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Q: May the Supreme Court tak e cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 1. The interests of the public in general, as distingurshed from those of a
64 t o review an interlocutory order issu ed by a Div ision of the COMELEC? particular class, which require the intervention of the State (Lawful subject):
ANS: Yes. As an exception, the Supreme Court may take cognizance of a petition for and
cert,orart under Rule 6 4 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the 2. The employment of means which are reasonably necessary for the
~OM~L_E C on t~e ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of accomplishment o f the purpose and not unduly oppressive on individuals
Junsdr~hon or \Yllh grave abuse of discretion amounting to tack or excess of jurisdiction (Lawful means) (City of Manila v. Laguio, G.R No. 118127, April 12, 2005).
wh en 11 does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of
P~o_c~du~e that the ~ alter is one that the COMELEC en bane may sit and consider, or a Q: What are the twin requirements of procedural due process?
01vrsmn 1s not authorized lo act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer ANS: The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of
to the COMELEC en bane. or necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the due process, and neither of these elements can be eliminated without running afoul of the
Cotirt because the COMELEC en bane is not the proper forum in which the mailer constitutional guaranty (Vinta Maritime Co., Inc., v. NLRC, G.R. No. 113911 January 23,
concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed (Cagas v. COMELEC G R 1998). ,..
No. 194139, January 24, 2012). ' · ·
Q: When may these twin requirements be dispen sed with? (ITO)
ANS: These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances,
SLICh as:
1. Where there is an urgent neeci for Jmmediale action. such as:
a. The summary abatement of a nuisance per se (CIVIL CODE. Arl. 704);
A;, OUE PROCESS · /': · · . ·- ·- ~ .-··, • ,i: b. The preventive suspeQ~iofi: of a public servant facing administrative
charges (LGC, Sec. Jj_;Jff °}{
0: What rights docs the due·p(ocess clause seek t o protect? c. The padlocking of fi!I~siif~vranls or theaters showing obscene movies
A NS: The due process.cJ?US.~ protects the right io life. l)bE!rtY, and properly (CONST. or like establishmei.its~ =,;:ire immediate threats to public health and
Art. Ill, Sec. 1). _.- · ... _ / . . .. • .. " · -. decency: and } ::~ .,,.
/,- ..."\~~-Fr - :· - -·-., •. :l·\·\ d. The cancellalion,"of fa'. ·,f.:Cb:<l ·=~rson sought for criminal
Q: What does " life;:u;ae'jlhe {du e proce~s 21ause;me'ap(, ..\ prosecuti J~'~ :· --,--;:_.. .i... :l.
A~S: The nghl to, !1f!qJ,,0ara~Jees...es.sen_tially_ th~ right tg'.Jfo' illive-upon which the 2. Where there enlativene1.. administrative[l'i~tion, that is, where the
enJoyment of all ofu~ights r~ pr~conditioned .(Ma,;nba V, Bueno G.R. No. 191416 respondent is l),0~(llilCludeci1ro'l'!,enjoying the rigtJ~ tq notice and hearing al a
i< ! c,\ · .·-.,:·
February 7 2017). : ·} l · . · · ·.. · ' ; : ' ·
· :e·- l.c- ~ ·""~·1;
later lime · fitiutif11!~lfdice lo ' · person aJl'ecfpd,\ such as the summary
distrai levy ol the~r rly of a }:feli!Ji:!Ue"J taxpayer, and the
Q : ~hat do~s " lib\ rf~('.dpdefj~'e du·e._p?p;sess
ANS. The right to ~ 1st at\d tli~,ifl~l tq~tiq.·fre-~]rt?,m. _
5'~~;e·mia~:f
arbil.(:ary reftraint or servi!ude. It is 3.
repla ,
Wher
· p
h
' tee; a
sly b
· ~

not_ ri:erely freedom f{om ptzysu::iol,t r~tq1i1t guf.:ff·is".-als.9" the ripht of man to enjoy his them had,W, t5 ary of Jus T
fac11i~1es, subJe~t only I~ such··~slr~in.t&fare.:fle~e.$sa~ for th9i common welfare (City of January 18li-l
Mantia v. Lagwo, G.R. fil'\
118/J_?,.. :~1:!!'
,'1..?.~20~1,~ci!iil![.J,u~llce Malcolm).
~1- ~ Y/~\ . -~...- -~ t-:; \ • F Q: What are the t wo pro (ll,\~u e process applies In this
Q ; What does " property" ur rd~r< t ~e dui1.p foc.J~~ ciJtu ~~ mean? Jurisdiction? •
ANS: Property is an_ything that can·corn~'.U~r..lhe"nght of ownership and be the subject ANS: The areas of proce d,ii.e process are the following:
of the_ C?nlract, and rncludes all thrngs - real, personal, tangible and intangible - that 1. Procedural due ess in judicial proceedings (El Banco Espariol v. Palanca,
are w1thrn the commerce of man (CRUZ, Constitutional Law, supra at 211 -.'212). G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918); and
2. Procedural due process in administrative proceedings (Ang Tibay v. Court of
Procedura l a nd Sub stantive Industrial Relation, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940).

0 : What are the two aspects o f due process?

ANS : The aspecls of due procesi; are subslanlive due process and procedural due
process.
1. S~bstantive due process refers lo the intrinsic validity of a law lhal interferes
with a person's life, liberty, or property rights.
2. Procedu_ral d ue pr~cess means compliance with the procedures or steps,
even periods, prescribed by the statute, in conformity wilh the standard or fair
play. a_nd w!thout_arbitrariness on the part of those who are called upon to
administer 1! {Alltance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc.• et al., v.
Non. Janette Garin, et al., G.R. Nos. 217872 and 221866, April 26, 2017).
Void- for-Vaguenuss
Q: What is the Doctrine o f Void-for-Vagueness?
ANS: It holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess al its meaning and differ as lo its application ($ps. Romualdez v. COMELEC, ~.R.
No. 167011, April 30, 2008). Void-for-vagueness doctrine can only be invoked against
!hat species of legislation that is utterly vague on its face. i.e., that which cannot be
clarified either by a saving clause or by construction (Celdran v. People, G.R. No. 220127,
November 21, 2018).

~~:h~I·
a:~ethe ~equis ites of subs tantive due p rocess?
- qursrtes or substan tive due process are:
Q : Why is the Doctrine of Void-for-Vagueness r epugnant to the Constitution ?
ANS: It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice o f the conduct to avoid; and
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2. It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and Q: When is administrative due process applicable?
becomes an arbitrnry flexing of the Government muscle (Southern ANS: Administrative due process is only applicable in the exercise of quasi-judicial
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. powers.
178552, October 5, 2010).
General Ru le: It may be stated as a general rule that noti_ce and hearing are. N?T
essential lo the validity of administrative action where the adm1n1strat1ve body acts 111 t.1e
Q: How do we apply the Doctrine of Void-for-Vagueness in Criminal Statutes?
A NS: In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process exercise or
clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. While 1. Executive;
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the
2. Administrative; or
operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to herein petitioner,
3. Legislative functions.
finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its entirety" Exception: But where a public adm!nistrative,.body acts in a judicial, or quasi-judicial
(Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. malter and its acts are particular and 1mmed1ateJather lnan general ano prosped1ve. lhe
178552, October 5, 20 10). persor~ whose rights oi property may be affected by the action is entitled lo notice and
Note: When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge hearing (Philippine Communications Sate/11/e Corporat,on v. Atcuaz, G.R. No. 848 18,
grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the December 18, 1989).
doctrine m ust be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T. Carpio explained in his
dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, · we must view these statements of a: What are the minimum requirements of procedural due process in school
the Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal disciplinary proceedings? (IA-IEC)
statutes as appropriate only insofar as these doctri nes are used to mount 'facial' ANS: The minimum requirements of pr,g~dural due process in school disciplinary
challenges lo penal statutes no\)nyolving free §-~fjectl_' (Oisini Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, proceedings: · ~ -I
G.R. No. 203335, Februa ry ,1-8,_-_~0":f:4)_ •, - '\.' ; , 1. The students must be writing of the nature and cause of any
..-- t ; •• • ' ~- accusation against then
Judicial and Adn11n;i;;-q_tj_l/e~b~~.Rroeess. -~ ····-~ ~ . -'-:~ ~· ·. 2. That they shall have thei. ~cges against them with the
assistance of counse!;;ifde ']f
Q: What are the nji~ i~ ~,;;(r~;uir~ii1e_rj~~ .9.f p;J~ed ~rJi"::-~t_e process in judicial 3. They shall be lnf -'eel of th _ nee against tq~,rn; _
proceedings? (IJOJ) j' t .''.:-. i \, - ·1~ 4. They shall ha right to~~~ _!;vIdence 1nj~e~ own behalf, and_
ANS: The minimuf }l<Nfremep"fs°?!P.iclci:io4r~! ~-µ'if ~roce~,!Jl,jl,l~icial proceedings are: 5. The evidence be ,duly co,),;idered by thJ mv1:_stIgahng ~omm1tlee or
1. !h~re r 1us_s pe an 'fmpar~il:l_f' .'~!'.l~_-,<;:?mpeJent cq~~_..9r) tribunal clothed with official d · The schc@ authoritiesJlo ~eat and decide the case
Jud1c1af[:PO.We( to _heiilt and ·d~tenuiMl"the tnatler oefore:it; (Cudia aent of ,lh ,,~ A, G.R. f/o. 2r
136.?, February 24, 2015;
2. ,./_urisdi<l1ip'f\i\usi\ ~~)~wfull1'.; aR,tJ.ired-9y.f£the~ ~.(SO[l of the defendant -or Guzm , , Universi(y, . No.,L- 8288 - ', 1 1986).
over th~ prope[ly \.'(_ti~ ~s t,l i~ ~~l?J~ft/ gtt_tie pfoceeqing; ~ ~1;::,
3. The parti:tis musJ be"·g(veti-i n Oppor-tun·ityrto b.e heard; and Q: Is appeal part of s? ' ... 'f right or part of due process. It is a mere
4. A proper J_~ dgme·qt .mutll'e~~~~f~f l{t5onJa\vful ~_iaring (El Banco Espanol ANS: No. The right t ~ . not ii nat
V. Palanca, 'Q.R. Nb>-..J,.-1-t;J9P~;M,arcn-ziA~J._8) . ..c statutory right, but one ,__Jte nial con ·oration of due process (Boardwalk
' _:,.I ·, 'C,,:.~¼ - ~ ·---=--- . _.;;:--~: . '..,-·"1~ ,:J
Business Ventures Inc .. v. areal . 10, 2013).
Q: What are the cardinal 'ifriQ"Cf~)}s oftjui prqc;f \ '},j'.~-"ii'ctministrative proceedings?
(RESS-BAKT) ......,.., t ,\(, ~-,,_ .' ',.-~·'· a: What are the differen _ n substantive due process and procedural due
ANS: Administrative due process ;~wrii·ifI 1itth;;;e must be: process? ·,t,\"-~J.~~. ·
1. Eight to a hearing; ANS: The differences between substantive due process and procedural due process are
2. Tribunal must c onsider !;vidence presented; the following:
3. Evidence must be _§_ubstantiat:
4. Decision must be .§upported by law and fact;
.
'
-
---
- .- .. -- · - ·_ · -- . ~ Sub-stantl~ ' · · ._ -__ _
.
· : -----Procedui-a, -: -·:_.
. - - •• - I - •

As to nature
5. Decision mus t be .§_ased on evid ence adduced at the hearing or at least Requires that the law itself. not Method or manner by which
contained in the reco rds and disclosed to parties; merely the procedure by which the law is enforced
6. The board or judge must ~ ct on its or his own independent consideration of the law would been forced, is
facts and law or the c ase, and not simply accept the view or the subordinate fair, reasonable, and just
in arriving at a decision ; ·1
Addressed to 1l1ose who
7. The decision must be rendered in such a manner that parties to controversy
can _!Snow various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered
As to who must Directed to the lawmakers
adjudicate
co_mply with the
(Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27,
r~quirement - .
1940); and
8. A n impartial I ribunat which dictates that one called upon to resolve a dispute Implies fundamental notions of Right to be notified and
As to.the
ma~ not sit as judge and jury simultaneously, neither may he review his fairness and justice heard
·requirements to be
dec,s,on on appeal (GSIS v. Cou,t of Appeals G.R. No. 128523 September complied with
28, 1998). ' '
(City of Manila v. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005).
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Q: How is the strict scrutiny test applied to the classification under the equal
Q : What are the tests of judicial scrutiny in relation to substantive due process?
ANS: The tests relative to lhe determination of substantive due process are rational protection clause? .
ANS: It is applied when the challenged statute either: . . .
basis test, intermediate review, and strict scrutiny: . Classifies on the basis of an inherently suspect charactenst1c. or
i. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they 1
2. Infringes fundamental constitutional rights (Central Bank Employees
rationally further a legitimate governmental interest;
Association v. BSP, G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004).
2. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined
and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered; and Under the strict scrutiny test, the focus is on the presence of compelling. rather than
3. Applying strict scrut iny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather substantial governmental interest and on the absence of less restr:chve means for
than substantial. governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive achieving ihat interest, and the burden befalls upon the Stale to prove the same
means for achieving that interest (White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,
(Kabataan Party-list v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 22'./18. December 16, 2015).
G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009).
Q: How is the intermediate scrutiny test appiied to the classification under equal
protection clause? . . ..
ANS· It is used as a iesl for evaluating class1ficat1ons based on gender and leg1t1macy.
Q: What does equal protection of the law mean? The · ovemment must show that the challenged classification serves an nnportant st.ate
1
ANS: It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all inter~st and that the classification is at least substantially related lo serving that 1nte est
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to (Birao O v. Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, o.ecember 7, 2010). u.nder
privileges conferred and liabilities eniorced. The equal protection clause is not infringed interm~diate review, governmental inter~~.)~;extensively exam.med and the ava1lab1h~ ~f
by legislation which applies only to those. persons falHng within a specified class, if it less restrictive measures is consider .-:ffiy~~e Light Corporatton v. City of Mam/a, · ·
applies alike to all persons wi.t.l1in ·suc11 c!ass, ~nd r~asonable grounds exists for making No. 122846. Janua,y 20, 2009). : ~fl.';:.',
a distinction between thoS!e-"'1'1h0_fall witlliQ..~ ucli cl.ass· and_ those who do not (!cf1ong v. r;.~ ~~;1 .
Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7.9f}5,·¥a~:a1, . 1957) . . .... ·· ~- ~ - -. Q: Dis tinguish the thr':e tests !~~rd~j""'·J'\i~i!~ i;::~.~~l :eness of classifications
~"" ~.. ,.· ·,.- ··- .
under the equal protection cl'.!,!!.§e. ·-,~ 1= '""''""'-q:r,: . .
Requisites for va1;/aa~~i;M,;t~~IJ ·-, ·, ANS: The three tests in d~r,-tnliiing re-iso1ableness of clas;,,\~cat1ons are.
[ ---~ i ·r.-··· - ..
' Intermediate ·
Q: What are the re~u isit~'s toria,v,alid classificatlori? (SA(;E)' ". ·; ':, -Scrutiny_ ·
f.l
ANS: The requisit~Hor. validt cla!l.sification are:. : ' ,•.... .-1 Legislative
1. Such c\a~Jqation r~sts uj:H;l~.~u~;,tantiaJ'.?.istinqt(ans;; i
·, classifications
2. It ~PP t1ally-tq.;a_ll mem.bers:of the ~a.nre, clqss; ·· ;
·ecting
3. It is Q. 'i!o
ili~);ib.rpose:-S-9Tihe lavJ;4il").d / ,.,.,..~ j'
fundamental rights
4. It is not ~ a,
to 'gx.i\;!,lll_ll ·i:.o1ditjpn.s -9!1,~ , (Sp.buses/fmbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,
or suspect classes
G.R. No.'-?_0481~. Apf:[I ~;,20.14). _,.,.-~:;-.· ~:·· / ~:
~,.. ' \,~~~ \~'~);--;~~;~::; •,: ·:~•• } , :,~~~~H $! gender prove compelling
Tests to Determine th"e Reasona lileness·ofa ,C /assification
. ,.,. ·,:.. '-,;::-""! ... ·'11.i...."Vlu:..~- .:i"-· . ·t~·\ ~- . f challenge
Q: What are the three tests"o(jl.td!~ial ~\?fl--ttil.)Y·t<>\ ~~termine the reasonableness of 0
classifications? ..,,_ . 0 ' ' ' ' : ~ . - ~ cl
ANS: The tes ts of judicial review are: ,.~ based on gender
1. Rational b asis test - the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not or illegitimacy
violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. This standard of won a particular govnt or law Must be
Must be legitimate Must be important
review is typically quite deferential; legislative classifications are presumed lo compelling
be valid largely for the reason that "the drawing of fines {hat create distinctions
is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable one" (British American Classification Classification
Classification
Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, August 20, 2008); must be rationally must bemust be
2. Intermed iate scrutiny test - it is used is a test evaluating classifications related to the substantially necessary and
based on gender and legitimacy (While Light Corporation v. City of Manila, legislative related 10 the narrowly tailored
G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009). The government must show that the purpose legislative purposeto achieve the
challenged classification serves an important slate interest and that the legislative
classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest (Biraogo ptirpose
v. Philippine Truth Commission); and . . SP GR N 148208 December 15, 2004).
(Central Bank Employees Assocrat1on v. B • . . o. ,
3. Strict scrutiny test (Sama/Jan ng mga Progresibong Kabalaan v. Quezon
City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017).
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cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant (Sec . Oe Uma
9.: AR.Rfst:s, _SEARCHES ANJ?~E./ZJ.(!!_/s..,__
:,.
v. Reyes, G.R. No. 209330, January 11 , 2016).
Q: What kind of search or seizure is prohibited by Art. Ill, Sec. 2 of the Constitution?
Q: What are the requisites for the person al determination of probable c ause by the
ANS: The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures.
j udge in the issu ance of search warrant? (SOW KA)
It is only directed against those that are unreasona ble. Conversely, reasonable searches
ANS: The following aIe the requisites: .
and seizures fall outside the scope of the prohibition and are not forbidden (Veridiano v. 1. The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine the
People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017).
complainant and the witnesses in the form of _§_earching queshons and
Q: What is t he purpose of constitutional provision against unlawful searches an d answers;
seizures? · 2. The examination must be under Qath:
ANS: Th'<! purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures 3. The examination must be in 'firiting~
is to prevent violations of private security in person and property. and unlawful invasion 4. The complainant and !he witnesses-must be examined on facts personally
Known to them; and
of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted (People v. 5. The judge must Attaci1 to the record the sworn statements of the complainant
and the witnesses together with any affidavit submitted (RULES OF COURT,
Pastrana, G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018).
Rule 126, Sec. 5).
lleg_uisites ofa Valid Warrant Q; Distinguish between the personal determination of probable cause by th e judge
in the issuance of a search warrant an · the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Q: What are the requisites for the i!l_suance-o.f a valid sea rch warrant and warrant of
arrest? (PJOK-D) ,.·· -_-··· ; , ;, ·::..,. ···-.,. ANS: They are distinguished as fol'
ANS: The requisiles for the ·is'suahce ola.Jaifei\Jialra~t'·are :
1. A determination of..P}obabli"fca~se·~ ·- •· . · . •
2. The deterf!Jinati.tzn_of p,robal}le cnuse _;;s~°t!;td~·p_ersonaily by a ,ludgc; In the issuance of a search warra,ot. of a warrant of arrest.
3. The det_e5(Y)!1Ja\19n by lhe_ jupg':l}"'a,s.. base,d oi;f~g~_i;?X<j!mination under Qath or must be probable cause, wlJji;n'.is ·'c'i nol personally examine
affirmati~in of'l9·e cornplamant-,ajld.:the witi;iess~s hi? i\;lay produce; determined personally b "e''judge, the complai t and the witnesses he
4. The coippla[riefnt af\Ulor..wjtn~s~e.sJestifie~ to fi\d(s wiU,in their personal examination under oat ffirmatiq, may produgi .~ i\ is sufficient that he
!S_nowl~'l:!ge;".i(nd j "'··"- ._, ~: ,. , ,:., J \ c•·--"' \ the complainant and the ·· either: f ~ \
5 The wa; r~.l.ifsuedj1ust i?a1J~\!.l_afly,Qesqribe th~ pla¢!) to be searched or the produce, and parr · 1. Perso_la11yl evilJuate the report _and
personi 1:>r>Jtilng~~-~ ~\~~~~~d_::Gf.f>~§~f1f.!:i ///, !>_ec. J'2}. place to be se the spppoqing cuments submitted
things to be sei b regarding the
Q: What is the diffe~[J:il of{}.is-~bl~~c~~~~' l f<; t~'t is.f u~:"iJ o f a search warran t exI able cause and. on
1. .,., .... i ·~ - • ... . , , . ... ., ,.. ...
an d a warrant of arrest? .,_ ~J ! _,,.--,.·:·) ~
. :-'.'--. 1 the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
The probable cause~
ANS: Probable caus¾as a ~~il~0.9~fQfiff~~µ~f1c~_,6f a selch warrant, exists when with one specific off arrest; or
there are facts and cIrcu~stan.c2;>JD.at,\YP~dde~.~sa' re11~s~p6ly ~rudent man to believe " the basis thereof he finds no
must, before issuin
that an offen_se has been co.ifl!)!l)e,°:"and: th~t-t ~ c;i1?JFi_9.f~..,sought m connection with that cause, he may disregard
personally examine i
offense are In the place to l:ie-.._§~af!:hedt lS:y/ r~p{~;Sy Tiong Gue, G.R. No: 174570, the fiscal's report and require the
searching questions a in
February 22, 2010). -....,,_~,~...;,,c'.',;;,..,.r--"·' writing and under oath, plainant
submission of supporting affidavits
or witnesses to aid him in arriving at
Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, exists where there and any witness he may produce, on facts
a conclusion as to the existence of
are_ facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to personally known to them and attach to the
probable cause (Soliven v.
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested (Webb record their sworn statements together
Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585,
v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995). with any affidavits submitted (Prudente v.
November 14, 1988).
Judge Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December
Q: What are the two kinds of determination of probable cause? 14, 1989).
ANS: The two kinds of determinstion of probable cause are the executive determination
of probable cause and the judicial determination of probable cause defined as follows:
1. The executive determination of probab le cause is one made during Q: When is a search warrant con sid ered particular? .
preliminary investigation. It pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a ANS· A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when
· · ·11 d. ·1 allow· or when
broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge the description therein is as specific as the circumstances w1 or 1nan Y · .
those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not or law - by_ which the_ warrant officer
thus should be held for trial; and may be guided in making the search and seizure; or when the things described are linllled
2. The judicial determination of probable cause. on the other hand, is one to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued (Bache & Co. (Phil.). Inc., v. Ruiz, GR. No. L-32409, Febniary 27, 19 71).
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the
~vtdence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody
111 order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable
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Q: What is a scatter-shot warra nt?

ANS: A scatter-shot warrant is a warrant issued for more lhan one specific offense. It 1s
void, because it violates the conshtut1onal requirement that there must be particularity of
the things to be seized and persons and places to be searched (Leon Tambasen v.
People, et al., G.R. No. 89103, July 14, 1995).
Q : What is a "general warrant"?
ANS: _ A general warran~ is one that allows the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which
items to take. It is void because it is not particular as to lhe person to be arrested or the
property to be seized (Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156413, April 14, 2004).
Warrantless Arrests andOotentlon
Q: When is warrantless arrest valid? (ICH-BED-DE)
ANS: Warranlless arrests are valid under the following circumstances:
1. When caught [n flagran/e deliclo - When person to be arrested has
committed, is actually commi!ting, or is attempting to commit an offense
(RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Sec. 5 (a)):
2. In case_s of f.ontinu_!p9_offeii~e -~ me""mber~hip in organizations like NPA is a
continuing . offe~s:.~~lh\J~_. a p~csqh _liu(lly ) h~reof can be arrested anytime
under them fj,agfa_nl!! de/iclo prineiple. -(U1tiil,V_-'~ mos, G.R. No. 79731 July
9, 1990): -· .-· ':-j J •-,,.__ ; .·" • ·- '
3. Doctrine </!igf ~iifs.uit --Wh-e-;, ~-;; ·offens~ has ju;tbeen commilted and the
arre~tor fas~p,~lfabifo cau~e to Q.elieve, ba_sed·{il)'' perspnal knowledge of facts
Warrantless Searches
Q: When is a warrantless search valid? (CIM-CAB-SCAPE)
ANS: Warrantless searches are valid in the following circumstances:
1. Consented warranlless search • when right has been voluntarily and
intelligently waived (People v. Omaweng, (JR. No. 99050, September 2,
1992);
2. Incident to a lawful arrest • a person caught in flagrante de/icto and lawfully
arrested may be searched, provided that the search is contemporaneous to
the arrest and within permissible area of search (RULES OF COURT, Rule
126, Sec. 13) or the place within the immediate control or the person bein_g
arrested (Espana v. Court of Appe§Jp, G.R. No. 120431, April 1, 1998). It 1s
essential that a valid arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed (People v. Chlla 1-io San, G.R. No. 128222, June 17, 1999);
3. Searches of _Moving vehicles - searches of vehicles. vessels, or aircraft for
violation of fishery, immigration, and customs laws (People v. Go, G.R. No.
1144639, September 12, 2003). Searches and seizures without warrant of
vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws have been a traditional
exception to the constitutionaj_r,E~Quirement because the 11essel can be quickly
moved out of the tocatilyJ?i:Jurjidiclion in which the search must be sought
before the warrant coulc:r· "'· - ured (l-lizon v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No.119619, December 1;),
4. Customs search. allowep Q.O_§..exerciaj!!9 police aulhority under the
customs law effect s~r<:h r~if'¢1ll!i:i~.cement of customs law.
Note: Custom.seaffhes however are not availablet in dwelling places (Dela

4.
or circurstan~es, that the person to be 'prreste,d/f1a's committed the crime
offense;(~[!Lf=S O'l COURT. Rule (1_:p}pc. 5 '(Ji))-,_,_ \
J!ondsitien ,:nay arn~st 01e accused, or u11'on written authority endorsed on a 5. Body chec~sjtF
~ -· ..- ~.. ,
Cruz V. Peoplli.?4,.R. No. 29.'§allz January 11, 2P{6Ji
: ::
g·. holde~and his han~"calfieq, luggage(s) are subject
certifieq <..Q~tiof !heJ indertal\ihg, cause IJi,n_Ip be'arr1ited by a police officer to searclf"for a izur~ ofJfilrohibited niateoals <0r substance. Holder
or any qt~ej.'pers9n·"Q\:,uilable·:age and·.d i~cr:etionJBU[ES OF COURT Rule refusi0~:i"o be' - ed_shalr n(J]!,
_" e allo~~c{tf '· ( e ~ircraft wh_ich sh_all
."
t.231
114, Se...... l.ar.'1't;·~---
I I{ (~ 'J.\~ ~ :·::
·. ,_;_,;· · ,i.1"<.-
h . ,•". •, .• ~'"' , .~
_i ·,. i
• J
' constffot~ a· p he "to_ntrac~§etween'"\~ · -and the air earner
5. !f a P~r\_on la~ully.~~ -'.~~-eaj _g ~~fp~·s>-or js res9iied, any person may (R.A. r./5~62 9J; "'·i ~ ·=:1 - "
1mmed1~te_'¥ purs4,e_o1y~l~~_:!11~_.w1thput ~--warra9I at any time and in any 6. tnspectio~~ ,!]_gs c)fld of"er premises for the entorcement of fire,
place wrth,rr--",!1e Ph~•R£•ne.~f~Y~.f.~'o,:.,,cq!!RT )WLE 113, Sec. 13); sanitary, an u_..g reguta eroso v. CA, G.R. No. 164815,
6. When a perso{! tR1'l)r:r·e~J_~.9._J\J!S, E!S~a,pef,Qetention facility (RULES OF September 3, ,., i:'-'" __ - .
COURT, Rule f1v_,._ s '6_d.,:5 (c)J.i ,f _\ --~, \,_>-· 7. When there is':'if:genuiJl!Af~ _ • - risk" in the light of the police
7. If the accused released.bn bail'a'tlen1pJs. td'_Qepart from the Philippines without officer's experi~ce cil idl surrounding condilions to warrant a belief thel the
permission of the court vAief'e'the"case is pending (RULES OF COURT Rule person stopped h ~$,?Eoncealed weapons (Malacat v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
114, Sec. 23, par. {2)); and • No. 123595, December 1, 1997);
8. Doctrine of gxigent Circumstances - under such urgency and exigency of the a. Visual search at fheckpoints (Valmonle v. de Villa, G.R. No. 83988,
moment where a search be lawfully dispensed with (People v. De Gracia, September 29, 1989);
G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994). 9. Conduct of "Aerial target zoning· and "saturation drive· in the exercise of
military powers of the President (Guazon v. de Villa, G.R. No. 80508, ,January
0: What items may b e subject to lawful searches and seizures? 30, 1990):
ANS: The following are subject to lawful search and seizure: 10. Plain view doctrine • where prohibited articles are in Elain view (People v.
1. Property subject of the offense: Hua, G.R. No. 197788, Febmary 29, 2012); and
2. Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits or the offense; and 11 . Doctrine of g xigerit Circumstances - enunciates the rule that under such
3 Property used or intended to be used as the means of cornmitting an offense urgency and exigency of the moment, search warrant should be lawfully
(RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, Sec. 2). dispensed with (People v. De Gracia, G.R. Nos. 102009-10, July 6, 1994).

A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which Q: What arc the elements of a valid warrantless search of articles in plain view?
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search {JIA)
warrant (RULES OF COURT, Rule 126, Sec. 13). ANS: The following are the elements: (JIA) . . . . ..
1. The executing law enforcement officer has a pnor ,!ushfication for an_irnhal
intrusion or otherwise properly in a position from which he can view a
particular order;
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2. The officer must discover incriminating evidence jnadvertently without ExclusionarvRute

conducting a search; and
3. It must be immediately ~pparent to the police that the items they observe may Q: What is the exclusionary rule in relation to the right against unreasonable
be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seiwre (United searches and seizures ?
Laboratories, Inc.. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28. 2005). ANS: Any evidencP. oht<1im,u in violation of the right agoinst unreasonablP. searche5 and
seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proccerling (CONS I, Art. Ill, Sec. 3
Q: What arc the requisites of a valid regular checkpoint? (PLV) (2)) .
ANS: The following are lhe requisites of a valid checkpoint:
1. 11 must be warranted by the exigencies of fublic order; Q: What is the doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree?
2. It must be conducted in a way _beast intrusive to motorists· and ANS: According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
3. The inspection of the vehicle is limited to a Visual search (Abenes v CA GR unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is
No. 156320, February 14, 2007). - · ' · · also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seitld evidence is obtained as a direct result
of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree· is the indirect result of the same
Q: What is a Terry Search? illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally
ANS : A Terry Search, or a stop and frisk search, is a warrantless search conducted to seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that
prevent lhe occurrence of a crime._The term was derived from the American case of Terry evidence illegally obtained by the Stale should not be used to gain other evidence
v. Ohio (392 _ u._s. _1 _(1968)). This case served as basis for allowing "stop and frisk" because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently
searches in this JUnsd1ctron (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014). obtained (People v. Briones, G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995) .
...:.:~·Ji
Q: What is the quantum of e~idencc"r~yiie'i rto, conduct a Terry search or a stop Q: What are the effects of illegal det~qtiQ'ii?
and frisk sea rch? ·• , ' ;, :- ~~ ANS : In case the detention is with ,,,-.-·.· ·"'· round, the person arrested can charge the
A_N S;, Genu'.n~ reason. Whil( pr~~able·~aose\ s -~ot\equ1red to conduct a "stop and arresting officer with arbitrary detentfq_n rticle 124 of the Revised Penal Code. This
frisk, n~ere_ susp1c1on o/ a !1un!th \~rll_NOT. va!i(;f_~te a.:'stop ar.9 frisk• A genuine reason is without prejudice to the possible filin t19.Q. for daWJJCS under Article 32 of the
must e~1st, in hght or t~~~~o(•c_e·officer's experie.n.cca np syrrqunaing conditions. to warrant Civil Code of the Philippines (In ~hJr- ma . _ io11;f~lJ..!4.ii,'i,j]J;C9 of writ of l1abeas corpus
the belief thc1t the pe~son·q: l~in~d ~as weapons conc?,aled_~ li6!;:f·!Jim (People v. Cogaed, with petilion for relief lnteg~~~f/Bar of thp P~il,ppmes v. Dep~J!menl of Jusl,ce, G.R. No.
GR. No 200334, Jaly 3?,;2014! c1tmg Terry _v._<;}h{o, ~92 U~S- 1, ( 1968)) . 232413, July 25, 2017). ~~ ,if;,,;J /n
,i,.....-.:--,.";.·-;:.:..;.-~"'":",~'·~.:..:J::r.."'---,.};--=i\_-. .:.i,.:-:_.:., .• ~--•. -..:··-- "--·~· i"l°'!# -;---~-
Q: H~w is a Terry ~_ea_~j;-~ diH~\ ent frD_fl!ll._--;s~irch i?cide~t~.'.!; f lawful arrest?
AN~. Searches lnf ldQ.f.:,tf l to a (1'1.~ful arrest require ttl~(:? criine be j::Ommitted in flagran/e
ff?:.ttf!I.{Ji,,~W.JJ.."<ie/f!..M!!...l'f..{~4[/9)i~t3(f'lP<-2Rl?_{§.ffi>/fll?l,".f.<?_l='!t~ ·' :ff~ f: '( ~:~
_;:sr ..,._._~ ~~-- ~ ;· ; ::.
del,cto, ~nd the ser~cp-;<;,onct,tJ.S,t.efwit~jn f t/1,e; vic~!Y..:andj wit_~inJ reach by the person
arrested 1s done lo :i:isure \hat t~~~~WeJJ?iW~?.PJ')~l):,s w~II as tojpreserve the evidence. Private and Puh](~Cor;;;~!Jica~f~~s I. · _'
On ~he other hand, i ,1op an~ frisk , s_e:ar,ch~s ai:e/ ~Ql)ductji<I to pr.event the occurrence of Q: What protectionis,91(..'.la#r.< d b0:Sec~ of Article e Constitution?
a crime (People v. Cog,a ed, GR. No::W<l?Jl.j,--:j (,_fy,:10, 2014). f ANS: The privacy of c'¾_1 on and Co[ fesponde:nce sh_all be inviolable except upon
~ ' ',· ' i ·-l~t ·1-~V'-, .., .,;
' 0 :.Pl,, ' -'..:..•i .I ;/" ~ ~.'. ,-''..ur,-r ~ +' lawful order of the court, ot.wh public saf er requires otherwise as prescribed
Q : What are the requi~ite~ (oq~e_;vaJg@y~~~"lif!l9,
,¥1',$,sit;ol and blood tests under by law (CONST. Arl. Ill, Se~·
R.A. No. 9165 otherwise KnQwoJas th\l_ eQmol;(!b~11s1ve Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002? -......, "' r.!l r-;i:. r ~
Q: What are the requisite=
ANS:. The requisites for the validit~"o'faruc i~;h;- and blood tests are: ANS: The reasonable expec · of privacy is subject to the following requisites:
1. It must be random: and
1. Subjective: A person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy: and
2. It must be suspicionless (Laserna v. DOB, G.R. No. 158633 November 3 2. Objective: The expectation to be one that society is prepared to recognize
2008). ' .
as reasonable (Pollo v. Constantino-David, el al., G.R. No. 181881, October
Note: The constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug 18, 2011).
testing for students emanates primarily from their waiver of their right to privacy when they
seek e_ntry to the school, and from their voluntary submitting their persons to the parental Q: What are the three strands of the right to privacy?
au thority of school authorities (Laserna v. DOB, G.R. No. 158633, November 3, 2008). ANS: The three strands of the right lo privacy are
1. Locational or situational - refers to the privacy that is Celt in physical space,
H?wever. t~ere is no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of such as that which may be violated by trespass and unwarranted search and
crimes punishable with at least six years and one day imprisonment as they are singled seizure (Vivares v. St. Theresa's College, G.R. No. 202666, September 29,
out ~nd impleaded against their will. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing 2014);
are randomness" and "s s i · • h - 2. Informational - right of individuals to control information about themselves
b . u P c1on1ess. 1n t e1r case, a mandatory drug testing can never
b~t:an~d~~ o r suspicionless. To_ impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a (Vivares v. SI. Theresa's College, supra); it has two aspects namely:
8 a. The right not to have private information disclosed which refers to the
stated 0~- ~ _p t to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters; and
to priva cJ~~~vr:~~e~-~~~:; 9165. Drug testing in !h(s case would violate a person's right
forced to in - - 1 Sec. 2, Art. ttl. Worse stilt, the accused persons are veritably b. The right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion (Vivares v. St.
crrmina e themselves (L a serna v. DOB, supra). Theresa's College, supra);
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3. Decisional • usually defined as the right of individuals to make certain kinds manner of communication (Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC. G R. No. 205728, January
of fundamental choices with respect to their personal and reproductive 21, 2015).
~ulonomy (V1vares v. SI. Theres1:1's Cullege, supra). ll is the right to
1111.h; µi,11u811(.8 m making u,rtain important decisio ns (Oisini Jr. v. Sec. of The ccope of freedom nf P.xprnssion protects speech, print, and assembly regarding
Justice, G.i"'?. No. 203335, Feb. 18, 2014). secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human
interest. The protection covers myriad mailers of public interest or concern embracing all
Q: Doe:cJ rrumi«ge diminish right to privacy of communication? iesur::., ::1bot1I whir:h informaHnn is needed or appropriate (Chavez v. Gu,ua/es, G.R. No.
ANS: A pers?n,_ ~y contracting marriage. does not shed his/her integrity or his right to 1olJ338, Febrw!/y 15, 2000). This freedom oleo includes the freerlnm In lllm and produw
~nvacy as an ind1v1dual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in theaters or to diffuse them through
l he _l~w only ins~res absolute freedom of communication between Jhe spouses by making television (Ayer Productions PTY Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. No. L-82380, April 29, 1988).
1! pnvileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the
consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined Q: What are included in the right to freedom 'ot expression?
without the consen_t of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one ANS: Freedom of Expression includes: (SAPRA)
from tile other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions (Zulueta v. CA. G.R. 1. Free §.peech and free press;
No.107383, February 20, 1996). 2. Freedom of ~ssembly;
3. Freedom of Petition;
lntru$ion, When Alloweq 4. Freedom to P rofess and Practice Religion; and
5. Right of ~ssociation or lhe right to form associations (Abrams v. U.S.. 250
0: When can there be a valid intrus~~ ],!)_to a person's privacy of communication U.S. 616, Nove mber 10, 1?1fJ,-}
and correspondence? .. ,.,·· · _ · ~ ·· ··~-.
Note: Speech, expression, and pr every form of expression, whether oral,
ANS: A valid intrusion intor_i(P;fs.pn's k~lnmunic;ilons and correspondence may be written, tape or disc recorded. It al movies as well as symbolic speech such
allowed under lhe followir:ig cf!,se;,:· :~ - .,__ . ' :· · ,,.
as the wearing of an arm band as ·. o! protest, as . well as peaceful picketing
1. Upon lawful 6ra.er, 0t the court: or ·. : .
2. When puglic ~'afl>lY er order requires such. inlruslqn as prescribed by law (BERNAS, Reviewer, supra at 62-9.;Jj. ,o ~~..,-,.-"'_.1it'..
(CONST! Art, Ill, Ser 3 (1)). ' :· ·..' .
Q; Why is there a need t~ r%f~=~_th;,J?_cic right t: · ;~:·:~4~J of expression? .
t !
Exclusionarv Ru/~ ~r.·--"_ f
1--- . -
: \. / i \
( ANS: There are several ] beories and}sch_Qols of lhought_,'111'at.strengthen the neeo lo
~--< protect the basic right to)W.ii"d~,of!expres{J n. . i i .\. . . . .
1. This relaie.P'fo the{n!ilJ.t ,of the P!!.llPle to part1gpat~ 1n 12ubl1c affairs , includmg
0 : What is the exclus,ionary_r.JJ_e in·relaffon ·to· this'. right?} '· ·-; '.
the ri . .· . . . . vernment~ tions; / ~ \
ANS: Any evidend,e ?P\~ined)p~\ ~iolali{m /if, the ,ri~~(t~· p1v..?~ : commtmication and pr 2. Free e~r,gourf~ d unde* ~,~~~'W·'a market place of
correspondence sha~ll>e 1!)adm_r~~q1e fQf ~l)Y P.Uf P,<;>,&~1111 any pFqceeding (CONST. Art.
Ill, Sec. 3(2)). \ \ \~_.,,.~·-. · / //:,·: ·- / t --.=:_5!: i-2if, •7~~~]~~
\ ~ '\.:.f;·~~l.¥·~-L-u--·~--;:~~.--· .f £! 3. self-ii<pre~ij1on that enhance·s human dignity. This right
individ ;,;- If-fulfillment, among others;
Q : What is the effect\[ there'i§_ a-yi~laffo.n ·Qf.th~,,A~ti-Wir{ Tapping Act (RA No
4200!? -~~~.. t:;(,t::~:-:~~:~~_:~~-:~-~:i._ ·<~-.il~ . . . 4.
5.
for gro
e~~.e'lfe pposed to protect individuals
ANS. It shall bt; u~lawful for~..r_1Y'.p,rson1~~\:~~iup-,~~Jhtlrized by all the parties to any _iffsl' majoritarian abuses perpetrated through t11e
pnv~te cornmumcat1on or spoken~..!.°.rd to!-lap '!,!,}¥---Wif e or cable, or by using any other
framework of .. ·c governance; and
device or arrangement, to secrelly '·overhiiar, intercept or record the same, or to
6. Free speech mus rotected under the safety valve theory. This provides
communicate the content thereof to any other person (R.A. 4200, Sec.1). The that nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of violence
co~,m~n1cat1on s_h~II not be a_dmissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial , (Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015).
leg1slat1ve or adm1mstrat1ve hearing or investigation (R.A. No. 4200, Sec. 4).
Q: Is the freedom of speech and expression absolute?
~on~over, any person violating the provisions of R A. No. 4200 shall be punished by
ANS: No. Freedom of expression is not an absolute, nor is ii an unbridled license that
imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the accessory
gives immunity for every possi~le use of language and prevents the punishment of those
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public
who abuse this freedom (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008).
official _at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall
be subJect to deportation proceedings {R.A. No. 4200, Sec. 2).
Q: What is the rationale b ehind the difference in t he treatment of different forms of

-~::-:· ili¥_lp~i,J::Sils_ili.fif!i,4Y-liiti,:i!,E.s.~1gi,t, i.t>:>:-Y'.¼/ - speech?

ANS: All speech is not treated the same. Some types or speech may be subJected to
.

0 : What is the scope of freedom of sp eech and expression ?
ANS·· Al'_ forms o f communicallon
· · are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of
~;~~s~~n clause (Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, Jr., G.R. No. L-59329, July 19,
from ~~tt : right to freedom of expression , thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech
erances made lo conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic
some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in ord:r that it may not be
injurious to the equal right of others or lhose of the commurnly or soc1ely. The difference
in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type o_r speech, e.g. ,
political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. D,st,_nctions have
therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the perm1ss1ble scope
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of restric tions on va rious categories of speech (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Q: What is the presumption on the power to exercise prior restrain t?
February 15. 2008). ANS: The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption
is against its validity (ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. ~33486. January 28, 2000).
0: What are the kinds of speech that are not protected by the Constitution?
AN_S: The Constitution does not cover unprotected speech or tow-value expression, Q: What is subseq u ent pu nishment in relati on to freedom of speech and
which . refers lo hbe_lous state1:7ents, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading expression?
a~vert1sement, 1ns~lllng or "fighting words," i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict ANS: The aspect of freedom from liability subsequent to publication precludes liability
1nJury_or tend _to 1nc1te an immediate breach of peace and expression endangering national for completed publications of views traditionally held innocent. Otherwise, the prohibition
security (Soriano v. Languardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2008). on prior restraint would be meaningless, as lhe unrestrained threat of subsequent
punishment, by itself, would be an effective prior restraint. Thus, opinions on public issues
Q: How do we determine which tes t to apply to determine the validity cf regulation cannot be punished when published , merely because the opinions are novel or
of speech? · controversial, or because they clash with currer\,doctrines. This fact does not imply that
ANS: In order to determine which kind of test to apply, the nature of the restraint must publishers and editors are never liable for what they print (Chavez v. Gonzaies, G.R. No.
be delermrned. The restraint may either be a (1) prior restraint or a (2) subsequent 168338, February 15, 2008, citing BERNAS).
punishment (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008).
Content-Based and content-Neutral Regulations
Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment
Q: Which test is applied when the prior restraint is in the form of a content-based
Q: What is prior restraint on freedom of speech and expression? regulation? "''"
ANS: Prior restraint refers to ~icial'·g'0v~mQiehtal restrictions on the press or other ANS: Clear and present danger rul~ ;- / il!vernmental action that restricts freedom of
forms _of ~xpression in adva9_of~f f~t~al ~~!btiqat_ tpnio/pi~emination. Freedom from prior speech or of the press based on contf the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent
restraint 1s largely freedoj11 frplT\ 9gyernment·,cej1Sor;;tiip ~oJ publications, whatever the and invasive impact. Only when theft act has overcome the clear and present
forrn_of censorship, and; feita~9(~ss_~~t.l:i1;:~ae(lt!~?iie\~f,d;o/t~e executive, legislative or danger rule will it pass constitutiona~ gov ent having the burden of
Jud1c1al _branch of th7cQQY~rnnie_nf. t,-ny ;. law, __or ·otf1C1@1_l9a}vequires some form of overcoming the presumed uncons.tifu ass constitutional muster
penrnss1on to be ha? l.5efo~e pybhcahon ~.an .lie maqe, c9~1niits0 an infringement of the only if justified by a compellj9.9.Je',\ison, a , Je restriction m~gsed are neither overbroad
const1tut1onal nght, ~nd remedy,can be had at the courts (Ghayeiv. Gonzales GR No nor vague (Chavez v. Go1.!TeJ. G.R. N,_9: ~1¥8338, Fel)ruarf [5 1 2008).
168338, February 1;5;_200'8). :-·--- ---:--··-'_--· · •·· · i :: " ·. '. ' · · · m11r-:t._ ·-' .... r :1 ';,
: I r :, • .: ,;• • O t :: "• . . . . ~
~I

.~ h~ijiJJ.~; prior r •· traint is In J he ,fori]1 of a content-neutral

Q: ~hich tests_ ar~ 3ij~l!ed'.Wl?,~_re th'~r~' il>":l prior j~s_trai~fcin}ffeed om of speech? ~ ·- l 1,
re not designed to
ANS. The appl1ca~I~ te~t. depe_o_a:; on w,.tie,tf\er_the1e.$fi\1mtJ~..&ontent-neutral or content-
based. : 1, ef >\ · ----. ,-... ! . :.~ . .&' ::·..._-;' f ··.. : suppress any pa · = st iorm of judicial
1. A conte'11.t-neu'tral 'i-~~~l!'ltj;;-n :is :m~f~jy:'t';nc.e~ned 0 ith the incidents of the scrutiny but an inter here bet ere rationality that is
speech, or,, one fl~t ~er,~li~fofo:·113f ti_qi~. plac,;{? or manner, and under required of any other terest standard applied to content-based
well-definecl,standa-r<l_s;·or, .'I p,•-r,:::;:--1 .?-_ .J' restrictions.
2. A c ontent-bls.~d .!.nl.~t~~i;isor~j_p~v~eh the restriction is based on
Under the Intermediate a rnment regulation is justified
the subJect matter..-9_ 1'Litteritn,~~:e~~ecp'fChavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
168338, February 1 , .Q.9..8). J --..'; I , ~_,..,...-" if: (PISI)
'"11:N~-··~~:•.
1. It is within the c anal Power of the Government;
Q: What are examples of valid prior restraint? (MP FADS) 2. ff it furthers an I mportant or ~bstantial governmental interest;
ANS: The following may be subject to prior restraint: 3. If the governmental interest is unrelated to the ~uppression of free
1. Movies, television, and radio broadcast censorship in view of its access to expression; and
numerous people, including the young who must be insulated from the 4. If the !ncident restriction on alleged freedom of speech & expression is no
prejudicial effects at unprotected speech greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest (Chavez v.
2. fornography Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008; Social Weather Stations,
3. false or misleading commercial statements Inc., v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001).
4. 6 dvocacy of imminent lawless action (Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No.
164785, Apn1 29, 2009); Q: What is the difference between content-based and content-neutral regulations?
5. Qanger to national security (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February ANS: Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions •based on the subject
15, 2008); and matter of the utterance or speech." In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes
6 - §ub judi~e rule - restriction of comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial controls merely on the Incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or speech. The regulation of the tarpaulin size is.a content-based regulation. The tarpaulin
obslruct111g the administration of justice (Romero II v. Estrada, G.R. No. content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium. Limiting the maximum size of
174105, April 2, 2009). the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners' message ano violate their right to
exercise freedom of expression (Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, supra).
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Fac;a/ Challenges and Overbr6adth Doc tri[l..f! Q: What arc the legal implications of a governmental act that suffers from
overbreadth?
Q: What is Facial Challenge? AN S: When a governmental act suffers from overbreadlh, the following effects may
ANS: The facial challenge principle is a challenge against the constitutionality of a occur:
statute that can be filed even v1here !he petitioner claims no actual violation of his own 1. · Challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of
rights under the assailed statute but relies instead on the potential violation of his or o1her third parlies {White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846,
persons' rights {Sps. Romualdez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, April :JO, 2008). Janua,y 20, 2009); and
2. The statute may be declared void because it swee[Js unnecessarily broadly
A facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, and thereby invades lhe area of protected freedoms (Adiong v. COMELEC,
not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on !lie assumption or G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992). Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from a statute is unconstitutional ·as appl!_$ld" lo him or her. Once there is a finding
constitutionally protected speech or activities {Southern Hemisphere Engagement of overbread!h, the courl invalidates tl:le entire statute 'on its face," not merely
Network, Inc., v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra). 'as applied for" so that the ove·rbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly (David v. Arroyo, G.R.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad No. 171396, May 3, 2006).
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The possible harm to society
in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
rests to Determine the Va/;dity ofGovernmental Regulatio"'
that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grie'Jances left to
fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes (Estrada v. Q: What are the tests for a valid governm nt interference to freedom of expression?
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 212!;1.().-41-;-J jinl!arn.1,,z915J_ ANS: The tests used in this jurisdicti1;1.o)"' alid government interference are:
,....,:-~ Cr.._ t ) .:\_· / i:..··1 •
1
1. Clear and Present ,--.-· st - when words are used in such
A facial challenge is an eiiceli'ti6't"1 ,t9Jhe•rule·tha'.t._9'nlY! persq_ns who are directly affected circumstance and of sue · to create a clear and present danger Iha!
by a statu ·3 have legaL·s~~ih_g· to as~aiLlbe sanie. T~is_is' pnly applicable lo statutes will bring about the su~st_ . _ XiJ::!i:i_at the ~late has a right to prevent
involving free speech,,·imp cagnep ·on _the grounds of,oiierb~~a,d~h or vagueness {Justice
0 {Roque, Jr. v. Arm_ep,c>-F=orc~;l ~ • thfi';'P.l;IJJ!p.B~.!· Chief of Staff, G.R. No.
Carpio in his Dissen[iiig Opipion in Spi;. Rom_ualpez v. :COMf?tEC; G.R. No. 167011, April .'i . . ..
3o. 20oaJ. 1 ,r ; ·
! ~-~w l t-• •••-- •~ ••. .
, \ f n\
' ·-• ~ •~
214986, Februa,Q';_:f5, 2017):, :;
a. Clear - ca.\;ls-al connect~O,:Wilh the danger offtl'J.e substantive evil arrsrng
from the oi1erance qu.etliofil)d; and / ~ \
0: Is a facial challcng~ woun~eci on_the:'void-for-~aguerje~~_fpplicable on a penal b. Preseri,.t/iinii~~inent, id€~_tified with im,mi"fni'fnd im~ediat~ da_nger;
statute that encroacf)es up_on t_he freedom of spc~ch? · ;· th~ilanger mffst· not.. on1}'.f be probaple, ~but _~1very llkel~ inevitable
ANS: When a pen'i"I SJq_tyte· enf;rQache.~ upon the f(c"!dpm ,Of. sp.eech, a facial challenge (p.%J!Dle5.:;v.,f;9-OMfLEC, ~ - No. ~- ;,3,! 33 \I\ ol l~r,_1969).
grounded on the vQfd:tor'fagueffJ~~s dqcl[ine 1s. €i~i:E_'!pta~le. Th_e inapplicability of the 2. Dange'r.ous'Tende]lcy Te-s.t -1·(2rds utters. .,,ngerous tendency of
doctrine must be carefully,delf~at~_d;_ As, Ju_s~ie~. -t,.nto9io T. iarpio explained in his an evil-.."; . h~~te tias~ rig]J to preven V. Fernandez, G.R.
dissent in Romualdei..v. Comf!:_issjo/1:_qiJ, Ele·ctiofti( ·w~··must yiew these statements of No. L-897 crobe'(:~18, 1,957);!8.nd
the Court on the inappllcabililt·-9j"IH~;Jijiei'b'r~~i'.lt~.,.an,~. v~u'eness doctrines lo penal 3. B alancing l ntere:st Test - standard when the court needs to
statutes as appropriate '<ltllY/ l(l~Orar.~<!Uiise-~~~~lriiJ.e;- are used to mount 'facial' balance confli~1wg•;¥oci~I Y.!!!H id,;i,al interests, and requires _a
challenges to penal statutes'n.9.t"1Qyofving;Jree.sp,eecb' :(0,sini Jr. v. Secreta,y of Justice, conscious and~taileq;gg~ioe I o m erplay of interest observable m
G.R. No. 203335, Februa,y 18,'-2e.1iJJ.. {v'l / \' _~.,,.---- . a given type of'sJtt1atiqp°'{Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15,
·"'-'~....;:---~··;,::'-• .
2008). -'~~~~
Q: What is Overbreadth Doctrine?
ANS: The overbreadth doctrine is a ground to declare a statute void when "it offends the Q: How do we determine which test to apply to determine the validity of regulation
constitutional principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities of speech? .
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep ANS: In order to determine which kind of test to apply, the nature of the restraint must
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms" (Estrada v. be determined. The restraint may either be a ( 1) prior restraint or a (2) subsequent
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 212140-41. January 21, 2015). punishment (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008).

Generally applied to statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the Overbreadth
Doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed
nghts {White Light Corpora/ion v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, Janua,y 20, 2009).
De~rees Iha! a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subiect lo state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected fre.:idoms {Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).
State Hegulation ofo;fferent TJP-es of Mass Media
Q : What is the rule on the regulation of broadcast media? .
ANS: Broadcast and radio media are subject to dual regulation. Firs!, by pro~urrng a
legislative franchise and second, by registering and being subject t~ the regulat1o~s set
by the National Telecommunications Commission (Divinagrac,a v. Consolidated
Broadcasting System, Inc., G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009).
Q: What is the rule regarding the regulation _of print and broadcast_media? d
ANS: All forms of communication, whether print or broadcast,_ a~e entitled to the broaof
protection of the freedom or expression clause. The test for hm1tations on freedom
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expression continues to be the clear and present danger test. Necessarily, however, the Q: What are the tests to determine when there is no violation of Establishment
freedom of television and radiobroadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the Clause? ·
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media (Easlem Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, ANS : The Lemon test requires a challenged policy to meet the following criteria to pass
Jr.. GR. No. L-59329. July 19, 1985). scrutiny under the Establishment Clause: (SPF)
In Chavez. however. the SC cl.:irified that: 1. The statute has a §ecular legislative purpose; . . . . .
1. The clear and present danger test applies only when the challenged act is a 2. Its f_rincipal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor mh1b1ts religion;
content-based regulation that infringes on free speech, expression and the a~ ..
press; and 3. It does not Foster an excessive government entanglement with rehg1on
2. When it said that freedom given to broadcast media was "somewhat lesser in (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, Aug 4,2003).
scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media," it was NOT
as to what test should be applied, but the context by which requirements or Q: What are the explicit Constitutional exceptipns to the non-establishmen! cla~se?
licensing , allocation of airwaves. and application of norms to unprotected ANS: As a general rule, the clause prohibits J.he government f~om using_ 1t~ n~hts,
speech (Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008, citing authority, funds, and resources behind an activity that is essentially and mtnns1cally
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. v. Dans, .Jr., G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985). religious. However, the following are expressed exceptions to the non-eslablishment
clause in the Constitution: .
Unprotected Speech 1. Article VI, Sec. 29 (2): No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the _use, benefit, or
Q: What are the types of speech that are not protected by the Constitution? support of any sect, church, denomination. sectarian msl1t~t1on, or system of
ANS: The following types or speech are not protected by the Constitution: religion, or of any priest, pr agper. minister. or other re_ll91ous te_acher, or
1. Hate speech is spe.!,lchFtliat 9arriefi'lf?'"m_l;laning other than the expression or dignitary as such, except .. -~,\.lcl1 priest, preacher, _m111.1ster. or d1gn1tary is
hatred for some _gr<fup,),!Jch <l~}I P,ac),icyta'i;:'rac;e, especially) in circumstances assigned to the armed '.. to any penal mstilut1on, or government
in which tht:,,COllJrii.uhj~'atiow·is···lik.eJy' tcf .prc)wke violence (Black's Law orphanage or leprosariu·q:i,
Dictionary)' .,' ,._ :-· .-"· --. ," ,..___.,:-,,_ 2. Article VI, Section 28 (3) · q~_churches and parsonages
2. Oefamatidh.~-~'dfi.:fbel··---· ----·--.,·~->,:!~-- ·. ,.,'\. or convents appurtern;rfit ,-i;i'}profit cemeteries, and all
3. Sedition J~~~(s6eet h 'in ,rela,tio~Jo Rebe~·loii =1·r~e essence of seditious lands buildin ~'a"'i mprove ts, actually, 1r~ctly, and exclusively used
1 ~a.t~ _te~dAncy l9\~pr:iip general discontent to
libel rr_ia,j ?e.sfd lo pe its irnni_ for r~ligious, jtable, or::\~ { ucational purp9s~\ shall be exempt from
the p1tcJ1 gf-111):gal courses.i th~l 1s to say \o indqc~pe9ple to resort to illegal taxation; and ~.,, -n .-· ~i!; / ; \. • •
methods' oth,e"r than !hose.provided tiy'ihe ,Constitulio11 ~n order to repress the 3. Article XI\I . 1an :Y (3): At ttie, option express~d i!J._ vmt1ng by the parents
evils w~ictte~ess up~n the]i,~1n4s '('EspuA/~s.y ¥rindbfa V. People, G.R. No. or gua~Jaif';, 'toir'shall ,~~ all.wed to be j~ug~t to 't_!1eir children or wards
L-2990,tf!eprmb~r._1..7,..--195·1j;- - -- ·--f ;~- ·, : ~--,·"' .' in pu avd high~chools - - i~r class hour~ _by
4. Obscerij ty7_a'n d P~t~_;o_g_~a_p,by; :-It fi;li ;q~e~.ed tna/ movies, compared to instru 01"a12pro ~., by 111 . nt1es or the religion
other rrn;d1a 0J expre!>s1on, , have.:.greaterr capacity for evil and are to whic n ort wa belong, dditional cosl to the
conseque[),tly subj~~! \P
,~ote.~{i'.u(E'l1i~ii'. Jtfe
bur_g~n of proving the film is Governme f
unprotecte&,i;xpres~1~rNJJ.lJ;:_t,f~~tton.:lh;,.llep,:or (§feedman v. Maryland, 380
U.S. 51, Marci, 1,) 9/;jSJ;,aosj ·- ~~,-, , "<' ··_/ Q: What is the free exer
;.. • '-;j- ~ t ...:..-.---=· -:\ .. y -
5. Com~ercial Sp~~:c.tv l· Tl)lis1, SAu~ ', l,~'.oognized false or misleading ANS: The free exercise
advertisement as unpro.l~cted. expre!/~on-onty in Pharmaceutical Health and discrimination or preferenc
Care Association v. Duque=m;·G'.'R': ·flo. 173034, October 9, 2007 (Concurring
Opinion of Justice Carpio in Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, Fe/Jruary Q: What are the two aspects of the free exercise clau se?
15, 2008). ANS: The aspects of freedom of religious belief and worship are: .
1. Freedom to believe - absolute as long as it is confined m the realm of
thought; and . b r r-
2. Freedom to act on one's belief - subject to regulation where l11e e_ie is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare (/gles,a m Cnsto v.
Non-Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses
CA, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996).
Q: What is the non-establishment clause?
ANS: No_law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the Benevolent Neutrality and Conscientious Obiectors
free ~xerc1se thereof (CONST. Ari. Ill, Sec. 5). The non-establishment clause means that
th e Stale cannot set up a church, nor pass laws which aid one religion. aid all religions or Q: What is benevolent neutrality ? .
ANS: Benevolent Neutrality gives room for accommodation. The wall 1s meant to protect
prefer one religion over another, nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion, etc. the church from the stale. Accommodation may either be: _
1. Mandatory _ accommodation is required to pr_e~erve. free exercise
(Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1 ( 1946)).
protections and not unconstitutionally infringe on religious liberty or create
penalties for religious freedom. The state must create_e_xcept1ons lo _laws or
general applicability when t11ese laws thre~ten religious convictions or
practices in the absence of a compelling state ,nterest.
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2. Permiss ive - the stale may, but is not required to, accommodate religious 1. Compelling state interest test - Used if the subject is religious freedom
interests. The limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no together with other rights; and . .
means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise 2. Clear and present danger test - Used if religious freedom 1s exercised
Clause (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, .June 22, 2006). exclusively (Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006).
3. Prohibited Accommodation - when establishment concerns prevail over
potential accommodation interests. It is also when the Court finds no basis for Q: What are the three prongs of the compelling state interest test?
a mandatory accommodation nor it determines that the legislative ANS: They are the following:
accommodation runs afoul of the establishment/free exercise clause (Estrada 1. "Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free
v. Escritor, supra). exercise of religion?" - The courts often look into the sincerity of the
religious belief, but without inquiring into the truth of the belief because the
Q: What approach is applicable in our jurisdiction? Free Exercise Clause prohibits inquiri_ng about its truth:
ANS: Benevolent Neutrality approach. The intent of the framers was to adopt a 2. " ts there a sufficiently compeiTing state interest to justify this
infringement of religious liberty?" - In this step, the government has to
benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religious clauses in the Philippine
conslttut1ons and the enforcement of this intent is the goal of construing the constitution establish that its purposes are legitimate f0r the stale and that they are
(Estrada v. Escri/or, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006). compelling. It must precisely show how and to what extent those objectives
will be undermined if exemptions are granted ; and
Q: What is the conscientious objectors test? 3. "Has t he state in achieving its legitimate purposes, used the least
ANS: The conscientious objectors test determines whether the regulation will force a intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achi · e the legitimate goal of the state?" • The
legiti~ate conscientious objector to p_~_rf9IITT ?.~ act against his will and conscience. Its
requisites are: ... ··-· , ; -·~,._, analysis requires the sta that the means in_whi~h it is achieving its
legitimate state objectiv t intrusive means, 1.e.,_ 11has chosen a way
1. There. must be Jl;ltif ip.,~od\ 9_r; Sfi~ p.~~~llet_belief that occupies a central
place in the ~,e~e,,.?r'i; l1[13;,-··
0
• • - - , - ~ ,. , : , .-· '•,.
to achieve its legiti that imposes as little as possible on
2. The religio_9?"m_us~ ipvol~.~•.s1-.moral.i;;qd~'·t1:?l").liCerid,!ng individual belief, i.e. ii religious liberties (Estr 92- 1651, August 4, 2003).
cannot be,<p.l,lf~ly~su~jectiv.e.~ '._' ' ··-·-.. '-<· '....,/,\ ~~~ll.!.t..~~§.~ ~·2.::-_,.-·- ~"'- ::~~?.;,··,:-~::;-"·"~;~~"'~;:;-Jfo:
3. ~ demor:\str'abt~>Sincflrity iribe!i.ef isneces,sar~<,_' t;fiJtJft~ court must not inquire
into the i~uth 01 rea~onableness of the belief; a'Rd f ; ',
4. There l}l,UStl?k sor(ie "ais\ iciaiiorial U~s allhougi:i°Jhele is also a view that Q: What is the Constituti!iflii'i !?Asis -<:if the~iberty of ab9{J:~? right to travel?
religim\S be~!i'is held,by a ~ing_le per_son raiher th~ri,~e.i_n;g part Of tile leacllings ANS: The liberty of 11& a~dfki,l~changingJ:!re same wi\_hin \he li,mits prescribed by law
of any ~1nd. of. groUP.' Or sect -are-entitled t9~he.prll)tection of the Free Exercise shall not be impai ·-· on tawfu!•orq\if; of the cou_r-i. Neither~hall the right to travel
Clause '(_Esfifda ·v/E$1?'itor,'A:M: N?. Pt02: J651t, d\{lgtjst 4, 2003). be impaired exce t Of.,Qalion~ecurity- · · · r public health, as
may be provided . ArJ,W, S~Rf 6).
Q: When can medi~al' pr~ciit;~h~~fb~-c~n~i<J.e,:.~~--~,~ l~sc;~~tious objectors?
ANS: Medical practih9ners·'who r"<fuse .to provide reproductive health care on the
-::,:~~ /! ¥1
scope and Lim itatiorf , f,.,
grounds of ethic_al or religious ~00.~ictfg_~ i-.a·re f0ns_Lde1~~ as_, cfonscientious objectors. In b,___-,.;.;
order to be cons1dered_a c0.~.s~r~ryJ1q~s.o.bj~.c;IJ)r,. a·'~k,il!!!':J.'li~1th professional shall comply Q: What right is covered,e:fth e Ii tyr,o~ ri_?~
with the following requirements·: '--' : ; ;; ·\ ·;•..:, \. · : /· ANS: The liberty of abo¢j· the right to choose and lo change one's abode
1. Submission to thel)08.•JJt,,!~~!!!JM.vit~stating the modem family planning (CONST. Art. Ill, Sec. 6; seJ;. encio v. Lukban, G.R. No. L-14639, March 25, 1919).
methods that he or she refuses·!o"provide and his or her reasons for objection;
2. Posting of a notice at the entrance of the clinic or place of practice, in a Q: What activities are covered by the right to travel?
prominent location and using a clear/legible font, enumerating the ANS: The right lo travel includes the following:
reproductive health services he or she refuses to provide; and 1. Right to travel from the Philippines to other countries;
3. Other requirements as determined by the DOH. 2. Right to travel within the Philippines (Marcos v. Mang/apus, G.R. No. 88211
October 27, 1989; Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan, el a/., v.
Provided, that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017).
to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural
health physicians, hospital staff nurses. public health nurses, or rural health midwives, Note: The right to travel is embraced within the general . concept of l(berty. Li~erty-a
who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules cannot be considered birthright of every person-includes the power of locomotion and the nght of citizens lo
as conscientious objectors (lmbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 2048 19, April 8, 2014). be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or
where they can best pursue the ends of life (Samahan ng mga Prograsibong Kabataan,
rests to Determine the Validitv ofGo vernmental llegq/ation at al., v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017).

Q: . vytiat arc the tests to determine the validity of governmental regulation of The riaht to return to one's country is not included in the right to travel. It is not among the
religious freedom? rights -;,pecifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty _of abod ~
0
A NS: The two !P.!'ts to determine the validity of governmental regulation of religious and Lile right to travel but it m:iy be considP.rfld, as a i:ienerally accepted principle
freedom are· international law and, ~nder our Constitution, is part of the la_w of the land. : lowever,
distinct and separate from the right to travel and enJoys a different protection under th
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3. Information concerning. !,_aw enforcement and protectinn of public and

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, i.e .• against being "arbitrarily
deprived"' thereof (Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211. October 27. 1989). personal safety;
4. Information deemed confidential for the protection of the frivacy of persons
Q: What are the exceptions to the rights to liberty of abode and the right to travel?
and certain individuals such as minors, victims of crimes, or the accused:
5. Information, documents or records known by reason of Qfficiat capacity and
ANS : The liberty of abode may be limited only upon lawful order of a court, whereas.
are deemed as confidential, including those submitted or disclosed by entities
the right to travel may be impaired in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law (CONST. Art. Ill, Sec. 6). to government agencies. tribunals. board or officers:
6. frejudicial premature disclosure; .
7. Records of proceedings or information from proceedings which, purstiant to
Wotch-list and Hold Departure Orders (HDO) iaw or relevant rules and regulations. are treated as confidential or privileged;
Q: What is precautionary hold departure order? and
ANS; It is an order in writing issued by a courl, commanding the Bureau of Immigration 8. Qther exceptions to the rights to infortr,iation under laws, jurisprudence, rules
to prevent any_attempt by a person suspected of a crime lo depart from the Philippines and regulations (Inventory of Exceptions to Executive Ore/el' No. 2, s. 2016,
which ~hall be 1ssu~d ex-parte in cases involving crimes where the minimum of the penalty Memorandvm from the Executive Secretary, Nov. 24, 2016).
prescribed by law 1s at least six years and one day or when the offender is a foreigner
regardless of the imposable penally (A.M. No. 18-07-05-SC, A ugust 7, 2018). Q: What are the restrictions on the access to information? (COINS)
ANS: The restrictions on the access to information include: .
Q: Can the OOJ issue a Watch-List Order or HOO? 1. Criminal matters or classified law enforcement matters. such as those relating
ANS: No. The right to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns national ~ the apprehension, prosec n and detention of criminals, which courts
security, public safety or publisJ1ealtfi~ 'rtierifj~.....,Q. law particularly providing for the may not inquire into prior · " rest, detention and prosecution;
~uthority of th_e Secretary oJ:i[sti~~ to i,;,u_rla{l~e ,ex"frnl~e of the right to travel, in the 2. O ther confidential matter'.
interest of national securil.Y: pcub1ic !i~fetror-pul:itie: heaJth.''.OOJ Circular No. 41 is not a
3. The exercise is subject~- · ble regulations to protect the [ntegrity of
law. It is a com~ulsory -~e'Q0r ~llnf~h?!Jn~r.~.!?_~~~n~e~sii1g:\"a.Y', complete and sufficient public records and to mipl ...... ',.,.,,,,R,t~o~ o~~_nment operatio_ns; . .
7
1n itself, conferring the,- 7x9~e~_s-eq--a1J[h_~nty;to 11.1~ cnni::e-r{leg,,aij"ltncy to promulgate rules. 4. !'.!_alional Security ~».~ters.:'1ttj'e3e"'lnclu gt~,~ecrets regardmg m11ttary,
On its own, the D_OJ pann9~ ma~e rules, i\s·,autti_orily \>eirig' 9biirii1_ed to execution of laws
0
diplomatic and o.tti.-er·nat1onal security. and 1nfoq1J.;it1on on inter government
(Genumo v. De L1mf--g_._R/ No. {97930, /J:MI !!,_2?!3/· \ '.] . :, exchanges pri~ o_}he concj~_si.~n of treaties an9' ?!<~cutive agreements: and
5. Trade Secrets~ndJbanl<jng·l ran~~ct1ons, pursui,n~to.the Intellectual Property
Q; Why is the power td Jss ue f;IDCi'inhererit ~o;the l ourt?,, S"" ~ '
Law, and iefr~~i~~laws, anithe Secrecyi)f ~an\Deposits Act (Chavez
ANS: The courts may"is'sue .an\ HDO agains1 an accu.sed ili 'a- c'riminal case so that he v. PC .R. No. 1.'J0716, Det;pJ11ber 9, 1998) . .
may be dealt with i~ aqccirda~ce.:with law. 01t· does ~t::>r
feq1,1ir.~ _legislative conferment or
'!JkffiIJlfliir§~... ~· -~g,_. ·.,, - i~:-~;:~.:l,7{~,~t:_:~::~;T'~;;~-- ··r~:6,,,_,. :'~:;:_=::{;
const1tut1onal recog11ilion; it_co•E:x,~ls wi_th the gr'ar;.t·b.[}ydici;;il power (Genuino v. De Lima,
G.R. No. 197930, April 17, 2018), · .- '.---· ' : · / .•
-~- ~
ConceJ}.! ~ .. ;.;~~·
1t:: u.wrriu¥&R#2i',-f~ff;:''.:ki~JE;~;~~}li,ti,;:;K:;c;~~i:~i'l Q: What is the power of !I.JP'
~~-,..;,
___ . " ':§:,- .
ANS: Eminent domain is gen described as the highest and most ex_act idea of
Scope and l 1m1tattons -<.:-· ·. :... . ~~~,!~~.t,\:.:.•·,u. :~.~4,..rl'
,. -. ·'.••~·
.. property remaining in the ~~-'""'-- nt" that may be acquked for ~ome p_ubhc pur~ose
Q: What is the scope of the right to information? through a method in the naturesaf'a forced purchase by the_State. ,t 1s a nght to take ~r
ANS: The scope of the right lo information include: reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to me_et . a public
1. The right to information on matters of public concern, as well as to exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most pnm1t1ve form
government research data used as basis for policy development (CONST. and thus inseparable from sovereignty (Manosca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106440,
Art. Ill, Sec. 7); and January 29, 1996).
2. Corollary right of access to official records and document (Secretary of
Justice v. Lan/ion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000).
Q: What is the proscription on the power of eminent domain under the
Constitution?
The right, as a general rule, includes negotiations leading to the consummation of a public ANS: The only direct ·constitutional qualification is that "privat~ ~roperty shall n~t be
transaction. Otheiwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is taken for public use without just compensation." This proscription is_ intended to provide a
consummated, or if one is consummated, ii may be too late for the public to expose its safeguard against possible abuse and so.to protect as well the 111d1v1dual against whose
defects (C/Javez v. PEA and Amari, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002), property the power is sought to be enforced {Manosca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
106440, January 29, 1996).
Q: What is the right to inform ation limited?
ANS: The right to information is limited in the following instances: (EN'-LPOPRO) Q: What are the requisites for th e va lid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
1. lnformaho~ covered by f_xecutive privilege; (NTP 2-JO)
2· Pnv,leged information relating to National security, defense or international ANS: The requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain are the
relations, following:
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1. There is a public Necessity (City of Mantia v. The Arellano Law Colleges Inc., fXn.ropriation bvloca/ Government Units
G.R. No. L-2929, February 28, 1950):
2. It must involve the Iaking of the property by !he government, whether actual Q: Is the power to expropriate inherent in Local Government Units (LGUs)?
(Republic v. Vda. De Castel/vi, G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974) or ANS: No. Before LGUs can exercise the right, some law must exist conferring the power
constructIve (Nat,onal Power Corpora/,on v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay upon it. The conditions before an LGU may exercise eminent domain are:
G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011), ' 1. Thal a law or authority exist for the exercise o! the right of eminent domain;
3. What is taken must be _Erivate property, except money and choses in action and
(Republic v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, GR. No L- 2. Thal the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law (City
18841, Janvary 27, 1969); of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, G.R. No. 14355, October 31,
'I . The taking must be for .e_ublic use; 1919).
5. The owner or the private property must be paid ,!_ust compensation for the
property taken (Reyes, el al.. v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511. Q: What are the requisites for LGUs to exe'fi;ise the power of eminent domain?
January 20, 2003); and (CPJ-ONDT)
6. Que process must be observed in the taking of the property (CONST. Art. Ill. ANS: For an LGU to exercise the power of eminenl domain, the following requisites must
Sec.1). concur:
1. The LGU through its Q_hief executive and acting pursuanl to an ordinance;
Q: What does " public use" s ignify? 2. For e_ublic use. or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the
ANS: For condemnation purposes, "public use" is one which confers some benefit or landless;
ad~antage to the public; it is not confiri_~clJQ. i'!~_tual use by public. It is measured in terms 3. Payment of ,!ust compensatii;m;;j)ursuant lo the provisions cf the constitution
of nght _of public to use propose,9J~cilitie!j tor vi~1G)l'C(Uldemnation is sought and, as long and pertinent laws; .'~if''}
as public h_as n?ht to use, "".'!J.~th~r ,ex,.ercis_ed by'9nE:lor/i'l<1.(1Y members of public, a 'public 4. There must be a valid a · Offer that has been previously made to the
advantage or pubhc be1J.~fil\ ac,cr1,i_es•soffftlenU<;:t cq0stitotti a public use (Manosca v.
Court of Appeals, G.RJJo·<.9~A~_,.!so.u.ary-2.~, !~116)~. ,.-(,' \ 5.
f'.-·-;...r.. :,f' :..,. - ': ·-=;~- ....,.;l'" 6.
Q: ~hat is _the exp}risili'ei o~9ept o.f"P,J,biic,use"? ~\?..tr\ .
ANS. Public use, Af. an; erntqent dom.atn concept ,has '[l()W acquired an expansive
meaning to includ1 .iny f use tfiai:)~9r- ,...userL1lnessi uti1i1t:or.J:dvantage, or what is 7.
vt
productive of gener~rbe)lffil of t11e publjc" (Vda,. Pe Oµano Repdblic, G.R. No. 168770,
February 9, 2011). ) <( i · ·' ,
f""'_i i

Just ColJlP-ensat}~j' J \. ,~,-~\ ; . / ··-,· 'J

Q: What is just com}Jensation? :_ ,.::· ·- . :. · · · '· · ·· / /
ANS: Just compensafi~ is i'~e.Jull ) )_n::.t j /air! equii ali~~ of 1-tfe
property taken from its
owner b_y the expropriator"--T.tre,::))1~~S.llfJ~" t~ot~~~f-,_ta_~ey5' gain, but the owner's loss
(Republrc v. Kabacan, Inc.: e t.,,J3/.\_ p_/R. N~·,P!.~1;2![;-,JiiJ(iary 25, 2012). It embraces not
only the correct determination ofihe.} lmounuo fje';paid to the owners of the land but also 0 1. Liberty or freedom:
the p~yment of the land within a reasoiia'6lt?t1nYefrom its taking (Estate of Salud Jimenez
v. Plu//ppmes Expott Processing Zone, G.R. No. 137285, January 26, 2001).
0: How is just compensation computed in cases of partial expropriation?
ANS; The formula for determination of just compensation is consequential damage to
the property not taken minus consequential benefits to the property taken plus the fair
market value (FMV) of the . property i.e. [(Consequential Damage - Consequential
Benefits) + FMV]. However, m no case shall the owner be deprived of the fair market
value of his property (RULES OF COURT, Rule 67, Sec. 6).
Note: The Local Government Code provides that the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court based on the FMV at the
time of tak·1g of the properly.
Q: When is just compensation not requir ed?
: NS: Ju st co~pensation is not required in wielding police power. This is precisely
ecau~e there_ is no taking involved. but only an imposition of burden (Southern Luzon
0 rug orporat,an v. Department of Social Welfare and Development G R No 199669
Apr,/ 25, 2017). ' . . . '
.'f:....•
Q: What are the two not1~s·com
Jf
e.o· ·.1~cJ)ight of association?
ANS : The right comprehelijs l\V() broad notions~· .,
e absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee
may act for himsel · out being prevented by law: and
2. Power. whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining
an association (Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, G.R. No. L-
25246, September 12, 1974).
Note: The right lo associate also guarantees the right nol to join an association (Sta. Clara
Homeowners Association v. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, January 23, 2002).
Q: Why is compulsory tBP membership not a v iolation of the _right to a~sociate?
ANS: The integration of the Philippine Bar is dictated by overndmg cons1d_erat1ons of
public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than conslltut1onally and
legally justifies the restrictions U1at integration imposes upon the personal 1nte~ests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers. All legislation directing the integration of the
Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
over an important profession (In Re: Marcial Edi/Ion. A.M. No. 1928, Avgust 3, 1978).
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K.·-
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.:NONIMPA°tRMENfQF-CONTl?ACTS
. ' ' . ' ·.-. >
s;onfPJ!_t and Limitations
Q: What is the p rot ectio n gu aranteed b y the non-im pairment clau se?
ANS: The non-impairment clause ;enders null and void a law which changes the terms
of a legal contract between parties. either in the time or mode of performance, or imposes
new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction
something different from that provided in its terms (Lepanto Consolidated Mining v. WMC
Resources Int'/. Ply. Lid.. G.R. No. 162331, November 20. 2006) .
Q: When c an a law b e invalidated on the ground o f impairment o f c ontracts?
ANS_: To fall within the p~ohibition. the change must not only impair the obligation of the
exrstmg contract, but the ,mpairmeni mus( be substantial. Moreover, the law must effect
a change in the rights c f the parties with reference lo each other. and nol with respec t to
non-parties (Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association v. Secretary of DILG, G.R.
No. 143076, June 10, 2003).
Meaning of Custodial Investigation
Q: What is custodial inves tigation ? . .
ANS: Custodial investigation is questioning initialed by a law enforcement officer after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise cieprived of his free~om of acllon 1~ any
significant way (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 1966). lt shalt 111c1ude the practice of
issuing an invitation to a person who is inve_stigated in connection ~1th_ an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without preJud1ce to the liab11ity of the mv1t1ng officer for any
viola!ion of law (RA No. 7438, Sec 2, Par. (2)) . .,
Q: When does an investigation b egin ? .
ANS: Investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved _crrme
but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the puhce rnvest_1gator
starts interrogating or exacting a confession from (he suspect in connection with an
alleged offense (People v. Mac;am, G.R. Nos. L-9 1011- 12, November 24. 1994).

Q: What are the exce ptions to the no1.1-impalm1ent clause? gjghts ofq Person under Custodi ation
ANS: The exceptions to the n@=lrnpairri;1enl cla.use'are the valid exercise of the inherent 2
powers of the state - police_p~w.er.!imine'A i-dohi8ini a11d'taxation. In every contract there Q: What are the rights of a per custodial investigation? (12sC -TDCR-
_ii
is an ir~ptied reservation_,t_~ ~!t~_ ~~ubjectfci-iHe' poljs;4.p6\~,.o f the State (0 1t igas· & Co. EWV) .. . . .
v. Feat, Bank and Trur,.~o-,: ~,R'/f.o..L-2t6-70;-,Dt1£,~m,bl-·f~.J.;{979). ANS: Any person under investiga~9 . ;,c.qrJffi!,~,~101~.:<~!,an o ffense shall have (he
following rights: ..,;,-"-" " . •· ···'1~.;-!!ii'l!f~s,}_
~ ,-1-.tl .f I li ;.:. ·-·, · \ '\ ':•4,....-• "-r
Q: What are the lin,Jtation.s on; the No n-impairment Cla°l,Jse? \ 1. Right to be !nfOJ!l:l~'ii"'o r his ri1;1ht . o remain silent<!~~-right to independent and
ANS: The legislatif.e-,;.S\3f1ot ti13cgaio .a~j..;th.e. Jl0Jk~ ~o~e(li~r\)Ugh the medium of a competent cod_ijse_l; '-~~-~ . :' ,; \ . . .
contract. Neither n;faY:J?rJvat_e P,art,13J_·.f;ttw the:.:Jeg1~latrve 1aulli'of ity by contracting on 2. Right to be ! =··· -~ ~uat if he \tc;1iv_es his rrgh}Ho?ef{1a1n silent, anythrng he
matters that are es{e_r:i~L<!ify w1th1_0, the po\yffr,gf_(he lav.:makinQJ l;l.ady fCRUZ, Constitutional says can l.l,lE!;,_~~rd aga1n.rl him: f . ,
Law. _supra al 574Jl b~e, fti e 1J,?.l~cg_110,y_e.['.:th,~ ·<:>~~eE ifl;ft~renf powefs may validly limit the 3. Right ilent; ;iiJ: \
4. Right eteot and ,.,. epend. rably of his own
1mpa1rrnent clause tC'\Y P{ Sa11,.:P'{blo v. Judge R_ey~s/anq MetaJco, G.R. No. 127708,
March 25, 1999). ;_ - · · _, <· · /-:'':.. .:' l ·: choic i::::,t.
\ \ ~:;:. >.:-Z:. , ..--:;/.:;-:;:· / ! 5. Right to b ittfQbw , if he canno a r the services of one~-
s. No Torture ~ lence, t t. intimidation or any other means w 1c 11
1i?ii ii~9ef{l€ifi~~t!~t.~~r~q~,~Q~~2~it<t~t{rtiiitlt~-~~;!f};:1 vitiate the free~'II s~~II be us , him;
7. Secret Qetent\ i~piace~~,S,9J' iQ~_do. or other similar forms of
Q: What is t he basis of t h·e,cl'gi,} fb:free"ii'i::'c~;;:i_il_'c~l:uii; detention are 1t€lif1~.- .
ANS: Free access to tile couris,a~ qua J.\-,i~~iici~l)~od1: s and adequate legal assistance a. c onfessions o . riiissions obtained in violation of these rights are
shall not be denied to any person b{f~ason-orpoverty (CONST. Art. Ill, Sec.11). i;;admissible as ·. ' eiice (CONS T. Art. Ill, Sec. 12); .. .
9. The custodial investigation R eport shall be reduced lo wnt1n_g by tne
Q: Who is an Indigent part y? investigating officer ilnd read and adequately explained_to him by hrs c~unsel
ANS: An indigent party is one who is authorized by the court to prosecute his action or or by the assisting counsel provided by the in~es(1gahng officer 1n the
defense as an indigent upon an ex parte application and hearing showing that he has no languag e or dialect known to such arrested to detained person, before such
money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for report is signed or thumb marked. otherwise such invest1gat1on report shall
hrmself and his family (RULES OF COURT, RULE 3, Sec. 21).
be null and void; . .
10. Any .!;_x(rajudicial confession made by a person arrested detained or under
0: Who are covered by the Co nst itution al prov ision ? c ustodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such. person in the
ANS : <?nl_y _a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. A corporation presence of his counsel , or in \he latter's absence. upon a valid waiver, and
being a JUnd_1cat_person has the power to acquire and possess property of alt kinds as well in the presence of any of the parents. el_der brother and sisters. his spouse,
as incur obhgallons and bring civil and criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and the municipal mayor municipal judge, d1stnct school supervisor. or priest_or
regulalions of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded minister of the gospe'I chosen by him; otherwise s~ch extrajudicial confession
the exemption from legal and filing fee.s granted to indigent litigants (In Re: Query of Mr.
shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding: . . rticte
Roger Pnoreschi. A.M. No. 09-6-9 SC. August 19, 2009).
11 . Any ~aiver by a person arrested or detained under (he prov~s1on of A .
125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial ,nveshgal:on shall be_111
writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel. otherwise
the waiver shall be null and void; and
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12. Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be

allowed :'lisits by or conferences with any member of his immediate family, or
any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or any Q: What are the rights of the accused in a criminal prosecution?
member of his immediate family or b>' his counsel, or by any NGO duly ANS: Under the Constitution, the rights of the accused are:
accredited by lhe CHR or by any international non-governmental organization 1. The right to due process;
duly accredited by the Office of the President (R.A. No. 7438, Sec 2). 2. The right to presumption of innocence;
3. The right to be heard;
Q: What are the rights of a person suspected and subsequently charged? 4. The right to assistance of counsel; . .
ANS: A person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with 5. The right to be informed of the cause and ~ature of accusation against h,m;
its commission in court, has Lile following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing 6. The right to speedy, impartial, and pubhc tnal;
evidence, to wit:
7. The right to confrontation;
1. Before the case is flied in court (or with the public prosecutor, for s. The right to compulsory process; ·•
preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or 9. The right against trial in absentia; and
otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being 10. The right to bail (CONST. Art. Ill, Secs. 13-14).
interrogated by the police: the continuing right lo remain silent and lo counsel,
and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have
evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2. After the case is filed in court;
a. To refuse,J,o-?if"awfn~~s~(- ~--·--~ .
b. Not t~~.Yf a~ll~_PrE!)l-/0IC8 ~h<JISQevw result to him by su_ch refusal;
c. To ; e_stIf,~ !P:,.'11s-own~behal(t sllbJec('.~tp cross-examination by the

d. R~~t{~~g;9[9 ~;;;~-!Pa"~~ief; ;;},jfic question which tends

oJqer
/ lo IR!'!pmif\ate hil.'ii fo(.sooie crit:ie !tliJn that for which he is
1
/ ,~nl>ros Eute_d _(Pt!gj?lf:. v. Judre A~1<!f, :qt. No. 85215, July 7,
i ,. .,.!. fs~- : -. ·-- ;~ ~ \ ~-; l

+n~f\'a~~~2\--~~':;F~ -~-~~---/>·:~· )::;:l

- ~ ~ i ~

Requisites ofa 1
Q: What are the rlg]its ttil)t ca,fr"b-c_waiv<id( . . .·· . .. ; ,
ANS: like other constitutli;,naf ·rfght$\ the righVagajnst _!;;elf-incpmination, including the
right of a person und~~ investigatio_n·.~o.°(enla!n..siient al).d' to coui1sel, and to be informed
of such right, rnay be wait ed (~t3.11~:._v.)Ji!J;~n~ro:·~Jl·:t!!.;. S/9378, February 11, 1986).
~ ..~ \).,·._."'C.·~---·:-- \--: \ :- . .r~
Q: What are the requisites"ota ya'[id waJv~rtl ",,., ·, •··,/
ANS: To be valid, a waiver ofil'le~f!_!lhtlh'iu~t'19.i. oniy be voluntary; it must be made
knowingly and intelligently, which presu"p'p·oses an awareness or understanding of what
is being waived (People v. Nicandro, G.R. No. L-59378, Februa,y 11, 1986).
Note: The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel (People v. Ga/it, G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985).

gxc/usipnarypoctrine
Q: What is the exclusionary doctrine in relation to the violation of the rights of a
person under custodial investigation?
ANS: Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear Q: When is bail a matter of discretion? . .
harmless or innocuous at the lime without the competent assistance of an independent ANS: Bail is a matter of discretion under the following cases._ h ble by death reclusion
counsel should be struck down as inadmissible. It has been held, however, that an 1. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punIs a ,
admission made to news reporters or to a confidant of the accused is not covered by the perpetua or life imprisonment; and . . s
exclusionary rule (People v. Bravo, G.R. No. 135562, November 22, 1999). 2_ If the RTC has Imposed a penalty of imprison:t~i;i:epd~~;g:~;t:rof
provided none of the circumstances· enumera _
Section 5, Rule 114 1s present, as follows._ . . has
a That he is a recidivist, quasi-rec1d1v1st. or habitual dellnquent_. or
. committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of re1terat,on,
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b. That he has . previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded Presumption ofInnocence
sentence, or v1ol_ated lhe conditions of his bail without valid justification;
c. Thal he committed the offense while under probation parole or Q : What does the right to presumption of innocence mean?
conditional pardon ; • ' ANS: The right means lhat in a criminal .case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal,
d. Thal lhe circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
releRsed on bail; or not mean such a degree of proof. excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
e. Thal there is undue nsk that he may commit another crime during the certainly. Moral certainly only is required. or that degree of proof which produces
pendency of the appeal (Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, GR. No. 213847 conviction in an unprejudiced mind (RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, Sec. 2).
August 18, 2015). '
Q: Who has the burden to overcome the presumption of innocence?
Q : When shall bail be denied ?
ANS : ANS: The prosecution bears the burden to overcome such presL1mpt1on. In doing so, it
must rely on lhe strength of its own evidence and' not on the weakness of the evidence
Prior ~o the conviction by th~ RTC of an offense punishable by death, presented by the defense. :f the prosecution fails to discharge this burden, lhe accused
reclusion ~erpetua, or fife 1mpnsonment and the evidence of guilt is strong: deserves a judgment of acquittal (People v. Hilario. G.R. No. 2 10610, January 11, 2018).
2. After conviction _by t_he RTC of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpelua, or hfe imprisonment; and . Q: What is reasonable doubt?
3. After conviction by the RTC of an offense nol punishable by death reclusion ANS: It is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after
P_erpetua, or life imprisonment and the presence . of b~il-denying such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of gum (People v. Dramayo,
circumstances (RULES .?f..9QJ!.{{!,_ Rule 114, Sec. 5). G.R. No. t-21325, October 29, 1971). -4/i•
-~-- . ,. ~-.. ., .. ;.:~ ,g

!'
i
Q: When is a hearing rnan_ga.(~~-·ii;i grJo_ttn~\f b~il.:'h, . Q: What is the equipoise rule?
ANS: For purposes ~f agjis~Jo,~ _!S.b~il·,;mrdet1r..,fui11~m:in'Q_f whether or not evidence of ANS: Where the evidence of t balanced, the constitutional
l
i guilt 1~ strong 111 cnm1_J1Pl_,.-~~e§:1h~og~Pi.teLorte0&,oi ·~ar1;..orfenses punishable with presumption of innocence should tilt th cused (Corpus v. People,
reclus,?n perpetua or !1~~:io;fi>j.1sopmen"t-hes_.witl)!p tftepfSi~-~ti'qf the trial court. But such G.R. No. 74259, February 14, 19fJ)f
1 discretion may be e} erclsep- only after. ll1e;:f:ieanng ca'/led~,{i$~_ef!ain the degree of guilt . . ...-ci:1#-"'~-
I of the accused for_t~11.p.~reose q_~~~~-~ol he saould'l?~_gca~ted provisional liberty. Q: What ts the pro reo Pf8)CIP,l_e ? •°1£'f.e
'' Therefo:e, that ba1l,c_~n~t be atlow.~-~ -wlJ~n 1t§l~r~nt is a m~!Jer.ol discretion on the part ANS: If inculpatory f~cts :flAdtf1rc4m$tilnc are capableJJ~o or more explanations,
I of the trral court un~essJ\ere ha~ beef a h~ar)J:1$. with{notice~9_JQ!l1f'rosecution. one consistent with the..inAilc~fof the a sed and the.fottfer 'bnsistent with his guilt,
I : ••· • .;. :-· ' • ,i.,.., ::; .

The heari_ng, ~vhich~m~y.:~e ~it~-~r,summary _o~ othf~i~l iftJbe;Jiscretion of the court,

: !
then the evidence ~e·sno( fulfjlrtfie tesJpf
(Amanq uiton v. PefBB,Jp, G.F3/,t;/Jj_o. 1~6080,
ral certainty and, wil['Jlo! justify a conviction
' ust 14,_2 (}9 . f \.

I
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should P!lll~arrly detfr~nin¢,. wli~~er,_or.l)o~lh'e--ell'.i~~n.Ge qf guilt Jgainst the accused is
strong (Enr,le v. San'd:ganb'a1,an~:-~~(-f:JO. ;2 1~~1-,)tugu;;i 18, 2__015).

Q: Why can a prospc.~ti_ve e-xtyaJ ite·~ -; 6t~~nt~~~~all;· ., :·

~- "'• ~,r .~,t~:~;

Right to Counsel \,,~,,.. ,.

Q: What is the extent ltthe ai'i:,uscJ•s ri
-':~I

;i'

ANS : '.he rig~! Of a prOSP.f~tf"'.~.. cJ<trad[teeJo.aµ,piy fci(~au'in this jurisdiction must be
viewed in the hght of the vano!),;'. _!rei3ty o~p~atJqris-:of~Jie··i=>hilippines concerning respect
for the promotion and ~rotecuon of.b!l,:i:ian"'!!~Et~~JJncfer these treaties, the presumption
hes m favor _o r human liberty. Thus. the Plill1pp1nes should see to ii that the right to liberty
of every 1~d1v1dual 1s not 1mpa1red. Although extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is
characterized b_y lhe followmg: (a) 1t entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the
potential extra~itee, and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is
also_the mac~mery of criminal law (Government of Hongkong Special Administrative
Region v. Olal1a. Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007).
Q: Wh_a_t is the quantum of evidence that may be employed in granting bail ·n
extrad1t1on cases? 1
ANS: l_n gra~ting bail in extradition cases, the quantum of evidence is clear and
co~vtnci~g ev1de1~ce. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
ev;dence that he 1s not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
eh~
19 rhadit!on court. This standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but
er tnan preponderance 0 r ·d (G
Region 01 ,- evi ence ovemment of Hongkong Special Administrative
v. a ta, Jr. , G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007).
ANS: The right covers t11~,:J,efi6d b~_gi_[I ft~.tq\!j~I investigatio_n, ~ell Into_ the
rendition of judgment, and;even 011:.ap'p'e . ·111 ·of·(tie 1987 Cons1ttut1on provides
this right to an accused not'~ r!Y. d/j/i{g trial but even before an information is filed (People
v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, Juh,(j-·f0, 1997).
Q: What are the rights to counsel of a defendant before arraignment?
ANS : When a defendant appears without an attorney, the court must:
1. Inform the defendant that it is his right to have an attorney;
2. Ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3. Assign an attorney de officio, if he desires and is unable to employ an
attorney; and .
4. Grant him a reasonable time, if he desires to procure an attorney of his own
(People v. Holgado, G.R. No. L-2809, March 22. 1950).
Q: What are the rights to counsel of a defendant during trial? . .
ANS : As a general rule, the right to counsel during the criminal proceeding 1s not subJe~t
to waiver {Flores v. Ruiz, G.R. No. L-35707. May 31, 1979), except if the accu~ed is
allowed by the court to defend himself (RULES OF COURT, Rule 116, Sac. 6), subJect to
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
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Q: What does right to counsel entail? 2. !,ength or delay; •

ANS: The right to counsel rnust be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the 3. Efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right;
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right 4. Reason of delay; and
assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial 5. Erejudice and damage caused to the accused (Cosco//ue/a v.
of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 191411, Juiy 15, 2013).
well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and
existing jurisprudence .. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal Q: May the right to a speedy trial be waived? . .
assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation (People v. Bermas, G.R. No. ANS: Yes. The right to a speedy trial may be waived. But waiver Is not to be inferred
120420. April 21 . 1999) . from mere failure of the accused to urge the trial of the case. Such waiver or abandonment
may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been sough_! a~d obtained
Q: How may a person exercise his right to counsel in a criminal prosecution? by the accused himself or by his attorney. The ~;esum~t1on Is always aga1ns, the waiver
ANS: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself of constitutionally protected rights (Coscol/uela v.$and1ganbayan, G.R. No. 191411, July
and counsel (CONST. A1t. Ill, Sec. 14 (2)). An accused may exercise his right to counsel 15, 2013}.
by electing to be represented either by a court-appointed lawyer or by one of r,is own
choice (People v. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, June 20. 1991) . The remedy in the event of a non-observance of this right is by habeas corpus if lhe
accused were restrained of his liberty. or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the
Q: How is a person's right to counsel under custodial investigation {Sec. 12) final dismissal of the case (Acebedo y Dalman v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-28025, December
different from one in a criminal prosecution (Sec. 14)? 16, 1970).
ANS: In custodial investigation, a ..P..~fSQn~_~as the right to have competent and
1n~ependent counsel preferab!Y..,or·liis o,wn ·ct)__ oic;e,{~ONST. Art. Ill, Sec. 12 (1)). In a Q: What does an impartial trial me_
cnmmal prosecution, the a0~g-~,eg.·,~as lf'\e r(g~[ y::i ~~' D,._eard by himself and counsel ANS: Due process requires no . e cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
(CONST. A,t. Ill, Sec. 14 {2)).·;[h~ e,i:.eferene,B'm4IJ~ ch,oJc·e of.counsel pertains more aptly Bolstering this requirement, we hav~f t the judge must not only be impartial but
a~d .specifically lo a p~rs6.p ~hfier
}!l¥~$tigatiQ(l_raih~r Jh~n-~_ne who is the accused in must also appear to be impartial, to gi e parties that his decision
ne 13, 1986).
cnmmal prosecution (fm,i0J1'j,f 'CJ1i6ng~,on, _,A.t~,_Nd:·~ril:~/F~t>-~~1. January 22, 1999). will be just (People V. Opida y Olf.f.iJmb
Thus, while the right pr ihe,1ccu1ed to .b~ cepres,ented\by c9uh'sf!lts immutable, his option ~g;~-

G.R. No. 118435, f!ce~2t 199P: .:, '.~-~~:·:~-~-~T. . . -,

to secure the servic,e.s of 1,ouns!l~_de pa,te,.however, Js NOTr'ahsolute (People v. Serzo
y,',-·~ j '
Q: What does a public t
ANS: A public trial is NO
.doors must be open !9f ·
inean?
'
,. "
ous w1t....,public1zed ln;!I; i1 o°QIY implies that the court
wish ti come, sit irf thf avt3ilable seats, conduct
themselves with d~G(J-rum . ve,~e ~ I process_fPer1z v.1Estrada, A.M. No. 01-
!lf.g_ht to be !nfor~lltl_o( t~:/i~t:1/e:on_'!<?~use_;ii'/1,ccji;-;,7;~n
... ,.-·, \ •• -".'. ' • . -. . ./' ~ -. ~:,.,~-C i!
Q: What is the ratiqilale f?ehir1dJh~ righpq.be _informed-of the nature and cause of
4-03-SC, June 29t )P1J~_,}itt . .. ,.,
4
I ' "
accusation? ~ ;· :-.. · · · ~-· _; Q; What are the exceP.tioni plil>lf,c tr{~?
f
0

ANS: The rationale ti~hind this ~b.11~\il~ilio~a(gpai:a~te~";re: / ANS: -~~1rt?T·,- :=-i. :

1. To furnish fh~ acctt',e.9·wl(h the,~e·scripLion _of the,tharge against him as Will 1. General put51ic~may} Qe exclud · .
enable him to•make,his'·defense· _:.,__ · . ' • proceeding ma'fp1fciiars1s;¼) · decency ~r publrc morals (In
2. To avail himself of l: is convic{i;~ -0_!: acqui~al, tor protection against a further Re· Petition for-Radio .ina'T, 1011 overage of the Mull1ple Murder Cases
prosecution for the s·ame cause;'and . .- Ag~inst MaguihrfaJJ::{Govemor Zaldy Ampalllan, et al.. A.M. No. 10-11-5-
3. To inform the court or thii "rac ls alleged, so that ii may decide whether they SC, Oct. 23, 2012)~"'···
are sufficient in law lo support a conviction, if one should be had (People v. 2. When a child testifies, the court may order the exclusion from the courtroom
Monteron, G.R. No. 130709, March 6, 2002). of all persons. including members of the press. who do not have a direct
interest in the case (RULE ON EXAM/NAT/ON OF A CHII.D WITNESS, Sec.
Right tq,~p_eedJ/1.f!J111.0rtial, and Public Trial 2~; .
3. All JDR conferences shall be conducted in private (A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-
Q: What does the right to speedy trial mean? PHILJA, Janvary 11, 2011); . .
ANS; The right lo a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and 4. The court may, on motion of the accused, exclude the pubhc from the trial
oppressive delay~, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be except court personnel and the counsel of the parties (RULES OF COURT,
free fro_m the an~1ety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt Rule 119, Sec. 21); and
determined w1th111 the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and 5. In writ of habeas data cases, a hearing in chambers may be conducted where
cons1derat1on or whatever legitimate defense he may interpose (Acebedo y Dalman v. the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information
Sarrmento, G.R. No. L-28025, December 16, 1970). in question shall compromise national security or sta!e secrets,_ or when the
data or information cannot be divulged to the public due to its nature or
~: What are the factors to be considered whether the right to speedy trial is privileged character (Rvle on the Writ of f-/abeas data, A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,
VIOiated?
Sec. 12).
ANS_: The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether
th e right has been violated involves the weighing or several factors: (CLERP)
1. £onduct of prosecution and accused;
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Right of Confrontation section of 10 of Rule 21 of the Rules or Court, as amended) is thus interpreted to apply
solely to civil cases (People v. Montejo. G.R. No. L-24154, October 31, 1967).
Q: W hat is t he purpose of the constitutional right to conf rontation?
ANS: Constitutional confrontation requirements have been held to have two purposes: Q: What are t he tests of propriety for the issuance o f s ubp oena d uces tecum ?
first and primarily, to secure the opportunity of cross-examination, and secondarily, to ANS: There are two tests which are the test of relevancy and tesl of def1mteness. Th_e
obtain the benefit or the moral impact of the courtroom atmosphere as it affects the former refers to the books, documents, or other things requested must appear pnma facie
witness's demeanor (People v. Seneris, G.R. No. L-48883, Avgust 6, 1980). relevant to the issue subject of the controversy: while the_ latter _states that such books
must be reasonable described by the parties to be readily 1dent1f1ed (Roco v. Contreras,
Q: Is t he r ight ava ilable to the defendant as a matter of right during preliminary G.R. No. 158275, June 28, 2005).
investigation?
ANS: No. An accused is not entitled. as a mailer of right, to be present during the Q: What are t he requisites of right to compuls"ory process?
preliminary P.xamination nor to cross-examine the witnesses presented against him before ANS : (EN DS) .
his arrest, the purpose of said examination being merely to determine whether or not there 1. That the Evidence is really material; ..
1s sufficient reason lo issue a warrant of arrest. A preliminary investigation is generally a 2 That the a'ccused is guilty of !:!_o neglP.ct in previously obtammg attendance of
proceeding ex parte in which the person charged has no right to participate or be present said witness; . .
(Marina s v. Siocl>i. G.R. No. L-25707, May 14, 1981). 3. Thal the evidence will be available al the lime Qes1red: and
4. Thal no Similar evidence could be obtained (People v. Chua, G.R. No.
Q: May the rig ht to cross-examination be waived? 128280, April 4, 2001).
ANS: Yes. Right to cross-examination __111ay be waived expressly or impliedly. Thus,
where a party has had the OPP.PrtUriitV/o~.cross,:exi;!mine a witness but failed to avail
Trial in Absentia
himself of it, he necessarily _for@°its;Jbe rig~\.lo ,c?rg'sifeis~u:qine and the testimony given on
direct examination or the yv1l1i~s~. \11[!!:be receive,Lo"r ajlp\V~cj to remain in the record (De Q: What are the requisites of a t ri~!
la Paz v. /AC, G.R. No_/ Z._1.5~7_, 0 .Sept~mP.<u.J.?, f98(; ~e,f't.ua,~s v. Buenaflor, G.R. No. ANS: A trial in absentia may be had; ·tes are present:
153166, December 16:'°2005j/'. ,.,-·-- •' · ··"··-··,. '-.,.:·._'" _a·\ 1. There has been an 8,g;iilg
t:., (.::,;,- / ·:·~ -i~ :;/~ \ "\.~-.~1-.f \~ 2. The accused h ,;een
!:!,o nd
Q: What are the l)ffects/ of the abseni:e. of or i~com'pletei hoss-examinatio n of 3. He fails to a ;.and f :'! \ ) G'
witness on the adrti~sit{ility c{t hTs-!pst1ilio·ny~on 'il(rect e;fmiJ_ation? 4. s .!;[njustifiel!_ (CONST. J\1,· 1y,:~ec. 14 (2 ; 1menez v.
ANS: If cross-exa_lriinatibn is npt an!',! caniici(be'" dode or cb'mple~ed, the rules may be ' ''37933, A -l il 15, 1988) } ~ -
summarized as foll9w_s~·- ! .. ,,~ ._, ' .:;-__;;_.._::
~ /;r-,
E··""".) f
1. Where lher,gi,t tq·c}6l,s· ex;imine·-:,s·losl'~~9ify ~;Jn..p~rt through the fault of
the crost-Jxa~1ine·c.-1h~i:i the t~_s!fril.o~f~1178irEl,t:I exafoination may be taken
into acco1tnt; \ ? ·.. >- ; _r-;~ :. .':"·-:>· ,../' } Q: What is the rig ht'tQ, .. t i , 1, f cases? · . . .
2 Where cross-examination_' ij•nbt ·i!ncf"cannp( be dp'ne or completed due to ANS: All persons shaii--t.. ave £ righ( to alispeed~ d1spos1hon of thetr cases before all
causes at_tn.putable· .tu the 'r:i:-arty_·:: qffe~jn§,._!he y/1tness the uncompleted judicial, quasi-judicial, or a~_[li~\ifrative bo . Art Ill, Sec. 16).
testimony 1s 01e~eby,_~e~de'.!;l_c!,in!;,Q{l'.Jp~(.eQt<>·.,
3. Where the cross-e,xani1rtat1on, c;;ir11:iot,.,b,e_. tqmplete due to fortuitous events,
e.g. , death of the wltne.s.s, theh' tiie\ji,reef'testimony of such witness can be Q ·. When is t he right to s ~..,. diJWb;ition violated?
·""
k~~
·
.
· ·ous and oppressive
ANS: When the proceed1 attended by_ vexatious, capnc1 . .
stricken only insofar as riot covered by the cross-examination (People V. delays: or even without caus r"Justifiable. motive, a long period of time is ali~edN~
Seneris, G.R. No. L-18883, August 6, 1980). elapse without the party having his case tned (Gonzales v. Sand1ganbayan, · ·
94750, July 16, 1991).
!ligh t to Compulsory Processes
Q: Differentiate right to speedy disposition of cases from the right to s~eedy trial.
0: What is covered by the r ight to compulsory processes of an accused? A NS: While the rationale for both rights is the same, the right to speedy tnal _may o_nly
ANS: The rigilt to compulsory process of an accused pertains to: 1
be invoked in criminal prosecutions against courts of law. The nght ~o_sjeedy di~po;_ ll_o7
1. His right to secure the attendance of witnesses (subpoena ad testificandum); of cases however may be invoked before any tribunal, whether 1ud1c1a or quasi-Ju_1c1a.
and
2. His right to the production of evidence in his behalf (subpoena duces tecum)
What is important 'is lhat the accused may already be prejudiced by the proceed
the right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked (Cagang v. Sand1ganbayan, - ·
f7{ mi
(CONST. A,t. Ill, Sec. 14 (2)).
Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42, July 31, 2018).
0: What is a viatory r ight?
Q: To wh om does the r ight to speedy d isposition _of cases ext e_nd? ccused
ANS: . The provisions of Sections 8 and 9, Rule 21 of the Rules of Court shall not apply , · ht to the speedy disposition of his case 1s not hm1ted to the a .
to a w itness who resides more than 100 kilometers from his or her residence to the place ~ N~: _A pl ersoocneesdr.,1ngs
g but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative
where he o_r she is to testify by the ordinary course of travel. or to a detention prisoner if in cnmma pr . . . · · d' · I l th' accord any
in nature as well as all proceedings, either 1ud1c1al or,, q:~1-ju ic~a . n t~!ked with the
no perm1ss1on of the court in which his qr her case is pending was obtained (RULES OF
COURT, Rule 21, Sec. 10). party to~ case may demand expeditious action to a o ic1a s w o are I 15 2013).
administration of justice (Coscol/uela v. Sand1ganbayan, G.R. No. 191 411 , Ju Y •
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Q: What are examples of instances when the right to speedy d. ·1· f Q: Who may invoke t he right against self-incrimination?
may be deemed waived? 1spos1 10n o cases
A NS
ANS: The right to speedy disposition of cases are deemed waived in the following 1. The accused in a criminal case, who may reluse to take the witness stand
instances:
allogell1er (Chavez v. CA. G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968); and
1. The respondent fails to file the appropriate motion upon the lapse of the 2. A witness in any suit, but only relating to particular questions asked of him in ·
stawtory or procedural periods: the witness stand. The questions he can refuse to answer are those which
2. The failure of the respondent to invoke the right even when or she has already lenrl to establish his participation or guilt in a criminal act that has not yet been
suffe'.ed or will suffer the consequences of delay constitutes a valid waiver of
..
·~
judicially proven (RULES OF COURT, Rule 132, Sec. 3, par. (4)).
that right; or
3 Unreasonable actions by the accused, includes delaying tactics like failing 1
0 lmmuni(ti.ta tutes_
appear despile summons. filing needless molicns against interlocutory
a~tions. or requesllng unnecessar1• postponements thal wi!l prevenl courts or Q: What are the two types of statutory immunitj '?
lnuunals lo properly udJud1r.ate the case (Caga119 v. Sandiganbayan ~ R ANS: Our immunity staiutes are of American origin. I,~ the United States, there are two
Nos. ?06438. 206458 & 210141-42, Juiy 31. 2018). · " · · types of statutory immunity granted lo a wilness:
1. Transactional immunity is broader in tile scope or ils protection. ~y its grant,
P. RIGHT-A GA INST SELF"!NCRJMiNAT/Oft/._. a witness can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever arising out
of the act or transaction; and
f xtent of_.i{g.!J.1 2. In contrast, by the grant of use-and -derivative-use immunity, a witness is
only assured lhat his or her cular testimony and evidence clerived from it
~: ~hat is the basis of righ~ga:(ri'it ~j 1r~l~;~ri":11'ii;iat[pn? will not be used againsl · er in a subsequent prosecution (Mapa v.

;>~:~~~=-=:~· -: ,: >·:\ ,
.NS No perscn shall be SPTP~ll~o-.;_o be-awi{rtefssagain~t himself (CONST. Art.Ill Sec. Sandiganbayan, G.R. ' April 26, 1994).

17). _,/·,:.- a: What is the purpose of immuniJ. , . 1..! . __

. .,,.,..~- ~=
Q : Wh~t is the scopt ~t\1f'r1!Jfi't° ag;,i!ns,t se!f-;°~~i'i.m'lniiJio'~\ ANS: Immunity statutes seek a_.~ tion ·"'io1. ~o~~;lll~een the imperatives of an
A:NS: fhe proh1~1t1gn aga~ st compelli'ng ~ tna-il in a crimirtafc~J\;\to be a witness a ainst individual's constitutional ri9.!J!:;..fgainsl s~ , i m,nation°lncS11i"e legitimate governmental
himself 1~ a prohibil}Qn.~.,9j1111S! ~1e_us.e_o-4>tfysical..or_Q"1oraP-Mpo_lsion in order to ~xlort interest in securing testim(;f.ii"y (Kasligao, 'J_- j6 US 441, ~f)7~. To secure lhe person's
comm~nicat,ons fr~rn:~\11}, It •st1ot.;roeapt;:t9. e~9ud!:f the accuS"e(J's body as evidence testimony without exposin~~h!!J1 to., ~~ f prosecutiorlf tlje\aw recognizes that Ille
f
~::n~~td ~:~x~:c~a~f :~~~~~ohi~ii~~,ri:j.s_;5ig,ply,~. pr?~~itio"N against any proces~
witness can be given j¢niuff; ···,'l1.1tl7r ulion (Quatfo f·
q_mbudsman, G.R. No.
(United States v rl,~
T:. ,t\e tJ\;nt ;0%,
.V!f2;S
.ti_e.~: ~~~'.{!-~t;;t11s~111, admission of his guilt 19 169042, October ztih;. ·;; "'"' , .-., .! £ \
· , u-e_rfrl_. o~-~o. ,l 1; . eRIem~r: 1, 1p.1.1zr ; ;"A'fftto'fs1,rdJk"flt: , :,,,~~1r~'r,-·..5~-;,i~-~~. .- ' :, ~;,
Q: Where m_ay the ~~ht a~~n:(~~[Q.t\'~ }:jj}~~ lvok:;; (CC-APP)
~~-:L~!i-.!-'l;i--~ t ~ ~<.:\:.:::::,.{ ~ ~µ;'":~,· :~.J;.- ,(

ANS: The right may 15e invoRed in· t~e·(q°il~i11a"cases: / _j' Q: What is the consti ona sis rif- t
1. ~riminal ca~~s; : ...~ __..., ':J{ 1 _r· "·J 'ff>· /~. .
2 ~iviJ actions; l' / •),.:;-'.- .... ~,_:_,,_,..J_. . :..... .-·· ANS: No person shall b?l (~i~1\\it in jeop gi~hmenl for the same offense. If an
3 act is punished by a law,,npo;in qr,qj(lari' :c acquillal under either shall
8di\Ji_!lis!J:ati-v'e case.iJ~r?-ceed)~g,st"rf.9s~ti,:¢.'{im, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, constitute a bar to anotherijose~.!,!f~h for the same act (CONST. Art. Ill, Sec. 21).
2006, Secret~ry of Justtce. v.., (;ftn!JJ)Dt-G. R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000); :~]-!:,~
4. In a fr?ceeding that can result in the loss of the privilege to practice a Q: What is double jeopardy"~"'"'
.Profession (Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners GR No L-25018 ANS: When an accused is acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him is dismissed
May 26, 1969); or ' · · · ·
or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
5. In a f roceeding which may result in folieiture of Property (Cabal v Kapun an upon a valid complaint or information, or when a formal charge sufficien t in form and
G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962). · • substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal oi the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
Q: ~hat kind of protecti~n does the right against self-incrimination guarantee? prosecution for the same offense (RULES OF COURT. Rule 117, Sec. 7).
ANS . It depe_n~s on the kind of proceeding. The rules are as follows:
1. If ~t 1s a criminal case, the accused can refuse to take the witness stand· Requisites and limitations
2., !'
.•t 1s_a~ a~ministrative case, the parties thereto can only refuse lo an~wer
if incnminatmg questions are propounded; Q: What are the requisites for double jeopardy to apply? (C-CPA)
3. If ii is an administrative case that partake of the nature of a criminal ANS: The requisites are:
Pr_oceeding, the parties can altogether refuse to take the witness stand· 1. Valid ~omplaint or information;
4
- If it 1s_ a civil action, the parties can only refuse to answer if incrimin~ling 2. Filed before a .Q.ompetent court:
questions are propounded· 3. To which defendant has Pleaded; and
5
- ff ii is a civil _action that is criminal in nature, the parties thereto can 4 . Oelendant was previously ~cquitted or convicted or the case is dismissed or
altogether decline to take the witness stand (Rosete v. Lim G.R. No. 136051 otherwise terminated without his express consent (People v. Ylagan, G.R.
~~~- · ' ' No. L-38443, November 25, 1933).
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Q: What are the limitations to the right against double jeopardy?

ANS: The following are the limitations to the right against double jeopardy: (DAFuSI)
1. Qismissal with the express consent or upon motion of the accused does not
result in double jeopardy. This is because such consent is considered as a
valid waiver of his right against double jeopardy;
Exceptions:
a. Dismissal is based on insufficiency ot evidence {demurrer to
evidence); or
b. Denial of the right to speedy trial (Philippine Savings Bani< v.
Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005).
To reconsider a judgment of ~ cquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy
of being punished for the crime of which he has already been absolved
(Lejano v. People, GR. No. 176389, January 18, 2011);
Exceptions:
a. When the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its
discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction; or
b. When a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, !he State may
assail the declsion,by--specil!J civil action of ce1tiorari under Rule 65
(Lejano '{.., •P~r;;ple, ~.R. l;J9.-·1f&-38.fi. January 18, 2011).
i_:,_ .._.,•' ·' :; . t :- ••
. . ~ · -NP",
Q: What is involuntary servitude? .
ANS: Involuntary servitude is !he condition where one is compelled by f~rce, coercion,
or imprisonment, and against his will, to labor !or anoU1er, whether he Is paid or not
(Aclaracion v. Gafmaitan, G.R. No. l-39115, May 26, 1975) .
Q: What are some of the exceptions to the prohibition against involuntary
servitude? (PANO-COW) . .
ANS: In the following cases, the prohibition against involuntary servitude does ~ot apply.
1. Posse comitatus - obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the
peace and good order of his commufu!Y (United Slates v. Pompeya, G.R. No.
10255, August 6, 1915}; .
2. Appellate courts may compel a former court stenographer to transcribe
;;;enographic notes. That prerogative is ancillary or_ incidental to its appellate
jurisdiction and is part of its inherent. powers_ which are necessary to the
ordinary and efficient exercise of its Junsd1ct1on and essential to the due
administration of justice (In the Matter of the Petition For Habeas corpus of
Segifredo Aclaracion, G.R. l'j gf./}39115, May 26, 1975);
dwin, G.R. No. 334. January 25, 1897);
3. Naval enlistment (Robert .. '"
4 . Service in Defense of t NS T. Art. JI, Sec. 4);
5. As punish;;:;-ent for a g_,

3. An acquittal is;1:,i1Jal\ anc,l:.\!,nappeal<J.ple gi'].-th'e,, ground of double jeopardy, f one has been duly convicted (CONST.
whether it lljlPP.~"1~.Ll'tfie trL~L.C_Q.!)_i:t,_!~vEll-ef/ b9(~~!he Court of Appeals. Only Art. Ill, Sec. 18, par. (2) ,.
~11hen the~e}~j··~.n8irg-'5(~ sh~m _tr~~l'th~tlti,e:_g!?r:;Nne of double jeopardy is 6. Obligation of childre!g!o' Q . g as they are under Iheir
1napphca_5Ii?....il,f!gausJ! the _;p·eqpl~ •. as represeQt~d bY, the prosecution , were parental authori AM/LY _ :.E, Art. 211, 1).
denie_d '}~~ pnfcessff!.'_~_?_?.le..:.~' /~i~-T_ironA, G. F( ,~p.;\ 30106, July 15, 2006); 7. Return to rder in indii§.tc~s affected wi blic interest (Kaisahan ng
4. Doctnn~ ,3,f,'§,uperv~n11:1~J(veii) ~ · ):J.1_ ~. aqcuseqi (!lay, 1>till be prosecuted. It Manggag .- _
!1oy, v.r:-001·· co Sawmills/ \.~ . o. L-1573, March 29.
allows /tne"·<P.rosect(tion' ·f9r, 0 anot~er off~nse 1f su~$equent development 1948). "' } i
Change'.s,t_~i~ha~aGt~r Of tlie /ii:sf'i1Jc/lt:tm~,\:U(ldejwnir;~ he may have already "~:- ! ~1': ~-
7'::___.)~:\..
been c~aJ~~\ or-. ~~v{ctedJP¥~R/.1;_ ·v:--,)ijfJ._ai;amf No. 99287, June 23, ,({f?,i rk for another, be
1992), afd· · "' . i,:;: .: · ·/.(,.:'...:,'. j ·!
5. Inseparable otl'e_nses., ; ·Wi1ere [C)ne~.eJt:.en.se 1s(-insepatable from another and nty, subject to certain
proceeds\ Jrom t'l_e ~\l~~)~,k!§~f-pan_g_oi be Jfie subject of separate
prosecut101T\ fCRU!,--Sf.?O§!'_!~f'.B-nfJl't~,&.Sl{f{B ~_F784).
1
However, it is''pqiI§fb)e-i°tpr'one"acqo'9j~f-}Lie to several crimes; separate
prosecutions for';\aG.ti.:crime n1a}f;~e,filefl p_r.e'Vided the elements of the several
crimes are not identica1 '(Ide). :_ ·. ___:, • , ··'

Q: What is the doctrin e of supervenin g event in double j eopardy?

ANS: Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts
existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said in
second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense (People v. Manolong, G.R. No. L-2288,
Marcl1 30, 1950).
Q: What is the nature of quasi-offense under the Revised Penal Code vis-a-vis the
right against double jeopardy?
ANS: As the careless act is single. whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense {criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and
cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions (/vier v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R.
-No. 172716, November 17, 20 10).
Q: When ls a fine considered excessive? . . .
ANS: For a penalty to be considered obnoxious to t_he Constitution, ,t needs to be more
than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or ~evere. To_ come under the
prohibition the penalty must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive or so disproportionate to
the offens~ committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable persons as lo what
is right and proper under the circumstances (Republic v. N. Dela Mercedes & Sons, Inc.,
G R. No. 201501, January 22, 2018).
1
Q: What is the scope of the prohibition against cruel a~d unus•Jal p_unishment?
ANS: The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments Is generally a1m_ed al the form
or character of the punishment rather than its seventy In respect of duration or amount,
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~nd applies to pu_nishmen ts which p~blic sentiment has regarde.d as cruel or obsolete. for
mstance. those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake,
breaking on _the wheel,_d_1~emboweltng, and the like. Fine and imprisonment would not
thus be w1thm the proh1b1t1on. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
pro~ort1on. or severe for a penally lo be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unu-ual
(Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180016, April 24, 2014). "
:t~~\.f{piJilM.tL?l~Qif¥t.~r.t_¢}:?lP..€.ifr.s·. ·1<--~:\~:i£'.'.;,.§}i;~~;#.fl¥~1iitt1-iti~-i;Jf~
Q: Wh at is the sc ope of applicability of the prohibit ion on ex post facto laws?
ANS: The prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to criminal or penal matters, and
not to laws which concern civil matters or proceedings generally. or which affect or
regulate civil or private rights (Republic v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-9141, September 25,
1946). It also applies lo criminal procedural law prejudicial to the accused (U.S. v. Gomez.
G.R. No. L-4630. December 19, 1908).
Ex posl facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant. are prohibited in this
jurisdiction (US v. Conde, G.R. No. L- 18208, February 14. 1922).

Q: Whal are invalid causes for imprisonment under the Constitution?
ANS: The following are not valid causes for imprisonment under the Con.stilution:
1 Debt - any civil obligation arising from a contract. It includes even debts
obtained through fraud since no distinction is made in the Constitution- and
2 Non-payment of P~II Tax - a specific sum levied upon any person bel~nging
to a certain class without regard to property or occupation. e.g. Community
Tax (CONST. Art. Ill, Sec. 20).
Q: What is a bill o f attainder ?
ANS: A bill of attainder is a legislative act that inff(ijs punishment without trial (Cummings
v. Missouri, 4 Wall 277). In more modern terms. a bill of attainder is essentially a
usurpation of judicial power by a legislative body. It envisages and effecls the imposition
of a penalty the deprivation of life or liberty or property not by the ordinary procasses of
judicial trial, but by legislative fiat (Bureau of Customs Employees Association v. Teves,
G.R. No. 181704, December6, 2011. citingJ. Feliciano).

Q: Ha_s B_.P. 2~, o!h~~ise know_~__as..the~ouu_cing Checks L aw, transg ressed the Q: What arc the elements of a Bill o f
const1fuh onal mh1b1hon agaiasr{nipri~onm~.nt fqr,debf? ANS: They are (LID)
~N~: No. The gravame~p(ih~ ?ffe_~-~t.::P..Y~sh'e1 by-~R. 22 is the act of making and 1. There must be a !,_aw;
isSuing a worthless chec!<'.9r a·cJJ~.~k·that 1s disl'iono~cf upo~t,s presentation for payment. 2. The law ! mposes a . _tlen on a named individual or easiiy
It is no_t the non-paymi:nl of:tifl,..05_!!gahon which the.1.efw.,pt[nistie.:;. The law is not intended ascertainable members ~I . ·;_,agd.,_, _..,.
or _designed to coercf<Cde,~tor t~ pay;his ~ebt:_The fl;irlf~·pffhe,law is to prohibit, under 3. There is Direct imposition cli",pen f°tibrderi.}'.11tbotit judicial trial.
- -~~y7 \ t1 ·~ .. ·.•
pain of pen~I sanct19~s. 1~ maJ<mg of wo.rthles_s che~ks arf~ J?U,tting them in circulation.
Because of ,ts deleten~,µs1 effec1s.on.the.puof1c~nter.e~t. the\pr.lictiie is proscribed by the Q: ls a bill of attainder ar':;;;to- ex p osj tit t o law? i ~ ·., .
law. _The law pums~esJ{tf ac_t npt as .an -9Hense;<1gai1st prov.erty; but an offense against ANS: Yes. As explained Svpreme QQurt, it is nol eno~yq_ that the statute specify
public order. (Lozaf°.-r.'t,ta~m-~~ G.R, ,Y~- ~--~3.419,ge~erri{'_e r-H, 1986). persons or groups in ~,e _
'Jfiay fall wgpin the ambi(of~he'!)rohibition against bills
of attainder. It is a~~1nece fiat it m':!s~_ppiy retroa9ttve1y and,_reach past conduct.
_.,...,.x ~ • '
f¼Wit~'§~!~!~~~lrf-~~~~~i:e,~~:·:·:~,~-. I 1
-~~~~!;.;;; This requirement ffi![~wsfi of !$ill atiJ1(
of Jjf.gistative adju~i~tion
of guilt. Thus, if (a sta~)- ~- ndt~t is also_an !"facto law. But 1~ 1t is not
Q: W hat are _the kinds of eX';{lO~tJa~t?,li!WS_:fac(El"PRR'P) /
an ex post facto law, th~}~as ~;_th ta that 11 ,s not are persuasive that it cannot
AN S: The kinds of ex)Jost facto 1Jv./s··afe·1 . -'. .., '·. _; f ,,
1 II. ·~ .._\ 1 '' I • ••~ / ii
be a bill of attainder" (PebPJ.{.;J,~rrer, G. . ,~! 13.·14, December 27, 1972).
. Laws which m;:i.k~,an,a"<:~:9:rfu)!(l.cll[~hicf~al'n_9l"';o before its passage;
2.
3.
Laws which ~ggr~'l{Jhe pelJ_aMY;{O(~ CJl~~·committed !!efore its passage;
Laws which inflict a·gr.~~.; ori mpre_::::~yera £ en ally for the same offense; 'f£~!B~P.§A1.: f~---·--·,y:;Jfi _:..,~ ';.; 'A}}"J.~p)jfA.; ,ff§~~84lto.11~
4. Law_s which all~r lhe legal ROles·6f evidence and allowing the receipt of less
or different testimony than what the law required at the time of commission Q: What does habeas corpu , erally mean?
m order lo convict accused ; • ANS: Habeas corpus is a Latin term which literally means ·You have the body" (Black's
5 Laws which assume to regulate civil Rights and remedies only, but in effect Law Dictionary).
imposes a penalty of deprivation of right for something which when done was
lawful; and Q : What is a w rit of habeas c orpus and its object? .
6. Laws whi_c h deprive the accused of some lawful £roteclion to which he had ANS: It is a writ issued by the court directed to a person detaining another, commandmg
been enlilied, such as protection of a former conviction or acquittal or a him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with t)'le day and
~~~c;;mation of amnesty (Salvador v. Mapa, Jr., G.R. No. 135080, Ma'rch 6, the cause of his capture and detention, to do, to submit to, and to receive whatever the
court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in his behalf (Bouvier's Law Dictionary).

Q: W hat are th e charact eristics of an ex post facto law? (CRP) The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of ~e detentio~. and,
ANS: The characteristics of an ex post facto law are; if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release or the detainee (Villav1cenc10
1- It refers to friminal matters (Republic v. Fernandez G.R. No. L-9141, v. Lukban, G.R. No. 14639, March 25, 1919).
September 25, 1946); '
2· Betroactive (.Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-54645-76 December 18 Q: What are t he grounds for t he issuance of the w rit of habeas corp us? (DJP)
1986); and · ' A NS: The grounds for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus are:
3 Pr · d' · I 1. _Qeprivation of a constitutional right resulting in a restraint of a person;
· - ei u icia to the accused (Rodriguez v. Sandiganbayan ·GR No 141710,
March 3, 2004). ' · · · 2. Court had no ,!urisdiclion to impose the sentence; or
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3. An excessive f enalty has been imposed, in which case the sentence is void
as to such excess (Harden v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-2349, Oclober
22, 1948).
Q : Does the absence of preliminary investigation affect the court's jurisdiction over
a habeas corpus case?
ANS: NO, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction over a habeas corpus case nor impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective. The remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the
attention of the courl lo the lack of preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of
right. that one be conducted (Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 89989, January 28,
1991).
description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed fo r. requiring all interested parties
to manifest their interes t to intervene in the case within 15 days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the
Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order (Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, A M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 2. Sec. 5).
Q: What is a writ of habeas data and when is it available?
ANS: It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty, or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering. collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, fa~1ily, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party (Rule on the Writ of Habeas dal~A.M. No. 08-1-1 6-SC, Sec. 1).

Q: What is tho privilege of tho Writ of Habeas corpus? Availment of the writ requires the exislence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the
ANS: II is the right to have an immediate determination or the legality or the deprivation one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, lhe existence of a
of physical liberty (BERNAS, supra at 146). person's right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence. of
an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the
Q: What are the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis for the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended (Vivares v. St.
su s pension of the privilege of the writ.Q.f }_1abeas corpus? Theresa 's College, G.R. No. 202666, S~p_(lf,ljiber 29, 2014).
A~S: The parameters for de~~~l'Y!ining-Jh~· ~}t~ien.cy of factual basis are as follows:
~ ......... -
(R1P 2) .-" ,' . ; , ; , , .- ; ., Q: What is a writ o f amparo? -;)ii'
1. Actual Eebelljo·~-ciai)v;ifon;..:·...:.~,~.•t ! / -;,,. ANS: It is a remedy available to atf hose right to life, liberty, and security is
2. f_ublic SafeJ{ ,iQ4~l s-1t; l!J.e_(irl\l,twQ.Iequ~egI~ni~n,ust concur; and violated or threatened with a violatio~ Ia mission of a public official
3. There is fr.~.tiib}e93trse,Jor } he._R.resiqeii~ t~J!>~li~ve (hat _there is actual or employee, or of a private indi D~I enforced disappearances
rebell1on;tirlhv9s1ony(lagn:1anil/', Medialde,a, G/f .Noi, 231568, July 4, 2017). and extralegal killings and thereo _ ,, paro, A.M. No. 07-9- 12-

/I \
i l- i " ~ : . . . . ...-.. ; SC, Sec. 1). "
Note: In determiniifg· the /exist~nce --0f--reb~llion,-the-lf>resicient 'oaly needs 1o convince
hims~lf U1at there f~~p~~able 1aus~;or ,ej.id_eri:C..e' s~bwing\ lfla1J1ore likely than not a
rebellion was comni1~~1~r is -~~)~9 com~//I~g/ T-O re~~J!e hi1~o-s,'afisfy a higher standard icYal riJief as it partakes of a
of proof would restrlct the\5X~8~~of.blS.:~.Q'.l-i{9.!!D.«Yj P,O~frrs_j(~a!!:1an v. Medialdea, G.R. ? ·> e the appropriate
No 231568 July 4 i2.-0if7,)\ -., ,·. , ,, , .·. --: , -·: • summary procee
• t I\ -..J .! ~ \r ~:•,.\o i.t. _/<:)i i -, f reliefs available e me administrative

~~d responsibility requiriO(L s~ that wi full and exhaustive

0: .What is the diffJ-rfnce\ f t ~~';,:) Vr.Jtef;~i(~;{ c_/ pus the Privil ege of the
Wnt of Habeas corp!ls.;f " -~ (. _.,-, -.-., .>;-:· ,.:;\ >-..' •./ j
ANS: The writ is the oro~r regwliAg)fie-pi rsbn' (p,wfoqi-U isfssued to produce the body
?f the person alleged lo be-.;E!'s°'4iijed"Bf'tris; upen,~i fl.O"J P'justify the detention. The writ
issues as a matter of cou_rse wtieo.:J.!~ ppe~1,~ f(or.) ~ .!f,fclelition that the writ ought to issue,
the suspension of the privilege notw1thstand1ng,...O n the other hand, the privilege of the
writ is the further order inquiring into !he cause of detention and directing the release of
the p erson if he is illegally detained (2 R/GUERA, Primer-Reviewer on Remedial Law
(2 017). p. 142).
Q: What is a writ of kalikasan?
ANS :. It is available lo a na tural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, people's
org~nizahon'. nongovernmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or
registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right
to a balan?ed and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act _or om1ss1on of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
env,ronmen!al damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants 1n two or more cities or provinces (Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases, A. M. No. 09-6-8-SC, Rule 7, Sec. 1).
Q: What is a citizen suit?
ANS: Any F ilipino citiz en in representation of others, including minors or generations yet
~~eb~~~ may file an action_to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon
9 of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief
2498, December 3, 2009).
proceedings (Razon, ) ~~;;;
,_ .
.~1mgs_
oceaa, gs are I om criminal proceedings. In
proceedings for petitions f .. \'([it \of amparo, the guilt or innocence of the respondents
is not determined, and nope· IJsanctions are meted. The proceedings only endeavor to
give the aggrieved parties immediate remedies against imminent or actual threats to life,
liberty or security. T he presumption of innocence is never an issue (Republtc v. Cayanan
and Pascua, G.R. No. 181796, November 7, 2017).
Q; What is the d octrine of command responsibility in Amparo proceedings?
ANS: The President may be held responsible or accountable for exlrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The President, being the commander-in-c~ief of all armed
forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies tum as a superior
within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine (Rodnguez v. Giana
Macapagal-Arroyo, et al., G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011).
Q: What are the requisites for determination of liability under the Doctrine of
Command Responsibility? (RKM) .
ANS: The requisites for determination of liability under the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility are: . .
1. Existence of a superior-subordinate Eelat1onsh1p between the accused as
superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
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2. Superior Knew or had reason to know that the crime ·,vas about to be or had b. Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure that
been committed; and protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce
3. Superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable ,Measures to prevent social, economic, and political inequalities (CONST. Art. XIII, Sec. 1); and
the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof (E.O. No. 226, 1995, c. ThP. State shall defend rii:iht of children to assistance, including proper
Sec.1). care and nutrition, special protection from all forms of neglect. abuse.
cruelty, cxµluitation a:id other cunuilionr, fHP.judicial to their deVf1lopment
(CONST. Ari. XV, 8Rc. 3 Par. (2)).
4. The Domestic law on adoption also supports the principle that foundlings rl:!
Filipinos. The said law does not provide that adoption confers citizenship
upon the adoptee. Rather. the adoptee must be Filipino in '.he first place to be
adopted; and
5. International laws. namely:
Q ; Who are the citizens of the Philippines under the 1987 Constitution? a. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 15:
ANS: Under the 1987 Conslitution. the following are the citizens of the Philippines: i. Everyone has the right to nationality;
1. Those who are citizens or the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this ii. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
Constitution; right to change his nationality;
2. Those whoso fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; b. UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 7:
3. Those born before January 17. 1973, of Filipino mothers. who elect Philippine i. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have
citizenship upon reaching J,he.age.Qf..rnajority; and the right from birth ·· ame, the right to acquire a nationality and
4. Those who are na!yr-alt~ed in; ac'co_r19~~-~ ith law (CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 1). as far as possi ' ht lo know and be cared for by his or her
.- ; ._ • I ~ •• " "•
parents;
Q : What is the law goy,,fc~i;; ".•! b.; ~electlo"ii~;fiJ1i!\ pi'.;te~citizenship under Par. 3, c. International Covena ' ii and Political Rights. Article 24: Every
Sec. 1 of Art. IV of th(l/ 1987 .C_onsj [tution'?--· ··--· "a .. / , , ' ' · child has the right ti ~\19,~ality, ~;t
AN_S: The governing_A,'i!~-\~ <::':1fFfo.:~2S/ wh(fh wa~
€n~J~1J\ursuant to Section 1(3), d. 1930 Hague Co .ent
Nationality
atlt'(~µ,_~~W,(x.:Relatmg to the Conflicts of
Artie~ _; "A child wfios·~~A arents are bolh unknown
Article IV of the 193f Con~lituli?n , presc~I1>1_n_ifc-the prpcedur~ tb_ aJ should be followed in
order to make a val(P,e~c}ton o~P.h1J1pp1ne~f tltzensbip_\ \ ,_) ) \ shall hav ationaU,~'<i[the country of gf1h'{; and
fr..-:.~.£ l ~- - -.~ ~· .~ f \·,.~-~\ e. 1961 Un · s ,Cony~ntion on the} R~d4ction of _Statelessness,
°:: _What_ is 1
the prs.~qriptiv~, per_(~~ _\~!,hlJ.i wlf ich tlJE,,,.,i.[~ction of Philippine g foun!;i;in the territo_ry of a t;:ontractlng State shall,
proof,to t~~contrary, q.~ co~sidiifed to have been born
cItlzensh1p must l:!e"'n'l~qe?, -_,(\ .··_ ; · I•T';> i ,1
· _-· , poss '· ' · ._
~lily of that State"
ANS: The electionh h~uJ~ b~~i:i'*wi!fiin."a·:~~asofu'.i81l tirile~ art~r attaining the age of
EC, G: -arch 8, 2016).
majority. The phr~s\=}eas_pn~~.1~\fl~et ~~s\i j·,~(€t3J'rpr~~d 16 /nean that the election
sh~uld ~e made wIthI~ 3 ye.1r,s frorv ~ -g(;~1r19 !,hEr_1~~-of fl'li:IJOrity.,However. the three-year
period _is NOT an. infl!;_xib~e ··-r.v_le/ ~~Y~1h~l_e_~~~--! he,_-extens~fi of lhe option to elect
Philippine c1t1zensh1p Is n9.t ind e,~~1-l%JRe:·J8ppllc~,9fl'.for-:_~trryssion to The Philippine Bar,
B .M. No. 914, October 1, 1-9~9):Y/"; ;······=~~----:-:. -(\\)·_..,.~ Q: Which principle is fol .,tf,1\l:,Bhl --cv., . .
--,~-- l. , / l ~\ ~f /}·_._ \ . .1 l,-~~•.-.::,,...
ANS: In our jurisdiction, t6_g prin~p~ of jus sanguinis has become the primary basis of
Q: What is the Caram provisio-;t?-..._.__ ; ~-'-.:'._;,.;.,,,· · citizenship by birth (Tecson V:~ flfg_LEC._G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004). person whose r:,
ANS: The Caram provision pertains to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. father or mother are citizens of tfit,i Philippines shall follow 1~.e c1t1zensh1p of his or her parents
The provision states that those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, (CONST. Art. IV, Sec. 1).
before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, llad been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands. shall be citizens of the Philippines. The privilege of citizenship granted Q: What are the modes of acquiring citizenship by naturalization? (JADeL)_
by the 1935 Constitution extends to the children of the grantee (Chiongbian v. De Leon, ANS: Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine _citizenship thro~gh either_
G.R. No. 1. -2007, Janua ,-y 31, 1949) 1. Judicial natuni lization (C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as The Revised
Naturalization Law'); •
0: Why are found lings considered Fi lipino citizen s In the Philippine jurisdiction? 2. Ad ministrative naturalization (R.A. No, 9139, otherwise known as The
A NS : Foundlings are considered Filipino citizens based on: Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000'?;
1. The 1934 Constitutional Deliberations - the cases of children born of 3. Derivative naturalization (C.A. No. 473, Sec. 15 and 16); or
unknown parentage are few and far in between that the constitution need not 4. J._egislative naturalization (So v. Republic, G.R. No. 170603, J anuary 29,
re fer to them and that under international law the principle that children or 2007).
people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is
recognized; Q: Differentiate judicial naturalization from administrative naturalization.
2. The Equal Protection and Social Justice clause; ANS: Judicial naturalization under C.A. No. 473 covers all aliens regardless of class
3. The following Constitutional Provisions; while administrative naturalization under R.A. No.139 covers native-born aliens who lived
a . The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full here in the Philippines all their lives, who never saw any other country and alt along
respect for human rights (CONST. Art. JI, Sec. 11 ); thought that they were Filipinos. and who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the