotov denounced this selfishness and refused to join with the
West in any treaty that was not based on equality and reciprocity. The negotiations broke down, and Hitler
at once stepped in to sign a pact of non-aggression with Russia (1939).
RISE OF THE LEFT IN EUROPE
Globalization and technological innovation comprise a great social
x revolution that has cast into crisis the most advanced model of social
compromise ever built in the world - the European welfare state, which
shifts resources on a national basis from the profits of business to
employment, social security, health and education.
The defence of these conquests, however, is beyond the horizon of the national state. If the response to this
revolution was restricted to the national level, the game would be lost immediately; it would be like
fighting atomic missiles with bows and arrows.
Today, the Europeans have to think of a left capable of promoting a world-scale movement to impose, for
example, a tax on world capital mobility as envisioned by the American economist, James Tobin. While not
demonizing mobility, it is crucial that the processes of integration should promote liberalization but at the
same time regulation of trade and capital.
How to cope with the reality of globalization has caused a profound rift in the left between those who see
the opportunities of globalization and technological change and those who see only an apocalyptic scenario
for the standard of living of the average European working person.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS
19
The pessimistic view is understandable if we look at globalization exclusively from the point of view of
male, middle-aged job-holders who live in Western Europe and are protected by their acquired rights and
contracts in the welfare state. As important as these conquests of civilization, they belong to a very small
minority of the human race.
Seeing globalization only as a threat leads to the idea that there is no option but to build up our defences
and merely resign advancing reality. Here, the line between defence of leftist values and the defence of
European privileges becomes very faint.
To be sure, globalization breaks down the industrial base upon which labour movements were built in
Europe, but it also broadens the field of production and the market to an extent never before achieved.
Far from Europe, in other parts of the world, globalization means, among other things, millions of new jobs
in industry and a better standard of living. There is no doubt that this often comes about through dreadful
industries and hateful forms of exploitation. On the other hand, industrialization in the West came about in
the same way.
Globalization brings Chinese or Brazilian workers in contact with roughly the same technologies and the
productive processes which workers in the great capitalist metropolis have. This is the means whereby, in a
few years time, the most industrialized countries may well include among their number Brazil, South
Africa or China.
Economic globalization, of course, must be accompanied by the globalization of rights if its benefits are to
be shared. In the East trade unions are being founded and workers’ struggle is advancing. As in the
example of South Korea, the affirmation of the rights of workers has been part and parcel of the bargain to
get past the present economic crisis.
So, today we are living in, an extraordinary period not foreseen by those who forecast the end of history.
The left is not only once again victorious in old Europe but as a consequence of globalization, is also
experiencing an unexpected expansion in the world from the South Africa of Nelson Mandela to the Latin
America of Fernando Henrique Cardosa to the Korea of Kirl Dae Jung.
For the first time, a worldwide left that may meet the challenges of globalization is truly conceivable.
20
TOWARDS INTERNATIOM.IS.V1:THE I MTF.l) NATIONS
21
PART II
CHAPTER 2
(l)
TOWARDS INTERNATIONALISM THE UNITED NATIONS

INTRODUCTION
The United Nations represents mankind’s latest, and only partially successful attempt to ascertain some
mechanism for world peace, ”Though the idea of attaining universal peace has never been achieved in
human history, yet mankind as a whole has never been despaired of it and efforts by well-meaning persons,
and nations or groups of nations, have continued to be made. It is an interesting phenomenon that such
momentous efforts have been made usually after some catastrophic events. After the First World War, the
League of Nations came into existence, but it had the seeds of destruction in its very conception and in its
early growth. With a maximum membership of fifty-nine, it remained predominantly a European
organization. It made some progress in economic and social fields, but its demise came with the coming of
the Second World War, which it had no power to prevent, with its important members having openly
flouted the principles of peace. One of the big powers, the United States, did not participate, although it
supported the League’s decisions. As regards the present United Nations, just as the rule of unanimity of
decisions hampered the League of Nations, the provision of veto in the Security Council of the United
Nations has effectively reduced it to a state of impotence.
Apart from the very human desire for peace, the concept of the United Nations arose out of the vision of the
Allied Powers in the Second World War, who wished to see some order emerge from the chaos of a
catastrophic war, visualizing for themselves, of course, a position of dominance. The two super-powers,
USA and USSR, crashed in the Council halls of the United Nations in Cold War or otherwise, under the
shadow of an emerging China as the third superpower.
In 1941 the Western Allies, in concert against Hitler’s Germany, started calling themselves ”the United
Nations.” The Moscow declaration of
1943 stressed the necessity of establishing an international organization for peace. Definite plans were
made in stages, at Tehran in 1943, at Dumbarton Oaks (USA) in 1944, at Yalta in 1945. Fifty nations sent
their representatives to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, which drafted the Charter. It formally came
into existence on 24 October, 1945.
The United Nations can be best defined as ”an association of states which have pledged themselves by
signing the Charter to maintain world peace and to co-operate in creating such conditions under which
peace and security can be achieved.” The Charter, however, does not authorize the organization to
intervene in the domestic affairs of a state.
The Charter is essentially a multilateral treaty among sovereign nations, establishing a system of collective
security, and providing various ways of co-operation between these states. It embraces all the three fields in
which nations can co-operate - political, economic and cultural. Mutual discussions and interminable
debates are the recognized modes of achieving this co-operation on international scale. There is a provision
for sanctions against those member States who violate the United Nations decisions but this depends on the
co-operation of the members, and particularly the delinquent members. Indeed, some member States have
persistently ignored the plea of the United Nations and carried on with their own policies. Israel and India
are examples of this recalcitrant brand among these nations.
Before attempting an evaluation of the United Nations, it would be appropriate to take into account the
details of the structure and methods of working of its principal organs, and to assess their impact on the
policies that have emerged from the debates. Only then will it be possible to draw a balance-sheet.
(II) THE MAIN ORGANS
The United Nations has the following main organs:
1. The Security Council.
2. The General Assembly.
3. The Economic and Social Council.
4. The Trusteeship Council.
5. The International Court of Justice.
6. The Secretariat.
Besides these, there are major organizations within the United Nations which are known as ”the
Specialized Agencies.” As we shall see later, it is me Agencies which have gone a long way into the
question of tackling
22
problems of world importance and have many concrete achievements to their credit. These are:
1. International Labour Organization. (ILO)
2. International Monetary Fund. , (IMF)
3. United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization. (UNESCO)
4. World Health Organization. ’ (WHO)
5. Food and Agriculture Organization. (FAO)
6. The World Bank. (International Bank For Reconstruction And Development) (IBRD)
Besides these, there are a host of other agencies, councils and committees, whose membership has
increased to such proportions that a few years ago a special committee had to be established to study these
various committees and suggest some rationalized structure in the midst of this multiplicity.
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
The Security Council is the most important of the principal organs of the United Nations. Since the United
Nations Organization is a vast one having a large number of nations as members, it was imperative that a
small council with sufficient executive authority should be created which should be able to take decisions
quickly and effectively for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council
consists of 15 (fifteen) members, of which five are permanent. These permanent members are China,
France, Russia, UK and USA. Previously the Formosan Government was recognized as representing China
in view of the attitude of USA. But now the Communist China consisting of 1000 million inhabitants has
been given membership. These five permanent members enjoy the right of Veto. In the original conception
ofthe United Nations, it was envisaged that primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace would fall on these big powers of the world, but with the change in the power status of UK and
France and the emergence immediately after Second World War, of conflict between USA and USSR, the
situation worsened. Since then the Veto power has been the greatest stumbling block in the way of
international peace. The ten other members of the Security Council, called tke non-permanent members, are
elected for a two-year term by the General Assembly and no member nation is elected for two consecutive
terms. For a non-permanent member nation to come on the Security Council a two-third majority vote in
the General Assembly is required. Generally, various geographical regions are given representation in the
election of nonpermanent members to the Security Council.
TOWARDS INTERN ATIONL.ISM:THE UNITED NATIONS
23
While dealing with international disputes, the Security Council either tries to arrive at a peaceful
settlement, or it uses its powers to take enforcement action by means of sanctions against the defaulting
members. The usual method is that after the case is referred to the Security Council either by the General
Assembly, the Secretary General or by any nation, the Council first admits the case by a majority decision
and then invites the parties for discussion. Then a resolution is passed, giving the line of action, and no
resolution can be passed without the consent of the five permanent members, because they have the Veto
right. The Security Council has the power to determine whether there has occurred a threat to breach of
peace, or an act of aggression has been committed. The sanctions, which can be imposed, are both
economic as well as those involving the use of armed forces. In the present context of world affairs, when
there is a conflict between the world powers, there is little hope of any effective sanctions which can be
enforced fully by the United Nations. During its history the United Nations has faced many crises, but only
in a few cases has it been able to take any corrective action. The formation of a United Nations Armed
Force for action in Korea could be done only when one of the great powers, the USSR, was absent at a
meeting and therefore could not exercise its Veto. The Security Council passed three important resolutions
in 1960 on the Congo crisis, providing for military assistance to the Government of the Congo against the
rebel regime of Tshombe. But after a successful start, the unanimity of opinion among the big powers did
not last and the measures adopted could not be completely successful.
The Security Council functions continuously. Each member nation has a permanent representative at the
Headquarters of the United Nations in New York. The Security Council also approves the admission of
new members to the organization. Another interesting feature of the Security Council is that the Veto does
not operate on questions of procedure. All disputes can be discussed. But before the Council can start
taking any action, the consent ofthe permanent members as well as that ofthe majority ofthe Council is
required. The abolition ofthe right of Veto enjoyed by the five permanent members has been advocated by
many thinking persons. That it is impossible for such a step to be undertaken for the time being, is a
symptom ofthe frantic struggle for world influence by the big powers.
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
The General Assembly, in which are represented all the member States of the United Nations, meets once a
year in regular sessions, but special meetings can be called. Under the terms of the Charter, the main
responsibility, for arriving at decisions and making appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly
rests with the Security Council.
24
But because of the addition of the new Asian and African members, the General Assembly has come to
assume a very important role. One of the main functions of the General Assembly is to elect representatives
to its various organs, such as the Security Council, Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council
and International Court of Justice etc.
The business before the General Assembly is divided into important matters and other matters, important
matters include elections to other organs and matters of concern for world peace, and are decided by a
twothird majority of the number of members voting. Even though the General Assembly is limited by the
procedure prescribed by the Charter, by a resolution called ”Uniting for Peace Resolution 1950” (during the
Korean War debate) a convention has been established that in the event of Security Council failing to
decide a problem concerning threat to peace because of the use of or threat of the use of Veto by a big
power, the matter can be considered by the Assembly. The General Assembly can, therefore, pass
resolutions recommending certain line of action for execution by its members. This happened during the
Anglo-French attack on- Egypt. When France vetoed, the matter was referred to the General Assembly,
which by a resolution condemned the attack on Egypt. In spite of this, the fact remains that it is the Security
Council which takes major decisions, and the resolutions of the General Assembly are only
recommendations of the member states. With a large number of small states the use of moral force has been
very prominent during recent years by the African and Asian member nations in the debates of the General
Assembly.
The General Assembly has many committees through which its work is carried out. There is the General
Committee, the Credentials Committee, the Committee on Financial Contributions and the Administrative
and Budgetary Standing Committee. Apart from these procedural committees, there are other committees
known as Main Committees which deal with different issues, that remain prominent in international
discussions. There are six such committees:
(i) The First Committee deals with the political and security matters including the regulation of armaments;
(ii) The Second Committee is concerned with economic, and financial issues; c
(in) The Third Committee deals, with the social, humanitarian and cultural subjects;
(iv) The Fourth Committee is the Trusteeship Committee which deals with matters pertaining to the
territories under the trusteeship of one of the member States and this includes the non-self-governing
territories;
TOWARDS INTERNAT1ONUSM:THE UNITED NATIONS
25
(v) The Fifth Committee is the Administrative and Budgetary
Committee; and (vi) The Sixth Committee is concerned with legal questions.
An interesting feature of the discussions in the General Assembly is that various groups have emerged
which act in concert while voting on international problems, e.g., there is the Afro-Asian group which
influences the discussions of the General Assembly in a very important manner. Efforts regarding the
formation of Arab Bloc have not been much successful. There was the Soviet Bloc, there is the American
sphere of influence, and a bloc of Latin American influence, and the play of politics is very much evident in
the manner these blocs of votes are wooed by one or other of the great powers. Now, one of the major
criticisms levelled at the working of the General Assembly has been that most of the resolutions are
watered down by consideration for the peculiar national policies of the member nations. Even if a general
consensus is achieved that consensus is too vague, impracticable and too much hedged in by limitations and
provisos to achieve any concrete results.
In the matter of nominations to the various committees and organs, however, these blocs do achieve a
certain amount of distinct uniformity. The membership is usually divided among different regions. Since
the General Assembly is the assembly of equal and sovereign nations, such inter-play of politics is perhaps
essential but many observers have felt the need of some rational basis of voting procedure. Either all the
decisions should be by a majority vote, or perhaps, on the basis of population but these questions are so far
only academic in nature, and only slowly and gradually will any pattern for the future of the United Nations
itself emerge.
In each session, the Assembly elects its President. The President’s duties are to direct the discussions,
ensure observance of the rules, give his ruling on points of order, and generally regulate the conduct of the
meeting. The President’s ruling can be challenged by any delegation and overruled by a simple majority,
but the President is in a strategic position and can very well direct the deliberations of the Assembly. Apart
from this, there is the informal side of the influence of the President of the Assembly. If he has sufficient
international stature, he can bring the weight of his personality to bear on the deliberations, and even on the
decisions of the General Assembly.
The General Assembly has an important supervisory role, which it exercises over all the United Nations
bodies. Apart from the formulation of policy recommendations, the General Assembly can regulate the
budget of the United Nations according to the provisions of Article 17 and the rules of
26
TOWARDS I\TERNAT1OM.ISM:THF. I’MTEI) NATIONS
27
procedure. The annual budget is prepared by the Secretary-General, who sends it to the Advisory
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary questions, which submits its recommendations to the Fifth
Committee and then this Committee prepares a detailed report. The Assembly has created a committee on
contributions which assesses the quota of contributions to the United Nations budget by various member
states. The General Assembly can recommend any amendment to the Charter, and it decides the question of
admission of new members. It also elects the non-permanent members of the Security Council.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL
International economic and social co-operation started during the First World War, but the League of
Nations could not take effective steps to co-ordinate the work of various bodies working for economic and
social cooperation among the nations. The League had, however, various advisory bodies, like the
Economic and Financial Committee, but they could not carry out the work effectively. Various
conferences, such as the Monetary Conference of 1933 and World Economic Conference, 1927, were held
and gradually the economic activities of the League of Nations came into prominence. World War II
brought further co-operation in this field, and during this war the UN Conference on Food and Agriculture
was convened in May, 1943. By 1944, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, International
Monetary Fund, and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had been established. At the
time of the signing of the Charter of the United Nations by its Members, there were, therefore quite a few
organizations devoted to the work in the field of economic and social co-operation.
The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations has 27 members elected by the General Assembly.
Nine members are elected each year for a three-year term. There is no permanent membership, though in
practice the five permanent members of the Security Council are always elected. The Council works on the
basis of one vote for each member with decisions being made by a simple majority. The Council normally
meets twice a year. It operates under the authority of the General Assembly and has specific responsibility
for the discharge of the functions of the United Nations set out in Chapter 9. Article 56 contains a pledge of
member nations to co-operate in the promotion of economic and social aims of the organization. The
Council has very wide terms of reference, but because the economic matters concern primarily the
individual member states and their policy depends upon their own interests, it has limited powers. The
Council carries out its activities by conducting studies in the economic development of under-developed
countries and also on specific products and processes.
The Council can make recommendations to the member States and call either for specific legislative action,
or action through the organized efforts of international agencies. Various conferences are held from time to
time.
The most striking example of help extended to the member states by
the Economic and Social Council is Technical Assistance Programme
*-** initiated in (1947 to aid the under-developed countries. A Technical
Assistance Committee determines questions of policy, and a Technical
Assistance Board executes this policy. This Board has done excellent work
l and special fund for the development of under-developed territories was

’ established in 1958.
Another important task assigned to the Economic and Social Council is the co-ordination of the work of
various specialized agencies of the United Nations, like the International Labour Organization, the Food
and Agriculture Organization and the International Monetary Fund etc. The council has various
Commissions on transport, on human rights, on the status of women, on population etc. whose work it co-
ordinates. These Commissions are functional in nature and they have been doing very useful work in their
respective fields. These Commissions collect statistics and
i formulate policies. Then there are Regional Commissions which consider
the questions of particular interests to the various regions. In short, the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations is a co-ordinating
, agency under which work various commissions and specialized Agencies.
. After the Security Council and the General Assembly, it is perhaps the most
important organization of the United Nations and in terms of concrete achievements, it is, perhaps, the most
effective.
THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL ,
Trusteeship means the assuming of responsibility by a State for the t government of a territory whose
people have not yet developed to the stage
*.* necessary for independence or self-government. The Trusteeship Council of
the United Nations deals with these territories. The members of the Council are those states which are
administering trust territories. The permanent members of the Security Council, besides other non-
administering member states are given a participation for a three-year term, elected by the General
Assembly. This Council functions under the authority of the General Assembly and assists the Security
Council. For strategic areas it works under the Security Council and for non-strategic areas on active
guidance from the General Assembly, but in practice these two things are regarded as identical. The
Council considers the report submitted by the administering authorities on the basis of its questionnaire and
then reports either to the General Assembly or the Security Council making recommendations. This
28
Council has various Standing Committees and ad-hoc Committees, where again the equality of
representation between the administering and nonadministering states has been established. As the
Trusteeship Council is entrusted with the promotion of economic, social and educational advancement of
the inhabitants of the states placed under trust, and to encourage responsibility for human rights and
fundamental freedom, its work is really important.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Its statute forms an
integral part of the Charter. All the members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the statute. The
Court consists of 15 judges elected by the Security Council and the General Assembly. President and Vice-
President of the Court are elected by the members of the Court from among themselves.
The judges are elected regardless of their nationality from among the persons of high moral character
possessing the highest judicial qualifications. They are elected for nine years and are eligible for reelection.
They cannot exercise any political or administrative functions or engage in any other occupation of
professional nature. According to Article
31 of the Statute of International Court of Justice, each party to the dispute has a right to choose its own
nominee to sit as a judge of the Court.
The permanent seat of the Court is at The Hague but the Court can sit elsewhere, when it considers
desirable. The Court remains permanently in session except during the judicial vacations.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Court exercises jurisdiction over states which are parties to the statute and over other states, who
deposit a declaration signifying their acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction and undertaking to comply with
the Court’s decision.
The jurisdiction of the Court is of three kinds:

1 • Voluntary
2. Optional, compulsory or obligatory
3. Advisory
As for the voluntary jurisdiction, its domain comprises all cases which the parties refer to the Court by
agreement. The .jurisdiction of the Court is compulsory m all legal disputes concerning:
TOWARDS INTER.NATIONLIS\1:THE I NITED NATIONS 29
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
and
(d) the nature and extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
States cannot be compelled to refer their disputes to the Court. The jurisdiction of the Court is confined to
the cases which are voluntarily submitted to it, except, where one of the parties to the dispute has bound
itself in advance to accept the jurisdiction of the Court. But says Oppenheim:-
”Apart from the reservations, there is probably no dispute which does not come within the purview of four
categories enumerated above.”
Under the Advisory jurisdiction the Court can give Us advice on any legal point referred to it by the
Security Council, General Assembly or other organs of the UN. Such advisory opinions are not binding
upon the parties unless the states are bound by agreement in advance to accept the verdict of the Court as
binding.
Article 38 of the statute provides that the Court shall decide the cases in accordance with International Law
and shall apply International conventions, international customs, recognized principles of law and judicial
decisions of the highly qualified publicists of various nations.
PROCEDURE OF THE COURT
Cases are brought before the Court either by a notification of the special agreement or by a written
application addressed to the registrar. The full Court sits for the decision unless provided otherwise. A
quorum of nine judges constitutes the Court. Decisions are taken by majority vote. In case of a tie, the
President has a casting vote. The judgment is final and without appeal.
SECRETARIAT
The Secretariat of the United Nations comprises a Secretary-General and a staff of international civil
servants. It carries out the day-to-day activities of the United Nations, arranges the holding of sessions,
corresponds with the member nations and undertakes specific jobs of
30
international diplomacy and contact. The Secretary-General is the Chief Administrative Officer of the
Organization. Among its chief duties is that of ensuring the efficient \\orking of the meetings of the organs
and committees and conferences. He draws up provisional agenda, notifies the member States, provides
staff and facilities, undertakes studies, advises on matters of procedure, and assists in preparing the
documents, resolutions and reports. Another important duty of the Secretary-General is to co-ordinate and
integrate the programmes of various branches of the Secretariat and the specialized agencies. The
Secretary-General is responsible for the preparation of the annual budget of the United Nations, which is
submitted to the Advisory Committee on Budgetary questions and the Fifth Committee, and ultimately
to’the General Assembly. He is the custodian of all UN funds, and he has a tesponsibility for their efficient
disbursement. Another function of the Secretary-General is to submit an annual report on the work of the
United Nations, which in fact, is a comprehensive summary of the work undertaken, and is very valuable as
a source of information. In practice, this report deals with the burning issues of the day and occasionally
contains suggestions and proposals related to political questions. The Secretary-General has the power to
bring matters to the attention of the UN organs and to make investigations and inquiries on his own
initiative. The Secretary-General can therefore, exercise considerable political influence. Apart from this, in
case of disputes between nations, the UN Security Council has been sending the Secretary-General for
conciliatory efforts as happened during the Indo-Pakistan War and Lebanon.
The conduct of the international civil servants working in the Secretariat is governed by staff regulations
and rules, and there are two main principles guiding recruitment:
(a) Personal qualification of the personnel, and
(b) The securing of adequate geographical representation.
There is a joint disciplinary committee, which works under the Secretary-General as an advisory body, and
there is also a Joint Appeals Board with three members, though the Secretary-General is not bound to
accept its recommendations There is a provision for further appeals regarding service matters to the UN
Administrative Tribunal.
(HI) THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES
We will now consider some of the major agencies working within the framework of the United Nations,
known as Specialized Agencies. These agencies are devoted to the work of economic development and
social and cultural betterment of the people of the world. They have
TOWARDS INTERNATIONL1SM:THF. I NITF.I) NATIONS
31
achieved considerable measure of success in their respective fields, and a brief view of some of the most
important of these agencies will be helpful in arriving at a broad view of the magnitude of effort being
made in this field.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
IMF
The IMF has been established to promote international monetary cooperation and to facilitate the expansion
and balanced growth of member nations. Among its most important functions is the promotion of exchange
stability and assistance to member nations in correcting their balance of payments position. Each member
of the IMF is assigned a quota of contribution, and the voting authority is in direct proportion to the
monetary contribution that the particular member nation makes. Certain conditions have been laid down by
the Fund, regulating the access to the Fund. The members are required not to alter their rates more than
10% from their initial par value without the Fund’s permission, and a certain percentage of gold value of
the contributions to the Fund must be maintained. If members purchase any currencies from the Fund they
use it only for the purposes approved by the Fund. It has often happened that a member nation, when facing
difficulty in its balance of payments, has drawn upon the resources of the Monetary Fund in order lo
stabilize its currency. It is a very useful institution.
IBRD
The main functions of IBRD are promotion of private foreign investments and strengthening of long-range
balanced growth of international trade. It provides loans to the member nations and supplements private
investments by providing finances for productive purposes. The Bank builds up its own funds by
contributions from Governments and by raising of funds in the investment market. In its turn, the Bank
gives loans to member countries either directly or to private business companies which invest in that
country, under suitable guarantees. Like the Monetary Fund a Board of Executive Directors under Board of
Governors manages it.
These two useful agencies have helped particularly the underdeveloped countries in large measures. The
International Bank in particular has been instrumental in providing funds for investments in industrial and
agricultural projects in many Asian and African developing countries.
32
IINTER.NATIO.NAI. AFFAIRS
TOWARDS LNTERNATIONUSMrTHE UNITED NATIONS
33
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION
The ILO dates back to pre-World War I era, but after the establishment of United Nations, its activities
have embraced a larger sphere. It works for the organization and welfare of the labour force in the world.
Through its various conventions, it has worked for the recognition by world governments, of the rights of
labour in matters of safety, continuity of employment, health and social security. It promotes legislation,
guaranteeing the minimum civilized conditions for labourers, and it has undertaken special measures for the
protection of women workers and children.
UNESCO
This organization started with the realization of the Allied nations to rebuild the war-damaged education
facilities. In 1945 its constitution was adopted, which has the famous phrase in its preamble ”Since wars
begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.” The
general purposes of UNESCO are to promote collaboration among the nations through education, science
and culture in order to promote universal respect for justice, the rule of law, and human rights. Membership
is open to all the members of the United Nations, who ratify its constitution, and even to non-member
States recommended by the Executive Board and approved by a two-third majority. It has an organ called
General Conference under which there is an Executive Board and Secretariat. Under the Secretariat there
are various bureaus and departments dealing with specialized subjects.
WHO
In 1945 preliminary conference for the establishment of United Nations also called for a special conference
to plan a new health organization. In 1946, under the United Nations Economic and Social Council, a
Technical Committee of health experts from 16 countries was formed and the international health
conference was called in June and July,
1966. This conference decided to continue the pre-War activities and to put greater emphasis on research
and technical assistance, Like the ILO, WHO works through the procedure of conventions. The structure of
this organization is similar to that of UNESCO. It is a health organization under which works an Executive
Board. The main executive work is done by the Director-General, under whom there are offices and
departments and divisions relating to various regions of the world, and the specialized subjects of study and
research. The assembly meets annually and decides important questions including the adoption of
conventions by a two-third majority. Conventions are the recommendations an international agency
makes, and these are ratified by the member states, after which they become binding. The main function of
WHO is to promote health, which is defined as a ”state of complete physical, mental and social well-being,
the enjoyment of which is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race,
religion, political belief and economic or social conditions.” The WHO has many regional organizations. It
helps its member States in evolving policies for the promotion of health and undertaking specific jobs of
research and extension.
POOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO)
The FAO of the United Nations, like other such agencies, is an extension of the efforts being made under
the old League of Nations. Its purposes are to improve the efficiency of agricultural production and
distribution, and to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living. Its structure is also similar to that of
other organizations. There is the General Conference under which there is a Council and a Director-
General. It has special committees on different aspects of its work and programme operations in various
fields. The FAO undertakes research and assistance to member nations in evolving their own programme
for the increase of agricultural production.
(IV) UNIYED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
The United Nations was conceived as an organization for international security mainly by the Western
Allies in World War II, and one of the main ingredients of international security was the continued unity
and harmony between the big powers of the world. But almost immediately after the war the harmony of
action disappeared and a Cold War started between the Communists and the non-Communists. The
situation became still more complicated with the rise of small nations who won their freedom from their
erstwhile colonial masters, and the two power blocs tried to get the allegiance of the young rising nations.
The power structure itself underwent a significant change. Britain and France no longer remained great
powers. The USSR and the United States were the two super-powers which came to dominate world
politics. The emergence of China as nuclear power considerably shook both the super-powers and the
world entered a phase where the two foes were beginning to see the emergence of a third power.
In the United Nations, during the first nine or ten years of its existence, quite a few international disputes
were rather successfully dealt with in spite of the bitter debate and the play of power politics.
34
TOWARDS INTERNAriONLISVhTHE I MTED NATIONS
35
The Iranian complaint against the Soviet Union for interference was amicably settled, and when the
question of Greece came up before the Security Council and the Security Council could not decide upon the
final measures for securing peace, the role of the General Assembly became more prominent. One of the
notable successes of the early years of the United Nations was the independence of Indonesia, but it
hopelessly failed in cases like Palestine, Arab-Israel conflict, Indo-Pak War of 1971 and Kashmir. The case
of Korea was a singular one, where the decision of the Security Council for a United Nations Force was
possible, only because Russia was absent at the time of voting in the Council.
UN intervention in Korea, (matchable only with the UN action in the Gulf in 1991), offered a precedent
which was later to be used for intervention in other parts of the world though to varying degrees and
executed under different sets of modalities and objectives. It showed a practical way to meet the
responsibilities of the UN under the Charter in the absence of a multinational force under the Security
Council for which the necessary agreements between the states had not been reached. Prior to this, the UN
lacked control or influence over the course of military action or the precise purposes for which it was
exercised i.e. to repel the aggression. The surfacing of new developments, some of them being novel in
character, gave the UN role in maintaining international security a more multifaceted character. The new
security environment demanded an enhanced role from the UN in general and the Security Council in
particular. The widening of UN peace and security responsibilities included not only traditional
peacekeeping operations but also election monitoring, human rights observation, humanitarian security,
peace making and peace enforcement. As far as peacekeeping is concerned the important UN operations till
date include:
(1) UNPKFIC (UN Peacekeeping Force, in Cyprus) consisting of 2200 military personnel to prevent the
recurrence of fighting, help maintain law and order and promote a return to normal conditions ;
(2) UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) with 1293 troops (in May 1974) to maintain and
supervise the cease-fire in the Golan Heights area between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic;
(3) UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon, March 1978) including 5854 troops to confirm withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon and assist Lebanese government in restoring effective authority in the
area;
(4) UNIKOM (UN Iraq-Kuwait Observations Mission. April 1991) with about 460 military and support
personnel to monitor the Iraq-Kuwait border;
(5) UNMFRIS (UN Mission for Referendum in Sahara, April 1991) including 350 military and
support personnel to oversee implementation of the settlement plan, including cease-fire
supemsion between Morocco and POLISARIO and organization of a referendum on territory’s future;
(6) UNOSAL’ May 1991, (UN Observer Mission in El Salvador) including 625 military and
civilian personnel; to monitor human rights situation to verify compliance with the December 31, 1991
cease-fire agreement and monitor maintenance of public order;
(7) UNAVEM 11 (UN Angola Verification Mission, May, 1991) with

750 military police and electoral personnel to carry out new verification tasks arising from the
Peace Accords for Angola, until general elections were to be completed.
(8) UNPROFOR (UN Piotection Force, Feb. 1992) with 13,000 military and civilian personnel to ensure
the conditions of peace and security, required for negotiation of overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis;
(9) UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, March 1991) with

15,000 military and civilian personnel to oversee transition to new administration after multi-party
elections;
(10) UNOSOM (UN Operation in Somalia, April 1992) 18,000 troops from various countries to facilitate
an immediate cessation of hostilities, maintain a cease-fire in Mogadishu, promote reconciliation and
political settlement and provide humanitarian assistance.
Besides these major operations the UN in the ten years or so has acted on behalf of the peace-loving world
community on a number of occasions, like passing a resolution concerning Iraqi Government treatment of
its own minorities, imposing sanctions on Libya due to her refusal to hand over the accused in the
Lockerbie air crash, the maintenance of security or stability in a given limited area (Southern Lebanon),
monitoring of elections in Namibia, Haiti and Eriteria, provision of humanitarian assistance in Cyprus,
Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Sudan etc., and the disarmament of insurgents in Nicaragua.
In all these operations three limitations on the use of peacekeeping troops have been consistently honoured
(1) peacekeeping has been interpreted as a provisional measure under the UN Charter i.e. as a measure
undertaken without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned. (2) peacekeeping
operations have been undertaken only with the c°nsent of all parties concerned (3) peacekeeping forces
may use arms only in self-defence.
36
I1STERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
The Gulf War of 1991, however showed a marked departure from the above-mentioned principles thus
reducing UN to only an organ of the policies of vested interests of big powers in a changing world. The
US-led allied campaign against Iraq and the manipulations to secure the interests of West, Japan (and
indirectly Russia) showed the impulse of big powers to maintain a regional balance of power favouring
their interests and it was the UN which was made a vehicle to decimate potential Iraqi power and thus
create a sort of demilitarized zone to make war unlikely for a long time to come.
The other instance in which UN has shown itself to be a playground for vested interests is the crisis of
Bosnia-Herzegovina where UN efforts have been limited to only humanitarian aid delhery, imposing arms
embargo on warring parties and effecting a no-fly zone. The Geneva talks under the aegis of UN have also
failed to deliver because of involvement of a number of factors; the most prominent being the US
reluctance to act decisively on behalf of UN because of the nature of her relationship with NATO
colleagues and Russia on the one hand and the nature of European countries (Western and former Soviet
bloc) mutual relationship on the other.
(V) UNITED NATIONS IN THEPOST-COLD WAR ERA
The diversified role of the UN in the post-Cold War era has stirred world-wide debate about the role of the
world body to meet the emergent demands of international security. Those in favour of using the UN in the
manner it is being used now are pleased with the burst of UN activities around the globe arguing that it is in
best conformity with the ”original” Charter. Others argue that this explosive activity in the Security
Council has overtaxed every critical link in the system. The Security Council is at its limits to oversee and
manage the crises. The Secretary-General’s ability to lead the Secretariat’s capacity to manage and the field
missions capacities to cope with the demands placed on the delegations of all council members are
enormous. They threaten to overwhelm the more modestly staffed-ones. Finally, the funding from 1988 to
the present, peacekeeping expenses have increased by a multiple factor of 10, military and civilian
personnel have increased by a factor of 5.
Moreover the concept of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security is changing. The line
between what is international in nature and what is domestic is becoming more and more bluffed. There is
the ’increasing concern on part of some UN members that the Security Council is expanding its authority
into areas they believe are properly the prerogatives of the General Assembly as happened in case of
Resolution
TOWARDS INTF.RNATIOM.ISM:THE I’MTED NATIONS
688 which determined that the repression of Iraqi civilian population threatened international peace and
security in the region and many members claimed that human rights violations did not fall within the
powers of the Security Council.
To make the UN a more effective organ of maintaining international peace and security, it is being argued
that the Council must be representative of the membership as a whole. It should reflect the power realities
of today’s world and not yesterday’s. There are arguments in favour of giving Japan and Germany a
permanent seat along with India and possibly a Muslim country. There are also demands that the business
of the UN should be conducted in such a way that all are heard, consulted and have the sense that they are
participants in the deliberations and not merely the spectators. There must also be effective channels to
communicate between the permanent and non-permanent members. As for the modalities of peacekeeping,
there is debate for the use of various methods. One of the ideas is that of ”co-operative security” meaning
persuading nations to seek security with others and not against them. It also means punishing the aggressor.
In other words, this is merely an extension of the very idea on which the UN Charter rests. The only
difference is on the emphasis given to the process of dialogue. One of the techniques of this desiderated
dialogue is preventive diplomacy. Once all channels of diplomacy, official and unofficial, have been
exhausted, there may be preventive deployment. This means that the UN may send troops to prevent war.
In addressing future crisis situations, the former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali proposed to
bring into being the special arrangements foreseen in the Articles 42 and 43 of the Charter; these proposals
were:
(i) Assurances that the member States will undertake to make armed forces assistance and facilities
available to the Security Council not only on an adhoc basis but also on a permanent basis;
(ii) To insure the availability of these forces the Security Council is urged to negotiate with the member
countries; (in) The Military Staff Committee should be encouraged to play an active role involving support
for military planning and diplomatic negotiations.
Thus if the UN is to establish effective arrangements for an enhanced post-Cold War collective security
role, proponents have contended that several institutional reforms and collaborative arrangements l have to
be solidified.
38
(VI) WHY THE UN FAILS?
On the face of it, the UN Charter creates an ideal structural framework for the setting up of a broad-based
international Organisation, fully capable of sorting out and resolving international disputes - both major and
minor - in an amicable and peaceful manner. As already mentioned, it provides for the establishment of six
organs - the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship
Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat for looking after matters related to peace and
security of the world and a web of ”Specialized Agencies” which are intended to help the UN achieve its
desired and set-out aims and objectives.
There is no denying the fact that the United Nations had in its Sixty years of existence, been successful in
averting a large scale war. This in itself is a big achievement. Even m the cold war years when tension
between the two super-powers was at its peak, no direct armed conflict ever took place. Instead it goes to
the credit of the UN that it has always encouraged peace.
Yet, however despite all the resources and the elaborate paraphernalia it has at its disposal, the performance
of the UN in dealing with the hot issues of international affairs has not been upto the mark. It has not been
able to fulfil the objectives its founding fathers had desired for and it has not really discharged its functions
in a manner in which a world organisation is expected to execute its operations and activities. Except for a
few military actions and efforts for peaceful settlement of disputes here and there, there’s not much to write
about. The UN has failed to live up to the expectations of the people of the world ; it has on most occasions
let down the oppressed and the downtrodden nations just when they needed its support, aid and assistance.
History would have been different had the UN taken a firm stand against the Israelis when they were
driving out the Arabs from their homeland, had the UN intervened when Kashmir historically, culturally
and politically an integral part of Pakistan was snatched away from us ; had the UN been effective and
strong enough, thousands of civilians would not have died in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Vietnam and
in other areas.
Why the UN has not been able to deliver the goods and why it has failed to ”settle definitely” and put to an
end most of the disputes is a question which is very often asked. Keeping in view the past experiences one
can point out certain very serious snags in the system of the UN and the factors which give rise to an
impression that the UN is a total flop. In the first instance critics have looked at the Veto power of the
permanent
TOWARDS INTERNATIONLISM:THE I NITED NATIONS
39
members of the Security Council with contempt. In the Cold-War era the Veto power was so liberally used
by the two big powers that it became virtually impossible to pass resolutions concerning matters of urgent
importance and value. The champions of the so-called ”free-world” hampered the smooth and effective
working of the UN. Even in the postCold War era a number of resolutions have been vetoed at ”crunch
time”. It would be advisable that the use of the Veto power should be made limited and specifically
defined. Moreover the Security Council should surrender a few rights to the General Assembly where the
members do not have the right to Veto.
Eversince its inception the UN has been dominated by the big powers who have without any restraint or
restriction sheltered and protected their ”favourites”. This has greatly undermined the importance of UN in
world affairs and has hampered its growth and development. The enormous influence wielded by the big
powers makes it difficult to treat each and every case on merit. The UN was’nt able to take any step against
the Jews in the Arab lands because they were patronised by the United States. Where the big powers desire
that an action should be taken and think that world peace is at stake, the UN ”peacekeeping” forces are at
once mobilised. Over the years military actions under the UN flag have been carried out only when the big
powers have approved and given consent for it. For example the American forces and their allies landed in
time when Iraq attacked Kuwait because they knew that a lot was in store for them. Same has been the case
in Somalia, Haiti, Panama, Nicaragua and so on. However on the other hand the big powers are the least
interested in areas where their interests are not served. Kashmir, Bosnia and Chechnya are the cases in
hand.
Another reason for the impotence of the UN to deal and tackle the burning issues is the controversy with
respect to the interpretation of Article
2 (7) of the Charter which provides that nothing in the Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or require the
members to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter. The difficulty has time and again arisen
with regard to the interpretation of the phrase 64 ”essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” of a State.
Infact the superpowers have deliberately adopted this phrase to justify their unjustified actions m
independent states. Thus France maintained that Algeria was a domestic concern of France and so out of
UN intervention. Similarly nothing could be done to stop the bloodshed m Chechnya recently since it was
declared as Russia’s ”internal matter”. It is necessary therefore to define in clear cut terms what this word
”domestic jurisdiction” is intended to mean.
40
The absence of effective power to punish the offending states also renders the United Nations impotent. As
a result the UNO is not able to help the weak and innocent states. Further it cannot take any action against
big powers who have ”armed themselves to the full” and insist that the UN has no authority over them.
They make certain promises of good behaviour but remain free to do as they like.
What the UN’s third Secretary-General U Thant said more than 25 years ago probably holds good even
today. He said: ”The United Nations born of the Charter has done well, but it has not done well enough. In
a sense, it is a great parliament of mankind to which evils, injustice and aspirations of man are being
brought, it has helped to prevent local conflicts
from turning into world-wide conflagrations it has assisted 1000
million people to gain independence... it has condemned and fought colonialism, discrimination and racism
in all its forms... it has looked far into the future, warning nations and men of world-wide dangers ahead.
But the United Nations has not done well-enough.”
According to another scholar, ”The United Nations, has chiefly played the role of forum for the
international exchange of opinions. The function to maintain international peace has not been performed
effectively and the expected results have not been obtained. The importance of the function of exchanging
opinions should not be underestimated. The practice of free discussion in the same forum by nations whose
opinions differ is an active method to promote mutual understanding and to reach agreement. In case the
two camps oppose each other, meeting in the same hall will help each to understand the other’s point of
view and circumstances. It is significant that the United Nations provides this conference hall. It
undoubtedly contributes indirectly to the maintenance of international peace. The people of the world can
judge the contentions of various nations by reading reports and news of the discussions of the conference.
They rebuke those who violate the peace and withhold support for them. In this sense the United Nations
has made a remarkable contribution to world peace.”
(VII) FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Unity among the nations of the world and strengthening of international relationship is an ideal which has
been recognized by all. Peace cannot be established unless various conflicting nations and ideologies come
to some sort of agreement on co-existence, and unless some basis is laid for honourable relationship
without resort to war for the settlement of disputes. But there are many difficulties in the way of
achievement of this international co-operation. Apart from the vast
TOWARDS INTERNATIO\USM:THE IMTED NATIONS
41
differences in cultures and political systems, the uneven economic development of various regions of the
world present major problems. For the effective strengthening of the United Nations, it is necessary that
some of the basic issues be solved by common agreement. One of the major differences is that of
disarmament. As long as the big powers continue accumulating and producing all sorts of arms and as long
as the race for the production of atomic bombs and other nuclear weapons remains unabated, there cannot
be any solid basis for peace in this world. The big powers must, therefore, agree on limitation of armament
and on the strength of their respective armies.
In the event of failure of agreement between the big powers, the only alternative appears to be that the
regional defence and economic organizations should be strengthened, so that one power alone has not the
responsibility and the authority in any one region to act on its own in disregard of the opinion of the small
nations. The forming of NATO and Warsaw Pact had posed a threat to world peace, but it is equally true to
say that the possession of the tremendous power of destruction hitherto undreamt of by man in the shape of
destructive nuclear weapons, has been in itself a powerful deterrent to war. But the possibility of a hasty
action and power of evaluation cannot be ignored. For the settlement of international disputes, if an
agreement could be achieved for the constitution of United Nations peacekeeping force, it would indeed be
a most important step towards the attainment of international security.
One of the most heartening features of the international system of today has been the growing, economic
and cultural- co-operation between the nations, bilateral and in groups. There is hope that if this co-
operation continues to grow, a time will come when the economic and cultural interests of nations will
come to predominate their thinking and with the linking of economics the chances of conflict and war
might be reduced. The originators of the idea of the European Common Market have held the implicit view
that the co-operation of the Western European nations will eventually be helpful for formation of a World
Government. The idea of a World Government is perhaps impracticable, as we cannot expect human nature
to change. It will never be possible for the individual nations to surrender their sovereignty for the sake of
international peace. At best the only hope that can be expressed is that nations will come to realize that the
attainment of universal peace is a reward much bigger than the loss suffered by partial surrender of
sovereignty in the cause of international cooperation.
The United Nations is a forum established precisely for the fostering of international co-operation in many
fields. Its Charter is a good document
42
but in practical application of its provisions there have been certain difficulties. The scourge of Veto, the
dominance of the big powers and procedural complications have not helped the cause of world peace and
international co-operation. Recently, suggestions have been made for the amendment of the Charter, but
again this will not be possible unless the big powers co-operate. The influence of the small nations of Asia
and Africa has been in evidence in the General Assembly, and one way of strengthening the structure of the
United Nations will be to give more powers to the General Assembly in order to make it as effective as the
Security Council. The reform, by which the membership of the Security Council has been extended,
touches only a fringe of the problem. While the political achievements of the United Nations are not very
bright, its notable successes in the economic and cultural fields point to the necessity of forging an
international economic community, where co-operation is achieved among various regions and various
nations for their common good.
In conclusion, it can be said that the futuie of the United Nations is linked with the developments of its
constituent nation states. Its successes will depend upon an agreement among the big powers on
disarmament, an agreement for the creation of a peacekeeping force, and on strengthening the existing
economic and cultural organizations established under the United Nations.
(VIII) SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE THE UNITED NATIONS
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the democratization of Eastern Europe, Latin America and
Central Asia, are historic developments of the post-Cold War era, making the world more independent.
Simultaneously, the regional crises and conflicts have also registered a marked increase, as ethnic and
cultural minorities in many parts of the world are striving to assert their identity, while nuclear weapons
have proliferated on a large scale. The international community’s attention is therefore focused on the UN’s
resurrection as there is a general consensus and awareness that despite its limitations and failings the UN is
vital to the stability of the world have no alternative. However, it needs both functional and structural
changes to make it a dynamic and effective organization in order to promote global peace, play a vibrant
role in the specific areas envisaged in its Charter i.e. preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and
peacemaking.
(a) Originally, the victors of the World War II assumed the role of custodians of world peace, but miserably
failed to avert almost 135 regional conflicts. The Veto power of the Big
TOWARDS INTERNATIOM.IS.M:THE I N1TEI) NATIONS
43
Five in the Security Council should be abolished and important decisions taken by simple majority.
Pertinently the Veio pcwer is contrary to article 2(1) of the UN Charter which guarantees the ’sovereign
equality of all its members. It has generated a unanimous concern amongst the majority of developing
nations and is considered to be against the democratic spirit of the UN.
(b) The Security Council should be enlarged in \iev\ of the existing objective realities. Significantly, the
UN membership has increased from 15 to almost 200 and the strength of the Council has also been
enhanced from 6 to 10 non-permanent members clearly undermines the Council’s status. The
present composition of Security Council is unfair as Asia, accounting for the majority of the world
population, has only one permanent seat, Africa and South America have no permanent seat, while Europe
holds two permanent seats. Justice demands the various regions be given their legitimate representation in
the Security Council.
(c) UN Secretary-General’s proposal for a standing international army under the aegis of the
Security Council for peacekeeping and peace-making operations needs to alleviate the misgivings in the
minds of developing nations that it would be used by the US for its own selfish ends.
(d) The International Court of Justice should be fully empowered in order to make fruitful
contributions in the field of arbitration and settlement of disputes. Its role in specific areas should be
institutionalized and punitive actions should be taken against member states, which ignore its decision.
(e) The UN annual budget should be guaranteed and mandatory monetary fines should be imposed on
the defaulting countries, as more than 1.2 billion dollars are outstanding presently. Moreover, a revolving
peacekeeping fund may also be raised.
(f) An appeal against the decisions of the Security Council should be decided by simple majority.
However, the final appeal should be taken by tlfe ICJ and a decision taken by either of these forums within
a specified time period.
44
(g) Experts of all the member states should make a critical appraisal containing suggestions to improve and
streamline the organization.
(h) It is genuinely felt that sustainable global development cannot be achieved without addressing
international economic relations in persuasive way. hence the UN must ensure equitable economic terms
between the developed and the developing countries.
. (i) The UN should sincerely aim to achieve world peace and security through global disarmament and
denuclearization.
The restructuring of the United Nations in the post-Cold War period is essentially imperative. Its future will
depend on the compliance of member states to honestly submit before the collective will of the world body
and endorse its newly envisaged role, regained security, human rights, economic and social development
and to augment its manpower and resources for the manifold benefit of humanity.
(IX) UN AND THE THIRD MILLENNIUM
In addition to the trampling and the distorting of the UN by the major powers, the international situation
has changed beyond recognition in almost fifty-eight years since the Organization was created. Among
other things, the UN is on the brink of financial collapse.
At a meeting held in London in 1995 to commemorate the first session of the UN in 1945, the then
Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali stated that lack of funds was being felt in all sectors of the UN
and that ’the Organization has no reserves and cannot borrow’. The situation today is a great deal worse
than it was then. Ghali also commented bitterly on the dishonesty of those ’who by denying funding make
the UN ineffective and then say that they are withholding funds because the UN is ineffective.’ Ghali’s
bluntness eventually heralded his downfall.
Funding is not the only area in which the US and its allies have tended to depress the UN. There are other
instances, such as the veritable dismissal of the UN from Bosnia and handing over of charge to NATO
because, apparently, the Washington administration and its friends felt that the UN under Ghali was not
doing what they wanted done. They were after all the prime financiers of the UN, weren’t they ? The US’s
share of the burden is a quarter of the over - all UN budget. So what if it still has arrears of$ 1.4 billion to
clear?
TOWARDS INTERNATIO.NLISM:THE I NITED NATIONS
45
On the question of NATO and the UN. there seems relevance in Article 103 of the UN Charter, which says
that ’in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the UN under the present Charter
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter,
shall prevail’. There is also Article
100 (2) which calls upon UN members ’to respect the exclusively international character of the
responsibilities of the Secretary - General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of
their responsibilities.’
As mentioned above, the situation has today changed from that in

1945 beyond recognition. There is a general trend towards socio economic globalization in almost every
aspect of individual and collective life. This includes of course the culture in action and politicking that
goes on in almost every region of the world. The trend is reinforced by an unprecedented technological leap
that tends to deprive the individual of not only his privacy but to some extent of even his individuality.
The situation begs urgently for appropriate changes in the UN. These changes have to come about in both
the Security Council and the General Assembly. In the Security Council, for example why should additions
to permanent membership be considered ? Why should not there be no permanent members, with the
Council comprising a stipulated number of members elected for a specified period of time ?
In the General Assembly, there is a desperate need for another chamber, the Chamber of the United
Peoples, to complement the Chamber of the United Nations: this is a democratic measure that will make the
UN everybody’s concern, and also to some extent counter the absurdity of every member state having one
representative, whether the population be about five million as in Singapore or a thousand million as in
China. As for the question of funding, there is everything to say for some effective method whereby the UN
is funded indirectly, so that among other things no particular state is identified as chief provider. That
should discourage those who want to hear their own particular tunes because they have paid the piper more.
Perhaps these changes are bound to come one day. Or is this a pipe - dream ?
(X) UN AND CHALLENGES OF A NEW DISORDERLY WORLD
As the 20th century drew to an inevitable close, the role of United Nations as the primary peacemaking
organization of the post Cold War era was increasingly called into question. As efforts went forward to
secure independence for East Timor, autonomy in Kosovo and sustainable peace in
46
INTFRNATIONM \FF\IRS
Bosnia critics expressed frustration at the slow deployment of I’N staff and peacekeepeis, and at the
complaining and quibbling ovei the limits of institutional power and mandates But the teal question is \
vhethei the I nited Nations is up to the new challenge of these ’new world’ conflicts the challenge ot
building ne\\ nations
The United Nations is quite used to handling tough problems History is witness to the fact that the
Organization’s response and contiihution to wars and humunitanan catastrophes spanning the \\oild liom
the killing fields of Cambodia to the burning buildings ot Dili has been immense
It is nothing but necessaiy that if the world wants to countei threats and honors and pursue the half century
old goal of um\eisal human rights, then each state must put its faith and financial support in an
Organization that will supercede their strategic self- interest
’Realists’ and opponents of the UN, who often aigue against the role of the Organization to act as a world
government, will certainly object However, despite all the sham and politicization taking place inside the
corridors of power, the UN remains perhaps the only available structure, a global mechanism for effective
collaboration in circumstances where states are reluctant or ill - placed to act on their own
In the changing, rather disordeily international environment, the UN is expected to be compatible with the
diverse colours of life, to do more than just provide a buffer between former combatants The new mission
is more often than not to piomote the responsibilities of statehood If the world wishes the UN to be a
’creator’, a builder of new states or a repairer of failed ones, it must be provided with the appropriate
paraphernalia, better tools for the job
The main obstacles so far in the smooth running of the UN have been the bureaucratic drawbacks and
shortcomings and the lack of political and financial will and commitment of the member states, especially
the major powers (P - 5 and the emerging global giants) who have considered the Organization as an
apparatus and mechanism to exploit the smaller nations
Prior to the end of the Cold War, UN primarily responded with peacekeeping operations to conflicts
betneen i>tatei> However, in the recent years, peacekeeping operations ha\e become broad based and
conflicts within .states now also fall under the puruew of the Organization’s ’list of jobs to be done’ The
’new role’ of internal conflict resolution has brought to light the inadequacy of traditional peacekeeping
methods and challenge
TOWARDS INTFRNATIONl ISM.TIIK I \mD NATIONS
47
the international community to think of more effective methods of establishing lasting stability
and tiust amongst nations
The conventional model foi peacekeeping was provided by the UN Emergency Force, which was
established in 1956 to manage the aftermath of the Suez Canal crisis It required the consent of the parties in
conflict and was intended to deal with disputes between states In the years that followed, operations were,
geneially speaking modest and involved deployment of lightly aimed forces to monitor cease-fires and
oversee troop pullouts, for limited and specific penods of time
The role of the LN since the late 80s, however, has changed Peacekeeping operations hav e taken on
political socio - economic elements that require relief specialists and civilian experts They are designed not
only to monitor the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements but also to devise and create a
dynamics for lasting democratic political systems Recent operations, such as those in Kosovo or in Bosnia,
have involved providing massive humanitarian aid and assistance, monitoring human rights, training police,
establishing a judicial system regulating elections and overseeing the repatriation of refugees
While disarmament, demobilization and cease-fire monitoring remain important agenda items, the UN
’vision’ must now also include promoting political reconciliation, reconstruction and building civil society
The need to introduce and take up new responsibilities has prompted debate about UN reform but has
produced only modest bureaucratic changes.
After the Kurdish refugee cnsis from Iraq in 1992, the UN has made an effort to expand its net to respond
to humanitarian emergencies The first step in this direction was the establishment of a Department of
Humanitarian Affairs within the Secretariat aimed at coordinating allocation of responsibilities among the
various UN agencies This department lost its importance five years down the road when its role was
reduced to an advisory one However, soon it was ’reincarnated’ and re-named United Nations Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and is headed by one of the Organization’s most
respected senior officials
Ready or not, the UN is very much in business of nation building Of course, conventional pursuits will
remain in place, but it is time to do some more radical thinking.
The need for a permanent standing UN force that can be rapidly deployed is felt after every major crisis
The delay in assembling an effective international police force is a sobering reminder of the need to ensure
continued security after a conflict
48
TOWARDS 1NTER1NATIONLISM:THE I’MTED NATIONS
49
While the expertise exists for the establishment of judicial systems and civil administrations that are the
basic building blocks of democratic nations, it is not well coordinated within the UN set-up itself. A
comprehensive institutional framework is needed to marshal and put this expertise into motion with
structural and bureauciatic hurdles to be got rid of as an initial measure.
Presently. 35 million people are caught in the. whirlpool of 22 humanitarian emergencies all over the
world. These include ethnic warring, human rights violations, forced migration, political instability and
unmet humanitarian needs. As time progresses, the magnitude, duration and pace of these emergencies will
continue to challenge and disrupt international community.
NEW CHALLENGES TO THE UN CREDIBILITY
The misperception regarding the UN to be an independent world institution with power and privilege to fix
any problem has been exposed in the recent Iraqi crisis. UN has always been constrained by the nature of
international system and the policies and interests of the great powers. The founders of the UN were
idealists having view of world peace through consultations, mutual cooperation and understanding. But in
the practical world realist ideals of ’Balance of Power’ and self-help have overtaken those idealistic ideas.
So the dichotomy is that UN was founded on the basis of liberal principles, but the foreign policy behavior
of the modern states is guided by structural realism. The new US doctrine of pre-emption is totally at odds
with the UN principles of collective security. The winds of unipolarity and the blind unilateralism of
America leave little space for UN to advance its world society goals. The world is moving back to the dark
days of settling scores through international violence. American forefathers have been critical of European
imperialism and colonialism, but today their nation is following the same course to control and reshape the
world system according to its vested interest. Under the garb of terrorism prevention and security
maintenance, America is trying to control the world business market and oil resources.
The recent American unilateral attack on Iraq while sidelining the international organization completely,
was a sheer blow to the credibility of UN as world’s independent and viable organization. UN weapons
inspectors were not allowed to complete their work in Iraq. The Chief UN inspector Hans Blix declared the
absence of WMD in Iraq even before the
attack. After the occupation of Iraq, once again US got cold feet in sharing the authority with UN over the
occupied country. UN is merely offered to play simple role in the reconstruction process of ravaged
country.
The UN Security Council’s resolution 1441 was aimed at disarming Iraq, it had no clue allowing any state
to attack Iraq unilaterally. The resolution had left the question to the UNSC to decide any future action
against Iraq. US violated the UN charter by itself in enforcing the UNSC resolution. International norm of
inviolability of borders of other sovereign states, has been thrown into the dustbin of the history. President
Bush’s doctrine of pre-emption has pushed the world back to the pre-UN anarchic society. The doctrine of
pre-emptive strike, as it is sponsored by the world’s sole super power, may become an international norm,
which can be adopted by any hostile state in pursuit of its national interest. This new trend is really
dangerous to the world peace and the international norm of collective security.
The UN has failed not only in maintaining its collective security system, but it has also proved its inability
in bridging the gap between the rich and poor countries of the world. The economic disparity between the
developed countries (DCs) and LDCs is on persistent rise. 86% of the world GDP is shared by the 20%
world population in the rich countries. The rising terrorism, militarism and extremism is the product of
poor countries economic frustration. The UN conference on Financing for development in Montreal
(Mexico) in 2002 pointed out that there was inextricable link between the international terrorism and rising
poverty in the third world. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, also said that ”no one is safe and none
can feel comfortable in this world while so many are suffering and deprived”. The UN seems to be helpless
in balancing the benefits of economic globalization between the DCs and LDCs. Various developmental
programs of UN have been funded poorly and those were used by the donors to get their own strategic
objectives. Nevertheless, it may not be fair to put all the responsibility on UN for its failure to carry out its
agenda, as the onus for its success lies on its membership. We cannot afford any more negligence with
respect to UN functionability. It is the time to revitalize the world body in its true spirit of world peace and
prosperity.
RESTRUCTURING OF UN IS INEVITABLE
The above mentioned problems of UN show that it is in sheer need of reforms. The need was emphasized
upon by almost all the developing countries in the UN General Assembly Session 2003.
50
The world body needs, foremost, democratization. The General Assembly should be restored as the chief
deliberative body of policy making with strict one-state one-vote system. Democratization of the Security
Council is also required, essentially through rationalization of the Veto power and increase in its non-
permanent membership.
Various proposals have been put forward by different people and states for the restructuring of UN. The
proposal presented by Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohammad, during the last UNGA session, seems to be the
most viable and rational one. According to the proposal, the Veto system should be replaced by a
mechanism which would require two permanent members of SC along with support of at least three elected
members to block or veto a resolution. It will provide a system of check and balance in the functioning of
Security Council. The unbridled powers of the permanent members will be restrained. The members of
Security Council, both permanent and non-permanent also need to be increased, keeping in view equitable
geographical distribution.
SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM
The report backs a proposal made by a high-level panel on UN reform, which early this year called for two
alternative models: Model A provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three
new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe and the
Americas, although it is still a matter of hectic debate whether the 11 permanent UN Security Council
members, the additional members, outside the privileged five, will have veto powers or not.
The six new member nations which will find a permanent slot will almost certainly include India, Brazil,
Japan and Germany, with a provision for two African nations for which currently South Africa, Egypt and
Nigeria are in competition.
Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term
seats and one new twoyear non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the four regional
groups.
Currently, the Security Council has 10 rotating, two-year nonpermanent seats and five veto-wielding,
permanent seats held by the United States, Britain, France, China and Russia.
India has secured the support of three of the five permanent members for its inclusion in the UN Security
Council. Russia, France and
TOWARDS INTERNATIONL1SM:THE UNITED NATIONS
51
Britain have reportedly no objections to India being included as a permanent member. China and the United
States have maintained a steady silence on the issue altogether.
Pakistan is a prominent member of the ”Coffee Club,” which opposes this plan as ”unfair” and insists on
Model B as the basis for UN Security Council reform. The smaller countries are particularly supportive of
model B as they feel it is more representative than Model A, which will block the number of available
seats, and make only a limited number available for those outside the permanent bloc.Pakistan’s support for
Model B is largely perceived by the establishment as an attempt to prevent India from becoming a
permanent member of the Security Council. At present the UN has 191 member states.
Annan attempts to link development aid with the expansion of the Security Council. He says that developed
countries running for permanent seats in the Council, including Japan and Germany, should ”achieve or
make substantial progress” towards the internationally agreed level of 0.7 per cent of gross national product
(GNP) for official development assistance (ODA).
Beside the democratization of UN, the working method of UN system also needs to be reviewed and
streamlined to ensure greater efficiency and coordination among its members in perusing its basic objective
of peace and prosperity. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General by self has realized the need to readjust the
world organization to the new geo-strategic environment of the 21st century.
(XI) UN AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In an ideal world, when gross violations of human rights take place with impunity in one state, the
international community should step in, promptly take even coercive action if needed, and bring the culprits
to book. Alas, such an ideal world does not exist even within a national society!
There are quite a few fundamental questions to be answered before the international community as
represented by the UN can legitimately claim the right to ’humanitarian intervention’. First, the
international community we are talking of is an international system of states, and its organ, the UN cannot
but mirror this state system. Human rights are primarily claimable against the state, and groups or
individuals that man or control the state. If a people cannot make their state institutions deliver human
rights, how can they expect an external agency of the state system to get this done? Second, gross
violations of human rights do not occur
52
overnight. The conditions that lead to them must be identified on time and eliminated. Third, very often the
root cause of a human rights tragedy in a country might lie deep in history, e.g., Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
This calls for intervention at the emotional level. (Remember the Preamble to the UNESCO Constitution,
”Seeds of war are sown in the minds of men”.) In such cases, ’humanitarian intervention’ as a one-time
surgical operation cannot eliminate the root causes of human rights violations. Fourth, the contemporary
state system does not as yet recognize any international mechanism adequately empowered, and capable, to
intervene in the affairs of a state without its consent, however badly that state runs its affairs internally.
This is definitely not a satisfactory state of affairs, but it has remained so since the Pease of Westphalia.
The situation can be tackled in two ways. One, action should be taken to encourage home-grown human
rights institutions in each state and strengthen them by mobilizing adequate resources through international
cooperation. Two, international responses to emergency humanitarian situations should be based on
consensus and in conformity with the principles of impartiality, fairplay, non-eclecticism and uniformity of
application of standards - in short, no power politics.
Does the Security Council fit the bill? It can, only with considerable difficulty. It has had a history of
selectivity, blatant partiality, and gross violations of even basic principles of natural justice. The reasons are
not far to seek - the Council is often manipulated to serve the foreign policy goals of some big powers.
Further, its constitutional mandate permits invocation of its peremptory powers only if a human rights
situation amounts to a ’threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression’ it is not competent to
act in a human rights situation per se. The Council, unlike the General Assembly, has no direct mandate to
promote observance of human rights, or even ’good governance’.
While the Namibia and South Africa situations of the 1970s justified coercive action (sanctions) by the
Security Council, the validity o these precedents was founded on their acceptability to the general
international community. The concern for human rights is universal. The core problem with the use of an
international organization for coercive action for protection of human rights is the politics of human rights.
Hence the importance of consensus as a justification or legitimisation of international action.
The following principal ground rules should be adopted for the UN to follow in case it launches coercive
humanitarian action: First, the root causes of conflict must be addressed by the international community
(social and economic development), instead of waiting for the volcano to erupt. Second, gross and
systematic violations of the rights to life, such as
TOWARDS INTERNATIONUSMiTHE t’NITEl) NATIONS
53
genocide, must justify coercive UN action under Chapter VII of the Charter. Third, the action and the
decision on which it is based must be in accordance with the principles of non-selectivity, objectivity,
impartiality, and uniformity of application of standards. Fourth, the operation must be under the direct
control of the UN. There should be no ’contracting out’ to individual states.
Fifth, there should be no ex post facto ratification of coercive action taken by any state or a regional
organization, such as in the case of Kosovo. Sixth, the coercive action must accord with the principle of
proportionality. Seventh, the decision must be based on consensus, as far as possible the parties to the
situation should be heard. Consensus should not be confined to the P5. Eights, politics of human rights
must be avoided in both the decision and its execution. Finally, there should be transparency in the process
of decision-making. Will the powers-that-be allow the UN to function according to these ground rules?
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON RACISM

It was inevitable. There was no chance that the United Nations World Conference Against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia arid Related Intolerarce late August 2001 would end up being more than a
grandiose gathering of the cynical and the naive.
If absolutely everything had gone well at the heroically named conference - which is still under way in
Durban, on the east coast of South Africa - all that could have emerged would be a paper telling us that
racism, anti-semitism arid other forms of intolerance are bad.
The conference machinery was immediately jammed by the insistence of Arab delegates that Zionism be
denounced as racist and Israel characterized as a nation that is practicing a new kind of apartheid. The U.S
and Israel walked out, taking with them any hope that the conference would be even minimally successful.
But the truth is that the conference was doomed to irrelevance from its conception. The tragic problems of
ethnic, religious and gender intolerance have stained every region of the globe. They are much too big and
much too complete and intractable to be seriously addressed by a U.N. conference.
Some African countries represented at the conference have demand apologies and reparations from
Western countries formerly involved in the
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TOWARDS INTERNATIONLISM:THE UNITED NATION’S
55
slave trade. But African delegates have been conspicuously quiet on the issue of present-day slavery in
Sudan and Mauritania.
The United States was as wary as anyone else about addressing the hard issues. Fearing lawsuits from the
descendants of slaves, American representatives objected to language describing slavery as ”a crime
against humanity.”
Even as the delegates in Durban wrestled with the minutiae of their various resolutions came more
evidence of the intransigence of intolerance and hatred. Catholic schoolgirls in Belfast, Northern Ireland,
were cursed and spat upon, and had bottles, stones and a - bomb thrown at them by Protestants who were
engaged because the girls had walked down a Protestant street on their way to class. The girls, aged 4 to 10,
were terrified and clung desperately to their mothers. They had to he shielded by the police and British
soldiers.
You can’t fight that kind of hatred with a resolution.
The problems in Northern Ireland, in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and Sudan, in the United States
require sustained efforts to find creative solutions by mature and open-minded individuals. They do not
lend themselves to easy solutions of any kind, and certainly not to the watereddown one-size-fits-all
proclamations of a world-wide convocation against racism
WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The Earth Summit or World Summit on sustainable development was hosted by Johannesburg, South
Africa on 26th August - 4th September,
2002. It was the biggest Un-orgamzed gathering ever, attended by some
21,000 delegates from 191 countries.
The summit was supposed not to raise big new issues, but to emphasize well-known problems and find
practical ways to solve them. It was all about ’actions not words’ starting a new era of implementation and
creating partnership. Whereas the Rio Summit, ten years ago produced a well-received final declaration,
little of substance followed. Clave Short, Britain’s Development Minister says ”the reverse is true, on both
counts, for this year’s talks”. Many agreements made during the first Earth Summit at Rio in 1992, have not
been properly followed up - notably a deal to curb global warning which has been undermined by President
Bush’s pull out in
2001. The difference at Johannesburg, Kofi Annan said, is that ”this summit has instigated a global action
among a wide range of actors. This
summit makes sustainable development a reality. This summit will put us on a path that reduces poverty
while protecting the environment, a path that works for all peoples, rich and poor, today and tomorrow”.
Although the delegates were not impressed by the final Johannesburg text and separate political
declaration, however the agreements that were reached on ways to fight poverty while reducing
environmental degradation can make a meaningful difference if the nations of the world work seriously to
enforce them. Most important is to deal to cut by half the number of people with inadequate water and
sanitation by
2015. The UN Development Program is charged with monitoring progress towards this target and other
millennium development goals: to halve the number of absolute poor, cut illiteracy and child mortality, also
by 2015. The delegates also agreed upon to do more to conserve and restore fish stocks, partly by
promising to guard ocean areas already designated as protected, again with 2015 as the date for achieving
sustainable stocks.
For Kofi Annan, one of the real triumphs of the summit was that it went beyond political declarations to
enshrine the concept of partnerships by and between governments, UN agencies, environmental and other
nongovernmental groups, local authorities and most importantly private corporations.
If the summit has made some remarkable achievements, it has caused some setback as well to the
international community. The US along with other members of OPEC have been successful in molding the
final test includes no targets for the use of renewable energy such as wind, solar or wave power. The US
has achieved its main aim at the meeting of keeping the emphasis on private investment rather government
aid to speed up development. The summit was slammed by environmentalists and development activists as
lacking much in the way of new action to tackle poverty and environmental degradation. Although the
meeting did not come up with instant solutions, but it did offer a conceptual framework and a series of
targets for how to go about reducing health and environmental problems in the coming decade or two while
promoting economic growth.
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CHAPTER 3
THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

(I) EVOLUTION
The Commonwealth of Nations, formerly known as the British Commonwealth, has an interesting history.
The colonial links of Britain started to snap with the American Revolution, when the British immigrants,
who had gone and settled in the American colonies insisted upon managing their own affairs, as they were
not satisfied with mere representation in the British Parliament. The British government resisted, and after
civil war, the American colonies attained independence. Following this example, the British colony of
Canada also demanded autonomy, and the British government sent Lord Durham who compiled a report
in 1837, known as the Durham Report. In this report, Lord Durham recommended that in order to satisfy
the colonies and to retain them within the fold of the British Empire, it was imperative to grant them full
freedom. He, accordingly recommended that, except for four subjects, the control of which should be
retained by the British government, the Canadian colony should be granted full independence. These four
subjects were land, external trade, defence and foreign affairs. Canada was, therefore, granted a complete
local selfgovernment, and the same policy was, gradually, adopted for its other European colonies by the
British government. In the case of Canada, land, external trade and defence were also surrendered by the
British to Canada, and only the control on foreign policy was retained by Britain until 1918.
Eversince the Durham Report, the process of attaining independence by the colonies continued, and sooner
or later most of the Asian and African colonies of the former British Empire also attained, first local
selfgovernment, and eventually independence. With psychological tenacity, the • British wanted to retain
certain links with their colonies, and they were called Dominions, and the concept of Dominion status
gained currency in
1919. Gradually, the concept of Dominions also expanded and the practice of appointment of a governor-
general by the British king on the advice of the British government, was replaced and these appointments
were made after consultation with the Dominion governments concerned. High
57
Commissioners were appointed by the British government in these colonies. Lord Balfour defined
Dominions as follows:
”Dominions are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate
to the other in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the
throne and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.”
After the Second World War, further evolution took place when Ireland declared itself independent and
maintained her neutrality in the War. During discussions, the Cripps Mission in India agreed in 1942, that
the Dominions had a right of secession. Burma, in 1947, left the Commonwealth, Ireland left in 1949, and
during this time, the word ’British’ was dropped and the association was simply known as the
Commonwealth.
An interesting development took place when, in 1949, during the Commonwealth Conference, India
wanted to become a republic and at the same time wished to stay within the Commonwealth. This was
agreed to, and in 1956 Pakistan also became a republic. After this, the Commonwealth countries recognized
the British Queen only as the Head of Commonwealth, or a sort of president of an international club. The
role of the British monarchy in the Commonwealth therefore, ceased to be of any consequence. Pakistan,
withdrew from the Commonwealth on 30th January,
1972, mainly due to impotence of the organization to help Pakistan in the East Pakistan crisis of 1971.
However, Pakistan rejoined the Commonwealth in 1989. In November 1999, Pakistan’s membership was
once again suspended due to military coup in the country.
(II) COMMENWEALTH RE- ENTRY
Even though Britain and Australia did work from behind the scene for Pakistan’s re-admission into the 53-
nation club, and this is seen by some as rewarding General Musharraf for his role in the global war on
terror, there is reason to believe that the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) that decided to
restore Pakistan’s membership had also taken other developments into account.
A key, nine-member Commonwealth meeting in London on May

21 and 22 could lift Pakistan’s suspension, imposed in 1999 after President Pervez Musharraf seized power,
and bring the world’s second largest Islamic country back into the group of mostly British ex-colonies.
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The Commonwealth is one of the last remaining international bodies to hold out against Pakistan, now a
key ally for the United States in the ”war on terror”. It has been named a major non-NATO ally, recently
sealed a commercial pact with the European Union and has also joined the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations Regional Forum.
Saturday’s decision reverses the Commonwealth’s consistent annual and sometimes self-righteous verdict
on Pakistan’s suspension since the military take-over in 1999. it repeatedly pointed out that the current
political dispensation under a military ruler as president was not acceptable to it as a democratic set-up.
The reversal now seems to have been based on President Musharraf’s subsequent agreement on the LFO
with sections of the opposition under which he promised to give up his military post by the end of 2004.
After suspension Pakistani government pointed out that, Commonwealth membership is not a life-and-
death issue, but if we have to be part of it, then it’s best that we do not remain on anyone’s sufferance. The
moral, therefore, is that we should not only adhere to agreements already reached on the country’s political
framework, but swiftly move towards a truly democratic parliamentary and accountable system. We should
be accepted as a democratic country’ on the strength of our own credentials, not on the basis of how
someone may look at us at a particular time.
(Ill) STRUCTURE
The present structure of the Commonwealth is like an informal group of independent nations, who carry out
their trade policies within the sterling area, and because of their historical colonial links with Britain,
sometimes they get together to discuss matters of mutual interest. To the British it affords a sentimental
satisfaction, while to the other independent countries, particularly the Asians and the Africans, it provides a
mere forum for discussion. The Commonwealth conferences are held at irregular intervals, which are
attended by the heads of government and the foreign ministers. These conferences are only consultative in
nature, and more often, there is expression of difference of views rather than the commonality of interests.
During the last few years efforts have been made to improve the working of the Commonwealth, and a
central Secretariat of the Commonwealth has been established at London. This aims to formalize to a
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certain extent the machinery of consultation among the sovereign nations comprising .the Commonwealth.
An interesting instance of the tenuous role of the Commonwealth was provided by British negotiations for
entry into the European Economic Community. While seeking entry into Europe, Britain demanded certain
concessions in the name of the Commonwealth countries, although no joint policy was formulated by these
governments. From this, one can conclude that because most of the Commonwealth countries were
members of the sterling area, their association in matters of commercial and international trade policy
would continue for some time to come. In no other respect is the Commonwealth a reality. As the position
of sterling in international money market changes to their disadvantage, these growing Asian and African
member nations will surely seek fresh avenues of trade and commerce and are less likely to remain
dependent on Britain. Presently most of the currencies are tied to the American dollar. Commonwealth has
53 members.
(IV) ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS
Economic ties between Commonwealth countries are also an important bond of friendship. In this regard,
there are three main areas of economic co-operation - the imperial preference, British overseas investment
and membership of the sterling area. A fourth item is British aid. However, by virtue of bilateral trade
agreements, certain specific industries like Indian textile, Malayan rubber are accorded duty free entry into
UK under the so-called imperial preference. British investment is also a considerable economic tie. As far
as the sterling area is concerned, all Commonwealth countries, except Canada, belong to it. The system is
one in which UK acts as an international banker in sterling and UK backs this with gold. However, after the
1967 devaluation of the pound, UK has been thinking in terms of abandoning its role of an international
banker. Anyway, these three economic ties give some kind of substance to an otherwise not very concrete
association of countries.
(V) COMMONWEALTH IN WORLD AFFAIRS
Fifty-two countries of the Commonwealth Australia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Barbados, Mauritius,
Singapore, Tonga, Swaziland, Canada, Sri Lanka, India, New Zealand, United Kingdom, Cyprus, Gambia,
Ghana, Jamaica, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Guyana, Botswana, Lesotho, Uganda, W. Samoa etc. are
scattered in every part of the globe and each is an independent, self-governing entity. The Commonwealth
states differ from each other in culture, religion, language and government
60
structure. It is not an organization in the ordinary sense of the term. It does not have a formal constitution.
It did not have any formal administrative machinery till very recently when a Commonwealth
Secretariat was established. The Commonwealth is the product of a slow evolution by which the former
British Empire has been dismantled and a new free association of equal partners has been developed. The
role of the British crown also has dwindled to almost insignificance. Although this cooperation among
nations has not produced spectacular results, yet it has shown a way for the orderly and peaceful getting
together of nations interested in mutual welfare. The method of consultation adopted is very flexible. Prior
to Second World War, imperial conferences were convened, but after the war informal meetings of the
prime ministers of the nations comprising the Commonwealth were held from time to time and the prime
ministers’ conference held now usually once in two years has become a recognized mode of consultation.
In addition to this, finance ministers’ conferences are occasionally held.
In the United Nations, the Commonwealth has neither acted as a whole, nor has it an identity. Indeed there
are disputes among its members also. In foreign policies each member state acts differently in a way
serving its own national interests. In most economic policies, there is some uniformity of action because of
the dependence of some other currencies of the Commonwealth countries on the pound. Co-operation
among the Commonwealth countries has centered mainly around questions of commerce and trade, and
these questions became prominent particularly during the negotiations between Britain and the West
European countries for the entry of Britain into the European Common Market.
More recently, however, Commonwealth has shown some signs of liveliness towards important political
and economic issues faced by the world. Since the early 1980’s, Commonwealth countries have
been, deliberating upon various issues of international significance and thereby trying to funnel a concerted
response on the part of the member countries. A vivid testification to this trend is reflected by the range of
subjects of discussion and the level of unanimity shown by the member countries to resolve these issues.
The examples are: Statement on Nuclear Weapon Tests (1973), the Goa Declaration on International
Security (1983), the Delhi Statement on Economic Action (1983), the Nassau Declaration on World Order
(1985), the Vancouver Declaration on World Trade (1987), the Langkawi Declaration on Environment
(1989), The Ottawa Declaration on Women and Structural Adjustment (1991). Besides in the
Harare Commonwealth Declaration, important issues like terrorism, underdevelopment and North-
South economic relations, functional co-operation etc. were discussed. In the 1993 Limassole (Cyprus)
summit, issues facing a
61
changed world and the ever sensitive trade ties in the new world highlighted the agenda.
(VI) WITHDRAWAL OF PAKISTAN AND RE-ENTRY
Withdrawal of Pakistan from the Commonwealth in 1972, was due to the following main reasons:
(a) Pakistan’s decision was a demonstration of a sense of frustration by a member over mfructuous nature
of the organization, which kept mute and unconcerned when Pakistan was being decimated by another
member.
(b) Pull-out by Pakistan was also meant to substitute breaking ’ off of diplomatic relations with
Commonwealth countries
who would recognize Bangladesh. Breaking off of diplomatic relations would have been in order, but this
could not be continued endlessly nor could it be afforded with countries like Britain, Australia and New
Zealand which were about to announce recognition. So pull-out from Commonwealth was considered as an
expedient equivalent to breaking off of relations. Subsequently Pakistan recognized Bangladesh, as it was
no more possible to turn away from reality. In retrospect, Pakistan’s decision to leave the Commonwealth
was tantamount to a face saving exercise to shed the stigma of defeat at the hands of another member of the
Commonwealth. Pakistan’s move, however, proved a tactical mistake in foreign policy formulation as
Pakistan lost an important international forum where it could voice its grievances vis-a-vis India which in
the following years was to wage a vociferous propaganda campaign against Pakistan on various bilateral
and international issues. Moreover Pakistan’s scope to enhance goodwill and cooperate with other member
countries suffered at the critical juncture of our history when such co-operation was vital for Pakistan.
After staying away for seventeen long years Pakistan re-entered the Commonwealth as its 49th member.
Pakistan’s re-entry to the Commonwealth came in the wake of wholesale changes occurring at the regional,
and international level. With the Afghan issue resolved, Pakistan needed extra economic options to make
up for the now suspended US aid. From one point rejoining it was also a tactical misjudgement, like
leaving it in 1972, as in 1989 Pakistan could not gain much due to the fact that the
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British entry into the EC had long diminished the potency of the preferential trade system envisaged by
Commonwealth. However it did mean to Pakistan an organ to rally moral support of friendly countries over
various issues including Kashmir. Pakistan was re-inducted into this organization at the Kuala Lumpur
Summit on October 18, 1989 and consequently all its embassies in the member states were converted into
High Commissions. Benazir Bhutto attended the 1989 Commonwealth Summit held in Malaysia on 18th
October, 1989 along with other 48 heads of the government.
COMMONWEALTH’S MANIPULATION AND PAKISTAN’S SUSPENSION
BY INDIA
By criticizing the October 12, 1999 change of government in Pakistan in unusually harsh terms in the
Commonwealth summit in Durban, South Africa in November 1999, the organization has allowed itself to
be used by India for its own malevolent designs. The Commonwealth reaction, as constrained in the
communique issued after the Durban summit contrasts sharply with the recommendations of its own
ministerial delegation headed by the Canadian foreign minister in November 1999, which had visited
Pakistan to asses the situation after meeting the government and the opposition leader. The delegation had
acknowledged ’the strongly felt desire for change in Pakistan’ and the fact that there was a failure of the
practice of democracy in the country to guarantee ’a just and honest government’.
That India had used pressure tactics to influence the Commonwealth decision was made abundantly clear
by the observations of Indian Prime Minister AB Vajpayee on his return from the summit.
According to him, some developed nations at the Durban summit wanted to take a softer stance against
Pakistan ’but the Commonwealth’s view has become more emphatic with our intervention at the summit’.
Vajpayee has made it clear that the Commonwealth would not consider any referendum that General
Pervez Musharraf may hold on the acceptability of his regime legitimate.
Flush with his Durban success, Vajpayee made the astonishing statement that as far as the Commonwealth
is concerned. Mr. Nawaz Sharif continues to be the prime minister of Pakistan. While main Indian
opposition party, Congress (I) expressed surprise over Vajpayee’s statement, the prime minister’s party BJP
described it as a triumph of Indian diplomacy.
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What surprised many observers was the impetuosity and intensity of Indian reaction to the ouster of Nawaz
Sharif government. After all, the army has not stepped in for the first time in Pakistan. Two democratically
elected governments were ousted by the military - one in 1958 and the other in 1977 - without causing
much concern in New Delhi, which treated the event, by and large, as internal affairs of Pakistan.
The Indian government did not show any reaction even to the hanging of Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who was
a democratically elected prime minister of the country.
The Durban summit’s decision, suspending Pakistan from the Commonwealth councils, violates the very
concept of that grouping. No Commonwealth member is under any obligation to follow any
’Commonwealth’ policy or submit to control or disciplinary action by other members of that body.
Since the suspension of its membership, Pakistan has been trying to re-enter the organization. But India is
persistent in blocking the entry of Pakistan in the Commonwealth. Lack of democracy has been the main
allegation against Pakistan. Even after holding elections to the National and Provincial assemblies in 2002
and installation of democratic government, the Commonwealth countries do not believe in credibility of the
democratic institutions in Pakistan. European Union’s observers have declared the
2002 elections as highly flawed and rigged. Nevertheless, Commonwealth countries gave signal of
possibility of Pakistan’s re-entry in the organization after the successful vote of confidence by President
Musharaf from the Parliament and provincial assemblies in December 2003.
The Commonwealth is a free association and its members are free to adopt whatever lines of policy may
seem appropriate to them as sovereign states. It has evolved to include many races, cultures and traditions
and therefore, it has to keep in mind the peculiar conditions prevailing in a particular member country.
The Commonwealth has changed since the 1931 Statute of Westminster from the club of white settlers in
self-governing dominions group around Britain to an association of 54 independent equals representing
varying stages of economic and social development and comprising various traditions and cultures.
Its main challenges and problems include sustainable social and economic development, alleviation of
poverty, universal access to education and promotion of rule of law and good governance. By completely
ignoring
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the recommendations of its own ministerial delegation which visited Pakistan to assess facts, the
Commonwealth has set a bad precedent and its Durban decision amounts to interference in the internal
affairs of a sovereign member country.
Pakistan, which joined the Commonwealth in 1947 along with India, soon found that the size and
importance of a member country mattered more than the principles and ideals of the organization.
In 1949 rules were amended to allow India to ’eat its cake and have it too’ by becoming a republic and still
remaining a member of the Commonwealth. Pakistan’s decision not to change the par value of its rupee,
when Britain devalued its currency in September 1949, was taken as a mark of Pakistan’s assertion of
economic independence of Britain.
Pakistan’s disenchantment with the Commonwealth came when Britain refused its request for a
Commonwealth mediation on the Kashmir dispute, although promotion of friendly relations between
member countries was - and still is - one of the chief objectives of the association. That India commanded
overriding influence in the Commonwealth was again proved in 1971 during the East Pakistan crisis
because that body remained a silent spectator when a member country dismembered another through
military intervention.
Following the recognition of Bangladesh by the rest of the Commonwealth countries, Pakistan walked out
of it as a protest in December 1971 when ZA Bhutto was in power. It is ironical that after about
18 years, it expressed a desire to rejoin the Commonwealth and Pakistan was re-admitted as a member in
October 1989.
The British and French military action in 1956 in Suez shattered the notion that significant action in foreign
affairs by Commonwealth members would always be preceded by consultations among them. Britain did
not deem it necessary to consult any member of the Commonwealth before launching, in collaboration with
France, its fateful military adventure against Egypt to solve the Suez Canal dispute on its own terms.
Economic, cultural and military ties among the Commonwealth countries have continued to dimmish over
the years as some members, including Pakistan, moved to develop links with non-Commonwealth
countries, especially the US. Even the bonds of a shared heritage in the form of a common language and
similar education and legal systems, which brought most of the Commonwealth countries together, have
now been weakened by the sweeping wave of Americanism.
65
Another development which has further weakened the Commonwealth was the British decision to join the
European Economic Community (EEC). As Britain’s economic power was eclipsed by the US, Germany
and Japan and as trade opportunities broadened, Britain became less of a magnet for other Commonwealth
countries both as a market and as a source of funds.
Though Pakistan has been suspended from the Commonwealth councils, it remains a member of the main
body. Pakistan should, therefore, continue to interact with it on the basis of reciprocity, norm of diplomatic
propriety and its national interests.
If, however, India continues to influence the deliberations of the Commonwealth and Pakistan is made to
leave the organization, it will not be a catastrophic loss. If we could do without the Commonwealth for
about
18 years, with no serious damage to our national interests, we can do so again, if necessary.
According to the Commonwealth summit decision, Pakistan is eligible for technical support aimed at
helping Islamabad restore democracy.
Since these countries have shown so much concern for the restoration of democracy in Pakistan, they
should also render assistance in combating corruption and tracing and recovering illegally transferred
wealth, a good chunk of which gone to some uf the more developed countries of the Commonwealth.
THE COLD WAR DEFENCE TREATIES
CHAPTER 4

In the post-World War II era, the world had been divided into two major power blocs. The American-
dominated Western bloc espoused the cause of democracy and capitalism: while the Russian dominated
Communist bloc with its socialist ideology, sought to extend its influence. China had been emerging as a
great power. Each side tried to win friends and create spheres of influence, particularly among the new
rising nations of Asia and Africa. Smaller Powers were drawn into the ambit of superpowers as a
consequence of the tremendous increase in the nuclear-arsenal of the big powers, with its unlimited
capacity for wholesale destruction. The problem of national security had become so complicated that for
many of the states no clear pattern of strategy in the field of defence was possible. The division in the
communist camp and China vying with Russia for the leadership of the Comumunist Movement,
introduced another element of uncertainty in this situation.
In a retrospective analysis of the factors which led to conclusion of defence treaties one feels that most of
these treaties were the result of mutual fear. The great powers wanted army bases and spheres of influence
and they therefore, concluded defence treaties with smaller nations. But due to the scientific progress and
the introduction of long range missiles and ABMs, the importance of these treaties kept declining. Later
with the inception of the process of detente, the mutual fears of both the USA and the USSR largely
subsided. Talks aiming at reduction and the limitation of both conventional and non-conventional weapons
were initiated. As the mutual tensions of the two blocs intensified towards the start of the 1980’s the
importance of these security arrangements, specially NATO and the Warsaw Pact was revived though only
to be short-lived. Again as the outstanding issues like the Afghan problem and the Polish crisis were near
resolution along with a steady progress in arms limitations, the utility of the defence pacts further declined.
With the conclusion of START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) and the reunification of Germany, the
Warsaw Pact lost the very justification of its existence. With SEATO and CENTO already shrugged off in
the wake of a changing world scenario, NATO remains the only security arrangement reminiscent of the
Cold War after the
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formal abandoning of the Warsaw Pact by the member countries. However, a study here of all these
security arrangements has been attempted to understand, in retrospect, the inputs underplaying the concept
of security in the post-War era. This study may also help to understand the factors underpinning the current
security structure of the world.
The following major defence treaties had been signed by various states in quest of security:
(i) NATO
(ii) WARSAW PACT
(in) SEATO
(iv) CENTO
NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was established after the Treaty was signed in April 1949. It has, as
its members, Britain, USA. Canada, France, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland,
Portugal and Italy. Turkey and Greece joined in 1951 (effective Feb. 1952), and West Germany in 1954
(effective May 1955). NATO is the product of the post-War thinking of the Western allies on the question
of Communism in Europe. Almost immediately after the end of hostilities in World War II, it became
apparent that Russia was determined to exert itself and to get the maximum advantage out of the spoils of
war. After having defeated Germany, the Western powers became acutely conscious of the rising power of
the Soviet Union, and NATO was their answer to it. Under NATO, the member states have given over
control of a part of their defence forces to an international organization. The major influence in the creation
of NATO was that of the United States. A revolution occurred in 1945 in the thinking of the American
people. Previously they were isolationists, but after World War II they started asserting themselves, and the
view came to be firmly held in American thinking that the defence of Europe was in fact the defence of
America. The expansion and development of armament had brought the US within hitting range of the
Soviet bases, and the Americans, therefore, sought to establish bases all around the world from where the
Communist bases could be attacked. In short, the old balance of power politics had raised its head once
again in the world.
The North Atlantic Treaty after affirming a desire for peace in the world, records the resolve of the
signatory powers to maintain and strengthen ”their individual and collective capacity and to resist armed
attack.” An armed attack on one of the members is to be considered an attack on all the members of the
Treaty Organization. There is a provision
68
THE COLD \VAR DEFENCE TREATIES
69
for revision of the treaty after 10 years and a provision for withdrawal, at one year’s notice, after 20 years
of its signing.
NATO has a cohesive structure. The Council is the principal body of the organization. It is charged with
the responsibility of considering all matters concerning implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.
This Council is essentially a body of governments which are generally represented by their foreign or
defence ministers. Each member government appoints a permanent representative, who leads a national
delegation of advisers and experts.
The Council sessions are presided over by foreign ministers of member countries in rotation. There is a
permanent Secretary-General who as a rule presides over ordinary Council meetings. There is a Military
Committee comprising chiefs of staff, or their representatives of all the member countries except France
which withdrew from the Military Committee in 1966. The military representatives remain in permanent
session in Washington. The standing group of the representatives of USA, UK and France, assisted by a
planning staff, is the executive agent of the Military Committee and works continuously. An integrated
NATO Force has been formed. There is a Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Under this Force, a
European Council, a Channel Command, and an Atlantic Command of Air, Sea and Naval Forces have
been established.
In recent past USA had been advocating the concept of multilateral nuclear force (MLF) in which all the
nuclear capability of NATO members was to be invested in a joint command. This was not appreciated,
largely because of the implication that the control of the trigger would have been with USA. Of late USA
had been assuming security responsibilities in many regions of the world, quite out of proportion to her real
interests involved in these regions; and on this exercise her smaller allies of NATO, as well as of SEATO
and CENTO, had either been dragged along or left behind. A re-thinking was thus forced upon the smaller
powers, who have been primarily concerned with their own national security.
Washington found itself embroiled in a dispute with the West German Government over short-range
nuclear weapons; the Bush administration regarded them as essential for security, while the Germans saw
them as instruments of their own destruction. West Germany had enjoyed over 40 years of peace, despite
being in the middle of the largest concentration of nuclear weapons in the world. The degree of West
German ambivalence towards nuclear deterrence had a tendency to change in response to trends in
international environment. In the early 80s for instance a majority of the West German public opinion
favoured the deployment of
NATO’s intermediate range nuclear missiles (INF) largely because of expansionism of the Soviet Union
and its rejection of the then President Mr. Ronald Reagan’s historic offer for a reciprocal removal of these
missiles by both sides. Now, however, seduced by the Gorbachev phenomenon, the West Germans were
apparently swinging towards the other extreme.
Following Gorbachev’s December 1988 announcement of unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional forces, the
West Germans had begun to feel that NATO had no reason to remtroduce the arms race in Europe through
the back doors of modernizing short-range nuclear missiles. With the exception of Denmark and Greece the
other members of NATO were not impressed by Bonn’s stance and saw modernization as ”crucial to the
maintenance of credible deterrent posture.”
During his first European visit President Bush in the NATO summit of May 29, 1989 suggested the
solution to what had until then been called a NATO crisis over the future of short-range nuclear weapons.
His more substantive initiative that was supposed to have resolved the NATO crisis was ambiguous. What
the West Germans wanted was not merely to postpone the NATO decision to replace the old short-range
nuclear weapons on their soil with improved ones but the start of East-West negotiations that would
eventually end Cold War and lift the nightmare of war in Europe.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization rejected on July 6, 1989 President Mikhail Gorbachev’s proposals for
cuts in short-range nuclear missiles. NATO in its May 1989 summit decided to give priority to negotiations
on conventional weapons.
However with Gorbachev’s continued peace offers and over willingness to cut the nuclear arsenals and the
mounting German insistence on removal of the perishing short-range missiles from its area, the NATO
members entered into meaningful dialogues with the then eastern bloc and these talks culminated in the
conclusion of START-II treaty in 1992 envisaging almost half reduction in the existing nuclear missiles of
Russian and the NATO countries. The effective use of NATO’s military capability was seen in the Gulf
War of 1991 when all members stood by the US in a concerted action against Iraq. Apart from France,
which first favoured time to see the sanctions work, all members were one voice in dealing with the issue
collectively. Turkey provided its southern bases for flights of NATO planes to bomb Iraqi positions as did
Greece. After this episode however there have been serious controversies in Europe specially with
reference to the role of the. United States. Instead of a US-led security set up, there have been suggestions
to the formation of a pan-European Security including specifically the ”European” powers.
70
IS NATO OBSOLETE?
In the post-Cold War era, NATO’s counterpart, the Warsaw Pact has been dissolved and the Soviet Union
has disintegrated making it difficult to justify the continuous existence of this relic of the East-West
tension. The question whether NATO has become obsolete or not has assumed even more significance as
many of the former Soviet Republics themselves want to join the NATO. Even former Russian President
Boris Yeltsin talked of creating a new system of security from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Does this mean
that NATO is obsolete? In fact not because the proponents of the continuation of the setup say NATO has
to meet the new challenges to Western security in the post-Cold War era. After the Cold War, NATO was
being criticized because so much of its military deployment looked unnecessary. Then came the Gulf
War that caused the Third World ”threats” to Western security rise on the defence agenda. This episode
aggravated the perception of maintaining Western security in the form of effective and mobile NATO
military force to enhance and safeguard the West’s strategic interests. Secondly, NATO can has also play
an effective role in the ethnic conflicts as in Yugoslavia, Kosovo and parts of the former Soviet Union.
Realizing this need the Rome Summit of 1991 introduced the new strategic concept replacing the old
reliance on Forward defense, with an emphasis on crisis management and preventive diplomacy. Thirdly,
the NATO arrangement can effectively be used to contain the onslaught of what the proponents of
NATO call the Islamic fundamentalism. More and more defence structures are being erected to cope
with this phenomenon. Apart from NATO, there are the West European Union, the NACC and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It is significant to note that the membership of
CSCE has been extended to all the former Soviet Republics (except Georgia) including those of Central
Asia, which are by definition out of Europe. The only feeling was that the Central Asian Muslim Republics
might be lost to anti-Western regimes of the Middle East unless they were brought into the Western
alliance.
As for the constraints on the smooth functioning of NATO as a security setup the foremost is the bickering
over the role of United States. Since German reunification, Bonn has been working for an enhanced
European identity for NATO. France is ever more advocating a more independent European foreign and
defence policy. Moreover in the wake of efforts for a more united Europe trade issues may intensify the
tensions between the allies. To add to this, maybe the financial strain on US economy (US is the largest
contributor to the NATO budget) which will force the US itself to re-think its role in the NATO. The
optimists however believe that America and Europe, relieved of the burden of defence, should
71
be able to settle their differences on minor economic and trade issues like government subsidies to select
industries and imports of select commodities. They argue that whatever unity Western Europe has achieved
was under the rod of NATO and the end of NATO will not only be the dismantlement of a military alliance
of the Atlantic States, it would also spell the end of one and the only political institution of the Atlantic
Community. Finally, NATO also presents a recipe for national interests of the major powers. For
Washington, it is a vehicle of exerting Trans-Atlantic political influence, for Berlin a security guarantee
with no political fringes and for London the best option to tame down both France and Germany. Hence we
may say that NATO, in the changed European and international scenario may continue to play an important
role though under a re-shaped framework of objectives and strategies.
At first glance, NATO’s planned expansion makes eminent sense. It was NATO, after all, that served as the
military shield and pillar of Western determination to deter and contain Soviet expansionism throughout the
Cold War. With Russia’s economic and political direction still unsettled, while Eastern Europe appears
embarked on the road to democracy and a market economy, what could be more logical than to extend
NATO’s umbrella over an even wider area and enhance the security of all Europe?
If NATO’s expansion makes little sense politically or militarily, what reason could there be for its whole-
hearted support among Western power brokers, from Berlin to Washington? To answer this question, one
has to realise that the alliance’s expansion is not a sign of robust health but a sign of near-desperation to
breathe new life into a terminally ill patient. Appearances aside, the fact is, after the end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO lost its enemy and thus its raison d’etre as a military alliance.
There has never been a military alliance in history that has survived in the absence of a manifest and clearly
understood threat and a well-defined mission to counter it.
The enlarged North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not only becoming a security model for the 21
st century but also trying to work in tandem with the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE), the most comprehensive forum within the European security architecture. The OSCE spans the
geographical area from Vladivosktok on Russia’s pacific coast to Vancouver in Canada and covers all
states in Europe, Central Asia and North America.
However, despite the OSCE umbrella, most Europeans are still confused about the journey ahead for
NATO. It is argued that for its entire current peacekeeping role in the Balkans, NATO still remains a
military
72
alliance without a clear purpose in the aftermath of the Cold War. It has yet to define its relationship with
Russia. The current imponderable for NATO’s strategic planners is how to expand the alliance eastward
without seriously jeopardizing it<; relations with Russia. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic became
part of NATO before its 50th birthday summit held in Washington DC in April 1999.
NATO EXPANSION AND NEW STRATEGIES
Western Europe is distinguished from Central Europe and Eastern Europe by differences of history and
culture rather than by geography. However, these boundaries of Europe are subject to considerable overlap
and fluctuation, which makes differentiation difficult. Thus the concept of Western Europe is associated
with liberal democracy; and its countries have been considered to share many cultural, economic and
political traditions with the United States of America and Canada - which have received millions of
Western European settlers since the discovery of the NewWorld.
Up to World War I, ”Western Europe” was thought to comprise France, the British Isles and Benelux.
These countries represented the democratic victors of both world wars; and their ideological approach was
spread further east as a consequence, in a process not unlike the ideological effect of the Napoleonic Wars,
when new ideas spread from revolutionary France.
During the Cold War, this ideological designation of Western Europe was supplemented with the aspect of
market economies in the West versus the planned economies of Eastern Europe, reflecting the
antiBolshevism that was aroused in Western Europe by the Russian Revolutions of 1917 and the remaining
opposition to the Soviet Union in general. Thus Western Europe came to include both traditional
democracies outside of NATO, as Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, and some market economy
dictatorships, as Portugal and Spain. This is also why NATO members such as Greece and Turkey were
generally considered Western European even though they are geographically in the southeast. The border
between Western and Eastern Europe, the Iron Curtain, was securely defended.
NATO Allies decided at their November 21-22, 2002 Summit in Prague to invite seven countries to join:
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In March 2004, the formal
exchange of instruments of ratification took place, which had brought the seven new countries into NATO
officially and formally. They became full members of NATO, and now participate in all the future NATO
meetings as
THE COl.D WAR DEFENCE TREATIES
73
full members. The membership process required each invitee country to confirm their willingness and
ability to respect the political and military obligations of NATO membership and to contribute to the
Alliance’s common-funded budgets and programs. Additionally, the U.S. and the 18 other current Allies
must ratify the membership of each invitee
U.S. and EU security today requires them to look closely at NATO, which is already the strongest security
Alliance in history, and find ways to make it even stronger. To confront and eliminate such global threats
as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, US and EU must ally with countries that
share values and act effectively Since the end of the Cold War, Europe’s newest democracies have proven
themselves as able partners, whether securing stability in the Balkans or fighting terrorism in Afghanistan.
The enlargement of NATO will cement these benefits for the United States and its Allies, making the
whole of NATO much stronger than the sum of the capabilities of individual members. NATO enlargement
will help to enhance the political and economic stability for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. By
helping Europe’s newer democracies as they strengthen good governance, rule of law, and human rights,
NATO will also facilitate a better long-term environment for American and European Union trade and
investment.
In simple words, EU and US are looking for benefits like; first NATO enlargement as far as the U.S and
EU, are concerned. They see the great opportunity for democratic reform in Central and Eastern Europe
fomented by enlargement. Second, it’s clear that enlargement brings a stronger collective defense and
ability to address new security challenges. The third issue is very clearly more than just on the horizon:
And that is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will be stopped from these weapon rich countries.
Fourth, a benefit of enlargement is improved relations among states. NATO’s lasting legacy for Europe is
its role as a peace promoter and a peace manager. Fifth, plenoprosperity. When these countries join NATO,
they will have a more stable climate for investment and economic reforms.
The question arises whether Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic made meaningful contributions?
Through their strong and unwavering support for the anti-terrorism coalition and assistance in bringing
stability to Bosnia and Kosovo, current aspirants have already shown that they can make positive
contributions to NATO operations. They have clearly demonstrated their willingness and ability to
participate in the Work of the Alliance. The three newest allies have sent troops to the Balkans,
Afghanistan, and other peacekeeping operations. They have also made excellent progress in building, their
capabilities and thus their contribution to common defense . No doubt enlargement put some monetary
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75
burden. The total cost for the last enlargement is estimated at $1.5 billion over ten years; of this, the U.S.
share is $400 million. The present round of enlargement is expected to carry similar costs, with greater
benefits, as the previous round in 1999, when Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic was provided
membership. That round of enlargement reduced the U.S. share of NATO’s budget and the costs of its
Balkan operations
Nato’s upcoming enlargement is a bitter pill to swallow for Russia, a former superpower which once
headed the Warsaw Pact alliance that opposed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although Nato has
not said it would station supplementary troops in the Baltic. Russia has described the Baltics as a ”gray
zone,” since the three countries have not signed the Conventional Weapons in Europe Treaty, which puts
limits on the amount of military materiel. Baltic countries, the mere possibility has rendered Russian
military leaders nervous. If Nato continues to keep to its offensive military doctrine, then Russia’s military
planning will be adequately reevaluated
To appease, Nato signed with Russia, Russia-NATO Founding Act, which w£s signed on May 14th by
Secretary General Solana and Foreign Minister-Primakov. (The full title is, the Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation, and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.) The act contains five
basic principles, plus a preamble in which it is made clear that neither NATO nor Russia considers each
other an adversary; and, although this is an important point that NATO made very clear at the end of the
Cold War, it is the first time that NATO and Russia have both articulated this non-adversarial position.
NATO is committed to an open door policy: any European democracy that is willing and able to contribute
to security in the EuroAtlantic area can become a member of the Alliance. Enlargement is not a new
phenomenon but an ongoing process, as illustrated by previous successful rounds of enlargement: Turkey
and Greece in 1952, Germany in
1955, Spain in 1982, and the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999. Those countries not selected
will continue to participate in MAP and work towards future membership.
But Nato is facing some internal problem, which could be traced backed to de Gaulle, President of France
to with draw its forces from Nato. Smoldering nationalism, colonial experience and stamina of war is
compelling Germany not to play second fiddle to America. Britain demonstration against unilateral attack
on Iraq is another breach in the Nato
European politicians have argued that promoting the overall European security is the main goal of the
process of enlargement. The EuroAtlantic Partnership Council and the agreements with Russia and the
Ukraine are further examples of the cooperative approach pursued by the NATO alliance. NATO’s
European partners are still alien to the US initiated strategy of NATO’s ’global’ role as the US is urging the
allies to refocus NATO’s role and strategy. The Americans are eager that the US mandate debate should
not limit NATO’s flexibility and render any military action subject to a Chinese or Russian veto in the UN
Security Council. In contrast to this perception, all European NATO members and Canada would prefer
NATO to act only in self-defence under the auspices of a Security Council resolution.
Within a decade or two, NATO borders will certainly reach Russia and if the oil states of the Caspian Sea
and Kazakhstan join NATO, the alliance can also border China. It is argued that nuclear considerations
have altered the strategic patterns. The conventional military forces have more of policing or peacekeeping
role. NATO has to establish a new balance to cope with 21st century’s security challenges.
Yet Kosovo did bring to surface NATO’s deficiencies: even now the peacekeeping force is about 20,000
short of ’planned strength’. The deficiencies and inadequacies are mainly in Europe - not enough smart
weapons, surveillance assets, transport aircraft, soldiers suitably trained and equipped.
Russia’s strategists argue with some justification that given the circumstances it does not matter much if
relations between Russia and the rest of the world are, at the moment, good. The fact is that at some future
date, if and when Russia is again at odds with Europe or America, it could find a well - oiled and powerful
alliance parked on its western borders from the Baltic Circle right across the Black sea.
There is also the question of NATO’s political culture and structure. The institution was created by
Washington and London in the wake of World War II. It was because it was perceived to be dominated by
Anglo - Saxons that the French effectively withdrew from its ranks.
NATO’s decisive action in Kosovo in summer 1999 also came about after its multinational leadership had
agonized over the question of intervention for long without coming to any decision. Finally, it was the US
pressure that carried the day. Britain’s prime minister Tony Blair was far less cautious than the Americans
and, even before the bombing campaign, had begun planning for the use of ground forces. Indeed, it now
seems clear
76
that the British did not bother to wait for the alliance and were already preparing for a ground war. That is
why the British troops were first to be ready to step into liberated Kosovo.
FROM CLINTON TO BUSH: COMMON GOALS FOR NATO
For all the differences between the foreign policies of the Bush administration and the Clinton
administration, policy toward NATO enlargement has been one area of significant continuity. The core of
the Clinton strategy was to promote peace and stability on the European continent through the integration
of the new Central and Eastern European democracies into a wider Euro-Atlantic community, in which the
United States w ould remain deeply engaged. A revitalized NATO was an important tool for the
maintenance of American engagement and leadership, and its expansion to the new democracies-especially
given the delays in their efforts to join the European Union (EU)- was a key part of the strategy.
President Clinton expressed his support for enlarging NATO as early as 1994- following the creation of
NATO’s ”Partnership for Peace,” designed to strengthen relations with the former Warsaw Pact states-and
at the Madrid summit in 1997, Alliance leaders decided to invite Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary
to join. The process was continued at NATO’s April 1999 50th anniversary summit in Washington D.C.
There, leaders not only welcomed the new members but pledged to leave open the possibility of expansion
to more countries and offered to help them prepare for membership. President Bush has largely picked up
where Clinton left off. Bush committed to the enlargement strategy on his first official trip to Europe in
June 2001, putting an end to speculation during the 2000 presidential election campaign that he might
withdraw American troops from the Balkans and back away from NATO enlargement in an effort to secure
Russian acquiescence to missile defense. The new president not only reiterated the Clinton ”in together, out
together” pledge in the Balkans but forcefully made the case for NATO’s continued expansion. In a major
speech in Warsaw, Poland, on June 15, Bush asserted that ”all of Europe’s new democracies”, from the
Baltics to the Black Sea, should have an equal chance to join Western institutions. He suggested that the
failure to allow them to do so would amount to the moral equivalent of the World War II Yalta and Munich
conferences and appealed to NATO leaders to take a forward leaning approach to enlargement at their
November 2002 summit in Prague. At America’s urging, Alliance leaders agreed to allow NATO Secretary
General George Robertson to announce that NATO expected to launch the next round of enlargement at the
Prague Summit in 2002.
Russia’s reaction to the new momentum behind NATO

THF. COLD WAR DEFENCE TREATIES
77
enlargement has not been as hostile as many expected. Indeed, Just 24 hours after the Bush speech, Russian
President Vladimir Putin warmly embraced the American President at a summit in Bled, Slovenia, strongly
implying that he did not intend to let enlargement undermine the potential for U.SRussia cooperation. Later
in the summer, Putin took a further step toward acknowledging the inevitability of enlargement by
expressing the view that Russia might itself want to join NATO, as an alternative to his preferred option of
seeing NATO disappear. Putin went even further in October 2001, as Russian-American cooperation on
terrorism was moving forward, saying that if NATO were to continue ”becoming more political than
military” Russia might reconsider its opposition to enlargement. This was hardly an expression of Russian
support for enlargement (still opposed by the vast majority of Russians), but it was the strongest signal yet
that Moscow wants to find a way to accommodate a development that it does not like but knows it cannot
stop.
ENLARGEMENT OPTIONS FOR THE NEXT ROUND

There are several ways NATO can move forward as it tries to meet the challenge of reaching consensus
among its members while not alienating important players like Russia. The main options include:
A Pause. Opponents of NATO enlargement-who have consistently argued that it needlessly provokes
Russia, costs too much, dilutes Alliance unity and distracts NATO from its original mission-will argue that
it is not too late to halt the process now, or at least that it should be suspended. After countless pledges by
Alliance leaders-bom individually and through the Alliance-that NATO’s door remains open to all of
Europe’s new democracies, a decision to stop the process now would badly damage NATO’s credibility
and have a devastating impact on a region that has suffered from Western cynicism in the past. To the
extent that the ”pause” seemed to be a reaction to Russian threats or the need for Russian cooperation on
terrorism, it would arguably only encourage future threats.
Limited Enlargement. A more likely approach that might appeal to lead? still cautious about taking in a
large number of countries at once woi.’^ , to invite a limited number of candidates to join. Among them,
Slovenia is seen to be the most viable, given its relatively advanced processes of. economic and political
reform, geographical contiguity with other NATO members, and lack of political tensions with Russia.
Slovakia, for many of the same reasons, is also often mentioned as a likely new member, though the
prospect of former authoritarian Prime Minister Vladmir Meciar replacing the current reformist
government next year could undermine its chances. More controversial would be extending membership to
the Baltic
78
1NTER.NATIO.NAL AFFAIRS
states-Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Whereas only a few years ago Baltic membership in NATO had little
support, their prospects have risen dramatically as a function of their remarkable progress toward economic
and political reform (with significant help from their Nordic neighbors) and the logic of the open door
process. This option proved to be a plausible one, as in November 2002 Prague Summit, NATO extended
its membership not only to Slovenia and Slovakia, but to the three Baltic States as well.
The ”Big Bang”. Because of the difficulties of deciding who should get in, some analysts have concluded
that the best approach is to accept all (or nearly all) of the candidates at once. The advantage of the Big
Bang approach is that it avoids competition among candidates as well as the potential for infra-Alliance
disputes, including between supporters of the northern and southern candidates. Extending invitations to all
nine of the previous candidates could also help to avoid protracted tension with Russia over membership
for the Baltic States.
But the Big Bang is also problematic, even beyond the potential tension with Russia. One risk is including
in the Alliance a candidate that might seem stable and cooperative now, but might pose problems later if
political and economic reform suffers a major setback. Another is that NATO may not be ready to
accommodate 27 members before it has even learned to work well with 19. A further issue is the impact a
big (and implicitly ”final”) wave of enlargement would have on those countries that did not get in-perhaps
Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus, and of course, Russia. Finally, the Senate might
hesitate to ratify a sweeping enlargement especially if it appeared that NATO standards-cither on
democracy or military capabilities-were lowered for certain candidates simply so that the process could be
completed early. Trying to include marginally prepared candidates in a membership wave could imperil the
entire process if it failed in the U.S. Senate or in another NATO parliament.
The ”Regatta”. To avoid the difficult choices of deciding now who should get into the Alliance, some
analysts have conceived of an alternative approach-often called the regatta-that would declare NATO’s
intention to eventually accept all the candidates, but limit the number taken in next year to just a few.
Proponents of this approach-modeled on the European Union’s (EU) approach to enlargement-argue that it
creates the best of all possible worlds by reassuring candidates that they will one day join NATO without
provoking Russia or diluting the Alliance by being part of an immediate, sweeping enlargement. At the
same time, the regatta-as least as implemented by the EU-carries the potential disadvantage of having to
articulate now just which European countries are potential disadvantage of having to articulate now just
which European countries are potential
79
candidates, and which ones are to be told that they can never join NATO. Such an approach (as the EU
discovered when it denied Turkey a path to membership at the 1997 Luxembourg Summit) cerates the very
divisions that enlargement was meant to help erase. If a regatta approach is adopted, NATO leaders should
make clear that those not included in the original batch of participants will still be eligible for future
membership.
The problem of NATO expansion is almost resolved by the Prague Summit 2002. Seven former Soviet
block adversaries, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are provided
membership of NATO. The question of membership of the above mentioned states, particularly that of the
Baltic states, has been a point of controversy among NATO’s members on one hand and between NATO
and Russia on the other. But now Russia has come to terms with NATO on the question of its expansion.
DEALING WITH RUSSIA

v^_
Whatever approach NATO chooses, it will need to be accompanied by a Russia strategy. While fears that
enlargement would provoke a new cold war were always greatly exaggerated, it remains the case that
enlargement will be most successful if it can be accomplished without driving a wedge between Russia and
the West. The latest signals from Moscow seem to suggest that Russia is finally seeing that an enlarged
NATO-even to the Baltic states-need not be a threat to Russian national interests. Indeed, whereas
opponents of enlargement argue th’it Washington’s need for Russian cooperation in the war on terrorism
giics Moscow added leverage in its dealings with the United States, the reverse proposition is more
persuasive: Russia’s desire to be part of the Western anti-terrorism coalition will lead it to seek a modus
vivendi on controversial issues like enlargement. Like all wars, cold or hot, the war on terrorisr/i has the
potential to bring former adversaries together. /
These new dynamics-together with NATO’s continued adoption of a more ”political” role and the gradual
disappearance of NATO-lRussia differences in the Balkans-suggest that efforts to strengthen NATO/Russia
ties are more likely to work in the future than they have in the plst. The Russia- NATO Permanent Joint
Council (PJC)-set up in 1997 bit never adequately used because of disputes over Kosovo and other issi/es-
could now become a forum to discuss seriously a range of political am/ military issues, including terrorism,
civil defense, and weapons of mass destruction proliferation. This process could be supplemented by new
initiatives such as the recently agreed ties between NATO and Russian parliamentarians and the ad hoc
body to study joint Russia- NATO relations suggested by
80
Secretary General Lord Robertson and welcomed by Putin. Washington might also consider calling for
more frequent meetings of the PJC at the national leaders level, somewhat like the G-7/G-8. To the extent
that September 11 truly has transformed the relationship between Russia and the West, an enlarged NATO
need not prevent strong NATO-Russia cooperation.
An even more interesting question is the possibility of Russia’s own eventual NATO candidacy and
membership. To be sure, today’s Russia is not ready for NATO. It is not able to meet the criteria rightly
being applied to other candidates-fully democratic governance, civilian control of the military, peaceful
relations with its neighbors, respect for minorities at home, and military forces that can work with the rest
of NATO’s. Russia’s foreign policy orientation is still too different from that of NATO’s current members.
One need only imagine how NATO would have functioned (or more likely, not functioned) throughout the
Balkan crises of the 1990s had Russia already then been a veto-wielding member of the Alliance.
Moreover, Russia’s long border with China and Central Asian states would require NATO to adopt special
provisions-such as a defense guarantee limited to Russia’s Western regions-before full membership could
even be considered.
Being unready for membership today, however, is very different from being rejected as a potential
candidate, and it would be a mistake for *>IATO to permanently shelve the idea of Russian membership.
The prospect of eventual Russian membership-while no doubt a long way offc -<(uld potentially have the
same construction effect on Russia that it has had on\ NATO candidates throughout eastern Europe, many
of which have resblved border disputes, improved treatment of minorities, and streamlined their armed
forces as part of their efforts to qualify. The symbolic message of a^NATO open to Russia would at a
minimum underscore the point that NAlfO has been trying to make for over a decade-which may finally be
sinkiW in after September 11-that NATO and Russia both need to get beyond the cold war mindset of the
past and work together for peace across the continent.
Finally, pursuing a better NATO relationship with Russia cannot mean ignoring the importance of a stable
and independent Ukraine. Ukraine is currently nowhere near ready for NATO membership, and practically
speakini, it is hard to imagine it ever joining before Russia. But the door to membership should be held
open to Ukraine just as to Russia or any other potential \candidate, and the NATO-Ukraine Council should
be used to ensure that Kiev also has a voice in European security affairs.
81
The September 11 attacks bolster the case for NATO enlargement because they bolster the case for NATO
in general, particularly in the United States. When the cold war ended in 1989, many observers questioned
whether NATO had a future with its original mission gone. The Balkan wars of the 1990s largely answered
that question, showing that American military power, U.S.-Europe solidarity, and inter-operable NATO
forces were still critically important to ensuring stability and security on the continent. Today, the political
and military solidarity of NATO countries in the aftermath of an attack on the United States further
demonstrates the importance of a strong and integrated Alliance.
In November 2002, the NATO leaders met at Prague and agreed on NATO’s enlargement to include seven
former Soviet block adversaries; Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in
2004, taking the alliance into territory of the former Soviet Union for the first time. Russia grudgingly
accepted the entry of its former allies into the NATO but only after it secured its own special relationship
with the alliance through the creation of a NATO-Russia council, giving Moscow a role in some NATO
policies and operations.
In addition to admitting new allies, NATO has established a network of so-called partnership with 27
states. They include five neutrals s (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland), all 15 former
Soviet Republics, four other members of the defunct Warsaw Pact and three remnants of Yugoslavia.
NATO’S FUTURE
It will be unfair to say that NATO is dead in the post-cold war scenario. However, different emerging
trends within the alliance signal a new evolving role of the alliance in future.
NATO was created more than half a century ago to protect its members against the threat of aggression
from Soviet Union. That threat having disappeared for the foreseeable future, NATO is not so much
expanding as transferring itself into a different institution. Seeking to adapt to new security threats, NATO
has taken global terrorism as is new enemy, and peace keeping as its new role. It has become more akin to a
collective security organization like the United Nations rather than a traditional alliance. NATO continued
to oversee peace in Macedonia under its largest peacekeeping operation code-named ’Amber Fox’. NATO
also played its role in maintaining peace in the Balkans.
82
At the outset of the 21S| century the world witnessed two major developments in the history of NATO.
First the expansion of NATO’s activities beyond its traditional European boundaries to other parts of the
world, and second is the rift in trans Atlantic relations which may cause far reaching consequences for the
future of NATO.
NATO’s decision to take over responsibility from International Security Assistance Force (1SAF) in
Afghanistan in August 2003 is historic, because for the first time in its history, NATO is embarking upon a
security mission outside Europe. Today more than 5000 strong NATO forces are standing in the capital of
Afghanistan, Kabul. The expansion of NATO forces in other cities of Afghanistan may take place very
soon. NATO has also agreed to provide the military support to the polish division in the Iraqi stabilization
force. It will give NATO an important role in the future of Iraq and the overall Middle East politics. NATO
also plans to build up security partnership with Israel and Arab states to bolster the ’war on terrorism’
around the Mediterranean region. This renewed vigor and modified role of NATO has placed it at the
forefront of the anti-terrorism campaign in the
21st century.
Similarly, the new international environment alters the relationship between Europe and the United States.
The strength of the alliance (NATO) has always been derived from American power. Yet these days many
allies are feeling not so much led by the US as bossed around; for them, the exercise of American power
has become less a source of protection and more a cause of resentment and a problem to be managed.
During the present George W. Bush presidency, America is being accused of greater unilateralism and high
- handedness.
NATO rose to the first major challenge of the post-cold war era in the aftermath of 9/11. NATO, for the
first time invoked Article V of its covenant, which declares an attack against one of is signatories an attack
on the alliance as a whole. Despite valuable contributions by the NATO members in planning and
executing the anti-terrorism campaign in Afghanistan, President Bush gave the impression on both sides of
the Atlantic that NATO was a wasting asset. Many among the members of NATO are worried about the
American increasing unilateralism, which had put NATO’s role in the ensuing Iraqi crisis, at stake.
The recent war in Iraq manifested the fragility of NATO owing to the growing rift in the trans-Atlantic
relations. NATO passed through a near-death crisis of its credibility, when US sidelined it in the war
against Iraq. America wanted to use and keep NATO’s machinery at its own disposal in the war against
Iraq, but some of the major European members
THE COLD \\ AR DEFEM F. TREATIES
83
of NATO; France, Germany and Belgium opposed any military attack against Iraq without UN permission.
Differences also rose among the European members of NATO on the question of war against Iraq. The
crisis reached to peak when Germany, France and Belgium threatened to block the NATO’s resolution
allowing military aid to Turkey in case of a retaliatory attack by Iraq in the proceeding war. Latter these
countries normalized their stand by pledging that they will do it only under the directions provided by the
UN.
Although NATO has survived the recent crisis but it does not seem to keep itself effective if the trans-
Atlantic differences continue. The future of NATO is dependent less on its military structure rather than on
the ability of its members to develop common political and strategic vision. NATO is a strong bridge
between the US and Europe, through which they are connected in every type of cooperation. US Secretary
of State, Colin Powell, putting emphasis on the importance of NATO, said that ”This is a great alliance
which kept the peace for more than fifty years. It is more than a treaty for collective defence, it is a central
organizing force in a great web of relationship that hold North America and Europe together.”
WARSAW PACT
This Pact had been signed by East European countries, with USSR playing the major role, as a counter-
balance to NATO. On 14th May, 1955, a co-operation and mutual assistance agreement was signed
between Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and USSR. These
states also decided to set up a unified command of their forces. The Treaty confirmed the principles of
collective security in Europe and, noting the danger of arming of West Germany, expressed the desire of
the parties to co-operate in all defence matters and to take joint action in case of aggression.
Under Article 4 of the Treaty in the event of armed attack on anyone of the parties by any state, the other
member states of the Treaty were to come to the assistance of the state attacked. The parties to the treaty
were supposed to consult immediately the measures to be taken in order to restore peace. Such measures
were to be reported to the Security Council. The treaty provided for the unified command of the armed
forces of the member countries with its headquarters in Moscow. It was headed by Marshal of the Soviet
Union and the defence ministers of the other countries acted as Deputy Commanders-in-Chief.
A Political Consultative Committee had been established under the Warsaw Pact. This Treaty was to
remain in force for 20 years and was open
84
to any State to join it. The Warsaw Pact had been considered, by many observers, to be a formality or
declaration of intention of unified action of Communist Powers of East Europe in the event of the clash
with the Western Powers. The close-knit relationship of the East European Communist countries had
already been established by means of bilateral treaties which the Soviet Union had concluded with these
countries. Because of the oneness of the Communist system, these countries were allying with Moscow in a
much more unified manner than the Western Powers were doing in the case of NATO.
However as the hold of communism began to recede from the East European countries after the German
reunification and the disintegration of Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact as a viable defence arrangement lost its
vitality. This culminated in the formal abandonment of the treaty in April 1991.
SEATO
The SEATO Pact was signed in Manila on Sep. 8, 1954 by the following countries:
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, UK and USA.
SEATO claimed the adherence of the member States to the principles of peaceful settlement of disputes
and declared their intention for collective defence against aggression. It also provided strengthening of free
institutions by economic and technical co-operation. The Pact was of indefinite duration. Any member
State could withdraw at one year’s notice. On the question of aggression, the United States government had
recorded an understanding in the Treaty that aggression in the eyes of the US government means only
Communist aggression.
Mutual consultations were stipulated in the event of the forms of aggression. A protocol had been added to
the Treaty making Cambodia eligible for the economic measures under the Treaty.
The structure of SEATO Organization was as follows:
(a) There was the Council of Foreign Ministers \\hich decided its policies; met usually once a year.
(b) There was the Secretariat with a Secretary-General, which dealt with the day-to-day affairs of the
Organization.
THE COLL) WAR DEFENCE TREATIES
85
(c) There were Military Advisers. They were named by their governments and were responsible to council.
(d) There was Military Planning Office and permanent working group of the senior staff members
from the Armed Forces of the member States. They prepared military plans in the light of changed
conditions.
Appended to the Treaty was a document called ”The Pacific Charter” which stressed the need to develop
the area and raise the standard of living. Like other such organizations, this was again a typical measure of
the American strategy to create influence in the different regions of the world. SEATO for military and
economic purposes was dependent upon the action of the US government. SEATO did not have a Standing
Force like that of NATO. In the field of economic development and cultural relationship, however, the
contribution of SEATO had been considerable. Exchange of scholars and other technical assistance and co-
operation between the member nations had been going on and that perhaps was the only tangible result of
SEATO.
As far as Pakistan was concerned, effectiveness of the Organization was tested during the September War
with India in 1965, when not a finger was raised in support of Pakistan by SEATO members.
CENTO
On 24th February, 1955, in the city of Baghdad, Turkey and Iraq signed a pact of mutual assistance which
later on UK, Pakistan and Iran also joined. USA became member of the Economic Committee in April
1956, and of the Military Committee in March 1957. Though not a full member of the Organization, USA
had been attending as observer all along. USA further concluded bilateral defence agreement with Turkey,
Iran and Pakistan on 15th March 1959 providing for defence equipment and assistance to these three
countries. After the revolution in Iraq, she withdrew from CENTO on 24th March 1959 and in August
1959, the name of organization was changed from Baghdad Pact to CENTO. Its headquarters were at
Ankara.
Like SEATO it was treaty of mutual aid and peaceful intentions and mutual consultation and assistance in
the event of aggression. This Treaty had been concluded for a period of five years renewable for five yearly
periods. Any member State could withdraw either at the end of a period or at six months’ notice.
Like SEATO, the development of Baghdad Pact and C’EN’IO had arisen essentially from the need of the
USA to have a system of defence arrangements with various regions of the world, in confrontation with
communism. When the Cold War was at its height between the two power blocs in order to maintain the
balance of power, the conclusion of these Pacts was considered essential, but with the passage of time and
passing of Cold War, the urgency for these arrangements has diminished. Apart from defence, some
measures in the economic field had been taken jointly by the CENTO countries. One notable aspect of their
mutual co-operation was the development of telecommunication system, road links, rail links, etc, between
Turkey, Pakistan and Iran. As far as Pakistan is concerned, her dissatisfaction with CENTO was very
obvious, and in the developing position of the three world powers - USA, USSR and China these regional
defence treaties with one power predominating have already acquired mere historical status, and their
relevance in emergent situation has dwindled considerably.
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
87
CHAPTER 5

BACKGROUND
After the First World War, Europe suffered from serious economic stagnation, well shown by the fact that
between the wars per capita income of Europeans rose by 6% only. Efforts by individual governments to
improve the situation did little to solve the problem. When the Second World War ended, Europe was
considerably impoverished because of the destruction during the war. At that time, the US Secretary of
State, George C. Marshall, announced that if the Europeans organised themselves and joined hands, the US
Government would provide aid for reconstruction. The motive of this offer is not far to seek. The Soviet
Union had refused to withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe, and the US foresaw the impending rivalry
between the two. Though the Cold War had not gained much momentum as yet, it was obvious that the two
great powers would have a clash of interests in Europe. The United States wanted to present a united front
against its enemy. The Marshall Plan was made with this object in view. The idea of European unity was
not new. After the Napoleonic Wars, there was a group of persons who wanted to unite Europe and thus
prevent wars caused by excessive nationalism. This idea sounded absurd then, and by the time Germany
became strong and Franco-German war started in the 1870’s, it had lost all support. Later, in 1930, an
American, Clarence Strait, had proposed a federation between the United States and European countries. In
September 1946, Churchill, who was aware of the dangers of ”Iron Curtain” (a phrase coined by him)
supported the idea in a speech at Zurich University.
Thus, while the idea was not new, it received impetus by US proposals. Moreover, the Europeans
themselves wanted to end the FrancoGerman rivalry and thus prevent another European war, like the two
they had seen, with bitter results. France wanted to lead Europe in the absence of German antagonism. The
French politicians therefore, played a prominent part in European integration. At the same time there was
the fear of a depression similar to that of the Great Depression of the 1930’s, the drastic consequences of
which were felt throughout the world and which individual
88
governments had failed to stamp out. Danger of Soviet expansionism was not only a headache for the
United States but also for Europe, where, except in France, Communist parties were not strong. The Union
of Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg had already entered into an organization named Benelux in
1948, and the advantages of such a union also encouraged their plans. After the World War 11. France and
Italy lost several of their colonies. The independence of the colonies, and the increasing nationalism of
other independent states, reduced the possibilities of exploitation and investment there. These countries had
to find markets for their products somewhere, and Europe seemed to be their refuge.
The Marshall Plan took the form of European Recovery Programme which implied the creation of
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). On April 16, 1948, it had seventeen members,
including West Germany, but later its membership was raised to
18 when Spain joined it. The European Recovery Programme, a practical form of the Marshall Plan, called
for survey of Europe’s resources, and needs by the European countries themselves, definite procedures for
coordinated self-rehabilitation, and a detailed report to the US setting forth the assistance needed. The
OEEC was to be the main instrument in carrying out these objectives. The plan envisaged American
financial aid, either as loan, or gift, or both provided that the Europeans made effective use of existing
resources and sought to overcome political division and trade barriers. The programme was officially
declared terminated in 1951, but aid was continued under different labels, and so the OEEC continued to
exist. Encouraged by the success of OEEC, six European countries, France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium,
Holland and Luxembourg, entered into an agreement on September 10, 1952, designed to create a single
market for coal and steel comprising the six participating states. The agreement envisaged the eventual
elimination of tariffs and other trade restrictions among the participants as well as the abrogation of private
cartels, marketing agreements, national subsidies, and legally established wage and price levels applicable
to the industries in question and the establishment of common customs frontiers. These measures were
expected to raise the efficiency (reduction in the cost of production) of industries in these countries as it
had done in the United States. Why these two industries only were chosen was because of their
fundamental economic importance. Mobilization of labour in the two industries namely, coal and steel, was
encouraged by issuing labour cards, which acted as labour passports, allowing the workers of these
industries to move freely from one country to another.
THE El KOREAN COMMUNITY
89
THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET
The success attained by ECSC won a lot of support for the creation of a Common Market. Thus the six
members of ECSC met in 1955 al Messina and prepared a plan for the creation of a European Common
Market. The meeting was called by the three countries of Benelux to pursue the establishment of a united
Europe by developing common institutions, by progressive fusion of national economies, by creating a
common market and by the progressive harmonization of social policies. Report prepared under the
leadership of the Belgian Foreign Minister was adopted at the Venice Conference of the six countries in
May, 1956. After negotiation and discussions, the six member governments of ECSC, met in Rome and
signed the treaty to create European Economic Community, or European Common Market or Euromart on
March 25, 1957. The terms of the treaty which was to become effective from January 1958, were:
(a) Customs and duties between the six countries would first be reduced to equality and ultimately there
could be attempts to abolish them completely in a transitionary period of 12 to 15 years. This period was to
be divided into 3 or 4 years stages.
(b) A common tariff on goods imported from countries outside the treaty members would be established
and quantitative import restriction would be abolished in a period of fifteen years.
(c) Provision was made for gradual adjustment to free trade in goods entailing national economic problems
and for eventual arbitration of disputes over adherence to the free trade agreement.
(d) There was to be free movement of labour and capital within the common market area in 12 years.
(e) Overseas territories of member states were to be associated with the European Common Market
through reduced tariff and when they became independent, they would be allowed to join it.
(f) A five-year common overseas investment fund was to be collected with contributions from the member
countries.
J
90
IVrEKNATIOVAI. AFFAIRS
(g) A European investment bank was to be set up vvith a capital of $ 1000m. The purpose of establishing
tlijs bank was to help in the necessary re-equipment if one industry is losing markets, while another is
expanding its tnarkets, to minimize the hardships during transitionary period.
(h) The agency was to be the central institution for facilitating research, security measures; investment
facilities and supply of atomic material for developing nuclear power to benefit the six nations.
In addition there was provision for the establishment Of four governing institutions similar to those of
European Coal and Steel Community. The functions of these institutions were mainly executive.
These were as follows:
(a) The Commission. This was the chief administrative body of the ECM. It had nine members who were
chosen by the member States, but who operated independent of government control. It was the
representative and official spokesman of ECM. Its functions covered the conmiunity agricultural policy,
negotiations of tariff in the Countries outside ECM, preservation of competition 3nd the implementation of
treaty regulations on tariff ancl quotas and general economic policies. On these issues, it presented its
policies and programmes to the Council of Ministers which might reject them or amend them unanimously.
The Commission had established ”Directorates1’ under which it dealt with main areas, i.e. with external
relations, economic and financial relations in internal rnarkets, competition, social policies, agriculture,
transportation and framing policy about overseas countries when they are independent, and their
administration while they are not. It had headquarters at Brussels. The Commission was in close
collaboration with High Authority of ECsc and Euratom Commission.
The Council of Ministers.
It consisted C)f one the six countries and
representative from each of represented their governments. It was the ultimate policymaking body of
ECM, though sometimes it had to consult
THE EUROPEAN ( OMMIMTY
91
t
the Assembly, the Monetary Committee, or the Economic and Social Committee. One of its most important
functions was to consider and approve, or reject, the budget. It could not alter it. The Council could not take
any initiative by itself but worked only on the recommendations of the Commission. In some matters it
acted by qualified majority, where the distribution of voting was: France, Germany and Italy having four
votes each, Belgium and Holland two each and Luxembourg one. The provision of unanimous approval
was valid for the first four years, but now all recommendations of the Commission may be vetoed by one of
the larger nations (France, West Germany or Italy) and one of the smaller nations (Holland. Belgium or
Luxembourg) agree to do it. The relations between the Commission and the Council of Ministers had been
quite smooth, showing a _ genuine desire to make the ECM a success.
(c) The Court of Justice. It was established in October, 1958. Its functions were similar to those of the
highest judicial court of any country i.e. solving or, as the treaty says, mediating between countries at
dispute, and ensuring that various departments of ECM do not encroach on each other’s field and do
nothing disallowed by the treaty. It also decided whether the member countries are obeying the decisions of
the Council. It could decide cases brought by private individuals as well as governments.
(d) The Assembly or European Parliament. Its functions were similar to those of shareholders’ meeting of a
joint stock company. It could compel the commission to resign by censuring it, but this has not been done,
as it required a two-third majority and, because of its unfavourable effects. It discusses the annual
report of the Commission and makes recommendations to it. Its importance was enhanced by the fact that it
is the assembly of all three European organizations, the EEC, the ECSC and Euratom.
The Parliament met regularly in Strasbourg each spring. It had 142 members, with France, Germany and
Italy having 36 members each. Belgium and Holland 14 members each and Luxembourg 6 members. These
members were appointed by the national legislatures according to the
92
INTERN YTIONAI. AFFAIRS
strength of political parties in them, but ultimately they were expected to be elected by direct universal
suffrage.
A draft proposal raised the number to 426, trebling the membership quota of each country. The members
were to be elected directly for four years and are to work independently of national governments. However,
it was unlikely that they forego national interest for European interests because they would have to seek
reelection. They will not, in practice, be independent of their governments.
European Coal and Steel Community, which was the forerunner of ECM. was now affiliated to it.
Moreover, another agency Euratom was also affiliated to it. This institution was created to develop jointly
atomic power for peaceful purposes. Developing it individually was not possible because of the cost
involved. However, atomic energy can also be used for more destructive purposes, and this had been the
main fear of the Soviet Union which had always looked upon the European Common Market with
disapproval. Euratom was to be headed by an Executive High Authority like that of ECSC and the
Commission of ECM. The main problem that faced the framers was whether the fissionable material should
be owned by the individual governments and cost borne by the organization, or whether it should be owned
by the organization. The latter course was adopted. Euratom now imported enriched uranium from the US
at subsidized rates, and distributed it within the community. Information gathered from research was shared
by all. There were in addition, three consultative committees besides the four mam institutions described
above:
1. The Economic and Social Committee, which had 101 members. The Council and the Commission
had to consult it on certain matters.
2. The Transport Committee which was composed of 30 experts and might be consulted by the
Commission from time to time.
3. The Monetary Committee, having fourteen members. Its functions were to promote the co-ordination of
current monetary and financial policies of the member committees.
Other agencies within ECM were:
(a) The European Social Fund which was administered by the
Commission. It was to promote employment facilities and

THF. F.I ROI’FAN COMMl MTY
to assist in retaining and the resettlement of \\orkers whose livelihood or jobs were affected by the
introduction of Common Market. Its mam source of finance was the European Investment Bank.
(b) The European Investment Bank had a capital of S 1000 m with contributions by the six
countries. It was administered by a Board of Governors, consisting of one Minister from each
country, a Board of Directors numbering twelve, and a Management Committee of three. Its work was
to grant loans and provide guarantees to finance projects designed to promote economic progress
within the Community. It was to help an industry gain market because of EEC. and if another was losing it,
thus to minimize any unfavourable results.
(c) The Overseas Territories Development Fund of value and contributions given in terms of treaty above.
It was administered by the commission and consisted of member countries in the economic and social
development of the associated overseas territories of EEC.
ECM was created at a time when Europe wanted reconstruction, and as this need withered, so did the desire
for unity. The first year of its inception was not very successful, partly because of change of government in
France. But on January 1, 1959, the tariffs were cut by 10% and import quotas were raised by about 20%.
They were further reduced by 5.10% eighteen months later. Moreover ECM countries decided to have
reciprocal tariff cut with outside countries up to 10%. Between the period 1958 to
1962, ECM followed its pledge of providing S 581 m, to African colonies under a new agreement, covering
the period from 1963 to 1967 ECM was to provide $ 730 m. more. In 1964 EEC participated as an entity in
the opening stages of the Kennedy Round negotiations in GATT for worldwide tariff cuts upto 50% on
industrial goods. In June 1964 ECM signed a trade agreement with Israel and in 1965 with Lebanon. Talks
were held with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Negotiations on Nigeria’s request for association with ECM
opened in 1964, and the Commission received a mandate to conduct similar talks with Kenya, Uganda and
Tanzania. Greece had already become an associate member in 1962 and an association agreement in
Turkey came into force on 1st December, 1964. A common agricultural policy was being formulated under
the threat of French veto.
94
INTKRNAIIO.NAI. AFFAIRS
The full rules of the Common Market did not apply to agricultural products. However, a common trade and
marketing policy was to be established.
The offer of 10% reciprocal tariff cuts with outside countries caused some worry to UK and it was a major
factor that led to the formation of the EFT A. The members of EFTA tried to project their interests, but
were not successful. So in August, 1961, UK formally applied for membership. Denmark and Ireland also
applied later. Britain made this notwithstanding the difficulties she faced in her relations with other British
Commonwealth countries, and the almost impossible task of reconciling her agricultural policies with those
of Western Europe. This point was clearly visualized in the five conditions of 1962 laid down by Hugh
Gaitskell, the then leader of Labour Party in Opposition. They \\ere:
(1) Safeguards for the trade and other interests of UK’s friends and partners in the Commonwealth.
(2) Safeguards for UK’s EFTA partners.
(3) Safeguards for the position of British agriculture.
(4) Freedom to pursue our own foreign policy.
(5) The right to plan our own economy.
Again on 10th November, 1966, UK Prime Minister emphasized that it was the intention of UK to enter
ECM if her British and Commonwealth interests could be safeguarded.
British application for membership met stiff opposition from the former French President de-Gaulle. After
many conferences and much bitterness when it seemed that agreement was about to be reached the ECM
denied admission. Because of the outspoken desire of USA that UK should join the market there was
widespread feeling that de-Gaulle’s snub to Britain was really intended to be one for the US because he
was opposed to expanding US influence in Europe. It was because of antagonism to outside influences that
de-Gaulle was opposed to economic co-operation with U.K and ultimately to US.
The first stage of the new British initiative was a meeting in London of the members of EFTA (including
Finland) on 5th December,
1966 Mr. Wilson emphasized the importance of maintaining the closest relations with EFTA countries.
The next stage was the visit of Mr. Wilson and Foreign Secretary George Brown to EEC countries for
discussion with governments. During talks with the French president, prime minister Wilson told him that
THF. F.I ROHEAN COMMUNITY
95
technological co-operation with France could only continue if Britain entered the Common Market.
In November 1967 Great Britain again tried for admission to the European Market but again she had to face
de-Gaulle’s firm refusal. General de-Gaulle said that France would refuse to open negotiations on the issue
and that France would rather break-up the community than be overruled. He repeated that London could
not qualify for full membership without a radical transformation in its economic political policies.
After de-Gaulle’s death in 1969 the prospects of Britain’s entry became bright. Three other European
countries Ireland, Denmark, and Norway, had also applied for the membership of the European
Community. Since October 1969 the meetings of ECM were continuously held. Various points were settled
among new candidate countries. At last a resolution was passed in March 1970 by the Council of the
European Community on the accession of these candidate countries. Again economic and political
consequences of the accession of the above-mentioned countries were discussed by the community
members in various meetings. At last, treaties of accession were signed on January 22, 1972 in Brussels.
EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY (EURATOM)
Europe is deficient in energy. Its vast Modern industry can usefully apply atomic energy for industrial
production on a large scale. Simultaneously with the establishment of EEC the original 6 members of the
community also signed a treaty called ”EURATOM” with a purpose to pool their resources for peaceful
uses of the energy released by nuclear fission. On their accession to EEC the four new members also signed
the ”EURATOM” on January 22, 1972 in Brussels.
OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
As for Council Voting Methods within the ECSC Treaty it was not necessary to modify the provisions
concerning unanimity, but the majority of 5/6 foreseen in Article 95 (concerning ”al petite revision”) was to
be increased to 9/10 of Council members.
Where the ECSE Treaty required a confirmative opinion from the Council, the opinion was considered
carried if the proposal of the High Authority gained the agreement of:
(a) The absolute majority of the member states including the votes of two of them representing each at
least one-eighth
96
INTERNATIONAL VFFAIRS
of the total value of Community coal and steel pro-culture five equal steps of 20% on December 31 each
year from
1973 to 1977. From December 31, 1974, a flexibility clause may by applied of up to 10% of the particular
alignment to be made.
(b) Or, if the voting is equally split and the High Authority maintains its proposal after a second
deliberation, the vote of three member states representing each at least oneeighth of the total value of
Community coal and steel production.
Other Council decisions were taken by simple majority including two member states representing each at
least one-eighth of the total value of Community coal and steel production.
Rotation of the office of President of the Council was to be in alphabetical order of member states as
expressed in their respective languages (Belgique-Belgie, Denmark, Deutsch-land, France, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg. Netherlands, Norway and United Kingdom). Their order of presidency would operate, as
from January 1973, with Belgium in the Chair.
THE MAASTRICHT TREATY
Twelve countries of Europe signed a treaty at Maastricht in December 1991 envisaging a more United
Europe. The treaty reflected an ambitious plan for economic, monetary and political union on the part of
the member states. The implementation of the treaty was made conditional with the ratification of the same
by the member countries during the year 1992. Though the treaty got ratified in almost all the countries, the
votes against the ratification have such huge proportions as can hardly be ignored. The enthusiasm which
had characterized the Maastricht Treaty fizzled out but it did not mean that the ambitious plan of European
Monetary Union (EMU) and European Political Union (EPU) had come down to earth. The recession in the
early months of 1993, however, dwindled its pace.
THE PROGRAMME
The Maastricht Treaty envisaged the unification of the key elements of Europeans’ strength. The treaty
called for the achievement of three goals.
(i)
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
THE EUROPEAN COMMlMTV
97
(ii) The European Political Union (EPU)
(in) The Establishment of the European Commission
Let us take up these proposed arrangements one by one.
(1) THE EMU
The EMU according to the treaty was to develop over three stages.
(a) Till 1994 the EMU was to strengthen the fixed exchange rate parity of the currencies through the
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)
(b) Phase-II would promote the convergence of monetary and fiscal policy among the EC-12.
(c) On the successful fulfilment of the Phase-II, the phase-Ill would establish by 1999 a central bank and a
joint currency, a modified version of today’s European Currency Unit (ECU).
(2)
THE EPU
Under the EPU the 12 countries were to harmonize their foreign policy interests and to give the community
a voice in international affairs by establishing a common foreign and security policy which would
eventually lead to a common defence policy.
(3) THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The third leg of the plan was to establish a European Commission in Brussels which would work as EC’s
executive and administrative body regulating public health, education, agriculture and environmental
policies. Thus the EC countries were to transfer portions of their national powers to the EC’s centralized
agencies.
TOWARDS EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The fears that once drove the cause of European integration are dissipating. The return of authoritarian
regimes is no longer too serious anywhere. Armed conflict between the state of Europe is now more and
more difficult to envisage. Integration now will move forward on its own merits and perceived benefits.
98
THE El ROPEAN COMMUNITY
99
European Union (EU) upto the Maastricht Treaty encouraged member states to go much further. Many
governments ignored public support for the major reforms contemplated. Public irritation was cleverly
shifted on to the shoulders of an ”unfeeling bureaucracy” in Brussels. Europe has begun to address
problems of decentralisations by accepting ”subsidiary” i.e. devolution even to sub-national levels.
As integration proceeds it has become necessary for the constituent state to surrender more and more
sovereignty to the EU. Maastricht not only provides for common currency, but also for common security
policy and a common policy on internal and judicial matters. To do this in a region, where the nation state
originated, requires time and effort and adequate acceptance from the general public. An integrated system
of this nature requires a more effective decision-making machinery than that provided by committees of
ministers and officials trying to reach a consensus. However, the provision in the Maastricht for qualified
majority voting, and giving the European Parliament a greater role will only be gradually accepted. Europe
is destined to become a loose federal state rather than a confederation of sovereign states. The first major
reform envisaged is the monetary union (EMU) and the common currency. Prior to implementation certain
criteria on the acceptable levels of budget deficits, inflation and national debt were met. Just then the world
moved into a state of recession and, attaining the criteria, became politically costly. Fortunately, there is
now greater acceptance that the European economies need reform in their own interest.
Integration has to go hand in hand with enlargement. It is now accepted by all that the EU will eventually
embrace all the countries of Eastern Europe, and the Balkans except for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The
time-table will depend on the capacity of the applicants to reform their economies, the capacity of the EU
to provide inputs required to further upgrade those economies, and radical changes in the common
agricultural policy. The first entrants before the end of the decade would probably be Poland, Hungary,
Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Baltic states could come in at the same time, or a little later. The
remaining countries in the Balkans could not join before the decade 2000 to 2010.
Tfee material attraction of closer association with the EU is also growing around the Mediterranean.
Cyprus and Malta could gain full membership soon. Turkey may have to wait longer because of Greek
opposition, and concern over her domestic politics. Apart from increasing economic exchanges, the number
of North Africans, working all over Western Europe have increased steadily. This demographic pressure
will continue until faster economic development picks up in the Maghreb countries. Hence the enlargement
agenda must focus South as well as East.
I, -t-
The old EEC relied on Franco-German leadership for policy direction. France’s economy has recently
declined. Germany is therefore the region’s major economy. In Europe, the leadership of Chancellor Kohl
was unquestioned, unlike that of Chirac and Juppe. Germany is anxious for faster European integration to
which Benelux states, Scandinavia, Austria, Sweden and Finland agree. Italy, Spain and the remaining
members want to go along with the majority for the sake of their economies. So the centre of gravity of EU
will shift eastward to Central Europe.
Foreign affairs and security were dominated for long in Europe by the Cold War. Hence it was NATO that
took primacy in coordinating these policy areas. The Americans who dominated here carried a higher
burden of the actual defence efforts. Today, most West Europeans cannot really function outside NATO as
their systems are too integrated with it. The US thus continues to have a principal role in European security
even though the Cold War has ended. But while the Americans are not averse to providing leadership, they
would rather not provide the ground forces. Events in Yugoslavia indicate the pitfalls of this duality.
Paradoxically, there seems to be no serious tension between states in the European system. The quite
arbitrary redrawing of national frontiers at the end of World War II could have caused strong pressures for
redressal after the collapse of the Soviet empire. In fact the German and Polish people have ratified their
present frontiers and so have most other states. It is difficult to control ethnic pressures only within nations.
Former Warsaw Pact members like Poland and Hungary (and the Baltic states) are as anxious to become
members of the NATO as they are of EU, since they still harbour fears of Russia. Russia has its
reservations about NATO coming right to its borders.
Thus we may say that the idea of European integration may continue to face challenges both from within
and without Europe and the member countries, unless they stop submitting to conservative economic
financing, and devise a common foreign policy outlook towards regional and international issues, all efforts
towards a greater, viabte unity will remain unrealized.
ADVENT OF EURO CURRENCY
The brain wave of something like Euro was first heard of in 1969 when the Monetary Union was first
adopted by Europe. In 1970 two Britons
- Roy Jenkins, the then Commission President and Kenneth Clark, the then Chancellor of Exchequer -
revived the idea of single currency. The 15member European Union has decided to introduce single
currency.
100
(i Union have signed the Euro Although all the members of the European p^n& made by th”e l j members
Document the initial entry into Euro era is bej^leaged by ,he Euro heads after out of 15, according to the
joint statement rel 1993 their meeting in Brussels held on May 1 - 2, 1?
of currency - was named in
The ’Euro’ - Europe’s new unit d january oi, 1999. However, it December 1995 and came into existence on
J”[Untji 2002. existed side by side with national currencies ui*
,ie into general circulation until Euro notes and coins did not come ’^y of ^ EMU zone from July
January 2002, and it became the only currend,h as me Dutch guilder> German
01, 2002. At this stage other currencies, such ’er mark and French franc sease to be legal tended
,JMU) is a single currency area
Economic and Monetary Union (EN^ which peopie) goodS; services within the European Union single
market in and capital move without restrictions.
»dent central bank and legal
It is supported by an independ*^tes to pursue sound economic obligations on the participating

member stat) jy policies to coordinate these policies very clos^
ps of the EMU are laid down in The rules, institutions and objectives’
the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.
i will be the arbiter of monetary The European Central Bank (ECB) V^Q ^ ECB is controlled by a
policy in the ENU-zone from January 1999 is modelled on its German Governing Council, and in
many ways every other Thursday, just like predecessor, the Bundesbank. It even meets d the
Bundesbank currently does.
|he eleven participating member In May 1998 the governments of th-i President and me four other
states appointed the President, the Vice-P^ ^^ appointment of June 01, members of the Executive Board of
the ECB.
1998 marked the establishment of the ECB.
jwhich will set interest rates in The ECB’s Governing Council, wl^.utive Board _ presided over by
Europe, consists of six members of the Execyal banks m me j j participating Wim Duisenberg - and the
heads of the centr1 liticaj {jes countries. The ECB is to be independent of pd’
,int till December 31, 1998 - on The ECU - Europe’s unit of accourf on a one.for.one basis. But the
January 01, 1999 was replaced by the ECU d

101
ECU is not currency. It reflects changes in a basket of currencies such as French Franc and German mark.
The final ECU exchange rates of December 31, 1998 were adopted by the European Council on January 01,
1999 as the irrevocable conversion rates for the Euro participating currencies. Eurolan or eurozone - the
eleven countries which have introduced the Euro on January 01, 1999 have a combined population of
almost 300 million, and gross domestic product of around $ 6,500 billion.
Euroland countries are; Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
There are four European Union countries not participating in EMU, and therefore outside Euroland. These
are Britain and Denmark, which chose not to join EMU at the first opportunity. They can join at a later date
- if they satisfy the economic criteria.
The other two non-Euroland countries are Greece and Sweden. Greece failed all the criteria for EMU entry,
and Sweden failed entry requirements due to its volatile currency. Sweden and Greece are committed to
joining EMU when conditions allow, and their economies meet the economic criteria.
EMU criteria-countries wishing to join EMU must fulfil several economic conditions before they do so.
These are:
(1) Their inflation rate should be within 1.5 per cent of the rate in Euroland.
(2) Their exchange rate should be stable in relation to the Euro, their government debt must be less than 60
per cent of GDP.
(3) Their annual budget deficit must be below 3 per cent of their GDP.
HELMUT KOHL’S EXIT IN GERMANY
Gerhard Schroeder’s defeat of Helmut Kohl marks the end of an era for Germany, for Europe, for the
Atlantic community. Mr. Kohl has been a fixture on the scene for so long that it is hard to imagine the West
without his bluff, hearty presence.
102
The pundits will say that he should have gone out on a high note after the unification of Germany. Perhaps,
but that would not have been Helmut Kohl. Historic, a step as it was, for him, German unification was a
milestone on a mission with an even more ambitious objective. He believed deeply in the European Union,
in embedding that the paroxysms of the past would never be repeated.
The achievement of a common European currency was a key step in that process. It would require
overcoming significant domestic opposition to the abandonment of the Deutsche mark, and Mr. Kohl was
unwilling to leave such a crucial element in his strategy to chance or to a successor.
Much of the current structure of the West shows the imprint of Mr. Kohl’s strategic vision. It is composed
of three principal elements: standing up to the Soviets as a staunch NATO ally, unifying Germany and
integrating Europe.
For starters, however, there are a few principles the European leaders might want to consider. The first, as
they should know by now, is that the cost of inaction is much higher than that of leadership. The second is
that chaos in Russia will make itself felt in ever greater insecurity in Western Europe. The third is that,
knowing the nature of western Europeans, EU enlargement will not an optional extra. And the fourth is that
Solana will have a voice in Washington only in so far as Europe shows it can punch its military weight.
DEBATE ON EU CONSTITUTION
Owing to the growing unilateralist tendencies in world politics and emerging regionalism in the
international political economy, the European Union has embarked upon changing from an economic
talking shop into a major world power. A single unanimous constitution for the EU is necessary to improve
its efficiency in asserting itself as a strong unified block.
A draft constitution of 59 articles, has been prepared by a 13member presidium headed by former French
President Valary Giscard d’Estaing in June 2003. The draft was presented to the EU Summit in Greece, and
a heated debate on various clauses of the draft constitution continued till the end of the year 2003. Some
important points of the draft constitution are as under:
The draft text, in its present form, avoids committing itself to some of the most controversial issues, such as
whether there should be a new
N 103
president of the Council of EU member stiles. It also a
time period for the post of EU’s foreign mister. âvoids specifying the
The draft constitution provides foil common
policy. Article 15 says, ”The Union’s competence iri , security and foreign foreign and security policy shall
cover-all areas of fo. matters of common questions relating to the Union’s security, including the ^>reign
policy and all of a common defence policy, which mightbdto a conv progressive framing
i defence.
The nature of European Parliament is covered k

says that ”The European Parliament shall’« directly %^ under article 19. It suffrage of European citizens in
free and secret ballov elected by universal years. Its member shall not exceed seven hi^t for a term of five
Representation of European citizens shall kdigressive^ndred in number, a minimum threshold of four
members per member stauoty proportional, with the European Parliament will be elected fai term of fiC «•”
The president of its members. ê years from among
The composition of European Council is provi%
The European Council’s status is cardinal ace it compêd under article 20. state or governments of the
member states together w\îses all the heads of the president of European Commission. TkEU foreig\^th its
president and participate in the meetings of the European CouncilAn minister shall also European Council
is to provide necessary impetus to L\ The main task of related activities and defines its general
politicaldirectio\ ni°n’s development qualified majority shall elect the European Council’s pr^ns and
priorities. A two and a half years, renewable once. Theperson elec^sident for a term of been for at least two
years, a member of ttt European ê<3 must be, or have gives the meaning of qualified majority, It says, ”
Council. Article 24 Council or the Council of Ministers takes decision hyphen the European such a
majority shall consist of the majority of members qualified majority, at least three-fifths of the population
of theUiion”. states, representing
The most significant institution ofEU, the Eu\
shall consist of a president and upto to fourteen otK opean Commission Commission shall be completely
independent in êr members. The responsibilities. The Commission’s merntes shall n^. carrying out its
instructions from any government or any olker body, $ther seek nor take shall submit a list of three persons,
of whoiat least onvâcn member state whom it considers qualified, to be a European C<v must be a
woman, president of the commission is empowered to select t .tarnissioner. The Commission of his own
choice from the siitoiitted nany>e members of the not necessary that each member country has its re\^s. It,
is therefore, Commission. Presentation in the
104
The Union’s foreign minister, under article 27, is appointed by the European Council with qualified
majority and with the agreement of the Commission’s president. He shall conduct the Union’s common
foreign and security policy. The foreign minister of EU is necessary to be one from the vice-president of
the Commission.
The draft constitution does not discuss the issue of rotating EU presidency. The presidium, ab-mitio, came
out with the proposal for a permanent EU presidency. But after stiff opposition from the smaller states, the
idea seems to have been diluted.
Benelux countries want to retain the current system of rotating the Union presidency every six months. But
Britain and other big countries believe this would weaken their concept of the full-time presidency.
There is a lot of differences among the members of EU on the draft constitution. Germany, England,
France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg - all want the Giscard’s draft to be the basis of the
new constitution. But majority of smaller nations are fighting for securing changes in the draft constitution.
A poll showed that 80 percent of British people were concerned that the constitution will erode their
sovereignty. At the EU’s 2000 Nice Summit, Spain and Poland were given greater voting strength as
compared to their population proportion. But the new draft constitution provides for qualified majority,
cutting the present voting strength of Spain and Poland, which is not acceptable to them. Germany and
France have warned to veto the new constitution unless Madrid and Warsaw accepted a downgrading of
their voting status. On the other hand Germany and France being the biggest states in terms of population
will, as feared by smaller states, influence the decisions of the EU.
Christian democrats bitterly lamented the absence of any reference to God or Christianity in the draft
constitution. A small majority of Eurosceptics agreed the draft had given birth to a ”European Super state”,
despite new rules that will, for the first time, give national parliaments a chance to block intrusive
legislative proposals from Brussels. Fervent federalists deplored the retention of national vetoes in sensitive
policy areas and what many saw as weakening of the super national European Commission.
Smaller nations are also opposed to the European Commission consisting of only 15 members. They
contend that each country should be able to send a commissioner to Brussels. There are disagreements
THE EIJROICAN CQOMMl MTY
105
regarding the ite and status of the first EU foreign minister. The European Commission isdso struggling
that the new Council’s president will not become a rivalif the Commission’s president.
Disagffiment: is also present among the EU members on the question of wkther t»o wait for the other
countries to join the drive for Common Euraean fMilitary and Security system away from NATO, initiated
by fe\inajor .EU countries recently.
The tils on tfhe draft constitution, started in October 2003 among the EU membes, fell aspart in December
over a row about voting rights that pitted France ari Gerfnany against Spain and new entrant Poland.
Madrid and Warsaw bdk resisted changes that would diminish, voting rights agreed under the Nice Treaty”
in 2000 that gave their countries almost the same ;> weight as muclkrger .countries like Germany and
Francfe.
The Gmian «Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder warned that failure to reach a deal cated ’the risk of a ”two-
speed” Europe, in which some countries movtJ aheacd with integration in a range of areas faster than the
EU as a whole But eWen then, he said, both Germany and France remained committed to uegratiion within
the EU. Having failed to meet their selfimposed end-213 dea< dline to finalize the new EU constitution, EU
leaders are now hoping’!) secure agreement by the end of this year (2004).
EU ENLARGEMENT
As inpeviouis centuries, expansion did not stop at the borders of the European atinentt: European countries
crossed the oceans in search of fertile land andn ordiler to take part in international trade. In this century
instead of Europe, Euroopean Union is expending as a powerful political and economic bloc toy 1,. 10
more countries enter the European Union after a long and torruoii proceess of negotiation.
The Eyiopearti Union originally consisted of six member states. It has since grownto 25 rfmember states,
and even more states plan to join: two new members u2007 i.e Bulgaria and Romania with even more after
that. All in all a uniaof mcpre than 30 states is fully within reach. This process is known as the Ejtopearn
integration. In order to join the Union, a state needs to fulfill the ©nomiic and political conditions generally
known as the Copenhagen crtria (alfter the Copenhagen summit in June 1993).
The Bropearin Union or EU is a supranational organisation of European courties. T^he Union was
established under that name by the
106
Treaty on European Union (commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty) in

1992. However, many aspects of the EU existed before that date through a series of predecessor
organisations, dating back to the 1950s.
Romania have been recommended to join the EU on January 1,

2007. These dates were firmly set at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 and confirmed a year later at
Brussels on June 18, 2004. The country reports of October 2004 also confirmed the January 1 2007 date of
accession for both Bulgaria and Romania. However, before becoming a full member Romania must fulfill
all its outstanding promises and reforms agreed during the negotiation phase. A safeguard clause has been
included that gives the EU the possibility of delaying entry to Romania (and Bulgaria) for one year if
commitments made by these countries are not met. It is believed that Romania’s accession is more likely to
require such a delay than Bulgaria’s.
Bulgaria is set to join the EU in 2007. Bulgaria has already taken steps to integrate itself with the EU,
including unilaterally linking its currency to the Euro (Lithuania and Estonia also did this before entry). It
closed entry negotiation talks in June 2004 and received confirmation from the EU that it would join in
2007 as planned.
The European Union’s activities cover all policy areas, from health and economic policy to foreign affairs
and defence. However, the nature of its powers differs between areas. Depending on the powers transferred
to it by its member states, the EU therefore resembles a federation (e.g. monetary affairs, agricultural, trade
and environmental policy), a confederation (e.g. in social and economic policy, consumer protection,
internal affairs), or an international organisation (e.g. in foreign affairs). A key activity of the EU is the
establishment and administration of a common single market, consisting of a customs union, a single
currency (adopted by
12 of the 25 member states), a Common Agricultural Policy and a Common Fisheries Policy.
On 29 October 2004, European heads of state signed a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, which
is currently awaiting ratification by individual member states.
The EU has no official capital and its institutions are divided between several cities:
Brussels is the seat of the European Commission and of the Council of Ministers and hosts the committee
meetings and some plenary sessions of the European Parliament. Since the most recent enlargement of the
EU, Brussels now also holds all European Council summits. Thus it is often regarded as the de facto capital
of the EU.
107
1
I
Strasbourg is the seat of the European Parliament and is the host for most plenary sessions. It is also the
cradle of the historical institutions of the ”large Europe” (Council of Europe, European Court of Human
Rights), with which the EU cooperate.
The European Court of Justice and the Parliament’s secretariat are based in Luxembourg.
A state is an organized political community occupying a definite territory, having an organized
government, and possessing internal and external sovereignty. Recognition of the state’s claim to
independence by other states, enabling it to enter into international agreements, is important to the
establishment of its sovereignty. The ”state” can also be defined in terms of domestic conditions,
specifically the role of the monopolization of the legitimate use of force within a country.
The state, the basic political unit of the world since the sixteenth century, has been giving way to
supranationalism in the form of world and regional organizations such as the European Union. European
Union consist of the combination of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech. Republic Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
EU FUTURE STRATEGY
The European Union has a tendency to enlarge regionally with a marked exception being the Greek
integration. At present the EU is very interested in the Balkans and their integration. After that it is likely
that Turkey would be the next focus. As Heather Grabbe of the Centre for European Reform put it,
”Belarus is too authoritarian, Moldova too poor, Ukraine too large and Russia too scary for the EU to
contemplate offering membership any time soon.” .With Ukraine’s recent (2004) ”Orange Revolution” and
Georgia’s recent (2003) ”Rose Revolution” which have led to reform programmes, however, there may still
be an open door for both Ukraine and the South Caucasus.
BALKANS
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (which disintegrated into the states of Bosnia Herzegovina,
Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Macedonia, Croatia and Slovenia) was reasonably close to applying to
join the EEC at the end of 1980s - it was already on a higher level than some member countries like Greece
and Portugal. However, it was still a non-
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IM ER.NATIONAL AFFAIRS
democratic communist state, though with a relatively benign regime when compared with Soviet satellites.
The civil war stopped the integration.
Albania, also a Balkan state, was for a long period under international isolation similar to that of modern
day North Korea and very impoverished.
At the Thessaloniki summit of 2003, the integration of the western Balkans was set as the next major goal
of future EU expansion. A further meeting in Mamaia, Eastern Romania, concluded that Serbia and
Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Republic of Macedonia, and Albania are considered likely to join the
EU between 2010 and 2015 depending on their fulfillment of the adhesion criteria.
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
Republic of Macedonia applied to become an official candidate on

22 March 2004. The EU will probably reply on whether the accession negotiation will start in 2005.The
country will probably have to resolve its disputes with Greece (over the name Macedonia), or at least
reduce them, before talks can begin. The republic also faces an Albanian problem similar to Serbia’s,
although it still maintains sovereignty over all its territory. Macedonian officials have suggested that it
could join between 2010 and
2015.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Bosnia and Herzegovina still has many economic as well as political problems. Recently it has been
making a slow but steady progress, so the outlook is good.
The Union may show some leniency regarding its economy due to the political issues at stake. Romano
Prodi has stated that Bosnia has a chance of joining the EU soon after Croatia, somewhere around 2010, but
that it is entirely dependent on local progress and that it may be delayed until 2014 or even later.
SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO
Serbia and Montenegro may join separately because of economic disputes between the two republics,
which still have to settle the decision of whether to continue in a union (around 2006).
Serbia has to deal with the ethnic tensions in the region of Kosovo as well as poverty in the south of Serbia
and widespread corruption. Montenegro is having ecological problems and problems with law and crime.
Serbia and Montenegro started the reform process in 2000.
THE EUROPEAN COMMl MTV
109
The European Commission and the government of Serbia and Montenegro are currently planning to
prepare the country for joining in
2012, together with Bosnia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. ALBANIA
Albania’s accession to the Union depends on its economic improvement and resolution of border disputes.
Given its comparatively recent engagement with Western European politics, it is impossible to predict
when it may join but it hopes to do so within a decade. Its entry has been set as a priority by the European
Commission so as to stabilise the Balkans. It hopes to join with the rest of the Balkans between 2010-2015.
SWITZERLAND
Switzerland took part in negotiating the EEA agreement with the EU and signed the agreement on 2 May
1992 and submitted an application for accession to the EU on 20 May 1992. A Swiss referendum held on 6
December 1992 rejected EEA membership. As a consequence, the Swiss Government decided to suspend
negotiations for EU accession until further notice, but its application remains open. The popular initiative
entitled ”Yes to Europe!”, calling for the opening of immediate negotiations for EU membership, was
rejected on March 4, 2001). The Swiss Federal Council (which is in favour of EU membership) had advised
the population to vote against this referendum since the preconditions for the opening of
negotiations had not been met. It is thought that the fear of a loss of neutrality and independence is the key
issue against membership among eurosceptics. EU membership however continues to be the objective of
the government and is a ”long-term aim” of the Federal Council. The Swiss federal government policy has
recently undergone substantial U-turns in policy, however, concerning specific agreements with the EU on
freedom of movement for people, workers and areas concerning tax evasion have been addressed within the
Swiss banking system. This was a result of the first Switzerland-EU summit in May 2004 where nine
bilateral agreements were signed. Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, said the
agreements ”moved Switzerland closer to Europe.” President Deiss said ”We might not be at the very
centre of Europe but we’re definitely at the heart of Europe”. He continued, ”We’re beginning a new era of
relations between our two entities.”
NORWAY
Norway, like most other Scandinavian states, is reluctant to surrender sovereignty to a supranational entity.
The Norwegian government also wishes to keep control of fishery resources in their territorial waters.
Norway has applied twice for EEC and EU membership, but the two referenda on the issue in 1972 and
1994 were lost by the government. In
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late 2004, Prime Minister Kjell Magnc Bondevik suggested that the debate about joining the EU might be
restarted in 2007.
ICELAND
Iceland has never applied for EU membership but is already associated with the union through the EEA
where it has access to the Single market, Iceland is also a member of the Schengen treaty.Fear of losing
control over the fishery resources in its territorial waters is the single largest issue keeping Iceland reluctant
to join the EU.
LIECHTENSTEIN
Liechtenstein, is (like Norway and Iceland) a member of the European Economic Area. It might consider
joining the EU if Switzerland joined. If it attained membership it would be by far the smallest member state
of the European Union -- this might require a significant rearrangement of voting arrangements in the
European Parliament.
THE CAUCASUS STATES
These states have been the site of much conflict in 1990s. Currently, there seems to be an overwhelming
feeling of hope in the region’s future. Their membership in the EU would be controversial as they are often
considered to be politically in Europe but not geographically. They have contributed to European culture
and the EU has been said to express interest in their integration and the hope to end war in Europe and
increase prosperity.
The Caucasus states are, however, closely linked with Russia and would need to concentrate more on their
European partners to attain candidate membership. It is unclear as to when they may join but they are part
of the EU Neighbourhood policy and are often referred to as part of ”a wider Europe”. Since their only land
contact with existing EU states is through either Russia or Turkey, it is possible that they could only join
after Turkey did so. Greece, a member since 1981, has no land links with the rest of the EU, and will not
until both Romania and Bulgaria have joined, though Greece is considerably closer to the rest of the union
and unencumbered by powerful neighbours like Russia in between.
GEORGIA
Georgia has recently undergone substantial reforms. Under Georgia’s new president Mikhail Saakashvili,
the wish to join the EU has been explicitly expressed on several occasions and the links to the EU and the
USA are being strengthened. Disputes continue over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In Ajaria, the
authoritarian leader Asian Abashidze was forced to resign in May 2004.
THE EUROPEAN COMMINITV
111
Georgia is the most favoured Caucasus country to join the EU, but territorial disputes and corruption are
still an issue. It has not, as yet, applied for EU membership, but the President has said the country would be
ready in three years’ time-however, it is uncertain if the EU would be. It is debatable whether any estimate
on a membership date can be made at this stage. ARMENIA
Armenia is still in conflict over the disputed area NagornoKarabakh with neighbouring Azerbaijan. A ten
year ceasefire has been in place, but tensions are high, and with Azeri military spending on the increase,
there is fear a war could be at hand. The country’s economy is growing, but at an incredibly slow pace.
Foreign investors are said to be extremely wary. Armenia is also in the embarrassing position of losing
20% of its population in recent years to hopes of a better life abroad.
Whilst Armenia shares European culture, it has not expressed the wish to join the EU, although public
opinion suggests the move for membership would be welcomed. It will have to resolve disputes and battle
corruption. The Metsamor nuclear power plant, which is sited some 40km west of the Armenian capital
Yerevan, is built on top of one of the world’s most active seismic zones and so would have to be closed for
any contemplation of their joining. Recently Armenia has told the EU they will not close the plant, which
has led to the freezing of 100m worth of aid by the EU and deterioration of the Armenia-EU relationship.
No speculation into Armenia’s dates of membership can currently be made but of all the nations of the
Caucasus it is the least favoured due to fewer natural resources and its close relationship with Russia.
AZERBAIJAN
Azerbaijan is a predominantly Muslim country and is not thought to share a lot with European culture.
Conflict over the disputed area Nagorno-Karabakh would need to be resolved. Its military spending is
becoming somewhat of an alarm to the EU which wishes to ease tensions in the area. The oil-rich country
has made improvements to its infrastructure but much of the money does not seem. tt> find its way into its
fragile economy.
EASTERN EUROPE
Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which are or have been closely linked to Russia, will probably
remain outside the Union, at least for a significant amount of time. All belong to the CIS and planned
furthur integration into an EU-like model would hinder European aspirations. They are not currently on any
enlargement agenda as the Union is currently focused on the Balkan states and Turkey but after this
inevitable
112
enlargement it is probable that they will be the logical next wave of enlargement. A summit in Mamaia,
Eastern Romania, in May 2004 has shown this to be the case, though only Ukraine and Moldova were
present as Belarus is currently not concerned with membership. ( the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy includes
these three states.)
UKRAINE
Most political factions of Ukraine advocate joining the EU and developing ties with Europe. However
many in the EU are more doubtful concerning Ukraine’s prospects. In 2002, EU Expansion Commissioner
Gunter Verheugen said that ”a European perspective” for Ukraine does not necessarily mean membership
in 10 or 20 years, however, that does not mean it is not a possibility. A Ukraine-EU Troika meeting in April
2004. on the eve of the newest wave of expansion, dealt a blow to Ukraine’s European aspiration when the
EU ministers failed to grant market economy status to Ukraine.
For the time being, Ukraine will most likely develop some sort of intermediate relation with the EU as it is
strongly backed by all major political forces in Poland, an EU member with strong historical ties with
Ukraine (through the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth).
The Orange Revolution of late 2004, however, significantly improved Ukraine’s European prospects:
Opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko hinted that he would press the EU for deeper ties, and described a
four-point plan: the acknowledgement of Ukraine as a market economy, entry in the World Trade
Organisation, associate membership with the European Union, and lastly full membership.In a similar way,
the Ukrainian government asked Brussels to give Ukraine a clearer prospect for membership, saying that
”The approved Action Plan reflects only the level of Ukraine-EU relations that we could have reached
before the presidential elections in 2004”
On January 13, 2005 the European Parliament almost unanimously (467 votes to 19 in favour) passed a
motion stating the wish of the European Parliament to establish closer ties with Ukraine with the possibility
of EU membership. Though there is still a long way to go before negotiations about EU membership can
start, the European Commission has stated that future EU membership will not be ruled out.
MOLDOVA
Moldova currently has little hope of joining, since it is not only hampered by poverty but currently leaning
more towards Russia (through the CIS) than the EU and facing political problems in Transnistria. Its
relationship with Romania, which is set to soon become a EU member, has
113
also been strained, with Moldova publicly accusing Romania in various aspects. The prospect of union with
Romania is constantly an issue, even though many people are expecting this not to happen. If Romania
joins the EU, and Moldova unifies with the country later, it could automatically become part of the EU just
as East Germany joined the EU when it reunified with West Germany in 1990.
BELARUS
Belarus is thought to be too authoritarian to join the EU, having been often called the last dictatorship in
Europe. It has a fairly high standard of living in comparison to Moldova and Ukraine, but private business
is virtually non-existent. Foreign investors stay away and even Moscow has shown signs of exasperation in
recent years. If conditions remain the same, it is unlikely that Belarus will ever join the EU.
However, a large Belarusian student group Zubr have linked themselves to Otpor, Kmara and Pora, all
movements which helped to oust rulers in a peaceful revolutionary manner. If dictatorship were replaced by
democracy, as is becoming an increasing trend in countries previously part of the USSR and/or communist,
membership would quite likely be a final aim of the Union as well as the country.
RUSSIA
At present, the prospect of Russia joining any time in the near future is slim.
Under the new voting system proposed in the draft EU Constitution Russia would cause a huge imbalance
within the union due to its large population. It also faces the problem in that its territory is mostly in Asia,
similar to Turkey (although unlike Turkey, most major population centres, and the centres of power, are in
European Russia).
The gap between the rich and the poor is extremely large, the economy needs improvement and corruption
is also a major issue. Added to this the view by some European states that Russia is fueling conflicts in
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria for its own gain make any prospect of
membership very slim.
Russia is also thought to be too authoritarian. Amnesty International and other human rights organisations
have recently declared the Russian press to be controlled. Human rights continue to be an issue and the
suspicion cast on Russia after years of communism is still vast. There are also numerous disputes within the
Federation, especially in Chechnya.
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KAZAKHSTAN
Kazakhstan has a portion of its territory in Europe, but the subject of joining the EU has not been even
remotely discussed.
EUROPEAN MICROSTATES
As for the other very small European microstates, such as San Marino, Andorra and Monaco, it is unlikely
that they will ever join, as their very existence as sovereign nations is tightly bound up with their special
economic laws, which are not compatible with EU standards. In the case of Andorra, however, a future
accession to the EU is not entirely impossible, should either Andorra reform their fiscal system or the EU
reform its stance on interaction with microstates Vatican City is also unlikely to join the EU due to its
unique status.
BEYOND EUROPE
In the Treaty of Maastricht (Article 49), it is stated that any European country that respects the principles of
the European Union may apply to join. No mention is made of enlarging the EU to include nonEuropean
countries, but the precedents with turning off Morocco’s application and speaking about Israel’s closest
integration, ”just short of full membership” show that currently it is impossible for non-European states to
get EU membership.
However, some non-European states have different degrees of integration with the EU stipulated by
agreements, always short of membership. The current frameworks for development of such agreements are
the Barcelona process and the European Neighbourhood Policy.
SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN (MAGHREB) STATES
Tunisia entered into an Association Agreement with the European Union in 11995 which started removing
tariffs and other trade barriers on most goods in the 1998-2008 period. Once the free trade area is fully
functional, the status of Tunisia with regards to the EU will be similar to the present status of Norway and
Iceland. However, no further involvement is planned be yond that point.
Morocco has submitted applications to join the EU several times, but it has been turned down since it is not
considered a European country. Other factors such as the developing economy or unresolved border issues
with several of its neighbours and the occupation of Western Sahara are hindering even adoption of other
policies like those applied to Tunisia (path to closest possible integration without full membership).
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r
ISRAEL
The Israeli government has hinted several times that a EU membership bid is a possibility. It is unknown
whether talks will begin, given the current instability in the Middle East. How Israel’s Law of Return
would interact with the free migration of citizens within Europe is also an unresolved issue.
As in the cases of Tunisia and Morocco, the status of being geographically outside Europe will preclude its
inclusion as full member into the EU as well,
CAPE VERDE
Cape Verde is an island nation of the Atlantic Ocean and former Portuguese colony. On March 2005,
former Portuguese president Mario Scares launched a petition urging the European Union to start
membership talks with it, saying that Cape Verde could act as a bridge between the United States, Latin
America and the EU
The Cape Verde archipelago is geographicaly closest to Africa instead of Europe, but there’s been a similar
situation already: Cyprus is an island-nation closest to Asia instead of Europe, however it’s already
accepted in the EU.
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PART in
CHAPTER 6
RISE OF NATIONALISM ASIA AND THE WEST

INTRODUCTION
In the history of the world, Asia has dominated in the political and the religious fields and this dominance
has declined in the last two centuries. Some students of recent history have felt that Asia is emerging once
again, and is shaking off the shackles of Western dominance under which it had fallen, and is asserting
itself once more as the centre of events. Just as the Arabs held sway over the south of Europe and had
established a civilization known for its grandeur, the resurgent spirit of Asia is likely to have a bright
future. The influence of the Ottoman Turks is visible in many parts of Europe. The old Chinese civilization
reached its peak, when Europe was in a state of barbarism. The supremacy of any nation or civilization, as
history shows, is only a passing phenomenon, and other and better civilizations supersede the old ones. The
West has been dominating for the last two centuries because of its technology, and the process of free
assemblage of new ideas and scientific advancement started with the Industrial Revolution when large scale
improvements in means of transport, agriculture, trade and mechanization were made. The advent of the
modern nation state is also a distinguishing feature of the Western civilization.
Asian nations have suffered from the disadvantage of having no organized structure of states and
governments. These nations have been backward in technology. Their economy is agrarian, and the absence
of mechanized cultivation has hindered their progress. Industrially, many countries of Asia are still
backward, with the exception of China, Korea, Singapore and Japan. During the last 50 years or so, Asian
nations have been emerging from their old difficulties and have established themselves on strong
nationalistic and political basis. They have imbibed progressive , ideas, and efforts are being made on a
vast scale for agricultural and industrial development. The people of Asia have become conscious of their”
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glorious past, and they have started asserting themselves in
affairs. A brief review of the major nations of Asia and their recent i,|; ^
world affairs is given below:
(I)
CHINA
Chinese civilization is very old but as it often happened witli|any civilizations after the Middle Ages it
declined gradually. And by th;|ltter part of the nineteenth century it had sunk to an unimportant pflst|0n.
Chinese ports and trade centres, like Hong-Kong and Shanghai, %e in Western hands. In 1900, there was a
joint military punitive actit, to humiliate China. In 1912 the great Chinese leader. Dr. Sun Yat-Senjave
three principles to his nation:
1. Nationalism
2. Democracy, and /
3. People’s livelihood.
But under the regime of Chiang Kai-Shek, national disintegatjon started. When the Japanese invaded
Manchuria in 1931, the natioinijstic feelings in China became very strong, and during this time a small but
cohesive Communist guerilla force was formed under Mao Tse-Tung for the attainment of national
liberation. The influence of the com%usts increased gradually and because of their sense of purpose, they
gained victories, and in 1949. the leaders of China under Mao Tse-Tung gained full control of the mainland
of China. Most of the States accorded diplomatic recognition to Communist China, but in the United
Nations the new regime was not given recognition and Chiang Kai-Shek who had taken refuge in Formosa,
established a separate government sponsored by the United States. The United States had supplied vast
amounts of aid to the Chiang Kai-Shek regime, and when the Communists came to power the US
Governrnent in sheer frustration did not open a dialogue and could not come to normal relations with the
new regime Soviet Russia had not fully supported Mao Tse-Tung in the struggle but when the Communists
gained control Of the country in 1949 and the United States started backing Chiang Kai-Shek still more
firmly, the Soviet Union forged close relations with Communist China. In 1950, a Soviet Chinese treaty of
alliance was signed, wnich surrendered the Russian rights in Manchuria, and also made arrangements for
military and economic aid. When in 1952 the Korean War started, china went to the help of North Korea
but Russia did not openly intervene in the war. However both the North Korean and Chinese armies
depended on Soviet Union for supplies. Later on differences developed between me Soviet Union and
China over the question of certain border territories an(j the acceptance of Russia to come to a working
arrangement with the United
States for co-existence, and maintenance of peace. Also differences arose due to Soviet policy in
Cambodia. This division in the Communist camp had come to a head, and open clashes occurred between
the representatives of China and Russia in international gatherings and were fully exploited by the United
States. China had become a nuclear power and this perhaps was one of the main reasons why both the
Soviet Union and the USA started fearing an emerging China as a third world power (See Chapter on China
also).
Having become a nuclear power China began asserting itself in the world affairs. China’s foreign policy
agenda has hinged upon the principles of promoting peaceful coexistence with all the countries and
promoting cooperation specially with the Third World.
China supported the independence movements of Asian and African nations and also intervened on
ideological grounds in certain areas of conflict. At internal level, there were efforts to modernise China
keeping within the parameters of an ideologically oriented regime. This also explains in part why China has
succeeded to sustain the effects of disintegration of Soviet Union and still follows the course of national
and international policies alongwith guiding principles set forth by the founding fathers of the republic.
China is fast becoming an economic power as revealed by the statistics showing a sustained and stable
development. With the demise of Soviet Union China is largely viewed as the major protagonist vis-a-vis
the USA in the international politics and certain issues between the two have already figured out thereby
explaining the nature and sources of conflict in the future. The growing Chinese influence in the adjacent
regions i.e. Central Asia, South Asia and South East Asia reflects the future leverage, political and
economic - China may exercise in the course of next few decades.
(II)
JAPAN
Japan lies off the east coast of Asia. It has four main Islands of Honshu, Kyushyu, Hokkaido and Shikoku
and many smaller islands. The major portion of the population professes Buddhism or Shintoism. Before
the Second World War; it included Korea, Formosa and many other islands like Bortin Islands, etc. But as a
result of Second World War, Japan was deprived of her overseas possessions.
Most of her territory is covered with mountains and about fivesixth of her land is not cultivable. But even
then about seventy-five per cent of the national requirement of food is supplied by her agriculture.
119
The imperial dynasty of Japan claims divine origin. It is said that the empire was founded in 660 B.C. by
Emperor Junweu who was a descendant of the Sun goddess. The powers of the emperors were mainly
ceremonial from 1186 to 1867. Until that time the emperors lived in spiritual seclusion while their temporal
powers were exercised by Shoguns. In 1876, the last Shogun abdicated his powers which were acquired by
the then reigning emperor. After that feudal system was abolished and new constitution was announced in
1889 which created two Houses-House of Peers and an elected House of Representatives.
Japan strongly resisted contact with the West until 1853. The opening of Japan to Western commerce can
be traced back to Commodore Perry, who led a squadron into Tokyo Bay in 1854. His purpose was to
Westernise Japan. After that, Japan entered into the field of industry and became a military power. The first
Sino-Japanese War in 1904-05 established the military supremacy of Japan in Asia. As a result of these
wars, Japan acquired Formosa, Korea and the port of Dairen, etc.
Before the outbreak of First World War in 1914, Japan was bound to Great Britain by an alliance which
contained provisions to help each other in the hour of trial. So when war broke out in 1914, Japan sided
with the Allies and declared war on Germany. China remained neutral in this war in the beginning, but she
had to enter the war in 1917 when America also came to the help of the Allies.
The First World War resulted in a Japanese mandate over the former German South Sea Islands-Bismarck,
Marshall and the Carolines.
After the First World War, the economic position of Japan became shaky due to post-war depression and
the earthquake of 1923. Then Japan realized that she could overcome the economic difficulties only by
capturing markets and it was probably one of the reasons for her expansionist policies.
During Second World War, Japanese attack on China led to similar attacks on Britain in the Far East and
on the United States in 1941. She joined Rome-Berlin Axis in 1940 and maintained friendly relations with
Germany. She declared war against the Allies in December 1941 when her aircrafts bombed a major part of
the US fleet in Pearl Harbour. In July
1945, Truman, Churchill and Attlee threatened Japan with complete destruction of Japanese armed forces
unless she accepted the terms of surrender offered by them. She rejected the terms. The war continued. In
August 1945 Russia declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria. She accepted the terms of peace after
the fall of atom bombs on Hiroshima and
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INTERNATIONAL AFF\1RS
Nagasaki on the 6th and 9th August, 1945 respectively The destruction caused by these bombs is
unparalleled in the history of the world Japan signed the terms of surrender in September Meanwhile, US
troops landed in Japan and took over the control
The post-war reconstruction of industry was still very far from complete Her industry had been destroyed
during the war Her trade position became difficult by the loss of her colonies, which \\ ere her main
markets and a source of raw materials But with the United States help amounting to $ 300,000,000
annually, she managed to obtain higher production at low cost Some important steps were taken to
modernise the economy which helped Japan to overcome the crisis
After signing the peace treaties, Japan entered an era of prosperity She developed her industry and raised an
efficient economic system Her export trade has increased Now she enjoys a substantial dollar balance
Because of its highly disciplined, industrious and intelligent people, this nation has been able to create for
itself a very sound economic structure by intensive export trade The present position is that it enjoys the
highest growth rate in Asia Japan’s mam exports are cotton, iron, steel, knitted goods, automobiles,
electronic goods and computers It is one of the world’s largest ship builders But in spite of the industrial
progress, her pre-War problems remain unsolved rapidly increasing population, unemployment, and dearth
of natural resources
Japan’s new Constitution came into force in 1947 In it the Japanese people pledge themselves to uphold the
ideals of democracy and peace It also guarantees fundamental rights and renounces war or use of force for
settling disputes with other nations It has established a Supreme Court and renounced the doctrine of the
divinity of the Emperor It vests legislative authority in the Diet which consists of a House of
Representatives, elected for four years and a House of Councillors, whose term is for six years The lower
House controls the budget and approves treaties with foreign countries Executive authority is vested in the
Cabinet which is responsible to the Diet The functions of the Emperor are purely ceremonial
The constitution of 1947 provided that Japan should never have any land, sea or air-forces But after the fall
of China to communism in
1949, US decided to make Japan a bastion in the chain of defenses Yet Japan has increasingly been
adopting an attitude of neutrality in world politics Imbued with the ideas of nationalism, she has stuck to its
policy of non-imperialism and concentration on economic development In 1950, US persuaded the
Japanese to by-pass constitutional difficulty and create a
RISE OF NATIONAL ISM ASIA \NDlHFV\tST
121
reserve force, equipped with tanks and aircraft The uniformed stiength of its army was 170510 in 1963
ASCENDANCY OF JAPAN
With the end of Cold War, the most significant development in the international politics has been the
emergence of new poles ot power With the traditional dipolar balance of power gnmg way to multipolanty,
the strategic power has conceded its sahance to the economic dimension of power This means that in future
international system, states with economic rather than strategic clout will acquire eminence as far as the
influencing capability on the course of international relations is concerned Japan with one of the most
stable economic systems of the world and its historical sahance as an international power since the Meiji
Revolution in the 19th century, is expected to emerge as a force to reckon m the 21 st century
A theoretical explanation of the hypothesis that Japan may become a power rival to the US hegemony in
the post-Cold War era may be sought in the fact that in the wake of a changing world scenario, two
historical trends have converged in Japan the hegemonic cycle, and the end of history Taking first, the
hegemonic cycle means an international system dominated by one dominant power The present cycle
which began in 1897 is crossing its peak resulting in the decline of the present hegemon the USA, which is
heading towards decline (like the Dutch, the British hegemons, of the early 20th century) due to its
”imperial overstrech” as pointed out by Paul Kennedy The trend that favours Japan to be the incumbent
alternate hegemonic power is the fact that at the decline of each hegemon two incumbents appear with one
of them eventually reducing the previous hegemon to the position of a junior partner with the help of the
other incumbent With Japan and EC collaborating m the economic field are expected to outrace the
Americans while Japan with its stability in economy vis-a-vis EC can be expected to acquire the position
vacated by the US The second trend is the ”end of history” as Francis Fukuyama puts which implies that
the world has had its systemic experiments (capitalism, communism, fascism, socialism etc ) and after the
end of Cold War has settled down with one well-known design of the world order-capitalism (democracy
and free market, the end of military heroism and beginning of a much less glamourous era marked by
economic control, technological advancement etc ) Japan being primarily an economic power qualifies for
the position of a hegemon in a world in which economic sahance has become a centre-piece of post-history
(post-Cold War) life
As far as the functions of a hegemon are concerned the most important one is, leadership with maintenance
of international institutions,
1
122
norms, values, principles and procedures. A hegemon must have the ability to bear the cost of global
leadership which means the taking up of major share in the financing of the international institutions that
run the international system and an ability to respond to the challenges and emergencies arising from the
imbalance in balance of payments, shortage of development capital exchange rates etc. To maintain a
hegemonic posture the incumbent hegemon should have (i) availability of economic resources that a
country can devote to world economic management and (ii) the country’s strategy and ability to lead the
world under normal as well as emergency conditions.
Looking at Japan, it does qualify for the first condition to be ready to assume the posture of a hegemon. Its
economic strength is indicated by the following self-speaking facts.
Japan is world’s largest aid donor with only 0.33% of the GNP and world’s largest net creditor with only 2
to 3% of the GNP allocation every year. Still at this stage the multinationalization of the Japanese firms is
at a lower level from international standards. This means that Japan is the world’s most stable economy and
can increase its economic clout even further.
Japan has also the ability to lead the world for it has got domestic prosperity which can readily be
transformed into a source of power and influence at international system through aid, credits and financing
the poorer economies.
These quantitative indicators of Japan’s economic power however do not accompany the qualitative
indicators of the same strength. The qualitative indicators include the nature and role of leadership and the
perception of influence on the part of those who are being influenced. The qualitative aspect of a
hegemonic posture does not suggest that Japan may become the power to dictate in near future. First the
Japanese leadership is not willing to acquire this posture and even if it does, it will take considerable time
before modalities to transform the economic power into political influence are devised. Two, economic
influence will take time to adopt to this changed concept of power (They are largely living under the old
sets of references like military and strategic power). Three, the declining hegemon, USA can still muster
enough capability to stall Japanese ascendancy in near future. Further, hegemony involves the element of
recognition and right. It is largely uncertain if the legitimacy for a Japanese hegemonic posture will be
available or not.
123
Thus we can conclude that Japan’s power in the wake of new global development is though fairly
established but as long as it is not accompanied by a will and mechanism to dominate, Japan cannot assert
itself in the international system as a dictating power. Economic power is only one of the aspects of
national power and without political will, Japan’s ascendancy will remain only in the economic domain and
not in the overall power structure of the world where complex inputs are involved.
(Ill) PAKISTAN AND INDIA
Detailed analysis of the situation in Pakistan has been attempted in other parts of this book, but a brief
mention must be made here of the main trends of its policy. After the demand of Muslim nationalism was
accepted, though reluctantly, by the British and the Hindus, Pakistan became a sovereign independent
country in 1947 and both India and Pakistan retained links with the British Commonwealth, when they
adopted their separate constitutions. In Pakistan successive governments have pursued the policy of
containment of the expansionist designs of India in particular relation to the burning issue of Kashmir. For
its defence, Pakistan was compelled to forge an alliance with the United States, which continued till very
recently in practical terms. The continued problem of Kashmir however, complicated the situation and
things came to a head in September 1965. When India launched a massive attack against Pakistan. This
attack was successfully resisted, but its ally, USA did not help Pakistan. During the rule of former President
Field-Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan tried to pursue a policy of balance between the three great
powers - the Soviet Union, China and USA. Border questions with China and Burma were successfully
settled, and with India the dispute over the distribution of Indus Basin waters was also amicably settled.
The growing friendly relations between Pakistan and China were looked upon with suspicion by the
Western powers. But the stand of Pakistan government remained firm. Indeed, a hope was expressed that
the continued friendly relations between Pakistan and China-would eventually be helpful in opening a
dialogue between China and the Western powers. Pakistan had been consistently pursuing the policy of
alliance with the Arab and other Muslim countries. In the UN debates on Palestine and on the independence
of African countries, it openly and courageously espoused the cause of nationalism and independence.
After the Israeli attack on Arab countries in 1967 and 1973, Pakistan gave very solid support to the Muslim
countries.
India under Nehru started with neutralism, and tried to assert itself as the spokesman of the newly
independent countries of Asia, but its small neighbours never fully agreed to the Indian claims to leadership
of Asia. As long as its relations with China were good, India was able to exert
124
1NTFRN \TION\I AFFAIRS
considerable influence, but after the capture of Goa by force of arms and the brief Smo-Indian bolder war,
the position of India even among the neutial countries seemed to have dwindled After the war with China,
and with Pakistan in September 1965 India flirted with the West particularly the USA, and it is now
generally recognised that India is no longer a nonaligned country Before India attacked East Pakistan in
1971, she entered into a defence treaty with USSR and received generous military aid which exploded the
myth of her neutrality The Indian policy of coexistence and Pancha-shila received a severe blow after its
conflict with China, and its attitude over Kashmir, Goa and Punjab amply proved that India had forfeited its
claim to the moial leadership of Asia The Smo-Soviet conflict contributed a little to rehabilitate India’s
position, since both the Western and the Socialist blocs had been competing with each other to provide
economic and military assistance to India in order to save it from coming under the influence of Chinese
Communism Both the super-powers planned to present India as an alternative to China in Asian politics,
but this posture was considerably weakened because of the attainment by China of nuclear status and also
because of the change in US attitude towards China and its admission into UN
With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan m 1979 and the revived US aid to Pakistan for military and
economic purposes brought USSR on the side of India and once again both the countries became pawns at
the chess board of Cold War politics The USSR used India to pressurize Pakistan to refrain her from
supporting the Afghanistan Jihad Consequently India and Pakistan came on the verge of war in 1984 (and
again in 1989 on the Kashmir dispute) Indian troubles in Kashmir and East Punjab and counter Indian
covert intervention in Smdh have been destabilising factors in Indo-Pak ties Another added element in the
late 1980s was the issue of nuclear non-proliferation on which the two countries have held diametrically
opposed positions Domestically with the assassinations of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, the charisma forging
unity among various communities in India is gone and there is an emergent revival of Hindu
fundamentalism The evidences to this trend have been provided by the rise of BJP as an electoral power m
the Indiart politics and the sacrilege of the places of worship of other communities at trie hands of Hindu
chauvinists The souring relations between the two countries have also been marred by the unabated arms
race which has risen to the level of concern even for the international powers Another development with
respect to India is the rapprochement between China and India The sources of conflict, chiefly the border
dispute, having been resolved, India hopes to play an even more active role m the affairs of South Asia The
vociferous support of India for SAPTA (South Asia Preferential Trade Area) under the aegis of SAARC
bears ample testification to the Indian designs to become an economic
R1SF OF NATION Al ISM ASIA AND THF \\ FST
125
hegemon, the military hegemon it already is This situation is alaiming for Pakistan whose concerns stem
largely from her eastern neighbours To counter this shifting balance Pakistan is forging close economic and
political proximity with its western neighbours in the Middle East and West and Central Asia Thus it may
be said that though the Cold War at international level is gone, at the South Asian level it continues to
persist and even intensify at different intervals
(IV) INDONESIA
STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
Indonesia is an independent republic comprising thousands of small and big islands, prominent among
them being the islands of Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, Bali and Madura These islands were under the
control of the Dutch from 17th centur> till 1941 when they were occupied by the Japanese Nationalist
movement against the Japanese was very strong in Indonesia The Japanese surrendered m 1945 and Dr
Soekarao, alongwith Dr Hatta, declared Indonesia as an independent republic and formed a government
The Dutch tried to suppress the new government but had to give way It became an independent republic in
1949 after a long and bitter civil war brought about by the obstinate determination of the Dutch to retain
their rule
In 1950, a provisional Constitution was adopted Dr Ahmad Soekarno was declared President, and Dr Hatta
as Vice-President who remained in power till 1956
Indonesia achieved independence after a long struggle and great sacrifices Anti-colonial sentiment was,
therefore, very strong m Indonesia from the very beginning The problem facing this country after
independence w as the establishment of strong central government, because it was very difficult to govern
this country with its huge population, and a chain of islands extending over a distance equal to that from
London to Cairo There w ere scores of races Lack of experience in administration and mass illiteracy
impeded co-operation between the scattered islands The Dutch had always discouraged education As a
result, the country was extremely short of capable administrators just after independence The original plan
for a federation of the United States of Indonesia had to be abandoned because there was no sentiment for
federation Central authorities had often been ignored The country needed strong central government and
leadership
I
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RISE OF SOEKARNO
The first national elections to the House of Representatives were held in September 1955, in which
Communist Party, National Party Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulema obtained a great number of seats. Coalition
government broke down and Dr. Soekarno proclaimed Martial Law in March 1957.
Dr. Soekarno formed a Cabinet with himself as Prime Minister in

1959. He dismissed the House of Representatives in 1960. He was declared life President.
When Federation of Malaysia was formed in 1963, Indonesia opposed it and declared its policy of Crush
Malaysia. Relations between the two countries deteriorated to the extent that Malaysia decided to sever
diplomatic relations with Jakarta. Indonesia refused to recognize the new Federation. In September 1963
thousands of Indonesian students wrecked British Embassy, because of Britain’s support to Malaysia. The
sentiment of hatred against Malaysia was so strong in Indonesia that when Malaysia became member of the
Security Council in 1965, Indonesia lodged a strong protest and decided to quit the United Nations.
Indonesia’s decision regarding its withdrawal from UN was endorsed by the National Supreme Advisory
Council.
THE COUP AND ITS AFTERMATH
The coup which took place in Jakarta on the night of 30th September, 1965, was short-lived. It could not
succeed, but it entirely changed the direction of politics in Indonesia. It is believed, that the attempted coup
was carried out by a group of Army Officers from the Presidential Guard. The involvement of Communists
in the coup was not apparent in the beginning, but the discovery of area used by the Communist
organizations for training purposes and the murdered bodies of six generals arrested during the incident,
seemed to implicate the PKI (The Indonesian Communist Party). By mid-day on 1st October, 1965, the
Army under General Suharto had reasserted its authority in Jakarta. The events of 30th September and 1st
October had however, precipitated a contest for power between the Army and Communists, whose rivalry
had for long formed the background to Indonesian politics. It had generally been supposed, that the real-
power struggle was to be deferred until the President’s death. Rumours of his failing health were thought to
have influenced the timing of the coup. The coup was followed by an anti-Communist campaign of great
violence. Many Communist leaders, including D.N. Aidit, Chairman of the P.K.I., were believed to have
lost their lives in the campaign. It was estimated that about five million people became victims of death
during the coup.
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The political situation in IIU!OIU:MU after the coup was very confused. The balances upon which
President’s authority had rested so far no longer existed now. Although Soekarno asserted again but power
had shifted into the hands of General Suharto. Many political and military decisions were being taken by
General Suharto.
In the meantime, the country’s economic situation took a sharp turn for the worse. The devaluation of the
currency failed to arrest the soaring prices of necessities. Mounting tension amongst the people found
expression in increasing number of demonstrations.
In March 1966, the president signed a decree, delegating executive authority to General Suharto. It was
believed that the president had been presented with an ultimatum to the effect that unless it were given the
necessary authority, the Army could no longer guarantee the security of the situation, nor the President’s
personal safety.
General Suharto after assuming power, banned the PKI and all its affiliated organizations. He also started
purging the cabinet. It was announced on March 15, 1966 that Dr. Subandrio and fifteen other ministers
had been placed in protective custody. Dr. Subandrio was tried by the Military Court and was sentenced to
death. During the proceedings of the Court, it came out that President Soekamo was also aware of the
Communists’ plans.
The anti-Communist campaign was accompanied by an almost equally popular reaction against China.
Attacks by demonstrators on Chinese nationals, property and institutions continued despite a stream of
protest notes from the Government of China.
In the meantime, the ground was prepared for the removal of President Soekamo. Demonstrations against
President were staged. The demonstrators, no doubt had support of the ruling clique. They demanded that
President Soekarno should be tried in court. In the last week of January
1967, General Suharto, Indonesia’s strong man, ordered the Indonesian army to a state of alert, since
documents recently found proved the involvement of President Soekarno in the abortive coup of 1965.
Students Action Front had already demanded, that the dual leadership should come to an end and General
Suharto should become President. The West Java Legislature also joined in the demand for an immediate
ouster of President Soekarno and his trial by an extraordinary Military Court. In February 1967, the
Indonesian Parliament also through a resolution, demanded the removal of President Soekamo.
128 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Meanwhile, it was suggested to Dr. Soekamo that he should delegate his powers to General Suharto, but
Soekamo refused to do so. Then, Suharto was appointed president by parliament.
In mid-1967, pro-Soekarno plots were discovered and foiled. Many high ranking military officers were
involved in it. But General Suharto, being moderate man, did not lend himself to the dictates of blind
political power. With all this simmering and bursting, any other man in his place would have adopted
violent methods to crush the elements. General Suharto was more occupied with the economic problems of
the country which he had inherited from his predecessor.
The Indonesian economy gradually showed signs of revival after

1968. During the year 1968, exports and imports showed a trade surplus of $ 94.949 million. But it had still
to go a long way before it could come out of darkness.
Under the previous regime, confidence of foreign capital was completely shaken, but with the efforts of the
government, the confidence was restored. As a result, many big foreign companies returned. Japan and US
committed themselves to provide one-third of the foreign capital requirements of Indonesia. In February
1968, US Government extended a sixty million dollars aid. In November, Japan gave $ 110 million aid.
West Germany also extended technical aid.
In the field of foreign relations, General Suharto pursued very moderate and cautious policies. He had been
trying to establish cordial relations with all the countries except China. He normalized relations with
Malaysia and Western countries, which were always the target of Soekano’s wrath.
General Suharto tried to put the nation on the road to prosperity. His efforts brought economic stability, and
Indonesia was emerging from its shell of introspection. In 1969, a Five-Year Plan was launched with the
goal of raising Agricultural and Industrial production by 50 percent by 1975. Such strenuous efforts were
paying off in various ways. The economy which grew at an average rate of only 1.6 percent a year between
1960 and
1967, expanded by 5 percent in 1969. Aid from non-communist countries was resumed. Indonesia received
generous foreign aid from USA also.
The result though did not match those figures yet secured a victory for Suharto which meant another term
of presidency upto 1992. During this tenure, President Suharto kept pie-occupied with the relationship
between the presidency and the army. Though he was head of the armed forces, there
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were evidences of discord between army leaders and Suharto over his choice of General (Retd)
Sudhharmono to become vice-president in 1988. There was however a measure of sustained growth in
economy as the real gross domestic product grew by some 5%. In January to July period, the rate of
increase in hydrocarbon exports lagged behind comparable rates in
1987. The start of 1989, however saw increased tangle over the question of political freedom and
repression of the dissident leaders like Sadikin. The increased, demand for respect to human rights and the
waning military influence in regional countries like South Korea and Thailand had left Indonesia
increasingly isolated as an Asian regime born in a coup and still dominated by the army officers. There
were talks in the ranks of armed forces about the possibility of removing Suharto or at least to prevent him
from running for another term. The People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) was called to discuss the New
Order after Suharto in mid-1990. The President however, preempted any threat to his position by wooing
the Islamist elements. A confidential endorsement to Suharto’s candidacy was made public in 1990 with 21
leading Muslim leaders pledging support to Suharto. This endorsement also appeared to be a gesture of
appreciation by Muslim leaders in Indonesia. Suharto’s position was also strengthening by the year 1991
mainly due to two factors; the increasing Japanese investment specially in the promotion of the tourism
industry and the increase in returns from the export of Indonesian oil and gas in the wake of the Gulf crisis.
Still Suharto did not take the next term for granted. His policy of appeasing the Islamic elements brought
fruit when he asked the conglomerates to sell 1% of their shares to cooperatives - whose membership
consisted largely of the Muslims. He also ordered the establishment of Indonesia’s first Islamic Bank.
During the year 1992, the Acehenese and Timorese conflicts strained Indonesia’s external relations with
Malaysia. Malaysia irritated Jakarta by not returning the fleeing Acehenese seeking political asylum.
Moreover, the increased human rights violations brought a degree of disgrace to Suharto regime at the
external level. These developments however, did not debar Suharto from running for another term of
presidency. On March 10, 1993 he was returned for another
5 years in office.
CRISIS AND TURMOIL IN INDONESIA
With country-wide anti-government agitation and food riots having become the order of the day since the
fall of Suharto mid-1998, Indonesia today stands on the brink of anarchy. Once again the student power has
asserted itself to demand an end to the role of the army in politics. This was precisely the mission of the
student protestors who marched peacefully towards the People’s Consultative Assembly building where the
legislators were discussing the badly needed reforms on November 13, 1998.
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The 12-point reforms left the armed forces quota of 75 members in the Assembly intact, together with their
civilian responsibilities at all administrative levels. These were rejected by the masses who are determined
to do away with the supremacy of the military in national affairs,
The composition of the assembly has become the central issue. From Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian
Democratic Party to Amien Rais’ National Foundation to Abdurrahman Wahid’s moderate Nahdatul
Ulema, all with one voice demanded the abolition of the army quota in the legislature and a representative
parliament elected on the basis of one-manone-vote. They want the troops to return to the barracks and
leave the civilians alone. Not too much to ask.
The students and the public were angry over the delay in holding an inquiry into the May 1998 killings of
the general people. Around 1,200 were massacred by the troops and police in their bid to suppress the
prodemocracy movement that eventually swept away the 77-year-old dictator who had ruled Indonesia with
the backing of army for over three decades.
Despite this national consensus on democracy there are divisive undercurrents in the sprawling island
nation that could be exploited by the political adventurers. In September 1998, there emerged in Eastern
Java the masked killers (Ninjas) who killed religious scholars, muezzins and practicing Muslims and burnt
the building of religious seminaries. The killings began in Banyungi and spread to neighbouring regencies
like Jember, Pasuruan, Malang and Surabaya, with the panic-stricken population fleeing to safety.
The army and the police failed to protect the lives of the people, giving rise to suspicions about their
complicity in the heinous crime. For its part the army blamed the politicians for destabilizing the country
but this explanation did not convince the people. Abdurrahman Wahid, Nahdatual Ulema chief, saw in the
orchestrated killing spree an attempt to set his party against Amian Rais, the former chief of Muhammadya.
The outbreak of Muslim-Christian riots in which churches and gambling halls were burnt and six people
were killed on November 22,
1998, portents disintegration of the embattled nation. It is out of character for the tolerant Indonesian
Muslim majority to persecute the religious minority, so it must be the work of agent’s provocateurs that are
inciting the mobs to cause violence. No less dangerous is what seems to be a recrudescence of xenophobia
against the relatively prosperous ethnic
131
Chinese minority that has made a substantial contribution to trade and economy of the country.
If Christian-Muslim riots become widespread in Indonesia, that might be used as a pretext for foreign
intervention then a divided nation may not be able to prevent secession of parts of its territory. Suharto’s
light control and usurpation of the earnings of the provinces has alienated them from the center and
separatist tendencies are gaining ground in Bali, Aech and northern Sumatra and Kalimntan. The
immediate task facing the rulers is to grant autonomy to the provinces in a federal set-up. The apprehension
of foreign intervention in the internal matters of Indonesia proved tp be right when UN intervened, on the
side of East Timores, in their struggle for independence. After the UN peace keepers had arrived in East
Timore in
1999, Indonesia had no option but to declare independence of East Timore.
The national leaders sooner or later will have to face up to the challenge of its ailing economy. In view of
the magnitude of the economic crisis that surpasses even the Great Depression of the 1930s, the political
parties will have to make a concerted effort to rescue the nation from its grip. Three years ago, the number
of people who lived below poverty line was 23 million out of a total population of 200 million; now that
number has reached 80 million. As a result, 47 million people are facing food shortage and the level of
malnutrition is higher than that in Somalia.
President Habibie had failed to restore law and order, improve the economic conditions and restructure the
Constitution in accordance with the democratic norm. Even so, he and the army chief were identified with
the hated old regime. The popular demand was that they must go and hand over power to a caretaker
consisting of the three major parties, namely PDI, National Foundation and Nahdatul Ulema.
In June 1999, the Indonesia Democratic Party of Struggle, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri, received the
largest number of seats in election for the House of Representatives. Megawati is a daughter of Indonesia’s
first president, Sukarno. In October 1999, the Peoples Consultative Assembly (PCA), the body that elects
the president, chose Abdurrahman Wahid as president and Megawati as vice-president. Wahid headed the
National Awakening Party and an alliance of other Islamic parties.
The problem of separatist tendencies continued during President Wahid tenure. Encouraged by the
Indonesia government’s decision to end its claim to East Timor, groups in Acch and Irian Jaya renewed
their calls for independence of their regions. In addition, Christians and Muslims
132
engaged in a series of bloody clashes in the Molucca Islands. In August

2000, in response to criticism of his administration. President Wahid transferred some powers to the Vice-
President Megawati. Megawati later succeeded Wahid as President. The problem of separatist movements
still continues in some areas of Indonesia.
See more on Indonesia in chapter ’Contemporaiy International Issues’
(V)
THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA
Malaysia, a Federation, appeared on the world map on September 16,

1963, extending from the northern borders of Thailand covering Malaya and Singapore to the northern
coast of Borneo.
This Federation was formed of Malaya, Sarawak, Singapore and North Borneo. Singapore and North
Borneo were formerly British colonies. Brunei was also in the Malaysian plan, but later its sultan backed
out and Singapore seceded from the Federation on August 9, 1965. Malaya is politically and economically
dominant, covering an area of 50,700 square miles and has a population of about 7 million. Sarawak is of
47,500 square miles and has a population of 78,400 and the population of North Borneo is
480,000.
On August 31, 1957 when Malaya got independence, Communism was spreading in the neighbouring
colony of Singapore and the basic problem was the political influence of the economically and
educationally strong Chinese population of Malaya. The Chinese accounted for 44% of the population
against 42% Malayas. London and Kuala Lumpur were sure of the political assimilation, assuming that this
majority of Chinese would be loyal to the Malayan Government, rather than to China. The constitution of
the Federation was possible in case of the union of Malaya and Singapore to balance the greater percentage
of the Chinese population, But Tunku Abdur Rehman did not agree to the plan as the Malaya predicted
Chinese dominance. Political supremacy over the Chinese was achieved by federating Sarawak and North
Borneo alongwith Singapore. The constituent units of the new Federation have an average Chinese
population of 42% of the total population.
At first Sarawak, Borneo and Brunei were not willing to join the federation, which was considered to be
based on political and social accommodation. They wanted independence. Sarawak and North Borneo were
compelled to join the Federation under pressure of the United Kingdom and were persuaded by promises of
attaining more political and economic powers than they could ever achieve by themselves. Tunku Abdur
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Rehman offered 70 seats to North Borneo in the Federal Parliament, while Singapore occupied only 15
seats and Malaya 104. But the Sultan of Brunei could not be persuaded to join the Federation.
On July 8, 1963, Britain and four Commonwealth territories, namely Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak and
North Borneo agreed to establish a new-federal union of Malaysia on August 31, 1963, to serve security
primarily and trade to some extent. The British Commonwealth Secretary, Prime Minister Tunku Abdur
Rehman of Malaya, Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore and the political leaders of Sarawak and
North Borneo signed the agreement known as ’London Agreement’ at Marlborough House. Thus Malaysia
was established on September 16, 1963.
INDONESIA AND PHILIPPINES OPPOSED THE FEDERATION

Indonesian attitude became severe, and after the rebellion in Brunei in December 1962, Soekarno opposed
Malaysian Federation openly and announced his policy of confrontation. The Philippines Government
invited the rebel leader Azahris to Manila and encouraged him to continue his activities, who was
afterwards invited by Indonesia to Jakarta. In April
1963, dispute among these three states arose again and again. Soekarno and Lengher agreed to hold a
plebiscite in Malaysian constituent units under the auspices of UNO. On August 2, 1963, Indonesia,
Malaya and the Philippines signed an agreement known as the Manila Agreement, and it was decided to
survey Sarawak only. Afterwards, Indonesia asserted that the rebels were permitted to speak over the
Malayan Radio, but Malaya denied them freedom of broadcast. Thus, there was a conflict between Malaya
and Indonesia.
The Philippines government claimed that a part of North Borneo belonged to the Philippines and could not
join the Federation.
The conflict was tense particularly between Malaysia and Indonesia. These two states are most closely
related in religion, language custom and race but they achieved independence in different ways. Their
political and social aims were different and they were led by statesmen with different training, experience
and temperament. But no such differences existed between Malays and Filipinos. Both of them obtained
independence with the consent of the colonial power and there were close commercial ties between them.
Thus Philippine’s attitude towards Malaysia was not so severe as the Indonesian open threats of attacking
Malaysia during the rule of Soekarno, ex-Indonesian President.
The UN team gave a favourable report of the plebiscite, but Soekarno was not satisfied with that report and
snapped diplomatic relations with Malaysia and started guerilla war on the Borneo border. An economic
confrontation was also begun. While Indonesian attitude was becoming more and more aggressive towards
Malaysia. UK, Australia and New Zealand started giving military aid to Malaysia, which made Indonesia
further intensify its activities against the newly formed Federation.
Malaysian demonstrators stoned the Indonesian embassy at Kuala Lumpur, and on September 17, 1963,
Tunku Abdur Rehman announced the diplomatic break with Indonesia and the Philippines after an
emergency Cabinet meeting. Soon afterwards, Indonesia and the Philippines announced that they would not
recognise the Federation of Malaysia.
On September 18, 1963, Tunku Abdur Rehman, Malaysian Prime Minister, put the Federation on military
alert and a Malaysian Defence Council was established with the Prime Minister as Chairman. On
September 13, 1963, Indonesia banned oil supplies to Malaysia. On September 24, Soekarno started
pressing the economic confrontations policy against Malaysia.
One year after the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia, Lee Kwan Yew began speaking of
socialism as helpful in absorbing multiracialism in the belief that Malaya could achieve a status equal to the
other States through socialism only. Tunku Abdur Rehman came back from London on August 5, 1963 and
talked to Lee. Lee said that the communal attacks should be called off. The same night, a Constitution was
framed at a meeting for Singapore’s withdrawal. So Singapore became independent on August 9, 1963.
In September 1968, relations between Malaysia and Philippines were charged with boiling anger -due to
the Philippines enactment of law incorporating the Malaysian province of Sabah into Philippines. Sabah
had been a part of Malaysia since her inception but Philippines, has always claimed that the province
belonged to her. Although opinion of the people of Sabah was ascertained which was in favour of
Malaysia, Philippines government remarked that the consent was taken under pressure. Due to Sabah
dispute, USA and UK were caught in a whirlpool because they had already recognized the Malaysian
Federation and had extended support for its formation.
The Constitution of Malaysia is based on the old constitution of Malaya, but includes safeguards for the
special interests of Sabah and Sarawak. The Constitution provides that the nine rulers of the Malay states
would elect one Supreme Head, who will hold office for five years. Parliament consists of House of
Parliament and Senate. Elections were first held in 1964 in which Alliance Party got the majority of seats
(89). Again
135
elections were held in 1969 but could not be completed due to disturbances, followed by emergency. The
emergency ended in February 1971.
MAHATIR’S ELECTION TRIUMPH
The following years had not been kind to Mahatir Mohammed, the new Malaysian prime minister. Once
credited as guardian of seemingly unshakable prosperity, he watched helplessly while the country’s
economy sagged under falling world prices for its leading exports, rubber, palm oil and petroleum. Key
associates were widely suspected of misdeeds ranging from stock fraud to misusing government funds.
Islamic fundamentalists stepped up a vocal campaign to impose their own moral code on Malaysian life.
But Malaysia remains South-East Asia’s most supple democracy. And the 61-year-old former physician
reasserted his hold on its reins leading his ruling coalition to overwhelming victory in a general election
hastily called
11 months ahead of schedule.
Before the election, the speculation was that the ruling coalitions led by prime minister’s own United
Malays National Organizations (UMNO) would lose its parliamentary majority. Still even boosters came
nowhere near predicting a landslide victory. When the votes were totalled, UMNO and its allies took 148
out of 177 seats in the new Parliament while PAS managed to retain only its one seat.
For months, amid allegations of corruption and mismanagement within the Barisan Nasional (National
Front), Malaysia’s 13-party ruling coalition, had been chipping away at the popularity of Prime Minister
Dr. Mahatir Mohammed, 60. Mahatir faced other problems as well: the economy was in recession, moves
for his ouster were underway in his own party, and Islamic fundamentalists were agitating to convert the
country into a theocratic state in the image of Iran. Thus, in an affort to ”get on with government,” as he put
it, Mahatir dissolved the parliament on July 20,
1986 and scheduled national elections eleven months before his term of office was to end.
In the 1986 elections the UMNO had emerged as a force to reckon with as far as the politics of Malaysia
was concerned thereby reflecting a consolidated position for Mahatir. But this consolidation of status of the
premier was marred by the split within the party and the resultant conflict between Dr. Mahatir and the
challenger Teng Ku Rozaleigh Hamza in 1987 which was to continue for the next three years to come. This
schism put the ruling coalition in a position of fragile power. The year 1988 saw the problem for the new
UMNO which had arisen out of the division of the party, as to how to maintain the traditional loyalty of the
majority of the
136
Malay community. In the process, it needed to Forestall further defections to the remnants of UMNO led by
Rozaleigh under the banner of Semangat
46. The economic development with a sustained growth at a rate of 7.2% provided some relief to the strife-
ridden party politics of Malaysia during these fateful years. Towards the start of 1990 the National Front
(consisting of 11 parties) also faced serious problems with other members of the coalition. The Malaysian
Chinese Association (MCA) went through its perennial leadership disputes. Another formidable challenge
facing the front was how to maintain the loyalty of party leadership in the Borneo territories and
particularly in Sabah where, prior to the 1990 elections, tension was simmering on arrests of the Sabahans
for seeking to take Sabah out of Malaysia. At the national level in the 1990 elections the Front won 127 out
of 180 seats. UMNO showed its continued dominance of the Malay vote, when in 86 head-on contests it
lost only 8 seats to Semangat 46 and 13 to PAS. The year 1991 saw continued strong growth while
politically it saw the sorting out of the results of the 1991 General Elections. Increase in foreign
investments helped sustain the political handicaps to the ruling coalition. Foreign investment was largely
dominated by Japan, Taiwan, the USA and Singapore but was also accompanied by strong performance by
the domestic investors. Malaysia, since early 1992 had been looking for an active role within the ASEAN.
The revenues from oil and rubber revitalized Malaysian economy to exploit the common economic
arrangement under ASEAN. In the field of foreign policy there were rising tensions between the Malaysian
and Indonesian governments on the question of Timor. Malaysia also resisted vehemently the US desire to
enter into the ASEAN arrangement.
THE ANWER EPISODE: A SHOCK TO MAHATIR’S SUPREMACY
Many months after he was sacked from the government and the ruling party, a lot of people are still
wondering what was the real reason, behind Anwer Ibrahim’s expulsion. Are Anwer’s ’low morals’, as
alleged by the Malaysian Prime Minister and UMNO Party President, Dr. Mahatir Muhammad, the real
reason? Or, is the former Deputy Prime Minister and UMNO Deputy President, the victim of a high-level
conspiracy, as Anwer and his supporters maintain.
To understand Anwer’s dismissal one has to understand the relationship between Mahatir and Anwer. It
was Mahatir who brought Anwer into government, in 1982. It was Mahatir who groomed Anwer,
accelerated his ascendancy within UMNO and exposed him to a variety of governmental roles until he
assumed the mantle of Deputy UMNO President and Deputy Prime Minister. Anwer was indisputably
Mahatir’s heir apparent, though the older man, was instrumental in the younger man’s
137
meteoric rise, Anwer himself, there was no doubt, was an astute politician with a knack, for mass
mobilization and for the intrigues of intra-party maneuvers. Besides, he was also a gifted orator with
tremendous rapport with his followers.
Anwer reciprocated Mahatir’s patronage by giving unstinted support to the latter whenever he was
confronted by a political crisis. From the 1983 Constitutional crisis through the 1987 UMNO split to the
1988 judicial calamity and the 1991 curbing of the powers of the Sultans, Anwer was Mahatir’s loyal
lieutenant, The relationship between the two men created quite a bit of resentment within UMNO,
especially among party stalwarts who had joined the organization long before Anwer was co-opted into
government. In fact, from 1982 itself, there were groups who sought to drive a wedge between Mahatir and
Anwer through poison pen letters and whispering campaigns. To his credit, Mahatir ignored these sinister
moves and stood by his deputy. Then in May 1997, Mahatir sent the clearest signal yet to UMNO, the
government and the people that Anwer would be his successor by appointing him Acting UMNO President
and Acting Prime Minister when he went off on two months leave. Anwer’s adversaries in the party,
regarded his ascendancy as a threat to their interests.
The foreign media brought to the surface differences in approach in the handling of the economic crisis by
the two. Mahatir preferred a credit expansionary policy aimed at stimulating the economy and preventing it
from sinking into recession, while Anwer took the more conventional route and sought to cut back on
expenditure and impose credit squeeze. Mahatir believed low interest rates would put businesses back on
their feet. Anwer maintained that high interest rate would check capital flight.
It was around this time, in June 1998, that the sex allegation which Mahatir had dismissed in August 1997,
re-surfaced through a thick book entitled 50 Reasons why Anwer cannot become Prime Minister which
included a whole host of other slanderous charges against the Deputy PM. The book, inter alia, alleged that
Anwer was not only a womanizer and sodomite but also a murderer, who was corrupt, had abused power
and was, at the same time, a CIA agent and a traitor to the nation. At the UMNO General Assembly, the
book was distributed free to party delegates. In spite of a court injunction restraining the distributor from
circulating the book or its contents. ’50 Reasons’ is easily available and has appeared in different forms.
Incidentally, the High Court judge in granting the injunction described the book as ’one long poison-pen
letter’.
That this poison-pen book designed to smear and vilify Anwer should appear at about the same time as
when Mahatir had lost confidence
J38 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
in his Deputy is not coincidence. The book, it is obvious, was written at the behest of Anwer’s adversaries
(some of whom were responsible for the earlier document) in order to character assassinate him, It appears
that Mahatir who was angered and incensed by what he regarded as his heir apparent’s betrayal and
disloyalty, was not averse to the production and distribution of the poison-pen book, He knew it would
serve his purpose of slandering and shaming someone who had the audacity to go against him. Thus
Anwer’s enemies succeeded finally in merging their goal with Mahatir’s motive.
Mahatir’s insistence on loyalty to him is not in itself an unusual feature of politics. In most political
systems, ancient or modern, a deputy or the number two man is expected to be loyal to his chief. Within
UMNO given its feudal history and culture - unquestioning loyalty to the paramount leader is one of the
most cherished traits of membership. It is because Mahatir was absolutely certain that Anwer had betrayed
him that he has marshaled all his resources to annihilate him.
Anwer and his supporters would argue that the bid about sodomy is nothing more than a cheap camouflage.
The real reason why Mahatir has gone all out to destroy and denigrate Anwer is because he fears that the
latter will not protect his family’s business interests after his time. By questioning the bail out for Mahatir’s
son, Anwer was telling his boss that he was not prepared to salvage the Mahatir family.
The above analysis has shown that at the root of the expulsion of Anwer from the government and the party
is the question of power. Mahatir sensed an attempt to ease him out of power. He responded to the
perceived challenge with vigor and without scruples. Anwer felt that Mahatir’s power base was weakening.
He sought to send a message and was repulsed. How this power struggle camouflaged by issues of morality
and justice will play it out in the future is anybody’s guess. Anwar stands sentenced to 5 years of
imprisonment.
(VI) BURMA (MYANMAR)
Burma is an independent Asian State situated on the east of India and Bangladesh. Eighty percent of the
population is Buddhist. Four percent of it consists of Muslims. It has resources of tea, tin, lead, petroleum
and many precious stones. Its biggest export is rice, which brings eighty percent of its foreign exchange.
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Burma was a great empire but its power was destroyed by the armies
of Kublai Khan. It later became a
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part of British India. It was occupied by the Japanese during the Second World War in 1941 and gained
independence at the same time as India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Union of Burma came into existence in 1948
comprising of Burma, Shan States and the Karen States. But it chose to stay out of the British
Commonwealth.
Since independence it has experienced a troubled period. There were two groups, who pursued guerilla
activities and created troubles for the government. Government had to deal with both these groups known
as White Flag and Red Flag parties. It is said that both these groups have Communist tendencies. In 1949,
law and order situation was at its lowest. Due to failure of these groups to join hands with each other the
situation has improved since 1957.
From 1948 to 1958, Burma was parliamentary democracy. It had two chambers of legislature. Anti-Fascists
People’s Freedom League was ruling the country from 1951 with the support of majority. It pursued the
policy of nationalizing all industry and gave land to the peasants. The League’s popularity suffered a great
setback in 1958, when a split developed in its ranks resulting in instability and deterioration. In April
1958, General Ne Win took over as prime minister claiming that the army could run the country more
efficiently. Elections were held in 1960, in which the party led by U.Nu came to power. He could not
suppress the tendencies of separatism and the moves of federalists. In March 1962, army officers under
General Ne Win seized power from U.Nu. A Revolutionary Council was established which vested all
powers in’ General Ne Win. Laws were promulgated in his name. Executive functions were exercised
through the Council of Ministers.
The strong government of General Ne Win was able to maintain law and order in the country. It
successfully suppressed all anti-state groups. The government encouraged the establishment of the Burma
Socialist Party. It pursued a policy of land reforms, industrialization and social welfare.
It endeavored to be neutral in world politics and refused to accept foreign aid from any power block. Burma
developed cordial and friendly relations with Pakistan. In 1967 it concluded a boundary agreement with
Pakistan.
As from April 1972, military ranks were dropped by most of the revolutionary council members. The entire
government system was reorganised. Security and administrative committees were composed of officials
and political representatives which functioned as central authority at center and in regions.
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For more than a generation the country existed in a time warp and in a state of solitary confinement. Since
1962, when General Ne Win seized power in Burma, foreigners were unwelcome, borders were tightened,
private business was discouraged and development was halted.
Still, after almost a quarter-century of isolation from the world at large, Burma resembled nothing so much
as a cobvvebbed attic cluttered with sepia-toned relics, moth-eaten keepsakes and old curiosities. Along the
capital’s street, there were no high-rises, no night clubs, no neon signs; even Coca-Cola was unknown
there. At the offices of Burma Airways, as in every other office, there were no typewriters, let alone
computer terminals, just bulky Dickinson ledgers thick with dust. The country boasted of-two TV stations,
but neither of them broadcast for more than two hours a day. If Burma did not exist, Evelyn Waugh would
have had to invent it, that much for the adage.
The great cost of Burma’s long sleep however had been economic. The country was uncommonly fertile,
blessed with large resources of teak, rubies, even oil before Ne Win, embarked upon his monarchical rule.
However, the economy had slipped steadily backward. Though the Golden Land, as it is known, could still
feed itself it was now one of the 15 poorest nations in the world. Foreign exchange reserves were at an all
time low and dropping rapidly.
For more than 30 years, the army had been embroiled in a stand off battle against a hornet’s nest of factious
groups, including opium warlords with armies up to 20,000 strong, the separatist. Karen Christians
remnants of the Chinese nation list forces of Chiang Kai Shek and the Burma Communist Party. By some
counts, at least twelve different groups have set up their own shadow governments. Ne Win managed to
make some gains against the insurgents, but the turmoil continued on the distant margins of Burmese life.
In 1981 the general handed over the presidency and nominal leadership of the country to a like-minded
sexagenarian, General San Yu. In August at the Fifth Party Congress, the ,18-man Central Executive
Committee all but enshrined San Yu as Ne Win’s heir apparent by creating the new position of deputy
party chairman for him.
Although Burma had oil reserves, mineral resources and a relatively well-educated population of 36
million, the country’s economy was troubled. Many blame Ne Win, who ruled by whim and by occasional
astrological guidance. His regime had become a ngid, isolationist dictatorship known for its centralized
state control, inefficiency and lack of
141
I
civil liberties. Declining export earnings from teak and rice made it difficult for Burma to pay the interest
on its $ 2.4 billion foreign debt, and unofficial estimates suggested that the country’s annual economic
growth was as low as 1%. As the official economy sickened, the underground economy blossomed.
In order to enhance his powers to effect his own version of a ”modernization programme”. Ne Win in 1983
made a powerful move against the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) by jailing his own protege and right
hand known as MI Tin O. He along with several key members of the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB)
were sacked on charges of misappropriation and corruption. Under Ne Win the section 124A* of the British
penal code, ”Prohibiting dissent, gathering and disturbing tranquaillity” became the Law for the law and
order and deployed as a generic and indiscriminate law for oppression. Meanwhile, the US govt. under the
programme of International Narcotics Control (INC) had provided training and military hardware including
the planes and helicopters. These military hardwares were used to crush the ethnic minority insurgents who
controlled the opium traffic emanating from the Golden Triangle. As the opposition grew to this absolutely
authoritarian regime, domestic and international pressure gained momentum to introduce some measure of
democracy. This pressure culminated into the surprise resignation of General Ne Win from the
chairmanship of the BSPP on July 23, 1988. This step was necessitated by two factors; political frustration
due to Ne Win’s maneuvering with cultural traditions and the bursting of economic bubble under the
mounting pressure of inflation and economic stagnation. Following bloody massacres, Ne Win installed
another one of his cronies, Dr. Maung Maung as a civilian president on August 8, 1988. Another General
Saw Maung staged a fake coup in September 1988 in the name of saving Burma. The BSPP was dissolved
and renamed as the National Unity Party (NUP) and in October the Commission was appointed to hold a
democratic, multi-party general elections. The timetable for elections was given on Feb. 16, 1989 which
provided for an election in 1990. By that time the Saw Maung military Unit had established itself finally as
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Reminiscent of the 1962 revolutionary councils the
SLORC was made up of 19 top military commanders with Saw Maung as the chairman and Brigadier
General Khin Nyunt as the Secretary. On September 18, 1989, the country was renamed as Maynmar,
instead of the Union of Burma. With the election schedule announced, the regime began tarnishing the
image of the political workers and leaders. Daw Aung Suv Kyi and U Tin Do of the National League for
Democracy were put under house arrest. Meanwhile the SLORC regime had -developed, trade and
diplomatic links with the countries like Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia and China. Japan was in
fact the first country to
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EMERGENCE OF AFRICA
143
recognize the legitimacy of the Saw Maung regime in Feb, 1989. Only the United States warned Burma of
trade sanctions if the human rights situation was not improved by the Saw Maung regime. In the May 27,
1990 elections, 93 political parties competed for 485 electoral seats. The National League for Democracy
(NLD) won in almost all the constituencies inflicting defeat on the -army backed National Unity Party and
the Union National Democracy Party of Aung Gyi. Though Saw Maung admitted the landslide victory,
however later he ordered an ”official” re-counting of the votes and said the final results could take two or
three weeks and the real transfer of power two or three years. The year 1991 saw increasing pressure on the
military, regime to arrange an immediate transfer of power and release all political prisoners. In September
1991, Burma made it clear that military may remain in power for five or ten years more as it follows its
own time table and agenda for political change. Responding to the mounting pressure, the SLORC in April
1992 made some announcements, including a change in leaders with Gen. Thou Shwe replacing Saw
Maung, release of a dozen of political prisoners, permission for immediate family members to visit Daw
Aung San Sun Kyi, the promise to hold political convention and began _the process of framing a new
constitution for Maynmar, the decision to end fighting against the Karen’s and the agreement with
Bangladesh to permit the return of Burmese Muslims. From these pronouncements onwards, things
changed little. In 1993, however, a new element was introduced into opposition to the military regime, the
DAB (the Democratic Alliance of Burma). The insurgent Karen’s were behind the mobilization from this
platform along with the Burmese students, Bhuddist monks and other middle class elites who had taken
refuge for protection against the regime.
CHAPTER 7
EMERGENCE OF AFRICA
RISE OF AFRICA
Africa which used to be a dark continent, is today flashing with light. Its 750 million people have
undergone complete transformation from a primitive life to an influential membership in modern society.
Although only a few years back, Africa was being ruled by the Western colonial masters, yet it has thrown
off the political shackles of the West with an amazing speed.
What factors have made possible such a quick transformation of Africa from a vast colonial domain into a
continent of independent states? Historically, it was one of the major revolutions in the twentieth century.
The emergence of Africa is not an automatic phenomenon. In fact, it is natural culmination of the political
cross currents which were working in Africa for the last many decades.
One of the factors which led to this transformation was the chance in the strength of the great powers after
the Second World War which shifted the centre of power from Western Europe to the US and USSR. The
conflict between these two world powers gave strength to an ideological struggle for Asia and Africa.
Western Europe, which had already been weakened, had to face the demands of African leaders, the threats
of USSR and an indirect pressure from USA. Since both these Powers were interested in securing a sphere
of influence in the continent of Africa, they, therefore, tried to win their goodwill by supporting their
liberation movements directly or indirectly. At the same time, they used it as a forum for propaganda
against each other.
Second and significantly basic factor was rise of nationalism which as a reaction, received strength from
the Western domination and the colonial policies based on racial bars, injustice and inequality. The African
leaders who received education in Western schools became the leaders of the movements and organized the
masses behind them. The independence of Gold Coast in 1957 also encouraged the political movements in
all the
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KMF.Kt.F.M F OF AFRICA
145
.
African countries. It set precedent, the repercussions of which were immediately felt in other territories
occupied by France, Belgium and Portugal.
The Asian revolt also stimulated the rise of Africa. The African leaders not only followed the path of Asian
leaders, but also received great assistance. With the establishment of United Nations, leaders from Arab
and’Asian countries found an opportunity to awaken a sense of sympathy for the grievances of Africans.
They presented the demands of Africa before the United Nations in an effective manner.
The fourth factor was the expansion of the principle of international accountability for colonial
administration. The trusteeship system of United Nations gave an opportunity to the African leaders to
criticize colonialism in Africa. Constant UN pressure to help Africa thus gave rise to African issues in
world politics.
The fifth factor was the communist influence in Africa. The communists exploited the trouble spots,
economic miseries and the attitude of colonial masters towards the natives. Then China also got interested
in
1960. Both the communist powers -- USSR and China rendered great help to the emerging people of
Africa.
The final factor was the change in the colonial policies of European Powers after Second World War.
During the nineteenth century, the only problem was to maintain law and order, but with the dawn of
twentieth century, a great change in timing had occurred. Old policies were replaced by the 20th Century
aim of promoting self-government. State activity was extended in economic affairs also. All these factors
contributed to the emergence of Africa in world politics.
PROBLEM OF UNITY
The African continent was under the colonial rule of four major powers, France, Great Britain, Belgium
and Portugal. During the 1960s, and
1970s currents for political and economic emancipation had been working in Africa. African countries
revolted against their masters and gained independence. Now Africa had become one of the major issues of
the world. With a ferment of the sentiment of nationalism, Africa asserted itself on the international
platform.
Although Africa enjoyed a wealth of mineral resources, yet most of the countries were economically under-
developed, educationally backward and politically weak because their colonial masters never desired
them to play an effective role in world politics. Most of them got independence after 1950. With
independence, they inherited political institutions introduced by their colonial masters, which were not very
familiar to them. As a result, the world witnessed great instability and uprisings in the African countries.
For becoming an effective bloc. African countries needed unity. But unless they were politically stable,
economically advanced and educationally developed, the dream of unity was not expected to materialize.
Another difficulty experienced by these countries was that they were under different colonial masters, and
after independence, inherited their political systems, institutions, organizations, and outlook which is
heterogeneous in nature. Until the African countries were completely free of the political influence and
manoeuvrings, they were not likely to achieve unity. Some of them, even after independence, showed
loyalty to their colonial masters, due to their economic dependence or for some other reason. But it proved
a great hindrance in the formation of an African bloc in the UN, a bloc that could assert its existence on
international issues.
THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS
History of African nationalist movements has been rather short as compared to that in Asia. It started late,
but in an amazingly short period of time it achieved most spectacular success because by the time
nationalism raised its head in Africa, colonialism was already beginning to peter out. Victories of
nationalist movements owe their success to the Second World War which had shattered the backbone of
even the greatest colonial powers. Asia broke its chains, Africa awakened and realized the opportunity to
work for its own salvation. It struck hard and has so far achieved a remarkable success in unfettering itself.
It can be said that the liberation movements got a tremendous moral support from the Russian Bloc, China
and newly independent countries, especially the neutrals like Indonesia and the UAR (Egypt).
Their freedom movements inside Africa were given a great impetus by Nkrumah’s struggle for the
liberation of Ghana, and President Nasser’s nationalist resistance to the neocolonialists moves of Britain
and France. While Ghana’s independence hastened the liberation of West Africa, President Nasser gave an
active support to Morocco. Tunis and Algeria. And Russia was not far behind. It actively supported the
cause of West African colonies of France. In fact Russia in some cases went too far in establishing its
influence. An example is that of Guinea. It gave a lot of economic and military assistance to Algeria which
was supplemented, and completed by China. And President Nasser incurred the wrath of France by
146
helping the Maghreb countries. The main reason for French collaboration with the British during the Suez
Crisis was this Pan-Arabism spearheaded by President Nasser.
First to be liberated after the Second World War, were Libya and Sudan. Ghana became independent in
1957. In 1957 a new page was turned in the history of Afro-Asian community, when Afro-Asian Solidarity
Conference was inaugurated in Cairo. The Conference was attended by 43 countries. The principles of
Bandung Conference were re-affirmed and the conference took particular note of liberation struggles of
Afro-Asian countries which were still under the Imperial Yoke. It also adopted a policy of eventual
establishment of a Secretariat at Cairo, a common fund and a common Afro-Asian market. This Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference paved the way for convening an All-African People’s Conference. The Conference,
held at Accra in 1958, represented the Africans from 28 countries. Slogans like ”Hands off Africa”. ”Total
liberation of Africa” and ”We want an African Africa” were passed. The Conference pivoted round Dr.
Nkrumah who became a symbol of the African Liberation Movement. In November 1958, several French
territories like Gabon, Mauritania, the Middle Congo. Chad and French Sudan were granted independence
within the French Community. Guinea had already complete independence within the French Community.
The next two years saw a number of French territories gaining independence in quick succession. They
were the Cameron, Malagasy, Togoland, French Congo, Senegal. Mali (formerly French Sudan). Mali
federated with Senegal as Mali Federation, but the federation broke down soon after.
All-African Peoples Conference next met in Tunis in February

1960. It again militantly urged the independence of African States. In April
1960, a second Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Conference was held. Guinea’s President Toure and
Nkrumah were exponents of African liberation struggle. They particularly denounced NATO help given to
France and Portugal in keeping its hold on its colonial possessions in Africa.
Nigeria got its independence in October 1960. Meanwhile a hot struggle continued in Algeria. The Algerian
nationalists were fighting to the finish. France was not only being backed by its Western Allies in UN, but
was also aided militarily by NATO. This was an expression of a firm desire of the Western powers to
continue their hold over their colonies. They embarked on a dangerous course of action by extending the
Cold War to this area. Every effort was made to ensure the economic dependence of newly independent
countries. Neo-imperialism came in the form of economic aid, and military interventions. Already Libya
was given a good
F.MF.KGKM F.OF AFRK A
147
economic assistance by Britain in return for allowing it to keep its two airbases there.
The Fiench put up a tough opposition over holding on to Bizerta air and naval base. America was
announcing its plans to extend economic assistance to the newly independent countries. This offer was also
extended by Russia and China. But the newly independent countries remained neutral in the Cold War
between the giants of power politics. One thing was certain, they were definitely hostile to Western powers
who had exploited them for a long time, and all their efforts for economic assistance were viewed with
suspicion and skepticism. The anti-West feelings mounted as the Western powers continued to strengthen
their hold over the rest of the continent which was awakening slowly to independence. The wrecking of
Congolese nationalist strength by the Anglo-American intervention through UN shattered all hopes of new-
Africa in the World Organization manipulated by these big powers. Russia gave a moral support to
proLumumba government of Gizenga in Stanleyville but it was of no avail. Russia then merely criticized
UN role in the Congo and refused to pay its share of the peacekeeping expenditure there. The Congo then
fell to the Imperialists’ designs of penetrating into Africa and creating their sphere of influence in the
newly-independent countries.
Meanwhile, Africa’s seven-year fight for freedom had come to a victorious end, Algeria became a
sovereign independent state in July 1962. A strong pro-Cairo and anti-West government was set up by Bin
Bella. He was deposed by a coup d’etat led by Boumedienne in June 1965, who assumed the office of
prime minister. He extended all support to Arab countries during the crises of 1967 and 1973. As the wave
of freedom swept across Africa, many nationalist movements sprang up, and those already active
intensified their struggle. As the countries gained independence, they formed regional organizations for co-
operation. They were loose groups who merely joined hands to resist any new danger to their sovereignty
and work for eventual economic and military collaboration. One such group was that of the Casablanca
Powers which met in Casablanca in 1961. They were the six African states of Algeria. Ghana, Guinea,
Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic. Another group was formed by Monrovia Powers, comprising
19 states, mostly former French colonies of Central and Western Africa. Both these prominent groups
merged into a larger one, as the only representative body of all Africa, the OAU, in May 1963.
Nkrumah and his fellow pioneers, whose radicalism is enshrined in the Charter of the OAU, believed that
an African country’s independence was chiefly significant as a landmark in the liberation of the continent.
Nkrumah advocated a United States of Africa \\ith a continental
148
IN FfRN \TION \l \hh\lKS
government and a high command and tailed loi an opposition to Atnean leadeis whose ievolutionai\
ambitions lell short ot these objectives
One leason advanced toi Nkiumah s own tailuie was that he identified himselt too doselv with the concept
of a I nited \tnca and too little with the needs and aspnations ot the people who had voted him to pow er
One gioup ot toimei 1 icnch \\cst Afncan countiics led bv then ’ giand signeui Piesident Houphonet-Boigii)
ol tlie Ivoiv Coast alieadv stiessed in Gaulhst teims the pie-eminence ot national pnonties Another gioup
which had leason to tear subveision opposed the tratfic ot guenlla aims across its holders because ot the teai
that the guns might be used against it
Where theie has been a change ot government in Atuca it has almost always involved a move to the Right,
usually to the At my and Military regimes by their very nature tend to take a non-romantic view of political
enterprise The setback ot Israeli attack also effectively deprived the OAL of perhaps its strongest force
after Nkrumah
In this situation Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) provided almost the only rallying point Even here the
ineffectiveness of the sanctions campaign against the defiant white settler regime provided its own
frustrations Only in the guerilla intrusions into Rhodesia, the movement was able to regain something of its
early levolutionary momentum
This movement was carried over from the unprecedented anticolonial fervour which swept Asia and Africa
in a decade and seemed to guarantee that rev olutionary forces could cleai their own path to power
The organization which was formed at Addis Ababa, now icpresents about 46 States The more recent
additions have been of those countries of the Central African Fedeiation Vehement opposition by
Nyasaland and North Rhodesia to the federation led to its bieak-up The plan of federation was hatched by
Britain to continue its hold over the sliding territories Moreover, this federation would have given Britain
better economic advantages It was also intended to continue White supiemacy over the natives and to train
them how to give political co-operation to its white governing minor rtv While South Rhodesia was a self-
governing country colonized and admimsteied exclusively by a Fuiopean white minority, the other two
were protectorates containing a Luropean minority but governed by the Colonial Office and not by the
Euiopean colonists The
UKK \
149
federation was formed when South Afuca had intensified hei tacist domination
\\hile S Rhodesia v\as expected to follow the South African line the other two turned against the huiopean
minorrtv A constitution giving limited \otmg lights to the natives, was piomulgated South Rhodesian
legislature had eaihei no native lepiesentative 1 he constitution piovided toi 1 *> seats toi Afucans But this
policv ot racial partnership was nothing but huiopean domination While South Rhodesian nationalist
leaders including Joshua Nkomo and Re Sithole boycotted the elections Northern Rhodesia and Nysaland
piessed foi independence So under this piessuie, the fedeiation was dissolved in 1963 Malawi and Zambia
emerged as independent Afuean states
The other federation which had to be broken up was the East African Federation It compused Uganda
Tanganyika and Kenya Now that the African nationalism had reached its bloom and freed almost the whole
of the continent (barring a few sore spots like South Africa and the Portuguese colonies), it was becoming
increasingly the cockpit of power politics There was a three-pronged attack by the Westein powers, Russia
and China to gam their respective spheres of influence While the AngloAmerican bloc was persisting its
military and racial hold the other two were reaping the harvest mainly due to the strong anti-West feelings
of these African countries The more there was the Western pressure in S Africa, the Congo, Southern
Rhodesia, and the remaining Portuguese and British colonies, more likelihood of a drift towards the
Socialist bloc Although countries like Ghana, Algeria and UAR, the main exponents of African
nationalism, were neutral between China and Russia, the countries which, had got independence very
recently, had definitely swung to the Chinese side China had a good influence in Tanzania, Uganda
Zambia, Malawi, French Congo, Mali and Guinea The Chinese Premier s tour of Africa m 1963-64 was a
tremendous diplomatic success Mary of the countries bad recently opened their diplomatic missions in
Beijing and vice versa Brazzaville-Congo seemed to be a stronghold of Chinese influence, where the
liberation movement of the Congo, it is said was aided and controlled by it Uganda s Prime Minister paid a
visit to China, and the Chinese foreign minister visited Mali
But it is futile to think that the whole of Africa shared the same political outlook Apart from the Anglo-
American foothold in Africa there was a separate influence, that of France, creeping in Most of the former
French colonies in which there was Christian majoiity were pro-France, and they were keeping aloof from
all such moots as Afro-Asian Conferences Although neutral they seemed to be apathetic tow aids the
confeiences
150
UION M. VFFAIKS
They were mostly members of OAMC (Organization of African and Malagasy Community) which, en
bloc, decided not to take part in the postponed Afro-Asian Conference. And then there \\as opposition in
West Africa to what they called Nkrumah’s domination of the area. And President Nasser had failed to
weld the Maghreb countries together. French influence in Tunisia and monarchy in Morocco, perhaps
prevented this. So the overall political position was that Africa, did not present even a semblance of unity.
Meanwhile, Nkrumah was deposed when he was on an official tour of Beijing, with it. Nkrumah’s
domination of the area came to an end for the time being. It was suspected that the plot to overthrow
President Nkrumah was engineered w ith the help of CIA because the increasing influence of Nkrumah in
Africa was an eyesore for the Americans.
After the death of President Nasser, Col. Gaddafi emerged as the nationalist leader of the Muslim countries
in Africa. As a result of the new wave of freedom spreading in these countries, most of the oil producing
countries had nationalized oil and expelled the foreign companies. By effective use of the oil weapon after
the Arab-Israel War of 1973. these countries successfully asserted their positions on the international forum
and posed a serious challenge to the imperialist forces.
Though until early 1970s, world’s interest in Africa continued to remain for the most peripheral, there was
a sudden and dramatic growth of interest during the following years. This was due to a number of reasons.
Large number of independent states of Africa (1 /3rd of the total number of General Assembly members)
meant that taken together they constituted the most important single bloc; it was an area endowed with,
important strategic minerals - oil, uranium, chrome, copper, gold and basic agricultural commodities like
palm oil, cocoa, cotton, etc. Strategically Africa was important to the Mediterranean world, the Middle
East, the Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic. Foreign intervention therefore became increasingly, visible
as the Cold War proceeded into this continent, the USSR making Libya and Egypt and Algeria pawns to
make it hot for Morocco. In Angola specially, the victorious group was not only Marxist in ideology, the
MPLA was also strongly assisted by Russia whereas the defeated FLNA and UNITA forces were supported
by South Africa, Zaire and more covertly by China and the United States. As the campaign against the
racist South Africa was intensified at international level, divisions surfaced among the African states
regarding a coherent policy to get an end to aparthied. In this case majority favoured the economic
sanctions, support for the armed struggle and total economic and diplomatic boycott of South Africa. A
substantial minority rejected this approach in favour of a dialogue
F.MFKCiF.M F. OF AFRICA
151
and diplomatic contacts. Ivory Coast and Malawi in fact engaged into talks with Pretoria. Similar problems
in devising a common approach towards the problems of independence of Namibia and earlier of
Zimbabwe were noticed.
THE FUNCTIONAL CO-OPERATION AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The only success in securing a measure of unity had been in the form of functional co-operation under the
aegis of Organization of African Unity (OAU). As described earlier, the establishment of OAU marked a
synthesis of two divergent approaches regarding the unity of Africa - those institutionalized in the
Monrovia and Casablanca groups. A common contextual background to the attempts for functionalism was
provided by the common colonial experience. Almost simultaneous timing of independence, economic and
social under development, racial selfconsciousness as institutionalized in the very concept of Pan-
Africanism and the communal way of life rooted within the general African society. However, the OAU
could not realize the long cherished dream of a united Africa because of a number of reasons. At the
economic level, integration spirit soon withered away largely because of the primacy of national interest
over the commitment to regional development. On the ideological level, it was diminished by the
vagueness of the very notion of Pan-Africanism by which different groups meant different things. The
arbitrary demarcation of state boundaries during the colonial era soon led to irredentism and tribalism
thereby impeding integration and sometimes even led to bloody civil wars and inter-state conflicts. Another
major problem was that of multiple identities, religious, economic and political. Take any conflict area
from apartheid in South Africa to the civil war in Somalia, super-powers’ rivalry in Angola to the famine in
Ethiopia, the African states miserably failed to devise a common strategy.
CRISES AT THE CONTINENTAL LEVEL
At continental level the current crises facing the African countries had their roots in the factors mentioned
above. Indeed only 9 out of 39 countries, for which data was available, achieved 2.5% per capita growth
per annum during 1960-89. Even countries with such high growth as Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Malawi and
Kenya experienced severe economic difficulties. Agricultural decline, worsening terms of trade with the
North, rising bills of oil imports, increasing interest rates and decline in receipt of foreign aid combined to
produce this crisis. The economic crisis, persistent poverty, marked inequality do not provide a socio-
economic environment conducive to the flourishing of democratic institutions and political stability.
Almost half of the regimes were military or civil dictatorships.
152
INTFRNATION VI \FF \IKS
FMHU.FM
Y Of \H<I( \
153
Only one-seventh of the relevant politics constituted competitive paity electoral systems Political instability
was common The mode of change was so violent that as many as 15 heads ot states were icplaced through
civil wars, demonstrations, assassinations etc between April 1990 to January 1992 Tribalism and ethnic
vvaifare in Ethiopia, I ibena, Somalia, South Africa and Rwanda caused massive bloodshed and
dislocations
This miseiable plight of the African countries can be attnbuted to three factors technological under-
development organizational incompetence and military weakness The failure of the Afncan elites to create
a complementarity of political values had been the foremost cause of disunity both at internal as well as
continental level The solution may be sought in federalism but some states were too small to realize the
idea Irredentist claims can be appeased by a re-demarcation of the post-colonial boundaries but that would
mean opening a new Pandora s box The approach of the West to suggest structural adjustment and making
aid conditional with democracy would also fail to deliver unless ideal of PanAfricanism which has been
relegated into insignificance by national parochialism is revived to guide the African people towards
creating a stable and viable continental society
CRISIS IN NIGERIA
Nigeria was the largest British colony until 1960 when it became an independent country It was already a
federation consisting of three regions, continuously at loggerheads with each other But the federation had
to be preserved, and for that matter British government had to persuade the three regions to co-operate with
each other, so that the emergence of three dominions could be prevented The country became independent
on 1st October, 1960, and became a republic on 1st October, 1963 Its territorial divisions are the Northern,
Eastern, Mid-Western and Western regions which enjoy sufficient internal autonomy They are inhabited by
different communities who have an old feeling of rivalry for each other, with the result that each tribe
views the other with suspicion and tries to dominate the center Thus friction arises
The Western region is comparatively wealthy and is inhabited by Goruba community comprising
flourishing merchants Their political party is the Action Group led by Mr Walowo The Eastern region with
a Christian majority, is economically backward and its main tribe is Ibos who are a vigorous people The
Northern region consists largely of Muslims and the mam groups are the Hausa and Fulani In other regions,
the two big communities are almost at par with each other
V Nigena became a republic \\ith Di /ilke\\ v\ho had been pienner of the t^,,, ieglon as piesident and Sir
Abu Baki Fatawa Ba a as e”eial Pnme Mimstei Meanwhile, mteiiegiondl jealousies and manoeuvenngs
dnlong jettons in the vanous paities aiming at gaining contiol at the co]ltei |]aj uedte(j qlllte a tense
atmospheie in the countiv
In Jan^la]^ 1955^ aim> olticeis Ldined out a coup d etat dining which Balevva a,nd some ome] cat,lnet \
imisters weie assassinated Oeneial Ironsi took o\el me LOU1]tIy an(j abiogated the Constitution But the
first Military Go\e]ho].Oeneral was dlso assassinated m Julv 1966 dining a coup and the tountry was taken
oxet by [ t Col Gowon
i ne M|jge,ian cusis diagged on since the hist military coup ove revv civilian Government in January 1966
Since the Machete massaue of Isastem ibos m me Noitn Qjukwu had become moie determined to pull
ou{ ol a Iecjerdtion that might be dominated by the North and finally d^man(jecj reglonai autonomy from
the Federal Supreme Military Coun^j when Col Ojukwu threatened to secede from the federation Col
Gcvvon Fecjeial Head of the State, tried his best to exert pressure and prevent secession but his efforts did
not succeed On 19th April, 1967, E^stem Nlgena took over an key Federal installations in the region under
ar^ ecjlct wmcn bore me S1gnarures of the Eastern Governor, Lt UJUKWU ê installations affected
included ports railways, posts and mmunicahons and various statutory corporations and institutions
covering Droa^castmgj coa\^ shipping and marketing It was the most significant ste^ m th£ Slniniermg
constitutional crisis which brought widening breac^ between tne £ast anj the rest of the country I he edict
said tnat the taKe-c^ver was necessarv because the Federal Government had stopped paying saiaries to the
employees of the organization and had withheld supplies Qf eqU1pment materials and spare parts to the
Federal bodies in the vegion Such measures as the non-payment of salaries and withholding ot materials,
were taken by the Gowon Government to exert pressure and s^rang[e tne economy Of tne Eastern region
Ojukwu reacted sharply to thes^ measures anc} t0ok over all the key Federal installations
a peace-making mission consisting of three chiefs and one university proêssor me( Qjukwu and tried to
reconcile the two young colonels, but tl,1£ efforts 0( tne mission could not budê the widening ijulf
between the E£\st and Fedeial Government
By th^ encj o^- jy[ay a stat£ Qj emeigencv was declared in Nigeria All political actlvities were banned, full
poweis were assumed by Col Gowon as the Commander in-Chief The federation was split into twelve
states instead o,f me four leglons Three of the new states were foimed from
154
INTERNATIONA!. AFFAIRS
the Eastern region, six from the Northern region, one each from the Western and Mid-Western region. The
decision of the Federal Government to split the Northern region into six states and the Eastern region into
three, was taken primarily to erase the feeling of domination by the North, from the minds of people of the
East. Col. Gowon went ahead with the division and installed nine military Governors who were all
members of the ruling Supreme Military Council. They were told by Col. Gowon to move quickly to their
posts as Heads of autonomous states within the federation so as to enable the .military government to
restore full civilian rule.
On the other hand, the ground for secession was being prepared in the East. On 28th May, the civilian
Consultative Assembly of the Eastern region passed a resolution calling for secession and declaration of an
independent republic, \\hich was to be called the Republic of Biafra (named after the nearby Atlantic
coastal shelf). The Assembly of 300 members recommended that Biafra should establish its own
commercial and diplomatic relations, join the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Organization of
African Unity, and adopt a new Federal Constitution.
Finally, Lt. Col. Ojukvvu announced the secession of Eastern region and the creation of Biafra Republic on
30th May. Immediately after his announcement, he called the consuls of the United States and Cameroon
and the British High Commissioner to tell them of-’his decision regarding independence. Col. Ojukwu also
announced the creation of five new ministries, including that of foreign affairs.
Lt. Col. Gowon, federal head of the state, reacted sharply to this announcement and ordered a general
mobilization of troops. He also decided to impose economic blockade both from land and sea on the new
republic. The federal government meanwhile declared its intention of revoking by force the decision of the
Eastern region. The new state of Biafra was virtually isolated from the outside world as Col. Gowon
clamped down strict control designed to bring it to its knees. The communications and air links were cut
and the main road to Eastern region was blocked. The Federal government also imposed a tight control on
the banks and banned import and export of Nigerian currency.
Determined to maintain Nigerian unity at all cost. General Gowon decided to strike by ordering a naval
blockade of the Eastern region. It spurred the bloody war.
Lt. Col. Ojukwu. in the beginning, scored some successes due to help given by Portugal. Israel and
Ethiopia. In the meantime. Gowon slowly built up his army and purchased arms including jet fighters from
USSR and
EMERGENCE OF AFRIC
_ 155
other European countries. When his army \\as fully prepared. Gowon launched a severe attack on the
East and captured all strategic points.
Intensive meddling by the West, including Wilson’s meaningless visit and French aid to Biafra, made
matters further indecisive. In fact, after the fall of Ummahia in April. 1969. Biafrans retaliated by
recapturing the junction town of Owerri following a lengthy .siege. By June 1963. Biafran units \vere
moving slo\\ly southward from Owerri toward the oil fields around Port Harcourt. The Biafran strategy, in
this regard. \\as not so much to regain the lost territory as to prolong the stalemate and inflict casualties
until the Nigerians agreed to peace talks and granted them independence.
Col. Ojukwu carried on \\ar against General Govvon \\ith the help of French. British and Russian
ammunition. Aid given by Portugal. Rhodesia and South Africa was never a secret. With all this aid it was
not possible for Col. Ojukwu to face the federal army for more than thirty-one weeks. So on January 12,
1970. the so-called state of Biafra crumbled. Thus came to end the bloody war.
General Gowon, being a broad-minded and generous man. proclaimed general amnesty, restored all Ibo
officers and ordered the army to turn itself into a relief and civil defence force. General Gowon also
declared that Ibos would not be discriminated against.
Despite the civil war, the economy of Nigeria did not come under strain. The country was self-sufficient in
food. Oil had boosted its economy to the extent that despite heavy expenditure on war Nigeria was not
under foreign debts. With the leadership in capable hands, it was expected to make progress.
Indeed one feels that the curse of colonialism did not end with the departure of the imperialists. In more
ways than one, it became a phase more vicious than the first. The secession of Biafra, like that of Katanga,
was no less than the counter-attack by the expelled white imperialists against the forces of freedom and
Afro-Asian nationalism. Thus, the civil \\ar in Nigeria was a treacherous campaign to balkanize Africa.
Gowon’s nine-year rule was ended m 1975 by a bloodless coup that made Army Brigadier Muntala Rufai
Mohammed, the new Chief of State. Mohammed was assassinated in 1976 and civilian rule was restored
after the election of Alhaj Shehu Shagari as President in 1979. Again coup took place in December 1983.
This military regime headed by General Mohammed Buhari was overthrown in coup in August, 1985, led
by General Ibrahiem Babangida, who proclaimed himself as President.
156
IVIKRN VTION.M. \KF\IKS
I lie general continued to rule ihe country with an iron hand and allowed little participation in political
terms. Despite mounting pressure he did not allow any political acti\iiy. As time passed, he began facing
problems similar to the most faced by such authoritative regimes in the Third World. The oil revenues
which had given the Nigerian economy an unprecedented boom crashed to S 6 billion in 1987 from S 22
billion in . 1982. The country was soon to run into a debilitating regime of debt that
now stood at about S 32 billion. With the ever troublesome problem of ethnicity was coupled the rise of
fundamentalism matched by the military of the Christian Churches. The problem took a serious turn when
in 1987 the regime sought the membership of the OIC. This was followed by periodic bouts ot serious
religious fighting. Traumatized by the situation, the people thought it was the time for army to return to the
barracks. The Babangida regime sought an ad hoc solution to this sensitive issue of ethnicity and
communalism by the process of ”zoning” the key political positions in turn to various regions. There were
also signs of differences within army’s ranks. In fact the rival officers attempted an abortive coup d’etat in
1990. Deterred by these developments Babangida announced a gradual transition to democracy, first
holding elections for the local government, then for the governorship and finally for the state legislature.
He also conditioned the holding of elections with the cutting short of parties to only two and providing an
open ballot system to avoid the charges of rigging. The aim of creating just two parties was to co-opt the
”new breed” of politicians, the middle class elites. Elections were held for presidency in June 1993 and
Mashood Abiola, who had stood for the Social Democrat Party (SDP) secured 58% of votes. But these
results were later annulled leaving the transition of power to an elected civilian government, still hanging in
balance. Instead Babangida in September 1993 installed another handpicked civilian Ernest Shouekan
to lead an interim-government until holding of elections in February 1994. The constitutional crisis
which had started almost a decade ago continued to persist mainly because military which Babangida
represented was not willing to see a civilian take-over. On November 17, 1993 another soldier. General
Sani Abacha took over, scrapping all the democratic arrangements that had been erected over four years.
Instead of honouring the promises made by the former Junta, the general opted to prolong his personal rule
acting as one Egyptian diplomat termed ”a stone age despot”. He, on May 23, 1994, arranged elections for
delegates to a new Constitutional Conference consisting of 360 members. The conference was to frame a
new constitution between June to October. The public response was discouraging as 9/10 of the voters
opted to stay at home. To put further pressure on the regime, the opposition parties formed National
Coalition for Democracy with the main objective of helping jailed Mashood Abiola to come to power as
President. The oil workers staged a country-wide strike on August 5 in support of Biola who was released
on
K.MKI«.KM KOK VKKICX
157
August 7. 1994. Howe\er. his release did not mean Nigeria’s return to democracy as the government
resorted to repressive measures involving sacking of. pro-Ahiola workers in the country’s major industry of
oil.
Abacha died in June 1998. He was succeeded as President by General Abdulsalam Abubakar. In 1999.
Nigeria held elections for a civilian government and adopted a new constitution. Olusgun Obasanjo. who
was a military ruler had handed o\er power to a democratically elected government in 1979, was elected
president as a Civilian.
ALGERIA’S NEVER-ENDING ORDEAL
For more than seven years now. Algeria has been caught up in a growing spiral of violence. In January
1992. after the Front Islamique Du Salut (F1S), Islamic Salvation Front, had won a large majority of seats
in the first round of Algeria’s first multi-party elections, the authorities fearing an ”Islamic backlash” and
the destruction of a carefully constructed secular framework, cancelled the second round of elections and
imposed a state of emergency. A lame justification offered for annulling the election results was that the
FIS sought an authoritarian system of government; its leaders had openly expressed contempt for
democracy as a western import. The allegation was correct insofar as the Islamic Front’s leaders held
ambivalent and opportunistic attitude toward parliamentary government. But the Algerian establishment’s
suppression of election results, w<as itself undemocratic, and most undesirable, both morally and
politically.
Algeria is predominantly a Muslim country, was recently a vaguely defined region located between the
historically prominent civilizations of Tunisia and Morocco. A French colony, since 1842, Algeria’s
”indigenous Islamic culture” had been submerged and hence destroyed by the policy of ”cultural cleansing”
enforced by the colonialists.
That policy of the French was later to give rise to a revival of longsuppressed Islamic identity. It was in this
background that in 1954, the Front Deliberation Nationale (FLN) started a civil war for independence that
claimed the lives of a million Algerians and heavy losses to the Front. In 1962, General de Gaulle,
President of France, despite internal opposition, declared independence.
Being used to open environment, liberal society, free press, the continuing dominance of French culture
and the spread of education had brought an elite into power structure which was essentially Westernized in
character. This situation led to a reaction from the grass-root level and the best tool of mobilization against
the existing elite. In 1985 protests began to
It
IMKKNAIIONAI. AFFAIRS
EMERGENCE OF \FRICA
159
be voiced; the first to rise were the Berbers of the Kabyle region. The government responded to this trend
by merciless suppression and labelled the insurgents as ”extremist Muslims. The excessive use of army to
persecute activists bore grim consequences for the regime. Most serious was the killing of Mustapha
Bouiali and several others. Aiming at political reforms, the army was withdrawn and on July 2, 1989.
Algeria became a multi-party polity and the major rival party to the ruling party FI.N - the F1S - was
formed.
Capitalizing upon the socio-political demands of the masses with an Islamic solution, the FIS s\\ept the
local bodies polls in 1990. In January
1992 elections, the FIS \\on 188 in the 400-seat parliament. Needing only
28 seats more in the January 16, 1992 in the second round to gain majority, the formation of a FIS
government was forestalled by a military coup. President Chadli Benjedid was forced to resign and Ahmad
Boudief was installed into power. Election results were annulled. Top leadership of the FIS was imprisoned
and a ruthless ’’operation clean-up” of party activists followed. In reprisal Boudief was killed in January
1992. The new regime under Liamine Zeroul, a career-diplomat, backed by the military continued to rule
Algeria.
That the FIS popularity graph was steadily growing is an undisputed truth. The overwhelming support that
it got from the masses in the general elections was a clear indication of the fact that the people want to rid
themselves of the authoritarian secular regime.
It is hard to believe, also, that the army remains a silent spectator when the massacres are taking place. It is
not really possible that the military does not make an effort to stop the rot. However, the failure of the
Algerian authorities to protect the civilian population can be attributed to the testimonies of survivors and
eyewitnesses of the massacres, that death squads are working in collusion with, and under the protection of,
certain units or factions of the army, security forces, and state-armed militias.
The courts banned the FIS in 1992, and thousands of FIS members were arrested. Violence increased as the
FIS and other Muslim fundamentalists continued to protest against the government. In June 1999. the
Islamic Salvation Army, the armed branch of FIS, announced it was ending its fight against the
government.
In 1996, the Algerian people approved a revised constitution that bans political parties based on religion,
sex. language, or regional differences. Multiparty elections for the National Peoples Assembly were held in
June 1997. In April 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. an independent
candidate supported by the Military and Zeroual. was elected President in a presidential contest marred by
charges of vote fraud.
Close observers of the developments have different approaches to the crisis. Most agree that the insurgency
and militant ”outburst” are in fact a case of cultural reassertion. an outrage of local culturists against the
suppression of national language and other symbols of the long French rule and later the perpetuation of the
Western way of life by the postindependence regimes.
The West looks at the upheaval as the rise of another Iran, the quest for power of the radical Islamists to
implement the Islamic order through militarizing against the West. The alleged Iran-FIS link has been
propagated by the Western media.
Most agree that it is more a case of cultural reassertion and support for the FIS and other Islamic groups
and is a vote against the ”denationalization’ of the identity of Algeria which the people believed had been
short changed by its rulers. However, the modus operandi of the FIS to seize power through democratic
process reflects the assertion of orthodoxy and not Iranian style fundamentalism, and this brand of
orthodoxy has been described by the FIS as a recipe to solve the growing economic problems of the people
and not to create a theocracy with maximalisation of seizure of power by the mullahs.
The movement for revivalism in Algeria has alarmed the Western world of growing trend towards reverting
to the policy of Islamisation of the Islamic societies. Algeria’s case has undoubtedly shown that the West’s
commitment to democracy, human rights and rule of law is nothing but ’high sounding nonsense’ and hold
good only when its own interests are involved.
Algeria’s present regime is involved in a desperate fight at the behest of France and the West against the
so-called Islamic terrorism. As it is, the country, already under a debt of S 26 billion and with the IMF and
other donor agencies refusing further help, is bound to face harder times ahead.
THE CRISIS IN SUDAN
Sudan is situated in the north-central Africa, south of Egypt. It is the second biggest Islamic country in
terms of area (after Kazakhastan) and extends over 2505815 Sq. Km. and has a population of 32 million. It
was formerly a British colony since 1899 and later an Egyptian British
160
IN TFKN VI ION VI VI K VIKS
FMHU.FM FOF URK \
condominium (called the \nglo 1 g>ptian Sudan) till its toimal independence in 1956 I he cuiient uisis
situation maikcd by se\eie famine and staivation. civil \var between a monolithic Muslim Aiab, increasingly
eneigised by the ideology of Islamic levivalism and a southern Sudanese population distinctly identified as
black African, Chnstian 01 animist and of a secular political outlook has been interpieted ditteiently by
observers While the western media poitiays it to be a siege by fundamentalism ot a multicommunal society
Othois hold that it stems tiom the setup left by the colonial masters, continued mle of mihtaiy and undei-
development in the economic field Befoie attempting an analysis ot the cuiient scenano, it sounds advisable
to have a look at the countiv s lelevant htstoiy so that links of the pievalent situation could be found in the
past to compiehend the real natuie of the issue
Since the countiv came undei Bntish occupation in 1899 the colonial masteis had been unconsciously
establishing the obstacles which were to eventually lender noith-south reconciliation an aiduous task The
deve opment efforts vveie concentrated in the noithern portion of the coun y - pnmanly in the teitile lands
between the Blue Nile and the White Nile outh of Khartoum 1 o hold as many as 500 ethnic groups the
British pursu d a divide and aile policy by co-opting what was termed as ”the bette lass of nativ es” at the
expense of larger segments of the population After ndependence this ”better class of natives” emeiged
along traditional sectar 11 lines, the Muslims under the banner of the’most powerful of the Mush i sects
that had dominated the political, social and economic life of the nc Kein Sudan since the 14th century
Before independence in 1955. the So . hern officers had staged a short-lived mutiny that sowed the seeds of
cleavage between the north and the south This cleavage ultimately played an important role in tnggenng a
tussle for power and in the following years sectarian factionalism saw in Khartoum a procession of
coalition governments, unable or unwilling to solve national problems
In 1958 therefore, General Abboud toppled the government of the I’mmah Party The General immediately
took to a brutal policy of forced Arabization and Islamization in the South that exaggerated the deep
cleavages between the country’s two halves Trumpeting independence for the South, the South Sudanese
Liberation Movement stalled a war against the north In 1969, General Numen assumed power in a
bloodless coup Numeif s initial populanty aided a peace process that led to the March 1972 Addis Ababa
accords, which created an autonomous southern regional government within a national unity government
Numen was thus successful to piomise the South protection of its distinct political and cultural identity This
delicate anangement was soon to wither in the wake of certain domestic aid international economic and
political changes By the
early 1990 the economy was crippled with 8 billion dollars debt and economic conditions weie ripe
for upnsmg Sensing this eventuality Numen undertook an Islamization piocess He established the
Islamic banks to appease the insuigent Muslim Brothers on one hand and attracting capital from the Arab
countries on the other In June 1983, under the pretext of granting more powei to the maigmahzed groups in
the South but pnmarily to secuie revenue attei the discovery of oil in the Southern town of Bentiu, Numeii
unilaterally declared the South’s division into three regions thus effectively abiogating the Addis Ababa
accoids In September. to enhance his political position and legitimacy of the regime, he
promulgated the September Laws introducing the application of the Islamic Law on all walks of life John
Garang, a tubal chief of the Dmka people in the South established the SPLA (Sudanese Peoples Liberation
Amy) with a view to ousting a cential government not only increasingly set against the South but also
extiemely unpopular in the north due to the absolute authoritarian rule of Numen The military successes of
SPLA with its bases in Ethiopia finally led to the ouster of General Numen who was already target of an
Intefada (popular uprising) in the north amidst large scale economic problems and political disaffection
Under the new regime, an agreement was reached with SPLA and the Democratic (Unionist) Party, Leader,
Osman-al-Mirgham envisaging an immediate cease-fire and a freeze on the September Laws until a
constitutional convention was convened to deliberate upon them At the central level, coalition
government failed to restore normalcy and in 1 989 military took over under the strong man General Omer
Hassan al Bahir replacing the prime minister Sadiq Al Mehdi The new regime adopted an even more
fundamentalist posture by reverting back to the Islamization process initiated by Numen and siding with
Iraq m the Gulf War of 1 99 1 Together these developments and the armed struggle in the Christian south
led to more intensified resurgence of Islamic revivalist elements in the north The National Islamic Front got
immense popularity and as time proceeded became an important element in the security structure of Sudan
along with Popular Defence Forces and the Security Police The reported Iranian support in terms of
weapons further strengthened the hands of the fundamentalists On the other hand peace process with SPLA
was continuing and in May 1992, an agreement was in the offing as a result of the Abuja negotiations in
Nigeria (aiming at creating a federal structure for Sudan) but differences surfaced on the programme of
relief aid delivery by the UN to meet the worsening famine situation The government continued to
pursue a policy of suppression of the insurgency in the south along with socio-economic policies
benefitting the north and specially, those associated with the front The country over the last few years has
been relegated to a position of international isolation The economy is specially in dire straits To add to
this worsening crisis, the USA on August 18, 1993 formally put Sudan on
160
INTKKN \TIOVVI. AKF-MKS
KMKKC.EME OF AFKK A
condominium (called the Anglo, l-.gyptian Sudan) till its formal independence in 1956. The current crisis
situation marked by severe famine and starvation, civil war between a monolithic Muslim Arab,
increasingly energised by the ideology of Islamic revivalism and a southern Sudanese population distinctly
identified as black African, Christian or animist and of a secular political outlook has been interpreted
differently by observers. While the western media portrays it to be a siege by fundamentalism of a
miilticommunal society. Others hold that it stems from the setup left by the colonial masters, continued rule
of military and under-development in the economic field. Before attempting an analysis of the current
scenario, it sounds advisable to have a look at the country’s relevant history so that links of the prevalent
situation could be found in the past to comprehend the real nature of the issue.
Since the country came under British occupation in 1899. the colonial masters had been unconsciously
establishing the obstacles which were to eventually render north-south reconciliation an arduous task. The
deve opment efforts were concentrated in the northern portion of the coun y - primarily in the fertile lands
between the Blue Nile and the White Nile outh of Khartoum. To hold as many as 500 ethnic groups the
British pursu d a divide and rule policy by co-opting what was termed as ”the bette’ ’lass of natives” at the
expense of larger segments of the population. After ndependence this ”better class of natives” emerged
along traditional sectai n lines, the Muslims under the banner of the- most powerful of the Musli i sects that
had dominated the political, social and economic life of the nr hern Sudan since the 14th century. Before
independence in 1955. the So,, hern officers had staged a short-lived mutiny that sowed the seeds of
cleavage between the north and the south. This cleavage ultimately played an important role in triggering a
tussle for power and in the following years sectarian factionalism saw in Khartoum a procession of
coalition governments, unable or unwilling to solve national problems.
In 1958 therefore, General Abboud toppled the government of the Ummah Party. The General immediately
took to a brutal policy of forced Arabization and Islamization in the South that exaggerated the deep
cleavages between the country’s two halves. Trumpeting independence for the South, the South Sudanese
Liberation Movement started a war against the north. In 1969, General Numeri assumed power in a
bloodless coup. Numeri’s initial popularity aided a peace process that led to the March 1972 Addis Ababa
accords, which created an autonomous southern regional government within a national unity government.
Numeri was thus successful to promise the South protection of its distinct political and cultural identity.
This delicate arrangement was soon to wither in the wake of certain domestic aid international economic
and political changes. By the
i
early 1990. the economy was crippled with 8 billion dollars debt and economic conditions were ripe
for uprising. Sensing this e\entuality Numeri undertook an Islamization process. He established the
Islamic banks to appease the insurgent Muslim Brothers on one hand and attracting capital from the Arab
countries on the other. In June 1983, under the pretext of granting more power to the marginalized groups
in the South but primarily to secure revenue after the discovery of oil in the Southern town of Bentiu,
Numeri unilaterally declared the South’s division into three regions thus effectively abrogating the Addis
Ababa accords. In September, to enhance his political position and legitimacy of the regime, he
promulgated the September Laws introducing the application of the Islamic Law on all walks of life. John
Garang, a tribal chief of the Dinka people in the South established the SPLA (Sudanese Peoples Liberation
Amy) with a view to ousting a central government not only increasingly set against the South but also
extremely unpopular in the north due to the absolute authoritarian rule of Numeri. The military successes of
SPLA with its bases in Ethiopia finally led to the ouster of General Numeri who was already target of an
Intefada (popular uprising) in the north amidst large scale economic problems and political disaffection.
Under the new regime, an agreement was reached with SPLA and the Democratic (Unionist) Party, Leader,
Osman-al-Mirghani envisaging an immediate cease-fire and a freeze on the September Laws until a
constitutional convention was convened to deliberate upon them. At the central level, coalition
government failed to restore normalcy and in 1989 military took over under the strong man General Omer
Hassan al Bahir replacing the prime minister Sadiq Al Mehdi. The new regime adopted an even more
fundamentalist posture by reverting back to the Islamization process initiated by Numeri and siding with
Iraq in the Gulf War of 1991. Together these developments and the armed struggle in the Christian south
led to more intensified resurgence of Islamic revivalist elements in the north. The National Islamic Front
got immense popularity and as time proceeded became an important element in the security structure of
Sudan along with Popular Defence Forces and the Security Police. The reported Iranian support in terms of
weapons further strengthened the hands of the fundamentalists. On the other hand peace process with
SPLA was continuing and in May 1992, an agreement was in the offing as a result of the Abuja
negotiations in Nigeria, (aiming at creating a federal structure for Sudan) but differences surfaced on the
programme of relief aid delivery by the UN to meet the worsening famine situation. The government
continued to pursue a policy of suppression of the insurgency in the south along with socio-economic
policies benefitting the north and specially, those associated with the front. The country over the last few
years has been relegated to a position of international isolation. The economy is specially in dire straits. To
add to this worsening crisis, the USA on August 18, 1993 formally put Sudan on
162
INTFRNAriONAI \FF\IKS
the list of terrorist states Consequently all non-humanitarian US aid to Sudan was withheld and the US
became obliged to veto all Woild Bank loans to Sudan
In 1966, Sudan held presidential and parliamentary elections AlBashir was elected President The new
parliament elected Hassanal Turabi the leader of the powerful political group called the National Islamic
Front as speaker In 1998 Sudan adopted a new constitution that allowed the formation of political parties
Several political parties were organized in
1999 In late 1990s tension grew between Al-Bashir and Al Turabi In December 1999 Al Bashir dissolved
the National Assembl> and removed Al Turabi as speaker
Beside that political instability fighting in the south continued, interfering with production and distribution
of food and causing widespread hunger Many civilians fled to the north or to the neighboring countries
Drought conditions in the mid-1980s, the 1990s and the early 2000s contributed to the spread of hunger and
disease
Allegations of supporting terrorism continued against Sudan Sudan harbored Osama bin Laden till he
departed to Afghanistan in 1999 In 1998 US cruise missiles targeted an alleged chemical weapon complex
in Sudan followed by heavy economic sanctions which added to the miseries of the country
The crisis in Sudan as evident from the above study, can be attributed to a number of domestic and
international factors mterplaymg to result in a miserable situation While the problem is rooted in the
preindependence dichotomous colonial policies, the continued military rule aggravated the conflict
situation The regime’s support to the fundamentalists was primarily aimed at securing a broader base of
legitimacy As for the international factors, Iran has been siding with the revivalists to have a foothold in the
region vis-a-vis its traditional animosity with conservative regimes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia As far as
USA is concerned, her chief concern in the post-Cold War era seems to be the possible threat of Islamic
revivalism for which Sudan can be a base too close to the sensitive area of the Middle East The crisis has
also a religious dimension as the major conflict is between dominant Muslims and the disgruntled
Christians The crisis has borne serious consequences on international and regional politics, USA to thwart
any challenge of radicalism, has become more conscious to the transborder infection of revivalism
particularly in Somalia The regional countries take it as a threat as the crisis may lead to irredentist claims
in their own areas (as in case of Eritrea) As for UN, it has posed a major challenge m terms of devising
I MFRGFNC F OF AFRIC \
163
effective relief progiamme in a eonflict-iidden atea \\heie the situation involves domestic legional and
international factois and inteiests
4FRIC \: AN Fc ONOMK AI LY Do\\ \ FRODDFN RFGION
There aie some reasons and evidence \\hich indicate that Africa after hav ing passed through the old and
neo-colomal periods is on the verge ot enteung a lenevved state of colonialism Pnor to the 1960s European
countries had directly colonised Africa and having such objectives as slave and gold trade plundered the
vast natural resources and wealth of this continent During this period, the people of the colonies weie not
permitted to rule or decide independently as they were being ruled by the colonialists This was the era of
old colonialism
After the 1960 s successive anti-colonial victories led to the independence of sev eral African countries In
this period the colonial rulers no longer consideied direct domination over the wealth of these countries as
advantageous They began to witness the awakening of the colonised people who demanded independence
and gradually began to leave colonies but retained their economic influence The economic dependency by
the colonies on the colonial rulers led to the continuation of their influence in their former colonies The
presidents and prime ministers of the newly independent African countries, some of whom were puppets of
the colonialist governments continued to protect the interests of their masters
After the collapse of the former So\ let Union, African countries which had enjoyed Soviet financial aid
and assistance for so many years and also had a governmental-based economic infrastructure suddenly
faced an economic \acuum and accepted the necessity of establishing fundamental changes in the structure
of their economies
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) during this period of time, put forward
a new programme entitled ”Economic Structural Adjustment Plan” for the improvement of the African
countries economic woes These international monetary organizations have played only minor roles in
regulating African economic equations in the past
Many of the progressive African leaders considered the active presence or the international monetary
organizations in the politicoeconomic scenes of this continent as the beginning of the revival and renewal
of colonialism They believed that Western countries, which during the neo-colomal period indirectly
colonized African countries had delegated such responsibilities to the Western monetary organizations,
while the
164
INTERNIATION VI. UFVIRS
Western countries were involved with the issues of new regions especially in East European countries.
Central Asia and Caucasia.
The fact is that the history of neo-colomalism (indirect domination) to control the fate of African
countries \\as not successful. The competition between East and West and the presence of progressive
leaders in African countries were obstacles toward the fulfilment of the new goals of the colonialists.
When the WB and the IMF, in the absence of socialist economy took direct control of the African
economy, the interests of the colonialists were better served than before. The ”Economic Structural
Adjustment Plan’’ was the tool to protect such interests.The objective of the Plan was to remove the control
over the economy by the government and to transfer it to the private sector.
The following recommendations had been included in that plan:
a) devaluation of currency;
b) privatization of public companies and industries:
c) elimination of subsidies:
d) liberalisation of trade;
The Plan for Economic Adjustment and the deadline for its implementation in the African countries
brought about negative effects and general public dissatisfaction.
In the recent past, the vice-president of the World Bank openly announced that the recommended policies
by this bank in Africa have failed and the bank would no longer recommend the economic plan for African
countries.
Despite this confession, the influence of the IMF and the WB is increasing only in the African continent
due to their economic needs. In this era, the key decisions in most African countries are made under the
supervision of Western monetary organisations. Ministers of finance and economic affairs are appointed
according to the recommendations of such organizations and leaders of African countries spend most of
their time consulting with the representatives of these organisations. The authority of the ruling regimes has
decreased and the continent is on the verge of a renewed colonialism.
Dr. Julius Nyerere, former Tanzanian President said, ”IMF is a tool for controlling the ideology and the
economy of poor countries by the richer countries.” The fact is that the economic independence \\hich
could have
EMERGENCE OF AFRICA
165
been the most important outcome of anti-colonialism struggles for African countries have not been realised
and the economy of the continent is controlled from outside just as before. The evolution of the old and
neocolonialism has entered a new phase of renewal of colonialism in Africa.
’i ’
ETHNIC CRISES IN AFRICA
The Ethnic crisis between the two African tribes Hutu and Tutsi have created a bloody conflict in Zaire and
Rwanda. The cases are rooted in the time when Africa was dominated by European colonial powers. After
World War II, when the color system came to an end a number of newly independent states emerged in
Africa. But the borders between these countries were not set out according to ethnic differences between
these people and based on historical facts. The borders were arranged by the colonial powers on the same
line which divided their realms in the continent. As a result of this policy, the members of a typical ethnic
group with its specific language, culture and traditions were divided into two or more countries. In other
words, the European colonial powers cautiously created such a situation in Africa that would always keep
the newly independent nations involved in border and ethnic disputes.
The colonialists also deliberately let the minority ethnic in any young state hold the political and military
power. If, for instance, the Hutus were in the minority in a particular country they would be brought to
power to rule the majority. The ethnic differences intensified as a result of the divisions within these
borders, which were set up for colonial intentions and have led to horrific bloodshed so far. Coup d’etats,
counter coups, civil wars, border clashes, which commonly occur between neighbouring African countries,
are part of this problem.
The most severe ethnic clashes between the Hutus and the Tutsis are going on in a region of Africa where
Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda are located. In recent years, there have been bloody conflicts in that
region, some as heavy as ethnic cleansing. The most recent of these conflicts have left thousands of
refugees and no solution has yet been found by the international community to repatriate them to their
native homeland.
Amid this situation, the Tutsi ethnic group is in the most vulnerable position as its members have been
divided along the borders between the countries in the region and their national loyalty mistrusted by the
people of these countries.
The segregated ethnic groups seem to have a natural tendency to secede from the states which reject them.
Besides, no African country has
166
succeeded in solving the ethnic problems v\ ithin its democratic syste and the minority ethnic communities
in Africa still have a strong feel g of being discriminated against. There is such a feeling among the mi jrity
Tutsi community who have lived in Zaire for about 200 years and Rv mda which has a common border
with Zaire is taking advantage of the situ ition in order to occupy some territory of Zaire which is
dominated by the ’I itsis. Rwanda thinks it can overcome its international crisis by this occup tion. The
weakness of the Zairian central government has encouraged Rwai la to step up its activities.
Having taken advantage of the crisis in the region and the dis >rder in the Zairian army, Tutsis in Zaire
have taken up arms against the a atral government. The occupation of towns and the looting and mutiny,
carried out by retreating Zairian soldiers with no commander have encouiaged Rwanda to extend its
territories in the region, historically dominated bv the Tutsi tribe. But, it remains to be seen whether the
countries in the region and the international community recognise the change of borders made by military
means.
Thus, changing the borders by sending troops to Zaire, as Rwanda is trying to do is not pragmatic. Any
change in the presently recognised border should be internationally approved and based on the limits of the
regions dominated by different ethnic groups, which at present is not possible. If Tutsis in Zaire call for
their political and cultural rights with the national integrity and sovereignty, of the country remained intact,
they may be able to achieve some of their rights. But, their secession from Zaire and annexation to Rwanda
will not solve their problems as it will put other countries of the region in a similar situation resulting in an
extensive regional war in which Zaire. Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda will be involved.
In July 1999, Zaire and the other countries participated in the conflict - except Chad, which had removed its
troops earlier - signed a cease fire agreement. The rebels signed the accord in August. However, some
fighting continued. In 2000, the UN sent a peace keeping force to Zaire (former Congo).
It is thought that the arms dealers and the Western arms manufacturing companies benefit more from the
intensification of the regional crisis in Africa, and they are, most probably, behind the regional conflicts all
over the world.
If the leaders of the countries which are on the verge of a war, do not realise the fact that any military
superiority is temporary and they
EMERGENCE OF AFRICA
167
cannot guarantee their long-term national security and stability and solve the ethnic crisis by extending
their territories within the borders of the neighbouring countries, there will be a new disaster in Africa.
Wars of expansionism will break-out between neighbouring countries, adding to the continent’s existing
crises such as poverty, famine, refugees, foreign debt and ethnic conflicts within national territories.
AFRICA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
The nevv millennium has brought great prospect of peace and prosperity to the downtrodden and backward
continent of the world Africa. On the economic front, Africa has put itself on the road to progress and
prosperity, with the commercial exploitation of vast reserves of oil in the west and Central Africa. Crude oil
is being pumped in Angola, Chad, Nigeria and Sudan inaugurating new oil markets. West Africa is
expected to emerge as a major supplier of crude oil to the US - supplying as much as
25 percent of America’s oil needs by 2015. It may substitute the Middle East oil market in the future.
African continent was the only region to see faster economic growth in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks
and the subsequent economic slump; four percent faster than any other developing region. With the
collapse of the international agricultural commodity prices, African countries with important mining and
extractive industries emerged as the most economically viable. The continent’s economic powerhouse,
South Africa led the way.
On political front too, the great strides made in advancing the democratization process were consolidated
during the last one or two years. Bostwana, Ghana, Mali Senegal and South Africa emerged as sustainable
and stable politics with multi-party democracies. These new democracies are successful in controlling
poverty in their respective regions, upto great extent.
On the other hand, the continent of Africa is still suffering with some serious social, political and economic
problems. Civil wars raged across the continent. Even as some conflicts ended or abated, for instance in
Sierra Leone and Angola; fresh wars erupted as in Ivory Coast. Political disturbances and border disputes
were much evident in 2002. The fault lines between Christians and Muslims, traditionalists and modernists
widened dramatically.
Conflict in Sudan continued unabated. Sudanese peace talks were held in Kenya under the auspices of the
Inter-governmental Authority of
168
Development (IGAD), East African regional organization of seven nations, but no headway was made.
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN DARFUR
Darfur (Arabic meaning ”home of the Fur”) is a region of the far western Sudan, bordering the Central
African Republic, Libya, and Chad. Darfur covers an area of some 493,180 sq km. with an estimated
population of 6 million people. It is largely an arid plateau with the Marrah Mountains (Jebel Marra), a
range of volcanic peaks rising up to 3,000 m . in the centre of the region. The north comprises a sandy
desert, while bush forest exists in the south. The region’s main towns are El Fashir, Nyala, and El Geneina.
The current conflict between the Janjaweed and the non-Arab peoples of the region has led to the
humanitirian crisis and the displacement of millions. Tensions between Arabs and Africans competing for
scarce natural resources in Darfur first surfaced during the 1970s
Darfur’s economy is primarily based on subsistence agriculture, producing cereals, fruit and tobacco as
well as livestock in the drier north. The main ethnic groups are the Fur (after whom the region is named),
speaking a Nilo-Saharan language, and the Arab Baggara. Others include the non-Arab Zaghawa, Masalit,
and Midob. The Baggara are divided into several tribes. Some of them, such as the Misseiria, speak
languages other than Arabic natively. Many of these ethnic groups also have significant populations in
neighboring Chad, particularly the Zaghawa and Baggara.
During much of Darfur’s history, relations between the Arab and non-Arab inhabitants of the region have
been tense. Formerly, it was a centre of the slave trade, with the Fur kingdom exporting Africans from
other parts of Sudan as slaves to the Arab world. The Arab and non-Arab inhabitants of the region have
differing economic needs, which has led to clashes: the non-Arab peoples are primarily sedentary farmers,
while the Arabs are nomadic herdsmen, which has brought them into conflict over access to land and water
resources.
The Darfur region is mostly semi-arid plains that cannot support a dense population. The one exception is
the area in and around the Jebal Marra mountains. It was from bases in these mountains that a series of
groups expanded to control the region.
The region became the scene of a bloody rebellion in 2003 against the Arab-dominated Sudanese
government, with two local rebel groups - the Justice and Equality Movement (Jem) and the Sudanese
Liberation Army (SLA) - accusing the government of oppressing non-Arabs in favour of
EMERGENCE OF AFRICA
169
Arabs. In response, the government mounted a campaign of aerial bombardment supporting giound attacks
by an Arab militia, the Janjaweed. The government-supported Janjaweed were accused of committing
major human rights violations, including mass killing, looting, and rapes of the non-Arab population of
Darfur. They have frequently burnt down whole villages, driving the surviving inhabitants to flee to refugee
camps, mainly in Darfur and Chad; many of the camps in Darfur are surrounded by Janjaweed forces. By
UN report 2005. 180.000-200.000 people had been killed and at least a million had been driven from their
homes, causing a major humanitarian crisis in the region..
Human Rights Watch urged U.N. Security Council members to urgently pass a new French-proposed
resolution that would refer Darfur to the International Criminal Court.
France put forward a resolution that would refer Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
move comes shortly after the United States indicated it would put its resolution on the peace-support
mission to a vote, establishing a U.N. peace-support mission for Sudan. This mission is to implement the
Naivasha peace agreement, the accord ending the 21-year civil war between the Sudanese government and
southern-based rebels. The peace-support mission will be deployed in the north and south of Sudan, but not
in Darfur, where Sudanese forces and government-backed Janjaweed militias have been responsible for
atrocities against civilians.
The Security Council also delayed a vote on targeted sanctions and accountability for Darfur. These were
initially included in a single resolution on Sudan. But the United States announced a decision to split the
single Sudan resolution into three separate resolutions.
In the year 2002, Nigeria witnessed the intensification of the conflict between the Islamist traditionalists
and secular modernists. Main reason for the religious violence was the promulgation of Islamic shariah in
the twelve northern states, predominantly Muslim in population where two Muslim women were sentenced
to death for adultery but neither was executed. There is very little possibility of resolving religious strife in
the near future. Madagascar is another example of civil strife and polarization, where elections resulted in a
political deadlock and old ethnic and racial tensions. Two communities, one of South East Asian descent
inhabiting the
•1
1 70 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
central high lands around the capital, and the other of African descent in the coastal areas are at
loggerheads with each other.
Environmental and climatic changes resulted in erratic and poor rainfall in some parts of the continent and
devastating floods in other parts. Chronic food insecurity became endemic in the arid Horn of African
region and Southern Africa in particular. The specter of famine reared its ugly head again in Ethiopia and
Southern Africa. HIV/AIDS is the chief cause of food crisis in the Southern Africa. The menace of
HIV/AIDS has caused social crisis where entire villages are depopulated. Labour shortages are created by
the vicious cycle of object poverty and starvation, disease and death.
Great Powers’ interest is increasing in the continent of Africa. They are really concerned with the
development of the region. The recent World Summit on sustainable development, if the agreements are
implemented sincerely, one of its most beneficiaries may be the African countries. The United States’
influence on the African political scene has become increasingly perceptible, especially in the sphere of
conflict resolution. The US role in ending the Ethiopian - Eritrean border conflict and its current efforts at
finding a lasting solution to the Sudanese civil war cannot be ignored. The great oil reservoirs of the region
increasingly attract the great powers.
THE MIDDl.F EAST
171
CHAPTER 8
THE MIDDLE EAST
IMPORTANCE OF THE AREA
By definition in geographical terms, the Middle East is the area that stretches over the regions between the
Far East and the Near East i.e. the area from Afghanistan to Libya including Arabia, Cyprus and Asiatic
Turkey. The Middle East is an area with immense historical, geopolitical and strategic significance. Its
importance owes to a number of other factors also such as:
(i)
(ii)
(in)
(iv)
It is the best of the world’s largest land mass, almost central in the inhabited earth. It serves as a gateway
from Asia into Africa and (through the Suez Canal) to Europe and the Americas. It is an area endowed with
abundant mineral resources, including the most important strategic mineral oil though the tapping of other
natural store houses of oil has diminished the importance of oil as was before. The Middle East and the
Gulf States still provide about 65% of the oil supplies to run the industries and cater for the fuel needs of
the world. Any disruption in the oil flow can lead to major disturbance in the existing balance of power.
The area is also important due to its typical geo-strategic location. It is a meeting ground for divergent
interests and playground for multi-farious policies. In the changed world, Middle East has acquired an even
more importance. Due to this aspect the world monetary policies have to take into account the wealth of
Sheikdoms, the strategists leave to keep an eye on the developments in the region regarding arms race,
ethnicity, border disputes, regionalism, radicalism etc. Finally, it is the meeting ground for various cultures,
civilizations and religions. The Holy places of Muslims, Christians and Jews make it fairly important for
almost all humans on the face of the earth.
] 72 IM FUN VTIONAL AFFAIRS
RECENT HISTORY
Until 1918, all Aiab countncs weie still, nominally at least, pait at the Turkish Fmpire, and of these Egypt
was virtually a British piotectoiate Alieady, when the Fust Woild War bioke out, the seeds of nationalism
were alive In letum for then assistance gnen to the agents such as Col TE Lawrence, the Bntish
government promised to aid them in obtaining their independence But when the war ended, the Bntish did
not fulfil their piomise, They divided Aiabia into several states not only creating malnes, but also staging
on themselves thiough the system of mandates First they failed to fulfil their piomise to Prince Peisal of
Hijaz, who had helped Britain against Tuikey He was not gnen the territory he was promised The Greater
Syria, dieam of Feisal, comprising Iiaq. Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Palestine, could not become a reality
Feisal was given Iraq and Jordan was given to FeisaFs brother, Amir Abdullah But the brothers claimed
”Greater Syria” In the meantime, Feisal’s kingdom of Hijaz was occupied by Ibn Saud This created a’
triangular animosity Two Hashimite States were each other’s rivals and both were opposed by Saudi Arabia
So by partition Britain created a lot of bitterness and division And above all this, they were not yet
independent Iraq, Jordan and Palestine remained under the British mandate, while Syria and Lebanon
became mandates under France When this arrangement was settled, the British thought that they had
liberated the Arabs from the Turks but, on the other hand, the Arabs thought of them as the new Turks
From then on, the nationalism of the Arabs was directed against Britain and France Besides this, the
British were creating a new cause for Arab opposition The Balfour declaration of 1917 promised the
Jewish National Home in Palestine Its exact nature was left vague at that time
Since that time the struggle started to oust the British Imperialism The fight went on two fronts, one was
against the British mandate system and its continued existence through military bases, the other was against
the formation of a Jewish National Home Let us deal with the first now
The Arabs felt that the foreign hand was distorting the cause of their political life The Arab intelligentsia
blamed the West for keeping alive out-of-date monarchies and feudal classes The Arabs resented the fact
that economic power was combined with political power in British hands Nationalism, oil and Palestine,
these three things united the Arabs and there was no Arab country where Britain could face an easy time
The mistake in the British policy m the Middle East was to under-rate the forces of Arab opposition to this
economic, political and military imperialism The stationing of foreign troops m a country, even if it is
alleged to be for the country’s own protection is a red rag to nationalism France in Syria and
MIDDI F, FAST
173
Britain in Iiaq taced a iea!ly tough time and icpeatedly had to lesoit to militaiy force in oidei to quell the
lebelhons I he 20’s and 30’s were a penod of haidship for Butain Egypt got independence in 1922. but the
contiol of Suez Canal base lemamed in British hands In 1936, due to piessure of Italy in Ethiopia, Egypt
consented to give them lease of the base till 1956 The mandate in Iiaq ended in 1930. but conliol of t\vo
(military bases was letamed thiough a tieaty Much piessuie was excited on Butain for revision of the tieatv,
in 1948 A new tieat) the Tieat\ of Portsmouth was agieed upon, but it was not latified by Iiaq Butain had to
hatch the plan ol CENTO, in oidei to keep the contiol of the base Mandate in S>na, Lebanon and Jordan
ended soon aftei Woild Wai II was ovei But in Jordan, the control of the two bases \vas letamed b\ Butain
But after the war, stiuggle against Bntish Impeiialism enteied a new phase moie grim than an> pievious one
The promised Jewish National Home was m-sight The idea of such Jewish State had oiigmated during the
lust Woild V\ai Britain wanted Jewish dollais foi the war and the Jews wanted a State ot their own At the
same time, Britain wanted the goodwill of the Arabs Britain followed her traditional policy of double-
dealing The Balfour Declaration of 1917 gave assurance to Jews of a home of their own Intact, Britain had
m view a State including both Arabs and Jews, both sharing in the control Now the Jews wanted to be in
the majonty while Arabs wanted them to be in the minority During the 1930’s immigration took place at a
tremendous speed The Arabs were opposing it with all their might and resolution, but the Jews came
pouring in In 1939, as it was a time of wai, Britain announced her intentions of limiting the immigration
mainly to placate the Arabs At that time there was a ratio of 6 to 10 between Jews and Arabs After the war,
the Jews came in v ery large numbers aided both by US and Britain The Arabs decided to face this peril of
disguised colonialism by uniting themselves in the Arab I eague in 1945
Britain failing to find any compromise solution, as the Jews weie now m considerable strength and
numbers, left the trusteeship to UN. During 1947, the matter was debated in UN As a result a UN
commission was formed for Palestine which suggested the partition of the country Before partition could be
effected, British troops departed on 15th May,
1948, thus facilitating for the Jews to establish an independent Jewish State, which came into being on the
same day and became known as Israel. The Arabs, who had been assembling an Army of Liberation,
maiched across the frontiers Fierce fighting took place and surprisingly enough, despite the greater Arab
numerical strength the Jews were able to defeat the Arabs and gain much more territory than was allowed
to them undei the British Plan of UN and since then they are not only consolidating their position, but
rather increasing their temtoual gains Now they have gained about 40% more than what w as due to them
1
T
174
INTFRN \1ION\I \FF\IRS
IMF MIODI F F\ST
175
Altei 1949 the aiea had been in an inflammable state ot semipeace Mutual laids \veie a lecuiring fcatuie
Both parties kept a ngid trade embargo In the early fifties, the policy v\as expiessed in the Tnpaitite
Declaration of 1950 in which Britain US and Prance announced that they would contiol aims deh\enes to
the t\\o paities so that neither could be notably stionger than the other and that in the event of an attack by
eithei paity they would take action against the aggressoi This policy however tailed It \\as in fact a policy ot
protecting Israel and then strengthening it Western hold ovei the Middle last partlv loosening, it was
imperative that Israel be made a fimi base ot impeiiahsm Aiab nationalism was surging up most ominously
for the West and they were hterall> being shoed out ot Arab land The bases which weie now the only
remnants of Western imperialism, were target of bitter opposition from Arab nationalism and their stay
became difficult with the advent of Nasser and his company in Egypt He not only oigamzed the Eg>ptian
nationalist forces, but also commenced a course of spearheading the Pan-Arab resistance movement against
the West whether it was against economic exploitation military bases or Israel Fgypt wanted the British to
go, while thev would not In
1947, the matter was taken to UN by Egypt, but found no support In 1951, the treaty was abrogated by
Egypt and every effort was made to make the British occupation impossible In October 1954, agreement
was reached through concessions by both sides British forces were to be completely evacuated within
twenty months The forces could return in ease of attack on any member of the Arab League by Turkey The
agreement ended a period in history It marked the end of British military ascendancy in the Middle East
The Bntish bases which remained in Jordan and Iraq, lost much of then importance Britain was letting go
its actual physical hold upon the Suez Canal its lifeline
A violent conservative revolt sprang up in Butain over the signing of this treaty The ultra-Conservativ es
were called the Suez Group the diehard imperialists and pro-Israelis Sir Anthony Eden had to struggle hard
to get the treaty ratified It was this Suez group which later caused the downfall of Eden one of the most
emotional Premiers Britain ever had On the other hand, Nasser became the leader and symbol of Arab unity
His actions had considerably boosted the anti-West feelings all over the Arab States Although some so-
called particulanst groups resisted this move for unification, as their vested interests would be destroyed the
intelligentsia desired unity and wanted someone who could lead them After hav ing failed to bring the
Arabs into MEDO Plan, the West went on to forge a new design of continued military presence The MEDO
Scheme was a link of Anglo-US global strategy against Russia Infact it was a manoeuvre to retain the
control of all the existing bases in the Middle East But the Arabs who were already determined to wipe out
all existing holds of Imperialism
were a hard nut to crack They saw in this plan perpetuation of western mmtaiy command and also of
Israel Already then nationalism had suffered a giave humiliation in the way of militaiy defeat at the hands
of Isiael The West which had dominated them lor so long replacing the earhei Turkish hegemony, and
which had lecently been guilty of the gravest sin against the Arabs by creating the Jewish State of Israel,
could not be trusted Their hard-won freedom was not to be lost again Intact, a lot had to be done, towards
the struggle against the military bases Israel and economic exploitation Moreovei the idea that
MEDO was intended to be defence oigamzation against Russia would not seive interest ot Arab States veiy
much It might have some appeal toi Tuikey Iian and Iraq but certainly not for States lying far away fiom
them and always immune from Russian threat So the plan fell thiough Meanwhile, Britain had lost the Suez
Canal base, and was on the verge of losing two air bases in Iraq And the Suez Group of Conservatives in
Britain was clamouring for salvaging this sinking military and political influence in the Middle East So it
was under these circumstances that the idea of Baghdad Pact originated The treaty was a reaffirmation of
the resolve by Western countries to maintain the bases in the Middle East It killed three birds with one
stone It was an alliance against Russia It was an imperialist move to stay on in the Middle East, and above
all, it became an instrument for blocking the ambitions of Egypt to be the paramount Arab state working for
Arab nationalist unity Dissension was sown Iraq having traditional ambitions of Arab leadership and thus a
close rival to the Egyptian claims, was chosen to be the British protege in the Middle East, and with it was
associated Turkey But if alliance was to be a counter-weight against Nasser, it had to draw in the other
Arab countries The Arabs saw in it one more desire by the West to try to use them as pawns in their Cold
War against Russia In their eyes such a manoeuvre was a desire for Arab equality and sovereignty And
above all, it intended to sabotage the plans of Arab unity Bitter struggles of rival parties raged on in Jordan
and Syria, but ultimately the West had to lose the struggle on both the places The counter attraction for
Egypt was too strong Nasser became the spokesman of the rising tide of Arab nationalism
The machinery of Baghdad Pact propelled Russia forward And it was encouraged to do so, because the
alliance angered most of the Arabs Western moves, having failed to bring round Egypt and her nationalist
offensive, tried a new manoeuvre This was a refusal of the promised aid for the Aswan High Dam Nasser
and the lest of the world interpreted the action as a rebuff But this counter-measure back-fired, and the
West suffered such a humiliation at the hands of Nasser that all subsequent attempts to conciliate the Aiabs
almost completely failed
176
INTERNATIONAL .\FF\IRS
THE MIDDLE EAST
177
A condemnation of Anglo-French military adventurism had to greet the aggressors. Russia, in the
meantime threatened military intervention on behalf of Egypt. The British were already incurring a huge
economic loss due to stoppage of the Sue/ Canal. Amid a world-wide denunciation and complete loss of
goodwill of the Afro-Asian block, there came to an end the novel way of ”gaining spheres of influence” by
direct militarism This tactless imperialism heralded the downfall of Anglo-French influence in the Middle
East and aroused the \\hole African subject peoples to demand their freedom.
THE CREATION OF ISRAEL
The creation of Israel on May 15, 1948 was an incident that was going to have far-reaching impacts on the
regional and international politics. It was not an isolated episode in history where a nation got a homeland
for themselves. The creation of Israel was into a well conceived idea of the complicated vested interests,
regional and international, interplaying together. As the later developments revealed Israel was implanted
in this sensitive region to serve as a protege of imperialist powers who wanted to perpetuate their hold over
the area indirectly. Israel is both a state and a state of mind to the Jews. It was named for Jacob whose
battle with the angel of God led him to be called Israel (”He who struggles with God”). It was the land of
Zion (Judea), the homeland of the Jews for seven centuries. The Romans expelled the Jews from Jerusalem
in 135 AD. But from then on the Jews never ceased to look upon the land as rightfully theirs, though had
been dispersed for 2000 years.
The Jews never forgot this claim over the land of Palestine. In succeeding centuries, Palestine was over-run
by the Arabs in 636 AD Crusaders (1099), Mamelukes (1250) and Turks (1517). The land was almost
settled by the Muslims, though a few lonely Jews hung on at Jerusalem’s waiting wall.
Towards the end of the last century, when Russia and Poland drove the Jews out of their ghettos, some of
them headed back to the land of their ancestors. The first pioneers began planning the revival of Jewish
state. They organized themselves into ”kibbutzim” and bought lands from the Turks. They got support of
the newly created World Zionist Organization to realize this object.
Theoder Herzl. a native of Budapest, gave Zionism a political turn. He founded a weekly die Welt which
became an official mouthpiece of
Zionism. The first Zionist Congress was called in 1896. A resolution was adopted that ”a home in
Palestine” for the Jewish people should be acquired and for this puipose a World Zionist organization be
created.
Mr. ilerzl negotiated with the British government, which later agreed to provide land to the Jews in Uganda
to establish a state. This offer was rejected by the Russian Zionist majority at the 7th Congress of the World
Zionist Organization in 1904. The Congress refused to consider any alternative to Palestine. The
organization raised large funds to acquire land in Palestine. The Jewish National Fund and Palestine
Foundation Fund were organized for this purpose.
In the beginning some orthodox Jews opposed the Zionist movement because they thought a return to Zion
must be brought about by divine intervention. Their view was that political Zionism was incompatible with
the religious basis of Jewry but Zionism was a national movement which gave scattered Jews the status of a
nation. It emerged victorious ultimately. There were some 85,000 Jews in Palestine by 1914. Among them
were David Ben Gurian, the dreamer of Israel, and Levi Eshkol, a burly Ukrainian youth who left school at
19 to follow the dream.
The British, who were given a League of Nations mandate over Palestine, could not make up their mind to
whom the land belonged. They promised it to the Arabs in 1915, to the Jews in 1917 (Balfour Declaration)
and fiscally, after almost 20 years of Arab rioting to the Arabs again in a White Paper issued on the eve of
the World War II. But the war swung the balance in favour of the Jews. The Western world took the cause
of the Jews as its own.
The Balfour Declaration set a new period in the history of the Jews. Now Zionists were to transform
themselves from mere missionaries into state builders. They applied themselves to the new task with zeal
and vigour. Strong Zionist delegates from Britain and United States took up the cause of the Jews
successfully and got a quota for the Zionist immigrants to Palestine. A Jewish Agency was formed which
co-operated with the mandatory power in many fields, including Health, Education and Agriculture. The
Agency became official spokesman of Jewry with regard to Jewish settlement in Palestine. It was due to
this fact that the scattered Jews of Europe began flooding into Palestine in defiance of the British
immigration ban.
With the increase of Jewish immigration, the Arab opposition was becoming more and more intense. The
Arabs demanded that immigration be stopped and that land sales to Jews by Arabs be prohibited, and
insisted
178
I\TER\ATIO\AI AFF\IRS
upon the establishment of a democratic parliamentary government But they were not organized Butish
diplomacy played its role and negotiated with the Arabs and the Jews side by side The British kept the
Arabs divided by offering them small kingdoms on the one hand, and continued settling Jews in Palestine
on the other Since the creation of Israel was a problem for the whole of the Islamic woild so the Indian
Muslim leaders took keen interest in it Ah Brothers, Dr Mohammed Iqbal, Zafar Ah Khan and others
strongly protested against the British policy and criticized the lole of the Arabs who were playing into the
hands of the English
The Arabs in general, adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the mandatory power Anti-Jewish riots
occurred in 1929 and 1933 but in vain Hitler’s rise in Germany brought a new wave of emigration to
Palestine, which alone accounted for over 60,000 new arrivals in 1935 This caused new unrest among the
Arabs and they started a campaign of terror in
1936-37, known as ”Arab rebellion ” It continued till the outbreak of World War II
The Zionists expressed readiness to stand by the British government in World War II The Jews extended
valuable material and technical support to the Allies The British caused artificial truce during the World
War II After the War, the British position became unstable, so they drew up their hands and turned over the
Palestine problem to the United Nations on April 2 1947 The General Assembly decided to partition the
land between Arabs and Jews on November 29, 1947 The Arab state was to include central and eastern part
of Palestine from Valley of Esdreation down to Beer Sheba, Western Galilee and a strip of land along the
Mediterranean coast from Gaza southward and along the Egyptian border to the Red Sea The Jewish state
would include Jaffa and Valley of Esdreation, a coastal area from Haifa to south of Jaffa Jerusalem and
Bethlehem with adjoining territory were to stay outside of both states and be subject to an administration
responsible to the Trusteeship Council The Arabs challenged this and declared ”Any attempt to establish a
Jewish State in Arab territory is an act of aggression which will be resisted in self-defence by force ”
The British government terminated the mandate over Palestine on May 1948 Ben Gunan declared Israel as
an independent Jewish State on the same day at 4 00 p m The declaration began ”In the land of Israel, the
Jewish people came into being ” The Western countries extended de facto recognition to Israel a few hours
later
The Arab reaction was immediate and violent Charging that the Jews had usurped Arab land, the combined
armies of Egypt, Jordan Iraq,
THF MIDD1 F F\ST
179
Lebanon and Syna maidied on Isiael and bombers attacked Tel Aviv on May 15 1948 After 8 months of
fighting, the Arabs accepted the cease-fiie as Isiael v\as suppoited by po\vertul Western countries The
Arabs put do\\n their guns, but refused to recognize Israel During the war about
75 000 Palestinian Arabs fled fiom the land of their ancestors to various neighbouring countnes
Isiael again imaded Egypt on October 29 1956, and soon occupied most of the Sinai peninsula France and
Britain also joined on Oct
31 1956 The United Nations Emergency Force occupied the Egyptian bolder to enforce the cease-fiie
THE SUEZ CRISIS
The canal owed its inception to a torrner French consular official in Egypt, Ferdinand de Lesseps, who
obtained from Mohammed Said Pasha, the Viceroy of Egypt, a concession to construct a canal that would
link the Mediterranean with the Red Sea This concession was obtained on November 30, 1854 The
concession authorized him to found an international company to administer it A second agreement on
January 5,
1856, specified that the concession was to last for ninety-nine years from the opening of the canal, after
which the waterway would become the property of the Egyptian government
Digging of the canal began in April 1859 The canal was formally opened m November, 1869 Already in
1858, de Lesseps had formed the Compognve Umverselle du Canal Maritime de Suez, the shares of which
were subscribed for in a large part by the French public and by the Egyptian government of course, with an
understanding that an adequate part of the stock would be available to other nations More than half of the
shares were purchased by Frenchmen
Since nothing is permanent in human affairs except change, it is not astonishing that the control of Suez
Canal passed through sundry vicissitudes m the course of a century Khedive Ismail, facing bankruptcy, sold
his shares m the canal company, thus constituting 44% of all shares to the British government in 1875
Although Egypt got independence from the British in 1922, British control of the canal in various forms
was to endure until 1956
Meanwhile politics m Egypt were explosive Insurgent forces of nationalism were struggling for total
emancipation Egypt had agreed in a
20-year treaty of 1936 to British defence of the Suez Canal The Egyptian parliament abrogated the treaty in
October 1951, and rejected an invitation
180
INTERNATIONAL VFFAIRS
to participate in an Anglo-Americun-French-Turkish ”Middle-East Command” to defend the whole area

against communism. Great Britain supported by USA, reaffirmed its treaty rights and reinforced its Suez
garrison which fired upon Egyptian police in November. In January 1952, anti-British riots took place in
Egypt. In July 1952, General Mohannned Naguib led an Army coup and took over the government.
Following the exile of the king, General Naguib \vas ousted in October 1954. by Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser.
Nasser was unanimously elected President in 1956. Nasser supported the idea of Arab unity and denounced
imperialism. In a short time, he became the leader of anti-imperialist forces in the Arab \\orld.
In the beginning of 1956, diplomacy in the Middle East revolved around President Nasser’s project of a
High Aswan Dam, designed to increase Egypt’s arable land area by 2.000,000 acres and thereby improve
the living standards of the peasantry. The dam was to require fifteen years to complete and was to cost $
1,300,000,000. In February, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development had sanctioned a loan
of S
200,000,000. Meanwhile the USSR government had also promised a loan for the dam.
In July, 1956, Great Britain and USA withdrew the offer of aid for the High Aswan Dam. On July 19, 1956,
the State Department declared that the developments within the succeeding seven months had not been
favourable to the success of the project and the US government concluded that it was not feasible in present
circumstances to participate in the project. Great Britain and the International Bank followed suit, as it was
all prearranged. The West wanted to place Nasser in a tight corner. Nasser found himself deserted. Nasser’s
reaction to the Western rebuff was swift and startling. On July 26, 1956, he proclaimed the nationalization
of the Suez Canal and declared that henceforth its revenues would go towards the financing of the High
Aswan Dam Project.
Nasser’s action shocked the Western Powers. They claimed that the nationalization was a violation of the
international character of the canal. France and Britain threatened to use force against Egypt and began a
gradual build up of their forces in the Middle East. In Paris, the cabinet favoured immediate occupation of
the canal zone, the British treasury blocked all Egyptian accounts in the United Kingdom but Nasser
declared, ”We shall meet force with force and will fight to the last drop of our blood.”
A conference of twenty-two interested nations was convened in London on August 16. to devise means of
solving the dispute. The conference decided to set up an international authority to administer the
THE MIDDLE EAST
181
Suez Canal. A commission of five nations was appointed to negotiate international control with Egypt, but
the negotiations resulted in failure.
On September 12, 1956, was approved the idea of creation of a Canal Users Association which was set up
on October 1, with fifteen member states. Despite this, Britain and France on September 23, decided to
bring the Suez matter to the UN Security Council.
The debate began on October 5. The Anglo-French resolution asked the Security Council to condemn the
nationalization of the canal as a violation of Egypt’s international obligations and to tell Egypt to negotiate
on the basis of the London proposals for international control and meanwhile to co-operate with Suez Canal
Users’ Association. Egypt was not willing to accept international control.
The Security Council again met on October 13. The Anglo- French Resolution was then put in a revised
form. The first para of the resolution consisted of a set of principles similar to those produced by Egypt
which reaffirmed the convention of 1988. The Egyptian foreign minister spoke in favour of this part. But
the second part of the resolution which endorsed international control, was vetoed by USSR.
Meanwhile new troubles were brewing in the Middle East. Tension between Israel and Jordan was
unusually high. On October 11, Israel made a heavy reprisal raid into Jordan. Finally Israel invaded Egypt
on October
29. The United States immediately called for an emergency meeting of the Security Council on October 30,
to consider an American resolution requiring the Israelis to go back to their borders. The resolution was
vetoed by France and Great Britain.
On the same day, (October 30, 1958,) the British and French governments delivered ultimatums to both
Israel and Egypt requiring them to stop fighting and withdraw to ten miles from the Suez Canal (which is
100 miles from the Israeli-Egyptian border on the Egyptian side) They declared that they would occupy
Port Said, Ismailia and Suez if these conditions were not met within twelve hours. Nasser at once rejected
the ultimatum. Next day, Anglo-French bombers began attacking Egyptian air fields.
An emergency meeting of the General Assembly was convened on

1st and 2nd November which resolved by 64 votes to 5, in favour of an immediate cease-fire, the
withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian troops to their borders, a general embargo on the entry of military goods
into the area of conflict, and immediate steps to reopen the canal after a cease-fire.
184
reasons. U Thant called a meeting of ambassadors from the seven countries contributing troops to the
Emergency Force and informed them of the situation. It was emphasized to them that UAR was acting
within its rights on its sovereign territory and the UN troops had no mandate to use force. Hence the UAR
troops moved into key positions near the observation posts along the border.
Egypt mined entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba and ordered to stop Israeli ships from entering the waterway on
May 24, 1967. Being in a state of war with Israel, UAR was entitled to the blockade. The position was
legally unquestionable because of the peculiar position of the Gulf and the fact that Israel’s so-called right
of passage was not derived either from an agreement with UAR or from some established usage. It is
entirely an internal Arab waterway. When Nasser blockaded the Gulf, there was disturbance in London and
Washington. Under the Anglo-American plan a declaration was to be circulated among the world’s
maritime nations offering that (1) the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway and (2) all signatories are
entitled to exercise the right of ”free and innocent” passage. UK and USA did their best to get the
declaration signed and secure a right of free passage for Israel. France declared that it was opposed to
signing any such declaration. So said Turkey. The Israeli premier called the blockade ”an act of
aggression.” President Johnson also called it ”an act of war.” President Nasser warned USA and UK
against collective action to end the blockade. Foreign Minister of UAR Mr. Riad said, ”Any collective
measure taken by these (maritime) powers constitutes all aggression against UAR’s sovereignty that
exercises legitimate rights over its territorial waters. Israel gave in to the temptation to strike first and fast at
the Arabs, knocking them off their balance and freeing the Gulf of Aqaba by marching down the Sinai
peninsula to the sea. It was natural temptation counting on diplomacy and goodwill of such friends as the
USA and Britain to work out the problem. Taking this into consideration, Israel attacked UAR and Syria on
June 5, 1967, at 10:30 a.m. without declaring war. In the hope of gaining an advantage, Israel launched an
unprovoked attack against UAR on all along the 117-mile Sinai border. Its military objectives were
achieved before Arab mobilization was complete. Israel wanted to gain an advantage by making the first
moves in the war. Being a country with no strategic depth, Israel’s military strategy relied heavily on the
capacity to wage a highly mobile warfare in its adversary’s territory and to inflict maximum damage on the
opposing forces within the shortest possible time.
At this crucial hour, all Arab countries from Aden in the east to Morocco in the west showed a sense of
solidarity and an urge for united action that finds no parallel in recent Arab history. King Hussein of Jordan
flew to Cairo and signed a 5-year defence Pact with Nasser. Iraqi Forces
THE MIDDLE EAST
185
moved into the Sinai Desert to back up Egypt. Algerian troops detachments reached Egypt and fought
against Israeli forces. From Morocco came pledge of troops. Libya dispatched soldiers to Egypt. The Sudan
ordered full mobilization and an airlift of troops to Sinai. Even President Bourguiba of Tunisia volunteered
a detachment of troops.
All the Muslim world, which had never reconciled itself to the destruction of Arab Palestine’s entity, was
committed to the Arab cause. The people and government of Pakistan decided to stand by the Arabs in their
hour of trial, and offered all moral and materiel support to them. Turkey refused to sign the declaration of
maritime powers, declaring Aqaba an international waterway and made it clear that Turkey would not
allow its bases to be used against the Arabs. Iran also stood by the Arabs and offered all support.
UAR and other Arab countries broke off diplomatic ties with USA and Britain as they had been supporting
the Israel right from the beginning. The Arab states also stopped oil supply to all such countries as were
friendly to Israel.
Within four stormy days, Israeli forces swept across Sinai, overwhelmed the holy city of Jerusalem and
seized substantial chunks of Syrian territory. Might triumphed over night once again. The Arab States had
to accept a cease-fire, and they lay stricken and bleeding. There had been a virtual massacre of the brave
Jordanians. The Syrians were being pushed back even after the cease-fire, and Jewish victory rocked the
UAR Government of its foundations. President Nasser resigned but was kept in office only after people’s
unanimous request. It was an almost crucial and unequal conflict. The Israeli war machines, perfected on
the Nazi pattern, gained a decisive advantage. Its striking power, particularly in the air, was far greater than
was commonly realized. Another factor which helped the aggressor was that the whole bloody drama was
over before the bulk of Arab armies from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, the Sudan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
could join hands against the enemy. If only the Arabs could have had more time to pool their resources and
seek support from friendly Muslim countries, the scale of battle might well have been tilted in their favour.
Over-reliance on USSR was yet another factor. What made the Russians pause was the fact that their
support of Nasser could backfire on them, The Turks, for example, might some day close the Bosphorus
and the Dardnelles, or the Scandinavians seal off the Baltic by blockading the Skagerrak and the Strait of
Kattegat.
Jgg I\1H{\ \IIO\AI
south and the north on October 6. 1973 against Israel Though Jordan did not open the thud front yet
Ionian’s aimy took active part in the wai on the Syrian front In the meantime Iraq, Morocco and Saudi
Arabia also sent their foices to the battle-field The Arabs initially got upper hand and captured 450 sq miles
in Sinai deseit besides the impoitant points of Golan Heights Israel had to fight a defensive war on the
noithem front fierce battles weie fought on Golan Heights and Isiaeh Air Force bombed target in Syria and
UAR in retaliation of Arab locket attacks Isiaehs regained control of Qmentrai and on October 13 Israeli
forces captured the road to Damascus Both sides continued to claim victories on battle fiont But picture
remained fluid In the naval battles Israel suffeied heavily
In the war Soviet Union helped the Arabs while USA supplied
arms to Israel On October 16 one Israeli task force made a major move and
crossed the Suez Canal occupying a part of the territory on the West Bank
of Suez Canal between great Bitter Lake and Ismaiha, By October 17
initiative was wrested by Israel despite the fact that Arabs were making
good progress and Israel’s losses were very heavy The war raged fiercely
till October 22 when UN was able to pass a resolution asking both sides to
cease-fire At the time of cease-fire 12,000 Israeli troops with 200 tanks
were holding a bridgehead on the West Bank of the Suez Canal running for
30 miles and were 20 miles inside Egypt Cairo-Ismaiha link was cut and
also were cut the supply lines to the Egyptian 3rd army, which was
encircled in southern sector near the town of Suez Israel had also cut-off
communication between Cairo and Suez Desprte agreement of both sides to
stop war, heavy fighting was reported around Suez Canal on October 23 and
24 Both sides blamed each other for truce violation Apart from some
sporadic outbreak of firing, the Sinai front remained calm after October 24
following the second UN cease-fire resolution
It was the fourth Arab-Israel armed clash since creation of Israel In the beginning Israel was very close to
defeat as admitted by the then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Merr The myth of invincibility of Israeli armed
forces was exploded for the first time Despite the heavy odds, the Arabs knocked out the first line of Israeli
forces and crossed the Suez Canal as well as the Barlev line
The Arab countries involved in the w ar got every possible help and suppoit from the Muslim world
Another important development was the use of oil as a political-weapon by the Arabs against those
supporting Israel The Western supporters of Israel learned to their dismay that Arabs were united and as a
result their stand on the cause of the Arabs underwent change The Muslim world on the whole became
conscious of a need for unity realizing that if Muslim countries act collectively they could achieve
IMF MIDDLFI wr
189
bettei terms in the international lelations Though Aiabs could not achieve their ob|ectives completely yet
they made the vvoild icalize the seriousness of Middle East problems and consequent danger to the world
peace It was unfortunate that the Arabs could not fight for long because of the open American suppoit to
Ibiael while they vveie not getting Russian support to the same extent This was confirmed by President
Anvvai Sadaat in a press confeience aftei the cease-hie in which he categoncally said that he could fight
Isiael but not America This tact made the Muslim Leadeis realise that Muslim world had no choice but to
put a united fiont on diplomatic and international foium The net result was a senous contemplation among
the Muslim leadeis to come together and decide upon the strategy and the steps they could take to wipe out
the effects of Isiaeh aggiession As a sequel Muslim vvoild agreed to call a Summit on the initiative of King
feisal of Saudi Arabia Pakistan took the lead and offeied to host the Summit which was held in Lahore in
February 1974 In this confeience. Middle Fast issues were discussed thoroughly Besides the firm and cleai
lesolution on these issues the Summit also agreed upon the mechanics and operational schemes, as well as
various steps to be taken by the Muslim world for solving the problems
THE SINAI AGREEMENT
The Middle East pot continued to boil after the Ramadan war of
1973. with peace negotiations labouring ahead inch by inch and a backdrop to them being provided by the
terrorist activ ities of the Palestinians against the Zionists and Israel’s reprisal raids against Palestinian
refugee camps in Lebanon Although the cease-fire on both the Sue? and Syrian fronts was generally
maintained, and despite the opening of the Geneva peace conference, clashes between the Arab and Israeli
forum continued to occur in both during late 1973 and early 1974
In this atmosphere of tension came the first ”Kissinger Shuttle ” Negotiations had been in progress for quite
some time between Egyptian and Israeli envoys both at Geneva and at Kilometer 101, under supervision of
the UN In the third week of January Kissinger embarked on his shuttle He undertook a number of flights
between Israel and Egypt to piesent each side’s ideas and proposals to the other in connection with the
disengagement offerees in the Suez-Sinai fiont On Jan 17. the agreement was reached and signed by Mrs
Meir and Piesident Sadaat. in the presence of Dr Kissinger An agieement coveung the military details of
disengagement was signed at Kilometei 101 by envoys of Egypt and Israel
The agieement provided for the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the areas West of the Suez Canal
which they had held since the cease-
190
THE MIDDLE EAST
191
fire, and for an Israeli pull-back East of the canal to the area covering the Mitla and Giddi Passes. The
general effect of the agreement was the creation of three parallel zones, six miles each Bast of the canal
occupied from East to West by Egyptian, UN and Israeli forces. Egypt thus regained the West Bank and
this relieved the beleaguered Third Army. By the end of February, disengagement had been achieved on the
Suez front.
More than four months after the signing of the Suez disengagement agreement, a similar agreement for the
disengagement of forces on the Golan front was signed by Syria and Israel in Geneva on May 31. The
agreement was the result of a spectacular Kissinger shuttle which lasted for one month, involving numerous
hopes between Damascus and Jerusalem. The agreement led to a cessation of hostilities on the Golan
Heights, where Syrian and Israeli forces had clashed almost daily for many weeks. The general effect of the
agreement was that Israel would withdraw from all the areas taken in the October 1973 war, as well as from
some areas occupied in the 1967 war. Israel would, however, retain control of three strategic hills West of
Quientrar, which itself was handed over to the Syrians.
In February and March 1975, Dr. Kissinger again embarked on his magical shuttle diplomacy. This time
however he ran into water much too deep for him. The essential elements of the further disengagement
sought by Dr. Kissinger on these missions comprised: (i) a withdrawal of Israeli forces by upto 30 miles on
the Suez front, effectively returning the strategically important Mitla and Giddi Passes to Egyptian control,
(ii) the return to Egypt of the valuable Abu Rudeis oil field; and (in) obtaining undertakings from Egyptian
government regarding the future peace and stability of the area.
On (i) and (ii) Egypt was not prepared for any compromise. However, Israel declared that it would
relinquish the Passes and the oil-field only after a public declaration of non-belligerency by Egypt. Such a
declaration would have antagonized Egypt’s Arab allies. Kissinger was thus very definitely facing a
deadlock, and as was expected, his efforts failed to sway either of the parties.
An important development was that the US let it be known clearly that it regarded Israel’s intransigence as
the primary cause of the failure of the Kissinger mission. The US was said to be in the process of carrying
out a reappraisal of its Middle East policy This was a clear attempt to pressurize Israel into adopting a more
flexible attitude: The success of US pressure ultimately led to the successful Kissinger shuttle of August
1975.
After eleven days of shuttling Kissinger succeeded in preparing an interim peace accord which was signed
by Egypt and Israel on September 1,
1975. The agreement envisaged a renunciation by the two parties of the use of force against each other and
an extension of their cease-fire indefinitely. In addition, Israel was to withdraw deeper into the Sinai desert,
including the surrender of Giddi and Mitla Passes and the Abu Rudeis oil-fields. The agreement was
accompanied by an American proposal to establish three manned monitoring stations in the buffer zone
between the Egyptian and Israeli armies. American technicians were also to inspect the work of Israeli and
Egyptian monitoring posts near the Giddi Pass in Western Sinai.
The agreement was a major breakthrough by the US in its peace efforts in the Middle East. Though interim,
it could be the basis of a future and permanent settlement in the region.
However, it would be misleading to assume that Israel had made the territorial concessions merely due to
American pressure. To offset the strategic disadvantages, which the loss of Giddi and Mitla would entail
the US had promised (according to Time magazine of 1st Sept. 1975) to supply Israel with the latest
weapons in its non-nuclear arsenal and had offered the Israelis what amounted to an unofficial security
pact. In addition the US promised Israel that it would not recognize the PLO (Palestine Liberation
Organisation) as long as the PLO refused to recognise Israel’s existence.
Then came the second part of the Sinai Agreement between Egypt and Israel in Sept. 1975. The principal
provisions of the agreement were as follows:
1. Israel was to withdraw its forces on the Suez front by 12 to 26 miles: except for a small coastal strip
south of Suez (which reverted to Egyptian administration), the vacated area would become the new UN
buffer zone, with the old buffer zone being added to the existing Egyptian limitedforces zone. As part of
this general withdrawal, Israeli forces would move back to the eastern ends of the strategic Mitla and Giddi
Passes, a new Israeli limitedforce zone being established adjacent to the vacated area on the eastern side.
2. Israel was to evacuate the Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar oilfields on the Gulf of Suez, together with a
narrow coastal strip running northwards to Egyptian-controlled territory south of Suez. No military forces
might be stationed in the area which would come under joint UN and Egyptian civilian administration.
There would be joint use of a road
192
INTERNATIONAL VFFAIKS
3.
4.
6.
running parallel to the coast to allow Israel to supply its forces in southern Sinai.
Each side undertook to refrain from the use or threat of force of military blockade, to observe the cease-fire
scrupulously and to renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force annually.
Non-military cargoes moving to or from Israel would be allowed to pass through the Suez Canal.
The United Slates \\ould provide up to 200 civilian technicians to man or supervise electronic early-
warning stations in the area of the Mitla and Giddi Passes.
A joint Israeli-Egyptian commission had to be established for the duration of the agreement; it would
function under the aegis of I.ieutenant-General Silasvuo and would deal with any problems arising and
assist the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in its duties.
An Egyptian-Israel ”military working group” would meet in Geneva within five days of the signature of the
agreement and draw up within two weeks a protocol establishing in detail the stages of the specified
changes in Sinai and the return to Egypt of oil-fields; the latter process was to begin within two weeks of
the signature of the protocol and to be completed within eight weeks, while overall withdrawal and
redeployment were to be completed within five months of signature of the protocol.
The principal commitments entered into by the United States in the US-Israel memorandum of
understanding were:
7.
(i)
(in)
To be ”fully responsive”, subject to congressional approval and the availability of resources, to Israel’s
defence, energy and economic needs;
to hold consultations with Israel in the event of a ”world power” (i.e., the Soviet Union) interfering
militarily in the Middle East;
to accept the Israeli view that another Egyptian-Israeli agreement and any negotiations of an overall Middle
East peace settlement;
THE MIDDLE EAST
193
(v)
to consult and ”concert” policy with Israel on the timing and procedure of a reconvened Geneva Peace
Conference; and
Not ”recognize or negotiate with” the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as presently oriented.
Actually these Sinai agreements were manifestation of United States conflicting interests and the
contradictory policy in the Middle East. It wanted to reconcile between her two conflicting national
interests of the security of Israel and the supply of oil. As the fragile economy of Egypt was also in dire
need of economic help therefore, Egypt also preferred to accept American-organized peace in the region.
But Egypt overlooked the overall Arab interest, keeping in view her national interest only. The Soviet
Union’s relations with Egypt went on exacerbating in the meanwhile.
There came another important change in the Middle Eastern politics when Egypt’s President Anwar Sadaat
cancelled his country’s treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union in March, 1976 and developed special
relationship with China. The two countries signed a pact in April, 1976, under which Beijing, in addition to
supplying an undisclosed amount of military hardware to Cairo, was to provide 50 million worth of
strategic raw materials for Egyptian industry and boost Sino-Egyptian trade from US dollars 450 million in
1975 to more than 600 million in 1976. The pact with Egypt provided a long-sought major foothold for
Beijing in the Arab world. It was a major diplomatic success for China.
WEAPON OF OIL
The Arabs during the Arab-Israel conflict of October 1973 effectively used oil as a political weapon. They
employed successfully the double-edged strategy to force a decision. While the Israeli aggressors were
being pushed on the battle front despite the western help to Israel, this collaboration compelled the Arabs to
a practical manoeuvering and they stunned the world, particularly America. An extraordinary conference
decided that ten of the participating countries would cut the oil flow to the USA and that the prices would
be multiplied three times and oil would be put on the open market for sale. In the meantime Saudi Arabia
suspended oil supplies to USA and reduced its oil production. The Western nations considered this a hostile
act. The energy crisis loomed large and the Western consumers were faced with a panicky situation because
of oil cut.
The oil production in the Middle East accounted for two-third of oil supplies to the non-communist world.
The reliance of the West on this was almost absolute, being 85 percent. In the mid-sixties. Middle East and
194
Africa provided three-fourth of the West’s energy requirements. It is also said that the Arabs, even before
the war, were considering to use oil as a weapon so that the supporters of Israel could be pressurised to
withdraw their support to Israel. The oil weapon came into play in the background of
1973 Arab-Israel war. The establishment of uneasy peace in the region sharpened the effectiveness of oil
leverage at the disposal of the Arabs. It was a foregone conclusion that if oil producing nations of the
Middle East acted in unison they could hope to exert more pressure on Israel through her Western allies, for
a final settlement. It was for the first time that the effectiveness of oil weapon had been realised. In most of
the Middle Eastern countries, oil had been nationalised. This was in sharp contrast with the position
obtaining in 1968 when seven Western oil monopolists controlled 78 per cent of the crude production 61
per cent of refining and about 56 per cent of marketing. In less than 15 years, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, South
Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Libya had nationalised the oil production. Even the moderate countries were
contemplating to have final say in oil production if not outright nationalisation. The most seriously affected
countries by cut in oil and its increased prices were Holland, Britain, Japan and America. They could not
face the shortage for a long time because they were the heaviest importers of oil. Japan’s policy towards the
Arabs underwent a drastic change. America had to revise her attitude. All threats of use of force or
stoppage of food supplies to the Middle East had little effect on the position adopted by the Arabs. Next
came Britain importing 65 per cent of its oil needs from the Middle East. The Arabs also reaped national
benefits from this situation. Six years ago the income from oil was
400 and half million dollars per annum but it had now increased to more than 1,000 million dollars and was
expected to reach 40,0000 million dollars up to 1980 annually and with this amount the Arabs could buy all
the gold and exchange reserves of the world. The oil weapon this time proved a real threat because the
West depended on energy production by oil supplied by the Middle East countries. The oil strategy played
a decisive role in bringing about peace, though unstable in the Middle East. France did not agree with
America to use force and supported the Arabs.
In 1977, important historic development took place in the Middle East especially in terms of Arab-Israel
relations. The foundation of new relationship was laid down immediately after 1973 Arab-Israel War, when
Egypt-USSR relations deteriorated to the extent that President Anwar Sadaat ordered the expulsion of all
Soviet advisers. This decision to oust the Russian advisers was necessitated due to growing resentment
among the Egyptians who took them as promoting their own interests rather than helping Egypt developed
a viable defence mechanism for their country; the growing lack of trust among the Soviet advisers and
Egyptian arrny officers, Sadaat’s calculation that in the wake of detente, the Soviets might not go all
THE MIDDLE EAST
__195
out to favour Egypt vis-a-vis Israel, refusal of the USSR to give sophisticated arms to Egypt to develop
their war-machine capable to launch another war against Israel. In the meantime Presidenl Sadaat started
looking towards US for assistance. The United States government also played a very important role in
bringing the two countries (Egypt and Israel) together. The efforts of the American government were
coupled with the desire to find a peaceful solution of the crisis instead of resorting to v\ar.
In 1977. the Egyptian president dramatically announced that in order to settle the Egypt-Israel dispute
through peaceful means, he was even ready to go to Israel and convince Israeli people that war was
destructive for both the countries. In order to stress upon his desire for peace. President Sadaat visited Israel
in November 1977 and his visit was followed by the arrival of Mr. Begin in Ismailia in the subsequent
month. The visit of President Sadaat to Israel was vociferously condemned by most of the Muslim
countries especially the Arab World, Syria, Saudi Arabia. Jordan, Libya, South Yemen, Iraq, Algeria,
Tunisia, PLO as well as USSR. The few countries which supported the new initiative were Sudan, Morocco
and Oman.
Apart from concluding an Egyptian-Israel treaty, the president also tried to arrive at a collective settlement
but the other parties to the dispute did not co-operate and continued vehemently denouncing his efforts. He
invited all the parties to Cairo for talks but the invitation was rejected by all the countries except Israel.
Besides not going to Cairo, the other Arab countries decided to call a summit of all heads of the Arab
countries in Libya which was held in December. It was attended by PLO and five other front-line Arab
states. The decision was criticized by the Egyptian leaders, who decided to sever connections with Syria,
Iraq, Algeria, South Yemen and Libya. President Sadaat also decided to break diplomatic relations with the
East European countries and closed down their consulates.
CAMP DAVID ACCORD
In September 1978, President Carter invited Mr. Begin and Mr. Sadaat to Camp David for talks and direct
negotiations for a peace settlement. President Carter worked as an intermediary. On September 17,
1978 a peace accord was signed between the two countries. The important provisions of the new
framework for peace which was termed as ”Camp David Accord” were as follows:
(a) It was decided that the inhabitants of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip would be allowed to elect a self-governing authority to replace Israeli administration.
196
INTFRN \TIO\XI VI-FAIRS
(b) Ihe Isiaeli forces will \\ithdia\\ and ic-deploy in specified locations within 5 yeais
(c) Negotiations will also be started with Joidan and elected Palestinian lepresentatives
(d) Ml the paities will cooperate with one anothei to maintain secuiity and peace during the tiansitional
penod
(e) Before the end of 3id tiansitional penod negotiations would be held between Isiael Joidan Pu\pt and
elected lepiesentatnes of the West Bank to detennine the final status of the \\ est Bank and Gaza Sti ip
(0 A full peace tieaty between Egvpt and Isiael would be
concluded w ithm 3 months
(g) The US should be My ited to all futuie peace negotiations (h) The UN Security Council was to
undeiwnte and endorse
all the peace tieaties
Acting upon the provisions of Camp David Accord, Israel and Egypt agreed to another framework on
December 17 which embodies the following points
(a) There would be a phased withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Egyptian territories which would be
completed within 2 to 3 years
(b) Both the countries decided to establish diplomatic relations Normal diplomatic relations were
established after the completion of the first phase of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula
(c) The Egyptian government also decided to allow Israeli ships to pass through the Suez Canal
(d) UN peacekeeping force was to be stationed between the Egyptian and Israeli forces
(e) The air-strips vacated by the Israeli forces were not to be used for military purposes
The final withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Sinai area was completed in March-April 1981 and these
areas were handed over to the Egyptian control
President Sadaat’s move to open direct negotiations with Israel after recognizing the Jewish State was
bitterly criticized by all the other Arab states who described it a conspiracy against the Arab unity The
peace moves initiated by President Sadaat were welcomed by the Western countries and he along with Mr
Begin was given the Nobel Prize for peace of 1971 The move, however, helped in solving some of the
major
THF MIDI)! F I \ST
197
problems Egypt was able to establish contiol over such aieas which \veie lost dunng 1967 Aiab-lsrael \vai,
without shedding e\en a diop of blood It would not have been militarily possible to captuie those areas
Egypt was excluded from the community of other nations so the unity amongst the Arab states was
damaged Especially the neutiahzation and purification of Egypt made it possible for Israel to deploy full
force on the other fionts The position had become very difficult for other front-line states le Jordan and
Syria The Israelis were also able to confine the activities of the PLO guerillas only to Lebanon
PEACE TREATY
Egypt and Isiael signed a formal peace tieaty on March 26, 1979 The pact ended 30 years of war and
established diplomatic and commercial relations
Egyptian and Israeli officials met in the Sinai desert on April 26,
1979, to implement the Peace Treaty calling for the phased withdrawal of occupation forces from the
peninsula On May 27, ahead of schedule, Israel handed over the gateway town of El Irish to Egyptian
administration By mid-1980, two-thirds of the Sinai was transferred, but progress here was not matched in
the other area covered by the treaty
Sadaat halted further autonomy talks in August 1980, because of continued Israeli settlement of the West
Bank A year later, he went to Washington to urge President Reagan to recognize the Palestine Liberation
Organization as a means of resuming the talks There were indications that the Reagan administration might
yield, but the process was arrested on Oct
6, 1981, with the assassination of Sadaat by extremist Muslim soldiers at a parade in Cairo Vice-President
Hosm Mubarak, a former Air Force Chief of Staff, was confined by the parliament as president the next
day
Although feared unrest m Egypt did not occur in the wake of the assassination, and Israel completed the
return of the Sinai to Egyptian control on April 25, 1982, Mubarak was unable to revive the autonomy talks
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June imposed a new strain on him, and brought a marked cooling in
Egyptian-Israeli relations, but not a disavowal of the Peace Treaty
EGYPT AFTER SADAAT
Although Mr Mubarak adhered fairly faithfully to the letters of Egypt’s Peace Treaty with Israel signed by
Sadaat, Egyptians felt that
198
signing a separate peace had robbed Egypt of its rightful place as the head of the Arab world. To maintain
support at home, and to win friends abroad, Mr. Mubarak intended to keep the peace cold until more Arab
countries \\ere persuaded for talks to Israel.
Egypt also looked to the United States for private investment. Little of it went into creating new industries.
The Russians provided Egypt with most ’of its early heavy industry. In contrast, more than four-fifth of $
1.5 billion invested in Egypt by American companies had gone into oil exploration and development. Most
Egyptian-American manufacturing ventures were low-tech affairs, making products such as furniture polish
and shampoo. General Motors agreed to assemble cars jointly with Egypt’s national car company, but
recession in Egypt knocked off the plans.
The Reagan administration had its own worries about Egypt. The Americans thought that Mubarak was
weaker than his authoritarian predecessor, Anwar Sadaat. They saw no evidence of his courage to push
through the economic reforms that Egypt desperately needed. Mubarak seemed paralysed by the fact that
the big changes the IMF wanted further cuts in subsidies, a proper exchange rate for the Egyptian pound
and a liberalisation of interest rates to encourage investment would make life dearer and harder for the
already born-poor majority of Egyptians. Egypt’s leader was still haunted by memories of the riots that
followed Sadaat’s proposal to cut subsidies in 1977.
Mubarak’s foreign policy has been scarcely better rewarded, The storming by his commandos of the
Egyptian airliner hijacked to Malta in October went wrong and killed a lot of people. The Camp David
Peace Accord with Israel, signed by his predecessor Sadaat in 1978, did not solve the Palestine problem.
Egyptian signing of the Camp David Accords in fact served as counter productive as though the Israeli
threat receded to some extent yet it led to serious repercussions at home in the form of a wave of
revivalism. Egyptian lopsided dependence on USA after the accords proved a shortsighted option specially
after the end of Cold War, when Egypt had to look for new ways to relieve the economy from economic
pressures. One was to revive the trade relations with the African neighbours but it did not bring the desired
results. The only notable success was the return to the Arab world and the QIC in 1989. Again in 1991,
Egyptian support to the Allied forces and subsequent acquiescence on the peace accords between Israel and
PLO has added to the difficulties at home.
Today more and mote Egyptians are protesting about an abysmal standard of living. In Egypt militant Islam
is very much alive. There may have been a growth, too, of another movement hostile to Mubarak.
THE MIDDLE EAST
199
Nasserism. followers of the Pan-Arab socialist hero, who died in 1970, have become noisier, along with the
rest of secular left.
The revivalists challenge to Mr. Hosni Mubarak has been growing due to certain internal developments.
With the recession of Cold War politics, foreign aid to Egypt has diminished to a great extent. The
educated middle class has been disgruntled by socio-economic factors and the best way to ventilate their
feelings has been rioting often involving violence. The official policy of using a heavy hand has hardened
the revivalists and stiffened the resistance. They have effectively penetrated into the professional
organisations which have embarrassed the Mubarak regime. It is also hurting the secularistic posture of
Egypt in the Western world as the activists have started targeting the European settlers and even the tourists
as a way to retaliate against the excesses of the regime.
INTEFADAH
With the signing of the Camp David Accords in September, 1978 the ”Arab phase” of the Middle Eastern
conflict had come to an end. Egypt had regained the Sanai area and become contented with that much. The
other countries Syria, Lebanon and Jordan had been left far behind in military capability to challenge the
might of Israel. Towards the start of
1987, all-important development took place which was going not only to reenliven the dormant issues
involved in the Arab-Israel conflict but also start the ”Palestinian phase” of struggle against Israeli
occupation of the Palestinian territory. This development was the starting of Intefadah, the uprising of the
Palestinian people against the Israeli occupation. Intefadah in its nature was a novel movement aiming at
posing an unmanageable challenge to Israel and thus pressurizing her to agree to peace in some degree in
accordance with the demands of the Palestinians. It started with the protests against the killing of five
Palestinian youths by the Israeli forces. The following developments saw Israel facing stone throwing,
massive demonstrations and a sustained law and order situation. As the word meant in lexicon (”shaking
off) it shook everything, the Jews, the Israeli state control, the traditional moderate leadership of the
Palestinians and in fact the very image that the Palestinians were too docile to attempt struggle against
Israel on their own.
The immediate reasons behind starting Intefadah on the part of the Palestinians were: to make for the
absence of a challenge to Israel after the Camp David Accords; to attract world attention to the forgotten
issue of Palestine after the other Arab countries had opted to remain silent for long and the super-powers
having neglected the issue altogether in their detente agenda; the Palestinians had been deprived of their
bases in the countries
200
INTFRNATIONM AFFAIRS
contiguous to Israel to continue a struggle against Israel hence making it necessary that the challenge must
come fiom the Palestinian temtoiies occupied by Israel Intefadah was, therefore, necessitated bv the
Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israel conflict They, therefore, started a movement of civil disobedience
marked bv demonstrations, lefusing payment of taxes, waving of Palestinian banners founding of popular
organisation, commercial shutdowns boycotting the Israeli goods etc
As far as the major characteristics and methodologies of the challenge are concerned it must be noted that it
was meant to be a controlled, calibrated challenge not involving the effective use of arms Intefadah
involved only 5% incidents involving firearms and only in 15% cases petrol bombs were used Further it
was a popular challenge Before
1987, only a small portion of the Palestinians (those living outside) were involved in the struggle but
Intefadah brought a broader segment of the Palestinian people into active struggle Further, the methodology
adopted combined military as well as political means The military challenge was accompanied by the peace
offensive marked by the 2-state solution Moreover, it was an unconventional challenge It thus hit at the
weakest point of Israeli security forces who cannot afford to concentrate for too long on internal front It
was started by the local leaders, mostly educated young professionals and the structure of leadership was
populist and decentralized
Intefadah presented the Israelis a challenge which they knew not how to cope with Israeli army is trained
for quick and decisive wars involving massive use of military capability but Intefadah tended to ditch the
Israelis rendering their traditional capability useless Further, the sustamabihty of the movement increased
the cost of occupation for Israeli economy thus forcing them to rethink the policy of keeping the occupied
territories with it Further, its methodologies of demonstrations and strikes tarnished the image of Israel as a
villain and violator of human rights
Forced by this successful challenge and the international (chiefly US) pressure after the Gulf War 1991,
Israel sought to get rid of this problem which was going to cripple its economy and demoralize its armed
forces Israel was compelled to join the peace talks which culminated in the Israel-PLO «vace agreements in
1993 Disgruntled by the PLO leadership and its submissive attitude the radical elements within Intefadah
were still continuing their movement This movement had contributed a great deal towards securing the
political and national rights of the Palestinians
THE MIDDLE-EAST PEACE PROCESS
The Arab-Israel peace process is passing through a crucial phase Some interesting developments have
taken place in the Middle-East which could
1HF MI1WI FFAST
201
change the shape of Arab-Israeli iclations and promote a new era of conflicts in the region After half a
centuiy ot the Arab-Isiaeli confrontation in the Middle East the question is why the deadlock on the peace
process has not been removed and how things could take a positive ruin in the dnection of peace and
stability^ The issue in the Arab-Israel peace process is not avoidance of anothei war in the legion but
granting of legitimate lights to the millions of Palestinians
The September 199”^ peace agitement between the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Israeli
government marked the culminating point in the Middle East peace talks initiated in Decembei
1991 with US sponsorship and inteiest It had been a usual practice on the pait of US government to initiate
a process aiming at the future security of this highly sensitive region each time the area saw a military
show-down somehow or the other related with the long-standing Arab-Israel conflict extending over a
period of four decades The 1991 Gulf crisis was no exception in this regard Though the showdown was
primarily involving the issue of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the linkage the Saddam
Hussein established between the case of occupation over Kuwait and Palestine led the Americans to
conclude that unless the Palestinian question was resolved, peace and stability in the Middle East will
remain a bleak and remote prospect
The fact that the US was very much eager to strike a break-through between the contending parties of the
Arab-Israel conflict may also be explained on a number of other grounds One, Middle East has been an
area of tremendous importance to the US because of its rich oil resources Although the supplies and prices
of oil had not been the headache of the industrialised countries since the oil crisis of the 1970s, the fact-that
the states m the Persian Gulf are still in possession of 65% of world’s total oil resources implied that any
eventuality like Kuwait could lead to instability in the region and hence a serious setback to the whole
industrial progress of the West and Japan Two US had long been contemplating the idea of a durable peace
in the Middle East that could be acceptable to all parties The fact that US after the Gulf War 1991 had
emerged as the power with will and dictating position spurred the US thinking to attempt peace and assume
the image of an honest peace broker which had been tarnished by US inability to act decisively in Middle
Eastern affairs since the signing of the Camp David Accord Three the regional circumstances were
favourable for a US brokered peace plan Israel being the recipient of US aid crucial to its economy, the
Gulf states and conservative politics obliged to USA for saving them from ’a radical tide” in the shape of
Saddam and above all the possible irritants had been sidelined by the Gulf War 1991 PLO had discredited
itself by siding w ith Iraq ev en in the eyes of its traditional Arab supporters, so were Iran and other
rightists who were left with little leverage
202
INTFKNATIUN VI UFAIRS
vis-a-\is a tutuie secmitv arrangement in the Middle East lour, in the piesence ot the Aiab-Isiael conflict,
theie weie chances of the assertion of radical forces in the aiea thereby posing a potential thieat to the US
interests in the aiea The developments like Intefadah resurgence of fundamentalism in Algena etc could
gam potency if the Arab-Isiael conflict peisisted Five, in the afteimath of the Gulf War the aiea \vas going
to witness a large scale aims race among the regional countnes The acquisition of sophisticated vveapomv
by the Aiab States from the foimei East Euiopean countries could explode into a serious disaster any time
in futuie
Encouraged by this regional and international scenario, the US Secretary of State. James Bakei
embaiked upon a lather tiresome diplomatic exeicise to bung the parties to the negotiating table The
respective positions of vanous parties in response to US proposals revealed a scenario of unbridgeable gulf
of differences and suspicions The common ground was provided by US emphasis on the question of
autonomy to the Palestinians as envisaged b> the September 1, 1982 Reagan Plan (though the wording was
different) President Bush though recognised Israel’s right to survive as a Jewish homeland but he also
believed that Israel’s frontiers had been defined by international consensus and did not include West Bank
and Gaza strip He proposed that surrender of at least some of these lands would anchor peace with Arab
states as well as with 1 7 million Palestinians ”Uand for Peace” approach (also shared by the Arabs
as they had no other option nor the capability) was unacceptable to Israel which emphasised only ”peace
for peace” The Arab parties had also then individual claims vis-a-vis Israel, Syria demanding return of
Golan Heights (conquered by Israel in 1967 and annexed in 1981) Uebanon demanding withdrawal of
Israel from its southern part, Jordan (though out of direct conflict since it gave up administrative control
over West Bank in 1988, to facilitate the establishment of an autonomous state in these areas) had in vision
the future of water resource arrangement in the areq in case the status quo was disturbed by any
development towards peace It was in this background that the interested parties got together in Madrid
The first round of those talks fell prey to mutual accusations in October 1991 among the Israelis and the
Syrians Moreover, the other ”super-power” USSR did not show any signs of influencing the process to
give a more sense of credibility to US efforts
The real boost to hopes for a settlement came in June 1992 when Israel’s Yitzhak Rabin icplaced Shamir as
the Israeli Prime Minister Previously, Israel had been insisting that the talks for autonomy will be held only
with the Palestinians hv ing inside the occupied territories but later the approach was abandoned in favour
of participation of the Palestinians in
THF Mll)l)l F FAST
203
diaspora The impoitant breakthrough came after 10 lounds (most held at Washington) mainly because ot
the following facilitating developments
i) Rabin government had accepted PLO as lepiesentative of
Palestinians pieviously only a Palestinian delegation comprising those from occupied terntories vveie
included
n) The Intefadah in the occupied teintones had incieased
piessure on the Isiaehs due to a sustained and unmanageable movement ot civil disobedience
in) Israel was complying to US proposals because the lattei had suspended the aid package crucial for the
deficit plagued Isiaeli budget
It was in this background that the 12th round of Middle East Peace Talks began in Washington in
September 1993 Besides formal talks, Israel and PLO were engaged in back-channelled talks in Oslo,
Norway The plan finally came out on September 13, 1993
THE OSLO ACCORD
Broadly speaking the provisions of the peace plan may be studied under the following steps categorisation
Step 1 Israel and PLO are to recognise each other formally Peace agreement would give Palestinians
control of Jericho and Gaza strip Four months after signing the agreement, Israel would withdraw troops
from those areas
Step 2 Palestinian Council to be elected within nine months will govern the West Bank and Gaza for five
years interim period The Council will control local police force utilities and welfare agencies
Step 3 Within two years Israel and PLO must begin talks on the status of Jerusalem Also on the agenda will
be the fate of Jewish settlements on West Bank, the Palestinian refugees who want to come back
Analysis of the contents of the agreement suggests that it is fairly positively chalked out in that it envisages
some measure of Authority to the Palestinian over their fate But on the other side, this autonomy is akin to
just municipal administration because the Palestinians have only 13 subjects to have control over religion
tourism, utilities, education, services, health and sanitation etc These are of peripheral nature The jews
living in the settlements will not be governed by the provisions of a local law, rather
204
INTFRN \riONAI AFFMRS
they will be sublets of Israeli laws This dichotomy ma> lead to senous admimstiative problems once the
Israeli tioops withdraw Further the question ot Palestinians in diaspora and future of tast Jeiusalem ha\e
been left out Again it has limited scope as the agreement was not consented by major paities involved in the
Arab-Israel conflict It addiesses just one aspect of the overall problem, the Palestinians and not Israel s
othei conflicts i e occupation of Golan Heights and presence in Southern Lebanon
Isiael-PLO talks foi institutionalization ot the teims and spirit of the ’Declaiation of Pnnciples’ suffered a
senous blow when on Febuiaiv
14, 1994 a fanatic Jewish settler opened fire in Al-Khahl mosque killing around 70 people The tragic
incident strengthened the feais toward a permanent tussle between the Jewish settlers and the Palestinians
once the Israeli foices withdraw from the area The impasse was bioken by the hectic diplomatic activity
involving various paities tegional as well as international Further talks precipitated into what was to be
known as the Cairo Agreement (May 4, 1994) which provided for
I) II)
in)
IV)
V)
An Israeli withdrawal within 3 weeks and take-over of the area
by 9,000 personnel of Palestinian Police
The control of Palestinian Authority over travel documents,
postage, international telephone code etc (currency was not
included)
Entitlement to Mr Yasser Arafat to take up residence in Gaza
and Jericho as ”head” of PLO or of Palestinian Authority (not as
president” of Palestine)
Joint patrols of the area joint committee for security problems
(with emphasis on the Israeli army guarding the Jewish
settlements)
Restriction over the authority of Palestinian police that they will not arrest any Israeli
The pace of implementation of the ”declaration of principles’ (DOP) was retarded by certain factors rooted
deep in the tense and hostile relations between the two communities over a period of about four and a half
decades The fact that Israel never seriously honoured its obligations in the past continued to cause mistrust
among the Arabs Contrary to Israeli expectations that the autonomy arrangement with PLO will ensure end
to HAMAS militancy PLO could not acquire sufficient popularity with the Palestinian Arabs largely loyal
to HAMAS aspirations of a fully independent, Islamic state of Palestine Moreover, the assertion of PLO
under the fiamework of Palestinian Authority has also been disturbing the Israeli government Further the
channelization and apportionment of aid to
THF MIDDI F FAST
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the Palestinian Authoiity has been a major issue because the western donors do not want PLO taking all the
credit ot development projects in the aiea It was in this milieu that Mr Rabin and Mi Arafat held an
impoitant border meeting with the Palestinians demanding speedy implementation of the Cano Agicement
while the Isiaeh side insisting upon a fiamework for secunty to the Jewish settlements as well as holding of
new elections to the Palestinian Authority (so that PLO s strength could be sottentd to get concessions over
the issue ot settlements) The talks culminated into the signing of an accoid on the expansion of self rule’ on
August 10 1994 accoidmg to which
a) icsponsibility of tounsm education, culture health and social welfare dnect taxation etc was given
ovei to Palestinian Authoi ity
b) ensuied withdrawal of Israeli army from Palestinian population” centers
c) envisaged election to a new Palestinian authority
Though PLO gained a relatively adv antageous position out of these provisions the key issues were left
unaddressed These issues had significance for the final resolution of the conflict and not for the short-term
diffusion of the tensions The issues which might hamper the arrangements during the long ”interim” period
(at least 5 to 6 years) were as follows
I) the question of Al-Quds Al-Shanf
II) the question of millions of Palestinian refugees inside and outside Palestine
in) nature and level of co-operation with neighbouring Aiab states
As discussed earlier, the PLO and the Israeli Government had been forced by compelling reasons to reach
some sort of agreement that would benefit the both Israeli was facing increasing international pressure
chiefly from the US, challenge of Intefadah and HAMAS and the rising costs of maintaining law and order
in the occupied territories while PLO was suffering from a lack of credibility among the Palestinians and
other Arab countries hitherto vocal in support of their cause, and a serious financial crisis to hold its ranks
in unity Critically, PLO has been a relative loser in this deal in that it has lost initiative to Israel To the
benefit of Israel, the accord has caused polarization among the Palestinians by dividing the land occupied
since 1967 into three parts, i e (i) Gaza and Jericho (n) rest of the territories on the West Bank, and (in) the
area of Quds Moreover, the Israeli plan of bringing the HAMAS militants at logeiheads with PLO
moderates’ dissolution of PLO into an administrative body rather than a political movement has led to the
following consequences
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a) omitting from its Charter the clause that refers to the Israeli right to exist would tantamount to the loss of
raison de cfiv for PLO to exist.
b) by abolishing the militia structure, the organization will be reduced to a loosely organized association
with little capability to enhance its political leverage.
c) with the ultimate control of Israel over the level and direction of PLO’s co-operation with other Arab-
states. PLO would just be a promoter of Israeli foreign policy specially the trade policy. Any sort of trade
links between PLO and Arab countries would mean expansion of Israeli markets and access to natural
resources of the region peacefully.
d) demographic balance would be tilted in favour of jews through continuous settlement of the jews during
the interim period.
e) by the time Palestinian Authority normalizes its relations with the Arab states to the pre-Gulf War level,
it would have lost some important bargaining chips like the Arab boycott, non-recognition, Muslim
perception of Israel as a common enemy of the Arabs etc.
PEACE WITH JORDAN
Besides important breakthrough in the PLO-Israel talks, in a significant development, Jordan and Israel
agreed to end an era of tense relationship. Though Jordan’s links with Israel over issues of mutual
relationship were nothing new, it was significant that both countries on June
7, 1994 publicaly agreed to hold talks, The meeting between King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin in
Washington formalized the understanding with both parties agreeing on setting up commissions for issues
like common borders, water resources, energy and environment, joint projects (like the park along Israel-
Jordan border south of the Dead Sea to promote tourism and the construction of a coastal road on the Gulf
of Aqba linking Egypt, Israel and Jordan.) The July 8 accord between Jordan and Israel focused on the
following fundamental points regarding peace between the two countries:
a) mutual declaration of ending animosity towards each other.
b) returning of about 380 Sq. Km. of the occupied land of Jordan.
c) Increase in Jordan’s share from the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers.
Analyzing critically the Jordan-Israel rapprochement was very much on the cards following the Israel-PLO
agreement of September, 1993. One, because the issue of Palestinian autonomy and the Palestinian
population in the occupied territories, a major source of tension between Israel and Jordan, had been
resolved to a great extent. Two, PLO’s
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unilateral accord with Israel left Jordan with a sense of having been betrayed by old allies and Jordan had
no reason to continue tension with Israel. Three, after the Gulf War of 1991, the common Arab stand
against Israel had collapsed and in the light of new realities. Jordan was compelled to look towards its
immediate neighbours for enhanced trade and cooperation. Lastly, the sizable Palestinian population in
Jordan could have caused troubles for the kingdom once their co-ethnics in the autonomous Palestine had
established authority in the areas of self-rule. Jordan, then could have faced problems ensuing from
migrations, trade and business activity and water management. Jordan, therefore, chose to strike the bargain
with the real arbitaro, i.e. Israel instead of waiting for consolidation of the interim set up for resolution of
these issues. Israel, in the wake of shrinking foreign loans and aid, wanted to promote its exports specially
in the regional Arab states and Jordan is one of them. By resolving issues like border demarcation and
financing the joint projects, Israel saved itself the trouble of dealing with the issues of future Palestinian-
Jordan relations, tourism in the border areas and water resources.
Like the Israel-PLO accord, the Israel-Jordan accord also left Israel in an advantageous position: Israel
gave up nothing except a relatively less productive land to Jordan. Normalization of relations with Jordan
would accompany economic dividends in the form of access to Jordanian markets. It would also set a
precedent and model for normalization with other Arab and Muslim states. Jordan on its part will be
contended with eroding of a permanent threat from the west-bank Palestinians as well as Israel. Expanded
trade with Palestinians and Israel would help make up the relative slash in the revenues. It may realize the
concept of Jordanian-Palestinian confederation - a state that would combine the West Bank and Gaza strip
with Jordan with a common foreign and security policies but regional administration. This is viewed by
Israel as the best pressure-lid on the Palestinian desire for full independence on one hand and an
arrangement enhancing Jordanian authority over its Palestinian population.
SYRIA
Syria has been the most potent challenger to Israel’s hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East after the 1973
Egypt-Israel War. The waning Cold War tensions (in which Syria had been an ally of the former Soviet
Union) forced the belligerents to rethink their policies with respect to each other. The Syrian decision to
take part in the Allied campaign against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War was one indicator of these changed
perceptions. The following peace process initiated by the US saw some bitter brawls between Syrian and
Israeli representatives. The key issue between the two has been the return of Golan Heights to Syria which
Israel had occupied in 1967.
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INTEKNATIOYM. Ah FAIRS
Besides, Israel wanted Syria to withdraw its troops from Lebanon and stop assisting anti-Israel militia like
AMAL and Hizbullah for Israel, due to the armed activities was obliged, to retain a sizable force in the
demilitarized zone South of Lebanon thereby causing considerable economic and security stress. As for the
strategic importance of the Golan Heights, one must keep in mind that it is a mountainous terrain and a
Syrian control over it means a favourable strategic position to attack Israel. For one thing Israelis willing to
hand the area over to Syria if it is kept demilitarized with proper guarantees from Syria. Israel’s insistence
on demilitarization stems from the fact that Israel has to guard the area without receiving significant
strategic or economic dividends. These issues have been on the agenda for the last couple of years or so. It
was in the follow up of the Israel PLO accord that Syria and Israel started secret negotiations on these
issues. Without any formal declaration though, both have agreed on a phased Israeli withdrawal from
Golan. The problems are there on questions like the post-withdrawal security arrangement, Length of
withdrawal period and the pace of normalization of bilateral relations. With the achievement of some
measure of rapprochement with Jordan and PLO, Israel’s peace with Syria appears to be only a matter of
time.
Five important events with far-reaching implications have taken place in the Arab-Israel peace process. As
things are moving in the Middle East, these events can contribute both to the success and failure of the
peace process in the region. First, the failure of PLO and Israel to reach an accord on the question of Al-
Khalil. Both Israel and the PLO have blamed each other for violating the Al-Khalil accord. Dennis Ross,
the US special envoy and mediator on settling the Israel-PLO discord on Al-Khalil since October
1995 was so disappointed with the deadlock on that issue that late October,
1996 he decided to leave for Washington but was asked by Israel and PLO to reconsider his decision and
stay for another round. As we know the bone of contention in the implementation of the PLO-Israel accord
on Al-Khalil is Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s unnecessary concern for 450 Jewish settlers in that area.
Al-Khalil was supposed to be handed over to the PLO long ago but with the election of Likud Party to
power in June 1996, Netanyahu refused to process the agreement.
WYE RIVER PEACE ACCORD
It remains to be seen \vhether or not the rosy picture portrayed by the foreign media regarding the Wye
River Peace Accord, signed late October 1998, will ultimately benefit the Palestinians as well. Apparently.
Israel has gained or at least tried to extract all the major advantages as a deal for the 13 per cent land it has
agreed to concede in the West Bank. In the interest of suppressing terrorism, Israel secured a permanent
right to interfere in the affairs of the state of Palestine.
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*l
Israel’s basic problem ever since the creation of the country has been its lack of security and ensuring
security is exactly what this document aims at. Israelis would not be too bothered in going back to the pre-
1967 borders, provided the security of its citizens and the enhance of the country are permanently
guaranteed, This has given birth to the concept of ’landfor-peace’. The fact that Israelis do not regard it too
much of a probability, at least at present, explains why they are reluctant to give any amount of land to the
Arabs.
To counter this feeling Israel requires military superiority in the Middle East Egypt, the strongest military
force in the region has ceased to be a threat since the signing of the Camp David in 1979. If we are to
believe in an Arab saying that there can be no war without Egypt, Israel, at present is not threatened by any
of its neighbours, unless hard-liners like Ikhwan ul Muslimeen lays its claim for forming a government in
Egypt. This power game in the Middle East also explains the reason behind America’s policy of no-
compromise against Iraq.
This leaves independent groups like HAMAS, Hizbollah and Palestinians to target Israelis in skirmishes
like stone pelting or suicide bombings. These pacts against Israelis are justified in a way because all
peaceful and political means have proved futile, as Israelis do not care about international opinion and UN
resolutions. Therefore, in order to vent their frustration, they are compelled to resort to such tactics.
Militarily, Israel is undoubtedly the strongest country of the region. The only thing which offers it are the
unsafe frontiers which the state possesses. That is why Resolution 242 of UNO, passed in 1967, said that
the country was entitled to have ’secure borders’. This resolution, according to the Israelis, vindicates their
appropriation of the surrounding land. So anything that secures the country’s frontiers is logical and
essential from their viewpoint.
It would be pertinent at this stage to review the text of the agreement and to find out exactly what each side
has to give and gain at least on paper.
• Israel will transfer 13 per cent of territory it controls in West Bank to the Palestinians. The Palestinian
Authority will allocate three percent of this territory for ’Green Spaces and/or nature Reserves’. ’The Israeli
side will retain in these areas the overriding security responsibility for the purpose of protecting Israelis and
confronting the threat of terrorism. Activities and movements of the Palestinian Police force
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may be carried out after coordination and confirmation; the Israeli side will respond to such requests
expeditiously.’
• A US-Palestinian committee will meet bi-weekly to review the steps taken to eliminate terrorist cells and
evaluate legal measures against suspected terrorists. The Palestinian side will make known its policy of
zero tolerance and violence against both sides.
« The Palestinian side will prosecute illegal weapons manufacturing or sales. A’US-Israeli-Palestinian
committee will work toward preventing weapons or explosives smuggling into Palestinian territories, ’...the
Palestinian side will establish and vigorously and continuously implement a systematic programme for the
collection and appropriate handling of all such illegal items in accordance with the prior agreements. The
US has agreed to assist in carrying out this programme.’
• The Palestinian side will issue a decree banning all forms of incitement to violence or terror and set up
procedures for quashing all such expressions or threats. ’A US-Palestinian-Israeli committee will meet on a
regular basis to monitor cases of possible incitement to violence or terror and to make recommendations
and report on how to prevent such incitement.’
• In the area of security co-operation, the two sides will maintain a ’continuous, intensive and
comprehensive’ bilateral programme, including an exchange of forensic expertise, training and
other assistance. A second committee comprising high-ranking US, Israeli and Palestinian officials will
meet at least every two weeks to review counter-terrorism measures.
* The Palestinians will provide a list of the Israelis of its policemen, who will execute their duties ’with due
regards to internationally accepted norms of human rights and rules of law.
* The Palestinian Liberation Organization’s National Committee and the Palestinian Central Council will
expunge anti-Israeli articles from the National Charter. US President Bill Clinton will address the
Palestinian governing bodies when they convene to amend the charter.
* ’The Israeli and Palestinian sides have agreed on arrangements which will permit the timely opening of
the Gaza Industrial Estate,’ and to fulfil a new protocol for international airport there. The sides will
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launch a ’strategic economic dialogue’ to enhance their economic relationship.
• Israel approves two ’safe passages’ through which Palestinians can move freely between Gaza and the
West Bank. Gaza airport is permitted to open.
The Oslo Accord, which aimed at giving 85 per cent of the West Bank to Palestinians, was ignored by the
Israelis. It is not clear whether Israelis would actually surrender 13 per cent more area, the only concrete
concession required of them in the agreement. Some important events which occurred in the days
immediately after the signing of the accord can give us some idea of what direction this ’peace’ deal may
take in future:
• Construction work started at Ras-al-Amud, a new settlement site. Palestinians regard it as sheer defiance
of the terms agreed upon in the accord. The area which is home to 30,000 Arabs is the last solidly
Palestinian district linking Islamic sites in Al-Quds nearby Old City to the area’s Palestinian suburbs.
• Provocative statement by Defence Minister Yitzhak Mordechai came immediately afterwards. The accord
we signed is fragile, it say, the Palestinians must act first before we fulfil our engagements, he said.
• Crackdown began on HAMAS by the Palestinian Authority and founder of the group, Ahmad Yassin,
was put under house arrest. And Palestinian police has been ordered to ’Shoot in the legs’ of HAMAS men
who do not yield.
• Israel and United States signed a memorandum on November 01, 1998, to help Israel counter any danger
posed by ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
• Israel postponed a cabinet debate on the accord, claiming the Palestinians had not provided
written guarantees concerning the arrest of 30 most wanted activists of HAMAS.
Nevertheless, the deal is clearly tilted in Israel’s favour, as it gives two important benefits which Israelis
cannot otherwise gain putting Palestine in a position of permanent subjugation and ensuring Israel’s
security.
SHARM-EL-SHEIKH ACCORD, SEPTEMBER!999
The Sharm-el-Sheikh Accord was signed on September 05, 1999 by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat,
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hosted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and witnessed by Jordan’s King Abdullah-Il and US
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. It revised and reviewed the Why accord signed at Maryland last
year by Barak’s predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu and Arafat. Significance of the accord lies in its
character as it envisages a final solution to the Palestine problem. Ehud Barak was more pro-active and
positive in his outlook towards negotiations with the Arabs including the Palestinians.
MAJOR POINTS OF THE ACCORD
1. Israel is to transfer 11 percent of the West Bank or £00 square kilometers to the Palestinians in three
stages. Netanyahu had suspended the Why accord just two months later after handing over only two
percent out of the thirteen percent promised land in the West Bank.
2. The first Israeli troop withdrawal from the West Bank was to begin in the second week of September, the
second by November 15, completing the withdrawal by 20* of next January.
3. Israel will release 350 Palestinian prisoners including security prisoners. Among them, 200 prisoners
were to be released within one week thereafter and another 150 on October 08, while a still undermined
number were to be freed shortly afterward. Netanyahu had suspended Whe accord after freeing only 250
prisoners out of
750 promised.
4. The accord also provided for the opening of a safe passage across Israeli territory for Palestinians
traveling between the West Bank and Gaza strip. This southern corridor connecting the two
Palestinian areas was initially due to open on October 01.
5. It also provided for a joint battle against violence. Palestinian authority is to seize unlicensed weapons
from the Palestinians.
6. A year later, on September 10, 2000 the two sides must complete the accord with the formulation of
framework agreement, which will focus on permanent status negotiations covering the complex issues such
as Palestinian statehood, the status of Jerusalem, the fate of the Palestinian refugees and the future of
Jewish settlements in the Palestinian areas.
Although the Sharm-el-Sheikh Accord was a serious and sincere effort towards the peaceful settlement of
the Palestine issue, but mutual
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distrust continued to hinder in the way of reaching at the final status framevv ork agreement.
ELECTION IN SAUDI ARAB
While the crowds of the Cedar Revolution were chanting ”freedom and democracy” in the squares and
streets of Beirut, another revolution that will go much further in reshaping the Middle East has gone
unnoticed. Saudis have been queuing over the past few weeks to vote in the first elections in the oil-rich
kingdom.
Throughout the 1990s, the monarchy has been under mounting pressure from sections of the Islamic clergy
and Saudi capitalists outside the royal family. An increasingly youthful population (38.3% of the
population is 14 years’ old or younger), is likely to have boosted the ranks of oppositionist movements. For
example, the day after the municipal elections were announced, in October 2003, Saudi riot police using
live ammunition broke up a peaceful march calling for democratic reforms
Saudi Arabia postponed municipal elections, originally scheduled for the autumn of 2004, to February
2005. The Saudi government’s decision to hold municipal elections was described by observers as the first
tangible political reform act in the Kingdom.
After several postponements, Saudi Arabia’s first local elections began on

10 February 2005. Voting took place in three stages, on 10 February in the Saudi capital Riyadh and in the
rest of the country on 3 March and 21 April . However, the elections are modest in scope and, when
constituted, the local councils will only have limited powers. Now councilors will be able to discuss bread
and butter issues such as garbage collection, street lighting and sewage disposal but any political debates
will definitely not be on the agenda.
Saudi Arabia was an absolute monarchy until 1992, at which time the Saudi royal family introduced the
country’s first constitution. The legal system is based on the sharia (Islamic law).
Participation in the election was limited to men over 21 years’ old. In Riyadh, home to 4 million people,
only 149,000 registered to take part in the ballot. The three elections decided just half of the membership of
the local councils; the royal family will appoint the other half. Women were banned from voting on the
grounds of ”logistics”, including the problem of providing separate polling booths for them. Election
candidates backed by Islamic clerics won races in the Saudi Arabian capital in the kingdom.
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Why Saudi election is so important, there are several reason for this: The first, and potentially the most
important in political terms is that a taboo has been broken. The second reason why the exercise is
important is that they have revealed no significant popular opposition to the idea of elections as such. The
third reason why these elections are important is that they offer the first glimpse of the Saudi middle classes
operating in a nontraditional political context. The forth, Saudi Arabia has been under U.S. pressure to open
up its conservative political system and has also faced growing demands from Saudi liberals to pursue
democratic reforms.
Bush’s State of the Union speech laid out an active American agenda of democratization and fighting
terrorism for most of the Middle East. The president’s appeals to the Saudi government to expand ”the role
of its people in determining their future” and to ”the great and proud nation of Egypt” to ”show the way
toward democracy in the Middle East” must indeed be considered provocative, given the very close nature
of Washington’s strategic relationship with these two countries
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ordered the constitution changed to allow multi-candidate presidential
elections in September, 2005 making a surprise reversal that could mean he will face a challenger for the
first time since taking power in 1981 It was the first significant move toward political reform in decades in
Egypt, a powerhouse in the Arab world that has had one-party rule for more than half a century.
The announcement came amid increasing calls for political reform from the domestic opposition and from
the United States and after historic Iraqi and Palestinian elections that brought a taste of democracy to the
region. Egypt is the most populous Arab nation and the second largest recipient of U.S. aid in the world. It
was the first Arab nation to sign a peace treaty with Israel, in 1979, and often mediates in the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
2005 PALESTINE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
After Yasser Arafat’s death, Mahmoud Abbas, at least by Fatah, was seen as his natural successor. The
death of Yaser Arafat removed a cherismatic leader who had become the symbol of Palestine resistance.On
November
25, Abbas was endorsed by the Fatah Revolutionary Council, as its preferred candidate for the Palestinian
presidential election, scheduled for January 9, 2005.
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Mahmoud Abbas (born March 26, 1935), commonly known as Abu Mazen . was elected President of the
Palestinian National Authority (PNA) on January 9. 2005 and took office on January 15, 2005.
With his main contender Marwan Bargouti dropping out of the race, Abbas’ election was virtually ensured
and on January 9, Abbas was elected by a large majority as the new president of the Palestinian Authority.
Abbas was formally sworn in as president in a ceremony held on January 15 in the West Bank town of
Ramallah.
President Abbas is a leading politician in Fatah. He has served as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), since November 11, 2004, after Yasser Arafat’s death. He served as the first Prime
Minister of the Palestinian Authority from March to October 2003 when he resigned amid a power struggle
with Arafat. Before being named Prime Minister, Abbas led the PLO’s Negotiations Affairs Department.
His reputation in the West is that of a ”moderating influence” in the Palestinian Authority, with a genuine
drive towards achieving peace. However many perceive his approach to be too lenient and conciliatory;
that he is compromising Palestinian rights in order to earn favor in Israel and the United States of America.
Abbas was born in 1935 in Safed, then part of the British Mandate of Palestine. His family became
refugees during the war of 1948 and settled in Syria. In Syria he taught school and graduated from the
University of Damascus before going to Egypt where he studied law. Subsequently, Abbas entered
graduate studies at the Oriental College in Moscow, where he earned a Ph.D. in history. In 1982, Abbas
wrote a doctoral dissertation, referring to so-called ”Holocaust deniers”, claiming secret ties between the
Nazis and the Zionist movement. In 1984, a book based on Abbas’ doctoral dissertation was published in
Arabic The Other Side: the Secret Relationship Between Nazism and Zionism, which, following his
appointment as Palestinian Prime Minister in 2003, was heavily criticized by some Jewish groups as an
example of Holocaust denial.
Abbas had secured an agreement on ceasefire from 13 militant group in Sharmul Sheikh. On February 12th,
lone Palestines attacked Israel settlements and Abbas quickly fired some of his security officers for not
stopping the attacks in a ceasefire. Abbass agreed with sharon on cease fire in a meeting in shermul sheik in
egypt in February,2005.he is extending his hand in peace to israel, but israel is extending her tretory. Israel
changed her map in 1967 and then in 1973.
”ROADMAP” FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE
President George W. Bush announced the long-awaited roadmap for the resolution of Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, in April 2003 amidst growing
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anxieties and suppressed hopes. Launched in the name of the Quartet - the UN, the EU, Russia and the US -
by any definition it is an American construct that assumes to benefit from the erstwhile Tenet, Mitchell and
Zini Peace Plans that failed to deliver on the heels of the 1993 Oslo Accord.
The presentation of the roadmap aims at reaffirming the credibility
of the US as a responsible superpower that seeks to promote peace and
stability worldwide and to resolve conflicts by peaceful means. The
roadmap sets a strange pre-condition when it states that the vicious cycle of
violence has to be broken before the problem can be resolved. It also refers
^ to several UN resolutions, is a significant departure from their explicit
demands of the total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied lands besides the
repatriation of the refugees. The Roadmap is projected as the formula for
enduring peace in the Middle East, while to its Israeli and Arab critics, it is
simply appeasement of one party at the cost of the other. Consisting of 2221
words, spread over seven and one-half pages and divided into three
sections, the Roadmap displays a rather brief and direct style over and
above the typical diplomatic nuances. It provides for two-state solution and
reconstruction in Palestine, where both Israelis and Palestinians are required
to show good faith and substantive steps towards peace.
The ”Roadmap” consists of three consecutive phases.
PHASE I: OCTOBER 2002-MAY 2003
During Phase I, Palestinians will undertake an. immediate and ”unconditional cessation of violence” and
reiterate Israel’s right to exist as a state.
> Israel will also put ”an unequivocal end to violence against Palestinians everywhere.”
> Israel will stop deportations, forced settlements and destruction of Palestinian infrastructure.
These measures will be implemented with the help of US, Egypt and Jordan, whereas other Arab States will
cut off assistance to Palestinian militants. While Palestinian Authority (PA) will concentrate on
institutionbuilding, facilitated by Israel and donor agencies. Israel will allow the movement of Palestinian
officials between the West Bank and Gaza.
This phase includes drafting of constitution for a Palestinian State, before the elections, whereas Israel will
withdraw from all the settlements established since March 2001 (200 new settlements with half-a-million
Jews).
PHASE II: JUNE 2003-DEC 2003
Phase II will build on the goodwill, gains and institution-building acquired during the first stage and will
cover a transitional period. The Quartet will assess the achievements so far and \vill recommend
multilateral agreements on water resources, environments, refugees and economic development.
Simultaneously, a ”comprehensive” peace for the entire region will be launched with the Arab States, re-
establishing pre-Intifada links with Israel.
PHASE in: JAN 2004-2005
The third phase, dependant upon the judgment of Quartet, will endorse the creation of a Palestinian State
”with provisional borders” and agreement on frontiers, refugees, Jerusalem and the future of settlements. At
this stage, Syria and Lebanon will be co-opted for an overall peace settlement, followed by restoration of
”normal relations with Israel” by all the regional States.
In other words, the Roadmap stipulates a gradual and evolutionary process for a twin-state solution and
mentions the UN Resolution 242 as well as Prince Abdullah’s offer of a full recognition of Israel following
its acceptance of Palestinian demands.
LOOPHOLES IN THE ROADMAP
Despite a sincere effort by the Quartet, its plan carries few areas of contentions and disputation.
1) PROBLEM OF THE NES PALESTINIAN STATE
The Roadmap does not promise the total abdication of the Occupied Territories, grabbed by Israel since
1967 and which makes about 22% of the total Palestinian land. The stipulated Palestinian State may include
cartons from Gaza strip and the West Bank, with Israel controlling vast chunks of territory all around and in
between. The new State is jeopardized with the provision of its ”provisional borders”. The new State may
not exert its full sovereignty while surrounded by Israel all around. Link of communication between Gaza
strip and West Bank may be disrupted at will by Israel.
2) REFUGEES’ PROBLEM
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The right of return to refugees, acceptable under all international covenant and instruments, remains
unclear or. at the most, could be irresoluble by the two parties during the third phase. The passive reference
to such a crucial issue is almost hedging its urgency. Home towns of most of the Palestinian refugees fall in
the territory of Israel. The return of almost five million refugees to Israel with neutralize the Jewish
character of Israel, which will never be acceptable to Israelis.
3) FUTURE OF AL-QUDS OR JERUSALEM
It is the most striking issue, which the Roadmap leaves to the future States, to solve it. It is mentioned just
once that, too, passively. Neither side is ready to surrender the city to the other. It bears sacred nature for
both Israelis and Palestinians. They don’t want to compromise on it.
4) ILL-PERCEIVED PHRASES OF THE ROADMAP
The roadmap has used the word ”terror” for the Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation. It has
put apprehensions and mistrust in the minds of Palestinians and has given courage to the Israeli repression
of the freedom struggle. Israel wants an end to the so-called ”terror” before giving any concession.
Terrorism can never be compared with by anyone.
5) DEMOCRATIZATION WITHOUT A STATE
The whole process starts from the wrong end, as it first puts emphasis on ’democratization’ of a State
which is not even in existence yet. How can a people be asked for tolerance and liberalization, whose land
is occupied and are subjected to relentless suppression by the Occupier. Democracy and liberalization can
flourish when Israel would vacate the land of the new stipulated Palestinian State.
HURDLES IN THE WAY OF THE ’ROADMAP’
The Roadmap for Middle East peace is appreciated by almost all the international community including
many Arab States. America, is probably, for the first time engaged in the issue of Palestine so seriously
with great determination. Although Israel had some reservations to the roadmap but it is likely to yield
under American pressure. PA also welcomed the Roadmap and called for its swift implementation.
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Nevertheless, we cannot be very optimistic, as the circumstances in Middle East carry many points of
disillusionment. There are some serious hurdles in the way of the implementation of the Roadmap. The first
thing is the mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians which has been lodged for many years. They have
developed a mindset of sheer animosity towards each other. They look at each other as aggressors. So far.
Israel’s record has been of encroachment, repression and expulsions that makes Palestinians suspicious of
their real intent. Besides, the biased Western official policies, partisan media portrage and an escalating
anti-Muslim idiom have done nothing but shaipened Palestinian serious reservations towards Israel. The
need is to change the mind of the people at the grassroot level on both sides and put forward confidence
building measures before jumping at concrete settlement of the dispute.
Second hurdle to the roadmap is the fundamentalist elements on both sides. They don’t want to see each
other living side by side. They want complete extermination of each other. They are big hurdles in the way
of the top leadership on both sides to move towards peaceful solution. Israeli PM Robin was assassinated
by Zionist fundamentalists after signing the Oslo Accord.
Third obstacle in the way of the roadmap is unrestrained Israeli moves to establish new settlements which
is strongly prohibited by the provisions of the Roadmap. Israel marked its 55* anniversary of the Zionist
State by establishing a new settlement. Besides. Israel continues with the construction of 290 miles long a
9 meter high concrete wall around ’ Palestinian territories. The wall has not only alienated Palestinian
territories ” but also encroached upon the original Palestinian land making it narrower in the West Bank.
Fourth problem is the open-ended agenda of the Roadmap that seeks to impose on the Arab States ”cutting
off private and public funding and support for the so-called terrorist groups” is even more difficult to
implement, and totally outside Palestinian control.
Fifth problem is the apprehension regarding the credibility as well as the level of willingness on the part of
Anglo-American alliance to implement the Roadmap in better spirit. The strong pro-Israel lobby in
America is pressing for maximum advantage to Israel while implementing the Roadmap. President Bush
will find it hard to neglect the wishes of Jewish lobby, keeping in view the forthcoming presidential
elections. Gilles Kepel. the well-known French Scholar, points out, ”Alienating the pro-Israel lobby,
strongly ’embedded’ as it is in the Neo-conservative Pentagon civilian elite, therefore seems totally,
unrealistic.”
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Sixth problem in the way of just implementation of the roadmap is Israeli intransigence to negotiate with
Yaser Arafat as Palestinian interlocutor. US has also sidelined Arafat, declaring him as the major obstacle
in the way of peace. This is unrealistic on the part of Israel and America. Yaser Arafat is democratically
elected president and unanimous leader of Palestinians. He has a long history on his back struggling for
peaceful resolution of the dispute. He can only be sidelined on the cost of destroying the whole plan for
peaceful resolution of the issue.
After an exhaustive study of the Roadmap and major problem in the way of its implementation, we have
reached at the conclusion that violence is the main disruptive force in the whole process of peace. No plan
can be successful unless the increasing acts of violence on both sides are controlled. The root cause of
violence is Israeli occupation and especially the establishment of new Jewish settlement on the Palestinian
territory since
2001. Thus in all fairness the first precondition should have been the dismantling of settlements on the
West Bank by Israel, followed by evacuation of the territories occupied by it in 1967, to pave the way
towards eliminating the root cause of violence and ’suicide attacks’. Second thing is that Israel and
America should co-opt Yaser Arafat in the peace process. Any settlement and negotiations with a new
Palestinian leadership will not be mandatory without Arafat’s approval.
After all it is a golden chance for Washington and London to prove to the world that their policies are not
driven by double standard. If the roadmap fails, it will be perceived not only as one more betrayal of a
bereaved community, but also as a serious denial of co-existence and human rights. Moreover the crisis
will fall into an unmanageable depth, which will lead to relentless violence in Palestine and dangerous
strategic and security imbalance in the whole of Mideast.
SETBACK TO THE ROADMAP ;
The Roadmap has stuttered to a halt soon after its implementation amid accusation by both sides that each
other is failing to meet their commitments. Ariel Sharon continued with his three pronged policy towards
Palestinians. First, to liquidate the Palestinian Authority (PA) and marginalize the leadership of Yaser
Arafat. Second to build more and more Jewish settlements in the West Bank and third, to sustain its
military occupation over the areas which were supposed to be given to the PA according to the Roadmap.
A ray of hope came when the new Palestinian leader, Prime Minister Mahmood Abbas engaged in a flurry
of negotiation with Ariel
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Sharon. An encouraging note in the negotiation process came out when in the Tripartite Summit -
participated by President Bush. Sharon and Abbas on June 4, 2003 in the Jordanian port city of Aqaba,
Sharon publicly accepted the creation of a new Palestinian state. The summit was followed by a truce
between Israel and militants of Hammas and Islamic Jihad on June 29, 2003.
However. Euphoria of the cease fire could not last long. The AlQuds suicide bombing killing 20 Israeli on
August 19. led to targeted killings of Hammas and Islamic Jihad leadership by Israeli forces. A vicious
cycle of violence stalled once again, which broke the seven week old truce. Mahmood Abbas feeling
himself, helpless in the situation, resigned from his office. He was replaced by Ahmed Qorei as the Prime
Minister of Palestine. The new Palestinian administration under Ahmad Qorei on November 29, 2003 ruled
out talks with the Israeli Prime Minister as long as Israel continued to construct a concrete wall encircling
the West Bank. The Israeli wall is also condemned by UN and even the US does not tick it. But Israel is
determined to build it. In such circumstances of mistrust and intransigent behavior on the part of Ariel
Sharon, one can hope little for the success of the Quartet’s ’ Roadmap’.
THE ”GENEVA PEACE PLAN”
Having disillusioned from the situation prevailing in PalestineIsrael relations, a major initiative was
launched on December 1, 2003 by two experts, one from Israel and Palestine each - former Palestinian
Information Minister Yasser Abed Raboo and ex-Israeli Justice Minister Yossi Belin. It is an unofficial
Plan aimed at the resolution of the Palestinian Issue on a win-win- basis.
About 700 people attended the glitzy ceremony marking the formal launch of the Geneva Initiative,
witnessed by the former US President Jimmy Carter. The 50-page document details the creation of a
Palestinian State encompassing 97.5% of the West Bank with shared sovereignty over the city of Al;-Quds.
The plan provides for a complete Israeli withdraw! from much of the West Bank and Gaza strip, in return
for the Palestinian waiving the right of return for 3.8 million Palestinian refugees, ousted from their homes
since the creation of Israel in 1948.
The Plan has the backing of the US and EU countries. It has been rejected outright by Israel Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon, who denounced it as ”dangerous” and has won only half-hearted support from the Palestinian
Authority. The hard line Palestinian groups criticized the plan because it renounced the Palestinian right to
return to their homes. Ariel Sharon
denounced the plan because, ”it is encouraging terrorist and harming the internationally-backed
”Roadmap.”
Despite its vast criticism the ’Geneva Peace Plan’ may lead the peace process in Middle East into a new
direction of hope in the future. The architect of the plan claim that it is ”the first step in long march”
towards peace.
MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND UNITED STATES
The seeds of the Gulf crisis vis-a-vis Kuwait were sown by Britain in 1899 when she signed a secret
agreement with a leading family, ’alSabah’ of Kut (Kuwait) city, which bound the al-Sabah to obey and
execute British directives with respect to Kut city and not alienate any part thereof, without Britain’s
consent. Thus in Kuwait, Britain won the first strategic outpost for use as a staging area to incite
Mideastern Arabs against their non-Arab Turkish rulers. After the end of World War I, Britain acquired
formal control over Ottoman Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Trans-Jordan, etc. Through the League of Nations in
1920, British intrigues also gave birth to several other Sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf. Hence Britain denied
chances of rapid economic development to almost entire Iraqi population and restricted Kuwait’s wealth to
a population that was only 0.2 per cent of the Iraqi population of 30 million - thus severance of richest part
of Ottoman Iraq and its subsequent creation as an independent nation was an international
conspiracy.
Since huge oil reserves had been discovered in Mosul (Northern Iraq) much before the end of WW-I, the
Treaty of Sevres was maliciously crafted to ensure continued strife and violence in formerly Ottoman
Mesopotamia and Mideast. The treaty was meant to provoke Kurdish minorities to launch their freedom
movements putting the whole region into turmoil.
When it became clear to Britain and US that Iraq was dead serious about reclaiming its Kuwait territory,
they succeeded in admitting Kuwait as sovereign member state of UN in 1961 and Iraq’s army sent to
reclaim Kuwait was beaten back by British troops landed for the purpose in Kuwait. This sowed the seeds
for discontent and war in the region.
The war in 1990 was a war ’created’ and fought by the West for the West and Israel, not in defence of
Kuwait or world peace. As a result of this, the US strategically stationed military hardware sufficient for
hundreds of thousands of soldiers, in addition to actual deployment of thousands of
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troops on Saudi soil. Thousands more have established bases in tiny Sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf at their
cost.
Here are a few queries to discover the answer to one question, and that being whether the true nature of the
Zionist enemy has indeed undergone any changes
1. Is it acceptable that Zionist is not a racist dogma’.’
2. How can it be claimed that Zionism is not built upon aggression?
3. The feasibility of the belief that in an era of emphasis on historical documents and deeds, an era of
human progress, fair human relations and establishment of democracy, Zionist regime is not oppressor of
Palestine?
4. How can one believe that by signing the peace agreement, the wings of expansionism, and racism of this
regime will be broken?
5. Are the principal rights such as the right of the Islamic world over Palestine, the right of hegemony of
each nation over its land and resources, the right of deciding future policies for their nations, and the right
of independent decision-making on cultural, political aspects involving their own countries justified? Is the
lack of these rights tolerable? What kind of logic can overlook these questions and leave them unanswered?
Answer to these questions is: Arab people are in need of a reassessment of what has been inflicted upon
them because the show and the time of superstars is over. Yet, why do the leaders who speak Western
languages and say whatever the East is willing to hear, are unable to hold the attention of the audience in
their countries?
There was a time when men like Gamal Abdul Nasser ruled over not only Egypt but the entire Arab world.
PLO was proud of having leaders such as Abu Ayad and Abu Jihad. Each of these men was the main cause
of important changes at his time. Gamal Nasser and Abu Ayad are no more and men like Anwer Saadat and
Hosni Mubarik, Mahmood Abbas - the architect of the Oslo Agreement - and Boutros Boutros-Ghali
entered the arena of the world of Arab politics. They are the outcome of the new world order which now
rules the Arab nations, a factor which has taken the first step toward compromise.
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In the past, Zionists never initiated any relations with Palestinians, because they did not even accept the
existence of Palestinians in Palestine. This agreement was the first in the history of Arab-Israel battles in
which the Zionist regime acknowledged the existence of Palestinians as a nation. The importance of
compromise becomes clear here.
The US has consistently insisted upon the preservation and security of legal, political and social aspects of
the Zionist government. Zionists believe that the priority is in the safeguarding of their legal and political
although economic superiority is planned for the future when that government is stabilized and has
complete supremacy over the Middle East strategically and militarily; yet its economic and technological
supremacy is evident in comparison to many Arab nations - especially after the economic crisis of the
wealthy Arab nations during the Persian Gulf war.
All that has been said is a result of policies which have no theoretical basis in the region and leaves the US
as the only contender in the arena. By relying on its long-term plans, this country is able to have total
control of the region. This is because as much as the Arab world has distanced itself from its own past and
entered the realm of non-identity, the US and Zionist governments dictate the directions for any political
movement in the Arab countries.
Considering all this, it is unfortunate to see the way some countries in favour of reconciliation with the
Zionist regime confront the current problems in the Middle East. One wonders about whether they have
forgotten the most obvious and irreversible goals of the US in the region. Everyone knows about the
unsparing support of the US of the Zionist regime.
It is indispensable that complete dominance world-wide is not possible, without access to Arab-Islamic
region, no matter which international strategy is used. Access to Palestine means access to crossing of Asia
and Africa. Palestine is, therefore, of vital importance. Former US President Richard Nixon also
emphasized this importance in this book The
Real War, ” Every power who has the control and supervision of the
Persian Gulf and the Middle East will ultimately have control and supervision of the entire world ”
The Americans are emphasizing on the security plan of Zionist regime as a strategic plan, in seeking a
peace plan based on the free spirit of nations. Its decades of active involvement in the Middle East issues
were to provide to the necessary balance between the security of the Zionist regime
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and a widespread peace in the Middle East. In order to defend the region a time bomb called Palestine must
be neutralized.
Have we seen any fundamental change in the American strategy regarding the security of Israel and the
peace plan? What is clear is that the US and the Zionist regime are moving exactly in the same direction
with the same mechanism as before, the only difference being the new changes. Oil and geographical
locations are the two axis around which one focused all their attention. We are living in a petroleum era, so
the Persian Gulf region will enjoy an enormous strategic importance for many decades to come.
The course of action in Middle East and Gulf region indicates that US has transferred its defence frontlines
to the Persian Gulf. Today the authority over every power in the region plays the same role that NATO’s
defence structure and balance of power played in Europe, to keep control of the whole, it is the key to many
closed doors. On this basis one can understand some of the American objectives in the region:
1. Causing instability in the Persian Gulf region.
2. Prevention of the creation of a cordial atmosphere between Iran and other Arab countries of the region.
3. To stall Intifadah (uprising) in the Arab countries.
4. Prevention of possible military centres capable of being a threat to Israel.
From the policies of the US, it is clear that the main condition of the US or the West in initiating co-
operation, or even a request to lessen their political and economic pressures, would only be achieved by
recognizing of the Zionist regime.
This is what has been offered to Islamic nations by the experience of the Middle East Arab nations and the
PLO. They who tried to attract American approval until just recently to reduce Zionist pressures, now find
themselves in a position to recognize to the regime officially, which leaves them without awareness or
return. It is apparently the beginning of an endless road.
PERSIAN GULF: END OF AMERICAN HOLIDAY
The most unmanageable risk facing American interests in the Persian Gulf is neither Saddam Hussein nor
Iranian expansionism. Rather, it
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is the slow but sure decay of the economic and political structures of the United States’ key regional allies.
They are the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) Washington’s obsession with external threats to friendly governments and the
direct risks to the continued flow of oil has blinded it to the end of these countries 25-year ’holiday’ from
politics and economics.
The holiday from economics was characterized by. among other syndromes, the lack of binding budgetary
constrains, which reduced and sometimes even eliminated the needs to set spending priorities and allocate
scarce economic resources. Furthermore, the financial pie was so large that even with a highly skewed
income distribution all sectors of society saw some measure of improvement in their standard of living.
Unemployment was unimaginable as governments showed a seemingly infinite capacity to hire both
citizens and foreigners in public jobs.
These economic circumstances led the way to a parallel escape from politics, in which the ruling elites
faced the need to share power, renew their legitimacy and credibility, or tolerate any meaningful public
debate over major economic, social, or political issues such as oil and budgetary policy. The resulting
system had neither taxation nor representation. The oil boom of the 1970s made the holiday possible. As
the average price of crude oil rose from less that $ 2.80 a barrel in 1972 to more than $ 34 in 1981, the
aggregate annual merchandise export earnings of the GCC states soared from less than $ 10 billion to more
than $ 163 billion. Although imports rose dramatically as well - from about $ 3.5 billion in
1972 to more than $ 52 billion in 1982 - the group managed to record a sizable current account surplus
exceeding $ 66 billion in 1982. However, neither the oil prices nor the export earnings were sustainable for
long, and by 1986 both had come crumbling down. The price of crude oil averages less than $ 14 barrel,
and the aggregate merchandise export earnings of the GCC were down to about $ 45 billion. Although both
oil prices and the region’s financial conditions improved somewhat from their 1986 through, the carefree
era technically came to an end that year.
But governments in the region prolonged the holiday with chronic deficit spending. During the last ten
years government deficits in the GCC have averaged well in excess of 5 per cent of GDP, reaching 15 per
cent in Saudi Arabia. Budget shortfall were almost entirely reflected in the external accounts, leading to
large current account deficits. External and domestic deficits were initially financed by drawing down the
substantial foreign assets accumulated during the 1970s and early 1980s. With the exception of the UAE,
most Gulf countries depleted their assets and turned to borrowing.
which for the first time exposed their economies and economic policies to serious international scrutiny.
This deficit spending is the main reason that ’cost-cutting* has become the operative word in budgeting
exercises. But the holiday cannot be ended by cost cuts alone, necessary as they are in the short run to
stabilize the budget and current account deficits. Cost cuts are no substitute for comprehensive structural
economic reform.
The Gulf syndrome of the 1970s was made possible by an economic order based on unearned income. The
economic link between production and consumption was severed, while free-spending rulers assumed the
role of providers, establishing an elaborate welfare state and securing their rule. The rise in fortunes was so
vast that few objected, and the oil boom froze in time the process of social and political maturation. While
the transformation of the physical landscape of the Gulf progressed at an incredible speed - with the
building of industrial infrastructure, hospitals, universities, housing and utilities - the social and political
structures were fixed and secured.
As long as money was available to grease its wheels, the system worked smoothly for over two decades.
But without the constant flow of funds through the elaborate income distribution networks, much of the
status quo is unsustainable. It is no longer possible to cover up structural weaknesses and policy
inconsistencies. All major interest groups, including governments, ruling families, merchant families and
the population at large are under pressure to earn not only their privilege but their keep.
Now that the economic order based on unearned income is no longer affordable, a new social contract must
be forged. The task entails getting rid of the unaffordable components of the old system and building on the
transferable achievements of the past 20 years. The former is by far the more difficult because it requires
changing entrenched attitudes toward work, consumption, government, and the most basic economic
norms. Further complicating this task are demographic and socio-economic trends such as the rapid rates of
population growth and urbanization and the emergence of a massive public sector as employer of first and
last resort. These trends are not easily reversible and have become entrenched in social relationships.
The internal forces transforming individual countries of the Gulf are particularly formidable because they
coincide with changes at the global and regional levels. The end of the Cold War and the systematic
dismantling of the Soviet Union destroyed a global context within which the
governments of the Gulf had grown accustomed to viewing their interests. Increasing demands for
transparency in domestic economic and political affairs limit the freedom Gulf governments once enjoyed
in dealing with strictly internal matters.
The unprecedented financial and economic dislocations in the Gulf states coincided with growing global
competition for markets and pressure from the industrialized countries to continue large military and
industrial purchases. The Gulf states in turn have suffered heightened anxiety about national defence, given
the post-Cold War potential for. and indeed reality of, increased interstate conflict.
Western complacency about this state of affairs has many causes;
the reflexive avoidance of embarrassing discussions about and with friendly
governments, an uniformed impatience with the internal political and
economic forces in developing countries, and the temptation to assume
conditions in the Gulf will change as little in the next ten years as they are
perceived to have changed in the past ten. The key players and systems of
. government seem to have survived the military, political and financial
repercussions of the Persian Gulf War. Furthermore, a by-product of the
advancing peace process between the Palestine Liberation Organization and
Israel has been perceived reduction in the chances for radical change.
Finally, the shifts currently underway in the Gulf are so subtle and slow that
they are not easy to detect because they challenge the roots of the old
system, on the surface, their impact is not immediately apparent, but that is
also why they are significant.
None of the conventional economic remedies and policy options will even begin to become relevant for the
oil producing countries of the Middle East unless governments there recognize the need to redefine their
role. But it is not easy to end the holiday, not only for the government but also, and often more important
for other socio-economic interest groups. Almost every oil-exporting government in the Middle East is
trapped in a vicious circle of failures. It usually starts with the failure to deliver on the economy which
eventually leads to vocal political opposition. Mounting complaints expose the many structural weaknesses
of the system. The governments, under increasing pressure, become more rigid in political and economic
decision-making. Serious policy paralysis results, which prevents much needed economic reforms and
leads to further deterioration of economic conditions.
This model, with minor adjustments, can be applied to most GCC states. In virtually every Gulf country
vulnerable governments and the main economic interest groups, including the ruling and large merchant
families, have tended retreat to defence of their traditional privileges. This process.
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can best be understood by considering how governments, the private sector, and the people at large have
hobbled themselves with what might be called chosen dilemmas. For governments, the dilemma consists of
the futility of trying, through budget cuts, to abdicate responsibility for the provision of economic well-
being while maintaining unquestioned authority without accountability. Equally futile is the bid by private
sector monopolies to inherit, under the guise of economic liberalization and privatization, the productive
assets of the public sector without assuming any of the social burden. The people of the Gulf states are
beginning to demand political participation and inclusion while solving to maintain the old economic order;
this, too, is impossible.
A guided process of change rather than a disruptive one remains possible if the region’s governments and
private sectors enter into rational partnerships and set in motion an evolutionary reform. This can be
achieved only through the initiative of social and political elements that can transcend their parochial
interests and demonstrate faith in their country’s long-term survival and prosperity. Only then can a
meaningful vision of the future be formulated.
The biggest challenge is broadening political and economic participation. The people of every Gulf state
are willing and able to participate meaningfully in political and economic affairs but are generally excluded
from both. Governments must create for public debate on key issues, including the budget and oil policy.
To facilitate a gradual scaling back of the welfare state, business must show a greater willingness to hire
national rather than foreign workers. Citizens must pay realistic prices for services that they receive from
the government and ultimately even pay taxes.
In this scenario, while the current regimes in the Gulf would be replaced, the ruling families would stay, but
without the exclusive control over their countries they now have. To remain important political and
economic players, however, they will have to demonstrate the finely honed survival instinct that led them
to bend with the demands of the times over the past century, when many of them evolved from tribal chiefs
to desert warlords, to colonial protectorates, to state builders, and now possibly to national builders and
eventually constitutional monarchs.
A relatively orderly, if monumental, process of change requires a little help from the West. The US, as the
ultimate guarantor of security in the Gulf, has a particular interest in seeing that the Gulf states make a
nondisruptive transition to a more manageable socio-economic order. At a minimum, Washington needs to
cast aside the denial syndrome associated
with clientits and recognize officially that is hitherto unshakable. Gulf allies face a potential crisis.
Moreover, the transition in the Gulf makes it imperative that Washington broaden its base of relationships,
reflecting the realities of the whole region and not only the particular sensitivities of any one country.
Perhaps much important, Washington should establish contact with most political movements of the region,
including those opposing the regimes currently in power. With regard to the Gulf, Washington’s holiday is
over.
A GRIM POLITICO-ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Ehud Barak’s negotiations with Syrians and Palestinians in 2000 may have come to little but they have the
merit of breaking taboos. He acknowledged the need to relinquish to Syrian virtually all of the Golan
Heights and he agreed, at least in principle, that Palestinian have the right to share. But he underestimated
the resolve of Arab leaders and the fractiousness of his own government. Who can be an effective leader of
Israel? Was ever a country so divided? One swath of its society emulates California in its liberalism,
education, and entrepreneurism and hi-tech savvy; the other swath is fundamentalist and reluctant to
relinquish four thousand year old customs. The new Israeli prime minister seemed not too keen on carrying
on the negotiation process; notwithstanding Washington’s concern for a negotiated settlement, things
seemed to be approaching towards a hostile impasse.
Bashr-al Assad Syria’s new 35 year-old leader could prove more forthcoming than his father on water
sharing arrangements for lake Tiberis. But he is as adamant about sovereignty over the northern shore of
the lake the issue that broke the back of negotiations in the past year. Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader,
is desperate for a peace agreement but unlikely to make concessions over sovereignty of Muslim holy sites
in Arab East Jerusalem. Israel’s border with Lebanon will be more volatile if peace negotiations with Syria
are not revived. Bashr’s focus is on consolidating his rule and reining in the competing intelligence
services. He will take steps to promote foreign investment in Syria, but liberalization measures will come
up against vested interests in the military and intelligence establishments.
For Gulf monarchies too, economic management is the top priorities. Rulers in the region will use the
windfall from high oil prices in
2000 - Middle East oil producers are established to have earned as much as two hundred billion dollars
from oil during the year - to replenish foreign exchange reserves and play down debt. With -the strain on
government finances reduced, the effects of the oil boom will begin to trickle down.
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Payments of arrears to the private sector in Saudi Arabia, for example, should revive the sluggish economy.
The kingdom can be expected to open its gas sector to foreign oil companies and to promote foreign
investment in non-energy sectors. But crown prince Abdullah now running the daily affairs of the kingdom
on behalf of his ailing brother King Fahd, will face competing pressures. Rival members of the ruling
family will want an expansion in spending, on military purchases, for example, and a more gradual pace of
reform. With the unemployment rate running at around 15 percent, daring structural adjustment will be
needed to promote the private sector.
Some foreign policy issues will aggravate this harmony. Saudi Arabia and Iran will pursue their cautious
detente but Iran’s dispute with the UAE over three tiny Gulf islands will put a drag on full rapprochement.
Meanwhile the prospects for a custom’s union look distant as ever.
THE MIDDLE EAST QUAGMIRE ,
Throughout their bitter history of over 50 years, Palestinians have often been the victims of developments
far beyond their control. The • present seems to be another such moment. A United States administration
that feels its power waxing to the full is set to reshape the West Asian situation to its requirements, and a
hardline Israeli leader has sensed an opportunity to add his own touches to the U.S. design.
From President George W. Bush’s ’axis of evil’ speech, the outlines of U.S. policy towards West Asia
appear clear enough. Follow-up statements from known hawks in his administration (which for once have
not been countered by those officials who are considered doves) made it clear that the U.S. was serious
about fulfilling its dream of a change of regime in Iraq. Allies in the
1990-91 coalition, who were also part of the recent anti^Taliban alliance, have expressed their reservations.
However, the US went to wage an avoidable war against Iraq unilaterally, with the agenda in hand to
disarm the rough State of WMD and liberate the people of Iraq out of clutches of the dictator (Saddam
Hussain). It seems to a first episode of the US broader agenda of democratization in the Middle East.
Bush also appears to have given up any hope or desire to work with the reformist tendency in Iran. The
U.S. has calculated either that the reformists are too weak to overcome the currently dominant
conservatives or that, whether reformist or conservative, the Iranian regime will never bend to its will. Iran
and the U.S. are already well-engaged in the race for dominance in Central Asia and Washington seems to
have decided that it has to work against the Ayatollahs since they cannot work with it.
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IVTERNATIONAI AFFAIRS
This two-pronged approach of the U S would ha\e \\oiked against the Palestinians even if all other
conditions were close to the theoretical normal Iran and Iraq not only have been strong proponents of the
Palestinian cause, but also represent the opposite pole to the U S approach to the Israel-Palestinian dispute
These two states have been consistent in their view that U S mediation will work to the disadvantage of
Palestinians, that this will further deepen the Palestinian tragedy, and that the USinitiated peace process
must be opposed If Iian and Iraq aie removed from the picture, the opposition to the U S policy v\ill
disappear
Since 1991 the Palestinian leadership has no doubt piefened to work with the US rather than with Iran or
Iraq Nevertheless, the demolition of this opposite pole will have a devastating psychological effect in that
Palestinians will be bereft of a source of succour, however nominal or rhetorical, if they ever revert to the
politics of resistance The Palestinians will be at a disadvantage in practical terms as well since the U S
moves, against Iran in particular, will have important side effects on Syria and Lebanon Whatever
advantages that currently accrue to the Palestinians on account of the pressure these two states are able to
exert on Israel will disappear once the two states find themselves under serious U S pressure
It will be a while before the U S is able to achieve its objectives vis-a-vis Iraq and Iran, perhaps it never
will But the very fact that it has signaled its intentions has had its repercussions Moderate Arab states such
as Egypt and Jordan, which acted as local guides to the U S through much of the last decade, no longer
seem confident that the U S will listen to their advice on local sensitivities They have perforce to try and fit
themselves into the U S scheme rather than try (as they did until recently) to fine-tune U S schemes to local
requirements
The embryonic U S plans are not per se unattractive to the moderate Arab regimes They have despaired of
ever getting Iraq back into the Arab fold and there is hardly any doubt anymore that they liked President
Saddam Hussein to disappear A major factor that had held them back from fully endorsing Washington’s
plans had been their fear that Iran would be the major beneficiary if Saddam were to be ousted But if Iran
were to be boxed in by U S pressure, even as Saddam was being ousted, it would be a totally different
situation A post-Saddam, and possibly moderate, Iraq that acts as a buffer to Iran would be very much to
the liking of these Arab states
Few Palestinians would have missed the significance of the charade that was enacted when King Abdullah
of Jordan recently visited Washington After Abdullah’s meeting with Bush, a White House
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spokesman announced that the King had agieed with the U S President that Palestinian Authonty Piesident
Yasser Arafat had been put in a box and should be kept there Jordanians immediately issued a clarification
to the effect that Abdullah had actually said that Arafat was already in a box and hence could not do much
to contiol the v lolence From the tact that the U S let this clarification ride and fiom the lack of a stionger
eftort by the Jordanians to explain the actual position, it could be inferred that Abdullah’s position vis-a-vis
the new U S policy on West \sia was ot the nature of something betw ixt and between
With the haidcoie regional lesistance to Israel under serious threat and the regional supporters ol the
negotiation track distracted by the advantages that could accrue to them, the Palestinian leadership
currently faces a severe dearth of options Whatever residual enthusiasm the moderate Arab governments
might letam to urge a resumption of negotiations is consistently frustrated by the U S -Israeli refrain that
Arafat must do more to curb violence lo underline this message, the Bush administration has effectively
suspended all mediation efforts that were launched contemporaneously with the Afghan operation
From any objective standpoint it is difficult to see how Arafat could really put an end to the violence from
the Palestinian side He is boxed inside his Ramallah office with Israeli tanks pointing their cannons at him
from a distance of less than 500 metres His security and civilian officials are prev ented from moving
between the Palestinian cantons and are thus unable either to persuade their people to give up violence or to
prevent them effectively from doing so A turbulent population, a few million strong, is under constant
economic pressuie and perpetual humiliation On top of all that, Israel provokes Palestinians periodically by
liquidating wanted militants (over 80 persons have been killed through targeted assassinations since
September 2000)
Arafat survived so long by balancing a plethora of often conflicting force* He tried to placate Israel and the
U S with an article in The New York Times in which he made two telling concessions For one, he
reiterated his acceptance of the ’Two States’ solution by writing that the Palestinians be allowed to
establish a state in the 22 per cent of the historic Palestine that was left after Israel set itself up on the
remaining 78 per cent Secondly, he sought to allay Israel’s worries over the right of return by stating that
the exercise of this right would only be done with due recognition of Israel’s demographic concerns He
topped off his message with a condemnation of terrorism underlining it by stating that violence against
Israeli civilians was indeed terrorism
234
From the manner in which U.S. officials, including the supposedly dovish Secretary of State General Colin
Powell, dismissed Arafat’s article as irrelevant until violence stopped, it appeared that Arafat had made
little headway with this gesture. The U.S. made it known that it was considering various options to put
Arafat under further pressure. To an extent, Arafat was also guilty of tactical blunders. First, he is unable to
shed militant rhetoric when he talks to his people and. secondly, he was unable to keep a distance between
himself and the Karme A incident. But even if Arafat had been tactically more astute, it is doubtful that he
would have made much headway with a U.S. administration that was fast recasting its regional policy.
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made the most of the changing situation. His persistence with the
assassination policy ensured that the Palestinians would be kept in a constant state of agitation with each
phase of relative quiet from its side being abruptly ended by the periodic assassinations of militant leaders.
Sharon reinforced his message that Arafat was no longer relevant by saying that he regretted not killing the
Palestinian leader during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in the 1980s, but that he no longer intended to
eliminate him. In meeting with Arafat’s three main deputies, including Speaker of the Palestinian National
Assembly Ahmed Korei, Sharon was on the surface trying to show that he was still interested in peace. But
besides showing the conciliatory face, which would have pleased the U.S., Sharon again seemed to reiterate
his views on Arafat’s irrelevance.
Arafat received a much-needed shot in the arm when the leadership of the Palestinian Opposition, notably
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin of the Hamas, and the heads of Arab states, reaffirmed his indispensability. As
regards West Asia, however, the U.S. seems to have decided that it alone is the arbiter of who is
indispensable and who is not. Unless and until the U.S. moves hit. a stumbling block, the immediate future
does not look very rosy for the Palestinians.
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CHAPTER 9
NORTH AMERICA
A study of world politics cannot be complete without having a glance at the two continents of the Western
hemisphere, North and South America. In those continents lies what is generally described in the postCold
War era the only super-power in the world the United States of America. The policies and perceptions of
this country have been influencing the political developments and issues at the international level since the
start of the 20th century. The role of the USA in world affairs has increased manifold after the end of Cold
War so much so that important concepts and even the terminology flow from the Capitol Hill. The terms
”New World Order” is the latest one reflecting the US idea of a world after the end of bipolarity. The
significance of the continent with respect to prevalent issues in international politics - regional integration,
environment, narcotics, democracy ethnicity, arms control, etc. - cannot be over-emphasized specially in
the context that all the countries - Canada, USA, Cuba, Mexico
- have some role or the other to play in these issues.
THE BIRTH OF A NATION
During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a tide of emigration came from Europe to America.
There were two reasons which led to this upheaval. Firstly, economic and secondly religious. In the
seventeenth century, England was passing through an economic depression. Multitudes of people were
without employment and to earn even just a bare living was extremely difficult. Economic distress was
therefore, one of the forces which led people to leave their homes.
Secondly, religious fanaticism also played its part. The Puritans were being subjected to persecution in
England during the reign of Charles I. They migrated to America and established colonies. They were also
followed by the Catholics who founded Maryland. When Cromwell came to power, many supporters of the
King also migrated to America in sheer horror, where they colonised Virginia. In this way different types of
people
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left England and settled in North America where, with the passage of time, they developed the
characteristics of a nation.
Most of the settlers, who came to North America during the first three quarters of the seventeenth century
were from England. There \\as a sprinkling of Dutch. Swedes and Germans in the middle region, a few
(French) Huguenots in South Carolina and elsewhere and scattering of Spaniards, Italians and Portuguese.
But they were hardly ten per cent of the total population. After 1680, a majority of the emigrants came from
Germany, Ireland, Scotland, Switzerland and France for various reasons. The stream of immigration
remained steady for a long time until, in 1775, the population amounted to about three million.
The emigrants from England brought with them traditions of civil liberty and self-government. They
transplanted all these traditions in their new homeland. The non-English colonies not only adopted the
English language, law and customs, but also developed great respect for the traditions of civil liberty. The
result was a new culture, which combined English and Continental characteristics in it.
Although theoretically there was supremacy of the Crown, yet practically these colonies were free to a
great extent. There was no effective control, with the result that the colonies, which had developed in a free
atmosphere, resisted all the attempts of British government to regulate their conduct.
The French were driven out of North America in 1763 as a result of the seven-year war. The British
Government had incurred a huge debt in fighting with the French. Now it was decided that the colonies
should bear a part of the expenses of their administration and defence. At the same time, the British
government tried to enforce the trade laws strictly, which created great resentment amongst the colonies.
But those who resented hardly dreamt of independence. Their protests stirred up popular feelings. Out of
this unrest emerged radical men like Samuel and John Adam and Thomas Jefferson who infused the desire
of independence in the people when George in decided to deal firmly with his recalcitrant subjects in 1760,
the colonists raised a rebellion against the supremacy of the British Crown which was followed by fierce
fighting between the British armies and the colonists The British armies were defeated and from its ashes
emerged a new nation.
The declaration of independence adopted on July 4, 1776, announced the birth of a new nation. It
declared the independence of the a democratic philosophy of man’s natural rights,
THF. AMERICAN CONTINENTS
237
popular consent was the just basis for political obligations. The treaty between the British Government and
the USA was signed in 1783 which acknowledged the independence of the thirteen colonies.
The Philadelphia Convention -- a constitutional convention composed of fifty-five members met in May
1787 and elected George Washington as the chairman of the Convention. The Convention during its
deliberations recognized that the predominant need was to reconcile two different powers - the power ’of
the autonomous states and the power of the central government. The delegates attending the Convention
decided that the National Government should be given ”real powers”, such as. to coin money, to regulate
commerce, to declare war and make peace. After deliberations spreading over sixteen weeks, a brief
document incorporating the organization of the new Government of the United States was signed by the
states present on September 17, 1787. The Convention also decided that the Constitution would operate
only when approved by the nine out of thirteen states, but by the end of 1787, only three had ratified it.
There was widespread controversy. Objections were raised against the proposed constitution. The
Constitution was amended to win the support of nonsignatory states The first ten amendments were made
to enable the wavering states to support the Constitution and finally, it was adopted on June 21,
1788. In the meantime, members of the Congress were elected and George Washington was chosen as the
first President.
The United States, which consisted of only thirteen states in 1787, today consists of fifty states covering an
area of about 3,022.387 square miles Alaska and Hawaii were the last states to join United States.
Since the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbour in the Hawaiian Islands in December 1941, the USA abandoned
her traditional policy of isolation. Now the USA followed a vigorous foreign policy and directly intervened
in African, Asian and European affairs. The USA accepted the need of positive commitment and became
member of defence pacts, such as NATO and SEATO. In the post-war period, the USA emerged as one of
the two super-powers and assumed the leadership of European world. The USA regarded itself as the leader
of a world-wide struggle against the advance of Communism and for that she not only fought in Viet-nam,
but also extended economic and military aid to such countries as were being threatened by Communism.
The USA refused to become member of the League of Nations as the Treaty of Versailles was not approved
by the American Senate, but now she is one of the original members of the United Nations, and is playing a
dominant part in world affairs.
colonies and set-forth

238
THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT
It is necessary to have a knowledge of the American system of government in order to understand the
developments in American politics which affect international affairs. The Constitution of USA is quite
different from the British Constitution. In Great Britain, authority centers round the Prime Minister who is
the leader of his party and always has the solid support of a majority in the House of Commons. But in the
USA there is a separation of powers. Power is shared between the executive, the judiciary and the
legislature. The Legislature Congress consists of two Houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives.
There is a system of checks and balances and each House imposes limit upon the power of the other.
The executive powers are vested in the President, who is elected for four years and can be elected only for
two terms. Almost all the senior officials are appointed by him and can be removed by him. But some of
high officials such as judges, are appointed by him and are removed by the Senate through impeachment.
The President enjoys vast executive powers, but he has no legislative authority. In the field of foreign
relations, the powers of the President are restricted by the Senate. All the treaties with other countries must
be ratified by a two-third majority of the Senate. The President can appoint ambassadors but must get the
approval of the Senate. The Senate did not approve the treaty of Versailles, and as a result the USA could
not become a member of the League of Nations. His main difficulty is that he must get the support of the
Congress for his foreign aid budget.
The President can address and send messages to the Congress. He has to obtain the assistance of some
members of the Congress to sponsor any legislation that needs to be enacted in pursuance of his policies.
The President’s officials and members of his Cabinet are not members of the Legislature. They are
responsible to him. The Legislature, therefore, cannot ask them any question as is done in the question hour
in British Parliament. But the committees of the Congress can interrogate the President’s officials.
A bill should be passed by both the Houses before it can be enacted. Normally, legislation can be initiated
in any House of the Congress, but financial measures can only be introduced in the House of
Representatives. The Senate consists of two elected representatives from each of the states of the Union.
Representation in the House of Representatives is proportional to the population of the states. In this way,
balance is achieved between the large and small states. The term of the House is two years, whereas the
Senatorial term is 6 years with one-third of the members contesting election after every two years. Thus
two-third members of the Senate are always the persons with considerable exposure
239
to the legislative process and experience while the remaining one-third coming with new ideas and fresh
approach to various national and international issues. Therefore, the Senators are considered to be more
important than the members of the House because of their longer tenure, experience, powers and political
effectiveness.
The system of electing the President represents compromise between the representation for the Senate and
the House of Representatives. In theory, the President is elected by an Electoral College. Each state elects
as many members for the Electoral College as it elects for the two Houses of the Congress - Senate and
House of Representatives. The number of the members of the Electoral College is the same as that of the
Congress. The presidential candidate who gets a majority of votes in a state gets the total votes of that state.
There are only two political parties in the USA, namely, the Republicans and the Democrats. Each party is
a coalition of a wide range of interests. Democrats are considered to be radical and Republicans to be
conservative.
The judicial part of the constitutional system centers round the Supreme Court, whereas in Great Britain,
Parliament is supreme and the laws passed by it cannot be declared invalid by the courts, in the United
States legislation may be held as ultra vires by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court is the guardian of
the constitution. One of its main functions is to see that the other organs of the constitution do not exceed
their limits. It is the function of the Supreme Court to see that the Congress does not make any law against
the spirit of the Constitution. Thus the Supreme Court has been given the power to declare any law as
unconstitutional.
Keeping in mind this background, it can easily be imagined that the American President is handicapped in
the field of foreign relations. He may not be able to follow the policy which he wishes to pursue. No doubt,
he can enter into ”executive agreements” and ”gentleman’s agreement”, but he cannot carry into effect his
policies in the face of congressional opposition. On the other hand, the President can veto the legislation
passed by the Congress, but Congress can override the Presidential veto. On the whole; the American
system of government is responsive enough to meet the demands of modern times.
POST-WAR POLITICS
FROM TRUMAN TO NIXON: A BRIEF REVIEW
With the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on

6th and 9th August, 1945, the World War II came to an end. With it began
240
TUF. AMERICAN CONTINENTS
241
the real ascendancy of the USA as an egalitarian democratic society having much say in the world affairs.
The USA favoured de-colonization and right of self-determination. A year after World War II. President
Truman proclaimed full independence of Philippines and supported independence of Pakistan, India,
Burma etc. and served to mediate the Indonesian independence with the Dutch. To help the European allies
shred off the ravages of war, the schemes like Marshall Plan were offered to all European nations. In the
meantime the Soviet Union had built nuclear device and from then onward started a new phase of
international history, the Cold War. Now joined by the USSR, both super-powers set out to win satellite
areas around the globe through defence pacts like SEATO, CENTO. MEDO, NATO. WARSAW PACT
etc. through economic arrangements and also through coercive manipulation. Occasionally USA came into
conflict with the Soviet Union on a number of issues in different areas such as the Korean peninsula. Cuba,
Angola, South Asia, Middle East etc. With Eisenhower in power, focus also was shifted to domestic
problems like racial discrimination against the black, social liberties, health care and economic
development. When President Kennedy took over, US outlook towards World Affairs underwent drastic
changes as super-power relations headed towards a detente and arms control and nuclear proliferation
began emerging as the future agenda. US also pressurised the colonial powers to set the African nations
free of colonial hold and establish ties with them. Another major development occurred as the United States
intervened militarily in Vietnam thus intensifying Cold-War rivalries once again. However, the Kennedy
era gave a new dimension to the concept of international peace. President Johnson however, opted to revert
to the policies of containment of Soviet influence and vowed to keep the nation’s commitments from
Vietnam to Berlin. At the inter-American level, the Organization of American States (OAS) was
established to bring other countries into the fold of economic co-operation. A landmark in the scientific
progress by man culminated into man’s ascent to the moon through Apollo-8 in 1968. President Nixon took
over from Johnson, and immediately attended to foreign affairs, significantly redirecting the US policies.
The Nixon doctrine envisaged refraining from US direct involvement into regional clashes. He disengaged
gradually from Vietnam and also established relations with communist China. Towards the USSoviet
relations, his major contribution was signing of the SALT agreement in 1972 aiming at limitation of
strategic arms by the two super-powers. He however, had a bad spot on his career when he was impeached
by Congress on what was later to be known as the ”Watergate Scandal”.
WATERGATE SCANDAL AND IMPEACHMENT OF NIXON
It was five months before the 1972 presidential election in USA that in June 1972, American police
arrested five persons from the Watergate
premises of the Democratic Party National Committee’s headquarters on the charges of conspiring and
entering into the same to tape the phone, to plant bugging devices and to steal and photograph documents
of the Democratic National Committee. Two other men were also charged with conspiring and intercepting
oral and telephonic communications in the headquarters of the party. Senior White House Officials were
implicated in the scandal by the press. During the trial of the seven accused, the prosecution charged that
one of them Mr. Liddy \\as paid $ 2,50,000 by Mr. Jeb Stuart Maguder, an important member of Campaign
Committee for re-election of Mr. Nixon. A break-through took place on Jan. 11, 1973. when one of the
accused Mr. Howard Hant pleaded guilty to all the charges. Four others also pleaded guilty on January 15,
1973. On March 23, six of the seven accused were convicted provisionally and sentenced to imprisonment
ranging from 6 years to 40 years.
The US Senate voted on Feb. 7, 1973 to set up a seven-man Select Committee to investigate into the
Watergate affairs and the political espionage in the 1972 presidential election and to report in one year. The
Chairman of the Committee was Senator S. J. Ervin. President Nixon on August 29, 1973 first time
commented on the scandal at a press conference and categorically denied the involvement of any White
House official or any one in his Administration in this very bizarre incident. But investigation into the
possible involvement of the Administration by the FBI went on with the consent of President Nixon and he
subsequently agreed to cooperate with the Select Committee in investigating the affairs yet putting certain
restrictions on the appearance or giving evidence before the Select Committee. The Chairman Mr. Ervin’s
reaction was sharp and he indicated that the Administration was not co-operating with the Select
Committee. In the meantime, President himself initiated an inquiry into the scandal and said on April 17,
1973 the ”major development” had come to light in the Watergate case and ”real progress had been made
in finding the truth.” He also said that staff members in the White House would voluntarily appear before
the Select Committee. Subsequently acting Head of FBI L.P. Gray gave testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee. But on April 27, Gray resigned and his resignation was accepted. This development
showed that there was something risky about the involvement of government officials in the Watergate
case. It was reported in the press that Gray had destroyed certain files regarding Hunt, one of the accused.
At the end of April, 1973, three of Nixon’s closest aides resigned. The US Senate on May
1, 1973 decided to call upon President Nixon to appoint a special prosecutor from outside the Executive to
take charge of the Watergate case. Senator Charles Percy said in the Senate ”Watergate is far worse than
Tea-Pot Dome and the worst is yet to come.”
242__
In June and July 1973, the Senate Select Committee held the hearings in which White House officials gave
evidence. Senator Ervin demanded in a letter from President Nixon to supply the Committee with all the
relevant documents and tapes under the control of White House that related to the matters as the Select
Committee was authorized to investigate and that the access to these should not be delayed. In the
meantime the Select Committee went on with hearings in which some former officials of the White House
also gave evidence besides public men. President Nixon in a statement in May 1973 said that he had no
prior knowledge of the Watergate operation, and he had no part in efforts to ”cover up” and that he would
continue the job he was elected to do. Senator Ervin’s suggestion that President Nixon, should personally
appear before the Committee was refused by Nixon on July 7. 1973 and the permission asked for access to
the presidential files was also denied. Subsequently a major constitutional crisis developed when the Select
Committee tried to pressurize Nixon to obtain access to the tapes of his conversations between June 20,
1972 and April 5,
1972 with some of his aides. Nixon refused to release the tapes. On August
29, Chief Judge John J. Sirica issued an order requiring President Nixon to turn over for Judge’s private
inspection of the tapes. Again Nixon refused, but later on handed over a few of them.
The Scandal assumed serious dimensions as the tapes were found to be washed and tampered with though
partially. The public opinion in the meantime continued to mount against President Nixon and chances of
his impeachment were freely discussed in the press. Most Americans thought that Nixon, was guilty. The
polls showed that 79% of those who voted believed that one or more of most serious charges against Nixon
were true and 56% favoured the impeachment of President Nixon.
The Ervin Committee demanded more tapes besides those already given but White House refused to release
any more out of nearly 50 tapes. The Chairman of the House of Representatives Judiciary Committee said
on January 8, 1974 that a final report was likely to be ready by the end of April, 1974. By mid-January,
1974, it was established that the gap in Watergate tapes was caused by erasing and restarting of tapes as
many as nine times. Some tapes were reported to be re-recordings.
IMPEACHMENT
In the beginning of August, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee recommended the House of
Representatives to impeach Richard M. Nixon and to seek his removal from presidency through a Senate
trial. Thus the Judiciary Committee after several months of inquiry concluded by approving the article of
impeachment charges, that violated both his oath to
.243
protect the constitution and his duty to take care that laws be faithfully executed.
In the wake of the disclosure of tapes, which revealed Nixon’s blatant involvement in the whole affair,
Nixon had no alternative but to resign because of the threatening mounting public pressure. On August 8,
1974 Nixon resigned and Mr. Ford, the vice-president at that time became the president of USA. Nixon was
given pardon afterwards.
THE REAGAN ERA
Americans as we all know badly want to believe in their presidents. In Ronald Reagan they found honesty,
leadership, a willingness to speak for America and above all his assertion on all major international issues
made them forgive his other shortcomings. If we examine America under Reagan then we have to see his 8
years and how he led his people and the people of the free world.
The most ”ideological American President” had also been one of the most practical. He could compromise
on certain issues, wait on others and simply put others out of mind. In other words, he was a politician.
America had been growing more conservative since 1960s and it became apparent that much of the Great
Society was an expensive failure, the wars could be lost as well as won and certainly had to be paid for and
that the New Deal prescription of problem solving by spending that had prevailed for a generation were no
longer grounded in fertile intellectual soil.
Now questions were being raised over the arms for hostages affair, the apparent compromise over the
Daniel-off exchange, and then at Reykjavik to leave Europe without medium-range missiles. These along
with the Nicaraguan Curlicue, was also a departure from the Reagan Style in that it was so complicated.
The sacking of air traffic controllers in 1981, the appointment for Mrs. Sandra Day D’ Connor to the
Supreme Court the same year, the invasion of Grenada in 1983 or the bombing of Libya in
1986 - he could have concentrated more force than in a five-year sustained policy.
Sustained policies were not, in fact his forte. In the management of the economy, for instance, they had
mixed results. On one hand, inflation dropped from over 12% to under 2%. Since Mr. Reagan took office,
the rate of growth of GNP rose from minus 1 % to plus 2 ’/2%. The hallmark was the belief that there ”are
simple solutions just not easy ones.”
244
INTEUNATION VI. AKKAIKS
Indeed Reagan’s instincts led him to be suspicious of Cory Aquino’s rise to po\\er in the Philippines and
loyal to Ferdinand Marcos. With the Philippines, Haiti and much of Latin America no\\ short of their
despots, the world has 250 million more people living under some form of democracy than 8 years ago. For
them, the Reagan era of world leadership will hardly be identified with a change for the worse.
What of the Angolans and Nicaraguans. \\hose plight had so capaired Reagan’s imagination that doctrine
was declared for them. This meant, ”Freedom. Regional Security and Global Peace.” Reagan however, had
no intention of going to \\ar with Russia. However, he proposed to rollback Communist revolutions by
giving American arms and money to indigenous counter revolutionaries; Jonas Savimbis UN1TA in
Angola, the Contras in Nicaragua, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.
By October 1986, six years after his election to the White House, one thing for which Reagan could take
credit was restoring confidence to America.. For that he could take the credit personally. In other areas, he
had often been swimming with the tide an expression of times rather than their creator.
And he had been lucky, a President who had faced no major international crisis on the scale of a Middle
East War, no intractable problem on the scale of Vietnam or the 1979 Iranian hostage taking. But, in
foreign policy, his administration could take little credit for preventing the Middle East fighting from
getting completely out of hand and in economic policy, the invoices had yet to be settled.
PRESIDENCY UNDER GEORGE BUSH
In the 1988 elections, the Republicans pitted George Bush against the Democratic Party’s presidential
nominee Michael Dukakis. Bush finished with a. 54-46 popular vote and carried 40 states to gain a 426-112
electoral vote victory. The Republicans however could not manage majority in the Congress. Bush had
pledged the continuation of Reagan’s policies during the election campaign specially supporting strong
defense and the ”new rightist” stand on issues like abortion and economic development.
The dawn of Bush era marked the assertion of the United States in world affairs to an even greater level
than in the Reagan era. The reforms initiated in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev culminated in the
fall of Berlin Wall in 1989 thus leaving the US as the sole super-power in the world, champion of the
victory of liberalism over communism. The second major development which enhanced the image of the
USA as the ultimate
THE AMF.RK AN ( ONT1NF.NTS
245
arbiter of international power was the Gulf War of 1991 following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August
2, 1990. The way US managed to manipulate the power politics at the UN with the help of the western
allies and the ailing Russia, reflected that in future the international organization would be largely reduced
to the status of a foreign policy organ of the United States. Meanwhile the US had managed to strike a
breakthrough with Russia in arms control by signing the START-I1 agreement envisaging to cut the
nuclear warheads of both powers to half by the year 1995. In the aftermath of the Gulf War a new term
’New World Order’ was added to the lexicon of world politics. This meant the sum of structural contours of
intentional politics after the demise of Cold War as perceived by US. This term coined by Bush led to
widespread speculations about what the US exacdy meant the future world to be. The new agenda meant a
multipolarity of power, dominance of economic over political issues and enhancing the interests of the US
through regimes, such as the non-proliferation regime, international trade and finance regime. US relations
with regional countries improved though to a limited extent. USA welcomed the outvoting of the
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and expected normalized relation with Cuba after the end of Cold War. US
interest in the Middle East after the Gulf War materialized the start of negotiations between the Arabs and
Israel towards the end of 1991 with the first round at Madrid, Spain. US felt that only in the post-Cold War
era. US role in the world affairs will increase. The US co-operated though to a limited degree towards the
resolution of the conflicts like Bosnia Herzegovina, nuclear tussle in South Asia, Kashmir etc.
At home, President Bush had to face serious difficulties. The black-white tussle was intensified by the Los
Angeles riots of 1992 over the Rodny King issue. The ensuing disturbances sparked suspicions about the
cohesive nature of the society in United States. Bush was also criticized for too much emphasis on the
foreign policy pursuits at the cost of domestic economic issues like subsidies to farmers, trade imbalance
with Japan, housing, health care and unemployment. It was this poor show at the domestic front that was
capitalized by Bill Clinton during the election campaign of 1992 when Bush was mainly relying on the
success at foreign policy level.
CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
In the 1992 elections, Bush was contesting for a second term against the Democratic candidate, the
Arkansas governor, Bill Clinton. This time the election had an added element of interest because of the
issues involved. While Bush was banking upon the success of foreign policy specially in the context of
Gulf War and East-West relations, Clinton was
246
INTFRNATIONU AFFAIRS
focusing upon domestic issues mainly of socio-economic nature The election campaign was marked by
some bitter episodes with Bush saying, that his dog knew better than Clinton how to manage the foreign
policy whereas Clinton held that healthier, labour reforms, pioblems of small business entrepreneurs etc
were more important than securing the role of ”Woild’s Policeman” for USA Amidst acrimonious
atmosphere, elections were held and as the polls had predicted Clinton emeiged victorious with a
56-44 popular vote
Though Clinton had capitalized on the domestic issues during the election campaign, on assumption of the
office on January 20, 1992 he stated that the United States would continue to play vital role in maintaining
international peace and security and if the situation demands would not refrain from the active involvement
and use of force Specially in case of Bosnia, the statement gave rise to speculations that the new president
intended in principle, to act decisively to restore peace in this highly sensitive area of Europe However, the
initial zeal soon fizzled out in the wake of growing differences among the NATO countries and the US had
to be contended with three options, enforce a no-fly zone over the area under UN relief operations, support
the Vance Owen plan to divide the state of Bosnia Herzegovina into three parts Serb, Muslim and Croat,
and finally keep consulting the NATO allies over the possibility of use of force The Secretary of Defence,
Los Aspien favoured a cautious approach while the chief of air staff favoured active intervention by the US
forces along wffh the NATO allies On the other hand international developments were demanding a more
active US role towards the resolution of conflicts in many areas Complying with the UN Resolution 751
(1992) the USA decided to intervene militarily into Somalia under the UN banner The subsequent failure of
the US led peacekeepers send warnings to rethink the US policy of military intervention to maintain peace
in the conflic-ndden areas The US policy towards Russia seemed to follow the footings left by the Bush
administration i e to support the free market, and political reforms initiated by Yeltsin About the Maastricht
Programme, the Clinton administration expressed reservations specially in the wake of worsening trade
imbalance with Japan and the European partners as well as the nature of future security arrangement for
Europe specially with reference to NATO An important development regarding regional co-operation
occurred when President Bill Clinton, embracing George Bush’s vision of a free trade system that links all
the Americas - North, Central and South as regional partners in the free-trade zone took initiative to realize
the same idea
On March 30, 1993 Larry Summers, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Department supported the
trade component of the broader
THE AMFRK AN C OVTINFNTS
247
enterprise for the Americans This led to serious ramifications at home The Michigan autoworkers staged
massive demonstrations to piotest against the idea as the new arrangement w ould mean narrowing down
the markets for US manufacturers to only the Americas costing the attractive East Asian and European
markets which may be captured by Japan (under an East Asian FTA) and by Germany (under EFTA) The
launching of NAFTA on September 13, 1993 meant a real test for Clinton’s programme to compete and
win the global economy for United States US policy towards arms control ind nuclear piohfeiation got
impetus during the year 1992 with two incidents, refusal of North Korea to sign NPT or agree to IAEA
safeguards and the .ale of M-l missiles by China to Pakistan USA imposed economic sanctions on Pakistan
and China for alleged violation of the MTCR Earlier the president had to face tough resistance from the
Congressmen over the granting of NMN status to China In South Asia the administration continued to
pressurize Pakistan and India to sign the NPT but Pakistan’s mtransigi nee in favour of its stance for a
regional approach denied the US The most important development however was the US acceptance to link
the nuclear issue in South Asia to the resolution of other issues between Pakistan and India specialty the
Kashmir In this context, the visit of Robin Raphel, former Under Secretary of State in November 1993 was
of much significance Perhaps the most important credit to Clinton in the foreign policy area came in the
form of Israel-PLO accords on the autonomic question at the peace talks in September 1991 This not only
enhanced the US image as peace broker but also gave rise to expectations that a viable security
arrangement for the Middle East could be envisaged according to the foreign policy objectives of the
United States US policy towards terrorism added to continue the imposition of economic sanctions on
Libya over the lockerbie suspects’ extradition issue during the year 1993
REJECTION OF CTBT BY US SENATE
The US Senate m October 1999 rejected the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The Treaty which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 1996, cannot enter into force
unless it is ratified by all the 44 countries judged to have nuclear facilities So far only 26 of such countries
have ratified the Treaty Till now 154 nations have signed it, of which only 47 have ratified it Pakistan,
India and North Korea are the only three countries who have not signed it as yet
The fractious debate in the US Senate on the ratification question shows that the issues involved aie quite
complicated and of far-reaching importance The CTBT was the first rejection of a Treaty by the US Senate
since 1919
248
It is interesting to recall that the United States opposed the CTBT till 1992 and began to support it only
when it realized that through the instrumentality of the CTBT it could freeze its ad\ antages in sophisticated
nuclear weapon technology. But the Cox report released in July 1999 on the alleged Chinese espionage in
the US has altered the situation and consequently played a major role in the rejection of the CTBT by the
Senate. China has vehemently denied the contents of the Cox report but the Senate’s refusal to ratify the
CTBT shows that the Chinese denial was not considered credible.
According to the Cox report, the Chinese have been carrying out nuclear espionage on the US for the last
two decades and are said to have obtained data on some of the latest American weapons developments,
including the design of W-88 thermonuclear war head and neutron weapons. In the opinion of CTBT
opponents in the Senate, China may even test these latest designs sometime in the year 2000 and start
deploying them two or three years later. The Senate has withheld ratification of CTBT because in the
opinion of the majority of the Senators this will perpetuate parity wityh China in weapon technology which
is naturally not acceptable to them.
Another factor that seems to have influenced the thinking in the Senate is the warning given by USA
scientist in charge of maintaining the safety and reliability of American nuclaer stockpile, that a science-
based substitute for actual nuclear tests will not be fully available for at least five to ten years. The
scientists’ caution about the possible consequences of the ratification of an accord, banning underground
nuclear tests as well, played a major role in influencing the Senate vote on the CTBT.
The Senate’s refusaHo ratify the CTBT is an embarrassing setback for President Bill Clinton who has
described CTBT not only as his top foreign policy goal but also as ’the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize
in the history of arms control. Of the five members of the nuclear club, only France and Britain have
ratified CTBT. China and Russia, who have been closely watching the tussle on the issue between the
Senate and the Clinton administration, are not likely to ratify it either after Washington’s inability to do so.
Under Article XIV of the CTBT, the Treaty shall enter into force
180 days after the date of deposit of the instrurment of ratification by all the
44 states, having nuclear facilities, listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty. The means that even if Pakistan and
India sign and ratify the CTBT, it will not come into force until the US, Russia, China and other members
of the group do so.
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US FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE THIRD MILLENIUM
At the out set of the new millenium United States foreign policy faces a severe test of skill, tact and ability
to stick to the standing and status it has acquired as the sole superpower after the demise of USSR. The US
needs a vision of the future it seeks to achieve. Only in that way will it be able to establish criteria for
judging \vheie it is heading.
Never before in \\orld history have so many structural changes in the international system occurred
simultaneously, as has been the case during the past ten to fifteen years. Some elements are now global -
for example, economics and communications - while politics remains confined to the nation - state or is
reduced to ethnic units.
Three issues are quite likely to pose the greatest challenges in the next century - Asia, the Persian Gulf, and
the transatlantic region encompassing the NATO countries and the territory of the former Soviet Union.
In Asia, China is set to emerge as an incipient superpower. Once it reaches the per capita income that
equals South Korea (about the third of US), its GNP will be double that of the US. Such an economic
colossus is bound to have a major impact. China’s huge market coupled with its military strength will
provide -a means for enhancement of political influence to its committed and sincere leadership.
However, it should be kept in mind that the Chinese leadership may not be necessarily looking for
establishment of hegemony nor will the US suffer or lose its capacity to affect the evolution of Asia since
China’s development will not take place in a vacuum.
There are chances that Japan will start to assert itself, its policies will become more ’nationalistic’ in
outlook, especially since the past few years have seen the rise of other power centres - in India, Vietnam,
China and South Korea. There is a growing concern in Japan that its interests are no more parallel to those
of the US. The consequence may be that Japan’s foreign and defence policy will be geared more towards its
own national priorities.
In South Asia, Pakistan and India will continue to engage US attention especially at the nuclear front. Both
need to be ”handled with care”. Pakistan, for its recent transition from civilian to military rule, will remain
a focus of attention, as General Musharraf makes an effort to
250
INTFRNATIONAl AI-FVIUS
transform the country’s sagging fortunes and strike off the ’failed state’ syndiome India primarily due to a
militant go\emment in power may become more and moie difficult to deal with as time goes by Also, is
efforts aimed at getting the region rid ot nuclear weapons, signing of CTB1 and establishment of a cordial
woikmg relationship between the two hostile neighbours will be major causes of concern
ASEAN is bound to increase inteiaction and coordination In these conditions, there are not many chances
of one nation establishing hegemony over others unless all others suffer an internal collapse, for which
there is yet no evidence, despite Indonesia’s troubles, and, which, if it occuired, would evoke strong
countervailing reactions
Many China observers propose that the US should preempt challenges that are non - existent by
confronting China with human rights pressures and economic warfare They believe that ’democratization
will lead to a more peaceful policy and that economic shortfalls will cut down on China’s military options’
Under the given set of circumstances, this seems highly unlikely to happen, and such a policy, if ever
followed, will evoke the very dangers with which it seeks to deal
US human rights pressures vis - a - vis China have failed since the past one decade, since they reflect a
number of misconceptions and misunderstandings There is a need to believe that the ’Middle Kingdom’s’
foreign policy is not so much driven by communist ideology as by growing nationalism, which can be
inflamed only by a confrontational American policy
What many tend to forget is that unlike the planned Stalinist system, Chinese economy is a self - styled
socialist market with the word ’market’ more operational than the word ’socialist’ The greatest threat it
faces is that it may overheat rather than just stale, as happened with USSR Also, Chinese society is being
transformed by indigenous elements - by centralizing the decision making process, they have created a sort
of pluralism, if not democracy in the Western sense Similarly, the impact of one - child family on historical
Chinese social patterns is likely to be far reaching
By the same token, advocating a policy of military containment on the model of cold war has no objective
basis Unlike the erstwhile Soviet Union’s anxious and ’scared’ neighbours who yearned for Uncle Sam’s
patronage, none of China’s neighbours feel threatened and will not be prepared to ground their policy or
join an alliance based on the assumption of Chinese aggression They may want American presence for their
THE \MFRIC \\CO\n\h\TS
251
diplomatic and economic stability but knowing fully well that US commitments aie likely to be jerky and
occasional, they will not opt for a direct challenge to base their policy on hostility to China
Washington needs to tiead a caieful path with lespect to China, confrontation will not help at all Chinese
diplomacy is more skillful than was that of Soviet Union , Chinese society is more cohesive , and
neighbouring countries are more ambivalent about where the threat to then security lies For the first time in
its histoiy, China is tied to the woild economy and a global international system Before turning to
confrontation, a cooperative relationship is preferable, something that President Bill Clinton has wisely
opted for o\er the past few years, despite Congress pressures
For all that is stated above, US policy towards Asia should be based on the following basic points
• Maintain good relations with all countries of the region There should be no effort to divide the area
into friendly and hostile blocs Paradoxically, this is the best method of ensuring the presence of allies in
unavoidable crisis
• The US should continue with Japan as the keystone of its Asian security policy remaining well aware of
the historical fears of other counti ics vis - a - vis Japan in the region
• For the sake of preventing hostility and quickening the process of unification, it is necessary to have good
relations with South Korea Given North Korea’s rickety financial position and its recent interaction with
Washington regarding missile testing, perhaps time is not far away when the process of unification will set
- in
• Establishing a genuine strategic dialogue with Beijing is a must in order to forge political understanding
with China Since both countries have a parallel interest in avoiding a major armed crisis in Asia, China’s
disagreements with several of its neighbours are likely to be greater than the ones it has with the US At the
same time, China will not adopt hegemonic policy This gives the US a reason to reconcile policies where
possible, and chum out differences with Beijing
Discussions regarding Middle East in the past have mostly focussed on the Arab - Israel question While
there exists a time - tested framework for dealing with the situation, there are other even more dangerous
issues that need speedy response History is witness that although
252 __
INTFKN \TI()\ U \FMIRS
THE AMFRK \N ( ON IINFNTS
253
the states in Gulf aie small in size, yet if and \\hen they unite, as they did back in 1973 when they uised oil
puces by 1387 peicent in a thiee - month period, theie was an economic CJIMS of international dimensions
Today the consequences of a cusis in the Gulf aie no less ominous The US does not get along \\ell \\ith the
tw-o stiongest states lian and Iraq
- which leaves it on friendly terms with only Saudi Aiabia and Jordan While Saudi Arabia is going through
the torments of adapting an essentially feudal souety to the modernization wrought by oil lesources. global
communications and the spiead of education, Joidan, boideung Iraq. Syria and Israel has its hands full with
its own immediate secunty concerns
Turkey though geogiaphically detached but for many years anchor of US Meditenanean policy, is central to
Gulf policy However, despite close links and ties with the West, it does sometimes find itself facing
American and European pressure over its policies tovvaids Cyprus and the Kurds The West also feais an
Islamist takeover anytime, ”reversing the Ataturk reforms and reonenting Turkey towards ’dark ages’ ”
Without Turkey, however, it is not possible for the West to sustain the stability of the Gulf region nor is it
feasible to continue international support for sanctions on Iraq for a longer period of time A policy of
keeping Iraq united as a potential threat to Iran conflicts with the goal of fostering the autonomy of the
Kurds in the north and of the Shia’s around Basra by means of no - fly zones and similar measures
Washington has alieady suffered setbacks in the Kurdish area - with the passage of time drawbacks in US
position will become even more obvious and apparent
After some uncertainty, Russia will come to grips with its problems and will once again become a major
international role player The central authority, despite upheavals in Chechnya and elsewhere, will be
restored and may well be closer to the political structures favoured by Pinochet or Salazar than to a
Western pluralistic model Once things are settled, the economy will start to roll and recover
Nations bordering the Atlantic in this situation will have to be careful in dealing with a far more assertive
and in - control Russia, and will have to make sure that its nationalism does not spill across its borders The
enlargement of NATO to include former Soviet allies has and will further provide the essential safety
network for the task
The United States foreign policy, in the new millemum, will have to face challenges never before
encountered in previous experience In the years gone by, the US engaged itself internationally by dealing
with
problems that weie seen as hav ing a temimal date In the times to come, the biggest challenge will be to
help umstiuct a system in which the tewaids and penalties are conducive to a broadei sense of global well -
being Whatever the future one nnpeiatrve lemams constant since the days ot the Cold War the
establishment ot a peaceful and humane international older in the this century lequnes a fiim commitment
fiom the American leadeiship complemented by its eltoits to iid the woild ol poveity. hatied and hostility
US. CHINA AND JAPAN’S ROLE IN \S1 A
»
China, the United States and Japan aie fundamentally committed to a peaceful environment, despite
domestic constiamts and puisuit of national interests They are ready to coopeiate to resolve regional
problems and to strengthen regional institutions
But only by building a strong tuangular relationship and cooperating closely can they gain the level of co-
operation needed to preserve peace and security in Asia It is in the inteiests of other countries in the region
to contribute towards this goal.
The proper management of the relationship requnes that important developments between two nations on
one side of the triangle be balanced by dealing carefully with the other two sides of the triangle
On major issues, the two sides will sometimes express the same view against the third But because of the
fragility of the triangle and the lack of mutual confidence, this can be seen as ’ganging up’ Many mistakes
have already occurred
The United States, in negotiating with Japan the redefinition of their security relationship in 1994 and 1995,
did not keep China adequately informed. Neither did Japan. This fuelled Beijing’s suspicions that the
USJapan Security Treaty was aimed at China, an issue that still haunts the
relationship
During his visit to China in June 1998, President Bill Clinton failed to mention the US security alliance
with Japan and chose not to visit Japan as well. His actions encouraged those m China who hoped to push
for improved US-China relations at the expense of US-Japan relations, creating worries in Japan that
Washington’s improved relations with Beijing would be at the expense of its relations w ith Japan
In 1998, Washington publicly castigated Tokyo for not following conciete American prescriptions on
stimulating the economy, and publicly
TT1
THF 4MFRK AN ( (>\ri\F\TS
__ 255
praised China for not devaluing its currency The pronouncements set off stiong nationalistic lesponses in
Japan against the United States Tokyo has also been insufficiently sensitive to the impact on Asia of its
failure to stimulate the Japanese economy, thereby ci eating the perception that the United states and China
aie co-operating to end the Asian crisis, while Japan is not
China, Japan and the United States cannot and should not become a bloc But high-level lepresentatives of
the three countnes should meet to exchange views on tegional and global developments to develop a
common base of understanding for co-operation, including issues that are also dealt with by broader
regional and global institutions like APEC - the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum, and the United
Nations
The three nations in the triangle should also keep open relations with other countnes. especially Russia.
South Korea, India. Pakistan and members of ASEAN - the Association of South East Asian Nations
Issues that need to be taken up in the discussions among the three powers should include
• Coming to terms with the World War II The Chinese remain highly emotional both about Japanese
cruelties in World War II and about the Japanese failure to discuss them fully and openly The Japanese feel
they have repeatedly apologized The countries need to open their historical records to objective scholars
from Japan, China and other nations, then educate their citizens about their findings
* Building a sound-post-crisis regional economic structure In the shortrun, the three powers need to work
together to avoid a new round of competitive currency devaluations and help in East Asia’s reconstruction
Among the issues to be considered are mechanisms for reducing the danger of sudden capital flight, reserve
currency baskets for the region that would include the Japanese yen and possibly the Chinese yuan as well
as the US dollar, mechanisms for controlling excessive fluctuations in exchange rates, agreements for
continued trade and investment liberalization in the region, and the creation of an Asia Fund to respond to
emergencies without the moral hazard of rewarding the speculators who lose from market decisions
1 Resolving the Taiwan issue How can the three powers avoid the dangers of confrontation that occurred in
March 1996 near Taiwan and the anxieties created in China the following month with the
leaffirmation of the US-Japan Security Treaty’ Misunderstandings could lead to conflict
• Preserving peace in the Korean Peninsula Long-term peaceful lelations on the peninsula require the co-
operation of Japan and China China should take part in the Korean Energy Development Organization,
while Japan, as well as China, should take part in the cieation of a new peace treaty Understandings need
to provide assurances to China, Japan and a united Korea that would avoid a new arms race in the region
• Accepting the US military role Asia The Chinese have enunciated the principle that no nation should
station troops in another country But the presence of US forces in Asia may help Japan to choose not to try
to become militarily dominant in Asia If China wishes to avoid the rise of independent Japanese militarism,
it is in its interests for US troops to remain in Japan Given the dangers of Chinese-Japanese rivalry on the
Korean Peninsula, it is also m Chinese interests to encourage the United States to retain troops in South
Korea to reduce risks of confrontation For the Chinese to accept the US military role in East Asia, Beijing
will have to develop confidence that American troops will not be used to contain China
• Extending arms control Following the May 1998 explosions by India and Pakistan agreements about
weapons of mass destruction and about conventional arms limitation will require co-operation throughout
Asia If North and South Korea are to reduce their armaments, and if Japan is to remain non-nuclear and
committed to only defensive military activities, China will have to become more transparent about its
activities and follow Japan’s path of not developing a military capable of projecting power beyond the
territory it now claims
• One of the central questions confronting Japan and Taiwan is whether to develop anti-ballistic missile
defence systems Since China has weak naval and air forces, its leverage is missiles It finds the prospects of
an effective anti-ballistic missile defence system in Japan and Taiwan disturbing
• Joint response to emergencies All three powers co-operated in peacekeeping activities in Cambodia
under the UN flag They should begin planning joint military exercises, starting with those for
humanitarian purposes, such as disaster relief and flows of refugees from such places as North Korea and
Indonesia
256
Maintaining the natural environment: Acid lain from China affects Japan. China is especially in need of
technology and financial aid to help deal with its growing pollution problems. The United States and Japan
are already working with China to provide it with technology and capital.
Gaining full representation of China and Japan in international organizations Even though Japan has the
second-largest economy in the world and pays more dues to the UN than any other country except the
United States, it is not yet a member of the Security Council. Although China is already the third-largest
economy in the word, it is not yet represented in meetings of leading industrial powers.
Washington and Tokyo need to offer continued reassurance to Beijing that a strong and prosperous China is
in their interest.
SEPTEMBER 11. UNITED STATES NO MORE INVINCIBLE
THE ASSAULT ON THE UNITED STATES WILL FOREVER CHANGE THE WAY AMERICA
LOOKS AT ITSELF AND AT THE WORLD
September 11th 2001 will be a date that America never forgets. Early that Tuesday morning terrorists
simultaneously commandeered four passenger aircraft flying from New York, Boston and Washington, DC.
On the evidence of cellphone calls from inside the hijacked airliners, groups of between three and six
terrorists herded passengers and crew into the back of each craft, threatening them with knives and
cardboard-cutters.
Two of the planes flew straight into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, felling both structures an
hour later while thousands of people were presumably still trapped inside. A third ploughed into the
Pentagon. The fourth crashed into a field in Pennsylvania, apparently after the passengers decided to
overpower the hijackers when they heard, again over cellphones, of what had happened in New York. The
aircraft had been aimed, it seems, at the heart of Washington. For Americans, these terrible events are
epoch-making, changing the landscape of geopolitics as indelibly as they have defaced the skyline of
Manhattan. Current debates about budget deficits and the Internet boom now seem frivolous. The country’s
sense of invulnerability, built on its superpower status, has been violated. America has learned that it is not
merely vulnerable to terrorism, but more vulnerable than others.
The parallels with Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, which

257 -
brought America into the second world war, have been widely drawn and are in large part justified. There
was the same shock of surprise. Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, said there had been no credible
warning. The enemy struck at the symbols of American might - its economic, military and (in intention at
least) political power. The principal difference was that the targets were on the mainland, not thousands of
miles. Even though the dead count is not certain till date, yet, the casualties were almost certainly greater
than the 2,403 who died at Pearl Harbour. This was the deadliest day’s military action against Americans
Since the civil war. It represents a profound change both in the scale and the complexity of operations
mounted by any terrorist group.
At Pearl Harbour, America could immediately identify its aggressor. The experience of the Oklahoma City
bombing - blamed at first on Middle Eastern action, but later discovered to be peipetrated by an American -
enjoins caution this time. But a growing amount of evidence points towards Islamic extremists, including,
some say, the date itself. September 11th 1922 was the day when a British mandate came into force in
Palestine, over the heads of Arab opposition.
Almost four months after September 11 and intense bombing of Afghanistan, killing thousands of innocent
civilians and will Osama bin Laden nowhere to be found, America’s leaders still seem increasingly
convinced that he was responsible. He is one of the very few terrorists with the organisational power to
carry out such an operation.
Assuming that the enemy is Osama bin Laden, then the biggest difference from Pearl Harbour may
eventually be that America has no clear idea about what it means to go to war with him. In the immediate
aftermath, America briefly behaved as if war had been joined in the old way. Financial markets were
closed. Traffic into the capital was turned away. The ordinary business of life-airline flights, sporting
events, shopping malls, Disneyworld was shut. For a few hours, the government itself seemed headless, as
the secret services spirited away the president and leaders of Congress to secure, secret spots.
Mr. Bush called these ”not acts of terrorism but acts of war”. In other words, he will treat the assault not as
a matter for an international criminal tribunal (as happened after the destruction of Pan-Am 103 in 1988) or
a cause for pinpoint cruise missiles (as after the bombing of America’s embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in
1998) but as a casus belli. The targets will not be clear but any country which the US believes is
committing these acts and those who harbour terrorists. That may mean America is considering attacks on
the military bases and government buildings of the countries that provide terrorists shelter and refuge. The
day after September
258
11, NATO invoked Article 5 of its treaty for the first time: this says that an attack on one member is an
attack on all.
Counter-terrorism will also take centre-stage in America’s reordering of its defence priorities. In March, a
commission on national security chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman argued
presciently that a ”catastrophic attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next
quarter-century. The risk is not only death and destruction but also a demoralisation that could undermine
US global leadership. In the face of this threat, our nation has no coherent or integrated government
structures.”
The report argued that the Pentagon should be reorganised to reflect these threats: that the special
operations division dealing with ”low intensity” conflicts should be given more clout (critics claim it has
been downgraded by the priority given to missile defence); and that a counterterrorism tsar should be
created, with cabinet rank, to co-ordinate the many different agencies that get in each other’s way when
responding to terrorism. On May 8th, the vice-president said he would take over this task.
Lastly, the attacks may seem to vindicate critics of Mr. Bush’s proposed missile defence, who say the
biggest threat to America comes not from missile programmes of rogue states, but from terrorists’ ”suitcase
bombs”. Logically, that point may be justified. But in their new vulnerability Americans may want defence
of all sorts and be willing to pay for it. You don’t tear up your fire insurance because your house has been
flooded.
Such arguments will form the debates of a new era of shadow war. No one can know in advance
where they will lead. But wherever it is, the starting point is the awful wreckage in lower Manhattan under
which so many Americans died.
”US UNILATERALISM UNDER GEORGE W. BUSH”
The US since the end of the Cold War, has perfected the art of exercising its influence in all spheres,
ranging from political to economic to military. Former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright termed
America as an ”indispensable power” in the new era. The events of September 11, 2001 have been
followed by trends and events that are rapidly eroding confidence in a peaceful and stable world. Even
before the
9/11 incident, the Bush administration had adopted unilateralist approach that had aroused widespread
resentment and concern across the world.
259
L
United States abrogated the ABM Treaty and allocated million of dollars for the National Missile Defence
System. The plan of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) was launched on May 1, 2002, without advance
consultations with allies and friends, which clearly shows the hegemonic designs of US. US also
undermined the NPT and CTBT by expressing its intentions for testing new nuclear weapons and refusing
to rule out a nuclear first strike capability.
US also repudiated international consensus to curb global warming and refused to accept the Kyoto
Protocol. Bush’s administration has declared all treaties null and void which go against the interest of US.
Another act of unilateralism was the dissociation of US from the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose
creation has been agreed upon by the international community. US has been campaigning aggressively to
exempt all American personnel from its jurisdiction, even threatening to veto UN peace-keeping operations
if it did not get its way.
The most severe act of unilateralism is the doctrine of ”Preemptive War” which has been adopted by the
Bush’s administration in the wake of 9/11. US while pursuing his doctrine of pre-emption, has totally
sidelined United Nations, the only world organization responsible for international peace and security. Ever
since the Bush administration took power, it has used the UN to gain legitimacy for its own actions, notably
in the war against terror. However, several recent decisions of the sole super power, have shown that the
UN is not its chosen instrument for ensuring justice and peace. Even some American officials have been
heard of hinting on either to change the UN behaviour or US departure from it, if it stands in the way of
American national interest. US has clearly declared that it does not need to seek ’permission slip’ from UN
in rooting out dangers and threats to her national security. The recent war in Iraq was a clear manifestation
of that policy and practical show of unilateralism.
One can reach at the conclusion by analyzing the policies and actions of the Bush administration that
Washington is determined to shape the world in the new century on the basis of its power rather than the
idealistic international norms of UN charter.
QUITTING THE ABM - A WISE DECISION?
Washington being what it is, the idea that politics and ideology should be set aside for a higher purpose
may seem a quaint, naive sentiment. But few would argue with the statement that the ultimate test in
deciding to scrap a treaty that has helped keep the peace for 30 years is
260
VIIONAI
VIKS
v\hether it makes the United States more or less seuue In that Imht, President Bush’s Decembei 2001
decision to umlateialK \\alk a\\a> fiom the Anti-Ballistic Missile Tieaty is a serious mistake
No one doubts we live in a dangeious \voild and that enemies of any nation are mthiess But a ’ Stai Wais’
defence, assuming it could be made to work would addiess only what the US Joint (Inets of Staff argue is
the least likely thieat to US national secunty
One of the lessons the is should ha\e leained fiom the devastating attack of Sept 11 is that tenonsts
deteimmed to do haim to the US can employ a wide \anety of means and that weapons of mass destruction -
chemical, biological 01 even nuclear -- need not amve on the tip ot an intercontinental ballistic missile with
a return address That s why the US Joint Chiefs of Staff argue that an ICBM launch ranks last on the
’Threat Spectrum,” while terronst attacks constitute the greatest potential threat to our national security
The administration’s obsession with missile defence -- with a price tag in excess of a quarter-trillion dollar
for the layered programme on the president’s wish list -- is doubly troubling because of the attention and
resources being diverted from critical efforts to addiess genuine threats While President Bush says
nonprohferation is a high priority, his actions speak louder Notwithstanding promises of new efforts the
fiscal year 2002 budget that he requested would have cut more than $100 million Out of programmes
designed to corral Russia’s ”loose nukes” provide help that Russia has requested to destroy its chemical
weapons stockpile and prev ent unemployed Russian scientists from selling their services to terrorist
organizations
Only when it comes to missile defence is the administration pushing hard But nothing could be more
damaging to global nonprohferation efforts than to go forward with Star Wars Russia has enough offensive
weapons to overwhelm any system the US could devise, so the real issue is what happens in China and
throughout Asia
China currently possesses no more than two dozen ICBMs US intelligence services estimate that moving
foiward with national missile defence could trigger a ten-fold increase in China’s expansion of its nuclear
capability And that doesn’t take into account likely Chinese behavior if an arms race ensues something
many experts argue is mev itable when both India and Pakistan respond as expected by ratcheting up their
nuclear programs
Thus, the cost of unilaterally walking away from the ABM Treaty
THF \MFRIC V\(ONTINFMS
261
and forging ahead with national missile defence includes not only dangerous neglect of the leal threats the
US faces but the likelihood that Washington will unleash a new aims race that will create a nucleanzed
Asia
Finally Sept 11 clanfied the fact that the woild is in tiansition from old Cold War alignments to new
patterns of conflict and cooperation Managing such a transition wisely will deteimme whethei the US take
an advantage of new oppoitumties or whether the countiy allows ideological zealotry to contiol stiategic
doctune
Al Qaeda s eager search for weapons of mass destmction highlights the importance of broad
nonprohferation efforts and Washington s need to work in concert with like-minded partners The president
skillfully worked to build a coalition to fight international terrorism That success has created an
environment for a changed world with the potential for old enemies to come together Out of the Sept 11
tragedy we have opportunities to pivot toward promising new relationships, following up on the
cooperation of the moment with a realignment of forces for decades to come
Indeed, there is some cause for hope The United States and Russia are making real progress to reduce
strategic offensive forces Secretary of State Colin Powell has indicated we are relatively close to a formal
agreement m this regard - presumably one that binds the two countries and provides for verification and
transparency
So far, the administration’s conduct of the war on terrorism has shown discipline, perseverance and an
ability to forge international consensus But the war is only few years old, and the new patterns of
cooperation and support are young and fragile The United States must nourish them and build on them,
rather than taking unilateral foreign policy moves that will make it people less secure
THE US STANCE ON ICC TREATY
The ICC (Inteination Criminal Court) treaty which was signed by more than 120 countries in Rome on July
17, 1998, required that sixty countries must ratify it before the statute of the ICC comes into force On April
11, 2002 , the statute achieved its required ratification, when ten countries deposited their instrument of
ratification to UN on that date It enabled the statute to come into effect on July 1, 2002
262
IN PFRN VT1ONAI.
The first proposal to establish a ”World Criminal Court” was made as eaily as 1876 In adopting the
Genocide Comention in Decembei
1948, the UN General Assembly expiessed its hope that a peimanent International Criminal Couit could be
established to tiy peisons who aie accused of committing genocide Moie than fifty thiee years attei its
formal mooting by the UN, the ICC is set to become opeiational in 2003
The court would have junsdiction to tiy peisons \vho are accused of committing genocide, war crimes and
cnmes against humanity eithei in the territories of the State patties or by the nationals of the State paities
The dimes must have been committed by those peisons after July 1. 2002 the date the statute of ICC come
into foice Moieo\ei, the ICC would ha\e ”complimentaiy” junsdiction, that is it would initiate proceedings
only when state parties are unable or unwilling to take action against such offenders, who would breach the
most basic norms of international law
When the ICC treaty was adopted in Rome in July 1998 by over
120 countries, the US was one of the seven countries which voted against it The US was concerned about
its nationals being dragged before the ICC for ’politically motivated prosecutions’ And the US still voted
against the treaty notwithstanding the fact that the ICC meeting in Rome had addressed most of the
demands made by the US delegation and had incorporated many procedural safeguards into the ICC statute
Although President Bill Clinton signed the ICC Treaty on December 31. 2000 but he refused to send the
treaty ”in its present form” to the US Senate for ratification
Now President George W Bush wants to backtrack totally by ”unsignmg” the ICC treaty that his
predecessor had signed The act of unsignmg the treaty will be unprecedented in the legal history of the US
According to the international jurists, US is not bound by the ICC treaty because it has only signed the
treaty but did not ratify it Nonetheless an important provision of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the law of
treaties which is in force, can be cited to analyze and critique the Bush’s administration contemplated
action It says that once a state has signed a treaty and even if it has not ratified, the country has an
”obligation to refiam from acts which would defeat the object and puipose of the treaty ”
The Bush administration s actions in the recent months including its covert actions to dissuade or pressure
some countries from ratifying the ICC treaty is clearly a breach of the obligation The US cleaily warranted
to abandon its support of peace-keeping operations from the Middle East to Cental Africa if the piotection
of US peisonnel is not guaranteed against prosecution in the ICC This unilateral acts on the part of the US
could encourage some reluctant countries to follow suit On the repeated call ol
THE AMFKICAN COSTINFNTS
263
US, ultimately its nationals are exempted from the ICC treaty obligations for one year Nevertheless, the US
intiansigence on the issue of ICC has exposed its unilateralist and hegemonic designs in the 21s’ centuiy
PRESIDENT BUSH’S DOCTRINE OF ”PRE-EMPTION”
Ihe doctune of ”Pie-emption” 01 ”anticipatory Sell-defence” is adopted by the US as an essential part of its
National Security Strategy in response to the tenonst acts of 9/11 The doctune of pre-emption embodies
that the US will root out any threat to its security which may harm its national interest in the near futuie
The so-called lationale behind the idea of pre-emption, as put foi w ard by the US. is that the consequences
of an attack by WMD will be devastating and the initiative for such an attack lies with the terronsts and
tenonst states So the only possible self-defence is to eradicate the danger befoie it could haunt on you The
doctrine has now become the corner-stone of the US defence policy
Six months after 9/11, it was observed by Dr Condoleeza Rice, the National Security Advisor to President
Bush, that ”An earthquake of the magnitude of 9/11 can shift the tectonic plates of international politics
This is a period not just of great danger but of enormous opportunity as well”
President Bush built upon this opportunity and re-defined the US Security policy in light of the new
circumstances He chalked out the National Security Strategy of US in his speech to the US Congress
(January
2002) and speech in the West Point Military Academy (June 2002) The new policy was unfolded in the
President’s NSS paper of September 20,
2002 The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the US says that, ”Our comprehensive strategy to combat
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) include Proactive Counter proliferation efforts We must deter and
defend against the threat before it is unleashed We can’t let our enemies strike first The overlap between
states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action To forestall or prevent such
hostile acts by our adversaries, the US will, if necessary, act pre-emptively ” The same tone was found in
the statement of the US Defense Secretary, Rumsfeld (June
2002) when he said that ”the greatest threat to western civilization may in unknown and unknowns ” By
this cryptic statement, Rumsfeld proposed that the US and its allies could not wait for ’absolute proof
before taking action against groups and states suspected of acquiring WMD
What this American biand of rationalization ignores, is that is precisely the hegemonic natuie of policy
being pursued by Washington that heightens the feeling of insecurity in other states and invites nuclear
264
IMFKNAriONVl AFFAIRS
proliferation and arms race This opens up enormous possibilities for unilateral aggressive actions in the
name of pre-emption and self defense It leaves little space for distinction between teiionsm and fieedom
struggle or movement of self-determination All type of acts of armed resistance whether fair or unfair are
branded as tenonst acts All these new trends indicate a sheer blow to the international noims of self-
determination, collective security and self-defense
The right of self determination was recognized for the fust time by President Wilson in his famous fourteen
points The UN General Assembly has adopted several resolutions to legitimize freedom struggle One of the
latest example is the East Timur freedom struggle, which was strongly supported by UN History is witness
to the right of self-determination The whole process of decolonization has come about as a result of direct
or indirect freedom struggles The US doctrine of pre-emption is contradictory to this historical international
norm It is not only in sheer contrast with the practice of international law but also a straightaway denial of
the principle of state’s sovereignty Article 51 of the UN Charter gives the right of use of force only in self-
defense But the condition for usej)f force in self-defense is that if a state is attacked by her adversary with
active military offensive on her homeland No country is allowed to use force against any threat in advance
under the garb of self-defense Similarly the UN charter demands all the member states respect one
another’s’ international boundaries National sovereignty is the Westphahan norm on which the present day
Nation-state system is based and that provides foundational stone to international law The Bush doctrine of
pre-emption violates both the UN charter and the foundational principle of International law
The Bush doctrine of pre-emption has put the world at danger The world is really concerned about some
nuclear flash points like Kashmir dispute and Taiwan issue Moreover, the doctrine has strengthened the
hands of suppressors and usurpers all around the world Since the adoption of the doctrine by the US, Israeli
PM Ariel Sharon’s heavy handedness with regard to suppression of the Palestinian Intifada, has been
intensified India also capitalized on the opportunity while crushing the Kashimri freedom struggle with
new vigor Even India threatened Pakistan with pre-emptive strike if the so-called cross-border terrorism
could not stop However, US Secretary of State, Colin Powell was fast in dismissing any parallel between
two cases of Kashimir and Afghanistan or Iraq
The US doctrine of pre-emption suffered setback in case of the recent Iraq war, where most of the
American close allies refused to follow American lines in imposing an unjust war on Iraq The US
bandwagon of the war based on claim of WMD being possessed by Saddam Hussam - a
THF AMFKIt AN (ONTIXFNTS
265
threat to the US interest in the legion The claim could not be substantiated by the UN Weapon Inspection
Team Nevertheless the US could not be deterred from waging a pie-decided pre-emptive wai against Iraq
The war against Iraq was a clcai manifestation of the US umlateialism, where the sole super powei. not
only sidelined the respectable world body UN but also her close allies in NATO
BUSH’S RE-ELECTION
A single foieign policy issue as the Bush-Keiry contest perhaps has dominated no other US presidential
election And no foreign policy issue has become so intertwined with domestic American concerns as the
’war on terror’
President George W Bush’s decisive victory on November 2 and the increased presence of the Republican
Party in the two houses of Congress have changed America’s political landscape
George Bush won 59 million votes, or 51 per cent of the total This was the largest number to have ever
voted for a presidential candidate in American history This large support for Bush was the result of two
factors a larger American population and larger voter turnout compared to the elections of
2000 In 2004, 119 8 million people voted, 14 4 million more than in 2000
In the final accepted count, Bush received 286 electoral votes, and Kerry received 251 One vote went to
Kerry’s running mate, John Edwards, when one of the electors pledged to Kerry voted for Edwards instead
For Vice President, 286 votes went to Bush’s running mate, Dick Cheney, and 252 to Edwards
The initial reading of the elections results is that the Christian right vote not i’:st evangelical Protestants but
also Conservative Catholics - came out to ôte m much larger numbers than most experts had expected
This larger turnout went counter to the assumption that larger voter participation generally favors liberal
candidates The finding that the Bush candidacy was favored by a wide swath of Christian right and not just
by evangelical Protestants is important since not all religious groups hold the same views on America’s
appioach to the woild outside
In the presidential elections of 2000, 15 million evangelical Protestants voted They accounted for 23 per
cent of the electorate and 71 per cent of them cast their votes for George W Bush
266
IVTFRNAFIONAI \FF\IRS
The Christian right tinned out in such large numbeis to \ote for Bush because of then concern with the
dnection Ameiica was taking on a number of social issues as well as then peiception of the challenges the
country faces from the outside
To these gioups of people Piesident Bush’s use ot good and e\il as the guiding principles of policy and his
fiequent refucnces to God motivating his actions held a special appeal
The lehgious wing of the Republican Paity will attempt to influence to an even gieater extent President
Bush’s foreign policy dm ing his second term The departure of the model ate Colin Powell from the State
Department and his replacement by Condoleezza Rice probably strengthened the hand of this w ing of the
party
Since this dispute is central to the concerns of the Muslim world - a fact now also recognized by British
Prime Minister 1 ony Blair who is a stout supporter of President Bush’s policies in the Middle Eastern
region Washington’s persistence in what is generally viewed as a bias towards the Jewish state will not ease
its relations with the Muslim countries
It does not seem possible that Washington under President Bush will be prepared to address the main
Palestinian concerns The Palestinians wish Israel to withdraw from the temtones it conquered in 1967, for
Jerusalem to become the joint capital of the states of Israel and Palestine and for some right of return for
the Palestinians displaced from their homes when the Jewish state was founded in 1948
They also want Palestinians to have full sovereignty in managing their affairs, including defense, foreign
relations, and economic management Israel, under the present leadership has a very different set of
interests, some of them of great consequence for the Muslim world
The most important of these is the futuie of the city of Jerusalem, the second most sacred site tor Islam
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s declaration soon after the death of Yasser Arafat that he did not believe that
a fully independent Palestinian state would emerge in the next two decades did little to assuage the highly
bruised feelings in the Muslim world
LATIN 4MERICA
Theie are about twenty countries which comprise Latin America They vary in size and population, tacial
composition, cultural background
TIIF AMFRK \\CO\TI\tNTS
267
literacy and economic and social development They wcie foimeily the possessions of thiee Latin Poweis of
Cut ope, Spain, Portugal and Fiance About eighteen states were a pait ot a single empire The long colonial
uile o\er the region has imprinted deep European featuies of which language and religion are the most
distinguished Eighteen states have Spanish as the common tongue Brazil has Poituguese and Haiti, Flench
All these states aie nominally at least Roman Catholic in teligion Biazil is the largest and most populous
South Amencan Republic It \\as a Poituguese colony and achieved independence in 1822 It is the wot Id s
largest pioducer ot coffee Aigentma Mexico, Peru and Colombia aie each moie than twice as laige as
Fiance Argentina is the second laigest countiy in South America It was a Spanish colony and achieved
independence in 1816 Mexico was uiled bv Spain from the 16th century until the ievolutionary war of
1910-21 The present republic was mauguiated in 1867 The country is fertile but is obliged to import
food Peru an independent state on the Pacific Ocean was ruled by Spain until the levolutionary war of
1921-24 Agriculture and mining employ moie than 70 per cent of the inhabitants Economic progress is
beset by many difficulties, but efforts are being made to develop the economy Colombia was Spanish
colony from 1536 until it achieved independence m 1819 as a part of Greater Colombia and became a
separate republic in 1930 It is the second laigest producer of coffee Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador are
other three states which were included in Greater Colombia Panama is an independent State on the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans It was formerly a pait of Greater Colombia but with US encouragement it revolted and
became independent in 1903
Its soil is \ ery fertile but only a small part has been de\ eloped The Panama Canal zone is governed by the
Canal Zone Government and operated by the Panama Canal Company, both set up in 19S1 The Secretary
of the US Army holds all the shares of the Company Ecuador achieved independence in 1830 Formerly it
was Spanish colony Venezuela was ruled by Spam from the 16th century and achieved complete
independence in 1830 The government receives over 50 per cent of the gross profits from petroleum, which
was discovered only in 1922 Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Haiti are veiy small
states in this region
MAJOR ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS
At the time of independence almost all the States of Latin America weie facing problems of the same kind
Politically the major problems concern stability of government the oiderly transtei of power and the
translation into practice of democratic punciples enshuned in many Constitutions Economically most of the
economies were maiked with poveity Resouices, especially land weie concentrated in a few hands The
268
INfH<\ \1IONAI AhFAIRS
THF \MF RK AN C ONTINFNTS
269
common aim was to secure growth Socially almost all the states faced difficulties in tiansioiming tiaditional
societies into modern ones In population, Latin America led the \vorld \\ith an annual rate of increase of
3%
The political atmosphere of Latin America has been maiked by instability ie\olutions and dictatorships The
reasons foi these problems are not tai to seek first the long colonial era, dominated by absolutist precepts
denied all oppoitunities to the people to acquire experience in public affans The result \vas that the Latin
American states weie not well equipped to govern themseKes aftei independence
Secondly, in most of the states of Latin America independence was achieved after violent wars in many
places, and revolutions were followed by civil suite Many states were huge, their communications poor and
the masses ilhteiate Thus a minority class, dominated often by land-owners made politics as its own
preserve, the numerically larger groups were excluded from government, and an oligarchical system
resulted Moreover, political parties usually revolved around dominant personalities Revolutions have been
engineered by small groups, in which the masses have rarely participated
For the reasons mentioned above, the Latin American nations have seen struggling democracies at the
hands of dictators and armies Revolutions and counter-revolutions have been the hall-mark of Latin
American politics The same trend persists even today as only Argentina under Menem represents some
measure of a democratic functioning of the state But this democracy too is controlled by the army
Another major issue besides fragile democracy in Latin America has been the economic deprivation and
under-development In most countries (especially m big states like Brazil and Argentina) there has emerged
an urban middle class with exerting ever more pressure on the national resources Trade imbalance marked
with lopsided dependence on fewer partners has been the major cause for increase of burdens on the
national economics The reforms m Brazil and Peru however have recently tended to improve the situation
mainly because these were initiated by popular new presidents Neo-hberal programmes and regional free
trade arrangements are expected to revert the trend in the 1990s Brazil has been the pioneer to support the
NIEO to secure somewhat relief to the developing countries vis-a vis the developed world More recently, at
the GATT talks the Latin American countries have pleaded the case of the South on issues like debt
servicing and the other financial and trade issues They blamed the
developed countries for not piovidmg their shaie to the pioblem of growth in the context of em ironment
safety
I atm America has also been at the centei ot tocus due to the nucleai contio\ersy with Brazil and Aigentma
having developed indigenous nuclear capability (though to an ambiguous level ot advancement) the issue
of non-prohfeiation of mass destructive weapons has been on the agenda of Latin American politics
Anothei aspect oi the I atm Amencan politics and
7 international affairs is the rise of ”naico-iegimes” over the last decade oi so
Countries like Colombia and Bolivia have become major expoiteis ot Cocaine and marijuana to North
America Diug money is in tact a maior ingredient of then national economics Although the IS A has poured
heavy funds under the Naicotics Control Piogiamme yet it has failed to solve the problem mainly for two
reasons, the drug cartels enjoy protection of private armies and the state machinery being unable to check
the drug tiaffkkmg activities and secondly because naico-money has held the structure by informally
running the economics specialty by prov idmg sustenance to the families of the racketeers In the global
context, this menace has put the developed countries development programmes at risk because ot the
dominance of this activity over the social political and economic activity
Traditionally, the most important issue m the Latin American politics has been the US influence and
intervention in diffeient countries While the US has been intervening under different motives, secunty of its
investments curbing the ideologically motivated upheavals typical of the Cold War as in Nicaragua,
Grenada and El Salvador, introduction of liberal reforms etc the Latin Amencan countries hav e responded
under mixed sets of behaviour Dunng the Cold War days the intervention was seen as a device to contain
the Soviet influence and roll-back the pro-Communist regime as m Cuba and Nicaragua More recently it
has been viewed as a vehicle to promote economic interests (as through NAFTA) US intervention in the
past has made the Latin Amencan states to be cautious in evaluating the possible dividends of the increased
US inteiest and the future ^, oj enmg to North America
CUBA
Cuba was governed by Spain from the 16th century to the 19th century, as the Spanish hold weakened,
theie were many revolts in Cuba In
1898, the USA defeated Spam in a war and occupied Cuba Under the 1901 Constitution a republic was
proclaimed, but there was a is Military occupation until 1902 and again from 1906 to 1909
270
IVrERV-VTIONAI.AFFA IRS
THE A.MEKK AN CONTINENTS
From 1933 to 1958. except 1944 and 1952. Cuba \\as under the dictatorship of Batista, \vlio \vas an army
sergeant and had seized power in
1933. His regime v\as marked by no reforms. It was a corrupt and personal regime and was based on terror
and brutality.
The demand for political and other reforms came from intellectuals and Fidel Castro, a law student at
Havana University. He made a disastrous attack on barracks in 1953. He was sentenced to a fifteen years
term and was released after two years as a result of general amnesty for political prisoners. In 1956, he
organized an expedition to fight Batista’s troops, but could not succeed during the following years. They
contacted the opponents of the Batista regime and gained strength.
The revolutionaries came to power in January 1959. Castro then promised a democratic government, free
elections, liberty of the Press and of organization. He also promised land reforms. He began a programme
of sweeping reforms, took over many large estates and divided this land among the peasants, erected
thousands of cheap houses and nationalised large firms. He became the popular idol of the whole of the
Latin America. He, of course, governed in an arbitrary manner without an elected Assembly.
In the wake of growing US pressure, Castro was driven to an even more hard-line ultra leftist posture.
Castro tried to challenge the United States by supporting Marxist revolutionary adventurism first in Latin
America and then in Africa in the 1970s (Angola, Ethiopia and Yemen etc.). Due to this intransigent
attitude of Castro the Reagan administration withdrew the peace gestures extended by President Carter and
Cuba was largely seen as Soviet agent trying to cause revolutionary havoc in the United States tidy
backward. However, the changes in the super-powers relations towards the late 1980s saw Cuba rethinking
her military and political commandments abroad. The gradual disengagement from Angola and Ethiopia
helped to ease the domestic difficulties for Castro regime but new element was now added to result into
even worse economic situation due to withdrawal of Soviet aid as now the western countries were
unwilling to support economically the reforms initiated by Gorbachev unless the Soviet aid to an
unreformed Cuba was terminated. At home, after strong economic growth during the period 1970-85, the
Cuban economy stagnated between 1985 and 1989, declined by 4 percent in 1990 and fell another 25% in
1991 to be followed by an additional 15% slump in 1992: Cuba has had a small and largely trade dependent
economy. Following the US embargo. Cuba had to depend on the old Soviet trade bloc
(COMECON) for more than four-fifth of its imports with access denied to the US markets and restricted in
others and with imports from the former
271
COMECON countries slashed by more than 90% between 19-89 and 1992. Cuba’s economy declined to a
lex el where people were struggling to survive. Overall Cuba’s imports fell from S8,l billion in 1989 to less
than $8 billion in 1992. The problems emerged in the form of an undermined labour market, growth of an
underground economy and a 45% cut in the national income. The Castro regime sought recourse to an even
tougher political line. Though the Fourth Party Congress in October 1991 had proposed direct elections to
the National Assembly, repression of political insurgency left the acts of protests and opposition mainly
isolated and individual in nature for the next two years to come. Amidst an acute energy crisis, crippled
economy and political inertia it was largely being speculated that the regime will fall very soon. The sugar
crop in 1993, being the worst in the decade, was expected to accompany large scale uprisings by
antiCommunist elements but to-date the socialist Cuba stands undaunted by these internal and external
threats and difficulties. The answer to this anomalous situation can be found in a number of factors. Some
pundits outside Cuba argue that Castro’s brand of communism is more durable than it seems coercion being
successfully combined with a Chinese style diversification of economic options. Though Cuba has lost
most of the former trading partners, it signed a new trade agreement with Russia and China. The energy
crisis has been overcome to some exttent with the Russian oil input and the bartered sugar exports. Most
OAS {(Organization of American States) speciality, Brazil and Venezuela and French investment in
tourism and oil exploration have pillared up the declining economy. Moreover, Castro had adopted some
openness in political amd economic system, press liberties and more democratization (on the style of low
level elections of 1991) has been promised alongwith permission to foreign investment in formerly state
monopolised sectors.
US-CUBA RELATIONS
In 1960, Castro quarrelled with the United States ov er the refusal of the American oil companies to
continue operating until pay/ment of their accoij nts. Meanwhile, thousands of supporters of Batista, who*
had suffered at the hands of Castro, gathered in Florida and. with US help, tided to invade Cuba. The
invaders were defeated. Following the defeat of the invaders, Castro obtained large quantities of arms from
the Communist countries.
CRISIS IN 1962
On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy revealed that the USA had discovered Russian offensive missile
sites in Cuba. He amnounced that ships carrying offensive weapons to Cuba would be blockaded. It
precipitated a major international crisis. President Kennedy threatened to
272
bombard the bases, but Khrushchev agreed to dismantle the bases. Thus a nuclear war was averted. The
crisis lasted about eleven days.
In 1964. at the initiative of the United States, in the Organisation of American States a decision was taken
that all members should break off relations with Cuba, and this was binding on all members. Most of them
did, but Mexico refused to do so. A few others followed suit after considerable delay and. of course, at the
cost of popular demonstrations against the move.
During tlie 1970s and early Castro dispatched Cuban troops to assist Marxists ii’ Angola, Ethiopia and
Yemen, and was accused by Washington of fomenting unrest and supplying weapons for Communist
insurgencies in Central America.
Emigration increased dramatically after April 1, 1980, when Castro, irritated by the granting of asylum to
would-be refugees by the Peruvian embassy in Havana, removed guards and allowed 10,000 Cubans swarm
into the embassy grounds.
As an airlift began taking the refugees to Costa Rica, Castro insisted they must go directly to their final
destination. At the same time he opened the port of Mariel to a ’freedom flotilla’ of ships and yachts from
the United States, many of them owned or chartered by Cuban-Americans to bring out relatives. More than
125,000 Cubans, poured out of Mariel in a mass exodus. It wasn’t until after they had reached the USA,
that it was discovered that the regime had opened prisons and mental hospitals to permit criminals,
homosexuals and others unwanted in Cuba to join the refugees.
For most of President Ronald Reagan’s first term. US-Cuban relations were frozen with Secretary of State
Alexander Haig calling Havana source of troubles in Central America. But late in 1984, an agreement was
reached between the two countries. Cuba would take back more than 2,700 Cubans who had come to the
United States in the Mariel exodus but were not eligible to stay in the country under US immigration law
because of criminal or psychiatric disqualification. The United States, in exchange, would reinstitute
regular immigration for Cubans to the United States.
As a first step in the accord. 23 Cuban aliens who had committed serious crimes either in Cuba or the
United States were moved from Atlanta Federal Penitentiary on February 21, 1985, and put aboard a
chartered airliner that flew them to Havana.
.273
Shortly afterwards, however, the Reagan* administration beaming broadcasts to Cuba from a new US
government station ”Radio Marni” after the hero of the 19th century Cuban strugi^’e , independence from
Spain and Castro angrily called off further transêi OI an indefinite period.
After a machine gun attack by leftist rebels in June 1985 kilêc* ’J diners - including six Americans - at an
outdoor cafe in El SaIA’a • President Reagan listed Cuba with Iran, Libya. North Korea and Ni in what
he called ”a confederation of terrorist states’ that carried out acts of war against the United States. He said
Cuba had openly a/- trained and directed terrorists operating on at least three continent5’ Havana, Castro
ridiculed the charge and said. ”This Reagan is a mac^manan imbecile, a bum.”
As the Cold War rivalries gave way to the process of d^tente marked by resolution of regional disputes
involving the USA and <^>oviet Union and the rise of new issues like arms control, liberal reforms et«c’
^n the super-power agenda, wholesale changes on the political map o^ world followed during the later half
of the 1980s. In case of Cuba how-/ever’ the US policy under Bush Administration changed little. President
Bu^sn in
1989 vowed to follow the Reaganite policy of forcing Cuba into reforrf115 ”^ more tightening of the US
embargo thus creating economic difficulties5 Castro. With the disintegration of Soviet Union and
subsequent loss o^ East European Trading Partners, Cuba’s economic situation worsened an^ the country
was caught in a serious crisis marked by bad sugar-cane ha’rv energy and fuel shortages and economic
recession of almost 45%. lo *ss the national income. Under these circumstances, the Clinton
administr;’a*lon undertook to continue the same policy of exploiting the issues of poh ltlc reforms, human
rights and economic welfare to achieve the aim of ge^^mS reforms in Cuba. The incipient normalization
initiated by President C’arter in 1978 .stood frozen in favour of keeping a consistent pressure on C/uoaFirst
the’ JS government prohibited the importation of goods that contaîne even the trace amounts of Cuban
impute. Second, companies oper^21111^ outside the US were not allowed to sell Cuban goods with more
than y ’ US inputs and if they wished to sell goods with 10 to 20% inputs, tl*nese transactions would be
subjected to a US government licensing. Furfrtner independent companies operating within the USA
were prohibited” to maintain dollar dominated accounts of Cuba. Moreover, ships dockings at Cuban
ports were not allowed to enter US ports for six months. This po^3 ^ however failed to deliver the
dividends anticipated by the Clirlnton administration because to fill the vacuum left by the absence of
\ ’iast European partners, West Europeans took over the market of Cuba a subsequently increased
operations of British Petroleum in oil explorat ftlon-
INTEKNATION -\1. AFFAIRS
274
and French and Spanish investment in tourism improved the situation considerably. With these
developments keeping guard against any popular threat to Castro by economically deprived masses, the US
policy was being questioned during 1993 specially in the wake of US failure to get the Castro regime
toppled and the prospects of smooth running of a democratic Cuba even if Castro is removed. The US
policy-makers, as Andrew Zimalist proposed must understand the political dynamics that have allowed
Castro to survive for the last four years, even though Cuba lost during this period its most important
political allies and its national income fell almost by
45%. The intensified economic embargo on Cuba would mean losing Cuban trade and investment
opportunities to foreign competitors and thus hurting Clinton’s cherished plan to ”compete and win” the
global economy.
As one would have expected, this hard-line US approach to the Cuban regime led to further complications.
Cuba on July 12, 1994 rebuffed US efforts for denuclearizing the region by demanding a regional NPT.
The US State Department on August 27, 1994 emphasized democratic reforms before negotiating to ease
the sanctions. The issue was to take a dramatic turn when in late August, thousands of Cubans started
exodus into Florida alarming the US over the question of immigration. Important talks were held on
September 4, 1994 in which US insisted on limiting the agenda to the refugees question only whereas the
Cubans wanted an agreement encompassing all outstanding issues including the sanctions. The issue was
finally resolved with US agreeing to issue 20,000 visas to Cubans every year whereas Cuba pledged to
check illegal migration.
Relations between Cuba and the US remained strained, despite occasional signs of improvement. The US
kept its embargo, first imposed in 1960, firmly in place. During the 1990s, the US passed legislation,
including the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, to broaden trade sanctions against Cuba.
NICARAGUA
Nicaragua is the largest of the Central American countries with an area of 140,621 Sq. Km. She shares its
total international boundary with Honduras and Costa Rica. Till 1990 when the conservatives outvoted the
leftists, the ruling Junta belonged to a political party known as the Sandinista National Liberation Front
which had seized power in 1979 as a result of the civil war in Nicaragua. It got the people’s verdict through
general elections held in 1984. After an election in November 1984 Daniel Ortega began a six-year term as
President in January 1985.
275
Since the Sandimsts were considered to be a Cuban-style group, the US feared that they would convert
Nicaragua into a Marxist State. Hence the US started funding, training and supporting the rival guerilla
organization Contras. for which the US Congress approved legislation on November 18, 1983 providing S
24 million in covert aid. The bill required the US Central Intelligence Agency to seek further funds from
Congress once the approved funds \\ere expended. She was invaded by the US fourteen times between 1950
to 1979.
The seven leaders attending a Western Summit in Bonn in May

1985 were divided over the issue of Nicaragua. However. President Reagan ordered the sanctions and
imposed the United States total trade embargo because he said ”leftist Nicaragua posed a serious threat to
Central America and the United States through its close ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union.”
In fact, tension between the US and Nicaraguan government was growing. US Secretary of State George
Shultz met the Nicaraguan President, Daniel Ortega, on March 2, 1985, but little progress towards easing
tensions between the two nations was reported. The US estimated that there were some 8,000 Cuban
advisers in Nicaragua and out of them
2,500 were military advisers. Shultz charged that the removal of just 100 of them was only a token gesture.
Although the Nicaraguan government rejected the US figures and promised to suspend the acquisition of
new weapons system, yet the negotiations could not make any headway.
While requesting the Congress to approve 14 million dollars aid for the Nicaraguan rebels, President
Reagan said in April 1985 that the Nicaraguan government was led by a small Communist clique that
sought to spread poison and brutality across the hemisphere.
’ The tensions between the Reagan administration and the Sandinista regime however, eased to some extent
when the Nicaraguan government accepted a plan drawn up by the Costa Rican president Oscar Arias in
1987. But the plan itself promised limited success because its implementation relied upon simultaneous
progress in a number of linked issues - the stoppage of US intervention, disbanding of the Contras and
international guarantees. In the wake of reforms in other communist countries of Eastern Europe in 1989,
pressure for the elections mounted. Besides, the Sandinistas were facing tough economic problems due to
withdrawal of Soviet aid. The Sandinistas however agreed to holding elections which did take place on
February 25. 1990 under monitoring of a group of international observers. As expected the Sandinistas
were defeated. The coming days also saw a transformation of the armed forces and the disbanding of the
Contra,
276
INTFRNVTION \l VFFVIKS
TUP \\URIC
(ONTIMNTS
guenllds As Violeta Chammoiro took ovei as the new piesident the ne\\ government faced a dilemma much
ciuual tor its tutiue Ho\\ to cope \\ith the pioblem of reforms in political and economic set up I he v ictory ot
the consenatives brought a sigh oi iclief to the is quaiteis as it could not anticipate a similar softening ot the
communist legimes or leftist ie\olutionary movements as in the LI Sahadoi
A.fter the election ot ( hamono, the I S ended its tiade unbaigo on Nicaragua During the 1990s the go\
eminent began to puvatize some aieas ot the economy such as banking and mining that had been
nationalized by the Sandinistas But \icaiagua still faced severe economic problems including high inflation
and pooi mdustiial development
In a presidential election held in Decembei 1996 Jose Ainoldo \lunon Lacayo of the rightist Libeial
Alliance defeated Danial Ortega ot the Sandinistas and several othei candidates Alemon took office in
January
1997
LATIN AMERICA’S ECONOMIC WOES
For much of Latin America 2000 was a year of economic recovery Growth for the region as a whole
reached 3-4% This marked an improvement on 1999’s sharp iccession, which saw output fall by perhaps
1% the worst performance in a decade In South America recov ery \v ill be steady rather than swift Mexico
escaped the recession because of its links with the United States’ economy, but that m turn makes it
vulnerable to any sharp slowdown north of the border
The region s economic performance will not be strong enough to sweep away the creeping political
disillusion with market economics But neither will the broad liberal reforms of the past decade be
abandoned wholesale some, such as privatisation, will continue, as \\ill (Venezuela perhaps excepted)
openness to foreign trade and investment And as fiscal constiamts ease somewhat, governments will pay
more attention to social spending
The pace of recovery depends partly on outside factors, such as renewed growth in Europe and Asia
offsetting a slowdown in the United States, and thus helping to boost pries for Latin Amenca’s commodity
exports Any sharp rise in American interest rates \vould hurt South America, too But the key to lecovery
lies with Brazil (which accounts for two-fifths of Latin American dI)P) President Fernando Hernque
Cardoso faces the challenge of holding his fractious coalition together despite his
277
o\vn deep unpopulaiity (prompted by the Januaiy 1999 devaluation) and the distraction of Octobei’s
municipal elections
That means the government will make little piogress with structuial refoim in taxes pensions and
public finances But a strong rival to Mr Caidoso is unlikely to emerge Instead Brazil will muddle through
(as it has done for much ot the ^00 >ears since the Poituguese arrived there an anniversary it will
commemorate in Apul) The government should manage to keep reasonably tight contiol over public
spending That together with improvised levenue-raising measuies will allow it to meet more or less the
fiscal targets agreed with the IMF, and its own taiget of
4% giowth helped by an increase, at last in expoits as they respond to dev aluation
Recoveiy in Brazil will help its neighbouis in the Mercosur trade block Piesidential elections in Argentina
Chile and Uruguay in the final months of 1999 were likely to usher in presidents of the centre-left in each
country Of the three, Argentina’s Fernando de la Rua, a cautious radical, inherits the trickiest challenge
Argentina’s rigid exchange-rate peg to the dollar was the cause of its rollercoaster economic progress
during the 1990s under Carlos Menem But if the arrangement is to survive (Brazil and Chile abandoned
their less rigid currency pegs during 1999), Mr de la Rua will have to move quickly to lower business costs
through fiscal, labour and anti-monopoly reforms For these, he will need congressional majority Even if he
fails, a weaker dollar might still let Argentina off its selfimposed hook Otherwise it will face an unpalatable
choice adopting the dollar outright, or a devaluation that would be more traumatic than Brazil’s Each would
constrain growth
The mam threat to Latin American democracy will remain in the n9 them Andes Colombia’s civil wares
will escalate The army’s new antidrugs battalion, trained and financed by the United States, will enter
combat against the left-wing guerrillas (but not the right-wing paramilitaries, even though both groups have
links with the drug trade) America will pump money and, perhaps, military advisers, into helping President
Andres Pastrana s government, but will not send in its own troops The guerrillas may respond by using
missiles against government aircraft Peace talks will not be formally broken off but will get nowhere
Slowly the guerrillas will start losing the war
In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez will win a referendum approving his new constitution and go on to
get himself reelected in a fresh presidential election, in the sixth national vote in 18 months Higher oil
prices mean the economy may temporal ily recov ei, prolonging Mr
278
INTF.KN VTION \l AFF VIKS
Chavez’s popularity. But his regime \\ill he marked by populist gestures and creeping militarism. In
Ecuador, general political chaos could see Piesident Jamil Mahuad not only unable to nail do\vn the IMF’s
support but overthrown by Congress, with a subsequent search for a strongman in the Chavez mould. Yet
even so, constitutional appearances \vould probably be preserved. That is the fashion pioneered by another
elected authontarian. Pern’s Alberto Fujimori, who since 1990 has successfully reformed his country’s
economy in a way Mr. Chavez seems unlikely to do. Having brushed off legal objections to his candidacy.
Mr. Fujimoii \\ill tiy for a third term as president in April. Renewed economic growth, his government’s
influence over the media and the opposition’s weakness ought to guarantee Mr. Fujimori victory. But
Peruvian voters, often unpredictable, may suddenly decide they ha\e tired of him, and turn to Luis
Castaneda Lossio, a canny centrist.
In Cuba, Fidel Castro does not allow such uncertainties. His dictatorship will survive yet another year. The
United States will relax its
40-year trade embargo against Cuba, allowing food and medicine sales into the country. But do not expect
any liberalising gestures from Mr. Castro in return.
IRAN
279
CHAPTER 10
IRAN
IRANIAN RESOLUTION 1979
The 1970s was a decade of violence for Iran. The early years were that of urban terrorism, bomb explosions
and assassinations. During 1976 and 1977 such incidents had decreased but another wave of unrest started
when the government decided to impose more restrictions on the political activities. Students, lawyers,
intellectuals, writers and ulema all resented the new restrictions.
Big religious processions were brought out by the religious leaders and their supporters in January 1978
when the Iranian press on the instigation of Information Minister embarked upon a policy of character
assassination of Ayatollah Khomeni, who was then residing in France. Many demonstrators were killed
when the police tried to disperse the crowds by force. The violence which had started from the holy city of
Qom soon spread to other areas and demonstrations were carried out in Tehran, Qazvin, and Tabriz. In
many cities army was called to help the law enforcing agencies. On 22 July, the Shah sacked General
Nasiri from the head post of the Chief of Secret Police, Savak. The Shah also took some other measures to
pacify the demonstrators but all those attempts proved futile.
In August, Jafar Sharif Emmami who was also respected by the rightist factions was appointed the new
Prime Minister in another effort to defuse the situation. But this move also failed and on Nov. 5, General
Gholam Reza Azhari was appointed as the new Prime Minister. The Shah also tossed several concessions
to win over the public but the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that nothing could pacify the
masses.
The rioting had spread all over Iran in January 1979 and General Azhan was not powerful and tactful
enough to control the masses who were demanding an end to monarchy. The strikes had paralysed the
country and cut down oil production. The Shah made another attempt and appointed Shahpur Bakhtiar as
the head of another government. However, the
280
situation remained uncontrollable which forced the Shah to leave Iran and take refuge in Egypt. In the
beginning it was announced that the Shah had left the country due to health reasons but it was evident to all
that he had left for good. After the announcement of Shah’s departure, hundreds of thousands of
demonstrators came on the road carrying photographs of Imam Khomeini, who had masterminded the
Shah’s debacle.
FORMATION OF ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT
Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran on February 1. 1979. A big mob of more than 3,000,000 Iranians
greeted the Ayatollah Khomeini on his return to Tehran. Mehdi Bazargan was appointed the Prime Minister
by Imam Khomeini on February 5. There was a brief tussle for power between Shah’s last choice of Prime
Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar and Ayatollah Khomeini’s nominee Bazargan in which the latter emerged
victorious. The transitional government of Bakhtiar fell on February 11 after heavy fighting between the
troops loyal to the Shah and dissident groups loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini.
Mehdi Bazargan was asked to head the new government. But within a very short span of time it became
evident that Bazargan was not allowed to administer full powers. There were several other forces which
worked almost independently and instances were not uncommon when their interest clashed with the
interest of the government. There were many centres of powers, hence the decision-making roles were very
numerous.
The first referendum about the outlines of the future constitution of the country was held in the last week of
March. On 2 April Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed the establishment of Islamic Republic of Iran after the
victory of Islamic forces in the referendum. The election to elect the Constituent Council of Experts to draft
the constitution was held on August
3, 1979 and the candidates enjoying the support of Ayatollah Khomeini were elected with comfortable
margins.
Since the establishment of the new regime a large number of supporters of the former Shah’s regime were
arrested and then executed. These included Dr. Amir Abbas Hoveida (Prime Minister under the Shah from
1965 to 1977), General Mehdi Rahimi (Head of Police and Martial Law Administrator of Tehran), General
Nehmat Ullah Nasiri (Head of Savak from 1965 to 1978), General Parvis Amin Afshar (Former
Commander of the Imperial Guard), General Abdullah Khajenouri (Former Minister from 1971 to 1978),
Javad Abbas Ali Khalatbari (Foreign Minister from 1971 to 1978), Javad Said (Former Speaker of Majlis).
I KAN
281
THE HOSTAGE CRISIS
In October, the former Shah of Iran, who had. tied to Mexico reached America for treatment. The Shah’s
arrival further infuriated the Iranians and on November 4, the US Embassy in Tehran vsas occupied by the
students. The entire staff of Embassy was taken as hostages. The students demanded immediate extradition
of the former Shah of Iran. The students’ action to occupy the Embassy was supported by Ayatollah
Khomeini, who dubbed the staff as spies. The American Government also reacted strongly and stopped all
oil imports from Iran besides freezing Iranian assets in the US banks. The efforts of USA many European
countries as well of United Nations Secretary-General failed to solve this problem.
Abol Hasan barn Sadder was elected the first President of the Islamic Republic on January 25, 1980, with
about 75% of the total votes cast, Bani Sadder represented the moderate elements in the Islamic
Revolutionary Party. He alongwith other moderate Iranian leaders was in favour of releasing the US
hostages but the militant Muslim students putforth several demands including extradition of the former
Shah and the return of the wealth of the Pehlavi family as the prerequisite conditions for the release of the
hostages. On 24th April, 1980, US made an unsuccessful attempt to release the hostages. The mission had
to be abandoned when one of the eight helicopters collided with the Hercules C-130 transport plane killing
8 commandos.
The former Shah died in a Cairo hospital on July 27 after remaining ill for almost one year. He was buried
in a mausoleum at the AlRifai mosque of Cairo. The 52 US hostages were finally released on January 20,
1981, they were kept under custody for 444 days. The agreement under which the hostages were released
embodied assurance of non-interference in the internal affairs of Iran, freezing of all the assets of the
former Shah of Iran, and restoration of the Iranian assets to the Iranian Government.
TUSSLE FOR POWER
The earlier Iranian governments did not prove very stable and during the first few years several changes
took place. Bazargan resigned over the issue of handling the hostages crisis. In the meantime Bani Sadder
had been elected as the president. But his moderate policies were rejected by the extremists. The President
and the Prime Minister (Rajai) developed serious differences and ultimately barn Sadder was forced to flee
the country. After Bani Sadder, Rajai was elected as the new President but his
282
reign proved short lived as he along with his Prime Minister was killed in a bomb explosion. After their
deaths Ali Khamenei and Hussein Moussavi were elected as the President and Prime Minister respectively.
The policies that matter were set by Khomeini and the Secret Revolutionary Council, an obscure group
made up largely of other Ayatollahs. Their decisions were implemented by a vast network of Islamic
revolutionary committees, or Kometehs. headed by local mullahs. Originally designed to handle local
administration in the wake of revolution, the Komitehs became deeply entrenched in Iran’s political life
and often operated as independent powers unto themselves. Likewise, the notorious revolutionary courts,
formed to mete out summary justice to agents of the Shah, expanded their authority. In the early stages, the
regime’s firing squads executed nearly 400 political prisoners and common criminals.
The army once second only to Israel’s was left with its officers dead or driven into factions, its rank and file
unarmed and largely dispersed by the revolution. As a result, the Islamic government found it difficult to
control Iran’s rebelious Arabs, Turkomans. Kurds and other minorities, whose long-suppressed demands
for autonomy now threatened the security of the country. Thus a complete reversal of morals was enforced
as compared to the Shah’s time. Perhaps the most feared symbol of the new Islamic order was the court
system, run by the powerful Ayatollah Khomeini or ”Judge Blood”, as he was to be known. Since the
revolution, the courts expanded their scope to include political and moral offenders, as well as the Shah’s
ex-lieutenants.
In any case, the signs of repression were multiplying. Iranians learned that their new masters were taping
phones and opening mail, just as the Shah’s intelligence did before them. Revolutionary guards rounded up
scores of their former comrades who now found themselves out of tune with Khomeini’s team. Iran’s
prisons were bulging with political prisoners held without charges, trial or even access to lawyers.
In the holy city of Qom, Ayatollah Hussein All Montazeri and his militant followers, many of them young
zealots from Iran’s theological seminaries, huddled over their plans to export the Islamic Revolution to
every Muslim country. Iran’s Council of Experts, an independent 83-man assembly, designated Montazeri,
63. as Khomeini’s successor, but a rival in Tehran got the upper hand. Iran top religious leaders chose Ah
Khamenei to succeed Khomeini as faqih. Khomenei had been Iran’s President. Hashmi Rafsanjani was
elected Iran’s new President in 1989 and was re-elected in
1993.
IR\N
283
Political discontent within Iran increased after the death of Khomeini in

1989. Serious conflicts and rivalries emerged among the Icadeis of the country. A growing number of
people openly blamed government leaders for the mismanagement of the economy and w idespread
corruption among government officials. In a general election held in 1997. Iranian voters elected
Mohammad Khatami as president. He \vas re-elected in 2001. Khatami is \\idely considered to be a
moderate. In parliamentary elections held in 2000. members of reform groups won a majority of seats in the
Majlis. These groups strengthened Khatami’s reformist agenda and supported a number of measures,
including freedom of the press and less government influence over people’s personal lives.
Due to the liberal reforms of Khatami, the US has eased some of the sanctions against Iran, which have
been imposed since the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
THE NEW FORMAT OF GOVERNMENT -’. ,
To begin with the new government on the 30th and 31st of March,
1979 through a referendum, enforced the new constitution in Iran which was endorsed by a majority of
98.2% eligible voters. The new constitution expresses the cultural, social, political and economic
institutions of Iranian society and is based on Islamic principles and precepts that reflect the true aspiration
of the Islamic community.
The fundamental principle of the Revolution, as compared with other movements in Iran in the last century,
is that it is Islamic and has developed from a school of thought. The awakened conscience of the people,
under the leadership of Ayatollah Imam Khomeini, the religious authority whose dictates on matters of
jurisprudence are followed, realized the necessity for the government to pursue genuine Islamic and
ideological course.
THE METHOD OF GOVERNMENT: ISLAMIC INTERPRETATION
Government, from the viewpoint of Islam, is not a product of any class, position or the supremacy of an
individual or a group. Rather, it is the crystallization of political ideals of a people of the same religion and
thought which gives itself organization so that in the process of developing the thoughts and beliefs it opens
the way towards the final goals of moving towards God. The mission of this Constitution is to create
conditions for the foundation of the beliefs of the movement and bring about conditions whereby humanity
is nourished by higher values of Islamic universal teachings.
284
IMEKNATIOYM VFFAIRS
LEADERSHIP OF JUSTICE SEEKING THEOLOGIANS
Based upon the principle of continuous leadership (hnamate), the Constitution of Iran prepares the ground
for the realization of leadership of qualified theologies who are recognised as a leader by the people, give
the administration of affairs to spiritual theologians, those who safeguard that
which God allows (halal) and prohibit that which God prohibits (haram).
ECONOMY AS A MEANS NOT AS OBJECTIVE
In considering economic foundations, the principle followed is to alleviate the needs of human beings in the
course of their growth and evolution, unlike other economic systems where the objective is concentration
of wealth and profit seeking. In materialistic oriented societies, economics becomes an element of
destruction, corruption and deprivation. But in Islam, economics is a means, a means in anticipation of
nothing other than more efficiency in reaching an objective.
The family is the fundamental unit of society and the main center of growth and transcendence for
humanity.
THE ARMY OF IDEOLOGY
In the setting up and equipping of defence forces of Iran, attention would be paid to the fact that faith and
ideology be the criterion and the rule. Accordingly, the armed forces of the Islamic Revolution are formed
with the above aim. They are responsible not only to protect, and safeguard the borders but they also have
the mission to spread the school of thought, that is. Jihad (struggle; enjoying the good and prohibiting evil)
for the cause of God and struggle for the spreading of the sovereignty of divine rule in the world.
THE JUDICIARY IN THE CONSTITUTION
The question of the judiciary, in guarding the rights of people aligned with the Islamic movement with the
idea of preventing local deviations within the Islamic community is of vital importance.
THE EXECUTIVE
The Executive branch, because of its particular importance in the implementation of the Islamic laws and
precepts, with the purpose of reaching a just relationship sovereign over society, and considering the vital
IRAN
285
significance of this objective in laying the foundations for reaching the final goals, must pave the way for
establishing an Islamic society.
CONSTITUTION
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is a Divine administration of the people, for the people,
and by the people. Islamic government is the government of God. Both the governors and the governed are
creatures of God and their respective duties have been laid down by Him. Everyone is expected to perform
his obligations to the best of his ability for reward in the next world. Islam instructs rulers to govern, not to
please themselves, but to bring happiness to the ruled. This is the spirit of the Constitution of Iran.
The political system of the Islamic Republic consists of an elaborate network of the checks and balances
which have been provided to guard against degeneration of the system into dictatorship. One of these
checks and balances is the Islamic nominee for prune mimstership and the Prime Minister’s choice of
ministers.
In spite of the apparent similarity of the Islamic Consultative Assembly to their parliaments that exists in
other countries of the world, there is main difference between the two from the view point of content,
function and criteria. This applies to the relations between Majlis deputies themselves as well as the
relations of the Executive Power with the people. This difference is as great as the difference between
Islamic and Western culture.
For example, the members of the Majlis are not elected on the basis of their affiliations with political
parties or groups. The criterion of their elections is not representation of power groups: rather, they are
elected on the basis of taqwa (piety), knowledge, commitment to Islam and determination to struggle
against Kufr (disbelief) and injustice. The same principle predominates during election campaigns.
Islamic ethics do not encourage individual self-promotion; they encourage humility and modesty. After
entering the Majlis, the deputies must stme to safeguard the interests of the people and improve on the
utilization of public resources, rather than engage in fraudulent activities or scandalous disputes for
personal benefit or for the benefit of a creation group. If a debate takes place in the Islamic Consultative
Assembly, it is solely for the purpose of sincere commitment, not for the purpose of gaining power, fame or
favour or to deceive the public.
286
INTUBATION VI \hF\IKS
In oulei to have better understanding of the concept of the movement begun bv Jihad-e-Sa/andegi it would
be bettei to begin \vith a glance at lian aftei the viUoiy ol the Islamic Revolution I he consideialion finds
moie impoilance \\hen it is obseived that many undei-developed countiies that is lliud \\oild countiies aie
passing tluough the same piocess Such a consideiation v\ill indicate the lole ot hhad-e-Sazandegi and it’s
aspirations
THE ECONOMY
1 ollowing the toppling of the Pehlavi dynasty in 1979. the Islamic Republic ot lian inherited a batteied,
sick and dependent economy The policies ot oppressors agents, specialty aftei 1961 imposed a fallacious
and humiliating economic oidei that biought about disastious social and culanal consequences
For example, the economic policy of the Shah’s regime was based on exporting great amounts ot crude oil
and impelling vanous goods such as foodstuff Accoidmg to the Fifth Developmenl Programme (1973-
1978) the income of Iran from oil was 83 5 billion dollars Of this figure 56 7 billion dollars was allocated
to imports
It is notable that unfortunately in Iran and other oil-exporting countries the oil income is not appropriated
foi funding a healthy production system but most of the oil income i^ spenl for consumptive goods and
foodstuff Wheieas oil is a resource that will end Hence mineral icsources which are the gifts of God should
be considered as capital not as production
The mam purpose of the establishment of Jihad-e-Sazandegi was to improve the life condilion ot the
deprived and oppressed people who are true heirs of the Islamic Rev olution and the true advocates of an
Islamic Republic Jihad-e-Sazandegi from the very beginning directed ils activities towards helping the
economy of the country to flourish by stiengthening agriculture sector Jihad-e-Sazandegi envisages to
impiove and to reconstruct the villages in all dimensions The reasons which encouraged Jihad-e-Sazandegi
lo adopt this policy are cleai
After rev i\ ing the agricultural production and crealing oppoilumties for occupalion in lural ateas a gieal
deal of backwardness can be eliminated Moieo\ei tluough strengthening the economic sector the need for
importing foodstuff would decrease and the ground for selfsufticiency in the field of food-stuff, which is
one of the main souices for independence, would be seuued
IK\N
287
Regaiding the inueasmg late of population giowth it is indispensable to make a balance between the village
and city family incomes Foi achieving this balance it is necessaiv to provide occupation oppoiamities for
faimeis and then families in non-agiicultuial seasons Jihad-e-Sazandegi has now taken up the task ot
providing and impioving niial industiies thai would help lo meet this important need
Ruial industiies because of then chaiacter. have no hmiiations In othei woids. any ruial industry (thai is
ihose ougmaling fiom anal aclivilies) and also industiies such as metal wotking, textiles, handiciafts,
chemical mduslnes, elc could be successful!) esiabhshed in iinal areas provided lhat those indusiiies be
appiopiuied lo the uiial emnonment and capabilmes
The deep gap between cily and village causes a tragic drift of villagers towards cilies II is clear lhal if ihe
opportunities of occupation are made available in rural areas, providing hygienic and health facilities and
other welfare possibilities in rural areas with the help of government and cooperatives it would not be a
difficult lask
IRAN AFTER KHOMEINI’S DEATH
The Islamic Republic of Iran has faced two major crises in Ihe recent pasl The firsl came wilh the
acceptance of cease-fire in the war with Iraq. The second and more serious crisis is ihe dealh of Khomeini
himself and the uncertain legacy he has left
Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini who swept to power in 1979 through the Islamic Revolulion that toppled the
Shah of Iran, shook the Muslim world and turned pro-Western Iran into a religious republic defying both
super-powers, died on June 2, 1989 Ayatollah Khomeini who was 89 according to his official biography,
died of complications following May 23 operation to stop mteslmal bleeding
This old while bearded religious scholar unleashed a whirlwind of dramatic change He led his country in a
war wilh Iraq that cost Iran at least
120,000 lives before accepling a cease-fire which took effect in August
1988 saying the idea of making peace with Iraq’s Piesident Saddam Hussain was deadlier lhan ”dunking
poison ”
Bent on building an Islamic society amid what he saw as a hoslile world, Khomeini rejected alien
influences lashing out against outside povveis he regarded as evil or coirupt Crealing a new culture based
on Islam in ihe woild and a sliong Islamic confrontation with American and
IM KKNATION M. AFFAIKS
IRAN
288
the Soviet Union entails hardship, martyrdom and hunger, Khomeini said. ”Our people have themseKes
chosen tins path and \vill also pay the price for it and they will be proud of it.”
In February 1989, he raised a storm by ordering Muslims to kill a British author Salman Rushide for
blaspheming against the Holy Prophet (PBL’H) in his novel ’The Satanic Verses.” The death sentence was
widely condemned in the West \\here. it led to a diplomatic ro\\, but few serious voices were raised against
his verdict in the Islamic world.
In March 1989 he forced his designated successor Ayatollah Hussain Ali Montazeri to resign saying that
the man was unfit for political leadership. The move left a potential power vacuum at the top yet Khomeini
insisted that it was in best interest of Islam and no other consideration \vas relevant.
Khomeini’s death left Iran at the edge of an intense power struggle among the radicals and moderates
especially those who control armed forces and the rival revolutionary guards coips and those incharge of
the powerful internal security forces.
Khomeini’s death came at an awkward moment of the Iranian leadership. He died just as the government
was publicly debating the question of who should succeed him, thus making the task exceptionally difficult
for the men responsible for filling the void.
The qualified choice of President Khamenei as Khomeini’s replacement appeared to have been a precipitate
measure taken at an emergency meeting of the Assembly of experts, the 83-member body convened to
choose the Khomeini’s successor. The announcement was designed to end uncertainties regarding the
succession. Khamenei had been President since 1980 and a respected figure who supported firmly
Hajotolislam Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, then country’s Majlis Speaker and acting Commander-in-Chief. The
move did not however, solve two fundamental and interrelated problems caused by the absence of
Khomeini’s dominant personality and unquestioned religious leadership \\ithin the country.
When Khomeini occupied the position of spiritual leader, outside and above the realms of temporal power,
the day-to-day administration of the country rested with the President and Majlis, but authority meant that
the last word was always his. This dual power structure had always been a problem.
289
Khomeini’s designated successor since 1985 Ayatollah Montazeri who was forced to resign had been
accused by Khomeini and his son, Ahmed, of yielding to liberal tendencies. Soon after his resignation, the
authorities took steps to change the country’s first Islamic constitution. A referendum approving these
changes as well as presidential elections was held on August 8. 1989.
Khomeini broadly agreed with Hashemi Rafsanjani in supporting a moderate foreign policy and backed
him in his bid for the Presidency in the August elections. Among others jostling for positions after
Khomeini’s death was his 43-year-old son Hajotolislam Ahmad Khomeini backed by the radicals. As
Khomeini’s private secretary, he had unique access to his father and a corresponding degree of influence.
But he proved a junior cleric who lacked the necessary religious or political credentials to make a challenge
for the leadership.
The victory of Hajotolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in the August 1989 election gave rise to the
dual leadership with an outlook markedly different from the set up under the dominant personality of the
Imam. A fundamental element of pragmatism was reflected by Rafsanjani’s word that ”the basic precept of
Iran’s foreign policy today is respect for territorial integrity as well as social and religious values of other
peoples.” He at home, consolidated his power to keep at bay the radicals who in his opinion could thwart
the reconstruction programme initiated by him to help the country regain the economic footings lost during
the eight years’ long war with Iraq. To keep the reforms at pace, he improved his grip on all levels of power
- the presidency, the cabinet, the National Security Council, the Assembly of Experts, the Council of
Guardians and the Majlis. To strengthen the war affected armed forces, he brought all defence related
agencies -- the security forces, freelance committees etc. under the new organizational heading ”Security
Force” and the army as well as Revolutionary Guards, under the new single general staff. In the sphere of
foreign policy, Rafsanjani inherited a no-war - no-peace situation with Iraq, with the continued Iraqi
occupation of 2600 square miles. And the nonrepatriation of 100,000 POWs, two-third of whom were
Iranian nationals. Rafsanjani’s initial policy was characterized by what he called resistance in negotiations
i.e. Iran’s determination to liberate the territory, to repatriate the POWs, to get Iraq accept the validity of
the 1975 Algiers agreement, to establish guilt in starting the war and pursuade the UN to consult all the
Gulf States regarding the future security of the Persian Gulf under the Security Council Resolution 598 of
July 20, 1987. With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 20, 1990 the Iranian government delinked in
the first place, its policy towards Iraq’s invasion from its policy towards Iraq in regard to the unresolved
issues of the Iran-Iraq war. Velayati, however, later
290
on denounced the swift UN Resolution denouncing Iraq saying that the Security Council had taken ”six
long days” before denouncing Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980. Iran, nevertheless, supported fully all
UN resolutions and faithfully observed UN economic sanctions not withstanding the wide
spread suspicion that it might violate the trade embargo to give boost to its own economy. Iraq under
pressure on the Kuwaiti front, accepted all Iranian demands before the start of the war. In the aftermath of
the war Iran supported the Shia uprisings in Southern Iraq but only morally. Since then the relations again
have presented a no-war, no-peace situation. Following the Gulf War 1991 there occurred a
remarkable improvement as far reconciliation with GCC countries is concerned. The absence of Hajj
incidents on June 18, 1991 proved a good omen for Tehran-Riyadh relations and led to the expansion of
economic and trade relations. Similarly, the Kuwaiti government offered $10 million to compensate the
losses of 70,000 former Iranian workers in Kuwait. Similarly bilateral agreements were concluded with
UAE, Oman and Qatar providing an enhanced scope of co-operation in the field of labour, technical and
professional affairs customs and tariffs. Supply of fresh water (to Qatar) and exploitation of the world’s
largest gas fields for mutual consumption. Iran also emerged as strong supporter of the revivalist
movements taking place in different parts of the Islamic world. It denounced the annulment of elections
won by FIS in Algeria and actively helped the rightist regime of Hasan Al Bashir in Sudan. HAMAS in the
Gaza strip and Hizba-Ullah in Lebanon were one voice with Iran over the Arab-Israeli peace talks arranged
by US because Iran thought that an Israel-Arab rapprochement will fail to resolve the Arab-Israel conflict
unless the issues are discussed in proper perspective. The September 1993 Israel-PLO agreement
was denounced as US dictated document with no practical utility for the security of Middle East. Iran
welcomed the independence of former Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union. In the follow-up of the
Armenia-Azerbijan conflict Iran stood firm behind Azerbijan and even threatened the use of force on two
occasions, once in September 1992 and again in June 1993. Iran also sought close co-operation with the
members of an expanded ECO. At the May 2, 1992 Ashakabad Summit, Iran vowed to extend co-operation
with all the states in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Quran. In November 1992, Iran actively
supported Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir issue besides agreeing to support the entry of Turkish Cyprus as
observer member of the ECO. The Quetta Plan of Action adopted on Feb 1993 was supported by Iran,
taken as an institutionalized framework for future cooperation between the ECO countries. Iran’s relations
with Western world improved to a limited extent only. Amidst the US declaration of Iran as ”a terrorist
state,” Iran was charged of developing its nuclear programme with the help of China and Pakistan. In
August 1993, a Chinese ship was blocked by USA on the charge that it was taking contraband materials to
Iran which
WAN
291
might be used in preparing chemical weapons. Iran’s serious efforts towards peace in Afghanistan have
been coordinated with Pakistan’s approach. Both countries have tried to help the Afghans lo resolve their
differences peacefully and Iran supported the Peshawar Accord of 1992 and later on the Islamabad Accord
in 1993. Pak-Iran relations were greatly strained by the Talibanization in Afghanistan. Pakistan supported
the extremist Sunni Muslim militia known as Taliban, which captiued more than two-third of Afghanistan
from 1995 to 2001. Iran had concern for the Shia minority in Afghanistan who were under plight with the
hands of Taliban. Iran supported the anti-Taliban groups in Afghanistan. Iran has been very critical of
Pakistan policy towards the Taliban regime. However, with the dismantling of the Taliban government in
Afghanistan. Pak-Iran relations came to normalcy.
Analysing the domestic and foreign policies of Iran in the postKhomeini era, it was widely speculated that
Iran would now emerge as a moderate and even ”conventional” nation-state, abandoning the sponsorship of
radicalism in the Islamic world. The reality on this question appears to be quite complicated however;
perhaps it may still be undergoing a process of evolution. Though under Rafsanjani, the threat to
conservative regimes of an exportation of the revolution has subsided, post-Khomeini Iran largely remains
a Shia radical phenomenon, thereby delimiting the possible influence of Iran over the traditional politics of
the Middle East dominated by Sunni Muslims. This phenomenon has perhaps been behind a conscious
switching over, on the part of Iranian foreign policy-makers, to the NorthWestern neighbours in Central
Asia and the Caspian Sea region because geographical contiguity and traditional historico-cultural
relationship with these states provide an even broader commonalty in bases for co-operation (than with the
Middle Eastern Arab states). This shifting of focus in promoting Iran’s national interests may give rise to a
new model of conflict (as the process of re-identification with Islam occurs in these states close to the
western world) which is being deliberated upon in the Western world as clash of civilizations.” At home
the policy is undergoing a process of transition marked by an emerging synthesis of ideology and pragmatic
realism. More political openings coupled with an Islamic orientation may lead to the formation of a stable
society with the emergence of an elite having adopted this synthesis. President Khatami has gone far ahead
in reforming the society and political system of Iran. Khatami’s liberal or moderate agenda of reforms is
greatly appreciated by the Western powers including the US. It has also created a considerable sphere of
influence at the domestic level. In the 2000 elections for the Majlis, moderate groups got substantial
number of seats in the Iranian parliament.
292 INTFRN \TION vl AFFAIRS
IRAN AND II S GROV\ INC, GLOBAL IMPORTANCE
A seues ot recent initiatives, including the opening of a ne\\ inteicontmental lail link, has consolidated Iian s
position in the emerging geopolitical leahgnment in Cential Asia and Afghanistan that could have
significant global consequences These changes could also piompt Pakistan to lethink its position \\ithin the
emeiging stiategic lault lines
No\\ offeimg a lail comdoi iiom innei Asia to the \\ann \\aters ot the Gulf, Iian has acquired a ntvv leveiage
in the unfolding gieat game ’ in Central Asia Woed by all the ma|or poweis the Cential Asian Lountnes ha\e
placed consideiable \alue on gaining an outlet to the sea
Iran has also consolidated its influence in the stiategically located Afghanistan backing the legime of the
President Buihan-ud-Dm Rabbani Iran’s’ text-book diplomacy’ since Septembei last has helped to
decelerate the continuing Afghan conflict by bunging key \vamng factions to the negotiating table
Tehran is exploiting its geographical location by offering a convenient and inexpensive exit for the huge oil
and natural gas reserves around the Caspian sea, hoping to increase its regional clout Besides, a proactive
Tehran is now seeking new strategic alignments with Russia and China, anticipating a classic East-West
geopolitical clash on the eve of the
21st century
Iran borders the hydrocarbon rich Caspian sea periphery of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and is fiercely
competing with the West, w anting to entrench itself in the region The key Central Asian republics of
Turkmamstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have an estimated reserves of 20 billion barrels of oil and seven
trillion cubic metres of gas Azerbijan is sitting on huge proven oil and natural gas reserves
Iran’s recent economic initiatives have helped it to break-out of a two-pronged US bid to isolate it
Washington, seeking to geographically cut off Iran, has moved feverishly along Tehran’s eastern and
northern flank The US has taken steps to dominate the strategic arc straddling Iran, choosing Afghanistan
as the bridgehead for its Central Asian Inroads
The long term stakes of the West in Afghanistan include a safe passage for a gas pipeline from
Turkmenistan, terminating in Pakistan through Afghanistan will also give it a leverage to contain the
Russian Influence in the region A turnaround in Afghanistan will bung pro-LS forces face-to-face with the
over 30,000 strong Russian defence in
IRAN
293
Tajikistan Once this is bleached Moscow’s second defence line can be Constructed only de^p inside its
borders
Afghanistan is thus in the eye of a ievi\ed 19th cenUuy ”gieat game’ which once sought to tieeze the
Russian influence along the Oxus nvei Denying Russia access to the warm wateis ot the Gulf is yet anothei
pait of the geopolitical diama
Iian is fuithei countenng the Western influence by getting closer to the landlocked Cential Asia Tehran has
played its tiump caid The recent opening of a histonc inter-continental link connecting the complex former
Soviet and the pivot of an unrivalled new Euro-Asia tiansport netvvoik A
16^-km rail link bridging the tormer Soviet and the hanian lailway systems brings Moscow Ankara Central
Asia and C hina on a common railway map making it a big geopolitical event
For instance, the landlocked Central Asia, in need of a sea outlet will, for the first time, get direct access to
the warm waters of the Gulf via Iran The Iranian Gulf ports of Bandar Abbas and Bandar Khomeni now get
linked to all the five Central Asian capitals of Ashakabad (Turkmenistan), Tashkent (Uzbekistan),
Dushanbe (Tajikistan), Bishkek (Kyrghyzstan) and Almaty (Kazakhstan) along the widely dispersed
railway A 3062km rail line from the Uzbekistan border with Turkmenistan, and extending further north-
east to the rest of Central Asia, terminates southwards at Bandar Abbas All this has increased Iran’s
regional leverage greatly The new rout will bring Iran close to possible allies, Russia and China, helping to
build new geo-political alignments
In case rivalry between Moscow and Washington is revived, it can inject a new dymanism to the ties
between Tehran, Moscow and Beijing But Iran would have to reckon with the Western economic and
commercial leverage over cash-strapped Moscow and Beijing
Washington is seeking to tighten the economic noose around Iran, and the transport routes for the Caspian
Sea are in the eye of a vigorous tussle, but Tehran appears to be having the upper hand The West wants to
pre-empt a favourably-positioned Iran from becoming a natural gateway for the tiansportation of the
Caspian Sea oil and natural gas to markets overseas Not surprisingly, top Western companies are looking at
developing possible alternative routes together with Georgia and Turkey as the hub
Iran s geography gives it unrivalled advantage to get the Caspian Sea reserves transported Besides, its
suitably-laid internal pipeline network
294-
IVTK.KN VTION \l. AFFAIRS
is yet another bonus. The construction of only 100km of pipeline will connect Iran’s Caspian Sea port of
Bandar-e-Anzah to the lefineiies in Tehran, Tabriz, Arak and Isfahan, which are currently supplied from
Iranian oil-fields in the south.
Iran is also cultivating special ties with Turkmenistan, \\hich has its giant Daulatabad-Domnez (formerly
Sovietabad) field along its boiders. In June 1995, Turkmenistan and Iran agreed to build a gas pipeline
connection from the west Turkmen Korpedzhe field to Kurkul in northern Iran.
The situation in Afghanistan has made it difficult for Turkmenistan to fulfil an agreement on an exit route
with Pakistan, reinforcing the focus on Iran as an outlet.
Iran is offering the neighbouring Caspian Sea countries an arrangement for immediate export. A similar
arrangement has been worked out with Kazakhstan too. These exit proposals appear far more attractive
than the costlier Western-backed options. An agreement between Azerbaijan and a British Petroleum-led
consortium envisages initial exports by train to Georgia and by pipeline to the Black Sea port of Batumi,
possibly on its way by ship through the Bosporus. A costly S2.6 billion pipeline of 1,100 km is also
proposed. This would connect Trills in Georgia to Turkey’s Ceyhan, to be further piped to the facilities on
the Mediterranean.
Iran is projecting the new railway network a part of a civilisational revival. It has christened the new rail as
the ”Silk Road” route, evoking memories of the estimated 8,000km ancient passage linking China and
Central and West Asia with Rome.
With the possibility of a post-Cold War, East-West confrontation once again looming, Pakistan is saddled
with making the right choices. With the US and Indian alignments deeply entrenched over Afghanistan and
Central Asia, it may become difficult to build upon a Pak-US strategic cooperation. It is said that the US
did its homework on possible regional alignments around four years ago and decided to forge a long-term
partnership with India. Pakistan was out of this new post-Cold War arrangement.
In the overall context there is a certain parallelism in the regional concerns and interests of Pakistan and
Iran. New political configurations, hopefully, would charactense the power stiucrures of both countries in
the
IRAN
295
coming years. In consequences, the government of both countries are likely to be subject to new internal
pressures and limitations.
It would be relevant to speculate how Iran and Pakistan would interact with each other under the new
political dispensation. Whatever the outcome of such speculations, the overriding necessity to sustain and
strengthen Pak-Iran relations cannot be doubted, because there is not only parallelism in interests, but there
are also clear indications that there is complementary and mutual benefit in undertaking this exercise.
PAKISTAN, IRAN AND AFGHANISTAN
Though it is more then two decades since revolution swept ’across Iran, its policies in the internal as well
as external spheres continue to exhibit a measure of over-reaction, anger and defiance at whatever seems to,
go against its wishes or perceived interests. This posture reflects, perhaps, the apprehension of Iranian
leadership that any let-up in these sentiments could undermine the strength of the revolutionary objectives
and achievements.
However, it serves to suggest to the outside world which obviously has its own interest to take care of that
to be on good terms with Tehran, it would have to tailor them to suit the requirements of the Islamic
Republic of Iran. For its part there is not much scope for compromise. This nonchalance is born of
revolution and sustained by oil wealth.
Pakistan, whose relations with the Shah’s regime were the envy of best of friends has been trying to enjoy
the same privileged position with the post-revolution Iran; for, the bases of friendship between the two
countries did not vanish with the change of leadership. Centuries long historical links, common religion and
culture, perpetual contacts between two peoples, shared roots of national languages and geographical
contiguity
- all have inextricably tied them together.
In fact, close friendship and all around co-operation is imperative for progress and prosperity to prevail in
the two countries and to act as a bulwark against any attempts to destabilize the region. But to operate
within * the limited range of maneuverability indicated above, however, has been a trying experience for
the ingenuity of Pakistan’s diplomacy.
To be fair to Iran, it must be acknowledged that the rationale behind the revolution demanded that the
friends of the Shah and of the United States which continues to retain, in the perception of Iranian
leadership and people the unenviable status of being their greatest enemy
296_
IMTKN \TIONA1 \FF VIKS
could not be easily trusted They had to demonstrate by deed and not meie oral overtures that they \\eie their
genuine tnends and \\ell-v\isheis
In the eaily yeais of the revolution, Pakistan took gieat pains to provide reassurance and evidence to the
Iranians of its earnest desire to maintain and strengthen the exemplary natuie of lelationship that existed in
the time of the Shah The conduct of Iranian attairs was constanth supervised and momtoied at the highest
level at Islamabad lest any slip on our part should jeopardize our efforts to regain Tehian s confidence
Taking into account the reality of revolutionary ftrvour that had enveloped entire Iran and multiple centeis
of power that had emerged there breaches of established diplomatic noims either elicited mild marches or
were quietly ignited by Islamabad Religious scholars of the seminaries at Qom and elsewhere holding
diplomatic passpoits and not needing visas were suddenly discovered delivering speeches at different
places in Pakistan whose content tended to rouse the people against the gov ernment
In the face of such provocation Pakistan kept its composuie and persistently displayed patience in building
up bilateral ties This policy seemed to pay dividends once our Western neighbour had trudged through a
fairly long period of turmoil and uncertainty Pakistan provided transit facilities to Iranian goods - to quote
one concrete gesture of our friendship
- at a crucial period of Iran-Iraq war when their supply through the Persian Gulf had been disrupted
Relations between the two countries came back on an even keel with the emergence of the Pushtoon led
Taliban phenomenon in the neighbouring Afghanistan threatened’ in the eyes of the Iranian leadership ’the
security of the region’, and Pakistan was accused of supporting it with men and material
Instead it were the Iranian military exercises carried out near the Afghan border and massing of troops there
late 1998, that menaced its security These moves were made ostensibly in response to the murder of Iranian
diplomats stationed at Mazar-i-Shanf but actually to relieve Taliban’s pressure on the Northern Alliance
This was nothing short of an actual support to the opponents of Taliban whom Iran wants to have a
disproportionate say in the power distribution anangement at Kabul
Tehran’s bitterness and grouse against Islamabad stems mainly from a single cause its excessive concern
for the interests and safety of the Shia minority whether it is occasioned by the defeat of the so-called
Northern Alliance or the condemnable sectarian killings in Pakistan
297
The single-minded puisuit of this objective has clouded its vision thus pi eventing it tiom seeing the giound
leahties in Afghanistan The exeiuse ot ettective contiol ol 8^ to 9S°o of the tenitoiy (according to varying
estimates) and the establishment ot peaceful conditions leplacmg mayhem and anaichy there have lent the
Taliban government some legitimacy \lso the Taliban not only lepitsent the majority communitv and tube
they have also given a tan amount of lepiesentation in then governing hieraichv to the vanous tubes
inhabiting the countiy
The meaninglessness of haman advocacy ot non-involvement bv outside forces in the intcinal powei
stiuggle of Afghanistan was badly exposed when Kyigzsatan seciet police captured a tiam canning 700 tons
of ammunition coming from Iian undei the label of humamtaiian assistance and heading for delivery to
Afghan opposition commander Ahmad Shah Masood
But, unfortunately, this did not prevent Iian fiom its persistence in charging Pakistan with rendering active
help to the Taliban, notwithstanding also the protestations of its non-involvement made by the highest in
Islamabad Tehran also ignored Pakistan’s proposal to set up a joint commission to determine which party
(Iran or Pakistan) was involved in providing assistance to the combatant in that beleaguered country
Iran should have known the limited extent of Pakistan’s clout with the Taliban, but it continued to insist
that Pakistan get the Iranian diplomats released holding it responsible for their safety Pakistan, which had
repeatedly asked the Taliban to accede to the Iranian request, It not possibly be expected to take up arms
against them Iran offered nothing but a perfunctionary appreciation of Pakistan s effort at ensuring the safe
return of other Iranians stranded in the Taliban-controlled areas
In the tribal milieu of Afghanistan, revenge killings (be it of the Taliban or of the Hazaras) are a norm
rather than an extraordinary event To wail for the deaths of members one tribe or sect which had either
killed members of the tribe or sect now delivering the punishment - both of them thoroughly reprehensible
acts - is to wail about the tragedy of tubal, custom-ridden existence One muider inevitably follows another
To prevent the second the first has to be avoided
As the sectarian v lolence in Pakistan the Iranians should feel assured that but for a lunatic fringe all
Pakistanis wish to live peacefully with one another regardless of religious affiliation The dilatory judicial
process is an unfortunate leahty in Pakistan affects all justice-seekers and
298
IN I KKNATIONAL AFFAIRS
IRAN
299
does not discriminate against anyone on sectarian grounds. It should not be a source of tension with
Pakistan.
Early January 1999, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmed visited Tehran, as a special envoy of
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the previous high-level visits mostly undertaken by Pakistani leaders are
manifestations of our desire to develop relations with Iran based on complete trust and free from any
misunderstandings.
Unfortunately, the Iranian response to our earnest desire and patient effort to improve bilateral ties has been
rather lukewarm. Apart from eliciting reaffirmation of Tehran’s support for the UN resolutions on Kashmir
and a reference to Afghan historical reality that discounts the utility of outside pressure in the evolution of a
government at Kabul no other convergence of views seemed to have emerged during Mr. Shamshad
Ahmad’s visit.
With the ouster of the Taliban and Pakistan’s realistic approach on Afghanistan, the chances of Iran and
Pakistan moving closer increased. The two neighours have started moving in that direction quite rapidly.
This fact is manifested by visits of high level Iranian officials to Pakistan. On November 30, 2001, the
Iranian and Pakistani foreign ministers in a press conference in Islamabad, stated their unanimity about
establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan. Such an understanding suits both the nations
and helps ensure stability in Afghanistan as well.
One serious threat to the Pak-Iran relations in future is the growing cooperation between India and Iran in
Afghanistan which is in direct conflict with Pakistan’s long-term interests. Relations between India and
Iran reached the climax in 1996 when Iranian President Hashmi Rafsanjani undertook a state visit to India
and concluded a number of bilateral agreements. That greatly affected the bilateral relations between Iran
and Pakistan. But that was a direct Iranian response to the Pakistan’s Afghan policy during the Taliban
regime. However, Iran denies that it is building relations with India at the expense of Pakistan. During his
visit to Pakistan in November 2001, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Dr.
Hassan Rouhani reiterated his country’s position and hoped that Iran’s good relations with India would help
in resolving the Pak-Indian differences. During the recent military stand-off between India and Pakistan,
Iranian foreign minister Kamal Kharazi and Dr. Hassan Rouhani visited both Pakistan and India and
offered their good offices to ease the tension.
Pakistan and Iran are geo-politically important to the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Iran and Pakistan
in the context of the new Afghan set-up under Hamid Karzai can together be the real guarantors of
Afghanistan’s reconstruction and security, \\hich itself is very important for the peace and stability of both
Iran and Pakistan. In fact, the convergence of interests and policies of these two countries on Afghanistan
can serve as strong basis for their future cordial relations. However, the US - Iran rivalry, the presence of
the American forces in Afghanistan and Central Asia, President Bush’s rhetoric of ”axis of evil” and
Pakistan’s support to the US policies in Afghanistan still cast doubts on the prospects of any long-term
strong relations between Iran and Pakistan.
IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND UNITED STATES’ CONCERN
IRAN NUCLEAR
After years of searching for a supplier to complete its first nuclear power plant, Iran secured a contract with
the Russian Ministry of Atomic energy (Minatom) to complete reactors at Bushehr under IAEA safeguards.
The $800 million contract, signed in January 1995, is scheduled for completion in two years’ time with fuel
due to be loaded next year. Vladimir Putin, the Russian President, promised the US and Britain that Russia
would not provide the crucial fuel for Bushehr unless Iran signs up to the extended IAEA safeguards
protocol. Once Russia completes the 1,000 MW Bushehr-
1 reactor plant, it may add another three reactors on the site.
However, in August 2002, a group of Iranian exiles, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI),
accused Iran of hiding a uranium enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy water plant at Arak, two
locations in Iran
In December 2002, The US accuses Iran of seeking to develop a secret nuclear weapons programme and
publishes satellite images of two nuclear sites under construction at Natanz and Arak
Teheran claims it needs the Natanz plant to expand its nuclear reactor programme, but it does not even have
an expansion plan, nor does it need the extra energy. When Natanz is complete, Iran’s nuclear programme
would be self-sufficient since it already has a uranium ore mine at Saghand. Evidence pointing to Natanz
becoming part of an Iranian weapons programme is considerable-
IAEA inspectors at Natanz have found particles of weapons-grade enriched uranium. Iran claims they stem
from contaminated components it
300
bought abroad on the black market in the 1980s, but diplomats doubt that Iran is producing nuclear bomb.
Heavy water, made at Arak, is used as a moderator in some reactors, but this has puzzled inspectors since
Iran’s known reactors do not use heavy \\ater. Heavy water reactors pioduce more plutonium than light
water reactors such as Bushehr
The UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (LAliA) conducts a series of inspections in February 2003
in Iran and give Iran 31s’ October as an altematem for complete cooperation. The country confirms that
there are sites at Natanz and Arak under construction, but insists that these - like Bushehr - are designed
solely to provide fuel for future power plants.
The IAEA, led by Mohamed ElBaradei, has been investigating Tehran’s nuclear plans since the NCRI
allegations were first made public. It has found no evidence yet to support US and NCRI claims that Iran
wants to develop nuclear weapons, but has doubts about whether Tehran has been entirely transparent
There have been long-standing concerns that the large amount of material moving between Russia and Iran
as part of Bushehr’s construction could provide cover for covert weapons-related assistance or smuggling.
Although Russia halted its plans (under the 1995 agreement) to provide Iran with a gas centrifuge uranium
enrichment plant, the IAEA discovered by chance in 2002 that Iran had secretly built an enrichment plant at
Natanz and a heavy-water production plant in Arak. Highly enriched uranium is an essential step towards
building a nuclear weapon
Iran is also a challenge for export control. The Iranian program is not indigenous.
Imports have fueled virtually all of Iran’s known weapon capability. Over the past decade, the United
States has sanctioned at least nineteen Chinese firms for contributing to Iran’s chemical and other weapon
programs. In addition, the United States has punished at least ten Russian entities for helping Iran build
missiles, and Russia has sold Iran a significant amount of nuclear wherewithal as well. Iran secured the
basic instruments i.e is centrifuge from A.Q. Kahn group, a Pakistani scientist. These exports have
contributed significantly to Iran’s nuclear capability and helped Iran to develop its own infrastructure and
scientific expertise.
, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) of which Iran is a member, allows Iran to legally build any
nuclear facility, including one for uranium enrichment, so long as it is intended for peaceful purposes.
Moreover, the NPT allows the member states to withdraw from the agreement, subject to
IRAN
301
giving a 90 days notice to the IAEA, if they believe that abiding by the terms of the NPT threatens their
national security (in the language of the NPT, if it is in their ”Supreme Interest”).
Iran’s nuclear ambitions cause alarm in many countries. The US suspects Iran wants to build a nuclear
bomb, has vowed to prevent this, and wants Tehran to halt all nuclear activities.
The escalating crisis between Iran and the United States over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program
exposes a Haw in the Bush administration’s understanding of why Tehran wants to be a nuclear power.
Iran defense strategy is Israel specific. It is considered that Israel start working on its nuclear program since
194S. and at present having more than 200 nuclear \\eapons.
The nuclear quest reflects not the nature of the clerical government but rather the national interest as
perceived by whoever rules Iran. It predates the 1979 revolution and is likely to continue beyond the
Islamic Republic’s clerical rule. Iran has openly said in meetings with EU3 (UK, Germany, France) that she
will not suspend her nuclear program in return of spare parts, provision of heavy water, member ship of
WTO or any other financial benefits, while Britain, France and Germany are trying to persuade Iran to
scrap its uranium enrichment programme in exchange for technological and financial aid
Threatening Iran with military action will only increase the insecurity of the regime in Tehran. It provides
the clerical regime with an excuse to exploit nationalistic sentiments, diverting attention with serious
domestic problems facing the regime.
302 DISINTEGRATION OF THE 1’SSR AND RE-EMERGENTF. OF Rl’SSIA
IN I KKNATIONAL AFK MRS
303
CHAPTER 11
DISINTEGRATION OF THE USSR AND RE-EMERGENCE OF

RUSSIA
HISTORICAL BAC KGROUND: FROM RUSSIA TO SOVIET UNION
Before the communist revolution of 1917, Russia was being ruled by a Czar. Although the foundations of
this autocratic rule were shaken even before the First World War, yet, the more he tried to cling to the
semblance of power, the more his authority was undermined. During the First World War, he received
support from all the political parties except the Social Democrats. As the war continued the government
disintegrated, because the country had to face unprecedented miseries in the ’shape of famine, disasters,
starvation, blackmarketing, corruption, financial difficulties, inflation and rising prices.
The circumstances thus prevailing at that time in Russia forecast the revolution. The government had
become corrupt, ministers were appointed and dismissed, the Emperor and Empress were surrounded by
inefficient and incapable advisors. The Empress was under the influence of Rasputin, who by 1916 had
become the undisputed master of the country. Resentment against the rule of Czar was spreading fast.
Conservatives sent warnings to the Czar regarding the impending catastrophe but in vain. The year 1917
began with a great foreboding.
Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks organized the working class, arranged strikes and hunger marches. By the time,
bread demonstrations had become a permanent feature of political life in Russia. The fire of resentment
flared up early in. 1917 when thousands of workmen gathered to demand bread. The troops were ordered to
suppress the rising tide of demonstrators, but they refused. The Government was unable to control the mob
and it surrendered to the revolutionary forces. Nicholas II was forced to abdicate. A provisional
government was set up headed by Prince Levov and consisting of Liberal, Conservative and Monarchist
members of the Duma. The government declared its intention to parliamentary system of government in the
country. But people were not in a mood to accept this
n
type of govenment. Thus the government ran into difficulties. The radical group propagated the rule of
middle class and coridemned the government. To enhance the difficulties of the government, came the
Petrograd Soviet of soldiers ’and workmen representatives in February 1917. Its branches were opened in
different parts of country. It had a support and membership of social revolutionaries, labourers and military
men. It defied the authority of the provisional government and issued its own decrees. As a result, its
activities paralysed the government.
During this period, other Bolshevik leaders including Lenin had arrived in Russia. They exploited the
situation, propagated their programme and organised great demonstrations in the beginning of May. Their
slogan was ”All powers to the Soviets.” Their progamme. by this time had gained great popularity amongst
the masses.
Prince Levov resigned on July 20, 1917. His successor, Kerenski tried to take severe action against the
Bolsheviks, but government was repulsed everywhere. In November 1917 the provisional government
rumbled down. The Bolsheviks seized power and established a government composed of Bolsheviks only -
headed by Lenin with Stalin, Trotsky and Rykoy as members. The government was known as Council of
People’s Commissars. The new government took two decisions immediately. Firstly, they renamed
themselves Communists. Secondly they shifted capital from Petrograd to Moscow.
The Communist government successfully suppressed all opposition and firmly established one-party State.
It also concluded peace with Central Powers to meet the threat of food shortage and economic difficulties.
The government decided to nationalize all means of production and regimentation of agriculture. It also
forbade private trade. The peasants were told to return to the government the surplus produce. The
government introduced rationing system for the urban areas.
The period commencing 1918 to 1921 is known as the period of war for communism in Soviet history.
During these years, the government followed a radical revolutionary policy, but the working class, found it
very difficult to reconcile itself to it, Lenin, therefore, introduced new economic policy in 1921. It
introduced the concept of individual ownership in the means of production. The peasants were allowed to
dispose of their surplus after paying a heavy tax. Trade treaties with other countries were signed. The State
also took control of banking and credit institutions.
In the meantime, a great change occurred in the foreign policy of the communist government. In 1922, the
Russian delegates attended the
304
international conference which resulted in the treaty of Rapallo. It seemed that by introducing new
economic policies and by attending international conference, the government had given up its plans for
world revolution. Soviet government was first of all recognized by Germany followed by Great Britain.
Italy and France in 1924.
The death of Lenin in 1924 led to many controversies, especially regarding \\orld revolution. Trotsky was a
great supporter of this idea, but Stalin preached his theory of socialism in a single country. A great tussle of
power between the two groups took place, but in the long ran victory sided with Stalin. The doctrine of
socialism became the official policy of the Soviet Government. Although in theory the dogma of world
revolution was upheld but in practice it ceased to exist. The Soviet Union which had so far followed the
policy of confrontation \\ith the capitalist countries, was now seeking the co-operation of all the countries.
During the inter-war period Russia was a secluded country. She did not enjoy diplomatic relations with
many countries. However, she entered into a trade agreement with Sweden and Great Britain in 1920-21.
Then she came out to resume diplomatic relations with the United States which had refused to recognize
Russia due to anti-American Communist propaganda. US extended recognition to Russia in 1933. In 1932,
a nonaggression pact was signed between France and Russia. With Germany, it had strained relations after
the rise of Hitler in 1933. Russia joined the League of Nations as a permanent member of the Council in
1933, when Japan and Germany quitted it. She extended great help to the League of Nations in lacing the
aggression of Japan, Germany and Italy.
In the meantime, USSR tried to enter into a collective security pact with Great Britain, but she was
disappointed. She extended her friendship to Germany and entered into a non-aggression pact with Hitler in
1939. War broke out in September 1939.
POST-WAR FOREIGN POLICY
In the beginning, Russia strictly followed a policy of neutrality. But when she found an opportunity to
expand her territory, she snatched Poland, which had been invaded by Germany. Later on Germany and
Russia decided to divide Poland. In the same year, she also captured all other territories which formerly
belonged to her.
In 1941, Germany attacked Russia. With the help of Allies, she successfully resisted the Nazi attacks.
During this period; communist parties
DISINTEGRATION OF THE USSR AM) RE-EMERGENCE OF Rl;SSIA
305
all over the world carried on an organized propaganda in support of Russia which showed her popularity
amongst the Communists-.
The foreign policy of Russia after the Second World War was marked by cold war between East and West.
(A full survey of cold war has been given in the chapter ”Cold War”. We will only touch on the main
points of post-war Russian foreign policy here.
Russian relations with Western world became strained just after the war due to disagreement over the peace
treaties, return of displaced persons. Germany and her problems of industries, elections in Eastern Europe,
disarmament and control of atomic weapons.
She fully utilized the opportunity offered by the post-war politics to expand her influence in other parts of
the world. She was able to bring into communist orbit the governments of Albania, Poland, Hungary,
Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. But with the emergence of China as a world power
and due to the Sino-Soviet dispute, some of these countries cherished better friendly relations with China
than with USSR.
In response to NATO, eight communist countries under the leadership of Russia signed a treaty in 1955
known as the ”Warsaw Pact”. By this treaty these communist countries had been knitted together. (The full
implications of this treaty have already been discussed in the Chapter ”Regional Defence Treaties.”)
Russia’s relations with Western countries, especially with United States, have been strained till recently, A
few factors were responsible for the confrontation of Russia and the Western world. We will discuss them
briefly here. The first reason was the conflict of ideologies. When the Western countries mostly followed
parliamentary form of Government and believed in the system of capitalism, Soviet Russia was opposed to
it. She adopted one-party system and believed in the common ownership of the means of production. The
second important factor was Russia’s policy of expansionism. The Western countries thought that Russia
was determined to expand her territories, that she cherished the dream of world revolution. On the other
hand, Russian leaders justified their policies on the basis of their defensive needs. Third point in this
connection was the division of Germany that had become a hot spot in that age. The Second World War
brought East Germany under the control of USSR while her Western part was placed under the superv ision
of Western countries. Movements for the unification of Germany had been quite brisk since its division.
They had support of Western countries. But Russia refused to come to terms with the Western block
because Russians believed that unified Germany would side
306
with the Western democracies rather than with the communist system, Russia not only opposed Financial
aid to Germany but also abhorred German rearmament. Moreover, the conclusion of such treaties as NATO
and Warsaw Pact by both the parties had shaken their trust and widened the gulf between them. Each party
had condemned the other side for pursuing aggressive policies. Last factor for tension between the two
blocs was the ”Clash of leadership.” After the Second World War, international politics had undergone a
great change. Great Britain and France were no longer considered to be the major world Powers. USSR and
USA emerged as the two ”super-powers.” They were interested in securing spheres of influence and thus
the clash occurred of leadership leading to military conflicts. These were in short the causes of strained
relations between USSR, USA and her allies.
The Western Powers had been very much concerned about (1) Russian domination of countries of Eastern
Europe (Poland, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia), (2) Russian influence over
countries in the Middle and Far East which the Western Powers previously regarded as subjects for
Western colonial or economic expansion or as Western military point, (3) the possibility that USSR might
launch an aggressive war, (4) Russian occupation of Afghanistan.
During Stalin’s rule till 1953, USSR’s foreign policy was hostile to the West. His foreign policy was based
on extremely rigid principles. He was success in maintaining the ”Iron Curtain” around his country. After
his death in 1953 Khruschev became the central figure in Russia. In March
1958, Khruschev demoted Bulganin and took over the premiership from him and unlike his predecessors he
did not execute his opponents.
During his rule significant changes took place in the Soviet policy. A new line of thinking became apparent
when Khruschev denounced Stalin’s policy before the Communist Party congress. He explained that during
Stalin’s period, Russia was weak among the nations. But the expansion of communism since 1945 and
tremendous increase in her industry had given her a great military potential. Russia’s achievement of parity
in nuclear weapons has made her impregnable to attack.
As long as he was in power, Khruschev followed a flexible policy of peacefull co-exsistence with the west.
Khruschev visited United States in September 1959 and also addressed the United Nations. He also paid
visit to Great Britain and appreciated the efforts of Macmillan, British Prime Minister, to improve relations
between the two countries. Khruschev visited France as well. Although France was a member of defence
pacts yet USSR and French relations developed normally under Khruschev. His visits to
DISINTEGRATION OF THE USSR AND RE-EMERGENCE OF RISSIA
307
various Western countries relaxed tension between the two blocs and strengthened the prospects of world
peace. But when, in 1960, an American spy plane was shot down by the USSR, Soviet-American relations
took an unpleasant turn and shoes were hurled at each other in the UNO. As a result, the historic summit
talks between the four major powers USSR, USA, UK and France were adjourned, because Russia refused
to attend it.
Meanwhile, Russia had been pursuing the policy of securing spheres of influence in the Middle East, Asia
and Africa. She developed very friendly relations with UAR to whom she gave an historic support during
the Suez crisis of 1956. The role played by USSR in and out of UNO during the. Suez crisis won her great
popularity in Middle East countries. USSR did not enjoy cordial relations with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan
because of their alliance with the Western group. Later the attitude of these three countries towards the
defence pacts convinced Russian leaders that they were not the blind supporters of Western Powers. Now
the relations of USSR with Turkey, Iran and especially Pakistan, were improving. (For Pakistan’s relations
with USSR consult the last chapter on Pakistan).
Russia gave direct and indirect support to the African liberation movements. Her consistent support
encouraged the freedom movements in the continent of Africa and boosted up the morale of their leaders,
who after independence got inclined towards her.
The rise of Communist China as a world Power threatened the Russian monopoly of leadership. Although
both China and Russia believed in the same ideology yet their relations had not been cordial for many
years. (For Sino-Soviet dispute, please consult the chapter on China). China and USSR were competing
with each other to secure spheres of influence In Asia, Middle East and African countries. It had become
apparent that Russia treated China and not USA as her real enemy in the context of power politics, with the
result that USSR began seeking the friendship of Western countries. The war in Vietnam confirmed the
belief that USSR and USA were gradually developing understanding with each other.
In October 1964, Khruschev was deprived of power. He was succeeded by Alexei Kosygin. The news of
Khruschev’s decline was heard with great surprise and anxiety all over the world. The main allegations
against him were: Soviet defeat in the Cuban Missile crisis, reducing the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict to
the level of a personal feud between himself and Mao Tse-Tung, encouraging decentralization in
agriculture, development of consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry and thus disrupting the
country’s economy.
308 _
INTERNATION \I. AFFAIRS
Kosygin was a man of moderate nature. He pursued very cautious policies. There seemed to be no
significant change in the foreign policy of USSR. The attitude adopted by Russian Government during the
Middle East crises of 1967 and 1973, her role in the Vietnam war and also in the IndoPak war of 1971 had
affected adversely Russian prestige in the Asian and African countries. The people of Middle East expected
very bold response affected from USSR against Israeli aggression, but they were disappointed. The Middle
East crisis offered an opportunity to Kosygin to enhance his country’s prestige in the Muslim World, but he
could not derive full advantage out of this situation. He also visited Great Britain and France. During his
regime; Russia’s relations with the USA however, improved to a considerable extent.
The year 1970 witnessed some rift amongst the top echelons of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
It was rumoured that they would fall apart before long. The leaders who tookover from Khruschev in 1964
were united only by their wish to get rid of their impulsive master. They differed on everything else, from
the pace of internal reform to the shape of foreign policy. However, they managed to avoid open fight and
clung to their respective offices. The members of the ruling Junta - Brezhnev, Podgorny and Kosygin were
riding in harness.
During this period, political strains and stresses were all the more explosive because they also reflected the
critical state of Soviet economy. The rate of growth had slackened. Production lagged behind its targets.
SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN 197<TS AND 1980’S
Russian foreign policy in its global perspective was characterised by a turn from cold war to the peaceful
co-existence of states with different social-systems. The emergence of detente considerably relaxed the
explosive international Milieu, ripe with potential tensions.
The nature of new Soviet-US relations was determined by two fundamentally important documents. They
were the basic principles of relations between the USSR and the USA signed in May 1972, during the first
summit meeting between the Secretary-General of the CPSU and the President of USA, and the agreement
on the prevention of nuclear-war signed in Washington in June 1973. The luminous summits of detente
came into limelight, when the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks proceeded further in 1974 at Valadivstock
meeting, and the resolution of complex European problems seemed in the offing in the Helsinki conference.
Russian foreign policy made certain important advances in South East Asia, resulting in the victories of
peoples of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos
DISINTEGRATION OF THE TSSR AND RE-EMERGF.XC E OF RfSSIA
.309
and the consequent withdrawal of the Americans from the region. Soviet Union’s relations with India were
remarkably good and the Russian rulers were whole-heartedly supporting them.
Soviet Union’s relations with China were still strained, and their diatribes against Chinese leadership were
still continuing with vehemence. In Arab world, Soviet Union enjoyed good relations with Syria, Iraq,
Libya and PLO, but she suffered retreats in Egypt, where America had made progress.
In Europe, Helsinki Conference, attended by 33 European countries alongwith Canada and USA was a
major diplomatic success for the Russians. From the Russian stand point, they gained the long sought
world-wide recognition of the inviolability of the frontiers of the Eastern European states. In turn, they
allowed the liberalization of the societies of Eastern Europe with the Western Europe on cultural, economic
and social basis.
With the introduction of the concept of detente, several major problems like disarmament, arms control and
the mutual economic cooperation were tackled with considerable success.
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS (RISE OF GORBACHEV)
On November 10, 1982, Soviet radio and television announced the death of Leoned Brezhnev, Yuri V.
Andropov, who formerly headed the K.G.B. was chosen to succeed Brezhnev as General Secretary. By
mid-June
1983, Andropov had assumed all the Brezhnev’s three titles.
The Soviet Union broke off both the START talks and the parallel negotiations on European based missiles
in November 1983, in protest against the development of medium-range US Missiles in Western Europe.
After months of illness, Andropov died in February 1984. Konstantin U. Chernenko, a 72-year-old party
stalwart who had been close to Brezhnev succeeded him as General Secretary and, by mid-April had also
assumed the title of President, In the months following Chernenko’s assumption of power, the Kremlin
took on a hostile mood towards the West of a kind rarely seen since the height of the cold war 30 years
before. Led by Moscow, all the Soviet bloc countries except Romania boycotted the
1984 Summer Games in Los Angeles tit-for-tat for the US which led to the boycott of the 1980 Moscow
Games.
310
After 13 months in office, Chernenko died on March 10, 1985. He had been ill much of the time and left
only a minor imprint on Soviet history.
Chosen to succeed him as Soviet leader was Mikhail S. Gorbachev, at 54 the youngest man to take charge
of the Soviet Union since Stalin. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union began its long awaited shift to a new
generation of leadership. Unlike his immediate predecessors, Gorbachev did not assume the title of
President but wielded power from the post of party General Secretary. In a surprise move, Gorbachev
elevated Andrei Gromyko, 75, for 28 years the Soviet Union’s Foreign Minister, to the largely ceremonial
post of President. He installed a younger man with no experience in foreign affairs, Edward Shevardnadze,
57, as Foreign Minister.
A new round of US-Soviet arms reduction negotiations began in Geneva in March 1985, this time
involving three types of weapons; systemstrategic, or long-range missiles and bombers, medium-range
systems in Europe, and space-based systems. In the new talks, the two sides differed sharply on how to
approach the three-part negotiations, with the United States putting the focus on cuts in land-based
weapons while the Soviet Union made curbing space weapons its first priority.
After months of quiet negotiations, Reagan and Gorbachev agreed to meet in Geneva on Nov. 19-20, 1985
- llth post-war meeting between the leaders of the two super-powers and the first since former President
Carter’s 1979 meeting with Brezhnev in Vienna. Expectations for concrete results were low because the
Geneva arms talks appeared to be at an impasse, with both sides repeating old slogans. But after a meeting
in Helsinki, Finland, with the new Soviet Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze, Secretary of State George Shultz
said that if the session turned out well, the two leaders might hold a rotating series of meetings in each
other’s capitals.
When Gorbachev took-over as the Soviet leader, Russia was suffering the consequences of what Lenin
would have called the ”infantile leftism” of the way Leonid Brezhnev ran the country in the 1970s.
Brezhnev neglected Russia’s economy while getting himself into a series of foreign-policy adventures --
Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen and Afghanistan which turned in offensive Carter. America into angry and later
on rearming Reagan America.
GORBACHEV’S REFORM POLICIES
When Gorbachev assumed the reign of power in March 1985, he was confronted with a choice: either to
maintain the status quo in the
311
country’s economic and political affairs or to introduce radical reforms which could end decades of
monotony and stalemate in the Soviet society.
The scenario inside and outside the Soviet Union presented a grim look. The economy of Soviet Union was
in shambles. It was largely due to the unnecessary defence expenditures which had kept engulfing the
resources of Soviet Union. Soviet adventures in other countries like Afghanistan and in Asia and Africa
demanded a 20 to 30 percent of GDP to be earmarked for defence budget only. Moreover, the state system
had fallen to ruins because of the highly centralized authoritarian setup in which the communist party had
monopolised every thing; from the means of production to the very minds of the people. The socialist
ideology subordinated to the state system had yielded into a lost cause and stagnated due to the lack of
reforms. It was in this background that Gorbachev decided to operate upon the entire setup in order to
restore it to its normal health.
The 27th party congress held in February 1986 was the first occasion when Mr. Gorbachev expressed his
profound desire to institutionalize Glasnost (Openness) and Prestrioka (Restructuring). The congress
members approved his policy of reforms but it was not easy for him to eradicate ills present in the Soviet
system without the participation of the people, Gorbachev realized that Soviet Union had failed to compete
with the West in technology and the key sectors of modernisation and that the rate of American industrial
growth was much higher than the Soviets. He identified the area in which the Soviet economic and
technological development was weak. The system was not working because the Soviet people did not want
to work as they were denied proper incentives and encouragement. Against this background it was very
difficult to ameliorate the quality of Soviet life without bringing some structural changes in the Soviet
society.
Gorbachev’s programme of radical reforms was endorsed during the Soviet Communist Party’s Central
Committee meeting held on June 27,
1987. His reforms called to give relative independence to Individual firms and to allow them to operate on
a profit and loss basis. Effective measures were recommended to control pricing structure, reorganization
of external debts, financing credit system. Moreover, for the first time the consumer was given an important
role to play especially in the centrally planned economic system. The central committee also approved the
draft law on state enterprise, thus giving individual companies greater autonomy and encouraging profit
and loss accounting. In order to revolutionize the system of management the central committee
recommended integrated system of management to ensure real acceleration of economic development. On
the
312
basis of these grounds it can be said that the conference of the Communist Party and Central Committee of
CPSU had vehemently endorsed Glasnost and ’Prestrioka’. The only major difference between the
decisions of conference and central committee was that the former made some basic changes in the political
and electoral system whereas the latter tried to reform the economic system.
Precisely speaking some important objectives of Glasnost and Prestrioka were:
1.
2.
3.
To eliminate corruption.
To increase production.
To emphasize on quality rather than on quantity and to achieve
the level of quality control.
4. To check bureaucratic nepotism.
5. To give people a say in the voting system.
6. To encourage initiative, skill and talent.
7. To allow positive criticism on party and government.
8. To effectively compete with the West in technology.
9. To improve the conditions of minorities.
10. To introduce judicial reforms
11. To increase efficiency.
Gorbachev felt that the accomplishment of these objectives would require modification instead of
disbanding the communist system. Moreover in order to catch up with the West in technological field and
to increase domestic production something should be done to control pricing system, reforming credit and
planning, improving management allowing some private trade and investment. All this would require
tremendous amount of effort from all the sectors of Soviet society.
The problem with Gorbachev was that he could not completely disown the communist system because he
himself was product of that system and the very survival of the communist society depended on the smooth
functioning of its ideological framework.
The results of ’Glasnost’ and ’Prestrioka’ were to come before the holding of the 28th party congress in
1991. But Gorbachev had to tacitly handle those elements who under the cover of openness wanted to
destabilize the communist system. As long as the process of democratization did not challenge the
legitimacy of communist ideology it was acceptable to the party leader. But when the reactionary and
conservative elements tried to take advantage of political freedom and tried
DISINTEGRATION OF THE I SSR AM) RE-EMERGENCE OF Rl SSIA
313
to change the communist system, it became fairly difficult for Gorbachev to justify his policy of reforms.
Prestrioka was affecting the Soviet military like any other sector of society. The armed forces were under
pressure to reform. Previously, in order to boost their performance and efficiency, they had traditionally
enjoyed the lions share of the country’s resources. What made the military a special case was that the
success of Gorbachev’s Prestrioka programme as a whole was to hinge directly on how much money could
be re-allocated from defence to other sectors of Soviet economy.
Gorbachev was therefore in dilemma: he was committed to maintaining the Soviet Union’s relative security
but he also had to cut defence expenditure and avoid any need to reinvest in defence in the short and mid-
term. Disarmament was therefore, the cornerstone of Gorbachev’s foreign policy. It was based on ”new
thinking”, an approach to solving conflict by political rather than military means. The doctrine made
economic sense. Military confrontations were costly politically as well as economically as Gorbachev’s
cautious criticism of the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan confirmed.
1988 was the year of Glasnost rather than Prestrioka, except in international relations. Only on the external
front had Gorbachev’s rethinking really begun to take effect. The installation of US and Soviet Union
inspectors on each other’s territory to supervise the scrapping of medium range nuclear (INF) missiles was
the most frantic manifestation of the new mood. The Soviet leader proved himself extraordinary adept in
exploiting an essential retreat from costly international engagements into a series of hugely popular peace-
making gestures. In so doing, he managed throughout to maintain the initiative and keep the Western allies
in disarray, unable to take advantage of his weakness.
Prestrioka at home was proving far more complex. On the economic front progress had slowed to a crawl,
as the contradiction of piecemeal reform caused more confusion than create new incentives.
Decentralisation of dCClSiOP-making, ordering Soviet enterprises to be selffinancing and balance their
books, clashed with the maintenance of fiveyear plan and the whole structure of the centralised-price-fixing
and supplies added to the problems.
Gorbachev’s tactical switch over in 1988 was from economic Prestrioka to political Prestrioka. Without the
latter he told the party conference, the former cannot become a reality for it was in the political structure,
the domination of the system by a highly centralised party
314
IVTFRNATIOISAI AFFAIRS
apparatus and state bureaucracy, lay the cause of the stagnating economy Neither Glasnost not political
restructuring could succeed in producing viable improvement in the standaid of living At the same time his
liberalisation process seemed to be producing its most radical effects at the penpnery, on the nationalist
movements of the Baltic republics and the Trans-Caucuses
The greatest challenge for Gorbachev during 1989 came from the nationalist movements and the threat of a
backlash against them from his o\vn Russian heart-land
SOVIET ELECTIONS
March 26, 1989, turned out to be the proudest day for Mikhail Gorbachev during four years of leading the
Soviet Union That day saw the people give a spectacular display of their ability and desire to practice
democracy, if given half a chance They turned it into a watershed in the history of the country This was
made possible mostly by the Herculean efforts of Goibachev to bring about changes in the country
In Moscow however the people voted overwhelmingly m favour of Boris Yeltsin He received nearly 90 per
cent of the votes cast He became a member of the Congress of Deputies m turn congress voted for a
Supreme Soviet which was to be m regular session for prolonged periods
Hounded by the party establishment, Yeltsin had already emerged as the nagging conscience of the
Gorbachev hero and folk hero Thus voting freely for the first time aftei 70 years the people delivered a
striking rebuke to the party and demonstrated how low its credibility had sunk, despite Gorbachev This was
the healthiest outcome of the elections
What really were the implications of the conspicuous level of support for Yeltsin7 In it’s essence it was a
vote against the establishment rather than solely for him Many voters when asked, openly said that they had
voted for Prestnoka, change in the society And many of those who were not voting, about 15 percent
overall, said they did not want to bother because they had no faith m the promises being made and no
confidence that any change in society would really come about Many young people said that they did not
vote because it was not a multi party system It was very evident that people wanted not only a system of
multiple candidates but in the long run also a multi party system It was significant that not a single, voter
expressed his opposition to multiplicity of candidate even when they were more than 10-12 candidates in
some constituencies All of them wanted more choices
DISINTFGR VTION OF THF I SSR AM) RF-FMFRGENCF OF Rl SSI \
315
Many prominent party leaders, notably those of Lemngiad, lost humihatingly The shock for the party \\as
veiy great Contiary to the conservatives in the establishment, \\ho had been strenuously holding back
Gorbachev from taking initiatives, the voteis unequivocally showed that they wanted more radical policies
In a sense this immensely stiengthened the hands of Gorbachev against his conservative colleagues even
though such a landslide victory for Yeltsin was quite embarrassing for him
The election result tended to shaipen the conflict between the radicals and conservatives within the party In
one sense the result was helpful to Gorbachev because he could turn around and tell the conservatives look
the people want more actions In an other sense he had to find a way of reassuring them that the party \\ as
not threatened
The most significant aspect of the outcome of the elections was that among the 100 candidates nominated
by the Central Committee of CPSU most of the noted Progressives and radicals did poorly With the
exception of Yego Ligachey against whom 78 per cent votes were cast by the elite doctoral college, all the
other candidates with conservative reputation did relatively well But the public voting was consistently in
favour of progressive and radical candidates
This meant that the party was more conservative than the masses and thus lagging behind the state of public
consciousness It also meant that mass of the people behind the party could no longer be so dogmatically
maintained It further meant that the party had to learn afresh to be led by public opinion rather than vice-
versa This was a plus not simply in favour of Prestnoka but in favour of its further radicahzation
The defeat of the many candidates from two bureaucratic groups who were dominant in government and
party had also strengthened the bank of Gorbachev It implied that meanings derived from Marxism by
Stalin had been declared wrong and movement of de-Stalimsation which evolved during the last 50 years
had succeeded to great extent
At this critical juncture in the Soviet history when Gorbachev was at battle with the conservatives and
hardliners who were against his Prestnoka and Glasnost reforms, Gorbachev’s will slackened a bit to give
way to the assertion of miscreants m certain parts With the Baltic Republics already on their road to
secession Gorbachev adopted the use of force to quell uprising in Tiblisi, Baku Vilms and Riga mainly
stirring out of nationalities question This opting the use of power proved inimical to the stability and
sustamabihty of the crumbling system already weakened
316 __
by the reforms initiated by himself. The mechanism of the Communist Party was simply unable to cope
with this situation.
Yeltsin started his reform programme cautiously. He tried to secure maximum foreign aid from the West
and the United States to implement his plan of reforms. Rouble was declared an exchangeable currency
besides initiating a well organised plan to rescue the economy from crumbling to disaster. In the process, he
developed rivalry with the Congress deputies who had been elected in 1990 with largely those elected
representatives who still cherished the dominance of the rights. On the forefront were the speaker of the
parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov and the Afghan war hero and rightist-oriented vice-president. Alexander
Rustkoi. With supposition that the credibility of the parliament had withered, Yeltsin on iMarch 9, 1993 at
the meeting of the heads of the Russian regions demanded that the parliament should surrender control of
the central bank to his reforming government. Deterred by the situation, Yeltsin on March 13, proposed a
referendum for his reforms and enhancing of the presidential powers. He also announced a referendum plan
in the face of a toughened parliamentary opposition. The parliament tried to impeach him but he managed
to survive.
The problem was to resurface in the wake of the continuing impasse. On September 21, 1993 he dissolved
the parliament before it could attempt to impeach him again. The Parliament however, under Rustkoi and
Khasbulatov occupied the Congress building, the White House and passed resolution to impeach the
president. To avoid a judicial ruling Yeltsin also suspended Russia’s top court. Under the emergency
clamped on Moscow on October 3, the army flushed out the resistance of Parliamentarians by 4th October,
1993. As announced, elections were held on December 12, with Yeltsin winning on the issue of enhanced
presidential powers in the constitution by securing 52% votes of the regional results. The liberal democrats
under Zhirinovsky, a hardliner nationalist took lead by securing largest number of seats.
DISINTEGRATION OF SOVIET UNION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Following the August 18, 1991 abortive coup against Gorbachev the developments in the Soviet Union
proceeded in such a way as to lead the whole communist empire to rump. While the implications of the
upheaval at the international level were no less significant, the domestic structure also underwent a great
change. On one hand a new shape of the global situation emerged and on the other re-emergence of Russia
and the subsequent turmoil within the Russian Federation gave a totally new character to the arrangement
of world security in general and that of Europe
DISINTEGRATION OF THE I’SSR AM) RE-EMERGENC F. OF RfSSIA
317
in particular. The causes of this process of disintegration were no less numerous than its consequences and
implications for the world at large.
CAUSES
If one has to point out the single most important factor behind the demise of Soviet Union, it was economic
factor: the economic deterioration that culminated into the disaffection and loss of credibility among the
people before the process of disintegration started. It was a direct consequence of the particular situation
marked by economic stagnation and inflexibility of the system to adapt to the changing trends towards the
end of the century. Useless expenditure on defence and empire building plus the centralised system of
production led to the disaster which otherwise could have been avoided. It invested 20 to 30%, of the GDP
on defence which hardly left any resources for capital regeneration. This lack of regeneration process was
also a result of investing heavily on the maintenance of an overstretched area of influence. Throughout the
decade of 1970s, the Soviet economy has stagnated to such an extent that attempts to reshape it towards
mid-eighties proved too late. The burden on the economy was three-fold: defence and heavy machinery
productions which impeded the process of regeneration of capital as most of these products were bartered
away in exchange of items which did not contribute to the flow of capital into Soviet Union assistance to
satellite states and commitments in the peripheral areas and this process was not accompanied by a
sustainable mechanism for mutual trade. Most of the allies took this assistance for granted due to mere
ideological proximity and not because of a genuine need for co-operation in the economic field: the very
nature of the centralised socialist economy alien to reforms and rethinking. Till the time Gorbachev look-
over, the whole economic system was in shambles which in the wake of opening of the socio-political
system exploded into the process of disintegration.
In its nature and tactics, the Soviet regime had been a totalitarian one with all tools of suppression, introvert
looking mechanism and lack of participation. It worked through a highly centralised system controlled by
an overbearing bureaucracy, a single party system mobilising the masses to either build socialism or fight
external enemies. The system had to have an enemy to sustain. Further there was a total control on all
forms of communication and the mass media control of the population by terror techniques exercised by a
monolithic secret police system. The leadership was provided by the one heavy-handed strong man and
dissent was unknown to the very apparatus of the communist party. The guiding principles of the state
hinged upon a single official ideology projecting a ”perfect final state of mankind” claiming authority on
both the legal order and the individual conscience. The sheer physical size of the country also
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INTLRNATIONAI AFFAIRS
made governance and integration under one central authority impossible The Soviet state comprised ovei
100 nationalities speaking hundreds of different languages and following diverse cultural patterns The
population was tried to be transformed into a ”sovietized”’ one through relocation of various ethnic entities
but the plan backfired in the wake of cultural plurality which was hardly supposed to lead to a merger The
same policy led to re-assertion of nationalities with even more intensity as the economic and political
system headed tow aids the decline Ideology, if it does not address to the recognition of cultural diversity
fails to unite the masses and it was precisely the same which happened in the case of Soviet Union The
Russian empire had been won by svvoid and as the ”order” leceded in the wake of its inability to coerce
The Baltic republics and the Cential Asians asserted themselves to facilitate the process initiated by
economic and political factors The overstretched size also posed certain administrative problems and
resulted in a loosened grip of the central authority over the periphery
The personality factor also contributed to the demise of the empire in that it was the personal vision of
Gorbachev as phrased out in his ”Glasnost” and ”Prestnoka” that tended to reform the system by rectifying
the inputs He accordingly aimed at the very linchpin of the structure i e the Communist Party to get rid of a
corrupt and degenerated party mechanism It was he who took initiative and m the wake of fast changing
scenario, tried to rebuild a sustainable state system However, his limitations m controlling the pace of
change led to a turmoil that eventually culminated into the break-up of the whole system
Some observers opine that the disintegration had been affected by a redundant appeal of the social ideal as
practical guideline This argument is valid but not entirely, the only point \ ahd is that the great experiment
was peihaps premature and that we might have to wait for some time before men and women, were mature
enough to order their lives according to this dream of Marx It will be appropriate to blame the theory to the
extent of saying that an experiment has been tried and it worked upto a point and then failed because they
bungled it and made serious mistakes which led them to abandon the experiment in despair Ideology when
subordinated to state authority gets distorted and same happened in the case of socialist ideology in its
application in the Soviet Union Besides these factors, there were certain incidental developments which
caused the disintegration of Soviet Union The flow of communication in the satellite era brought ideas and
developments outside the former Soviet Union breaking the state censorship walls The changes m the wake
ot detente between the USA and the USSR proved conducive for transition towards democracy and liberal
leforms The debacle of Soviet Union m Afghanistan came at the time when the people of
DISINTEGRATION OF THE I SSR AND RF-EMERGFNCF OF Rl SSIA
319
Central Asia, due to their pioximity to the aiea and the transnational wave of revivalism were beginning to
move towaids a re-identification process along ethno-religious lines These incidental occurrences also led
to the disintegration of the empire
IMPLICATIONS OF DISINTEGRATION
As far as the implications of the disintegration on the overall global structure are concerned these are
numerous and all encompassing and have virtually led to a change in the very complexion of the globe The
disintegration resulted in both the qualitative and quantitative change of international power structure as the
previous bipolai system gave way to unipolanty but this unipolar world is not permanent because
underneath a unipolar framework, there is taking shape a multipotar redistribution of power along
economic orientation Japan, EU, ASEAN and ECO may develop into effective economic powers dictating
rules of business partly Third world as a united political entity will have serious implications for the
activities of a UN collective security system Two, the ideological conflict is also gone (perhaps not forever)
with the disintegration of Soviet Union Instead a new wave of pragmatism has replaced the ideological
parochialism as institutionalised m the East-West conflict Three, the demise of Soviet Union has resulted m
a victory for liberalism, though it is debatable but the ground facts at the international level reveal that the
world is gradually heading towards the adoption of idioms of liberalism, democracy and free-market
enterprise Four, the internationalistic nature of global politics is giving way to a switching over to the
regional perspective of the issues specially m the form of regional economic integration, state interest is
now being enhanced through regional mechanisms and security perceptions are modified with respect to
the regional context These regionahstic approaches will m future shape the nature and dynamics of conflict
Five, the disintegration of Soviet Union has brought about drastic changes in the issues agenda of global
politics, the issues like human rights, non-proliferation, liberal reforms, environment, narcotics and growth
debate have outdated the concepts of containment, deterrence, security alignments etc
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA
As far as the implications of the disintegration of Soviet Union for South Asia are concerned they are no
less numerous The disintegration has changed the balance of power in the region to a fairly modified extent
With the emergence of Central Asia, Pakistan in the wake of close relations with the Muslim republics has
got a strategic depth as well as capability leverage vis-a-vis India China in the absence of Soviet Union
may become more
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active as an ”extra regional” power filling the vacuum left by the defunct Soviet Union. Though Soviet
Union had prior to Afghan problem, a low profile in the area. It did play its role in the form of proposing a
collective security system for South Asia under ”Brezhnev Doctrine”. In the wake of disintegration, the
Soviet perspective vis-a-vis the regional security has undergone marked change as manifested by President
Yeltsin’s emphasis on resolution of the Kashmir issue and the nuclear controversy in the regional context
channelizing the bilateral mechanism of conflict resolution. In the wake of increased Russian pressure
alongwith the Western concern regarding human rights situation in Kashmir, this issue may be resolved in
future. The South Asian countries may develop a more pragmatic approach culminating into regional co-
operation in the economic field in particular under the regional mechanisms like SAARC. With ever
growing interdependence, the regional countries may opt to shred off previous commitment and
orientations thus embarking upon a new set of ideals to be pursued collectively. The disintegration of
Soviet Union has resulted in •’regionahzation” of outstanding issues in South Asia. In the wake of these
developments, India may not emerge as a regional hegemon due to its debilitated capability in the
economic and military field and withdrawal of close economic and military co-operation with the former
Soviet Union. India and Pakistan (with China) may make a new balance of power format with India and
Pakistan more or less in a state of politico-strategic parity.
RUSSIA’S CHECHEN ULCER:
Defying world opinion, mocking wise counsel for restraint and turning a blind eye to the sufferings of
thousands of innocent Chechens, Moscow seems determined to re-impose its imperial writ on
predominantly Muslim Chechnya which broke free from Moscow’s iron grip in November
1991.
As a sequel to its disastrously unsuccessful military campaign against the autonomy-seeking Chechens in
1994-96, Moscow since August
1999 has been waging a brutal war of revenge and destruction against them. Moscow’s war of conquest has
already killed over 100,000 Chechens, mostly civilians, rendered hundreds of thousands homeless and
refugees and decimated the capital city of Grozny. Countless smaller towns and villages have also been
destroyed due to Russia’s relentless aerial bombardment and heavy artillery fire.
After a brief pause early January 2000, Moscow renewed its military offensive against the besieged city of
Grozny. In the likely event of Grozny’s fall to Russian troops, the lives of over half a million civilians
stranded in the Chechen capital would certainly be fatally put at risk. That
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would be worse than what happened to Chechens in 1944 when over half a million of them were rounded
up and forcibly deported by the Red Army to Siberia on the unfounded suspicion that the populations of the
ChechenIngush republic were collaborating with the Nazis.
Moscow has been arguing that Chechens have brought these misfortunes upon themselves through terrorist
bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk in summer 1999 and through armed incursions into Dagestan in
August and September of the same year. Russian newspaper reports, however, contradict these assertions.
Two leading Russian newspapers, Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Izvestia, have published reports which reveal
that ”ethnic Chechens were not involved in the bombings in Moscow and Volgodonsk” and that ”nine of
the 10 leading suspects reside in KarachevoCherkessia, another troubled republic of the North Caucasus
region. The Cherkess’s involvement is supported by the fact that the explosives used in the terrorist
bombings and transported to Moscow had been placed in bags labelled ”Cherkess Sugar Plant.”
CHECHNYA
Asian Maskadov, a 53-year-old guerilla leader who was elected Chechnya’s president in January 1997, was
killed on March 8, 2005 by Russian forces in the village of Tolstoi-Yurt. Asian while the only viable
partner for negotiation on the future Chechnya. He declined himself as a party in Beslan school attack and
denounced it as barbaric. He was a credible Chechen leader, liberal minded, he separated religion from the
state and was the strong supporter of modern and secular education , even while respecting the Islamic faith
fully. Many Chechens back his moderate stance, it is true that the inexperienced Maskhadov failed to
reverse Chechnya’s downward slid during his brief rule , but ist is doubtful that any one close could have
done better with out assistance from Moscow or abroad.,
Putin persist in painting all Chechens with the same brush of terrorism, he will block the only remaining
path to peaceful between Russian and Chechens.
Huge international outcry crapted over the attack last year on Russian school at Beslan ostensibly by a band
of Chechen that killed three hundred including 150 children. Russian calls the Chechen resistance as
terrorist attacks linked to bin laden.
Similarly, the alleged Chechen armed incursions into Dagestan are believed to have been carried out
largely by natives of Dagestan, with support by some Chechens, Central Asians and others. Given these
facts,
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the only valid complaint that Moscow might have against Asian Maskhadov’s Chechen government is the
latter’s inability to effectively police its border with Dagestan. But can this inefficiency justify Moscow’s
full-scale invasion of an independent people and terror bombing of civilians, a practice prohibited by
international law?
The real reason for Moscow’s predatory war against Chechnya is the growing Russian desire to make
”early” exports of crude oil and natural gas from Azerbaijan to western markets. The northern route from
Baku to the Black Sea port of Novorossisk passes through over 153 kilometres of Chechen territory, which
makes it unreliable unless firm Russian control is established over Chechnya. In September 1997 Russia
and Chechnya concluded an agreement to allow large quantities of Azerbaijani oil pass through the latter’s
territory. Under this agreement
Moscow agreed to pay a 43-cent fee per ton of oil, down from 2.2 dollars initially demanded by the
Chechens. Russia also agreed to take care of maintenance and security but the flow was soon halted after
armed gangs began stealing large amounts of oil. Moscow tried to overcome this problem by’ developing
an alternative pipeline in Dagestan, bypassing the Chechen section. But armed incursions by Chechen
guerrillas into Dagestan last August rendered this alternative route equally unsafe.
Additionally, this presumed terrorist activity has held up the construction of a 1,600 kilometres link
between the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan and a Black Sea port near Novorossisk, known as the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium (CPC). The CPC project is expected to generate 23.3 billion dollars for Moscow and
about 8 billion dollars for Kazakhstan. These mega petro-dollars cannot accrue to Moscow unless
Chechnya is totally ’pacified’ by the Russian military.
Moscow has been considerably ’helped’ by the international community in its armed aggression against the
hapless Chechens. Besides engaging in verbal protestations, the western world has practically done nothing
to influence Moscow’s predatory onslaught against Chechnya. American aid and multilateral financial
assistance continues to flow unabated to Russia. American export-import Bank has proposed a fresh loan to
Tyuman Oil Co after it gained control of a large Siberian oilfield in December 1999.
Emboldened by this western policy of appeasement, Moscow has rebuffed attempts by international
humanitarian organisations to gain access to thousands of Chechen refugees, mostly children and women,
stranded in Ingushetia and the surrounding areas. Calls by the international community
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including those made by the EU, G8, QIC and the OSCE for a ”complete and immediate” ceasefire in the
war in Chechnya have been dismissed by Moscow as ”blatant attempts” at interference in Russia’s ”internal
affairs”.
Instead of seeking a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Chechnya, Moscow has not only moved to
create a government in exile, which it plans to instal on Chechen territory it controls, but has also floated
plans to deport over 250,000 Chechen refugees to distant parts of the Russian Republic, including Serbia.
Taking full diplomatic advantage of its newly formed strategic partnership with Chain against forces of
”Islamic fundamentalism”, Moscow has told Washington that it will not take any ”dictation” from the US
on the conflict in Chechnya.
This uncompromising Russian attitude toward the conflict in Chechnya, besides being informed by political
economy considerations of ”oil routes”, is attributable to three other factors. The first and foremost is the
deeply ingrained Russian perception of Chechens as ”unruly” people. Ever since the sixteenth century,
when contacts between Russia and the North Caucasus were established, fiercely independent Chechens
have been in the forefront of local resistance to Russian imperial control.
Starting with revolts led by Sheikh Mansur in 1780, Chechens have periodically revolted against Moscow
and as ”bandits of honour” have managed to humiliate Russia’s best and most feared troops.
The second factor underlying Russian intransigence is Moscow’s insistence that Chechnya is part of the
Russian Federation, notwithstanding the fact that since November 1991, Chechnya has been virtually
independent. It is worth noting that the 1996 Khasavyurt agreement signed by Maskahadov and Russia’s
General Alexandar Lebed, which recognised Chechnya as a quasi-independent state, was denounced by
Russian politicians as selling out country’s territorial integrity and as a capitulation to the ”rebels”. Lebed
was sacked and since then Moscow has not moved from its stated aim of re-incorporating Chechnya into
the Russian Federation.
The third reason for Moscow’s quest for a military solution to the conflict in Chechnya has been the
pernicious impact of growing western tendency to employ military force in pursuit of their foreign policy
goals in the post-cold war period. As graphically illustrated by Nato’s war against Yugoslavia, and the
American missile strikes against Sudan and Afghanistan in August 1998, the legal prohibition against the
use offeree in resolving conflicts has been considerably emaciated by the western democracies themselves.
Having used military force repeatedly against Iraq
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since 1991, in Bosnia in 1994-95 and against Yugoslavia early this year, the western countries have set a
dangerous precedent which is only being repeated by Moscow against Chechnya.
YELTSIN’S EXIT AND PUTIN’S EXPECTED ENTRY
Boris Yeltsin gave a big surprise to his people on the last day of the previous century. Instead of delivering
his usual new year address on December 31, he announced his resignation from office in a televised speech
about six months earlier that the next presidential elections.
Latest polls in Russia put support for Vladimir Putin in the forthcoming presidential election at more than
55 per cent. During the last presidential election in 1996, the winning candidate, Boris Yeltsin, the
founding father of the present Russian nation state, did not enjoy even a fraction of the public approval that
new-comer Putin seems to enjoy today. The Putin phenomenon becomes even more remarkable as one
begins to deconstruct it and relate its various elements to the forces at work in Russian politics.
According to analysis, a mere two to four per cent Russians were prepared to vote for Putin in August-
September 1999 were he to become a presidential candidate in the face of heavyweights like the
redoubtable Yevgeny Primakov, Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, the communist leader, Gennady Zyuganov,
and even Grigory Yavlinsky, the Yabloko party leader often considered much too intellectual and
principled for the rough and tumble of Russian electoral politics. During the last two months of the year
that ended with Yeltsin’s dramatic eve-of-the-millennium announcement of ’abdication’, the support for
Putin had climbed to a spectacular 45-plus per cent.
At present, the next in the order of public rating, Zyuganov, trails behind him with a mere 13 per cent while
he moves towards an unprecedented 60 per cent mark. Primakov, whose appointment as prime minister
produced hundreds of well researched commentaries all over the world heralding a new synthesis in the
dialectics of post-Soviet politics, has plummeted in public approval to such an extent that he first dropped
out of the presidential race to become an aspirant for the post of Duma’s speaker and then gave up even
that ambition as unattainable. The speaker’s election was a clear indication of a new in-house correlation of
forces in the Russian parliament, a body prone to work by its own peculiar dynamics.
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The western media frequently allege that Putin has deliberately planned and promoted his ascent to the
commanding heights of the Kremlin through a bloodstained path in Chechnya.
Unlike 1994-96, when the Chechnya conflict was viewed by large segments of the Russian people with
horror and abhorrence, the current campaign is a popular enterprise that easily translates into political
support for the ruthless warrior, the best of the KGB-appartchik, Vladimir Putin.
The Chechnya factor is only a half-truth if one interprets the cheering by the Russian people as the
expression of an outdated form of jingoistic European nationalism. But it becomes highly relevant if one
treats Chechnya as the tragic battleground where Russia chose to articulate its new response to several
internal and external pressures on its state and society. That this had to happen at the expense of the lives
and property of a large number of innocent Chechens is just one more cynical illustration of the way
realpohtik works in our imperfect world. The message underlying Putin’s masterly exploitation of the
Chechnya crisis, which many suspect he also engineered, is that the Russian Federation is reordering not
only its internal polity but also its international relations.
At the basic and elementary level, the Chechnya war is a declaration that Moscow would be the sole judge
of how much autonomy the constituent units of the Russian Federation can claim. The permissible measure
would vary from region to region but it would meet zero tolerance if there was the spectre of de facto
secession in a sensitive zone.
Russia was increasingly being seen as an aggregate of powerful regions with a progressive erosion of
federal authority. Putin was fast emerging as the man who would preside over the revival of a re-
centralized state. What happened in the Russian Duma on January 18, 2000 was highly instructive. In a
somewhat unexpected deal, Unity, the party created in recent months to provide a political base for
Yeltsin’s chosen heir, Vladimir Putin, secured the cooperation of the Communist Party (KPRF) to create a
new framework for future relations between the parliament and the executive.
All through the Yeltsin years, an inherent antagonism between the two branches defined their interaction,
with the Duma trying to block or delay the government’s programme, ranging from internal legislation to
the ratification of international treaties such as START II. Making a major move towards cooperation,
Unity and KPRF shared the leadership and . composition of the new Duma committees and entrusted the
august office of the speaker to a communist deputy. The stage was thus set for an easier
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passage of government-sponsored legislation and, more importantly, for a more consensual vision of
Russia’s destiny.
There is no evidence that Putin, who combines hard-line thinking of an intelligence chief with strong
educational attainments in the intellectually-oriented Russian city, St. Petersburg, is planning to turn the
clock back on economic and political liberalization.
The post-Soviet scene in Russia has been marked by a strong nostalgia for the loss of its superpower status
and by a deep sense of humiliation at its growing dependence on the West. If Primakov was briefly seen as
the pragmatist who would help heal the internal divisions of the Russian body politic and thus preserve its
unity and territorial integrity, Putin is staking a claim to being the leader of the restoration theology of a
new generation of men determined to reclaim Russia’s pre-eminence in world affairs.
Citizens of a highly educated society, most Russians understood the price they were paying for the painful
transition from a failed command economy to a market-regulated free enterprise world. They accepted,
albeit temporarily, a noticeable decline in their military and diplomatic clout as well as the severe
limitations of Yeltsin’s peculiar brand of electoral democracy because of the need to place West-assisted
economic revival on the top of the agenda. But it was here in the economic sphere that they experienced
some of their worst traumas that, in turn, caused much disenchantment with the West.
Whatever chances the new oligarchs had of defusing social pressures through trickle-down benefits of their
capital accumulation were nullified by the fall in the oil prices, the effects of the East Asian crisis, the
growing debt service liability and, above all, the declining capacity of the state to collect taxes and generate
revenue. The day of reckoning came on August 17,1998, when Russia was obliged to announce a hefty 34
per cent devaluation, a ninety-day moratorium on some of its commercial debt and an inescapable
restructuring of short-term rouble debt.
Many Russian believed that Putin would take advantage of this autocratic arrangement for the transfer of
power to him and then distance himself from the Yeltsin legacy by developing an independent profile for
himself. The process may well include a Russian version of what, in China, is known as ’the Chinese way’
of political, economic and military reforms. Putin may well nuance democratization in more specifically
Russian terms than was implied in the traditional slogan of transforming Russia into a western liberal
democracy.
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Putin has already moved to elicit a different response to issues rankling Russia including NATO’s eastward
advance and the growing western interest in states like Azerbaijan, Georgia and, above all, Ukraine. Russia
has renounced the concept of ”No First Use” of nuclear weapons and defined the kind of military situation
where it would not hesitate to use them first. Putin has also enhanced military expenditure by more than 50
per cent. Russia is demonstrably engaged in upgrading its conventional and nuclear arsenal and delivery
systems.
”ORANGE REVOLUTION” IN UKRAINE
It will now be facing a new challenge at its doorstep in a Ukraine that is split from within and is, at the
same time, the focus of the contesting powers - Moscow, Washington and the EU.
Like two sides in a tug of rope battles, some what fatigued after the last pull following November 21 polls
for the Ukrainian President, which gave the pro-Russian Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich ’victory’, but
on an appeal citing irregularities by his opponent Yushchenko, the Ukrainian Supreme Court declared the
result null and void .The legal action was reinforced by incredibly well organized sit ins and
demonstrations in Ukrainian capital Kiev, and called the ”Orange revolution’ with large scale financing by
the West and help in training of thousands of Yushchenko supporters .The re-poll held on 26 December
gave pro-West Victor Yushchenko, 52% against 44% for Yanukovich
Yushchenko again declared himself the winner as he has done in the wake of his petition against the
November poll. The Parliament had also joined in the fray and set aside 21 November elections and
dismissed Yanukovich as Prime Minister, which the President Leonid Kuchma did not ratify. The
Parliament also changed the constitution to reduce incoming President’s power and unanimously voted for
the return of Ukrainian soldiers from Iraq.. Yushchenko supporters did not allow Yanukovich to hold a
cabinet meeting and occupied government buildings in Kiev barring the latter are supporters from
discharging their duties.
At the same time Yushchenko hinted that his wealthy controversial ally Yulia Tymoshenko might be his
prime minister. Many Ukrainians are suspicious of Ms Tymoshenko who was on Interpol list on a fraud
case and was arrested for further interrogation into charges that she took part in illegal smuggling
operations, forgery and bribery amounting to $80 million.
Unlike the November poll when outside supporters were vocal in support of their favoured candidate, this
time around the major powers with
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strategic interests i.e., Russia, USA and EU were cautious. But Putin accused the US of interfering in the
affairs of Ukraine, stating, ”...this was not simply a struggle for power between the two Viktors, but was the
beginning of a dangerous democratic transformation when Ukraine, after living almost entirely within the
Russian space for a thousand years, turns towards the West and seeks membership in Nato and later the
European Union.” The expected loss of Ukraine, therefore, is considered a national disaster
Soon after 26 December re-poll, Mikhail Saakashvili, West’s poster boy of the ”Rose revolution” in
Georgia, who studied in Kiev, and is thus fluent in Ukrainian, turned up to address a meeting of hundred
thousand Yushchenko supporters in Kiev and proclaimed,” This is the triumph of good over evil.”
The Orange Revolution is the latest in what appears to be a slowtrend toward more democracy among the
former Soviet republics and satellite states, including Georgia in 2003, Serbia in 2000, in which US failed
to topple Slobodan Milosevic and years earlier in the Czech Republic and Poland.
The power struggle is for strategic control, influence, and raw materials; the so-called promotion of
democracy and peoples welfare is of the least concern
The US miscalculated post-Cold War unipolarity, looking upon it more as an opportunity to maintain its
global primacy and pre-eminence with the typical imperial arrogance evident in its infamous doctrine of
”preemption
Ukraine’s orange revolutionaries are making large claims about the victory they achieved but take the tone
of moral righteousness out of the great Ukrainian debate and Yushchenko’s democrats will find their path
blocked in two directions - westward and eastward. The idea that Europe, in its current xenophobic state,
will embrace 48 million Ukrainians on an average salary, is an absurd illusion
If Ukraine’s regional polarization continues as a result of the political crisis, the future for Ukraine does not
look bright or orange at all. One model for what could happen in Ukraine is Moldova, Europe’s poorest
state on Ukraine’s southwestern border. The loss of Ukraine may prompt Russia to develop its own strategy
of pre-emption, adding a new dimension to confrontation
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This development will have serious repercussions on the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, as the intensity of
resistance is likely to increase. It will also abate nuclear proliferation, establishing the nuclear fault line,
from Israel to Iran, Pakistan to India and South Korea to North Korea, with its fulcrum in Moscow and
Beijing. The battle-lines seem to have been clearly drawn.
”ROSE REVOLUTION” IN GEORGIA
On November 22, 2003, Saakashvili supporters had charged through the portals of the Georgian
parliamentary building in Tbilisi, forced Shevardnadze, a fixture on the Georgian scene, since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, who along with Gorbachev dismantled the USSR .was forced resign. Saakashvili then
won the new poll by 90%, which looked suspiciously like Communist era results.
The Economist of London called the events in Georgia a ”velvet” or ”rose” revolution. ”Proud Georgians
will point to this non-violence to argue that their country is fundamentally different to its Caucasian
neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Both of these held flawed elections earlier this year too.” US had put
up with Shevardnadze misrule and provided aid worth $ 1 billion, and other help to build Georgia as a
bulwark against Russian interests in the region., under Shevardnadze, Georgia fully toed the US line.
The apparent replay of the ”Rose Revolution” has already created shock waves, leading to global tremors.
Surprisingly, the European Union, which had shown a maturity of judgment in opposing the war on Iraq,
has fallen for the neo-colonial ambitions implicit in the crisis first in rose and then in Orange Revolution.
RUSSIA AND THE EVOLVING NATO SITUATION
September 11, 2001, is etched in American minds as a vast tragedy, but it is likely that history may record
it as well as the turning point in shaping the international order for the 21 st century. September 11 ended
some of the smug illusions of the 1990s, among them that international politics has been supplanted by
global economics or by the Internet.
The idea that a united Europe should seek its identity in distinction from the United States has been
overtaken by European offers to join the American diplomatic and military campaign against terrorism.
Russia has become a partner in the ant-terrorism campaign. China has provided intelligence. Relations with
India have grown closer despite America’s reliance on Pakistani bases m the war against Afghanistan. The
United
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DISINTEGRATION OF THF I SSR AND RF-FMFRGFNC E
States has made quiet overtures toward Iran And the two defeated nations of World War II, Germany and
Japan, have abandoned previous domestic constraints, Germany by sending troops beyond NATO’s
boundaries, and Japan by deploying ships in the Indian Ocean far from home waters None of these steps
was conceivable six months earlier
To be sure, the motives are not necessarily congruent with each other Europe has recognized its
vulnerability President Vladimir Putin perceived (even before Sept 11) that, to play a major international
role, Russia needed to replace confrontation with cooperation with the United States China has come to
similar conclusions that its overwhelming need for growth and reform was incompatible with avoidable
tensions with the United States And India’s movement away from non-alignment has grown in tandem with
its unease about its Muslim minority - the second largest Muslim population in the world In short, the
assault on America has brought home to the major powers how crucial America’s role is for the peace and
stability of the world
As a result, the United States, for the first time in half a century, no longer faces a strategic adversary or
any country, alone or in combination, capable of becoming one for at least the next decade Nor do the other
major powers perceive each other as strategic threats, The danger for all of them comes not across frontiers
but from terrorist cells implanted inside their countries, or from quarrels between secondary military
powers
Nowhere is that new geopolitical promise more striking than in the relationship between America, Europe
and Russia, the centrepiece of American foreign policy since the end of World War II Before Sept 11, most
European media and many leaders were charging Washington with insensitive unilateralism America was
deemed to be imperilling relations with Russia on missile defence, and not a few European leaders were
edging toward questioning the significance of common security in the postcold war world A European
army was coming into being outside the NATO framework for nebulous missions defined primarily by
political dissociation from the United States
Sept 11 brought home to our allies that Europe is without means of retaliation against similar attacks, hence
that the need for a common transatlantic security relationship remains And the steadily improving Russo-
American relationship obviates the need for the incipient mediating role between Russia and America that
some European leaders sought to achieve For these reasons within 48 hours of the terrorist attack, the
NATO Council, for the first time in NATO existence, invoked Article 5 of the NATO treaty authorizing
collective self-defence The coalition
Rl SS[A
^ - . - JJ 1
diplomacy that emerged reflected a greater embhasis Qn bi]ateral cooperation with Washington on a
national basis ar^ xvlt]im tne North Atlantic framework than on the institutions of the E\,rODean UmOn
The subtle coalition diplomacy of the Bush admimstration greatjv ajcje(j tms process
\fter the end of the Afghanistan episode, u ^ possible ^ perceptions about an appropriate - and necessary -
secqnd phase of the ann_ terrorism campaign will differ, especially if it involves Iraq And European
integration efforts are going to regain momentum BU{ all mis wil] take place in a new atmosphere When
Prime Minister Ton^ gjair too^ ^ jea(j in emphasizing Atlantic cooperation on terrorism, it sefved born
gntam s interest in the special relationship with America, b\J{ be no doubt nad Britain’s European
objectives in mind as well, havmg demonstrated a commitment to Atlantic unity, he set the stage for a
context to
European integration other than distmctiveness fron^ America German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
adopted a comparable
In these circumstances, the hitherto divisive 1SSU£ of missile defence is disappearing partly because of a
new recct hon of Europe>s vulnerability and, importantly, because of the emer^mg new Amencan
relationship with Russia In this context, America’s init\aj cooiness towarc} a European force can be
reexammed as well Afghanis:^ has demonstrated America’s preference to act with Allied support but
outsl(je me NATO framework, a similar context could be provided for k European mmtary force
A fresh perception of relations with Russia 13 ^ most rtant single issue For the greater part of its history,
Russia h^s tteaied ,ts western neighbours as a threat to its security and has respbnded by relentless
expansion to create buffers, either by military means or by geological intervention, as in the Holy Alliance
or the Brezhnev DtJctrme
Vladimir Putin, graduate of the analytical hranch of me appears to have concluded that imperialism caused
ôre ^g triumphs for Russia and is unsustainable by the re((uced conte Russia, threatening it with isolation
This is why tl,e mrust of putm’s strategy has been to strive for a kind of partnership wi\^ ^ Tjmted states
which is another way of saying that he is pursuing Rv,ssia>s objectlves by enlisting Amencan power in
their support
President Bush has decisively seized this openmg gut lt 1S important to keep in mind that the new Russian
policy resujts not from a personal preference but a cool assessment of Russia’s i\terest putm nas jeft
332 _
himself other options with China and with Europe, especially Germany, should his emphasis on America
founder. Therefore, personal relations between leaders - necessary to create an initial psychological
framework must be translated into agreed permanent common interests. Otherwise, there is the risk of
repeating the experience of previous western leaders who relied on their ties to Mikhail Gorbachev and
Boris Yeltsin (and before that with Joseph Stalin and his successors). One does Putin no favour by
ascribing his policies to his personality - impressive as it is; it is an argument that domestic opponents may
well turn against him.
There is hope for improved American and Atlantic relations with Russia precisely because there is an
objective new basis for them. It is not only that the current political structure of Europe bars the kind of
Napoleonic or Hitlerite invasions that gave rise to Russian security concerns and that wars between nuclear
powers inevitably exact costs out of proportion to any rational objective. Above all, the political calculus
has changed in regions of historic contention such as the Middle East.
The previous conception of a zero sum game between two dominant powers is no longer applicable. During
the cold war - and for some period afterward - both Russian and American leaders thought that a political
gam for one side was a strategic loss for the other and systematically attempted to reduce each other’s
influence in the Middle East Under post-Sept 11 conditions, such policies would weaken both countries
against Islamic fundamentalism and undermine the stability of the region in which they both have a vital
interest
The challenge is how to create consulting mechanisms capable of dealing jointly with the new common
realities without giving Europe the sense that it is facing a Russo-American condominium. An attempt in
that direction occurred when NATO Secretary-General George Robertson (following the lead of Prime
Minister Blair) advanced a scheme to fit Russia into NATO. A new NATO council including Russia is
supposed to deal with specifically defined policy areas while the existing NATO council without Russia
deals with all other matters. Decisions by the new body would be unanimous, thus giving Russia a veto
within NATO. The topics have not yet been selected, but nuclear proliferation, terrorism and refugee
displacements have been mentioned by Lord Robertson.
These subjects deserve common exploration with Russia. But Russian membership in NATO - however
partial - is not the solution. NATO is, and remains, basically a military alliance, part of whose purpose is
the protection of Europe against Russian invasion. Since the end of the cold war and the advent of the
common front against terrorism, this danger
DISINTEGRATION OF THE I’SSR AND RE-EMERGENCE OF RUSSIA
333
has disappeared for the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, the reason why former members of the Warsaw
Pact have joined NATO and others are in the process of seeking to do so is that Central Europeans consider
history more relevant to their concerns than personalities. NATO does not protect its members against each
other. To couple NATO expansion with even partial Russian membership in NATO is, in a sense, merging
two incompatible courses of action.
It will be argued that this problem can be avoided by a careful definition of objectives assigned to the new
NATO-Russian council. But that would not solve Russia’s problem nor that of NATO. For if measures
designed to protect against a reimperializing Russia - however unlikely that contingency - are handled
separately by the same group of ambassadors who, wearing another hat, are practising cooperation, Russia
will be inclined to claim discrimination; and if Russia becomes a de facto NATO member, NATO ceases
being an alliance or turns into a vague collective security instrument.
Nor is a permanent assembly of NATO ambassadors the best forum for exploring issues such as terrorism,
nuclear proliferation and migration or other global issues. For NATO is not now the principal forum for
such issues. A new pattern of consultation outside the NATO framework is needed.
The situation is analogous to that posed by the collapse of the Napoleonic empire. The end of Napoleon did
not end the fears of a resurgent France. But it was also recognized that permanent peace required the full
participation of France in international diplomacy. The solution was the creation of the Quadruple Alliance
to guard Europe against a renewal of French expansionism. France was not a member of the security
undertaking. But it was invited to join as an equal partner in the sc-called Concert of Europe that dealt with
political issues affecting the political stability of Europe.
An analogous institutional framework is in order to address the contemporary challenge. Russia should
become a full and equal partner in political discussions affecting international order. On matters affecting
Atlantic relations, the consultative machinery of the Organization for European Security could be raised to
the head-of-state level; for global issues, the G-8 meetings of industrial democracies could be returned to
their original emphasis on substance by giving them a political and not simply an economic subject-matter.
Or else a new consultative framework should be created. But what will not work is to try to squeeze the
new wine of an upheaval of the international system into the old bottles of institutions
334
created half a century ago for quite different purposes.
US-RUSSIA RELATIONS: END OF THE COLD WAR?
When Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin got together at Bush’s Crawford Texas ranch in the
third week of November 2001, they had the opportunity to launch a fundamentally new era in US-Russian
relations. The Cold War, of course, has been over for more than a decade, but the period that followed it
was little more than a Cold Peace. Throughout the 1990s Russian and American views diverged on the
Balkans, NATO enlargement, Iraq, missile defense, Chechnya and more. Washington and Moscow may not
have been enemies, but they weren’t friends either.
As world events take a rather abrupt turn, Bush and Putin now have a chance to change that. Of course, 48
hours in Texas did not going to change the fundamental interests of the two sides, but Russia’s geopolitical
calculations have changed dramatically since the September 11 terrorist attacks. And Putin, who, to many
experts in the US, is the most intelligent leader Russia has had in a long time now seems willing and able to
make hard choices as part of a new bargain with the US. If Bush doesn’t overplay his own hand, a Russian
realignment with the West could be one of the few good things to emerge from the terrorism crisis.
Some of the key issues and possible ways ahead:
NATO ENLARGEMENT
Only a few months ago, Russian officials were still warning of disaster should NATO proceed to enlarge to
the Baltic states next year. Recently, however, Putin has softened his opposition, even musing out loud
about whether Russia should consider joining the Alliance. American national interests dictate that Bush
should not miss this opportunity. He should be clear that Washington will not drop its promises to enlarge
the Alliance to democracies willing and able to contribute to it, but he should also embrace Russia’s new
willingness to cooperate - for instance by turning the currently moribund NATO - Russia Permanent Joint
Council into a real forum for dialogue. Bush should even express his openness to seeing Russia itself join
NATO one day - there would be no better way than that to symbolize the real end of the Cold War.
MISSILE DEFENSE
America’s and Russia’s need for each other in the w5ir on terrorism
DISINTEGRATION OFTHF. I SSR AND RE-EMF.RCENCF. OF lU’SSIA
.335
are also leading them toward compromise on the divisive issue of missile defense. Whereas the Russians
had been warning that even the slightest amendment to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty could lead to
a new nuclear arms race, now Putin says that he could imagine a new form of agreement. In turn, the Bush
administration has gone from insisting that the treaty must go to suggesting that it might, after all, be able
to amend it. at least for now. BuslT should pledge to dramatically reduce American offensive nuclear
forces, accept limits on space-based missile defenses, and agree to share technology with the Russians. By
doing so he could take a major step toward a new relationship with Russia while preserving key American
interests at the same time.
CHECHNYA
Many suspect the price of Russian concessions on issues like NATO or missile defense is a free hand to
conduct their own war in Chechnya. And it is true that the Bush administration has ceased whatever meager
criticism of that campaign it was making before September 11 and also begun to acknowledge links
between Chechen fighters and global terrorists that it was never previously willing to acknowledge. But the
need for Russian cooperation on terrorism need not, and should not, mean blind support for Moscow. The
Western complaint there has never been that Russia had no right to fight terrorists, but simply that using
indiscriminate military force, while refusing political dialogue, was counterproductive. Bush should
continue to explain this to his new Russian friend.
ECONOMIC AID
Prior to September 11, the Bush administration spoke with disdain about ”wasted” economic assistance to
Russia and some even suggested cutting the amounts of U.S. money allocated to the monitoring of Russian
nuclear weapons. With Russia playing a key role in the anti-terrorism coalition, however-offering military
aid to the anti-Taliban forces and supporting an American military presence in Central Asia-this view is
likely to change. In the new climate, Bush should do more, not less; to help the Russians get control of their
”loose nukes”, and support measures to help the Russian economy including its membership in the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Putin’s real interest in the WTO may well be as much to control it as to use it
to liberalize the Russian economy, but either way the opening of Russian markets will ultimately be a good
thing, and Bush should support it.
We should not be naive about the prospects for a new US-Russia relationship. Putin and Bush -among the
most ”realist” leaders on the planet
336
- will not strike a new bargain because they like each other, but only if it is in their country’s perceived
national interest. But that is precisely the point. After a decade of seeing things differently, the new
common threat from terrorism is pushing both American and Russians to see their interest - and choose
their friends and enemies - in a very new light. If they play it right, despite the recent pulling out of the
ABM by the US, the end of the Cold War might still just be at hand
NEW US-RUSSIA DETENTE
The last one or two years have seen intense foreign policy activities of Russia. Few major break through
have been achieved during this period. Among the recent events, that highlight new trends in the Russian
foreign policy are the summits of Eurasian Economic Community and the collective Security Treaty,
Russian - American summit, the Russian
- NATO summit, the regular Russia - European Union top-level meeting, the Shangai Cooperation
Organization summit and annual Big-Eight forum. Russia’s active role and participation in these events
recommends that it is once again at the center of world politics.
In the course of the recent Russian - American summit, the new Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction
was signed. The document is very small in size, but is of great importance. It speaks of the reduction of the
aggregate number of strategic nuclear, warheads to an agreed level of 1700
- 2200 for each country, by December 31, 2012. Furthermore, each party will determine for itself the
composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. Moreover, the new treaty contains a direct
reference to the Genoa statement of the Russian and American Presidents, regarding the inter-connection
between strategic offensive and defensive arms. A permanent bilateral commission is to be created
which will monitor the implementation of the new treaty. The treaty is a compromise document. It may
hopefully, prove the first step within the framework of possible future agreements between the two great
powers - America and Russia. It has definitely led to the dawn of a new era of understanding and mutual
cooperation between the two powers.
Can the spirit of the successful achievement of the Putin-Bush meeting of November 2001 be now carried
over into Russia’s relationship with Europe? In many ways it is easier for the US to make a big peace with
Russia than it is for Europe. There has never been any territorial issue between the two, apart from the quiet
selling of Alaska to the US in 1867. Despite all the tension of the cold war it remains true that neither
Russia nor the US lost a soldier to the other side in combat. Yet for Europe the memories of war with
Russia and Russian occupation run deep. Is it at last
DISINTEGRATION OF THE I SSR AND RE-EMERGENCE OF Rl SSIA
.337
possible, ten years after the fall of communism, for contemporary Europe to finally respond to Mikhail
Gorbachev’s plea to build a ”common European house”?
This is Europe’s call. America will want to be privy to the content of the discussions, but Washington
knows that in this case what Europe decides it wants it cannot obstruct. Nor does it have any real reason to
interfere. There is now urgency in the matter. The European Union made it clear that most of the eastern
European countries, not long ago stalwart allies of Moscow, are on track for integration into the European
Union by
2004. The larger ones are already members of NATO and Russia seems to be downplaying its opposition to
future membership of the smaller nations on its Baltic border.
Is Russia a European or Asiatic nation? It is a question that has been debated for 500 years at least. The
nineteenth century Slavophile, Nikolay Danilevskiy argued that Russia possesses an instinctive Slavic
civilization of its own midway between Europe and Asia. Yet Dostoevsky speaking at a meeting at the
unveiling of a statute to the poet Pushkin said, ”Peoples of Europe, they don’t know how dear to us they
are.
If this is the predominant mo.od among Russian intellectuals today they still have to contend with the
nationalism - and Slavism - of the rump Communist party and those powerful voices in the army, and even
the foreign ministry, who fear a loss of independence if Russia is swallowed up in a greater Europe.
Seventy years of totalitarian communism, following on the autocracy of the tsars, as Norman Davies writes
in his monumental history of Europe ”has built huge mental as well as physical curtains across Europe.” It
was Churchill who called the Bolsheviks ”a baboonery”, steeped in the deadly traditions of Attila and
Genghis Khan. Yet Lenin and his circle assumed that one day they would join up with revolutionaries in
the advanced capitalist countries. The Comintern in the early 1920s discussed the idea of a United States of
Europe. It wasn’t the Bolsheviks but Stalin who pointed Russia eastwards.
Russia has now found with America that it has been able to fashion a common alliance- against terrorism,
for nuclear disarmament, against nuclear proliferation to unstable countries and perhaps even the quiet,
unprovocative containment of the growing might of China. The agenda with Europe is more demanding,
but its rewards will be much more long-lasting.
If discussions on the future membership of Russia in the European

Union began now it would take at least ten years and probably twenty to bring to the point of
consummation. Russia still has too much corruption, misadministration, and lack of widespread
democratization, not to mention seriously inadequate legal institutions for it to be a quick process. But, as
with Turkey today, the carrot of future entry can prove to be a good stick for beating the system into shape.
Europe itself has to decide how much it wants this. It has within its power the opportunity to anchor Russia
firmly within Europe, to cut off for all time the Russian temptation to look eastward. Without Russia
welcome in Europe it leaves the Russian psyche dangerously exposed insecure, exiled from its natural
centre of gravity and horribly free to roll around the deck like the proverbial loose cannon.
Yet for some Europeans there will be a price that goes beyond the usual debate on subsidies and the cost of
the development of backward regions.
It is to give up the vision of a united federal Europe, under one parliament and one president.
Already with the planned admission of eastern Europe and Turkey the EU is getting too large for such a
grandiose idea. With Russia a member, clearly it could not work. Yet Europe would still gain more than it
ever dared aspire to - the continent - wide union of its members and the stabilization of this great centre of
civilization that has spent too much of its history at war with itself. »
CHINA
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CHAPTER 12
CHINA
China, which was thought to be the ”sick man” of the Far East till the end of the 19th century, is now being
described as a ”giant” of the Far East. The People’s Republic of China was proclaimed in October 1949.
Since then it has made tremendous progress in every field of life. It has achieved great economic progress
and also become a nuclear power. The emergence of China into great power caused a severe setback to
Russia’s leadership of the Communist world. But, despite the opposition of Russia and America, China was
determined to assume the role of a major power. China was becoming popular amongst the newly emerging
nations of Asia and Africa due to the fact that these nations had suffered at the hands of Western
imperialism. The new nations consider China as one of them. The emergence of China as a great power has
given a new shape to the politics of the world.
During the 1960s China challenged both the super-powers by assuming the leadership of the third world
national liberation movements and in doing it willingly accepted the risk of super-powers collision against
it. The trend however, was shifted when in the 1970s, particularly in the aftermath of the Soviet-supported
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the December 1979, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; China moved
closer to the United States and called for a ”United front” of China and America against the Soviet
hegemony. With the advent of Gorbachev era, a process of steady improvement in the Sino-Soviet relations
was initiated heralding the end of two decades of Soviet-China rivalry. However, with rise of Russia under
a reformist Yeltsin following the disintegration of Soviet Union, the role of China in world affairs
underwent a radical change. With a ”westernized” Russia, China became last major power enshrining the
Marxist ideology and also potential future challenge for US hegemony. China represents one ”pole” of
power in the emerging ”multipolar world.” In the new agenda of global politics, China is a major
incumbent of a significant role at regional and international level.
340
INTERN VIION VI AFFAIRS
EMERGENCE OF COMMUNIST CHINA
China was being ruled by Manchu dynasty till 1911 Imperial power was steadily decaying and the countiy
was about to fall apart in the beginning of the 20th century In 1911, the Impenal dynasty was ovei thrown
by a revolution organised by the Kuommtang led by Dr SunYat-sen China was proclaimed a Republic and
Dr Sun \at-sen became President in 1912 Dr Sun-Yat-sen was of the view that the wealthy landlords were
responsible foi the weakness of China The result was that the Revolution was directed towards the landlord
class Kuommtang was impelled by the Zeal to leform the country The whole countiy was in the grip of
anarchy and it was not possible foi Dr Sun to establish his authority over the whole country Dr Sun died m
1925 and was succeeded by Chiang Kai-shek, who promised to carry on his woik of establishing a republic
throughout China The Kuommtang Government became a militaiy dictatorship and was opposed to
political democracy It became very unpopular amongst the masses because the Government was indifferent
to the rights of the people which had been expounded by Dr Sun Chiang Kaishek’s Government was on
friendly terms with the Russian Communist Party
The Chinese Communist Party was founded m 1921 and was developing as an independent party of the
Kuommtang, which was the ruling party The Kuommtang regarded the Communist Party as rebel force The
Communists kept up their rebellion against the Government till 1937 with a little help from USSR Japan
took advantage of this situation and invaded Manchuria in 1931 When the war with Japan ended in August
1945 the struggle between the Communists and the Kuommtang continued, General Marshall was
appointed envoy by President Truman who tried to persuade both the parties to sign an armistice in 1946
His efforts failed and the war continued Meanwhile, the reforming zeal of Kuommtang was on the wane
The party was now extremely inefficient and corrupt, on the other hand the Communist Party appealed to
the peasantry The appeal had a magic effect The result was that popular support went increasingly to the
Communists During these years, it was felt that Mao’s Communism was not rigid like the Russian
Communism The Chinese Communists were enemy of the landlords and gave a leading place to the
peasants They were nationalists and land reformers
After a number of military successes, the Communists obtained full control in 1949 and the Kuommtang
Forces retieated to Formosa The new Chinese Government was recognised by the United Kingdom and by
many other countries, but the United States of America refused to recognise it The USA gave 3,000 million
dollars to the Chinese Nationalist
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341
Government, from 1949 to 1962 People’s Republic of China applied for admission to the United Nations
but failed to be a member of UN due to the opposition by USA
The foreign policy of China since 1949 was characterized by the desire to regain control of those areas
which were part of China in the past China was giving support to Communist Vietnam, Malaysia,
Indonesia and North Korea There w as a feeling of great n\ airy between the tw o great Communist Powers,
and both Governments openly condemned each other These differences were more political than
ideological
Relations between USSR and China deteriorated to an extent that the Chinese Government expressed its
inability to protect the Russian diplomats in Peking In early 1967, Chinese students were beaten up in
Moscow There were demonstrations in Peking against Russia and its Embassy was stoned In 1968, clashes
between the Chinese and Russian Forces were reported along the border regarding boundary violations
ADMISSION OF CHINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS WHY US OPPOSED?
Communist China made its first bid for a seat in UN in November

1949, by sending a radio message In this message, the delegation of Nationalist China was repudiated On
January 10, 1950, the Soviet delegation submitted a resolution to the Security Council demanding that the
credentials of the representative of Nationalist China should not be recognized The resolution also
demanded its expulsion from the Security Council The Russian delegation, on this occasion, declared its
intention of withdrawal from the Security Council but the resolution was rejected by a vote of six to three
with two abstentions Meanwhile, Russia continued her efforts for the entry of China to UN In 1950,
resolutions for the recognition of Communist China as the functioning Chinese Government were moved in
the General Assembly by India, Russia and Canada The Indian resolution was rejected by 33 votes to 16,
Russian 37 to 11, but the Canadian resolution calling for referring the question of Chinese representation to
a special ad hoc committee, was adopted by 38 votes to 6 The second part of the resolution resolved that
the Nationalist Government should retain the seat until the decision is taken on the basis of report to be
submitted by the Committee
The so-called ad-hoc political Committee submitted its report in December 1950 It recommended that the
question of representation of a member State, in cases where more than one authority claims to be the
Government, be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the
342
Charter and the circumstances of each case. The other organs of the United Nations should also take into
account the attitude of the General Assembly.
The General Assembly, on November 13, 1951, approved the recommendations of the Committee to
postpone the consideration of Soviet bid to include the Chinese question on the agenda for the General
Assembly and any further proposals to this end during its 6th regular session. It \vas emphasized that the
time was not appropriate for its consideration. Obviously, the Korean War had complicated the situation.
Similar proposals were adopted by the General Assembly at each of its subsequent sessions from 1952 to
1960. In 1952, the proposal was adopted by 42 votes to 7 and in 1960, it was 42 to 34. The question of
Communist China’s admission was being postponed, but on the other hand the number of countries which
opposed postponement of its admission had increased from 7 in 1952 to 34 in 1960.
In 1963, the resolution moved by Albania for the expulsion of Nationalist China from the UN and the
seating of the Chinese People’s Republic in its place, was defeated by 57 votes to 41. As in the former year,
the voting was divided on ideological basis. During these years, Communist China was getting support
from the newly admitted countries. USA had made arrangements to deal with the new situation by moving
the resolution that the change of representation of China was an important question and required two-third
majority- When the General Assembly met in 1966, the resolution sponsored by twelve nations for the
recognition of People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representative of China was rejected by a tie
vote, 47 to 47. Obviously the world was equally divided on this issue. Before adopting this resolution, the
Assembly had passed by 56 to 49 votes the US resolution re-affirming UN decision that any proposal to
change the representation of China was an important question, thus requiring under the charter two-third
majority for its adoption. Although deciding for the fifteenth time in sixteen years not to admit People’s
Republic of China to the UN, the voting was the closest ever on this question and showed significant
change since 1963. Now Communist China needed 2/3rd votes to be admitted to UN, but it seemed that
China would never be able to secure the required majority. In November 1968 the resolution for admission
of China and expulsion of Taiwan was rejected with 44 votes for 58 against and 23 abstentions.
The question, as to which Government should represent a Member State in the UN, is either decided by the
State itself or by the UN. Every State under international law has the right to determine who is authorized
to represent it abroad and what form of Government it shall have as well as the right to change that
Government when the State wishes to. Regarding
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343
China, it was held, the term Member State should be taken to mean the Government in effective control of
its people and territory rather than its recognized Government. People can express themselves in an
international organization only through an organized Government to which they have accorded the right to
represent them abroad.
When China became member of the UN, the nationalist Government was in effective control of the people
and the territory. But now that Government was no more in that position. Hence, the nationalist
Government no longer represented the people of China. It merely represented that part of the Chinese
people who lived in Formosa. Hence, there was only nominal and not substantial representation of China in
the UN.
The other aspect, that the UN should itself decide who should represent one of its member States, rests on
identification of the right of a member State to representation with the right of the organs of UN to approve
its credentials. Credentials may accredit the powers conferred by a Government on its representatives.
Representation is the right of a Government to act on behalf of the State. Each UN organ has the legal right
to approve the credentials presented to it. This is essential for the integrity of these organs in the exercise of
their functions. Regarding China, to have substantive, rather than nominal, representation in the UN, the
various organs of that body were required to approve the credentials of the Communist Chinese
Government, while refusing the Credentials of the nationalist Government.
ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES
US policy had been strongly committed to the maximum isolation of Communist China and the full
recognition of the Nationalist Government in Formosa. The core of the US policy was composed of:
(i) Political non-recognition, (ii) Economic embargo (in) Opposition to almost all forms of interaction
between the non-Communist world and Communist China, including opposition to its admission to the UN.
Political non-recognition is entirely a US unilateral decision.
Economic embargo, however, involved consideration of others and was rejected by a vote of six to three
with two abstentions. Opposition to all forms of interaction required active co-operation and support which
were rapidly waning.
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The major considerations of the US for opposing Communist China were as follows:
(i) Recognition of Communist China is against the interest of
US because that Government .has shown implacable hostility to US, is guilty of grossly immoral actions, is
dedicated to establishment of world Communism, and has given no indications of being willing to fulfil its
international obligations.
(ii) Communist China stands charged as an aggressor by the UN, and any recognition or admission to the
UN would seriously damage the meaning and effectiveness of that body. Moreover, it would result in the
weakening or destruction of Nationalist China to which US is committed.
(in) It is always possible that Communist China might collapse, or that some colossal upheaval might take
place.
(iv) Change of policy on the part of the United States would be taken by the Asian nations as a weakness or
capitulation particularly by weak ones who look to US firmness for support.
(v) There are signs indicating that the Soviet Union, for various reasons, may be interested in an
accommodation with the USA but Communist China is in an entirely different category and mood, hence
different treatment to China.
THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY
The impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute has been widely realized by students of international politics. It has
not, however, been so clearly understood. It is commonly believed that it was Khruschev’s policy of
peaceful co-existence with the West which activated the long ideological warfare with China. As to
whether the world’s socialist cause was to be achieved by violent or peaceful revolution, was at the root of
the SinoSoviet split. In this regard the present student of international politics will discover many irrational
elements in the analysis of many Western thinkers who persuaded by the skill of Khruschev, even while he
had launched two Berlin crises and installed missiles in Cuba, believed that Kremlin stood for peaceful co-
existence while China was aggressively bent on world revolution. Nor, indeed, can we assume that
Khruschev’s military adventures were merely meant to assert that USSR stood for the real road to socialism
vis-a-vis China. The fact, however, is that there was a great deal
of contrast between Peking’s advocacy of world revolutions and its relatively sober deeds.
China’s foreign policy strictly followed discreet and limited aims. Unlike USA or USSR for that matter,
she created no sphere of influence nor any vassal state; in the two border clashes with India, Chinese forces
made limited advances in accordance with their claims to the frontiers and even unilaterally withdrew from
areas not claimed by tier in the frontier controversy; in Vietnam, China had not directly intervened, either
in the French or the American phase, although she could easily argue like USA’s notorious domino theory,
or like. USSR doctrine of limited sovereignty in Czechoslovakia. It is high time therefore, that the students
of international affairs realize that the Sino-Soviet dispute was not purely an ideological dispute where
USSR advocated peaceful co-existence and China revolutionary Communism.
It is generally believed that Communism in China succeeded with the help of the ’Red Army’, and it had
been maintained with Russian assistance. But this is not a correct estimate. History bears witness to the fact
that Mao received very little help from Stalin during the civil war. The fact is that the revolution in China
was successfully brought about due to the Chinese Communist leaders, and it was opposed by Stalin. From
the very beginning, the Chinese revolutionary leaders could not develop sentiments of love and friendship
for Russia which was supposed to be the leader of the Communist world. In spite of the fact that he always
preached ”world Communism”, Stalin did not extend whole-hearted support to the Chinese Communist
leaders. Their hopes and expectations, therefore, were shattered with the dawn of revolution in China.
Expulsion of Russian students from China and Chinese students demonstrations against Russia in
1967 were only the expressions of the deep-rooted causes of the conflict.
In spite of the differences in their policies regarding the revolution from the beginning, China was forced to
remain in alliance with Soviet Russia as it served its interest for the time being. The alliance was neither
based on sincere feelings nor was it a child of common ideology, but was necessitated by an external
military threat to the existence of both the countries. The most cohesive force in alliances was an outside
threat to the continued existence of partners, whether it is from war or threat of war. As, soon as the fear of
war was removed, the myth of alliance was exploded. This alliance was only necessary as long as Russia
was not equipped with ”nuclear parity” with the West, the point of strain and difference that had
disappeared before the threat of war, started appearing on the surface. The same was true about China.
After becoming a nuclear power, she no longer needed Russian protection.
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On close examination, ideological differences between China and Russia seem to be parallel to the
bieakdown of the Chnstian Church in the
16th century The fact is that these differences of the two countnes were an expression of the deep-rooted
cultural differences between Europe and Asia, as well as an outgrowth of clashing Soviet and Chinese
national interests Chinese Marxism which is described as ”Maoist Marxism’ represented the development
of a neo-popuhst Maixism, one oriented primarily not to the industrial proletariat but to its peasantry With
Maoist-Marxism, icvolution of the orientally backward has found its o\\ n ideology ” The Marxist
movement of the pre-World War I was never able to integrate within it the freedom movements of the
coloured and colonial peoples’ It only laid its stress on the industrial proletariat because Marx’s philosophy
was a reaction against the miseries of the working classes Naturally, it embodied the problems of the
industrial proletariat only and could not foresee that it would inspire the peasantry also It naturally centered
on the industrially advanced countries of Europe, and they were all White with the result that it alienated
the Asian, African and Latin American Communists who felt racial humiliation Their feelings caused great
division in the ranks of the Communists Neither had it the solution of peasantry’s problems
The Bandung Conference was held m 1955 It proved to be a turning point in the history of relations
between China and Soviet Russia It was attended by most of the coloured and ”uncivilized” countries They
found their future guide in China, and they felt that she was one of them They found great similarities with
China Besides being a member of the coloured club, it shared their common past that was marked with
colonial exploitation and imperialism, Same political experiences often become strong bonds of friendship
between nations This meeting resulted in dissociation of Soviet Russia from China and her friends
Russians, who were barred from the Conference, immediately felt the change in the wind and there started
a series of attacks and counter-attacks The real point of conflict was the clash of interests China had made
tremendous progress m all the fields during these years It had emerged as one of the great Powers of the
world It find become a nuclear Power At the same time it was assuming importance and popularity among
the African and Asian States and other backward nations In fact, it was going to assume the rival position
to Soviet Russia m international politics Naturally, Russia was afraid of it ”What was inherent in them was
now a close rivalry over the question of gaming support in the under-developed nations of the world” China
was trying to win these countries over to its side for its national survival and security Russia was interested
mainly because it wanted to neutralize these countries of Western influence Russia’s policy was to protect
the newly liberated nations from the domination of Western Powers Having reached a stage of sufficient
nucleai parity and military and
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territorial security, it was not interested in gams Foi it all minus West was a gain and this minus was
automatically going on due to national libeiation movements all o\ei the African-Asian woild Russia had
been extending help by giving moial support or at the most selling aims on easy terms to all such States as
weie smuggling to oveithroxv the yoke of Western Imperialism It was not sufficient to satisfy these
snuggling nations They did not feel indebted to Soviet Russia But on the other hand they found great
affinity \vith China because it was still sutfenng at the hands of American ”design” in the Far East and
Indo-Chma The fact is that American Imperialism was to a great extent responsible for the solidarity of
these coloured nations American militarism had been a common danger force to all these countries that
were united by its common danger China’s independent nationalism and its new position in the under-
developed countries was an eyesore to both Russia and USA, otheiwise this ideological warfare was merely
a weapon of controveisy Chinese charges of ”Revisionists”, ”Peaceful coexistence” and all People’s State
and the Russian counter blasts of orthodoxy and ”revolutionary romanticism” had no other purpose than
discrediting each other, or hiding their nationalist rivalry In fact, the real dispute was between their rival
national interests
Another factoi, which also contributed towards the dispute between Russia and China, was the deep-rooted
spirit of national humiliation in China The Chinese had not been able to forget the history of the last one
hundred years during which Russia inflicted many injuries on China They were still smarting under the
pain of the injury they received m Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang from the Russians Their border,
extending over about four thousand miles, was a source of long-standing clash of interests Communist
China had established its Government quite recently as compared to Russia It was faced with a lot of
problems and unfinished business of State-making One of these immediate huge tasks was to re-establish
its natural borders It wanted to gain all its lost territories, and in this list, Formosa occupied first place
Russia’s attitude was indifferent towards China’s problems It was not going to help it in this case unless
there was a danger of China’s extinction, which was only possible if another world war took place
Secondly, China had to create a zone of positive neutral countries around it It had also to struggle to
eliminate American danger from SouthEast Asia and the Far East Only this could bring feeling of security
to it On the other hand, Russia was indifferent to the American threat This was also one of the factors
which strained the relations between China and Soviet Russia
Russia had not shown any concern for the problems of China because it was pursuing the policy of non-
involvement m war with USA so that it might strike some baigam over the Berlin problem At the same
time,
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Russia was not extending piactical help to China in Vietnam because it realized that libeiated Vietnam
would be more ’Peking-onented’ than ’Moscow brand’ due to her geographical contiguity and historical
affinity with China
Both the countries wanted to avoid a rift, but by 1960, they had come into an open conflict The clash
between Russia and China came to the surface in 1961 at the Congiess of the Communist Party in Moscow
The cause of this immediate clash was Khrushchev’s policy of attacking Stalin Khruschev had been
discrediting Stalin for a long time, but at this Congress, he went too far He delivered a speech in which he
made more severe allegations against Stalin than previously China defended Stalin It created an atmosphere
of bitterness China blamed Russia for revisionism
Russia dealt another serious blow to the development programme of China by withdrawing its technical
advisers m 1960-1961 It was followed by vilification of the Russian Government in the newspapers of
China Attacks and counter-attacks were made which further shook their confidence in each other
Despite the failure of the 1960 Summit between USA and USSR at Geneva Smo-Soviet relations continued
on a steadily downward trend in the next three years Firstly USSR continued its aid to non-communist
India and not to Communist China After the Smo-Indian border clashes the crucial question arose, whether
USSR would continue its economic and military aid to India now that the latter was indulging in an open
war with China’7 The answer was that it would And what is more, USSR strongly condemned China
through Walter Ulbncht of East Germany, for what he called Chinese attack on India Secondly, China
openly spoke of Russian ’revisionism’ based on Khrushchev’s private conversation with Eisenhower at
Camp David As a conciliatory gesture, Khrushchev made haste to go to Peking, but the meeting there was
cool and in 1963, when China accused Soviet Union of betraying the world Socialist cause, they dated this
from Khrushchev’s Camp David meeting However, the precipitation of the SmoSoviet conflict took place
at Cuba in 1962 USSR’s capitulation at Cuba, to the Chinese meant not only a betrayal of Castro or world
Communism, but also the beginning of USSR-USA detente
Post-Cuban Communist politics were marked by this growing disintegration, earlier defined as
polycentrism’ This new crystallisation of the Smo-Soviet schism transferred the conflict to the communist
parties of their countries in the world at large Thus two factions were created in the Communist parties in
Indonesia, Korea, Vietnam, Japan and Malaysia, with China having an upper hand in the Afro-Asian bloc
since she too had risen
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from colonialism oppressed by the West, including Russia In this way China giew popular m the Third
Woild, especially by its exploitation of the racial theme Any way, by mid 1964, Khrushchev was icady toi a
trial of strength with the Chinese He decided to call a special Congiess of Communist paities where he
wanted to drive the Chinese out of the movements but on October 13, 1964 Khrushchev was leplaced by
two men Biezhnev and Kosygm, through a unanimous vote of the Party Presidium Yet further
developments showed that he was not personally responsible for a conflict that had further been
accentuated since his deposition After the Smo-Indian border clash India was leceiving massive mihtaiy aid
from USSR and USA obviously USSR and US were joining hands against China To counteract Indian
influences China established coidial lelations with Pakistan Duimg these years, Russian attitude towards
the admission of China in UN had also become lukewarm In 1969, boidei clashes also took place between
the two countnes that further bedev illed their relations
SINO-SOVIET THAW
The Soviets belatedly responded in 1971, by proposing agieement on non-use of force Two years later it
offered a non-aggression pact The Chinese rejected both the gestures By November 1974, however, the
Chinese leadership supported the idea of a non-aggression pact and dropped its demand on a new boundary
agreement It asked for a cease-fire agreement and mutual withdiawal of troops from the disputed areas of
borders
Responding the Soviet leader, Gorbachev agreed that the official bolder might pass along the main ship
channel, recognizing the middle channel as the border He also offered to meet the Chinese representative
”at any time, at any place”, to ”discuss” additional measures to create a good neighbourly atmosphere
The Smo-Soviet rivalry m Asia has to be judged carefully Except for Vietnam and India, China held a
political advantage in the rest of the area Gorbachev had in a reference to Vietnam a sour point with China
that stoutly demanded withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia, hinted at the eventual acceptance
of this demand China supported NATO and opposed Helsinki-style detente on Euiope It did not want
Moscow to transfer military assets from its European front to the Far Eastern front, where Moscow had
deployed a quarter of its aimy (Forty-five Divisions) against China
Differences between China and USSR centeied mainly around these points
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i) Soviet military concentration along the Chinese borders.
ii) Divergence of strategic interests in Far Eastern and South East
Asian policies, in) China broke off normalisation talks with the USSR after Soviet
move in Afghanistan.
Sino-Soviet negotiations for normalization started at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers in Moscow in
October 1982. It was followed by high level contact during Brezhnev’s funeral ceremonies in November
1982, when former Chinese Foreign Minister Hue was welcomed by Andropov and Gromyko. Trade
increased significantly from $ 210 millions in 1981 to $ 815 million in 1983 and $ 1.2 billion in 1984.
Border trade suspended since 1969 was also resumed, along with student exchange programme.
The process of normalisation was interrupted by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan that was interpreted
as a hostile move by the Beijing. During his speech in July 1986, Gorbachev showed friendly gestures to
Beijing after twenty-seven years when Khrushchev broke relations with China. Gorbachev said that
Moscow would accept Chinese position regarding border dispute. He also promised to withdraw 75,000
troops from the Sino-Mongolian border. China welcomed these efforts in a cautious manner. It led to
increase in contact between the Communist parties of both the countries. Ideological polarisation also
declined as both the countries were following revisionist policies with the rise of Deng and Gorbachev in
China and USSR respectively.
Thanks to the emergent Sino-Soviet detente in the wake of a pacifist Soviet Union under Gorbachev and
visible signs of settlement of the Afghan issue, Sino-Soviet relations improved to the extent that by 1986,
China had become the Soviet Union’s second largest trade partner in the Pacific (after Japan). China’s more
independent foreign policy gradually encouraged the Soviet Union to make in 1986, concessions on
definition of the river frontier and formal talks were opened to demarcate the border. This was followed by
the demilitarization of the frontier. Formal talks on arms cuts and confidence building measures were
opened in 1989. The pace of detente was disrupted by the 1991 abortive coup against Gorbachev and
subsequent rise of Boris Yeltsin. China accused the Russian government of deviating from the Marxist path
by introducing free market economy and political liberalization under pressure from the Western countries.
These developments were responsible for the resultant dormancy of the SinoSoviet relations. The Chinese
government although declared the August
1993 developments in Russia as latter’s internal problem, but subsequent election victory by the hardliners
in Dec. 1993 elections were seen as a
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welcome omen. As stated by the nationalist Soviet leader Viladmir Zhirinovsky warmer Soviet-China
relations may be revived if and when a process of revivalism of socialism in Russia takes place. This
eventuality however, is considerably out of sight at this moment.
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
For the proper understanding of the significance of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, it is necessary to
clarify that it was not cultural in the ordinary sense of the word. It was as much concerned with agriculture,
industry and political thinking as with culture itself. In fact it was completely ideological.
Mao Tse-tung launched the Cultural Revolution in May 1966 to counter revisionism, propagate ideology,
strengthen the foundations of socialism, and increase production and to remove the revisionists and
bourgeois from the party bureaucracy. It is said that Mao Tse-Tung was alarmed to see corruption in the
younger generation and in the party bureaucracy.
The party bureaucracy had become very powerful with the passage of time. It not only controlled the
Government at all levels but also was in complete command of all the communes and factories. Since they
held all the administrative posts, they had started asking for special privileges such as monetary rewards,
etc. Above all, they treated themselves as superior creatures above the ordinary workers, which was against
the spirit of socialism preached by Mao Tse-tung. The party bureaucracy had grown enormously and
encouraged parasitism. The fact that the administrative staff was reduced to half during the revolution
reveals that the bureaucracy had created much more posts than were actually required.
Still another factor that alarmed Chairman Mao Tse-Tung was the corruption of younger generation,
students and the teachers. A large number of the university teachers propagated amongst the students the
idea that they were the elite. If these Chinese Khrushchevs were allowed to preach whatever they liked,
then it was likely to create two problems. Firstly, it was likely that the party bureaucracy might consume a
great part of the production. Secondly, it would arouse the anger and envy of the workers who were greatly
responsible for the national production. It was likely to divide the society into classes and thus class
conflict; while socialism conceives a classless society. This situation would definitely slow down the tempo
of production that would ultimately affect badly the economy of the country. In short, the corruption of
party bureaucracy and infection of the
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students could have great repercussions on the bright future visualised by Chairman Mao Tse-Tung.
Apart from acceleration of economic growth, it was also a mass campaign for political and social
education. Looking deep into it, the Cultural Revolution aimed at creating a new man-a selfless, egalitarian
and moralist rather than a materialist human being. The Chinese believed that it was only by the
preservation of their revolutionary spirit that they could regenerate their nation and emerge as a great
power.
The Cultural Revolution met with great success. The opponents of the revolution’s ideology were defeated
everywhere. Revolutionary Councils were set up in each town, city and factory, etc. These councils were
directly controlled and guided by the central committee of the party of which Mao Tse-Tung was the
chairman. The establishment of these committees had broken the monopoly of party bureaucracy and had
provided representation to the common man and armed forces. The Cultural Revolution had the support of
the masses and once again generated revolutionary spirit amongst the people. It resulted in great increase in
the agricultural and industrial production. The revolution infused a feeling of confidence in the whole
nation.
In retrospect, the Cultural Revolution marked the process of synthesizing ideology with compulsions of a
stagnating dogmatic structure / of China. The process of acclimatization with the changing World proved
very useful was having far-reaching impacts on the experiment of Marxism in China. As the later
developments proved, the Cultural Revolution acted as a precursor to introduce reforms that enabled China
survive with its own brand of Socialism through the tides of upheavals in the late 1980s. It provided
sufficient background to the economic reforms in the mid-1980s, which helped sustain the Chinese
economy to a visible position of strength and stability in the 1990s.
ADMISSION INTO UNO
After the Communist take-over of the mainland, the US Government was not against the idea of
recognising the new Government of the People’s Republic of China. About Formosa, the official view of
the US Government was that it fell outside the American Defence Perimeter, but after sometime, such
changes and political developments took place that moved the American Government into a position of
non-recognition of the People’s Republic of China. It strove for isolation and military containment of the
Chinese Communism. Amongst these developments, some important events were Korean War, harsh
treatment by the Communists of American
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people and property and the mainland, conclusion of treaty between China and USSR, etc. As a result,
Taiwan (Formosa) became part of US Defence Perimeter and Seventh Fleet was interposed to prevent the
Chinese invasion of Taiwan. In 1954, Taiwan and US signed a defence treaty.
On the other hand, People’s Republic of China stated that China was a one country, Taiwan was an illegal
government and that US recognition of Communist China must also settle Taiwan issue i.e. its
incorporation into mainland.
Diplomatic ice between China and US began melting during the period 1969-70. During this period, Nixon
revised the American foreign policy and tried to arrive at an understanding with the Communist World.
Peace settlement was also being pursued in Vietnam. Accordingly, US withdrew Seventh Fleet, lifted
embargo on trade with China and removed restriction on USA citizens travelling to China. The Chinese
responded with an invitation to US table-tennis team that was accompanied by two journalists and was
received by Chou En-Lai. Dr. Henry Kissinger’s visit in July 1971, made public only when he had returned
home, played vital role in bringing the two Governments to a stage of understanding. Kissinger’s second
visit was in October 1971, to conclude a’rrangements for President Nixon’s visit that materialised in
February 1972.
President’s visit was followed by a series of contacts, scientific and cultural exchanges and meetings
between the Chinese and the American Ambassadors in Paris.
A major obstacle was removed in October. 1971 when UN accepted the Albanian resolution, seating
People’s Republic of China and ousting Taiwan from UN. China’s admission into UN was hailed as the
biggest diplomatic coup in the history of the UN. What were the factors, after all, behind this
overwhelming, but unexpected win?
Looking back, with a bit of hindsight one can categorically say that the answer lies in the spate of
recognitions of China that took place in the year preceding the UN admission. Canada quite
unquestionably, opened the floodgates of recognitions of China. The Canadian negotiations over this issue,
it will be recalled, lasted over a year. Both sides knew that the negotiations were critical, as they were to set
the pattern of future talks between China and other countries. A year of gruelling talks between China and
Canada resulted in the announcement of a compromise formula in which Canada recognized China’s
position vis-a-vis Taiwan without overtly and explicitly endorsing China’s sovereignty over the island.
Canada also agreed to cease to have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This formula latei
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on became the basis of recognition by Belgium, Italy, Kuwait and a host of other countries in rapid
succession.
On top of these landslide recognitions, the fact that US desired China’s admission played very vital role.
President Nixon had already set in motion the process of normalizing relations with China and he figured
out that China’s admission to UN would soften the attitude of unreconciled American public and thus
facilitate his task. Despite the expression of anger by US over her allies and friends who voted for China’s
admission, the fact remains that US did not actively lobby against China. She just remained quiet.
POST-MAO SET UP
Chou En-Lai, who died in the first week of January 1976, in Henry Kissinger’s words, was ”the greatest
statesman of our era”. From 1949 soon after the independence of China, he held the post of Premier and led
the country with remarkable dexterity and talent. Indeed few men in the 20th century did more than Chou
En-Lai to forge the Chinese Revolution and to change the shape of international politics. By his moderate
policies and flexible approach in the foreign affairs, China gained a new international status and prestige.
His moderation led towards the emergence of a group known as ’radicals’ in the party, who were critical of
Chou’s policies and his non-doctrinaire approach. In the wake of chaotic Cultural Revolution of
1966-69, Chou was the man, who restored the economy to order and tried to build a stable political
leadership based upon a shrewd balancing of China’s party factions. As the Chief architect of China’s
foreign policy, after acquiring the seat in UN Security Council, that had long been held by Chiang
Kaishek’s nationalist Taiwan, he gained his major diplomatic success by welcoming Richard Nixon to
Peking in the following year. It was an event that symbolized China’s emergence as a potential superpower,
indicating to the world clearly of a new order of the tripolar world.
After his death, Teng Hsiao-Ping was expected as the next Premier of China, as he had been handling the
affairs during the period when Chou had been ill. But the party differences came to the surface, which had
successfully been masterminded by Chou during his lifetime. The radicals came into action. Teng was
openly blamed for his moderate and pragmatic approach, demonstrations and the wallpapers erupted; a
thing that was unusual and extraordinary in China. Politbureau was divided and hesitant to appoint Teng,
who was once, a victim of the Cultural Revolution and had been rehabilitated again. Because of Mao’s
dominating influence, the differences were again hushed up by choosing a compromise between both
the factions and Hua Kuo-Feng was appointed as acting Premier. But this party struggle erupted again after
the death of Mao.
After the death of Chairman Mao in 1976, Hua Kuo-Feng was made the Chairman. In the meantime, the
domestic political situation became turbulent when gang of four (Mr. Wong Hung-Wen, Mr. Chang Chun
Chiao, Miss Chiang Ching and Mr. Yao Wen-Yuan) tried to snatch power. They were arrested in October
1976.
The new constitution was also presented to and adopted by the Congress in 1977 that contained 60 articles.
The constitution was completely re-written. After the death of Mao, though the Chinese new regime
continued with the same policies but a slow departure from his teachings became evident. The Cultural
Revolution became major topic of criticism. Gang of four was particularly associated with the miseries that
the people had to face during the Revolution. Soon the rehabilitation process of thousands of those persons
who had been disgraced during the Revolution started. Teng Hsiao-Ping emerged as the new strong man of
China.
Major changes were made in the economic policy of the country. Foreign companies were encouraged to
work on several projects in China in collaboration with the Chinese companies. Foreign loans and credits
were accepted. The Chinese were given more wages to ameliorate the economic conditions of the workers.
A 10-year ambitious programme to modernize the economy of the country was approved.
The government also embarked upon the policy of selfemployment. This policy was adopted to eradicate
increasing unemployment that according to reliable sources had risen to an unprecedented 20,000,000
number. Due to unemployment, people especially the educated class had started illegal emigration to Hong
Kong.
In 1980, the government cut down industrial growth programmes and more emphasis was laid on the
agricultural growth. The government made special endeavour to fight against inflation.
The Central Committee of the Communist Party in its session held in 1978 decided to increase the purchase
prices of the agricultural produce. The prices of the fertilizers and machinery were reduced. Thus double
benefit was provided to the farmers who proved to be a good impetus to raise agricultural production. The
grain production increased to 332,120,000 tons in 1979 as compared to 283,000,000 tons in 1977.
The trial of the ’Gang of Four’ opened in China on November 20,

1980. A special court comprising 35 judges was constituted to try the
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’Counter revolutionaries.’ Mr. Jiang Hua, President of the Supreme People’s Court, headed it. There were
48 charges against 10 accused including persecution of party members, suppression of cadres and masses,
plotting military coup and plotting rebellion in Shanghai. The court on January 25, 1981 found all accused
guilty and awarded sentences to all of them. Miss Jiang Quig and Mr. Zhang Chunquiao were awarded
death sentence with a two-year reprieve.
On the occasion of the 5th National People’s Congress, held from August to September 1980 important
political decisions were announced. Hua Kuo-Feng, who was working as the Chairman and Prime Minister
of the country resigned and accepted a junior position of Deputy Premier. The political pundits had
predicted Hua’s downfall much before the event actually took place. The reason advanced for the change
and re-designation of several other people was that an attempt was made to separate party and government
posts. Zhao Ziang was elected as the new Prime Minister. It was widely believed that this change had taken
place with the approval of Teng Hsiao-Ping who after the death of Chairman Mao had emerged as the new
strong man of China. Zhao was a close associate of Teng. In this session, the speakers were given increased
freedom to discuss the issues and criticize the controversial issues.
Other important developments were also taking place in China during those days. The Chinese press was
given freedom to criticize the policies of Chairman Mao. It was described that such freedom was given to
tarnish the personality cult surrounding him.
So many policies of Mao especially those adopted during the Cultural Revolution became focus of
criticism. The critics also denounced the selection of Hua because he was not elected by anyone. He was
accused of encouraging personality cult.
During 1980 and 1981 unrest was also noticed amongst workers, students as well as soldiers. The armed
forces felt that due to the trial of several important generals on the accusation of being associated with the
’Gang of Four’ their prestige was adversely affected. The government decided to cut down expenditure on
the army. This factor also contributed towards the discontentment.
Further important developments took place in China in June 1981 when Hua Kuo-Feng resigned from the
post of Chairman of the party, but he was retained as the Vice-Chairman. Hua’s demotion thus ended the
political crisis that had developed after the death of Chairman Mao. In a further re-shuffle, in May 1982,
Hua also resigned from the posts of Vice-
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Chairman and Vice-Premier. Teng Hsiaos-Ping and his colleagues alone became the new rulers of the
country without any legacy of the Chairman Mao’s regime.
RISE OF DENG AND HIS POLICIES
Several years before his death on September 9, 1976 Chairman Mao wrote, ”Seize the day, seize the hour”.
Deng Xiao Ping did just that. Deng now said that he had ushered in the country’s Second revolution-a
radically non-ideological gamble to replace Marxist dogma with material incentives as the real force behind
China’s hard march to prosperity. Deng opted for some old-fashioned trickle down economics-allowing a
few of China’s billion people to become richer faster than others in hope of raising the common
denominator for all. To Mao’s way of thinking, such changes a spotty outcropping of affluence, private
entrepreneur-ship and individual initiative - would stick of dangerous ”Contradictions” among the people.
Therefore, question of magnitude provoked controversy. Will Deng’s pragmatism succeed where Mao’s
uninterrupted revolution failed in restoring China’s greatness? Will Deng’s successors remain pitiful to his
goals, or will they, too, fall victim to the lust for power that had enveloped China’s revolutionary founders?
Can China itself break free of the centuries-old cycle of strong man rule and paralyzing political
convulsions? These were the main questions to be debated upon.
There was not much talk in the People’s Republic of China about ideology or class struggle. Wall posters in
the countryside had to do with road safety not Mao Tse-tung’s thought.
Was Maoist China dead? With some important qualifications, the answer would have to be on the operating
table. Yes, but with at least some vital signs still strong. Deng Xiao Ping had indeed performed some
astonishing surgery-burying Mao’s legacy of ideological ferment. Disbanding his cherished communes,
running roughshod over the People’s Liberation Army and reopening China’s long-closed doors to the
outside world.
Indeed, ”Deng-style pragmatism” was inherently double-edged; Seek truth from facts. ”A favourite slogan,
was first wielded by Chairman Mao himself, who nevertheless managed to justify horrifying atrocities and
persecutions. Deng was clearly looking to lighten the heavy hand of the 42million-member Chinese
Communist Party- but in the name of efficiency, not of ending communist rule. And he was not talking
now about disbanding the omnipresent Ministry of Public Security-not as long as
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Tibetan nationalists, unauthorized pamphleteers, church activists and any one who consorted too closely
with foreigners continued to be defined as unlawful elements.”
Happily for Deng, most Chinese seemed more bored than confused by official doublespeak. Indeed, politics
of all kinds seemed to have been supplanted for most Chinese by a determined pursuit of what were known
unofficially as the Eight New Things: color-television sets, Esselte-tape players, fancy watches, video
recorders, electric fans, motorbikes, cameras and washing machines, previously considered Western and
therefore decadent.
Still Deng managed to pull some fairly substantial bricks from the bureaucratic walls. Since he came to
power, more than a million pre-1949 cadres were retired. By some estimates, nearly half of all senior
functionaries at the provincial and prefectural levels had been replaced, in almost every case by younger,
better-educated technocrats. Closer to the top, the party’s 210-member Central Committee also saw a
significant turnover, with the average newcomer around 50 years old, a remarkable change in a group long
dominated by men in their 70s and 80s. The bloated people’s Liberation Army, once seen as the most
menacing bastion of conservative Maoism, was being similarly whittled down. As many as onefourth of its
4 million members were ultimately to be retired or de-activated, including hundreds of senior officers,
whose careers dated back to the Red Army’s Long March in the mid-1930s.
The hard question was whether Deng could afford not to make the effort without imperiling the push for
decentralized decision-making that was the centerpiece of his economic reforms. At the very least Deng
allowed a nearly unprecedented degree of political debate in parry and intellectual circles. Outright
challenges to communist rule or attacks on the Peking elite remained proscribed: anyone seriously
contemplating such a move needed only to remember 1983’s Anti-spiritual Pollution Campaign, in which
hundreds of liberal intellectuals were attacked. Still, China’s intellectuals, whom Mao scorned were a
resource that Deng, looking hard for new ideas, was disinclined to waste. And having talk of reform in the
Peking air could only help embolden working-level officials willing to push for change.
Even modestly rising expectations in so giant a nation as China can be a dangerous thing, particularly as the
country groped towards a so far hazy new synthetic of democracy and strong state control. That is one area
where idealists like Mao clearly had an edge: they knew precisely where they wanted to go, and could set a
people notching. China’s hope for the
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future was that pragmatists like Deng were more likely to enable them to complete the journey.
Under the guidance of Deng Xiao Ping the country embarked on a process of modernisation. This led to
relaxation of central controls and decision-making was allowed at the level of local production units in the
agrarian and industrial sectors. In addition, private enterprise was being encouraged. A burgeoning private
entrepreneurial sector is visible in the cities in the form of, for example, restaurants and shops. Special
economic zones, functioning on capitalist patterns, have been created to attract foreign investment. On
agricultural communes, members were allowed to individually market any surplus they produced after
having met state quotas and paid government tax and work brigade dues. Apart from economic reform,
greater social freedoms were allowed. Consequently, opening to the West has not only had an impact on the
economy but has influenced the Chinese culture also.
In fact, the Cultural Revolution launched by Mao in the twilight of his years was not intended to prove the
superiority of Communist dogma but to secure the future of the Chinese nation. Regardless of the
technological gap between China and the industrialised world Mao believed that the mobilisation of the
nation along the lines of Maoist orthodoxy was its best defence against internal instability. Party that did
not support his views down the line would open China up to influence and ideas that would be inimical to
the national interest as he saw it. The Cultural Revolution was calculated to smash that faction, and weed
out the individuals, including Deng Xiao Ping, who advocated bourgeois liberalism.
During Mao’s lifetime, the man and his doctrine were unassailable. But after his death, the group that he
disgraced was rehabilitated and gained control of the CCP under Deng Xiao Ping.
Although the Chinese had conceded officially, but Marxism Leninism-Maoism did not have the answer to
all problems. There was no indication that the Communist system is about to be dismantled. Whatever
liberalisation or reform Deng permitted, it is important to understand that the motive behind the move was
not to promote individual freedoms and rights in the first instance, but to promote economic and
technological development.
PRO-DEMOCRACY DEMONSTRATION AND AFTER
In early 1980 students demonstrations in Beijing redefined at least temporarily the scope of permissible
political dissent in China, establishing
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an organised student movement based on independent student union for the first time in China since 1949.
Using as a cloak of legitimacy the mourning for former party General Secretary, Hu Yau Bang, the students
won considerable support among establishment and intellectuals particularly liberal teachers and journalists
for their goals of press freedom, freedom of speech, and opposition to official corruption.
Branding the movement as an anti-party and anti-socialist conspiracy, the party issued a clear warning that
it was going to use authority of its dictatorial powers to suppress further disturbances. Participation in
demonstrations was treated as a counter-revolutionary crime
In early 1987 a smaller and less organised student movement quickly dissolved after People’s Daily
editorial (on Jan. 6) which blamed students demonstrations on the unchecked spread of bourgeois
liberalisation and the failure of some comrades to take a clear stand. Hu’s resignation as party Secretary
General came 10 days later.
The scale of the student movements and the fact that it had gained a degree of mass support means that it
had become - if only for the moment -- a political force in its own right which both conservative and
reformist leaders sought to use for their own purpose.
The model that had been most clearly present in the minds of both demonstrators and authorities was the
1976 Tiananmen Incident, when mourning for premier Chou En-Lai escalated into mass anti-leftist
demonstrations involving as many as one million people. The demonstrations revealed a broader base of
support for democratic political reforms among students and the general public than had ever been seen
before, reflecting the currently high level of dissatisfaction with the current regime.
On 20th May 1989 martial law was imposed in the capital and the authorities sent People’s Liberation army
on a murderous rampage on June
4 to end the student occupation of Tiananmen Square.
At that stage, the Prime Minister Li Peng, derived his powers from his elders especially 84-year-old Deng
and the 82-year-old Yang Shall Kun. They had clearly won the leadership struggle against the liberal
minded Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang.
During pro-democracy demonstrations the students occupied Tiananmen Square of Beijing. On 3-4 June
1989 People’s Liberation Army took action against them to crush the movement. The People’s Daily said
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that 36 students died in this action. US intelligence figures put the death toll at around 3,000 while earlier
Chinese reports said that some 300 people had died in military assault most of them were soldiers.
Despite these pro-democracy demonstrations, the Chinese government continued following Marxist lines in
an even more staunch manner. The process of re-stabilisation in the period following the Tiananmen
incidents in retrospect gives an impression of a paradoxical situation while the other communist regimes
could not survive in the wake of popular uprisings immediately after the year 1989, China which had been
the first to see the public outburst continued to keep up with the upheavals caused by these changes.
Several factors can be attributed to the success of the CCP (Communist Party of China) in avoiding the
unhappy fate shared by most other Leninist regimes. First, and the most important of all was the plight of
Chinese economy too strong to allow the Urban consumers to join dissident intellectuals and workers in a
wave of anti-communist protest. Secondly, the public interest declined sharply due to effectiveness of
government’s high-profile campaign to suppress the alleged hooligans and social irritants. A related factor
limiting the potential of renewed mass protest was the virtual lack of any viable Chinese infrastructure of a
civil society. The presence of a powerful central state apparatus, including a loyal respected army coupled
with a near-total absence of strong, independent social forces such as self-governing trade unions, churches,
newspapers, student organisations, writers’ unions or commercial associates contributed to the death of
popular resistance following the June 4 crackdown.
As the polity searched for stability in the aftermath of the Tiananmen episode, the leadership appeared to
have developed cleavages on the question of reforms, specially between Deng and President Yaung
Shankun who differed on issues relating to the scope and pace of structural reform, the extent of necessary
marketization and the degree of imminent danger posed by ideological contamination from abroad. Chen
Yun, a fiscal conservative with not known political leanings was highly critical of Deng’s unilateral
decision to use military force to curb the prodemocracy demonstrations. The growing trend towards local
economic assertiveness of the periphery indicated a trend towards declining political integration and social
cohesion of the polity. This was coupled with a deteriorating social order as China’s overall crime rate rose
dramatically by 12% in 1990 as compared with 1989. Communist Party’s reputation for integrity and
incorruptibility was severely tarnished with suspicions about Marxist ideology viewed as incapable of
inspiring young people. By the later half of
1990 and through the 1991 spring period, the moderates and reformist appeared to be in the ascendancy.
Zhu Rongji’s transfer from Shanghai to
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the center and appointment as the vice-premier the reactivation of reformists in the State Council and the
promulgation of an ambitious five-year plan and a series of reformist articles published, all indicated that
the postTiananmen chill was wearing off and China was returning to a reformist agenda. The formal party
meetings during the year were by far ritualistic and cautious affairs avoiding tough decisions and bold
initiatives. Premier Li Peng’s work report set out the goals of the long awaited and hotly debated Eighty
five-year plan at the fourth Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress of March 1991. Zhao
Ziyang in the meantime was being quietly removed from the scene as books and documents relating to
China’s policies in the 1980s had been re-issued without his name and photographs erased. During 1992,
China saw the leadership cleavages still sharpening in the midst of important socio-political changes taking
place, the most important being the spectre of the coming generational succession in the top leadership but
as the later developments revealed there was little transformation or the change of leaders precisely because
the mode of change in China is dependent on many factors interplaying with each other such as social
structure, ideology, economic stability etc. There was distinct popular disaffection among the public arising
in part out of the confusion about political reforms and mainly due to price hikes, 11-12 % in big cities and
about 15% elsewhere. In the 1993 elections, the Prime Minister Li Peng was given mandate to continue
sustained reforms, as promised by him at the Seventh National People’s Congress. Another major
development was the absence of Deng from January to August 1993, from the public scene thereby leading
to speculations about the struggle for succession to the 84 years old leader. In the later half however, the
debate largely subsided because of economic debate arising out of US imposed trade sanctions on China.
POST-DENG ERA
China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, whose historic reforms made him a seminal 20th century figure,
finally succumbed to death on February 19, 1997 at the age of 92. Thus ended an eventful era in
contemporary Chinese history, though Deng’s policies will continue to shape the fortunes of his country for
years to come.
With the passing away of Deng, all eyes were then fixed on his successor, President Jiang Zemin, who was
also the leader of the Communist Party and the Supreme Commander of the army. When Deng chose him
to lead the party and the country in 1989, China was passing through one of the most turbulent periods of
its recent history. Jiang Zemin was then the mayor of Shanghai, and although he was 70 according to some
observers, though he lacked the charisma of his predecessor and was still to
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prove himself worthy of his grand position, He was, known and respected for his shrewdness and for his
ability to keep various sections of his party together. In order to attain the sympathy and backing of the
powerful People’s Liberation Army and the conservative elements within his own party, Mr. Jiang always
adopted a tough line regarding Taiwan, but at the same time, of all the Chinese leaders he was the most
popular one in the West. Trained in the Soviet Union in the early 50s. He had also spent some time in the
West. He pledged to continue the economic reforms initiated by his predecessor. In his first public
statement after the death of Deng Xiaoping, he vowed to change grief into strength and to continue working
for the prosperity of the country. He established intimate links with the US. Nonetheless, he undertook an
extensive tour of South Asia and boosted China’s image in this region.
During the last few years of his life Deng tried hard to introduce and strengthen a system in which absolute
power, instead of resting with a single man, should be exercised by a collective leadership. Of course, Jiang
Zemin was the centre of this new leadership and seemed quite capable of leading the country successfully
into the next century. In the short run, he did not seem to be facing any serious challenges from various
groups within the Communist Party, but in the long run, he came under more and more pressure to loosen
the grip of the one-party system. The process had actually begun but Jiang Zemin was very careful
regarding the speed of the process. He started a campaign to popularise the Communist Party among the
masses. Moreover, he frequently spoke against corruption and was least in theory in favour of
accountability, which was never on the agenda of Deng. Keeping this most populous country of the world
united is quite an uphill task and the president had to be extremely cautious in his approach trying to work
together with all the segments of the society. Besides this, China is no longer an isolated country. Its
strategic and economic importance for the rest of the world would further increase with the passage of time.
Whatever regime emerges from the succession of Deng, it is likely to carry on with almost the same kind of
foreign policy. However, there is one danger that in case of domestic unrest, instability and uncertainty, the
government may be tempted to pursue nationalistic interests abroad to build reputation and credibility.
Chinese public and the leadership wanted Deng to live at least till the first of July when after one and half
century of British rule Hong Kong would return to China. In fact, it was one’ of the triumphs of Deng to
devise the arrangement of ”one country two systems” for Hong Kong. The future economic prosperity of
Hong Kong mainly depends upon political stability in China.
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PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON’S VISIT AND CHINA’S ECONOMIC INTERESTS
US President Bill Clinton visited the People’s Republic of China in June 1998, a visit termed by many in
Washington and elsewhere as a turning point in US-China relations and a step towards creation and
establishment of a strong strategic and economic bondage.
What are America’s national interests in its relationship with China? So far there is scant sign of coherent
and hardheaded policy.
On the one hand here is the usual pleading from special interest groups, be they aircraft salesmen, Taiwan
loyalists or human rights activists. At the broader level there is a vague idea that better relations with
Beijing is a good thing: this can mean trying to skirt issues where US interests are at odds with Beijing.
At the US State Department, much of the China policy establishment seems to believe that there is some
sort of ’special relationship’ with China. This group identifies avoidance of Chinese hostility and
expectation of being able to influence China as the dominant US interest, if necessary, over-riding
economic interests or relations with other countries. It favours the general maintenance of good relations as
an end in itself.
Even an excellent Rand analysis prepared for the Defence Department not long ago, China Domestic
Change and Foreign Policy concluded: ’Strong public US pressures on China in a variety of areas could
greatly increase the likelihood of strongly anti-Western conservative nationalists gaining control of the
Chinese political system.’ The analysis urged closer economic and military links to minimize this risk.
The Rand view probably overstates the influence that America has on China. But its real problem is that by
definition it tends to inhabit action on specifics.
In the manner of the master, Henry Kissinger, foreign policy is conceived in grand strategic terms that
demote economics to the footnotes. Yet if economic self-interests were firmly at the core of the US position
on China, the United States would not be, via its trade deficit approaching $40 billion annually, the
principal external contributor to Chinese growth.
No one should begrudge China its economic successes, not the attractions of an economy growing by 8 per
cent a year. But US official
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complaisance on trade is astonishing. The deficit is written off as an inevitable consequence of China’s
competitiveness in certain products, or as a result of the transfer of former Taiwan and Hong Kong
surpluses, or as simply part of a global US trade problem. At times it is even explained as the price the
United States must pay to convert China to the meats of the market.
The bottom line is that China so far enjoys almost all the advantages of a WTO member without the
obligations.
It is up to the businesses to decide whether they can ever make good returns out of the billion-people
market after considering the hidden costs, piracy of brand names, opportunities far gone elsewhere, the true
value of the technology transferred, and the prospects of eventually repatriating their profits. Private risk
should be just that.
Forcing the issue of the US trade relationship with China on a more equal footing would be painful in the
short-term but would help the whole relationship. The United States has a general interest in Chinese
economic growth and political stability, but so it does in Brazil, Russia, South Africa, etc. there should be
nothing special, for or against, in the China relationship.
A healthier relationship should have been the result of the (correct) decision to delink trade and human
rights. While human rights are a legitimate US concern in China as elsewhere, their absence does not
specifically threaten US interests as a $ 40 billion trade deficit does.
No doubt the United States has a moral commitment to help Taiwan defend itself, and to let Taiwanese visit
America in un-officiai capacities. But there is no reason to buy into cross-straits rows about the nature of
One China, any more than there is to court Chinese anger by backing Taiwan’s UN admission.
The US obligations to Taiwan have nothing to do with ’containing’ China. Such talk only provokes Beijing
to more nationalist positions.
That does not mean that the United States should avoid reasoned opposition to the more extreme parts of
China’s South China Sea claims which so concern America’s other (and closer) allies in the region and
threaten its own navigation rights. Nor does it mean going slow on the long delayed rapprochement with
Vietnam because of Beijing’s suspicions of American motives.
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It does mean, however, that the United States should moderate its global moral policeman role and
acknowledge that China has legitimate, non-expansionist interest in its relations with such countries as
Pakistan and Iran. Beijing may be using rocket and nuclear plant sales as bargaining chips in its dealings
with the United States. If so, Washington is being gullible, sacrificing self-interest to selective and doomed
crusades.
America should spell out more clearly its own interests and aims, and pursue them with the same diligence
as do the Chinese. Perhaps the best way to start would be as the British have found in Honk Kong, to take
policy out of the hands of the China experts with emotional and career commitments to one side or other of
China issues, and treat China as what it is a country like any other except for its size.
Many Americans believe that China’s policies across the board run counter to US interests and that efforts
to moderate Chinese behaviour by co-operation will be unproductive. Others reject this view, but recognize
that its existence complicates a smooth implementation of the policy of reconciliation and coordination.
To revitalize the US-China relationship, the US president must take the lead. The president and his cabinet
must articulate publicly as soon as possible a carefully reasoned, broad-ranging policy. That would not only
give Americans a clearer understanding of the objectives, benefits, and costs of the China relationship, but
would also strengthen the political support for a long-term policy and provide a basis for clearer and more
consistent communication and engagement with China. This will require the president to:
engage with Congress to build bipartisan support;
- maintain a schedule of regular meetings with the Chinese leadership that is not derailed by transitory
friction;
- direct a range of high-level exchanges, including the military;
- encourage direct Congressional engagement with the Chinese, including visits to China.
At the same time, it is imperative that a compelling case for a revitalized approach to China be articulated
to the media.
A healthy US-China relationship will not only depend on governmentto-government relationships, but also
on the contributions of a range of private organizations, both businesses and non-governmental
organizations. These are important because they can:
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support the development of needed instirutons in China, for example the law, the court system, legal aid,
alternative dispute resolution organizations, local elections, independent parliamentary bodies and
judiciary, Chinese NGOs, and a freer and livelier press: lend expertise where it can be helpful as China
seeks to improve its capacity to govern effectively:
- provide additional channels of informal dialogue on important issues; support experimental projects
that enable China to deal more effectively with specific problems, such as environment: and help
inform the US public and promote educational and cultural exchanges.
Mutual suspicions between the United States and China are too deep to be erased by a few visits or a series
of newly announced programmes. Domestic political considerations in the United States may make new
initiatives to improve relations difficult. On some issues, Chinese leaders’ reluctance to pay the costs of
participation in international organizations may prevail over their desire to participate. Yet with such high
stakes, the United States and China must take risks and exercise patience to set the relationship on a sound
basis for the next century. The risks of trying and failing are negligible compared to the risks of not trying
at all.
CHINA: SUPER-POWER OF THE 21ST CENTURY?
The term ”super-power” is often referred to a country in possession of and which enjoys an all-
encompassing superiority in both hard and soft power. To be a ”giant” in the major ”power-league”, it
should lead and be superior to most other states in economic well being, military capability and strength,
technological awareness and capacity, international influence and cultural attraction.
Many China scholars and critics in the US and elsewhere often discuss and debate the importance and the
’pivotal position’ which China can enjoy in the coming century. Financial analysts and political gurus in
the US see China as a potential super-power possessing all the ’virtues” and ”characteristics” of being
called as such. The immensity of China’s territorial and human resources, its strategically important
geographic location, rapidly increasing economic strength, and the remarkable military muscle, people in
Washington firmly believe, gives China the ”cutting edge”. Given the fact that China was a super-power in
ancient times and had dominated the Sino-centric world order for one millennium, the return of ”good old
days” may not be far away as China re-asserts itself and reemerges as a world power.
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l\TFR.\ATIO\Al. AFFAIRS
A careful scrutiny of the existing situation reveals, however, while China will certainly move up the ladder
of power balance, Washington’s prophesy of the ”Central Kingdom” turning into a super-power may be
misplaced as it is unlikely to overrun other major powers in every aspect of the comprehensive capability.
On the economic front the prospects certainly look promising. Since 1980, China’s economy has improved
by leaps and bounds and the country has enjoyed an annual growth rate of 9.9 per cent. Due to a constant,
rather the relentless ”onslaught” of external direct investment and the steady expansion of domestic and
international market, the high growth rate of around 7 per cent can most probably be sustained throughout
the next decade. World Bank and the International Monetary Fund figures indicate that if measured by the
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) China’s overall economic capacity will become the second largest, next
only to that of the US, even though China’s per capital GDP will remain relatively low as compared to
those of the G-7 states.
If China is to become an economic might in the coming years, then chances of it becoming a military
super-power are less likely. In the postCold War era, although military resources are not that relevant in
international relations, still this factor plays and important role in a major powers status and standing in the
global ”market”. Here it is necessary to have a balanced view of what China’s defense modernization
efforts can and cannot achieve.
The Gulf War opened the eyes of the Chinese and gave them a reason and an impetus to build a strong
defense. Beijing has sped up the upgrading, reconditioning and rejuvenation process of the People’s
Liberation Army’s (PLA) military doctrine, force structure and weapons system. Since 1989, the PLA’s
budget has grown immensely, partly due to the sky-high inflation rate brought about by the economic boom
in China, and partly to cater for the PLA’s modernization drive. To upgrade the PLAs outdated weapons
systems, Beijing has made efforts to mobilize its own military research and development R & D capability
on the one hand, and on the other it has also purchased from Russia a variety of advanced weapons,
including SU-27 fighters, S-300 surface-to-air missiles, kilo-class conventional submarines and missile
destroyers.
While Beijing’s military concerns and drive for modernization of resources may be justified given the
rather hostile environment that it finds itself in today, there are serious limitations to this concept.
Obviously, one of them is the budgetary constraint. Beijing has made it clear that defense modernization
should not sacrifice economic growth. China has learnt its
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lesson from the Cold War, in which the two super-powers of the time were locked in a deadly arms race,
devoting themselves in a big way to military building-up at the expense of economic growth and welfare.
The Chinese leadership is wise enough not to commit such a suicidal mistake and secondly things are not
as bad as they were during the Cold War years.
The other restricting factor is the technological gap. In many aspects, analysts argue that China’s military
technology is about 30 years behind that of the US and Russian armies, and perhaps also behind Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan. Such a wide gap is not expected to be narrowed in a decade or two. Whats more
important is that the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) will change the outlook of the army,
war and the balance of power in the next century. As the US and some of its Western allies are leading this
new game, it will be more difficult for China to catch up in the foreseeable future.
Thirdly and lastly as well, China finds little incentive to seek paramountacy with respect to becoming a
military power. China is cognizant of the fact that in a world of growing inter-dependence, it should be
sensitive to its neighbors’ concerns over its military build-up. Development of any excessive power
protection capability will naturally send wrong signals and leave a negative impression amongst the
neighbors, hence creating bad blood which will, in the long run, undermine rather than enhance its security
environment. In the post-Cold War era, security through co-operation or in other words the concept of
common or collective security is gaining ground. Arms control, disarmament, confidence-building and
peaceful solution of disputes are being hailed as the more rational and realistic approaches to resolve
national as well as international disputes. China is and will continue to be confronted with various
challenges and therefore has the legitimate need to mobilize its national arsenal. However, as already
mentioned, Beijing is unlikely ”go berserk” and pursue an unlimited military build-up, as did Washington
and Moscow in the Cold War years. Instead, it seems more likely that it will prefer to develop, maintain
and mobilize a somewhat moderate defense force which is advanced, effective and commensurate to its
security needs.
With respect to international influence and power wielding, many see China as mainly a regional player
rather than a global one, even though it holds a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. As China builds
up its material strength its clout is bound to expand. Nonetheless, as compared to the United States and the
erstwhile Soviet Union of the Cold War years, China, primarily due to a changed scenario, cannot enjoy the
status of a super-power. The former Soviet Union, by virtue of being the leader of the Communist world
had set itself up well in the Cold War, and had
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established its influence in world politics especially in Eastern Europe. Hence the existing scenario of those
years facilitated and helped Moscow to play a role of a global actor. Similarly, during the Cold War,
Washington not only headed the Western camp, but also weaved a global alliance system, covering
important geo-strategic theater. In the post-Cold War scenario, America endeavoring to reach beyond the
Cold War boundary and to enlarge the web of its worldwide influence; expansion of NATO is one prime
example.
China lacks the clout, ”the stuff dreams are made of and the charisma, which made USSR and US super-
powers. It is unlikely to be the leader in the fast changing Third World, nor can it set up a sphere of
influence on its periphery even if it wishes to do so. The lack of allies and followers will therefore make
China act as an ordinary major power, not as super-power.
China’s actual and real problem in acquiring a super-power position may not be so much with its hard
power, but more likely with its soft power i.e. the attraction of its value system, way of life, mass media,
and cultural products. Hard power is more visible but less enduring, while soft power less visible but more
enduring. Since the 80s, China has gradually discarded Marxist-Leninist ideology as the rationale for its
political and social life. Ideology is no longer a workable instrument for domestic political mobilization -
there is a lesson in it for Pakistan as well -
- to say the least of attracting audience abroad. Some have suggested Confucianism as a new value system.
While Confucianism still wields influence and holds sway in certain regions of East Asia, its problem lies
in the lack of modernity, incapable to adjust and accommodate to the realities of the industrialized society
and the changing needs of time. However, as a consequence of war, revolution and ”great transformation”
in China’s modern history, the legacy of the Confucianism is rarely seen in today’s China. Some thinkers
advocate for the creation of Neo-Confucianism, but the question is how much ”profit” can you derive from
a doctrine, which is not capable of delivering the goods anymore. The Chinese are clever people, money is
now their messiah, and they won’t succumb to ’doctrinal pressure’. As a matter of fact, with China getting
more industrialized, it is more inclined towards the Western values and way of life. With regard to mass
media and entertainment (music, TV programmes and movies, etc.) obviously the US has already set up its
hegemonic role and China or for that matter any other country has little scope in this regard and cannot
expect to catch up. Overall, China’s soft capability will confine it to a regional power, certainly not a global
one.
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In fine, it can safely be said that China will greatly build up its military, strategic and economic strength but
is not a candidate for the super-power slot, at least in the context of this discussion. Beijing may acquire
some sort of super-power capability in certain respects, but at best it can be one of the several major powers
and not ”the” power. As in the new millennium, the ”super-power syndrome”, call it as you may, is slowly
and gradually becoming an obsolete phenomenon, with a wide range of international institutions -
subregional, regional and global ~ making appearance and increasingly playing a prominent role in world
politics and all sorts of integration and amalgamation taking place both at the regional and global levels,
this process of mixing and blending may well send the existing super-powers or the majors into oblivion
and hence putting an end to the monstrous clout they possess today.
CHINA AS AN EMERGING ECONOMIC GIANT
The past two decades have been the longest period of sustained, rapid modernization in China since the
Opium Wars began in the mid-19th century. But while the reforms are fundamental, they are incremental in
design and implementation.
For China’s leadership, reform is essentially a process of learning by doing and continuous national
consensus-building to ensure a balanced approach and popular understanding. A collective leadership style,
as envisaged in China’s 1982 constitution has emerged in the last five years.
While they have increasing confidence in their ability to manage the reforms, Chinese leaders continue to
seek advice from many sources, including World Bank, and study the experience of other countries. They
try to make sure that reforms do not outrun institutional capability, as has often happened in other transition
economies.
Few elements of the old centrally planned and closed economy are left untouched. For large state
enterprises, corporationalization and ownership diversification have become real options or even market
requirements. For thousands of medium and small state enterprises, owned by lower-governments,
privatization is becoming increasingly common.
To promote efficiency in the state sector, China, unlike most other transition economies, has relied
primarily on competition policy and management improvement.
In 1996, well over 6,000 mostly small state enterprises with no economic future and no buyers were closed.
Most domestic prices are now
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market-determined Budget subsidies to loss-making state enterprises have been sharply reduced State
commercial banks have been told to begin cleaning up their balance-sheets by writing off bad debts
Insufficient progress in this area could jeopardize the entire reform and modernization effort and the
Chinese know it
China s fiscal situation remains weak It is the Achilles heel of the reform effort Total budget revenues at all
levels of government account for just slightly more than 10 per cent of gross domestic product, one of the
lowest such rations anywhere The building of Modern national and local tax collection programmes is a
colossal challenge
China aims to establish a le\ el playing field for state and non-state enterprises, which are often, more
dynamics Compaied to non-state enterprises, the state sector is overtaxed This imbalance tends to slow
down state enterprise and hence financial sector reform It also underlines the critical importance for China
of learning to tax the non-state sector more effectively and to eliminate unnecessary tax incentives
Serious inflation, which threatened to derail reforms in 1995, was brought under control in 1996 without
killing growth Enormous political effort, supported by increasingly skillful macro-economic management
was responsible for this important success It was a wrenching experience from that emerged a central bank
with real power and growing professional competence Correcting the remaining, deep-seated structural
problems in the economy, however will be a long, difficult and painful process
The rapid growth of foreign direct investment and external trade and their importance for the development
of coastal provinces is wellknown The development of internal trade and markets, including labor and
financial markets, is not as well documented but will be equally or more significant in the long-term
China’s internal economy was never well integrated The virtual absence of a Modern communications and
transportation infrastructure until
20 years ago kept internal trade at a very low level All that is changing thanks to rapid technological
development and extremely ambitious investment programme financed largely from domestic savings
An inter-provincial highway system is under construction The railroads are modernizing Air transportation
by some 40 domestic airlines is growing at 13 per cent a year and the quality of service is improving The
fax machine was made for China It has allowed people to speak different dialects but use the same
characters for words to communicate over distance
with ease for the first time More than 15 million new telephone connections with state of the art technology
are being installed each year Cellular phones have become ubiquitous
In 1949 there was no bridge across the Yangtze River, dividing North and South The first bndge was
constructed with Russian assistance and completed in 1959 The second was built by the Chinese and
finished in
1969 Since the beginning of the reforms in 1978, 11 major new Yangtze bridges have been built Thirteen
more are under construction or planned
The effects of all this on domestic trade labour mobility and above all on the attitude and thinking of the
Chinese people is nothing less than revolutionary The major parts of China are being knitted together as
one country like never before
As internal economic integration progresses, domestic barriers to competition are coming down One of the
results of this is that better intellectual property rights protection has now become as much as domestics as
an international trade issue Domestic pressures to replace remaining administrative discretion with sound
competition policy and rule of law is building
China is on the move both figuratively and literally Masses of ”redundant” farm labourers are seeking a
better life elsewhere and have money and much greater freedom than before to do so Unneeded workers in
the state sector are slowly being released After retraining, most find alternative employment rfl the more
efficient state enterprises and in the rapidly expanding non-state sector Many open private businesses, often
with initial state support A large proportion of more than 60,000 taxis in Beijing started this way
Transitional unemployment is nonetheless high in some cities, perhaps 20 per cent or more Some Chinese
workers and retirees are losing out in the transition Social safety nets are being built, but they are as yet
inadequate Tensions and social inequality are rising, presenting major challenges to the leadership, as do
worsening environmental pollution and urban congestion The challenges are indeed enormous and success
is not guaranteed
So far a large majority of China’s population, both urban and rural has gamed from the reforms, many
significantly Consumer choice has become impressive evert in small towns Food supply is abundant
everywhere China has become a significant net exporter of food, meat, fish, poultry, fruits and vegetables
in recent years While incomes are rising,
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interest in sports, arts, music, fashion and religion is expanding. High growth is no longer limited to coastal
provinces. Two populous interior agricultural provinces - Anhui and Jianxi - were the growth leaders in
recent years. Though poverty is still severe in many parts of rural China, the incidence has declined
significantly.
It is important to remember that average income is still below $

1200 per year. Yet because of China’s large population, its economy, however measured, is already
considerably larger than those of Russia are and India combined. China is likely to become one of the
worlds leading economies in the current century.
For Pakistan, given its abiding intimacy with China, three aspects of this resurgence of China are
significant. First, China is a stickler for principles, remaining committed to a perspective even if it takes
decades for its position to be accepted. For instance, it took China over two decades before it was given its
rightful place in the United Nations Security Council as a representative of China in place of Taiwan which
had occupied that position since the end of World War II.
The second aspect that is of interest is the role of India in this emerging equation of China’s rise. There are
those who feel that China and India are restoring their old relationship which pre-dated the period of
Pakistan-China friendship and there are others who feel that India is being promoted as a ”card” and
counter-weight by the United States to pressurise China as and when required. At least on one count the
myth of India emerging, as a possible competitor to China needs to be set at rest. Certain stark economic
facts are evident. Today, only 65 million Chinese live in absolute poverty, i.e. only 5 per cent of the
population. In India, almost 25 per cent people, i.e. over 300 million live below the poverty line. By the
middle of the next century, China, expects to become a middle income country with a population of less
that 1.6 billion. India, by then, will be the world’s most populous country with a per capita income of less
than half of China.
China’s reforms have a long way to go, but they are on the right track. What China needs more than
anything is time. It is not easy to turn around an ancient society with a population larger than all of North
and South America, the European Union countries, plus Australia, New Zealand and Israel put together.
CHINA’S MEMBERSHIP OF WTO
China’s entry to the World Trade Organization late 2001 will eventually change the face of China. It will
transform the country’s markets
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and systems and speed up its receptiveness towards international norms and practices. After thousands of
years of seeing itself as the center of the world, China, the Middle Kingdom has been taking one painful
step after another into an increasingly globalized and fast-changing world. Accession to the World Trade
Organization will bring about total change in China in virtually all spheres. It will be a revolution - not just
of systems and markets - but of the Chinese Soul.
The feeling of innate Chinese superiority that had defined the Chinese psyche for centuries is being
replaced by a pragmatic acceptance of
21st century realities And by a realization that equality and partnership is the only way forward in a planet
that grows smaller by the day as communications technology become ever more advanced.
The tradition of rule of man, handed down from dynasty to dynasty since the days of Emperor Qin more
than 2,000 years ago, is gradually being replaced by the concept of the rule of law. The first tentative
moves towards a regulation-based system - taken after the ping-pong diplomacy which had brought the
socialist giant out of its isolation - are being cautiously woven into the fabric of government.
The wish to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) is the clearest signal yet of China’s intent to
continue ks move towards allowing market forces to shape its economy. And, more importantly for
American businessmen, move towards accepting international norms and abiding by international rules in
its commercial dealings. Pride and prejudice, however, still exist in a curious mix of conflicting emotions in
China. The urban young Chinese, who proclaims proudly that his ancestors invented gunpowder, printing
and paper currency and recorded the sighting of the first supernova in space, now talks with admiration of
western technology and, in particular, of American savvy in finance and business management. At the same
time, he bristles with indignation at the very thought that maybe Westerners are riding roughshod over
Chinese sensitivities and closely-held values. But this thin-skinned sensitivity and tendency to see insults,
which frequently draws western criticism of xenophobia, is still a far cry from the Cultural Revolution days
of the 1960s. Then, few people admired the West - and fewer still speak publicly of it even if they did.
It was all change after the fall of the notorious Gang of Four. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping regained
power and relegated Marxist ideology to the back burner. He made all sorts of ”isms”, even capitalism,
acceptable and even respectable in his famous ”cat” speech that it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or
white, it’s a good cat as long as it catches mice.
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Chinese premier Zhu Rongji has continued the legacy of Deng. In leading China along the WTO path, he
took the politically-bold move of opening up the country’s highly-protected markets to the rest of the
world. Old China hands, who remember the early Far-Left days of vitriolic broadbrush condemnations of
western ”imperialism”, speculate on the political difficulties which Zhu and his forward-thinking
supporters must have been facing at home in their push to enter the world club. In small ways too, the
current Chinese leadership has shown its increasing willingness to relax its iron grip on the expression of
personal opinion.
In a little-publicized English-language book about China published earlier this year, Zhu penned a two-
page introduction. Nothing very surprising about this except that the book, which is a collection of essays
by businessmen and academics, contains some rather open criticism of government policies. It was couched
in very polite phraseology but it was criticism nonetheless. In western societies with a much longer and
stronger tradition of unfettered expression of opinions, this may not seem such a big deal. But to the man
on the tram car on Nanjing Road, who has been used to decades of unyielding dogma, the shift towards
greater liberalization is clear. Zhu wrote: ”We warmly welcome and anticipate entrepreneurs from all
countries in the world and international investment institutions to come to China and establish businesses.
Hand in hand, we shall march together toward a brighter future.”
In May 2001, when Sino-US relations were going through its periodic roller-coaster dips, Chinese central
banker Li Ruogu frankly and freely expressed his admiration for the institution of the US Federal Reserve.
In an hour-long meeting in Beijing with the Washington Times China Report to explain Chinese monetary
policy, he said as an aside: ”We have learnt a lot from central bank practices in the United States. And the
Fed has given us a lot of help. Of course, we do not copy wholesale from the United States. We only take in
what is good for China.” Li, assistant governor of the People’s Bank of China, is among the younger
generation of government officials who fully understands the need for China to integrate into the modern
world. The need to integrate not just in finance but also in trade, in technology, in industry, in agriculture -
in fact, in the whole spectrum of interdependence and mutual cooperation that is embodied by entry into the
WTO. For a culture that records its written history in millennia terms, accepting the future where its role
will be so dramatically changed cannot be easy. As one ranking Chinese government official puts it:
”Americans have a history of less than 230 years. We look back four or five thousand years. Americans are
the first to advocate diversification and pluralism. They should practice what they preach.”
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CHINA’S WTO ENTRY AND THE WEST
But bringing China into international Systems such as WTO will help temper its worst behavior, both as a
possible threat to its neighbors and in its treatment of dissidents. Joining the WTO, like its hosting of the
2008 Summer Olympics, is part of China’s strategy to become a global power. That creates unease in the
Western capitals, which both welcomes China’s economic growth and worries about how China might use
its exports and imports as a diplomatic weapon. China has a track record of using its huge market to force
nations into making decisions they otherwise wouldn’t make. Such actions will be more difficult under
WTO rules, but old habits may die hard. That is the reason why economic experts in the US are prompting
the Bush administration to carefully watch China and Southeast Asian nations plan to form a free-trade area
within 10 years.
In theory, this free-trade zone would have a total market of 1.7 billion consumers - albeit mainly poor ones.
That could make it the largest in the world. If it succeeds, it will help China overtake Germany and Japan to
become the world’s second-largest trading nation after the US.
In fact, China is pushing Japan aside as Asia’s economic giant, forcing Southeast Asian nations to court
China through a free-trade zone. Many of those nations have yet to recover from the region’s 1997
financial collapse, and they need access to China’s market. Japan’s efforts to form trade pacts in Asia have
faltered on its unwillingness to open its agricultural markets.
CHINA’S NUCLEAR AGENDA AND US WORRIES
What had been an internal debate in the Bush administration about the strategic nuclear relationship
between the United States and China went public late 2001, when troubling statements attributed to ”senior
administration officials” suggested that they were not opposed to China’s increasing its nuclear stockpile.
Then came White House backpedaling. At the heart of these mixed signals is the question of how the
United States should counter China’s small nuclear force, in the context of China’s abilities to develop new
weapons and its opposition to missile defense. As the Bush administration prepares for a more serious
strategic dialogue with China, this process must be informed by certain uncomfortable truths.
First, for the past 20 years or more China has had the ability to incinerate at least a handful of American
cities. Unpleasant, but true. Its nuclear force, however, has remained comparatively small since its
inception. In its early years, China couldn’t detect incoming missiles, had
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only a fledgling nuclear command and control system, and had very slow preparation and launch times for
its missiles, making it highly vulnerable to a first strike by either the Soviet Union or the United States.
China now has about 20 long-range nuclear missiles with sufficient range to reach the continental United
States, and while it apparently has the ability to place multiple warheads on its missiles, it has so far chosen
not to do so. The Chinese continue to rely on a ”minimal deterrent” and the barest of abilities to retaliate
with nuclear force should they come under nuclear attack. So while China has basic deterrent capability
against the United States, that capability is fragile compared with the nuclear forces of the United States
and Russia.
Second, while the US may not like Chinese missiles pointing at its cities, the current nuclear balance
between the United States and China is nevertheless strategically stable. Neither side would dare initiate a
nuclear attack against the other for fear of the damage the other would inflict in response. The
overwhelming nuclear superiority of the United States a single American nuclear armed submarine carries
more warheads than the entire inventory of Chinese warheads capable of reaching the United States means
that even if China were to triple its current number of nuclear missiles, the strategic balance would not be
fundamentally altered.
Third, like it or not, the US should expect China’s ongoing nuclear weapons modernization to continue.
China’s second-generation nuclear force, to be deployed over the next 10 to 15 years, will be far more
mobile, accurate and reliable than its current force Yet this force will almost certainly remain small in
comparison to the American nuclear arsenal, even if the Bush administration unilaterally reduces United
States nuclear forces.
But numbers of missiles alone don’t fully determine the nuclear threat. There are plenty of steps China
could take that would be very damaging to American interests. It could decide to accelerate its
modernization program, in response to the Bush administration’s missile defense plans, by adding several
hundred nuclear-tipped missiles aimed at the United States, developing and deploying sophisticated decoys
to foil missile defenses or mounting multiple warheads on its missiles. An aggressive modernization effort
would spread alarm among China’s neighbors, spurring a nuclear build-up in South Asia.
China’s warheads and US worries
President Bush made it clear from the outset of his administration that he was not much interested in
negotiations on arms control matters, preferring instead unilateral measures designed to induce cooperation
in
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U.S. partners. In this way, the administration would make fast progress on arms control while avoiding, as
Under-Secretary of State John Bolton put it in a December 2001 Senate testimony, ”small armies of
negotiators inhabiting the best hotels in Geneva for months and years at a time.”
The problem with this approach, of course, is that without the probes and feints of the negotiating process,
one is in danger of giving too much to induce cooperation in the other parties. There could be no clearer
example of this than the Bush team’s signal to China over Labor Day (September 01, 2001) that it might be
willing to see a return to nuclear testing so that China could field new warheads-- and specifically multiple,
independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).
On the one hand, MIRVs would enable China to be confident that the limited missile defense system of the
United States would not negate its strategic offensive deterrent. On the other, MIRVs are universally
regarded as a stepping-stone for aspirants to strategic superiority. Encouraging a boost in Chinese warheads
in this way is highly destabilizing and will do nothing for U.S. national security. And although the Bush
administration seems to think it so, the Chinese were not inevitably headed in the MIRV direction.
Since that time, however, China has entered into a full moratorium on nuclear testing that would sharply
constrain the development of the new warheads needed to deploy MIRVs. This step was taken at some
political cost, since many Chinese military and nuclear experts were unready to halt testing. Now, at a
single stroke, the Bush administration’s signal will give courage to this lobby and undermine those figures
in the leadership who have been holding the line against testing.
Moreover, the Chinese are considering quite a different response to the U.S. missile defense program.
Chinese diplomats and military specialists emphasize on what they call the ”Andropov solution” to their
missile defense response problem.
Back in the 1980s, faced with the necessity of responding to the Reagan administration’s ”Star Wars”
initiative with an economy that was already in crisis, the Communist Party general secretary, Yuri
Andropov, decreed an approach that was an innovation in Soviet policy at the time: Instead of trying to
match U.S. strategic defenses or engage in a strategic offensive buildup, as had been past practice, the
Soviet Union would concentrate on developing countermeasures to the system - chaff, balloons and other
technologies that would defeat the system without destroying it. In that way, Andropov argued, he could
maintain Soviet security on the
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cheap, without having to match or mirror U S programs.
CHINA AND SOUTH ASIA
As far as China’s policy in South Asia is concerned, since the beginning of the 1990’s it has emphasized
’good neighbourliness cooperation based on equality and mutual benefit”. It has based its policy on the
’Five Principles of mutual existence’ and has reiterated in many world forums that its friendship with one
country is not at the cost of another. Besides, it believes that disputes left over from history need to be
settled by ’peaceful negotiations’ and ’mutual consultation’ by parties to the dispute. Moreover, China’s
experience is that ultimate security springs from a country’s intrinsic economic strength.
Presently, China is reluctant to take sides openly either in peace times or in an actual armed conflict, as this
might pose an embarrassing dilemma for it. Moreover, China, in the throes of modernizing its economy, is
itself keen on getting foreign funds, investment and technology and is unable to render major financial
assistance or undertake mega-projects abroad. However, it will continue to increase trade and commerce,
extend project and joint venture aid, rather than extend subsidies and grants. If the present trend towards
normalization continues, both China and South Asia comprising nearly two-fifth of mankind could play a
decisive role in Asia’s regeneration in the 21st century.
Some observers expect that the Chinese will play some meaningful role in conflict-resolution in South Asia
since their policy hinges on maintaining good relations with all neighbours. In that case, its traditional
friend, Pakistan expects that China will be able to use its good offices and friendly contacts with India to
dissuade it from any future military adventure against it. However, China has been emphasizing that the
Kashmir dispute should be settled through ’dialogue and discussion’. It has also given friendly advice to
India and Pakistan not to raise this issue in international forums. Of course, China understands that its role
is limited and it has no intention to mediate in the dispute, immersed as it is in its ’four modernizations
programme’. Hence it feels that it does not have the required leverage of a mediator.
China has traditional friendship with Pakistan but will not take sides with Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute
and that it does not believe in strategic alliances, pacts or blocs but only ’strategic partnerships’. On the
Kashmir issue, China was ’only generally involved’ and during the meetings of Pakistani Foreign Minister
with former Chinese Prime Minister and Chairman of China’s National People’s Congress, Li Peng on June
11,
1999 in Beijing, Pakistan was advised that it ”.... Should remain coolheaded and exercise self-control and
solve conflicts through peaceful means and avoid worsening the situation.” The Indian Foreign Minister
Jaswant Singh was told during his Beijing visit (June 14-16, 1999) that the Kargil issue needed to be settled
through ’dialogue and consultations and through peaceful means.’ Beijing desire to see peaceful resolution
of the Kargil dispute underscored the need for ’peaceful and tranquil borders’ which are necessary for
economic development but also a feared danger to its western Muslim region of Xinjiang autonomous
province.
China and Indo-Pakistan sub-continent share rich common bonds of history as well as common borders.
Moreover, the precedent of nearly half a century of ’all weather’ Sino-Pakistan friendship has developed a
momentum of its own, which has become a model of friendship.
However, unlike big powers, China has a direct territorial dispute and strategic stake in the peaceful
resolution of the Kashmir dispute. Following the 1963 border settlement between Pakistan and China
(which meant demarcation of the frontiers between Azad Kashmir and Xinjiang) India has been blaming
Pakistan of ’unjustly trading 13,000 square miles of Indian territory’ between them.
If there is a plebiscite in Kashmir, China will have to vacate Aksai Chin and other areas ’gifted to it by
Pakistan’. On Aksai Chin, the Chinese official standpoint is: ”There exists no issue of China’s evacuation
from Aksai Chin because Aksai Chin has been Chinese territory since ancient times and always under the
effective jurisdiction of China.”
The Indian intransigence over Aksai Chin goes not only against China’s declared policy of settling
territorial dispute through peaceful means, but also bodes ill for settlement of its border disputes with China
which have been shelved for the time being.
Today, China has the best of relations with one country in SouthAsia and that is Pakistan. Many Pakistan-
China watchers believe that in order to further boost their relations, China and Pakistan need to go beyond
mere state-to-state level to building ties at the social level. Caution and circumspection is the hallmark of
Chinese policy and expectations from very friendly neighbours, such as Pakistan, sometimes tend to be
quite inflated.
There is, for example, a dire need to inject greater economic content in their relations, Many observers
believe that China albeit neighbouring South Asia, is strictly speaking in East Asian power and still
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considers itself as a developing nation of the Third World. Its current attention is engaged towards the
maritime region of East Asia. It is building relations will India and has no desire to extend its hegemonic
influence as the Soviets did in East Europe, and Western Europe. No wonder, South Asia as a region fall
below in the hierarchy of China’s overall global interests (after Russia, East Asia, Central Asia and
Southeast Asia).
Friendships between nations are not built on abstract principles ; they invariably follow the calculus of
economic and mutual benefit. To take a rather simplistic analogy, just as poor and rich blood relatives in a
family find it very difficult to enter into any meaningful, harmonious and abiding friendship, so do poor
and rich nations. And China is in the big league of nations outstripping those who won independence at the
same time.
As the next millenium has unfolded, prospects of China-Pakistan relations generally seem auspicious.
Many factors coalesce to validate this futuristic thinking. First, their mutual friendship in the last five
decades or so has survived many vicissitudes ; secondly, it is friction-free, based on respect for each other’s
sovereignty and not dependent on the type of regime in either country ; thirdly, China has still unresolved
problems with India (border and Tibet issue); fourthly, India’s inordinate urge for a global role through its
unilateral nuclear and missile tests since May 1998 have abetted Chinese apprehensions ; and fifthly,
China’s need for support from Pakistan and in its problems with bordering Muslim Xinjiang autonomous
region together with its desire to have South Asia free from Great Powers influences argue for a
harmonious relationship.
If the current century is going to be an ’Asia Pacific Century’, it is necessary that South Asia, comprising
one fifth of the world population should be a part of it too. For this, the South Asians have to resolve their
debilitating intra and inter-nation feuds and embrace the lofty paradigm being followed by the PRC ; in a
nutshell, this paradigm is to attain economic vitality and robustness that will translates into real and security
for a nation.
CHINA ANTI SECESSION LAW
China’s parliament on March 14, 2005 passed a law giving itself the right to attack Taiwan if it moves
towards formal independence. Beijing has always declared itself willing to use force to reunite the island of
23 million people with the mainland, but this time has enshrined that stance in law.
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The parliament passed the anti secession law by a vote of 2896 to none, with only two abstentions. To
soother the emotional pain of Taiwanese people Chinese premier Wen Jaibo considered this law as a source
to strengthen and promote cross straight relation, for peaceful reunification, not a law of war. Taiwan
considered the law as unfortunate and provocative.
This law is a powerful blow to the interest of US in the straight of Taiwan on one side and a strong implicit
message of china to Japan to not support the Taiwanese independent stance.
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CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSl ES
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CHAPTER 13
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

THE KASHMIR DISPUTE
According to the plan of June 3, 1947 it was decided that on the withdrawal of British Power, the
sovereignty of the Crown over the Indian States would lapse and they would be free to join India or
Pakistan, or remain independent.
However, Lord Mountbatten advised the Princes on July 25, 1947, to accede to India or to Pakistan, bearing
in mind the geographical situation of their respective states, the composition of thejr population and the
wishes of their people. But the question of these States became a subject of dispute, namely (1) Junagadh
(2) Hyderabad and (3) Kashmir. But here we will only deal with the dispute over the State of Jammu and
Kashmir. This State has an area of 84,471 square miles. It is bounded on the north by Sinkian and the
narrow Wakhan strip of Afghanistan, beyond which lies Tajakistan. To its west and southwest is Pakistan,
to the southeast is India, and to the east is Tibet. Kashmir has a 902 miles long border with Pakistan and
with India
317 miles only. The three main rivers of West Pakistan, namely, the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab have
their sources in Kashmir. Kashmir is linked with world by two roads, both of which lie through Pakistan.
The rivers are very important for trade and commerce owing to the ruggedness of the terrain in Kashmir,
where other means of communications are few. All means of communication lead Kashmir into Pakistan.
The history of cultural ties between Pakistan and Kashmir is as old as the history of India itself. According
to the census of 1941, the total population of the state was 4,000,000 of which 77 per cent were Muslims.
In Kashmir valley the Muslims were 93 per cent, in the Jammu area 61 per cent, and in Gilgit 100 per cent.
There have been intermarriages between Pakistanis and Kashmiris. Thus geographically, culturally,
economically and religiously Kashmir is a part of Pakistan.
HISTORY OF KASHMIR
The State of Jammu and Kashmir came into existence in 1846 as a result of the Treaty of Amritsar, when it
was handed over to Gulab Singh, a chief of a Hindu Dogra tribe, for the petty amount of Rs. 7,500,000.
Lord Lawrence who sold this State to Gulab Singh commented, ”The iniquitous arrangements by which
Kashmir and its ill-fated inhabitants were to be transferred without their consent as though they were so
many logs of wood, to Gulab Singh, a Dogra Rajput, who had nothing in common with them.” Due to this
treaty Gulab Singh was considered an independent sovereign of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Maharaja
Partab Singh was the successor of Gulab Singh, and later on Sir Hari Singh was Head of the State at the
time of partition of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.
The people of the State were living in miserable conditions under the rule of these Maharajas. Public
officers were appointed only from among the Dogras or the Hindus. The Muslims were suppressed and
were not given any status in society. They were always at the mercy of the Dogras and Hindus of the State.
There was lawlessness in the state during the reign of the Dogra Maharajas.
It was quite clear that the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would rise against the rulers.
Agitation started against the Maharaja’s rule early in 1930 when the All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim
Conference was founded and a demand for basic political rights were put forward. On this occasion, the
Maharaja tried to suppress this movement and he used the armed forces to crush the Muslims. They were
fired upon and sent to Jails. Muslims from the Punjab and the Frontier Province went to Kashmir to help
their Muslim brothers. Many of them were killed or arrested. Thus ”the first demonstrations by the
Muslims were launched against the Maharaja. As a result of these demonstrations, some rights were
restored to the people of Kashmir. A Legislative Assembly was created whose members were partly
elected. In the first elections to the Legislative Assembly, which were held in 1933-34, the Muslim
Conference captured
16 out of 20 seats. In the election of 1938, again the Muslim Conference got
20 out of 21 seats. The Hindus and Dogra Maharajas realized the political strength of the Muslims in the
State of Kashmir. Now the leaders of the Muslim Conference changed their policy and decided to open the
doors of their party to the non-Muslims. The decision was finalized in 1939 and a new name was given to
this organization i.e. National Conference.
There were a few Muslim leaders who did not appreciate this change, as they were doubtful about the
loyalty of the Hindus. Generally, the Muslims believed that the Hindus would co-operate with them in the
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struggle for independence. It was quite late when the Muslims realized that they had been deceived. The
Hindus of Jammu and Kashmir never wanted democratic government in place of»the Maharaja’s rule under
which they were ruling the majority. All the non-Muslims who had joined this organization were united and
dominated the Muslim leaders even in their own organization. Due to influence of its non-Muslim
members, the National Conference became an instrument of the Government. Besides, this organization
also gave its support to the Congress.
The Muslims were divided into two groups. The other group consisted of those Muslims who were
disappointed with the National Conference. Most of the Muslim leaders left the National Conference in
1941 and again established the pld Muslim Conference under the leadership of Ghulam Abbas. Sheikh
Muhmmmad Abdullah remained in the National Conference and was in the forefront of the movement for
freedom since
1931. Sheikh Abdullah continued his campaign to popularize the National Conference among the Muslim
masses. But Sheikh Abdullah was disappointed because the Muslim masses loved the idea of Pakistan.
They did not pay any attention to the National Conference. Sheikh Abdullah went to Delhi, met Mr. Jinnah,
and explained the whole political situation in the Valley. During the visit of Mr. Jinnah to Kashmir in 1944,
he made public speeches in his praise, but Mr. Jinnah refused to recognise the National Conference as the
representative body of the Muslims of Kashmir. Now Sheikh Abdullah turned to Pandit Nehru who visited
Kashmir in 1945 to build up prestige of the National Conference. The Muslims of Kashmir openly
supported the idea of Pakistan and they greeted Pandit Nehru with black flags.
The partition plan was announced on June 3, 1947. After the announcement of partition, President of the
Congress Acharya Kriplani visited Kashmir and suggested to the Maharaja that he should continue as Head
of the State, since it was his private property. The Maharajas of Patiala, Faridkot and Kapurthala also
visited Kashmir after Kriplani. They tried to convince him of the desirability of accession to India. Later
on, Gandhi also went to Kashmir and held talks about the future of Kashmir with Maharaja. Obviously, the
Government of India was trying to obtain the accession of Kashmir to India. This view is further continued
by the statement which Pandit Nehru made on March 8, 1949, before Parliament that all steps which he had
taken in Kashmir had Gandhi’s blessings. The Indian Government was determined to get Kashmir even by
using force against Pakistan if necessary. Pandit Nehru stated on September 26, 1947, ”If Pakistan
Government persistently refused to see its error and continued to minimize it, the Indian Government
would have to go to war against it.” There were rumours in the State that the Maharaja would accede to
India,
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSl’ES 337
but a majority of the population of Kashmir was in favour of accession to Pakistan. The Maharaja himself
was aware of this fact, but he was more inclined towards the Congress than to his own people.
Under these circumstances, the Maharaja of Kashmir made a ”Stand-still Agreement” with Pakistan to
avoid possible disturbance in the life of the State. The Stand-still Agreement between Kashmir and
Pakistan, (a) debarred Kashmir from having any relations with any Country other than Pakistan, (b) Under
an obligation to accede to Pakistan, and it would render Kashmir’s accession to India invalid.
Lord Mountbatten had given an outline of the policy for accession of States to India or to Pakistan. While
addressing the princes of the States on July 25, 1947 he said, ”Accede to India or to Pakistan, bearing in
mind the geographical situation of the respective States, the composition of their population and the wishes
of their people.” But contrary to the principles enunciated in this statement, the State of Junagadh, which
was a Hindu Majority State with a Muslim ruler, acceded to Pakistan. The Hindu leaders did not accept this
accession. The Indian Government’s stand was that one person could not decide the fate of majority. It was
the case of Hyderabad that was also a part of India. The Indian Government occupied Hyderabad State that
had a Hindu majority and a Muslim ruler, and wished to retain her independence. Here again the Hindu
leaders and the Indian Government came into action and refused to recognize Hyderabad as an independent
State. They said that the masses of the State were Hindus, therefore, Hyderabad was also a part of India.
The Indian government occupied Hyderabad State by force.
On the other hand, the Kashmir State had a Muslim majority and a Hindu ruler who acceded to India. The
accession was not justified from any point of view but the Indian Government took a novel stand in case of
Kashmir. Here she laid more emphasis on the declaration of Maharaja than on the importance of public
opinion. The Indian Government refused to restore the right of self-determination to the Kashmiris.
Towards the end of July 1947, the Maharaja ordered the Muslim population to surrender all firearms. He
also disarmed all the Muslims who were in Maharaja’s army.
This was followed by the entry of Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sang and Sikh murderer gangs into the State
of Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistan Government made an appeal to the Maharaja of Kashmir to protect
the lives of the Muslim population, but he turned a deaf ear to it. Open fighting broke out between the
Maharaja’s troops and the freedom fighters. After three months, Maharaja’s forces were defeated and Azad
Kashmir
388
Government was established under the supervision of Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan.
Borrowing words from Richard Symonds, ”As August 15 (1947) and the partition of India drew near, there
were many meetings and demonstrations in Poonch in favour of Kashmir joining Pakistan. Martial Law
was imposed and meetings fired on. After one such incident on August
27 in Nila Butt, Abdul Qayyum, a young zanimdar started the revolt with his few friends. Sensible men told
me that they vvould not have joined such a rash enterprise but for the folly of Dogras who burnt whole
villages where only a single family was involved in the revolt. Rapidly most of the Muslim ex-servicemen
joined Qayyum and in six weeks the whole district except Poonch city itself, was in the hands of rebel
leaders.”
Ian Stephen, formerly editor of the British-owned ”Statesman” of Delhi and Calcutta, speaking of the
Muslim population of Jammu, records:
”These half million or so had almost totally disintegrated in the autumn of 1947. About 2,000,000 simply
vanished being presumably butchered or killed by epidemics and exposure while seeking to get away. The
rest had fled into Pakistan - Punjab. Now the forces of the Maharaja were engaged with the patriots every-
where in the State and on 22nd October Pathan and Frontier tribesmen entered into Kashmir.”
In the Security Council, India charged Pakistan for sending these tribesmen into the territory of Kashmir.
She described Pakistan as an aggressor in Kashmir. The Indian representative claimed in the Security
Council that the tribesmen created the whole trouble in Kashmir. He further said that there had been no
killing of Muslims, nor any Muslim was expelled before the entry of the tribesmen. It was a mere lie. Sir
Muhammad Zafarullah Khan justified the entry of tribesmen into Kashmir. He said ”That kind of thing
might be expected of angels, but it cannot be expected of human beings. I will say that a man would be a
coward if under those circumstances he did nothing to help his brothers.”
On October 25, at mid-night the Maharaja left Kashmir and the Treaty of Amritsar was torn to pieces. The
Dogra rule that was imposed by the British on Kashmir, came to an end. The Maharaja took refuge in
Jammu near the Indian border and wrote a letter on October 26 to Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General
of India. The Maharaja said:
”Naturally they (the Government of India) cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding
to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the instrument of accession for
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONA!, ISSl’ES
389
acceptance by our Government.” The Maharaja concluded by saying, ”I may also inform Your
Excellency’s Government that it is my intention at once to setup an interim Government and ask Sheikh
Abdullah to carry on the responsibilities.”
Next morning Lord Mountbatten wrote a letter to the Maharaja which he concluded by saying: ”My
Government and I note with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form
an interim Government and to work with your Prime Minister.” It should be kept in mind that this letter
was written on October 27, and on the same day, at 9 a.m., Indian airborne troops had landed at Srinagar. In
fact everything was pre-planned. Afterwards the Indian Government stated that accession of Kashmir was a
dispute between the ruler and the people of the State and that this would be solved according to the wishes
of the people.
The Government of Pakistan protested against this Government accession and also informed the Security
Council that the Government of Pakistan had not accepted and could not accept the accession of Kashmir
and Jammu State to India. Pakistan considered this accession a violation and a fraud. Pakistan Government
told the Security Council that it was a conspiracy between the Maharaja and the Indian Government against
Pakistan.=Pakistan also challenged the authority of the Maharaja who made this accession to India. The
ruler had no right to decide the fate of his people who had already demonstrated against him and had
defeated his forces.
In May 1946, Sheikh Abdullah was jailed for the Quit-Kashmir Movement. The purpose of this movement
was to end the Dogra Raj in the State. He was released on 29th September 1947. Some prominent leaders
of India were friendly with Sheikh Abdullah, and they proposed his name to the Maharaja for his
appointment as Prime Minister of the State. After the release of Sheikh Abdullah, a campaign was started
against all those people, groups and parties who were against the accession of Kashmir to India. All
meetings of the opposition, processions and demonstrations were banned throughout the Valley of
Kashmir, while the Government bribed all those who supported accession to India. All the prominent
leaders of the Muslim Conference who had gone to Karachi were refused re-entry into Kashmir. Mehr
Chand Mahajan, a Hindu leader, was appointed Prime Minister of the State.
Then Mr. M.A. Jinnah, the Governor-General of Pakistan proposed a conference of the Governor-General
and Prime Ministers of both the countries. It was decided to hold a conference on 29th October, but it was
later postponed due to the indisposition of Pandit Nehru. Jinnah met
390
Mountbatten on 1st November, and made proposals for solving the problem, but the Indian
Government did not accept these.
After some time, Pandit Nehru, while commenting on JinnahMountbatten talks, stated that Lord
Mountbatten had agreed to a plebiscite in Kashmir under the auspices of UNO. On November 8, 1947.
Pandit Nehru said the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to UNO to hold
plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date.
Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan responded: ”We are ready to request UNO immediately to appoint its representative in
Jammu and Kashmir State to stop the fighting, to stop the suppression of Muslims in the State, to arrange a
programme for the withdrawal of forces, to setup an impartial administration of the State till a plebiscite is
held and to undertake the plebiscite under its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free
and unfettered will of the people of the State on the question of accession.”
Pandit Nehru objected to these proposals and insisted that Indian force would stay on in Kashmir. He
further said that the=plebiscite would take place under the control of the Indian Government, the observers
of UNO would only act as advisers.
Sheikh Abdullah was never in favour of Kashmir becoming pail of India. He wanted that Kashmir should
remain independent in internal affairs, and that Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Communications should be
placed under the control of Government of India. He was given assurance by the Indian leaders that her
people would decide the future of Kashmir.
The battle of words continued between Liaqat Ali Khan and Nehru. The Indian Government accused
Pakistan of sending tribesmen to Kashmir and giving them aid. Fighting continued between the Indian
Troops and the Kashmiris. The area of Gilgit had been liberated by the freedom fighters. After six weeks
battle, when the Indian leaders realized that they could not get Kashmir by force, only then Pandit Nehru
agreed to meet Liaqat Ali Khan. They had two meetings in December. Liaqat Ali Khan proposed that
Nehru should request UNO to send a commission to examine the question of settling the dispute, but Pandit
Nehru refused. He only agreed to request UNO for sending its observers. Later on, India referred the case
to the Security Council on the last day of 1947. Pakistan welcomed the Indian decision.
The Indian representative in the Security Council said, ”Such a situation now exists between India and
Pakistan owing to the aid which
391
invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and of tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining the
North-West, were drawing from Pakistan for operations against Jammu and Kashmir, a State which
acceded to the dominion of India. Kashmir, is a part of India.”
The Indian representative carefully avoided mentioning the revolt of Kashmiris against the Maharaja and
the establishment of Azad Kashmir Government. The representative of Pakistan said, ”The Pakistan
Government have continued to do all in their power to discourage the tribal movement by all means short
of war.” He denied that the Government of Pakistan had given any aid to the invaders. The Security
Council passed a resolution asking for a cease-fire from 1st January 1949. Another resolution was passed
by the Security Council in which it requested the countries, India and Pakistan, to withdraw their forces
from the State so that free and impartial plebiscite might be held under the control of UNO to decide the
future of Kashmir. India and Pakistan both agreed to appoint a Joint Committee that was to arrange the
withdrawal of the forces. Pakistan nominated its representatives on March 9, 1949, but India did not honour
its agreement. UNO again presented its new proposals in August 1949 and requested India to honour its
agreement, but India again refused to do so. Now the UN Commission found that India was not prepared to
withdraw her forces. Meanwhile, many proposals were put forward to undo the tangle, but they failed due
to the stubborn attitude adopted by the Indian Government.
Sir Own Dixon was appointed as US representative in July, 1950, under the Security Council resolution. He
put forward his proposals for demilitarization, which were rejected by both the parties. Lord Attlee
proposed three alternatives during the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers in January 1951. (1)
Commonwealth Force, (2) A joint Force of Indo-Pakistan, (3) A local Force to be raised by the plebiscite
Administrator. Each one of these proposals was accepted by Pakistan and rejected by India. Before
February 22, 1951, an Anglo-American resolution was brought before the Security Council to submit the
dispute for arbitration to the International Court of Justice. Pakistan showed its willingness, but India again
refused.
Dr. Frank P. Graham was appointed representative in Kashmir under the Anglo-American resolution of
March 30, 1951. His mission also ended in failure. In his report of October 19, 1951, he said that the
Security Council should try for demilitarization of Kashmir through negotiations. Dr. Graham was again
requested to continue his efforts to obtain agreement from both the parties for demilitarization. Dr. Graham
resumed his talks with the Governments of Pakistan and India on May 20, 1952, but he failed
392
to find any formula for compromise. On February 4, 1953, negotiations between India and Pakistan began
at Geneva regarding the demilitarization of Kashmir and holding of a plebiscite. India refused to accept the
proposals.
Muhammad Ali, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan and Pandit Nehru met in London in June 1953, to
discuss all their disputes and decided to meet again in Karachi. Nehru came to Karachi in the last week of
July. He said before his departure, ”We all know Kashmir is the toughest problem and there is no good my
saying that it is nearer a solution. Muhammad Ali also visited India and discussed the Kashmir problem.
Both the Prime Ministers accepted the importance of the dispute and again agreed that the future of
Kashmir should be decided by the Kashmiris themselves through a plebiscite. It was decided that a
committee of experts should be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers. It was also decided to appoint a
plebiscite Administrator to examine the situation and then report. The Indian Prime Minister afterwards
declared that India wanted to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan, and would try to solve all problems
peacefully. But on the other hand ”Abdullah Coup” was engineered and he was dismissed from the
Premiership of Held Kashmir on August 8, 1953. Afterwards, he was arrested.
The main factor for Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal was his refusal to act according to the wishes of the Indian
Government. His removal was hailed in India but the world Press condemned it. Bakhshi succeeded Sheikh
Abdullah. The Government of India and its puppet Government created such a situation in Kashmir that
UN authorities could not make any positive efforts for holding the plebiscite. On May 14, 1954, the Indian
Government accepted the Constituent Assembly’s decision of February 1954, for the ratification of
”Accession to India”. The Indian Home Minister, Govind Valabhai Pant, said on July 9, 1955, ”We made
certain statements when Kashmir acceded to India but when we made those statements circumstances were
different from what they are now. The time factor is very important, many things have happened since
then.”
Nehru, while addressing the Lok Sabha, said that Kashmir had acceded to India and was the duty of the
Indian Government to protect it from any foreign aggression. He said that the question of plebiscite in
occupied Kashmir was now out of date. He gave the following reasons for this:
1. US Military Aid to Pakistan.
2. Economic development of the State.
3. Creation of the Constituent Assembly in Occupied Kashmir.

CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSl’ES 393
4. Pakistan’s membership of SEATO and CENTO pacts which are an open threat to India.
Muhammad Ali, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, rejected the statement that Pakistan’s membership of
SEATO and CENTO Pacts and US Military Aid was a threat to India, and that it had changed the position
of Kashmir problem. He charged India with encouraging communal trouble in Bengal. Pakistan now again
decided to take the case to the Security Council.
The Government of Pakistan requested the Security Council on January 2, 1957, for a meeting at its earliest
convenience and drew the attention of the Security Council to its resolutions after 13th January, 1949, in
which an assurance was given that the future of Kashmir would be decided by a free and impartial
plebiscite to be held under the control of UN.
On February 14, 1957, Britain, Australia, Cuba and US submitted a resolution to the Security Council
requesting Gunner V. Jarring of Sweden to go to India and Pakistan to discuss the Kashmir problem with
both the Governments, and study the prospects of sending a UN Military Force. On
20th February, 1957, the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution. But just after the veto, US, Britain and
Australia drafted a second resolution which was adopted on 21st February, 1957. Mr. Gunnar V. Jarring
visited India and Pakistan in March-April, 1957, and held discussions with Indian and Pakistani leaders on
the Kashmir problem. Mr. Jarring submitted his report on 29th April, 1957, to the Secretary General,
stating that Pakistan had accepted his proposals while India had rejected them.
Meanwhile India had started a new move to encourage Hindus to settle in Kashmir. The Indian
Government offered loans to the settlers. It also constructed its air bases in the Valley and in Laddakh.
Airfields in the area were renovated and expanded to receive the large-sized civil and military aircraft. This
matter was also reported to UN on June 6, 1957, by the Pakistan Government.
Kashmir dispute again came up for discussion on 24th September
1957. before the Security Council. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister promised to withdraw its forces if a strong
UN force occupied the area and if India reduced its forces to the number which was prescribed in UN
resolution of December 23, 1952. Dr. Graham visited Pakistan and India in February
1958, and he submitted his report to the President of Security Council which was released in Pakistan on
3rd April. 1958. In the 5th part of his report, he said that the Government of Pakistan accepted all the
proposals in
394
principle, while India rejected all of them. Meanwhile, Sh. Abdullah was released on 8th January 1958,
after a prolonged detention of four and half years without any trial, but was again arrested in Srinagar on
April 29.
1958. On June 15, it was decided by the Central Kashmir Liberation Committee to launch a peaceful
crossing into Held Kashmir.
Ch. Ghulam Abbas was arrested while crossing the cease-fire line. Martial law was imposed in October
1958. President Ayub Khan showed keen interest in the Kashmir problems. He said, ”We have to continue
the struggle for the liberation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In no case we can give up that struggle.”
On October 6, 1960, President Ayub Khan said, ”Our communications, our rivers, and even the cease-fire
line in Kashmir, one and all are sufficient factors to indicate that our neck is in the grip of others.” A joint
communique was issued in November 1962, by the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India in
which a Ministerial-level conference was proposed to resolve the main difference over Kashmir. The
delegates of India and Pakistan held six meetings between December 1962 and May 1963 but nothing came
out of it. Z.A. Bhutto said, ”We have clarified our proposal that the Valley should be internationalized as an
interim arrangement, say, for six months. Thereafter the wishes of the people should be determined
regarding their future.”
Pakistan Government reported to the UN Security Council about the Indian merger move of Held Kashmir,
but the Security Council could not take any effective step. When the people of Kashmir demonstrated
against the move, the Indian President proclaimed an emergency in May
1965, under articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In January
and March 1965, the Assembly passed the Integration Bill and gave Kashmir the status of a Province of
India. The Integration Bill and the imprisonment of Sh. Abdullah sparked off the uprising in the early days
of August. As a result the freedom-fighters of Kashmir started the war of liberation. The Government of
India charged Pakistan with sending in infiltrators into Kashmir. Then India crossed the border and
occupied a post on August 15, 1965, on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line. Indian Minister Chavan
declared on August 15, 1965, that Indian forces had crossed the cease-fire line at two points. Indian
artillery shelled a Pakistani village, Awan Sharif on 24th August without giving any ultimatum. Indian
armed forces crossed the international border on 6th September, 1965, and attacked Lahore from three
sides. In fact, the Indian leaders were so sure of their success that they announced fall of Lahore. Chavan
told the House that Indian forces had entered the Lahore city. Bhutto, then Foreign Minister of Pakistan,
requested the Security Council to meet on 22nd September, 1965. Bhutto stated, ”Although
Pakistan considered the 20 September Resolution unsatisfactory, it would accept the
395
cease-fire for the sake of peace and for solving the Kashmir dispute, the main cause of the conflict.” The
cease-fire was concluded on September 23,
1965, at 3 a.m.. West Pakistan time. President Ayub Khan addressed the General Assembly on 13
December, 1965. He made an offer to India for nowar pact after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The
world Press hailed this statement of the President.
Both the Governments agreed to meet at Tashkent. Indian and Pakistani delegations had many rounds of
talks at Tashkent. Finally they agreed to establish good neighbourly relations with each other. Thus
Pakistan and India agreed to the Tashkent Declaration on 10th January,
1966, and the Soviet Union signed this declaration as witness.

People of Pakistan had great expectations from Tashkent Declaration but their hopes were shattered
because later on USSR did not show any interest in the dispute. She continued giving military aid to India
against the wishes of Pakistan.
The Kashmir dispute has been hanging like a sword over Pakistan. Although Pakistan has urged India many
times that this dispute should be resolved, yet friendly gestures of Pakistan and resolutions of UNO have
failed to change the attitude of the Indian Government. Contrary to all democratic values, Indian authorities
were determined to prove that Kashmir is a part of India.
The only significant development in this connection was that Sheikh Abdullah was once again released.
Sheikh Abdullah had been in and out of Indian jails for the last fourteen years. In a statement on January 2,
1968. he declared, ”Fourteen years in prison have not changed my views on Kashmir dispute”. The next
day, he said that he would ”Pick up the thread of his mission to bring Pakistan and India closer which was
broken by the death of Mr. Nehru in 1964”. He also made it clear that peace cannot be achieved in Kashmir
and relations between India and Pakistan cannot improve unless solution of Kashmir dispute is discovered.
Mrs. Indira Gandhi on January 5, 1968, reiterated India’s untenable claim that Kashmir’s accession to India
was irrevocable.
The Indo-Pak war of 1971 further hardened the attitude of the Indian Government. Intoxicated with the
sense of victory, Indian Government almost shelved the matter. Sheikh Abdullah, disappointed as he was,
tried to reconcile with the situation. Increasing Indian influence on the international forum, had clouded the
importance of the issue to the extent that the problem could not be raised even in the Islamic summit held at
Lahore.
396
Then came another significant development in Feb, 1975, when Indira-Abdullah agreement was declared
under which Sh. Abdullah was sworn in as Chief Minister of the Indian-occupied Kashmir. This fait
accompli, presented by India was the culmination of the process, spreaded over three years negotiations
between Sh. Abdullah and Indira. This agreement was the shameful barter of the holy principle of right of
selfdetermination of Kashmiris to which Sh. Abdullah had pledged to stick; the clear violation of UN
charter and resolutions and a blatant violation of the Simla Accord. Special privileges, accorded to the State
of Jammu and Kashmir still reflect the Indian guilty conscience attitude. Abdullah’s return and the special
autonomy within the Indian Union were the things which could hardly be reconciled to India’s previous
claims to it as an integral part.
This agreement added insult to injuries, Bhutto called for a general strike in Pakistan on 24th Feb, and in
Kashmir on 28th Feb. He also declared that Pakistan had not signed no-war pact with India, This issue
became live again.
With the promulgation of Martial Law in Pakistan in 1977, the government became, preoccupied with the
domestic problems and the Kashmir issue was relegated to a state of comparative insignificance. President
Zia, however, to win popular support and to strengthen his regime frequently reiterated Pakistan’s resolve
to secure the right of selfdetermination for the Kashmiris. However, with the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979, the Kashmir issue suffered a shift of focus because Pakistan could not afford to have a
volatile situation at both its Eastern and Western frontiers. As Pakistan kept busy in Afghan tangle, India
devised a well thought upon policy of giving rise to some minor issues. She moved her forces into the
glacier area of Siachen in 1984 and in 1986 as well as started the construction of a barrage on Wullar Lake
to make use of the Jhelum river water. This policy aimed at entangling Pakistan into minor issues and thus
keep Kashmir out of the bilateral agenda for a long time. Therefore, as it should have happened, both sides
kept negotiating inconclusively throughout the mid-eighties. Indians quite successfully used these
peripheral issues to force Pakistan not to raise the Kashmir issue and thus secure a status quo on this
problem. The democratic Government of Junejo, however, showed keen interest in making the world
conscience realize their commitment to the Kashimiris. During the second SAARC summit at Bangalore,
the Prime Minister described Kashmir as the main obstacle in normalization of Indo-Pak relations and
emphasized the need to resolve it immediately.
CONTEMPORARY INT^RNATIONAl. ISSI F.S
397
On the othe^r hand the situation in Kashmir itself was gradually proceedina towards a> volcanic outburst
of popular sentiments against Indian occupation. In 1973- 74, four major parties representing radical
Muslims Jamaat-i-Islami, Peogples League, Mahaz-i-Azadi and the Islami Jamiat-iTulba - had forged unity
and adopted the strategy to make efforts for the liberation of Kashmir through Islamic revolution inspired
by the success of Iranian revolution atfid the armed struggle of the Afghans against Soviet’ Union. They
adopted- the symbol of Islam and Pakistan. This movement saw a major turning point* m 1987 when the
Muslim United Front was formed. It galvanised the entire population in a manner that all political analysts
were sure that in any free s&nd fair elections, the front would win a clear majority; power however, wa^
denied to radical powers by disrupting the political process and installation of puppet arrangements one
after the other. On August 14, 1988, th*e whole Valley expressed solidarity with Pakistan and expressed
resentmer»t on August 15, 1988, by observing a black day. On August 17, 1988. President Zia’s death was
mourned throughout the Valley. In the 1989 electioru-S, 98 per cent of the Kashmiris did not cast vote; this
was taken as a refereendum in which 98% people showed their unwillingness to stay with India. From then
onwards, the Indians adopted a policy of brutal repression thi*s turning a political movement into all armed
struggle through state terror. The period from October 1989 to January 1990 was of transition. From Jam-
Jary 26, 1990, onwards there has been a virtual collapse of socio-economic and political life in the Valley.
The assembly was dissolved and Gove«ôr’s rule imposed. Governor Jagmohan actually flared up the
movement by his brutal and repressive measures.
On the otr»er hand, the Pakistan government became ever more vocal in favour of tiroe Kashmiris suffering
massive brutalities by the Indian authorities. With th^ Afghan conflict having lost its top priority status in
the foreign policy, the PPP government extended full moral support to the down-trodden Kasr»niiris. India
accused Pakistan of interference in her ”internal” affairs an. <1 blamed that the uprising in the Valley was
caused by the infiltration of ”-terrorists” trained by veteran Afghan freedom-fighters. They referred to a*i
imaginary plan ”Operation Topac” devised by late General Zia to liberate Kashmir by waging an Afghan
style guerilla struggle. These alle .gations and counter allegations further deteriorated the strained relations
between the two countries and both came virtually on the brink of an armed s Jiowdown. This eventuality
was however averted by the Pakistani PM’s hurricane tours to the friendly countries and thus seeking
censure to the Indian atrocities on one hand and preempting any aggression on Pakistan on the other. The
foreign press also reported, ”the shifting of nuclear racks from the nuclear facilities at Kahuta to the
Chaklala air base near Rawalpindi” b^ Pakistan thus conveying to India that an advancement
398
could lead to a nuclear show down. The validity of the whole story not withstanding India refrained from
imposing war on Pakistan.
FACTORS LEADING TO THE RESURGENCE OF STRUGGLE
It would also be significant to look into the factors which were responsible for this ”Kashmiri Intet’ada” at
this juncture in the history. Actually, it was a combination of both external and internal inputs which
culminated into a heroic chapter of the history of all popular uprisings in the World. First, it was India’s
holding Kashmir through brute force and military power which resulted in socio-politico-economic
alienation of the Kashmiris followed by economic subjugation and conscious efforts by India to change the
demographic balance in favour of the Hindu population by extermination and ethnic cleansing” and last but
not the least, a cultural invasion of the Kashmiris in the form of intrusion of Hindu mythology in education,
art and literature. In reaction to these moves and sensing a threat to their cultural identity they rose against
the Indian occupation. Second, the significant changes at regional and international level forced them to
revise their strategy. In the first place they were inspired, as mentioned above, by the punching back of the
Soviets by the Afghans. Then there was spate of successful attainment of self-determination by the
communities much less numerous than the Kashmiris e.g. the Baltic republics. Further, the transnational
impact of the Palestinian Intefada since 1987 showed the Kashmiris a viable and sustainable struggle
against the might of India (which in case of traditional armed uprising could easily crush the resistance of
the Kashmiris. Now mass demonstrations by Kashmiri youth and females, curfews, video films of atrocities
offered a unique challenge to the Indians which they knew not how to tackle. Lastly, there were clear
indications that major powers had agreed on resolving the regional conflicts as a prerequisite for stability in
the world and also curb arms race in various parts of the world. It was in the wake of this shift in
international politics that the Kashmiris began a valiant effort to attract the attention of the world powers
and thus exert a combined pressure on the Indians to set them free.
THE LEGACY OF KASHMIRI INTEFADAH
Since 1989, the situation in Kashmir represents a scenario of worsening deterioration of the policy in all
respects. Kashmiris have gone all out in freeing themselves from the cruel clutches of India while India on
the other hand has been trying to suppress the movement by sheer force. This policy has brought India to a
stage where she seems to have lost Kashmir, occupying only a territory, not the people. Kashmiris have
been facing house-searching, curfews, firing on the prayer congregations, sacrilege of holy places and
mosques. Since then about 35,000 youths have
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSl F.S
399
been martyred, some 40,000 to 50,000 missing and more than 45,000 languishing, in prisons and torture
cells. About 3,000 women have been raped (Asia Watch). Dawn to dusk curfews have virtually collapsed
the social life The economy is also in shambles. The agriculture which largely depended upon the work
force from other parts of India has also been affected since the virtual cordoning off of the Valley; the
tourist industry, the chief source of income for the Kashmiris has been worst affected because of a
considerable fall in the number of tourists from the subcontinent and especially from all over the world.
Consequently, unemployment is on the rise. The export-oriented economy of Kashmir has been destroyed
by the blockade of transport routes and as a result carpet industry and fruit industry have declined
considerably. The passage of political development has been choked as all political parties have been
banned and all pro-freedom newspapers closed.
RESPECTIVE POLICIES OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Since 1989, there have been many ups and downs in the struggle of the Kashmiris. The Indian government
has tried to drive wedge between the unity of the resisting parties and groups. She first adopted a policy of
supporting JKLF, a moderate secularistic party enshrining independent Kashmir slogan against the hard
liner, ultra rightist Hizab-ul-Mujahideen who cherish to liberate Kashmir through armed struggle and join
with Pakistan. This policy succeeded to the extent that in late 1990 and early
1991, there were sporadic violent clashes between the two factions. With JKLF enjoying political support
in the Kashmiri masses, India had tried to seek a political solution of the issue by alienating the Hizab
among the masses and branding them as terrorists out to dismember Kashmir from India. This policy
however, did not deliver enough as the Kashmiris mended their fences in time. The other option used by
the Indian authorities has been the attempts to woo influential Muslims and through them promising
redressal of excesses and compensation to the Kashmiris in the form of employments, better political
environment, respect to fundamental human rights etc. At the international level, India has been implicating
Pakistan into the unrest by alleging that the infiltrators from Pakistan were sowing the seeds of conflict and
perpetuating what they term as declining upsurge in the Valley. There have been allegations on one hand
and on the other a total disregard on the part of Indians to the very nature and dynamics of the struggle.
India has been much vocal in getting Pakistan on the list of terrorist states and thus tarnishing its image in
the comity of nations. The international community on its part has offered a number of packages of
arbitration proposals for turning the LOC into permanent border. Firstly, plebiscite in the Valley only.
Secondly, with Jammu and Laddakh with India and Gilgit and Baltistan with Pakistan, partitioning the
400__
Valley along what is called ”Chenab line”. The ”third option envisaging independent Kashmir; and a
confederation of Kashmir with India or Pakistan or a joint Commission of both and so on. But the Indian
policy has been to label these efforts as intervention in internal affairs” and get more and more time to quell
the resistances by force. The exhibition of this approach is the siege of the Holy Shrine at Hazrat Bal which
continued for
41 days (30th September to 2nd November, 1993). By using this siege as a cover, India launched a last
ditch campaign to crush the resistance. Moreover, she attempted to make the world realize that the problem
in Kashmir is not a political and international one but a religious and local one. Pakistan on the other hand
has been supporting the cause of Kashmiris morally and politically at various international fora. She has
stuck to the stance that Kashmir is a part of the unfinished agenda of the partition of the subcontinent and
that the right of self-determination is inalienable to the Kashmiris. She has rejected all nations like
restricted plebiscite, independent Kashmir etc. as these are diametrically opposed to its traditional stance.
She on the other hand welcomed offers of arbitration from neutral countries like UK and the United States.
At the international level Pakistan has highlighted the human aspect of the issue by denouncing unabated
Indian atrocities. Pakistan has successfully mobilised the world opinion in favour of its own stand and has
created realization in the United States that the major cause of instability in the region is the Kashmir
problem.
The recent terrorist attacks on America have caused serious damage to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir.
India has tried to utilize the opportunity to apply coercive diplomacy and compel Pakistan to normalize its
stand on Kashmir. Indian attempts have been successful to a large extent.
Pakistan is no more in a position to continue with its decade old policy to ’bleed India’ by abetting
Kashmiri freedom struggle in the valley. The global circumstances are no more conducive to tolerate any
type of uprising in the name of self-determination and freedom after 09/11. International community is
determined to root out every type of extremism. In the post 09/11 scenario, Pakistan certainly needs to
formulate a new pragmatic policy on Kashmir issue, to safeguard its broader interest in the region.
RE-INTRODUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL FACTOR
Since the surfacing of the issue in 1948 the two super-powers, the USA and the former USSR had used
their influence in negative or positive manner favouring one side or the other. USA supported Pakistan after
it
401
joined the US sponsored alliances of SEATOand CEu-). The USSR came
to support the Indians, after the Sino-Indian war of 1(^’’” China also entered the scene to favour Pakistan.
With the passage of\ .Vie, USA however, adopted the policy of maintaining the balance of pc ’ / and
treating both the parties even handedly, as also indicated by her rol We the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars.
Until recently it has been pursuing Cautious policy but
a (1
after the collapse of Soviet Union, new realities be, modifying the US
an
approach. US needs not only India as a potential ally, the New Cold War
in
with China but also perceives stability in South Asia first prerequisite to
the implementation of another foreign policy agen^,as . tern, arms control. With Clinton’s assuming power,
the US has been ket3 lp follow the policy of resolving the regional issues peacefully to curin ic
proliferation of weapons specially the nuclear weapons.
In the wake of re-introduction of the US into in Kashmir, it was

rpcf”
hoped that the chances of resolution of the issue \ become somewhat brighter but India has persistently
evaded meaning discussion on the issue. The hopes pinned with the Secretary-level ta|< /nded in smoke as
the parties stood poles apart and- the formal talks soo, s 2gan to appear as a futile adventure. Only ’non-
papers” with unpracti , Je proposals were exchanged in the first week of February 1994. P;,,3 *;an in
desperation, decided to raise the issue at the UN Commissiq ls/>n Human Rights. Unfortunately, most of
the members opted for absten,. > and some friendly countries like Iran and China pursuaded Pakistan ntj
OI\? ask for voting in exchange of the Indian assurance to these two coui\. / s that India would allow a
Muslim envoy’s mission to visit the Valley . ”Border to watch the human rights situation. In
The lukewarm support of Iran and China wa^ .derstandable in the context of certain regional and
international dev^ n,ments. China had recently struck thaw with India over the long-standii| °^ .order
question and was looking for economic co-operation with India. If on the other hand, also wanted more
economic openings into South Asi n’ oecially India. Iran had concluded a major agreement with India in N’
, 1994 envisaging, besides enhanced trade, the construction of a gas pi| T’ /ie to India through Pakistan. At
the international level, the big powers ^ l.p preoccupied with other issues like non-proliferation, population,
er yvironment, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, etc. Moreover, most of the coun>en p on whose support Pakistan
was relying don’t have a very good record .ies, the area of human rights. India pledged to allow a Muslim
countries fa-1” /nding mission into the occupied Kashmir but their visit was marred bj’Vpited access to the
worst affected areas. With the high-handed polici ’ A suppression and torture, India started trying to co-opt
the Kashmiri md elections were announced but as the struggle of Kashmiris ir^ a îfied, the Indian
government on August 10. 1994, postponed elections in the Valley and the Federal Rule was extended for
another six months. To reinforce its peaceful gesture, the government also removed bunkers from outside
the Hazrat Bal Shrine on August 9, 1994 and re-opened the mosque for prayers. To counter the ever vicious
Indian propaganda Pakistan arranged an emergency meeting of the foreign ministers of the OIC Countries
on September 9,
1994. The most important feature of the conference was that all the representatives expressed their censure
to the Indian policy in Kashmir and demanded the formation of an international contact group for Kashmir
as in case of Bosnia. On September 8, 1994, UN Secretary-General Boutras-Ghali discussed various
options for the resolution of the issue but the initial optimism about Ghali’s visit to the sub-continent
fizzled out when in New Delhi, Ghali expressed willingness to mediate between India and Pakistan but
underlined slim chances of success for a UN role as in other issues around the World.
Ghali’s visit was followed by the British State Secretary Douglas Kurd’s visit to the subcontinent in
January, 1995. He, much to the dismay of Pakistani quarters termed the UN resolutions on Kashmir as
invalid. The damage to the Pakistan stand was somewhat compensated by US Under Secretary Mr. William
Perry’s visit. He spoke of US policy of viewing Kashmir as a disputed territory but stuck to traditional US
demand that the issue should be seen within the purview of the Simla accord. Pakistan, however, achieved
a notable diplomatic success by persuading the OIC heads at Casablanca (January 7-9, 1995, to pass a
resolution condemning India for human rights violations in Kashmir and supporting the right to self-
determination of the Kashmiris. India, on her part, allowed the representatives from the All Parties Hurriyat
Conference (APHC) to attend the meeting with Mir Waiz as head. This move was to deter the Pakistani
efforts to portray India as a violator of the human rights denying the Kashmiris to raise voice at the
international fora. This tactic however, was rebuffed by the cancellation of the announced elections and
extension of the Governor’s rule under request from the Governor Mr. Krishna Rao.
Since 1998, when the two arch-rivals in South Asia tested their nuclear weapons, the international
community, especially the great powers are really concerned about the security in the region. The
resolution of the Kashmir issue is earnestly felt, as it can trigger nuclear debacle in the region. The Kargil
clashes have further intensified the apprehension and need to resolve the issue. The recent military stand-
off between India and Pakistan in the wake of terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13,
2001 has further increased the fear of nuclear war in the region. Since then the role of international
community in resolving the Kashmir issue has come to the fore.
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 4Q3
Frequent visits of American. British and other Western delegates to South Asia recently, show the renewed
and active role of international community in resolving the issue of Kashmir. But this time the international
community is more pro-Indian in its tone. Richard Armitage (US Deputy Secretary of State), Colin Powell
(US Secretary of State) and Christina Rocca (US Under Secretary of State) visited India and Pakistan in the
midst of the Pak-India stand-off. All they seemed to pressurize Pakistan into conceding to Indian demands
of stopping cross-border infiltration rather than making efforts to break the stalemate. Jack Straw answering
to a question, at a press conference in New Delhi said, ”Obviously we want to see an end to infiltration -
more needs to be done by Pakistan”. The Western Powers, especially America has indirectly assumed the
Kashmir freedom struggle to be an insurgency and rebellion, which is not less than terrorism. Almost all
the renown Kashmiri Jihadi groups are outlawed and declared as terrorist groups by America. Musharaf s
crack down on the religious extremists in Pakistan was a response to the changed international scenario. All
these recent developments have caused serious damage to Pakistan’s traditional position on Kashmir.
KASHMIR - POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Many years of insurgency in Kashmir has shaken the myth of Indian invincibility on successfully dealing
with secessionist movements. Solution of the problem requires a change in the position adopted by all the
three parties involved - India, Pakistan and Kashmiris themselves.
Pakistan is not ready to change its position and wants to stici to the application of UN Security Council
Resolutions on Kashmir Issue. In India, hawkish elements representing the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
and Shiv Sena want to undo the special status of Kashmir granted under Article
370 of the Indian Constitution and legally absorb the territory in the Indian Union.
Certain developments at regional and global level augur well for a peaceful solution to the Kashmir
problem. Pakistan must exploit the situation with a pragmatic policy on Kashmir. Plebiscite as the basic
solution is not possible as evidenced by the past years. Pakistan should pressurise India and bring the
United States to the mechanism to solve the Kashmir problem. Following steps are suggested to evolve an
effective policy on Kashmir in order to achieve the desired solution:
(a) Efforts to bring about a united Islamic stand;

404
(b) Holding international conferences on Kashmir in the major capitals of the world where pro-
Kashmiri international personalities be invited to address;
(c) Supporting overseas Pakistanis and students in foreign universities to stage demonstrations and
influence members of the elected houses of government;
(d) Evolve a ”think tank” for formulating coherent guidelines on Kashmir;
(e) Start a national Kashmir Fund;
(f) Most important of all, we should take advantage of the revival of Kashmir issue at the United Nations
through a united move of the Muslim Ummah, Organisation of Islamic Conference and Non-Aligned
Movement;
(g) Approaching the International Court of Justice by Pakistan, for the issue of a ”cease and desist”
order to the Indian forces in Kashmir who are ruthlessly persecuting, the Kashmiri Muslims and are
violating the human rights.
If even now the Kashmir dispute is left unresolved through international efforts, then to borrow IqbaPs
symbolism, the time has come when the desperate sparrow will pounce upon the mighty falcon and
overpower it.
KASHMIR - LOOSENING THE KNOT BUS, CBM
Kashmir, one of the most dangerous and thorny disputes from the colonial era, still festers after 53 years.
Since both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, contested Kashmir can be regarded as
the most likely trigger anywhere in the world for a nuclear war. How conflict could escalate was hinted at
in the 1999 Kargil conflict, which cost over
1,000 lives. Kargil easily could have expanded into a full-scale IndoPakistani war except for a Washington-
mediated stand-down in July.
For India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris, measurable progress could halt the Kashmir violence in which some
50,000 lives have been lost since
1989. This would open the way to rehabilitate Kashmir’s ravaged schools and society, and would release
military expenditures to improve the security, politics, and economy of the two rival states. Relations could
be normalized, and the nuclear danger might well recede.
Signs of the Kashmir knot loosening appeared in ”ceasefire” proposals to arrest the fighting between Indian
security forces and militant groups in the Kashmir valley. Hizb-ul-Mujahiddin, a Kashmiri insurgent
405
group, offered New Delhi a ceasefire in July 2000 in exchange for negotiations, only to withdraw this offer
in August when India refused to include Pakistan. The underlying idea of halting the shooting and starting
negotiations was revived in November, however, and this time at Indian initiative.
Pakistan responded positively on December 2, declaring that its forces along the ”line of control” (LOC)
that divides Kashmir would ”observe maximum restraint to strengthen and stabilize the cease fire,” calling
for a halt to the artillery firing both sides routinely employed against each other along the LOC. Pakistan
urged India to join tripartite as well as bilateral negotiations. Pakistan itself endorsed the All-Parties
Hurriyet Conference (APHC), the political umbrella of most Kashmiri proindependence groups, as the third
party’s representative for tripartite negotiations.
While these moves were procedural, not the outline of a settlement, something more fundamental seemed
to be at work. With little outward notice over the last two years, three changed conditions made a
breakthrough conceivable: (1) India recognized by its actions that the insurgency had Kashmiri roots which
could not be removed by any acceptable use of force, and that negotiating with the militants was key to
draining their rationale for violence; (2) Pakistan recognized that, irrespective of its own interests as a
primary party to the Kashmir dispute, any settlement of the Kashmir question must be done in conformity
with the wishes of the Kashmiri people; and (3) the United States had become involved behind the scenes
and benign outside influence of this kind was needed to move the three parties to an equitable and durable
settlement.
Three of the ”four R’s” President Clinton advocated when visiting India and Pakistan in March 2000 -
respect for the LOC, restraint by both sides, and reduction of violence - were observed by Pakistan and
India for some time. What was missing was the fourth, resumption of dialogue.
THE AGRA SUMMIT
The Agra Summit (14 - 16 July, 2001) between the Prime Minister of India, Altai Behari Vajpayee and the
President of Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharaf, started with great hopes and expectations. Gen. Musharaf
visited India on the call of Vajpayee, with confidence to resolve all the impeding issues to improve
relations between the two arch-rivals of South Asia. It was the climax of the Pak-India dialogue. The
occasion provided an opportunity to further the process of negotiation and mutual understanding
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INTERNATIONAL AKF MRS
between the two countries. Unfortunately, the summit ended somewhat abruptly in an unexpected way.
During the summit many outstanding issues were discussed. Greater understanding was created between
the two sides on many controversial issues, especially the Kashmir issue. Everything had been arranged and
settled for the signing of a joint declaration at the end of the talks when suddenly India sent in two more
points for inclusion in the draft declaration. First, the need to stop cross-border terrorism and second, that
the talks were a continuation of the Simla agreement and the Lahore accord. At this Pakistan also sent in a
point about the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir to be taken into consideration. Due to this the
declaration could not be signed and had to be abandoned.
Some people argued that President General Pervez Musharaf s breakfast meeting with the senior editors
was resented by the hawks in the Indian cabinet and thus led to the final collapse of the talks. The Indian
hardliners were not happy with the Indian position on Kashmir in the proposed declaration. P.M. Vajpayee
was unable to sign the declaration in his own discretion given the weaker position of his multi-party
coalition govt.
Three main factors can be held responsible for the failure of the Agra summit; one, neither India nor
Pakistan was in a negotiating mode; two, neither country had made an attempt to educate the other about
itself; three, neither side seemed to know the threshold to which the other could be pushed, especially on
Kashmir. According to Dr. Mohammad Waseem, ”India followed a confidence building approach to the
Musharaf-Vajpayee summit. On the other hand, Pakistan took a conflict resolution approach to the dialogue
between the two leaders. The former overestimated the potential of CBMs to deliver where decades of
diplomacy had failed. The latter overestimated the capacity of an issue specific strategy to lead to a meeting
of minds across a gap of trust spread over half a century”.
However, the summit was not fruitless. It internationalized the issue of Kashmir and made the Pakistan
stand point on the issue clear to the world and successfully demonstrated its readiness to resolve the issue
peacefully.
KASHMIR ISSUE AFTER 09/11
The events of 09/11 have brought overwhelming consequences for both the global and regional politics. Its
impact on the Kashmir issue is not ignorable. The anti-terrorism campaign caused serious blow to the
Kashmiri freedom security. The whole international community agreed on
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSl’ES
407
a one-point agenda to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestation, everywhere in the world. The
world is no more ready to tolerate any type of insurgency in the name of self-determination and freedom.
Terrorists and freedom fighters are no more distinguishable groups to the world. In such circumstances
Kashmiri freedom fighters cannot maintain the status of their domestic insurgency against India as a
legitimate freedom struggled. Most of the Kashmiri Jihadi groups are outlawed and declared as terrorist
groups creating restlessness in Kashmir.
Pakistan, comprehending the situation carefully, brought gigantic changes in its Kashmir policy. It had to
give up its decade old policy of supporting Kashmiri freedom fighters to ’bleed India’. The U-turn of
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy was manifested by a swift move to outlaw many Jihadee groups and crack down
over the religious extremists by the government of Pakistan.
India had adopted a high profile since September 2001 in seeking to brand the insurgency in Kashmir as
concerted campaign of foreign terrorism against India, sponsored by Pakistan and possibly linked with
AlQaeda as well. India had thus set the stage for an intense reaction to Pakistan in the event of any major
terrorist incident inside could be linked to Pakistan and used as a trigger. India got an opportunity to
materialize the post 9/11 scenario in its own favour. Some unknown terrorists attached Indian parliament
on 13th December, 2001. Indian security guards effectively disrupted the suicide attack before the gunmen
could enter the building of the parliament. The ensuing shootout resulted in the death of all five attackers
and nine security guards and paramilitary troops. No member of the parliament was injured or dead. Indian
Intelligence Agencies claimed through tracing cell-phone calls made by the attackers that they belonged to
Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, among the most violent of the organizations active in Kashmir
and well known to be Pakistani in origin. India used this occasion, nevertheless, to accuse Pakistan of
sponsoring the attack. Three days after the attack on the parliament, the New Delhi Police Commissioner
issued a report that tenuously connected the Pakistani ISI with a collaborator in the conspiracy. India
quickly mounted a campaign of ”coercive diplomacy” clocked in the same themes that President Bush used
in launching the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, implicitly threatening pre-emptive war on Pakistan
to root out terrorists. India dramatically cut off all the means of communication with Pakistan, recalled its
ambassador from Islamabad, placed constraints on Pakistan’s ambassador in Delhi, and initiated a
mobilization of the bulk of its military forces along the border with Pakistan and began moving the leading
edge of its naval combatants towards the Arabian sea to hover opposite Karachi. List of twenty
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t ONTFMPORARY INTFRNATIONA1 ISSt FS
409
fugitives, accused of compliance in the attack, was handed ov er to Pakistan for immediate extradition
Underneath this Indian brinkmanship, India’s prime objective was to exploit it for coercive diplomacy
objectives India’s overt aim was to force Pakistan to outlaw militant organizations operating across the line
in the Indian-held Kashmir and to get the support of international community for this purpose In essence,
India hoped to seal off Kashmir irrevocably from Pakistani influence, to dram the Kashmiri struggle for
independence at its roots and to turn Kashmir into a normal state inside the Indian Union Taking advantage
of the war on terrorism, India sought to stigmatize Pakistan permanently in the eyes of the world as a
terrorist state, thereby marginalizing its external influence altogether In fact, India largely succeeded in
achieving these objectives, at least for the time being, although how far it succeeded in stigmatizing and
marginalizing Pakistan remains to be seen
President Musharaf s immediate response to India’s brinkmanship was two fold He put the Pakistani Army
on ”high alert” and threatened to retaliate with force if India took ”any kind of precipitous action” He
denied any role of Pakistan in the terrorist attack and called on India to provide evidence to support its
claims On the other hand Musharaf announced measures to reign in Islamic radicalism at home By the first
week of January 2002, about 200 militants were arrested including Masood Azhar (founder of Jaish-e-
Mohammad) and Hafiz Mohammad Saeed (head of Lashkar-e-Taiba) Formal ban was announced on many
extremist groups including Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, the two extremist organizations
implicated by Delhi in the attack on its parliament
Indian officials insisted that the infiltration of Pakistan-based extremist groups into the Indian-controlled
Kashmir must stop and extremists still operating in the valley should be called back India kept the military
confrontation in place to squeeze maximum concessions from Pakistan India also used missile testing to
attract media attention in the West as a means to escalate pressure on Pakistan
Amidst this military stand off another crisis erupted that added into the graveness of the situation In May
2002, a suicide attack was made on a bus load of civilians and the family quarters of an Indian army camp
in Jammu, by Kashmiri Mujahideen The event claimed the lives of 30 persons The Indians alleged that the
perpetrators of this attack were Pakistanis, who had recently infiltrated into the Indian held Kashmir
Despite the fact that two organizations in IHK (the Al-Mansooreen and the Jarmat-ul-Mujahideen) claimed
the responsibility, Indians insisted that the
attack was the handwork of Lashkar-e-Taiba or Jaish-e-Mohammad or both together Actually the Indians
wanted to clarify that even though these organizations were banned in Pakistan, they still continued to
operate
From Pakistan s perspective, the attack was designed to sabotage American efforts to bring about a de-
escalation of tension between India and Pakistan, a resumption of dialogue and a withdraw al of the armies
of the two countries currently deployed on the borders
American and British dignitaries paid frequent \ isits to South Asia to de-escalate the tension between India
and Pakistan But India did not come down from its intransigent position, denied to pull back its forces from
the borders and to resume dialogue with Pakistan India maintained that war footing for over six months and
has only partially released that pressure in late August 2002 India got very little from the expensive military
showdown Mujahideen are still active in the Indian-held Kashmir, infiltration could not be stopped
completely, as the Indians accuse and Pakistan is still a front-line state in the contemporary world politics
On the contrary the recent happenings, especially the threat of a nuclear war has in real terms
internationalized the Kashmir issue Pakistan’s readiness to stop incursions at the US urgings has opened the
opportunity for international community’s engagement in resolving the root causes of the issue
India is attempting to move on multiple fronts in desperate efforts to adequately manage the insurgency in
the Indian-held Kashmir It plans to use the carrot and stick approach To begin with, India attempted to split
up the All Parties Humyat Conference (APHC) Many of the top leadership of the APHC were imprisoned,
and one was martyred with unfulfilled expectation that his murder could be laid on Pakistan’s doorstep
Despite all this the APHC remained resolutely unified in the occupied Kashmir So the Indian govt had no
choice but to try to bring around APHC to participate m the forthcoming elections On this front too the
Indian govt could not make much headway Indian intransigence not to dialogue with Pakistan seemed to be
affected by the fact that India was trying to use the elections to demonstrate to the world that it can resolve
the Kashmir issue unilaterally But like Indian earlier attempts, this time too it could not succeed in this
venture The elections were highly rigged and were boycotted by APHC The results of the elections were
rejected by Pakistan along with APHC and even America was not satisfied with it All that drama of fake
elections proved one thing that the issue can’t be resolved unilaterally by India and resolving the issue
needs something more than mere elections Election is a democratic process and can’t be conducted under
strict controlled environment Unless the people of Kashmir are given their right of self-determination, no
election will bear fruit
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411
Pakistan’s current Kashmir policy is also based on the same principle to give more and more share to the
voice of Kashmiris in resolving the issue of Kashmir. Kashmir is a political and not a military problem. It
can be solved by tripartite dialogue between India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris.
CEASEFIRE AND RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUES
India has always tried, as mentioned before, to resolve the problem of Kashmir unilaterally, but it could not
achieve its desired objectives. India has always been insisting that Kashmir issue is not an international
issue rather a domestic problem of India. But the continued chaos and growing sufferings of Indian army in
the valley brought India round to the fact that the issue cannot be resolved without engaging Pakistan in a
constructive dialogue.
The ice was broken by Mr. Vajpayee in his speech at Srinagar on April 18,
2003, where he offered talks with Pakistan on all bilateral issues including Kashmir. Since then the political
climate of South Asia has been improving through a number of CBMs from the neighbors. The proceeding
events gave a silver lining to the resolution of the Kashmir issue.
On November 25, 2003, PM Jamali made a path breaking announcement calling for unilateral and
unconditional ceasefire along the Line of Control. The guns fell silent along the LOC for the first time in
the history of Kashmir issue, when India reciprocated the cease fire in kind. The move was appreciated
very much by the international community.
Another important development regarding Kashmir dispute was the statement of President Musharaf in
which he publicly accepted that Pakistan is ready to set aside the UN resolutions on Kashmir if there was
any other possible solution of the issue. It was a remarkable shift in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy where it
normalized its traditional position on Kashmir. President Musharaf s new approach towards the resolution
of Kashmir issue consists of three stages.
At the first stage, the two countries should and must start a dialogue. At the second stage, they shall accept
the importance and centrality of the dispute. At the final stage, they should eliminate the solutions
unacceptable to Pakistan, India and the people of Kashmir. Then they should go for a solution acceptable to
all. This new approach shows clearly the normalization of the traditional standpoint of Pakistan. President
Musharaf has been repeatedly emphasizing that both countries need to move beyond their stated positions
for the resolution of the Kashmir issue.
Another breakthrough came around during the SAARC Summit at Islamabad in Vajpayee-Musharaf
meeting on January 5, 2004. Both the leaders agreed to start a composite dialogue covering all the bilateral
issues including Kashmir. Given the improved relations between India and Pakistan and the flurry of CBMs
between the two, one can really hope a bright future for the peace process in South Asia. India, in the recent
months, has not only stopped the ”cross-border terrorism” rhetoric but also acknowledged a considerable
reduction in the cross-border infiltration. All these show a positive change in moods on both sides.
Another major development regarding the Kashmir dispute is the negotiation of APHC leadership with the
Indian leaders. It is a remarkable shift in the India traditional policy where talks with Kashmiris were
always denied. For the first time India has virtually engaged the Kashmiri leadership in the tripartite peace
process.
BUS SERVICE
India and Pakistan, though under intense pressure from the US and other major powers, are now engaged in
their ”composite” dialogue, which offers them the best opportunity to resolve their outstanding issues,
including the Kashmir issue
India and Pakistan on 16th Feb, in a high delegation meeting between Foreign Ministers agreed, as part of
their ongoing peace process to restart a bus service between the Indian Kashmir summer capital Srinagar
and Muzaffarabad, the capital of the Pakistani zone of the divided Himalayan state.
The service was halted in 1947 when the two nuclear-armed rivals first went to war over Kashmir. The
buses will stop at the Loc. Passengers will have to cross by foot between the Indian and Pakistani
checkpoints. The bus carrying passengers from Srinagar to the Loc will return with passengers who have
arrived from Muzaffarabad. Kashmir have issued permits, which Kashmir is will use instead of passports
and visas.
The neighbors, who hold Kashmir in parts but who both claim it in full, began a slow-moving peace
dialogue after Islamabad summit in 2004, The service, to start on April 7, is the first tangible fruit of 13
months of dialogue between the neighbors. The and February agreed to restart the bus service is he most
visible sign of progress of CBM.the Indian prime minister will fly to Srinagar to flag off the service. Bus
service is considered as journey towards peace.
412
•Since 9/11. the world has changed. Violence of all sorts is today an anathema to the world community.
There is no place for any kind of militancy, not even in the name of freedom struggles, in the current global
environment. The distinction between people’s liberation struggles and terrorism has almost blurred.
Dialogue and constructive engagement remain the only acceptable means of resolving disputes. Economic
cooperation and market forces are now the inexorable forces that impel mutual relations.
BAGLIHAR DAM
Pakistan had raised objection over the design of kishanganga storage and hydropower project being built by
India on river Neelum. By this project Neelum will be diverged to river Jehlum through a tunnel, which
will leave impact on Pakistan water use.
Pakistan raised three technical points and want its to be resolved through negotiation. First, India has not
provided no an outlet to original route of the river, which means its flow of water would be reduced by
about
27%, reducing the3 power generation capacity of the proposed 969 Mw Neelum Jehlum hydropower
project in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
The design suggested that India was diverting the Neelum River through a 22 Km tunnel to Wullar Lake on
river Jehlum, while under the treaty India have no right to divert one tributary to another. Third, the
construction of kishanganga project could cause a water shortage of eight to nine percent. Signed in 1960,
the Indus Water Treaty was aimed to attain the most complete and satisfactory utilization of the water of
Indus system. However, Baglihar dam construction emerged as a big problem and threat to the treaty. The
negotiation in the two countries broke down. Pakistan has gone to the World Bank for interpretation of
certain clauses of treaty. The course of events is unfortunate. The spirit of Treaty is not being respected.
This 450 Mw hydropower project is being constructed by India on the Chenab River of its side in disputed
Kashmir since 1999.
As for as Pakistan is concerned, the dispute arose because India started construction work on the Baglihar
dam project with out informing Islamabad. Which is the violation of Indus basin Treaty of 1960, Pakistan
has exclusive right on western rivers, Jehlum, Chenab and Indus, while Eastern Rivers, Ravi, Beas, and
Sutlej belongs to India. Its height is 308 meter, which is 4.5 meter high than the lake and Pakistan also
expressed its objection over the construc9iton of gates, while Indians are of the view that construction of
gate structure in necessary. Its live storage is 30400 and dead storage capacity is 291000 cusec feet.
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Beside this India has already finalized 10 Hydal power projects. To exploit the hydal potential of
Himalayans. Some of these projects are under various stage of construction, including Bursar with an
installed capacity of
1010 Mw and a dam height of 252 meters.
Having exhausted diplomatic route of bilateral discussion. Pakistan has finally decided to refer the question
of Baglihar to the would bank for appointment of a neutral expert
There is a danger that the failure to resolve differences over the Baglihar dam may cast a shadow on the
ongoing composite dialogue including Bus Service and Gas pipe line from Iran to India.
CYPRUS
Cyprus is the third largest island in the Mediterranean, having an area of 3,572 square miles and being
approximately 140 miles in length. It is situated some 40 miles to the south of Turkey, 60 miles west of
Syria and
240 miles north of Egypt. Nicosia is the capital.
It was the base territory in the Eastern Mediterranean where Britain retained sovereignty, in spite of
forceful nationalist movements in the Middle East. Cyprus was acquired by the British in 1878 to protect
the Suez Canal from Russian threat to penetrate into Africa. Britain was forced to end its occupation of the
Suez Canal Zone, and it decided to select Cyprus as the site for its new Middle East base, from which it
could assist Turkey in the defence of Asia Minor. It was decided that the island should remain in Britain’s
occupation until Russia restored and quits the other conquests made during the war of 1877-78.
The island was annexed by Britain in November 1914, when Turkey entered the war during World War I
against Britain and its allies. In
1915, the island was offered to Greece in return for Greek support to Serbia, but the offer was rejected. In
1925, it was made a Crown colony and a Legislative Council was established. Turkey gave up all its claims
by the Treaty of Lausanne and it recognised British sovereignty in 1924. In 1931, serious riots took place in
Cyprus as a result of Enosis demonstration. Enosis (Union with Greece) was for years a rallying point for
all Cypriots opposed to foreign rule. Result was the burning of Government House and suspension of the
Constitution which continued till the Second World War. Later the movement led by the Ethnarch,
Archbishop Makarios, united two major parties, the Right wing which was pledged to support the Greek
Monarchy and the Left wing reform party of working people, known as A.K.E.L. (a communist party).
From 1944 to 1948, while the communists
414
were busy in a civil war in Greece, this party advocated independence for Cyprus.
After the war, the British Government suggested in 1948, a Legislative Council consisting of 26 members
out of which only four were to be nominees. But this, proposal was rejected and a plebiscite was demanded.
As there was no proper channel through which the people could express their disapproval of the British
policies, the Enosis parties resorted to strikes and riots which were intensified in 1954 as a result of transfer
of British military headquarters from Egypt to Cyprus. The British Government’s decision to make Cyprus
the Middle East base was resented by the people. The situation became more serious when Premier Sir
Anthony Eden made a statement in response to Cypriot protests that the issue was closed and Cyprus was
British property w ith which Britain would do what it pleased, Suggestions were put forward that the
Cyprus base should be made NATO responsibility under some sort of association consisting of Britain,
Greece and Turkey. The main obstacle was the attitude of the Turkish-speaking population who objected to
coming under the rule of the Greek-speaking majority. They were also being supported by the Turkish
Government. Meanwhile, situation became serious in Cyprus and demonstrations were started. Government
tried to suppress them, but violence increased. Government was forced to give way and the issue previously
declared to be closed, was reopened. Discussion with Archbishop Makarios were held without any result.
The Suez incident convinced the leaders of Great Britain that Cyprus was not a convenient base for Middle
East. It was realised that Cyprus had only two ports, which had limited capacity. At the same time, it was
not suitable for the Navy or the Army. In short, the military authorities were convinced that Cyprus could
never serve as a Middle East base.
Makarios was released in 1957 and was allowed to proceed to Greece after 13 months’ detention.
Emergency regulations were relaxed and Government was prepared to make more concessions.
In February 1959 an agreement concluded by Greece, Turkey and UK. and declared acceptable by the
Greek and Turkish Cypriots by which Cyprus was to become independent, but UK was to retain
sovereignty over the areas containing its military bases. The essence of the settlement was that the
parliament was to comprise 70% of the Turkish population. The President was to be Greek-speaking and
vice-president Turkish, and each was to have separate vote on foreign affairs, defence, security and other
domestic legislation. The Cabinet and Civil Services were to be shared
415
between the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots according to the proportion of population in the
ratio of 70 to 30.
On 14th December. 1959. Archbishop Makarios was proclaimed President under the agreement concluded
in July 1959 and certain military facilities were granted to Great Britain. At the elections to the House of
Representatives held on July 31, 1960, the Patriotic front, supporting. Archbishop Makarios, won 30 seats
A.K.E.L. 5 seats and the Turkish Nationalist supporting the Vice-President. Dr. Fazil Kutchuk. 15 seats.
The old settlement could not work for long and a crisis occurred in December 1963, when Makarios
disclosed his intention of amending the Constitution by weakening some of the safeguards it provided for
the Turkish community, since they gave the Turkish representative a right of Veto. Both sides took violent
steps and a sort of civil war in the country started. Turkey had to intervene to save the Turkish Cypriots
from the Greek Cypriots who were in the majority. For the time being, peace was restored with the help of
the United Nations and discussions were started for a new solution which could satisfy both sides.
The Makarios regime forfeited Turkish confidence by its performance. It not only failed to curb the EOKA
militants, the crusaders of union with remote Greece, but it also dragged its feet over the implementation of
the agreements. The quota fixed for Turkish representation in the Civil Service, Army and Security Forces
was ignored.
On March 4, the Security Council recommended the establishment of UN Peacekeeping Force and the
appointment of a mediator for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the
problem in accordance with the Charter of the UN.
On the departure of the UN Cyprus Mediator, Mr. Sahari, Mr. Erim told him in August 1964 that they were
”ready to consider a new status for Cyprus provided that the rights and safety of the Turkisli community
and Turkey were safeguarded. If there was any modification of the Zurich agreement regarding the status of
Cyprus, then Turkey must obtain satisfactory concessions in return.” In return for this, the Greek forces to
NATO were withdrawn, which was a major step towards a peaceful solution of the Cyprus problem. Strong
US pressure was believed to have been behind this decision of the Greek Government.
After the crisis of 1964, the situation in Cyprus remained explosive, In spite of Turkey-US pressure and UN
efforts, peace could nqt be achieved. Obviously there could be no peace until some settlement to the
satisfaction of Turkey and Greece could be found. The beginning of direct negotiations between Turkey
and Greece on the future of Cyprus in second week of September, 1967, raised hopes of an ultimate
solution. But as usual, the Greek attitude in favour of Enosis (the merger of Cyprus with Greece) was the
main stumbling block on the way to peaceful solution. ”Times”, London, reported that Turkey was willing
to agree to Enosis for a price. And the price was allowing Turkey a military base on the Island of Cyprus
from which to safeguard the interests of the Turkish Cypriots. But as the history of this conflict shows, that
such a solution would not be acceptable to Turkey, because if Greece allowed a NATO base, it could
demand its removal in future.
Suddenly in November 1967, again erupted the flames of war in Cyprus. The crisis started as usual with
Greek Cypriots offensive against the Turkish Cypriots villages. Turkey reacted to these brutalities sharply
and gave warning that any fresh fighting in Cyprus could mean war with Greece.
Meanwhile, peace emissaries from Secretary-General U Thant and President Johnson rushed to the scene.
The NATO Secretary-General also came to pacify the parties. However, it fell to the lot of US envoy,
Vance, to bring round the parties. Turkey insisted that she was going to use force to protect the Turkish
minority in Cyprus unless her demands were accepted. Main demands were:
(1) Recall of General Grivas.
(2) Withdrawal of Greek troops in excess of the 1950 men limit allowed under the 1960 Independence
Treaties. Greece had illegally amassed between 10,000 to 15,000 troops on the island following the crisis of
1964.
(3) Disarmament of 10,000 Cypriot national guards.
(4) Assurances that such incidents will not be repeated.
The Greek Government had no alternative but to accept the demands. The first indication of retreat came in
the immediate recall of General Grivas from Cyprus. After detailed negotiations, the peace plan that came
out combined all the Turkish demands with slight changes.
In the last week of December 1967, Cypriot Turks established a transitional Government headed by Dr.
Fazil Kutchuk with an executive council. It was to administer Turkish-controlled areas of the Island. The
Greeks immediately reacted to it and declared that these steps were virtual partition of the Island. President
Makarios called the new Government unlawful. The then UN Secretary-General U Thant started mediation
between the parties to explore ground for a permanent settlement. As a result, Turkish and Greek Cypriot
leaders held meetings in June 1968. They wanted to formulate the future shape of rights and responsibilities
of the two communities in an independent Cyprus.
A major international crisis broke out in Cyprus as a result of the overthrow of President Makarios on July
15, 1974, by a military coup d’etat by Greek Officers of the Cypriot National Guard. The seeds of the coup
were sown when in a lengthy letter on July, 2, to General Phaedon Ghizikis, the then Greek President,
Archbishop Makarios accused the Greek Government of conspiring to seize power in Cyprus and to
assassinate him and strongly demanded the immediate withdrawal of the 650 Greek Officers of the Cypriot
National Guard. He also disclosed his firm intention of loosening, and finally removing, the Greek
stranglehold over the National Guard.
The first announcement of the coup came from the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation on July 15, which
said, ”The National Guard intervened today to stop internecine war between Greeks. Makarios is dead”.
The radio also announced that Nicos Sampson,, a Greek-Cypriot Deputy Leader of the Progressive Party
and publisher of a daily newspaper ’Machi, (Battle), and with a past record of terrorist activities, had been
sworn in as President of the Republic. On July 16, he announced the formation of a Government, most of
whose members were said to favour Enosis. On the same day, it was confirmed that Archbishop Makarios
was alive and he reached Britain the following day.
However what by now appeared inevitable, materialised before long. At dawn on July 20, Turkish troops
landed in force near Kyrenia, on the north coast of Cyprus. Heavy fighting ensued, with the Greek National
Guard and Greek Cypriot irregulars putting up a stiff resistance. By the time cease-fire came into force on
July 22, following the Security Council Resolution, the Turkish Army had captured Kyrenia, was in control
of the
1 6-mile road linking Kyrenia and Nicosia and had established itself in the Turkish Cypriot quarter of
Nicosia.
The cease-fire resolution adopted by the Security Council (Resolution 353 of 1974) ”deplored” the
outbreak of violence and stressed the necessity ”to restore the constitutional structure of the Republic of
Cyprus established and guaranteed by international agreements.” Following the cease-fire on July 22, the
UN Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) was, at Dr. Waldheim’s appeal, reinforced to a figure of 5,000 and it
took control of Nicosia airport.
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The first phase of talks between the Greek and Turkish representatives ended on July 30, in agreement on a
cease-fire line and the establishment of a security zone between the Greek and Turkish forces. However,
the breakdown of the second phase of the talks dealing with the constitutional future of Cyprus led on
August 14, to renewed hostilities and a second cease-fire two days later. It left Turkey in control of 1/3 of
Cyprus north of the so-called ”Attila line.” Turkey now began to reemphasise its demand for a federal state
with two autonomous administrations of Turk and Greek Cypriots. But Greek did not agree to this.
Archbishop Makarios returned to Cyprus on December 7, 1974, to resume his Presidential function. His
return was preceded by the talks in London and Athens between himself and Mr. Clerides, the acting
President of Cyprus, and the British and Greek Governments.
On the international scene in a bid to intimidate Turkey and obtain concessions from her on the Cyprus
issue, the American military assistance to Turkey was suspended on December 10, 1974, under legislation
passed by the Congress in October after President Ford had vetoed two previous measures. The excuse was
that Turkey had violated US foreign aid laws by using American supplied equipment in the invasion of
Cyprus.
Turkey retaliated by proclaiming, on February 13, 1975, a Turkish Cypriot Federated State in that part of
the island under Turkish control. Denktash said the new state would not seek international recognitions but
reaffirmed that a federation was the only solution acceptable to TurkishCypriots. This proclamation was
denounced by Archbishop Makarios and the Greek Prime Minister Kamamalis.
As the US Embargo on Turkey continued, the Turkish Government after a series of warnings, in August
1975, took control of all US bases on Turkish soil which, later on, were restored to US.
Various rounds of inter-communal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, Glafcos Clerides and
Rauf Denktash were held in Vienna on July 31-August 2, and in New York on September 10, 1975. At the
third round, it was agreed that 9,000 Turkish Cypriots from the Greececontrolled area should be allowed to
rejoin in Turkish area and the 10,000 Greek Cypriots already in the north should be allowed to stay and to
be joined by their 800 relatives from the South. Other matters remained inconclusive. Simultaneously, there
came an improvement of US-Turkish relationship when President Ford on October 7, signed a bill lifting
the arms embargo against Turkey imposed in February, 1975.
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CYPRUS AND TURKEY BID FOR EU
The peace plan for Cyprus put forward by UN Secretary General Annan in April; 2004.It was an historic
opportunity to resolve 30-year division. The island remained ”divided and militarized” as it joins the
European Union on 1 May.The EU has signalled that it will seek ways to end the economic isolation of the
Turkish Cypriot state.
Over three-quarters of Greek Cypriots voted ”no” on 24 April 2004 referendum, unhappy at limits on their
right to return to property in the Turkish North.Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, endorsed the plan with a 65%
majority, seeing it as a way to end the international isolation they have endured since Turkish troops
invaded the island in 1974.
Mehmet Ali Talat, prime minister of the self-declared Turkish state in the north of the island, supported the
UN peace plan which goes to the vote on both sides of the border on 24 April. Greek Cypriot President
Tassos Papadopoulos, who urged voters to reject the plan, said he remained committed to reaching a deal
with the north. While Cypriot Communications Minister Kikis Kazamias announced his resignation, citing
his disagreement with Mr Papadopoulos1 stance. Turkish Cypriots allowed Many Greek Cypriots refugees
who fled the Turkish assault to return and recover some of the land they lost.
Ankara’s backing for the plan was seen by analysts to be partly because it wants to boost its own chances
of EU membership. After rejecting UN peace, turkey announced that Greek Cypriots did not deserve to
recognize, which Turkish Cypriots supported. As a compromise to become a member of EU, Turkey agreed
to extend an existing trade accord to the newest 10 E.U It will mean granting effective recognition to the
Greek Cypriot government, but gives Turkey more time to sell the idea to its people.
Turkey has been recognized as a candidate state for EU membership since the 1999 Helsinki European
Council and has been an associate member of the EU since 1963. According to the decision reached at the
Brussels Council in December 2004, accession negotiations are scheduled to start with Ankara on 3
October 2004. Some objection are creating hurdle in turkey member ship.
The principal economic objections to Turkish membership, centers on the relative underdevelopment of
Turkey’s economy compared to the economies of EU members and Turkey’s high rate of population
growth. The latter issue is perceived as a potentially serious problem because of free labor movement
among EU members and the fact that Turkey’s already
420
large population is expected to surpass that of Germany-the most populous EU member-by 2010. The
political obstacles to EU membership concern Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. EU members have
also expressed reservations about Turkey’s human rights record. Amnesty International and Helsinki
Watch, two human rights monitoring organizations supported by the EU, have reported the persistence of
practices such as arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extra judicial killings, torture in prisons, and censorship.
In terms of foreign policy, the main obstacle to EU membership remains the unresolved issues between
Turkey and EU member Greece. Turkey agreed to have trade relation with Greece Cyprus in December
meeting with EU.
The deal clears the way for Turkey - large, poor and overwhelmingly Muslim - to start entry talks in
October 2005 However, French President Jacques Chirac stressed that Turkey’s membership of the EU was
still not guaranteed, and promised the issue would eventually be put to a referendum in Frnce Under the
agreement.
SITUATION IN LEBANON
Lebanon presents the typical case of a multicommunal polity torn with strife due to the interplay of
domestic and foreign factors. Though the country is enjoying a bit relief after the 15 years long internal
turmoil, peace appears fragile because the fundamental ingredients of the conflict, domestic delicate
political situation, foreign intervention, social dichotomies, administrative vacuum etc. still provide reason
to speculate resumption of hostilities unless certain fundamental changes to eradicate these negativities are
effected.
A national pact was concluded in 1943, verbally between the Christian President and the Muslim Premier.
The covenant provided for an independent Lebanon, which would maintain fraternal relations with the
Arab world. It also divided the political and administrative posts along sectarian lines. According to 1932
census, the Christians constituted a slight majority and the maronite Catholics were the single largest
religious group. Therefore, they out-numbered Muslims in important posts. The constitutional system of
Lebanon was arranged as such that the President has to be a Christian, the Premier a Sunni Muslim and the
Speaker of the Parliament a Shia Muslim. In 1975, Muslims constituted 60% of the population roughly
besides the 3,000 stateless Palestinians and guerillas. It is important to note that a basic tension had always
existed between Christians and the Muslims, and the sectarian differences had been flourishing for quite a
long time. In this atmosphere, the Muslims demanded the reformation in the political system on the basis of
their majority. The presence of guerillas in the country gave the military strength to the Muslims to acquire
their rights by force, if need be.
421
There were various political parties in Lebanon. Heterogeneity of the society can be viewed by the fact that
there are 17 religious sects in 2.6 million population. Notable among the Christians was Pierre Gemayel’s
party, known as ’Phalangists’ a predominantly Christian right wing Lebanese nationalist party founded in
1956. Among the Muslims was the Socialists Progressive Party known as National Movement, headed by
Kamal Jumblat, with the force of 7,000 Druze fighters alongwith other leftist Muslim groups and
Palestinian ’Fidayeens’ .
Initially, there started clashes between the Guerillas and the Christian dominated Lebanese army in 1973. In
May 1974, there erupted clashes between the rival Palestinian factions. As a result of this, the 15 years old
Government Takieddinal-Sulh resigned. In the beginning of 1975, severe fighting between Palestinian
commandos and the Israeli forces led to the counter-reprisal by the Israelis, adding more unrest and
disruption in Lebanon internally.
Clashes between Phalangists and Palestinians were renewed in
1975. Government remained ineffective, as the situation had gone out of its control. The civil war entered
in its most destructive phase in April when a Muslim bus was ambushed by the Christians and the
passengers were slain ruthlessly. From thence, there had been 35 cease-fires innumerable political
dialogues, formation of many supervisory committees, but all in vain. On January 23, 1976 a Pax-Syrianna
was imposed by Syria in order to restore peace but that also failed. Actually leftist Muslims wanted the
overturning of antiquated sectarian system of distributing the power. In words of Mr. Jumblat:
”We want to westernise this country as a secular, democratic state. We can no longer be segregated as
Druzis, Sunni Muslims or minorities. This system makes this country look like a zoo, full of different kinds
of animals. It is really indignified to be a part of it.”
President Suleman Franjieh, whose 6-year tenure was to run till September 23, 1976, was the principal
obstacle to peace. He had stubbornly opposed the political benefits, the Muslims had sought in a country
traditionally dominated by maronite Christians. He was also against the general amnesty to the officers.
The Syrian President, Hafez Assad who originally intervened on behalf of fellow Muslims, became the
protector of Franjieh in order to avoid the division of Lebanon. Syria intervened militarily in a cautious
manner with the tacit approval of USA and without provoking Israel. But Syria was facing another
dilemma, that there was a serious fear of confrontation between leftist Muslims and Syrians, which might
benefit Israel only.
422
The results of this civil strife had also great importance for Israel because Lebanon had remained neutral in
the three Arab-Israel wars. If it was changed into a socialist country, Israel would have a troubled flank of
49 miles on her Southern side. Therefore, Israel by prolonging and complicating the crisis wanted to create
the conditions to interfere in Lebanon to occupy the Southern part, and secondly, by creating more
animosity between Muslims and Christians, it could present the Arabs with the fait accompli of the division
and thirdly, wanted to reduce the Palestinian guerrilla activities from the Lebanese border.
In the South of Lebanon Maj. Haddad, a Christian soldier was able to carve out an area of his influence.
This area had an estimated population of about 100,000 inhabitants. Maj. Haddad, who had a force of about
2,500 men enjoyed the support of the Israelis. Slowly this area developed into a buffer between the Muslim
Palestinians and Israel, thus reducing the Palestinian raids to a great extent. Maj. Haddad pronounced the
establishment of an independent state in April 1979.
Another factor which weakened the position of the government, was the frequent Israeli raids on the
Palestinian position. Many a time the Israeli forces crossed the borders and attacked the Palestinians in
order to teach them a lesson. Besides the ground attacks, the Israeli air force launched frequent attacks on
Muslim positions.
The month of June 1982, brought in its wake tremendous trials and tribulation for the Palestinians. By all
showing, Israel was determined to infest west Beirut where Yasser Arafat’s Mujahideen had their sanctuary
and Headquarters and from where they launched their attacks against Israel. Therefore, the latter resolved
to liquidate it. For this end in view, Israeli Forces besieged this vital area resulting in 6,000 Palestinian
Mujahideen being trapped leaving no outlet for their escape. Israelis resorted to terror raids on their
positions, in an effort to demoralise them. They were held out the choice of surrender or total destruction.
Day by day their plight worsened as the Israeli aggressors cut off their water supply and reduced them to a
state of utter helplessness. Yasser Arafat declared unequivocally that he would prefer total annihilation to
humiliating surrender to Israel. He urged that he was inclined to lay down arms to Syria without let or
hindrance under UN peacekeeping Security Force. Throughout this devasting crisis Americans stood by its
stooge Israel and supported their stand on Palestinians unconditional capitulation.
Most of the Western Countries bitterly rallied against Israel and denounced their policy of genocide of
Palestinians.
423
The entire world of Islam continued to unanimously champion the cause of the Palestinians. The leaders of
the Middle Eastern states held hurried meetings at which they discussed ways and means to succour the
besieged Palestinians. Iran and Libya showed readiness to dispatch their forces to Lebanon. Iraq agreed to
give passage to the Iranian troops to get to the theatre of war to encounter the Israeli forces in Lebanon.
Finding his position untenable, Yasser Arafat came out with the proposal that his troops be allowed to leave
by road to Syria with all their weapons. Disdainfully spurning it, President Reagan declared that he would
deploy units of the Sixth Fleet for the evacuation of Palestinians to an unknown destination. As expected,
Russia vehemently reacted to this move, President Brezhnev of Soviet Union sent a strongly worded note to
President Reagan warning him of the disastrous consequences.
Since 1981 until July 1988, Iraq was engaged in a conflict with ”Iran and had little time or resources to
spare for the Lebanese factions. After the cease-fire in the Gulf War, Iraq supported the Christian
Government of Gen. Michael.
There was great bloodletting in 1975-76 and again during Israel’s invasion of 1982. Otherwise most battles
had been small contests for leadership within the respective camps, not between them. The country
developed a well-understood system of sectarian cantons policed by private armies.
The fighting began again when General Michael Aoun, the Christian commander of Lebanon’s official
army pushed his power beyond his own enclave. He did so in the name of a central authority that had
disappeared in September 1988, when parliament failed to pick a successor to President Amin Gemayel.
The departing President made General Aoun head of administration that was not recognised by the
Muslims who promptly formed an administration of their own under Prime Minister Selim al Hoss. For a
few months, the arrangement was accepted and became the new status quo. Later it had been jeopardised
by the fighting. Under the Lebanese constitution the president of the country has always to be a Maronite
Christian, its Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of its parliament a Shiite Muslim.
To resolve the impasse arising out of General Aoun’s intransigence to accept the civilian authority, talks
were initiated. The General took the stance that unless the Syrian troops were withdrawn from Lebanon, no
talks would be possible. He was instigated to this stance by Israel which wanted Syria out of Lebanon.
However, as a result of Taif Conference in October
424
1989, the other parties agreed to recognise the proposed Presidentship of President Elias Harawi until
elections were held. In the wake of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Syria was given free hand by the western
powers to flush out the forces of General Aoun and later demilitarisation of all militia in Beruit and pave
way for holding of general elections. A revised constitution envisaged more political leverage to the
Muslims. The elections were held in 1991 with Hizabullah emerging as major Muslim power. Sporadic
violence followed between rival militia. In the Arab-Israel peace talks initiated after the Gulf War, the
Lebanese government focused on the question of Israeli withdrawal from the southern part of the country.
With Israel refusing to comply, the Hizabullah continues to wage guerilla attacks on Israeli forces in the
security zone to be retaliated by Israel by bombing the Hizab positions. With the September, 1993 Israel-
PLO Accord, one could expect the resolution of the security zone issue. At that time, though domestic strife
had subsided to some extent, the persistent involvement of foreign factor remained the major irritant, thus
belimiting the chances of success for the emerging situation of relative peace.
CEDER REVOLUTION LEBANON
The ghastly assassination of former Lebanese prime minister and billionaire businessman, Rafik Hariri,
leaded to abrupt changes, which is called cedar revolution..
The Cedar Revolution is the name given to the chain of demonstrations in Lebanon, mainly in Beirut
triggered by the assassination of Rafik Hariri. It is also known as Lebanon’s ”Rabiee el Irz” (Cedar Spring),
in reference to the prevailing season when protests first broke out, and also in deference to other famous
freedom and independence movements like the Prague Spring. The primary goal of the Cedar Revolution
appears to be the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and a cessation of undue influence by Syria
on’Lebanese politics. During the period of the first wave of demonstrations, Syria had been maintaining a
force of roughly 14,000 soldiers and intelligence agents in Lebanon. These changes have precipitated, or at
least acted as a catalyst for, not only changes in the Syria-Lebanon relationship but within Syria’s own
body politic.
The significance of the word Cedar is in reference to a national emblem, the Lebanon Cedar, a tree featured
on the flag of Lebanon. The opposition has taken, as its symbol, the white and red scarf, and the pro-Hariri,
the blue ribbon.The movement’s motto was either Horryeh, Syedeh, Este’lel
( piNTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSl’ES
.425
en
/freedom, Sovereignty, Independence), or Ha’i’a, Horryeh. Wehdeh w(ftanieh (Truth, Freedom, National
unity).
ceâr will affect not only the relationship of the Levant with the rest of the Middle East, but may well
change the nature of the politics within the region, and in all likelihood, in many parts of the Islamic world.
This may se^med too sweeping a conclusion to draw from the tragic event in Beirut bu< much that has
happened since seems to bear it out.
weeks after the February 14 bomb blast killed Hariri, Prime Minister Karami felt compelled to resign
despite the fact that he clearly joyed a majority in parliament. It was the same parliament that had, under Sv
rian pressure, extended the term of President Lahoud and brought about Hariri’s resignation a few months
earlier.
Tjj,e resignation came apparently because of the outrage of the Lebanese people, or at least one section of
the people, which brought large crowds on to the streets of Beirut and had the streets echoing with
allegations that i’s government and Syrian intelligence were behind the assassination. March 9, however,
just a week or so after his resignation the prime mi nister was literally voted back in office.
Th*is followed a day after Hezbollah - that represents the Shia plurality in Le banon, was the principal
instrument in securing Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and is viewed as a supporter of Syria -
mounted a demonstration of more than half a million people easily dwarfing all the anî-Syria and anti-
government demonstrations held in Beirut’s Martyr’s §q uare earlier, and leaving no one in any doubt about
the political support t the Hezbollah could muster.
Hezbollah’s strength seemed to make it clear that it would be demonstrating against foreign interference in
Lebanon and not opposing Syrian wr-thdrawal, even while wanting the Lebanese to acknowledge the debt
they to Syria.
importantly, the Hezbollah wanted that the Syrian withdrawal should seen as an implementation of the Taif
agreement of 1989 rather than the TJJ.AI Security Council Resolution 1559, passed last year with joint US
and prênch sponsorship, which called for the complete withdrawal of Syrian folf ces and the rapid
disarming of the Hezbollah.
Ujîder the Taif agreement which brought the long running civil war in Lebanon to an end, the Syrians
agreed to withdraw their forces from the rest Of ’ Lebanon into the Bekaa Valley within two years and
thereafter hold
426
negotiations with the Lebanese agreement on a complete withdrawal. This agreement also permitted the
Hezbollah to retain its arsenal to fight the Israelis who at that time continued to occupy parts of southern
Lebanon. Hezbollah was formed in the early 1980s with Iranian support and won itself a broad measure of
support among the Lebanese Shias, who form the plurality of Lebanon’s population, by providing a broad
range of social services in the impoverished areas of Lebanon. Their real claim to support within Lebanon’s
broader population, however, flowed from their armed resistance to the Israeli occupation of southern
Lebanon.
The party was credited with having secured Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and for continuing
to maintain pressure on Israel with regard to the disputed Sheba farms on the Israel-Lebanon border.
Its ties with Syrian grew in part from the fact that Syria acted as the conduit for the assistance Hezbollah
received from Iran and in part from the fact that Syria found Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel a useful
tool to protect its own borders against Israel.
Hezbollah under Syrian patronage was allowed to retain its arms and wage its battle against Israel when
under the Taif agreement all other militias in Lebanon were made to disarm. But now the indications are
that the shrewd leaders of the Hezbollah are positioning themselves to be part of the Lebanese polity rather
than the surrogates of foreign forces.
From the American perspective the Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. It is blamed for the bombing of
the American embassy in Beirut and for other attacks on American targets. The Americans made every
effort to have the Europeans also declare the Hezbollah a terrorist organization but failed in the face of
French and other opposition.
The US priority is to get the Syrians out of Lebanon so that the parliamentary elections can be held without
foreign interference. In fact, Condoleeza Rice’s statements seem to suggest that the United States expects
the Hezbollah to do well in the elections and entertains the hope that once the Hezbollah comes to power it
will modify its policies.
She went on to add that ”in the long run you can’t have a democratic society and a society based on rule of
law where you have groups or organizations that are committed to violence outside of that framework”, but
for the Hezbollah it is a clear indication that the Americans will not stand in the way of the Hezbollah
scoring an election victory.
After having failed to implement the Taif agreement for some 16 years, Syria’s President Bashar Assad,
first termed as the ”young leader” when he
427
took over the reins of power after his father’s death five years ago and now termed the ”weak leader” has
promised the UN envoy that he would withdraw his forces from Lebanon.
According to the agreement, one-third of all Syrian forces and intelligence agents returned to Syria while
the remaining moved to the Bekaa valley by the end of March.
The timetable for the return of the forces moved into the Bekaa valley determined in a meeting of the
Lebanese and Syrian leaders. Bashar Assad has agreed to this not only because of the demonstrations in
Beirut or the unrelenting American pressure but because such Arab countries as Egypt and Saudi Arabia
have asked him to do so.
The most important question is how the Syrian withdrawal can affect Lebanon’s internal policy. The
sectarian differences in Lebanon run deep. The confessional system under which the president is a
Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni and the speaker of the parliament a Shia is patently unjust
given the fact that the Shias are the plurality in the country.
If the Hezbollah sheds its Syrian and Iranian connections and becomes a nationalist party one of the first
demands that it is likely to make is that the power structure in Lebanon should more accurately reflect the
demographic reality.
This cedar revolution is a therapy to the wary coexistence between the Sunni, Shia, Christian and Druze
continue and avoid any chance to return to the civil war fought on sectarian lines that tore Lebanon apart
from 1975 to
1990
Since the end of the Iraq war, the US and Israel have come up with some more allegations against Syria.
These include the asylum, which Damascus is purportedly giving to Iraqi Ba’athists, the perceived
infiltration of terrorists from Syria into Iraq, supporting Hezbollah and its alleged plans to develop weapons
of mass destruction.
Both Israel and the US also want Syria to pull its troops out of Lebanon. A Lebanon, which does not have
Syria’s security cover, is bound to be vulnerable to political and military pressures from Washington and
Tel Aviv. As the Syrian reaction to Mr Hariri’s murder said, this crime ”cannot be separated from these
pressures.”
America’s aim basically is to further Israel’s agenda in Syria. The Bu sh administration has already placed
Syria under sanctions, and every otjyer day there are threats of military action
AFGHANISTAN
In Afghanistan, Sardar Daud who had come into power after abolishing monarchy in 1973, remained in
control of the situation till 1978, his government was also toppled in a bloody coup. The main figure d this
group was Colonel Abdul Qadir, Deputy C-in-C of the army. the coup, a new government was formed by
People’s Democratic par4y (PDF). The People’s Democratic Party was founded in January 1965 and/ Nur
Muhammad Tarakai was elected its first General Secretary. Apart frol/n a small faction which was later on
known as the Parcham group, it had not supported Sardar Daud. The rebel faction was known as the Khalq
The political situation in Afghanistan had started deteriorating rapjdly in 1978. There were many gun-fights
between rival groups and pOjjtical murders. On April 17, 1978, one prominent leader of the Parcham
grm/rp, Mir Akbar Khaiber, was assassinated. A big demonstration was organised after his funeral. The
government accused PDF leaders of mui^dering Mir Akbar Khaiber and arrested all prominent leaders, but
the situation did not improve and on April 30, a new Revolutionary Council was set up after the coup.
Unlike the 1973 coup, this change of government took place on the hear? °^ dead bodies. Sardar Daud and
his brother Sardar Naseem were kille d alongwith many companions. There was heavy bombardment by
the aircraft an^ a portion of the President’s palace was demolished. The new lead^rs vociferously pleaded
that the new government would try to work for
d nad no connection with the Communists.
The new regime was recognised by the Soviet Union immediately. In MâX’ me USSR Government signed
a number of pacts with the Tarakai government. The dissension between the Khalq and Parcham groups of
PDF created many difficulties. Several Parcham group leaders including Babrak Kan/ml were arrested and
put behind the bars.
In December 1978, the Afghan President Tarakai visited Soviet Union wnere both the parties signed a 20-
year agreement of friendship and co-oêration-
.429
Tarakai’s reign came to a sudden end when on September 16,

1979, Kabul radio officially announced that he had resigned from his post. The reason for his resignation
was described to be his severe and prolonged illness. In his place Hafeez Ullah Amin who was Prime
Minister and Minister of Defence under Tarakai’s government, was elected as the President of the country.
The news about the sudden removal of Tarakai became clear after a few days when it was narrated by
several people coming from Kabul that serious differences had cropped up between the President and the
Prime Minister. Tarakai was severely injured in a shooting mishap on September 16. 1979, and died two
days later.
The Muslim rebel forces continued to wage Jihad against the forces of Hafeez Ullah Amin. In spite of the
fact that the government forces launched several offensives the uprisings were not quelled. The control of
the government diminished only to a few major cities and it looked as if the Muslim groups would be able
to overthrow the Government. President Amin could remain in power only for a very brief time. In
December 1979, his government was also overthrown by Babrak Karmal with the help of the Russian
troops. One of the reasons given for the overthrow of Amin’s government was his refusal to allow the
Soviet Union to send her troops in Afghanistan to strengthen the hands of the communist regime.
With the installation of Babrak Karmal, Russian troops started pouring into Kabul and within a few days
more than 50,000 Russian soldiers were airlifted into the city. The Russian decision to send troops for
fighting against the Muslim revolutionaries was vehemently denounced and was declared to be a flagrant
violation of the International law and world peace. By the end of January, the number of Russian troops
stationed in Kabul soared up to 85,000 strong. The Soviet presence was not welcomed and students and
anti-government elements staged demonstrations which led to imposition of Martial Law and curfew in
major towns and cities. Besides, there were large desertions from the army.
In order to strengthen his hands Babrak Kannal who, unlike his two predecessors belonged to the Parcham
factions replaced Khalq supporters from all the important government posts with Parchamite supporters.
Efforts were also made to bring the two factions closer but these mainly remained futile. The purge was
also made in the armed forces and to resent such activities of the government, the 14 Division of the
Afghan army revolted in Ghazni in July, 1980. The Russian forces crushed one attempt to overthrow the
Babrak KarmaFs government in the same month.
During 1980, about 85,000 Russian troops remained stationed in Afghanistan while another 35,000 were
stationed close to the Afghan-
430
Soviet border. The number of the Afghan forces reduced from 1,00,000 to
40,000 due to large scale defections and variety of other reasons. On many occasions the Soviet leaders
clarified that the Russian forces would not be withdrawn from Afghanistan until the hostile anti-
revolutionary forces completely stopped their activities. By 1987 the total Russians swelled to 1,
15,000 with war picking up.
The exodus of Afghans continued during 1980 and 1981. Pakistan had to bear the burden of more than
2,000,000 Afghan refugees by the end of 1981. The activities of the freedom-fighters also continued during
these years. In many battles, the Mujahideen inflicted heavy casualties on Babrak Karmal forces. Many
Afghan provinces including Herat, Kandahar, Nagar, Nangarhar were under repeated invasions of the
Mujahideen.
The freedom-fighters enjoyed the support of most of the Muslim countries. In the Makkah Declaration of
January 1981, after the Third Islamic Summit Conference, emphasis was laid on finding a political solution
of the problem. It was also urged that all foreign troops should be immediately withdrawn from the area
and the non-aligned character of Afghanistan be restored. It was also decided to cooperate with the UN
Secretary-General’s envoy to find a solution of the problem.
Due to the uncertain conditions in Afghanistan a large portion of population was forced to flee the country
and in September 1981, more than
2,298,767 Afghans had got themselves registered in Pakistan while more than 1,500,000 had fled to Iran.
GENEVA TALKS FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL
Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Russian role in South Asia was at a low ebb except for Indo-
Soviet friendship. But the Soviet presence in Afghanistan changed the political scenario of this region
leading to improvement in Pak-US relations and further deterioration in Indo-Pak relations. As a result,
Pakistan faced a security problem on three fronts: from India, from regionalists and dissident group within
Pakistan and from the Soviet presence on the border which made this region vulnerable to super-power
involvement.
Historically, Afghanistan had served as a buffer between South Asia and the Soviet Union, but the Soviet
move turned Pakistan into a frontline state. Naturally, this development influenced the threat perceptions of
the people of Pakistan. Hence Pakistan explored the prospects of a negotiated settlement of the Afghanistan
problem from the beginning.
431
Because the Committee of foreign ministers appointed by the OIC failed to resolve the situation, the United
Nations was approached which passed a resolution in 1980 with 111 votes in favour and 22 votes against
calling for a peaceful settlement of the problem the withdrawal of the Soviet army, restoration of
Afghanistan’s independence, return of the refugees and formation of an elected government in Afghanistan.
Since 1980, the UN General Assembly voted several times by over-whelming margins, for a resolution
expressing grave concern at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan. Diego Cordovez,
personal representative of the UN Secretary-General, frequently shuttled between the parties. The third
round of UN sponsored indirect talks in Geneva between Pakistan and Afghanistan, held in August, 1984,
ended without progress like the subsequent round up to 1986.
In fact, these two issues were inter-linked. The Soviets were reluctant to announce a time-table unless
international guarantees were furnished and the US refused to offer any guarantee prior to Soviet
withdrawal. The situation was further stalemated because international guarantees were not forthcoming
despite Pakistan’s efforts to obtain them. The Soviets insisted that the refugee issue should be tackled
separately but Pakistan insisted on integrated approach. The situation, therefore represented mistrust
between the super-powers. The Soviets desired to protect the pro-Soviet government in Kabul in any broad
arrangement whereas the US wished to install a government acceptable to the Mujahideen and capable of
defending American interests. Hence Pakistan was somewhat helpless. Pakistan had to face the threat
directly but could not proceed alone towards any understanding.
Yuri Andropov, Brezhnev’s successor, adopted a sober posture towards the US. In his first major foreign
policy address, he avoided inflammatory rhetoric in reference to the United States. His accession to power
generated optimism about a possible agreement.
However, the Soviet Politburo was divided about the military action in Afghanistan. Andropov belonged to
the group which did not favour decisive action like that taken in December 1979. Hence, he was favourably
inclined towards concluding the agreement leading to the withdrawal. Moreover, the Russians had realised
the consequences of their action by 1983. They had been condemned by the world community and were
unable to establish firm control of the Afghan territory. When President Zia visited Moscow for Brezhnev’s
funeral, he was received by President Andropov, which was interpreted as a healthy change in Soviet
attitude.
432
Unfortunately, this optimism was dashed when negotiations were stalled in June 1983, at Geneva. The draft
agreement was rejected by the US on the basis that it did not provide for political change in Afghanistan
acceptable to the Mujahideen. It was further learnt that the agreement was not supported by some states
friendly to Pakistan. Thus a valuable opportunity was lost.
Pakistan could not make the best of the opportunity and also annoyed Soviet policy-makers. With June
1983, impasse at Geneva and Andropov’s death, Pakistan entered a difficult phase in its diplomatic life,
where prospects for a negotiated settlement appeared dim and escalation of Soviet military operations was
visualised. It did happen.
In fact, Andropov’s successor was believed to be a hard-liner. Chernenko had adopted a tough posture on
Afghanistan. During the visit of the UN Secretary-General to Moscow in July 1984, Chernenko
categorically stated that the Soviet Union would not withdraw its forces unless asked to do so by the Kabul
government, following international guarantees of non-interference.
Accordingly, President Zia was not received by Chernenko when he went to Moscow to attend Andropov’s
funeral in 1984. During President Zia’s March 1985 visit to Moscow at the time of Chernenko’s funeral,
the Soviets exhibited a tough attitude, which was also hinted at by the Prime Minister of Pakistan in his
first National Assembly speech in 1985. It was learnt that the Soviets had told the Pakistani President that
they were not prepared to engage in a prolonged stalemate with Pakistan over Afghanistan. Indications
were that the Soviets may opt for long range military solution of the situation by increasing their strength in
Afghanistan, followed by increasing pressure on Pakistan, if a diplomatic solution was not achieved soon.
In dramatic move, endorsed by the Soviet leadership, Najibullah, the then ruler in Kabul announced a
unilateral cease-fire on January 1, 1987 and offered a government of national reconciliation. The seven
party alliance of Afghan Mujahideen rejected Soviet sponsored peace overtures.
The only disagreement preventing a settlement now was regarding the calendar for a withdrawal of Soviet
forces. All other aspects of the settlement had already been covered by draft agreements signed between
Kabul and Islamabad including guarantees by the US and the Soviet Union. Pakistan was insisting on six-
month deadline while the Afghan Government proposed a withdrawal by stages spread over two years. It
was believed that Pakistan’s insistence was prompted by the USA.
433
The unexpected thaw in the Afghan stalemate came with the dramatic extension of a diplomatic olive
branch by Afghanistan. The change in Kabul’s stance was first indicated in December (1986) when, during
a visit to Moscow, Afghan leader Dr. Najibullah called for national reconciliation to pave the way for the
withdrawal of Russian troops. This was followed by a unilateral declaration of a cease-fire from January
15,
1987. In a speech on January 3, 1987 the Afghan leader also announced several incentives aimed at
persuading the three million refugees to return to their country. These included an assurance that there
would be no victimisation, and a promise of a six-month exemption from conscription, with general
amnesty, for army and police deserters.
The euphoria, however, soon dissipated. The leaders of the Peshawar-based resistance rejected Kabul’s
reconciliation offer outright and vowed to continue the ’jihad’ until the total withdrawal of Russian forces
and the establishment of an Islamic government in Afghanistan.
THE GENEVA ACCORD

A UN sponsored agreement under which the Soviet Union started pulling out its 115,000 troops from
Afghanistan on May 15, was signed on April 14, 1988 by the four parties. The Soviet Union and the United
States, acting as guarantors, joined Afghanistan and Pakistan in a series of Agreements aimed at ending a
bitter nine-year-old conflict in the landlocked Muslim country, Afghanistan.
The Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and the US Secretary of State, George Shultz for the
two super-powers, Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil for Afghanistan and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs,
Zain Noorani for Pakistan signed the agreement. UN SecretaryGeneral Javier Perez De Cuellar presided
over the historic ceremony in the council chamber of the old League of Nations Headquarters, The Palas
De Nations.
In a series of accords contained in a 36-page document, the four countries agreed that there would be a
phased withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, beginning on May 15.
”One half of the troops will be withdrawn by August 15, 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be
completed within nine months,” the agreement stated. It said that from May 15 there would be no
interference or intervention in the affairs of parties and the voluntary repatriation would begin of the
estimated five million Afghan refugees, mainly living in Pakistan and Iran.
434
In another document, the two regimes, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to conduct their relations on a
strict basis of non-interference in each other’s affairs and refrain from aimed intervention, subversion or
training or recruitment of mercenaries in their territories.
The two countries agreed not to tolerate ”terrorist groups saboteurs or subversive agents” against each
other. The Soviet Union and US delegates signed a bilateral agreement expressing support for the political
settlement made by Pakistan and Afghanistan and undertook to refrain from any form of interference in the
two nations’ internal affairs.
SYMMETRY
Pakistan made it clear that its Support for the accords was conditional on the super-powers’ maintaining
equal levels of military aid to their respective allies. It did not go into detail but during the talks, Pakistan
and its ally US had insisted that if Washington were to cut off arms supplies to the guerillas, Moscow
should also end military aid to Kabul Government in symmetry.
GENEVA ACCORD: MAIN POINTS
Following were the main points of Geneva Accord for an Afghan settlement.
1. Bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the principles of mutual relations in particular
non-interference and nonintervention. The two parties undertake:
* To respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-
alignment of others.
* To refrain from threat of use of force in any form whatsoever, so as not to violate the boundaries of each
other.
* To ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political
independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the other.
* To refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation.
* To prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries of
whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other.
* To abstain from any defamatory campaign or hostile propaganda.

.435
2. Bilateral Afghan-Pakistan accord on the voluntary return of Afghan refugees.
* All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland.
* All returnees shall enjoy the free choice domicile and freedom of movement.
* All returnees shall enjoy the right to work and adequate living conditions.
* All returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on equal basis to the civic affairs of the republic of
Afghanistan.
* All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges including freedom of religion and have the same
obligations as any other citizen of the republic of Afghanistan.
* Afghanistan undertakes to provide within its possibilities all necessary assistance to the process of
repatriation.
* Pakistan shall facilitate the orderly and peaceful return of all Afghan refugees staying within its territory.
Late President Zia-ul-Haq in an exclusive interview with a panel of NPT editors and senior correspondents
spoke in detail about the conditions prevailing in Afghanistan following the Geneva Accord and its
aftermath. He made it clear that Pakistan had not accepted any dictation with regard to the signing of the
Accord and had firmly maintained its principled stand. The main objectives of the Accord from Pakistan’s
view point were the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the return of refugees to their country
with honour and dignity and the setting up of a government in Afghanistan which was acceptable to all
sections of people.
Afghan Mujahideen did not accept Geneva Accord because they were not a party to the agreement. The
Geneva Accord was not binding on the Afghan Mujahideen since the Soviet Union had thought it fit to
adopt a negative symmetry rather than a positive one which meant that the Soviets could make supplies of
defence equipment to the government in Afghanistan and Americans were free to make available arms to
the Mujahideen. Therefore, the element of strife was implicit in the symmetry arrangement agreed to
between the two super-powers. During the second half of the 1988 the Soviet Union had been very vocal in
accusing Pakistan of violating Geneva Accord. Criticism of Pakistan came from Eduard Shevardnadze as
well as Soviet military commander in Afghanistan. Their main complaint was that Pakistan continued to
assist the Afghan Mujahideen who had waged a relentless war against the Soviet occupation and Najibullah
government. Pakistani authorities availed of every possible
436
INTERNATION \l. AFFMKS
opportunity to reiterate their commitment to the Geneva Accord and their determination to observe the
agreement in letter and spirit.
The Afghan scenario became complex with the passage of time. The Geneva Accord accomplished after a
laborious and lengthy exercise still had not brought Afghanistan nearer to peace. The guns continued to
boom there and it appeared that the worst was yet not over in the war-torn country.
The symmetry provision had in a way legitimised interference. There is a thesis that but for the symmetry
clause the Geneva Accord \\ould have been a more effective instrument. The Geneva Accord did not carry
the kind of consensus that it required. The Pakistan and US leadership were divided on it. The late General
Zia from the Pakistan side and the hawkish elements in the US administration did not favour signing the
Accords. Their opposition was bound to mar the prospects of the agreement as it eventually did. As a
matter of fact, had it not been for the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s determination to have an accord at
all cost the Geneva exercise would have lingered on indefinitely. This explains a lack of will to stop
fighting in the case of all the parties to the conflict.
The Afghan Interim-Government (AIG) was established on the Pakistan soil in early 1989, but could not
achieve wide international recognition even among the Muslim countries. After prolonged negotiations
among various factions of Afghan Mujahideen, Sibghtullah Mujaddadi was nominated as president of AIG
and Abdul Rub Rasool Sayyaff as Prime Minister and Gulbadin Hykmatyar as Foreign Minister.
After the Soviet military exit, the battle of Jalalabad began on March 5, and it was generally assumed that
by March 13, the date when the Islamic Foreign Ministers were to convene in Riyadh, the AIG would be
ready to be installed in the 3rd largest city of Afghanistan and also the most important city, close to
Pakistan border. The lack of coordination among the Mujahideen was also evident during the attack on
Jalalabad as none of the major Groups that had formed the AIG were keen that one of them should
exclusively get the credit for taking Jalalabad.
Afghan Interim Government still lacked a strong and identifiable territorial base, it excluded the eight party
alliance of Afghan Mujahideen based in Tehran and it also did not enjoy the confidence of such important
non-Pakhtoon military commanders like Ahmad Shah Masud based in Panjsher valley or Ismail Khan,
operating, in Herat.
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL 1SSI ES
.437
Contrary to the general perceptions and anticipations about the short lived span of Najib government after
the Soviet withdrawal, the regime sustained pressure from the resistance guerillas for about a year and a
half. The main reason for this sustainability was the continued support of arms to the Najib government by
the Soviet Union under the symmetry provided in the Geneva Accord and most important, the division
among the AIG ranks mainly on the future share of the cake once Najib regime was toppled. The USA had
revised its policy regarding symmetry mainly because it feared the toppling of the Najib Government may
result in ascendancy of radical Islamists in Afghanistan. In a dramatic development in Febniary 1992,
Ahmad Shah Masood forged critical alliance with the militia forces in the north and after defeating the
Afghan army went beyond the UN plan which had proposed the takeover by a neutral interim set-up.
Masood demanded:
i) A total and unconditional transfer of political, military and
administrative power to an interim government, and ii) The dissolution of the Wattan Party.
In a plan later to be known as the Peshawar Accord, and hurriedly put together by the Mujahideen factions
after the ouster of Najibullah in April 1992, Sibghatullah Mujaddadi became the first interim-President.
The internal challenges faced by the post-communist government were:
a) Establishment of centralised political authority,
b) Political legitimacy, and
c) Political institution building.
THE PESHAWAR ACCORD
The Accord provided that Maujaddadi would take office on April

28, and govern for two months after which power would be transferred to another Mujahideen leader. A
prime minister to be nominated by Hikmatyar’s party Hizab-i-Islami and a 50-member Council were to
assist these leaders. The first phase of transition would culminate into an interimGovernment that would
pave the way for elections.
THE ISLAMABAD ACCORD
The Accord was detailed enough to lay down the framework for setting up basic constitutional processes,
institutions and relationships. It provided for:
438
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
439
4.
5.
6.
The formation of a government for the period of 18 months in
which Rabbani would remain President and Hekmatyar or his
nominee was to assume the office of Prime Minister.
The cabinet was to be formed by the Premier in consultation
with the President and the other Mujahideen leaders within 2
weeks.
An election commission to be set-up ”constituted by all parties”
to hold elections to the Constituent Assembly within 8 months.
Elections were to be held, after the Constituent Assembly had
drafted a constitution for the President and the parliament within
18 months.
There was to be a Defence Council comprising two members
from each party ”for the purpose of formation of a national
army.”
A Joint Commission comprising representatives from the QIC and all Afghan parties was to monitor the
cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.
The Accord concluded mainly because of sincere Pakistani initiative and also had the blessings of other
interested parties - Iran and Saudi Arabia. But after a somewhat smooth running of the government, none of
the above-mentioned objectives could be realised. Serious differences on the means and modalities of
stabilisation process led to revival of clashes towards November 1993.
The rivalries developed into renewal of civil war on a large scale. The early months of 1994 saw fierce
battle claiming the lives of civilians in Kabul. President Rabbani opted to hold office in the face of tough
opposition from Hikmatyar who insisted on holding of elections immediately. As the supreme court
authorized the President to work on, Hikmatyar resigned from the premiership and embarked upon
dislodging the president by force. With mediation from the QIC, however, warring factions agreed to a
cease-fire on July 20, 1994, and form a broad based shura of 560 members to elect successor to President
Rabbani, who in turn would arrange for elections. This uneasy truce though a welcome development left a
murky scenario about the future of this arrangement keeping in view the bitter animosities and mistrust
among the factions involved in power struggle.
The mandate granted to President Rabbani for paving the way for elections had hardly expired when a
crucial development came to the fore to further complicate the power struggle in Afghanistan. While efforts
were on to effect the Mesteri formula for transition of power, in November 1994, the Taliban, a new
element in the Afghan politics appeared on the scene. Vying
to
w create an Islamic order, these student militants from southern part of Afghanistan entered the force
struggle going on between present Rabbani and Hikmatyar Holier the two antagonists had accused each
other of playing in foreign l»ands. The credibility of the major parties already at the lowest, the Taliban
swept their way to Kabul by taking over the provinces of Baghlan and LOgar during January 1995. They
brought Kabul under siege from the eas«rn side on February 11, 1995 and were ready for a showdown with
HiKmatyar’s forces. It was at this stage that the UN envoy, Mahmood Mesteri, once again started
«gohations but these talks with the Taliban which were held on February 19-20 failed to persuade the
militants.
Analysing current phase of instability, it seems to have resulted from the lack of political will and vision on
part of the Mujahideen after
t, . c , <itarv rpQkfanre aeînst the Soviets and Najib. Further,
their successful mullary resistance dg<* j
the texture of Afghan set-up marked by ethnic differences and multifarious references of onentôn and
identification in political thinking has impeded the emergence of * pragmatic political approach, so crucial
for political
..... , mtinn nf institutions. Further more, the economic
stability and evoluuon OI insiuuu^ >
,. , . . , ^ ,,„ vqr;nn<; arpas led to jealousies, fatal to mutual codichotomies betwe^n various areas K •> ’
T ivâl fiplH A fohan nrthty had been caught up between the operation. In politic?31 neia, Aignan pt/
j, ,, •
pre-war central authority and the need for a devolved power sharing arrangement after Afghanistan’s
exposure to modernity in the wake of federal model during long Soviet occupation and process of
migration and settling in Pakistan ûring the same
As far Pakistan, the continued power struggle inside a close
• , , x,ttpr nf rrvnrprn Ttie unstable Afghanistan was a major
neighbour was a matter ot concern, n & j
«. ui • ui • .H-P wav nf pxnanded co-operation with the bCO countries stumbling bloc in tl»e wav
OI exp<mucu r.
specially the Centra,! Asian Republics ^hich are linked to Pakistan only via
Afghanistan.
RISE OF TALIBA^ AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
The advert of Taliban on tfce political horizon of Afghanistan surprised the Afghan Mujahideen and
political observers alike. Taliban, a
i_ j c *r i an warrinrs have rio history behind them. Even during new breed of Afgh^11 warriors, nave i
J, °
a. 1 A t r aoainct thp Soviets, the Taliban were never heard of. It
the 14-year lone war against me aovie* >
• o i? <nQQ4 that Taliban c?ave a shocking surprise to many by was in September f yy^ mat L
anodn # , , .,;. ,
i_- r jf thp Wai AfuhaJi warlords in several parts or the
smashing forces o^ me local Aigiid-’ ^
country, within a srrt span of several weeks; Taliban who were educated in religious madrases extended
their presence beyond the Afghan province of Kandhar in a bid to restore peace to the strife-torn country.
440
INTERNATIONAL AFFA
an 7 T °[ Taliban who aPPeared on ** Political scene of
we eroo” H °f T ”* iS Stl” ”^ b°88ling- ft ’S S3ld that Tal’ba” were groomed in madrassas at

Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan during the war agai t the Russms ^ jt .$ ^ ^ %
bts ;:: si KdeTrrs both m

Afghamstan ind pakistan’ «-X
big cities hke Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi and Peshawer. However they might have received
military training m Afghanistan. ’ *
obliee Ish he Taliban could «fi«e to
couSv IT °r 6 Amencans’ once th£y h^ taken control of the country. They were not an
organised force in the sense that a professional army is. Their fundamentalist, agenda was not
going to fadeTwa >mepgiven the fact that they hailed from various seminaries in Afghanistan
A fundamentallst upsurge ln
Afghan’s<an
Afghanistan’s battlefield situation has always had an external dimension to it. Smce the date the
Taliban rose as a force in the KandTa
b ck d bv 7taPPrehCnded’ » by the Iranians, that they were being backed by Pakistan and
financed by Saudi Arabia. There were also
re hid” M ^ , ””* * they **” **»”** 3 Su rea”° ° force had a tacit approval of the Americans.
The Saudis were said to be
invested m spreading Wahabism to Muslim Central Asian states and
AelvaendS;ar°Uld Pr°Ve l° bC 3 gatCWay f°r The P^°se- Pakân was Deneved to be interested
in expanding its trade links with these states which
was possible only if Afghamstan was under the rule of a pro-Islamabad establishment. And, given
America’s long-standmg enmity Lh IraTany government set-up ,n Kabul enjoying close ties with
both Saud, Arabia and Pakistan would have best suited the United States as well. Both the states
have seldom disappointed the United States m times of need in the region laliban were primarily
militant Afghan religious students from Maulana haza -ur-Rehman’s madrassas of JUI led by
those who had deserted from smaller Afghan militant factions. All of them were religiously
fanatic Early last year their spiritual leader Mullah Umar after coming to power sa,d that he
would hke to install in Kabul a ’”Saudi-style” Sunm reglme to implement Shana in the
country. The biggest achievement of 1995 was the capture of Herat on September 5. In Herat’s
fall alleged the Rabbani administration, Pakistan’s backing of them was a major factor Thus the
very next day, on September 6, Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul was attacked allegedly by an Afghan
mob. The entire diplomatic staff, including the ambassador, suffered severe injuries. One also
died. Pakistan alleged that the attack was made by Rabbam’s men. A major accomplishment for
Pakistan was the partial opening of the Chaman-Torghoundo road for trade between Pakistan and
Central Asia through Afghanistan. With Herat’s
C QNTEMPORARV INTEKNAT1O.NA1. ISSi KS 44]
capture by Taliban, Iran was devoid of a significant geographical reach to Afghanistan. Herat’s
governor, Ismail Khan, affter the fall of his province took refuge in the Iranian city of Mashad.
Iran expressed similar concerns about the Taliban movement as the Rabbani administration did.
The long battles which the Taliban fo«ught against their rivals from pro-Najibullah Kandhar
rulers in Octob er 1994, to Hikmatyar in Charasiyab in February 1995, to pro-Rabbani governor
Ismail in Herat in September 1995, to repeated attacks against K abul rulers - should have
exhausted the Taliban force, had it been purely an indigenous phenomenon but that did not
happen. All of a sudden, and in a matter of weeks, Taliban became so strong that they expelled all
of their main rivals from Kabul in one go.
The incredible epic of the Taliban triumphs and their conquest of Kabul in September 1996 left to
whole worfld wondering and full of admiration for their exploits. However, rather than the grand
finale, the fall of Kabul touched off the opening of yet another, and the most catastrophic, almost
terminal phase of the Afghan ordeal. Im May 1997 they captured Mazar-i-Sharif, heart of the
North. Pakistan, thte UAE and Saudi Arabia recognised the Taliban’s Kabul regime as the- de
facto government of Afghanistan soon afterwards.
The Taliban failed to hold on to M azar-i-Sharif, in the first instance. They regrouped and went
for it again l»ter in 1997 to capture and establish their hold there. In the course of the mapping up
operations in the city, they raided the Iranian Consulate-General, killing and kidnapping a number
of the diplomatic personnel. The incident created a war-like situation between Iran and the
Taliban. Deployed all along the border, the two forces stood eyeball-to-eyeball. Taliban-
Afghanistan represents threefourths of the country and yet its legitimacy goes abegging
internationally. The Taliban had enforced rather than established their writ within the territory
under their control. The kind of popu-lar support which would ultimately serve as the sole basis
of their legitimacy was still lacking, usama bin Laden, as an honoured guest continued to enjoy
their protection and hospitality in the best Pathan tradition. But it coul«d not go on for very much
longer in the face of the mounting US and other in ternational pressures.
PLANE HIJACKING AND TALIBAN
The hijacking of the Indian Airlines p»lane in December 1999, which spent almost a week at the
Kandahar airport: in Afghanistan, served to shed favourable light on the ruling Taliban, who baad
suffered from a highly distorted international image in the western media. The Indian foreign
442
minister, as well as the UN official dealing with Afghanistan, paid tribute to the handling of this crisis
situation by the Taliban, who displayed humanitarian concern for the passengers while conforming to the
interna lonal conventions in their attitude towards the hijackers.
Prior to the onset of the harsh winter, there were clear signs of
intens” ing international pressure on the Taliban. This arose primarily from
a deci; >n by Washington to turn the heat on the faction that controls 90 per
cent o Vfghanistan.The US. which has declared Saudi.dissident Osama bin
Laden s one of its most wanted criminals, on account of his alleged
compl ity in the bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998,
wante lim to be extradited by the Taliban.
Apart from exerting political pressure through informal contacts with Taliban representatives in Pakistan
and in New York, a human rights campaign was launched, especially over the treatment of women, and the
unusual spectacle of Hollywood adopting the cause of Afghan women was projected in the US media. US
influence was also exerted to impose stringent UN sanctions on the Taliban that had the effect of grounding
the Afghan airline, apart from affecting the banking and other transactions of Afghanistan.
There were reports also of the US intelligence agencies planning a covert operation to capture Osama bin
Laden through direct action. In the meantime, propaganda was stepped up to depict the Taliban as a
fundamentalist force that was aiding and abetting international terrorism. This hardening of attitude of the
”unique superpower” against the Taliban encouraged other known opponents of the regime in Kabul to step
up their support to the anti-Taliban factions in Afghanistan. As a consequence, large quantities of military
hardware were supplied to the Northern Alliance, which launched attacks on the Taliban-held areas in
northern Afghanistan.
The Taliban regard Osarna bin Laden as a guest, whose personal safety becomes a sacred trust in the
Afghan value system. They had repeatedly asked for proof of his involvement in international terrorism, on
the basis of which they had shown readiness to prosecute him. However, the Americans refused to take
notice of this position, and insisted that Osama must be handed over to Washington to face trial for his
involvement in antiUS terrorist acts.
This movement, whose support came mainly from young students of religious schools (hence the name
Taliban or seekers of knowledge), sought to promote Afghan unity to end the fratricidal strife, and was also
committed to establishing a state based on the Islamic sharia. The goals of
443
the movement appeared to enjoy broad populai support so that the Taliban rapidly won the support of local
tribal leaders who were fed up with the endless strife.
Since the capture of Herat, close to the Iranian border, by the Taliban, the Iranian government had regarded
them in an adversarial light. Apart from occupying an area that Iran considered to be within its sphere of
influence, the Taliban leadership subscribed to the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence which differed
from the dominant Shiite school in Iran. Therefore, though the Taliban had brought 90 per cent of
Afghanistan under their control, the Iranian government remained implacably opposed to it, and was in the
forefront of efforts to support the Northern Alliance.
The international community had denied recognition to the Taliban mainly because of their adherence to a
rather strict version of the Sharia, in which segregation of the women was enforced in a manner that is seen
as violating their human rights.
TALIBAN’S DESTRUCTION OF BUDDHA STATUES
The Taliban’s Buddha-bashing early March 2001 was un-Islamic, argue Islamic scholars and religious
leaders across the world. It was illegal, claim international jurists. It was unnecessary, irrational,
unreasonable, stupid, nay barbaric, say others. Indeed, not one word in defence of this senseless destruction
was uttered by anyone outside Afghanistan. Yet the Taliban were defiant. What was the reason?
In fact, the latest episode of Buddha-bashing may be seen in the light of the UN sanctions on the Taliban
regime January 2001. The UN sanctions were applied when drought and famine stalked Afghanistan, when
millions were faced with starvation, fuelling the exodus of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Pakistan.
The aim of these sanctions was to weaken the Taliban’s hold on Afghanistan, partly by provoking internal
instability and partly by denying them Pakistani military assistance in the forthcoming spring offensive by
the Northern Alliance led by former Afghan president Burhannudin Rabbani (whose non-existent
government was still recognized by the UN as the legitimate government of Afghanistan).
In pursuit of dubious notions of statecraft, Islamabad had relentlessly, and often recklessly, sought to make
Afghanistan a subservient client state. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was Pakistan’s first blue-eyed boy. But when
Rabbani demonstrated that he had a mind of his own, Islamabad was quick to clutch at Mullah Umar.
Mulla Umar had become unpredictable and
444
INI ERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
unreasonable but there was no fallback or forward position for Pakistan. Indeed, even though Islamabad
claimed that it did more than anybody else to dissuade the Taliban from carrying out their threat to
demolish the Buddhas, the world reserved in harshest criticism for Pakistan as the ”sole defender and
supporter of the extremist regime in Afghanistan”. The fear was that Islamabad could be further isolated as
moderate Muslim nations scrambled to evade the fallout of the Taliban’s extremist s’ersion of ”Islam” that
borders ”international terrorism”, as the European Union fulminated about Pakistan’s failure to exercise its
”considerable and unique influence” with the Taliban, and as the United States weighed its options to bomb
Osama Bin Laden out of Afghanistan.
WINDS OF CHANGE IN AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan was once again the focus of world attention in 2000 and 2001. The new administration in the
White House is focusing its efforts to get rid of Osama bin Laden and to blast away his hideout somewhere
in the outskirts of Kabul, which according to intelligence reports was wellprotected by the Taliban.
A few worth mentioning development took place during the period in the Western world. On the negative
side, the United States had aligned itself with ’like-minded’ individuals in the Kremlin who were all for
teaching Osama a lesson. Efforts and mobilization to bomb the Arab millionaire had reached to an extent
that Pentagon had even started to contemplate and perhaps talked to a couple of Central Asian Republics
(CAR) if their territory could be used for carrying out an attack on the Osama ghetto.
These Washington overtures were coming at a time when the Central Asian states are already growingly
concerned about President Vladimir Putin’s maneuvers to regain the ’Soviet glory of the good old days’.
Also, as the Russians began a crackdown on terrorism and fundamentalism, which according to them was
being instigated by the ’Islamic menace’, the CAR, predominantly Muslim, see in Russian activities yet
another move to snatch away the religious rights and freedoms of the people of those states.
The second major development during early 2001 was that US State Department officials met ’friends of
Russia in the Indian government’ and discussed with therh as to what type of government should replace
the Taliban. Hence skeptics of the idea were questioning the validity of such a measure by Washington
where, on the one hand, it claimed that it was against a military solution to the Afghan problem but, on the
other hand, it
445
was actually pondering about the practical and physical overthrow of a regime that had during the past five
vears or so come to control almost the whole length and breath of Afghanistan. This anomaly and the
contradictory stance beats all concerned.
Three, the US tried to force a resolution in the UN which aimed at showing Taliban the stick only but did
not mention their opponents, who still controlled about 3 to 5 percent of the territory. These opponents,
when they had controlled the reigns of power had a consistently adverse human rights track record; yet, not
only Washington was not too bothered to take any ”action” against them but also they were actually the
ones \\ho occupy Afghanistan’s seat in the United Nations, thanks to US backing and support.
AFGHANISTAN: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
9/11: CONSEQUENCES FOR AFGHANISTAN
On September 11 2001, the world witnessed horrible terrorist air attacks on the twin towers of the World
Trade Centre in New York and on Pentagon in Washington D.C. The attacks were overwhelming in its
effects to mould the future politics among nations. Afghanistan is one of the most affected countries, which
received very fast and direct impact of the events. President Bush lost no time in pointing finger towards
the prime suspect and asked the Taliban government to hand Osama bin Laden over to the US for trial. As
expected, the Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omer refused to oblige America. President Bush without
losing anytime moved to form an anti-terrorism world coalition backed by the UNSC resolution.
Afghanistan was heavily bombarded for almost three months - October to December 2001. The ultimate
result was the collapse of the Taliban regime in the second week of December and subsequently a new UN
backed government came into power in Afghanistan.
THE BONN ACCORD
Rival Afghan factions on December 5, 2001 signed an historic power-sharing agreement to form a post-
Taliban government and set the shattered country on the road to recovery after two decades of war. The
accord, sealed after nine days of exhausting negotiations near the German city of Bonn, paved the way for a
six-month interim administration to be headed by Hamid Karzai, a moderate Muslim from the dominant
Pashtun ethnic group. The deal gives the Northern Alliance control of three key portfolios in the 30-
member cabinet including two women. It also gives a symbolic role to the former king and provides for a
UN security force for Kabul. The agreement was signed by the leaders of the four delegations and
446 __
UN special envoy for Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi to applause from an audience which included German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. The new Afghan administration took office on December 22.
Under the terms of the 11 -page accord, the interim government would run Afghanistan for six months
before an emergency Loya Jirga - or grand tradition assembly of elders - appoints an 18-month transitional
government. Former king Mohammed Zahir Shah, 87, was pulled out of exile: he got a symbolic role
presiding over the Loya Jirga.
The agreement also provides for a UN Security Council-mandated international security force in Kabul and
its surrounding area, and possibly other urban centers. The decision on the size and composition of an
international force rests with the Afghans. The deal tries to allay the fears of Pashtuns with the appointment
of Karzai, a former deputy foreign minister who is also an ally of the exiled king. The nomination of Karzai
and the unifying role of the former king are seen as helping reconcile the Pashtuns to the transitional
arrangements pending elections in some three years’ time. The Taliban regime drew much of its support
from the Pashtun, who live mainly in southern Afghanistan and are the traditional rulers of Afghanistan.
The Northern Alliance - now in control of Kabul and much of the country -- is dominated by minority
ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras.
UN spokesman Ahmad Fawzi said the Alliance’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah, Interior Minister
Qannoni and Defence Minister Mohammed Qasim Fahim would all keep their jobs.
MAIN POINTS OF BONN ACCORD
THE AGREEMENT:
acknowledges the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future in
accordance with the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice, and expresses
appreciation of the Afghan Mujahideen for their years of combat and sacrifice for the defence of the
country’s independence.
notes that these interim arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment of a broad-based,
gender-sensitive, multiethnic and fully representative government.
establishes an Interim Authority consisting of a 30-member Interim Administration presided over by a

Chairman, a Special
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSl F.S
.447
Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga, a Central Bank and a Supreme
Court.
lays down that an Emergency Loya Jirga or assembly of elders shall be convened within six months of the
establishment of the Interim Authority. The Emergency Loya Jirga will be opened by His Majesty
Mohammed Zahir Shah, the former King of Afghanistan.
the Emergency Loya Jirga shall decide on a Transitional Authority, including a broad-based transitional
administration, to lead Afghanistan until a fully representative government can be elected through free and
fair elections held no later than two years from the date of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga.
The agreement says that a Constitutional Loya Jirga shall be convened within eighteen months of the
establishment of the Transitional Authority, in order to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan.
The agreement also essentially restores the constitution of 1964, save for the role given to the monarchy.
It commits the Interim Administration to establish an independent Human Rights Commission with UN
help to monitor human rights and investigate violations.
The Special Independent Commission to convene the Emergency Loya Jirga will ensure that due attention
is paid to the representation in the Emergency Loya Jirga of a significant number of women as well as all
other segments of the Afghan population.
The Emergency Loya Jirga will elect a Head of the State for the Transitional Administration.
ANNEX I to the agreement provides for an international security force:
this says that while responsibility for law and order lies with the Afghans themselves, some time may be
needed for Afghans to establish new security and armed forces.
the participants to the talks therefore request the United Nations Security Council to consider authorizing
the early deployment to
448 _1
IN rERNATION’AI. AFFAIRS
Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force. This force will assist in the maintenance of security for
Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a force could, as appropriate, be progressively expanded to other
urban centers and other areas.
the participants pledge to withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban centers or other areas in
which the UN-mandated force is deployed.
PROSPECTS OF PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN
Despite Afghanistan’s chillingly notorious history of ethnic troubles, turbulence, turmoil and treachery the
prospect of a durable peace in this war-ravaged country has improved after the UN-sponsored Bonn accord
and the defeat of the Taliban by the US-led military forces.
Christina Rocca, the US assistant secretary of state, said that ’the Bonn Accord on the interim government
(effective from December 22) in Afghanistan could not have occurred without the help of Pakistan’.
The Bonn Accord is the first vital step in the long and arduous journey to peace, rehabilitation and
reconstruction in Afghanistan for which foreign aid worth at least S20 billion would be needed. The aid
flow may commence after an internationally acceptable level of peace and security returns to the country
destroyed by two decades of inter-Afghan infighting and war. President Pervez Musharraf has promised
full cooperation to the interim administration ’for the gigantic tasks’ faced by it.
Hamid Karzai-led interim government is Tajik dominated, a tribe that is barely 27% of the population of
Afghanistan. On the other end of the spectrum, the largest ethnic group, Pakhtuns - 47% of the population -
are under-represented in the interim government largely owing to the follies of the now vanquished
Pakhtun-dominated Taliban. Additionally, the public acceptability of the ministers nominated by former
King Zahir Shah in the interim government remains uncertain. Also, some smaller ethnic groups have
voiced concern about their non-representation in the interim government.
The Hazara tribe is indignant. The Taliban representative calls it a puppet government. Notwithstanding
such reservations the Bonn Accord, a compromise of conflicting interests of many ethnic groups, is a
wellconceived document and a step in the right direction. It deserves a fair trial.
449
Some ministers nominated in the interim Afghan government showed impropriety by traveling to India
(even before the government was formed) where they made public statements accusing Pakistan on
selfserving frivolous grounds. The expression of personal views on controversial issues in a third country
exposed their ignorance of diplomatic etiquette and behaviour. Pakistan is not unaware of the reasons of
their exuberance and has shown maturity by ignoring their undignified outbursts.
Looking ahead, Pakistan should provide land-locked Afghanistan with generous moral, material and
economic support for its recovery and development plans besides giving transit facilities for normal
imports and trade. It should not meddle in Afghanistan’s internal politics. It is for the people of Afghanistan
and its leadership to live with their ethnic and tribal diversity. We must never fish in Afghanistan’s troubled
waters. Instead, we must play a visibly positive and constructive role in enabling the Afghan government
and the people of this country in creating unity out of their diversity.
Under-representation of the Pakhtuns in the interim government is the price paid by them for their defeat in
war. It may be prudent for the Pakhtuns to accept the fait accompli gracefully and prove to the world by
their conduct and response that they as much suffered from the tunnel vision of top Taliban hierarchy as the
rest of the Afghan groups did.
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
The next step as provided under the Bonn Accord, was the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga
(Afghans’ traditional consultative body of elders) within six months of the establishment of the Interim
Government. The Emergency Loya Jirga was supposed to suggest a new administrative set up for
Afghanistan. It was the discretion of the Loya Jirga whether to endorse the Hamid Karzai’s administration
or elect a new government at all for the future 18 months transitional period. Loya Jirga was convened on
its due date in mid April 2002. It was the first working session of the Loya Jirga constituted of 1550
members. It endorsed the Karzai administration with little ministerial changes as a new Transitional
Government for 18 months. Hamid Karzai was nominated as the President of Afghanistan. King Zahir Shah
returned home after living in exile in Rome for 29 years.
The new Karzai government is transitional in nature. Key posts in the cabinet were retained as were in the
Interim Government. Foreign Ministry, Interior Ministry and Defense Ministry remained with Northern
Alliance. Although Pashtuns were tried to be satisfied by electing a Pashtun
450
tribal leader Haji Abdula Qadeer from Nangarhar province as Vice President of Afghanistan, although he
was murdered latter on 6lh July by some unknown armed militants. His murder put the new fragile
administration at stake and Karzai’s attempt to bring stability to Afghanistan is threatened.
Next step is to convene a Constitutional Loya Jirga within 18 months of the Transitional Government
which will adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan and will be responsible to conduct fair and free
elections to elect a fully representative government of Afghanistan for the future.
”THE NEW CONSTITUTION FOR AFGHANISTAN”
According to the Bonn Accord, Constitutional Loya Jirga, was elected in November 2003. Total number of
delegates was 502. 344 were elected by some 19,000 representatives of Afghanistan s 32 provinces. 64 are
women representatives, two from each province, elected by women. There were also 42 special category
representatives, consisting of 24 to represent refugees in Iran and Pakistan, 9 to represent nomads, 6 for
internally displaced people and 3 to represent the Hindu and Sikh minorities. President Karzai had also
appointed 50 delegates, half of them women.
Loya Jirga is a historical pashtun tradition of mutual consultation and discussion over matters of common
concern. The constitutional Loya Jirga or Grand Assembly met at 15th December 2003 in Kabul to discuss
the draft constitution for Afghanistan. The deliberations of Loya Jirga took place under tight security
system. The deliberations of the Loya Jirga were supposed to close by 25th December but it took more and
ended on 4th January 2004.
The Loya Jirga discussed a variety of issues under the chairmanship of Sibghatullah Mujaddadi. The Jirga
came to near-deadlock when it was bitterly divided on some contentious issues. Some important issues
which remained bone of contention between different groups were; the form of government (Presidential vs
Parliamentary), Center-province relations, role of religion, status of national language and social status of
women etc. President Hamid Karzai was in favour of strong presidency but his opponents both the Jamat-i-
Islami Afghanistan, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Northern Alliance supported weak presidency and
strong parliament. President Karzai even warned that he would not be a presidential candidate in the
forthcoming presidential elections if the Jirga does not endorse the presidential form of government. He
argued that a battered Afghanistan needs a strong central government. Some former
451
Jihadi groups demanded for a more explicit role of Shanah in the future political system of Afghanistan.
Women rights activists also struggled for greater role of women in the future social set up of the country.
After 22 days of hectic deliberations, a consensus was finally hammered out under pressure exerted by
important mediators representing the US and UN.
The constitution adopted by the Loya Jirga on January 4, 2004 is ninth in the history of the war-ravaged
country, replacing the 1964 constitution which is currently in use partially. In include 160 articles and 16
chapters. Main factors of the constitution are as under:
Presidential form of government
Bicameralism
Islamic Republic
Pashto and Dari as national language
Women equal status with men
The constitution provided for a presidential form of government with strong president. President will enjoy
sweeping powers that include the appointment of service chiefs. President will be directly elected by the
people of Afghanistan. He would be accountable to the parliament which can veto key appointments. The
parliament will contain two houses. The parliament will also set up a body to oversee the implementation
of the constitution. Two vice presidents will also be elected.
The country was declared as Islamic Republic with ”Islam as its sacred religion.” However, followers of
other faiths are free to worship within the provisions of the law. Dari and Pashto have been approved as
official languages, but other ethnic minority languages will also be considered official languages in the
areas in which these are spoken. National anthem was agreed to be in Pashto, it will also contain references
to other ethnic groups, and an Islamic colouring by the inclusion of ”Allah-o-Akbar” in it.
Women are conceded equal social status with men in society. They will carry same rights and duties.
The adoption of a new constitution has marked a watershed development in the constitutional history of
Afghanistan. It is very encouraging that the country is well on course of its first-ever democratic elections
after having seen monarchy, communism and so-called Islamic rule under the Mujahideen and extreme
version of Islamic governance under the Taliban. In June 2004 presidential elections are going to be held
under the
452
IMFRN \riO\\l \1FUKS
constitution \vlncli will put the countiv foi the fust time on demociatic track Nevertheless the constitution
which envisages a strong center has been passed under exigencies of nation building suppoited by pressures
excited by powerful international playeis So it would be premature to piedict that the ethnic tault line is no\
v no more a soiuce of political instability Although the constitution foimation is a step in the right dnection,
Afghanistan \\ill continue to face many challenges in the course ot reconstruction T\\o most imminent
challenges \vith heavy destructive force are, holding peaceful elections due towards the end of the year
amid increasing Taliban activity and the dormant ethnic rift which may rise at any time to dismantle the
whole system
RECONSTRUCTION OF AFGHANISTAN
After dismantling the Taliban legime, the international community especially the western powers are really
concerned about the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Afghanistan The objective of America-led war in
Afghanistan was not to dismantle the Taliban regime but to completely drain the swamp of terrorism The
modernization and rehabilitation of the war - ravaged country is necessary condition to seal the region from
any future terrorist activity Before a comprehensive programme of reconstruction of the country is
launched, genuine and lasting peace in the country is an important condition to be met Some major hurdles
in the way of establishing peace in the country are the spread of arms on vast scale among the people m
Afghanistan, internal fighting among the War Lords and ethnic cleavages in the Afghan society
Concerted efforts are required to bring nearly 70,000 militiamen under control, to disarm them so that they
don’t resort to arms to settle disputes among themselves After nearly eight months of the fall of Taliban,
low-level infighting is still going on in Afghanistan The country is split into five regions controlled by
different war-lords - Ismail Khan m heart, Dostum m Mizar-e-Shanf, General Faheem in Pangsher, Gul
Agha in Qandahar and Badshah Khan ikn Gardez etc In sum, there could be as many as ten warlords vying
for power with durable peace prospects eluding in the foreseeable future
Ethnic cleavages aie another threat to peace in Afghanistan Afghanistan can’t dream of a lasting peace
unless a genuine consensus is reached between the major active groups - Pashtuns Tajiks and Uzbeks In the
interest of peace and progress in the country, the future constitution must provide for a genuine coalition of
the three ethnic groups aside other minorities
(OMFMPORARY INTFRNVTIONAI ISM FS
453
Unless peaceful conditions are icstored, no country m the world 01 even UN agencies would be willing to
make investment in cash 01 in the form of human resources The restoration of peace m Afghanistan is
linked with political restructuring The first working session of the loya Jnga in April 2002, has laid the
foundation of a demociatic piocess in the country It should be maintained through a new constitution winch
would reflect genuine requirements of the country, paiticipation of the people in the legislation and
executive functions can be achieved through elections to the national and provincial assemblies with
regular and specific intervals Another factor w hich needs to be looked into after peace is restored, is the
availability of basic infrastiucture i e roads railways supply of water, gas power and telecommunication,
airports etc, which is pre condition for economic growth in the country
The maintenance of peace and security m the country urgently needs a viable national army Some
observers estimate that a modest army of 50,000 personnel is a minimum requirement of the country The
process of constructing Afghanistan’s national army has already been started along with international peace
keeping forces stationed m Kabul Turkey took charge of the international security assistance force ISAF
from Britain in June 2002 260 Turkish soldiers have joined the 4,800 strong force set up in Kabul after
toppling the Taliban regime In addition to the combat forces, there are 1367UN peacekeepers along with
the ISAF in Kabul The US-ked campaign, code named ”Enduring Freedom” also involved 2,135 sailors
and 795 royal air force personnel
Finally, the reconstruction of Afghanistan can be possible through massive economic aid and foreign
investment The international community has already approved $4 billion for the purpose But it needs more,
at least $15 billion will be enough to rebuild Afghanistan in the first ten years There is great need for
sustained efforts in the sphere of education The stress should be obviously on the technical education In the
end, the most important step towards the reconstruction of Afghanistan should be the human resource
development, without which economic development of the country would not be fruitful
Through a gradual process both tribalism and feudalism can be replaced by a social structure that favours
dignity of labour equality of man and respect for law The ADB has proposed 200 million $ assistance
package including special assistance rapid impact projects in agriculture, institution building, infrastructure
and education
Pakistan s government and private sector should be ready to explore business opportunities by actively
taking part in the reconstruction
454
of Afghanistan. President Pcrvez Musharaf paid a visit to Afghanistan on

2nd April 2002, as a response to Hamid Karzai’s visit to Pakistan on 8th Febmary. During the visit an
agreement was signed to promote trade and economic activities and a joint ministerial commission was set
up to coordinate in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Pakistan’s President delivered a cheque of $10
million as a part of the 100 million $ package for the reconstruction of the country.
AFGHANISTAN ELECTION
An election to the office of President of Afghanistan was held on October 9, 2004. Hamid Karzai won the
election with 55.4% of the votes. It is estimated that more than three-fourths of Afghanistan’s nearly 10
million registered voters cast ballots. The date was originally set for July 5. The elections were twice
postponed, first until September, and then until October.
Hamid Karzai took oath on December 7, as the first democratically elected president in Afghanistan’s
known history. Karzai gained more than
50 per cent of the vote against 17 other presidential candidates and is thus endowed with a strong popular
mandate to govern the country.
There was widespread apprehension that the forces opposed to the democratization of Afghanistan may
launch large-scale attacks to discourage mass participation in the election and subverting the electoral
process. However, the Afghan voters shrugged off these threats and took part in the polling with great
fervor and enthusiasm. The Afghan people are ready to participate in the parliamentary election in
2005with a similar interest and determination.
After the parliamentary elections the process set in motion by the Bonn Agreement would reach fruition
and may strengthen the hands of Hamid Karzai to reshape the political and economic landscape of
Afghanistan.
It is generally believed that Karzai, who was politically weak in the past and could not, therefore, take bold
decisions, is now likely to emerge as a strong leader and make use of his mandate to move the country
forward. However, if he failed to meet this expectation Afghanistan will have to wait for years for another
such opportunity.
The most serious threat to Afghanistan emanates from persistent insecurity caused by warlords, drug
peddlers, banditry, factional fights and terrorism. Unless the deteriorating security situation is brought
under
.455
control, the establishment of a viable state in Afghanistan will remain a forlorn hope and seriously imperil
the prospects of peace, which was crucial to its political, economic and social recovery.
The international community would also be expected to extend its full support to Karzai to improve the
security situation. However, prolonged stay of the foreign troops in Afghanistan for this purpose would be
undesirable and indeed counter-productive.
Afghanistan remains the world’s largest opium producer, accounting for 75 per cent of global production.
This menace presents a formidable challenge to Afghanistan and the world at large.
The drug barons in the country constantly tried to thwart efforts aimed at developing a healthy economy in
the country and as a result there has been little progress on reconstruction.
There are reports of human rights violations in Afghanistan.These include illegal imprisonment, prolonged
pre-trial detention, pathetic conditions in prisons, maintenance of private prisons, confinement of women,
denial of public role to women, despite the constitutional guarantee against discrimination on the basis of
gender, denial of health, educational and similar other facilities to the ordinary people in the country.
President Karzai will have to make concerted efforts to ensure that Afghan society is governed by the rule
of law under which respect for human rights is the norm rather than the exception.
After 25 years of savage warfare in Afghanistan there is high expectations attached to the first ever
induction of democratic rule in the country. The people want to see Afghanistan as a bright, prosperous and
peaceful country where there will be the rule of law.
BANGLADESH
On May 30, 1980, President Zia-ur-Rehman was assassinated in Chittagong by a group of army officers,
led by Maj. Gen. Muhammad Abdul Manzur in an unsuccessful coup attempt. Gen. Manzur and President
Zia had developed serious differences on a number of issues. Both Gen. Zia and Gen. Manzur were war
heroes of Bangladesh.
Gen Zia-ur-Rehman had emerged as the strong man of Bangladesh, after the assassination of President
Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman (in 1975). He became the President of the country in 1978. His party was able to
win an overwhelming victory during 1979 elections, After assassinating the
456
President, the coup-leader announced the formation of a revolutionary council. He proclaimed Martial Law
in the country, dismissed the government and abrogated the constitution of the country.
But the coup attempt failed because the rebel leaders did not win the support of the army stationed in other
parts of the country, especially in Dhaka. The support of the rebels was only confined to Chittagong. When
the government troops advanced in Chittagong on June 1, the rebel forces melted without putting any
resistance. The government announced a price of Tk. 500000 for the capture of Gen. Manzur who had fled
from Chittagong when the loyal army advanced. He was also killed by a group of angry soldiers on the
same day.
The government decided to hold new elections to elect a-successor of President Zia-ur-Rehman on
September 21, which were later postponed to November 15. The trial of those who were accused of
conspiring, the coup was held on July 10, and the military court found 29 people guilty of assassinating the
President. On August 11, Lt. Col. Mahfuzur Rehman and
11 others were sentenced to death. On September 22, the Supreme Court confirmed the sentence and all of
them were executed on September 23,
1981.
The elections to elect a new President were contested by all the leading parties but Mr. Sattar and Dr.
Kamal Hussain were the main contestants. Dr. Kamal Hussain was backed by the Awami League and the
Nationalist Party of late President Rehman supported Sattar. Sattar emerged victorious, but the result of the
elections were not accepted by the Awami League which accused the Government of rigging the election.
The tenure of President Sattar also proved very short, when Gen. Irshad set aside this government in April
1982 and promulgated martial law in the country. He assumed the office of the President in 1983.
President Irshad after assuming power ruled the country in a truly despotic manner. All political activity
was outlawed and intense censorship clamped over national press. The first 2 years of his rule followed the
same trend. The cyclones of 1984 and 1985, led to massive losses in terms of men and material and
consequently caused much disturbance among the people, The opposition capitalised over this plight of the
masses and began asserting itself through demonstrations and rallies. Moreover, international donors also
pressurised the Martial Law regime of totalitarian nature to introduce some sort of public participation.
Driven by these factors, President Irshad announced to hold a referendum in October 1985. He manipulated
the results and got a mandate to rule for the next five years. Meanwhile he enhanced his own powers
through arbitrary measures and strengthened his position as the President. To sustain his powerful position,
( ONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSIF.S
.457
he kept shifting the Prime Ministers, whose powers were reduced to those of a virtual non-entity. (President
Irshad in fact shuffled his cabinet for more than sixty times during his 9 years rule). The opposition,
however, kept ground with demands for removal of military regime headed by Irshad and revival of true
parliamentary form of government. Two major opposition parties, the Awami League (headed by Hasina
Wajid) and the BNP (Bangladesh National Party headed by Begum Khaleda Zia) boycotted the 1986
elections as both these demands \\ere unacceptable to Irshad. As a result of these elections, however.
President Irshad succeeded in getting a foothold in the Parliament as he formed \\hat was later to be known
as the Jatiya Party. This new arrangement, however, proved short lived as Hasina Wajid, serving as leader
of the opposition from the Autumn of 1987 to November 1987, gave a call for general uprising against
President Irshad. She was supported by Mrs. Khaleda Zia. Major riots broke out in midNovember 1987,
and it was necessary in Irshad’s view to declare emergency. Like in 1984, annual flood season hit the
country badly in 1987 and 1988, to add to the worries of the President. Irshad had to yield to this situation
and elections were held in 1988 March. The opposition charged the government of rigging and labelled the
new Parliament as fabricated saying that only 10% people had participated while all major parties had
boycotted. Although the opposition could not force the government to stepdown, it took its allegations
abroad, specifically to the United States. The report of the US House sub-committee on Asia and the
Pacific was attached to the Foreign Aid Authorisation Bill of 1989-90. This linked further US aid with the
holding of a free and fair elections. At home, various proposals were being tabled by different quarters as to
the political future of the country including dissolution of the Parliament, leave for Irshad and handing over
of power to an impartial vice-president acceptable to all parties till the next elections. The nature of the new
government was also extensively discussed but no agreement could be reached. The political parties were
split in opinions. The opposition felt further disgruntled when the government was able to exact the 9th
amendment in the constitution allowing for an elected Vice-President and limiting a President to two
consecutive terms in office. This move was a further blow to the much cherished parliamentary form of
government by the opposition. An important boost to Irshad’s supremacy came when in March, 1990, the
Jatiya Party captured 197 out of 393 of the contested seats for the local councils. Confident by this victory,
President Irshad announced his decision to contest the next Presidential election. The opposition called for
a ”sit-in” on October 10, anniversary of the 1987 riots. This proved a successfully organised campaign to
oust the President. A blockade was called for October 27 and the communal riots in Chittagong further
deteriorated the situation. Curfew was imposed on November 2. There was a general strike called by the
opposition demanding immediate dissolution of Parliament
458
and resignation of Irshad who would first appoint a Vice-President and replace Moudud. The Vice-
President was to become acting President till the elections. There were more demonstrations, increase in
violence. On November, 27 Irshad declared a state of emergency but this did not stop the opposition. Faced
with no other choice, Irshad resigned on December 4. He invited the opposition to nominate a new Vice-
President and Chief Justice Shahabuddin was chosen. For the proposed elections on February 27, 1991, the
Awami League contested elections on the issue of a parliamentary system whereas the BNP appeared as a
pragmatic party with nationalistic ideas, recognition of Islamic nature of Bangladeshi population and
continuation of Irshad’s economic policies. The Jatiya Party also presented a more or less similar agenda.
In the elections the BNP got 140, AL 88, the Jatiya Party 35 and Jamaat-i-Islami 18 seats. Begum Zia was
sworn in as Prime Minister on March 20. Begum Zia became vocal in favour of a parliamentary system
because her party was in clear majority and uncertainty about victory in presidential poll due to narrow vote
bank difference with the AL (31% and 28% respectively), A constitutional amendment was drafted by a
select committee comprising all political parties and with a consensus the parliamentary form of
government was revived.
Under leadership of Begum Khaleda Zia, Bangladesh emerged a fairly stable polity which has relatively
improved its economic development. The government worked as well as rehabilitated successfully in the
cyclone calamity in July 1991. Bangladesh also figured prominently at the forum of SAARC during its
summit in 1992. It condemned the sacrilege of the Babri Mosque. Though India did not attend the summit,
Bangladesh provided a useful opportunity to deliberate upon various economic issues concerning the
member countries. At the 1993 summit, the Prime Minister eagerly welcomed the idea of enhancing inter-
SAARC trade by launching of a preferential trade area (SAPTA) in South Asia.
In 1996 elections were held twice in Bangladesh- once in February; won by the Bangladesh National Party
(BNP) but annulled due to a wave of violent protests against results by three opposition parties and then in
June, under a caretaker regime. After the June elections Begum Hasina Wajid of Awami League came into
power. The June 12, 1996 elections gave the Awami League absolute majority with 169 seats in the
parliament alongwith 31 seats for the Jatio Party, its allied party, led by former military strong man,
Hussain Mohammad Irshad. The Jaamat-iIslami could not fare well with fetching only 3 seats. The BNP
emerged as the second largest party represented in the Parliament. The Awami League had come to power
after 21 years,
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSIES
459
REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY
Germany had been divided into East Germany and West Germany since the end of World War II. Both
parts throughout the Cold War represented rival ideological blocs of the communist and the capitalist
world. The Berlin Wall represented the separating line on each side of which the respective ideological
tensions had been fossilized in the form of NATO and Warsa Pact defence frameworks, \\ ith the end of
Cold War the urge for reunification fomented invariably since the partition became a popular sentiment
ending up in the collapse of the Berlin Wall and thus symbolically marking the end of an era which had not
only divided the German nation but also the whole world.
PARTITION
The partition of Germany was effected in the aftermath of the World War II when the Soviets from the east
and the Allies from the west entered the city as victors. Later, when the great powers met at Yalta, they had
no intention of partitioning the country as it later on became. The only aim was the de-Nazification of
Germany alongwith securing a demilitarized zone. The country was supposed to be occupied under Central
Control Commission which after its eventual political and economic recovery was to leave and Germany
was supposed to be back to the Germans. Differences emerged in the subsequent Postdam Conferences
(July and August 1945) as Russians differed on the question of reparation and before an agreement was
reached began removing technical equipment to make up for the demanded indemnities. They also imposed
blockade on foodstuffs for which the Westerners depended on the East. For two years the problem lingered
on and at one stage a show-down was not out of question when hell the western powers forced into the
blockade by airlifting the foodstuff to the Westerners. The year 1949 saw setting up of two separate
German governments. In the wake of this tension, the western countries started rearming Germany. While
the Western powers wanted to slowly re-arm West Germany to press for reunification once it was
strengthened a bit, the Russians were aiming at a percolation of communism into East Germany with a
view to reducing a reunited Germany into a loose federation. It was precisely this strategy that resulted in
arming of the two Germanys to such an extent that both the western powers and the Russians began
attempting to perpetuate the: status quo. The post-war formation of NATO and the Warsa Pact led to
alignment to each by each of the two parts. This East-West divide was to be the most important security
concern for the whole of Europe through four decades to follow. As far as Europe is concerned it was the
single most important development that was going to shape the global politics. As the split between the
East and the West Germany got
460
formalized, there was a spate of refugees influx from East towards the West (1.5 million between 5 years
1950-55). The influx increased in the wake of collective farms policy launched by the East German
government now proclaimed German Democratic Republic, (GDR) in 1960 and by January
1960, over 3 million had crossed into the Western part of Germany. Set to check this trend, the Soviets and
the GDR Government erected a wall between the two points with only specified entry points.
TOWARDS UNIFICATION
In the wake of a consolidated economic and political system in the Western part, the urge for migration
towards the west increased. Moreover, the partition of Germany presented an anomalous situation as both
the super-powers were defending a partition which was not real but imposed by circumstances. In this
situation the leadership of Chancellor Willy Brandt provided the signs of a possibility towards a German
reunification in future. He perhaps impressed by the stakes theory propounded by Henery Kissinger
in the context of a US-Soviet detente, launched his Ostpolitik in
1969. The intent of the whole scheme was to recognise realities in order to change them. The concept
though paradoxical was wisely thought as expected from a statesman of Brandt’s status. He aimed at
recognition of East Germany and after forging economic relationship of East Germany with the latter
nullify the partition in practice. This led to the signing of a treaty between West Germany ’and Soviet
Union recognising the post-war frontiers as inviolable, on August 12, 1970. The treaty, however, was not
approved by the West German parliament in the wake of emotional reaction implying shock on part of the
Western Germans. Similarly, West Germany entered into negotiations with Czechoslovakia thus
developing the eastern policy to its culmination point. However, the whole process emerging into a visible
detente was stalled in the wake of reintensification of the Cold War tensions towards late 1970. However,
towards the middle of 1980 as the end of Cold War looked visible the centralized authority of communist
Soviet Union slackened on its Eastern European Satellites. Gorbachev’s reforms policy backfired giving
way to free choice to people not only at home but also in Eastern Europe. The growing tendency among the
East Germans to join the West led to massive disturbances in East Germany. On 3rd December, 1989,
people thronged with all sorts of tools to dismantle the wall symbolising the end of an era and start of a new
one.
The falling of Berlin Wall was facilitated by a number of factors; first was the fundamental change in the
Soviet foreign and domestic policy which was aimed at strengthening the economy through reforms and
gradual hands off policy from the satellite areas. Secondly, the change was spurred by wholesale chances in
Eastern Europe as the process of opening
rONTEMPOR\KY INTERNATIONAL ISSl F,S
461
up got strength in the wake of stagnation of the economies and breaking-up of the rigid authoritarian
regimes. Thirdly, in the wake of arms reduction treaties and East-West co-operation, the security pacts
were rendered obsolete. Since the partition of Germany had been perpetuated by military considerations, it
was inevitable that East should join the West Germany. Further, the process of detente had resulted in the
ascendancy of economic perceptions in place of the military considerations. Thus for better economic
development, the East naturally turned towards the West.
The reunification of Germany has brought mixed results to the people of a united Germany, while the
Easterners were expecting more opportunities in economic terms, the westerners were hoping the revival of
a united Germany with greater political and economic leverage vis-a-vis other continental actors specially
UK and France. The dream of dominating the European Market and strategic leverage under NATO, has
not come true as yet. Another major problem has emerged in the shape of Neo-Nazism. During January to
September 1991, arson attacks were reported involving violence against the asylum seekers. The worst
episode came in January,
1993 when some 150 people of Turkish origin were by the Neo-Nazi activists. The problem has been
caused mainly by the disaffection among the youth due to joblessness and, SOUO economic degeneration
caused by long communist rule. The East German economy was hardly exportoriented and thus lacked the
capital regeneration capability. The toll has been taken by the post-unification resources of capital
generation. This dichotomy also is in the social area as the East Germans were largely nonparticipant
introvert-looking community alien to the egalitarian character of the West German society. The situation
has been worsened by rising unemployment (40% loss of jobs) and 20 DM budget deficit. Further, there are
serious differences over the shifting of the capital from Bonn to Berlin as the West Germans have serious
reservations keeping in view the cost of this shift. Further the East Germans are disgruntled over the so far
invisible implementation of the promises made by Helmut Kohl in his five-year plan announced just after
the unification.
IMPLICATIONS
German re-unification has multi-dimensional implications in the regional as well as global context.
Germany has emerged as a force to reckon with specially because of its economic stability and politico-
leverage vis-a-vis other countries of the EC. United Germany may lead the European countries once the
process of European integration is transformed into reality after the ratification of the Maastricht
Programme by all European nations. Germany will emerge as a revived military power under the cover of
NATO which Germany largely sees as a tool of security without political
462
T
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL IS.Sl ES
463
liabilities as exhibited by it during the Gulf War of 1991. A united Germany may pose threat to US design
of retaining leadership of Europe even during the post-Cold War era. On the other hand ascendancy of
United Germany may pose a threat to other European countries in the strategic terms. France has already
begun, eulogising national grandeur and enunciation of the delayed missile manufacturing project. NATO
will largely be used by Germany for keeping both USA and Russia down in the context of their role in
European affairs vis-a-vis German interests. With the ascendancy of economic factor in the foreign policy
consideration, USA and Germany may collude to execute a mutually beneficial trade arrangement in the
context of Europe. However, all these assumptions depend for their validity on the future shape of West
German set-up in which the German revivalists are expected to assert themselves.
THE GULF WAR 1991
Just two years after the guns fell silent after an eight-year long Iran-Iraq war. The Middle Eastern hot-spot
witnessed a bloody show down termed as Umm-ul-Harb’ (the mother of all battles) in 1991. In a
retrospective co-relation of the regional and international changes taking place around the same time, the
Gulf War of 1991 had far-reaching impact on the shape of global affairs. As the world passed through this
turmoil coupled with developments like disintegration of the Soviet Union, reorientation of US policy-
making doctrine and reactivation of the UNO, a new world emerged in which terms like ’New World
Order’ got attention. Gulf War marks an important watershed in the era of catastrophic transition that had
started in October 1989, with the collapse of Berlin Wall and crystalized into the emergence of unipolarity.
As far as Middle East is concerned, it virtually affected every thing, from state structure to the foreign
policy.
PRELUDE TO INVASION
The popular notion that the war started as a result of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 is only
partially true, because the prelude to that war had been set much before this development. It had historical
origins as the long Iraqi claim on Kuwait as ”its province” had caused much hue and cry in 1961. The
immediate motive behind the Iraqi invasion also was a cumulative economic deterioration in Iraq caused by
the 8 years long conflict with Iran. However, as far as the choice of time is concerned, it did emanate from
the prevalent balance of power in the region which Iraq wrongly perceived to be in her favour.
Like the invasion of Iran a decade earlier. Saddam’s latest aggression against a neighbouring state had less
to do with a premeditated grand design than with his perennial source of insecurity. This security stemmed
from two important dimensions of national power, economic as well as political. Though after the end of
Iran-Iraq war, Saddam eulogised his military success, the socio-economic scenario within Iraq presented a
totally different picture. Iraq had a wrecked economy. The cost of reconstruction demanded US S 230 debt.
The oil industry which accounted for 95% of Iraq’s total revenues had been for most period under
government control and there was no significant viability of a privatization process or sizeable foreign
investments. Given the repressive nature of the regime, this situation was strictly guarded by the regime so
that a leakage could not affect insurgency. However, when the Iraqi masses came out of the euphoria of
victory. Life had become really hard for them. As a social consequence of the war, a whole Generation had
been lost. Unable to bear the burden of a large standing army. Saddam attempted to diffuse the problem by
ordering partial demobilization in 1989. This decision also backfired as huge number of youngmen pouring
into labour market proved too much for the shaky economy to absorb. On paper, the solution to this
problem was simple decisive reduction in expenditure and a significant increase in revenues. This in reality
however, was a difficult task requiring heavy reliance on coercive capability. During the Iran-Iraq war. Iraq
had pressurized Arab neighbours to write off its loans. To meet the second end i.e. increase in revenues,
Iraq required immediate infusion of about 30 billion dollars. Iraq to this end attempted manipulation of the
OPEC arrangement by asking the other members to increase the price and reduce their respective quotas.
The demand was completely ignored and Iraq decided to force Kuwait to bail its economy out of disaster. If
the Gulf states still had any illusions regarding the intensity of the Iraqi anxiety over the stability of the oil
market, these should have been repelled by the Iraqi attitude at the Arab summit in Baghdad. Saddam in
categorical terms said that continued observance of the quota was an act of war against Iraq which Iraq
knows how to retaliate. Iraq saw Kuwait an opponent of higher oil price and revived claims to the Kuwait
portions of oil fields that straddled their mutual borders. Iraqi claims on Bubiyan’an and Warbah were
revived again. Even when Iraq moved troops to the frontiers, Kuwait had suspicions that Iraq would really
invade its neighbour that had given recently a 10 billion dollar grant in its war efforts with Iran. Kuwait
even then did not take it seriously and focused on the results of Jeddah talks that finally collapsed on
August 1. As far as Iraqi preparations of war are concerned Saddam had launched a serious anti-western
campaign to mobilize his people once again into war activity. Theoretically Iraq suffered through a total
lack of perception of balance of power at the regional level. Kuwait was no match to Iraq. USSR had its
own internal problems and in Iraq’s
464
I>TF.K\ VTIO.NAI. AFFAIRS
perception, USA won’t mind occupation of Kuwait as Kuwait was not enjoying warm relations with USA
due to the former’s tilt towards Soviet Union after US refusal of sophisticated weaponry. The capture of
Kuwait would make Iraq the leading power in the Arab World and give it a decisive say in the world oil
market. It was in this background that Iraq stormed into Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
REAC TION OF THE US AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
In the wake of a rapidly escalating crisis the US pledged support to Saudi Arabia, possibly the next target
of Iraq. Under US leadership an antiIraq coalition was built in NATO States comprising friendly states i.e.
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf States, Syria and friends from South Asia and Asia Pacific. The UN Security
Council intervened and forced sanctions against Iraq through Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990. Failing to
comply with another dozen of such resolutions, Iraq saw the UN Security Council Resolution No. 678 of 20
November, 1990 which authorized the use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait after January 15, 1991.
President Bush in an unexpected gesture invited Iraq to talks. Iraq perceived it as an indication that the US
resolve to liberate Kuwait was faltering. On the other hand unconditional withdrawal would have damaged
Saddam’s domestic position beyond repair. The alternative of continued occupation was also equally
ominous as once the full impact of the economic sanctions sank in, public discontent was bound to force
Saddam into a hasty and humiliating withdrawal. On the other hand an all-out war which would destroy
Iraq’s military machinery and strategic infrastructure could become a recipe for his personal destruction.
The past record of Saddam showed him to be an utterly ruthless and over pragmatic. Once provided a face-
saving formula, he would seize at it and claim his withdrawal without involving war or with involving
limited defeat as victory over imperialist forces.
On the other hand, the crisis was a stress test for the allies, specially for the US. US was faced with a public
opinion out-cry against US involvement in ”another Vietnam.” The congress was hostile to Bush’s plan
which they thought had overstretched its requirements. There was also a lack of consensus among major
powers as to the modalities adopted to resolve the conflict. Japan and Germany were not prepared to
contribute militarily and diplomatically. There was a distinct cleavage between London and its EC partners
specially France which opted to remain aloof to save from any political liability. China though had branded
the invasion of Kuwait as contrary to the Charter but emphasized an Arab solution and letting the sanctions
work before use of force.
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSIT.S
465
”OPERATION DESERT STORM”
”Operation Desert Storm’ as the code name implied storming of Kuwait and Iraq through air raids which
did begin on Jan. 16. Earlier the last bid to peace-making especially by the Soviet Union had failed to win
an Iraqi consent. The ground war began on 23rd February. In a swift campaign the allied forces soon
liberated Kuwait and occupied 15% of Southern Iraq. With an air war that had already destroyed Iraq’s
nuclear and chemical weapons capability, not to mention the majority of its ground forces, the ground war
was more a rout than the projected real war by Iraq. After only
4 days, casualties were estimated at 100,000 while less than 400 Americans,
60 British. 35 French and 300 in the forces of the Arab coalition. While retreating the Iraqi forces set the oil
wells on fire. On April 3, UN Security Council passed a resolution arranging for a permanent cease-fire.
Iraq was required to accept 1963 frontier and full inspection of Iraqi demilitarization, compensation for war
damages and appointment of UNIKOM (UN IraqKuwait Observation Mission) on both sides of the border.
Iraq unconditionally accepted all these terms. A bloody civil strife ensued within Iraq in the southern Shia
dominated area and in the northern Kurdish area.
POST-WAR SECURITY ARRANGEMENT
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait promoted new security concerns among the leaders of the small states of the
Pef sian Gulf. Having, survived after shocks of the Iranian Revolution and Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War
1991 once again reminded these states of their domestic and foreign vulnerabilities. This realization had led
to the formation of GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council). Iran also took initiative and offered a number of
states to sign non-aggression pacts. In the future security arrangements, Iran can emerge as a major power
as it has embarked upon modernization programme aimed at strengthening its capability. The Gulf states
will have to give consideration to a viable security arrangement in the light of these developments. As for
US policy towards Middle East, the previous policy of projecting coercive influence seems to give way to
multilateral arrangements to restrict the flow of weapons and technology into the region.
THE SECOND GULF WAR 2003
After the decisive victory of ”Desert Storm Operation” Saddam Hussain had to pay enormous amount of
war damages along with the human and financial damages caused by the decade long UN sanctions. UN
inspectors continued raiding suspected sites of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons for about seven
years. In 1998 the UN inspectors quitted their job on the complaint that the Iraqi authorities were
obstructing their
466
work. On the other side Baghdad accused the inspectors of being American spies under the garb of UN.
Since then the dismantling of Saddam’s government in Iraq, has been on the top of the US agenda in the
region. America used different tactics to achieve that objective, for example encouraging insurgency
against Saddam, inciting rebellion within the armed forces and bringing the economy of Iraq under the
strong clutches of the UN sanctions. Very little could be achieved through these tactics. Then Iraq was tried
to pressurize on the basis of human rights violation, tyranny and dictatorship of Saddam and possession of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
The confusion and outrage created by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 provided the Bush’s administration with
an opportunity to fulfill the unfinished agenda in Iraq. President Bush in his speech to the UN General
Assembly on 12 September 2002, urged for a new UNSC resolution on Iraq to disarm it. On 8th November
2002, the 15 members of the UNSC adopted UNSC resolution 1441 unanimously. The resolution required
Iraq to disarm and yield up its WMD or face ”serious consequences”. Its main provisions are as under:
1. Weapons inspection would begin within 45 days.
2. Iraq has seven days to accept the resolution.
3. Iraq has 30 days to convey all information about its WMD and missile technology.
The UNSC resolution 1441 gave powerful mandate to the UN Weapon Inspectors to investigate the
suspected sites in Iraq for WMD It asked Iraq to provide immediate, unrestricted and unconditional access
to the installations and work of research, development and production units, besides programs related to
WMD. President Saddam accepted the demands of the UNSC resolution 1441, and provided a
comprehensive report of 12000 pages, on its suspected weapon sites, assets and related material. Mr. Hans
Blix headed the team of some 600 UN Weapons Inspectors, which thoroughly investigated hundreds of
suspected sites and installations including the Presidential Palaces in Baghdad.
Hans Blix presented his first report of 1200 pages to the UN Security Council. It confirmed full cooperation
on the part of Iraqi administration. The Inspectors did not find WMD and demanded more time for the
purpose of further search. The US did not agree with the inspectors to prolong the search of WMD. At the
same time Iraq had started destroying the Al-Samood missiles which was ordered by the UN Weapons
Inspectors.
467
As the.US was determined to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussain in Iraq, war preparation had already
been started by the American troops in the Gulf. Frequent air strikes had been started even during the
inspection by UN Inspectors was going on. The Anglo-American forces had started building up in the Gulf
waters and full-time war exercises were started in the Kuwaiti deserts along the border of Iraq. The US and
UK desperately sought fresh mandate from the UNSC to allow use of force against Iraq. Many European
powers were not in favour of the new UNSC resolution to allow attack on Iraq. There was great divide
among the NATO members on the issue of attacking Iraq. Germany and France forwarded a proposal for a
stronger UN peacekeeping force to supervise another round of arms inspection. The US rejected the
proposal and President Bush said in clear terms that he will go to war against Iraq ”with or without ” the
UN approval if Saddam failed to prove the elimination of WMD.
As the war clouds were looming, millions of activists took to the streets all over the world to protest against
the impending unilateral attack by US on Iraq. Important NATO members along with Russia and China,
and the Muslim world opposed any unilateral attack by US on Iraq. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also
warned the US of serious consequences of unilateral attack that will be a death blow to the credibility of
UN as a world body.
President Bush, sidelining the world public opinion and the sole world body UN, gave ultimatum to
Saddam and his sons to leave their country, otherwise US forces would invade Iraq. Failing to meet the
ultimatum by Saddam, the US forces crossed the border of Iraq from Kuwait and unleashed a storm of
missiles and bombs against Baghdad. Iraqi cities were bombarded heavily. The invasion started on 20th
March
2003 and the Agio-American ground forces moved towards the Southern cities of Nasiriya and Basra. They
faced tough resistance in capturing these cities. Then the forces moved towards Baghdad with full strength.
President Saddam’s Republican Guards were expected to give the invading forces a tough time.
Surprisingly Baghdad was captured with more ease than it was expected on April 9. The Bathist regime
collapsed and the US named Paul Bremer as the administrator of Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussain.
On May 22, the UN Security Council lifted the 13-year old sanctions against Iraq and allowed the US and
Britain to run the country with its oil riches. An Iraqi Governing Council has been established under the
chairmanship of Paul Bremer to run the day-to-day affairs of the country. More than 150,000 US troops are
stationed in various cities of Iraq
468
backed by strong 12000 British forces in Basra and some 9000 Polish forces in Baghdad. Japan has also
sent, very recently, some 1000 forces to Iraq for humanitarian assistance. It was a historic decision as
Japan’s first ever military deployment in any foreign country since World War II.
AMERICAN OBJECTIVES BEHIND THE WAR
The US and its allies attacked Iraq with twin stated objectives: elimination of WMD and liberation of the
people of Iraq out of clutches of the dictator. Both the objectives, even after the complete occupation of
Iraq, seem to be unfulfilled.
The first stated objective was the destruction of WMD, that allegedly possessed by Iraq, viewed as major
threat to the world security. Since the fall of Baghdad on April 9, 2003, no evidence has yet been found in
support of the assertion. WMD were neither found by the UN Inspectors nor the US forces has succeed to
find any clue of that. Both President Bush and PM Blair are under heavy pressure from their public on the
question of WMD in Iraq. They have been assuring their masses of its presence in Iraq and that they would
find it at any time in future. They adopted even a facesaving approach by arguing that if WMD are not
found in Iraq, it had the capability and required technology to prepare that any time.
The second stated objective was liberation of Iraqi people. Most of the Iraqi people really welcomed the
ouster of Saddam Hussain, but they soon realized that the shift was only to a new master and they were not
liberated rather enslaved under the foreign occupation. Iraqi people took the term ”liberation” as an end to
the dictatorship and restoration of democratic government. But the recent developments exposed that the
US was not ready to handover authority to democratically elected Iraqi representatives. General elections in
Iraq were scheduled to be held in mid-
2004, but now the US is reluctant to hold elections and hinted on choosing the representatives through
nomination rather than election. This new stance of the occupiers has sent a message of disillusionment
among the Iraqi people and flared their anger against occupying forces. Their have been widespread
demonstrations by all communities; sunnis, shias and kurds against the imperialistic designs of the US.
Many people think that the US objective to occupy Iraq is control of Iraqi Oil reserves and overthrow of
Saddam, who was a threat to Israel. The view seems to be realistic that main motive behind the attack was
economic and strategic interests of the US. Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister, Tanq Aziz remarked, even before
the invasion, that the war was a . manufactured one aimed at redrawing the political map of the region and
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSt ES
469
putting it under permanent American control, and seizing the vast ml resources of Iraq. Hans Blix, the
Chief Ul Weapon InsPector m ’raq’ stated that the invasion of Iraq was planned along time in advance and
the US and Britain were not primarily concernd with finding5 any banned weapons of mass description.
For years before the Bush administtioin took off~jce’ Rumsfe’d and Wolfwitz have been calling for the
overthw of Saddam Hussain, as he posed a danger to the region in general and feel in partic^’31”-
Wolfwitz has even accepted it now that the US attack vis not primari^ necessitated by WMD but the
elimination of Saddam was.ecessary to c°ncihate Israel to adopt the US sponsored Roadmap in Palestine.
All it inîcates .that the US attack on Iraq was motivated by geostraitgic and ecoJômic interests rather than
WMD.
Edward Said pointed out that ”The American Prog*~amme for *e Arab world is the same as Israel’s.
Along nth Syria, Ir3<3 theoretically represents the only serious long-term threat to Israel and ther£?fore
had to put out of commission for decades.”
Mahatir Mohammad stated at the NAf suimmit m<?etmg at Kuala Lumpur that ”The war against Iraq was
nclortger just & war a8amst terrorism. It is in fact a war to dominate the woild.”
The UN Charter does not allow anuouuntry to e*Tlbark uPon a regime change in another country
unilaterally rh« US arts*11?1 of regime change in Iraq was a clear violation of the IN charter. ^ the above
discussion shows that the objectives of US fronoccupation 0$ Iracl’1S long~ term and that is to re-draw the
political map of ^Middle 0ast to lts own benefit. The US may attack other countries iither region, ostensibly
Iran and Syria, to fulfill the agenda .
POST-WAR CHALLENGES IN IRAQ
The Coalition forces seems to be owh«-elmed by the Post-war situation in Iraq. Actual occupation of Iraq
proes to be mo*”6 dlfflcult for US than mere conquering it. President Busls ir»vasion of Iraq has le^
America what is looking like a quagmire. Insead *3f showir^S the streng of America the war has revealed
how susceptibta v7vell-equiJ?Ped advanced army is to guerilla warfare. Instead of securinjnevw bushiest
opportunities for American corporations, the war in Iraq has khlighted th^ suPer Powers economic
vulnerabilities.
470
INTERNAT1ONAI AFFAIRS
The mounting controversy about human financial and diplomatic costs of occupation of haq have put at
stake not only the possibility of President Bush’s re-election tor presidency, but also the credibility of the
United States as worlds sole super power
The US and its allies are confronted with daunting challenges in the post-war chaotic Iraq Some of the most
serious problems are mounting human and financial costs of the occupation, post-Saddam clean-up
operation, socio-economic stabilization, reconstruction of democratic political institutions and the
prolonging war of attrition etc Besides, the early unilateral moves by the US have started haunting on the
super power America, going to w ar against Iraq unilaterally, not only sidelined the UN but also bypassed
her close NATO allies
The first major challenge to the US in Iraq is the financial cost of the occupation It has exceeded one billion
dollar a week which has started to register in the public mind Presidential candidates among democrats as
well as various media analysts have gone public with criticism of the Iraq policy on that account They have
raised the issue of taxing the nation for war with no well-defined goals nor clear cut ways of achieving
these goals
Second challenge is human cost of the occupation The rising number of American casualties on the war
front after the actual war was over, has started haunting on the nation The toll of US casualties since
Saddam Hussam’s capture in December 2003, has gone higher than the same period before it President
Bush’s always dubious argument that Saddam was running the insurgency from various well-hidden
quarters has fallen apart
Third challenge is to find WMD in Iraq, which provided basis for the US attack It is very essential to find
the alleged Iraqi WMD so that to legitimize the unjust war Uptill now there has not been found any clue of
WMD in Iraq Even if it is found, it will be very difficult to eliminate the most essential part of Iraqi’s
unconventional weapons infrastructure i e its skilled scientists and engineers The issue of WMD has led to
a serious controversy Some hold the faulty British Intelligence responsible, other accuse the White House
of lying to the nation
Fourth challenge is the growing lawlessness, chaos, socioeconomic instability and ethnic disruption It is the
challenge of political reconstruction and nation-building, which is viewed as the most difficult task for the
US since Vietnam It is simple rather easy to conquer a country and stay their as an occupier but it is very
difficult for the invading forces to stay m the occupied country as nation-builders
471
So far the question of national-building is concerned, internal characteristics of Iraqi society poses many
problems Iraq’s large population along with its deep ethnic and sectarian cleavages present the most serious
challenge to Washington The long-running ethnic and religious antagonism between the Sunnis, Shntes and
Kurds has already complicated the reconstruction work in Iraq because each one is trying to exploit the
American presence for its own interest on the cost of the other The Kurd minority who supported the US
attack on Iraq, has a well organized armed force If they are allowed to return to Iraq, major oil production
center, Kirkuk, from which they were expelled by Saddam, they can easily take the northern parts of the
country Kurd’s domination of the Northern Iraq will not only cause internal instability, given its animosity
towards the other factions, but will also encourage foreign interference in the country, because Turkey and
Iran do not want Kurd’s domination in the country
The other problem in the national-building is setting up of the administrative machinery of the battered
country Most of the state institutions like Police, Judiciary and bureaucracy etc are manned by Bathist
elements It will be a daunting task to purge the Iraqi administration of elements loyal to Saddam, America
is faced with the same problems in Iraq as it had in Germany and Japan after the ”Second World war
Besides civil institutions, it is even more difficult to raise a national Iraqi force for the purpose of security
maintenance Thus US cannot take the risk to share its military control with the national army, where many
Saddam’s loyalists and radical elements may join under the garb of national forces
The most severe problem of nation-building in Iraq is the lack of ethnic homogeneity, socio-economic
equality and national identity, which are pre-requisites for national reconstruction
Last problem of nation-building in Iraq is political restructuring The US has promised to liberate the people
of Iraq from the dictator’s control and to introduce democratic government in the country But there are two
major obstacles m the way of establishing a democratic government in Iraq First, under the long
dictatorship of Baath leadership, Iraq’s civil society is completely destroyed It has no sound pol-parties
system nor there are stable political institutions The people know little about democratic tradition and
values, they have hardly any experience of grassroot political participation All these are essential
conditions for democracy which Iraqi society totally lacks Second, democracy means free elections on the
basis of adult-franchise, which will definitely lead to Shnte supremacy m the future democratic government
that is totally unacceptable to the US That is the reason that US is hesitating to hold elections, rather
472
C ONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
.473
wants to chose the government through nomination. This plan of the US is challenged by the Iraq’s
majority shia community. The Shiite spiritual leader Ayatullah Ali Al Sistani, has repeatedly called on the
US that nothing less than direct elections will be acceptable to him. All these development have added to
the enormity of the situation.
The last but not the least challenge posed to the US in Iraq is the pitfall of its unilateral attack on the oil-
rich country. There is a clear transition from the nationalist assertion of par-Americana to the grim
realization of the potential loss of NATO allies such as Germany and France. Russia, India, Turkey and
Pakistan had linked the issue of sending their troops to Iraq on a peace-keeping mission with the UN
mandate. So, the US felt obliged to back to the world organization, which it had bypassed in its resolve to
invade Iraq.
The above mentioned challenges are seriously haunting on the possibility of President Bush re-election.
The Bush administration increasingly feels that casualties in Iraq must stop, financial cost must be slashed
and NATO allies must be won over. All it depends on how soon President Bush manages to address issues
emanating from opposition of various shades.
The Bremer administration has already taken some steps to restore the confidence of Iraqi. For instance the
formation of supra-government council, followed by a cabinet in place representing major interests and
communities in the country. Other steps include recruitment of a security force amongst the Iraqis,
increased vigilance over strategic assets i.e. oil and water resources and recruitment of forces from allied
countries like Poland and Japan. But all these steps are not enough. The US has to do more to bring down
the growing American casualties and to stabilize the domestic chaotic situation in Iraq. The most realistic
solution would be sharing of military and political control of Iraq with the UN. Beside that free and fair
election should be conducted as demanded by the UN Security Council resolution. Only through
installation of democratic government, the US can win the confidence of the Iraqi people which will pave
the way to further reconstruction of the country.
Failing to hold elections will further intensify the guerilla activities in Iraq. It will be great deceit on the
part of US who had claimed to liberate the people of Iraq before invading the country. Prolonged instability
and lawlessness in Iraq will turn it into a hot bed of terrorism and will ultimately cause instability in the
whole region of Middle East.
IRAQI ELECTION
The capture of Saddam in December 2003 was one such pivotal
moment; 30th janaury,2005 election was another. Yet controversies are there
in Sadam capture. According to a Sergeant who participated in the
operation that netted Saddam, saying that the Iraqi leader was actually
captured the day before and that ”the public version of his capture was
j fabricated.” A Pentagon public relations team apparently choreographed the
T entire event. To destroy Sadam image, they showed him being walked out
of a house in chains with mess up his hair, cover with dirt, and shove in a
hole.
The second important moment for a nation that has been so traumatized, whose infrastructure and social
fabric has been wrecked by a quarter century of tyranny, war, invasion and economic block. ie, was 30lh
January 2005 in which Iraqi people defiantly and jubilantly voted. Both the two important occurring
completed Bush’s purple revolution.
Purple Revolution is a term that some have given to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq
and the coming of democracy to the nation. The name follows a recent naming trend of democratic
revolutions in former dictatorships - the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine,
and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon are three examples. In this context, the ”purple” stands for the ink-
stain marking the index fingers of first-time voters in Iraq (the semi-permanent stain was to prevent
fradulent multiple voting).
The term may have been coined by U.S. President George W. Bush during his visit to Bratislava, Slovak
Republic for a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Bush stated: ”In recent times, we have
witnessed landmark events in the history of liberty: A Rose Revolution in Georgia, an Orange Revolution
in Ukraine, and now, a Purple Revolution in Iraq.”
Bush attacked Iraq on the pretext of producing weapon of mass destruction, but implicitly US has different
intentions ranging from Isreal security to capturing ME oil. US unilaterally attacked Iraq with the
permission of UN. Which created resentment in the whole world. Differences among Europe and US
increased and breaches in Nato surfaced. Million of people protested US invasion of Iraq through out the
globe. Tonny Blair unconditional support for president Bush was strongly criticized domestically and in
through out the Europe.. A two-year search by 1,000 personnel with a budget of $lbn has found zero threat:
no weapons stockpiles; no chemical or biological agents; no nuclear plants; no delivery systems. When
Tony Blair was obliged to admit last summer that
474
he could find no weapons, he promised to produce weapons programmes. Now Washington has closed
down the search without uncovering any such programmes either.
After fall of sadam regime by Americans, President Bush nominated Paul Bremmer as Iraqi Administrator.
In June 2004 power was transferred to interim government. Ayad Allawi was sworn in as prime minister
and Ghazi Alyawar as president
In January, 8.5 million people went to the polls and nearly half voted for the Shi’ite Alliance.
The provisional results from the January 30th elections show the Kurds coming in second position,
securing over two million votes.
The White House congratulated the winners of the election even though it’s preferred candidate, interim
Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi’s List party, came in a poor third place Many Arab Sunni Muslims, who
make up just a fifth of the population of Iraq, but dominated the country under Saddam Hussein, did not
vote, with turnout as low as 2% in some parts.
The list of candidates blessed by the Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani hold nearly 48% or 140 seats in the
National Assembly. Discriminated against for decades, this is the moment of the Shi’ites but they say they
are not going to create an Islamic state Next came the Kurdish Coalition with just over 25%, or 69 seats
leaving Prime Minister Allawi’s list third with less than 14%, 37 seats. Kurds are in strong bargaining
power.
Sunni boycotted January election. But in Anbar province, which includes Fallujah and is predominantly
Sunni, only 2% voted and only 17% in Nineveh and 29% in Salahadin, also mainly Sunni areas.
NEW WORLD ORDER
The term ”New World Order” bears connotations that have given rise to widespread hot controversies
among scholars and observers of the international politics. In the wake of wholesale changes that the
international political system was under-going since the collapse of Berlin Wall and the emerging shape of
the global politiko-strategic structure after Gulf War 1991, President Bush of USA coined the phrase New
World Order to outline, in principle, the guidelines for the US foreign policy in a changed world. On
January 29, 1991, in his address to the Congress, he exhorted the nation:
.475
... ”What is at stake is more than one small country it is a big idea a New World Order where diverse
nations are drawn together in a common cause to achieve the universal aspiration of mankind peace and
security, freedom and the rule of law. Such a world is worthy of our struggle and our children’s future.”’
Though primarily aimed at the future formulation of US policies the concept bore an objective
internationalistic content the future shape. Or the world as US saw it or more broadly; the sum of structural
features of the post-Cold War era politics with special reference to the US approach and response towards
them ”At its core, the concept connoted three different but chained processes, interplaying simultaneously
in the new world, the shape of things after the demise of Soviet Union, the structural changes that will
emanate from this transitional phase leading to a changed world, the US approach and role during this
transitional and emergent phase of history.
The changes at the international political scenario that contributed to the articulation of this concept into a
prescription for US policy-makers were fundamental in that they changed the whole complexion of the
globe. While the end of Cold War meant that the East-west tussle for influence was gone, the reunification
of Germany bore all implied need to reshape the security structure in Europe with the process of the falling
of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, an era of transition began which could take the European
continent to an internal strife as in the case of Yugoslavia, peaceful parting of the ways as in the case of
Czechoslovakia, reunification of former single units as in the case of Germany or replacement of
communist-oriented authoritarianism by political experimentation with other forms of government. The
demise of the Soviet Union in its own right was the biggest upheaval leading to the emergence of new
realities, obsolete utility of the security arrangements, disengagement from the regional disputes like
Afghanistan. Cambodia, Angola. Ethiopia, Cuba and Nicaragua etc. re-emergence of Central Asia and what
not. The Gulf War of
1991, manifested in its aftermath the redundancy of the traditional balance of power in the region on one
hand and need for a new pragmatism among the regional countries towards a future security arrangement
on the other. All these changes were bound to affect the decision-making structure of the United States
thereby necessitating the chalking out of a set of principles as guidelines to policy formulation.
New World Order as perceived by the US, includes certain concrete issues underpinning the US foreign
(and domestic) policy in the new global structure. Peace in the world (peace strictly defined in the
American politikostrategic lexicon) would be top priority on US agenda. President Bush’s words
emphasised the need for ”the UN to become a
476
forum for achieving international consensus and maintain effective influence as an instrument for
international peacekeeping” This leads to the inference that the US sees UN to be a vehicle for promotion
of her interests in the execution of the foreign policy objectiv es The first instance which testified this was
the Gulf War 1991 in which the US manipulated the apparatus of international Organisation for forging
consensus to legitimise the use of force against Iraq and later confirmed by US in action to resolve other
crisis such as Bosnia, Kashmir etc
Non-proliferation of arms specially the chemical and nuclear weapons is the other most important objective
of US foreign policy To achieve this end, the US seems to use the international regimes institutionalised to
secure limitation and reductions of these weapons The destruction of Iraqi nuclear facilities, the continuous
pressure on Pakistan and North Korea to sign the NPT and imposition of economic sanctions on Pakistan
and China for an alleged violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) are ample
testification to this trend However, the discriminatory nature of these arrangements tends to reduce the
effectiveness of the US policy
Promotion of economic reforms along liberal market pattern and the activation of the regional trade and co-
operation arrangements is also a goal of US policy The US has not only been active in the establishment of
NAFTA (in November 1993) but also showed keen activity at the conference of Asia Pacific Economic
Community It also wishes an active co-operation with the countries of EC and ASEAN, though to the
reservations on the part of other members of these arrangements The international trade regime WTO
seems to be a tool for regulating international trade in accordance with the objectives of USA as the
December 1993 conclusion of GATT talks revealed Other institutions like IMF and World Bank are
supposed to serve the American interests in the areas of Third World Development, North-South relations,
debt crisis etc Aid relations will mainly be governed by uses of democracy, human rights, environmental
development, population control, arms control etc Democracy and human rights are supposed to be the pass
words for the promotion of stability m the world These two issues have been made conditional with the
provision of aid to incumbent recipients As far as human rights issue is concerned, the US has so far
achieved little success because of the very nature of the pressure applied Most countries charged with as
violation of human rights take it as intervention in the internal affairs of the state or take it simply as a
propaganda cover to coerce the respective state to achieve some other objectives Moreover, the application
of the tool of human rights has been selective and discriminatory As far as democracy is concerned, the US
policy has limited scope of success as long
CONTFMPORARY IMTRNATIONAI ISSl ES
477
as the countries urged towaids demociatic reforms do not acquire the status of civil societies, with
paiticipation in pluiahstic organisations and movements, willingness to tolerate disparate political views
and membership of fellow citizens and citizenship It is precisely the absence ot a civil society in all its
dimensions that makes a toad to democracy treacherous in many parts of the world
There are divergent approaches as to the interpretation of the concept of New World Order as its operative
form The fhst assumption in this legard is that the world will be brought under a system of collective
security under UNO A part will be contnbuted by other regional and international organisations The second
assumption is that the world will be a condominium of USA and Russia each acting in unison with the
other The third assumption is that New World Order will be effected through a Pax Americana While the
implications of the third assumption as crystallised after the Gulf experience render it quite important, the
other two can be seen operating behind the US response to certain issues and areas where US and Russia
with UN arrangement are following an almost consensus agenda As for the role of US in the future global
politics, there is a serious controversy among the scholars and observers of international politics some point
out that due to the economic constraints US will be heading towards adopting a relatively isolationist
posture This argument has been augmented by President Clinton’s emphasis on the domestic agenda such
as health care and unemployment Of course an active role outside, such as in Bosnia and Somalia The other
school of thought holds that after the cold war, US is obliged to lead the world due to the expanded
American interest virtually across the globe Isolationism is simply an impossible option The ideal holds
currency specially in the wake of the very nature of American economy export-oriented and strategic
perception global and not continental or regional This is precisely for these reasons that the USA wants to
play an active part not only in the Atlantics and the Americas but also in Asia and the Pacific
As far as the role of other powers and regions in the implementation of the New World Order is concerned,
the traditional partners like EC, UK, Japan and Germany are expected (with little reservations) to work in
collaboration with USA Japan is though a fast emerging economic super-power, in other areas it does not
seem to pose a potential threat to any US designs China the only power with a Marxist socialist orientation,
too is not expected to emerge as an alternate ideological rival to the US in place of the defunct Soviet
Union A united Europe under a United Germany will also tend to co-operate vis-a-vis the delicate balance
of power pievaihng in the continent The challenge cannot either come from other quarters, Thud Woild or
the revivalists in the
478
Islamic or other traditions because they are still at a rudimentary stage of developing enough capability to
challenge the US designs. The world will in fact be governed by the interdependence of all these actors and
agencies with the US of course holding a prominent position. It will only be at a later stage that the global
structure after some kind of transformation may lead to a rethinking of these aspirations.
NEW WORLD ORDER AND THIRD WORLD
The new international political order which has come into existence after the disintegration of the Soviet
Union has two predominant characteristics. First, for the first time in the history of the world,
international relations have become truly global. The international political order which was brought into
existence by the Congress of Vienna in the form of the Concert of Europe was an exclusively European
oligarchy. The League of Nations had a wider geographical coverage, but it was still a predominantly West
European affair. When the UN system was established, it was also in effect a closed oligarchy of the five
permanent members of the Security Council, all of which, with the exception of the Soviet Union, were
under the hegemony of the USA.
The decolonisation process led to the virtual universalisation of UN membership. But the bipolarity of the
international system brought about by the Cold War prevented the emergence of a truly global and
universal political order. The end of bipolarity, the virtual globalisation of capitalism through the
operations of the transnational corporations, and the spectacular advance of mass communication have
imparted a truly global and universal character to the international system.
Secondly, for the first time in the history of the world, the international political order has come under the
hegemony of one state. The Concert of Europe was characterised by the virtual equality of the European
oligarchs who had divided the world into their own respectable spheres of influence. The League of
Nations also functioned as an ineffective oligarchy of more or less equal European powers, with the USA
opting out of it, and the Soviet Union being prevented from joining it, for the better part of its existence.
Although the USA had initial dominance over the UN system, the Cold War and nuclear deterrence
established a kind of global balance of power which prevented any one state from establishing its
hegemony over the entire international system. With the Soviet counter power disappearing from the
international system, the new international political order has come under the virtually unchallenged
hegemony of the USA, the other militarily strong states being either in strategic alliance with the USA, or
at any rate unwilling to challenge its global hegemony.
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSt’ES
479
The NATO, of course, is not an entirely monolithic militarypolitical bloc. But the occasionally anti-
American stand taken by some NATO members on specific international issues, such as the US blockade of
Cuba or the unilateral US missile attack on Iraq on the Kurd issue, are only minor irritations caused by
tactical, often economic considerations, rather than the result of a divergence of strategic perceptions.
Japan, though nominally outside the NATO, is a close and almost unquestioned ally of the USA and other
NATO states, so far as foreign policy is concerned. Russia and the other erstwhile republics of the USSR
are depending heavily on the USA and other NATO states for their economic survival and accelerated
return to capitalism. China, although ideologically in conflict with the US, developed a strategic and
economic understanding with the USA from the sixties onwards. China was helped out by the US in a big
way in the SinoSoviet conflict. The rapid development of state-sponsored capitalism in China, which has
created a new Chinese dependence on the USA and its allies for private foreign investment, appear to have
given a continuity to this strategic understanding. Thus the Security Council, the UN system, and the whole
structure of international relations appear to have come under the hegemony of the USA. The new
international political order is increasingly wearing the look of a new imperial international order.
The USA, which is perhaps the most aggressively nationalist state of the world today, has been trying more
or less openly to use the UN as an instrument for the promotion of its perceived national interests across the
globe. Politically, it has been trying to bend the UN to its will by the nonpayment of its dues, by opposing
the renewal of the tenure of a SecretaryGeneral, who was showing a trace of independent behaviour, by
persistently demanding ”reform” of the UN system, and more importantly by trying to induct two of its
surrogates, Germany and Japan (India was also lobbying hard, but thankfully seems to have lost the bid) as
permanent members of the Security Council.
Economically, it has been using the World Bank and the IMF over which it has decisive controlling power
for undermining the public sector and promoting a form of dependent capitalism throughout the Third
World. Militarily, it has been trying to use the UN as a support base for its own foreign military
interventions, as well as a series of discriminatory arms control regimes, including the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). designed and sponsored by it
to make its own military power and that if its strategic allies globally unchallengeable.
This policy of using the UN as an instrument of American foreign policy may be consistent with the US
national interest as perceived by the
480
US decision-makers, but it is certainly detrimental to the national and collective interests of the Third
World states whose sovereignty, security and independent development are constantly threatened by it.
Pakistan and other Third World states should not, therefore, unresistingly and wilfully accept the new
hegemonic international political order in the name of ”liberalisation” and ”globalisation”, and abandon the
policy of non-alignment, as they seem to be doing. It must be remembered that one of the cardinal
principles of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) Pakistan was refused entry for many years since the
members of NAM considered it as an ”aligned” country - was its opposition to imperialism and hegemonic
military alliances. That principle still remains valid in the new international context. What is now
imperative for the militarily and economically weak states of the Third World is to build up organised
political resistance against the hegemonic structure of the new international political order and to work in a
determined and persistent manner for the democratisation of the UN system. For in a necessarily
asymmetrical international system their security, independence and development can be safeguarded only
by an International political order with a democratically constituted regulatory authority.
In this context, Pakistan’s steadfast and defiant opposition to the NPT and the CTBT along with India is a
step in the right direction, indicating as it does a measure of resistance against wanton pressure from the
hegemony of the new world order for the acceptance of a palpably iniquitous and discriminatory regime.
Similarly, there is a dire need to introduce democratic changes in the Security Council, not necessarily
giving countries like India, which themselves have terrible human rights records, a place in the body but by
limiting the powers of the existing members and pressurising them to give due consideration to world
public opinion before taking any ”drastic” steps and measures. For muscle power or money power used to
be the basis of political organisation only in the predemocratic age. But these appear to be more or less
spordiac and episodal political thrusts on the part of Pakistan without a broader strategy geared to the
democratisation of the international political order.
The strongest opposition to the democratisation of the international political order would inevitably come
from those very NATO states which so vociferously advocate democracy and human rights at the national
level, albeit on a selective basis. Just as their advocacy of individual liberty and national self-determination
at home happily coexisted with their own global imperialism for several centuries in the past, so also there
appears to be an easy and comfortable co-existence of their democratic profession with their advocacy of
an oligarchic international order for the 21 st century. Since any
CONTF.MPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
481
amendment of the UN Charter must have the concurrence of each of the five permanent members of the
Security Council, it seems nearly impossible that the UN can be democratised through an exclusively
constitutional process. That is why an organised struggle on the part of the Third World states both inside
and outside the world body, is urgently necessary for its democratisation. The non-aligned movement, QIC,
SAARC, Organisation of African States and the numerous other international fora to which they have easy
access may be utilised for this purpose. On account of the overwhelming majority of the Third World states
in the UN General Assembly, such an international political struggle should possibly be less hopeless than
it may appear to be at first sight. Pakistan has both the legitimacy and the obligation to sponsor and
spearhead such a movement for international democracy.
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION ORGANISATION (ECO)
The idea of Economic Co-operation Organisation was initiated by the Iranian government in 1985. The
intent was to revive the regional economic co-operation as formerly envisaged by the defunct RCD. After
keeping dormant for about seven years ECO saw an important development in mid-February, 1992, when
the three basic members, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey welcomed the admission of former Soviet republics of
Central Asia, Azerbijan Turkmanistan and Uzbekistan (to be followed by Tajikistan Kyrgystan Kazakhstan
and Afghanistan) into the fold of the Organisation. The watershed highlighted one of the most important
developments in the region following the collapse of Soviet Union. It brought some 300 million people of
these Republics into the ambit of expanded arrangement for regional co-operation thus opening new vistas
of development and prosperity in the region.
BACKGROUND
The origin of the arrangement which the ECO represents can be traced back to 1964 when three major
countries representing South West and Euro-Asia embarked upon the formation of RCD (Regional
Cooperation for Development). The arrangement was facilitated by realisation on the part of all the three
members of shifting trends in global politics. The emergence of a Soviet-American detente had rendered
allegiance to the military alliances less obligatory on the part of the member countries on one hand and
emphasised replacement of military partnerships by economic cooperation on the other RCD was created
by its members in part because of their disenchantment with role of military alliances in resolving conflicts
which involved the three member countries (Kashmir, Cyprus and Iran-Iraq tussle). The countries
therefore, undertook to turn to mutual help; safeguarding peace in the region, promotion of intra-regional
trade;
establishment of common projects mutual provision for technical assistance improvement of

communications; co-operation in shipping, air transport service, postal tariffs and insurance etc.
RCD proved a fair success in realising the common goal of mutual development. The success can be
attributed to a number of factors cultural, ethnic and historical affinity almost same level of economic
development diversity resources of ideological homogeneity the approach of co-operation (joint ventures)
first trade and second which helped them refrain from indulging in trade competition.
Towards the end of 1970s however, the arrangement of RCD was in shambles due to various regional and
international changes and disrupting factors. First, there was lack of collaboration and co-operation in the
field of foreign policy. Turkey and Iran had recognised Israel but Pakistan did not. Pakistan was more
friendly to China than the other two and also opposed the entry of India and Afghanistan into ECO wanted
by Iran and Turkey. Second, the member countries had multiple affiliations. Turkey was member of NATO
and EC resulting in more allegiance towards Europe and Pakistan was promoting ties with China. Third,
there was lack of funding as USA and other allies had withdrawn aid packages considerably. Fourth the
Iran Revolution which proved a death-knell for the organisation’s very existence. While Pakistan and
Turkey were willing to continue Iran took it as ”an instrument of super-power influence in the region” and
”a by-product of CENTO”.
Thus after the initial success the RCD sank to ambivalence as the major thrust behind the idea i.e. will to
co-operate was gone.
THE EMERGENCE OF ECO
In 1985 Iran again initiated the revival of the idea of regional cooperation feeling the winds of change in
the global and regional politicoeconomic environment characterised by following important features.
i) New detente with signs of the end of Cold War and subsequent need for re-orientation of foreign and
economic policies.
ii) Global trend towards regionalism as represented by EC, ASEAN etc.
in) Growing trend towards interdependence.
iv) Worldwide endeavours to denationalize and liberalise national economies and subsequent need for free-
trade zones giving easier access to the markets of trading partners.
CONTF,MPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
483
It was in this background that Pakistan, Iran and Turkey again switched over to the idea of promoting
mutual co-operation aimed at common development of one another by exploiting the natural resources and
abundant manpower potential. The Treaty of Izmir thus provided a trilateral Organisation comprising
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey with a view to promote conditions for sustained socio-economic growth in the
member states.
The structure of the new organization had much in common with its predecessor’s (RCD). The only
difference was that the Treaty of Izmir which had been adopted as the Charter of ECO had relegated the
level of decision-making apparatus from ”ministerial” to ”official” level, thus making it without requisite
political backing of the three member states. Although a steady trade activity followed between the member
states from
1985 to 1990 (Pak-Iran 1247 to 2902 million rupees. Pak-Turkey 115 to 956 million rupees during these
five years) yet ECO remained largely dormant till the start of the decade of 1990s. The organizational void
was overcome by an amendment into the Treaty of Izmir as adopted by the member states in the 1985
Tehran meeting. Following the ratification of the amended treaty of Izmir by the three member states, ECO
was fully launched in 1991. This was followed by the May 22, 1991 Tehran meeting of the Council of
Ministers. In order to boost trilateral economic co-operation among themselves the three countries signed a
protocol that promised to reduce custom tariffs by ten percent. They also agreed to work jointly for the
establishment of an investment bank, to be used as a vehicle for investing in the joint projects in conformity
with internationally recognized financial regulations. These important decisions were formalised into
specific agreements in a meeting held in Ankara in February, 1992. ECO received a big boost in its first
summit meeting in Tehran on February, 16-17, 1992. It was attended by heads of the three member
countries as well as by the Presidents of the Republics of Azerbijan and Turkmanistan and the foreign
Minister of Tajikistan, Chairman High Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan and Deputy Prime Ministers
of Kyrgystan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. Membership was extended to five newly independent republics
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbijan, Turkmanistan - were given observer’s status. The Summit meeting also
adopted a protocol on preferential tariffs and decided to continue its efforts for the elimination of all trade
barriers and subsidies among the member states at the earliest. The communique also called for ”return of
peace to Afghanistan and offered full support to efforts for an early political settlement acceptable to the
Afghan people. The inclusion of these republics was significant in the sense that ECO became the second
largest economic Organisation after EC with a total population of 265 million people on areas of 3.21
million square kilometres with resource richness and strategic location.
Then came the Ministerial meeting at Islamabad on November 28,

1992 starting a new phase of ECO with inclusion of seven new members, raising the total membership to
10.
As envisaged by the May 1992 Ashkabad summit. The economic co-operation was to be made possible
eventually leading to economic integration of the member countries. The provisions of the Ashkabad
Summit were later on institutionalised into specific arrangements at the Council of Ministers’ Conference
in Quetta on February 6-7, 1993. The understanding was incorporated into the Quetta Plan of Action. In
reviewing the progress achieved in the development of regional cooperation the Council commended the
Regional Planning Council and the Technical Committees for their important contributions which had
resulted in the initiation of significant projects amongst the member states. The Council stressed that ECO
projects and programmes which could be put in motion whenever any members of ECO countries were
ready to act together. A plan of action which would aim to achieve its objectives by the year 2000 included
certain provisions like:
i) Extension of road, rail and air links in accordance with
internationally recognised standards, ii) To promote trade a uniform system of customs procedures was
stressed to be devised along with establishment of a Trade
Development Bank, in) Development of hydel and fossil sources of energy a network
of pipelines and inter-connection of grids are envisaged, iv) Investment of the industrial projects by
encouraging private
sector participation, v) Establishing of new institutions to promote technical
knowledge and exchange of experience in agriculture and
related industries, vi) Promotion of tourism, human resource development
programmes, and feasibility studies were also envisaged.
At the November 1993, Ministerial moot in Islamabad progress over the working of various committees
was reviewed and various recommendations made.
ECO summit held in Istanbul in 2002 is the recent development in connection to the mutual cooperation
among the member countries. Istanbul summit took account of ECO’s decade long performance, which
aimed at profiting from mutual strengths and complimenting mutual weaknesses. The member countries
recreated their oath to honour sovereignty, territorial integrity and nation ethos of each other.

.485
Istanbul summit has been focused, especially on Afghanistan where war against terrorism has left the
country with devastation, ECO’s fund has been reoriented for the country. Its political and economic
stability has been ensured through strengthening the new government and devising viable economic
projects.
The Istanbul summit of ECO has marked another development by launching a project with the purpose of
constructing gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan via Afghanistan, which is to be financed by the
ADB. The summit is also marked by the tenth anniversary of the expansion of ECO in 1992. President
Pervez Musharaf participated in the summit on behalf of Pakistan. In his address at the meeting, he
emphasized the need for coalition in the perspective of increasing globalization in the world. He further
asserted the necessities of close coordination among the economic policies and uniformity of the political
views of the member countries.
THE FUTURE OF ECO
With Pakistan, Iran and Turkey as ECO’s original members, the expanded ECO has the potential to become
a politically and economically powerful bloc. Spanning over South, Central and West Asia, ECO now
comprises 300 million predominantly Muslim people spread over 10 regional countries ECO members also
have the advantage of territorial contiguity cultural overlap rich resources shared faith and absence of any
major territorial conflict. This strong association has the potential to become a major political and
economic force in international affairs. It is a tribute to the governments. In our region that they are moving
with swiftness to adopt the agenda of our times - the agenda of regional co-operation. The stress on
regional co-operation within the ECO framework acquires special significance against the backdrop of the
chaotic and frenzied times we are experiencing. The mayhem in Kashmir continues. The Chechens are in
anguish. Use of force is rampant. Thus while much of the human response meanders along a reactive path
this conscious effort at co-operation by the ECO governments is indeed promising.
Much has been said and written about the compulsions and premises underlining regional co-operation.
There are historical compulsions that call for regional co-operation - the silk route the common thread of
empires that ran through our respective lands etc. Many among us believe that a common religion and
overlapping cultures make for a sound basis upon which co-operation can be built.
While agreeing with all this it is important to add that we all know and feel the affinities of a common past
What we need is to build a shared
486
future. The demands of our times give out territorial contiguities, postIranian Revolution and post-Soviet
wave of cultural reassertion, a shared fate as underdeveloped economies and the commonalities in our
relations with the Industrialised states are that we join in the common task of evolving a common vision for
the future.
It is a vision that must be all encompassing covering all dimensions of human development. It must cover
the requirements of policy, economy, defence and society at large. Any talk of co-operation especially in
non-official forums that restricts itself to economic cooperation alone appears flawed on two counts. One, it
views economic activity alone as sufficient for a society’s progress other dimensions include the social
sector and above all an enlightened political outlook. Focusing on economic development to the exclusion
of other sectors in regional cooperation will create the problems the ECO unity today faces. The much
trumpeted Maastricht Treaty is endangered by racism.
Two, it ignores the on-going sociocultural exchange at the nongovernment and perhaps the governmental
level infact even at the political level while some governments make the standard statements about
noninteference in each other’s affairs there are super-national quasi-political forces operating. The political
imperative underlying the need for regional co-operation can be appreciated within the context of
contemporary issues and challenges the countries in our region face. Within individual states, especially the
former Soviet states, ethnic politics is emerging. Inherent in ethnic politics is the fear of People blindly
adopting agendas like settling of old historical scores through use offeree etc.
Stalin’s policies of ”sovietization” produced ethnic collages in the former Soviet territories. These
otherwise harmless ethnic collages could become explosive in the event that ethnic politics gains
momentum. An offshoot of all this could be the undermining of territorial nationalism. In addition in the
ECO territory there is the transnational phenomenon of religion-based politics.
The ECO region especially with the entry of the seven new states acquires strategic importance for outside
powers. Its raw materials, its ability to absorb second-rate industrial technology and its need for capital,
make it an attractive area for the weakened capitalist forces of America. In countries like Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, the Israelis have entered into partnership with Amercan companies to undertake commercial
ventures. Historically, it is true that whenever an area becomes economically critical for Washington, it
would attempt to control its security policy and manipulate its local politics.
487
Given this multiple level of issues, the ECO region faces the primary requirement of reforming the state
and to create a new, a more enlightened political culture. The state needs to undergo fundamental changes
both with respect to its comprehension of its responsibility towards civil society and with respect to its
structure.
What is needed is a common outlook, a shared vision of how the ECO region must address issues of socio-
political and security nature. It is unrealistic to assume that given the significant ethnic and ideological
overlap among the ECO states any state can deal with these issues independent of the others. Economic
agendas often fall on the way side in the absence of a common outlook on non-economic issues. As the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) virtual impotence on the economic front
testifies.
ROLE OF PAKISTAN
As far as Pakistan’s role in the promotion of regional cooperation under ECO is concerned, Pakistan can
provide useful assistance in forging greater proximity among divergent interests and politics of the other
members. Pakistan, owing to its moderate outlook, can help resolve differences among various members
such as Afghanistan and Tajikistan. As Leo Rose puts it, Pakistan occupies a highly strategic position
between South, South West and Central Asia and thus belongs to all the three essentially linked regions.
Pakistan’s proximity with all member countries can rum it into a centre of nourishing trade and
development activity under ECO. Pakistan can depend upon the large export potential of its commodities to
ECO members and thus compensate for the cut-off US aid and by diversifying its economic options
through entering into joint ventures. Pakistan can provide transit facilities to member countries and thus
earn in terms of tariffs which will not be burdensome to the countries seeking these facilities. Pakistan’s
close and friendly relations with its western neighbours will provide a ”strategic depth” vis-a-vis India once
Pakistan is tied up with these states through trade links. On its part. Pakistan must strive to secure the
viability of ECO trade activity through development of communication networks with the ECO partners.
Pakistan should keep neutral in mutual disputes involving other member countries. The stability in
Afghanistan can provide an opening to Central Asian republics and Pakistan should contribute towards this
end using its good offices with all the parties concerned. The construction of a road linking Pakistan,
Afghanistan and Uzbekistan has been proposed which is a good sign but a lot more has yet to be done
which all depends upon stability in Afghanistan.
488
EVOLVING SINO-US RELATIONS
Although China’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era does not mark any major departure from the
previously dominated trends. Some substantial changes have occurred in several areas after the Tiananmen
episode of 1989. These shifting trends are significantly visible in China’s relations with the USA. The
significance of this relationship lies in the fact that after the demise of Soviet Union, China has emerged as
a force to reckon with as far as the future power structure of the globe is concerned. While the Chinese are
still sticking to the Marxists path, the USA is worried with respect to some important issues regarding the
international as well as domestic agenda of China. However, a conflict situation that marked the Cold War
with Soviet Union is fairly far from vision due to the typical geopolitical dimensions of the Sino-US
relations.
The Chinese for most of their history as a nation have been an introvert looking community. Their contact
with the Western world came in the late 18th century. Prior to that the Chinese had apprehensions about the
domestic consequences of the extended relationship with the outside world in general and with the west in
particular. The more xenophobic elements among them have consistently feared that close contacts with the
west could subject the Chinese economy to foreign exploitation, introduce unorthodox new ideas into the
Chinese society, thus undermining the security of the Chinese state. This trend persisted through the
following one and a half century as the inception of a communist regime not only adhered to this principle
but also added a more close mechanism in this approach in the form of a centralised Communist Party
system. In the post-Mao period however, the Chinese leadership realised that this approach was not all
correct as it was one of the major reasons behind their relative backwardness vis-a-vis the other open
societies as without coming into contact with the outside world and socio-economic and technical
exchanges, national interest cannot be enhanced to the desired level. The result of this approach culminated
in the form of the Great Cultural Revolution, aiming at liberalisation of the Chinese policies in foreign
economic and cultural fields. Coupled with the Sino-Soviet rivalry to the leadership of world communist
movement, the fresh approach led to dramatic expansion of trade investment tourism and academics with
the west and specially with the United States throughout the 1980’s. The relations in these years were
fostered to such an extent that China today is the 9th biggest trade partner with the United States. In the
post-Cold War era, the Chinese leadership was expecting that the Sino-American relations would evolve
from a geopolitical alignment aimed against the Soviet Union to an economic partnership with the US
providing to China the capital markets, technology and specific scientific and technical know-how needed
C ONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSIES
489
for China’s modernisation through liberal reforms. A serious blow to this approach came in the form of the
Tiananmen episode of 1989, which provided a graphic evidence that the dilemma of open door had not
been resolved. Popular demands for ”freedom” and ”democratisation” illustrated the disruptive impact of
the western values in the Chinese society. The economic sanctions imposed by the US suggested that
American willingness to co-operate in China’s economic modernisation was much more tentative and
conditional.
The emergent situation sparked a heated controversy in China as to the right approach to deal with the
USA. The conservatives in the Chinese power echelon look at the whole issue from an ideological
perspective depicting it as an inherently antagonistic relationship marked by confrontation between
socialism and capitalism. They suggest the following modifications in the Chinese policy towards the US:
i) Reducing academic and cultural exchanges with the US so that
the primary channels through which unorthrodox western ideas

and values that can enter China could be plugged, ii) Less accommodating attitude towards economic
relations with
the US in favour of a more self-reliance oriented strategy for
economic development, in) A more critical attitude towards American foreign policy
specially in Third World and Asia, iv) Imposing countervailing sanctions against the US including
sharp reduction of Chinese imports from the US and the
withdrawal of diplomatic envoys.
While this line is not gaming currency with the moderates, the Chinese policy right now presents a
synthesis of the two approaches. The moderates do not see the contemporary world as a struggle-striken
theatre of capitalism and socialism but as a competition for comprehensive national strength. Among the
growing number of the countries with diverse economic and political systems, only nations fully integrated
with international economy, maintaining friendly relations with countries and minimising their military
expenditure could attain the comprehensive national strength. Isolation from the world especially from the
US can cause severe damage to China’s efforts towards this end. They suggest these options:
i) The placing of countervailing sanctions should not be effected.
ii) Concession on certain issues which are very sensitive to the US e.g. releasing the political prisoners, and
making special efforts to increase Chinese imports of American commodities.
490
in) Wait for the American emotions to cool down.
Similarly in the US a debate is going on how to deal with China in the changing world perspective.
Coercing China into reforms may not be appropriate as increasing pressure towards reforms specially
towards democratisation of the Chinese system may result in chaos at the internal level which in turn could
lead to military ascendancy and resultant hardening of the position of China. This eventuality will also lead
to increase in Chinese budget expenditure - a situation which would be inimical to US policy towards arms
control on one hand and loss of capability advantage over China and other major powers on the other. The
other group opines that an economically stable China must be the top priority of US. They favour
abstention of sanctions as growing Chinese economic difficulties would further alienate China, resulting
not only in loss of a huge consumer market for the US but also in emergence of a potent competitor in the
global market for the US. Here again a synthesis of the two approaches for the core principles of the US
agenda towards China is to play hot and cold at the same time. These two respective approaches are visibly
under-pinning both the Chinese and the US policies towards each other in all bilateral and international
issue areas which may be studied as follows:
The major US demands from China include the tougher issues like human rights and democratisation.
Many individual and organisational factors, the President, the liberal and conservative members of
Congress, human rights groups, Chinese students etc. are concerned over the human rights abuses,
mistreatment of prisoners, repression in Tibet and arrest of political prisoners that continues in China. They
perceive that a more democratic China would ensure the same standard of human rights for its citizens that
the US has. In the economic field, the US wants more opening into the Chinese market which will be the
biggest in the world within next
20 years. The negative trade imbalance with China should be reverted or at least, be decreased to
reinvigorate the export-oriented US economy. The American trade unions also want to end the prison
labour exports to United States which contravene US trade law such as Section 307 of the 1930 Tariff Act.
At the international level, US wants China to stop selling long and medium range missiles to countries in
unstable regions like South Asia and to enemies of America, i.e. Syria, Iran etc. China they think which has
agreed to abide by the MTCR has a moral obligation to restrict its missiles sale. The same has resulted in
the September, 1993 imposition of sanctions on Pakistan and China due to the deal over the M-11 missiles.
Same is the case with the issue of nuclear proliferation. Further, concern is that the US wants China not to
employ military measures, to resolve its territorial dispute with Taiwan. As far as East Asian security is
concerned, the US
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSIT.S
491
needs high level Chinese co-operation if any kind of regional arrangement is to be built. With this co-
operation, a new era of nationalism will emerge. A deal with China is a must specially in the wake of a
rising China whose economy is growing rapidly and whose military is in a stronger position domestically
than at any time since 1970s. Similarly, the US needs Chinese support for resolving many global crises.
With its seat in the UN Security Council, China has a great deal of power over the UN development into a
multilateral peacekeeping force and over the Security Council’s ability to become a real centre of
negotiating solutions to the crisis. On North Korea, China is by far the only state that has direct access to
top Korean leaders and a united Sino-US strategy may be the only way to ensure a nuclear-free Korean
peninsula. The US also wants a strong interest in China’s environmental policy. The Americans believe that
China’s environmental problems are so severe that they constitute a collective crisis with global
consequences and powerful implications for the US.
China on the other hand has a somewhat different approach over the mutual and bilateral issues. With the
end of Cold War the Chinese understanding with the US vis-a-vis a Soviet threat is gone. China thus does
not have to make major concessions in its dealings with the United States. However, of lesser strategic
dependence over the US has resulted in the saliance of economic dependence mainly arising out of China’s
need for more opening into the US market to sustain its adaptation of export oriented industrialisation
strategy. Further, China wants increased investments in the coastal areas which are growing rapidly through
community-led, exportoriented strategies. In a bid to launch joint ventures and attracting foreign
technology and capital, China looks at US as the only feasible option for increased investment in its key
capital regenerating industrial infrastructure. China also wants access to American technology, the growth
of China’s high-tech industries including computers, space vehicles and electronics will require US
technology. Hence, China wants US co-operation in lifting western restrictions on the transfer of ”dual use”
technology. China also wants the US to facilitate increased educational exchanges. Perhaps the most
important issue in the Sino-American relations is the role of China in the prevalent international system. An
international pariah since the Korean war and the Tiananmen episode, China wants to see a just and
equitable New World Order prevailing in the world in which security concerns are not subordinated to the
national interests.
Though on the surface the Sino-American understanding on these issues looks difficult but in the wake of
increased saliance of economic issues which involve both China and US at regional as well as international
level, may lead to some sort of a shared perspective towards these issues. In the wake of trend towards
pragmatic liberalism instead of ideological
492
parochialism in China and US tendency to accept the established reality of China being a fast emerging
economic and strategic power a new international system will emerge which would accommodate interests
and concerns of the both.
SINO - US RELATIONS AFTER 09/11
When the Bush administration assumed office, it had declared China to be a ”strategic competitor”. Now
the signs of cooperation in almost all spheres represent a remarkable transformation. China has worked
closely with the US in the global campaign against terrorism; it contributed into the efforts to enforce UN
resolutions on Iraq, has adopted stringent regulations on the export of dual-use technology and other
proliferation issues, and is ready to cooperate with the US on North Korea.
The US has responded by supporting China’s entry into the WTO, and recently put a key terrorist group in
China’s Xinziang province on its terrorists list. Great conveyance of perceptions between the two countries
has been seen during the recent visit of President Jiang Zemin to the US. President Bush demonstrated
personal warmth when he hosted President Jiang at his ranch in Texas.
While the terror of Sino - US relations has been improved through deliberate Chinese initiatives to stress
the areas of convergence, there remain many significant issues over which the strategic and political
perceptions of Washington and Beijing diverge. It would be pre-mature to conclude that the Sino - US
relationship has stabilized. Even in areas where they are cooperating, such as counter-terrorism campaign,
China has reservation about the US tactics. During the prevailing Iraqi crisis, China implacably opposed to
American unilateral attack on Iraq. China’s economic growth would be affected by the high prices of
energy that may result from American unilateral attack on Iraq.
China is not happy with the long-term US policies, ranging from Ballistic Missile Defense to its vastly
increased military presence in Central Asia and Afghanistan. US military sales and political support to
Taiwan is viewed with growing concern in China. The adoption of pre-emption as the core strategic
doctrine by President Bush is likely to further irritate China. The extension of the concept of ’Theatre
Missile Defense’ to Taiwan is strongly resented in Beijing, as is the support extended to Tibetan
irredentism. Criticism of the human rights situation within China by all and sundry in the US is seen as
unwarranted, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Some conservative elements in the US Republican Party
are critical of the US warm ties with China.
.493
In summing up the parameters of the evolving relationship between the world’s only super power and the
Asian giant, the existing blend of ’engagement’ and ’containment’ will continue. China’s goal of
modernization and other economic benefits are dependent on cordial relations with the US. On the other
side the US also needs China’s support in the war against terrorism and fostering peace in the Korean
peninsula.
TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA
Apartheid in South Africa has until recently been a major issue in international politics with reference to
the colonial exploitation and repression of the black majority at the hands of whites in a largely
postcolonial era. However, feeling the winds of change marked by wholesale transition of authoritarian
regimes into democratic and pluralistic polities, the then President D.F.W. de Klerk initiated a process
aiming at end of apartheid in South Africa in 1989, adopting a gradualist approach the virtual end of
apartheid was envisaged by April, 1994.
To understand the nature of the apartheid issue and the factors that contributed to sustain it through decades
we must have a retrospective glance at the historical origins of the problem. The origin of the issue can be
traced back to as far as the inception of Dutch colonialism in the region in
1652 and subsequent British entry into and annexation of the Cape Province in 1814 as a result of colonial
power’s ”Scramble for Africa”. The Dutch settlers (Boers) did not like the entry of the British as they now
had to share the exploitation of natural resources with the latter towards the middle of the 19th century.
With the passing of a British parliament act, the Union of South Africa was created in 1909. Later on, the
status of Union Act of 1934 was enforced which declared South Africa an independent state with sovereign
powers. The white minority introduced a democratic setup but only for themselves. Their number
amounted to 4.8 million with 22.8 million blacks suffering under their policy of apartheid. The word
apartheid implied ”separate development for races” a policy institutionalised in the establishment of
separate localities, educational institutions, legislatures etc. for both the black and the white communities.
The implementation of the policy was facilitated by the very socio-economic texture of the South African
black community marked by ethnic and tribal differences, lack of capability on the pan of blacks vis-a-vis
the whites, and economic and social deprivation of the blacks. With the sweeping tide of decolonization, in
the late 1950s and early 1960s most of the former African colonies got independence. In Africa the
decolonisation process was followed by a virulent reassertion of the African identity under the notion of
”PanAfricanism”. The black people of South Africa inspired by the slogans of ”Hands off Africa” and
”Africa for the Africans” underwent a process of a
494
cultural reidentification which later on acquired an intent of racial consciousness in the wake of continued
discrimination and exploitation on the part of the white minority. Perhaps, the most important factor that
inadvertently helped in sustaining the apartheid system was the sharp polarisation of the world in the wake
of Cold War rivalries. Whenever, concerted pressure was applied on the South African regime, it took
refuge in threat of communism. Many international conferences condemned the practice of apartheid and
the UN upheld the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that all men are born free yet the regime
continued its policy of discrimination against the blacks. Even the sanctions imposed could not force ”the
white tribe” as they called themselves into abandoning this policy. The issue of apartheid in South Africa
was both local and international in nature. Locally, the white minority was concentrated into the north
eastern l/3rd portion of the country. They had also close ties with the parent metropoles which depended for
the trade and import of natural resources on the South African state. This partly also explains the defiance
of South African apartheid regime in the face of international boycott and even the sanctions. In the face of
mounted pressure, the regime tried in vain to appease their black populaces by setting up black reserved
areas called ”homelands” over the decades of 1970s and 1980s. Relocation of blacks resulted in population
density in certain areas as well as a sense of alienation in these homelands. Sporadic clashes followed
between the black settlements near the urban white localities. Such clashes were mainly triggered by the
widespread economic deprivation of these blacks. The episodes like the Sharpvill massacre (1960) Sueto
uprising (1976) and the black unrest in 1984 and onwards resulted in widespread disaffection among the
blacks and severe socio-economic implications for the whites. Imposition of emergency was taken as one
solution but it did not work. In the wake of sustained pressure from within and without and facilitated with
certain incidental factors like the ouster of President Botha, Pretoria initiated a process of reforms aiming at
the end of apartheid and transition of the polity from a white dominated authoritarian system to the broad
based multiracial, pluralistic democratic South Africa.
THE REFORMS AND TRANSITION
As a token of changed attitude the realist-like new President F.W. De Klerk decided to release the political
prisoners including the old campaigner, head of the banned African National Congress (ANC), Mr. Nelson
Mandela after 27 years of imprisonment alongwith Walter Sisula. Segregation at 80% of the nation’s
hospitals was abolished and emergency was lifted. Negotiations between the South African leaders and the
black organisations led by ANC were initiated. The common commitments by both the black and white
leadership quickly transformed the racist society of
495
South Africa into a more humane one within a short span of a couple of years. These changes led to
positive international response as UN arms embargo as well as trade embargo of the ECC were lifted in the
beginning of 1992.
The most important watershed came in the form of March 17, 1992 historic referendum in which the South
African people voted in favour of the reforms programme initiated by President de Klerk by a ”Yes Vote”
of
68.7%. At that time, there were suspicions that victory in the referendum did not mean end of apartheid as
it was taken only as a personal success for de Klerk which had not supported the transition. However, as
time proceeded, issues and structure of the reforms began to crystallise and the main players in the talks the
ANC and the ruling National party moved closer on the need for an interim government and the issue of an
elected Constituent Assembly to draw up the constitution. The talks culminated into the agreement
concluded by the two leaders on a draft constitution outlining
27 general constitutional principles meant to set clear parameters for the transitional parliament for drafting
a permanent constitution. These principles were meant also to guarantee strong regional governments but
these were so broad that they could lead to a unitary system either, delegating minimal and may be
revocable powers to subordinate provincial governments. This development in September, 1993 was
followed by formal approval to this agreement envisaging a democratic constitution for a future South
Africa giving the blacks the right to vote. To facilitate the blacks to participate in the 27 April, 1994
election, a deal on December 3,
1993 was signed which restored South African citizenship to the blacks. On December 27, a transitional
administrative council was set up to act until the elections.
As one would have expected, differences arose between disparate political entities over the mode of
elections and the post-election constitutional framework. These differences stemmed from three
fundamental factors: (a) divergent tribal affiliations and resultant political parochialism: (b) fears and
expectations from the electoral process with regard to its effect on the political status of each party and (c)
the nature of power-sharing arrangement, etc. There were differences between the blacks and the whites as
well as between the blacks and the blacks. On March 1, Mr. Mandela (ANC) and Mangsuth Bothelezi of
Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP) held talks regarding the post-election constitutional framework. ANC was
advocating a strong center while IFP stood for true federalism. These differences for once threatened even
the holding of the elections but to forestall any violence President De Klerk on March 31 declared
emergency in Kwa-Zula Natal (stronghold of IFP). As for the composition of the new assembly was
concerned, it was agreed that only representatives from
496
parties securing at least 5% of the votes will be allowed to sit in. Overall ’ parties were to contest the
elections. To facilitate the administrate e functioning of the new government, it was agreed that the country
be divided into 10 regions with voters voting for 9 new regional parliaments alongwith the proposed
National Assembly comprising 400 members, the break-up of these seats for the various regions and
categories was as follows:
i) Members from national group list: 200
ii) Eastern Cape: 28
in) Eastern Transval: - • 11
iv) Kwa-Zulu Natal: 422
v) NorthWest: 12
vi) Northern Cape: 4
vii) Northern Transval: 25
viii) Orange Free State: 14
ix) Pretoria-Witwalersrand and Vaal: 44
x) Western Cape: 20
Elections were held on 26th and 27th April. The political and electoral activity was re-enlivened by the
decision of IFF to contest the elections. The results gave ANC a total of 63% of votes while De Klerk’s
Nationalist Partly got 32% IFF got 5% of the votes. The results were unexpected only for ANC which
aimed at securing two-third majority in the Constituent Assembly. This also confirmed, to a great extent the
preelection political divide, which could have bearing upon the constitutionmaking process following the
elections.
SOUTH AFRICA AFTER THE ELECTIONS
The significance of the successful transition through elections in South Africa lies in the fact the process
heralded the dawn of a new era in which aparthied was an irrelevant term. It also promised stable,
democratic and considerably rich state in the African continent which can play a vital role in resolving
certain key issues confronting the region the chiefest being political stability in individual countries and
unity among the African nations. Besides, success of power-sharing arrangement between divergent
political interests can be a good model for other polities in which governance has been hampered by tribal
parochialism and ethnic violence.
The problems discouraging this optimistic thinking are, however, no less numerous. These problems are the
unwanted legacy of the white dominated rule over a period of 350 years. A huge economic and social
divide separates the blacks from the whites. A ”lost generation” of black
497
children has gone unschooled and families have been divided through imprisonments and exiles, on top of
this, there are muddled ethnic identities and feuds that aparthied has bred: a process that has not only turned
blacks against whites but also set blacks against the blacks.
THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF SOUTH AFRICA
In 1996, South Africa adopted a new constinition. It provides for a strong presidency and includes a wide-
ranging bill of rights. Among the rights it guarantees are; freedom of religion, belief and opinion, freedom
of expression, including freedom of press and freedom of political activity. It also establishes the right to
adequate housing, food, water, education and health care.
In 1997s, Mandela stepped down as head of the ANC. He was replaced in that position by Thabo Mbeki,
who served in the South African government of Mandela as Executive Deputy President. In 1999, Mandela
retired from presidency. In elections held that year, the ANC won a majority of seats in the National
Assembly. The assembly elected Mbeki as President.
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
The origin of the tragedy in the tiny Muslim republic of Bosnia, a part of the rump Yugoslavia, can be
traced back to early 1991, when the process of disintegration of Soviet empire in the Eastern Europe
reached its final stages with large scale upheavals in the former satellite states of Soviet Union. Ethnic
realignments being the hall-mark of the process, state structures tumbled to give way to ethnically
organised fragmentation of larger territorial and political units. Yugoslavia an artificial entity created after
World War I to reward the Serbs and sustained upto 1990s through a centralised state structure dominated
by its Serbian Christian community, faced this worst form as a bloody war ensued after declaration of
independence by its 6 federating units. Bosnia of these six republics had been in existence since early
Middle Ages with borders recognised in several international agreements from the end of 17th century
including the Berlin Congress of 1878. After World War II, the area had been brought under control of
central government dominated by Serbs who tried to exterminate the Muslims from Bosnia Herzegovina.
Moreover, the Muslims remained a deprived community and despite living in one of the most fertile parts
of the country whose exports included gold and petroleum they were almost at the bottom edge of the
economic ladder. The Serbs had outnumbered the Muslims in all executive committees of the Communist
Party even though the Muslim community, 44% was larger than the Serbs
and Croats (31 and 17.4%) in the total population of Bosnia. The disintegration process stalled when on
January 25, 1991 the Parliaments of Slovenia and Croatia passed declarations of independence from
Yugoslavia. (Earlier since the January 22. 1990 Communist Party decision to allow other parties in the new
system of political pluralism”, individual republics had elected their own nationalist governments thus
practically having buried the previous system of collective presidency of Belgrade). The federal parliament
of Belgrade, capital of both Yugoslavia and Serbia asked the army to intervene and stop this act of
secession. Following this directive, the army engaged in war with Croat forces for the next one year
resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. Following suit the republic of Bosnia Herzegovina also decided
to declare its independence.
INDEPENDENCE AND WAR
On March 1, 1992 a majority of voters approved independence of Bosnia through a referendum. The
implementation of this verdict had been opposed by the Serbian Democratic Party and the Croatian
Democratic Community representing the Christian Serbs and Croatian communities of Bosnia. While the
Serbs wanted Bosnia to be a part of the ”Greater Serbia”, the Croats were largely in favour of making it a
part of a .loose federation with other republics of the defunct Yugoslavia. For all practical purposes,
however, Bosnia emerged as an independent country recognised immediately by a number of Muslim
Countries and member states of the European Community. (Slovenia, Bosnia and Croatia were admitted to
UN on May 22. 1992). This was followed by the inception of a bloody war imposed by Serb militias
backed by the federal army. In a frantic move for survival the Bosnian President Alija Hizatbegovic called
for the formation of national guards composed of volunteers. The Serbian aggression was condemned by all
international quarters. The European Community, the USA and Canada alleged Serbia for aggression and
recalled their ambassadors from Belgrade. The EC imposed trade sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro,
an action also supported by the USA. Washington also banned flights by the Yugoslav national airline.
Canada demanded an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to cut Serbia’s trade links. In May 1992,
USA asked the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) to suspend membership of
Serbia. On July 8, it moved to suspend Serbia initially for a period of two months. The Governing Council
of GATT also suspended Serbia. The Serbian aggression coupled with atrocious campaign of a Muslim
genocide continued unabated as more and more opposition from the Muslim countries developed. On the
other hand, leaders of Croatia and Bosnia agreed to sign an agreement on military cooperation against
Serbian forces, if international efforts to stop the bloodshed fail.
CONTEMPORARY INTF.R.NATIONAL ISSIJF.S
499
EFFORTS TOWARDS PEACE
As the war raged the ”ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian Muslims through heinous crimes of war like gang
rapes, torture etc. peace efforts were initiated on July 29. when Bosnia’s three warring factions Muslims,
Serbs and Croats agreed to set up a committee in their bid to end the fighting and relieve the suffering in
the former Yugoslav republic. Prior to this the UN had intervened when on May 30, 1992 the Security
Council imposed wide ranging trade sanctions against Serbia. The sanctions called for cessation of trade
transactions of Serbia with all the countries in anycommodity including oil to freeze all foreign assets of the
SerbMontenegrin federation; to refuse the repair or service or provide spare parts for aircraft registered in
Serbia or Montenegro and suspend all traffic to these two federating republics. The sanctions had the
potential to cripple the already strained Serbian economy. Although self-sufficient in hydrocarbon energy,
Serbian energy crisis deepened as the prices of gasoline were doubled by June. The EC leaders on June 27
in Lisbon proposed the use of UN force to help sustain the supply of relief goods provided by UNHCR to
thousands of displaced persons. In its August 13 resolution, the Security Council too authorised the use of
force to aid relief activities. The previously forged alliance between the Muslims and Croats fell tottering
because of the continued clashes between the two factions. As the war reached the stage of ”all against all”,
the UN allowed to strengthen the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia to 14,000 personnel to
help the smooth supply of relief goods. The UN Secretary-General appointed Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance
as members of the envoys committee to search for a viable peace plan for the war ravaged Bosnia. The
Bosnian Croat leader Tudjman and the Serbian leader Milosevic along with Bosnian Serb leader Rodovon
Kradzik had fabricated a plan to partition Bosnia along the ethnic lines. The Bosnian Croats and Serbs
declared independence from Bosnia and also created their ”parliaments”. The international efforts towards
resolution culminated into the UN and EC envoys’ (Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance) peace plan known as the
”VanceOwen peace plan”. The scheme was presented on February 1, 1993 at Geneva talks. It envisaged:
i) A UN monitored cease-fire.
ii) The establishment of a central government composed of 3
Muslims 3 Serbs and 3 Croats, in) The creation of ten partially autonomous provinces with
proportional representation of ethnic groups in the provincial
governments, iv) The return of forcibly transferred property.

500
The plan was accepted by the Croats only in that it left them with control over western Herzegovina where
they had set up a mini-state called Herzeg-Bosnia and which had been for all practical puiposes annexed by
Croatia. The Serbs opposed it because they were in control of some 65% of the total Bosnian territory and
wanted to retain it with them, in hope to join Serbia once the Muslims had been exterminated. They staged
a referendum to show that 90% Serb voters were against the proposed plan. Heavy fighting entailed
between the warring factions once the peace talks fell to differences with the Croats besieging the Muslim
held city of Mostar and the Serbs virtually on doors of Sarajevo. Meanwhile, the UN SecretaryGeneral had
appointed Lord Stottenberg as the EC member to the peace mission alongwith Cyrus Vance. The talks that
followed at Geneva, resulted into the August 3 Geneva Plan which envisaged the following arrangements:
i) A constitutional agreement that would divide Bosnia into three republics (for ethnic, Muslims, Serbs and
Croats) under a loose union: this would become the constitution for the country.
ii) A re-drawn map of Bosnia and Herzegovina with areas under the control of three parties delineated.
in) Military agreements that would provide for the withdrawal of weaponry as well as for cease-fire (a
cease-fire agreed on August
18 did not work).
iv) An agreement that Sarajevo would be a UN protectorate for two years.
The plan was initially accepted by the Bosnian President Izetbegovic but later was rejected by the Bosnian
Parliament on September
29. 1993. The war continued with mounting Serbian pressure on Sarajevo. The US Secretary of State
warned the Serbian President of possible NATO air raids to stall Serbian efforts to strangle Sarajevo. This
step was opposed by Russia. The leaders of three factions again engaged into talks on November 26, 1993
with Bosnian Muslims accepting the demand of Serbs to give more territorial concessions but these offers
failed to strike any break-through. The Muslims were at a loss according to the August 3 proposals of the
Geneva plan because it did not envisage an integrated Muslim area and access to sea for Bosnia while the
Serbs also opposed it because they wanted an area close to Serbia so that it could be annexed into Serbia.
The impotence of the Owen-Stottenberg plan (also called the Geneva Plan) becoming evident the Serbs
continued their siege of Sarajevo, Tuzla and Gorazde. To help the UN operations continue smoothly NATO
sent warning that both parties surrender their heavy weapons to the UN
501
personnel. The Serbs and Bosnian Muslims complied before the ultimatum was to lapse on February 14,
1994. Russia moved her troops under the banner of UNO to monitor the defence line around Sarajevo. The
offer of Muslim countries forces (including Pakistan) was not accepted by the UN Security Council.
In a significant development on March 18, Bosnian premier Haris Slajdzic and Croation leader Kresimir
Zubak and foreign minister Mate Granic signed in Washington an agreement to create a federation of
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croat areas. This US sponsored deal envisaged common defence, commerce
and foreign affairs along with understanding on sharing of the benefits of joining the partnership for peace
(in Europe) and western aid. Croatia was moved to sign this deal because noncompliance could lead to
sanctions; moveover, peace gesture could lead to a US-Russian consensus over Krajina (the major source
of Croat-Serb conflict). The Croat and Bosnian parliaments readily ratified the arrangement. With the Serbs
still stubborn, a so-called Contact Group comprising Charles Radman (US), Vitaly Chuokin (Russia) and
the British, French and German envoys was formed on April 25 to find a solution to the impasse. On May
13, 1994 the Contact Group Peace Plan was presented which envisaged:
I. a 4-month cease-fire.
II. territorial division with 49% area to the Serbs and 51 % to Croat Muslim federation.
The important feature of these proposals was that it were based upon the principle of ”take it or leave it”.
While the Muslims accepted it promptly, the Serbs continued to defy international public opinion by not
accepting it. They arranged a referendum on August 25 to disapprove the plan in which 95% Serbs rejected
the plan. However, there were certain plus points in the emergent situation as the plan accompanied certain
potent threats to the Serbs in case of non-compliance. NATO on August 7, had threatened to attack in case
of Serb advancements. Even Serbia announced to sever links with Bosnian Serbs. On top of this, perhaps,
the most potent threat was of lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia.
THE DAYTON PEACE AGREEMENT
On November 21, 1995, a tripartite- Bosnia, Croatia and rump Yugoslavia- agreement was initiated at
Dayton, Ohio, which redrew the boundaries of ethnic entities that emerged from the debris of three and a
half years of the Balkan war. The accord comprised a document, eleven annexes and 102 maps.
502
The main points of the agreement may he summarised as follows:
1. The agreement committed the parties to end the war. and start building peace with justice.
2. Bosnia-Herzegovina was to continue as a single state whose sovereignty would be internationally

respected. The agreed federal institutions included a presidency, a bicameral legislature, and a
constitutional court. The country would have a central bank with a single currency.
3. The territorial issues were to be settled, with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslims
and Croats) administering 51% of the country, while the remaining 49% would constitute the Bosnian
Serb Republic. Sarajevo would continue to be reunified within the Federation, with open access to all
people of the country. Gorazade, where a large number of Muslim refugees created by ”ethnic cleansing”
were concentrated, was to remain secure and be linked to the Federation by the land corridor. Another
corridor would link the Serbs concentrated in Banja Luka to the Serb Republic, with the status of Bracko to
be decided by arbitration.
4. Free and democratic elections were to be held throughout the country one year after (1996), with people
displaced by war having the right to vote in their original place of residence, ”if they so chose”.
5. Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia were committed to cooperating fully with international investigation and
prosecution of war crimes and to complying with the decisions of the War Crimes Tribunal.
6. The highest level of recognised human rights were to be respected by the parties, which were to
cooperate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in the search for missing persons, and to
release all prisoners. Rights of all people to freedom of movements and of the refugees or displaced
persons to return home, or to obtain just compensation were stipulated, and omissions created for
Human Rights, and for Refugees and Displaced Persons.
7. The parties were to carry out withdrawals behind an agreed cease-fire line in 30 days, and take other
confidence building measures by restricting military deployments, and returning heavy weapons and
forces to barracks. NATO peace implementation force (IPOR), was to monitor the cease-fire and
withdrawals. A comprehensive programme of reconstruction was envisaged, to rehabilitate the war-
ravaged Bosnian economy.
503
8. The UN Security Council was to be asked to suspend the arms embargo on the states of former
Yugoslavia, and to lift trade sanctions against Serbia, which could be reimposed if the Serbs fail to meet
their obligations under the agreement. Sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs were not to be suspended till they
withdrew their forces and free elections were held. The agreement contained detailed provisions on the
military aspects, including full co-operation with [FOR, the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. though POOR
was to operate under the authority of the UN.
Other aspects, such as confidence building, arms control, constitutional provisions for the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, elections, human rights and war crimes were also comprehensively covered. The
UN role was spelt out in enforcing compliance, and through the establishment of an International Police
Task Force (IPTF), to be headed by a Commissioner appointed by the UN Secretary-General. A request for
the designation of a High Representative to facilitate civilian tasks, such as humanitarian aid, economic
reconstructions, human rights and holding of free elections also formed a part of the agreement.
The interesting or perhaps the intriguing part of the Dayton Accord was that the agreement between the
Croats and Serbians preceded the socalled final accord. The justification for this could have been found in
the fact that since the Croat-Serb conflict was considered less complicated, it was thought prudent to decide
that first. But what the sponsors of this summit did not realise was that the 43 months old Balkan conflict
had its axis elsewhere. Or did they want to show the Bosnians that in case they did not agree on the terms
dictated by the outcome of this one-sided display of brutal aggression by the Serbs, they will have to face
the united wrath of the Croats and the Serbs?
The Dayton Accord revealed the pressure of this highhandedness: Bosnia will remain a single state but only
with 51% of its territory and that too would be jointly controlled by the Muslim-Croat Federation. The
remaining 49% will be administered by the Bosnian Serbs. Sarajevo stood united under the Muslims-Croat
administration but some of its districts were to remain autonomous under the Serbs. The question of
widening a Serbian corridor to the town of Brcko from the eastern and northern Bosnian territories under
the occupation of the Serbs were left for international arbitration. War criminals indicated by an
international tribunal for prosecution were only asked not to hold any political office, at best for the time
being.
506
INTERNA>|()VA| AFFAIRS
In the East, China claims all of Arunachal Prac)esh jn 1952 SinoIndian war, .the large chunk of Arunchal
Pradesh wa$ occupied bv China but later returned to the pre-war position after the ceas^.^re Qnjna’s claims
in the eastern-sector are in fact, a bargaining chip for |,K^jan concession in the West.
In the West, there is an area, disputed in n^Te aiOns; Laddakh called Aksai Chin. This is the territory
Chinese really \vant They”built their Sinkiang Highway through the Aksai Chin even before Nvar
ponowin2 their unilateral cease-fire in 1962, the Chinese establish^ a jjne Qf c”ontroi virtually coinciding
with their claim-line. India asserts tnat China is in occupation of 12,000 sq miles of its territory includii^
occupied territory conceded by Pakistan.
TOWARDS THE RAPPROCHEMENT
Beijing and New Delhi have tried to expand trade and economic co-operation but without much success.
The reason for mjs js mat j,otn economies are largely competitive rather than corr\p[ementary Neither
produces much of what the other wants and both look t0 me êst and japan for modern technology,
machinery and equipment. SinCe earjy 199o efforts have shifted from track to joint ventures, investments
and omer types of economic compensation. But here too little h^s resuited Indian businessmen find very
few incentives to invest despjte repeated Chinese requests.
Moreover a major factor underlying the sr,ift in Indian po|icy towards China in mid-1987, was Sino-Soviet
rappro^^^,. Gorbachev after assuming office, rapidly re-oriented Soviet Policy from oppOSjtion to improve
Sino-lndian relations and support for New Deihj a£,ainst Beijing to encourage better ties and disengage
from Sino-lndian cjjspuês -r-nis created difficulties for New Delhi, making Indians realise that mey were
about to lose a component of New Delhi-Moscow axis. This was pajnfuiiy evident in late 1986 when
Moscow took a neutral position in tê face of escaiatjno border confrontation. Thus, the Sino-Soviet
rapproche^g^ oreatly reduced the value of Soviet-Indian treaty of Friendship (1971) VhichJiad been a key
element of Sino-lndian Policy. This prompted India to êdesien its policy
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH ASIA
The Sino-lndian rapprochement came about a{ a tjme when me South Asian region is in the process of
adaptation t^ me reaijtjes of tne changed world. A thaw in these two major powers of Asia is bound to
affect the course of new developments as well as the old jssues. ihe ;ssue ot
507
Kashmir, a stumbling block in the region, is supposed to acquire a new dimension specially in the context
that China has always been a supporter of the Pakistan stand. Though a major shift in the Chinese stance
cannot be visualised in near future, China will definitely want to see this issue resolved so that its neutrality
towards both India and Pakistan does not suffer in future. The nuclear issue will also be brought into
broader perspective as both China and India are nuclear powers. With Pakistan’s stand on the issue in
perspective. China is expected to continue with the stand demanding resolution of the issue in its regional
perspective. As for Indian hegemonic designs over the smaller regional countries like Sri Lanka.
Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives are concerned, they will have to be pursued by India with
caution. The most important headway is expected to be in the economic co-operation and regional trade
area. This will be both in the interest of China and India in the wake of growing trend towards economic
regionalism in the post-Cold War era. A regional trade arrangement will provide economic opportunities to
both India and China Which alongwith Pakistan make a sizable unit with great consumption scope for one
another’s goods. Pakistan’s relations with Central Asian republics may help in expanding this co-operation
to an even greater level. A Sino-lndian rapprochement accompanied by support of other regional countries
can lead to a stable and prosperous area once outstanding issues are resolved.
SINO-INDIA DETENTE: THE PRESENT SITUATION
A flurry of high level visits between India and China raised quite a few eyebrows in Pakistan and made
political pundits to ponder about the future dynamics of Indo-China relations.
Visits from China included those Mr. Qiao Shi, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress and China’s third highest ranking leader, Premier Li Peng and Li Ruihaun, number two
and number four in the Chinese political hierarchy, and President Jiang Zemin early in 1997. As a result,
there were now elements in some Indian circles of the euphoria of the fifties’ ”Hindi-Chini bhai bhai”
which had ended disastrously with the 1962 border war between the two countries. Will it result in a similar
disaster or is it the beginning of a new and mature relationship?
Now that the Cold War has ended, and the Soviet Union has disintegrated, China may not have to be too
apprehensive about India’s hostile international links and ties. Both Beijing and New Delhi can thus
develop their bilateral relationship independently of Cold War politics.
510 -
them warily watching the ’other’ under Washington’s shadow. Such a Sino-India block in future would
diminish Washington’s influence in Asia. However, there are many obstacles in the way of China-India
block, which can not be underestimated.
Some major hurdles in the way of growing Sino-lndian collaboration are; Sino-India border dispute,
different views on establishing nuclear deterrence, different roles in the war on terror, relations with
Pakistan and competition for political and economic influences in the Indian Ocean region.
Despite these roadblocks the two nations want to open windows of engagement. The two neighbours have
sought to solve some of the problems, particularly the border dispute, which dates back to the end of
1962 Indo-Sino war. The main difference relates to the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC)
between India’s state of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and Tibet.
Visits to China by Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee and Defence Minister George Fernandez have
helped to ease the hangover of this dispute and elevated the border issue to the political level from a
military one. Each side also made significant concessions with India acknowledging for the first time in
writing that Tibet was a part of China.
Only future will tell us how far this growing partnership between China and India, will go. The challenge
before the two countries, is to transform this growing economic cooperation into a broader strategic
alliance covering non-economic issues like security and foreign policy.
RUSSIAN ATTACK ON CHECHNYA
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in early 1991, the nationalities which had been pinned down by
a ruthless and authoritarian regime began to assert themselves. The first to secede were the Baltic
Republics, then the Central Asian Republics followed suit. Given the economic difficulties and political
instability inside the Russian Federation, the aspirations for independence and autonomy set the assertive
nationalities within the federation struggle against the centre. The chiefest among these nationalities were
the Chechyns - a Muslim community that already had a long history of resistance against the Russian
dominance.
Chechnya falls in the mountainous Northern Caucasian region, southeast of the Russian Federation. The
other neighbours of the republic are Georgia and the republics of Ingushetia, North Ossetia and Dagestan. It
J
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSl F.S gj ,
is an oil-rich area with one of the major oil-refineries of Russia situated outside its capital Grozny. The
population accounts for some 1.2 million people. 98% of which are Muslims of the moderate Sunni-
Naqashbandi school of thought with a moderate approach and orientation of the religion.
Islam came to this region in the 16th century. During this long period of adherence to Islam, the Chechyn
Muslims faced two major challenges to their existence as a separate community. In the 18th and 19th
century, they resisted the onslaught of expansionist Czarist militarism. After the communist take-over of
Russia, they were subjected to the policy of ”assimilation” under the Stalinist regime. These two challenges
made them even more conscious of their separate identity on one hand and inculcated a tradition of armed
struggle on the other. These two factors combined in their quest for independence and as later events
revealed, accounted for the potency and consistency of their war-effort against the Russians.
Contrary to general analysis, the Chechyn crisis has deep roots which can be traced back to what can be
regarded as the ”Chachyn revolution” of 1991. The simmering discontent within Russia and assertive
nationalistic aspirations precipitated into the declaration of independence on the part of the republic. What
happened in 1991 can be summed up as follows.
Phase I: The failure of the coup d’etat in Moscow and the
dissolution of the Chechyn Supreme Soviet on September
15. Phase II: From September 15 to November 11 when the local
Supreme Soviet refused to endorse the state of emergency
called by Yeltsin. Phase in: The intensification of the tension between Moscow and
Grozny and the declaration of independence.
On ground level, the tension arose when in the backlash of the abortive coup to oust Gorbachev
demonstrators in Grozny called for resignation of the local Supreme Soviet for having sided with the rebels.
On its refusal to dissolve itself, the National Guards led by General Dzhokhar Dudayev on September 6,
seized the building of the Supreme Soviet rendering impossible the functioning of the Supreme Soviet. As
head of its executive Committee, the general assumed leadership of the Chechyn Republic. This brought
law and order under control of a central authority and for the time being, it was a welcome development for
Moscow. Differences arose when the Executive tried to remove the deputies, havine pro-Moscow
aspirations, from the Soviet, through fresh elections. This move was deterred by the imposition of a state of
emergency by Moscow
512
which was however, denounced by even the sitting deputies. The mounting pressure from Moscow resulted
in the declaration of independence by the Chechyn ”president” Dudayev. This step could not get much
attention from Moscow because of the internal political instability. Moreover, there was a substantial
Chechyn lobby in the Russian top-brass which prevented a hardliner approach to the problem. In a bid to
resolve the tangle constitutionally, the Russian Federation arranged for the signing of a federation treaty for
the 20 autonomous regions inside the Russian Federation. Here Chechnya and Tartaristan (the Muslim
neighbours of Chechnya) refused to sign. To weaken this assertive posture of Chechnya, the Moscow
leadership in June 1994, announced separation of Chechnya from Ingueshetia to form a new republic.
Besides, Ruslan Khasbulatov, in a bid to add to difficulties of Yeltsin in the power struggle at Moscow,
demanded military action to nullify the 1991 independence declaration. It was in this background that on
December 11, 1994 Russian troops moved into Grozny.
The Russians, miscalculating of course, the military muscle of Dudayev-led Chechyns, expected a swift
end to the whole business. But despite heavy aerial bombing and ground offensive they could not capture
Grozny until Feb. 12, 1995. In the process, some 65,000 people lost their lives with considerable loss of
material and morale on the part of the Russians. The fall of Grozny did not bring the desired results as
clashes continued in the suburban areas of the capital. The February 15, truce proved short lived as the
army commanders made it a point of prestige to put the war to an effective end despite contrary thinking of
the civilian leadership.
The crisis in Chechnya is although in essence a local one it has farreaching significance from various points
of view. Internally, it has brought dissension within the Russian leadership into sharper focus. Yeltsin was
taken to be in control by the west but the refusal of army to halt hostilities time and again negates this
general misperception. It has led to strong criticism by the media which has openly denounced the use of
force not only in this conflict, but as a general rule. It has also led to mounting economic difficulties for
Moscow and as the cost of this misadventure (already 1.6 m US S per day) increases it would be difficult
for Yeltsin to carry out the reforms which in turn, may result in further cuts in and a relative drop-up of the
foreign aid. The continuation of the conflict over a long time, may result in the radicalization of
neighbouring Muslim areas including the Central Asian States. One possible reason for US acquiescence
over the use of disproportionate force may be to give Russia a free hand to quell the insurgency before its
effect is felt in the adjacent
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES __513
areas. Russia may also face tough criticism from the international quarters over the violation of human
rights.
On 30th August, 1996, thanks to the efforts of Alexander Lebed, Boris Yeltsin’s security adviser, a peace
treaty between Chechnya and Russia was signed, but not before the Chechens had lost their supreme
commander Jaffer Dudayev as a result of a Russian rocket attack, two months earlier. The peace accord
was a triumph for the Chechens who got terms and conditions of their own choice. However, celebrations
and merrymaking notwithstanding, the Moscow-Chechen relations are not out of woods yet. It seems that
President Yeltsin was not interested either in: peace and prosperity of Chechnya or even the way his
countrymen feel about the prolonged crisis in this small Muslim state of Caucasus. He wanted to gain some
mileage on road to his elections in June 1996 and to use the so-called peace agreement as a pawn in his
game of politics.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CHECHNYA
For the last two or three years the conflict in Chechnya has gone through various new developments. As the
roots of the conflict can be traced back to the Russian move to modernize its society in European style and
the Chechen traditional clanish system which refused the forced modernization of their society. However,
since 1997, the Russian authority has made frequent mention of the ’Wahabi threat’ in their political
discourse. Russian officials claim that their fight against Chechen independence is part of a greater effort to
neutralize religious extremism in Russia. Chechen guerrilla movement has been accused of being financed
by the Gulf countries as well as International Islamic Organizations.
The 09/11 terrorist attacks on American has given new spur to the Russian accusation of the Chechen
Independence movement as religion fanaticism and terrorism abetted by Islamic extremist groups. There
was also a mention of Taliban involvement through sending of volunteers and weapons to support Chechen
struggle. The destruction of Al-Qaeda and dismantling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, led many
analysts to predict that the Chechen struggled would weaken but the results were opposite. The fighting has
substantially increased in the aftermath of the anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan.
The current Chechen guerrilla struggle has gone through a new development by introducing new tactics of
”helicopter war” and commando-type incursion involving several hundred fighters. The new tactics consist
in targeting and downing of the Russian military helicopters, vulnerable to missile strikes, and to occupy
key areas and dislodge Russian
troops. In the first phase of the renewed guerrilla war (1999-2001), the Chechen guerrilla resorted
frequently to ambush type operations with the aim of annihilating entire units. Lately however, these types
of operations have been dropped in favour of more punctual strikes.
Another development was the increasing use of ’Islamic rhetoric’ by Chechen officials who were otherwise
known as moderates. Chechen President Aslam Maskhadov declared the conflict a jihad against the
Russian infidels and called on Muslims world-wide to join the Chechen in their struggle. One of the most
important and latest developments is the recent alliance between the President in excile Maskhadov and the
field commander Shamil Bassayev. The alliance was the result of the second war when Russian troops
attacked Chechnya in October 1999, which forced Maskhadov to side with the Islamist camp out of sheer
necessity. The alliance was made official in June 2002. Maskhadov is now officially commander-in-chief
of the guerrilla, while Shamil Bassayev remained the military commander.
The hostage crises took place in Moscow in October 2002, has given new direction to the conflict. Russia
has been remarkably keen to create the impression of the connection between Al-Qaeda and the Chechen
guerrillas, who took nearly 700 people hostage for almost a week in a theatre in Moscow. After more than
hundred fatalities inside the theatre, the hostages were released by pumping poisonous gas into the building
by special forces in a brilliant rescue effort. That crisis changed the international community understanding
of the issue. Now the West, particularly America is no more critique of the Russian occupation and human
rights violations in Chechnya. Indeed if September 11 events gave President Veladimir Puttin more
legitimacy in perusing his war on terrorism in Chechnya, the recent hostage crisis gave him a free-hand to
use any means to dispose of the ’Islamist terrorists’.
All these recent developments highlight the complex nature of the conflict in Chechnya. At the same time it
confirms that the conflict has entered into a new phase, one that sees the increased radicalization of both the
sides.
When we look at the crisis in Chechnya, it shows two important features which unfortunately, Moscow has
not been able to comprehend: firstly, the marriage between Chechnya and Russia was never a mutual affair.
From the second half of the 19th century up to this day, the Chechens have demonstrated their anger and
frustration over this forced relationship and if such a prolonged ”union” could not cement the links and ties
between the two, no political gimmick is going to help in the future. Secondly, the
(ONTE.MPOR.ARY INTERNATIONAL ISSIJES
515
present struggle for independence is a part as much of the people of this area as it is of Russia’s own status
after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. These two factors have neither been appreciated nor
understood by the present leadership of Russia. The third factor is the war itself. The Russians have
witnessed that when a nation is determined to gain independence and to guide its own destiny, no amount
of force, destruction or even bargaining can match the courage and valour of the people.
LIBYA AND THE LOCKERBIE AFFAIR
It was on December 21, 1988, when an American airline Pan-Am flight 103, which was on its way from
London to New York exploded over the Scottish town of Lockerbie, killing a total of 270 persons on board.
Later, two Libyan secret service agents Abdul Basset Ali elMegrahi and Al-Amin Khalifa Fhimah were
indicted on charges of having caused the explosion. The US and Britain, as the aggrieved nations
demanded that the accused Libyan agents be immediately handed over to Washington or London. But
Libyan strongman Colonel Gaddafi, fearing that the accused would not get a fair trial, rejected to hand over
his citizens to a country which was party to the conflict. He however, offered to hand over the accused for a
trial in a neutral territory. Rejecting his offer, the US and Britain imposed punitive sanctions on Libya in
the form of air and arms embargo through the United Nations Security Council. The embargo caused
troubles for Libya but not as much as the US and Britain had expected. This was mainly because of four
reasons
1.
2.
3.
4.
Libya is an extremely rich country with enormous oil and gas deposits. Its economy was therefore able to
survive the effects of the sanctions.
As a trade embargo was not imposed on Libya, it kept on exporting its oil. Europe alone imports one
million barrels of Libyan export earnings.
Many European companies have heavily invested in Libya in joint ventures with local companies carried
out their businesses even during the embargo years, thus diluting the impact of sanctions.
Libya, facing an air embargo, opened its borders with the neighbouring Arab states. Libyans moved freely
across the border and were able to undo, to some extent, the effects of air embargo by using the airports and
airlines of the neighbouring countries.
516
This free movement across the borders also benefited the neighbouring countries. A large number of their
citizens entered Libya to find employment. The economies of these countries also flourished as a result of
routine transactions carried out by the Libyans in their market places. Similarly their aviation authorities
and airline companies also made huge profits from the traveling Libyan population.
The Libyan stand of not handing over its citizens to any country involved in the conflict, was supported by
the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Arab League, O1C, NAM, and almost all the neutral countries
of the world. The OAU moved even a step further and in a meeting on June 1998 announced a unilateral
lifting of sanctions with effect from September 01, 1998. Accordingly, the Presidents of Chad, Nigeria,
Gambia, Eritrea, Mali, Sudan, Congo and Uganda violated the air embargo and visited Libya to express
solidarity with its people. Mr. Nelson Mandela, the President of South Africa and present Chairman of
NAM, visited Libya even before the OAU countries pledged to violate the sanctions. The act of OAU
countries was the greatest ever-diplomatic defeat for the US since became the sole super-power of the
world.
As the 10th anniversary of the bombing approached even the relatives of the US and British victims started
pressing their respective government to reach a compromise over the venue of the trial. Corporate pressure
to end sanctions against Libya also increased following Libyan announcement of plans for $ 10 billion of
oil, gas, and transport projects requiring foreign technology and investment. Amid mounting criticism the
US and Britain finally shifted their positions. They have agreed to a trial in a third country and have
selected The Hague, the site of the World Court, where the suspects would be tried under Scottish law by
Scottish judges.
Libya has agreed in principle but has attached certain conditions before it hands over the suspects to the
Dutch authorities. It is demanding guarantees regarding the neutrality of the trial procedure. Safety of the
suspects and that, the suspects, if found guilty, would not be handed over to the US or Britain, but would
serve their sentences in Holland or Libya. Libya also expresses apprehensions on the site of the trial - a
Dutch military base, which it says, is used by US forces. And finally Libya wants the lifting, not the
suspension of sanction when the suspects are extradited.
SOUTH ASIA ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY
The never-ending process of an incremental defence build-up in the Indo-Pak sub-continent, in the name of
security at the cost of human development, welfare and prosperity of the masses, will have to be, sooner,
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no matter what the ground situation, carefully scrutnized and a balance struck between perceived military
threats and the real risk of a dramatic economic crash.
While the rest of the world heads towards peace and tranquillity, India and Pakistan would not know it.
Despite the crushing poverty of their respective populations, the two countries are spending approximately
$ 20 billion a year on defence, twice as much as Saudi Arabia, a country 25 times wealthier. Both countries
have six times more soldiers than doctors, in a region where epidemics, disease, starvation and death are
rampant.
How tragically comic that after bleeding their economies, the two governments, despite high and lofty
slogans of breaking their respective begging bowls, continue to beg and submit to all sorts of
conditonalities from IMF, World Bank and other international lending institutions. The economic costs of
the continuing confrontation between Islamabad and New Delhi are overwhelming and prohibitive, but
policy-makers and shortsighted bomb-totting leaders in the two capitals seem unable to recognize what is
obvious to everyone else, that human security is the most important element of national security.
Some say that there is a need for balance of terror in South Asia. But where should that balance be set? If
people are sleeping on pavements, ministers have no business shopping for modern jets and howitzers.
While children suffocate in windowless classrooms, generals go about in airconditioned jeeps. Nations
might accumulate all the weaponry they want, but they have no strength when their people starve, groan
and grieve under the immense economic pressures and hardships.
The World Bank, in a report, on the wealth of nations’ which studied 190 counties, pointed out that 16 per
cent of the wealth worldwide comes from ’physical capital’ (buildings, roads and machinery), and 20 per
cent from natural capital (minerals, forests and other resources). Fully 64 per cent of the wealth of nations
is human capital. Yet, as we collect useless ’security-oriented’ hardware and exploit our natural resources
in South Asia, we do not bother about people. Not long ago, until the recent great South East Asian
economic crisis hit the region, people who mattered promised to emulate the achievements and feats of
South Korea; but that country invests $130 per person every year in basic education. Malaysia spends $128,
India spends nine dollars, Pakistan three and Bangladesh two. All we can do is to curse ourselves and hang
our heads in shame.
With India and Pakistan leading the way, South Asia trails behind while the rest of the developing world
surges ahead. Even sub-Saharan
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Africa’s basket case is doing better than South Asia. In some sectors, their average adult literacy rate is 55
per cent, compared to South Asia’s cumulative 47 per cent. Also, 800 million South Asians do without
elementary sanitation, fully 380 million are illiterate, and 300 million drink from ponds rather than taps. As
we continue to put more and more er iphasis on accumulation of conventional weaponry and nuclear
prolifer >on, the scale of social deprivation and human despair is tremendous.
Global military expenditures, which were at $ 1,000 billion in

1987, are down to $ 750 billion, a reduction of $ 4 billion each year. Only two regions increased their
expenditure, the two poorest in the world ; again sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Every other region,
including the Middle East and Latin America reduced spending. These facts arf not known, they should be
highlighted so that policy-makers are embarrassed into action.
About two decades ago, the ratio of military to social spending was highest in Iraq (eight times), Somalia
(five times) and Nicaragua (3.5 times). Yet, none could effectively defend its national security where the
challenge came. On the other hand, Costa Rica abolished its army in 1948, and now spends one-third of its
national income on education, nutrition and health. Today, it is the only prosperous democracy in a
troubled Central America.
However, economic growth is not enough; there has to be distributive justice. Three decades ago, Pakistan
had one of the highest rates of growth in the developing world - seven per cent a year. So, why were people
protesting out on the streets? The reason was that economic growth had not touched their lives - income
distribution was skewed against the poor. In West Pakistan, where most of the growth occurred, it was in
hands of landlords and industrialists - the Chaudris, the Sardars and Waderas dominated the economy.
Their children were sent for higher studies to Oxford and Cambridge, Harvard and Stanford, whereas even
elementary school education was not available to the common folks. The lesson was clear: You have to
stop worshipping the goddess of growth; put people at the centre, enrich their lives, and provide them with
options.
Amidst all the gloom, South Asia itself provides examples of the dynamism that can be released when
human lives are made the focus. In Bangalore, once they started training people in computers, the industry
took off and India is now the second largest exporter of software in the world. One comes across countless,
bright and talented young Indian computer science graduates in the United States doing well-paid jobs and
making a name for themselves and their country. India presently sells a billion
519
dollars’ worth software; by the year 2006 the figure may reach ten billion. Before 1971, what was then East
Pakistan, the area did not have significant industry. Bangladeshi businessmen went into it, and today the
country has out-competed India and Pakistan; it exports two billion dollars worth of garments to North
America and Europe.
CTBT:WESTERN MOVE TO BLUNT THIRD WORLD INITIATIVE
At its 50th session, the UN General Assembly adopted, on September 10, 1996, the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT). The stated purpose of the treaty is to ban all explosive tests that lead to a nuclear chain
reaction.
The unstated mission of the CTBT is to give Western nations an additional pressure point on countries that
entertain nuclear ambitions, mostly in the Third World, and, by extension, in the Islamic Bloc.
The treaty is aimed mostly at excluding the newcomers while preserving the ”rich-man’s club”. At the end
of the day, it would serve to strengthen and maintain the US nuclear supremacy since, nearly 10 years after
the fall of Berlin Wall, the United States maintains an arsenal of 8400 operational nuclear warheads, of
which several thousand can be launched in minutes.
To-date, 151 countries have signed CTBT and 21 of those countries have ratified it. However, the treaty
requires 44 specifically named countries, including India and Pakistan, to sign and ratify the treaty before it
can enter into force. India has stated that it will not sign or ratify the treaty. Countries like Russia, China,
Israel, India, Pakistan, and yes, the US, have yet to ratify the treaty.
In the United States, treaty ratification requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate (67 out of 100 Senators
must vote in favour of CTBT). The US-position on CTBT is far from clear. There is no national consensus
on the subject.
Does signing the treaty create a commitment not to conduct nuclear tests? It is unclear and there seems to
be a legal loophole. Once CTBT has entered into force, any state that has signed and ratified it is bound to
forswear nuclear testing. However, in a speech to the UN, Indian envoy Arundhati Ghose declared ”India
will never sign this unequal treaty, not now, not later.”
520
Consequently, the CTBT entry into force to-date appears dim. Arguably, a nuclear weapons state may view
the CTBT being rendered imperative as a consequence of India’s non-signing. If India maintains its
position, the treaty can never enter into force and nuclear weapons states may view India’s non-signing as
nullifying the treaty’s vital purposes. This, then, Can be used as a justification for renewed testing. Even
now, the US has conducted and plans future underground ’sub-critical’ nuclear weaponsrelated tests, which
they view as not in violation of CTBT. Opinions, however, differ here. In the light of the foregoing, the
whole issue of CTBT seems to be connected more with power, control and ensuring monopoly, than \vith
principle.
Some see the US as playing a game with CTBT, pushing other states to ratify the treaty, while taking no
movement on its own, and with no commitment to even begin moving the treaty through the Senate until all
43 states, including India, have ratified CTBT. Critics of CTBT even see it as a double game. Others raise
the issue of hypocrisy, stating that the US position is: do what they say ; not what we do.
Pakistan policy-makers would do well to remain vigilant and continue to be guided primarily by
considerations of Pakistani security interests.
NEW PHASE OF SINO-RUSSIAN ENTENTE
Russia and China took a giant step forward on the road to strategic unity in December 1999 when they
signed three border agreements which marked the termination of their longstanding teiritorial enmity. The
agreements were signed by Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Russian counterpart Igor Ivanov in
Beijing during a two-day informal summit meeting between Chinese President Jiang Zemin and former
Russian President Boris Yeltsin.
Two of the three documents are protocols which relate to demarcation of the eastern and western parts of
the over 4,000 kilometres shared Sino-Russian frontier. The third accord contains an agreement on the
mechanisms for joint utilisation of the economic resources of the Amur River and adjacent islands by the
two countries. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov has described the settlement of the Sino-Russian
border dispute as a new ”step in our strategic partnership” and Beijing has hailed this development as the
removal of the last barrier to the forging of friction-free ties between the two neighbours. Chinese analysts
have also said that the ”results of this visit will push forward our strategic partnership” and will prove
”beneficial to global stability and a multipolar world.”
521
The genesis of the territorial dispute between Russia and China goes back to the Czarist period when,
taking advantage of the declining power of the Manchu Empire, Moscow imposed a series of unequal
treaties on China and seized large areas of the Chinese territory in the Far East. Moscow’s refusal to
recognise the illegitimacy of its colonial conquest of the Chinese territory after the 1917 Bolshevik
Revolution became the major cause of the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s.
The Sino-Soviet border dispute escalated into armed hostility in March 1969 when, in retaliation against
Chinese ambush of a Soviet patrol on a frozen and disputed island in the Ussuri River, Moscow used
massive force and inflicted heavy casualties on China. These violent clashes led to a rapid and massive
Soviet military build up near the contested border including veiled threats of Soviet ”surgical nuclear
strike” against China.
The dynamics of Sino-Soviet cleavage were radically transformed with the demise of the Soviet Union in
1991. In an effort to normalise their strained and battered ties, China and Russia launched efforts to
broaden and deepen the process of thaw initiated by the restoration of party-to-party ties during the May
1989 Deng-Gorbachev summit.
Former President Boris Yeltsin visited Beijing in December 1992 and April 1996. Russian Prime Minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin visited China in May 1994. Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Moscow in
September
1994, May 1995 and for a summit in late April 1997. Prime Minister Li Peng went to Russia in June 1995
and December 1996. These highest level contacts have been reinforced by numerous encounters between
the foreign ministers, defence ministers, military officers and economic officials of both countries. As a
result of these visits, areas of friction between the two sides have been minimised while possibilities for
identifying areas of mutual agreement have been enhanced.
For instance, the two sides have identified many areas of mutual agreement which include the following:
the commitment to a ”strategic partnership of equality, mutual confidence, and mutual coordination”; the
pledge to observe the 1991 and 1994 treaties delimiting the common border; the affirmation that Russian
policy in Chechnya is an internal affair necessary to keep Russia united; opposition to Nato expansion and
US-led Nato intervention outside the UN framework; China’s support for Russia’s entry into the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agreement; Russia’s commitment to avoid official ties with
Taiwan; Russian public declaration that Tibet is an integral part of China; and continued military
cooperation, arms reductions and conventional and nuclear confidencebuilding measures.”
522
The prospects for forging Sino-Russian entente cordiale have been considerably enhanced following tne
Beijing summit meeting of the presidents of the two countries. Curjng mis ^strategically timed”
JiangYeltsin summit, both countries notonly engaged in verbal denunciation of the West but also expressed
their villingness to work together to seek an end to the US dominated unipo|ar World. In a toughly worded
joint declaration both sides stated that ”tiiey are against the use of placing human rights higher than state
sovereignty mcj using human rights to interfere or to harm an independent country’s sovereignty.” The
statement called for a ”mutlipolar world and for the Umted Nations to play a leading role in maintaining
world peace”.
In response to mounting western criticism of Moscow’s brutal military campaign against Chechnja an<j
President Clinton’s warning that Russia ”will pay a heavy price” for jtj the siuo-Russian joint declaration
stressed dial ”the Chechen issue is j)Ureiy an internal matter of the Russian republic” and pointed out that
”mtobers of the international community must respect sovereignty and non-interference in others internal
affairs.”
In a throwback to the nuclear jingoism of the bygone era of the US-Soviet cold war, Yeltsin reminded
Washington that his country ”still had nuclear weapons and would not bow to US pressure over Chechnya.”
Rejecting Washington’s advice thatmiiitary conquest of Chechnya was not in Moscow’s long-term interest,
Yeltsin bluntly told President Clinton that ”it has never been the case, and it wju never be the case, that he
can dictate how the whole world should, live, \vork and pjay. No, and once again, no. A multipolar world,
that is the basis of everything.’’
Several considerations underpin this congealing of Sino-Russian opposition to the United States. Boih
China and Russia have been angered by Nato’s war against Yugoslavia, conducted outside the framework
of the UN, in which Chinese Embassy in Beigrade was hit and destroyed. Moscow and Beijing also feel
threatened by ongoing U”S attempts to develop and deploy an anti-theatre missile syste^ jn Asja> vvhich
will cover Japan and Taiwan. The joint declaration issued in Beijing explicitly stated that ”the plans to
build a theatre-missile defence syStem would threaten peace and stability in the region.” It further str^ssed
that both countries are opposed to the ”position of any country und«r any form of bringing the Chinese
province of Taiwan into an anti-missjie defence plan.”
China and Russia also share trie perception that strident American advocacy of human rights and calls for
demoralisation are nothing but flimsy pretexts to legitimise western intervention in their domestic affairs.
The Moscow-Beijing link is also reinforce(j by their joint efforts to play the
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”oil game” in the Caucasus and Central Asia to the exclusion of the western countries.
One of the most dramatic diplomatic turnarounds in the past decade is the deepening of Sino-Russian
strategic ties. In addition to the settlement of all but few kilometers of border demarcation, Russia and
China have captured ongoing military trends through agreements to limit deployments and to open military
activities near borders to observation and dialogue. They have expanded military-to-military contacts,
particularly at high levels. Arms sales and military technical cooperation have flourished. In April 1996, the
leaders of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan agreed to a set cf confidence - building
measures on their shared borders, including the regular exchange of information on military exercises, and
limits on the size of such exercises to no more than 40000 troops. At the April 1997 summit, Russia agreed
to reduce the size of its forces on the 100-mete border zone by 15 percent and place limits on a wide range
of ground, air defense, and frontal aviation equipment and personnel. From 1995-1996, Russia’s arms trade
with China accounted for more than $3.3 billion.
Despite this high profile of strategic and military ties between Russia and China, economic cooperation
between them is still lower. It is a great challenge before the two countries to convert their strong strategic
ties into mutual economic cooperation. The 2000 Russian Foreign Policy Concept admits that, for the Sino-
Russian partnership the main task is ”bringing the scale of economic interaction in conformity with the
level of political relations”. The two countries have started moving in that direction. President Putin’s visit
to China in July 2000, resulted in agreements on feasibility studies on gas and oil pipelines from Siberia to
China. In June
2001, President Putin and President Jiang Zemin along with the leaders of four Central Asian countries,
met and reaffirmed their partnership and interests on major global issues, and recommended measures to
expand their economic ties. Just weeks later, in July 2001, President Jiang Zemin arrived in Moscow to
sign the Good Neighborly Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It was a great breakthrough in the
relations between the two countries, which certainly caused worries for America. It was taken by the U.S as
anti-US Sino-Russian alliance.
While the strategic convergence between China and Russia may not blossom into a true security
community based on complete mutual trust and harmony, it represents a major step towards managing their
bilateral disputes. The world badly needs a degree of Sino-Russian partnership to counteract the tyranny
and excesses of the unipolar world. A Sino-Russian concert can be a factor for world peace provided it
loosens the bands of
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525
wickedness in the world and helps foster the cause of stability and regional peace.
peace.
INDEPENDENCE OF EAST TIMOR
Twenty-four years after Indonesia invaded East Timor, the final soldiers have left, slipping out under cover
of darkness in ignominious retreat. They leave behind a territory in ruins, destroyed in a last desperate act
of revenge after the Timorese voted for independence and an end to Indonesian rule.
Now both sides must count the cost: an estimated 200,000 East Timorese dead from war, famine and
disease in the years directly following the invasion in 1975 hundreds more killed, disappeared, tortured and
dispossessed under Indonesia’s military occupation and, in the past few months, two-thirds of the
population terrorised and forced to flee under an army-backed reign of terror aimed at spoiling the UN
supervised referendum.
No one knows how many were killed, or how many will live out the rest of their lives in exile, forced to
resettle in Indonesia. There is little glory in any of this for Indonesia and it too has paid a terrible price for
its occupation of East Timor.
Up to 20,000 soldiers have been killed, the public standing of the military has plummeted as knowledge of
its abuses in East Timor and elsewhere has emerged, and Indonesia has invited comparisons with the worst
regimes in existence, and come perilously close to pariah nation status. On top of that, other regions of the
republic have called for independence, threatening the integrity of the nation as a whole.
So why did Jakarta let it happen? And what lessons have been learned? Timor was a Portuguese colony for
hundreds of years, with the western half of the island ceded to the Dutch early this century. When the
Indonesian Republic was born at the end of World War II, the army took a leading role in all aspects of
national life - a development which militarised society as a whole, and gave the generals extraordinary
power. Having thrown out their own colonial masters - the Dutch - it rankled some that another European
colonial power should hold on to a slice of territory at the end of their archipelago. But it was the fall in
1974 of the dictator Marcello Caetano in Portugal’s Carnation revolution that galvanised them into action.
Decolonisation began and as the Timorese prepared for the future, the generals devised a covert plan to
subvert ideas of independence.
John Taylor, an expert on East Timor, believes the military was worried that if East Timor became
independent and managed to survive, it would set a bad example to other areas of Indonesia. The army had
just brought the country together and won its own freedom from colonisation. It was not about to see that
victory destroyed.
The Timorese never gave up, and leaders such as the guerrilla commander Xanana Gusmao proved
themselves more than a match for Indonesia. After sustained bombing in the late 1970s, Fretilin told the
people to go down from the mountains and save themselves, or risk genocide. The war against Indonesia
was abandoned and replaced by an underground resistance and lobbying abroad.
The army countered with intelligence operations carried out by Special Forces designed to turn the people
against each other. Timorese were recruited to spy on fellow Timorese and regular campaigns of
intimidation silenced the population.
Few knew at first what was going on inside a territory declared off limits. When news did leak out, it was
studiously ignored. Western governments did not want to upset Indonesia. It was large, it was
anticommunist, and it controlled highly-strategic waterways. Under strongman President Suharto, the
economy was growing, promising a big market for exports and lucrative contracts for foreign bidders
willing to pay the appropriate inducements.
Indonesia poured money into the territory, building roads to facilitate the movement of troops, and schools
and clinics. Literacy rates rose dramatically. Some East Timorese even went to university. But the clinics
were never quite what they were cracked up to be, teaching was mostly in Indonesian, not native languages,
the military controlled the most lucrative industry - coffee - and the Suharto family got its share of what
was going. The civil service was corrupt and inefficient and at the end of more than two decades of
development, there was not a lot to show for it.
Ordinary Indonesians had little idea of the reality in East Timor. Their own papers could not print it, even if
they wanted to. Government propaganda ensured that the Timorese were perceived as ungrateful second
class citizens, semi-savages who, like the Irianese, needed to be civilised or else they would tear each other
to pieces.
But then events conspired against Jakarta. The Asian financial crisis toppled President Suharto. Indonesians
found out about wide-scale military abuses across the country, especially in the north Sumatran
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province of Aceh where troops had attempted to crush a separatist rebellion. Indonesians - overwhelmingly
Muslim - learnt about the killing of ulemas, the rape of women, villages peopled only by widows.
The lame-duck President Habibie, a Suharto protege, attempted reform. The first democratic elections for
more than 40 years were held earlier this year. The military’s role was scaled back further. But ethnic and
religious violence was spiralling out of control across the archipelago. The military, demoralised and
weakened, could not or would not control it. And out of the blue, the unpredictable Mr Habibie offered East
Timor first autonomy, then independence, without consulting the army.
INDONESIA AND THE ACEH PROBLEM
Aceh’s clamour for independence has gone a long way in fanning flames of separatism in other parts of
Indonesia. As these ominous shadows of separatism lengthen, alarmed neighbouring countries fear that if
this wave of political unrest continues unabated, the entire South-East Asian region will stand destabilised.
Hence, officials and analysts have cautioned that any further unravelling of Indonesia, following the violent
departure of East Timor, would lead to an unending chain of naitonal disintegration - an action replay of
what has happened in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
The vast country of Indonesia has always served as a bedrock of regional cooperation among South-East
Asian states, which were often in conflict with each other before ASEAN, which includes Burma,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philipines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam was formed in 1967. In
case Indonesia breaks up it would split into numerous potentially feuding, small states of doubtful
economic viability. It is also believed that its disintegration would shake investment confidence in South-
East Asia. This would, in turn, create a serious situation as many of the 10 ASEAN members have recently
recovered from recession and the resultant political instability.
Almarmed at the growing signs of fragmentation in Indonesia, Singapore’s senior minister Lee Kuan Yew
and the Philipines foreign secretary, Domingo Siazon have voiced serious concern about the potential
impact of the growing Indonesian restlessness. Wane Gungwa, Director of the Institute of East Asian
Studies in Singapore, says that the people who had earlier raised alarm had always felt the importance of
ASEAN as a basis of a new regionalism in South East Asia. He said that they would now like to see a
restored Indonesia play its part in enbling ASEAN to move
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forward, because for the last year or so, ASEAN has virtually been in abeyance due to the political
instability in Indonesia.
Analysts are concerned that if Aceh were allowed to break away from Indonesia, it would most probably
form an Islamic republic that would stoke the simmering Muslim separatist movements in southern parts of
Philipines and Thailand. Aceh had long been an integral part of Indonesia, like Mindanao that had always
been an integral part of the Philipines. As and when a vote for independence was made, it could become a
serious issue.
Indonesia comprises about 400 different ethnic and religious groups, five of whom in Aceh - Irian, Jaya,
Riau, South Sulawesi and the Maluka Islands - have already started asking for independence, thus causing a
stir in the newly installed democratic government. The government is thinking of ways and means to
handle the separatist pressure in an amicable manner. Also the qustion is how can he keep his words of
giving voting rights to the Achnese, East Timor style, without triggering the Balkanisation of Indonesia.
INDIAN NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
The Indian draft nuclear doctrine which the BJP government suddenly unleashed in summer of 1999 just
before general elections explains credible minimum deterrence, enhanced nuclear and conventional forces
capability, and a matching command and control system capable to absorb a first nuclear strike and respond
with nuclear retaliation. The document defines minimum nuclear deterrence as ”sufficient survivable and
operationally prepared nuclear forces; a robust command and control system, effective intelligence,
foolproof early warning capabilities, comprehensive planning and effective operational training to
implement nuclear strategy and the will to employ nuclear weapons.”
According to Brajesh Mishra, India’s top nuclear hawk, ”minimum but credible deterrence is the watch-
word of the nuclear doctrine.” Minimum deterrence has been quantified in so far as the number of nuclear
warheads are concerned. India hopes to have 400 nuclear and thermonuclear warheads in 10 years time.
The doctrine speaks of ”effective, enduring, diverse, flexible and responsive nuclear forces.” These forces
are to based on a triad of aircraft, land based missiles and sea based assets. To achieve credible nuclear
deterrence, India is likely to create a strategic bomber commander for accurate nuclear strikes. The nuclear
doctrine postulates a conventional war followed by nuclear pre-emptive and second strikes. India will
maintain effective conventional capabilities to raise the threshold of
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conventional military conflict and use of nuclear weapons. The command and control systems will be
duplicated and made fool-proof to ensure that they are not destroyed by nuclear surprise attacks, and are
able to respond immediately to nuclear pre-emption.
The Indian Press has commented favourably on the draft nuclear doctrine, but there are some serious
reservations as well. Regional and global reaction has been highly critical. Pakistan has reacted angrily
because the Indian nuclear doctrine is Pakistan specific. Comments in Pakistani newspapers and journals
reflect this fully. The views of nuclear strategists like Brahama Chellaney have influenced the formulation
of the nuclear doctrine. In his book, Securing India’s future in the new millennium, Brahama Challeny
states: ”Nuclear deterrence works in a peculiar fashion. The threat of the bomb is intended to prevent the
use of the bomb, and the mission of nuclear weapons has evolved into a denial of the mission. But the
effectiveness of the deterrence is paradoxically tied to the usability of the nuclear weapons to deter
aggression, i.e. by the distinct possibility that they would be used against the aggressor. Nuclear weapons,
therefore, must be deployed for operational use. With a deterrence credibility inseparable from its certainty
and horrors, the symbiosis of deterrence and use is a central reality of the nuclear age.”
The criticism of the nuclear doctrine is also very revealing. In his article ”Mindless militarisation”, C
Rammanohar Reddy states: ”Reason is the first causality of war. A mood of militarisation has gripped the
country in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict, and there are irresponsible scientists talking about India’s
ability to make neutron bombs and the like. If the draft doctrine becomes a reality, then not only will
nuclear weaponisation impose a crippling financial burden on the economy, but we will also be
contributing to make South Asia one of the most dangerous places to live in. The open nuclearisation of
South Asia, far from reducing tensions, provoked a conflict within one year. Now with a quantum jump in
the conventional defence expenditure, there are enormous financial implications of the nuclear doctrine as
laid out by NSAB. The second strike no-first-use doctrine visualises full nuclear weaponisation. The
arsenal will contain a triad of strike aircraft, land based missiles and nuclear powered submarines fitted
with SLBMs. When the doctrine becomes a reality, we will be launching in South Asia, in a miniature
fashion, the nuclear arms race between the US and the erstwhile USSR.
India is ignoring global condemnation of its nuclear doctrine. China has asked India to implement UN
Security Council Resolution 1172. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Zhu Bangzao, said: ”China has
urged to renounce its nuke programmes and induction of IRBM Agni-II into its
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armed forces to prevent a nuclear arms race in the region.” A nuclear arms race in the region is inevitable
due to Indian bellicosity.
WTO SUMMIT AT SEATTLE
The third ministerial summit of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), held between November 29 and
December 4, 1999 in Seattle, ended up making more headlines than even people demanding more coverage
of the issue had hoped for. Hometown to Microsoft and General Motors, Seattle witnessed the biggest
protests in the US since Vietnam and experienced its first curfew since World War II during the summit.
The summit also ended in a singular lack of consensus among participants as the US failed to push through
a new round of trade proposals aimed at furthering the project of globalisation and liberalisation.
Opposition to the policies of the WTO in general, and to the agenda of the talks scheduled for the Seattle
summit in particular, had been simmering for a long time within and outside the US. Ironically, the internet,
central to the technology of glabalisation was an active medium through which dissidents voiced their
opinions and coordinated protest that rocked Seattle. While no one expected smooth sailing, authorities
ended up with more on their plate than anyone had bargained for as Seattle was stormed by a crowd of
50,000 environmentalists, human rights activists, and advocates for economic and social justice - both
global and domestic. Together, the protestors were able to thwart the proceedings of the summit, forcing
local authorities to impose a curfew and call on federal assistance in an effort to maintain order. Sensational
as the showdown was, however, viewing it in its immediate context would only cloud the issue’s
significance.
What the talks sought to do was to open up the services and agriculture sectors, where the highest potential
for growth exists, to the capital of the developed world. On the other side of the fence, the majority
consisted of US labour unionists whose principal concern, when stripped of the niceties of political
correctness, was the competition they would face from cheap Third World labour in this scenario. As the
global marketplace becomes further integrated, American workers stand to lose their blue-collar jobs to
cheaper labour elsewhere. And thus the vociferous denunciation of globalisation, dissemination of
technology and corporate downsizing. When seen from this perspective, the Seattle summit was in fact the
confrontation between organised labour and business interests at the international level. However, the
collapse of the trade negotiations can be attributed to more than just the presence of the protestors,
significant as their number, impact artd demands may be. In fact, the talks failed due to a number of
reasons.
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Conflicts between the members of the organisation, for instance, were an essential factor. While Third
World representatives insisted that the proposed reforms were unworkable in the existing political economy
of the world, fissures within the developed world were also evident at the summit. The European Union and
Japan stiffly resisted US efforts to eliminate agricultural subsidies which protect their farmers, and the EU
trade commissioner Pascal Lamy declared on the crucial last day of negotiations (after a conspicuous
absence of six hours that they would not agree to any deal on agriculture. Following the achievement of the
basic economic goals of reducing tariffs and quotas to negligible levels, the project of glabalisation requires
social and political adjustments to be made at an institutional level. At this stage of globalisation, conflicts
between members states, are, quite naturally, inevitable.
Reactions to the failure of talks were as varied as the reasons that led to their paralysis. Enthusiastic
protestors hailed the event as their ’victory’, claiming that they had won the ’battle of Seattle’ and now
need to create ’many Seattles to destroy international capitalism’. The American public, however, was
disappointed that the US had failed in its role as the hegemonic leader of the capitalist world economy for
the first time in 50 years.
Theorists of global capitalism also argue that nation-states, historically shaped as political units of the
capitalist world economy, also face new challenges in this scenario. Economic policies pursued in the last
50 years have created unprecedented income inequalities and given birth to the modern alienated man.
Now, the onslaught of globalisation is dislocating populations from national economies and these people
are regrouping in political movements on the grounds of their ethnic, religious or tribal identities. This
trend strikes at the very foundations of the nationstate’s legitimacy as a viable political unit.
”WTO SUMMIT AT CANCUN”
Fifth WTO Summit was held in Cancun (Medico), on September

10-14, 2003. The summit ended in fiasco without producing any agreement. The summit was originally
intended to complete the unfinished business of the Doha Development Round (Nov. 2001), but
unfortunately was caught in a stalemate and that too by leaving a bad taste in the mouth following a rebuff
to the industrialized countries by the poor African countries on Singapore issues. It rather gave an
indication of new balance of power among the 148 members of the WTO.
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The principle reason why the talks did not end on a positive note, was the unwillingness of the rich
countries to offer substantial and meaningful cut in the over $ 300 billion a year from subsidies that depress
worldwide crop prices. Instead of treating this issue seriously the rich countries decided to launch another
round of talks relating to trade and investment enhancing issues that suited them most. These issues
include, competition, policies, protection for foreign investment, trade facilitation and transparency in
government procurements - the so-called Singapore issues, pending since the 2nd WTO conference in
Singapore in 1996.
The developing countries insisted that the above issues could not be considered without discussing the
agricultural subsidies first. Also the newly formed group of 21 developing countries (G-21), in which
Pakistan is also included, felt that the new issues raised by the rich countries would make the WTO even
more cumbersome and unwielding to play the role for which it had been established. Many international
economic analysts held the US and EU responsible for the failure of the Cancum Summit, as they refused
to give up much ground on farm trade issues.
A major development at Cancum that may compel the developed countries to reform certain WTO
procedures was the coalition of the third world states, which made a marked contribution to its outcome
and shifted the balance of power away from the rich countries. For the first time in any international
organization, the developing countries managed to unite around a common position and that allowed it
finally to assert itself successfully against the US and EU. The group of 21 developing countries from
Africa, Asia and Caribbean, successfully defended their position against the agricultural subsidies that
reached to US$ 40 billion in the US during the year 2002 and 50 billion Euros per year in EU.
Although the Cancun fiasco was a severe blow to the future of WTO but it is also true that liberalization of
trade without any steps to simultaneously eliminate agricultural subsidies would be even greater disaster,
especially for the poor countries. The consequences of the Cancun meltdown, if not as serious as those of
the Seattle Summit a few years ago, will definitely cripple the ability of world economy to become more
buoyant and resilient in the near future. That alone will dampen the growth of many developing countries
around the world well below their potential levels.
Another serious danger is that the US and EU would now tilt more and more towards bilateral and regional
deals which would put small countries at greater disadvantage. The US has already started bilateral talks
with many countries.
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Besides, a new wave of protectionist mentality would grip the policy makers in the rich countries, thereby
making a further dent on multilateralism.
Although the Doha Round is not dead yet completely, however, the deadline to reduce barriers to trade by
January 1, 2005, is unlikely to be met due to the setback at Cancun.
Since the 146-nations negotiation process to build consensus in trade policies, is too unwieldy to proceed
smoothly, it seems more advisable for a select group of rich countries representatives to negotiate and work
out an acceptable draft proposal with G-21 and then present it to a larger group of all the member countries
for minor modification in the next WTO summit.
POST-SEPTEMBER 11 GLOBAL DYNAMICS
That the world would be a very different place after 11 September was clear even as the World Trade
Centre was collapsing. The murder of
6000-plus people on the American mainland could never be just another news story. Much of the change
was predictable tightened security, a backlash against Muslims, reduced business confidence, etc. But much
of it was not. Few, for example, could have anticipated the extent of international realignment. The global
political scene after September 11 has much that is strange and unfamiliar.
The biggest change without doubt (and not surprisingly) has come in the US. One can see clear differences
between pre- and post-11 September American foreign policy. The former, particularly since George Bush
entered the Oval Office, was characterised by a marked unilateralism. Side-lining the UN, the pursuit of
NMD, the rejection of Kyoto, disengagement from the Middle East - all spoke of a United States
determined to selfishly pursue its own interests at the expense of its allies, global security, human rights
and the environment. It also spoke of a United States lacking both global vision and purpose. The defeat of
communism left a vacuum in US foreign policy-making - one that the promotion of human rights,
economic growth, etc could not satisfactorily fill.
One month on, there is a definite sense of purpose in the White House and State Department. International
terrorism has succeeded communism as the global menace to be crushed. The new criterion for dividing the
world into ’g.ood’ and ’evil’ is opposition to or support for terrorist groups. (Whether this criterion survives
beyond the initial anti-
CONTEM PORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES
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Taliban s;tage, is too early to say.)
The tone in Washington is also totally different ’Internationalism’, ’engagement’, ’building up global
coalitions’, ’working together’ - these are the new buzzwords. George Bush and Colin Powell have
probably lost count of the number of international leaders they have met or spoken with over the past
month. For a President who ran for office blissfully ignorant of the wider world, this is indeed a conversion.
The reason for this new internationalism is partly, of course, that Washington cannot wage the new war
against terrorism alone. Today’s terrorist networks are global in reach and therefore global efforts will be
required to counter them. But it is also because of the painful lesson brought home to Americans by the
attacks of that fateful Tuesday: no country can live in iso lation. The US cannot remain immune to the
effects of events and policies taking place or being carried out far from its shores. The fallout from those
can-and has-reached America itself. Hence it has to work with the rest of the world, not apart from it.
That realisation also explains the novel sensitivity in American foreign policy-making. There has been no
repetition of the ’hit out and be damned’ response of previous administrations. Recall the Sudanese
Pharmaceuticals factory destroyed by American bombing in 1995, and the
70 cruise missiles sent into Afghanistan after the 1998 US embassy bombings. George Bush, in very
surprising contrast, has been a model of restraint. True, he deployed a force of Goliath proportions around
Afghanistan. But the actual military action (so far) - taking out the handful of viable targets in the country -
is on the David scale.
A.s the grounds of the new good vs evil global conflict have changed, so too have the forces ranged on
either side. This is where one sees the biggest shifts in the global political order. All sorts of unlikely
friendships, even romances, are blossoming.
M ost surprising is that with Moscow. The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 officially ended
the Cold War, but unofficially it lingered on. in the form of mutual suspicion and distrust between Russia
and America. This latent ideological hostility surfaced over issues like the Balkans and NATO’s advances
to former Warsaw Bloc states. Bush’s single-minded pursuit of NMD even threatened to start the Cold War
anew.
By making pledges of support that in the Cold War era would have been considered unthinkable (allowing
US planes to use Russian airspace for humanitarian purposes, permitting the CARs to provide military
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cooperation to Washington, and even hinting that Moscow would no longer oppose NATO’s eastward
expansion) President Vladimir Putin has finally ended the Cold War and cleared the way for a genuine
friendship. (He has definitely been one of the post-11 September winners - others being Tony Blair and
Cohn Powell.) Note the irony of Moscow and Washington being brought together by the Afghans and bin
Laden - once sponsored by the latter to hammer the former.
The other radical shift - for similar reasons - has been seen in the Middle East. Here it is not so much a case
of romance blossoming as souring. Tel Aviv and Washington had their most heated spat since Bush Senior
was in office a decade ago. It was provoked by Ariel Sharon’s accusation that the US was acting like
Britain in 1938, when it appeased Hitler with Czechoslovakia. Those remarks, in turn, were a totally
disproportionate response to Washington’s courting of the Arabs.
Initial hiccups aside (e.g. the ’crusade’ reference) George Bush quickly realised the importance of keeping
the Muslim world on board. One, because America ’needed the cooperation of the Gulf states to attack
Afghanistan, and two, to prevent a real clash of civilisations from materialising. He and Powell assiduously
wooed the vital Arab states of Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf, etc, as well as other Muslim countries like
Indonesia, Malaysia and Bangladesh. The price for their support, in particular of the Arabs, was a more
balanced US approach to the IsraelPalestine question. That is what so riled Ariel Sharon.
Pakistan and Afghanistan, for obvious reasons, feature prominently in the current global scene. The
international community has once again opened its arms to Islamabad. Lack of democratic rule - until
recently such a repellent to outside attentions - is now a secondary issue. General Musharraf s decision to
cooperate in the war against terrorism has made his government infinitely more attractive. Similarly,
Afghanistan - whose people until recently were suffering the triple burdens of civil war, famine and Taliban
rule untroubled by outside assistance - is suddenly number one on donors’ charity lists.
There have been other, less seismic shifts. The US not vetoing a UN Security Council resolution to lift
travel restrictions on Sudan. Khartoum apparently reciprocating with intelligence information about Osama
bin Laden. Britain’s Foreign Secretary making a historic visit to Iran. The US paying some of its UN dues.
The speed with which antiterrorism resolutions were passed by that body. These are all small but
significant changes.
L,
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In conclusion, the global political order has altered dramatically since 11 September. Much of the change is
to be welcomed: countering terrorism, working multilaterally, etc. But there is also a great deal of concern
for the price being paid for cooperation against terrorism, the dubious characters being courted, the
durability of the changes.
EXPLAINING MUSLIM HATE TOWARDS THE U.S.
Since September 11, 2001 much of the American media has consistently asked, ”Why do Muslims hate the
US?” To most Americans, oblivious to the outside world to the point of naivete, the hate mongering crowds
they see on television are representatives of Islam and its teachings. This question has been asked to the
point that it becomes a cliche but has to be answered effectively and with a perspective on history for us to
defuse the explosive situation that the world finds itself in today.
Let us in light of history and also the recent events try to answer this question and also attempt to suggest
long-term steps, which should be taken to avoid a ”clash of civilizations”, a phenomenon that according to
Huntington is bound to occur.
MUSLIM RESENTMENT: COLONIAL BEGINNINGS
The mistrust of the Muslim mind towards the West has a long history. Today’s all blanketing term of
Islamic terrorism is very much a product of this mistrust which has in many parts of the Muslim world
matured into hate for the west or its leader i.e. the United States of America.
Unlike most other colonized civilizations, the Muslim civilization had a creed and a well-developed system
of governance, justice, education and administration before being colonized. Though in decline when
colonized, it had at different points in history boasted some of best justice, education and governance
systems witnessed anywhere in the world. The colonization ended the long history of competition between
the Christian west and the Islamic world in favor of the stronger west. Since that time resentment against
the west and the hope for Islamic resurgence has always been a part of the Muslim psyche.
The systematic loot and pillage which was carried out by leading western colonial powers in the Islamic
lands did not win them many friends in the colonies. Classic examples of this loot being the stealing of
jewels and wealth from the moguls of India. Kohinoor once the proud property of Moguls is now a part of
the Queen of England’s crown jewels. Lahore Fort Sheesh Mahal’s walls once embedded with precious and
semi-precious
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stones now look bare and ravaged after the English finished with them. Countless examples of this loot can
be found all over the Muslim world from the Maghrib to the East Indies.
The Ottoman Empire was the last bastion of Muslim civilization’s indigenously evolved system of
governance. It must be admitted that it had declined to a large extent but still had a big symbolic value all
over the Muslim world. It still had a working caliphate system, corrupted as it was. Students of history
know about the kind of reactions seen on the Muslim streets of India, when the Ottoman Empire was
systematically taken apart by the West. This defeat of the Ottomans was in no small part due to the help
provided by the Arabs, who were bribed with sheikhdoms and promised independent coutries in return for
help in defeating the Ottomans. The only terrorism being committed then was against the Turks, inspired
and instigated by none other than Lawrence of Arabia! He actually brought the concept of guerilla war and
harassment of the occupying force through acts of ’terrorism’ to the Middle-East. At that time these tactics
were kosher for the west, as they were being omitted against an enemy by an ally, now such tactics are
defined as terrorism.
This honeymoon between the Arabs and the West came to a screeching halt when the Arabs found a Jewish
state in one of their holiest lands right in their midst. They found no mention of this Jewish state on their
soil, when being promised the world by the British plotting the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Today
Israel encompasses Jerusalem, one of the holiest cities in Islam. The same Jerusalem for which Saladdin
fought the crusades. In one swoop Israel achieved (albeit with active help of the west) something for which
the entire Christendom fought the Islamic Middle-East for so many long years during the crusades.
Is it surprising then to find extremists like Osama bin Laden inflaming Muslim sentiment on the question of
Jerusalem and claiming to be fighting to liberate this holy city today? It would be interesting to see the
reaction of Roman Catholics if Muslims incorporate the Vatican in one of their countries and make it their
capital. Would the same definition of terrorism apply then?
MUSLIM RESENTMENT: POST-MATURATION
In the period between the 1940’s to the 1970’s the colonial powers gave independence to many of their
colonies, a lot of these were Islamic countries. The West in large part got and still gets the raw materials to
sustain its consumptive life style from the third world feels today is shared by most third world countries
which are former colonies of the west. Most
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of these countries could not sustain western style democracies after independence as their own
indigenously evolved government systems had been systematically dismantled by the western colonial
powers during their rules. This, and the fact that the former colonial powers wanted friendly puppets as
rulers in these countries gave rise to massively corrupt regimes in the third world. This was true even to a
larger extent in the Muslim world which had huge deposits of oil, making them bigger targets of
exploitation by their own elite propped up the west.
The west desperately needed pliable rulers in these countries, the fact that these rulers exploited their lands
and their people was of no consequence to the west. Even today, as the western media points out glibly, the
Islamic world has no truly democratic country, resulting in the gagging of dissent and therefore of the
creative and progressive forces of society. In doing so they easily ignore the fact that democracy pre-dates
Christianity, starting as an idea with some practical implementation sin classical Greece. Therefore no
monotheistic religion can claim to be the founder of the democratic system and each culture has to evolved
its own system to implement democracy keeping in mind its ideals. Today’s yardstick of a democratic
system being truly democratic if it complies to either the Westminister or Washington model is both unfair
and wrong. Apples and oranges are both fruits but have different tastes and textures.
The birth of modern terrorist organizations can be directly traced to the injustices of the colonial and post-
colonial eras. Most of these organizations started off as far-left independence/nationalist movements, the
shift to politico-religious right happened much later. One of the reasons for this shift being the loss of
credibility of the leftist/nationalist organizations thus leaving the field open for the religious right in the
Middle-East. Many third world countries in the sixties and seventies, especially in the Middle East and
Latin America, saw leftist organizations which picked up arms to protest exploitation and dictatorships in
their countries by rulers propped up the west. Most of these Latin American organizations saw their causes
disappear when Latin America started returning to some form of democracy in the eighties. Unfortunately
this did not happen in the Middle East, resulting in political issues being turned into religious causes. A
case in point being the rise of the religious Hamas as an alternate to Yasser Arafat’s secular PLO. Hamas
makes the issue of Palestine and Jerusalem very much a religious issue as opposed to the PLO, which
considers it a political issue. The rise and popularity of Hamas, incidentally, also forced the west and Israel
to do business with PLO in the early 90’s, as they preferred doing business with a secular organization with
a political agenda rather than a religious and ’terrorist’ organization. In the process Arafat very
conveniently went from being a terrorist of the 60’s and
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70’s to a Nobel Prize winning political leader of the Palestinians in the 90’s. A remarkable turnaround by
any standard!
Today we see Muslim extremists using the very same issues of Palestine and Jerusalem as rallying cries in
their causes. A case in point being, Osama bin Laden’s use of Palestine as one of the causes for his
followers to take innocent lives in addition to their own, as was demonstrated on the 11* of September.
Posters having the face of Osama and Masjid-e-Aqsa (in Jerusalem) are common place amongst Muslims
protesting American bombings in Afghanistan. Old sins cast long shadows.
THE WAY FORWARD: THE EMBRACE OF CIVILIZATIONS
Many believe that the clash of civilizations is inevitable, but if the world asks hard questions of itself and
answers them honestly, there is no reason this clash cannot be avoided. This is true for all civilizations of
the world including the western and the Islamic civilizations.
From the above discussions it is evident that the roots of today’s ’terrorism’ lie in political problems. With
frustrations building up with time due to the non-resolution of these problems, these issues became
religious agendas in the Islamic world. Consequently, if we take away the political issues, which are at the
core of these disputes, the rationale for the existence of mistrust between civilizations will cease to exist.
The West will have to atone for their sins of the past and clear up these political problems.
They, through the U.N, will have to address the issues of Kashmir and Palestine and solve them as soon as
possible. This would require impartiality on the part of the west, something which it has not showed so far.
The hardest choices will have to be made by the U.S, which to-date has been designing its Mid-East policy
around Israel and its interests. This policy will have to defined anew, based on the principles of justice and
fair play. Enormous political will, will have to be generated in the west in general and the U.S in particular
to do what is required. If this is not done the mistrust amongst civilizations will multiply and the future
generations of the west and the Islamic world will keep on paying for the faults of their forefathers.
THE WAY FORWARD: RE-DEFINITION OF ISLAM
To achieve a stable and peaceful world Islam will have to ask equally hard questions of itself. We Muslims
must make difficult choices in
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the days to come, if we are to progress beyond where we are today. To do that we must wrest our religion
free from the people who speak for Islam today i.e. the religious extremists who claim to speak for all
Muslims. Our message must be spread in the world by the Muslim ’civil’ society, with the humanistic and
tolerant values of Islam in the forefront. We have to start acting instead of reacting, this would require us to
reject the persecution mania which we suffer from today, and extend a hand of friendship and peace to
other civilizations. The alternate is too disastrous to consider.
WHO SPEAKS FOR THE MUSLIMS
Today the media is full of people claiming to speak on Islam’s behalf. Many of these people are religious
fanatics who can be seen burning effigies and flags in the streets of the Muslim world. We the ’civil’
Muslims need to find a voice, a forum which projects our definition of Islam i.e. an Islam with tolerance
and forbearance in its forefront The ’civil’ Islam will have to shout very loud Indeed to be heard above the
din of the war drums being beaten by extremist and violent fanatics amongst the ranks of Islam.
The Muslim world is faced with the most severe crisis of its history. The idea of the ”Clash of
Civilizations” which attracted the attention of the most Western policy makers has become cornerstone of
Western Policy towards the non-western world, particularly Muslim world. In the contemplated
’Civilizational Clash’, Islam is pointed out as the main source of danger to the western civilization. Islam
has been declared as a disruptive force producing extremism, fundamentalism and even terrorism. The
terrorist acts of 9/11 have accentuated western fear of Islam and ever since, the West especially the US is
determined to root out the so-called Islamic fundamentalism under the garb of war against terrorism. Two
Muslim countries Afghanistan and Iraq have been targeted in sheer violation of international norms and
morality. Syria, Iran, Libya and Pakistan are under constant pressure from the West vis-a-vis issues of
nuclear proliferation and terrorism. All this concerted campaign initiated by the West has really stigmatized
and the image of Islam in the world and has put the interest of Muslim Ummah at stake. The enormity of
the situation requires bold and committed leadership on the part of Islamic world to save the extinction of
its ideals and traditions.
The need for a central authority in Islam has never been greater. It’s needed to define the future of this great
religion in a non-isolationist, progressive tolerant manner. It is time for deep introspection in Islam, we can
exist in our present state to denial and being a victim, or progress after making difficult choices. Success
always follows tough and sometimes
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSl F,S
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painful decisions. The Islamic crescent should be a symbol of peace, justice and tolerance rather than for
hate and enmity.
THE ROLE OF OIC IN COPING WITH THE CHALLENGES FACING THE MUSLIM WORLD
The 10lh Summit of OIC was held in Putrajaya, Capital of Malaysia in September 2003. The summit
provided a timely opportunity to identify the challenges faced by the Islamic world, some long standing and
some that had been highlighted by the 9/11 events.
The communique issued by the OIC countries at the summit rejected ”Selectivity and duplicity of standards
in combating terrorism and all attempts to associate terrorism with a particular religion or culture.” It called
for signing of a convention to ”distinguish between terrorism and the legitimate struggle for the right to
self-determination of people living under occupation of foreign domination.” All these steps were
encouraging on the part of the OIC. Nevertheless, the Islamic Organization is lagging far behind of the
actual role it was supposed to play averting the challenges facing the Muslim Ummah.
As regards Iraq, OIC failed to condemn unprovoked pre-emptive attack by the US and Britain against Iraq
on the false pretext of possessing WMD. Even the Muslim leaders at Putrajaya dropped plans to pass a
resolution calling for a specific timetable for the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq but simply called for
moves towards the restoration of Iraq’s sovereignty to be accelerated. UN Security Council resolution
which authorized a multilateral force in Iraq was welcomed and the suicide attacks in Iraq against UN
headquarters and Jordanian and Turkish embassies were condemned as ’criminal terrorist bombings’.
Besides, the OIC Summit, though strongly condemned Israel for its atrocities on Palestinians but did not
say a word of open support for the legitimate Palestinian Intifada. These are some sad stories on the part of
OIC which indicate the inefficiency of the organization and its sheer attitude of indifference towards the
actual problems of the Muslim Ummah.
The OIC had come into being in 1969, following the attempt to set fire to the Al Aqsa mosque. It was an
attempt on the part of the Muslim countries to institutionalize their efforts to strengthen and further Islamic
solidarity and to consolidate cooperation in political, economic, social, cultural and scientific fields.
However, its subsequent evolution had been a source of disillusionment.
•«Wf
A scrutiny of the performance of OIC during the last three decades indicates that the commitments of the
member states to fulfill their obligation to the promotion of objectives, set out in the charter, remained
merely a pious hope. OIC has been a failure in coping with both the internal and external challenges facing
the Muslim Ummah.
So far the internal challenges of the Muslim Ummah are concerned, it is marked with deep social, political
and sectarian cleavages. The promotion of Islamic solidarity is the foremost objective of the OIC.
In practice one can see only superficial unity among the Muslim countries. Instead of harmonizing the
collective interest of the Ummah, most of the Member states often acted in self-interest which also affected
adversely the functional capacity of OIC and eroded its credibility as a viable and fruitful institution. It
must be borne in the mind that every international organization is directed and sustained by its members.
Similarly OIC too, is dependent on its member Muslim states’ commitment and willingness, for its
successful role in resolving the problems of the Muslim Ummah.
The external challenge, which is the most pervasive challenge the Islamic world is facing currently, that is
the sinister campaign has been launched by some powerful anti-Islam lobbyists to denigrate Islam
byequating it with intolerance and terrorism. In order to counter the sinister propaganda against Islam and
to project its values, especially its human message of tolerance, moderation and respect for human rights,
the OIC carries heavy responsibility on its shoulders. To carry out those responsibilities efficiently, the
Organization urgently needs to be revitalized at its core. President Pervez Musharaf s proposal for the
establishment of an independent commission to study the problems obstructing the function of OIC and
then derive appropriate solutions to those problems, at the Putrajaya summit was encouraging.
The OIC should convey, in clear terms, its position in the war against terrorism. It should not wait for
others to define terrorism, rather it should draw the distinction between terrorism and legitimate freedom
struggle to remove any ambiguity. Two Muslim countries had already been attacked and occupied, the
Muslim States should warn against any further adventurism under the garb of combating terrorism. The
OIC members must emphatically reject the illegal occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan and demand the
immediate transfer of authority to the local people and fast withdrawal of foreign troops from their
territories. The OIC members should resolutely oppose any illegal action against any of the Muslim
countries under any pretext.
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543
Another equally important matter which requires a firm and unified position on the part of the OIC
countries relates to the nuclear nonproliferation. Unfortunately, only the Muslim countries are the focus of
concern in this regard, which is clearly biased and discriminatory and must be strongly opposed. The OIC
should offer its full cooperation in indiscriminate de-nuclearization of the world. It should raise the issue of
nuclear weapons programmes of Israel, India and other hostile non-Muslim countries. These countries are
as hostile and dangerous to the Muslim’s interest as Iran and Libya are alleged to be dangerous to the
Western interest.
The OIC should also raise its voice against the economic inequalities around the world. It should convey
the message to the Western world that the actual cause of extremism and terrorism is the economic
exploitation of the poor countries by the advanced countries. It needs to call upon its members to enhance
economic, technological and scientific cooperation among them to face the imminent challenge of
economic globalization.
The great weakness of OIC is political disputes among its members. The charter of the OIC does not
provide for any dispute settlement mechanism. It should envisage a proper mechanism to resolve all the
political, cultural, social and sectarian disputes among the Muslim countries. Besides, individual Muslim
countries should seek political stability and economic development at domestic level. Their political
systems need further democratization and openness.
The OIC countries also need to develop a common fund for the economic development of the poor Islamic
countries. The institutional machinery of OIC needs to be made more transparent and efficient. It should
develop common policy goals for the whole Muslim Ummah and its decisions should be binding on all its
members.
In conclusion one can say that the OIC will be able to face the formidable challenges faced by the Muslim
Ummah if its member countries bring radical change in their behavior towards fulfilling the obligations the
organization demands from them. What is required is the spirit of commitment and will-power on the part
of Muslim countries. The Muslim Ummah will have to show ”Enlightened Moderation” as coined by
President Musharaf.
NORTH KOREAN
In exchange for North Korea’s signing the NPT in 1985, the USSR agreed to provide four light water
nuclear reactors to be built at this site.
The agreement, signed in December 1985, stipulated that Moscow would provide technical assistance in
the construction of four VVER-440, each with a rating of 440MW(e), or a total of l,760MW(e).. However,
under pressure from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to permit the conduct of special
inspections, given discrepancies in North Korea’s initial inventory accounting of its nuclear program,
Pyongyang announced in March 1993 that it intended to withdraw from the treaty. In June 1993, North
Korea suspended the decision to withdraw, following negotiations with the United States. Since 1994, the
CIA has estimated that North Korea had diverted enough plutonium prior to 1993 to have developed one to
two nuclear weapons
The Stalinist regime vowed to bolster its nuclear weapons, as it abruptly pulled out of multi-party talks
aimed to halt its nuclear weapons Programme and accused Washington of plotting to overthrow it.
North Korea’s bold statement that it has nuclear weapons - in order to thwart a possible US strike - puts
Beijing in an uncomfortable position. This is because it exposes China’s ambiguous position on the
primacy of the United Nations when it comes to dealing with the communist country.
As North Korea’s oldest and staunchest ally and a UN Security Council member with veto- yielding power,
China’s stance on Pyongyang’s nuclear threat is crucial to resolving the crisis on the Korean peninsula. But
ever since Pyongyang expelled the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) inspectors in 2003,
Beijing has blocked all efforts to censure North Korea at the UN Security Council.
Instead, Beijing has chosen to host nuclear talks between the North and South Korea, Japan, Russia and the
Untied States. China’s willingness to act as a mediator is considered a marked departure from Beijing’s
lowkey diplomatic profile in the past and regarded as a sign of a new, more mature and pro-active
diplomacy.
Experts have told a congressional committee that options are limited on how to deal with North Korea, but
the United States must work harder with key allies in the six-nation talks to resolve the dispute over North
Korea’s nuclear ambitions.
North Korea’s decision on 10 February 2005 to indefinitely pull out of talks on its nuclear programme
appears, on the surface, to have come out of the blue. According to North Korea, the turnaround was
provoked by recent high-profile speeches by the Bush administration, including Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice’s branding
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Military action is highly unlikely because of the size of North Korea’s conventional army, and the
international consensus that it does have a nuclear weapons Programme, and at least six to eight nuclear
weapons already in its arsenal.
On one stage North Korea probably wanted in return for giving up its nuclear weapons is a little respect,
some peace of mind and a whole lot of money. North Korea watcher Douglas Shin said Pyongyang’s
nuclear boast could be aimed at getting as much as $10 billion in compensation for scrapping its weapons
Programme. North Korea played a trick on US in
1993, when she received heavy aid from us to not suspend NPT in June
1993.
THE F.NI) OF (OLD WAR
545
CHAPTER 14
THE END OF COLD WAR
COLD WAR POLITICS: A REVIEW
The term ”Cold War” signifies bitter relations and confrontation between the former Soviet Union and the
Western countries. It is called cold war because this tension and conflict, did not result in actual war
between these nations. But served as a cause of diplomatic and economic confrontation between these rival
groups of nations. It started in 1945 almost immediately after the end of World War II. The Soviet Union,
Britain and USA were allies in this war, but when Germany was defeated and was divided between the
conquering Powers, mutual suspicion and distrust started growing. One of the basic causes of this distrust
was the conflict of national interests between the Soviet Union, Britain and USA. The Russians wanted to
extend their areas and influence and to gain a stronghold in the whole of Eastern Europe, and they
succeeded in doing so. The Western Powers were suspicious of Russian intentions, but they could do
nothing to stop the penetration of Communist influence in East European countries. Eversince the October
Revolution in Russia in 1917 the aims of Communism had been to convert the world by means of
revolutions. The Communists thought that the single Socialist State in the world was Russia at that time,
and it was surrounded by a hostile capitalist world, and it was their constant fear that the capitalist countries
would try their best to undermine the Soviet Union. Immediately before the start of Second World War in
1939 while negotiations were being carried on in Moscow between the British, the French and the Soviet
Governments for an alliance against Hitler. Stalin began secret talks with Hitler and in August 1939
concluded a pact. Thus the Russian Communists wanted to create a split in the capitalist countries. By
Stalin’s pact with Germany, Poland was partitioned and the Soviet Union acquired a large portion of
Eastern Poland. Gradually, between 1939 and 1941, the Baltic States, and also a portion of Romania, were
annexed by Russia. Finland was attacked and defeated by Soviet Union in 1939. It can be seen from these
developments that even at the beginning of the Grand Alliance between the Soviet Union, Britain and USA
mutual suspicion was there, but the force of circumstances and the growing power of Hitler, compelled
these nations to come together. From
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the Russian point of view there was also cause for suspicion. The Western Allies kept the development of
atom bomb secret from Russia. They helped Russia with vast amount of economic aid. but did not make
much military efforts to help relieve the burden of a full-strength attack on the Russian mainland. When the
Alliance grew it was because of the great threat from Germany and Japan posed to Russia and the Western
Powers alike. During the course of World War II there was great sympathy everywhere for the heroic
struggle of the Soviet Army in resisting the invasion by Germany and in all the dealings there was no
mention of Communism and a common cause was made because of grave circumstances prevailing which
threatened the very existence of Britain and France. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, USA was also
drawn into the conflict. There were the seeds of cold war in the Grand Alliance itself. The difference of
approach between the allies was very evident. As an illustration we can quote the case of Poland. Britain
and France had signed a military alliance with Poland, and when in 1939 Hitler attacked this country, the
war started. The British and the Americans, therefore thought that they had made sacrifice for the cause of
Poland, and this country should have a fair deal and should be granted full sovereignty and independence,
but in 1939 Poland had been partitioned between Germany and Russia. In June 1941, when Hitler invaded
Russia, the Soviet Government requested the British Government to recognise the new frontiers of Soviet
Union by including this portion of Poland in its territory. When in 1941 Russia was hard pressed by the
Germans, it signed an agreement with the Polish Government in exile in London, but two years later when
Soviet Union had withstood Hitler’s attack, these relations cooled off and in January 1944, the Russian
army advanced into Poland. This dispute over Poland dragged on till the end of the War, and by the end of
1945 the American and British Governments had agreed that the Soviet Union should keep that part of
Poland which it had annexed in 1939. This was done and Poland was given a part of German territory. In
1945, in Poland a committee of National Liberation was recognised by the Soviet Union as Provisional
Government of Poland, gradually the country was taken over and ruled by the Communists, and formed a
firm part of the Soviet Eastern Europe.
When Germany was defeated and was divided between the four occupying Powers, namely Russia,
America, Britain and France, British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, suggested that the American and
British Armies should not vacate the areas which had fatten to the share of Russia until a settlement on the
whole question of Europe had been solved, but the American President, Harry Truman, did not agree with
this. Subsequently, the British, the French and the American occupation zones in Germany were merged
into a separate Government called ”The West German Republic” and the Russian occupied zone became
the ”German Democratic
THE END OF C OLD WAR
547
Republic”. The city of Berlin was divided into two portions, and a cold war started.
Between 1945 and 1947 the Grand Alliance between Russia and the Western bloc broke down completely
and from 1947 to 1949 the cold war was intensified. Communist Governments had been formed in
Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania. The same happened in Hungary and Poland, and later on
Czechoslovakia also went over to the Communists. Thus the Soviet Union gained a wide area of influence.
During 1947 to 1949 the Soviet Union, while exacting war damages and reparations from Germany, took
away larger part of industrial machinery from various cities of Eastern Germany that it had occupied. Peace
treaties were signed by all the big Powers with Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, but no peace treaty had
been signed with Germany. In 1946 United Nations had been established and it became the main forum for
cold war debates, where bitter quarrels and disputes took place. The Soviet Union attempted interference in
Iran, Turkey and Greece, but had to withdraw.
In 1948, the Soviet Union attempted to force the Western Armies out of Berlin by erecting a blockade, but
the inhabitants of West Berlin were supplied by air for about a year, and eventually this blockade was
lifted. Meanwhile an important event had occurred in Yugoslavia when in June 1948, this country was
expelled from the Communist community because of differences of approach between Tito and Stalin. The
Western nations created NATO. An economic development was taking place under the Marshall Plan by
which the Americans gave massive economic aid to West European countries. In 1949 the Communists
won the civil war in China under the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung.
When the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, in Indo-China war had broken out between
the French occupying forces and the Viet Minh rebels. In June 1950, war broke out in Korea. This country
had been divided in 1945, after the defeat of Japan, into Soviet and American zones of occupation, and
these zones had become hostile State. When North Korea attacked South Korea, the United States came to
the rescue of the latter country and a full scale war started. This war had an interesting history. In
September 1950 the United States and United Nations Forces (in the absence of Russia in the General
Assembly a resolution had been passed condemning the North Korean attack and pledging help to the
South Koreans) advanced into North Korean territory. In October, however, China intervened and pushed
them back, but in the winter of 1950 and 1951 the United Nations troops regained their lost territory and
went up to the
38th parallel, which is still the boundary between the two Koreas. When the American Commander,
General MacArthur suggested the bombing of
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INTERNATIONAI. AFFAIRS
Manchuria inside the Chinese territory, President Truman did not agree and dismissed the General. This
stalemate in war, when it became apparent that no side could win a decisive victory resulted in a
compromise and a ceasefire was ultimately agreed upon in July, 1953. After that an international
conference was held in Geneva in 1954. but no real peace could be achieved for Korea. The Geneva
Conference of 1954 had another very burning question to tackle, which had not so far been tackled, the
problem of IndoChina where the French colonial power and the communist-led nationalist movement were
struggling hard. The Americans were helping the French, when the French forces were defeated in May
1951, at the fortress Dien Bien Phu, a peace treaty was concluded and Vietnam was also divided into North
and South portions. Laos and Cambodia were recognised as separate States. Later on when the Viet-Cong
guerillas started their activities in South Vietnam, the Americans gradually built up their massive army and
a full scale war started.
In 1953 some signs of a detente began to appear. With Stalin’s death in 1953 a milder tone was induced in
Soviet dealings with the West. The Russians achieved a reconciliation with Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia. In
May 1955 an agreement was concluded on the evacuation and neutralisation of Austria.
The cold war extended to the Middle East in 1955. An anti-Soviet Defence Alliance between Turkey, Iran,
Iraq and Pakistan in collaboration with Britain and USA was formed with the name of Baghdad Pact but it
was later replaced by CENTO. Egypt started having apprehensions about this pact and with the Suez
invasion by British and Israeli forces, it inclined increasingly towards the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union
succeeded in establishing influence in the UAR. The USA did not help the Anglo-French attack in 1956.
Another attempt at reconciliation in 1959 was made when the Russian Prime Minister, Khrushchev
engaged in a Summit Conference with the American President, Eisenhower, and a bigger Summit
Conference had been arranged for 1960, but an important incident upset the whole thing. American
reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Russian territory, and this Summit Conference in May 1960 in
Paris could not be continued.
Another important theatre of cold war was Africa, particularly in the Congo, when Belgium left the Congo
in July 1960, the country was split into factions, and some elements tried to force a unity of these factions
with America supporting one side and Russia the other. In Latin America great tension developed in Cuba
where Fidal Castro installed a Socialist regime in
1959. Because of Castro’s firm Communist convictions, the United States
THF. F.IND OF COLD WAR
549
.’in
started an economic boycott, and in April 1961 an invasion of Cuba was attempted by the emigres, but it
failed. In November 1962 the Soviet government installed nuclear weapons in Cuba, but President
Kennedy made a swift move, and after an exchange of mutual threats the nuclear installations were
withdrawn and the Americans pledged that they would not attack Cuba.
The cold war subsided after 1963. In June 1963, a direct telephone link was established between
Washington and Moscow. A treaty was concluded in Moscow in August 1963 between the Western Powers
and the Russians, banning the carrying out of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Although the conflict in
Vietnam continued and there had been interesting developments within both the rival camps the cold war
lost its intensity. Two important events had emerged which had a decisive influence on EastWest relations.
The starting of a split between China and Russia in recent years weakened Communist unity. This rift had
many causes, the most prominent were the non-acceptance by the Russian Communists of Mao Tse-Tung
as a great leader and interpreter of Communist doctrine, and the nationalistic feelings in China as well as in
Russia. In the Western camp there had been disunity. President de Gaulle of France had increasingly been
adopting an independent line. He refused to follow the American lead in NATO and withdraw his armies
from this defensive alliance. The HQRs of NATO had been shifted from France to Belgium, and on the
question of disarmament, of membership of European Common Market and of Vietnam there were sharp
differences of opinion between America and Britain on the one hand and the French on the other.
Later events showed a resurgence of Cold War between America ’ and Russia in a much more subtle and
all embracing way. In this development France played a notable part. Two events were noteworthy in this
respect, The first was the War in the Middle East in June 1967 between the Arabs and Israel. The second
was monetary crisis faced by United Kingdom and the devaluation of the Pound. Russia did not help the
Arabs during the War and when Israel defeated Arabs and United States was considered ally of Israel, the
Russians stepped in immediately and went in a massive way to build up their influence in the Middle East.
They started arming some of the Arab countries on large scale and took full advantage of the stalemate to
consolidate their position in the Middle East politics.
When Britain announced its decision to wind up its overseas military bases in the early seventies, both
America and Russia felt the need for filling this vacuum. France openly sided with the Arabs. It criticised
the American policy in Vietnam and thus it sought to replace America and Britain in Middle East and
Africa. The policies of Russia and France
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J
seemed to have acquired a common basis, namely that of ousting the American influence from these areas.
The gold crisis facing the American Market was another facet of the same struggle. When the prices of gold
in her open market rose and there was large scale purchasing and a danger of more severe depletion of the
American Gold Reserves, it was decided to free the Dollar of its gold cover. Temporarily the storm was
weathered, but with the growing competition in Cold War it had to recur in one form or another. The
position of Britain became really vulnerable and she had to curtail her expenditure and restrict her role as a
World Power very severely. Indeed, there was ample justification for some of the contemporary
commentators to declare that Great Britain was no longer great. It had lost initiative in world affairs and
became completely pre-occupied in setting her own house in order.
In the Indian Ocean the Cold War assumed another shape. The American and British interests coincided as
far as the containment of Russia was concerned. Both the Powers were arming India as a counter-balancing
course, but Russia was trying to outstrip America and gain control of the Indian Ocean. She undertook to
equip Indian navy in a big way, keeping the strings in her own hands.
From 1969 onwards until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in

1979. Cold War politics was marked by a steady evolution of the process of detente in super-power
relations which was to culminate in broader understanding between the two super-powers towards the
middle of the
1980s. The process began with cultural exchanges, frequent dialogues, trade agreements and co-operative
technological ventures. The change took place on account of a realisation of necessity for a mechanism to
avoid direct confrontation and the preservation of mutual interest as institutionalised in the follow up of the
”stakes theory” doctrine of Henry Kissinger. In 1970, Soviet Union signed a treaty with West Germany and
agreed not to use force against her. This greatly contributed to reduction of tension in Europe. In the
following of this development in November 1972, East Germany and West Germany concluded a treaty not
only recognising each other but also to co-operate in different spheres of co-operation. Brezhnev visited
Washington in 1973 to participate in the super-powers Summit focusing on important issues like co-
operation in agriculture and trade, negotiation agenda on reduction of nuclear weapons. Both agreed not
only to refrain from a nuclear showdown in mutual confrontation but also in a third state. The process of
detente culminated into Helsinki Summit of July, 1975 which marked the peak of understanding between
the two supe-powers. Meanwhile a new dimension had been added to the Cold War in the wake of tense
relations between Soviet Union and China and the emerging
THE END OF COLD WAR
551
”united front of China and America against the Soviet Union. With the formal establishment of diplomatic
relations between China and USA, and the subsequent developments like the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in December 1979, Cold War rivalries between the two super-powers surfaced again. The
January 1979 SALT II agreement was deemed to remain suspended because the US senate did not ratify it
under the pretext of US security concerns due to the presence of a Soviet brigade in Cuba. The Islamic
Revolution in Iran gave fillip to the American plan for Rapid Deployment Force to make up for the loss of
an important ally in the Middle East. USA sought to secure bases in Kenya, Somalia, Oman and even
Pakistan (due to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) to protect its interests in the Indian Ocean and the Persian
Gulf. NATO planned to deploy advanced medium range Perishing II missiles in West Europe from 1983 to
deter the development of Soviet SS-20 missiles. Cold War also intensified in the wake of US-Soviet
extended antagonisms in the Latin American continent specially due to US invasion of Grenada and
assistance to conservatives of El-Salvador Nicaragua and Cuba. This phase of a renewed Cold War was
important from many standpoints, an overview of which provides, in retrospect the true factors operating
behind the transformation process the world was soon going to witness. The Cold war hardened the
ideological orientation of the two super-powers thereby leading to clash of interests to an extent where the
redundancy of Cold War itself could easily be visualised in the wake of collapse of one of the two powers.
The new Cold War gave impetus to other powers and even the satellite states to adopt a somewhat neutral
posture in favour of maintaining their autonomy and keeping the options open: the Cold War also resulted
in great economic burden for the two super-powers, adversely affecting the state of international economy.
It was realisation of these shifting trends largely against the superpowers’ interests which forced the
process of cooling the hot beds. The process was facilitated by Gorbachev’s ”peace offensive” aiming at
many things: internal reforms, deteriorating budget situation due to defensive arrangements,.arms reduction
and Soviet military commitments abroad. At the Geneva Summit of 1985, both leaders emphasized the
desirability of regular and intensified dialogue between the two. The headway was made at Reykjavik in
1986, though to a limited extent because of a Soviet insistence on an overall package including an
agreement on SDI. The subsequent Washington Summit of 1987 proved a threshold in super-powers
agreement on a number of issues. The major success was the understanding on intermediate range missiles.
Later at the 1988 Moscow Summit both exchanged documents on ratification of the IMF. Treaty also
pledging to strive for a Treaty on Strategic Arms Reduction (START.)
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THE END OF COLD WAR
If one attempts to trace the single important breakthrough which facilitated the end of Cold War, it may be
said that it was the Malta Summit of December 1989 at which the two leaders (Gorbachev and President
Bush) made a serious bid to reduce tensions and check growing threats of conflict in various areas for
example, the Middle East. The summit also laid foundations for the political co-operation between the USA
and USSR in shaping the post-Cold War order in Europe. At the Washington Summit
1990, a number of agreements were concluded on nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons, starting to
destroy them in 1992 and complete the process by the year 2000. They also pledged to make START
documents ready for signatures in 1991. The Cold War formally came to an end when the NATO leaders in
their London meeting of 1990 announced the end of Cold War. For practical purposes Cold War had come
to an end with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in December, 1989 symbolising the end of an era marked
by hostilities at bilateral and international level between the two super-powers and their allies across the
globe.
As for the factors contributing to the end of Cold War, the first one was the strategic perceptions of the two
super-powers. As the two attained parity in nuclear capability they realised the futility of continuing the
policy of winning over each other. Another was the factor of economic fatigue being incurred by the
maintenance of bases and fulfilling the commitments to regional allies. Further, both realised aptly that
proxy wars in areas like Middle East, South and South East Asia, Africa and Latin America were futile in
the context of failure of both in incorporating the allies into a strict orbit of influence. Lastly, the end of
Cold War was facilitated by the leadership factor in particular the pacifist and reformist vision of
Gorbachev.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE END OF COLD WAR
The end of Cold War meant the dawn of a new era in which the old concepts that governed the
international world during the Cold War would be rendered obsolete. Some of the major implications of the
end of Cold War may be discussed in the following manner:
The end of bipolarity meant a new configuration of power in the World. While the terms of Cold War
politics were dictated by balance of military power as institutionalised in defence arrangements of NATO
and Warsaw Pact and alignments of regional allies, the post-Cold War era would experience a balance of
power maintained by the economic dynamics of the concept of power. Bipolarity has given way to an
emergent
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553
multipolarity. This new distribution of power is bound to lead to a different set of rivalry mainly along the
ideological or economic lines. One thing is final, the world is fast becoming similar to a chess board where
various powers are balancing one another according to their relative capability with none in position to
dictate. China is a potential rival to US hegemony. Japan and United Germany alongwith EC are the future
economic giants challenging US economic interests. Strategically, Russia still holds enough capability in
terms of arms to deter any US ambition to effect a unipolar world. The third world countries taken together
specially in the context of a reactivated United Nations is a political balance against the illegitimate use of
force. The scenario after the Cold War suggests the obsoleteness of the concept of a strategic balance of
power on one hand and transformation of global politics into a situation which is complex, ambiguous and
uncertain.
In the post-Cold War world, there is a distinct trend towards the use of economic force than the traditional
military force. Consequently, there is a process of ”competitive disarmament” between the major powers as
reflected by the ratification of START treaty by almost all of them. The prominence of economic over the
military power can be gauged from the fact that there is a growing tendency towards the use of
International trade and finance regimes (such as GATT, IMF, World Bank etc.) to realise the interests by
various’ powers.
The end of Cold War has also resulted in regionalism aimed mainly at economic co-operation. Due to
withdrawal of aid packages which was characteristic of Cold War politics, emphasis is being laid on
forging economic ties with regional partners as in case of arrangements like EC, ASEAN, ECO and
SAARC. Even the United States was obliged to seek cooperation with regional countries under NAFTA.
This growing trend towards regionalism may result in a relative loss of sovereignty by the state (already
under threat from the growing role of multinational corporations). This ”Sovereignty-at-Bay Model” may
result in further squeezing of the world thereby facilitating the prospects for a more cohesive international
community. State sovereignty on the other hand is also under threat from subnational movements, which
may lead to a rejuvenation of the pre-1914 era of nationalities providing potential scope for conflict in
future.
There is also a feeling that the end of Cold War has led to an end of history. With ”defeat’ of communism,
capitalism is the only ideology that prevails. The Western countries are therefore, trying to become
incumbents of global leadership under the banner of capitalism and striving to establish a world level
market mechanism. Those against this notion hold that the end of the ideological conflict does not mean
end of the conflict. Huntington has aptly observed that the ideological conflict may be replaced
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I.NTERNATIO.NAL AFFAIRS
by a ”clash of civilisations” primarily along cultural fault lines and the major protagonism will be between
the west and the rest.”
End of Cold War has also resulted in a notable assertion of the periphery to an extent that major powers are
tiying new mechanism to adapt this trend. Industrialisation in the Third World countries has ’brought about
individualistic consciousness and the masses are fast coming out of their previous allegiance patterns. This
can also be observed in the growing trend towards self-determination. This has led to the process of ”self
conscious deconstruction” aimed at search for self identity and this process is heading towards a revival of
primordial identities.
The end of Cold War has led the Third World in a situation where various countries have low levels of
political and economic development. In the wake of this lack of political development (which remained
largely subsided in the Cold War era) the level of governance may lead to disturbances in individual
countries.
’ fr /
DISARMAMENT AM) NIC LEAR PROLIFERATION 555
CHAPTER 15
DISARMAMENT AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

First in the Atlantic Charter and then in the UN Charter, it was provided that a general disarmament should
take place. The UN set up, in
1964, the Atomic Energy Commission for the elimination of nuclear energy for destructive purposes, and in
1947, a Commission for Conventional Armament was set up. The Commissions were separated because it
was thought that chances of nuclear disarmament would lessen if the problem was linked with conventional
disarmament. Some eminent pacifists in the West, including Lord Russell, suggested that before, arms race
took place, some compromise should be reached with Russia for co-operation on the basis of give and take.
The American plan, known as Baruch Plan, which had great merits and showed a considerable generosity,
proposed an International Atomic Development Authority which would monopolise the manufacture of
nuclear energy for useful purposes. But the plan fell through, as Russia felt that such an Authority would be
dominated by the Western Powers. And it was right, because America had proposed that it would be having
an exclusive control of such an International Authority. And Russia in a mood of suspicion, fear and
hostility felt that such a World Authority which gave superiority to the non-Communist world, could not be
acceptable to her. And, moreover, it would cripple its plans, to have an independent nuclear deterrent
without which it could not feel safe at that time. As Russia could not be given enough assurance of security
it proceeded to have its own bomb in 1949. This precipitated a crisis, and then there could not be any hope
for settlement. There was a war-cry in the West, and race for armaments was faster than ever. China had
been added to the Communist Block and now the West could not, under any circumstances, renew its
earlier offers to put nuclear energy under international control. The West settled down to a cold war with a
hardening of anti-Russian feeling and policy. TALKS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
Disarmament negotiations during the 1959s mainly focused on limitation of conventional weapons. Here is
a summary of East-West dialogue over disarmament:
DISARMAMENT AM) M .’CLEAR PROLIFERATION
557
Focus on Conventional weapons; Russia proposed the reduction of armed forces to one-third. Proposal
rejected on the issue of inspection. West wanted inspection should precede disarmament, while Russia
proposed that disarmament should precede inspection. The West also objected to this proportionate cut. It
wanted an absolute number.
1952 In view of the limited progress made, two Commissions were merged into UN Disarmament
Commission.
1953 Hydrogen bomb exploded by Russia. Russia continued with its 1/3 cut proposal and repeated its
demand for unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons. America persisted with its own demand of
international pool of atomic energy.
1954 Disarmament talks in London under Five Powers. Special Committee appointed by Disarmament
Commission of UN but no result.
1955 USSR altered its approach. It agreed that elimination of nuclear arms could not take place until cuts in
other arms had been made. It agreed to Western proposals of absolute numbers but advanced her own
condition of abolition of American foreign bases. The discussion took place in Geneva during meeting of
the Big Four who had assembled to discuss the situation in Indo-China. The discussions broke down on the
vital question of inspections. The Western Bloc asked for a thorough-going international inspection, but
Russia could only agree to have inspection of key points.
Following the 1955 Geneva Conference, the disarmament discussions were side-tracked for a time and then
collapsed. The discussions were carried to UN General Assembly where Gromyko proposed universal and
complete destruction of nuclear arms. The USSR for the first time, suggested reciprocal aerial inspection.
In November 1957, Russia withdrew from the Disarmament Commission, which was then disbanded, but
assured its continued co-operation outside the Commission. In 1958, it proposed:
(i) ending of tests for two or three years.
(ii) non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact.
(in) the creation of atomic-free zone in Central Europe, comprising
East and West Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. (The
Rapacki Plan).
But the West rejected these proposals on the plea that they were not prepared to disregard UN in its efforts
to bring about disarmament. One cannot but conclude that neither side was sincere in pretending to wish
that disarmament should take place. In 1960 again, the Western Powers •
proposed a three stage programme for nuclear and conventional disarmament. Counter proposals by Russia,
asking for an immediate withdrawal from European bases and destruction of nuclear deterrent were not
acceptable. The matter then, after this deadlock over disarmament issue, boiled down to stop further tests.
For a time the negotiations centred round this issue only. It had no sincerity to reduce the defence budget
and to placate those pacifists who were clamouring about the effect of radioactivity. In 1963, thus, partial
test ban treaty was signed. One of the purposes was to restrict the membership of the nuclear club by
ensuring other Powers to join the pact. The power most aimed at was China.
The inception of nuclear weapons in the defence strategy led to serious repercussions on the international
politics: the nuclear capability diffused and diluted the traditional bases of state power. The traditional
factors like population, territory, industrial capacity lost salience in favour of nuclear capability as a major
source of power in the coming years: the nuclear weapons together with the notion that security of the
citizens of a state depends upon the nuclear capability of its adversary (and not on the parent state) gave
rise to what may be termed a relative loss of sovereignty by the traditional nation-state; it also affected the
traditional concept of power and balance of power and defined by Hans Morganthaw; further the inception
of nuclear weapons resulted in a serious setback to the alliance system rampant in various parts of the
world: the nuclear reality also helped preserve the status quo as institutionalized in the Cold War apparatus
and thus acted as the most viable balances preventing war in the subsequent years: the deterrent effect of
nuclear weapons restrained the use of force in settlement of disputes regional as well as international, the
super-powers were forced to proceed cautiously in realising their security interests; paradoxically, the
inception of nuclear weapons gave rise to the desire for maintaining global security and eradication of war.
It was in this background that efforts towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons were initiated.
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
Following the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), emerged many countries aspiring to acquire
the nuclear capability. China refused to sign the PTBT and also exploded their first nuclear device in
1964. China was soon to be followed by India which had initiated its own nuclear programme. Similarly,
countries like South Africa, Israel, Brazil, and even Pakistan started speculating development of indigenous
nuclear programmes as essential part of their security mechanisms. Moreover, the PTBT was used by major
powers only to refrain those countries which were desirous of having nuclear weapons and not those which
had already
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developed ones. USA, USSR, UK and France continued conducting nuclear explosions defying the
provisions of PTBT openly. In this situation a comprehensive treaty encompassing these emergent
dimensions of the nuclear issue was needed. The same realisation initiated a process which was to dominate
the subsequent international political agenda for the decades to follow i.e. non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)
The NPT was signed on July 1, 1968 by 62 nations including three weapon states - United States, Britain
and Soviet Union. The US Senate stalled its ratification after the August 1968 Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia but approved later (in 1970) on request from President Nixon. Neither France nor China,
the other nuclear powers at that time, were parties to the treaty. The Chinese did not participate in the
negotiations even. The French government said that it did not intend to block implementation of the Treaty,
but it held that without specific disarmament proposals, the Treaty did not guarantee adequate security. The
NPT consists of eleven articles, the last of which is purely of administrative nature. The first ten are:
I
Article I:
Article II:
Article in:
Article IV:
Article V:
Article VI:
Article VII:
Nuclear weapon states pledge not to transfer nuclear explosive devices or the means to produce them to
nonweapon states.
Non-weapon states pledge not to receive nuclear explosive devices or the means to produce them. Non-
weapon states agree to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, inspection of nuclear
facilities and accounting of nuclear materials (When have-not states balked at the one-sidedness of this
proposal, the USA and Britain agreed informally to let the IAEA inspect some of their nuclear plants which
they deemed unrelated to National Security).
Materials related to the production of nuclear energy are excluded from the ban on transfer of explosive
related materials.
”Peaceful nuclear explosions” are permitted and their potential benefits will be made available on a
nondiscriminatory basis.
The signatories pledge to work towards universal nuclear disarmament.
Regional associations have the right to declare their regions nuclear free zones.
Article VIII: Any party may propose an amendment to the treaty. If onethird of the treaty’s signatories
request it. a conference must be called for the purpose of considering the amendment. The treaty will be
amended if a majority which must include the weapon states, agree. Treaty review conferences will be held
every 5 years.
Article IX: Any state which accepts the IAEA safeguards may become a member (since 1970 membership
grew from 62 to 140).
Article X: An extension conference will be held 25 years after the treaty has taken force to determine
whether the treaty should be renewed periodically or indefinitely. Any state may withdraw from the treaty
three months after it has advised the other parties and the UN Security Council that it intends to do so.
The NPT produced mixed results and reactions while some considered it a landmark which could prove to
be the turning point in human history, others looked on the treaty as an attempt on the part of the USA and
the USSR to establish their nuclear hegemony over the entire world. The Chinese government denounced it
as ”a big plot and a big fraud of the US imperialists and the Soviet revisionists”. They alleged that through
this treaty, the USA and the USSR wished to deprive the nonnuclear nations under Soviet-US nuclear threat
at the cost of their right to develop nuclear weapons. As for the success of NPT, it was clear and as later
developments proved that due to its discriminatory nature, slow progress in the bilateral disarmament
negotiations between the USA and USSR, and absence of a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests the treaty
would be doomed to failure in resolving the highly sensitive and complex issue of nuclear disarmament.
The same spirit prevailed over the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) held in Vienna in 1970. The
talks were conducted in an atmosphere of mutual distrust. The US Govt. supported the idea of limiting
strategic arms and on the other hand she was going ahead with her plans for deployment of an anti-ballistic-
missile system (ABM) and of the Multiwar head missile system known as MIRV. At the same time the
Soviets were building new nuclear submarines, huge new rockets and their own ABM. Neither the US nor
the USSR had any proposal to present at the meeting. In this situation, not even a limited agreement was
expected.
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, NPT AND PAKISTAN
Pakistan from its very inception has been badly lacking in energy resources. To meet this requirement
Pakistan had to launch on a nuclear programme and so nuclear technology was merely a tool for economic
development to meet energy needs and enhance agricultural potential. This
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561
perspective is valid even today except that Pakistan cannot allow its security to be compromised by a
powerful neighbour, equipped with nuclear weapons and with whom we have had a history of highly
strained relations resulting in three wars and threat of a conflict is predicted periodically as long as such
core issues like Kashmir are not amicably settled and resolved. Hence, the arms race between India and
Pakistan poses perhaps the most probable prospect for future use of weapons of mass destruction including
nuclear weapons unless a total stop is put on their programmes. India is said to have adequate nuclear
material for about 60 and Pakistan six atomic bombs.
Pakistan acquired its first research reactor in 1965. A second small reactor was obtained from China in
1988 with the help of Canada. Pakistan commissioned a 125 MW power reactor at Karachi in 1972.
Pakistan’s nuclear programme received importance after 1972 and started expanding its research facilities
at PINSTECH. However, India’s nuclear explosion of 1974 changed the international climate about nuclear
technology and forced Pakistan to adopt nuclear option to face the Indian threat Pakistan embarked upon
local production of nuclear fuel in 1980. Simultaneously, she undertook a uranium enrichment project in
Kahuta in mid-80’s and in 1984 succeeded in enriching uranium and developing basic capability in nuclear
fuel cycle. Now it produces its own uranium, fabricates natural uranium fuel, operates uranium enrichment
plant using enriched uranium and has constructed facilities for R & D in various fields at PINSTECH. In
November 1991, it also completed a 10 MW research reactor.
There is a growing realisation by the world community that there should be strict controls over all types of
weapons of mass destruction. The end of the cold war has improved the chances of meaningful
disarmament.
Pakistan’s proposal that both India and Pakistan sign the NPT and that South Asia be declared a nuclear-
weapon free zone (NWFZ) has not worked so far. Although Pakistan has always advocated halt to nuclear
weapons race yet there are certain security reasons that do not let Pakistan sign NPT.
In regard to India-Pakistan relationship the nuclear factor has infact tended to act as a stability factor, in
that Pakistan does not seem driven by the same urgency in establishing a conventional arms equation with
India, nor does it suffer from alarming insecurity in the face of India’s conventional military advantage.
It is true that nuclear weapons do play a strategic role in policymaking ’process. India cannot roll-back its
programme because of her strategic ambitions. Similarly, for Pakistan nuclear option stands in her strategic
interest because;
(i) Pakistan cannot match India’s geopolitical superiority,
especially in military strategic terms; (ii) Since deterrence is working implicitly in South Asia, it is
widely believed that a war is avoided because both sides
possess nuclear capability.
Thus both India and Pakistan consider that a nuclear option is necessary and inevitable for them and are
reluctant to sign the NPT. It is, however, not in strategic interest of both to have nuclear bombs considering
the futile nuclear arms race between US and former Soviet Union, which ultimately led to the disintegration
of the latter and economic decline of the former. Even in the case of Pakistan and India this nuclear race is
depriving them of their huge resources and causing unforgivable neglect of their poor masses.
US and Russia are hell bent in support of NPT and consider it as the only instrument to curb and curtail
nuclear spread while India and Pakistan are practically sworn against NPT. To persuade more nations to
join NPT, Russia has recently pledged not to launch first strike nuclear attack against a signatory of NPT
and US will not use weapons against such a country.
There are, however doubts to the sincerity behind the resolution NPT as the big powers are not going to
touch their own arsenals and may continue to discriminate between nations in the light or their own
interests like it is happening in the case of Israel and India where dual standards are being maintained.
Moreover the fact remains that contrary to the spirit of NPT and the initial commitment to review it, the
”nuclear haves” are not keen for any review - they only want the ”status quo”, which works to their
advantage.
To be honest NPT is not a criterion for establishing a safer world. It is infact a mechanism that the nuclear
powers use at their own discretions e.g., Washington’s ”innocent” neglect of Israel’s 200 strong stockpile
compared to its relentless and vicious efforts to prevent transfer of any nuclear technology to Iran. Clearly
on a moral and logical plane, the NPT has no standing. It is no more than a mechanism that US and its
allies want in hand to contain the nuclear threat and to retain their clear hegemony. Only with a diminished
sense of insecurity among states will nuclear threat recede from
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our world - it is with us as long as the Bosnians and Kashmiris stay with us.
Pakistan, therefore, will be well advised to stick to stand as long as India does not sign the NPT in earnest
spirit. However India and Pakistan can ill-afford the luxury of a nuclear race. Efforts should be made for a
capping of nuclear programmes of both with some kind of verifiable standoffs instead of demanding a
unilateral roll-back or signing of NPT. Both must learn the lessons of the nuclear age. Nuclear secrecy does
not enhance security. No doubt India and Pakistan have moved in the right direction by signing an
agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear installations. But much more needs to be done to defuse the
nuclear tension. Nuclear collision can be averted in South Asia only and only if element of restraint is
enforced now. A freeze would put both countries on the path of nuclear non-proliferation without
compromising core security interests.
People of the two countries have lived through a nightmare of fear, wars, deprivation and oppression in the
58 odd years of their existence and deserve a better future that holds a true promise of a new deal. Both the
countries have had enough of hatred, revenge, ill-will without gaining anything much. They should scrap
the bombs and reassess their requirements to achieve an economic breakthrough to improve the lot of their
highly neglected masses instead of aiming to destroy each other.
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT)
After three years incessant efforts, five declared nuclear powers on September 24, 1996 signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the United Nations Headquarters, signalling a political
commitment to stop nuclear test explosions forever. The CTBT caps more than 2,000 nuclear tests carried
out since World War II, and will constrain the development of advanced new weapons.
Pakistan which voted for the test ban treaty resolution did not sign it and said that it will only sign if India
does so. India has vowed not to sign it until a comprehensive time-bound disarmament plan was
announced.
The CTBT provides for the following:
i) Each state party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear
explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction and
control.
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ii) Each state party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way
participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion.
The Treaty is designed to bring to an end a series of 2,046 tests since 1945. The United States has by far
carried out the most tests ~ 1,030 in all, including the very first in New Mexico on July 16, 1945. The
former Soviet Union did 715 tests, France 210, China 45 and Britain 45. The last French test was in the
South Pacific. With its last test, China promised that it would sign a moratorium on testing together with
the other acknowledged nuclear powers. India carried out one test blast in 1974 for what it called peaceful
purposes. It is not considered a nuclear power, however, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), only countries which did tests prior to January 1, 1967, can lay claim to such title.
The Treaty will only come into force if signed and ratified by 44 named countries possessing a nuclear
reactor, including nuclear threshold states India, Israel and Pakistan. Although Israel has signed the Treaty,
India was adamant that it will not do so, and Pakistan has followed suit, fearing Indian nuclear ambitions.
CTBT AND SOUTH ASIA
Despite the fact that each side seems to appreciate the probable cost of forging ahead with an overt nuclear
stance neither feels secure enough to reverse its nuclear course. For India and Pakistan, as for all nuclear
powers, maintaining the nuclear option is the ultimate insurance policy in an unpredictable international
system. India’s substantially superior conventional military forces would still give Pakistan a reason to
maintain nuclear deterrent even without an Indian nuclear threat.
For most analysis, in the United States the three Indo-Pak wars, the festering Kashmir conflict and India’s
and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capabilities are a recipe for nuclear disaster in the sub-continent. Two
aspects of this view stand out. One suggests that the insurgency in Kashmir may escalate to a direct
conventional war between India and Pakistan and Islamabad may then use nuclear weapons to forestall
another national humiliation like the Bangladesh war of 1971. The second holds that the purposive use of
nuclear weapons is unlikely, but warns that the grinding Kashmir struggle may eventually lead to an
inadvertent nuclear war as Indian and Pakistani leaders fall prey to their own worst case perceptions and the
notoriously unreliable estimates of their intelligence agencies.
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A dissecting minority of American analysts believe that Indian and Pakistan nuclear weapons capabilities
stabilise South Asia by making war less likely. India and Pakistan fought three wars in the first 24 years of
independence, but have not fought in the last.
Nuclear-capable India and Pakistan have weathered several serious crises during the last decade, including
one over Kashmir in which it appears that both sides were deterred from aggression by the prospects of a
military encounter escalating to a nuclear level.
The least likely scenario for South Asia’s strategic future is a major premeditated attack by one side. At the
nuclear level, the opportunity for an India preventive strike against Pakistan nuclear facilities has long
passed. Pre-emptive nuclear strikes are also extremely unlikely, since neither side is confident that it could
destroy all the opponent’s nuclear potential in a first strike: failing to do so would mean that heavily-
populated areas on the attackers own territory would be subject to nuclear devastations. This ”first strike
uncertainty” bolsters mutual deterrence.
At the conventional level, a full-blown invasion across established borders is also difficult to imagine. It
would be almost impossible for Pakistan to inflict total defeat in a conventional war on India. While India
could possibly prevail over Pakistan in a ground war, it would, in the process, have to worry about the
possibility of a last resort Pakistani nuclear reprisal. No political objective would be worth the risk of such
an outcome.
Balanced against incentives to lash out at Pakistan is the disincentive of Islamabad’s nuclear muscle. This
is best illustrated by comparing New Delhi’s restraint since 1990 with its more aggressive behaviour in
South Asia’s pre-nuclear era. In 1965, Pakistani support for rebellion in the Indian-held Kashmir was met
by Indian counter-attacks aimed at insurgent supply and assembly points in Pakistani part of the disputed
territory as well as across international frontiers. New Delhi has refrained from a similar strategy in the
1990s, at least in part because any major military engagement could end in nuclear conflagration.
A related danger often cited is an inadvertent nuclear war, implying that in a future crisis, India and
Pakistan might stumble in a war that neither side actually wants. From this perspective miscalculation of
the enemy’s designs by one side or both sides could possibly end in a shooting war. As the fighting
progresses, both sides might ready nuclear weapons for use as a last resort. At this point, a nuclear war
might become a distinct possibility. Fortunately, this logic does not stand up to a close examination. None
of the Indo-Pak wars began inadvertently. It is most unlikely that two
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nuclear powers would step into an inadvertent war, given the additional margin of caution induced by
nuclear weapons. Those who hold this view, say that in devising policies to help contain South Asia’s
nuclear dangers, the US will do well to remember the following factors:
(1) India and Pakistan are not nuclear outlaws. As sovereign states they have the right to pursue whatever
nuclear and conventional capabilities they believe are necessary to ensure their security. Islamabad and
New Delhi are also entitled not to sign treaties that they view detrimental to their national interest. Israel
deploys nuclear weapons and is not a NPT signatory, yet barely a word of protest is heard from
Washington.
(2) India and Pakistan derive deterrent security from their nuclear capabilities and are as unlikely to
give them up as were Washington and Moscow at the height of the Cold War. There is an unfortunate
tendency in US foreign policy formulating circles to equate the end of Cold War with a generally more
benign international order. US officials should remember that the Cold War in South Asia is as intense as
ever and that New Delhi and Islamabad cannot base their national security decisions on an intangible
”global” trend that may actually have made their own defence problems more challenging, not less.
(3) US policy-makers should recognise and help to build on the arms control measures that have already
evolved between India and Pakistan, some formally but most tacitly. The list is impressive:
a) an agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear installations;
b) no deployment of operational nuclear weapons;
c) no deployment of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles;
d) no transfer of nuclear weapon technology to other states; and,
e) so far as is known, no development of strategies that make it easier to conceive of using nuclear
weapons.
In terms of specific policies, the holders of this view stress that Washington’s overall goal should be to help
stabilise the sub-continent’s nuclear deterrence and preventing nuclear accidents and unauthorised nuclear
use. As a crisis stability measure, US officials should continue to press India and Pakistan not to deploy
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.
The holders of this view advocate that both Islamabad and New Delhi should agree to a progressive
moratorium on missile deployment. Both sides should agree to an initial delay of perhaps three years,
thereby
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formalising policies they have already chosen themselves. Missile testing might still be allowed in this
period. The United States could help to verify a missile moratorium, thereby easing each side’s fear of
being surprised by the other. Assuming that both countries find this arrangement reassuring, it could then
be extended perhaps with an additional agreement not to test the missiles. Eventually, Indian and Pakistani
officials might conclude that their nuclear arms competition is more stable in the absence of ballistic
missile deployments.
Islamabad and New Delhi should also be encouraged to continue their apparent practice of not maintaining
assembled nuclear weapons. This tacit threshold is a superb crisis stability and nuclear security measure.
Complicating the issue of nuclear weapons in South Asia is a thicket of American non-proliferation laws
that affect Pakistan but not India. Pakistanis do rightly feel aggrieved for several reasons. They believe they
were ”used”. From their perspective, Washington kept the aid flowing as long as Pakistan was fighting a
good war in Afghanistan, but closed the tap after the Red Army retreated across the Amu Darya in 1989.
In view of the overwhelming numerical and qualitative superiority of the Indian armed forces and their
weaponry (even if India) tries to a rollback of its nuclear programme), Pakistan’s security and integrity
demand that India reduces the strength of its armed forces to a size which would not be a source of threat to
Pakistan. In the absence of such an agreement, and India’s refusal to sign the CTBT, Pakistan’s security
requirement demand that Pakistan should not accede to this treaty.
SALT
Following a few insignificant arms limitation talks in Helsinki and Vienna during 1971-72 an important
development took place during Nixon’s visit to the USSR in May 1972. On May 26 Nixon and Brezhnev
signed two historic agreements in the Kremlin - a treaty on the limitation by the two countries of their anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) systems, and a fiveyear agreement ”freezing” the number of offensive missiles
possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union. It would be correct to state that these two agreements
were the fruit of the long and arduous struggle, covering a period of 25 years strategic arms limitations
talks (SALT). In itself SALT achieved little, but they fostered an understanding between the two nuclear
giants which, eventually, led to the above-mentioned agreements. These two agreements also signify a
profound change of concepts in the field of arms control. The accent was now on arms ”limitation”,
freezing of the present strategic arms position, or the
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institutionalisation of a status quo in thermonuclear weapons. The concept of ”Disarmament”, or reduction

in the arsenals, had somewhere along the way, since 1945, become an anachronism.
Realising their importance, the USSR and USA agreed to the resumption of the SALT which now entered
their second phase. In June
1973 Brezhnev paid a return call to President Nixon. As a result of the general understanding achieved at
SALT, the two leaders on June 22 signed an agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. About this
agreement Brezhnev said, ”one can hardly over-estimate its significance for the peaceful life of our people
and for the future of all mankind.” Another agreement of an infrastructural nature, on the Basic Principles
of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was also signed on 21 June.
Needless to say, it was a solemn commitment at the highest political level.
In June-July of 1974 Nixon made his second trip to Moscow. Once again more steps were taken towards
arms limitation. On July 3, a SovietAmerican treaty was signed on the limitation of underground
nuclearweapon tests together with all attached protocol forming part of the treaty. Also signed was a
protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (signed in 1972). Kissinger and
Gromyko also signed, two technical protocols which related to the dismantling and replacement of missiles
and which remained classified.
SALT II
Several years of hectic and prolonged deliberations between the Soviet Union and America at last resulted
in the signing of the second treaty on the limitation of the strategic weapons which was popularly termed as
SALT II. It was signed on 18th June, 1979, by President Leonid Brezhnev and President Garter.
There were several factors which were responsible for the delay in signing the agreement, American
insistence on developing the neutron bomb and cruise missiles and the linking of talks with the human
rights, caused annoyance to the Soviet Union. Similarly Russian involvement in the African Continent
especially in the Somalian-Ethiopian crisis complicated the progress on Salt II.
Main provisions of the Salt II were as follows:
(a) Both sides agreed to limit intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles,
heavy bombers and air-tosurface ballistic missiles, to 2400.
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(b) Each side agreed to limit to 1320, the number of launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs.
(c) No additional ICBM launchers were to be constructed.
(d) Multiple war-headed reentry vehicles were not to have more than
10 war-heads.
(e) USA and USSR were to conclude another treaty before 1985 to further limit the stockpile of nuclear
weapons.
The treaty was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. However, when it was presented
before the full committee of Senate the discussion was deferred on the request of President Carter, who
viewed that the Soviet Union by interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan had violated the spirit of
the agreement.
THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT
Super-power rivalry in the wake of a renewed Cold War in early

1990s failed to diffuse the tensions over the nuclear disarmament issue. However in the mid-1980s with
Gorbachev in power, talks on strategic arms reduction were started. The two leaders met in the Iceland
capital of Reykjavik in the midst of high expectations of a breakthrough.
TOWARDS START TREATIES
Soviet-American talks on limitation and termination of nuclear weapons tests resumed in Geneva on 26th
June, 1989. The third round of talks was completed in December 1988, but the talks were discontinued in
connection with the change of the US administration due to elections. Agreement on their resumption was
reached when Foreign Ministers of the USSR and US met in Moscow in May 1989.
The START talks were resumed in Geneva after about eight months amidst cautious hopes. But the
experience within a week dashed hopes of an early breakthrough. The two sides were still apart and still
bogged down in their interminable argument basically over definition and categorisation and verification
procedures. It was as though a new element had entered in the situation. It really went to prove that
business was as usual. According to a message of President Bush to the Congress if the Congress would
approve of the funding of additional relatively new soil mobile MX and road mobile Midget man missiles,
he would change the American position in the Geneva talks regarding these rockets. It would be recalled
that it had been an old American stance that given other requirements, they would agree to ban these
missiles altogether. Now if the Americans were to change this position and insist on retaining this category
of missiles the whole format of Geneva negotiations would be thrown into confusion. The Russians were
sure to see this as an ill omen and extremely suspicions of American intentions.
Favourable background to break the impasse was provided by the December 1989 Malta Summit between
the two leaders; President Bush and Mikhael Gorbachev. The focus was on the future shape of Europe in
the context of conventional disarmament and withdrawal of medium range nuclear war heads. This
understanding yielded fruit at the Washington Summit 1990 when the two sides agreed on a number of
agreements on nuclear, chemical and conventional arms. The two sides agreed to destroy thousands of tons
of chemical weapons and reduce their stockpiles. They agreed to start destruction of these weapons in 1992
and finish the process by the year 2000. They also agreed to cease further production of these weapons with
immediate effect. Another important outcome of this summit was that the two leaders agreed on a set of
principles regarding the strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to be ready for signing by the end of the
year. The two leaders also reiterated their commitment to complete the negotiations on the conventional
forces reduction in Europe.
START (STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY)
On July 3, 1991 at Moscow Summit, the START treaty was signed by the two leaders. It marked the
culmination point of the arduous and nerve-shattering diplomatic negotiations started in 1982. The treaty
was concluded to remain in effect for 15 years and (renewable after every 5 years). It envisaged cuts in the
Soviet and American warheads total from
22,000 to 15,000. START II envisaged the combined ceiling down to 7,000 over the period of one decade.
The treaty confirmed US nuclear strategic superiority because it effectively shares Moscow of its first strike
capability. This balance was further confirmed by the disintegration of Soviet Union which meant nuclear
arsenals of the defunct Soviet Union were under control of various breakaway republics. After the
establishment of C.I.S. on December 9, 1991, the Bush administration launched a vigorous campaign to
convince independent states of Ukraine and Kazakhstan to become signatories to the NPT. The republics of
Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine concluded the Alma Ata accord on December 21, 1991 vowing to
keep the Soviet strategic arsenals under collective control command and accept US experts to move nuclear
weapons from outlying republics to Russia for carrying out already announced plans for the ^destruction of
weapons. In the follow up of these developments on May 23, 1992 the USA, Russia and the republics of
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed a protocol in which they committed themselves to nuclear arms
reduction in accordance with the broad provisions of the strategic arms reduction
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agreement concluded between President Bush and Gorbachev in 1991. At the June 1992 Summit Yeltsin
and Bush agreed in broad terms to the provisions of a follow-on START II treaty envisaging reduction of
strategic war-heads to 3500 over a decade in the first stage. The land based MIRVs and ICBMs will be
eliminated by the year 2003 and the SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles) will be reduced to
1750. As agreed the START II ratification process was to happen in 1993.
By 1998, START II faced serious ratification difficulties in Russia; although America has ratified it in
1996. Russian authorities claimed that the treaty was biased, because it banned MIRVS and ICBMS on
which Russia relies heavily. They demanded that it should be linked to NATO’s eastward expansion and
American developments of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System. Arms Control advocates in both
Russia and the U.S proposed immediately, beginning negotiations for START in, which could alleviate
these concerns and provide for even deeper cuts. The debate over START II shows that just as during the
Cold War, strategic arms control remains an inherently political process, and progress is difficult to achieve
when it is linked to other political issues.
Besides, Russian and the U.S., France, Britain, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea and a good
number of other countries have been well into the armament business for a long time. Arms trade has been
increasing substantially. In 1995, the U.S. exported $22 billion worth of arms, accounting for 57 percent of
the world’s total arms sale. Just after signing of the CTBT by more than 175 countries in May 1995, France
and China conducted nuclear tests. India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998 have strengthened the
myth of disarmament. It is said that even if START II had been ratified, at least 17,000 nuclear weapons
would still remain in
2007. Nevertheless, though many disappointments and detours, the SALT and START negotiations finally
achieved significant agreements on the reduction of the two largest nuclear power’s strategic arsenals, and
further reduction may be possible as the Cold War fades into distant memory.
The future of disarmament agreements is bleak in face of the increasing military expenditure after the 09/11
terrorist attacks. The U.S. military expenditure which had been brought down during the Clinton years, has
risen exponentially upto $400 million in the wake of 09/11 attacks. Other Western powers are really
concerned about the increasing American unilateralism and Bush’s new doctrine of ”preemption”.
American rejection of the ABM Treaty and embarking upon new concepts like Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD), can certainly create hurdles in the way of the disarmament process.
DISARMAMENT AM) NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
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Recently in May 2002, President Bush and President Putin concluded a deal, which aims at the deepest cuts
in atomic arsenals of the nuclear age. Even long before this deal, Bush and Putin had agreed in principle to
reduce their arsenals to 1700 - 2200 warheads from the 6000 allowed under START I treaty. President
Bush said, while announcing the deal on May 13, 2002, that ”the new era will be a period of enhanced
mutual security”. However, Moscow is still worried that the U.S has not agreed to permanently scrap all the
warheads from active service under the deal, and instead may shelve some for later use.
THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA
The cherished American objective of achieving nuclear nonproliferation in South faces an equally
formidable obstacle: the determined Indian goal of becoming a dominant fearsome world power laced with
the most Modern atomic weapons. Understandably, Pakistan, another player in the field which has borne
the brunt of lifelong hostility of its eastern neighbour, cannot be expected to renounce die nuclear option
without a corresponding move by New Delhi.
The development of nuclear capability by India as its production and acquisition of massive quantities of
conventional weapons represents it’s over-arching ambition to exercise hegemony over the countries in its
neighbourhood. It wants to be the sole arbiter of their fate. An evidence to that effect was provided by the
abortive coup d’etat in the archipelago of Maldives in the second half of the 1980s in which India was able
to convince the United States to keep away from the scene and let it manage the show.
Quite interestingly, the coup had, in the first instance, been engineered by New Delhi by dispatching
Tamils from Sri Lanka in the garb of rebels, and ’put down’ by its own forces which landed there quickly
after the ’rebels’ launched the attack. The whole maneuver was conceived to bring the tiny, though
strategically situated, island state under its thumb. The disclosure of an Indian army colonel that his
contingent had been put at the ready for a lift-off to an unidentified place even before the coup had been
attempted laid bare India’s ulterior motives.
The Indian troops remained there for several months to ’secure peace and stability’. According to many
influential Moldavians the Indian High Commissioner assumed the role of an arrogant viceroy during the
post-coup-attempt period, issuing directives to the local officials in matters relating to security and even the
conduct of government business.
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The roll-call of the Indian arrogant and aggressive behaviour towards neighbouring states would need
volumes to fill. Even while posing as a champion of non-alignment, in the heyday of the movement, New
Delhi continued to show its teeth to the smaller neighbours on the strength of large-scale sophisticated
military equipment obtained from the erstwhile Soviet Union with whom it had entered into a treaty of
peace, friendship and co-operation. The treaty constituted a crucial factor in the break-up of Pakistan in
1971.
The new found pride gained through the acquisition of the nuclear muscle duped die Indians into throwing
all caution to the wind by characterizing China as their enemy number one and threatening Pakistan with an
invasion of Azad Kashmir on account of the unrelated issue of purely indigenous freedom struggle the
Kashmiris are fighting against the occupying forces. New Delhi, it is apparent, preferred to rekindle the old
fire of antagonism against Beijing, which was being smothered by the gradual growth of bilateral relations
as a result of a long process of negotiations between the two parties. As for Pakistan, a relatively smaller
fry, it did not care two hoots about its likely reaction. India was confident it could deal with Pakistan quite
easily.
For the sake of its survival, Islamabad was left with no choice but to ignore the entreaties of friends and the
threats of sanctions by those who hold the purse strings of international financing institutions whose
assistance it so badly needed. It took the dreaded nuclear road to Chaghi, following the Indian lead as it has
always been forced to do in the case of arms build-up.
It is quite ironic that in becoming a mighty military power, conventional as well as nuclear, New Delhi
received no mean support from the super-powers of the Cold War days and several other Western states.
By raising the bogey of Chinese threat it cleverly exploited Moscow’s estrangement with Beijing on
ideological grounds and the US policy of containing China to its advantage. While Moscow became its
principal source of the top-of-the-drawer military hardware supplied on most favourable terms, Washington
and its allies chipped in with help in developing atomic capability.
Incomprehensibly, the United States which has emerged as the apostle of non-proliferation rewarded India
after it had exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and with a blatantly contradictory approach punished
Pakistan for expressing its determination to match its rival across the eastern frontier at any cost in the
words of former Pakistani Prime Minister ZA Bhutto ’even if we have to eat grass’.
While putting pressure on France to renege on its commitment to build a reprocessing plant, Washington at
the same time compelled it to supply heavy water to India since under the law the United States could not
dispatch heavy water to a country which has conducted an atomic test.
It seems no one but the Americans were naive enough to be taken in by Indian Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi’s stratagem of calling the test as a ’peaceful explosion’ and code-naming it, outrageous profanity,
”Buddha is Smiling’.
The policies of world powers to build India into a strong military giant with nuclear fangs can only be
explained by the assumption that they believed that it could serve as a bulwark against Chinese
expansionism. They failed to realize that Beijing was firmly committed to the principle of peaceful co-
existence so that it could uninterruptedly pursue its chosen course of economic development. Their failure
to judge the real motive of India under the cover of Sino-phobia does not also speak well for their
intelligence networks.
As India took full advantage of the super-powers antipathy for China and developed its nuclear arsenal
without so much as provoking objections from them, Pakistan became the target of all possible restrictions.
Country specific Pressler, Glenn and Symington amendments were passed by the American Congress
blocking all routes of nuclear technology and material to Pakistan. Self-reliance was the only bastion of its
support.
CTBT - TO SIGN OR NOT TO SIGN IS PAKISTAN’S DILEMMA
PAKISTAN is under growing pressures to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) and
consequently the government has decided to involve the National Security Council (NSC) to deliberate on
this sensitive issue and take a decision in congruence with the security imperatives of Pakistan. This
undoubtedly is a right step to resolve a contentious issue which has triggered varied responses from
intellectuals, politicians,security experts and other opinion makers in Pakistan.
Differences of opinion are a very positive sign that our people are intrinsically concerned about the issue of
our nuclear status which is a matter of great psychological relief to them, particularly when living under the
constant threat of India’s posture of intimidation.
The acquisition of a nuclear status by Pakistan also has an added dimension to it, as Pakistan is the only
country within the orbit of the Islamic world to have the distinction to achieve this capability - a leap
forward in determining a stable security paradigm in the region which has
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now been disturbed as a result of India’s avowed ambition to be in the company of prestigious members of
the nuclear club hitherto limited only to five nuclear nations.
Before going into the question whether Pakistan should sign the CTBT or not it is essential to recall the
decision made in Pakistan in 1989 by the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), having a direct bearing on
the CTBT issue. In fact, Pakistan took a very bold initiative to evolve its policy of nuclear restraint based
on following salient points:
Pakistan will adhere to the policy of restraint (which is now termed as Nuclear Restraint Regime). This idea
was. not only theoretically adhered to but was operationalized in Pakistan’s nuclear policy.
• The level of enrichment was brought down from 95% and above to
5% and below - the commercial grade uranium needed for our nuclear power reactors. The logic was plain
and simple because Pakistan had achieved the objectives of its nuclear programme, hence there was no
need to waste resources and effort to stockpile weapon grade fissile material.
• By adhering to the policy of nuclear restraint there was no compromise on Pakistan’s nuclear
deterrence capability because the work on all other phases of the programme had continued
uninterrupted and there was no lowering of the guard whatsoever. It was neither ’frozen’ nor ’capped.’
This policy was so clearly vindicated in May 1998, when Pakistan responded befittingly to Indian
explosions at Pokhran.
• Pakistan, out of its own free will, was to demonstrate that the principle of non-proliferation was being
adhered to, as it was a restraint based on good judgment.
• The level of a credible minimum non-weaponized deterrence was to be maintained.
There was nothing intrinsically wrong with the CTBT as it is friendly to the values that serve humanity;
provided no double standard is adhered to. Nothing could be more ironic than the fact that a country like
the US, the great advocate of the CTBT, finds it extremely difficult to get the treaty ratified by its own
Senate. Notwithstanding the fact that the US has lost a moral ground to champion this cause, Pakistan does
feel that the CTBT is a noble objective to be pursued by the nuclear powers. We, therefore, advocated that
Pakistan could sign
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the CTBT, keeping in mind the following aspects of the CTBT charter:
The CTBT is not targeted to the roll-back of our nuclear programme.
• It does not entitle foreign agencies to inspect our nuclear installations, and our freedom in this respect
would be maintained.
The inspection teams will inspect only that site, which would be earmarked for nuclear tests and that too
not without our concurrence.
Subject to these conditions, Pakistan could take the initiative and sign the treaty irrespective of whether
India signed it or not. However, since May 1998, the ground realities have changed, adding new
dimensions to the issue. Had India remained content with nuclear explosions and demonstration of its
nuclear capability, Pakistan had nothing to fear about.
But the situation drastically changed after India’s display of nuclear arrogance by propounding an
excessively ambitious Nuclear Doctrine, which, if implemented, would be nightmarish for the region and
even beyond. In the event India is left free to geometrically multiply its nuclear capability, Pakistan’s
security concerns would be greatly accentuated.
In the light of India’s grandiose nuclear design, Pakistan of necessity has to reorient its policy of nuclear
restraint towards the CTBT. It is on this account that we very strongly felt that signing of the CTBT at this
stage would not be in the supreme national interest of Pakistan. What is intended to convey is that signing
is not to be linked to India doing the same but the idea is to correctly ascertain the real contours of its
nuclear doctrine which have not yet been spelt out. It would be in Pakistan’s interest, therefore, first to
examine if objectively and then determine the right course. There is absolutely no hurry at this stage to say
”yes” or ”no” to the treaty.
There cannot be an absolutist approach for any viable deterrence and, therefore, it is essential to adjust it to
India’s overall nuclear posture. As in the conventional field, a very well calculated operational balance
based on the existing correlation of forces has to been maintained, a similar approach would be required in
the case of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to ensure a correct level of nuclear balance.
It may be pertinent to mention that India’s nuclear plans are aggressively overbearing not only for Pakistan
but also for the region. It is thus not without significance that a mind-boggling budget of about four billion
dollars would be spent on Nuclear Command and Control System
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alone. India will also be spending some $15 billion on the purchase of hightech weapon and equipment
from Russia during the next ten years, while another $10 billion will be spent to upgrade and modernize
their armed forces. These are ominous developments, which, combined with their nuclear capability, would
create very serious security problems for Pakistan which cannot be ignored.
There is a pathological compulsiveness on the part of India to suppress the Kashmir uprising through
ruthless state terrorism, breaking all records of human rights violations. The gravest genocide is a matter
which cannot be ignored in assessing the overall threat scenario. Signing the CTBT at this juncture
therefore would convey a wrong message to the freedom fighters and weaken our resolve on Kashmir,
demanding a solution with third party mediation. There is also a calculated move to malign Pakistan and
label it a ’terrorist state’.
After the US Senate’s rejection, the CTBT is seemingly a dead horse, why whip it now? After the elections
in the US who knows, the new president (likely Republican) may be instrumental in the CTBT’s formal
burial. Why must Pakistan be targeted to sign it at this stage ? Doubts and apprehensions do arise. What is
good for the gander, must also be good for the goose.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS - THE FEAR FACTOR
If the raising of decibels in the numerous seminars being held all over the world is any indication, nuclear
restraint and nuclear risk reduction are definitely the flavour of the emerging ’new world order’. The
United States has taken the lead to highlight the dangers of nuclear war in South Asia. These risks are
believed to arise from the continuing proxy war in Kashmir that, in the absence of any dialogue between
India and Pakistan, could provide the flashpoint for a conflict with nuclear dimensions - hence the need for
nuclear restraint and risk reduction.
Are such fears irrational? Do they reflect an ingrained cultural prejudice? Does the US truly believe that
brown men cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons? The emotional counter-argument has been made in
India that Stalin and Mao and Nixon had their fingers on the nuclear trigger, and had acted irrationally,
even abnormally, on many occasions; yet no one thought they would launch a nuclear war in a whimsical
fashion. Moreover, the US and the Soviet Union were involved in recurrent crises during the nuclear era -
the most serious being the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 that brought the world to the edge of a nuclear
precipice. Nuclear weapons have not been used after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It could, therefore, be
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reasonably surmised that India and Pakistan would muddle along despite periodic alarms.
The contrary argument is, however, possible that if no nuclear conflict occurred during the Cold War, it
owed less to rationality and everything to plain good luck, which may not be available in the current
impasse between India and Pakistan. More seriously, their capacity for muddling through is questionable
on several counts. First, the Indo-Pakistan leadership seems unable to comprehend that nuclear arms
comprise an entirely new genre of weaponry in terms of destructiveness and their longterm effects on
biological life and the environment. Only such incomprehension could explain the frequency with which
the two countries are hurling nuclear threats at each other.
Second, the Kargil war proved an exception to many a priori dicta regarding nuclear confrontations that
have long been accepted by the international community, viz. that democracies do not fight with each other.
Pakistan was a democracy when the Kargil war erupted; the military coup was a later event. The other
dictum that nuclear weapon states do not conflict directly with each other was also disproved by Kargil.
The only other example of a clash between nuclear states took place in 1969 along the Ussuri river between
the Soviet Union and China.
The case for exhibiting nuclear restraint and establishing risk reduction measures between India and
Pakistan is, therefore, unassailable. What are the measures possible by India in the absence of bilateral
dialogue? The most obvious is continuance of its moratorium on nuclear testing and refraining from testing
its Agni-II and longer-range missiles. One of the ”benchmarks” laid down by the US specifically requires
India and Pakistan to ”refrain from deploying nuclear weapons or missile systems”. India would need to
accept, however, that, whilst it might be possessing a deterrent against Pakistan, further missile and nuclear
testing would be essential to deploy a deterrent against China; this is unavoidable for deploying the triad of
nuclear forces envisaged in the draft nuclear doctrine, and especially to acquire thermonuclear capabilities
that are of the essence here. Nuclear restraint, premised on a no-test regime, would also question the logic
of the Pokhran tests.
In brief, a difficult judgment has now to be made by India whether to proceed with the logic of the nuclear
tests to weaponise and deploy its nuclear capabilities or exhibit nuclear restraint and adopt risk reduction
measures. Not weaponising and deploying its nuclear capabilities would be the most credible means to
achieve these ends that could be taken unilaterally. Shou!- ••• . -,litical decision be taken, nevertheless, to
weaponise
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FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN
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and deploy, a margin of restraint and risk reduction would remain if the warheads are not mated with their
delivery systems hut verifiably kept apart in different locations.
What about Pakistan? It would be relieved of the pressure to respond. It is well aware of the political and
economic costs involved in weaponising and deploying its nuclear capabilities and entering a debilitating
nuclear arms race with India: this will not relieve if of upgrading and modernizing its conventional forces.
What about China? It is more sensitive now to the consequences of its no-longer-surreptitious transfers of
nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan. This has spurred India’s nuclear and missile programmes which
could affect China’s national security adversely; so it would be in China’s own national interests to broaden
its rapprochement with India.
There are several nuclear risk reduction measures worth simultaneous pursuit by India and Pakistan at this
stage itself when their nuclear capabilities have not yet been deployed. Some are included in the
Memorandum of Understanding that accompanied the Lahore Declaration. It contained several confidence-
building provisions. These suggestions could be negotiated into agreements.
Most significantly, the MOU envisaged that the two countries would consult each other on ”security
concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence-building in the nuclear
and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict”, which required immediate attention. A very first
item on the agenda for these consultations could be the need for deploying tactical nuclear weapons that are
really meant for battlefield use; do India and Pakistan need them to acquire warfighting capabilities? The
need for a common language to understand each other’s signals, such as the states of alert sounded in a
crisis, is of supreme importance to defuse future crises and avoid conflict.
More visible measures could also be pursued such as establishing risk reduction centres manned by mixed
groups of officials from both sides to defuse crises before they erupt; according greater transparency to
command and control arrangements established, exchanging information on national steps taken to ensure
safety and security of nuclear stockpiles, establishment of hotlines between the two Air Forces and the two
nuclear establishments, and so on. In the absence of dialogue; however, it is not possible to proceed with
these salubrious suggestions, this emphasizes the imperative need for re-establishing the Indo-Pakistan
dialogue to grapple with the nuclear issues that have emerged after the Pokhran-Chagai tests. The absence
of dialogue between the two self-styled putative nuclear weapon powers causes major concern to the
international community.
CHAPTER 16
The foreign policy of a country is the product of the interaction of many factors - historical, cultural,
ideological, economic and geopolitical. These factors determine the country’s outlook on world affairs.
Their order of priorities changes with new developments in the world politics. Foreign policy cannot be
static. The process of moulding the foreign policy according to the new realities continues but her
fundamental principles do not change, Borrowing words from Lord Palmerston, ”In international relations
there can be no eternal friends nor can there be eternal enemies. The only thing eternal is the national
interest”.
Robert Schuman, a former Prime Minister of France, said that since 1871, the French foreign policy has
been continuously dominated by one main preoccupation; that of ensuring her security and independence
from her neighbour, Germany. This is equally true about Pakistan. The main preoccupation of Pakistan
from the very beginning has been to ensure her security from India. On the other hand Kashmir is also a
bone of contention between the two countries. Pakistan feels it is her moral duty to support the right of self-
determination of Kashmiris who had been enslaved by India. Thus the foreign policy of Pakistan, in the
beginning was determined by these two factors. Pakistan joined defence pacts expecting help from western
powers in solving Kashmir problem and also to serve as deterrent against foreign aggression. These
expectations did not materialise. However, Pakistan was used by the western powers for the promotion of
their interests and global strategy.
In order to study the foreign policy of Pakistan, period after independence, has been divided into four major
headings each highlighting common trends in the policy formulation:
i) Foreign policy in 1950s and 1960s - during this period Pakistan was part of the defence treaties
sponsored by the West.
ii) Foreign policy in 1970s - during which emphasis was laid on bilateralism and there was a marked
shift on part of Pakistan from
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the South Asian sub-system to the Middle Eastern sub-system and Pakistan sought to forge economic and
political ties with the Middle Eastern and West Asian Muslim countries.
in) Foreign Policy in 1980s - in which there was revival of a close alliance with the West and the USA.
iv) Foreign policy in the 1990s - this era covers shifting trends in the foreign policy in the wake of
changing realities in and around Pakistan. A distinct feature of this era seems to be ”regionalism.”
Let us take up these periods one by one to analyse and comprehend fundamental inputs in policy-making
and modalities adopted by Pakistan to entrance her national interests at various levels of external-relations.
1. FOREIGN POLICY IN 1950s AND 1960s
Kashmir dispute and fear of Indian aggression had been the cornerstone of Pakistan’s foreign policy since
India had not yet reconciled herself to the emergence of Pakistan. This fear was further strengthened by the
September 1965 war. Congress leaders had thought that Pakistan would collapse sooner or later. They left
no stone unturned to undo Pakistan after the partition. The Indian Government stopped canal water, and
encouraged the ”Pukhtoonistan” movement just after the achievement of Pakistan. All this was not an
isolated expedient, but a deep conspiracy to undermine the foundation of this newly born State. On the
other hand India invaded Junagadh and entered Kashmir, violating all principles of justice. Communal riots
and pushing refugees into Pakistan was another indication of Indian policy towards Pakistan. But even
then, Mr. Jinnah sent a message of goodwill to the Indian government, and advised Indian leaders to bury
the hatchet. But Congress leaders did not change their attitude and continued their sabotaging activities in
East Pakistan. In these circumstances Pakistan had to search for friends to neutralise the growing military
threat of India. The fear of Indian aggression led her to join defence pacts SEATO and CENTO. When
Pakistan joined these pacts, India started a campaign of propaganda projecting Pakistan as an American
satellite. At the same time, this campaign helped her to isolate Pakistan from the Muslim countries. During
this period, India proclaimed neutrality, played host to heads of many Muslim states and extended her hand
of friendship towards Russia. Among Muslim countries, she had established close relations with Indonesia
and Egypt exploiting their dislike for these military pacts with the West. Pakistan was completely out of
touch with Soviet Russia and other communist countries. Even Liaquat Ali Khan had preferred to visit
USA than to accept Russian invitation. On the other side Nehru paid visit to Russia and established friendly
relations with China.
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The result was that Russia not only recognised Indian occupation of Kashmir but also used veto against
Pakistan in the Security Council. It came out later that India had also made Military pact with USA, but for
the time being it was able to play a double game by adopting the tactics of secret diplomacy. Meanwhile,
Pakistan had earned the hostility of the communist bloc and isolated herself from the camp of Asian
nations.
In 1958 President Ayub tookover the country. During the Tibetan crisis 1959, President Ayub made an
offer of joint defence to India but Nehru’s response to this gesture was disappointing. The refusal of India
went a long way in driving Pakistan into the arms of China and it decided to demarcate the border through
friendly negotiations. Pakistan signed a border accord with China in 1963. During the Sino-India War,
Pakistan kept strict neutrality. After this conflict India magnified the fear of Chinese attack to get massive
aid from the West and the USSR. Massive military aid to India disillusioned Pakistan with her Western
allies. Pakistan knew that American arms would be used against her and her suspicions came true in
1965 war. Pakistan pjotested to her allies, but they turned a deaf ear. On the other hand Pakistan had
expected that her Western allies would help it in solving the Kashmir problem. Disillusionment with the
traditional allies led Pakistan to review and revise her foreign policy.
SEPTEMBER 1965 WAR
Pakistan’s fear that American aid would disturb the Indo-Pak military balance came true when in
September 1965, India attacked Pakistan and used the military arms against her which were obtained for
using against China. UN intervened and a cease-fire was agreed by both the States. Then Russia offered her
good offices to mediate between India and Pakistan, which were accepted. President of Pakistan and Prime
Minister of India visited Russia in January 1966, where the Tashkent Declaration was signed by both the
Heads of State, Armies were withdrawn to the previous positions and diplomatic relations were restored.
Though relations between the two States became normal but the situation along the borders remained
explosive. Pakistan had certain expectations from the Tashkent Declaration. She thought due to Russian
influence and mediation Kashmir dispute would be solved, but Russia’s cold attitude disillusioned her. It
neither won her Russian friendship, nor it neutralised her attitude because Russia continued giving military
aid to India. President Ayub clearly stated many times that there could be no friendship with India until the
Kashmir problem was solved.
Pakistan is an ideological State. The ideology of Pakistan is based on Islam. One of the objectives of
Pakistan’s foreign policy was to promote
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brotherly relations with Muslim countries. But the efforts of Pakistan Government did not bring the desired
results. On the other hand she could not join hands with the Communist bloc because of her ideology,
Pakistan had to search for friends who could ensure her security. All these factors led Pakistan to join the
Western bloc. Liaquat Ali Khan was invited by both USSR and USA but he preferred to visit USA which
indicated Pakistan’s tilt towards the West. Her relations with USA were guided by two principles. Firstly,
USA was one of the major powers of the world. The pattern of her relations with USA was not likely to
affect her role and relations with other countries. Secondly, USA was in a position to make contribution
towards Pakistan’s economic development and ultimately to her national security. On the other hand, USA
also wanted to establish cordial relations with Pakistan, because of her geopolitical situation and proximity
to USSR which could be used for containment of Communism.
Liaquat Ali Khan visited USA in 1950, but he did not indicate even the slightest desire to enter into any
defence pact or treaties. He believed in strict neutrality. During his tour, he emphasised that Pakistan
desired peace and needed economic aid for her development, and military aid to ward off aggression from
India. The same policy was pursued by Khwaja Nazimuddin. Although the clouds of economic depression
were appearing on the horizon of the country. Yet Khwaja pursued an independent foreign policy, and did
not align his Government with one side or the other.
It was only in the time of Muhammad Ali Bogra that Pakistan turned to the West completely. He was not
only impressed by the economic progress of USA but it is also said that even his choice as Prime Minister
was indicated by the USA.
It is said that Pakistan was disillusioned with the Muslim countries, and at the same time, facing economic
depression and a challenge to her security. Pakistan, therefore, was compelled to lean towards the West. It
was realised that neutrality did not suit Pakistan’s interests. Thus ideology was subordinated to national
interests and Pakistan joined SEATO in September 1954. No amount of argument could persuade the
sponsoring Powers to agree to a provision in the treaty that her signatories should defend aggression.
Pakistan was given some economic and military aid under SEATO.
Later on Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact, which was known as CENTO. This pact was better than the
previous ones, because her members pledged to help each other to meet aggression from any quarter.
I
FOREIGN POLKA’ OF PAKISTAN
583
No doubt, Pakistan was member of both the pacts, but the fact remains that the partners had conflicting
objectives. The Western Powers wanted to use Pakistan against Communism in Asia, while Pakistan had
expected that her powerful allies would help her in solving the Kashmir tangle.
The pro-West policy was pursued by all the Prime Ministers from Muhammad Ali Bogra to Suhrawardy,
who went a step further. His view was that ”if Pakistan was attacked by India, he would appeal to her
SEATO and Baghdad Pact partners”. The reaction was that both London and Washington refuted in clear
terms any such commitment. Even then it did not open the eyes of Pakistani leaders.
During the Suez crisis, great damage was done to the prestige of Pakistan due to the foreign policy pursued
by Suhrawardy. Pakistan had always supported the cause of the Arabs in respect of Palestine. Libya,
Morocco and Algeria, but due to Suhrawardy’s policy, all her previous support for their cause lost her
value.
Gradually Pakistan lost initiative in the world affairs. Matters deteriorated to such an extent that Western
Powers started interfering in the internal policies of the country. The Arab world became suspicious. Russia
supported Afghanistan and India on all fronts against Pakistan and even exercised veto in favour of India
on Kashmir question. In 1960, the U-2 incident further damaged the prestige of this country. Khrushchev
even threatened Pakistan with nuclear destruction.
Then leaders of Pakistan started realising that they had alienated Russia and China, the two giant
neighbours. On the other hand India was receiving massive military aid from Western countries as well as
from USSR. Naturally, Pakistan was perturbed over it, because a powerful India posed greater threat to her
security than International Communism. Moreover, development in military technology had also reduced
the value of military alliances. All these factors led Pakistan to make a reappraisal of her foreign policy.
This process started in 1960 and crystallised towards the end of 1961. Now Pakistan was decreasing her
dependence on Western allies. Her relations with the Socialist bloc were improving. Pakistan approached
the other bloc for technical assistance. For this purpose, Pakistan signed an oil agreement with Russia, and
also extended a friendly hand towards Communist China.
In 1962. war broke out between China and India in which the Indian army was defeated. Nehru threw away
his cloak of non-alignment, and extended his hand towards the Western Powers for aid. USA
584
immediately sanctioned $120 million aid for India. Great Britain also promised help against China despite
Pakistan’s protest. Meanwhile Pakistan and China were coming closer to each other. They had already
demarcated their borders, which was not liked by her Western allies. Trade pacts were signed. Exchanges
between the two countries became frequent. China even offered a loan of sixty million dollars free of
interest to Pakistan.
Then the historic visit of President Ayub to Peking and Moscow also strengthened the growing relations
with these countries. The support which China extended to Pakistan during the 1965 September War left
indelible prints on the memories of Pakistani people. On the other hand Pakistan also made a friendly
gesture to Russia by accepting her good offices resulting in the Tashkent Declaration in 1966. Her relations
with all other Socialist countries were also improving. All these developments were not liked by her
Western allies, but Pakistan was determined to follow an independent foreign policy.
President Ayub paid third visit to USSR in September, 1967. The reports stated USSR, understood
Pakistan’s problems, but there was hardly anything encouraging in the speeches from both sides. Kosygin’s
advice regarding Kashmir solution was quite meaningless. He was of the view that Pakistan inherited this
problem from colonial times and the best way for the parties was to solve it themselves.
In April 1968, Premier Kosygin again visited Pakistan. He was given a very warm reception. The
communique issued declared that there was a great identity of views between Pakistani and Russian
leaders. It was expected that such exchange of visits would go a long way in melting the ice, which had
marred Pak-Soviet relations in the past.
One obstacle in the way of friendly relations of two countries still remained to be removed. It was the
Soviet massive military aid to India, which amounted to strengthening Pakistan’s enemy. Obviously,
Pakistan showed resentment against Soviet aid to India but in vain.
Pakistan’s relations with the Middle East countries have been based essentially on her firm adherence to
Islamic ideology and the promotion of fraternal relations with Muslim countries. Apart from Saudi Arabia,
which being a sacred place of the Muslims has a place of special affection, other Middle East countries,
like Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, all have had very cordial relations with Pakistan. Pakistan has been
consistently seeking to extend these ties and to strengthen them. The peculiar circumstances prevailing in
the Middle East however prevented the development of a close alliance of Pakistan with Muslim countries
of the
585
Middle East for some time after independence. Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact in the hope that,
eventually it would evolve into an essentially Muslim alliance. But only Iraq from the Middle East joined
this pact and hostile attitude of UAR and her determined opposition forced the signatory nations to
reconsider their position The formation of SEA TO alliance though it is different in concept could not
remove the reservations which Arabs had always felt while dealing with Western powers the creators of
Israel. While Pakistan’s determined and consistent advocacy of the cause of Palestinian Muslims produced
very favourable atmosphere in the Arab world the political weakness and internal schism among the Arabs
prevented the flowering of a solid bloc of Muslim countries acting in concert for their mutual benefit Iraq
left the Baghdad Pact. Syria forged unity with UAR but a revolution reversed the tide. The Qasim
revolution in Iraq assumed an anti-Nasser posture, which was reversed only after another revolution - that
of Arif. Jordan being small and insecure needed Western patronage but King Hussein bravely tried and
succeeded in steering an independent course. In spite of an attempt at overthrow he survived and asserted
himself on the question of Arab rights in Palestine. Syria, Iraq and Jordan extended their support to
Pakistan on the Kashmir issue and Jordan took a courageous stand in the Security Council on the issue of
Indo-Pak War of September,
1965.
With UAR Pakistan’s relations remained cool, mostly because of the sensitiveness shown by the Nasser
Government over some of the pronouncements of Suhrawardy during the Suez crisis. In spite of the
overwhelming sentiments of the people of Pakistan in favour of their Egyptian brethren, the stand of
Pakistan Government in the beginning of the Suez crisis, was somewhat equivocal. Later events and the
popular demonstration in Pakistan in favour of Egypt mollified the Nasser Government a little but the
disillusionment remained. When President Ayub assumed power in 1958, he earnestly desired to put the
relations between the two countries on a mutually satisfactory basis, and he succeeded. In forthright speech
at a public reception in UAR, he answered President Nasser’s allusions to policies followed by the
Suhrawardy Government and pointedly asked whether UAR had supported Pakistan on Kashmir. Certainly
the record of Pakistan support of Arab cause was much better and forthright than the equivocal stand and at
times apathy shown by UAR for Pakistan in the case of Kashmir. However, as a result of intimate contacts,
the attitude of the Nasser Government improved. With India’s standing as the leading non-aligned country
in Asia having perished, UAR felt more sympathetic towards Pakistan. In the September War in 1965, the
UAR Government adopted a neutral posture, while the public sentiment was decidedly pro-Pakistan. The
exchange of visits by Presidents Nasser and Ayub further strengthened this process. Another important
factor
586
I VrKKNM IQNAI. AFFAI RS
contributory to this development had been the failure of India to further the non-aligned movement started
by Nehru. With the acceptance of American military aid, and her tacit support of the American policies,
India had lost her neutralist posture. Pakistan’s foreign policy, on the other hand despite her continued
membership of SEATO and CENTO, had decidedly moved towards neutralism and a balanced approach to
the great powers. With better appreciation of these trends in Pakistan, UAR had come closer to Pakistan.
During the Middle East crisis of 1967, Pakistan gave full support to Arab countries. President Ayub also
promised aid to these countries, for which the leaders of Arab countries expressed their thanks. Pakistan
sponsored resolution calling upon Israel not to proceed with the annexation of the Holy city of Jerusalem
was the only redeeming feature of the General Assembly. People of Pakistan showed great enthusiasm
during this period of crisis and collected money which was sent to these countries. Demonstrations took
place to condemn Israel and her supporters.
The support rendered by the Government and the people of Pakistan had greatly increased her popularity in
the Arab world. Pakistan’s unstinted support for the Arab cause was highlighted with the visit of two
dignitaries from the Arab world in September 1967. The visitors were King Hussein of Jordan and
Mahmoud Fawzi, President Nasser’s special envoy and adviser on foreign affairs. King Hussein again paid
a visit to Pakistan in early 1968. These friendly visits resulted in increasing goodwill between Pakistan,
UAR and Jordan. After the marriage of Prince Hassan with Princess Sarwat, relations between Pakistan and
Jordan were further strengthened.
It was however clear that the Government of UAR was still not prepared to deal with Pakistan as a Muslim
State. She considered Pakistan as a friendly state like other friendly states. When some reporter of a
newspaper asked Fawzi if the brotherhood among the Muslims of the world had deepened after the 1967
crisis, he replied: ”Brotherhood should not be limited between the Muslims alone but between all men for
good purpose.” It was reported that he also parried questions on the formation of an Islamic bloc and the
utility of regional alliance like the RCD.
The visit of King Hussein, however, came under an atmosphere of unlimited warmth and friendship. He
was given a rousing welcome. President Ayub was reported to have promised all assistance to Jordan, both
moral and material in his struggle against Israel. The feelings of King Hussein were reflected in his
farewell message to President Ayub. He said, ”Your staunch support for us in our stand against the Zionist
aggression will
FOKKKA HOI.1C V OF PAKISTAN
.587
leave a great effect on the outcome of our rightful struggle against our enemies and in every field. I shall
always and lor ever remember the glorious stand of great Pakistan and her noble people in support of my
country and nation.”
Pakistan championed the cause of freedom for Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria and her stock was high in
these countries. Algeria, alongwith Pakistan played a pivotal role in the preparatory stages of convening of
the second Afro-Asian Conference on the Bandung Conference pattern but the revolutionaries in Algeria
and Indonesia blighted the prospects of such a Conference. With Turkey and Iran, Pakistan has always had
very cordial and brotherly ties. In the time of the Khilafat Movement the Indian Muslims expressed their
heartfelt sentiment about their Turkish brethren, and eversince the establishment of Pakistan these ties had
been growing. Pakistan always supported the Turkish stand on Cyprus and looked upon this question with
as much concern as for Kashmir. The Shah of Iran was the first head of a friendly state to pay a visit to
Pakistan after her establishment. Because of cultural and religious affinities and geographical proximity,
these ties have remained firm. Pakistan supported the Iranian stand on Shett el Arab and so did Iran on
Kashmir.
Then, with these two countries, Pakistan evolved especially close relationship in the form of RCD. The
Regional Co-operation for Development as the Organisation became known, was intended to achieve
closest harmony in economic and social policies. It was designed to coordinate the national policies of the
three countries to their mutual benefit. Steps were initiated to start joint projects in industries,
telecommunication and commercial fields. A Secretariat had been established at Tehran. Its success was to
pave the way for greater collaboration among the Muslim countries in particular. An instance of these
fraternal ties was provided when Turkey and Iran came to help Pakistan in a big way during the September
1965 war with India.
During 1965 war, Indonesia gave all-out support to Pakistan. The response to this momentous event was
immediate and whole-hearted, in Indonesia whose relations with Pakistan had been placed on very firm
footing with the conclusion of an Economic and Cultural Co-operation agreement known as I.P.E.C.C.
(Economic and Cultural Co-operation between Indonesia and Pakistan). The Suharto coup of 1965 changed
the position to this extent that Indonesia tried to normalise her relations with India as with Malaysia, but the
new leadership reaffirmed the ties with Pakistan.
588
-589
Malaysia being a Muslim country and a member of the Commonwealth has had good relations with
Pakistan. In September war, however, her representative openly sided with India and Pakistan broke off
diplomatic relations. Later, however, these relations were resumed.
The case of Afghan-Pakistan relation has been a peculiar one. Afghanistan, became the only country to cast
her vote against the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations. The concept of Pakhtoonistan unrealistic
and legally unsustainable as it was fostered by Indian propaganda in spite of the fact that the Pakhtoons of
the area had cast their lot with other Muslims through a plebiscite just before the establishment of Pakistan.
The later trend in Afghan-Pakistan relations had been that of cordiality and cooperation. Afghanistan
comdemned the bombing of civilian population by India during the September 1965 war. Trade relations
grew and in early
1967, the visit of King Zahir Shah to Pakistan put the ties on a firmer footing. But the fact that Ghaffar
Khan was staying in Kabul and working against Pakistan pained the Pakistanis.
Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognise the People’s Republic of China soon after her
establishment. Geographical proximity, historical ties and mutual sympathies fostered these relations in
1950. Pakistan supported the resolution for the restoration of rights of China in the General Assembly of
the United Nations. In the debates on Korea, Pakistan abstained from voting against China. Indeed,
Pakistan consistently advocated the UN membership for China and President Ayub declared in
unmistakable terms this stand when he addressed a joint session of American Congress in the Senate during
his visit to USA.
In spite of Pakistan’s alliance with America, China had always been sympathetic to her and the Chinese
leaders did not take sides on Kashmir issue even when they had close relations with India and Nehru had
raised the slogan of ”Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai.” The early development of Sino-Pakistan relations had an
element of foresight, because as the events unfolded themselves, India came to adopt an attitude of
implacable hostility towards China and the Western allies of Pakistan cooled off towards this country
because of their preference for India as a counterbalance Power to China.
At the Bandung Conference of 1955, China and Pakistan played a notable role and in spite of provocation
by India and others China showed understanding of Pakistan’s membership of the military pacts and the
two Prime Ministers issued a statement of cordiality after the talks. The Bandung Conference brought into
focus the Indian bid for Asian leadership and the disillusionment of the smaller nations of Asia.
Suhrawardy, as
Prime Minister, visited China in 1956 and the leaders announced in a joint communique their intention to
continue and strengthen economic and cultural relations. In December 1956, Chou En-Lai visited Pakistan
and was given an enthusiastic welcome. The next important development in SinoPakistan relations came in
1961, when Pakistan and China opened negotiations for the demarcation of boundary line between the two
countries. On May 3, 1962, Pakistan and China concluded an agreement for demarcation of boundaries.
India protested and launched a campaign against these Sino-Pakistan negotiations which, however,
continued in a cordial atmosphere.
Sino-Indian war started on November 20, 1962, when Nehru ordered Indian troops to drive out the Chinese
from the territory which India claimed. When the Chinese decisively hit back. India asked for military aid.
Pakistan was alarmed over the massive military aid which India received from Pakistan’s allies. This
department led to a new phase of Sino-Pakistan relations. In March 1963, the border demarcation
agreement was signed by the Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto and Chen Yi. This agreement determined the
boundaries between the two countries and a ”provisional” clause was added providing that after the
settlement of Kashmir dispute, the question of boundaries between Kashmir and China might by settled by
the authority inheriting sovereignty over Kashmir. This fair and mutually satisfactory agreement put Sino-
Pakistan relations on a very solid footing. Pakistan took a bolder stand at SEA TO and CENTO meetings
and in the United Nations, in favour of China as a peaceful country. In August 1963, both the countries
signed an air agreement providing for commercial air services which provided a window to the outside
world.
In September 1965, when India attacked Pakistan, China stood unreservedly on the side of Pakistan and
gave full military and diplomatic support to this country in resisting the aggression. The former Chinese
President Liu Shao-Chi. received a tremendous ovation when he visited Pakistan in 1966 and the public
pronouncements of the leaders of both the countries gave evident signs of profound understanding.
President Ayub’s visit to China earlier in March 1965 strengthened these relations to an enthusiastic level.
He was given a grand and colourful welcome and in their talks the Chinese and Pakistani leaders re-
affirmed their friendship in forceful terms.
In the economic field, too, relations have ever been growing. An agreement was signed on June 2, ]966, by
which China was to supply machinery and technical know-how for the establishment of a heavy
engineering complex in West Pakistan. A similar agreement to provide
590
FOKF.K;\ POLK v OF PAKISTAN
-591
electrical equipment to Hast Pakistan (now Bangladesh) WARD A was also signed. A cultural and
scientific agreement and the one for the export of jute was concluded. China gave interest free loan to
Pakistan. She also promised to provide wheat to Pakistan in 1969.
In 1967, Pakistan also tried to establish firm friendly relations with France. President Ayub visited France
in November, 1967. Direct arms deal concluded by Pakistan with France, indicated that USA vvas losing
her monopoly as the only arms supplier to Pakistan.
After the assumption of power by General Yahya Khan in 1969, there was no significant change in the
foreign policy of Pakistan. Her relations with China. USSR, and Middle East countries remained stable.
China tried to fill up the vacuum caused by the decreasing economic assistance from USA and promised to
extend aid and other facilities for the Fourth Five-Year Plan. President Nixon visited Pakistan in August
1969 and admitted in his speech that Pakistan and USA had some differences which would be resolved
slowly. But Pakistan again affirmed her stand that unless USA stops military aid to India, these differences
would not be resolved.
As regards Muslim countries Pakistan’s prestige in these countries kept improving. She played an
important role in the Rabat Conference which was held to consider the Palestine question. Pakistan
promised complete support to the Arab cause. It was also due to the stand taken by Pakistan that the Indian
delegation was not allowed to attend the meeting.
2. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1970s
December 1971 was a critical juncture in Pakistan’s national history. Seldom had a nation faced a crisis of
the type that Pakistan had to face on December 20, 1971. With one part of our country torn away as a result
of a humiliating defeat at the hands of India. The morale of the nation was at the lowest level. More than
90.000 of her valiant soldiers were held captives in India which also occupied 5,000 miles of land in West
Pakistan. There were more than 12 lac shelterless people in the refugee camps, who had lost their homes
and hearths.
Such was the situation when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over the reins of the Government of Pakistan. He was
the architect of the foreign policy adopted during the sixties based on ”Bilateralism”. As the President of
Pakistan, he gave it a concrete shape recognising the emerging realities in the sub-continent and the
changing situation in the world politics. The basic
principle remained to serve the best interest of Pakistan by maintaining friendly relations with all the
countries.
The major steps, indicative of radical changes in the foreign policy of Pakistan were:
(1) Withdrawal from the Commonwealth.
(2) Recognition of East Germany, Democratic Republics of Korea and Vietnam, the Republic of
Guinea Bissau, the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia.
(3) Withdrawal from SEA TO and t INCLJRK.
The main objectives of the foreign policy were as follows:
1. Restoration of the confidence of friendly countries and rebuilding the morale of the people.
2. Establishing friendly relations with all big powers.
3. Elimination of the consequences of 1971 war and settlement of outstanding issues with India on
honourable basis.
4. Restoration of ties and contacts with the authorities and people of Bangladesh.
5. Restoration of foreign aid for immediate and future needs.
6. Re-establishing the lost prestige of Pakistan in foreign countries specially in the Western World.
Prime Minister Bhutto believed in personal diplomacy and it was in this regard that he undertook a
whirlwind tour of 20 countries immediately after taking over, concentrating in the first instance on friendly
countries who had stood by Pakistan. A reaffirmation of support from these countries enabled Pakistan to
negotiate with India from a position of strength. The desire to establish bilateral friendly relations with big
powers took him to China in January and USSR in March 1972 and to US in September 1973.
The most perilous and hazardous chapter in Pakistan’s foreign policy has been the negotiations with India.
President Bhutto declared that he desired normalisation of relations with India. Consequently the Simla
Summit between Bhutto and Indira Gandhi took place on 28th June, 1972 leading to an agreement on 2nd
July. It was resolved to put an end to conflict and confrontation and with that in view to settle differences
through peaceful means, to respect each other’s national unity, territorial integrity, political independence
and sovereign quality, to refrain from use of Force
592
and to cease hostile propaganda against each other. The steps decided for the step by step normalisation of
relations were withdrawal of forces within
30 days on both sides of the International Border and to show respect to the Line of Control in Kashmir
without prejudice to the recognised position of both sides. The Simla Agreement was duly ratified by the
National Assembly on July 14, 1972 and the instrument of ratification was delivered to India on July 18,
1972 which in turn handed over her own instrument of ratification on August 1, 1972.
The withdrawal of forces was, however, delayed on account of India’s insistence that it was linked with the
demarcation of Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. Dispute also arose on the question of Thako Chak.
However, Pakistan strove to resolve the issue and after a meeting of special emissaries in Delhi during
August, 1972 and by India’s agreement to compensate along the Line of Control in return of Thako Chak,
the withdrawal offerees was completed in December, 1972.
The most delicate issue between India and Pakistan was that of
91,000 prisoners of war. President Bhutto addressed a letter to Indira Gandhi on December 21, 1972 urging
upon her a settlement of this issue. The Indian POWs in Pakistan were released on December 27, 1972, as a
gesture of goodwill and fulfilling the obligations of Geneva Convention. India did release some 540 POWs
captured on the Western front but about
91,000 who had surrendered in East Pakistan and who had been assured treatment under Geneva
Convention, India stated that they had surrendered to a joint command of India and Bangladesh and hence
could not be released without the prior consent of Bangladesh. Bangladesh insisted on discussing the issue
only on the basis of equal sovereignty. These POWs were used as a lever for extracting political
concessions.
Meanwhile Bangladesh applied for the UN membership in August

1972. The resolution calling upon her admission was, however, vetoed by People’s Republic of China.
During the General Assembly Sessions in September, 1972 Pakistan took the stand that Bangladesh should
be admitted only after the implementation of General Assembly resolution of December 7, 1971 and
Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971. Pakistan also clarified that it was not irrevocably
opposed to the admission of Bangladesh into the UN. Simultaneously Pakistan continued her efforts to
enlist world support in favour of release of her POWs. A world-wide campaign was launched in this
respect. India and Bangladesh issued a joint declaration on April 17, 1973 delinking the humanitmian issue
of POWs from the political question of recognition of Bangladesh. This was welcomed by Pakistan but it
had to file a petition with the International
593
Court of Justice to prevent the transfer of 195 POWs, which Bangladesh wanted to try for ”War Crimes” by
the end of May 1973.
Talks were held between the representatives of India and Pakistan in Islamabad in the last week of July
1973 but remained inconclusive because India could not make commitment without consulting Bangladesh.
The talks were resumed in New Delhi on 18th August, 1973 and continued till 28 August when the first
Delhi Agreement was signed.
The salient features of this agreement were:
(a) Simultaneous repatriation of all Pakistani prisoners of war and civilian internees, all Bengalis in
Pakistani and a substantial number of non-Bengalis in Bangladesh;
(b) Bangladesh agreed that trial of 195 prisoners of war shall take place during the entire period of
repatriation and pending the settlement of the question, these prisoners of war shall remain in India;
(c) On completion of the agreed repatriations or earlier, if agreed Bangladesh. India and Pakistan will
discuss the question of 195 prisoners of war. Bangladesh stated that it would participate in the meeting on
the basis of ”sovereign equality.”
(d) The Government of Pakistan would initially receive a substantial number of non-Bengalis from
Bangladesh who were stated to have opted for repatriation to Pakistan. The Prime Ministers of Bangladesh
and Pakistan or their designated representatives, will meet after the initial repatriations are completed to
decide what additional number of persons who may wish to migrate to Pakistan be permitted to do so.
The repatriation of Pakistan POWs from India and the Bengalis from Pakistan which started as a result of
this agreement was completed. The fate of 195 POWs, however, remained undecided for a very long time
with Bangladesh repeating her determination to try them for crimes against humanity and Pakistan firmly
standing by her resolve not to support the admission of Bangladesh into UN until all the POWs were
released.
Meanwhile important developments were taking place in the relations of Pakistan with the Muslim World.
Pakistan’s efforts to restore her prestige and revitalise her relations with the Muslim countries culminated
in a decision to hold the Muslim Summit Conference in Lahore. February 1974 saw Pakistan at the height
of her glory when 37 Heads of Muslim States met in Lahore under the Chairmanship of Bhutto to discuss
the problems facing the Muslim World.
594
IMTER1SATIONAI. AFFAIRS
It was on the eve of this conference that under advice from the Muslim friends and in the best interest of
Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto declared to recognise Bangladesh. This decision made possible to bring
Sh. Mujib to Lahore to participate in the conference and sit among the Muslim brethren.
The process set in motion by the Delhi Agreement of August, 1973 of solving the humanitarian problems
left by 1971 conflict had entered her last phase. The three-way repatriation of Pakistan POWs and civilian
internees in India, Bengalis in Pakistan and Pakistanis in Bangladesh was almost near completion. The only
issue which remained to be settled was that of 195 POWs whom Bangladesh wanted to try on the charge of
”War Crimes”. In a spirit of reconciliation peace and friendship it was decided in April, 1974 that
Bangladesh would not try the 195 POWs and they would be repatriated to Pakistan alongwith, others. The
process of repatriation of the POWs was completed on 30th April, 1974.
THE MUSLIM SUMMIT
Eversince the ouster of colonial powers from Muslim lands, efforts have been made on various fronts to
forge unity among the Muslim countries and the people. There is nothing new about these efforts which
form integral part of the history of Islam. The desire and yearning for unity is but natural for the Muslim
world because the source of inspiration is the same. The lead was given by Jamaluddin Afghani, Mufti
Mohammad Abduhu, Shakaib Arstan and Iqbal on the intellectual front; on the political front, Saad Zaghlul
Pasha, Dr. Hatta, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah were the prominent freedom-fighters in recent history.
The existence of Israel and her expansionist policy had been a source of constant conflict in the Middle
East eversince the creation of a Jewish State. In 57 years since 1948, about 6 Arab-Israel Wars were fought,
the Palestinians turned out of their homes and hearths. Territories belonging to Arab States had been
occupied by Israel and there was still no chance of any solution to the tangle.
Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa was set on fire in August, 1969. The Arab Foreign Ministers met in Cairo to consider
the situation and gave a mandate to Saudi Arabia and Morocco to convene an Islamic Summit Conference.
The first Islamic Summit Conference was held in Rabat in September 1969. Pakistan was represented at the
level of the Head of State.
The Conference resolved to promote between Muslim States close co-operation and mutual assistance in
the economic, cultural and spiritual
595
fields, inspired by the immortal teachings of Islam. It condemned the arson in Al-Masjid Al-Aqsa as a
criminal act, emphasised the importance of preserving the holy character of the Muslim religious shrines
and decided to reject any solution which did not restore the status which Jerusalem had before June, 1967.
It provided for the setting up of a permanent Secretariat to maintain liaison among the Muslim countries
and co-ordinate their individual actions.
RELATIONS WITH MUSLIM COUNTRIES
. Pakistan was demanded in the name of Islam and when Pakistan came into being several Muslim
countries were faced with serious political problems. The need for uniting the Muslim world, therefore,
became more urgent. The Father of the Nation, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah very aptly said in his
Eid greetings to the Heads of the Muslim States in August 1948 ~ we are passing through perilous time.
The drama of power politics that is being played in Palestine, Indonesia and Kashmir should serve as an
eye-opener to us. It is only by putting up a united front that we can make our voice felt in the counsels of
the world.” Pakistanis, therefore, showed great zeal for doing something to bring the Muslim countries
closer to each other.
To achieve this objective, Pakistan undertook to organise several International Muslim Conferences at short
intervals. The World Muslim Congress was reactivated and in February 1949, a conference was convened
under her auspices at Karachi. This was followed by a similar conference in Tehran in October 1950 and
eleven countries sent delegates to it. This conference inter alia recommended the establishment of an
International Islamic Bank. In February, 1951, the Muslim Congress organised another conference at
Karachi which was inaugurated by the Pakistan Prime Minister. The Economic Conference which met at
Karachi in April 1954, proved to be the last meeting of its kind but the Muslim Congress continued to
organise international Conferences. The next one was held after a long time at Baghdad in 1962. In 1964,
Muslim Congress conference was held in the Somalian capital, Mogadishu.
The progress towards Muslim world unity and solidarity gained impetus by the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict
which was the result of Israel’s intransigence. The initiative was this time taken by Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan. The Muslim World responded positively and agreed to participate in the proposed Summit which
was held in Lahore from February 22, 1974 with thirty-eight Muslim nations participating in the
Conference.
The Muslim Summit held at Lahore attracted the world attention. This was the first time in the modern
history of Islam Cat the entire Muslim
596
597
World gathered to discuss the Middle East issue. Though Middle East and Palestine were the main items,
the economic aspects of the problems facing the Muslim countries were also thrashed. The Muslim World
chalked out a comprehensive economic and political strategy to take a united stand. The mechanism to
implement the decision was also decided alongwith a definite time-table.
Pakistan played the pivotal role in the Summit. Rationale behind the whole exercise was that if Muslims of
the world united and acted collectively they could become a force to reckon with. It was the first time that
Iran and Turkey also supported the move to internationalise Jerusalem.
The Islamic conference was a landmark in the history of the Muslim World to get out of the shackles of
Western interests. Though the major objective was to harmonise the views of Muslim countries on the
question of Middle East, the political and economic strategy to be adopted was also decided upon because
it was felt that until and unless Muslims were economically strong, they could not apply political pressure.
It was heartening to note that oil strategy proved successful in changing the policies of Israel’s supporters.
Pakistan was proud of hosting the conference and had as in the past, contributed toward bringing the
Muslim World together for the issues and problems common to the Muslim countries. In the Lahore
Summit, the Middle East tangle and economic issues were debated and concrete decisions were made. But
there was a general feeling in Pakistan that problems facing Pakistan got no attention. These problems such
as the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and her economic difficulties were not considered. It was rightly
expected that the Muslim countries participating in this Summit would also attend to the difficulties of the
host country but it was rather a pity that no voice was raised regarding her problems. Pakistan in deference
to the wishes of Muslim countries, recognised Bangladesh which was a part of Pakistan and was the
creation of Indian aggression.
Pakistan enjoyed remarkably good relations with the People’s Republic of China. Chinese continued
support on Jammu and Kashmir issue and her vigorous support in the UN was always a source of strength
for Pakistan. Besides, the massive economic aid and the considerable military aid had strengthened the
relationship. Chinese Vice-Premier Lie Hie Hsien Nien’s 6-day official visit on 20th April, 1975 was a
great success. Prime Minister Bhutto also visited China in May, 1976. This visit was significant in the
context of the change of political leadership in China after Chou EnLai’s death. The joint communique
issued at the end reaffirmed Chinese support on Kashmir issue and support for Pakistan’s integrity.
The process of normalisation of relations with India progressed rapidly in the wake of Simla Agreement.
Tele-communication links and the travel facilities were resumed, trade agreements were also struck. On
14th May, 1976 at a foreign Secretaries-level meeting, Pakistan and India, agreed to resume diplomatic
relations, air links, over flights, goods and passenger rail traffic between the two countries. It was also
decided to withdraw the case from ICAO jointly in order to create a better atmosphere. Pakistan took
initiative to normalise her relations with Afghanistan. Bhutto offered a nonaggression treaty to Afghanistan
and also extended considerable aid in the wake of a terrible earthquake. The tense atmosphere was relaxed
and Bhutto toured Afghanistan in June 1976 in response to the invitation from Sardar Daud. It was declared
in the joint communique that the bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan would be based on
Bandung principles. This was a major diplomatic success for Pakistan.
On 15th August, 1975 there came an important change in Bangladesh. Sh. Mujib was killed in a coup
which started a chain of coups and counter coups, finally culminating in the takeover by Gen. Zia.
Pakistan’s immediate recognition of the new regime proved a landmark in Pak-B.D. relations. The old ties
began to revive with vigour and joy.
During 1970s, Pakistan continued to embark upon her policy of bilateralism. On the one hand, it tried to
improve relations with the neighbouring countries especially India and Afghanistan, on the other efforts
were made to strengthen cordial ties with USA and China. Pakistan also made significant endeavours to
revive good relations with the USSR. Pakistan also resigned from the membership of SEATO and CENTO
and joined Non-aligned Movement in 1979.
3. FOREIGN POLICY IN 1980s
After the 1971 Pakistan-India war, most important development which had taken place in the region was
the toppling of King Zahir Shah’s government by Sardar Daud. After setting aside the government, USSR,
had installed Sardar Daud which was considered to be an ardent supporter of the Pakhtoonistan stunt and a
faithful supporter of the Soviet Union. However, he along with many other family members was killed in a
coup engineered by Noor Muhammad Taraki, who was an Afghan Marxist. In another change of
government Taraki was replaced by Hafizullah Amin who after a brief rule of few months was replaced by
Babrak Karmal in December
1978.
Throughout these years political and administrative conditions in Afghanistan remained chaotic. The
installation of the Communist
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government was resisted by the freedom-fighters who enjoyed the support of the Islamic groups.
Pakistan watched all the developments in Afghanistan as a neutral observer without involving herself in
any affair. After the installation of Babrak Karmal, 90,000 Russian troops were air-lifted in Afghanistan to
assist the government forces to maintain law and order in the country. The government troops with the
support of the Russian forces launched massive attacks against the Mujahideen to pacify the troubled
regions. Due to the atrocities perpetrated on the Afghan masses, more than 25,00,000 people were forced to
flee their country and take refuge in Pakistan. Another
15,00,000 Afghans fled to Iran. The influx of refugees created numerous financial as well as administrative
problems for Pakistan. In spite of all this Pakistan continued making efforts to improve relations with every
Afghan government but their response seldom proved to be encouraging.
In March 1981, one Boeing aeroplane of Pakistan International Airlines was hijacked to Kabul. The
handling of the hijacking affair by Kabul authorities was against the internationally recognised principles.
Babrak Karrnal’s regime refused to provide any support to the Pakistan authorities. Instead the hijackers
were given arms and ammunition. The tension between the two countries mounted but on 8 March, 1981
the aircraft was taken to Damascus. All the hostages alongwith the crew members were released on March
12, when the Pakistan government freed
54 political prisoners confined in various jails. The Kabul stance on the hijacking incident was condemned
all over the world and it caused a setback to Pakistan-Afghan relations.
Meanwhile UN Secretary-General’s special envoy, Javier Perez de Cueller started negotiations in an

attempt to resolve the dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan and to find a formula for the return of
Afghan refugees.
In August 1981 Pakistan proposed to India that both the countries should declare South Asia as a nuclear
free zone, should agree to inspection of nuclear installations, sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and join
other countries in banning the manufacture or testing of nuclear weapons. During the same year Pakistan
took a major initiative by suggesting that both the countries should sign a mutual non-aggression treaty. But
due to the mistrusts and suspicions on the Indian side, the relations could not improve.
Pakistan’s relations with US had deteriorated especially after the suspension of American economic aid in
1979 as a protest against Pakistan’s nuclear programme. But the situation dramatically changed after
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Russian intervention in Afghanistan. In 1980, American government offered a 400million economic and
military aid to Pakistan but it was not accepted by Pakistan. In June 1981, both sides agreed to a new five-
year programme of $3000 million for economic and military support. The United States also agreed to sell
F-16 and military equipment to Pakistan.
Pakistan has always supported the struggle of the Palestinian people for their legitimate rights, self-
determination and independence. Speaking at the occasion of the Third Islamic Summit held at Taif on 26
Jan., 1981, President General Zia-ul-Haq reiterated that Pakistan will continue her support for the Arab
countries in fighting against Jewish Zionism.
Pakistan also made efforts to find a solution of the Iran-Iraq dispute. Pakistan was one of the members of
the peace committee set up by the Islamic Conference. Pakistani President visited Iranian and Iraqi capitals
several times alongwith other members of the peace committee to resolve dispute between the two
countries to end war but in vain.
Pakistan pursued an active foreign policy aimed at protecting her national security in the wake of continued
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and India’s domineering style, and_the stepped up American presence
in the region. Bilateralism, mutuality of interests, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, Pan-
Islamism, the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, economic development and the augmentation
of defence capability through international co-operation were emphasised as guiding principles. Pakistan
continued to identify with the principle of nonalignment although the drift toward America was quite
conspicuous.
The mutuality of interest in regional security and development between Pakistan and the US shaped their
multifaceted relations. The American government reiterated her support to Pakistan on several occasions.
President Reagan reaffirmed American commitment to Pakistan under the 1959 Mutual Security Pact.
When the Soviets issued a terse warning to Pakistan about her nuclear programme. The US government
advised the Soviet Union to keep her ”hands off Pakistan.” This was in
1986. The ongoing economic assistance and military sales programme initiated in 1981, entered her final
phase. In addition to the regular economic assistance, the US agreed to provide about eleven million dollars
for development of energy resources and another five million dollars for development activities in NWFP.
Two agreements for exchange of scholars (March 1985) and for enabling Pakistan to buy sensitive
technology (July
1986) were signed. Pakistan also received economic assistance from inter alia, West Germany, the EEC
and Italy. Aid to Pakistan Consortium
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comprising 21 governments and international credit institutions pledged 2.3 billion dollars which showed
an increase of 200 million over the 1984 allocation. The US, her western allies and the World Bank
continued to devote special attention to the development of Balochistan which included irrigation and
industrial development, improvement of means of communication (i.e. roads and airports) and extension of
harbour facilities fishing ports on the Makran Coast. These measures helped to stimulate Pakistani
economy and reduced economic pressure on the political system.
Pakistan continued to obtain sophisticated military equipment: which enhanced the defensive capability of
the three services. The supply of
40 F-16 aircraft was completed and negotiations were resumed for obtaining more of these or similar
aircraft in the future.
Pakistan’s relations with the Soviet Union ranged from bitter exchanges to sober and restrained interaction
in the backdrop of the Afghanistan crisis. The Soviets accused Pakistan of playing the American game in
Afghanistan and demanded that Pakistan should close down 100 ”training camps” which it had established
for training the Afghan insurgents. Their relations were also adversely affected by the assassination of
Soviet Assistant Military (Naval) Attache in Islamabad in September by a Pakistani national. The Soviet
reaction was extremely bitter and harsh in the wake of the incident. It was later proved that the assailant
was insane.
The Soviets also made a number of conciliatory gestures which indicated that they were gradually adopting
a relatively flexible position on the Afghanistan question. Gorbachev admitted that Afghanistan was a
”bleeding wound” for USSR. The Soviet government also communicated a timeframe for withdrawal in
four years and recalled six battalions from Afghanistan and the ultimate removal of Babrak Karmal from all
posts and the replacement of Shah Mohammad Dost as Foreign Minister were indicative of the new Soviet
mood. Pakistani Foreign Minister had a brief meeting with his Soviet counterpart during the UN General
Assembly session. The most dramatic gesture was made by Gorbachev during his visit to India where he
neither endorsed the Indian leadership’s anti-Pakistan tirade nor attacked American arms supply to
Pakistan. His statement that he favoured an independent and non-aligned status for Afghanistan was a
pleasant surprise.
The seventh round of the UN sponsored Geneva parleys on Afghanistan was spread over two sessions; May
5-23 and July 31 - August
8, 1986. Two sides agreed on three major issues which included (i) noninterference and non-intervention in
the internal affairs of Afghanistan (ii) international guarantees for non-interference and non-intervention
and (in)
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the safe return of Afghan refugees to their homes. However, there were serious disagreements on two inter-
related issues, viz, measures for effective implementation of the agreement and a timeframe for withdrawal
of Soviet troops and her inter-relationship with the above-mentioned three terms. The timeframe and
modalities for the withdrawal remained to be the major stumbling block in the finalization of the settlement
package.
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH ASIA
South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC), formerly launched at the Dhaka Summit of
the Heads of State/government in 1985, showed signs of life in 1986, by holding meetings, conferences,
workshops and training courses in areas of common interest. In addition to the meeting of the Standing
Committee comprising the Foreign Secretaries (August and November) the Council of Ministers (August
and November) and the second SAARC Summit (November), ten major meetings and workshops were
held. Some of the issues debated in these meetings and workshops included international economic issues
renewable energy sources, women in development, terrorism, drug trafficking, agriculture and rural
development, rural energy oceanic resources, and of training course for officers of postal services.
The second SAARC Summit held at Bangalore in November, 1986 provided an opportunity to the leaders
of South Asian states to sit together under one roof and deliberate on social, economic, cultural and
technological matters of mutual interest. They decided to set up a permanent SAARC secretariat at
Kathmandu and appointed Abdul Anhan of Bangladesh as the first Secretary-General.
The SAARC declaration reaffirmed commitment to promote peace, stability, amity and progress in the
region through strict adherence to the principles of the UN Charter and non-alignment. The member states
declared that they would work towards promoting welfare of the people, improve their quality of life,
accelerate economic growth, social development and provide opportunities to the people for a life with
dignity. Despite the expression of such noble sentiments, the discrepancies in the perceptions of the
member states, bilateral disputes between India and some of her neighbours, especially Pakistan and the
deep rooted mutual distrust proved to be the major obstacle to the realisation of the goals of SAARC.
These developments generated the hope that the two states would soon enter a new era in their relations and
India’s Prime Minister would be in a position to visit Pakistan in early Summer as agreed in December,
1985. However, this optimism proved short-lived. The anti-climax occurred
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in the last week of February and March, 1986 when India’s Foreign Minister B.R. Bhagat accused Pakistan
of involvement in the Sikh trouble in East Punjab and resented Pakistan’s expression of concern on
antiMuslim riots in India.
MUSLIM WORLD
Pakistan maintained the most cordial relations with the Muslim states and supported the Muslim cause and
especially the Palestinian rights on all international forums. Emphasising the urgent need of an end to the
Iran-Iraq war, Pakistan deplored the use of chemical weapons by Iraq. Pakistan’s relations with Iran and
Turkey expanded on bilateral level as well as within the framework of Economic Co-operation
Organisation. The ECO’s High Council held her 3rd session in 1985 at Islamabad which deliberated on
various measures for the achievement of self-reliance in agriculture, education, science and technology and
the related areas. Iranian President Khamenei’s visit to Pakistan in January 1986 and several reciprocal
visits of the cabinet members of the two countries added new dimensions and depth to their relations.
Pakistan was now obtaining 20,000 barrels of oil per day and some non-oil products from Iran. In return,
Iran began importing wheat, rice, textile products, canvas, jute bags and several other items. Turkey and
Pakistan signed a protocol to remove trade imbalance and expand economic co-operation. The Prime
Minister of Pakistan visited Turkey in July, 1986.
The Gulf has been the major area of interest for Pakistan. Since the early seventies Bilateral trade economic
and technological co-operation and relations in the fields of education, culture and security figured
prominently in Pakistan’s relation with these states. The remittances from the Pakistani manpower in these
states showed a downward trend and a few thousand Pakistani workers returned home but the overall
contribution of the ties with these states was quite significant to Pakistani economy. Pakistan also obtained
some assistance / loan from the Arab states and Islamic Development Bank. Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-
Nahayan President of the UAE gifted Rs. 300 million for ultra-modern Shaikh Zayed Medical Complex at
Lahore.
Pakistan participated in the 8th Summit conference of the Nonaligned Movement held at Harare in
September, 1986, and reaffirmed her faith in the principles of NAM. Other major themes of Pakistan’s
foreign policy in 1986 included support to the Palestinian national rights, antiapartheid struggle in South
Africa and Namibia including the independence for Namibia, withdrawal of foreign troops from Cambodia,
global disarmament including measures to check nuclear weapons proliferation,
FORF.IG.N POLICY OF PAKISTAN
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the designation of South Asia as a nuclear weapons free zone and the restructuring of the international
economic order.
Historically, Pakistan’s foreign policy was determined by two factors i.e. security and development. Threat
perceptions have been changing according to circumstances yet security has remained to be the cornerstone
of Pakistan’s foreign policy because of her peculiar geopolitical situation and historical background.
Pakistan had common border with two big powers i.e. Russia and China and also two unfriendly
neighbours i.e. India and Afghanistan. This situation naturally accentuated Pakistan’s security
consciousness from the very beginning. Strong Defence was therefore her first requirement. But Pakistan
could not afford to purchase armament from the world market due to her weak economic base and shortage
of resources. It also needed economic assistance for development. On the other hand, United States desired
Pakistan’s friendship for her long range interests in the area. As regards USSR., it established close
relations with India immediately after the independence. Secondly, Moscow was not in a position to meet
Pakistan’s requirements. The convergence of Pak-US interests, therefore, led to close relationship between
them and ultimately paved way for the Defence pacts. Obviously, convergence of interests is not a
permanent reality. Unlike Pak-China relations, Pak-US relations kept fluctuating according to the political
weather, injecting a permanent feeling of uncertainty in their friendship.
It should also be kept in mind that the foreign policy of a country is always an extension of her domestic
policy and is formulated by many factors such as history, ideology, geographical position, state structure,
ethos of the people and type of leadership. The security compulsions which shaped Pakistan’s foreign
policy in the past continued to determine Pakistan’s foreign policy strategies during the period 1985-88.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet presence on its border became Pakistan’s first concern.
India’s pressure, as usual necessitated skilful diplomacy. In addition to foreign pressure on Pakistan’s
external front pressure was also mounted on domestic front by the hostile foreign powers in the shape of
bomb blasts, air-attacks, sabotage activities and encouraging internal clashes. These activities were
intended to pressure the people and Government of Pakistan into accepting the terms offered by the Soviet
Union at Geneva. Hence domestic law and order situation remained directly linked with the foreign policy
of Pakistan during this period. Anyhow Pakistan’s resistance could not be weakened and she remained firm
on her principled stand regarding Afghanistan. Due to convergence of Indo-Soviet interests in this region,
Pakistan suspected Indian hand in her internal problems. As in the past, Pakistan maintained cordial and
friendly relations
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with China, USA Muslim countries and South Asian countries. She continued playing effective role in
UNO, NAM and SAARC.
PAK-US RELATIONS: CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS
Pak-US relations lacked warmth before 1979 because President Carter’s policy towards the Third World
was guided by the Brezezinski Doctrine of ”regional influential”. Hence Washington tried to develop
special relationship with India in this region, ignoring Pakistan’s interests. In 1979, two major
developments took place in this area which influenced Pakistan’s foreign policy as well as reactivated
American interests in Pakistan. Firstly, the Islamic revolution in Iran demolished American influence in
this area and she needed a foothold. Their first response to Iran was formation of Rapid Deployment Force.
Another development which caused major geopolitical transformation in this region and led to the revival
of American interests was the Soviet Military intervention in Afghanistan This situation also served the
interests of the Zia’s military regime in Pakistan which lacked popular domestic base and was faced with
hostile neighbours. It seized the opportunity created by the Afghanistan crisis to consolidate herself on
internal and external fronts.
Significant improvement was experienced in US-Pak relations especially during 1985-86 due to their
shared perceptions of the regional security environment in the backdrop of the Afghanistan problem. In
1985, the American administration reiterated her support to Pakistan and appreciated Pakistan’s
steadfastness against Soviet threats. Steady implementation of economic assistance programme initiated in
1981, was followed by an offer of one million tonnes of US wheat, economic assistance from World Bank
as well as assistance from consortium. Another important gesture was that the American Congress did not
apply cut on the administration’s aid proposal to Pakistan during 1986. In addition to some other weapons
and military hardware, Pakistan received 25, F-16 aircraft from USA in 1985 and remaining fifteen in
1986.
Although many important visits were exchanged and new six years Economic Assistance and Military
Sales Programme was approved by the Congress in December after delaying it for a few months yet some
irritants surfaced in US-Pak relations during the year 1987. The most important issue which created tension
and led to temporary suspension for the aid was Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme. Suddenly an impression
was built up in the American policy-making circles that either Pakistan had already acquired nuclear
capability or was going to do so very soon. Pakistanis believed that the international press made decisive
contribution in creating this impression. They further believed that India was involved in this campaign
605
because an Indian journalist, Kuldip Nayyar, alongwith a Pakistani journalist, interviewed Dr. Abdul
Qadeer, the Pakistani scientist, and the interview was released to the international press in a twisted form.
Consequently, US pressurised Pakistan to abandon her nuclear programme in response to which Pakistan
made it clear that she had no intention of producing nuclear weapons and that her programme was entirely
for peaceful purposes; mostly to overcome the energy crisis in Pakistan. She refused to sign the NPT
unilaterally as it required regional approach because India was not a signatory to it. This issue was raised
during Prime Minister Junejo’s visit to Washington in September, 1987. Junejo told President Reagan that
Pakistan ”does not have a capability of manufacturing nuclear weapons. You should accept my word”. He
tried hard to convince the Americans but could not succeed, at least apparently.
Pakistan wanted to obtain AWACS aircrafts from USA so that an airborne early warning system could be
established against regular intrusion by the Afghan air force. Washington recognised the genuineness of
Pakistan’s problem but refused to oblige her. They offered less sophisticated aircraft which was not
acceptable to Pakistan.
Suspension of American aid caused great resentment in Pakistan where pervious record of US friendship
was not credible. Rajiv’s reaction was typical. He said ”It would be a realistic step if temporary US
Congress action about suspension or aid to Pakistan be given a permanent shape”. In this background
restoration of American aid to Pakistan in December, 1987 was an important event. The Congress finally
approved $ 4.02 billion aid package with a two and half year waiver of a key nuclear non-proliferation law.
The new package required the American President to certify to Congress that Pakistan was not producing
highly enriched uranium. The aid was therefore, conditional and could be stopped at any time. However it
became clear that the aid was dependent upon American policy towards Afghanistan.
PAK-SOVIET UNEASY RELATIONS
Pakistan-Soviet relations had been under great stress since Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. No
improvement was noticed during 1985, though Zia visited Moscow in March, 1985 in connection with
Chemenko’s funeral and had a brief meeting with Gorbachev. As in the past, the Soviet government
continued employing pressure tactics and harassment campaign against Pakistan. The Soviets blamed
Pakistan for ”aiding and abetting” the insurgents in Afghanistan. The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister went
to the extent of saying that Pakistan was at war with the Soviet Union. It was followed by a statement of
Soviet ambassador to Pakistan in February
606
alleging that Pakistan was involved in an undeclared war against Afghanistan and that Pakistan had
established training camps for the Afghan freedom-fighters.
With the assumption of power by Gorbachev some positive changes were anticipated by the world press in
Soviet foreign policy especially towards Afghanistan problem. General speculation was that Gorbachev
would like to have honourable exit from Afghanistan apart from improving relations with the West.
Contrary to his predecessors Gorbachev gradually assumed reasonable and flexible posture on Afghanistan
issue. He openly admitted that Afghanistan was a bleeding wound for the USSR. Then the Soviet
government expressed her willingness to withdraw from Afghanistan in four years. It was followed by the
removal of Babrak Karmal and Shah Muhammad Dost. Some army battalions were also recalled. These
developments indicated positive change in the Soviet mood. The most important gesture, however, came
during Gorbachev’s visit to India when he ”neither endorsed the Indian leadership’s anti-Pakistan tirade nor
attacked American supply of arms to Pakistan”. These developments paved way for the visit of Pakistan’s
Foreign Secretary to Moscow in December,
1986 where the question of timeframe for withdrawal of Soviet army from Afghanistan was discussed. This
visit was reciprocated by the visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister in January, 1987.
In spite of strain on diplomatic front, trade relations remained cordial between the two countries. Two trade
agreements were signed in March, 1987. It was also agreed that goods worth 34 million dollars each way
would be exchanged between the two countries during 1988.
PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS AND GENEVA ACCORDS
The major achievement of Pakistan on the foreign policy front during this period was the signing of Geneva
Accord in April, 1988 which marked the end of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This was a major
achievement in the sense that: (i) it projected Pakistan as a nation capable of standing in the way of a super-
power’s designs: (ii) it projected Pakistan as a country with strong military and defence capability; in the
long range context, hostile Afghanistan was converted into a friendly country because the process initiated
by these developments was likely to establish a popularly elected government in Afghanistan which would
be under obligation to Pakistan. Thus Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan became secure and Pakistan also
got strategic depth which is important for any future eventuality.
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Background of the Afghanistan problem has already been discussed elsewhere in this book. As regards
settlement of the problem, in spite of the international support, endorsement of Pakistan’s stand by the UN,
NAM, OIC, EEC, and gesture shown by the Soviet Union, settlement of the Afghanistan problem could not
be achieved till April, 1988. During these years, Pakistan had been demanding withdrawal of the Soviet
troops, restoration of non-aligned status of Afghanistan and safe repatriation of Afghanistan refugees.
Issues involved in this problem had already been analysed including Soviet apprehensions and guarantees
or non-interference in Afghanistan. As usual, the United Nations passed resolutions in 1986 and
1987 supporting political settlement of the problem on the lines indicated above by 122 and 123 votes
respectively. Geneva parleys also continued. In the seventh round held in May and July 1986, the two sides
agreed on noninterference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, international guarantees for non-
interference and safe return of refugees. However, the real differences were regarding the effective
implementation of the agreement and timeframe of withdrawal.
The 8th Geneva talks round were held in February-March, 1987, in which composition of Afghanistan
government and procedure for withdrawal were discussed. The Soviets offered 18 months withdrawal
period whereas Pakistan suggested 6 to 7 months period. In the September round of Geneva talks. Moscow
suggested sixteen months and Pakistan was willing to accept eight months’ period. However, the deadlock
continued on the timeframe issue. But an encouraging outcome of the YaqubShevardnadze meeting in New
York in September, 1987, was the indication that the Soviets would drop the pre-condition of a coalition
government to setting a date for withdrawal. After the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in December 1987,
Soviet Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze visited Kabul and US Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Armacost visited Islamabad in December, 1987, and January, 1988, respectively. The period beginning
1987 to April 1988, witnessed unprecedented diplomatic activity and indicated the genuine desire of the
concerned parties to conclude an agreement on Afghanistan issue because Soviet Union as well as Pakistan
were under pressure to resolve the conflict. In February 1988, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister visited
Islamabad. Then Gorbachev made a dramatic announcement yielding more ground in meeting Pak-US
terms for a settlement. He also announced May 15 as the withdrawal date in case agreement was reached at
Geneva. Final and longest round of Geneva talks was held in March, followed by Tashkent Declaration by
Afghan-Soviet authorities saying that all obstacles had been removed. Finally, the Geneva accord was
signed on April 14, 1988.
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The Geneva accord, consisting of four instruments, envisaged relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan
on the principles of noninterference and non-intervention, international guarantees by USA and USSR,
return of refugees and inter-relationship for the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan. The
accord also provided for arrangements with the United Nations for the implementation of the agreement.
The concept of symmetry was also accepted which meant that both the super-powers would continue arms
supplies to the respective parties.
The accord was welcomed almost all over the world because after Vietnam, this was the first time that a
super-power decided to withdraw from a war to which it was deeply committed. The Geneva accord was
not a treaty imposed on anyone after defeat; it was a road map to sensible destination of international
understanding. Then the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Junejo said that ”no better agreement could be wrested
under the given circumstances”. Most of the analysts reacted favourably to the accord and remarked that
the time to mend fences with the Soviet Union had arrived. It provided an opportunity to Pakistan to pursue
her policy of nonalignment and to improve economic relations with the USSR. On the whole, the Geneva
accord was expected to meet the legitimate interests of all the concerned parties. Withdrawal of Soviet
army from Afghanistan coincided with the security needs of Pakistan and the regional interests of US.
The question of costs to Pakistan of her involvement in the Afghan conflict has been widely discussed in
the Pakistani press. Large number of apprehensions were expressed in the beginning regarding serious risks
involved in hostility with a super-power. Drug trafficking, Klashnikov culture and bomb blasts were
attributed to it. Zia was also blamed for using Afghan problem for strengthening his political position. On
the other hand, the advantages included economic and military assistance which went a long way in
modernising Pakistan’s armed forces. Perhaps, an important gain was the emergence of Pakistan as an
influential state in the Asian region. Pakistan had acquired support and prestige due to her role in the
Afghan war.
However, the major criticism against Geneva accord was that it would fail to achieve her basic purposes.
Due to symmetry, both the superpowers would continue providing weapons to the warring parties. As a
result, neither peace nor stability would be achieved, nor Afghan refugees would return to their homeland.
Pakistan was also blamed for her failure to resolve the issue relating to the formation of provisional
government in Kabul.
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As expected, both the super-powers started blaming each other for violation of accord soon after signing it.
Moscow blamed US for providing weapons to the Afghan Mujahideen followed by a Soviet threat ”to slow
down the pullout”. As a matter of fact, seeds of conflict were present in the accord as supply of arms to
both the parties was legalised and made part of the accord. Above all, the Afghan Mujahideen, also felt
frustrated as the accord fell short of their expectations. Naturally so because they considered themselves to
be the victor. Though they claimed that the Najib government would be defeated and overthrown soon yet
they made it clear that the accord would neither end the war nor ensure return of the refugees. The accord
was also rejected by the Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen.
PAK-CHINA RELATIONS
Sino-Pakistan relations are an excellent example of shared perceptions on important issues and dependable
friendship based on principles. Both the countries maintain regular contact, adding new dimensions to their
friendship. Periodic consultation is a regular feature. Hence Pak-Chinese friendship continued her steady
march towards greater understanding and warmth. Throughout this period China extended wholehearted
support to Pakistan on Afghanistan crisis. Several trade and cultural delegations were exchanged which
contributed to expansion in trade. Prime Minister of Pakistan visited China in November 1985. China
extended an interest free loan amounting to 27 million US dollars and also helped Pakistan in modernising
of the Heavy Mechanical Complex at Taxila during the year 19g7. Negotiations were also started for
setting up a small tractors production plant Under a protocol signed in May, 1987. Karachi shipyard was
required to fabricate two heavy cargo ships for China.
China’s willingness to transfer Modern technology in defence industry to Pakistan is an evidence of their
trusted friendship. In order to make Pakistan self-sufficient in arms production. China made the most
outstanding contribution in setting up the Heavy Rebuild Factory and Kamra Aeronautical Complex. With
the assistance of China. Pakistan Ordnance Factory at Wah also started producing anti-aircraft guns.
Pakistan signed a contract with China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corporation
in November 1985, for setting-up Heavy Electric Complex in Frontier Province for which China would
provide the technical assistance as well as foreign exchange component amounting to Rs. 27.3 million. Thjs
project would help Pakistan in overcoming the power shortage problem.
The Karakoram Highways popularly known as Silk Route, is a living example of durable friendship
between the two countries. Large
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number of delegations exchange visits every year by using this route constructed with the blood of Chinese
and Pakistani engineers.
Chinese Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang, was given very warm welcome when he visited Pakistan in June,
1987. Earlier he had visited Pakistan in June, 1981 and it was after fifteen years that the Chinese head of
the government had paid visit to Pakistan. As in the past the communique issued in 1987 reflected complete
identity of views on all important issues. In short, trade, cultural, military and diplomatic exchanges with
China during 1987 outnumbered exchanges with any other country.
INDO-PAK RELATIONS
Indo-Pak relations have always been marked with uncertainty and simultaneous pursuance of positive and
negative interactions. In spite of the expression of good intentions and noble sentiments for each other by
both the countries, there have remained deep-seated apprehensions and historical experience which shape
their outlook on each others. That is why except for short period when Janata was the ruling party in India,
Indo-Pak relations have never been stable. Therefore history of Indo-Pak relations is a story of mutual
distrust and disharmony.
During 1985 large number of visits were exchanged including the visit of foreign secretary, foreign
minister as well as meetings of IndoPakistan joint Ministerial Commission were held. Direct dialling
system was introduced and the Sikh hijackers held in Pakistani jail were put on trial yet bickering continued
on the front of Indo-Pak relations.
Historically, three issues were considered by the Indians to be the obstacles in the way of normalisation
between India and Pakistan. Firstly, Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. Secondly, Pakistan’s acquisition of
American arms. Thirdly, Pakistan’s unwillingness to accept India’s hegemony in this region. Especially
after the Indo-Pak war of 1971 followed by Indian atomic explosion in 1974. India considered herself as
the regional superpower having the right of interference in the affairs of South Asian countries. It was
known as Indira’s Doctrine and was applied on Sri Lanka. Contrary to this concept, Pakistan believed in
sovereign equality.
Other differences which emerged during these years and complicated the normalisation process were
Pakistan’s peaceful nuclear programme, Siachin Glacier issue and Indian accusation that Pakistan was
aiding and abetting Sikh insurgents.
Indian campaign against Pakistan’s nuclear programme had mounted since 1981 and it reached her
crescendo in 1985 when Rajiv
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visited Soviet Union. US, France and other countries had accused Pakistan of manufacturing nuclear
weapons. In 1984, the Reagan administration testified before the US Congress that the Indian military had
presented Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with a plan for a Military strike against the Kahuta facility. Earlier
Subramanyam, member of the Indian Parliament, also disclosed in an interview to daily Muslim Islamabad,
during his visit to Pakistan that Israel had prepared a plan to attack Kahuta. He said that the Israeli
authorities had requested the Indian government for certain facilities to implement this scheme. In this
perspective, there were press speculations in Pakistan regarding the Israeli attack on Kahuta in collusion
with India.
In the backdrop of these tensions and developments. President Zia’s visit to India on his way back from
Maldives in December 1985, was a positive move which went a long way in easing the situation. The visit
was deliberately kept at low key by India. President of Pakistan was neither received nor seen off by his
Indian counterpart. Zia-Rajiv meeting produced many agreements leading to expansion of economic and
cultural relations. The most important development was the mutual agreement not to attack each other’s
nuclear installations. Hence this meeting generated hopes and expectations.
During 1986 talks and meetings between senior officials and political leaders of both the countries were
held on issues relating to political relations, trade, Siachen Glacier and the Khokrapar route. Apart from an
agreement on co-operation in agricultural research, another accord relating to the modalities of the accord
not to attack each other’s nuclear installations was also signed. Optimism created by these developments
proved to be short-lived, as usual, because Rajiv’s proposed visit to Pakistan was postponed, followed by
Indian Foreign Minister’s accusation that Pakistan was involved in the Sikh trouble in East Punjab. India
also resented Pakistan’s expression of concern on anti-Muslim riots in India in which large number of
Muslims were killed. Many other complaints such as construction of airports in Azad Kashmir and alleged
involvement of Pakistan in an attempt on Rajiv’s life in October, 1986 were made by India and rejected by
Pakistan. Pakistan also expressed her concern on India’s anti-Pakistan propaganda concentration of Indian
troops on Pakistan borders, construction of a barrage on the Wullar Lake (Jhelum River) and India’s
involvement in troubles in Sindh. These complaints and countercomplaints only revealed deep seated
distrust between the two neighbours which formed part of their legacy of the past. In this background it was
illogical to expect change of hearts in spite of many visits and efforts made by Zia and Junejo which only
served as a temporary device for diffusing tension. Therefore, Prime Minister Junejo’s visit to Bangalore in
November
1986 in connection with SAARC Summit where he also met the Indian
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Prime Minister could not create favourable climate for normalisation process. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister
Yaqoob Ali rightly stated in the Parliament on April 27, 1987 that the impetus in the Indo-Pak contact
which had generated hope for a new chapter in their relations received a serious set-back due to unfounded
doubts expressed by India regarding Pakistan’s involvement in their domestic troubles. He also referred to
Pakistan’s proposal for cut in the defence budget and implementation of nonaggression agreement the
proposal made to India in response to their propaganda against Pakistan’s nuclear programme. Instead of
giving favourable consideration to Pakistani proposals, India enhanced her defence budget by 43 percent
and acquired sophisticated weapons, war planes, missiles etc from abroad. It is interesting to note that the
increase of 3 billion dollars in the defence budget of India for 1987-88 was higher than the total defence
budget of Pakistan which stood at 2.6 billion dollars.
In January, 1987 India concentrated army on Pakistan’s border which created a provocative situation.
Dialogue at the level of Defence and Foreign Secretaries led to de-escalation of tension at least for the time
being. President Zia took the initiative and arrived in India in February for two days private visit to witness
the Cricket match. The visit was described as cricket diplomacy by the media. His meeting with Rajiv led
to relaxation of situation. As stated earlier, these meetings and exchanges between India and Pakistan did
not change the basic pattern of relationship. However, they did create short-lived but positive results and
helped in averting awkward situations. Rajiv again made hard hitting statements against Pakistan’s nuclear
programme during his visit to US which were designed to disrupt Pak-US relations including US assistance
to Pakistan.
The beginning of 1988 witnessed the repetition of the same old story. Rajiv’s public statements assumed
threatening tone. During his foreign tour to Syria and Germany. Rajiv alleged that Pakistan was making
nuclear bomb, stockpiling arms and encouraging terrorism in India. In his speech in the General Assembly
of UNO, Rajiv repeated these charges and adopted a militant stance.
Indian charges of encouraging Sikh terrorism had been repeatedly denied by the Government of Pakistan.
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Yaqoob Ali, issued strong denial of this allegation during his visit to China in
June, 1988 but it did not make any impact. President Zia, during his address in an international Seminar in
Islamabad on 28 June also called upon the Indian leaders to resume serious dialogue with Pakistan on
issues of peace and regional security. He warned that smaller nations did not necessarily have a smaller
right to sovereignty.
Problem relating to Pakistan’s support to Sikh terrorists discussed at all levels between India and Pakistan,
led to an agreement to start joint patrolling of the border as well as building of fence by India. Accordingly,
barbed wire fence was erected by India and border was closed. These precautions should have allayed
Indian apprehensions. But it did not happen.
LAUNCHING OF SAARC
An important development in this field during 1985 was the formal launching of South Asian Association
for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) on 7-8 December at Dhaka where heads of the state/ government of
the seven South Asian countries met for the first time for this purpose. The Organisation was proposed by
President Ziaur-Rehman of Bangladesh in May, 1980. It was established for promoting the welfare of the
people of South Asia improving their quality of life, accelerating economic growth and socio-economic
development. The SAARC charter envisages equality of sovereignty of member states, respect for their
territorial integrity, political independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. The
charter lays down that decisions would be taken unanimously. Bilateral and contentious problems shall not
be taken up. The Charter also promises to eliminate the atmosphere of suspicion from this region.
RELATIONS WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD
”Stretching right from Morocco to Mauritania in the extreme north of the Dark continent to shiny shores of
Malaysia and Indonesia in the extreme south of the Indian Ocean,” there is a continuous chain of more than
fifty Muslim countries. Most of them are linked with each other like loops of a chin. In spite of the ethnic
diversity, these countries are bound with each other through common faith, religion and culture. Due to her
geographical position, Pakistan occupies the status of a gateway to the Muslim world.
Historically, Pakistan had closer relations with Iran and Turkey which had formed RCD many years ago.
The pattern or relationship was disturbed after the exit of Shah of Iran. However, the three countries
realised the need for close collaboration in the economic field and decided to form Economic Co-operation
Organisation which held her first meeting of the High Council in Tehran in January, 1985. The high council
discussed the scope and functions of the organisation and set up four committees to promote co-operation
in the economic, technical and industrial, agriculture and education-scientific research fields. Regular
meeting of the high council was held in July, which reaffirmed the determination of three countries to
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promote co-operation in the four areas of mutual interests. Third meeting of the high council, held at
Islamabad in 1986, reviewed the progress made in different sectors and led to expansion of relations on
bilateral level. Pakistan imported oil from Iran and exported wheat, rice, textile products etc. to Iran.
Iranian President’s visit to Pakistan followed by reciprocal visits at ministerial level added new dimensions
to Pak-Iran relations which lacked warmth after the beginning of Khomeini era in Iran.
Gulf states have been the area of major interest for Pakistan since early seventies when Pakistani labour
was exported to these countries which made a substantial contribution towards foreign exchange earning of
Pakistan. However, remittances from these countries showed downward trend as the workers returned
home. Pakistan obtained loan from Arab States and Islamic Development Bank. On the other hand,
Pakistan’s relations with Libya suffered a set-back because it extended lukewarm support to Libya during
her conflict with USA in 1985 and 1986. It created an impression as if Pakistan was under the influence of
pro-America Arab States which offeneded other radical and anti-America Muslim countries.
Pakistan kept up her non-partisan posture in the Iran-Iraq war urging both sides to cease-fire and to
negotiate for settlement of differences. Meanwhile, meeting of ECO’s high council and other committees
were held which reviewed progress, explored prospects of better economic, relations and considered ways
and means to boost trade. Turkey and Pakistan signed a memorandum of understanding in March, 1987 for
collaboration in defence production which was re-affirmed by President Zia during his visit to Turkey in
October 1987. Third meeting of Pak-Iran Joint Ministerial Commission, held at Islamabad in October led to
increase in two-way trade.
Pakistan maintained her historical warmth and cordiality for Saudi Arabia. President and Prime Minister of
Pakistan paid many visits to Saudi Arabia during this period. Saudi government did not renew the contracts
of several Pakistani army personnel serving there. However, a large number of Pakistanis are still working
in Saudi Arabia.
Pakistan maintained very close relations with Jordan. President Zia’s fifth visit to Amman in October,
1987, further strengthened the friendship and led to expansion of private sector collaboration in joint
venture projects. Jordan has all along maintained fraternal ties with Pakistan. They have always stood by
each other in times of crisis. PakistanJordan friendship is deeply embedded in history.
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4. FOREIGN POLICY IN 1990s
The trends currently visible in the foreign policy of Pakistan stem out of the wholesale changes that took
place in the last two years of the last decade. The years of 1989 and 1990 were turbulent to the extent that
developments taking place during this period virtually changed the complexion of the world. Pakistan like
any other country of the world was affected by those changes. Pakistan, responding to the new realities
rephrased her objectives in relations with other countries and there occurred a fundamental change in the
approach to realise these objectives.
Pakistan’s relations with US, warmed by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, did not keep the same note
as there was a marked change in the American outlook concerning Pakistan’s role in her foreign policy
with the Afghan issue settled. US policy had achieved her basic aim behind a revived relationship with
Pakistan. Moreover, with the collapse of Soviet Union. Pakistan was no more a front-line state. This
development completely changed the international political and security system. With these developments,
the controversies regarding Pakistan’s policies directly opposite to those of US began to surface. Following
US experience in the Gulf War the US was now ever more eager to put an end to the arms proliferation and
specially the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Till 1989 the US president had been issuing a certificate to-
the Congress about Pakistan’s nuclear innocence. But now the US outrightly demanded a rollback of the
nuclear programme. Failing to comply Pakistan had to suffer aid cut-off under the Pressler Amendment. In
October 1991, Secretary of State James Baker told Pakistani Foreign Minister that further aid package
would not materialise unless Pakistan gave substantial evidence about the nonexistence of a Pakistani
nuclear device. ”International donors also cut the aid to Pakistan for 1991 which slumped to $2.3 billion, $
Ib less than 1990 figures. Japan and other donors from Europe also expressed dissatisfaction over
Pakistan’s nuclear pursuits. The US even sought to penalise Pakistan for not yielding to the US pressure on
this issue. It stopped the supply of F-16 jet fighters for which Pakistan had already paid to the US. The
lease for US frigates under use of Pakistan navy was not renewed. USA’s final action in regard to the
nuclear issue came in September 1993 when the US imposed sanctions against China and Pakistan on
alleged transfer of M-ll missiles to Pakistan labelling it a violation of the MTCR (Missile Technology
Control Regime). Other irritant in the Pak-US relations has been the Indian factor. US has till recently
blamed Pakistan of supporting terrorism in Kashmir and Indian East Punjab. This issue though linked with
other issues specially the nuclear pregamme in her essence was to bring grave’implications for Pakistan, as
Pakistan was feared to be enlisted with other ”terrorist” states of the world.
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The other issues further straining the relations have been the menace of drug trafficking and situation of
human rights in Pakistan Relations in 1993, were also soured by the evidence that Pakistani authorities
were involved in illegal emigration to the US in the PIA planes. This problem went to the extent that at one
time, the US was considering ban on PIA flights to her airports. Later, the USA has shown better sense in
looking at South Asia in a proper perspective. USA linked the issue of nuclear proliferation in the region
with the resolution of outstanding issues between India and Pakistan and the major focus is going to be on
Kashmir.
Pakistan’s relations with India have been a cornerstone in Pakistan’s foreign policy. Since 1989, situation
in the occupied Kashmir had been deteriorating. Pakistan kept supporting on moral and political grounds
the just cause of the Kashmiri people for their fundamental rights to self-determination. India in early 1990
tried to impose war on Pakistan but due to the US reports that Pakistan had developed a nuclear arsenal and
any showdown could lead to a disastrous confrontation, India refrained from undertaking such an
adventure. India’s persistent refusal to accede to the just demand of Kashmiris and instead charging
Pakistan of providing military support further strained their relations. Intensifying her vociferous
propaganda campaign against Pakistan, India broke off all talks with Pakistan in December 1990. The
relations were further strained by the sacrilege of Babri Mosque at the hands of fanatic Hindus which
Pakistan took as a violation of the Liaquat-Nehru Pact of 1951 safeguarding the fundamental rights of
minorities in both countries. The issue of nuclear proliferation also figured out in mutual relations as India
continued accusing Pakistan of making the bomb and declined all Pakistani proposals to declare South Asia
a nuclear free-zone. The 5 proposals put forth by Pakistani Prime Minister in 1991 were dubbed by India as
Pakistan desire to be treated at par with India which had a different perspective of the nuclear issue and saw
it in a broader international perspective. Compelled by the awkward situation in the occupied Kashmir,
India was forced to resume talks. Besides Kashmir, both countries entered into the secretary-level parleys
regarding Siachen and Wullar Barrage. Pakistan had been demanding the withdrawal of forces from the
Siachen as envisaged by the
1989 understanding between the two countries. The site of Wullar Barrage in the meantime was attacked by
the Kashmiri Mujahideen and all existing installations were destroyed. However, India used these issues as
bargaining chips in exchange of status quo on Kashmir. The Indians ditched in an awkward situation in
Kashmir were compelled to agree to talks in late 1993. Partly also due to the US pressure, India seems to
have realised the genuine nature of the Kashmiri uprising. At the Dhaka ministerial conference, both
countries agreed to resume the Secretary-level talks on Kashmir from January 1, 1994. Both countries
continued to play an active role in the
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affairs of SAARC. Indian refusal to withdraw her ”peacekeeping” force from Sri Lanka strained the
relations between the two countries and it was Pakistan which helped to defuse this situation. Both
countries however tended to support all joint programmes envisaged under the aegis of SAARC.
Pakistan’s trusted relationship with China touched over higher peaks of mutual friendship and co-operation.
In 1989 due to the visible Sino-Indian rapprochement, it was being felt that Pakistan may suffer a relative
loss of Chinese support which it had traditionally been banking upon. But later as developments unfolded
Pakistan and China entered into a relationship based upon even closer proximity of perceptions. China
continued supporting Pakistan on Kashmir issue. On Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif s visit to China in early
1992, Chinese co-operation in defence production was enhanced as both countries agreed on transfer
technology to Pakistan in the field of aviation, tank-building as well as development of medium range
missiles. This generous offer from China helped Pakistan to a great deal in her security arrangements
crippled by the aid cut off from the USA. Moreover, the transfer of technology; a hall-mark of Chinese
assistance helped Pakistan to develop an indigenous defence production infrastructure. The development of
MBT-200 Al-Khalid and the training aircraft Karakoram 2 are manifestations of this trend. China also
continued financing various development programmes like the Sandak Project in Sindh and the Hub Power
Project. China has kept defiant to all western and US pressurs in the context of transfer of technology. The
Chinese President reciprocating the Prime Minister’s visit, highlighted this extended cooperation and
reflected the resolve of both countries to promote joint ventures. Pakistan and China also enhanced the
volume of border trade through the Khanjrab Pass to about worth $2.3 m compared to the previous year’s.
In the changed global scenario, Pakistan’s relations with China are of great significance because in the new
global security perception, the USA has shown a distinct tendency to portray China as a major destabilizing
factor for US interests in the region. Thus Pak-China relationship has acquired ever more significant status
in the context of South Asian affairs in particular and the global affairs in general.
In the year 1991, an important development in the north west of Pakistan occurred when the Soviet empire
virtually collapsed leading to the independence of the Central Asian Muslim Republics of Uzbekistan,
Kyrgystan, Azerbijan, Khazakhistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. This development opened new vistas of
co-operation at inter-Islamic level. These countries were soon inducted into the fold of ECO. This major
development occurred when at the first Summit meeting in Tehran (16-17 February,
1992) of the heads of state of ECO countries joined by their Central Asian
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Counterparts the pioneer members of ECO expressed a firm resolve to develop the Organisation into a
viable economic bloc. At the ministerial meeting at Islamabad on 28 November, 1992 the ECO’s promise
of becoming a major vehicle for regional co-operation was geared towards reality by agreeing upon various
projects envisaging enhanced co-operation as later outlined in the understanding reached at the Ashkabad
Summit.
Pakistan considered the situation of Afghanistan as major obstacle in promoting expanded level of
interaction with these states. She has tried to help the Afghans reach a viable peace within Afghanistan
eversince the conclusion of the Geneva Accord of 1988. Pakistan denounced the Najib regime’s offers for a
shared approach on the Afghan imbroglio and continued to support the efforts of Mujahideen to establish a
peaceful acceptable and viable arrangement for Afghanistan. Pakistan also helped the Afghans to sort out
major differences after the fall of Najibullah and used good offices towards the conclusion of the Peshawar
Accord of April, 1992. Later, as differences deepened between the Prime Minister Hykmatyar and Prof.
Rabbani the President of Pakistan initiated a patch up which finally culminated into the conclusion of what
was later to be known as the Islamabad Agreement of March, 1993. Meanwhile, Pakistan also helped ease
the simmering conflict situation at the Afghan-Tajik border and pledged her role to both parties in reaching
an amicable settlement. Towards the end of 1993 the struggle for power inside Afghanistan led to another
episode in the conflict which marred internal scenario of Afghanistan. The Pakistan government sent the
foreign minister to Afghanistan on a peace mission.
Pakistan’s relations with other Muslim countries also kept an advancing pace. Pakistan reacted very
cautiously to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Although later on Pakistan sent troops to join the Allied forces
yet peace efforts by Pakistan focused on the search for a peaceful settlement of the issue. The notice of the
bombing of civilians in Iraq by the Allied planes, demanded immediate stopping of the hostilities. As
for the rebuilding of the war-ravaged Kuwait, Pakistan offered help in terms of manpower. After the war
when peace was being negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians, Pakistan emphasized the need for a
solution acceptable to the Palestinians. Even after the conclusion of the peace agreement of September
1993 Pakistan did not recognise Israel as it was in Pakistan’s view an illegal state. Pakistan also maintained
close ties with other Muslim countries. It strengthened the already existing ties with Iran and Turkey under
the ambit of ECO. Pakistan offered generous aid to Bangladesh in the
1991 cyclone and the visit of Begum Khaleda Zia explored further avenues of mutual co-operation
specially in the field of industries. Pakistan has been vocal in her unqualified support for the Bosnian
Muslims under the threat of
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extinction at the hands of Serbs. Pakistan not only convened the conference of QIC foreign ministers but
also offered to send her troops to relieve the poor Bosnians of their miserable plight as a part of the UN
sponsored peace force. Pakistan condemned the atrocities let loose by the Serbs and also initiated proposals
for establishing the UN war-crime commission to investigate into charges against humanity by the Serbs.
Repeatedly Pakistan emphasized the conclusion of peace which is acceptable to the Bosnians. The
President of Bosnia visited Pakistan and Pakistan offered to settle some
2600 Bosnian refugees in Pakistan. The first batch of these refugees arrived in Pakistan in mid-1993.
At various regional and international organisations, Pakistan played an active role. Pakistan attended the
Commonwealth Summit of Harare and Limasole with an active participation in deliberations on various
issues. In developing a functional co-operation at SAARC level Pakistan’s efforts cannot be over-
emphasized. Pakistan since January 1993 has been a member of the UN Security Council. Throughout the
year Pakistan played a vital role in all UN efforts to diffuse tensions, resolve the problems and promotion
of co-operation and stability in various parts of the world. As regards UN peace missions, Pakistan sent her
troops to Somalia to join UNOSOM and a Pakistani batch oversaw elections in Cambodia in the summer of
1993 under the UNTAC.
In the sphere of foreign policy the government of Pakistan attached greater emphasis with the Kashmir
question. The Prime Minister herself visited China and N. Korea and both the countries supported
Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. To project the issue on the international front, Pakistan sent delegations to
various countries of the world. Pakistan also tabled a resolution calling for censure of India on human
rights violation at the UNHRC (UN Human Rights Commission). Though it was withdrawn later on, the
resolution contributed a lot to Pakistan’s policy to propagate Indian brutalities let loose on Kashmiri
people. Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan suffered a set-back in the aftermath of the bus hijacking
incident in 1994 which culminated the closure of Pakistan’s mission in Kabul following the attack of
violent demonstrators in the backlash of the hijacking episode.
Pakistan however, kept trying for a peaceful settlement of the power struggle among warring Afghan
factions. Pakistan supported all endeavours made by the UN envoy Mahmood Misteri and the QIC
Secretary-General Hamid Al-Ghabid. The prime minister on June 30, 1994 undertook a visit to Ireland and
England to seek support on Kashmir issue. On July 15, 1994 the PM declared that Pakistan would not give
up its unclear programme until the solution of Kashmir problem. Pakistan on July
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16, 1994 also started talks with India on a Code of Conduct for diplomats. Pakistan also welcomed the
switching over to black rule in South Africa. A diplomatic success was achieved when on August 9, 1994,
Pakistan was granted membership to the Association of Commonwealth Parliamentarians. In the nuclear
field, Pakistan re-affirmed its resolve to make S. Asia a nuclear free zone but not to accept any
discriminatory treatment. The prime minister also attended the World Conference on Population in Cairo
on September 6. 1994 where she supported planned parenthood. The delegates at the OIC Foreign
Ministers Conference in Islamabad (September 7-9, 1994) at which stress was laid on solidarity in the
Ummah besides reaching understanding on various international issues. The following visit of Mr. Ghali to
Pakistan on September 8, 1994 provided useful opportunity for discussing various issues of international
and global interest with special reference to Pakistan’s role in the peacekeeping operations of the UNO.
Pakistan once again moved a resolution on human rights violations in December 1994 at the UNHRC in
Geneva but withdrew it before it was to be voted upon. A major development in the Pak-US relations
occurred with the visit of Mr. William Perry, the Under Secretary of State, on January 11, 1995. The two
countries agreed to revive the Consultative Group formed in 1984 to devise the modus operandi for
provision of aid keeping in view restrictions imposed by the Pressler’s Amendment. On the Kashmir front,
Pakistan at the OIC Summit in Casablanca (January 7-9,
1995) managed another unanimous resolution on human rights violations and demand for plebiscite in
Kashmir. Although not on agenda during Mr. Perry’s visit the nuclear issue also figured out in the informal
talks with special reference to the US policy towards the 1995 NPT review conference. The prime
minister visited the Philippines to attend a moot on climate changes from Feb., 19 to 20 where she
underlined the need for understanding global issue in the cultural perspective. She advocated to follow the
West in its liberal traditions but cautioned against adopting its moral values. After the induction of the
Taliban factor in the Afghan embroglio, Pakistan supported the UN policy and the efforts of the UN envoy
Mahmood Misteri, on diplomatic mission since February 12, 1995 to help the Afghan leaders reach some
sort of understanding on peaceful transfer of power before paying the way for elections.
PAKISTAN AND PERSIAN GULF
The presence of American military forces compels Pakistan to pay attention to the Persian Gulf, however,
much Pakistan would like to avoid entangling itself in the complex politics of the region. About six years
after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the American war in the Gulf to liberate
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Kuwait, the region remains volatile and unstable as ever. Pakistan can continue to ignore the importance of
the Gulf only at the risk of hurting its own interests.
During the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, Pakistan’s foreign policy was paralysed by contradictory pulls and
pressures. Islamabad was uncomfortably ambivalent on all the political issues that were thrown up by the
Gulf War. When the Bush administration unleashed one of the largest post-World War II operations in
Pakistan’s neighbourhood, Islamabad vacillated between political condemnation of the United States and
hesitant co-operation with its military operations.
The core of the American strategy towards the Gulf, ”dual containment” ~ the simultaneous isolation of
Iran and Iraq - had increasingly become untenable. For years before the Gulf War, the US took advantage
of the rivalry between the two largest powers of the region -•* Tehran and Baghdad. It sought to ensure that
neither State became too strong to dominate the Gulf, nor too weak leading to the creation of a power
vacuum and imbalance. It was this balance of power logic that restrained the Bush administration from
going all-out to oust Saddam Hussain in the final stages of the war. A fragmentation of Iraq at the end of
the war, the US feared, would make Iran the dominant power.
The Clinton administration moved away from the delicate balance of power strategy towards a containment
of both Iran and Iraq. Declaring that both countries posed threats to Gulf security and that neither can be
depended upon to ensure stability in the region, Washington began to squeeze both Iraq and Iran, the
former through the United Nations system and the latter through unilateral sanctions. The US moved from
being an external balancer in the Gulf to the sole underwriter of Gulf security.
While the moderate Arab states might not be unhappy to see Saddam Hussain pulled down a peg or two by
the US, they find it difficult to endorse the American military acts against a fellow Arab state that is
intervening in its own territory. Meanwhile the American assumptions about the stability of the Gulf region
are beginning to unravel as many of them begin to confront popular discontent within their nations.
The American efforts to build a regional security system in the Gulf have largely failed. The collapse of the
six-plus-two formula aimed at uniting Egypt and Syria with six-nations of the Gulf Co-operation Council
(GCC) is symptomatic of the problems in establishing a stable framework of regional security co-operation
in the Gulf. The GCC is itself deeply
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divided on a number of issues and does not have the strategy coherence to serve as the bedrock of security
in the region.
PRIME MINISTER MIR ZAFARULLAH JAMALI’S VISIT TO GULF COUNTRIES
Prime Minister of Pakistan Mir Zafarullah Jamali visited four Gulf countries in the last week of January,
2003. It was the first visit of Pakistani Prime Minister to these countries, since 1991 Gulf war. Prime
Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali visited U.A.E., Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain one by one. The Prime
Minister got the first opportunity to interact with leaders of such a large number of Gulf countries in one go
and developed a kind of personal rapport with them.
The visit was aimed to get a first hand view of the Gulf States, opinion and stand on the Iraq crisis. The
Prime Minister also got an opportunity to explain Pakistan’s stand point on the issue of Iraq. What the
Prime Minister underlined repeatedly during his deliberations with leaders of the Gulf States, was that Iraqi
people should not suffer any more and complete annihilation of Iraq in the war would damage the Muslim
Ummah as a whole. His deep concern was to resolve the crisis amicably and avert a war that was bound to
threaten the international peace and security. He gave clear message to Saddam Hussain to quit and leave
Iraq to obviate the catastrophe.
The main objective of Mir Zafarullah Jamali’s visit to the Gulf countries was to personally convey to them
that Pakistan was not oblivious to the alarming situation at their door steps, and was prepared to make any
contribution to steer the region out of the prevailing crisis. The Prime Minister also emphasized that Iraq
must fully comply with the UNSC resolutions for elimination of weapons of mass destruction to avert a
war. He also pointed out that any inevitable military attack against Iraq should be within the UN
framework.
During the visit various bilateral issues were discussed to enhance mutual cooperation in various fields.
Many leaders and ministers representing different fields in the Gulf countries pledged to visit Pakistan in
the near future, which will help in strengthening bilateral relations. Pakistan may succeed in sending more
manpower to these countries.
THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND ASEAN
At the time of its establishment in 1967, the Association of SouthEast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was
belittled as an assemblage of suspicious
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countries bound by little else except anti-communism. Today, at 38, it has not only just survived but is a
major diplomatic player in the Asia-Pacific region. Pakistan, from the very beginning has been keen to
establish links and ties and seek some kind of participation in this forum. Now in the postCold War era in
which economic relationships are given preference over political and strategic bondings, Pakistan must
draw up a purposeful agenda to engage constructively with the Association of ”Asian Tigers”. In doing so,
Pakistan’s ”Look East” policy may have to take into cognisance three distinct characteristics of the
ASEAN.
First, ASEAN is not a uni-dimensional security forum, concerned only with military threats, strategic
doctrines, force structures and modern weapons. In the specific Asia-Pacific context, ASEAN endeavours
for the ”peace of the market place”, where economic engagements provide cushions for security concerns.
In this approach, interaction is pursued at various official and unofficial (track-II) levels with a significant
degree of cordiality and openness.
Establishing relations with ASEAN nations will open for Pakistan new opportunities for strengthening
economic co-operation with the AsianPacific countries. Such opportunities were denied to Pakistan partly
due to the lack of dynamism on its part, but more so due to the Cold War mindset in South-East Asia which
perceived Pakistan as a country shackled in subcontinental conflicts, obsolete economic approaches and an
unaccpetable strategic relationship (with the US). Pakistan can now set itself free from these shackles and
demonstrate that it has the necessary will and capabilities to play a constructive role in wider Asian affairs.
To adjust with the style of ASEAN countries, the mandarins of South Block may have to shed a lot of their
reservations and disdain, if not outright contempt, for the experts, opinion-makers and activisits, outside the
official corridors.
Secondly, the US strategic presence is central to ASEAN, making global priorities and regional concerns
deeply entagled with each other. With a 100,000 strong military presence, the US is not seeking protection
only of its trade and investment, but also of its dominant balancing role in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific
region. The rationale of containing the former Soviet Union, which legitimised this role has now been
replaced by the anxieties regarding: (i) China’s growing military and economic power, (ii) possibilities of
conflicts in the Korean peninsula, South-China Sea or in the Straits of Taiwan, and (in) Japan seeking to
acquire military muscle to back up its economic clout for an independent and assertive role in the region.
The US strategic policy-makers and analysts are carefully scrutinising the implications of the renewed anti-
US warmth between China and Russia which may encourage China’s assertiveness as well as
624
North Korean intransigence. The ultimate US aim in the region is to reduce human and financial costs of its
dominance without, in any way, diminishing its influence and hegemony. In this respect, the US would
want ASEAN to facilitate its strategic thrust in the region and accordingly, acquire necessary political
motivation and military teeth to undertake measures ”that might serve actually to constrain military forces
and operations.”
The ASEAN members share a good deal of US objectives in the region. And yet, ASEAN has its own
styles and priorities. They are all worried about China’s growing military power and tendency to use force,
but they want to moderate China by tying it up in economic stakes. They want ASEAN to become an
effective and sophisticated instrument of ”containment through co-option”. And in doing so, ASEAN must
preserve its ”Asian way”. ASEAN members certainly want to avoid provoking China while accepting that
China is their major security concern. ASEAN values the importance of US strategic presence in the region
as a counter-weight to an aggressive China or a potentially ambitious Japan. But for this, they are neither
prepared to surrender their autonomy and resilience on the issues involved, nor would they like to see
ASEAN turned into a mere US surrogate.
The US does not like all this, so much so that it is even encouraging alternate security fora for the Asia-
Pacific region. The Council on Security Co-operation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) has been serving as an
important track-II forum in this regard. More recently, the US Defence Secretary, Mr. William Perry’s
suggestions that APEC be open to defence debate and that a separate meeting of the region’s Defence
Ministers be convened, may be recalled here. These proposals have come in the aftermath of the crisis in
the Taiwan Straits where ASEAN has very little or no role to play. Much to its chagrin, the US did not even
get the expected endorsement of its ”force projection” in the Taiwan-Straits from the ASEAN members.
Pakistan has to tread cautiously in the cross currents of USASEAN tensions. Pakistan has to bear in mind
the hard reality of the US strategic placement in the Asia-Pacific region and that there is no major conflict
of interests between Pakistan and the US. The US infact, has been asking Pakistan to share its strategic
concerns in the Asia-Pacific. Particularly so, regarding the challenge that China poses as an emerging Asian
super-power, and also regarding the prospects of instability and uncertainty that loom large in the Korean
peninsula. The trouble with the US approach, however, is that it is not sensitive towards Pakistan’s security
concerns, either in relation to Pakistan and China or with regard to the
FOREIGN POMC Y OF PAKISTAN
625
issues of nuclear and missile capabilities. There are also problems in Pakistan closely identifying itself with
the US confrontationist stance towards China which may prove to be counter-productive in the relaxed
bilateral context of Pak-China relations. In relation to the Korean peninsula, Pakistan does not enjoy its
status of the early 50s to exercise a benign influence for defusing tensions, nor would it like to be a blind
follower of the American line towards North Korea. It is therefore, in Pakistan’s longterm interests that
ASEAN consolidates its ”Asian” identity. The ASEAN resilient approach of constructive engagement
towards China to deter it from pursuing an aggressive and expansionist course suits Pakistan’s interest the
most.
The question of building a mutually productive economic and strategic relationship at the regional as well
as bilateral levels constitutes the third part of Pakistan’s South-East Asian / ”Look East” agenda. Pakistan
needs to enhance its trade with the region and harness surplus investments. Within the ASEAN security
framework Pakistan cannot hope to gain much ground in the highly competitive and dynamic region
without radically improving its economic performance. There is also an urgent need for Pakistan to
improve its poor image and poorer awareness in the region. In this regard, programmes of building
institutional ties and efficient networking at various levels of social, cultural and economic interactions
deserve to be accorded policy priorities on a continuing basis.
All said and done, South-East Asia provides an ideal opportunity for Pakistan to shake hands and get closer
to countries which are well on their way to dominate global economic and political scene in the 21st
century and are well set to become world powers. With India already granted membership of ARF
(ASEAN Regional Forum) we must hurry up and make efforts to penetrate into the region in order to
establish longlasting and durable relations and friendships with the ASEAN countries.
TOWARDS INDO-PAK RECONCILIATION
As West Asia. Latin America and other regions ease their security concerns through confidence-building
measures, South Asia seems to be moving backwards toward heightened tensions and nuclear dangers.
The last war-scare in South Asia was in 1990, the next may not be long in coming, given the abysmal level
of Indo-Pak relations and the increased tension and conflict across the Line of Control. Sensible leaders in
both countries can be expected to avoid new hostilities that could badly damage economic growth and
development. The immediate problem is not
626
FOREIGN POLKA’ OF PAKIST VN
627
war prevention, but stopping the current downward spiral of damaged relations.
Under current conditions, the passage of time does not bode well for any of the parties to this dispute, as
popular support for independence from both India and Pakistan appears to be growing in Kashmir. Unlike
West Asian states, which sought the intervention of a third party to help resolve their differences, India
rejects outside help to resolve the Kashmir dispute.
The new global currency in power is sustained economic growth, which provides the basis for domestic
tranquillity and international clout. Peaceful neighbourly relations are specially critical for states that rely
on exports for high growth rates. Not surprisingly, China and its neighbours have agreed to shelve
territorial disputes.
South Asia marches to the beat of a different drummer. Official economic transactions between India and
Pakistan are minuscule. If anything, Pakistan needs domestic tranquillity and sustained economic growth
even more than India, but each successive government has allowed the Kashmir dispute - to a large extent
justifiably so - dominate all other bilateral issues. It remains to be seen whether new preferential trading
agreements will be honoured, unlike previous pledges. Meanwhile, centrifugal forces within Pakistan are
growing along with uncertainty about the country’s future economic prospects.
Nuclear weapons have gradually lost their coercive power, except in the minds of armchair strategists. Over
the last 15 years, explicit threats by nuclear weapons states to use their arsenals have been non-existent, and
veiled threats have been rare. Current trend lines diminishing the value of nuclear weapons will become
more pronounced with every passing year of non-use and with the completion of the comprehensive
nuclear test ban treaty all eyes are now on India and Pakistan to sign it. As the currency of nuclear weapons
has declined, the coercive potential of economic transactions has grown. Capital outflows, investment flight
and negative growth rates can cripple entire countries without a shot being fired. Dynamic economies are
insulating themselves against these shocks, using foreign investment to promote international co-operation
as well as internal developments. Japan and Germany have now eclipsed Britain and France, whose
conventional forces and economic woes have been impaired by the burdens of retaining ”prestigious”
nuclear arsenals. Russia is awash in bomb-making material and domestic difficulties. China’s new power
stems from economic growth, not nuclear testing.
Can India and Pakistan somehow manage reconciliation after five decades of animosity? Between previous
wars, national leaders never seized the opportunity to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The West Asian peace
process was engineered by heroic figures who played key roles in their nations’s struggle for independence.
Such leaders no longer exist in South Asia, and subsequent generations may find it more difficult to make
peace, given the reinforcement of enemy image fuelled by mass media. Pakistan seems ready to turn away
from this seemingly endless quarrel, but India refuses to be ignored, while -also refusing to talk. South Asia
now stands apart from the rest of the world.
MFN STATUS TO INDIA
As India and Pakistan relations continue to downslide at all levels, the question of granting the Most
Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India has sparked off a debate eversince the Benazir government
indicated its intention of taking this step early in 1996 year.
Certain sections of the society find it more than welcome if the Pakistan grants MFN status to India, since
they find this a good first step towards the normalisation of relations in this rather volatile region. Others
find it as a death knell for most of our industry and the employment opportunities present therein. Some
find it ideologically hard to swallow, given India’s recent bend towards Hindu fundamentalism and
militancy, as well as due to the continued dispute with Pakistan over the future of Kashmir. A lot of
arguments finally come down to rather crude estimations of costs and benefits, and it would be interesting
to try and clean-up some of the intuitions behind these hunches through more thought out and rigourous
reasoning:
Those who oppose the accordance of MFN status to India put forward the following points:
1. Liberal trade between India and Pakistan, without any tariff or non-tariff barriers will result in the
flooding of our market with cheap Indian goods and a section of our traders will enter into clandestine
arrangements with Indian manufacturers to eliminate their rivals from the market. We will end up with a
huge balance of payments deficit.
2. Pakistan’s trade opening to India will mean it is narrowing its options on Kashmir.
3. There is the question of Hindu fundamentalists as well. Bahartiya Janata Party (BJP) is calling
more and more shots in
628 _
INTKKNATIONAI. AFFAIRS
India and what is more important is that it has a very strong presence in Bombay, the nerve centre of Indian
economy.
4. Supposing if normal trade links and ties are established between the two countries, what if, in these
circumstances India decides to devalue its currency. Would Pakistan have any other choice but to devalue
again. The question here is, would the state banks of the respective countries be able to operate
independently and without any interference from political pressures from the two governments?
5. Considering that GAIT or WTO is going to help the advanced countries much more than the less
advanced ones, why did the third world countries sign the treaty in the first place? Given North’s high
level of research and development. labour productivity, and economies of scale in production, the
third world countries are fearing that they will simply become dumping grounds or material
providers for the industrialised nations. Similarly, with India’s strong industrial base especially in heavy
metals, engineering, computers and chemicals, Pakistan is in for tough competition.
6. There is an unpleasant racial (or perhaps religious) prejudice to this aspect which many refuse to
recognise. It is the congenital unwillingness of the Hindu consumer to allow any Muslim-made goods into
his home. It is this unwillingness which continues to govern the trade between the Hindus and the Muslims,
not only between India and Pakistan, but in India itself, and even in the UK and the US where Hindu-
Muslim shopping is segregated. The Muslims in London go to Hindu restaurants, but the Muslim
restaurants in London are no-go areas for the Hindus. Like the Rupee Payments Agreement, all the
liberalisation steps will have to be reversed when our financial wizards will be caught on the wrong foot
finding that nothing that Pakistan produces is acceptable to the Indian consumer. Nothing but leather
bags and cricket bats. Our fans and sewing machines, our heaters and gas appliances, our steel frames and
iron bars, even our saris and chadars will be ex-communicated.
7. As far as the political aspect is concerned, it is asked how often have the Americans threatened to
withdraw the MFN status from the People’s Republic of China because of the alleged human rights
violations. We are trying to persuade the Muslim world to impose economic sanctions against India
because of the barbarities which the Indian armed forces are committing in Occupied Kashmir. How
would it look if we were to accord India the stams of our most favoured nation? The US and other major
countries do not hesitate to impose comprehensive
K>IO.H;N I’OI.K v OF PAKISTAN
629
sanctions, as they have done against Iraq and Libya to safeguard their political interests. If the WTO cannot
prevent the US from indulging in wholesale economic discrimination, why should we find ourselves
compelled to grant the MFN status to India regardless of its inhuman record in Kashmir?
8. The bitter truth is that there is nothing which India needs to buy from Pakistan, except, perhaps,
leather goods (a field traditionally left to the Muslims and low caste Hindus for religious
reasons). According to one estimate, Pakistan now imports goods worth $ 100 million from India and
exports worth $ 60 million annually. Goods of Indian origin worth one billion dollars are smuggled every
year into Pakistan via Dubai. Singapore, and other routes. The interesting thing is that even Indian
smugglers find nothing worthwhile to take away from Pakistan, not even heroin. But our greed for Indian
goods is insatiable. Apart from smuggling we have started importing even agricultural items of daily use
like potatoes and sugar from India. Let there be no doubt that any liberalisation of trade between India and
Pakistan will entirely be to the benefit of India.
9. There is a need to zero onto pure economics, keeping political issues out of all financial deals - the
international economic gurus never tire of telling us. Yet look at the Israel-Palestine issue. Why did the
Americans burn Japanese cars as a protest during the recent recession? Why do France and Germany insist
on growing foodstuff when they can import cheaper food from America? Why did Europe refuse to allow
American movies free access to their countries, even though they are the best of pals who even have joint
defence forces as NATO? What would our policy be about Indian cinema? Would we allow their movies
free access into Pakistan, or would they be censored? Will India allow them to be censored? And what
about the respective permissiveness of dress and behaviour that would be brought into Pakistan? These
concerns will spill over into other cultural spheres like dance, drama and written media too. Irrespective of
whether they are good or bad, the issue is that the authorities should have an opinion as to how much are
they willing to let our culture be influenced by another culture.
And what if the new generation takes up Indian cultural metaphor as its own metaphor? Why do the Jews
feel it important to keep reminding the world about the holocaust through books and Hollywood movies,
despite the fact that they have long emerged from the crisis; what puipose do the movies meet?
630
10. If any government in Pakistan, caretaker or elected, has to make the decision based on international
compulsions, it has to take the people into confidence, telling them why is it necessary, how it could or
could not be avoided and what steps is the government taking for improving the situation.
11. It is never an economic stance per se that determines the sociological and ideological development
of a society. It is an economic policy planned, guided and implemented by a political direction of a society
as a whole. If such a strategy is not present in the different area we are likely to create more dichotomies
than we would be resolving.
12. Trade ties with India will mean importing poverty from India where per capita income in terms of
Purchasing Power Parity (AN) is 65 per cent less than in Pakistan. Standard of living in India is much
lower and wages are almost half of those
; prevailing in Pakistan. Indian industry will be flourishing at the cost of Pakistani manufacturing sector
ultimately leading to higher level of unemployment in Pakistan.
THE PROTAGONISTS OF GRANTING MFN STATUS ARGUE
1. So much illegal trade is already taking place between India and Pakistan. It is generally acknowledged
that every year, about one billion US dollars worth of illegal trade takes place between the two countries.
The argument is that once MFN status is granted to India, this illegal trade will get regularised as the
two countries will start trading across their frontiers all the previously smuggled items.
2. A great volume of trade is already taking place between India and Pakistan through third countries like
Afghanistan, the UAE, Bangladesh, Hong Kong, and even Switzerland. Obviously, this means high mark-
up. When intermediaries are involved, the cost of the item being traded naturally goes up. In the absence of
direct trade, the tax-payer has to pay more for a product.
3. We are at the moment importing many bulk commodities like coal and cement from far-off states like
Poland and Germany. Coal, for instance, is available at far cheaper rates than the one we get from Poland.
4. Political differences between India and Pakistan aside, there is no harm in trading with each other. It is in
the interest of behindthe-scene forces to keep intact the tensions between the two countries. However, our
leaders must take into consideration long-term benefits. India has a much better managed economy, but it
cannot afford openness. On the other hand, Pakistan’s
CIGN POLK Y OF PAKISTAN
__v_ 63j
economy is not so close, and it could take advantage jn | .
regard.
5. Pakistan, like other developing countries, has strong ir»terest . the maintenance and strengthening of the
multilateral m)es baseri trading system represented by the WTO. The current sit^)atjon . South Asia
indicates that there are large un^Xploit H opportunities for intra-regional trade that could be
mutuall
beneficial.
6. We have given MFN status to most of the WTO member_stat with whom our bilateral trade has been
going on for man ’ The question thus arises, if cheaper goods from Taiwan ’ Hong Kong, for instance
have not flooded our market, now c the same from India? Also, if we feel that cheaper goQ(js f Taiwan or
Hong Kong have indeed affected our iryieeno industry why can’t we withdraw MFN status from tl\em’> Q
we?
7. In case we legalise our trade with India, we will have tj^ c^ to market our own videos in India. Who
doesn’t kno\\, tnaj television dramas are highly popular in India? So far, li^g ug , Indians are also getting
our drama videos through busi’n concerns stationed in a third country or these are being Smug2i , into
India.
8. The matter does not end with video films. Our old booing filled with books (especially on law and
medicine) Kj-jutgj • India and available at much lower rates than those in ê ., market. There are several
hundred other small items îcli being smuggled into Pakistan through the Wagha border anj , Rajasthan
border.
9. India no doubt, is a large country, but not to be affaid Of -f statistics are any indicator. It is four times
larger than âjjjsta’ • area, with seven times population. However, the unfavouraw comparisons end there.
We are not doing badly in the econo • and social fields when compared to India. Our per c^ta Qr^p (PPP)
is $ 955 higher than India’s, while in per qpjta Q (nominal) India trails behind us with $ 310 to our j 4,^
exports only 3.4 times more than us. We have per qpjta ’ telephones than India. In the social sector it is
only jn ^ that we are way behind India. Our population dock. r t- . slightly better. ° is
10. We should not overlook the fact that India offers amar, over 1000 million consumers. We have,
theref^re opportunities to penetrate deep into the Indian market jV ^ course for Pakistan lies in achieving
higher degree °f efflc quality control and cost consciousness. Only then ^ •,,C^’
632
possible for our industrialists even to enter the twenty-first century with the industrial confidence.
11. International events in the past two decades have shown that countries which have succeeded in
invigorating their economies and achieving high rates of economic growth have done so through increased
reliance on foreign trade. In more recent times bitter enemies of Japan in East Asia (and often of each
other), sank their differences and engaged in intensive trade with each other in the larger interests of their
peoples’ well-being. Despite the political posturing between Taiwan and China, a healthy and growing
trade and investment relationship between the two economies has flourished.
12. The major stumbling block in SAARC’s progress as a regional economic co-operation Organisation is
the poor and worsening state of political relationships between the two largest economies of the SAARC
namely, India and Pakistan. Unless there is a significant improvement in this relationship, SAARC’s image
as a regional economic co-operation grouping will remain lacklustre and its high potential will not
materialise. Tie lack of mutual trust between India and Pakistan affects the overall functioning of the
Organisation, since as envisaged in its charter, decisions at all levels in the Organisation have to be taken
on the basis of unanimity.
13. It is somewhat irrational to assume that trade with India will be detrimental to the cause of Kashmir.
Trade between India and Pakistan will not be a new phenomenon. Indo-Pak trade has been going on for
years without harming the cause of Kashmir. Why should the mutual granting of MFN status that will
expand the existing trade, and which basically entails elimination of discrimination against each
other harm the sacred cause of Kashmiris? Pakistan is not the only Muslim country with which India is
trading. India enjoys a very good trade and economic relations with almost all the Muslim countries
including Saudi Arabia and Iran. Both these countries who are ardent supporters of Kashmiris are
improving their trade links and ties with India. They are also planning to invest huge amounts in the energy
sector of India. The Muslim states of Central Asia also have close economic and trade relations with India.
Moreover what does trade have to do with our mutual animosity over Kashmir? India, if it wants to, can
continue to be our enemy number one and we shall continue to support our brethren in Kashmir.
By the same token no one believes that Kashmir can be liberated through another war. The only remaining
sensible approach to it is to follow
FORF.KJ.N POLICY OF PAKISTAN
633
the path of the great trading nations of the century and to move forward by opening up our trade frontiers
not only with India but with the rest of the world.
All said and done, having considered both the antagonist and protagonist view points, we may say that the
arguments put to rward by those who oppose giving India the MFN status do not hold wa ter. They seem to
be knee jerk reactions that show fear and apprehension rather than reason. It is true that India is much
larger, with a huge middle class, large skilled and educated population and likely to enjoy some economies
of scale and scope. At the same time, the concerns about interest rates, energy costs and labour costs can be
easily exaggerated. What we need is a very vigilant economic and finance ministry as well as industry and
independent researchers that would conduct detailed, non-trivial and deep analysis of all individual
industries so that we can know the likely effect in advance and prepare for them before the MFN
agreements kick in. Pakistani industry is also likely to receive some advantages and the analysis should t»e
able to pinpoint these regions.
We must understand that mere extension of MFN status does not mean that we are in any way creating a
free-trade area - the EC-like concept, where the member states will not impose custom duties or trade
tariffs on to India, we will retain the right to stop the trade of certain important items through various
means - from outright banning to increasing non-tariff barriers.
Under the IMF conditionalities, we have already started reducing tariff. And developed states of the West
are taking due advantage of this development. Even if India is our enemy, let us accept the bitter reality and
it is nobody else but the World Bank points out - that India is one of the world’s largest developing
economies. After the United States, it is the largest exporter of software, the device of the present and the
future. With or without giving the MFN status India will survive. In any case, in relative terms, India is not
going to gain much from us. The issue at stake is that of our own economic survival. If not today, under the
WTO requirement, we have no other option but to grant the MFN status to India tomorrow. Better do it
today. Tomorrow, the one billion US dollars worth of smuggling or trade between the two via third country
may become two billion.
We already permit trade with India of some 574 items. The number of items actually being traded is around
1000. Commerce ministry officials confirm that even in this limited trade with India the country enjoys
favourable terms of trade.
634
635
Living for more than 51 years in an environment conditioned to promote prejudice and hatred, it is difficult
to change attitudes overnight. However, the problem gets more and more complicated when the free flow
of communication is blocked. There is, thus, a need to break this impasse by allowing free and effective
communication between India and Pakistan at all levels.
PAK-US RELATIONS
Pakistan-United States relations have enjoyed proximity and closeness but at the same time have remained
distant, failing to develop a relationship and stability. There have been ups and downs in the levels of
understanding and co-operation but at critical moments, the government and people of Pakistan
experienced betrayal when the US changed her policies unilaterally.
On the other hand, we have always given a lot of importance to the US. We base our importance for
Washington on our opinion that we (were) a frontline state, perhaps in the tradition of Turkey, Korea and
Germany. In any case, this scenario has changed after the demise of the former Soviet Union. Then in our
opinion, Pakistan is situated strategically and our strong links and ties with the Muslim world make us
beneficial and meaningful to the White House policy-makers.
At times, when our leaders paid courtesy visits to Washington, the US presidents described us as ’the most
important pillar of their foreign policy’. It was obviously nothing but rhetoric meant to inflate our ego.
We will have to accept what Norman D. Palmer wrote in South Asia and United States Policy in 1966 is
still valid even today. He then wrote: ”most Americans are vague even about the geography of Pakistan
all too often they think of it as a part of India and they have only
the foggiest notion of the circumstances which led to the creation and which forms the raison d’etre of
America’s Asian ally. US decision-makers as well
- as the masses were much better informed about India by virtue of the press coverage of the Indian
nationalist movement.”
When Pakistan came into existence, the country’s founding father, Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah,
through a special emissary in September 1947, tried to secure arms and ammunition from the US but did
not receive a positive response. President Truman, however, in his message on the Independence Day
affirmed: ”I wish to assure you that the Dominion embarks on its course with the firm friendship and
goodwill of the United States of America.” We, in Pakistan took all these statements rather seriously and
went out of the way to stress our importance to the United
States. We tried our best to ensure that Pakistan’s perceived potential as a bulwark against the expansion of
Soviet influence and control of the Middle East and South Asia was accepted by the US policy-makers.
Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan. Ghulam Mohammed, Malik Feroze Khan Noon, Suhrawardy all are on
record in asserting Pakistan’s commitment to maintaining a stand against communism and that ”Pakistan
with a population of seventy million persons is the largest Muslim country in the world and occupies the
most strategic area in the world.”
There was indeed a similarity in the point of view of the US joint chiefs of staff, Secretary of State George
Marshall and the Defence Secretary James Forestall who were concerned with the Soviet threat to all the
oil-producing states of the Soviet-German Accord of 1940, which affirmed that the ’areas South of Batnus
and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf are recognized as the center of aspiration of the Soviet
expansionism.”
It was in the background of this perception that the US joint chief of staff in the memorandum dated March
24, 1949, ”highlighted the importance of Pakistan-Afghanistan and the Karachi-Lahore area as vital for
meeting the basic strategic objectives.”
Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan’s visit to the United States in 1950 was the turning point in the
US-Pakistan relations. The US administration at last saw the necessity of a security relationship in South
Asia especially the strategically oil producing Muslim countries.
The 50s and the early 60s earned for Pakistan the title of ”most allied ally” of the US. The 80s attracted the
label of ”frontline state” for Pakistan, as she became part of the ”strategic consensus” as operationalized by
the US after the Soviets marched into Afghanistan.
During the post-Eisenhower period Pakistan’s geo-strategic location at the crossroads of Central, South and
South-West Asia was appreciated and an era of close Pakistan-US security relationship was inaugurated.
Vice-President Richard Nixon during his visit to Pakistan in December 1952 declared: ”A strong
independent Pakistan is an asset to the free-world.” However, this was valid as long as their purpose was
served.
A US base near Peshawar, Bada Ber, to keep an eye over the former Soviet Union’s nuclear activities was
created. Its existence remained a secret till the downing of the US U-2 spy plane by Moscow and the
capture of its in 1960.
636
SEATO and CENTO, formerly the Baghdad Pact, came into being and a bilateral agreement of co-
operation between Pakistan and the United States was signed in March 1959. It declared that the
”government of the United States of America regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the
preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan.” Were Pakistan’s independence and integrity
really threatened or did we put out independence and integrity at stake by signing SEATO and CENTO, are
the vital questions that need to be studied by our experts on international relations.
The US aid took many forms, ranging from overt military aid in the form of grants, military sales and credit
for purchase from commercial sources, to the training of Pakistan military personnel in US military
institutions. Regarding the training facilities to Pakistan’s military officers. Secretary of Defence Robert
McNamara remarked: ”It is beyond price to make friends of such men.” Indeed, it was a worthwhile
investment and the US is still reaping fruits.
Between 1954 and 1965 Pakistan received military grants assistance valued at $650 million; defence
support assistance valued at $619 million and cash for commercial purchases $ 55 million. It is estimated
that for every dollar given about 80 cents went back to the US.
The 1965 Indo-Pakistan war in which our gallant defence forces beyond the expectation of all the Western
military analysts were able to blunt the Indian attack was the turning point in the US-Pakistan relationship.
Most of the Muslim countries - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia - lined up with Pakistan with material
support. During the post-
1965 period Pakistani defence personnel became a sought after commodity in the Muslim countries.
Pakistan provided about twenty military missions and training contingents in friendly countries in the area.
All these events forced the Western planners to reappraise and reformulate their policies visa-vis the
Middle East and Pakistan.
CENTO and SEATO were already dead horses, President Soekarno, King Reza Shah and King Faisal had
to pay for the positive support they gave to Pakistan during and after the conflict. Pakistan from being an
asset to the free world turned into a pariah. Supplies to Pakistan were embargoed. Like the latest F-16s deal
which hangs in limbo, in 1969 the US had offered to sell 300 armored personnel carriers for $50 million,
the delivery was made six years later, in 1975 on a cash and carry basis.
The curtain on ’detente’ between the super-powers was drawn when the Soviet troops marched into
Afghanistan in December 1979. This
FORF.KiN I’OI.ICY OF PAKISTAN
637
brought a sharp reversal m 15 years of US &olicjes of embaraoes. cut-offs bans and discrimination. Carter
Doctrine and ,he rheto|.fc of Reat,an administration renewed by the era of the Cold Wa|. by pledeine us ^r,
tor anti-communist movements world-wide. As,am paklstim ^Ked ,o ,he US plan and became an effective
mstmment for containins, tn; Soviets in Afghanistan and became a ’frontline state’ t<> qua,ify for ^
economic am] military aid and assistance which was suspended jn |979 ove,. me nuc,ear issue.
”Once again Pakistan became an essentia, anchor of lhe cn,ire South West Asian region” (James L.
Buckley Unde,. Secretary of State before Foreign Relations Committee on S<*ptember 16 i981)’Our then
foreign minister Agha Shahi said in April 198, -We do be,leve m th(, determination of the new US
administralion to strongly support the independence of Pakistan”. Was Pakistan’s impendence threatened is
a million dollar question. In tact what was u>eatened was as Jimmy Car{er told Congress in January 1981.
’any attac^ by an outside force to in control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded QS an assault Qn ^
yM interests of the United States of America. And such an assau,t wjl, be replied by any means necessary,
including rniljtary force-, In spit£ of antj Pakistan lobbies and pressure groups, a majl)r shift came m me us
po,icy towards Pakistan, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the outcast of Washington turned
overnight into a darling or yg policy-makers
Despite the renewal of US aid anq dose secunty des many m Congress remained concerned about
PakistaVs nudear programmei base(i in part, on evidence of US export control violations mat suggested a
crash programme to acquire a nuclear weapons capabl]jty ,n 19g£ Section 62Q E (e) (the so-called Pressler
Amendment) Vas added to FAA (Foreign Assistance Act) requiring the US President to cmjfy ,o Congress
^ Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive devjce during ,he fisca] year for which aid is to be
provided.
Basically Pakistan participated in ^ framework of Cold War as operated by the US. This explains partly the
dependency of Pakistan on the US and the reason why Pakistan vo!ced grievances when the us perceptions
changed and hence her policies.
The new government of Benazir Ulmtto mherited in December

1988, the policies pursued by General Zia. Qiven her domestic pohtica, compulsions, Benazir did not object
to the po,ides of hef predecessor in assuming her posture, she faced criticism from withjn her Qwn
particularly the radical faction which presse^ for a hosti)e H tQwards
638
639
the US. On the contrary, she publicly gestured that the US remained the linchpin of Pakistan’s security and
development.
Almost a decade of relationship during the Afghan jihad rendered Pakistan’s economy too dependent on
American aid (S3.6 billion between
1982-87). The US government provided Pakistan with S576 million in economic and military assistance in
1988. Moreover, Washington based World Bank committed another S3.2 billion in assistance for 1989-90
through the Pakistan Aid Consortium. The Bush administration asked for another $621 million for 1990.
Benazir’s June 1989 visit to the US provided the opportunity for announcing Congressional approval for
the 60 additional F-16s. Pakistan had requested in the new six-year S4.02 billion aid agreement entered into
in 1987. This dependency syndrome left little room for Pakistan to take bold initiatives.
The nuclear issue resurfaced as a major irritant in Pakistan-US relations. Just before Ms. Bhutto’s arrival in
Washington, Director CIA Mr. Webster told the US Congress that ”Pakistan was engaged in developing a
nuclear capability that would attract amendments that apply to assistance and relief to Pakistan”. Senator
John Glenn insisted that the Congress already had sufficient cause to cease its aid programme to Pakistan.
If not for the continuing situation in Afghanistan, the law would be duly observed.
Benazir Bhutto’s presence in Islamabad, however, prevented the suspension of aid and the Bush
administration’s rather sympathetic attitude towards Pakistan was due to the restoration of the democratic
process. BBs emergence as Prime Minister of Pakistan was lauded by the American administration as a
victory for democracy. This support would also vindicate the charge of American complicity in the
overthrow of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government. As the first woman leader of a Muslim state the young Ms.
Bhutto came across a unique phenomenon in the politics of the Muslim world. In view of her impressive
speech before the Congress, her position on Pakistan’s nuclear programme was not seriously challenged or
questioned, the reservations on it in the light of American reports notwithstanding.
Ms. Bhutto wanted to paddle smoothly with the US and she came across pretty close to the American
perception on the Afghanistan issue, wherein she looked for a political settlement of the crisis. Her
Afghanistan posture caused a serious rapture with the military establishment in Pakistan who wanted to
pursue an activist policy. Ms. Bhutto’s ’relaxed posture’ with India also created irritants in domestic
politics.
The dismissal of Ms. Bhutto’s government in August 1990 helped the US to crystallize its thinking as those
considerations remained no more valid, the Bush administration more or less revived Carter’s policy and
the American president did not issue the certification to the Congress allowing the continuing aid flows to
Pakistan. The caretaker government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi had to face the challenge of suspension of aid
to Pakistan.
The Nawaz Sharif government whose credentials were challenged by the PPP leadership continued to face
the problems. The Gulf policy of Mr. Sharif government was perhaps appreciated by the US government
but was obviously not good enough to help them see nuclear issue from Pakistan’s perspective.
Pakistan’s public opinion looked and still indeed looks with favour on Pakistan’s joining the nuclear club.
American pressure tactics were and are not only resented but are seen as pro-India, an affront to Pakistan’s
sovereign status and a conspiracy against the Muslim world. All governments in Pakistan have resisted the
American pressure and the ”Kahuta project” has moving on amidst competing claims.
Additional factors were also responsible for the changing outlook of the US. With the war in Afghanistan
in a transitional stage and the USSoviet relations at a historic turning point, American assistance to Pakistan
would be subject to reappraisal.
With the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan beginning in May

1988, Pakistan’s nuclear activities again came under close US scrutiny. In October 1990, President Bush
suspended aid to Pakistan because he was unable to make the necessary certification to Congress. Under
the provisions of the Pressler Amendment, all military aid to Pakistan was stopped and deliveries of major
equipment suspended. Also affected by the aid cutoff was an economic aid request for FY 1991 totaling
about $ 150 million. Under Section 552 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriation Act, added in 1992, provision of PL-
480 food aid was permitted. Narcotics assistance of S3-5 million annually, administered by the State
Departments Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, was exempted from the aid cut-off.
With Pakistan troops involved in ’Operation Desert Storm’ in the Gulf and the public opinion voicing
stridently anti-American and pro-Iraqi sentiments the IJI (led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif) government
found itself at loggerheads with the powerful army establishment. The NS government responded by
declaring its preference for self-reliance than to compromising on sovereignty in return for American aid.
1
640
The long-standing US-Pakistan relationship has experienced a downturn in recent years because of
Pakistan’s continued pursuit of nuclear option and the consequent cut-off of US aid to Pakistan. Aid was
suspended in 1990 under the Pressler Amendment, which requires an annual certification, by the US
President that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear.
A second major concern of both Congress and the Administration is that Pakistan continues its progress
along the path of democratization and economic development. With this in view. Congress in 1992 partially
relaxed the scope of the aid cut-off to allow for food assistance and continuing support for non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). A small counter narcotics assistance programme has also been
continued. In September 1994. the Clinton administration announced a S10 million Agency for
international Development grant for a child survival / maternal health programme to be administered
through NGOs. PL-480 food-aid totalled about $ 5 million in both FY 1997 and FY 1998. The Clinton
Administration requested S 350,000 for International Military Education and Training (IMET) for FY
1999.
One of the most serious results of the aid cut-off for Pakistan has been the non-delivery of some 71 F-16
fighter aircraft ordered in 1989, 28 of which Pakistan has already paid for. In January 1995, Secretary
William Perry told the Pakistanis that the Defence Department would try to find another buyer for the F-
16s. in order to refund Pakistan that S 658 million paid for the fighter plans. During an official visit to the
United States in early April 1995, Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto requested the release of the
planes or the refund of Pakistan’s money. In a joint press conference. President Clinton told Benazir Bhutto
that he would ’ask Congress to show some flexibility’ on the aid cut-off ’so that we can have some
economic alternative buyer for the F-16s.
Provisions included in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY 1996 relaxed somewhat the
restrictions on aid to Pakistan. Contained in an amendment introduced by Senator Hank Brown, the
provisions allow certain types of economic aid to Pakistan, as well as onetime release of $ 368 million in
military hardware ordered before the 1990 aid cut-off. An amendment to the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act for FY 1998, sponsored by Senators Harkin and Warner, restored Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) coverage for US investment in Pakistan.
Both India and Pakistan have combat aircraft that, with modification, would be capable of delivering
nuclear weapons. Both countries have developed or acquired missiles with the capability of striking
FORF.IGN POLK Y OF PAKISTAN
641
others major population centres. India has tested both its short-range Prithvi surface-to-surface missile and
its Intermediate Range Bal-listic Missile
(IRBM), Agni. Pakistan also tested short and intermediate range missiles.
In late 1995, the United States became concerned over reports of increasing tension and nuclear
proliferation in South Asia. In December
1995, US press reports - based on US intelligence leaks - suggested that India was preparing to test a
nuclear weapon at Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert, where it conducted its first nuclear test in 1974. India
denied the reports. In February 1996, the US press reported on leaked US intelligence reports alleging that
China sold ring magnets to Pakistan, in 1995, that would be used in enriching uranium for nuclear
weapons. Pakistan denied the reports, as well as press reports in early May that it was preparing for its first
underground nuclear test in the event that India conducted a nuclear explosion.
Neither India nor Pakistan is a party to the NPT. Although Pakistan joined the 158 nations in the UN
General Assembly who voted, in September 1996, to adopt the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it
said it will not sign the treaty unless India does. India, Bhutan and Libya voted against the treaty, while five
other nations abstained. ”Pakistan cannot be oblivious to threats to its security which reintensified by
India’s position on the nuclear test-ban treaty,” according to a September 1996 statement by a Pakistan
government spokesman. ”Pakistan, in view of its security concerns, cannot accept unilateral commitments,”
he said.
On April 06, 1998, Pakistan successfully tested its medium-range Ghauri missile, reported to have a range
of 1,500 kms and a payload of 700 kgs. US State Department officials called the test ’regrettable’ and
urged Pakistan and India to exercise restraint in their arms programmes. On April
27, New York Times quoted an unnamed Clinton Administration official as saying that Russia is helping
India to build a sea-launched ballistic missile. Both India and Russia denied the report.
On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted a total of five underground nuclear tests, claiming concern about
the ’deteriorating security (and) nuclear environment,’ as its reason for testing. The tests, which appeared to
have taken the US intelligence and policy community by suiprise, set off a world-wide storm of protest.
President Clinton announced, on May 13, that he was imposing wide-ranging sanctions mandated under US
nuclear proliferation legislation. Japan and other nations joining the US in expressing their dismay and
condemnation of the. tests.
| . E|1NATIONAL AFFAIRS
642 INTEI^”* ””’””-’ ’
Concerned that India’s actions would pit11”?’ Pakistan and other countries to follow suit, the Clinton
administration ^patched a high-level team, headed by Deputy Secretary of State. StroPe Talbot- to
Is”amabad. Despite US and world efforts to dissuade it, Pak’stan co”ducted lts ow» nuclear tests - a
reported five tests on May 28 andslxth test on May 30’In defending Pakistan’s tests, PM Nawaz Sharif
stressed Provocatlve statements about the Kashmir dispute by Indian leaders followmg their nuclear tests,
as well as failure of the internal1 community to apply meaningful sanctions against India.
At a press briefing by Deputy Secretary o/State Strobe Talbot’ on June 18, the State Department issued a
fact sheet o^’tlininS US sanctions on India and Pakistan, as a result of their nuclear test*- as wel1 as the
goals of the sanctions: ”In imposing these sanctions, we seeK1
(a) to send a strong message to would-be nu’’ ar es ers’
(b) to have maximum influence on Indian ar>d Pakistani behaviour;
(c) to target the governments, rather tMn the People’ and ll minimize the damage to other US
interes15’
the people, and to
Our goals are that India and Pakistan
(a) halt further nuclear testing ; sign
P^jiiprehensive Test Ban
(b) (c)
(d) (e)
Treaty (CTBT) immediately and without
conditions
not deploy or test missiles or nuclear we0Pons’
co-operate in fissile material cut-off tre^ (FMTC) negotiation
in Geneva;
maintain and formalize restraints on sha(in§ sensitive g°ods and
technologies with other countries; and,
reduce bilateral tensions, including Kash)1111’
On the one hand, Pakistan is less affected b? the sanctions, since most US assistance to Pakistan has been
cut-off si^6 1990’ On the other hand, Pakistan’s much smaller - currently weak^r ” economy 1S more
vulnerable to the affects of the sanctions.
The major areas of US concern in Pakist^ are nuclear weapons and missile proliferation, regional stability,
dem0cratizatlon and h”man rights, and economic reforms and development. An On-SomS Pakistan-India
nuclear arms race fueled by rivalry over Kashmir, C0ntmues to be tnefoc”S of US non-proliferation efforts
in South Asia ant a maJ°r *ssue .m US relations with both countries. This attention mtensifP after J^” s y,
28 nuclear test, which followed India’s tests of May ’! and 13, 1998^ South Asia is viewed by some experts
as one of the most ilkely Fleets for use
643
of such weapons. India has developed short and intermediate range missiles, and Pakistan has acquired
short to medium range M-l 1 ballistic missiles or components from China. India and Pakistan have fought
three wars since
1947.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to United States of America early December 1998 on a highly important
visit which may determine, in the months to come, the future direction of Pakistan’s politico-economic and
security relationship with the world’s sole super-power, in the postCold War and post-nuclear tests era. The
fact that Mr. Sharif was specially invited to Washington was an indication there was a lot in store to talk
about and sort out many ’pending’ issues of mutual and international significance.
The Clinton administration has been trying awfully hard in finding ways of helping us out after sanctions
were imposed last May when Pakistan decided to go nuclear. It was due to the US President’s personal
efforts that Congress granted him the authority to waive off certain parts of the Glenn (Amendment)
sanctions, in a ”limited and targeted manner” to create a ”more positive environment for the on-going US
non-proliferation endeavours.
The decision to waive off sanctions could not have come at a more appropriate time; Pakistan has been a
victim of undesirable and unjustified sanctions by the US since a long time now. The fact that Mr. Sharif
visited Washington when the Clinton administration was in a mood to allow some concessions, after years
of mistrust and misunderstanding, did augur well for the cash-strapped economy of Pakistan.
It must be borne in mind that the overall pattern of relations that has shaped up in the post-Cold War period
will not be changed drastically. It will be an issue-oriented and area-to-area relationship in the backdrop of
US global agenda. Pakistan and the US can have smooth interaction in one issue / area, but, at the same
time, run into difficulties in another area of interaction. Thus positive and negative interactions will proceed
simultaneously. The challenge for Pakistan’s policy-makers is how to maximize their gains and minimize
the cost in such a complex pattern of bilateral interaction.
In the 21 st century and now an established nuclear power, the end of super-power conflict offers Pakistan
with an opportunity to play an autonomous role as opposed to dependent role in the 50’s and the 80’s at the
regional and global levels. This requires a down-to-earth assessment of strengths and weaknesses in foreign
policy and identification of national
644
IMF.RNATIONAI. AFFAIRS
interest so far as regional issues are concenl°d, i-e., problems with India, China, Central Asia and
Afghanistan, ant? the Persian Gulf region. The extent to which muaiality of interests c#n be identified with
US cooperation is advisable. However, co-opei’ative interaction on one issue should not restrict Pakistan’s
options in ^ther areas or on other issues. Similarly, Pakistan’s policy towards global and especially regional
issues should not appear as being directly influenced by US priorities.
Pakistan appears to have gained st”>me relevance to the US policy in the region due to the proximity
factor. Commercial and political considerations make Central Asian region important for the US. Some
parts of this region face internal strife and other domest’c threats to their stability. From the US perspective,
instability in the region can adversely affect its commercial and political interests. They do not want
Afghanistan-type situation or the ascendancy of anti-Us elenients in any of these states. Pakistan is an
important transit route to Cent’’3’ Asia and it can facilitate US interaction with this region. A pro-US
papstan w’th good links and ties with the states of Central Asia can be a ne’P f°r promotion of US
commercial and political interests of these countries. However, it all depends on how Pakistan carries itself
a^d staves off the pressure of extremist and fundamentalist forces inside tfte Country.
China is another important country m me region. Currently, China is seeking American technology, and
economic co-operation which moderates its stance on a number of regional issues, i.e., co-operation with
Pakistan in missile technology and supply °f nuclear technology to Iran. Once China overcomes its current
economic and technological handicaps, it is likely to play a more independent and active r°le in Asia. This
means that in the long run, Chinese goals are likely to cJasn Wltn tnose of the US. From this long range
perspective, it is advisable f°r the US to maintain good relations with some country of the sanie re£i°n (i-e-
Pakistan) whose long range political and strategic interests are not likely to clash with those of the US, at
least in the near future. These ^me(ican considerations need to be weighed against Pakistan’s interests jn
niamtammg cordial and multidimensional relations with China.
Similarly, US interests are also aoing to clash with those of India as the latter endeavours to project its
power ar>d influence outside of South Asia by the turn of the century. Since Pakistan has its own axe to
grind against India, it could be good partner in pressurizing India as and when it competes with the US as a
stabilizing factor within South Asia. A stable and reasonably strong Pakistan is the only state °ftne region,
which is capable of and willing to act as a check on India’s power ambitions in the region and beyond.
645
So far as the Gulf region is concerned, peace and stability are in the interests of both Pakistan and US. The
latter views Iran and Iraq as sources of trouble for different set of reasons. Pakistan need not share such
perceptions. Iranians are currently trying to break out of isolation they have faced at the global level due to
strong American opposition. They are thus talking of closer economic co-operation with India and China
and want Pakistan to join in. Also, President Khatami’s offer to have good relations with the US early this
year and the reciprocity shown by Washington, may finally herald an end of the isolation era. By the same
token. China and India are viewed by the Iranian policy-makers as states, which are not likely to fall
completely in line with the US. In case Pakistan gets too close to the US, Iran is likely to move quickly
towards India. The Chinese will also be perturbed if Pakistan develops very close interaction with the US
because Sino-US relations reflect positive and negative trends simultaneously. As China pursues an
independent course of action in Asia in the future, greater strains will crop up in their relations.
It is therefore, important that while improving relations with the US, especially in the security field,
Pakistan should not altogether ignore Iran’s sensitivities - Afghanistan is one area where Pakistan must
adopt a’ hands off policy at once to avoid further ’collisions’ with Iran - and China’s inherent divergence
with the US. Both will be apprehensive if Pakistan’s relations with the US in the security field go beyond
transfer of weapons or technology and training. The possible re-activation of ties with the US central
command may cause concern to both countries, especially Iran.
Problems, however, will continue to bedevil relations in the field of nuclear technology. In the past
Pakistan’s policy was a combination of flexibility and firmness; but things changed all of a sudden after
May 28th nuclear tests. CTBT remains a bone of contention and the biggest and lasting hurdle in the way
of a cordial US-Pakistan relationship. Incessant efforts have been made by Washington over the past few
months to get Pakistan sign the Treaty and hence make a principled commitment for nonproliferation.
Pakistan, on the other hand, has consistently followed an India-centric policy. However, it has been felt that
the PML (N) has realized the futility of such a stance and is more or less ready and willing to sign. Signing
CTBT will not necessarily mean that Pakistan will have to unilaterally abandon its nuclear programme. In
fact, it will give a muchwanted boost to Pakistan’s image as a peace loving country and help us go one up
on India.
With the current improvement in the environment of Pak-US relations, prospects of investment and trade
will boost Pakistan’s economy
646
but Pakistan must insist on transfer of technology. If Pakistan has to compete in the international market in
the context of GATT and WTO agreements, mere foreign investment will not help. Pakistan must acquire
Modern technology in order to compete at the international level at a time when tariff walls are going to be
lowered and trends are towards economic liberalizabon.
Pakistan’s internal polarization and domestic political compulsions are taking a toll of its external relations.
Instead of having an objective national approach on major foreign policy options, its policy-makers and the
opposition increasingly tend to view external developments affecting Pakistan through the narrow prism of
their domestic political expediency and party interest, nay self-interest.
What one gathers from the news and views expressed in the Pakistani print media is that, firstly, the US
wants all argumentative and controversial issues between India and Pakistan to be resolved amicably; these
issues obviously also involve Kashmir. The US is ready and willing to mediate for Kashmir, only if both
parties to the conflict agree to its involvement. This means that things will remain where they have been for
the last 50 years; India has always refused third party mediation and hence the stalemate will continue.
The Americans believe, and quite rightly so that although the economic progress in India is not dramatic,
but apparently it is steady, even now, with the bad conditions in the economies of East and Southeast Asia.
The Indian success in making money in software production and in attracting foreign computer and
software firms to set up facilities in Hyderabad and Bangalore is a bright spot that some seem to believe
will burgeon (as Microsoft and Intel did in the United States) into humorous source of revenue for India,
and as a Centre of innovation that will have innumerable scientific and technological spin-offs.
The US has serious concerns with the Islamization in Pakistan because it would encourage fundamentalism
and it should strengthen its ties with the Islamic world. Regarding this issue, distrust by the US leadership
on the Pakistani leaders, who converse in divergent vein and spell different rhetorics in America and in
Pakistan, is of significance. Their pseudo demeanour is disliked by the Americans and produces distrust
with the US administration.
Pakistan is among the largest narcotic producing nations in the world. No Government has paid much
serious and practical attention to it despite persistent US reminders to root out this problem. Pakistan has
647
proved to be a good trade root for this illegal business because it has become impossible for the official
machinery to stop it. In the recent years, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has supplied a reported 20-40 %
of heroin consumed in the United States and 70 % of that consumed in Europe. The region is second only
to Southeast Asia’s Gold Triangle as a source of the world’s heroin
The post-cold war shift in American strategic focus is having its most telling policy impact in South Asia.
Discarding its traditional posture of ”even handedness” towards chronically feuding India and Pakistan,
Washington now seems willing to adopt a new regional policy of ”strategic partnership” with India.
The last round of Talbott-Jaswant talks that was held in London in mid-January 2000, while failing to make
any progress in terms of New Delhi’s willingness to sign the CTBT, did lead to the formation of a Joint
Working Group on combating terrorism. Combating terrorism has been both an ideological obsession for
the United States as well as an important policy objective. By joining hands with India in its fight against
the menace of terrorism at a time when New Delhi has declared Pakistan an ”enemy country” on account of
its alleged links with anti-India terrorist groups, Washington has underscored its disaffection toward
Pakistan on this issue.
In marked contrast to the growing convergence of views between New Delhi and Washington in several
issue areas, Pak-US ties have continued to fragment. Besides imposing additional sanctions against
Pakistan following the October 12 military takeover, Washington also suspended foreign secretary level
dialogue with Pakistan.
While stopping short of accepting Indian characterisation of Pakistan as a ”terrorist state”, Washington has
warned Islamabad of serious consequences over its failure to stem the rising tide of religious militancy in
the country. During his January 20-21, 2000 visit to Islamabad, Karl Inderfurth, US assistant secretary of
state for South Asia, reportedly conveyed his ”extreme” concern over the spread of terrorism in the region
and urged the need for full Pakistani cooperation to reduce this threat which had endangered the lives of
American citizens and brought bad reputation to Pakistan internationally. Inderfurth also reiterated
Washington’s demand that Pakistan should sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since doing so did not
compromise Pakistan’s right to aminimum deterrent. He also called for Pakistan’s ”return to democratic
civilian rule as soon as possible.”
Notwithstanding its ”image problem” and current economic difficulties, Pakistan-by dint of its strategic
location, size of the population
648
and middle-size economy, its leadership role in the Islamic world and its nuclear status-remains a ”pivotal”
state which will continue to be an influential regional player. Regardless of the ”zero-sum” manner in
which Pakistan has historically reacted to changes in Indo-US ties, balance of power considerations alone
would suggest that the Indo-US strategic partnership is not likely to augur well for the cause of regional
and global peace.
South Asia is a highly polarised and fragmented region marked by the reality of strategic dominance by a
single power, namely, India. This structural asymmetry in South Asian power structure has not only been
the primary cause of insecurity in the entire region but has also led to constant refusal by countries like
Pakistan to succumb to India’s dominance.
This shared unwillingness on the part of all South Asian states to submit themselves to Indian hegemony
has resulted in Indian attempts to subjugate them either by force and coercion or diplomatic intimidation.
As a consequence of this Indian bullying behaviour, South Asian states have tended to seek security against
India rather than with it. Any attempt on the part of the United States to appoint New Delhi as a regional
hegemon will only evoke greater resistance by them not only against India but also, by extension, against
the United States itself. This will mean more fragmentation, more violence and greater regional instability.
One argument which the proponents of the Indo-US strategic partnership have advanced relates to India’s
value for Washington as a strategic counterweight to China. This argument is flawed on several counts.
First, India cannot become a countervailing force against China mainly because it is economically
impoverished, lacks internal cohesion and does not possess strategic assets to become a potent military
challenge for China. Second, India and China are not ”born enemies.” Ever since the Sino-Indian War in
1962, relations between the two countries have steadily improved. Third, China can easily counteract US-
backed Indian attempt to emerge as a challenger to it by forging a triangular strategic partnership between
itself, Russia and the other South Asian states including Pakistan. Finally, India cannot emerge as a
counterweight to China simply because any such Indian move will have a great ”legitimacy” problem in the
eyes of the international community. A dominant India, which is incapable of getting itself recognised as a
paramount power in South Asia, will hardly be viewed as a serious contender against a resurgent China.
PAK - US RELATIONS AFTER 09/11
Pak - US relations got new momentum in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 on
America. The US has reviewed and
649
redefined its foreign policy towards South Asia, especially towards Pakistan. Immediately after the 09/11
attacks, the US asked Pakistan, what mounted to an ultimatum, whether to side ”with us or with the
terrorists”. The 09/11 events gave unique credibility to both the US offer to resume economic aid and the
threat of dire consequences to Pakistan if it refused to cooperate with the US. President Musharaf, without
losing any time gave clear, positive and quick response to the US call for cooperation in the antiterrorism
campaign, keeping in view the broad national interests of Pakistan: the country’s security, its economic
revival, to safeguard its strategic (nuclear and missile) assets and the Kashmir cause.
The first visible response of Pakistan to the US call, was the abandonment of a decade long effort by
Pakistan to turn Afghanistan under the Taliban regime into a virtual client state, a change that years of
effort by U.S officials had failed to achieve. In addition to abandoning its support to the Taliban, Pakistan
stood at the forefront of the US coalition, by providing a range of assistance to the US, including the use of
military bases and airports, logistic and intelligence support etc. Pakistan, as acknowledged by President
Bush, play a vital role in routing the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Despite strong opposition and
warning from the radical Islamic elements in the society, President Musharaf has also allowed the FBI and
CIA to take part in raids against Al-Qaeda’s members who have escaped to Pakistan’s tribal regions.
Musharaf also removed the head of ISI as part of his new Afghan policy.
Appreciating the role of Pakistan in the anti-terrorism campaign, the US has removed all sanctions imposed
on Pakistan since 1990, including those that took effect after Pakistan and India tested nuclear weapons in
1998. The US economic assistance to Pakistan in financial year
2002 reached $ 600 million and another S250 million for financial year
2003. President Bush offered an additional amount of $ 220 million to Pakistan to cover costs incurred in
aiding ”Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. Pakistan also got relief in shape of rescheduling of
some loans by the US and IMF.
After the collapse of Taliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan saw its most entrenched Afghan opponent, Northern
Alliance in charge with strong US back. Despite this difficult beginning. US and Pakistan interests in
Afghanistan are now reasonably well aligned. Pakistan has placed stability at the top of its Afghan agenda
and made considerable efforts to improve relations with the Afghan new authority. Pakistan has also
pledged to contribute in the US sponsored movement to rebuild Afghanistan.
President Musharaf s government held great expectations from the US, after a vital role being played by
Pakistan in the anti-terrorism
650 _
651
campaign. Musharaf s state visit to Washington DC. in February 2002, where he received generous praise
and ample high-level attention, was demonstrated to the audience at home that his decision to side with the
US had paid off. However, religious circles in Pakistan have been critical of Musharaf s cooperation with
US in Afghanistan. They tried to argue vociferously that American good-will towards Pakistan has always
been issue-based; this time too America would betray Pakistan once its objectives in Afghanistan were
achieved. It may be true partially as the upcoming consequences of Pakistan’s new-Afghan policy have
started to realize the apprehension.
Once regime change had been accomplished in Afghanistan, President Bush turned its attention to the
remnants of Taliban and AlQaeda, soon expanding the hunts to parts of Pakistan. Pakistani government has
allowed the FBI and other US forces to participate directly in operations against important terrorist targets.
Such types of operations may fit with the Pakistani government’s desire to eradicate religious militarism in
the country but at the same time may harm the broader interest of Pakistan; sovereignty and national
integrity. Popular backlash in the wake of FBI operations has already started to surface in the country.
Events like military showdown in Angoor Addah (FATA) along the Durand Line, between the US forces
and Pakistan’s security forces, can further undermine Pakistan’s position in the anti-terrorism coalition and
aid to the internal instability of the country.
Like gigantic changes in Pakistan’s Afghan policy, considerable new changes have been brought by
Pakistan in its Kashmir policy. The eight months long military stand-off between the nuclear rivals of
South Asia; Pakistan and India, in the wake of terrorist attack on the Indian parliament building in
December 2001, has brought the Kashmir issue back to the forefront. India, exploiting the post - 09/11
scenario, accused Pakistan of supporting terrorist Islamic groups across the Line of Control (LOG) in the
Indian held Kashmir. India wanted to pressurize Pakistan to stop abetting Kashmiri freedom struggle and
to malign its international image. Pakistani leadership hoped that, Pakistan’s support to US policy in
Afghanistan, would lead the U.S to turn blind eye to Pakistan support for militancy in Kashmir, and to
provide some diplomatic support for a Kashmir settlement which would be suitable to Pakistan. On the
contrast, President Bush not only condemned the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament but also warned
Pakistan to stop infiltration across the LOC. Statements by different American officials, implied that
Pakistan, more than India, was responsible for the crisis which had brought the subcontinent to the brink of
a nuclear debate.
In response to the American pressure on Pakistan, President Musharaf in a remarkable speech on January
12, 2002 denounced all forms of terrorism, and pledged that Pakistan’s territory would never be allowed for
any type of terrorist operations. He cracked down on the Islamic militants and outlawed many jihadee
groups including Lashkar-e-Tayba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, which were accused by India for the attack on
its parliament. Lately, the US has been putting the heat on Pakistan for not going far enough in reigning in
the militants. Different American delegates to South Asia during the stalemate period have been putting
pressure on Pakistan to ”do more” while stopping infiltration across the LOC. In short Pak-US relations are
once again marred by mixed messages reflecting the two nations conflicting goals. So far stability in
Afghanistan by pursuing operations against the Al-Qaeda remnants, is concerned, the two countries will be
cooperating with each other. But it is difficult to presume that Pakistan will be able to cash in the situation
in getting American favour on Kashmir issue.
Another important development in the post - 09/11 scenario is the US concerns regarding the safety of
Pakistan nuclear assets and their accessibility to Al-Qaeda operatives. Although the US abandoned sanction
on Pakistan which were imposed after its nuclear tests in May, 1998. Still the apprehension is haunting
Pakistani leadership, whether the crippling sanctions will continue once the US has achieved its objectives
in the region. A more worrying development has been the unfurling of a new Bush doctrine of ”preemptive
strike”.
Another important development which has strong capacity to , undermine the prospects of Pak-US relations
in the future, is the recent allegations against Pakistan, of supplying North Korea with uranium enriched
equipments and technical expertise in exchange for ballistic missile technology. President Musharaf has
turned down the charges as ’absolutely baseless’. US Secretary of State, Colin Powell and National
Security Advisor, Condoleeza Rice, said they believed President Musharaf though they refused to say in
absolute terms that there had never been Pakistan - North Korean cooperation. Recently Pakistan’s
government has been charged of providing support in development of nuclear weapon programs of Iran and
Libya. Information collected by IAEA and even clear confession by the government of Iran, substantiate
that few Pakistani nuclear scientists and some military officers have sold enriched uranium to Iran,
Pakistani government has started debriefing of suspected nuclear scientists and retired army personnel in
that connection. Musharaf s assurance to deal with the responsible persons effectively and to ensure the
security of nuclear programme in future has been well received by the US.
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Although the allegations are exaggerated but it can cause serious damage to Pak-US relations in the future.
As Pakistan’s role is important in the present anti-terrorism campaign, once this indispensability of
Pakistan wanes, these very accusations could become the basis for new sanctions against a less compliant
Pakistan.
The changing domestic political dynamics in Pakistan can also bear serious effects on Pak-US relations.
Mutahida Majlas-e-Amal (alliance of five religious parties) has got impressive position in the recent
elections for the national and provincial assemblies. It may play an important role in Pakistan’s future
political discourse. These religious parties have been protesting against Pakistan’s compliance in the US-
led war in Afghanistan. They are implacably opposing FBI’s operations against Al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
These new emerging Islamic elements in Pakistan’s power structure, can complicate Pakistan’s role as a
US alley in the region.
The more fundamental problem in US policy towards Pakistan is the clash between US and Pakistani
priorities, especially Pakistan’s relation with India and its Kashmir policy. Although Pakistan has yielded
much to the US pressure but it still remains questionable, whether Pakistan could be persuaded to change
completely its Kashmir policy. It seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. The normal carrot and stick
approach used by the U.S aid, intense political consultations and even greater military supplies, are not
sufficient to leverage this change in the mind of a skeptical leadership of Pakistan. This needs to become a
major and sustained element in the U.S. policy, backed by a comprehensive strategic vision of how to bring
about the necessary changes on all sides of the conflict. Without such a strategy, however, there is little
chance that Pakistan and India will move towards peaceful resolution of their differences, and U.S. and
Pakistani views will continue to clash on this fundamental and dangerous issue.
PRESIDENT MUSHARAF’ VISIT TO CAMP DAVID
Pakistan has a chequered history of relationship with the US, dotted with heights of mutual trust and
cooperation of Cold War years and depths of distrust and mutual indifference, with 9/11 making a new
phase of cooperation and understanding. The warm relationship between Pakistan and the US since 9/11
reached to its climax when President Musharaf was invited by the US President to Camp David on June 24,
2003. It was the most robust phase of Pak-US relations.
President Musharaf is the first Pakistani leader invited to Camp David. It is a great diplomatic victory in
itself, leave alone the material gains. The warm treatment extended to President Musharaf by President
FORKIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN
653
Bush, was the endorsement of Pakistan’ domestic and foreign policies. President Bush appreciated
Pakistan’s role in combating terrorism and banning extremism at home. In symbolic terms the visit was
successful as Pakistan once again became one of the most ”allied allies” of the super power.
On material side too. the visit bears some important gains tor Pakistan. President Bush announced S 3
billion aid for Pakistan which showed American commitment to Pakistan security and prosperity. Half of
this aid will go to defence and half to the social sector.
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) is concluded between the two. It is very encouraging
because emphasis is shifting from aid to trade. In a long term the agreement can pave the way for Free
Trade Agreement between the two, which will open the US market for Pakistani exports. Another triumph
of the visit was an Agreement on cooperation in Science and Technology. Pakistan is in dire need of
modern technology and scientific advancement for its socio-economic progress. The above mentioned
agreement will help Pakistan in its scientific development.
Now let us see the other side of the picture. It is very obvious that the trust expressed by the US President
in Pakistan is due to the close support it has been receiving from Islamabad in the conduct of its hunt for
the Al Qaeda and Taliban militants. Dr. Dennis Kux says regarding Pak-US relations, ” I fear the future
will be much like the past once the problems with Al Qaeda wind down.” The Camp David visit produced
nothing remarkable.
The aid of $ 3 billion to Pakistan in lieu of its stout support and exemplary services rendered in the course
of the US-led war on terror, was just peanuts. The aid packaged is overtied and largely conditional and its
time span is long enough to make the amount even smaller. Half of the $ 3 billion package goes to defence,
is useless for the poor. Only .5 billion, will be left for socio-economic development after returning S 1
billion to US to retire the debt.
In military terms, the weapons being offered to Pakistan by the US, do not address our urgent need vis-a-
vis the heavy Indian build up. India got latest SU-30MK-1 fighter planes and soon is going to get advanced
phalcon Air-bom Reconnaissance system and Arrow anti-missile system from Israel. The US has been
generous in providing modern military equipments to India for the last few years. But President Bush
turned down Pakistan’s request for F-16 delivery which was the most crying demand of
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Pakistan on the agenda for the meeting. The US did not pledge for yielding F-16 because it would affect its
strategic relationship with India.
On the strategic front also, President Musharaf could not get any thing special from the Camp David. The
issue of Kashmir, which Pakistan terms as its core dispute with India and the fundamental factor of its
foreign policy, was not given fair treatment and appropriate deal of time and space during the meeting. It
was a diplomatic failure of Pakistan. The US policy towards South Asia has manifested no remarkable
change. India still remains as one of important strategic and business allies of the US.
Instead of getting American favour on the issue of Kashmir, Pakistan has been under relentless pressure
from the US for stopping the alleged cross-border infiltration in the Occupied Kashmir. The US wants to
resolve the issue of Kashmir, but not at the cost of India’s resentment. It will most likely prefer a solution
within the existing territorial realities; greater autonomy for Kashmir with soft borders.
The above analysis of the Camp David visit of Musharaf, shows that although Pakistan got modest
economic gains but lost on the diplomatic and strategic fronts. The thing which made President Musharaf
and the whole nation contented with, was the outstanding protocol given to the President of Pakistan at
Camp David. The spirit of the renewed relationship seems to lie on the element of expediency rather than
mutual trust and understanding. Both Pakistan and the US need each other at this very juncture. Mutual
trust and confidence provide basis for permanent strategic partnership, which is totally lacking in the Pak-
US equation.
Dr. Muqtadar Khan has rightly said, ”The US Policy towards Pakistan is a mixed strategy of coercive
diplomacy and economic assistance.” Pak-US relation is not based on principles rather it is a product of
expediency. It is a chequered history of engagement and disengagement, trust and mistrust and cooperation
and compulsion.
PAKISTAN’S STANCE ON IRAQI CRISIS
Pakistan was pushed to a dilemma during the recent Iraqi crisis. It was very difficult for Pakistan to clearly
define its position in the crisis. Being a member of Security Council. Pakistan was under great pressure
whether to say Yes or No to the new UN Security Council resolution aimed at allowing use of force against
Iraq. It was fortunate for Pakistan that the US did not bring the intended resolution to UNSC and decided to
go to war unilaterally against Iraq.
President Musharaf has always pledged for peaceful resolution of all international disputes Deluding the
Iraq and Kashmir issue. During the recent 13 summit of Non Aligned Movement (NAM) in Kaula Lumpur
on February 24 - 25, 2003, several resolutions were adopted but main focus remained on the Iraq crisis. The
member countries rejected any invasion on Iraq not sanctioned by the UN. President Musharaf also
participated in the conference.
During his speech to the NAM conference President Mmsharaf said that ”we must go by the ground
realities. Let us give peace a clhance”. He emphasized on that both sides i.e. Iraq and the U.S. should
maWe efforts to avoid war. All means of peaceful resolution of the conflict! should be exhausted.
Clarifying Pakistan’s stance on the issue, he said tlhat Pakistan is not in favour of regime change in Iraq
because this \would bring instability to the entire region. He also said that Iraq should fullly cooperate with
the UN weapon inspectors and all WMD should be destroyed.
After the occupation of Iraq, the US asked Pakistan to contribute troops to the reconstruction forces in Iraq.
Pakistan’s responsee was again lukewarm. Though the US pressure was mounting but Pakistam adopted a
pragmatic position and conditioned the deployment of its troops in Iraq with the UN resolution calling for
peace keeping operations in Iraq. Pakistan boldly resolved that it will send troops to Iraq only under UN
umbrella.
US INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA
For a variety of reasons, South Asia, which has so far been a region of secondary importance for the United
States, is now receiving a higher level attention from Washington than it did in the past.
Influential American Senator Sam Brownback, who wisited New Delhi and Islamabad in the third week of
January 2000, has advocated ”aggressive” US engagement in the South Asian region. He wants his country
to adopt a separate and distinct American policy fo«r a ”robust relationship with Pakistan and India. Senior
State Departmemt officials, including Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, Under secretary of State
Thomas Pickering and Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth who visiting Islamabad just after
Brownback, have also indicated in their recent pronouncements that South Asia has acquired more than
secondary importance for the United States.
Making a fundamental shift in Indian policy, the? Vajpayee government has decided to build closer ties
with the United Startes which is likely to remain the world’s pre-eminent power in the foresee-able future.
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Though Indo-American relations have been improving steadily after the end of (he cold war. the real
breakthrough has come about as a result of ten rounds of talks between External Affairs Minister Jaswant
Singh and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbolt. For the first time in 52 years, India seems to have
decided to bring its foreign policy closer to that of the United States.
Talbott, on his part, has reiterated that the US wants to establish ”a qualitatively better relationship with
India.” He has, however, made it clear that an early solution to the nuclear issue will help establish a
relationship that will encompass what he called ”the bright areas” of a multifaceted partnership.” including
the pursuit of ”common interests regionally and globally.” At the heart of the nuclear accommodation
between India and the US is the American acknowledgement that India’s May 1998 nuclear tests cannot be
undone and that New Delhi’s security interests go beyond the subcontinent. Though US Under-Secretary
for Arms Control John Holum clarified on January 15. 2000 that India and Pakistan would never be
accepted as nuclear weapon states under the NPT, the fact remains that Mr Talbott has acknowledged
India’s sovereign right to choose nuclear security by building a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. He has
even tried to remove New Delhi’s fears that Washington is trying to limit the nuclear weapon potential of
India.
The continuing decline of Russia, the rise of India’s Asian rival, China, as an increasingly powerful and
influential country and the consequent emergence of an imbalance of power in Asia have forced New Delhi
to seek closer ties with the United States. Also, there is a strong IndoUS convergence on issues relating to
liberalization, restructuring and expansion of the Indian economy. As American economic involvement in
other parts of Asia, including China is reaching a saturation point, India offers a potential market of
commercial and industrial opportunities.
Instead of focusing on short-term tactical gains, Indian diplomacy has concentrated on building a stable and
enduring relationship with the United States, in which there is no major conflict of interests between the
two countries. New Delhi appears to have succeeded in persuading Washington to give up what it calls ”the
Siamese-twins approach” to India and Pakistan. In a recent interview Mr Strobe Talbott reiterated that
”contrary to widespread belief, we do not regard India and Pakistan as flip sides of the same coin... We see
each as having its own differing circumstances and differing concerns and we treat with each on its own
merits.”
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New Delhi has, however, failed to win Washington over to its side for declaring Pakistan a ”terrorist” state.
It is also perturbed over Washington’s attitude towards the military regime in Pakistan which it wanted to
be ostracized. It is also unhappy with Washington’s repeated calls for resumption of dialogue with
Islamabad and taking meaningful steps to settle the Kashmir issue with Pakistan.
The broad goals of the US policy in South Asia were specified in a statement issued by the White House on
January 12, 2000 accompanying the report entitled ”A National Security Strategy for a New Century.” The
report was transmitted to the Congress by President Clinton as required annually under the Goldwater-
Nichols Act of 1986. The report, which also covers South Asia, strongly urges both India and Pakistan to
refrain from any actions that would further undermine regional and global stability. It urges them to join the
international consensus in support of nonproliferation and a cut-off of fissile material production.
In his report, President Clinton says that regional stability and improved bilateral ties are also important for
American economic interests in a region that contains one-fifth of the World’s population and one of the
most important emerging markets. The US seeks to work closely with regional countries to stem the flow
of illegal drugs from South Asia, most notably from Afghanistan.
Interestingly, the report submitted by President Clinton to the US Congress also alludes indirectly to Indian
atrocities in occupied Kashmir and New Delhi’s charge of cross-border terrorism against Islamabad. It goes
on to say that respect for human rights also requires rejection of terrorism. ”If the nations in the region are
to safeguard their own citizens from threat of terror, they could not tolerate acts of indiscriminate violence
against civilians, nor could they offer refuge to those who commit such acts.”
American foreign policy approach towards South Asia under the George W. Bush administration has been
different from the previous one. It is partly due to growing strategic and economic importance of the region
and partly due to the changing international scenario over all. Since the
09/11 events the region of South Asia tops the US foreign policy agenda. Current American foreign policy
towards South Asia is based on the following main points:
1. Ensuring the security of South Asia nuclear stockpiles against terrorist theft or diversion.
2. Prevent accidental or unintended escalation to a nuclear war in South Asia.

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3. Bringing India and Pakistan on the negotiation table to find a lasting solution to the Kashmir issue.
During the recent anti-terrorism war in Afghanistan, both India and Pakistan sided with the U.S. They
assured that they will provide logistic and intelligence support. In response to that cordial offer the U.S.
normalized all the previous sanctions on the two countries and generous economic, military and diplomatic
support was assured to them. Here one can realize a paradox in the American approach towards South Asia.
The range of American favour, especially in terms of diplomatic and military assistance, has been greater
towards India: while Pakistan, playing frontline
- state role in the U.S. led anti-terror campaign, has got much lesser. In the Kashmir issue, which is the
basis of Pakistan’s foreign policy, American stand has seriously damaged Pakistan’s Kashmir cause. The
US consistently pressurize Pakistan to stop cross LOG infiltration.
The post - 09/11 Scenario provided new opportunities of bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and India.
The Bush administration not only signed a memorandum on cooperation on terrorism in February 2002, it
also endorsed the sale of 20 military items, including fire-finder artillerylocating radar systems long sought
by India. Both the countries have also engaged in their first joint military exercises since 1962, in May
2002.
In a nut shell American relations towards India and Pakistan have improved in the post - 09/11 periods.
Inspite all this improvement, great flaw of the relations is that the Bush administration has failed to bring
the two nuclear rivals to a dialogue on Kashmir, although Pakistan has yielded much concessions due to the
relentless US pressure.
In a unipolar world, it is important that Pakistan diplomacy focus not on short-term tactical gains but on a
stable and enduring relationship with the United States by following an approach rooted in realism,
longterm vision and specific and well-defined aims. In s relationship between a great power and a smaller
country, it is an uphill task to build and sustain close cooperation and understanding, since the relationship
is basically asymmetrical. It is thus crucial for Pakistan to adopt a diplomatic strategy with a clear set of
goals and realistic expectations to promote its interests in a relationship between two enequals.
PAK-INDIA RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY
Everybody knows that relations between India and Pakistan have touched the lowest ebb for the last few
years. This might not have sounded unusual for these two neighbours because they have hardly ever
developed
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the kind of cordiality geography dictates. However, the present developments are causing alarm because
the threat of a disastrous armed conflict has increased. And possession of nuclear arms capability by both
countries not only makes the prospect of hostilities between them unbearably grave, it is also apparently
affecting the judgment of policymakers.
That this is happening at this time in the history of South Asian peoples cannot be too strongly regretted.
After having followed mutually destructive policies for several decades, the people of both countries had
over the last few years begun to count their losses - the misery caused in the name of national security, the
missed opportunities of mutual benefit through cooperation in the fields of economy, culture and scientific
development, and extinction of the role South Asia could have played in international councils by virtue of
its size and resources.
The main reasons for this disastrous plunge seem to be Pakistan’s increased isolation in the world and
India’s policy of exploiting its advantage for strategic gain. Those who thought that the Kargil affair would
generate a new movement towards a settlement on Kashmir did not fail entirely. The world in general and
India in particular have been offered an opportunity to dispose of the matter on terms that they might have
hesitated to advance some years ago and which Pakistan may consider quite unfriendly to it.
The disruption of constitutional order also has made Pakistan more vulnerable than before. It is not just a
matter of the global community’s newly discovered love for democratic regimes. Pakistan’s case has
acquired extraordinary significance because of the general perception of its defence forces’ approach to
Kashmir and national security and the existence of a large force of uncontrolled - some say uncontrollable -
religious militants on its territory. In view of its huge dependence on external aid and goodwill Pakistan’s
bargaining position vis-a-vis the world at large has greatly weakened.
Pakistan’s western friends are obviously demanding a price for maintaining its life-support system in place.
For them restoration of democratic governance does not appear to be the main issue. They may not give up
their pro-democratic rhetoric but they will accept a reasonable timeframe for the country’s return to
representative civilian rule. What they appear to be pressing for as a priority issue are guarantees of
restraint on the nuclear issue and restrictions on the activities of religious militants. India finds these
western concerns helpful in its diplomatic campaign to isolate Pakistan. Its manoeuvre to get Pakistan
declared a terrorist state may have
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failed for the time being but its wish to go on using this card is manifest. ’ Now it has raised the spectre of a
limited nuclear war as the only way to stop the ’Mujahideen’ operations across the line of control in
Kashmir.
It is impossible to exaggerate the grave implications of the present precarious situation. An all-out war
between India and Pakistan will be catastrophic for both. Nobody can make a safe bet on what will survive
if the current views on the effectiveness of nuclear warheads are made the basis of defence strategies. The
prospect is too horrible to be visualised by any sane person. Even if an actual conflict is avoided the costs
of the continued confrontation will be unbearable. Not only will both Pakistan and India be diverted further
from their essential obligations to their hungry, malnourished and unemployed millions, the prospect of the
South Asian states acting in concert to defend their rights, through SAARC and otherwise, will also suffer a
grievous setback.
The moment demands exceptional statesmanship from the leaders of the two neighbours. Talks between the
two capitals must begin at the topmost level because the situation is too grave to be entrusted to officials.
India’s refusal to hold talks with the preserrt Pakistan regime is devoid of both logic and good sense.
Pakistan will invite similar criticism if it maintains that Kashmir will be the sole agenda for negotiations.
Securing guarantees of peace is the most important issue at the moment. The people expect the leaders of
the two countries to enter into a compact that they will not seek a military solution to any matter dividing
them and that they will make sustained effort to resolve all disputes and differences through peaceful
negotiations. At the same time, both governments need to rethink their external policies.
That there is no getting away from the Kashmir issue is plain enough. But both India and Pakistan should
have realised by now that no instant solution is possible. Indeed, abrupt initiatives like the Lahore
Declaration or agreements in the making of which any party feels itself under unwelcome pressure, such as
Tashkent and Shimla accords, do not bear fruit because they are flung into the faces of unprepared people.
The problem demands a peaceful process aimed at facilitating the evolution of a formula that is primarily
acceptable to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who are the principal party, and also does not leave
Pakistan or India with a grievance that will obstruct normal relations between them in future. Nothing
would be gained if India continued to insist that the only issue pending settlement is stoppage of cross-
border support to the insurgency in the valley or if Pakistan continued to place the issue in the
1948 context and kept repeating ’Kashmir first.’
Since Pakistan’s need of peace seems at the moment to be greater than India’s, Islamabad should not allow
all of its policies to be determined by India’s attitude. It must enlarge the space for diplomatic initiatives to
dismantle the props recently provided to the extremists in New Delhi. The concerns of the international
community need to be addressed.
FINDING A WAY OUT IN KASHMIR
As the prime ministers of the two enemy states embraced each other at Wahga in February 1999 it seemed
that the ice of strained relations had been broken. But many anticipated that this embrace would not
necessarily mean a meeting of minds , a view that was later vindicated.
The Indian Express of March 2, 1999 summed up the mentality behind the reluctant steps towards peace:
”Gladioli bouquets wilt as they should and the cadence of Urdu shairi fades away. The challenge for both
India and Pakistan and the respective prime ministers, is really to keep the spirit of the brave new moment
at Wagha alive, amidst the compulsions, despite the compulsions, of the domestic politics.”
”Those opposed to this initiative were quick to point out that the possibility of normalising relations
between the two countries is well nigh impossible given the 51 years of implacable hostility between them.
On Sunday, both prime ministers made statements that seemed to prove the cynics right. Vajpayee,
speaking in New Delhi while inaugurating the Bhegwan Mahavir Kendra, stated the nation is ’determined
not to lose our land in future.’ In Islamabad former prime minister Nawaz Sharif stated that ’there could
come a time when talks have to be suspended if no concrete development is made (on the Kashmir issue)’.”
During the last 56 years, many solutions have been proposed to ease the tension relating to this disputed
territory, ranging from accession to Pakistan or accession to India, to total freedom for Kashmir. But none
of the official solutions have touched upon the most important factor of the issue, the Kashmiris
themselves, who have never been included in the discussions.
In 1999 US Democratic Senator Daniel P. Mohnihan, a former ambassador to India, dropped another
bombshell over the valley by suggesting a novel solution. ”Maybe now at last they look at each other and
say; divide it up and be done with it,” he was quoted as saying.
There are many other similar or less similar options available or being voiced but, none offer anything
drastically new or acceptable to all parties. The old options are now being voiced by new people. Is
Palestinianstyle peace a viable option? Should US intervention break the deadlock and
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help solve the issue? How can India and Pakistan recede from their original stands on Kashmir? Should the
UN General Assembly take a legal initiative and ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory
opinion on the issue?
The UN General Assembly can inteipret India and Pakistan’s claims over the valley in the light of
international laws, the existing UN resolution on Kashmir, and bilateral treaties and agreements like Simla
dealing with the dispute, and last but not least the right to self-determination of the Kashmiris. But for this
UN has to formally ask the World Court for an advisory opinion through a formal Security Council
resolution. Till now it has not done that, thus leaving India and Pakistan to themselves which speak the
same language but interpret different meanings of the same thing.
A compromise formula has to come from within and for that Kashmiris need to be involved. The Jammu
Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), a party which waged a separatist campaign in the Occupied Kashmir
proposed a formula for the solution of Kashmir in their document titled ”Kashmir -- Who Will Bell The
Cat?”
According to the JKLF formula: ”The solution of the issue that fulfills all these conditions is that the
divided Jammu Kashmir State (including Kashmir Valley, Jammu, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir and
GilgitBaltistan) are re-united and made a fully independent country with a democratic, federal and non-
communal system of government and having friendly and trade relations with both India and Pakistan. Let
there be an agreement between Kashmir and international community, immediately after re-unification, to
the effect that the international community, in particular the immediate neighbours of Jammu Kashmir, will
not violate its frontiers or its territorial integrity nor interfere in its internal affairs and that Jammu Kashmir
will not allow any country to use its territory against any other country.
”Making Jammu Kashmir a federal, democratic and non communal State is aimed at safe-guarding the
rights of religious and cultural minorities. The Federation will consist of five provinces, i.e. Kashmir
Valley, Jammu, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan each enjoying reasonable internal autonomy.
There will be a Parliament consisting of the House of Representatives (The National Assembly) and House
of Notables (Senate/Upper House) with the former having representation on the basis of population and the
latter having equal number of representatives from all provinces. This arrangement could be altered by the
elected parliament.
FORF.IGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN
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”Fifteen years after the re-unification and independence, let there be a referendum under UN supervision to
determine whether the State should retain its independence for ever or become part of India or Pakistan and
that popular verdict be accepted by all concerned i.e. India, Pakistan, all Kashmiris and the international
community, as final settlement of the issue.”
The problem with this formula is that even JKLF is not consistent when it comes to negotiations regarding
a permanent solution. It keeps changing its stance, thus contributing to making the issue more ’unsolvable’.
For example in 1994 a JKLF pamphlet suggested that the new re-united state be given five years to decide
whether to be under Indian control, Pakistani control or emerge as a fully independent state.
The irony about the whole Kashmir issue is that those who are trying to solve the issue do not really
understand it. Security Council resolution 47 of 1948 which was jointly presented by Belgium, Canada,
China, Columbia, the UK and the US envisaged a two-option plebiscite on the question of accession of the
State to India or Pakistan. Where are Kashmiris and their right of self-determination?
On the other hand the pro-independence Kashmiris want to include Gilgit-Baltistan in their re-united state
without realising that Gilgit-Baltistan declared independence after overthrowing the Sikh governor of the
region. Later they asked Pakistan to run the affairs of the newly independent state.
The Indian claim on Kashmir is based on the concept of instrument of accession signed by the then
Maharaja Hari Singh with a proviso in the Indian Constitution, Article 370, which is supposed to guarantee
it a degree of autonomy. India claims that the Hindu raja, ruling over a Muslims majority feared that his
subjects would opt for Muslim Pakistan, and invited the Indian Army to help when he heard of an invasion
by the tribals of Pakistan. Ironically the opposite happened in Junagarh and Hyderabad where Muslim
rulers of Hindu majority states opted for Pakistan but the Indian Army forcibly annexed the states. Perhaps
Pakistan is repeating the same strategy which India adopted 52 years ago.
Pakistan’s claim over Kashmir is based on at least 18 UN Security Council resolutions and has taken a
political, moral and diplomatic stance on the issue, arguing that there can be no peace in the region without
a solution of the Kashmir dispute.
Following the Indian plane hijacking by guerillas working for the Kashmir cause in December 1999,
Pakistan’s Chief Executive General
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Pervez Musharraf, vehemently stated that there would be no dialogue with India without discussing
Kashmir. The last government of Nawaz Sharif, too, suggested some proposals to defuse the tension. These
include: Indian troops be withdrawn from held Kashmir, political activities be encouraged, repression by
Indian forces be stopped, Hurriyat Conference leaders be allowed to visit Pakistan. India rejected these
proposals outright because of the different wavelengths of the two parties.
Finding a compromise formula on Kashmir is no easy matter, given the complexity of the issue where egos
and the territorial hegemony have soared above the lofty mountains of the area.
On what grounds are Indian security forces murdering and raping thousands of innocent Kashmiris? What
made Kashmiri Pandits leave their homes and flee the valley? Do the Gilgitis still have a sense of
belonging to Kashmir? And last but not least, do the minorities of Kashmir want to live under Muslim
majority rule if Kashmir accedes to Pakistan or gets freedom?
These and many other questions need to be answered with an open perspective and this cannot be done
without the participation of the Kashmiri people. Unless the people of Kashmir are given the right to decide
their fate the stalemate over the valley will continue.
The recent events with regard to Pak-India relations have created new optimism of finding an amicable
solution to the issue of Kashmir. For the first time guns fell silent along the LOG followed by considerable
concessions from both sides, transcending their traditional standpoints.
Pakistan has agreed to any solution of the issue, which is acceptable to all the involved parties. It also
subsided the UN resolutions as the only way to resolve the issue. From Indian side a remarkable
breakthrough came when the Indian leadership agreed not only to start a composite dialogue with Pakistan
covering all issues including Kashmir, but also to engage the Kashmiri leadership in the peace process.
APHC leadership visited India in the last week of January 2004 with optimistic outcome. The omens are
good so far and one can really expect a major breakthrough on the issue of Kashmir in the renewed
composite dialogue between India and Pakistaa. PAK - INDIA RELATIONS DETERIORATED
Pakistan and India have entered into the twenty first century with strained relations between themselves.
They have fostered deep rooted distrust and hatred towards each other during the last half a century.
FOREIGN I’OI.IC V OF PAKISTAN
665
Kashmir issue has been continuing as a bone of contention between the two countries and the problem has
been extended into the new millennium.
The expectations created by the Lahore Declaration between the two rivals at the closure of the twentieth
century, could not be maintained longer. The euphoria of improved relations between the two countries was
soon blown in the Kargil war. After the Kargil clashes, the Hindu extremists dominated, BJP government
started concerted campaign to isolate Pakistan in the international community. That Indian propaganda was
accentuated by the Military takeover in Pakistan on 12’1’ October, 1999. India sought to get Pakistan
expelled from the Commonwealth. SAARC summit of 1999 was also postponed by India, because it did
not want to talk with Pakistan on any bilateral or regional issue.
Unlike Mr. Vajpayee hard stand against Pakistan, President Musharaf took some sincere steps towards
normalization of relations between the two countries. He took initiative in October 1999, to reduce troops
along the international border with India. In June - July, 2000 Hizbul Mujahideen declared cease-fire which
was supported and appreciated by Pakistan. In December, 2000 Gen. Musharaf asked India to allow APHC
to visit Pakistan to initiate the process of tripartite negotiations among Pakistan, India and APHC. On May
2001, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister issued statement, reaffirming Pakistan commitment to Simla and the
Lahore Declarations. Furthermore, Musharaf came forward with a proposal to resolve the issue of Kashmir.
The proposal was issued in June
2001. It was based on four step process. First, accept that there is a Kashmir dispute. Second, negate
solutions completely unacceptable to both sides. Third, discuss possible solutions. Fourth, mutually
acceptable solutions to be finalized.
On December 20, 2000 the Indian Prime Minister acknowledged that ”there had been a decline in incidents
of terrorist violence in the State” and a remarkable decrease in the cross LOG infiltration. In the same
statement Vajpayee said that ”as part of our continued commitment to the Simla agreement and the Lahore
Declaration, the government will initiate such exploratory steps as are considered necessary by it, so that
composite dialogue process between the government of India and Pakistan can be resumed”. He also
mentioned that ”we shall not traverse solely on the beaten track of the past. Instead we shall be bold and
innovative designers of a future architecture of peace and prosperity for the entire South Asian region.
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister warmly responded to Vajpayee’s statement. He said in a PTV interview that
”we are impressed by what Vajpayee has said and hope that a dialogue will begin between the two
countries”. . •
666 _
FOREIGN I’OI.IC Y OF PAKISTAN
Pakistan’s ambassador in Delhi developed a special relationship with key ministers of the Vajpayee
cabinet. All these personal efforts and India’s willingness to start the process of dialogue with Pakistan led
to the Agra summit between Vajpayee and Musharaf in July 5-6, 2001. It was a great opportunity to
resolve Pak-Indian disputes including Kashmir problem amicably. The Agra declaration could not be
signed, although every thing was settled to arrive on the occasion. Pakistan had conceded no mention of the
UN resolutions on Kashmir plus the mention of cross-border terrorism as one of the areas for future
dialogue. The failure of the summit owed to the absence of pre-summit preparation between the two sides,
the absence of Musharaf - Vajpayee personal chemistry, role of the hard liners in the Vajpayee’s cabinet
and Musharaf s strong worded press conference with senior Indian journalists etc. However, the summit
cannot be dismissed completely, at least it has provided a framework for future to initiate the process of
dialogue.
An attack on the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001 brought Pak-India relations to the lowest ebb.
Indians did not loose to cash in the occasion in the post - 09/11 anti-terrorism Scenario. Delhi, without
losing any time denounced Pakistan for harbouring the accused terrorist groups. Diplomatic ties were
downgraded and all means of communications with Pakistan were cut off. More threatening was the
deployment of over half a million troops on the border between the two countries. The deployments
continued to in place for eight months, eyeball to eyeball, which really brought the two rivals on the brink
of devastating war.
India has been successful in applying coercive diplomacy to push Pakistan into cutting off material support
to the Kashmiri freedom fighters. India has been successful too, in bringing down international pressure on
Pakistan to put ban on the Islamic extremist groups, which have been operating in Kashmir. President
Musharaf conceded to the Indian demands substantially, when he announced strict measures against
Islamic Jihadee groups and cross-border infiltration.
At the July 2002 SICCA summit in Almaaty, although both the Indian and Pakistani leadership avoided
each other, but President Musharaf declared in clear terms that Pakistan would control cross - LOG
infiltration. Although the measures announced by Musharaf were appreciated by international community
but Indians still continued to blame Pakistan for not doing enough to prevent terrorist attacks and stop
infiltration.
India has staved off diplomatic not politico - military pressure on the Kashmir issue. The international
community continued to believe in Delhi’s argument that Islamabad can do more to stop cross-LOC
667
infiltration. India conditioned the dismantling of military deployments along the Pakistani border, with the
complete stoppage of infiltration. Various Western delegates to the region during the period of military
stand off between the two rivals, have been putting pressure on Pakistan to ”do more”, in stopping
infiltration.
Since the attack on the Indian Parliament, India has adopted notalks policy. India tried to apply new tactics
by capitalizing on the state elections in Kashmir held in September-October 2002, to show the world that
Kashmir issue is Indian internal problem and can be resolved unilaterally. Pakistan denounced the elections
as shame elections and APHC boycotted to participate in it. India has failed to achieve its objectives on this
front. No one can expect any normalization and betterment of situation in the valley unless India agree to
come to the negotiating table, with Pakistan.
The recently, new-elected government in Pakistan had great expectations that India might come to the
negotiating table with them, but the Indian sudden boycott of the SAARC summit, scheduled to be held in
Islamabad in January 2003, has shattered all hopes. Prime Minister Jamali complained that ”I was
expecting that the Indian leadership would adopt a flexible attitude towards my government. Regrettably, it
has not happened, yet I urge them to sit with us and discuss all contentions issues - we want to tell them
that we are ready for talks”.
During the recent Non Aligned Movement Summit (February 24 -

25, 2003) in Kaula Lumpur, Malaysia, President Musharaf extended cordial offer to India to resume the
process of dialogue. He strongly pleaded for the solution of all the disputes, including Kashmir issue,
because, he said, South Asia is the only region not concentrating on its economic development. He also
strongly advocated the position of Kashmir issue as an international issue. The President said that there is
no difference between Palestine and Kashmir issue. Both have started in 1948 and UN is involved in both
along with the involvement of human rights issues in both the cases. President Musharaf pleading for the
implementation of the UN resolutions on Kashmir said that we should not apply UN resolutions selectively.
President Musharafs mentioning of the UN resolutions on Kashmir might have annoyed India, which does
not accept those resolutions. In such circumstances there is little possibility of dialogue resumption between
India and Pakistan in the foreseeable future. The onus lies on the Indian leadership to accept the ground
realities and come to the
668
INTERNATIONAL .AFFAIRS
negotiatmnablt-; in true spirit, to pick the thread from where it was left in Agra.
PAK-INEIlDBETENTE
Closing otle yesar 2003 witnessed a remarkable improvement in Pak-India relations. 1 na _scent peace
process was emerging in South Asia in the closing monks cof the year. After lurching to the brink of war
twice in two years. Indimd Pakistan finally came round to exploring the prospects for peace. Wider they
will succeed in ending their confrontation, time alone will tell, kaus* the two countries have undertaken on
many occasion similar venues ””which fizzled out. However, a number of initiatives taken by both
sicfctow-’ards normalization of relations are a welcome change from the atmospre of hostility and
near-war like situation that loomed dangerous!) arg e over the region for the past two years. The
recent Vajpayee-Msharraf meeting during the SAARC Summit at Islamabad in
2004 has gin n« ew hopes of peace and normalization in South Asia. The two leadersilTinrried their
determination to stait a composite dialogue from February 214, \*vhich will include all the contentious
issues including Kashmir.
Since the Demr>«er 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, relations between India and FJistam have been
extremely deteriorating. Not only did New Delhi accus of Pakistan being behind the attack, but also
severed diplomatic atio ns with Islamabad and denied its airspace to Pakistan along with tsusspension of
rail and road links. Besides, India mobilized its armed foes, forward air bases were manned and deployed
some half a million troop along the Pakistan border. Pakistan responded in kind. Since then Ira Hias taken a
series of provocative steps and spurned all offers of a iloguje until Pakistan stopped what Indians termed as
crossborder terroisn.
Having faileito -_ pressurize Pakistan through diplomatic, economic and military meailncdia pulled back its
forces and re-assessed the value of strategy of csrcio>«n it had adopted for more than year. However,
Indian intransigenceijntiinued and they ruled out any possibility of dialogue with Pakistan. P»tan , for its
own part, has been taking a number of steps to lower the teiiin. Pakistan even offered a third party or UN
monitoring of LOG to keeps e^ye on infiltration. Pakistan has also repeatedly offered unconditionalalkss to
India but all such conciliatory moves have been rebuffed by Ma. Meanwhile, India continued to project
even the smallest incident of *len ce in Kashmir as an act of cross-border terrorism instigated byikistran. A
week before the Vajpayee initiative for dialogue, Indian Foreii NMinister, Mr. Yashwant Sehna went to the
extent
669
threatening Pakistan as a ’fit case’ for pre-emptive strike by India. Pakistan promptly warned of dire
consequences of such a stupid action by India.
Suddenly, the clouds of tension started to wither away after the landmark statement of Vajpayee on April
18, 2003 offering talks to Pakistan without any pre-condition. A number of CBMs were also initiated by
India, Pakistan welcomed the offer and cordially accepted the CBMs with minor amendments and some
new additions. These CBMs included the return of high commissioners to the two capitals and the
restoration of Lahore-Delhi bus service, besides a decision to re-open air and train services.
On May 12th Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Senha presented a detailed roadmap for peace with
Pakistan, beginning with official-level talks that would work towards a summit level meeting. He reiterated
that future talks will be held in a composite framework, covering all issues including Kashmir.
Pakistan also adopted a positive and constructive approach to easing bilateral tension. Prime Minister
Zafaruilah Khan Jamali’s telephonic conversation with Vajpayee followed by a formal invitation to him to
visit Pakistan for bilateral talks, are appreciated across the globe. Alongside the official contact between
India and Pakistan, track-11 diplomacy also played an important role in softening the behavior of the two
governments. Many delegates of politicians, artists, social workers and students paid reciprocal visits
across the border. The increased people-to-people contact has been actively working on breaking down the
barriers in the way of peace between India and Pakistan.
A bold initiative was taken by P.M. Jamali on November 25, 2003 when he offered unilaterally an
unconditional and comprehensive ceasefire alongside the line of control, the working boundary and line of
actual control. It was not only a bold initiative towards de-escalation of tensions, but also initiated a fresh
round of CBMs. Pakistan also proposed complete withdrawal of forces from the LOC by both sides. In a
flurry of proposals that began immediately after the ceasefire announcement, Indian side proposed the
resumption of over flights, the Samjhota express, increase in diplomatic and counselors staff as well as
more routes for the India-Pakistan bus service, and also a possible road link between Muzafarabad and Sri
Nagar. Indian proposals also included a new rail service between Sindh and Rajaslhan, and a ferry service
between Karachi and Mumbai. Pakistan has been arguing for some time that the ground for the resumption
of the dialogue should be prepared by restoring the position that existed before December
2001. Most of the CEJMi have been undertaken since then.
670
FOREICN POLICY OF PAKISTAN
671
So far the very crucial and central issue of Kashmir is concerned, both the rival parties have normalised
their traditional standpoints. Pakistan is ready as stated by President Musharaf, to resolve the issue of
Kashmir through a solution acceptable to all the parties, Pakistan, India and Kashmiris. President Musharaf
went to the extent that Pakistan could even set aside the UN Resolution in seeking any just solution to the
issue of Kashmir. The world community appreciated this move very much. India has also agreed to discuss
the issue of Kashmir as a bilateral issue with Pakistan in a composite dialogue framework. Even India gave
signals of possible negotiation with Kashmiri leaders, that is a remarkable deviation from the traditional
Indian standpoint as they have been denying any talks with the Kashmiris on the issue of Kashmir.
All the preceding CBMs and courageous initiatives from both sides paved the way for India’s willingness
to participate in the SAARC Summit at Islamabad in January 2004. The successful adoption of Islamabad
Declaration, a Social Charter. Framework Agreement on SAFTA and an additional protocol to the
Convention on Suppressing Terrorism, all show a good omen and indicate a genuine thaw in Pak-India
relations.
A major breakthrough was the Musharaf-Vajpayee meeting on January 5,

2004 in Islamabad during the SAARC Summit. Both the leaders agreed to initiate the process of composite
dialogue that broke down in Agra in July
2001. The process of dialogue was agreed to be resumed in February 2004. The joint statement says that
”The two leaders are confident that the resumption of composite dialogue will lead to peaceful settlement
of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the satisfaction of both sides.” The modalities for
the dialogue has yet to be worked out. The joint statement of P.M. Vajpayee and President Musharaf may
prove a ”path breaking” in the Pak-India relations in future. Foreign Minister of Pakistan Khurshid Kasuri
declared the joint statement as no one-man victory but ”a victory for common sense, a victory for
moderation, a victory for South Asia, a victory for all SAARC leaders and SAARC countries.”
The history of confidence building measures between the two South Asia neighbors may be chequered and
so far not so encouraging, and the road to peace may be slow and sluggish. However, if a genuine and
sustained effort is undertaken, it may not be an entirely idealist notion that South Asia peace initiative may
prove to be a model for conflict resolution for other conflict regions to emulate.
PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY- NEW CHALLENGES
Pakistan faces challenges in the foreign policy domain partly due to the negative attitude of Western
countries towards the establishment of a
military government in Pakistan, and partly because of the country’s foreign policy management problems.
The assurance to the world community of continuity in foreign policy may be a good starting point for the
military regime but this will not help to overcome the current foreign policy problems. A down to earth
reassessment of the strategies and direction of foreign policy is needed to cope with the challenges. Four
aspects require immediate attention: how to deal with the Western negative attitude towards the change of
government in Pakistan; recognition of Pakistan’s diminished positive relevance to the global agenda of the
West or Pakistan’ inability to cash in on the proximity factor in the changed international and regional
environment; compartmentalization and partial ’privatization’ of foreign policy; and the problem of
negative importance.
It is not surprising that a number of Western states are crticial of the change of government in Pakistan.
They are trying to reiterate their support to a principle that occupies an important place in their political
rhetoric at the global level in the post-cold war period. By taking a negative view of the establishment of a
military government they want to show consistency in their ideological commitment and actual policies.
However, this posture does not take into account the ground realities and why a military than had been
showing patience since 1988 had to step directly into the political domain. The conference of heads of
government of the Commonwealth went overboard by passing a resolution on the developments in
Pakistan. Some of the Commonwealth members suffer from a self-cultivated illusion that the
Commonwealth’s tough policy towards Nigeria was the result of the interplay of domestic factors and
considerations. The Commonwealth resolution on Pakistan will not contribute to Pakistan’s return to
democracy. The internal factors rather than the ideological arrogance of the West will shape the nature and
direction of political change in Pakistan.
The Western attitude towards Pakistan compromises the important principle of good and effective political
and economic management. The abysmal performance of the ousted government on these two counts has
been totally ignored. Furthermore, the Western attitude has encouraged India to adopt a strident approach
towards the new Pakistani administration, thereby undermining the prospects of reviving a bilateral
dialogue between India and Pakistan. This upsets the Western, especially American agenda for
improvement of relations between India and Pakistan.
The best Pakistani response to Western reaction should be to concentrate on its domestic political and
economic affairs. If the new administration can improve political and economic management and put
Pakistan’s economic house in order, the West will be left with no option but to accept the change
672
in Pakistan. Unless Pakistan consolidates internally, its ability to play on international role will continue to
be hampered and others will attempt to use international pressure to effect domestic changes in Pakistan.
The successful elections to the National and Provincial assemblies followed by an installation of
democratic government in Pakistan, have somewhat improved its image in the community of nations.
Moreover. President Musharafs vote of confidence from the Parliament and provincial assemblies has
further strengthened the representative character of the present government of Pakistan. The Western
countries including the US and Commonwealth countries have appreciated Pakistan’s return to democracy.
The end of the cold war has diminished Pakistan’s strategic significance to the interests of the major
powers. In the past, Pakistan enjoyed Western support because of its proximity to the areas where the West
had strategic interests. Pakistan’s multifaceted security relationship with the US in the mid-fifties and the
early sixties as well as in the eighties can be explained with reference to Pakistan’s relevance to the
American global agenda and strategic world-view. During this period, it was not relevant what kind of
government existed in Pakistan and how were its authorities managing its economic and political affairs.
The proximity factor is still valid because the West maintains interests in Central Asia and the Gulf region.
However, the proximity can be taken advantage of in the post-cold war period only if the concerned
country can ensure economic and political stability within its boundaries and turns itself into an attractive
economic proposition with reference to foreign investment and trade.. Initially, Pakistan attracted much
attention as a suitable place for investment and an important production and transit point for economic
interaction of the West with Central Asia. It was also viewed as a possible outlet for Central Asian oil and
gas. However, the fragmentation of the domestic polity, increased domestic violence and corruption at the
highest level in government dissuaded foreign investors. Above all, a failure to promote coherence and
order in Afghanistan raised serious doubts about Pakistan’s role as a stabilizer in the region. With
Afghanistan in turmoil, Pakistan could no longer serve as a transit route for trade to Central Asia. The
problem is diluted by the recent war on terrorism in Afghanistan and the role played by Pakistan in
dismantling the alleged terrorists net work in the region. In the post-Taliban era, Pakistan’s support is
inevitable to bring stability in Afghanistan and to strengthen the new fragile government of Karzai.
What makes the situation complex is that, since the 1980s, Pakistan has allowed the ISI and some
Islamic parties to pursue their own
673
policy towards Afghanistan. This amounts to ’privatization’ of foreign policy, i.e., some institutions and
non-official groups are allowed to p%sue a political agenda in another country independent of the official
design,ated foreign policy institutions and officials. Such a freedom to private grûps undermines the
ability of the government to pursue foreign policy jn a consistent and effective manner because it cannot
control or direct all interactions across the territorial boundaries of the state.
Pakistan’s policy makers have good reason to be satisfied with, the successful conduct of its foreign policy
in the year followed the com£,iete transformation of the global scenario in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of 09/11 on America. Nevertheless, Pakistan has been exposed to few new challenges in the years to
come. As the victim of the horrible terrOrjst attacks of 09/11, the U.S. declared war on terrorism, President
Mushaâps prompt decision to join the coalition against terrorism, served to put Pakistan in the mainstream
of international diplomacy. Pakistan’s role in eradicating Taliban regime and the AI Qaeda’s network in
Afghanistan has been very crucial in the anti-terrorism campaign. President Bush and Qther top American
officials have repeatedly appreciated Pakistan’s service ii\ the U.S-led war in Afghanistan. President Bush
in his recent statement clearly announced that Pakistan is one of the most important countries ir\ an
important region and her role is crucial to the American interest in the region. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s
compliance in the war against terror has brought serious consequences to the country’s internal and external
politics. Pakistan has been exposed to furious terrorist attacks both from internal an{j external. Its internal
instability is at stake in face of the increasing ^ntj. American sentiments in the country. On the other hand
American contern has shifted from democracy to the religious bigotry and various jihadi groups in the
country. Pakistan is under consistent pressure from the \j § to control the religious fanaticism in the
country.
It is a great challenge for Pakistan’s foreign office, to tell the \j $ that people of Pakistan have different
view on how to fight international terrorism. It has to convince the U.S. that great cause of the so-called
international terrorism is the unresolved conflicts like Palestine issue Kashmir issue and Chechny’s
problem etc., unless the U.S. is willing to balance its stance in these conflicts, lasting victory over the
internati^nai terrorism can never be achieved. The new elected government of Zafaruuah Jamali has the
task to persuade America to draw clear line between pending the so-called terrorists and interfering in the
internal affairs of Pakistan. Unnecessary FBI’s operation need to be stopped immediately if the equation
between Pakistan and the U.S. has to be rationalized and n\ade sustainable- notwithstanding, Pakistan’s
need to seek financial assistance and debt relief.
1
674
Pakistan relations with the U.S. have improved during the last year but on the cost of deteriorating relations
with India. Pakistan has to cope with pressures, both political and military, that India has sought to build up
against her on the pretext of countering terrorism. Pakistan has to seek American role to pressurize India to
come to the negotiating table to resolve bilateral disputes including Kashmir issue. The problematic issue
of Kashmir will certainly not be resolved through the continuing war of words, which has become the
defining factor of our Kashmir policy. Bilateralism must be the key for further progress in the relations
between India and Pakistan.
Another important challenge for the Pakistan’s policy makers is the nuclear proliferation issue. Recently,
Pakistan has been accused by some American officials, of supplying nuclear weapon’s materials to North
Korea in return for ballistic missile technology. The accusation has come out at a time when the U.S.
considers Pakistan’s support crucial for its antiterrorism operations. It is the appropriate time for Pakistan
to negotiate the issue with the U.S. and settle it once but for ever. Because the accusation can cause
renewed sanctions on Pakistan, once the indispensability of Pakistan to America wanes. In the recent month
IAEA got some information pointing towards Pakistan’s support to Iran and Libya in developing their
nuclear weapons programmes. These allegations have stigmatized greatly Pakistan’s image as a nuclear
proliferator and are bound to cause great difficulties for Pakistan in future.
The latest and most important challenge for Pakistani leadership is to clearly define Pakistan’s role in the
Gulf crises. Although Pakistan has always remained silent over the American policy towards the Middle
East, but this time the U.S. needs Pakistan’s support in the stabilization of Iraq. The US has already called
for Pakistani troops to contribute to the reconstruction of Iraq. Given the unilateral attack of US on Iraq and
the world’s opposition to it, Pakistan is reluctant to send forces to Iraq. Almost the whole Muslim world is
opposed to the US polices in Iraq, so Pakistan cannot afford to annoy her Muslim brothers. . The situation
has pushed Pakistan into a great dilemma. It is a test for the diplomatic efficiency of the new government.
Pakistani leadership needs to handle the situation pragmatically, keeping in view its broader national
interest.
Pakistan needs to adopt a low profile approach in the international system and concentrate more on
improving its domestic economic and political conditions. A country that depends on external economic
assistance to stay afloat cannot effectively pursue its national interests at the global lever. Internal
economic and political strength is the key to playing an effective role at the global level. The domestic
context was never so
£OHF.IGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN 5-75
relevant to determining nature and direction of foieign policy as is the case nowadays. There is an urgent
need to restore the confidence of the international community in the Pakistani state. The world is waiting to
see if Pakistan can demonstrate efficacious management of domestic economic and political affairs and
foreign policy. This will make Pakistan an attractive proposition for investment, trade, and a transit point
for countries of the region. Pakistan should revive its imag« as a factor of stability in the region.
WHETHER PAKISTAN SHOULD RECOGNIZE ISRAEL OR NOT

One of the important elements of American agenda in Middle East is to usher an era of democratization and
free market economy in the region. The resolution of Palestine issue is essential for that purpose. The
recently projected ’Roadmap’ for peace in Middle East sheerly needs to improve Israel’s credibility in the
Muslim world. Recognition of Israel by Pakistan is a part of that broader American project.
The issue of recognition of Israel carne to fore during Musharaf s visit to Camp David in June 2003. The
aid of USS 3 billion is promised to Pakistan by President Bush, which is conditional by some stated and
unstated conditions. Recognition of Israel by Pakistan may include in the unstated conditions.
Among the Muslim states, Egypt, Joidan, Mauritania, Turkey and Uzbekistan have diplomatic ties with
Israel. Oman and Qatar maintain business relations, and Morocco and Tunisia have low level diplomatic
ties with Israel, but all these relations have been suspended since the start of second Intifada. PLO has
recognized the st4te of Israel pnder the Oslo Accord 1993, Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia pushed
forward a proposal to recognize ]srael along side a sovereign Palestinian state consisting of pre-
1973 war tenritori«s of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its Capital. The Arab Lestgue has unanimously
adopted this proposal.
The recognition of Israel by Pakistan will not change or affect the ground realities in Middle East.
Recognition of Israel by Pakistan will merely amount to restoration of diplomatic ties between the wo, but
it does not mean necessarily that the two countries will agree on each and every point of their intemaE and
external policie:,. Israel’s policy towards Palestine will not be changed by Pakistan’s recognition of the
Jewish state. Pakistan also does not need to be over-enthusiastic in its Islamic fervor. Pakistan has
iccogjiized many non-Muslim stalps and even India that is not only an iôlatral country but also a staunch
eneiny of us.
676
Recognition of Israel by Pakistan will have many consequences both positive and negative, and some of
which cannot be bre-judged
POSITIVE SIDE
1) Pakistan’s image in the eyes of USA c;an be improved, as the present American administration is
Overburdened with neoconservatives and pro-Jewish elements. Israel has always been fearful of Pakistani
nuclear weapc)ns and has termed it as ’Islamic bomb’. USA is also suspicious that Pakistani nuclear
weapon may slip into the hands of Islarhjc fundamentalists and terrorists. Pakistan’s recognition «jf
israei wjn reduce American pressure on her, with regard [o the nuclear weapons.
2) It will ensure the supply of US assistance both economic and military, to Pakistan. It will save
Pakistan from being declared as failed state or terrorist st.:lte. It will strengthen Pakistan’s stand point on
various political issues and will ensure American support on various diplomatic fronts
3) Israel has long sought recognition by Pakistan. During the recent visit of Israel PM Areal Sharon to
india, israei Deputy PM expressed his liking for good relations with Pakistan It will boost up Israel’s
position in the Muslim world. Similarly Pakistan position vis-a-vis India will be strengthened It is the only
way to neutralize the Indian psychological boost which it got from the recent Sharon’s visit to india. [t
will help to restore the strategic balance in the sub-continent
4) Pakistan can get access to Israeli technology both for military and economic advancement. Relations
restored with Israel can provide good business and trade opportunities
5) Pakistan will be in better position to i|Se its good offices for resolution of the ongoing problems in
Faiestine. Pakistan may serve the Palestinian cause better by keeping in touch with Israel along with other
parties of the Palestine issue
NEGATIVE SIDE
Recognition of Israel will bear serious consequt;nces for Pakistan both at internal and external levels:
677
1) It will seriously polarize public opinion at domestic level, which will further aggravate the fragility of
the new elected government. It will add to the momentum of rise of religiousright in the society which has
already been manifested by the recent electoral results. It will be difficult for the government to co-opt
MMA, the staunch religio-conservative alliance with strong anti-Israeli elements. All these will inevitably
lead to political instability in the country.
2) It is naive to think that recognition of Israel will lead to good and healthy relations between the two
countries. Pakistan can never take the place of India. India and Israel share strategic and geo-political
interests along with economic interests. Israel can never support Pakistan on any front on the cost of India
which is her strategic partner in the region.
3) It is foolish to expect technological cooperation from Israel. Israel will transfer technology to Pakistan, if
US wishes so. But as the US itself has refused to provide F-16 aircrafts to Pakistan, then how can we
expect her to allow Israel to provide highly advanced weapons system to Pakistan. Besides, Israel
is not a favourable country for investment nor even for trade, given its internal instability.
4) It will alienate Pakistan in the Arab world and will harm its image in the Muslim world. How can
Pakistan recognize Israel at this critical juncture when Israeli forces are determined to crush
the right of self-determination of Palestinians. It will weaken Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir issue and
demand for the right of self-determination for Kashmiris.
5) Supporting the cause of Palestinians and maintaining good relations with Israel are two extremes, which
cannot be kept together. Pakistan can recognize Israel only on the cost of Palestinian cause, which it
cannot afford keeping in view its Kashmir cause as the two cases are quite similar. Arab states may
recognize Indian right over Kashmir in retaliation.
To conclude the discussion, if Pakistan has any benefit of recognizing Israel, that is short term gain. For
instance, it may ensure the delivery of $ 3 billion promised American aid to Pakistan, which may otherwise
halt. There is little long-term benefit of the recognition of Israel but strong demerits which may outweigh
its merits. Fruitful and good relations between states always require mutual trust and good-will which is
totally
678
lacking in the case of Pakistan and Israel. Pakistan may recognize Israel due to American pressure but
never out of good-will. This is a known fact which the whole world knows. So relations which are
established under compulsion and out of expediency, are never reliable and strong.
If many Arab states and especially PLO has recognized Israel in 1993 under the Oslo Accord, that was
inevitable for the restoration of normalcy and initiation of the peace process. Pakistan has no such
emergency to embark upon the recognition of Israel. It is the most critical period in the history of Middle
East peace process. The Middle East peace Roadmap seems unlikely to succeed despite mounting
international pressure on Israel. In such circumstances, Pakistan should not offend its Muslim brethren
states by recognizing Israel. Pakistan should say clearly to the US that iccognition of Israel can only be
possible if Israel by itself accepts and recognizes the existence of an independent Palestinian state.
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA
679
CHAPTER 17

INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Indian nuclear explosion of 18 May, 1974 was an important event, which changed the political scenario of
South Asia. It also gave the World a dawning realisation of the demolition of her efforts of the nuclear
nonproliferation. Although India was not a signatory to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty of 1968, her
nuclear explosion wrecked the already shattered, fragile nuclear non-proliferation treaty, giving stimulus to
the other aspirant powers to go nuclear.
India was the sixth member of the nuclear club so far. India had a long cherished desire to play the role of a
great power in the International Politics. Her nuclear aspirations began to flourish, when the Chinese
exploded their first nuclear bomb in October, 1964. Since that time, Indian leaders had been diverting the
gigantic resources out of their poor economy to having an indigenous nuclear deterrent. This nuclear device
had important global and regional implications.
As far as the global implications are concerned, these were bound to create horrifying consequences,
threatening the international peace and
• security. Because it would set off a process of nuclear devices by the nearnuclear states. According to the
one contemporary report of International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, there were eleven
countries, who had the scientific resources and the economic feasibility to develop a nuclear bomb. These
included Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Iran, Japan, Italy, West Germany, Israel. Pakistan and Turkey.
Indian nuclear explosion emboldened these countries to embark upon these reckless and hazardous
ventures. South Africa, which had vast resources of Uranium and the technical know-how, immediately
declared, ”Any thing the Indians can do, we can do it better”.
680
M C LEAR PROLIFERATION l\ SOUTH ASIA
.681
Although the Indians claimed that their nuclear device was for peaceful purposes, the world could not be
duped by false statements Because experts note, that there is virtually no difference between the atom for
peace purposes and warfare, Besides, it was also regrettable that a country, where the people were starving
to death for want of food was planning to spend $1500 million on the nuclear programme. Out of’1000
milhon population, 25% people live below the poverty line. Instead of improving their economic
conditions, Indian leaders are obsessed with their international image.
Another global implication was that India had acquired a new international status at the expense of
devastating economic costs But no doubt this nuclear device added to her political weight and now she was
in a better position to exercise diplomacy vis-a-vis super-powers. Super-powers tacitly recognised the
Indian hegemony after the nuclear status Even Dr Kissinger was very cautious while criticising Indian
nuclear blast.
As far as the regional implications are concerned, India had no doubt emerged as the dominant power in
South Asia. But her supremacy was more of political and psychological nature, because India would be
reluctant to use atomic weapons in the South Asian States because of the fear of harmful radioactive effects
on India herself. But of course India had a powerful weight in her negotiating kit. The neighbouring
countries got worried over this nuclear blackmail that is why Pakistan’s reaction was very strong, as India
had waged three wars against Pakistan. Although the process of normalising between India and Pakistan
had set in, but as Pakistan was not going to accept Indian hegemony in any case, therefore it seemed more
probable that Pakistan would also go nuclear. Besides, Pakistan could also not ignore India’s aggressive
and threatening posture towards her neighbours which had been manifested in the annexation of Sikkim
and Bhutan. Sri Lanka was also worried over the situation and championing the cause of declaring South
Asia as a nuclear-free zone Her efforts were thwarted by India in the 29th session of the General Assembly
of United Nations.
THE INCEPTION OF PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
Alarmed by the Indian nuclear explosion as a serious threat to its security, Pakistan soon embarked upon
the nuclear course In 1974 it entered into a deal with France to get a reprocessing plant which later the US
government got cancelled by pressurising France. In 1979 the Carter administration cut off all aid to
Pakistan by invoking the ’ Symington Amendment.
Despite all these prohibitive measures by the US, Pakistan’s nuclear programme continued to advance. A
major positive role was played by the determination and consensus of all Pakistani leaders on the issue and
the restoration of US military and economic aid to Pakistan by the Reagan administration in the wake of
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistan, redeclared a cornerstone in the US foreign policy because of
being a front line state in the policy of containment of communism, was given aid worth US$ 32 million
and 40 F-16 fighters (to be delivered from 1981-87). However, threats that enrichment of Uranium to the
weapon grade level might also jeopardise the economic package continued reaching Pakistan but Pakistan
kept firmly denying the reports that the programme was intended to produce nuclear weapons.
In 1984, Washington received reports that Pakistan had succeeded in acquiring the capability of enrichment
of Uranium to the weapon-grade level at the nuclear facilities at.Kahuta. Pakistan also did not officially
deny it. IP 1987, Pakistan declared that it had got the technical know-how to develop a nuclear device but
at the same time reaffirmed its resolve to use the technology for peaceful purposes specially to meet the
worsening situation in the energy production sector.
THI<: US RESPONSE AND SUBSEQUENT POLICY

Alarmed by the 1984 reports that Pakistan had acquired the capability of enriching Uranium, the US
administration got passed what was later to be known as the Pressler’s Amendment. The major thrust of the
amendment was to subject US economic and military aid to the issuance of a certificate from the US
President affirming the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme pursued by the recipient country. This
policy worked as the US President continued certifying each year that Pakistan’s nuclear programme had
not crossed the nuclear threshold. The arrangement however collapsed in October 1990 when President
Bush refused to issue the same about Pakistan’s nuclear innocence. Consequently the economic and
military aid to Pakistan was withheld. So far this stoppage of aid continues and US has hesitated to disburse
even the aid in pipeline including F-16 aircraft for which Pakistan has already paid for.
This major departure in the US policy was caused by many factors. Pakistan had suffered a relative loss of
strategic importance after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. President Bush soon after the
Gulf War of 1991 had outlined future foreign policy agenda in the changed world and one of these
guidelines was full US support to the efforts aiming at arms control, specially the nuclear non-proliferation.
Contour’s of US foreign policy announced by the Clinton administration
682
expressed that foreign aid should be ”goal-oriented” rather than ”state or Project oriented.” Instead of 30
criteria for aid of the 1960 law, the new criteria envisages six or seven conditions: (i) promotion of
democracy, (ii) nuclear non-proliferation, (in) population control (iv) environment, (v) structural economic
adjustment, (vi) narcotics and market-oriented economic reforms as laid down or better still dictated by the
World Bank and the IMF. The aid will now be used both positively and negatively; positively to help
establish norms of democracy and respect to human rights etc. and negatively to penalise the countries not
addressing to the abovementioned fundamental goals of the US foreign policy.
The cut in aid to Pakistan also marks the culmination of Israeli and Indian propaganda against Pakistan’s
nuclear programme. In the context of an absence of ideological conflict an ”Islamic Bomb” could pose
threat to US designs in the world. That is why US also expressed fears that Pakistan may transfer nuclear
technology to fellow Islamic countries (specially Iran) and thus lead to a potentially strong challenge from
the Muslim countries.
Analysing the US policy one feels that US demand from Pakistan to ”roll-back” her nuclear programme
and sign the NPT, unilaterally is quite unjust, and lacks potency in helping to promote the cause of nuclear
nonproliferation. Nuclear proliferation is a complex phenomenon and NPT addresses only one dimension
of the issue minimising the chances of acquisition of nuclear arsenals and thus lowering the chances of war.
But it overlooks that nuclear deterrence has averted the eventuality of war in South Asia on two occasions,
in 1987 and 1990. Furthermore, the US policy does not address the alternate security arrangement for
Pakistan in case it renounces its programme. This is specially pertinent in the wake of Indian advancement
in the field of a reliable delivery system developed through •* the missile programme. Until recently, US
had been pressurising Pakistan without taking the whole affair into proper perspective that nuclear
proliferation in South Asia is not an isolated issue and is linked with other outstanding issues between
Pakistan and India directly involving security perceptions of the two. US ignoring all these factors, has had
resorted to penalising measures, the latest episode of which was the imposition of sanctions against
Pakistan and China on the alleged M-ll missile deal which can be used to carry nuclear war heads. Until US
addresses to the fundamental aspects of the issue and formulates an all encompassing policy, all efforts to
impose a one sided solution to the problem will meet failure.
RESPECTIVE POSITIONS OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN
As for the signing of the NPT, India declares NPT as discriminatory as it does not bring into
her fold the countries which have
NT CLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA -,0. (,}J3
already acquired this capability, therefore, it calls for a Comprehensive jest Ban (CTB). This policy stems
out of Indian preoccupation of prom^tina herself as a major actor of international stature. Further, it
considers Qnuia as a potential threat for herself and takes Pakistan’s acquisition of sophisticated weapons
from the USA during the Afghan war a threat t<-, ner security, and that this could be deterred only by
pursuing a viable nucjear programme. Pakistan on the other hand has never refused to sign N^j jf India also
does the same. It has expressed not to yield to sign ^jpj unilaterally under US pressure or accept IAEA
safeguards on its nucjear installations unless India agrees to the same. Ever since Pakistan’s decjsjon to
pursue the nuclear programme it has repeatedly expressed her willumness to declare South Asia as a
nuclear free zone, under international guarai\(ees Pakistan’s foreign policy on the nuclear issue has been
phi-asecj comprehensively in the following six proposals as initiated by Pakjstan since 1991. These, define
basic contours of perception and responê of Pakistan over this sensitive issue. These proposals were:
i) Simultaneous acceptance of NPT by both India and Pakistan.
ii) Simultaneous acceptance of both the countries of full scope

safeguards of IAEA.
in) Mutual inspection of each others nuclear installations, iv) Joint declaration renouncing the
acquisition or development of
nuclear weapons.
v) A bilateral treaty to ban all nuclear tests, vi) Convening of a conference on nuclear non-proliferation
in Soum
Asia which would be attended by Russia, the US and Cnma
besides India and Pakistan.
India has however, rejected all these proposals under one prete^ or the other. The US has also been putting
pressure on India. The US withheld the sale of dual-use super computers to India as well as pressurised
Riissja not to sell multi-use rockets which may be used in developing deliyerv system of nuclear war heads.
Despite these measures both Pakistan an(j India are pursuing nuclear programmes defying all enticements
and th*eats by the nuclear club. Out of 32 nuclear installations in India only 5 come under international
safeguards of the IAEA whereas in Pakistan only 3 Qf the eight facilities fall under international
safeguards. On bilateral levej however, on the eve of 4th SAARC summit in Islamabad both cqun^jgg
agreed not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities.
The defiant Indian posture in the face of international pressure for resolution of the nuclear issue kept the
stalemate intact. With In<)ja<s induction of medium-range Prithivi missile (also capable of carr^,mi,
nuclear warheads) into its forces the intensification of arms race in tne
684
region became a visible likelihood. In a dramatic move Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the then dismissed Prime
Minister of Pakistan confirmed that Pakistan had a nuclear device. He claimed to have made this statement
to deter the Indian aggressive posture after its acquisition of the missile useable for launching a nuclear
warhead. It was also hoped that the US will now treat both India and Pakistan at par as both have officially
undeclared nuclear capability. Subsequently, the US ambassador to Pakistan said that the US had never
demanded rolling-back of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. However, the US President on September 23,
1994 stated that the US policy towards nonproliferation in S. Asia focused on gradual elimination of the
programmes of India and Pakistan both.
As for options available to Pakistan on this issue, Pakistan should not commit itself to any unilateral move
to roll-back its nuclear programme. Moreover, the defence capability should be diversified in terms of
means and modes so that security needs can be properly addressed even in the absence of a nuclear option.
There is also an imperative need to secure resolution of outstanding issues with India so that in the wake of
nationalisation of relations, defence mechanism could be relieved of excessive pressures necessitating
resort to the development of nuclear arsenals.
INDIA AND PAKISTAN NUCLEAR TESTS 1998
South Asia became overtly nuclearised in May 1998. The ominous development has turned this conflict-
ridden region into the most dangerous area in the world, where conventional hostilities could easily escalate
into nuclear confrontation. India and Pakistan were already known to be nuclearcapable states. Their policy
of nuclear ambiguity served them well by providing a minimum-cost deterrent without actual
weaponization, But this changed almost overnight when India decided to conduct tests, forcing Pakistan to
follow, thus paving the way for an open nuclear and missile race in the region.
After the 1974 test India did not put forward the claim that it could become a nuclear-weapon state. In fact
it went on projecting itself as a peace-loving non-nuclear state which had just conducted a nuclear
experiment without intention of making nuclear weapons. For a long time, this prevention was believed in
the West; but as it is revealed now India had continued its nuclear weapons programme based upon the data
gathered from the Pokhran test. It went ahead to design and fabricate better nuclear devices and carried out
R&D for making beryllium, lithium and other nuclear materials. It also decided to build a larger, 100 MW
Dhurva plutonium production reactor based on CIR experience. It also began
M CLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOl’TH ASIA
M CLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOl’TH ASIA 535
building new reprocessing plants for recovery of plutonium and began amassing it for the future.
In 1995 India realized that the five established nuclear powers had resolved their differences over the text
of CTBT which would become a reality soon. The US, Russia and the UK had already stopped all testing
for some time, Informal understanding was reached with France and China so that they could carry out the
last and final rounds of testing and be ready to sign the CTBT in 1996. India felt very uncomfortable at
being left out of the nuclear game. The nuclear establishment advised the government that it was better to
carry out tests while France and China were conducting their own. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao agreed.
He also thought that such a move could help him in the forthcoming general elections. He authorized the
tests to be conducted in November 1995. Unfortunately for India, the US spy satellites and other
intelligence sources detected the preparations for these tests at Pokhran and confronted New Delhi with
satellite photographs and other evidences. Consequently, Narasimha Rao, under pressure from the US and
Russia and others, decided to-cancel these tests. But for this last-minute cancellation the drama of May,
1998 would have been played out in November, 1995. When the BJP government took over for a short time
in May, 1996, it immediately authorized a nuclear test. However, it -was too short lived, it lasted only 13
days to see the implementation of its orders that were cancelled by the coalition government that followed.
The successor Prime Minister IK Gujral, was fully briefed about the preparation for the test and was not
opposed to it in principle, he only wanted to wait for the most opportune moment. It is quite clear that none
of the governments in New Delhi opposed the resumption of nuclear testing, it was just a question of
deciding the proper timing. Similarly, the decision not to sign the CTBT was also shared by the various
governments and was not just that of the Congress or the BJP. In fact it was the Gujral government which
decided to defy the near-consensus in the UN General Assembly and voted against the CTBT.
When the United Front government of IK Gujral called for new elections in February-March 1998 it was
already clear that the Front faced certain defeat in the polls. The BJP had become much stronger and came
up with a highly nationalistic platform that promised to make India a real nuclear power, a power to be
reckoned with. Its manifesto pledged not only the resumption of nuclear testing but also the development of
nuclear warheads, induction of nuclear tipped missiles into India’s arsenal, and declaring the country a
nuclear-weapon state, discarding the remaining thin veil of ambiguity. This manifesto was open for all to
see. The US ambassador warned New Delhi of the serious consequences if India exploded a nuclear device,
but it was of no avail.
686
l,Y»MrER.NATIONAL AFFArRS
The BJP emerged as the single largest pwrowarty in the elections and set upon a coalition government since
it was far shMmort of the majority required to form a government on its own. The nationuiiiuial agenda of
the coalition included the essential goal of making India a nmuiuuclear-weapon state It was announced that
nuclear review policy committees would decide on the new nuclear stance and whether India would test or
anunot would be decided after the review had been completed. This declaration was merely a facade to lull
the international community into believing thsât there was no imminent possibility of India conducting a
test. The US believed it and felt reassured m this assumption after US ambassador Bill Ricr--hardson and
his team held
discusswn on this matter in New Delhi on 14 -15 April. 1998 Actually
having been caught red-handed in November ::..:;!995, India was far more circumspect this time and had
prepared a well Mrrhought-out plan to disarm and deceived the international community re^garding its
intentions. As reported in the press, soon after this assumptiniiion of office Atal Behari Vajpayee had
directed the chairman, IAEC, to stwrt making preparations for the test.
On May 11, after a lapse of 24 years, .India resumed its journey towards overt nuclearization with three
nuclear tests at Pokhran. Without giving the world a long breather it conducted twr-m more tests on iMay
13th Following these tests India announced to the whole world that it had become a nuclear-weapon state,
like it or not. Th-le BJP had lived up to its promise. The government announced that it was now ready to
weaponize and induct nuclear weapons into its armoury, no rrmrmatter what the rest of the world thought
about it.
The worst rhetoric, however, was rese=rved for Pakistan, India started issuing direct threats and warnings
to PssEakistan. The BJP interior minister, LK Advani, ’vowed to end Pakistani ^menace’. He said that ’a
qualitative new stage of Indo-Pakistan relations h«.,sas been brought about by
the country becoming the nuclear weapons state ’ He wanted Pakistan to
realize the change in the geostrategic situation an<=d demanded that it should roll-back its anti-India
policy, especially in Kashm-. dr.
The multiple tests carried out by India anr-r-1 the nuclear belligerency reflected in the statements of their
leaders confirmed Pakistan’s worse fears. There was no doubt that, among other things, tl-lese tests were
aimed at intimidating and demoralizing Pakistan and pre=senting it with an open nuclear military threat to
behave or else. Pakistan v^vas put in a very difficult situation its primary interest was to safeguard iiiiits
national security and integrity. Could it be done without demonstrating j- - ts own nuclear capability and
responding to Indian tests in kind? Pakistan sta«a»rted looking at its policy options.
V
687
At first it decided to observe the international reaction It was deeply disappointed at the tame response of
the international community. The US immediately announced imposition of sanctions in accordance with
the US laws. However, it failed to persuade the other G-7 countries to follow suit. While Japan and Canada
supported the US, France and UK refused to go along. G-7 was divided and in the G-8 meetings Russia
also opposed sanctions or any other strong measures, Pakistan was deeply disappointed, The US tried very
hard to respond to the dilemma faced by Pakistan and sent its Under-Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to
dissuade Islamabad from testing. But it had no political, economic and security package to offer which
could address Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and be acceptable to the political and military
leadership of the country and also satisfy its public opinion. President Bill Clinton personally called Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif several times. The best US could offer was no imposition of sanctions, possible
release of the stuck-up F-16 planes over a two-year period, repeal of the Pressler Amendment subject to
approval by US Congress, restoration of military-to-military contacts and vague promises of enhanced
economic support through the international loaning agencies. This vague package did not include security
guarantees against conventional or nuclear attack by India, resolution of the Kashmir issue and restoration
of security and economic relationship and resumption of military sales to Pakistan. It was clear to Pakistan
that the slow-moving process of bringing about a change in US policy did not enable the administration in
Washington to make any firm and far-reaching commitments to meet the security needs of Pakistan created
by the Indian nuclear explosions and the open threats that followed from New Delhi. The Pakistan
government tried hard to explore all possible alternatives for responding to the Indian tests. But the US and
other countries could not offer sufficient incentives to Pakistan in this regard. Meanwhile, the pressure of
the public opinion, political parties and defence establishment was growing in direct response to India’s
increased nuclear belligerency. Pakistan felt that it had no choice but to respond in kind to Indian testing,
There were other weapons. The Indian political and nuclear establishment and some opinion-makers
always had a feeling that Pakistan’s nuclear capability was over-played and over-rated and Pakistan might
be just bluffing. Within the country, there was also a strong feeling that if Pakistan has, indeed, acquired
nuclear capability, now was the time to demonstrate its claims and actual capability. There was also an
understandable measure of demoralization among defence establishment and policy planners who had to
find quick answer to the new situation. One could also not ignore the fact that the freedom movement in
Kashmir would suffer a setback because of the statements made by Farooq Abdullah and other supporters
of Indian policy in Kashmir that ’the time has come to teach Pakistan a lesson’. All these factors combined
together to force Pakistan to show its hand.
688
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIUS
INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO TESTS
The Indian and Pakistani tests were condemned by the international community but there was a slight
difference. Most of the countries agreed that India that took the first step was the main culprit and Pakistan,
which was forced to respond, was less guilty. The Security Council strongly deplored the Indian tests and
expressed concern on the effect of this development on the peace and stability in the region. The Security
Council urged the states in the region to exercise maximum restraint and underlined that the sources of
tensions in South Asia could only be resolved by dialogue and not by military build-up.
On 12th June, 1998, the G-8 met in London and issued a communique after considering the serious global
challenge posed by the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan. The communique, inter alia, made
the following points:
• These tests have affected both countries’ relationships with each of us. Worsened rather than improved
their security environment, damaged their prospects of achieving their goals of sustainable development
and run contrary to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear-disarmament.
• The negative impact of these tests on the international standing and ambitions of both countries will be
serious and lasting. They will also have a serious negative impact on investor confidence.
• India and Pakistan should immediately take the following steps, already endorsed by the United Nations
Security Council.
1. Stop all further nuclear tests and adhere to CTBT immediately and unconditionally, thereby facilitating
its early entry into force;
2. Refrain from weaponization or deployment of nuclear weapons;
3. With a view to reducing tension, building confidence and encouraging peaceful resolution
of their differences through dialogue, India and Pakistan should resume without delay a direct dialogue
that addresses the root causes of tension, including Kashmir;
4. The recent nuclear tests do not give India and Pakistan the status of nuclear weapons states in accordance
with the NPT.
• Both India and Pakistan face enormous challenges in developing their economies and building prosperity.
However, the recent instability which will undermine the region’s attractiveness to both foreign and
domestic investment, damaging business confidence and the prospects
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOI TH ASIA
689
for economic growth. The diversion of their resources to nuclear and other weapons programmes displaces
more productive investment and weakens their ability to pursue sound economic policies. It calls into
question the commitment of both governments to poverty reduction and undermines the regional co-
operation between SAARC countries on social and economic issues.
REGIONAL EFFECTS
Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan is bound to have a significant impact on the countries in Asia,
particularly those adjoining the subcontinent. In order to justify its action India used the excuse of an
imminent nuclear threat from China. This is bound to radically alter perceptions in and relationship
between these two Asian powers that together represent 40 per cent of the world population. Over the past
few years relations between them have been gradually improving which could have contributed immensely
towards peace and security in Asia and particularly in South Asia. These hopes have been severely jolted
by the emergence of an adversial relationship between them precipitated by the Indian statements. To back
up its claim or a perceived nuclear threat from the north, India will have to develop and deploy a sizeable
nuclear arsenal for what it calls a ’minimum deterrent’ against China. The cost of such a” credible nuclear
build up will be extremely high, economically and politically.
The impact of Indian and Pakistani tests on the neighbouring countries cannot be underestimated. It is
obvious that Iran is now surrounded by nuclear states on three sides - in the west by Israel, in the north by
Russia and in the east by India and Pakistan. Although Iran is a signatory to the NPT, it cannot ignore the
so-called emerging nuclear encirclement and could justify considering acquiring nuclear capability to
protect its security and national interests. If Iran at some stage decides to exercise its rights and withdraw
from NPT, as is permissible under Article X (1), it could pose a serious threat to peace and security in
South Asia. The testing of a 1300 km nuclear-capable missile by Iran has sent a clear message that it is
prepared to do whatever is needed to defend itself. At present all the nuclear facilities in Iran are under the
IAEA safeguards and Iran has not known nuclear-weapon programme. Nevertheless, the situation could
change in the future as a result of the developments in South Asia and elsewhere.
The development of India’s nuclear delivery capability including land-based ICBM and submarine-
launched (SLBM) systems would constitute a major threat to a number of countries in West Asia, Central
Asia, the Far East and Southeast Asia besides China. The induction of these missiles into the Indian
arsenals will take some time. The affected countries
690
M ( LEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOI TH ASIA
will begin perceiving the potential threat from India much earlier. This would naturally force them to
consider counter-measures that could adversely affect the security climate in the entire area.
SOUTH ASIA’S FUTURE
Nuclear clouds have darkened the future of the troubled subcontinent of South Asia. Even before May 1998
South Asia was considered a land of anguish with a dubious distinction of containing 60 per cent of the
impoverished people of the world. It has been called the most likely spot where a nuclear conflagration
could erupt with disastrous consequences for millions on both sides. The question is can South Asia step
back from the edge of the nuclear precipice? The answer to this question lies more with India than with
Pakistan, It is New Delhi that will determine which way the continent will go - will it rebound and survive
to witness prosperity or will it slip aside into gloom?
There are three main choices before the subcontinent; the first is to proceed with weaponization along with
suitable delivery systems to ’deter’ outside aggression as defined separately by India and Pakistan;
secondly, joining the non-proliferation regime and sign the NPT and other instruments of non-proliferation;
thirdly, stop short of deployment of nuclear weapons and enter into dialogue with each other and the world
community for achieving de-escalation on the nuclear and conventional fronts.
A full-fledged nuclear-weaponization will depend largely on India. If this path is followed, the economic
and political cost will be extremely high and perhaps unbearable. India and Pakistan will have to think of
spending billions of dollars per year to develop and deploy credible ’mini’ nuclear arsenals to meet the
perceived requirement in conventional armed forces and their defense expenditure will escalate further.
Such a nuclear race will, in the long run, increase the existing tensions instead of bringing stability and
equilibrium. There will be spill-over effect into the adjoining countries of South Asia. China will no doubt
begin taking a serious view of the Indian deployment and take counter measures. The subcontinent will
become a hotspot to be monitored and observed by spy satellites for suitable actions, including pre-emptive
moves.
Ideally, after convincingly demonstrating their nuclear capability, India and Pakistan could decide to
voluntarily opt out of the ’nuclear option’ and settle their bilateral disputes and differences. This scenario,
however, welcome, is not likely to materialize in the near future. This does not mean that it should not be
considered, There are concrete examples of how other countries have done just that and reaped the
enormous benefits of
691
denuclearization. This could also bring a gleam of hope to the eyes of the poor of the subcontinent who
have begun to believe in living with despair and poverty as their ordained fate. We need new initiatives
about security and development in South Asia. Without a bold vision and breaking away from the
rancorous legacy of the past the subcontinent may not be able to survive the specter of nuclearization.
The most likely scenario will be that India and Pakistan decide to keep their weapons and slowly develop
their nuclear arsenals because politically it is difficult to step away from the nuclear path after the euphoria
of detonation and glorification of the bomb. It may be possible to go Mown this road for a while but not
indefinitely. The world community is turning against nuclear weapons and even the major nuclear powers
are beginning to realize the futility of nuclear arsenals that seem to have no practical military utility. The G-
7 countries along with Russia are getting mobilized to stop the nuclear escalation in South Asia, which
may, someday, engulf them also, in a nuclear confrontation.
For a long time the world remained indifferent to the fate of South Asia. Major powers, particularly the
United States, neglected it. Now the nuclear bangs of the two countries have suddenly alerted everybody
that South Asia exists and it has enormous problems and potential for initiating a nuclear conflict at the
regional and global levels that the world so desperately wants to avoid. It is quite possible that the act of
nuclearization will bring into play forces of mediation, disengagement and reconciliation to ultimately
bring peace to this trouble region.
CTBT: WESTERN MOVE TO BLUNT THIRD WORLD INITIATIVE
At its 50th session, the UN General Assembly adopted, on September 10, 1996, the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT). The stated purpose of the treaty is to ban all explosive tests that lead to a nuclear chain
reaction.
The unstated mission of the CTBT is to give Western nations an additional pressure point on countries that
entertain nuclear ambitions, mostly in the Third World, and, by extension, in the Islamic Bloc.
The treaty is aimed mostly at excluding the new-comers while reserving the ”rich-man’s club”. At the end
of the day, it would serve to strengthen and maintain the US nuclear supremacy since, nearly 10 years after
the fall of Berlin Wall, the United States maintains an arsenal of 8400 operational nuclear warheads, of
which several thousand can be launched in rninutes.
692
To-date, 151
INTF.R.NATIONAIJFFAIKS
io-date, 131 countries have siened CTBT and !l of those countries have ratified it_ However, the ”treaty
requires ^specifically named countries, mcluding India and Pakis,an< to S}i,n an(, ,.al|fy the treaty before ii
can enter into foj.ce Indja faas statcd that -^ ^.^ Qr ratify the treaty. Countries hk, Russ]a Chma Israd ^
Pakistailllld the US, have yet to ratify the treary In the Umted S{^ ralifiallon ires
a two-thirds majority q the Senat£ (6? Qut of {QQ Senators ,ulst vote in favour of CTBT).
Does signing the treaty cr£at£ a commitment no, to conduct nuclear tests? It is unclear and there seems tQ
fe£ a ^hok_ Qnce
CTBT has entered into forc£ any stat£ ^ ^ & andratified it is
bound to forswear nucl«ar testmg Howeve,. jn a speech ,o theUN, indian envoy Amndhati
Ghosedeclared .,India win n£v£r ^ ujequal treaty_ not now, not later.”
Consequently, the CTBT £ntry infc) force to_dat£ jppears dim Arguably, a nuclear w«apons s^ may yi£w
th£ CJBT being rendered imperative as a conseqW of India>s non_sigmng If India ^mtams its position, the
treaty cannev£r £nt£r mtQ force\nd nuc,£ar wapons states may view India’s non-slgning as nu,lifying the
^ ,& yital yOses. This, then, can be used as a jttstiflcation for renewed testmg Evenllow, the US has
conducted and plans fvjtur£ underground ’sub.criticar nuclear weaponsrelated tests, which tfy yiew as not
m violation of CTBT. Opinions, however, differ here.
In the light of the foregoing, the whole issue of CTBT seems to be connected more with toVer> CQntrol
and ensuri monopoiy, than with principle.
Some see the (j§ as piaying a game with CTBT, pushing other states to ratify the treaty, Vvhlle takmg no
movement on its OW]1 and with no commitment to even be^ movmg ^ treaty ^^^ th£ Semie Qitics of
CTBT even see it as adouble gam£ Qthers rajs£ ^ issu£ pf hypocnsy, stating that the US Posi1,011 ig. do
wha{ they say. nQt what w£ dfl_
Pakistan policy.^^,. would do W£ll tQ remain vigilant and continue to be guided primarily by
consideratlons of Pakistani security interests.
STROB E TALBOTT’$ \UCLEAR DIPLOMACY
United States Deputy Secretary of Sta(£ Strobe Taibotti ear]y February, 1999, conchy ,he gth round of
nudear ta,ks wjth Indm and
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOI TH ASIA
693
Pakistan. Given the global significance which the US enjoys in the postCold War era and the fact that
Washington has always been ’a key role player in South Asian politics, many who care to think about the
region’s future expect the resolution of a number of contentious issues like CTBT and matters related to
nuclear restraint in the coming few years.
On the question of declaring a unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material, both India and
Pakistan have rejected Talbott’s proposal but have shown interest in the negotiation process on the FMCT
at the Conference of Disarmament (CD) in Geneva later this year.
There is, however, a difference of positions between Pakistan and United States regarding FMCT. Pakistan
wants the existing stockpiles to be included in the proposed FMCT. On the other hand, the chief of US
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) John Holms recently said that US would not agree to any
restrictions on the existing stockpiles. It may be appropriate to mention here that attaining entry into force
for the CTBT and a completed FMCT would be beneficial in the run up to the NPT Review Conference in
the year 2000.
Certain positive developments have taken place in early 1999 in the region. On the eve of the Indian
Republic Day (January 25) Indian President KR Narayanan appealed for communal harmony. On January
27, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes pleaded for cooperative security on the nuclear
disarmament issue and sought a firm commitment from other nuclear weapon states to a no-first-use of
nuclear weapons, to eliminate the risk of ’accidental and miscalculated use’. On January 30, Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee observed a day’s fast on the occasion Mohandas Gandhi’s death anniversary
to promote harmony and tolerance in South Asia. From January 28 to 31, after a dozen years of ’no action’
Pakistan and India finally met in a Cricket Test match. For a change, the Indian crowd was also supportive.
On February 4, Vajpayee accepted Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif s invitation to travel to Pakistan
by the Delhi-Lahore bus service on its inaugural run. On February 5, Nawaz Sharif showed his intention to
travel back with Vajpayee by the same bus on its return journey. Also, on February 4, Foreign Minister
Sartaj Aziz made a solemn pledge to sign the CTBT before September this year.
Though not at all ’earth-shaking’ in nature, these were regarded as initial steps towards the rather thorny
task of rapprochement. Not to forget that the bitter and harsh realities of the past could be washed away
within a matter of few months; the process of adjustment and reconciliation might, in the long run prove to
be painfully slow; the need was for a sustained dialogue, aided by US encouragement and effort. Only
through parleys,
694__
Indo-Pak bilateral relations can grow and prosper and serve as an edifice to resolve more difficult issues of
foreign policies.
PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR POSTURE
India’s and Pakistan’s successive nuclear tests of May 1998 marked a fateful watershed for security in the
subcontinent. Pakistan sensibly deliberated before crossing its own nuclear Rubicon, but New Delhi’s BJP-
led dash for nuclear weapon status was a defining event. Proliferation threats before 1998 often were
earmarked by mini kushti jousting for political effect. Now vveaponization is a fait accompli and nuclear
use could lay huge swathes of the local landscape waste.
Absent a nuclear umbrella, Pakistan’s choices in May 1998 seemed stark -- opting for nuclear deterrence
with all its incalculable risks, or unilateral nuclear disarmament and progressive loss of self-determination.
The die was cast, unsurprisingly, for nuclear deterrence. But what concrete form would this nuclear posture
take? An explicit public answer may not soon be available for understandable security reasons.
Stopping the physical deployment of nuclear forces by India and Pakistan - this being one immediate
objective of U.S. diplomacy, another being full Indian and Pakistani adherence to the CTBT - now hangs
by a thread. These restraint thresholds may be doomed by the relentless march of provocative events such
as the reciprocal Agni-2 and then Ghauri-2 ballistic missile testing in April 1999, the Kargil conflict in
Kashmir from May to July in 1999, India’s shoot-down of a Pakistan Navy plane and finally Indian
”nuclear doctrine” of August 17, 1999.
For the outside world and evidently India, the big Kargil surprise was that Pakistan’s military leadership
was not self-deterred by India’s nuclearization and conventional military superiority from supporting a
mujahideen intrusion across the ”line of control” (LOC) in disputed Kashmir, in digging in on mountain
peaks, firing on vehicle traffic along the Srinagar-Leh highway, and threatening to cut off resupply of
Indian forces on the Siachen Glacier during the precious few months when the highway was clear of snow.
The implication was that top Pakistani military leaders viewed their own nuclearization as a ”shield”
protecting against an Indian expansion of the conflict.
The big external consequence of Kargil was that it focused international attention on the Kashmir dispute
and elicited concern over the nuclear risks of leaving the problem unresolved, a political gain for Pakistan.
President Clinton publicly agreed to take a personal interest in
MCI.F.AK PROLIFERATION IN SOI TH ASIA
695
Pakistan and India negotiating a bilateral solution of the Kashmir issue through a resumption and
intensification of the Lahore Summit dialogue process, in return for Nawaz Sharifs undertaking to bring
about mujahideen withdrawal from positions beyond the LOC. largely accomplished by midJuly 1999.
Meanwhile, India won the public relations advantage with praise abroad for its restraint, although it had
alerted and mobilized forces along the border with Pakistan, implicitly threatening to expand the conflict
and even to blockade Karachi, reflecting the escalatory dangers underlying brinksmanship.
A reminder of the potential for escalation was inherent in India’s August 10, 1999 shooting down of an
unarmed, propeller-driven Pakistani naval reconnaissance aircraft flying close to the border without prior
notification. This was a technical contravention of the 1991 bilateral confidence-building agreement against
violations of airspace. The airplane and sixteen occupants were blown up in the air by an Indian missile
from a MiG-21 fighter, however, without effort to establish radio contact. India claimed the Pakistani
airplane had crossed the border into Indian airspace, yet the wreckage fell inside Pakistan. Here, India
exhibited no restraint.
Finally, despite promises to the United States in diplomatic channels to observe ”strategic restraint,” India’s
caretaker BJP government dropped yet another shoe on August 17, 1999. Its interim National Security
Advisory Board published a draft ”nuclear doctrine” document that called for a nuclear declaratory no-first-
use policy with the ostensible objective of ”minimum credible deterrence” but based on an expansive
nuclear warfighting force structure including a triad of survivable, mobile groundbased, airborne, and sea-
launched nuclear strike systems. Without specifying adversaries or an actual threat, the language alluded
provocatively to using conventional preemptive capabilities offensively against any party that might
threaten to use nuclear weapons against India.
Since Pakistan has limited depth of defense against a sustained conventional attack by India’s numerically
larger forces against the Punjab heartland and is potentially vulnerable to a massive armored thrust across
the desert against its narrow lines of communication between Punjab and Sind, Pakistan’s military leaders
probably would consider the core objective of their nuclear weapons to be an effective deterrent against a
major Indian invasion that could threaten Pakistan’s self-defense capacity and ultimately national survival.
Other military purposes would be hard to identify.
696
Conservative estimates suggest that Pakistan’s nuclear inventory might consist of approximately two dozen
weapons, against an Indian inventory that might range from 4 to 8 times as large. The small inventory itself
presumably would lead Pakistani defense planners to reserve nuclear weapons exclusively for strategic
targets.
Pakistan’s defense planners almost certainly have thought through the main issues of nuclear-equipped
delivery systems, their survivability under conventional preemptive and nuclear attacks, and their
destructive capacity against various types of target, given tradeoffs of range, reliability, accuracy, and yield.
Force structure options exist in Pakistan’s tactical fighter aircraft and missile acquisitions. Aircraft are
recallable and have flexibility and precision of attack, but in the local asymmetry that prevails Pakistan’s
aircraft are more vulnerable to surprise attack on their bases as well as air defense attrition after launch than
India’s dispersed air force. Ballistic missiles are more assured of penetration but may be less accurate and,
once launched, cannot be recalled. The Gulf War demonstrated that mobile ballistic missiles can be
concealed against preemption even by the most advanced air forces.
For force survivability and strategic range objectives, the conjecture is that Pakistan’s planners would
allocate the limited nuclear weapons about equally between aircraft and mobile ballistic missiles. The
testing of the Ghauri-2 missile suggests the objective of being able to hold targets at risk all across India,
even deep in the south.
Pakistan’s military probably will conclude that countervalue targeting will yield the highest deterrent or
strategic value, and that nuclear warfighting (protracted or escalating nuclear exchange) is not a meaningful
option. Presumably the aim points therefore would be in urban areas, consisting of key industrial
installations or areas with high economic value, and certain infrastructural assets, such as big hydroelectric
installations. The availability of commercial imagery in recent years has meant that fixed targets can be
located and surveyed at arms length, in advance.
Operationally, this posture would forgo any presumption of a nuclear disarming (preemptive) strike
objective - which Pakistani reflection probably would show is unattainable against India, and beneficially
could be renounced. This would assume that India would not initiate nuclear use because it enjoys the
advantage of conventional military superiority.
NTCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOI TH ASIA
697
Maximum nuclear deterrent credibility arguably would be structurally inherent in such a Pakistani posture.
Due to the existing asymmetries in defence depth and conventional military capability. Pakistani defence
authorities would face enormous pressure to resort to nuclear retaliation if their conventional forces
suffered heavy attrition and could no longer withstand an invasion. Credibility would be inherent
technically, as well, in a combination of aircraft and mobile-missile, deep strike capabilities whose most
plausible targets would be countervalue types. Credibility would also flow from the condition that
Pakistan’s operational arrangements for system dispersal, concealment and availability are proficient
enough to enable the force to survive a conventional preemptive attack for days but not necessarily weeks.
How stable would the resulting political and military relationship be? The answers probably differ
somewhat for crisis management and arms race activities, but are not necessarily reassuring. Nuclear crisis
stability will be dependent partly on the perceived credibility of Pakistani use under duress. It will also be
dependent on the degree to which both sides refrain from efforts to change the basic status quo by the use
of military force, avoid aggravating the other’s internal security problems, and genuinely search for
diplomatic ways to solve important differences. This recipe is difficult to achieve when there are such deep-
seated and volatile differences as those embedded in the Kashmir dispute, overall power on either side is so
unequal, and the temptation is irresistible in this era of instantly televised images to use political theater to
attract outside influence. Not surprisingly, outsiders are skeptical that nuclear stability can be achieved with
India.
Besides the global CTBT and FMCT efforts which Pakistan is on record as supporting in principle, the
conjecture here is that Pakistani officials would see a national security logic in raising soundly constructed
bilateral proposals that would, for example, call on India to:
(1) mutually forgo deployment of nuclear forces, and if that is overtaken by events outside Pakistan’s
control, to urge agreed ceilings on deployed nuclear forces, agreed limits on ballistic missile range, and a
ban on introducing new types of ballistic missiles (note that a unilateral Pakistani sufficiency criterion
could also be used to define ceilings that Pakistan might offer to adhere to, or a 2,000 km range limit, or
other restrictions on missiles that it would observe anyway, provided the threat does not grow in
unexpected and fundamentally different ways, drawing outside attention to existing disparities, a new
baseline, and unexpected future changes) ;
698
(2)
INTFKNATIONAI. AFFAIRS
(3)
(4)
remove India’s preemptive conventional threat by restricting peacetime levels of conventional forces close
to the borders, capping military exercises well short of the levels reached in recent years - and that provide
a standing start for invasion, and limits on blue water naval vessels ;
mutually accept international technical monitoring of confidencebuilding and nuclear crisis prevention
measures by UN-organized or other outside parties (possibly analogous to voluntary participation in the
international seismic network which is preparing to support the global ban on nuclear testing, and arguably
needed now to restore the viability of the 1991 IndoPakistani agreement to restrict airspace along the
borders) ; and
conduct a joint military study of regional criteria for limits on the introduction of destabilizing arms and
cooperative measures for controlling armed international terrorism in the region.
Authentic Pakistani proposals, even when unrewarded by immediate movement in bilateral negotiations,
would give added depth to Pakistan’s diplomatic engagement with India on security matters, add substance
to Pakistan’s diplomatic reputation, and possibly win some measure of confidence among international
circles in the self-discipline of its nuclear security posture. Pakistan’s leaders will think through how even
the intangibles of arms control diplomacy can help the nation keep its powder dry and avoid entrapment in
the incessant whipsawing and . emotional toll of what could easily otherwise be a protracted nuclear
armaments competition with India.
This may also help enlarge political space and time to focus domestic effort consistently on other vital
national agendas, particularly a positive direction for the nation as a whole, social and economic
development, and other tasks that are also indispensable to national security over the long term.
While some deterrent stability probably will accrue from a successful Pakistani projection of a will to use
nuclear weapons in extremism, this approach is bound to be met with apprehension in international circles.
If the nuclear deterrent is consistently employed as a defensive shield only, confidence may grow in its
stability objectives. If, however, it is used systematically to shield unconventional warfare or its threatened
use is brought into play as a sword to change the status quo - a potential the Kargil conflict illustrated, the
bilateral nuclear military relationship could become critically unstable. India would be tempted to press the
envelope by probing and testing Pakistani forbearance militarily.
M’( I F.AK|>ROI.IFF.RATION IN SOI TH ASIA
699
and this would naturally increase the risks of escalation. Indian freedom to run such risks with impunity are
narrower in the post-nuclear weapons situation than before, but il is not clear that this has been recognized.
iMaintaining a maximally credible deterrent force over time could place unprecedented demands on the
society and economy. Pakistani planners \vill have to cope with challenges to the survivability of a limited
nuclear arsenal. But they will also have to support a disciplined allocation of resources that facilitates
economic growth. Without economic health, nuclear security may be unsustainable over the long term.
CTBT - THE OPTIONS
The public debate initiated recently on the CTBT has succeeded in clearing a lot of mist that has
surrounded this sensitive issue after India and Pakistan exploded their nuclear devices.
The common view that seems to have emerged out of the discussions is that there is no harm in signing the
CTBT provided Pakistan withholds its ratification till the remaining designated states which possess
nuclear reactors (such as the US, Russia, China and India) also agree to ratify the treaty.
It may be mentioned that if any of the 44 designated states does not sign or ratify, then under Article XIV,
the CTBT cannot enter into force. Under the CTBT, a state may sign the treaty but may delay or even
refuse ratification. So far 41 designated states have signed the treaty but only 26 have ratified it.
In order to remove the prevailing confusion in the public mind, some of the key provisions are worth
recalling. So long as the CTBT does not enter into force, implementation of the treaty cannot begin. Until
then neither a signatory nor even a state that has ratified the CTBT incurs unilateral obligations. This means
that until the treaty comes into force, if another country conducts explosive tests, Pakistan’s option to do
the same remains open.
Under the treaty a state party undertakes, after the treaty has come into force, not to carry out any nuclear
weapon test or any other nuclear explosion. But the acceding state is not restricted from maintaining
nuclear arsenals, producing fissile materials, conducting laboratory research, etc.
Verification activities shall be earned out in the least intrusive manner and on-site inspections can be
conducted only in pursuance of a
700
INTERNATIONAL AKFAIRJ-i
M’C!_EAR_ PROI.llgBr KRATIO.N IN SOtTH ASIA
701
decision of the Executive Council with at least 30 affirmative votes o>»ut of its 51 members. Inspections
under the treaty would be limited to clariJfying whether a nuclear explosion has been carried out. The
CTBT providers for withdrawal on six months’ advance notice on grounds of an ”extraordinary” event or
events which a state regards as jeopardizing its supreme intearests. This means that if, for instance, India
withdraws from the CTBT, then Pakistan can also withdraw, if, in its assessment, the event constitutes a
serious threat to its security interests.
So far the CTBT has been discussed from the political and diplomatic points of view. The strategic aspect
of the issue has not received the attention it deserves. We are told that our scientists have given g»reen
signal that our nuclear programme will not suffer because the data gathaered at Chaghi is adequate to
further improve and refine the nuclear weapons. Despite this go-ahead, there appear to be gaping holes in
Pakistan’s nuaclear strategy since many experts believe that future designs of more sophisticated nuclear
weapons may require explosive testing. If that iss so, signing the CTBT would amount to accepting a ”cap”
on future capabilities. However, if India joins the CTBT, its programme will also be liable to be frozen like
Pakistan’s.
Since a credible and dependable minimum deterrent is vitaM for Pakistan’s security, the strategic aspect of
the problem should not be ignored. The effectiveness of a nuclear weapon system is measured lar gely by
the amount of blast that it needs and causes for its development. Blawst is a compressed wall of air that
moves outwards at supersonic speeds from the impact point shattering everything that comes in its way. For
a one meg .,,aton bomb, the blast at 10,0000 metres would be 18 atmospheres and the wind could approach
400 mph. All civilian targets and most military tar-gets would be destroyed at two atmospheres of a blast.
The optimum size of a bomb, needed for successful use, is aroived at by judging the accuracy of the missile
system and the ”hardness” off” the target. An inaccurate missile will need a bigger warhead to destroy the
target. As missiles become more accurate, warhead size can be reduced. The yield-to-weight ratio is
paramount in the creation of a modern nuclear war arsenal. The Indian device exploded in Pokhran in 1974
weighed 1,5QO kg and was thus militarily unusable. We have to be sure that the tests at Chaghi have given
us the necessary yield to obtain weight ratios commensu. rate with today’s technology. The flurry of tests
that China and France carried out in 1995, despite worldwide protests, before signing the CTBT had ofle
primary objective: to obtain higher yield-to-weight ratios.
Whe issuwBu-e before us is. therefore, not only political and diplomatic, but a Iso strategic-- - and
technological. The foreign minister has said that the <jove«rnme=:nt is d. etermined to maintain a ”robust
and credible” deterrent capab->ility~. But thuuu_.e concept of minimum deterrent cannot be static; it has
got to be dynamic in order to retain its credibility. The real question is: will the simpBe fis-sion
urcHsanium weapons, which Pakistan possesses today and which are qwuite mcredible=: and effective in
today’s context, retain their dependability in 10. , 15 «”«or 20 yf=-ars from now’.’
WVithout:::r entering into a nuclear arms race with India, we have to
ensur-e thzsat our n ninimum deterrent does not lose its credibility by becoming
outm. oded3 and olBBbsolete with the passage of time. In order to achieve the necessary- yield-MBMo-
weight ratios, commensurate with today’s technology, we may 1-lave to go for designs of more
sophisticated weapons which may not b e po=ssible \v~-=-nth the help of sub-critical and computer
simulated tests.
ZSThus it would appear that if elementary precautions, mentioned abov*e, arse taken, we could sign the
CTBT. Since it is not the signing but the ratifimcatiown whicURn will bring the CTBT into effect, signing
is merely a first
step ._and -does m ->t in any way bind a party to the provisions of the treaty.
Noth ing i_n the tr- -<eaty imposes unilateral obligations on a state that signs the treaty because so long as
the CTBT does not enter into force,
implementation < >f the treaty cannot begin. Pakistan may sign but then delay
or ev-en resfuse ra tification if it discovers that it has been misled and made a
targe t ofcdiscrimSSination.
NUCLEAR COHSSTROVERSY IN PAKISTAN
Pakistan, which had declared its nuclear capability in May 1998, with a series of underg -round nuclear
tests in response to similar detonations by
rival Indii_a, has ! .trongly denied sharing nuclear technology with any other
coun try. Pakist=:an assured the international community that she was a responsible nucl car state and that
her nuclear assets were in safe hands. How ever_^ since its becoming a nuclear state, some concerted
campaigns have beeum under-way to malign the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan. It has beeirs a
sommmjrce of concern for the international community that
Pakistan’ s ”’”’’° >r weapons might slip into the hands of some terrorist and
extremist eroups or transferred to the rouge states.
Rece^fltly^ Iran vr
Recently,,,. Iran vr~ as accused by the US for establishing a clandestine nuclear weapons prograi ._ii. Iran
first rejected the allegations but latter succumbed to interrnaticamal pre-.;^rssure and signed an additional
protocol to the nuclear Non-
proli feration Tn -aty to allow UN inspection of all its nuclear facilities.
Durfcug a:zn exhansntstive investigation of Iran’s nuclear installations by IAEA

702
in November 2003, the international agency discovered working centrifuges at Iran Natanz Plant. Iran first
claimed to have built them alone, but it latter admitted that some second-hand pans been received from
another country, when inspectors detected traces of highly enriched uranium on the machines, which Iran
insisted had never made.
Inspectors studying the machines also found that the design of Iran’s uranium enrichment technology was
same as that of Pakistan achieved in
1970s. It was discovered that the centrifuge blueprints included design modification similar to ones made
by Pakistan, and the uranium traces were consistent with material produced in Pakistan. Besides these, the
documents provided by Iran to UN nuclear inspectors since early November
2003 have exposed the outlines of a ”vast, secret procurement network that successfully acquired thousands
of sensitive parts and tools from numerous countries over a 17-year period.” Although Iran has not directly
identified Pakistan as a slate, but mentioned ”middlemen” who helped her in promoting her nuclear
program. The Iranian information pointed towards some individual nuclear scientists and companies as
supplier of key blueprints, technical guidance and equipment for a pilot uraniumenrichment plant. In short,
the evidence discovered in a probe of Iran’s secret nuclear program points overwhelmingly to Pakistan as
the source of crucial technology that put Iran on a fast track towards becoming a nuclear weapons power.
Although the alleged transfers occurred years ago but the startling discoveries really complicated
relationship between United States and Pakistan.
Pakistan promptly rejected the allegation and assured the international community that it has never been
involved in international nuclear proliferation and will continue the same in future. However, the shocking
discoveries of investigation in Iran and the increasing pressure from IAEA and US compelled Pakistan to
launch an exhaustive investigation of the alleged clandestine nuclear activities in the country. The pressure
on Pakistan was intensified by the fresh allegations from Western media that Pakistan had also supported
Libya and North Korea in developing their nuclear weapon program. Owing to the precarious
circumstances, Pakistani government started a comprehensive debriefing of many prominent nuclear
scientists in light of the information provided by IAEA about links between some Pakistani scientists and
Iran’s nuclear program. The father of Pakistan’s atomic bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan and the top KRL
nuclear scientists were thoroughly questioned by the Pakistani intelligence agencies. The US appreciated
Pakistan cooperation with IAEA and the comprehensive debriefing process to investigate into the matter.
The on going probe and inquiry is also expected to focus not only on Pakistani nationals but also on a
number of European sources and individuals without
Nl I I.KAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA
703
whose collaboration, the illegal operations would not have been possible.
The outcome of the prolonged debriefing process revealed that certain individual scientists of Pakistan top
nuclear establishment might have breached the strict export control procedures by making unauthorized and
irresponsible contacts with foreign nationals. Those individuals have been instrumental in leakage of
information or nuclear components to foreign sources. The debriefing process was stopped in the end of
January 2004, when the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons system. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan publicly
confessed the illegal and clandestine transfer of nuclear information and equipments to Iran. President
Musharaf pardoned Dr. Qadeer being a national hero and the crisis seems to be averted for the time being.
Although the US and IAEA have strongly appreciated the steps taken by Pakistan to uncover the extent of
proliferation that Dr. Qadeer had engaged in and of the President Musharaf pledge to ensure that no such
proliferation will ever occur again. But that does not mean that the US government and other influential
western governments accept at face value Dr. Khan’s assertion that he acted alone and that he alone was
responsible for the crimes committed by him and his subordinates. The principle interest of the US and
IAEA lies in locating every participant in the Dr. Khan’s clandestine network and ensuring that such
activity is permanently ended. The accomplishment of this task will require Pakistan to make available all
details that it is able to collect about the network from its interrogation of Dr. Khan and his colleagues. In
the process Pakistan may give access to IAEA to its nuclear facilities. Only the time will tell us the extent
of American interference in the nuclear weapons program of Pakistan. The principle point evident from the
present nuclear crisis in Pakistan is that the fear in the West of Pakistan’s nuclear capability falling into
extremist hands, has acquired a sharper edge, which may harm Pakistan’s interests in the long run.
\ARC
CHAPTER 18
705
)7 ;o
SAARC
FORMATION AND OBJECTIVES
South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation (SAARC) was formed in 1983 but it was not until 1985
that it started seeking concrete results. The countries of South Asia, one-fifth of the entire humanity, are:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, India and Sri Lanka. They share many common values that
are rooted in their social, ethic, cultural and historical traditions. Regional collaboration or co-operation for
the resolution of common problems and achievements of mutually shared goals in a region is generally
accepted as an important mode of interaction across the territorial boundaries of a state. The idea of
SAARC is to promote greater interaction and understanding, increase mutual relevance and
interdependence amongst the regional states.
Geographical proximity coupled with the overlapping historical experiences, traditions, common problems
of development and social change underlined the need of pooling the resources of the South Asian states.
The idea of South Asian Regional Co-operation was mooted by the late President Zia-ur-Rehman of
Bangladesh in 1980. He was keen to hold a summit meeting of the seven South Asian countries in order to
deliberate on establishing an appropriate machinery to promote co-operation among the | countries of the
region. The response of Pakistan and India to the proposal [was not very encouraging. India feared that her
smaller neighbours might (gang up against her in the bilateral problems with New Delhi, and Pakistan
(thought that India, being the biggest country in the area, would dominate Ithat organisation. However on
second thought, both the countries joined it. (Establishment of SAARC was also encouraged by
international agencies Hike UNDP. Although President Zia-ur-Rehman did not succeed to hold a •summit
in his life, Bangladesh did succeed in bringing the seven nations foreign secretaries together at Colombo in
1981. From 1981 to 1983, these lountries held four meetings and agreed on the feasibility of South Asian
Kgional co-operation and recommended to their respective governments to lold meeting at Foreign
Ministers’ level. The Foreign Ministers in their turn leld three annual conferences and prepared ground for
holding the SAARC limmit conference on December 7 and 8, 1985 in Dhaka.
rer to ch nd he he nd tat ral ral
ity tal he he
.rd
)St
nd
.as ns lir is JN >nhe dy m, da

706
It took about six years to hold the summit meeting in order to formally establish what is now called the
South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation.
ACHIEVEMENTS
It will not be wrong to say that the future of SAARC which has entered the 19th year of its formal existence
hinges mainly on normalisation of the relations between the ”big two” of SAARC namely India and
Pakistan. Abdul Ahsan the former Secretary-General of SAARC once said No doubt the SAARC
Organisation is still a long way from addressing the deep-rooted suspicions and outstanding problems in the
region, but experience has shown that discussions during its meetings, thoughjinformal in nature and
outside its framework, have helped contain many difficult situations. Indeed, SAARC has opened a new
horizon for South Asia. SAARC has played a significant role:
(i) In developing understanding among the member states which has
led to the reduction of tension in the region. The achievements of
this organisation must be seen in the light of its modest agenda
with which it started functioning in 1985. (ii) The SAARC Regional Convention of Suppression of
Terrorism
signed by foreign ministers during the Kathmandu Summit came
into force in August 1998. (in) In the same year the SAARC Food Security Reserve became
operational, (iv) The SAVE (SAARC Audio-Video Exchange) programme has
also successfully completed more than 4 years of telecasting and
broadcasting of items of popular interest, (v) The working of regional documents centre has also
made
considerable head way. (vi) Substantial progress has been made for the launching of SAARC
tourism scheme, (vii) The member countries have devised modalities for confronting
many important issues such as poverty, terrorism drug-trafficking
etc. (viii) Institutional arrangements such as South Asian Development
Bank, South Asian Development Fund etc. have been initiated, (ix) There has been a general trend to
co-operate at functional
level, ignoring political differences.
(x) SAARC Agricultural Information Centre (SAIC) has been set up at Dhaka to promote co-operation
in the field of agriculture.
SAARC
707
(xi) A Center for Human Resource Development (CHRD) has also been established. This is a
satisfactory achievement for a regional co-operation with such a diversified population and economic,
political and cultural differences and approaches to various objectives.
HURDLES IN THE WAY OF SAARC
The answer to the anomaly as to why SAARC has failed to deliver the goods is present in the charter of
SAARC itself, which simply refers to the possibility of increased co-operation, contact and exchanges
which hopefully would contribute to the promotion of friendship and understanding as well as the welfare
of the people of South Asia. The Charter also requires that the decisions at all levels would be taken on the
basis of ”unanimity”. It further specifically excludes bilateral and contentious issues from Oraganisation’s
deliberations and lays down that co-operation under the Organisation ”shall not be a substitute for bilateral
co-operation and shall not be inconsistent with bilateral and multilateral obligations”.
Other reasons pertain to a lack of convergence of political security of the member states as also an absence
of a perceived threat to their vital interest from a common enemy factors which contributed towards the
viability of other regional grouping such as the European Union and the ASEAN.
Besides these factors, is the fact of a powerful India and its record of hegemonic and aggressive designs.
Unfortunately its relations with most of its neighbours are not very cordial. Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladsh
and Pakistan have their grievances against it.
The problem in South Asia intrinsically is India and how it has treated its neighbours. Pakistan is right to
say that normalisation of relations with India entirely depends on the latter agreeing to settle the Kashmir
question on the basis of the right of self-determination to which India is solemnly committed, India on the
other hand openly repudiates the UN stand and holds Kashmir as an integral part of India and is, therefore
nonnegotiable. It has already killed more that 50,000 freedom-fighters since the uprising began in 1990.
India cannot continue with its barbaric and bloody repression and at the same time wax eloquent for
regional co-operation, President Leghari did tell PM Rao about the meeting without the agenda having been
identified.
708
Through the SAARC and bilaterally, India is only interested in trade and more tourist facilities. No real
headway can be made under the circumstances when Kashmir is burning and bleeding and shrines are
being torched. Kashmir question has to be settled before other confidence building measures can start
giving dividends. The big obstacle needs to be removed first and the small irritants will fade away soon.
There is little hope of SAARC succeeding so long as India clings to its hegemonic ambitions and refuses to
treat its neighbours with respect.
Long-standing mutual disputes and irritants exist between a good number of the seven SAARC nations
with no sign of their being resolved in the near future which is weakning the case for a regional format of
cooperation. Some of these bilateral issues are;
Though BD was carved out through the active connivance and long-term scheming, India has constantly
kept its relations with BD on the boil and is not ready to grant her full-fledged freedom. The principal issue
is the sharing of the Ganges river waters. Millions of farmers have been reduced to penury by India’s
unreasonable step to build Farrakha barrage depriving BD of much needed irrigation water.
Nepal is unhappy with an unequal trade treaty forced on it by India in 1950’s. Being landlocked it has to
accept Delhi’s hegemonic hold.
The unending woes of Sri Lanka are due to the initial help to Jafna Tamils from India. For sometime, Sri
Lanka remained in the occupation of the Indian army.
Pakistan had to fight three wars since independence. The forcible occupation of Kashmir continues. India
has let loose a reign of brutal terror in Held Kashmir for the past many years with more than 50,000
freedomfighters martyred.
In short, Indian policy towards its neighbours has been hegemonic and imperialistic for a long time even
before the SAARC inception. Small neighbours of India have been under permanent threat to their
sovereignty and integrity from their big neighbour. Out of the prevailing mistrust among the South Asia
countries, India perceived the creation of SAARC as a common front of the small states against the bigger
India. General H.M. Esrshad, former president of Bangladesh, revealed the purpose of SAARC summit in
1985, ”It was because of all were allergic to India, so we wanted to get together to deal with the problem by
having India as an equal partner in the group.”
SAARC
709
Besides these political differences and mutual distrust among the member states of SAARC, another
serious hurdle to the functioning of the organization is the asymmetry between India and the other members
in terms of demography and economic and technological development. It is a peculiar feature of SAARC
that India overwhelms the other member countries by its size of population, GDP and technology. India
accounts for more than three quarters of the regional GDP and two-thirds of the region’s global exports.
Besides, India is in the middle of region and other six members are on the periphery. Hence India provides
the link among all SAARC countries. Without Indian glue, the region cannot move forward.
The SAARC has another peculiarity in the sense that four members India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and
Maldives are in the middle-income group of developing countries, whereas Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan
belong to the least developed group. This disparity between the two groups of the region is not conducive
to rapid economic cooperation, as the least developed group wants special and preferential treatment, which
is very difficult. Besides these, the extent of complementarities which represents the level of economic
cooperation in a region, is very poor in the case of SAARC. Most of the members of SAARC export similar
products. They compete rather than compliment for each other.
The ultimate target of SAARC economic cooperation is an integrated South Asian economy in a step-by-
step manner to implement the shared aspirations of 1400 million South Asians for a more prosperous
region. The action to achieve this goal has been more in form than substance. India plays the pivotal role in
the region, and SAARC economic cooperation can surge forward if India behaves like a family elder rather
than an Orwellian Big Brother.
THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF SAARC
The future of SAARC as a helpful regional organization to promote peace, regional integrity and mutual
co-operation among its members, is really very bleak in face of the increasing Pak-India rivalry in the
region. Indian intransigence on various regional and bilateral issues with its neighbours is one of the main
hurdles in theway of SAARC. Since the rise to power of the Hindu nationalist party BJP under its hawkish
leadership, the hopes of mutual co-operation have further faded away.
The Indian delaying tactics in holding its sessions has always paralyzed the function of SAARC. The
summit of SAARC held in Kathmandu was scheduled to be held in November 1999, but India has been
delaying it due to one reason or the other till January 2002. The Kathmandu
710
Declaration urged greater efforts to speed up co-operation among the members. President Musharaf came
forward with open arms and shook hand with Mr. Vajpayee during the summit, proving that Pakistan is
ready to cooperate with India on each and every front to bring peace and property to the region.
Next summit of SAARC was due to be held in January 2003 in Islamabad. But Pakistan had to postpone it
indefinitely, due to India’s negative and ambiguous attitude towards participation in the summit. Although,
Indian ministers attended meetings of ministers of information and economic affairs held in Islamabad
during March and April 2002. But Indian participation, in the SAARC annual summit in Islamabad was
conditioned by Vajpayee to stoppage of, as they accuse, Pakistan’s crossborder infiltration in Kashmir. Mr.
Vajpayee also accused Pakistan, failing to implement economic measures decided by SAARC, including
the extension of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status by members to each other. At the same time India
launched a propaganda, putting the blame for the postponement of the summit on Pakistan. All this Indian
intransigent and saber-rattling behaviour towards its neighbours particularly towards Pakistan put the future
of the SAARC at stake and hopes of its viable role in the progress of the region receded in the background.
ISLAMABAD SUMMIT OF SAARC 2004
Ever since its inception, SAARC has been held hostage to Indo-Pakistan differences. Following military
stand-off between India and Pakistan in
2002, relations between the two countries almost reached to the threshold of war. The people of the region
were seriously worried about the future of SAARC as a viable and functional organization. But suddenly,
for the last one year relations between the two bigger members of SAARC have been improving. The new
mood of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan following a number of confidence building
measures from both sides, has given rise to the hope that SAARC may at last become an operative
organization for economic growth and prosperity in South Asia.
The SAARC summit was held at Islamabad from 4 to 6 January 2004. Islamabad Declaration was adopted
which is comprised of 43 Articles spread over seven pages. The Islamabad Declaration carries some
remarkable achievements over the last 18 years life of SAARC. It calls for promoting peace, stability,
amity and progress in the region through strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter
and NonAlignment, particularly respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity,
national independence, non-use of force and noninterference in the internal affairs of the states and
peaceful settlement of all
711
disputes. The Declaration also recognizes the importance of enhancing political cooperation. It reaffirms
the pledge to promote good neighborly relations and ”recognize the importance of informal political
consultations in promoting mutual understanding and reinforcing confidence building process among
member states.” It envisages that ”We envision, South Asia to be a peaceful and stable region where each
nation is at peace with itself and its neighbours and where conflicts, differences and disputes are addressed
through peaceful means and dialogue.” Security concerns of small states are removed through a strong
pledge by all the member states to strictly adhere to the universal principles of national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of all states.
On economic front too, the summit has some remarkable achievements. The member states affirmed their
”determination to create an exclusive, just and equitable partnership for peace, development and prosperity.
The signing of the Framework Agreement (South Asia Free Trade Area) is a major milestone. It is aimed at
broadening of economic cooperation and to ensure equitable distribution of benefits of trade among the
member states. The Islamabad Declaration also reiterates the commitment made at the 11th SAARC
Summit for the creation of a South Asia Economic Union. It affirms ” to strengthen transportation, transit
and communications links across the region.” It also stressed the need for harmonization of standards,
simplification of customs procedures, as well as cooperation among the central banks.
Another important feature of the Islamabad Declaration adopted at the 12th SAARC Summit, is that it
recognizes poverty alleviation as the greatest challenge facing the people of South Asia and declares
poverty alleviation as the overarching goal of all SAARC activities. The Plan of Action on Poverty
Alleviation, prepared by the meeting of finance and planning ministers in Islamabad in 2002, is approved.
It also calls for facilitation in sharing of scientific and technological expertise, joint research and
development and industrial application of higher technology.
The Islamabad Declaration also calls for cooperation in medical expertise and pharmaceutical and to set a
SAARC Health Surveillance Centre and Rapid Deployment Health Response System ”to deal with the
emerging and re-emerging diseases”. It also underlines ”the need for preservation of traditional skills and
crafts and promotion of cultural exchanges between nations”.
The Islamabad Summit of SAARC achieved a remarkable progress in the area of suppressing terrorism as
well. It not only reaffirms the member states commitment to SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression
of
712
^,
IIS’TERNATIOISAL AFFAIRS
Terrorism but also adopts the Additional protocol to the Convention, so as to deal effectively with
financing of terrorism in the region.
At the end, the Islamabad Declaration declared the year 2004 as the ”SAARC Awareness Year” and it was
affirmed that SAARC Secretariat should effectively implement the proposed programs on the observation
of the SAARC Awareness Year.
The declaration adopted at the Islamabad Summit is a new ray of hope towards a better future for the South
Asia people. A healthy and wellfunctioning SAARC can play a very beneficial role for South Asia in the
impending age of globalization which is to be accompanied by the age of regionalism as well.
NEW PROSPECTS OF SAARC
The new emerging trends of globalization has made it imperative to forge economic ties as a stepping stone
for competing at a global level. ,Owing to these new trends, strong regional economic blocks have emerged
all over the world; for instance ASEAN, EU, NAFTA etc. SAARC was also aimed at the economic
integration of South Asia. But unfortunately, it has been a dysfunctional organization. Nevertheless, the
successful summit of SAARC at Islamabad, manifested the realization of the fact that the organization
should be revitalized to cope with the forthcoming global economic challenges. The Islamabad Summit
made some remarkable achievements which offer an evidence to commitment of the member states to seek
a better future for the downtrodden people of South Asia.
In the last 18 years of life time of SAARC, none of the member countries of the organization, including
India, could develop a deep commitment to the objectives of SAARC. India being the biggest member of
SAARC, has been cpncerned with the organization might be used as a common platform by the other
members to exert pressure on New Delhi on some important regional issues. The Islamabad Summit has
greatly diluted this apprehension of India. Pakistan’s positive attitude towards Safta and other contentious
issues has transformed the feelings in Indian camp regarding the organization from a platform against India
into an organization which holds out the promise of common good for the region.
The smaller members have always been fearful of India’s hegemonic position in the region. These fears are
allayed by the Islamabad declaration laying emphasis on ”the principles of sovereign equality, territorial
integrity, national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in
SAARC
713
the internal affairs of the States, and peace and peaceful settlement of all disputes.
Achievements of the Islamabad Summit are, no doubt, remarkable. The adoption of Islamabad declaration,
social charter and the additional protocol to the regional convention on suppression of terrorism in addition
to the unexpected progress on SAFTA is, indeed a notable progress by the SAARC over the last 18 years.
The progress on Safta by the adoption of a framework for regional free trade zone, was a historic event.
Under the agreement reached, tariffs between member countries of the SAARC will be reduced by the
beginning of 2006, which will definitely boost trade in the region. The decision to make Safta operational
in just four years time is a courageous decision to mould the SAARC forum in line with other trading
blocks. Pakistan made a crucial policy shift by agreeing to the proposal of a framework for regional free
trade zone in South Asia. It has reversed its hitherto followed policy - no economic cooperation with India
till Kashmir dispute is settled. Significantly, both Pakistan and India, for the first time, refrained from
raising any controversial issue at the Islamabad Summit. Pakistan did not mention Kashmir and India did
not make any direct reference to cross-, border terrorism. All these achievements show a changed mood
from simmering tension to constructive cooperation.
There are three reasons for being optimistic about the future prospects of the SAARC. The first is that
bilateral relations between India and Pakistan are now set for improvement. Second, the SAARC leaders,
for the first time, have succeeded in adopting a framework agreement on SAFTA containing specific
schedule for the lowering of tariffs. Third, the genuine concerns of the least developed countries of SAARC
- Bangla desh, Nepal and Bhutan - have been adequately met. It is for the first time that SAARC members
have strongly realized the importance of regional economic integration in a world where bilateral and
regional trade pacts have become economic necessity.
Despite these remarkable developments in the history of SAARC, talking of economic union or common
South Asian currency at this very stage would be mere a wishful thinking. It will require a genuine free-
trade agreement, followed by a customs union, with common external tariffs, and a common market with
free cross-border movements of labour and capital. It is doubtful if any SAARC member, especially India,
will agree to free crossborder movement of labour at this stage. Regional economic integration should be
the ultimate objective of the SAARC. But in view of the challenges involved, it will be advisable to hasten
things slowly.
714
SAARC
.715
The dream of South Asia’s economic integration cannot be fulfilled unless the daunting challenges,
mentioned earlier in this chapter, are met. The most serious challenge is to maintain the current momentum
in improving bilateral relations between Pakistan and India. Once all the major disputes between the two
rivals are resolved, we can expect a successful future for the-’SAARC in the impending economic battle of
globalization.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The last minute decision by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan singh, not to attend the 13th SAARC summit
that was scheduled for Feb 6 and 7 in Dhaka out of security consideration, culminated in the postponement
of summit.
The Dhaka summit was set to endorse numerous decisions taken since 12th summit last year in January to
promote co-operation in various areas. The reasons advanced for India’s decision relate to development in
two SAARC member states> Nepalese king Gyandra dismissal of his government and the alleged lack of
security in the host county Bangladesh. India had itself suggested the summit date of Fe6-7, after earlier
dates in January were dropped owing to the destructive tsunami that has caused heavy loss of life in
Srilanka and India.
New Delhi is directly responsible for most of the eight postponement of earlier summit. The post
postponement of 6lh summit in Colombo in 1991 was sought on the basis of apparent illness of king of
Bhutan. However the real reason was the New Delhi wanted to register its disapproval of Srilanka attitude
to the prolonged presence of Indian forces in country.
While persuing ”liking East ” policy, building up close kinks with ASEAN, India has not actively promoted
co-operation with south Asian neighbors. Even Srilanka is more eager to be a part of ASEAN rather than
SAARC .In past ”Indra” and ”Gujral” doctrine dwarfed SAARC status.
Pakistan is the chair till the next summit, actively participated in the follow up meetings designed to
promote increased co-operation in trade, poverty alleviation and social action programs. Due to this sudden
and unexpected second postponement, the momentum of the last year has been lost.
International competitiveness can be enhanced through regional economic cooperation, as is the experience
of EU. As a pre requisite to this objective is a genuine free trade agreement. Pakistan is a stench supporter
of SAFTA,
which was signec with Srilanka. Th
SARRC
almost a quarter c value and global t
d at the 12th SAARC summit and signed FTA agreement .is is the first FTA Pakistan has signed with any
country.
countries are spread over an area of 4.5 million Sq km and =>f the world population lives in this region. In
spite of the -iade of the SAARC countries is very low.
716
717
NOTES
83TOH
718
720 _.
NOTES
A

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Dr. Safdar Mahmood

© Copy Rights Reserved

Publisher: JANG PUBLISHERS, Lahore

Editor in charge: Muzaffar Muhammad AH

Assistant Production: Muhammad Azeem

Title by: Anees Yaqub

Printers- Jang Publishers Press, Lahore

Price: Rs. 400

PREFACE TO THE TWELFTH EDITION

February 7, 1994, Lahore

DR. SAFDAR MAHMOOD

12-Golf Road, GOR-1, Lahore

PREFACE TO THE 2005 EDITION

Hasnat Shah for His Assistance.

DR. SAFDAR MAHMOOD

BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

Rise of the left in Europe

THE UNITED NATIONS

The Specialized Agencies: IMF, IBRD, H.O. UNESCO, WHO, FAO.

United Nations and International Security.

United Nations In the Post-Cold War Era.

Why the UN Fails?

Future of the United Nations.

Suggestions to Improve The United Nations.

UN and the Third Millennium.

UN and Challenges of a new disorderly world.

New Challenges to the UN Credibility,

UN and Human Rights

World Summit on Sustainable Development

Chapter 3 THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Chapter 4 THE COLD WAR DEFENCE TREATIES

Chapter 5 THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Chapter 7 EMERGENCE OF AFRICA

Chapter 9 THE AMERICAN CONTINENTS

DISINTEGRATION OF THE USSR AND RE-EMERGENCE OF RUSSIA

Chapter 13 CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 384

• South Asia, Sino-India Detente:The Present Situation,

Chapter 14 THE END OF COLD WAR

Chapter 15 DISARMAMENT AND

Chapter 17 NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN SOUTH ASIA 679

Chapter 16 FOREIGN POLICY OF PAKISTAN

INTERN VnONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE. TMOWORU) \\ARS ]3

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO WORLD

I Whatever disarmament efforts took place outside the League, were

- In 1934, he entered into a non-aggression pact with Poland for

To make friends with the Fascists and the Nazis.

RISE OF THE LEFT IN EUROPE

Globalization and technological innovation comprise a great social

shifts resources on a national basis from the profits of business to

employment, social security, health and education.

TOWARDS INTERNATIONALISM THE UNITED NATIONS

(II) THE MAIN ORGANS

The United Nations has the following main organs:

1. The Security Council.

2. The General Assembly.

3. The Economic and Social Council.

4. The Trusteeship Council.

5. The International Court of Justice.

1. International Labour Organization. (ILO)

2. International Monetary Fund. , (IMF)

3. United Nations Educational, Scientific

and Cultural Organization. (UNESCO)

4. World Health Organization. ’ (WHO)

. necessary for independence or self-government. The Trusteeship Council of