Avsec For Air Crew - TRB

Trainee Reference Book
Course on
Aviation Security Course for Air Crew
This Restricted material is

Published by
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
Issue Date: 2015

Avsec for Air Crew BCAS Training Division
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02nd April 2013 Trainee Reference Book
List of Modules
Module No. Topic Page No.

1 Introduction to the Course
1.1 Course Programme
1.2 Threats to Civil Aviation
1.3 List Of Significant Acts Of Unlawful Interference
1.4 Civil Aviation Security Setup in India
1.5 Terminologies Relating to Civil Aviation Security
2 Development of Counter Measures

2.1 Development of Security Measures
2.2 Security Responsibilities and Awareness
2.3 Classification of Threats for Air Crew
2.4 Powers of The Aircraft Commander
3 Legislation and Aviation Security Programme

3.1 Basic Principles and Philosophy for Aviation Security
3.2 International Conventions / Protocols Concerning Aviation Security
3.3 National Civil Aviation Security Programme
3.4 Role of various agencies in AVSEC
4 Recognition of Explosives / IEDs and prohibited Items

4.1 Categorization of Prohibited Items
4.2 Recognition of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
4.3 Methods of Concealment
5 Protection of Parked aircraft

5.1 Threat Identification & Means of Protection
6 Aircraft Security Checks

6.1 Threat Identification & Aircraft Search
6.2 Aircraft Security Search Checklist
7 Organization of Response to acts of unlawful Interference

7.1 Types of Emergencies and Crisis
7.2 Crisis Management
7.3 Command and Control
7.4 Role of Police, Airport and Airline Operators
8 Response to Bomb Threat to Aircraft on Ground

8.1 Bomb Threats
8.2 Bomb Threat Assessment
8.3 Bomb Threat Response by Ground Authorities
9 Response to Bomb Threat to Aircraft in Air

9.1 Bomb Threat for Aircraft-in-flight
9.2 Recommended In-Flight Emergency Safety Procedures for a Suspect
Device On Board
9.3 Least Risk Bomb Locations (LRBL)
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9.4 Flight Crew Checklist for In-Flight Chemical/ Biological Weapons
10 In-flight Response to Acts of Unlawful Seizure (Hijack)

10.1 Definitions
10.2 Understanding the Behaviour of Terrorists
10.3 Procedures to Be Used By Aircrew In The Event Of a Hijacking
10.4 Psychological Reaction to a Hijack
10.5 The Stockholm Syndrome
10.6 Signals and Covert Communication Systems for Hijack Situation
10.7 Contingency Plan – For Indian Registered Aircraft
11 Hostage Negotiation
11.1 Hostage Negotiation
11.2 Make-up and role of HNT; Strategies & Techniques by HNT
11.3 Armed Intervention Team
11.4 Post Hijack Procedures
12 Persons Traveling Under Special / Legal Status

12.1 Person authorized to carry weapons, fire arms on board
12.2 Persons in custody and under Administrative Control/ Deportee
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Handout 1.1
Page 4 of 1
Module 01
Introduction to the Course
Module Objective
• To understand the course objective, structure and methodology

• To understand the Terminologies related to Aviation Security and Vital Installations
• Act and rules related to AVSEC
• To learn about the organisations involved in Aviation security and of the applicable legislation followed for
Civil Aviation
• Need for Security Awareness
Course Objective:
After completion of this course, the trainees will be able to:

• Implement the relevant contents of an airline security programme.
• Understand the responsibility for security control of people and items taken on board the aircraft
• Recognize prohibited items, dangerous articles and substances
• Describe the procedures for handling, carriage and disposal of restricted and dangerous articles
• Assist in the process of searching aircraft and
• Respond to security incidents or emergencies on the ground or in flight.
Course Methodology:
• Slide presentations
• Lectures by certified instructors
• Group discussions
• Demonstrations
• Role-playing and practical exercises
• Overnight reading Assignments.
• Progress Tests
• Mastery Tests (written and practical)
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Handout 1.2
Page 5 of 2
Course Programme – 06 Days
Session Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
Module # 1 Module # 2 Module # 4
Introduction to the course Development of Counter Recognition of Explosives /
ONE Measures IEDs and prohibited Items
1000 – 1045 Course Aims, Structure & AVSEC Role of Air Crew Define & Classify Prohibited
Methodology members Items.
Threats on CA Ops Industry counter – measures to Weapons, dangerous articles,

TWO Nature of threat prevent acts explosives and Dangerous
1045 – 1130 of unlawful Interference substances.
15 mins Break
Characteristics of offenders, Need of Security Awareness Weapons, dangerous articles,
techniques and aims explosives and Dangerous
THREE
Film – Disruptive Passengers; substances.
1145 – 1230
Security Awareness
Module # 3
Legislation & Aviation Security Identify places & methods of
Past Incidents Programme concealment
FOUR Principles & philosophy of
1230 – 1315 AVSEC Film - Methods of
Purpose of Intl Security Concealment
Conventions
Lunch Break (1 hour)

Annex 17 SARPs, ICAO & IATA Module # 5
Recent Attacks Security Manuals Protection of Parked aircraft
FIVE Principles involved in Need for protection of
1415 – 1500 Film – Pan Am Lockerbie formulation of National parked aircraft, Surveillance
Legislations & Guarding
CAS setup in India and Purpose & contents of national Procedure to protect
SIX
NCASP & AVSEC programmes unattended aircraft Action if
1500 – 1545
aircraft is not protected
15 mins Break
CAS setup in India and Role of various agencies in Module # 6
NCASP AVSEC Aircraft Security Checks
SEVEN
Terminologies relating to CAS Reasons for aircraft security
1600 – 1645
checks, types and timing of
search,
EIGHT Terminologies relating to CAS Film – ICAO The Bridge Builders use of search lists
1645 – 1730 Film on Aircraft Search
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Handout 1.2
Page 2 of 2
Session Day 4 Day 5 Day 6
Module # 7 Module # 10 Module # 12
Organization of Response to In-flight Response to Acts of Persons Traveling under
Acts of Unlawful Unlawful Seizure (Hijack) Special / Legal Status
ONE
Interference
1000 – 1045
Types of emergencies and Carriage of Prisoners
crisis
Characteristics of a Crisis Main principles of CAS relating

TWO to aircraft seizure and Carriage of Arms &
1045 – 1130 Principles of crisis Procedures to be used by flight Ammunition
management crew in the event of hijacking
15 mins Break
Command & Control Psychology of Hijackers,
Functions of crisis Characteristics of mentally Procedures on carriage of
THREE
management centers abnormal persons, offenders, deportees / Inadmissible pax.
1145 – 1230
techniques and aims.
Role of Police, airport and Recommended procedures to

airline operators be used by aircrew in the Procedures on carriage of
FOUR event of a hijacking, signals deportees / Inadmissible pax.
1230 – 1315 and covert communication
systems for
hijack situation
Lunch Break (1 hour)
Module # 8 Preparation of reports Module # 13
Response to Bomb Threat to Hijacking & Hijacker data Course Evaluation
FIVE Aircraft on Ground form
1415 – 1500 Related Terminologies and Action agenda & post
Contingency Plan incident response check list
Film – IC 814 Hijack
Evaluation process and Bomb Module # 11 Feedback from participants /
threat search Hostage Negotiation & Crisis Group Discussion
SIX Procedures, actions after off Management
1500 – 1545 loading pax, need for caution Command, Communication &
in media and public handling information required for
crisis management
15 mins Break
Module # 9 Make-up and role of HNT
Response to Bomb Threat to Closing Activities
SEVEN Aircraft in Air Strategies & Techniques by
1600 – 1645 Related Terminologies. HNT
Actions on detection of
suspected articles.
EIGHT Recommended Airline Need & Function of Armed
1645 – 1730 technical crew response Intervention Team
procedure. Post Hijack Procedures
Movie – Bomb On Board.
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Handout 1.3
Page 1 of 5
Terminologies Relating to Civil Aviation Security
1. Acts of unlawful interference. These are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety of civil
aviation, including but not limited to:
• Unlawful seizure of aircraft,
• Destruction of an aircraft in service,
• Hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
• Forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility,
• Introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended
for criminal purposes,
• Use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to
property or the environment,
• communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the
ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of
a civil aviation facility.
2. Aircraft. Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than
the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.
3. Aircraft in flight. An aircraft from the moment when all its external doors are closed following
embarkation until the moment when such doors are opened for disembarkation.
4. Aircraft in service. A parked aircraft which is under surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access.
5. Aircraft maintenance area. All the ground space and facilities provided for aircraft maintenance,
including aprons, hangars, buildings and workshops, vehicle parks and roads associated therewith. Such
an area is normally designated as a security restricted area.
6. Aircraft not in service. An aircraft that is either parked for a period of more than 12 hours or is not
under surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access.
7. Aircraft operators’ documents. Air waybills/consignment notes, passenger tickets and boarding passes,
bank and agent settlement plan documents, excess baggage tickets, miscellaneous charges orders,
damage and irregularity reports, baggage and cargo labels, timetables, and weight and balance
documents, for use by aircraft operators.
8. Aircraft stand. A designated area on an apron intended to be used for parking an aircraft.
9. Airport. Any area in a Contracting State which is open for aircraft operations.
10. Appropriate authority for aviation security. The authority designated by a State within its
administration to be responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the national
civil aviation security programme.
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Handout 1.3
Page 2 of 5
11. Aircraft security check. An inspection of the interior of an aircraft to which passengers may have had
access and an inspection of the hold for the purposes of discovering suspicious objects, weapons,
explosives or other dangerous devices, articles and substances.
12. Aircraft security search. A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of the aircraft for the purpose
of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances.
13. Airside. The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof, access to
which is controlled.
14. Apron. A defined area, on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading
or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance.
15. Background check. A check of a person’s identity and previous experience, including where legally
permissible, any criminal history, as part of the assessment of an individual’s suitability to implement a
security control and/or for unescorted access to a security restricted area.
16. Baggage. Personal property of passengers or crew carried on an aircraft by agreement with the
operator.
17. Bomb threat. A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, which suggests, or infers, whether true
or false, that the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, or any airport or civil aviation facility or
any person may be in danger from an explosive or other item or device.
18. Cabin baggage. Baggage intended for carriage in the cabin of an aircraft.
19. Cargo. Any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or mishandled
baggage.
20. Catering stores. All items, other than catering supplies, associated with passenger in-flight services, for
example newspapers, magazines, headphones, audio and video tapes, pillows and blankets, amenity
kits, etc.
21. Catering supplies. Food, beverages, other dry stores and associated equipment used on board an
aircraft.
22. Certification. A formal evaluation and confirmation by or on behalf of the appropriate authority for
aviation security that a person possesses the necessary competencies to perform assigned functions to
an acceptable level as defined by the appropriate authority.
23. Comail. Abbreviation of aircraft operator company mail, shipped within the company’s network of
stations.
24. Comat. Abbreviation of aircraft operator company materials, shipped within the company’s network of
stations.
25. Commercial air transport operation. An aircraft operation involving the transport of passengers, cargo
or mail for remuneration or hire.
Handout 1.3
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Page 3 of 5
26. Contingency plan. A “proactive” plan to include measures and procedures addressing various threat
levels, risk assessments and the associated security measures to be implemented; designed to anticipate
and mitigate events as well as prepare all concerned parties having roles and responsibilities in case of
an actual act of unlawful interference. A contingency plan sets forth incremental security measures that
may be elevated as the threat increases. It may be a stand-alone plan or included as part of a Crisis
Management Plan.
27. Crew member. A person assigned by an operator to duty on an aircraft during a flight duty period.
28. Crisis management. Contingency measures implemented in response to increased threat levels as well
as the implementation of measures and procedures in response to the emergencies to include acts of
unlawful interference.
29. Dangerous goods. Articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety, property or
the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in Document 9284 —Technical
Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air or which are classified according to those
Instructions.
30. Deportee. A person who had legally been admitted to a State by its authorities or who had entered a
State illegally, and who at some later time is formally ordered by the competent authorities to leave that
State.
Note. — The competent authorities may provide an escort for such persons.
31. Disruptive passenger. A passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on board an
aircraft or to follow the instructions of the airport staff or crew members and thereby disturbs the good
order and discipline at an airport or on board the aircraft.
32. Explosive substance. Solid or liquid substance (or mixture of substances) which is in itself capable by
chemical reaction of emitting gases at such a temperature, pressure and speed as to cause damage in
the surrounding area. This definition includes pyrotechnic substances, even if they do not emit gases.
Those substances that are in themselves not explosive but may produce an explosive atmosphere of gas,
vapour or dust are not included.
33. Facilitation. The efficient management of a necessary control process, with the objective of expediting
the clearance of persons or goods and preventing unnecessary operational delays.
34. Hijacking: Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (i) Unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by
any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of that aircraft, or attempts to perform any
such act, or (ii) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act, commits
the offence of hijacking that aircraft.
35. Gate-no-show. Passenger who has checked-in but does not show up for boarding
36. Inadmissible person. A person who is or will be refused admission to a State by its authorities.
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Handout 1.3
Page 4 of 5
37. In-flight security officer. A person who is authorized by the government of the State of the Operator and
the government of the State of Registration to be deployed on an aircraft with the purpose of protecting
that aircraft and its occupants against acts of unlawful interference. This excludes persons employed to
provide exclusive personal protection for one or more specific people travelling on the aircraft, such as
personal bodyguards.
38. Landside. The area of an airport and buildings to which both travelling passengers and the non-
travelling public have unrestricted access (see also Non-restricted area).
39. Person with disabilities (reduced mobility). Any person whose mobility is reduced due to a physical
incapacity (sensory or locomotor), an intellectual deficiency or any other cause of disability, age, or
illness, when using air transport, and whose situation requires special attention and the adaptation to
the person’s needs of the services made available to all passengers.
40. Pilot-in-command. The pilot responsible for the operation and safety of an aircraft during flight time.
41. Profiling. Systematic observation of persons and baggage and questioning if necessary to categorize
them into two groups i.e. threatening and non threatening so that more attention can be paid to the
threatening category.
42. Restricted articles. Articles which are, in the specific context of aviation security, defined as those
articles, devices or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference against civil
aviation or which may endanger the safety of an aircraft and its occupants, installations or the public.
43. Sabotage. An act or omission intended to cause malicious or wanton destruction of property,
endangering or resulting in unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its facilities.
44. Screening. The application of technical or other means which are intended to identify and/or detect
weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances which may be used to commit an
act of unlawful interference.
45. Security. Safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This objective is achieved by a
combination of measures and human and material resources.
46. Security control. A means by which the introduction of weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices,
articles or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference can be prevented.
47. Security inspection. An examination of the implementation of relevant national civil aviation security
programme requirements by an airline, airport, or other entity involved in security.
48. Security programme. Measures adopted to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful
interference.
49. Security restricted area. Those areas of the airside of an airport which are identified as priority risk
areas where in addition to access control, other security controls are applied. Such areas will normally
include, inter alia, all commercial aviation passenger departure areas between the screening checkpoint
and the aircraft, the ramp, baggage make-up areas, including those where aircraft are being brought
into service and screened baggage and cargo are present, cargo sheds, mail centres, airside catering and
aircraft cleaning premises.
Handout 1.3
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Page 5 of 5
50. Sterile area. The area between any passenger inspection or screening control point and aircraft, into
which access is strictly controlled (see also Security restricted area).
51. Terminal. The main building or group of buildings where the processing of commercial passengers and
cargo and the boarding of aircraft occurs.
52. Transit passengers. Passengers departing from an airport on the same flight as that on which they
arrived.
53. Travel document. A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization,
which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel .
54. Unidentified baggage. Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage tag, which is not picked up by
or identified with a passenger.
55. Unruly passengers. Persons who commit, on board a civil aircraft, from the moment when the aircraft
door is closed prior to takeoff to the moment when it is reopened after landing, an act of:
• assault, intimidation, menace or wilful recklessness which endangers good order or the safety of
property or persons;
• assault, intimidation, menace or interference with a crew member in the performance of duties or which
lessens the ability to perform duties;
• wilful recklessness or damage to an aircraft, its equipment, or attendant structures and equipment such
as to endanger good order and the safety of the aircraft or its occupants;
• communication of information which is known to be false, thereby endangering the safety of an aircraft
in flight; and
• Disobedience of lawful commands or instructions for safe, orderly or efficient operations.
56. Vulnerable point. Any facility on or connected with an airport, which, if damaged or destroyed, would
seriously impair the functioning of the airport.
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Handout 1.4
Page 1 of 3
Abbreviations
1. AAI - Airports Authority of India

2. AC – Aerodrome Committee
3. ACI - Airport Council International
4. ACS - Assistant Commissioner of Security
5. ACOS (CA) - Additional Commissioner of Security Civil Aviation
6. AEC - Airport Entry Card
7. AIT – Armed Intervention Team
8. ASG - Aviation Security Group
9. ASTC – Aviation Security Training Centre
10. ASTI – Aviation Security Training Institute
11. ASTP - Aviation Security Training Package
12. AWO – Air Worthiness Officer
13. ANFO - Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil
14. AHCR - Anti-Hijacking Control Room
15. AHCP - Anti-Hijacking Contingency Plan
16. AVSEC – Aviation Security
17. BCAS - Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
18. BDDS - Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad
19. BTAC - Bomb Threat Assessment Committee
20. BTCP - Bomb Threat Contingency Plan
21. BWAF - Bomb Warning Assessment Form
22. CASO - Chief Airport Security Officer
23. CBRN – Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear
24. CC – Central Committee
25. CISF - Central Industrial Security Force
26. CTCP - Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan
27. CCCR - Central Committee Control Room
28. CCS – Cabinet Committee on Security
29. CLIP - Caller Line Identification Program
30. COE - Controller of Explosives
31. COMAT – Company Material
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32. COSAH - Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijacking
33. COSCA - Commissioner of Security Civil Aviation
34. DAW – Directorate of Air Worthiness
35. DG – Dangerous Goods
36. DGR – Dangerous Goods Regulation
37. DGCA - Directorate General of Civil Aviation
38. DIP - Diplomatic Mail
39. EOD - Explosive Ordinance Disposal
40. ECAC – European Civil Aviation Conference
41. HNT – Hostage Negotiation Team
42. IATA - International Air Transport Association
43. IB – Intelligence Bureau
44. ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organisation
45. ICPO - International Criminal Police Organisation
46. IED - Improvised Explosive Device
47. IFSO – In-flight Security Officer
48. INAD – In Admissible Passenger
49. LEG’s - Liquid Explosives and Gels
50. LAG’s - Liquid Aerosols and Gels
51. MCA - Ministry of Civil Aviation
52. MHA - Ministry of Home Affairs
53. MANPADS - Man Portable Air Defence System
54. MZDFMD - Multi Zone Door Frame Metal Detector
55. NCASTP - National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme
56. NCASQCP - National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme
57. NCASP - National Civil Aviation Security Programme
58. NSG – National Security Guards
59. PIC – Pilot in Command
60. PSO – Personal Security Officer
61. QRT – Quick Reaction Team
62. RA – Restricted Article / Restricted Area
63. RDCOS – Regional Deputy Commissioner of Security
64. RDX – Researched and Developed Explosive
65. SARP – Standards and Recommended Practices
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66. SHA – Security Hold Area
67. SLPC – Secondary Ladder Point Checks
68. SOP – Standard Operating Procedure
69. SRA – Security Restricted Area
70. SPG – Special Protection Group
71. TNT – Tri Nitro Toluene
72.
73.
74.
75.
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Handout 1.5
Page 1 of 5
Threats to Civil Aviation
Introduction
It is the responsibility of Civil Aviation Security set up in India and International Civil Aviation Security regime
to assure protection and safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel, general public, aircraft and facilities of
airports against act of unlawful interference perpetrated on the ground or in flight. This is carried out by
combination of measures and marshalling of various human and material resources on international, national
and airport level.
The aviation industry is still the most threatened one at present time and would remain so in future. Airports
and airlines are soft targets for terrorist attacks. Any sabotage / explosion at airports or in aircraft shatter
public confidence in the States machinery. Such acts have high news-value and the terrorist group gains
publicity with very low investment.
What is Threat?
It is defined as "the probability of an attack being attempted against a target within a specified time frame”.
What is Vulnerability?
Vulnerability is those characteristics of a target which could be exploited in an attack.
What is Risk?
Risk is the probability that an attack will be attempted and will be successful
RISK = THREAT x VULNERABILITY
Terrorism
What is Terrorism?
Terrorism is an act of placing someone in extreme fear. It is the unlawful use of violence against the Public to
intimidate a Government.
Factors contributing to terrorism:

▪ Religious factors
▪ Economic conditions of a country
▪ Natural disasters
▪ Political factors
▪ Social recognition
The supports needed by the terrorist organizations:
▪ Financial support
▪ Motivated manpower
▪ Support of Public
▪ Arms & Ammunition
▪ Media
▪ Training
Handout 1.5
Page 2 of 5
Who are the Terrorists?
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• Terrorists are generally people who feel alienated from society and have a grievance or regard themselves
as victims of an injustice.
• Terrorists are devoted to their political or religious cause and do not regard their violent actions as
criminal.
• Terrorists are ruthless and show no fear, pity or remorse.
Characteristics of Terrorists
• Target specific individuals on an aircraft, such as Diplomats or VIPs
• Engender fear of flying in the general public and disrupt normal life; and
• Obtain the release of prisoners, perhaps from their own group
• They operate in small groups or complex networks
• They are usually well organized
• Have access to necessary resources such as money, technical expertise, weapons, explosives and
sometimes supported by governments or States; and
• Aims are political in nature
Characteristics of Criminals
Attacks on Civil Aviation by criminal groups or individuals are rare and their motivation is
• Monetary gain or
• Extortion
• Personal gains
• Difficult to classify
• Unpredictable
Threats to civil aviation operations:

Why is aviation an attractive target?
• Instant Publicity
• Aircraft possesses Inherent Mobility
• Different Nationalities Involved
• Aircraft Can Be Easily Taken in Control
• Aircraft Itself Can Be Used As a Missile
• Small Amount of Explosive Is Sufficient to Cause Huge Damage
• Adverse impact on tourism thereby furthering the terrorist cause
• Excellent Means of extortion
• Economic damage to the country
• Economic damage to the airline
• Carriers are seen as flag bearers
• Large number of people in a confined area
The conventional types of threat to civil aviation are hijacking and sabotage.
• Hijacking of aircraft
• Sabotage of aircraft
• Terrorist attack at airports (Terminal Concourse, Check-in, Passenger & Baggage search areas)
• Sabotage of airports
Handout 1.5
Page 3 of 5
• Attacks against off-airport locations (crew accommodation, national carrier ticket offices, cargo facilities,
ANS equipment).
• Criminal Acts or Damage
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The threats to civil aviation are normally stated as acts of unlawful interference which include:-
ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a
civil aviation facility.
New and Emerging threats:
No one in the past had ever thought of that aircraft loaded with fuel could be used as a weapon of mass
destruction as in the case of World Trade Centre. It has resulted killing of over three thousands people from
70 countries. Today the terrorists are finding new methods to create fear among the traveling public and
government agencies. These new type of threat is termed as emerging threat. Few example of emerging
threat are:
• Suicide attack on ground facilities
• Misuse of aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction
• Misuse of nuclear and other radioactive substances
• Off airport facility attack.
• Threat from biological weapons
• Threat from chemical and dangerous substances
• Air to air attack by aircraft or by missile
• Ground to air attack by missiles.
• Cyber terrorism
• Attack through electronic systems to misguide the air traffic communications to the aircraft.
• Attack by magnetic systems.
Where can the threats come from?

• Terrorist disguised as a passenger with the intent to hijack the plane
• A terrorist may infiltrate a piece of luggage containing an explosive device directly onto the conveyor belt
• Using naïve passenger to infiltrate a bomb into their luggage
• Explosive device concealed at the check in area set to explode during the operations
• Direct attack
• Explosive device placed at the boarding gate area
• Passenger used after check-in
• Interline passengers and baggage
• Cargo/Courier infiltration
Handout 1.5
Page 4 of 5
• Catering infiltration
• Airport employees
• Terrorist disguised as an airport worker
• Explosive device or weapon left on board to be used on the second leg of the flight
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Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking)
Who are the offenders?

• Individuals
• Criminals,
• Refugees,
• Psychotics.
• Terrorists.
Objectives of these hijackers

• Criminal activities
• Personal
• Political, seekers asylum
What are the techniques used for hijacking?

In order to execute a hijack of an aircraft, the perpetrator must be able to coerce the pilot-in-command.
Therefore, it is necessary to:
• Smuggle weapons onto the aircraft (examples of how this has been done ranges from concealment in toys
to false prosthetics)
• Possible collusion with or bribery of airport or airline staff
• Armed assault. This has been has been used on several occasions
The types of weapons used vary and may include pistols, automatic weapons, explosive charges, knives, or
flammable material.
Sabotage:
Sabotage techniques
Most sabotage devices targeted against aircraft are either explosive or incendiary devices and can
even be a combination of the two. Other means can be use of dangerous goods, chemicals or
incendiaries
The saboteur needs to have access to the aircraft to plant the device or place the device on the
aircraft using passenger baggage, air cargo, catering or other stores loaded onto the aircraft prior to
flight. The most common means of infiltrating sabotage devices in the past have been:
• Infiltration of device into baggage;
• Collusion with airport or airline staff to place device on aircraft;
• Subterfuge, use of an unsuspecting dupe
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Handout 1.5
Page 5 of 5
Sabotage of airports
Certain critical areas of an airport are vital to the continued operation of an airport, namely:
• Runway;
• Passenger terminal buildings;
• Navigational aids;
• Electrical power supplies;
• Air Traffic Control communications;
• Aviation fuel storage;
• Rescue and fire-fighting services.
Any sabotage to the above facilities can seriously impair the functioning of the airport.
Suicide bomber
While most successful saboteurs move away from the event of the device activation the suicidal saboteur is
ready to kill himself for the cause.
Whether a religious, political or nationalistic fanatic, these individuals or groups present a formidable threat
to today’s security measures.
These offenders may endeavor to achieve sabotage by:
• Carrying the device on their person; or
• Providing the means to have a device boarded through their checked baggage.
Counter Measures to prevent act of unlawful interference
The countermeasures developed to prevent any act of unlawful interference against Civil Aviation are as
under:
• A dedicated ASG has been inducted at airports.

• Deployment of sky marshals on selected routes.
• Secondary security checks by airlines security staff at the ladder points.
• Strengthening of cockpit.
• Revision of contingency plan
• Installation of Caller ID (CLIP)
• By wide publicity in local newspaper if caller is identified
• Prompt evaluation of call with help of BWAF
• Training of employees.
• Up gradation of EDS / EDDS.
• Conduct periodical mock up exercise.
• Centralized monitoring of CCTV by APSU, customs proposal under consideration.
Conclusion:
Attacks against aviation targets which have taken place in the past, made the world aware that civil aviation
has become an attractive target for terrorists.
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Handout 1.6
Page 1 of 9
List Of Significant Acts Of Unlawful Interference
21 Feb 1931: 01st Hijacking in the world

The first recorded aircraft hijack took place on February 21, 1931, in Peru. The pilot Byron Richards, was
approached on the ground by armed revolutionaries. He refused to fly them anywhere and after a ten day
stand-off Richards was informed that the revolution was successful and he could go in return for giving one
group member a lift to Lima.
31 Jan 1971: 01st Hijacking in India

The first hijacking in India occurred in 1971. An Indian Airlines flight from Srinagar to Delhi was forced to fly to
Lahore by a former associate of Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF). All the passengers were released but
the aircraft was blown up.
Jun 1985: Kanishka Tragedy (Air india)

Air India Flight 182 operating on the Montréal - London - Delhi route. On 23 June 1985, the Air India airplane
named after Emperor Kanishka was blown up by a bomb while in Irish airspace crashed into the Atlantic
Ocean over the Cork Island. 329 people perished including the crew members. The incident was the largest
mass murder in modern Canadian history. The explosion and downing of the carrier occurred within an hour
of the related Narita airport bombing.
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Handout 1.6
Page 2 of 9
23 Jun 1985: Narita Incident

Air India incident resulted in loss of life of all on board, together with explosion at Narita Airport (Japan)
during transfer of baggage to Air India aircraft.
2 Apr 1986: TWA Rome : Athens Bombing

A seat bomb exploded on TWA 840 flight while descending at Athens Greece. The bomb which was less than
one pound was triggered by a countdown battery. The attack killed four U.S. citizens who were sucked
through a hole made by the blast, although the plane safely landed.
3rd May 1986: Air Lanka Bombing

Flight UL 512 was supposed to fly from Colombo to Maldives but the aircraft was blown at Colombo Airport.
The explosive were infiltrated to Cargo Consignment Containing Tea. There were 128 Pax on Board but 17
were Killed & 41 Injured.
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Handout 1.6
Page 3 of 9
December 21, 1988: Lockerbie, Scotland.
Pan Am Flight 103 departing from Frankfurt to New York was blown up in midair, killing all 259 passengers and
another 11 people on the ground in Scotland. Two Libyan agents were found responsible for planting a
sophisticated suitcase bomb onboard the plane.
2 October 1990: Hijack of Xiamen Airlines (China). The presumed hijacker attacked pilot during landing and
the aircraft went out of control and collided with another aircraft, killing 127 persons and injuring 53.
24th Dec 1999: Hijacking of IC – 814

IC – 814 aircraft bound for New Delhi was hijacked from Katmandu It had 188 pax on board. The Plane denied
landing at Lahore and was diverted to military base in UAE. The aircraft eventually landed at Kandahar. One
pax Mr. Ripan Katyal was killed in UAE.
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Handout 1.6
Page 4 of 9
24th July 2001: Colombo airport attack

The Bandaranaike Airport attack (Colombo Airport Attack) was an assault by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Elam (LTTE) on Bandaranaike International Airport, on July 24, 2001. 8 Air Force Planes, 3 Air Lankan Airlines
aircrafts completely destroyed & 3 Air Lankan aircrafts were damaged. The attack was one of the boldest the
LTTE has mounted during its war with the Sri Lankan government, and had a profound impact on the country's
military, economy, and airline industry.
11th September 2001: US Attacks

The September 11 attacks (also referred 9/11) were a series of four suicide attacks that were committed in
the United States on September 11, 2001, coordinated to strike the areas of New York City and Washington,
D.C. 19 terrorists from the Islamist militant group al-Qaeda hijacked four passenger jets. The hijackers
intentionally piloted two of those planes, American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175, into the
Twin Towers of the World Trade Center complex in New York City; both towers collapsed within two hours.
The hijackers also intentionally crashed American Airlines Flight 77 into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia,
and intended to pilot the fourth hijacked jet, United Airlines Flight 93, into a target in Washington, D.C.;
however, the plane crashed into a field near Shanks ville, Pennsylvania after its passengers attempted to take
control of the jet from hijackers. Nearly 3,000 people died in the attacks including the 227 civilians and
19 hijackers aboard the four planes, none of whom survived.
- 23 -
Handout 1.6
Page 5 of 9
22nd December 2001: Shoe Bomber

On December 22, 2001, passengers on American Airlines Flight 63 from Paris, France to Miami, Florida
complained of a smoke smell in the cabin shortly after a meal service. One flight attendant, thinking she
smelled a burnt match, walked the aisles of the plane, trying to assess the source. A passenger pointed to
Richard Reid, who was sitting alone near a window and attempting to light a match.
28 Nov 2002: Arkia Airlines Mombasa – Tel Aviv

Arkia Israel Airlines Flight 582 took off from Moi International Airport, Mombasa, Kenya when shortly after
take-off the aircraft was shot at by two surface to air missiles which narrowly missed the plane. The pilots
decided to carry on with the flight and landed the aircraft safely at Ben Gurion International Airport, Tel Aviv,
Israel. The attack left two trails behind the left wings. Passengers on the flight reported seeing small
explosions before the aircraft rocked slightly.
- 24 -
Handout 1.6
Page 6 of 9
Aug 2006 : Terror Plot against US bound Flights from UK
Terrorist’s allegedly targeted flights included aircraft bound for Montreal, Toronto, San Francisco, Chicago,
New York, and Washington, DC.
Searches of the flat purchased by the group produced many components with the ability to create liquid
improvised explosive devices that could be assembled and detonated on an aircraft.
The main ingredient of the explosives mixture was hydrogen peroxide mixed with other organic materials.
THIS PLOT IF EXECUTED COULD HAVE TAKEN OVER 1500 LIVES.

After this incident the LAG’s were introduced and restriction on carrying more than 100 ml of liquid items was
implemented. It was made mandate that if Pax who want to carry than 100 ml of liquid in carryon baggage
should carry it in STEB.
December 25, 2009: Northwest Airlines Flight 253 (Schiphol Incident)

There was an international passenger (Umar Farook Abdul Mutallab) flying from Amsterdam to Detroit. The
flight was the target of a failed Al-Qaeda bombing attempt on Christmas Day, in which the passenger tried to
set off plastic explosives sewn to his underwear. There were 290 people on board the plane, which was
operated by Northwest Airlines. The small explosive device caused only a small fire inside the plane, which
was extinguished by a flight attendant. The man was subdued by the passengers and crew. There were only 3
minor injuries on that flight.
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Handout 1.6
Page 7 of 9
28th & 29th October 2010: IED in Cargo from Sanaa (Yemen) – Ink Bomb
On October 28, one package left Sana'a, Yemen, on a passenger plane, flying to Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
It then was flown onward on a UPS cargo plane to Cologne/Bonn Airport in Germany, where UPS Airlines has a
hub. There, it was switched to UPS Flight 232, a Boeing 767 cargo plane bound for East Midlands Airport in
Leicestershire. From there, it was to fly on to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and then on to O'Hare International
Airport in Chicago.
On October 29, 2010, the UPS plane landed at East Midlands Airport at 2:13 AM local time. British authorities
had been alerted to the existence of the bomb, and British military and police explosives experts waiting for
the plane conducted an initial search of the plane's cargo in the airport's UPS parcels distribution depot.
Officers from the Scotland Yard Counter Terrorism Command joined them. An Explosive Device was found in
the Ink Cartridge of a printer.
25 Jan, 2011: Moscow Incident

A dual suicide attack at Moscow's main commercial airport left 35 people dead and 130 injured. The blast,
which happened at 4.30pm local time in the arrivals hall of Domodedovo Airport, was caused by a bomb with
7kg of TNT.
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Handout 1.6
Page 8 of 9
Historical review
1 First hijacking in the world The first recorded aircraft hijack took place on February 21,
1931 in Lima, (Peru).
2 1969 Year of maximum Hijackings – 87 Aircrafts hijacked, 71 from
Cuba.
3 First hijacking in India 30th Jan, 1971, Indian Airlines flight from Srinagar to Jammu
taken to Lahore.
4 Post First Hijacking in India Rule 8 A of Aircraft Rule 1937 was being implemented.
5 Second hijacking in India Indian Airlines Aircraft hijacked on 10th Sep, 1976, Mumbai
to Delhi taken to Lahore.
6 Post Second hijacking in India Shri B.D. Pandey committee was formed in 1976
7 18th Jan, 1978 Formation of DCAS as a cell under DGCA on the
recommendation of Shri B.D. Pandey Committee
8 2nd August, 1984 A Bomb Explosion at Chennai (Meenabakkam) airport.
9 Post Chennai Airport Explosion Bomb Threat Contingency Plan was Implemented.
10 23rd Jun, 1985 • Sabotage of Air India aircraft Kanishka Tragedy over
Atlantic Ocean.
• Explosion at Narita airport (Japan) during transfer of
baggage to Air India aircraft.
11 Post Kanishka Tragedy Justice B.N Kirpal, Commission was setup.
Following security measures were introduced
• Identification of baggage-Mandatory
• Reconciliation of baggage was introduced
• Re-identification of registered baggage on interline
station by passenger
• Checking of baggage manually even after X-ray screening
• Inspection of security arrangements of national air-
carriers at foreign stations by BCAS officers
12 1st April, 1987 BCAS was formed as a Regulatory Authority on Civil Aviation
Security under MCA.
13 3rd May 1986 Sabotage of Air Lanka aircraft at Colombo airport. Explosives
send through tea consignment in cargo.
LTTE rebels bombed Air Lanka plane at Colombo airport,
killing 16 people
14 21st Dec 1988 Pan Am 103 incident resulted in death of 259 persons on
board aircraft, as well as 11 persons on the ground at
Lockerbie (Scotland).
15 Post Lockerbie Marking of Plastic Explosive for the purpose of detection.
16 24th Dec 1994 Air France aircraft seized at Algerian airport by four persons
dressed as airline staff - three hostages killed. Aircraft flown
to Marseilles (France) where four hijackers killed.
17 24th Dec 1999 Hijack of Indian Airlines (IC-814) operating from Kathmandu
(Nepal) to Delhi (India). Finally taken to Kandahar
(Afghanistan)
18 Post Kandahar Incident • Introduction of CISF as ASG in Feb 2000
• Secondary Ladder point checks (SLPC) introduced in
January 2000
- 27 -
• Introduction of Sky Marshals
• Modernization / up gradation of electronic detection
devices
• Preventing an Hijacked aircraft to take off from Indian
soil, once it lands
• Review of contingency plans
19 06 Feb 2000 Ariana Afghan Airlines B-727 was hijacked after take-off from
Kabul Airport and landed at stanstead Airport, London.
The purpose of hijacking was asylum.
20 24 July 2001 Colombo Airport (Bandaranaike Airport) attack by LTTE.
21 Post Colombo Attack • Raising of Perimeter wall to the prescribed height
• Access control system strengthened
• Security of parked aircraft at night
• Modernization / up gradation of electronic detection
devices
22 11th September 2001 Attack by Al Qaida using 04 Aircrafts as a weapon of Mass
destruction in USA.
23 Post 11th Sept. Attack • Strengthening of cockpit doors
• Locking of cockpit doors
• Implementation of strict pre-embarkation security checks
• Deployment of sky marshals
• Ban on steel / metallic cutlery with sharp edges.
24 22nd December 2001 • Richard Reid (Shoe Bomber), a member of Al Qaeda,
boarded American Airlines from Paris to Miami.
Passenger was on Aerial suicide mission.
• Shoe Scanning through XBIS was introduced.
• Carriage of Lighters & Matchbox in the aircraft is
prohibited.
25 28th November 2002 Arkia Airlines (Israel) shot at by shoulder launched surface-to-
air missiles on departure from Mombassa, Kenya.
26 August 2006 (Heathrow
Attempt to blow up 11 aircraft with the liquid explosive TATP.
Airport Attack)
27 Post (Heathrow Airport) Restrictions on carriage of more than 100ml of liquid in cabin
baggage
28 Moscow Airport A passenger exploded himself in the Moscow airport
29 Post Moscow Random screening at the entry gate of the terminal building.
Strengthening of security towards city side.
- 28 -
Handout 1.7
Page 1 of 3
Civil Aviation Security Set Up In India
History
The BCAS initially set up as Directorate of Civil Aviation Security (DCAS) on 18 Jan, 1978, as a cell under the
DGCA on the recommendation of the B D Pandey Committee, in the wake of the hijacking of Indian airlines on
the 10th Sept 1976.
The BCAS was organised into an independent organisation on 01st April 1987 under the Ministry of Civil
Aviation on the recommendation of Justice Kirpal Commission formed to investigate Kanishka tragedy .
BCAS is the regulatory authority for civil aviation security in India. It is headed by an officer of the rank of
Director General of Police and is designated as Commissioner of Security (Civil Aviation).
COSCA is the appropriate authority for implementation of Annexure-17 to Chicago convention of

International Civil Aviation Organization.
COSCA is responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of NCASP.
COSCA, BCAS under powers conferred to him by Government of India through MCA notification number 1797
dt. 03rd July 1997 under section 5A of aircraft act 1934, has the authority to issue the AVSEC Orders and
Circulars.
Roles / Functions / Duties /Responsibilities of BCAS
Laying down AVSEC norms in accordance with ICAO Annex-17 to Chicago convention for Airport Operators,
Airline operators and their security agencies responsible for implementation AVSEC measures.
Monitoring the implementation of Security rules and regulations and carrying out survey of security needs.
Ensure that the persons implementing security controls are appropriately trained and possess all competencies
required to perform their duties.
Planning policy on civil aviation as per ICAO guidelines, to prepare contingency plan, to prepare NCASP and
formulation of Policies.
Coordination among different organizations on AVSEC matters.
Conducting surprise / dummy checks to test professional efficiency and alertness of security staff. Conducting
mock exercise to efficacy of contingency plan and operational preparedness of various agencies.
Advising the Govt. of India on Security matters
Technical Evaluation of equipments used in aviation security.
- 29 -
Handout 1.7
Page 2 of 3
Responsibilities of COSCA:
• Establish, Develop, implement, maintain and review the NCASP, NCASTP, NCASQCP in India in accordance
with Annexure 17.
• Issue necessary directions on AVSEC
• Respond immediately to meet any increased security threat
• Allocate the responsibilities and ensure coordination amongst various agencies responsible for
implementation of the various aspects of the NCASP.
• Designate an authority at each aerodrome serving Civil Aviation who shall be responsible for coordinating
and implementation of security controls.
• Establish Aerodrome Security Committee (APSC) at each aerodrome serving civil aviation for coordinating
the implementation of security controls and procedures as specified in the airport / aerodrome security
programme.
• Arrange for security audit, test, survey and inspection to be conducted on a regular basis
Role of Aviation Security Group (ASG) / Airport Security Unit (APSU)
Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) has been entrusted with security of airports in India. They are termed
as Aviation Security Group (ASG). Wherever the State / Union Territory Police is responsible for security they
are termed as Airport Security Unit (APSU). The In-charge of CISF at an airport is designated as the Chief
Airport Security Officer (CASO) and is responsible for enforcement of security measures at an airport.
The primary role / responsibilities of the ASG is as under:
• Surveillance and patrol of all airport terminal areas;

• Surveillance of arriving/ departing passengers for persons who may pose threat to civil aviation;
• Pre-embarkation screening of passengers and hand baggage;
• Ensure security control are applied for cargo, catering items, company stores, mails, unaccompanied
baggage and courier bags by agencies concerned.
• Ensure no prohibited items gain access into an airport.
• Maintain strict security system in the sterile lounge to prevent contamination of the security cleared
passengers;
• Provision of specialist response, including but not limited to:
o anti-terrorist units,
o armed intervention,
o hostage negotiation and
o explosive devices disposal;
• Action in the event of contingency and unlawful interference at the airports in accordance with the
guidelines contained in the Contingency Plan of the concerned airport;
• Airport Security in-charge will ensure strict implementation of PIC instructions issued by the Appropriate
Authority;
• Issue daily pass on authorization by the BCAS at metro airport;
• Enforce access control measures at the airports.
• Impart aviation security training to security personnel in accordance with the National Civil Aviation
Security Training Programme;
• Implement and monitor Airport Aviation Security Quality Control Programme;
• Any other AVSEC responsibilities allocated by the Commissioner.
Handout 1.7
Page 3 of 3
- 30 -
Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad (BDDS)
The ASG’s BDDS unit is responsible for the following functions
• Detection and disposal of Explosive Devices.
• Attending bomb threat calls of aircraft and terminal buildings
• Handling of unclaimed and suspected baggage.
• Disposal / Demolition of confirm threat / IED.
• Store Explosive used in demolition of IEDs.
• Participate in the BTAC.
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Handout 2.1
Page 1 of 1
Module 02
Development of Counter Measures
What Is Unlawful Interference
An illegal interference with international civil aviation, “acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or
do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeopardize good order and
discipline on board”. Available in the Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful
Interference (Doc 8973 — Restricted) is a comprehensive definition of unlawful interference. However, from
the crew’s perspective, the three major forms of unlawful interference are unruly passenger, hijacking and
bomb threat.
Development of Security Measures
To prevent attacks against civil aviation, it became necessary for the industry to develop security measures.
These security measures can be said to be either:
• Legislative: Legislative measures include the development by ICAO of legal instruments, such as the ICAO
Conventions relating to security.
• Technical: Technical measures are the development of ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
contained in Annex 17 of the Chicago Convention and the development of AVSEC Programmes at a
national, airport and airline level.
• Physical: Physical measures include preventive procedures, such as the screening of passengers and their
baggage and controlling the movement of people at an airport, protection of aircraft, catering, stores,
cargo, etc.
The Security Measures include the following:
• Baseline security measures

In general terms, this can be described as a normal threat situation where, while there is no intelligence
to indicate that any air carrier or airport has been targeted for attack, there is always the possibility of
unlawful interference by groups and individuals about which there is no intelligence or from criminals,
the mentally disturbed, disaffected employees and the general public. At this level, baseline measures
need to be in place at all times to manage the possible risk.
• Enhanced threat measures

Intelligence indicates the probability (relatively high probability vs. that for Level One) that a particular
air carrier or air carriers and/or a particular airport or airports have been targeted for attack. At this
level, baseline security measures should be enhanced to manage the increased risk.
• Contingency planning for periods of extreme threat

Intelligence indicates that an air carrier and/or airport have been specifically targeted for attack. At this
level, baseline security measures should be further enhanced to manage the increased risk
- 32 -
Handout 2.2
Page 1 of 3
Aviation Security Role Of Air Crew Members
Security Responsibilities and Awareness
It is the responsibility of everyone to be aware of the need to be alert and vigilant in order to assist in
preventing attacks against aviation. General security awareness applies to any business that has assets to be
protected from inside or outside interference
Security Responsibilities of Air Crew

• Cooperate with and assist security personnel in the implementation of the aircraft operator, airport and
national security programmes;
• Conduct security checks and searches of aircraft to detect weapons or explosive devices which may have
been placed on the aircraft;
• Ensure that passengers, staff, baggage, cargo, mail and all items carried on board an aircraft have been
subject to security control; and
• Respond to acts of unlawful interference or threats of such acts in accordance with the aircraft operator
security programme and prescribed aviation security procedures.
Avoid being Naïve:

Naïve means showing unaffected simplicity or lack of experience, judgment or information. The crew
members should not be naïve and can take precautions to being naïve with the following actions –
• Don’t accept packages from people you have not known for a long period of time.
• Never leave your baggage unattended
• Open and check your bags if you have left them in an hotel room, office, or with a porter
• When purchasing a product overseas, ensure it is wrapped in front of you.
• If you are given something by somebody or do leave your baggage unattended …….. Declare it
• Don’t check-in baggage for other people
• Don’t look after the baggage of strangers at airports
• Be aware of date rape
• Only have electrical items repaired by recognized retail outlets
• Only purchase goods at airports from recognized airport shops
• Don’t lend baggage or electrical items to people you have not known for a long time
• Don’t allow hotel staff to pack your baggage
Personal Security Awareness

Crew must ensure that the operator’s aviation security measures are implemented and that they set an
example by complying with the airline and airport security procedures. Crews should ensure that they:
• Do not leave crew baggage and personal items unattended.
• Do not accept items from any person for carriage on the aircraft.
• Protect items of uniform, identification cards and permits.
• Protect crew documents such as licenses and manuals; and
• Challenge unidentified people at all times who are near, or attempting to board an aircraft, or are within a
security restricted area
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Handout 2.2
Page 2 of 3
Stay Secure:
The Crew members while on duty or on layover have to go to various points viz Hotel, Airport, and Transport,
transiting or even socializing. The crew members must make sure that they are secure in all aspect and take
certain preventive measures or precautions to make themselves secure and safe.
Stay Secure At the Airport

• Lock your Luggage and keep it close by.
• Keep well away from unattended bags and do not use a mobile phone near them
• Where possible avoid long check-in queues, especially for higher risk airlines
• Don’t write your home address on the baggage label
Stay Secure in Transit

• Use approved taxis, avoid sharing
• Get your luggage out of the trunk before leaving
• Have the fare ready, separate from your wallet
Stay Secure at the Hotel

• Trust your Instincts
• Vary your routine when returning to your room
• Check for intruders, look for tampering
• Be discrete with your room number
• Watch out for hotel elevators
• Stay away from the window if you hear gun fire or bomb alarms
• Leave DO NOT DISTURB sign on door when out in the evening.
• Don’t take unexpected deliveries
Stay Safe Whilst Socializing

• Never leave your drink unattended
• Don’t draw attention to yourself
• Avoid sitting in outside cafes on the street
• Areas that attract lots of foreign customers can be easy targets.
• Don’t trust new acquaintances with sensitive information about yourself, your company or your
movements.
• Be aware of sexually transmitted diseases
• The sex industry poses a health risk and security risks to its punters
Crew Baggage:
Preventive measures include ensuring the protection of crew baggage:
• Whilst in transit from home/hotel/point of departure;
• By private/ public/ hotel and company transport.
• At airport/public areas/ banks/ restaurants/ toilets/ shops/ crew lounges.
• Within company or airport restricted areas such as crew reporting/ briefing/ meteorological offices/
transport pick-up/drop-off points; and within passenger lounges and gate areas.
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Handout 2.2
Page 3 of 3
Crew Uniform
Acts of unlawful interference have been assisted in the past using stolen uniforms. Therefore crew should:
• Not leave uniform items unattended or exposed in transport/public areas.
• Not lend uniforms for costume parties.
• When disposing of uniform components de-identify by removal of insignia, name bars, wings, stripes or
other identifying features.
• Report all losses / thefts immediately.
Identification Documents / Airport Permits

• Crew should set an example by always displaying their identification passes/permits and always wear and
display when in security restricted areas;
• Do not abuse use of ID / Permits when off-duty;
• Cooperate fully with security staff at control of entry points
• Produce ID/ permit when requested by police/ security/ airport officials.
Do not be afraid to challenge the identity and purpose of any unknown person around company property,
whether the crew is on or off duty.
Security is the responsibility of everyone and should be seen as an everyday component part of your job.
• Enhance your security
• Be ALERT
• Be OBSERVANT
• Act RESPONSIBLY
• Comply with the SECURITY PROCEDURES
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Handout 3.1
Page 1 of 7
Module 03
Legislation and Aviation Security Programme
Basic Principles and Philosophy for Aviation Security
The primary objective of international civil aviation security is to assure the protection and safeguarding of
passengers, crew, ground personnel, the general public and facilities of an airport serving international civil
aviation against “acts of unlawful interference perpetrated on the ground or in flight.”
The basic principles and philosophy for aviation security are as follows:
• Civil aviation shall operate from a safe and secure environment free from unlawful interference;
• States shall develop and implement such legislation and procedures as are necessary to ensure the safe
and secure environment;
• The security measures put in place shall be consistent with Standards and Recommended Practices as
promulgated by ICAO, and adequate to meet the threat; and
• States shall either prosecute or extradite any person(s) who unlawfully interfere with civil aviation of any
other State.
Aviation Security Countermeasures National regulations on Aviation Security shall comply with the
specifications made in the international conventions Annex 17and in ICAO’s. For example, training
programmes, quality control programs, airport and airline security programs can contribute to optimal
aviation security on a national level. The civil aviation industry has developed various countermeasures to
counter the threats. These countermeasures can be categorized as:
• Legislative
• Technical
• Physical
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Handout 3.2
Page 1 of 6
Legislative Measures International Conventions (Legal Instruments) International Conventions are

International legal Instruments by which Contracting States affirm their intention to enforce the terms and
provisions contained in these Conventions.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
The Chicago Convention of 1944 on International Civil Aviation was instrumental in the formation of
International Civil Aviation Organization on 4th April 1947. The organisation serves as a forum for cooperation
in all fields of Civil Aviation among its 191 member states.
India became signatory to the Chicago Convention on 04th April 1947. The ICAO is a specialised agency of the
United Nations and is responsible to promote safe and orderly development of International Civil Aviation
throughout the world. It sets standards and regulations necessary for Aviation safety, security, efficiency and
regularity, as well as for Aviation environmental protection.
ICAO has its headquarters in Montreal, Canada with 07 regional offices throughout the world.
ICAO has legislative powers by means of the SARPs provided by Annex 17. It also organises obligatory
security audits at States worldwide. The ICAO Security Manual contains guidelines on how to implement the
SARPs as provided by Annex 17.
International Conventions
Chicago Convention 1944

The Chicago Convention, officially called the Convention on International Civil Aviation, was signed on 7
December 1944. In 1947 it led to the establishment of International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The
governments that signed this convention agreed on certain principles and arrangements to allow a safe and
orderly development of International Civil Aviation. Furthermore, this convention defines that international
air transport services should be established on the basis of equal opportunities. This convention has 18
Annexes in total. The most important one concerning security issues is Annex 17, containing a description of
Standards and Recommended Practices that apply to aviation security.
Tokyo Convention 1963

The Tokyo Convention was established in 1963. The official name of the convention is the Convention on
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. The Tokyo convention only applies to offences
that are committed on board an aircraft in flight. This convention focuses on offences that jeopardise:
• The safety of the aircraft.
• The safety of the persons on boardthe aircraft.
• The good orderon board the aircraft.
• The penal code of the State of registry of the aircraft.
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Handout 3.2
Page 2 of 6
This convention grants certain rights to the pilot in Command (PIC), in order to ensure the safety and order
on board of his aircraft:
• Restrain passengers when they cause problems.
• Allow the crew to ask assistance from other passengers to overpower unruly passengers.
• Disembark unruly passengers at the next port of call.
This convention also contains some obligations. The State of landing should:
• Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge.
• Allow the pilot in charge to disembark unruly passengers, disregarding the State's visa or immigration
requirements.
• Take delivery of unruly passengers.
• Take unruly passengers into police custody until the prosecution or extradition is accomplished.
The Hague Convention 1970

The official name of the Hague Convention, established in 1970, is the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. This convention made the unlawful seizure of an aircraft (hijacking) an
international offence. The convention came into being following a year in which hijackings peeked: 73 acts of
unlawful seizure, mainly on flights from the USA to Cuba.
Contents of the Hague Convention

This convention obliges the States to:
• Make the unlawful seizure of an aircraft punishable by severe penalties.
• Extradite or prosecute offenders without exception. Both the State of landing and the State of registry of
the aircraft can exercise jurisdiction over these offenders.
• Restore the controlof the aircraft to the pilot in charge, not allowing the aircraft to take off to another
destination while the offenders are still in control of the aircraft.
• Report every occurrence to ICAO .
The Montreal Convention 1971

The official name of the Montreal Convention, established in 1971, is the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The primary focus of this convention was the sabotage of
an aircraft. This convention, established the term aircraft in service, extending the period from the pre-flight
preparation of the aircraft until 24 hours after the landing. In the early 70s, the number of acts of sabotage
increased considerably. These acts of sabotage were mainly aimed against Israeli targets.
Contents of the Montreal Convention

This convention defines the following offences:
• Violence against a person on the aircraft.
• Destroying or damaging the aircraft, thus endangering the safety of aircraft in flight.
• Placing on board a device likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.
• Destroying or damaging air navigation facilities, likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.
• Communicating false information, such as a bomb threat, likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.
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Handout 3.2
Page 3 of 6

• Make attempts and accomplices to offences also punishable by severe penalties.
• Extradite or prosecute offenders without exception. Both the State of landing as the State of registry of
the aircraft can exercise jurisdiction over these offenders.
• Take all practical measures, like pre-board screening of passengers, in order to prevent offences.
• Restore the controlof the aircraft to the pilot in charge, not allowing the aircraft to take off to another
destination while the offenders are still in control of the aircraft.
• Report every occurrence to ICAO .
Protocol to the Montreal Convention 1988

The official name of this protocol, added to the Montreal Convention in 1988, is the Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation offences
international. With this protocol, the definition of is broadened to all unlawful acts against a person or an
airport serving civil aviation, causing or likely to cause:
• Injury or death at an airport
• The destruction or serious damage to the facilities of the airport
• The destruction or serious damage to an aircraft not in service located in that airport
• The disruption of the airport's services
This protocol was created following a series of attacks on international airports that occurred after the
creation of the Montreal Convention in 1971.
The Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention 1991 (MEX CONVENTION)

The official name of the Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention, established in Montreal in 1991, is the
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purposes of Detection Convention. This convention focuses on the
detection of explosives. By 1990, a series of explosions on board an aircraft had a taken place, resulting in the
loss of uncountable lives and the destruction of multiple aircrafts. These explosions were most probably
caused by bombs placed in checked baggage of passengers who finally did not board the aircraft. Contents of
the Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention This convention allows the use of existing vapour detection
technology to detect plastic explosives. Marking agents should be added to plastic explosives by the
manufacturer.
• Prevent the production of unmarked explosives
• Prevent the movement of unmarked explosives through their territory
National Legislations
National Legislations Enactment of Acts in India to implement International Legal Instruments:- India is a
signatory to all the above conventions. The terms and provisions of international conventions are given legal
backup in India by virtue of following Acts:-
• Tokyo Convention Act – 1975
• Anti-Hijacking Act 1982 and amended in 1994 again being amended in 2010
• Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982 Amended in 1994
- 39 -
Handout 3.2
Page 4 of 6
Other National laws related to implementation and enforcement of National Civil Aviation Security
Programme and other related matters are as under:-
• The Aircraft Act, 1934
• The Aircraft Rules, 1937
• The Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003
• The Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
• The Indian Penal Code
• The Criminal Procedure Code
• The Evidence Act, 1872
• The Arms Act, 1925
• The Extradition Act,
• The Carriage by Air Act - 1972
• The Airport Authority of India Act. 1994
• The Restricted Areas Act
• The Prohibited areas Act
• The Immigration Act
• The Explosive Act
• Official Secret Act - 1926
• The Other Minor Acts connected with crimes against civil aviation and related matters.
• Orders and regulations o Gazette Notifications, AVSEC Orders, AVSEC Circulars and Directions issued by
appropriate authority to implement ‘National Civil Aviation Security Programme’.
• Airports Authority of India Regulations, 2000
Aircraft Acts (1934) and Aircraft Rules (1937)
The Aircraft Act, 1934

It extends to the whole of India and applies also-
(a) To citizens of India wherever they may be;
(b) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be;
(c) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered outside India but for the time being in or over India; and
(d) to an aircraft operated by a person who is not a citizen of India but has his principal place of business or
permanent residence in India.
Aircraft Acts (1934)
Section 4A Safety oversight functions

Section 5 Power of Central Government to make rules for Civil Aviation
Section 5A Power to issue directions (DGCA or any other officer empowered by Central Govt)
Section 7 Power of Central Government to make rules for investigation of accidents
Section 8 Power to detain aircraft
Power of Central Government to make rules for securing safe custody and re-
Section 8C
delivery of unclaimed property
Penalty for failure to comply with directions issued under section 5A (6 months
Section 11A
imprisonment or fine upto Rs. 10 Lakhs or both)
Handout 3.2
Page 5 of 6
- 40 -
The Aircraft Rules, 1937
The Aircraft Rules 1937, extends to the whole of India and apply also (unless the contrary intention appears) -
(a) To, and to persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be, expect cases falling under
sub-rule(4);
(b) To, and to persons on, all aircraft for the time being in or over India
Aircraft Rules (1937)
Rule 7 Documents to be carried in aircraft
Rule 7A Prohibition of carriage of persons without passport

Rule 7B Carriage of cock-pit check list in aircraft
Rule 8 Prohibition on carriage of arms, ammunition, explosives, military stores etc.
Rule 8A Security check of persons boarding aircraft at aerodrome
Rule 12 Prohibited areas
Prohibition on carriage of intoxicated person entering the aircraft (Operating
Rule 24
Crew)
Rule 24A Carriage of persons suffering from mental disorders or epilepsy in aircraft
Rule 24B Carriage of prisoners in aircraft
Rule 24C Carriage of animals, birds and reptiles in aircraft
Rule 25 Smoking in aircraft
Rule 27 Carriage of persons in unauthorized part of aircraft
Rule 29 Acts likely to imperil safety of aircraft
Rule 29B Prohibition on the use of portable electronic devices
Rule 29C Adoption of the Convention and Annexes
Rule 38A Carriage of operating crew
Rule 38B Carriage of a cabin crew
Rule 68 Notification of accidents
Rule 69 Report on accidents
Rule 77B Notification of Incidents
Rule 77C Investigation of an incident
Rule 90 Entry into Public Aerodromes

Prohibition of slaughtering and flaying of animals, depositing of rubbish and other
Rule 91
polluted or obnoxious matter in the vicinity of aerodrome
Rule 141 Duties of Pilot in command (Final Authority)
Inspection - (Empowers some of government officials authorized by Central
Rule 156 Government to enter aircraft for inspection, but are not exempted from frisking/
searching)
Penalties - (No persons contravening any of these rules shall, where no
Rule 161
punishment is provided for such contravention in the Aircraft Act, 1934)
Aircraft (Carriage of Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Air
- 41 -
Dangerous Goods)
Rules 2003
- 42 -
Handout 3.3
Page 1 of 2
Technical Measures
Annex 17
Annex 17 to the Chicago Convention was adopted in 1974 by the Council of ICAO. Its purpose is to safeguard
International Civil Aviation against acts of unlawful interference. Annex 17 contains Standards and
Recommended Practices (SARPs) that apply to aviation security.
The Standards and Recommended Practices are adopted and incorporated as Annexes to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation. There are 18 Annexure to the Chicago Convention Annex 17 deals with safe
guarding civil Aviation against the act of unlawful interference. The first edition of Annex 17 was being issued
nd th st
on 22 March 1974 and the current edition (9 ) was issued in March 2011 to be implemented from 01 July
2011. ICAO conducts Security Audit of each contacting state in order to review the compliance of Annex-17.
Standard Practice:
Specification necessary for the safety and regularity of international air navigation. ICAO contracting states
will conform in accordance with the Chicago Convention. When they fail to do so, they are required to inform
ICAO about this. In Annex 17, standards always contain the word shall. Examples of standard practice:
• Pre-embarkation security checks of passengers, crew, ground personnel
• Screening of hold baggage’s
• Background checks of personnel
• Each contracting state must have a written NCASP
Recommended Practice:
Specification desirable for the interest of safety and regulatory of international air navigation. ICAO
contracting states will endeavour to conform in accordance with the Chicago Convention. When a state does
not comply with a Recommended Practice, they are invited to inform ICAO about this. In annex 17,
recommended practices always contain the word should.
Examples of recommended practice:
• SLPC
• Locking of Cockpit Doors
• Deployment of IFSO (Sky Marshals)
ICAO Security Manual
The ICAO Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference, (Doc 8973)
Restricted, is the principal guidance document developed by ICAO to assist States in the implementation of
the technical specifications contained in Annex 17.
The Manual has been developed for the purpose of assisting States to promote safety and security in civil
aviation through the development of the legal framework, practices, procedures and material, technical and
human resources to prevent and, where necessary, respond to acts of unlawful interference.
- 43 -
Handout 3.3
Page 2 of 2
National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP)
Primary Objective of the NCASP

The objective of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme is to safeguard civil aviation operations
against acts of unlawful interference through regulations, practices and procedures which take account of the
safety regularly and efficiency of flights.
The National Civil Aviation Security Programme of India aims at maintaining the security of national and
foreign air operators providing services from India as well as of civil airports/ civil enclaves in India supporting
international and domestic flights and the national air carriers providing services from airports abroad.
The Programme is designed to meet the international Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
contained in Annex 17 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation as well as related aviation security
provisions found in other Annexes
Airport Security Programme
Primary objectives of an Airport Security Programme are as follows:

• To meet the requirements describe in the NCASP ( based on ICAO Annexure 17)
• To define the Aviation Security measures and assigned responsibilities.
• To ensure that Aviation Security measures and responsibilities are clearly defined and understood by those
who need to implement them.
• To ensure that the security measures are properly implemented.
An airport security programme is a document that defines the local security concept of an airport. It aims at
protecting the airport against acts of unlawful interference. Based on the National Aviation Security
Programme, an airport security programme must or can include local security procedures, which are not
defined in the international or national aviation security legislation.
Airline Security Programme
In addition to the national and airport security programme, each airline should have a written airline security
programme, based on the national Civil Aviation security programme (NCASP).
This document defines the security concept of the airline, the responsible authorities for the implementation
of it, the details of the security measures and a description of the airline's security programme.
Primary Objective of an airline security programme is as follows:

• To protect the airline's customers, employees and assets against unlawful interference.
• To provide all staff, handling agents and other contractors with sufficient guidance in achieving the first
aim, in normal and in enhanced threat situations.
• To comply with Annex 17, Standard 3.3.1 and the State's national Civil Aviation security programme
(NCASP) requirements.
- 44 -
Handout 3.4
Page 1 of 2
Physical Measure
SOP’s / Aviation Security measures at Airports:
Anti hijacking Measures

• Frisking of passengers and search of hand baggage
• Armed support to frisking / searching staff
• Escorting of passenger to aircraft
• Apron and perimeter security
• Security of catering items
• Surveillance in Departure areas
• Use of electronic aids-DFMD,HHMD,XBIS,CCTV
• Secondary Ladder Point Checks
• Pre flight security checks / search of aircraft
• Deployment of sky marshals
• On the job supervision by airline staff
Anti sabotage Measures

• Screening and protection of registered baggage until loaded into aircraft hold
• Identification / Reconciliation of registered baggage
• Anti sabotage check of aircraft at originating station
• Guarding of aircraft
• Access control of aircraft
• On the job supervision by airline staff
• Security of air crew baggage / aircraft document bags / fuel
• Security of catering items
• Security of cargo, courier, human remains, postal mail, company stores
• Non acceptance of last minute items by passengers
• Passengers to ensure they are aware of contents of their baggage’s
Measures Against Terrorist Attacks

• Guarding of aircraft and airport facilities
• Apron / airport access control
• Deployment of Quick Reaction Teams (QRT)
• Perimeter wall of standard height
• Perimeter road for patrolling
• Perimeter lighting
• Watch towers \ Patrolling- foot or mobile
• Police stations in close proximity of airport
• Efficient communication system
Security Of Personnel
• Airport entry permit (AEP) / Airport Entry Card (AEC) issued after security vetting / background checks
• Display of AEP/AEC to detect misuse
• Frisking of all AEP/AEC holders before entry to airside
• Never leave your baggage unattended
Handout 3.4
- 45 -
Page 2 of 2
• Never lend your uniform / AEP to others

• Never accept a packet for carriage without screening
• On the job supervision / surveillance
• Always display a positive security attitude
- 46 -
Handout 3.5
Page 1 of 2
Role of Various Agencies in AVSEC
Agencies Responsible For Security at Airport
Security Of Provided By
Passengers, Crew, General Public APSU (Police) / ASG (CISF)
Aircraft ASG (CISF) & Airline
Cargo & Mail Airline, ASG (CISF), Airport Operator.
Catering Airline
Airports And Vital Installations Airport Operators And ASG (CISF).
Areas Responsibility
Anti-hijacking Security. APSU (Police) / ASG (CISF)
Registered Baggage, Catering & Cargo. Airline
Access Control & Issue of AEPs / PICs / Passes. APSU (Police) / ASG (CISF); Airport
Operators; BCAS
Perimeter Security APSU (Police) / ASG (CISF); Airport
Operators;
Bomb Detection & Disposal Operations BDDS- ASG / Local Police / Army
Emergency - Unlawful interference- Hijacking. AAI, APSU/ASG & NSG
Law and Order , Crime, Intelligence and Traffic Local Police/ Traffic Police
Role of Airport Operators:
The authority who provides infrastructure and facilities at airport is called airport operator. It is their
responsibility to provide a secure operating environment to airports as per norms approved/prescribed by the
appropriate authority.
The main roles of airport operators are:

• To provide administration, maintenance, communication, fire fighting, air-traffic services and other
operational services.
• Provision and maintenance of perimeter/fencing, perimeter road, gates/entry points security hold area,
frisking booths, hand baggage checking counter, cooling pit, isolated parking bay, security stamps,
stationary/furniture to Airport Security Staff (APS), seating arrangements and basic amenities including
telephone in the security hold area for passengers, lighting on perimeter, apron, aircraft etc.
• Sign boards for educating the passengers/airport employees.
• Co-coordinating in the event of any contingency at the airport like bomb threat, unlawful seizure/hijacking
of aircraft or any other act of unlawful interference with civil aviation operations.
• Guarding/enforcement of access control of civil aviation installation and cargo complex.
• Issuance of vehicle permits for vehicles of the agencies working at the airports to have access into the
operational area.
- 47 -
Handout 3.5
Page 2 of 2
Role Of Airline Operators:
Airline / Aircraft Operator is responsible for anti sabotage functions including security screening of registered
baggage passenger baggage reconciliation, checking catering, cargo etc. They carry out these function based
on their security programme.
The main role of airline / aircraft operator is:

• Access control to the aircraft;
• Aircraft security search / Security check during normal as well as bomb threat situation;
• Screening of registered / unaccompanied baggage, cargo, mail and company stores etc.;
• Surveillance of screened baggage till acceptance at check-in counters;
• Security control of the checked baggage from the point it is taken into the charge of aircraft operator till
loading into aircraft;
• Passengers baggage reconciliation/identification
• Security of baggage tag, boarding cards and flight documents;
• Security of mishandled/unaccompanied/transit /transfer baggage;
• Secondary checks at ladder point of aircraft;
• Security of catering items from pre-setting stage till loading into aircraft;
• Security control of express cargo, courier bags, cargo, company stores, parcels, mail bags and escorting
from city side up to aircraft;
• Receiving, carriage and retrieval of security removed articles;
• Any other security functions notified by the Commissioner from to time.
- 48 -
Handout 4.1
Page 1 of 7
Module 04
Recognition of Explosives / IEDs and Prohibited Items
Prohibited Items / Restricted Articles
Restricted articles are not allowed to be carried in the cabin of an aircraft, or taken into the Security
Restricted Area of an airport, except by authorised persons who require them to undertake essential tasks.
Such essential tasks may concern the operation of airport, aircraft operation, engineering, airline/airport
catering facilities and restaurants. Authorised persons may include aircraft crew members who require the
restricted item for the performance of normal in-flight duties or as part of mandatory emergency/survival or
medical equipment.
Some Restricted articles though restricted from carriage in the cabin of an aircraft may be transported by
passengers in their hold baggage so long as the articles will not endanger the aircraft, are properly packed,
and are authorised for carriage by the airline operator concerned.
Persons tasked primarily with the detection of restricted articles should also be aware that there are certain
articles or substances which are classified as “dangerous goods” by the ICAO Technical Instructions for the
Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. (Doc 9284).
Some or these articles and substances classified as restricted articles will also fall under the classification of
dangerous goods. With the exception of a small number of permitted items, dangerous goods must not be
carried by passengers on their person or in their carry-on baggage or hold baggage.
States may in reaction to intelligence about a particular threat also decide that other articles not normally
classified as Restricted articles or described below should also be excluded from carriage by passengers or any
other person in the cabin of an aircraft or in hold baggage, or carried into the Security Restricted Area of an
airport.
Restricted Articles
“Articles which are, in the context of aviation security, defined as those articles, devices or substances which
may be used to endanger the safety of the aircraft and its occupants, or installations and the public”.
• Will not endanger the aircraft
• Are properly packed
• Are authorised for carriage by the airline operator concerned.
High Threat Situation

Articles not normally classified as prohibited articles may also be excluded
from carriage in the cabin of an aircraft or in hold baggage, or carried into
the Security Restricted Area of an airport.
E. g. Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAGs)Liquids, Aerosols and Gels (LAGs)
- 49 -
Handout 4.1
Page 2 of 7
Prohibited / Restricted Articles can be broken down into four categories, as follows:
(a) Weapons;
(b) Dangerous articles;
(c) Explosives; and
(d) Dangerous substances.
Weapons
These are "articles that were primarily designed to kill, injure, immobilize or incapacitate". Examples of items
categorized as Weapons are:
▪ Handguns
▪ Flare Guns
▪ Blow Guns And Darts
▪ Electric Dart Guns
▪ Rifles
▪ Shotguns
▪ Pellet Guns
▪ Spear Guns And Darts
▪ Knives With Blades Over 10 Cm Long
▪ Mace, Tear Gas, Liquids, Powders In Canisters, Or Disguised As Pens
▪ Martial Arts Weapons, Blades Or Spiked Finger Rings And Wrist Bands
▪ Sword Canes And Umbrella Swords
Dangerous articles
These are articles which "include any items that may be used to threaten the safety of passengers or aircraft".
Examples of Dangerous Articles
• Starter Pistols
• Toy Guns When Carried By An Adult And If They Are Realistic When Carried By Children
• Sharp Pointed Scissors And Letter Openers
• Chisels, Ice Picks, Large Screwdrivers And Knitting Needles
• Pocket Knives With Blades Over 4 Cm
Explosives
Any item that can be triggered to explode is an explosive. Examples of explosives are:
• Dynamite, Tnt And Other Explosives Found In The Form Of Sticks, Slabs Or Blocks
• Plastic Explosives, Black Powder, Flares, Smoke Bombs And Firecrackers
• Ammunition, Cartridges, Shells (Loose Or In Clips)
• Hand Grenades And Pipe Bombs
• Blasting Caps, Safety Fuse And Blasting Wire
Dangerous Substances
Dangerous Substances constitute the following:
• Acids,
• Corrosives
• Inflammable Items
• Bacteria in syringe / vials
• And Radio-Active Materials
- 50 -
Handout 4.2
Page 1 of 6
Items that are banned for carriage on person/hand baggage on board flights operating from civil airports in
India; and Indian Registered aircrafts from foreign airports(Refer AVSEC Order No. 5/2005: dated 07.06.05
Personal Items
01 Lighters
02 Scissors-metal with pointed tips
03 Realistic replica of toy weapon
Sharp Objects
04 Box Cutters
05 Ice Axes/ Ice Picks
06 Knives (any length and type except round-bladed, butter, and plastic cutlery)
07 Meat Cleavers
08 Razor-Type Blades such as box cutters, utility knives, razor blades not in a cartridge, but excluding
safety razors
09 Sabers
10 Scissors – metal with pointed tips
11 Sword
Sporting Goods
12 Baseball Bats
13 Bows and Arrows
14 Cricket Bats
15 Golf Clubs
16 Hockey Sticks
17 Lacrosse Sticks
18 Pool Cues
19 Ski Poles
20 Spear Guns
Guns and Firearms

21 Ammunition
22 BB guns
23 Compressed Air Guns
24 Firearms
25 Flare Guns
26 Gun Lighters
27 Gun Powder
28 Parts of Guns and Firearms
29 Pellet Guns
30 Realistic Replicas of Firearms
31 Starter pistols
- 51 -
Handout 4.2
Page 2 of 6
Tools
32 Axes and hatchets
33 Cattle Prods
34 Crowbars
35 Hammers
36 Drills (including cordless portables power drills)
37 Saws (including cordless portable power saws)
38 Screwdrivers (except those in eyeglass repair kits)
39 Tools (including but not limited to wrenches and pliers)
40 Wrenches and Pliers
Martial Arts / Self Defense Items

41 Billy Clubs
42 Black Jacks
43 Brass Knuckles
44 Kubatons
45 Mace/ Pepper Spray
46 Martial Arts Weapons
47 Night Sticks
48 Nunchakus
49 Martial Arts/ Self Defense Items
50 Stun Guns/ Shocking Devices
51 Throwing Stars
Explosive Materials
52 Blasting Caps
53 Dynamite
54 Fireworks
55 Flares (in any form)
56 Hand Grenades
57 Plastic Explosives
58 Realistic Replicas of Explosives
Flammable items
59 Aerosol (any except for personal care or toiletries in limited quantities)
60 Fuels (Including cooking fuels and any flammable liquid fuel)
61 Gasoline
62 Gas Torches
63 Lighter Fluid
64 trike-anywhere Matches
65 Turpentine and paint Thinner
66 Realistic Replicas of Incendiaries
- 52 -
Handout 4.2
Page 3 of 6
Disabling Chemicals and other Dangerous Items

67 Chlorine for Pools and Spas
68 Compressed Gas Cylinders (including fire extinguishers)
69 Liquid Bleach
70 Spillable Batteries (except those in wheelchairs)
71 Spray Paint
72 Tear Gas
S. No. Can I take it Carry on Checked

A Personal Items
Cigar Cutters Yes Yes
Corkscrews Yes Yes
Cuticle Cutters Yes Yes
Eyeglass Repair Tools (including screwdrivers) Yes Yes
Eyelash Curlers Yes Yes
Knitting and Crochet Needles Yes Yes
Knives ( round bladed butter or plastic) Yes Yes
Lighters No No
Strike anywhere matches No No
Nail Clippers Yes Yes
Nail Files Yes Yes
Personal care or toiletries with aerosols, in limited quantities (such Yes Yes
as hairsprays, deodorants)
Safety Razors (including disposable razors) Yes Yes
Scissors-plastic or metal with blunt tips Yes Yes
Scissors-metal with pointed tips No Yes
Toy Transformer Robots Yes Yes
Toy Weapons (if not realistic replicas) Yes Yes
Tweezers Yes Yes
Umbrellas (allowed in carry-on baggage once they have been Yes Yes
inspected to ensure that prohibited items are not concealed)
Walking Canes (allowed in carry-on baggage once they have been Yes Yes
inspected to ensure that prohibited items are not concealed)
B Medication and Special Needs Devices

Braille Note-Taker, Slate and Stylus, Augmentation Devices Yes Yes
Diabetes-Related Supplies/ Equipment, (once inspected to ensure Yes Yes
prohibited items are not concealed) including: insulin and insulin
loaded dispensing products; vials or box of individual vials; jet
injectors; pens; infusers; and preloaded syringes; and an unlimited
number of unused syringes, when accompanied by insulin; lancets;
blood glucose meters; blood glucose meter test strips; insulin
pumps; and insulin pump supplies. Insulin in any form or dispenser
must be properly marked with a professionally printed label
identifying the medication or manufacturer’s name or
pharmaceutical label.
Nitroglycerine pills or spray for medical use (if properly Yes Yes
marked with a professionally printed label identifying the
- 53 -
medication or manufacturer’s name or pharmaceutical label)
Prosthetic Device Tools and Appliances including drill, allen Yes Yes
wrenches, pull sleeves used to put on or remove prosthetic devices,
if carried by the individual with the prosthetic device or his or her
companion.
C Electronics Devices
Camcorders Yes Yes
Camera Equipment Yes Yes
The checked baggage screening equipment will damage
undeveloped film in camera equipment. We recommend that you
either put undeveloped film and cameras containing undeveloped
film in your carry-on baggage or take undeveloped film with you to
the checkpoint and ask the screener to conduct a hand-inspection.
Cuticle Cutters Yes Yes
Laptop Computers Yes Yes
Mobile Phones Yes Yes
Pagers Yes Yes
Personal Data Assistants (PDA’s) Yes Yes
Note: Check with your airline or travel agent for restrictions on the use of these and other
electronic items during your flight.
D Sharp Objects
Box Cutters No Yes
Ice Axes/ Ice Picks No Yes
Knives (any length and type except round bladed, butter, and No Yes
plastic cutlery)
Meat Cleavers No Yes
Razor-Type Blades such as box cutters, utility knives, razor blades No Yes
not in a cartridge, but excluding safety razors
Sabers No Yes
Scissors – metal with pointed tips (Scissors with plastic or metal No Yes
blunt tips are permitted in your carry-on.)
Sword No Yes
Note: Any sharp objects in checked baggage should be sheathed or securely wrapped to prevent
injury to baggage handlers and inspectors.
E Sporting Goods
Baseball Bats No Yes
Bows and Arrows No Yes
Cricket Bats No Yes
Golf Clubs No Yes
Hockey Sticks No Yes
Lacrosse Sticks No Yes
Pool Cues No Yes
Ski Poles No Yes
Spear Guns No Yes
Note: any sharp objects in checked baggage should be sheathed or securely wrapped to prevent injury to
baggage handlers and security screeners
F Guns and Firearms

- 54 -
Ammunition No Yes
(Check with your airline or travel agent to see if ammunition
is permitted in checked baggage on the airlines you are flying. If
ammunition is permitted, it must be declared to the airline at check-
in. Small arms ammunitions for personal use must be securely packed
in fiber, wood or metal boxes or other packaging specifically designed
to carry small amounts of Ammunition. Ask about limitations or fees,
if any, that apply)
BB guns No Yes
Compressed Air Guns No Yes
Firearms No Yes
Flare Guns No Yes
Gun Lighters No Yes
Gun Powder No Yes
Parts of Guns and Firearms No Yes
Pellet Guns No Yes
Realistic Replicas of Firearms No Yes
Starter pistols No Yes
Note: Check with your airline or travel agent to see if firearms are permitted in checked baggage on
the airline you are flying. Ask about limitations or fees, if any, that apply. Firearms carried as
checked baggage MUST be unloaded, packed in a locked hard-sided gun case, and declared to the
airline at check-in. Only you, the passenger, may have the key or combination.
G Tools
Axes and hatchets No Yes
Cattle Prods No Yes
Crowbars No Yes
Hammers No Yes
Drills (including cordless portables power drills) No Yes
Saws (including cordless portable power saws) No Yes
Screwdrivers (except those in eyeglass repair kits) No Yes
Tools (including but not limited to wrenches and pliers) No Yes
Wrenches and Pliers No Yes
injury to baggage handlers and security screeners
H Martial Arts/ Self Defense Items

Billy Clubs No Yes
Black Jacks No Yes
Brass Knuckles No Yes
Kubatons No Yes
Mace/ Pepper Spray One 118 ml or 4 fl. Oz. No Yes
Container of mace or pepper spray is permitted in checked baggage
provided it is equipped with a safety mechanism to prevent
accidental discharge. For more information on these and other
hazardous materials, please consult your airline.
Handout 4.2
Page 6 of 6
S. No. Can I take it Carry on Checked

Martial Arts Weapons No Yes
Night Sticks No Yes
- 55 -
Nunchakus No Yes
Stun Guns/ Shocking Devices No Yes
Throwing Stars No Yes
injury to baggage handlers and screeners.
I Explosive Materials
Blasting Caps No No
Dynamite No No
Fireworks No No
Flares (in any form) No No
Hand Grenades No No
Plastic Explosives No No
Realistic Replicas of Explosives No No
J Flammable items
Aerosol (Any except for personal care or toiletries in No No
limited quantities)
Fuels (Including cooking fuels and any flammable liquid fuel) No No
Gasoline No No
Gas Torches No No
Lighter Fluid No No
Strike-anywhere Matches No No
Turpentine and paint Thinner No No
Realistic Replicas of Incendiaries No No
K Disabling Chemicals and other Dangerous Items

Chlorine for Pools and Spas No No
Compressed Gas Cylinders (including fire extinguishers) No No
Liquid Bleach No No
Spillable Batteries (except those in wheelchairs) No No
Spray Paint No No
Tear Gas No No
- 56 -
Handout 4.3
Page 1 of 3
Recognition of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)

Airports and airlines are soft targets for terrorist attacks. Any sabotage / explosion at airports or in aircraft
shatters public confidence in the State machinery. Such acts have high news-value and the terrorist group
gains publicity with very low investment. 11 September 2001 incidence has opened new chapter in aviation
history where fuel-laden aircraft has been used as a weapon of mass destruction. The Colombo incident on
24th July 2001 exposed the weakness in perimeter security system.
A bomber has all the advantages. He can choose the time, target, territory, means of placements and almost
infinite variety of IEDs. An IED is designed to explode the way the bomber wants to have it. He can incorporate
a delay from 5 minutes to 194 days, which enables him to be miles away, continent away, months away
before the actual explosion occurs. An IED can be planted during the day and it will explode when darkness
set in and vice versa. It is difficult to track down the explomaniac (Bomber in many bomb explosions.
In aviation bomber has graduated from simple time mechanism to barometric, now to explosive
jacket and microprocessor bomb. Microprocessor bomb integrates inputs from number of sensors to
make a decision. These bombs can be designed to explode over a populated urban area, at a
particular height, time, motion, sound, temperature and pressure or exposure to light / darkness etc.
A passenger, Richard Reid was overpowered while he was igniting a shoe bomb flight from Paris to Miami on
22 Dec 2001,
What Is an IED
An IED is the explosive device designed, fabricated, placed and activated with an intention of causing
injury/death or to create panic and chaos amongst public or to cause intensive damage to property. These IED
could be of any size and shape. They could be manufactured in any innocuous objects such as brief case,
suitcase, Tiffin carrier, sweet packet, gift item, Radio, Laptop computer, TV, VCR, Telephone, Cycle, Scooter,
Car, Vehicle etc. It may be operated electrically or mechanically and designed to explode while handling or by
use of any delay mechanism or remote control etc.
A standard IED mechanism consists of: -
(a) Explosives
(b) Detonator
(c) Power source
(d) Switches (Bomb Initiating
Mechanism)
- 57 -
Handout 4.3
Page 2 of 3
Recognition of Explosives
S.No. Explosive Colour Physical form
(a) TNT Pale Yellow Flex Per/block
(b) RDX White Crystalline
© PETN White Crystalline
(d) PEK Yellow Cartridge/plastic mass
(e) LTPE Black Flexible
(f) Semtex Black/orange Slurry
(g) Tetryl Yellow Granular/Powder
(h) Sheet Expl White Flexible
(I) C–4 White Plastic
(j) Cordtex Chocolate & White Cord
(k) Gun powder Black Granular
Pyrotechnic
(a) Safety Fuse Dirty black Yarn/jute bounded
Civil Explosives
(a) Gelatin Yellow Stick
(b) Dynamites Yellow Cartridge wrapped in paper
© ANFO Greenish Slurry with white crystal of AN
Recognition of Detonator
All high explosive needs a detonator to initiate them. It may be electrical or non electrical. There have been
incidents where improvised detonators are manufactured in plastic or non-metallic tubes to avoid detection.
Recognition of Power Source

Power sources of bomb could be from normal batteries such as 1.5V, (pencil and torch cells), 6V, 9V etc. There
are flat batteries, which can be used for letter bombs. Latest batteries area manufactured in pure plastic
containers, which are difficult to view in x-ray machine.
Power Sources
(Batteries)
- 58 -
Handout 4.3
Page 3 of 3
Recognition of Switches
These are also known as Bomb Initiating Mechanism. It normally is based on four principles they employ such
as: -
a) Anti Handling
Many bombs are targeted at innocent people, security agencies or bomb technician in such a way that
when it is inadvertently removed, lifted or opened it may explode. It is generally made of anti-
handling switches and these bombs are too dangerous to handle. They rely on concealment or
disguise. During war, mines and grenades are strapped on the bodies of dogs to destroy the enemy
concentration of tanks. The anti-handling switches area also meant to eliminate unsuspecting target.
Anti-handling switches may vary from small micro switch to improvised switch such as cloth-peg or
loop made from normal electrical wire. Inadvertent or careless handling will certainly activate the
bomb causing serious damage to the target. The anti-handling switch may employ any one or
combination of the principles. It is more sort of booby-traps to kill or main the unsuspecting targets.
b) Delayed
The delayed bombs may have a delay varying from 5 minutes to 5000 hours today. For earlier days,
delay was achieved by normal clockwork mechanism like watch or timepiece. Today, many
sophisticated timer mechanism are available in the market. Delay can also be used by chemicals
cleverly concealed in ordinary objects and these chemicals when come in contact with Improvised
explosives causes fire or explosion.
c) Ambient Condition
The triggering mechanism is activated by environmental factors such as gas, smoke acoustic,
barometric, humidity, proximity etc. A bomb may be planted during the day and activate the same
when darkness sets in or by the principle of difference in pressure variation. The sound from small
bomb can be used to activate a bigger bomb. There is a tendency among the public to crowd near a
suspected bomb, the very proximity to noise created by curious on lookers or security people will
activate the bomb.
Whenever a suspected object is located, crowding of public near the bomb must be prevented and
the area evacuated immediately.
d) Remote Control
Normal remote control bombs are activated by transmission of electromagnetic waves. Remote
bombs will have a transmitter with the bomber and receiver at the target with explosive. The range of
radio control device depends on line of sight and power of transmitter. Range from 10 mtr to 1000
mtrs is very common. A remote control bomb assassinated Lord Mount batten.
Another method of remote explosion is by means of a wire connecting from bomber to the intended
target. Such command wire bomb can be easily activated up to a distance of one KM. The terrorists
had used these bombs in Punjab and Andhra Pradesh very frequently.
- 59 -
Handout 4.4
Page 1 of 1
Methods of Concealment
In addition to passengers, airport and airline employees may secrete items inside an aircraft or in external
places to which they may have access.
These items may be concealed and conveyed on their person, in service equipment or vehicles and then are
placed or concealed in or on the aircraft.
Disguised and concealed explosives;
In order to overcome the security problems of transporting explosives across frontiers, terrorists have
adopted various methods and techniques for disguising and concealing such materials so that they appear as
innocent example.
Small pieces (approx 50 g) of blasting gelatin (nitroglycerin based) explosives embedded with pistachio and
other nuts covered with icing sugar and wrapped in cellophane to give the appearance of Arab sweetmeat
1. TNT cast into shapes such as dolls heads, animals, wall plaques etc
2. Concealed explosives and IEDs : Explosives concealed in shaving cream tubes, liquid explosives hidden in
bottles to look like whisky or wine.
3. Explosives concealed within a birthday cake
4. Plain detonators with a short length of safety fuse attached, concealed inside felt tip pens (The ink
cartridges having been removed)
5. Detonators concealed inside cigarettes, in the soles or heels of shoes and in the handler of a suitcase
6. IEDs built into luggage in a manner that detection by x-ray is made more difficult by explosive and
components being concealed behind the lining of the case.
7. Grenades (and weapons) concealed in wine bottles
- 60 -
Handout 5.1
Page 1 of 7
Module 05
Protection of Parked aircraft
General
The protection of aircraft is an important element within the protective measures and procedures necessary
for total airport protection.
Passengers cannot be considered as the only means of introducing weapons and explosives onto aircraft. An
aircraft, before coming into service at the beginning of each operating day, will need to be subjected to
security checks to ensure that it has not been exposed to an act of interference. It is dangerous to assume
that the security of an aircraft cannot be breached within the confines of an airport.
The operation and protection of an aircraft is generally accepted to be the responsibility of the airline owning
and operating the aircraft. The airport authorities are also responsible to protect the airport and facilities
from unlawful interference.
Threat Identification
Threat Items can be infiltrated into an Aircraft either by employees working at the airport or by passengers. A
wide variety of airport employees or organizations can have access into an aircraft they can be authorized or
unauthorized.
An airport / airline employee may be authorized to have access into an aircraft if he is a bonafide employee of
the organization and is required to access the aircraft to perform his job functions.
An airport employee needing access into an aircraft maybe from the following depts.:
• AAI Medical Team,
• ATC Official,
• Customs,
• Airport Security Unit / Aviation Security Group
• Catering,
• Staff from fuelling company,
• DGCA Officials
• BCAS Officials
- 61 -
Handout 5.2
Page 1 of 3
Aircraft Protection (Security Principle – Defense in depth)
Rings of Protection
Security principles for physical protection are a series of protective "in depth" rings which are known as "The
Rings of Protection".
The first line of defence in preventing unauthorized access to aircraft is by safeguarding the airside/ landside
boundary by physical means such as fencing.
Outer Protective Ring
It is established at the airside / landside boundary line and includes fencing, lighting, signs, alarm systems and
controlled doorways. These measures are designed to channel people and vehicles through controlled access
points provided in the outer ring.
Eg: Perimeter walls/Fence : 8’ + 1½’ barbed wire hung over ‘Y’ shaped angle
Perimeter Gates : For control of access into restricted areas
Static Posts : An elevated platform/ observation post which is constructed at

regular intervals round the perimeter wall and guarded rounded the
clock by armed guards
Lighting : Adequate lighting is required for areas which are dark / during night
Signs : Information of restricted areas etc.
Alarm Systems : In case of any intrusion
Middle Protective Ring
It is established at the exterior of buildings, terminals and other structures sited within an airport boundary
and include greater protection of doors, windows, roofs, skylights, etc.
For open areas, such as aircraft movement areas security is maintained by means of patrolling guarding and
surveillance.
The measures designed for the middle protective ring are more positive than at the outer ring and comprise
locks, bars, alarms, additional lighting and increased surveillance.
Eg. Perimeter Roads : Road around the perimeter inside the restricted area for mobile
patrols
Because there are difficulties in preventing unauthorized access to aircraft within the airport boundary,
measures need to be taken in the immediate proximity of parked aircraft to provide the third inner ring of
protection.
- 62 -
Handout 5.2
Page 2 of 3
Inner Protective Ring
For aviation purposes the inner ring can be considered to be buildings, areas, and aircraft, which require
maximum protection, by special means, such as guards and additional barriers.
Eg.Vital Installations : Areas such as ATC Tower, navigational facilities etc. which if damaged
or destroyed will seriously impair the functioning of the airport.
Security staff operating in the immediate proximity of parked aircraft or patrolling the apron / ramp area
provide yet another layer of protection.
Finally flight /cabin crew and airline staff actually working on board the aircraft provide another layer.
Responsibility for Aircraft Security
The basic responsibility for the security of aircraft rests with the aircraft operator.
During diversions, due to weather or mechanical, responsibility rests with the Captain as the Airline
representative. The Captain must make arrangements for securing the aircraft if no company ground
personnel are available. If local security personnel are not available crewmembers should be assigned security
duty.
Means of Protection
When aircraft is parked and unattended, precautions should be taken to prevent unauthorized access to the
aircraft. The process involves that:
(a) aircraft are parked in a well-lit area;
(b) all external doors locked;
(c) stairs and loading bridges removed; and
(d) Stairs and steps in vicinity of aircraft moved away and immobilized.
Because of the large number of access points on an aircraft which must remain open during its stay on the
ground, it is difficult to seal the aircraft entirely. Such access points include the following:
(a) undercarriage wells and wheel assembly;
(b) engine access panels;
(c) engine intakes; and
(d) Fuel intake panels.
When aircraft is under increased threat level:

(a) Higher Threat will require Greater Protection
(b) Stress that when a higher level of threat exists and additional protection is required, it will be necessary for
a specific person from the airline concerned to be in charge of the aircraft to coordinate all security
measures and ensure they are properly implemented.
(c) State that when a higher level of threat is known to exist the following additional precautions may be
required;
(d) Dedicated point guards posted in close proximity to each aircraft;
(e) Frequent irregularly timed security patrols on foot or by vehicles; canine reinforcement of guard capability;
Handout 5.2
Page 3 of 3
- 63 -
Aircraft Guard Duties
(a) Establish the integrity of the aircraft upon taking up duty;
(b) Search immediate area for suspect explosive devices
(c) Challenge all persons approaching the aircraft;
(d) Check the specific authorization of persons claiming a need to access the aircraft;
(e) Patrol and make visual inspection of aircraft at random intervals.
(f) Stress the importance of a communication system (radio/telephone) being required between guard and
security authority reaction force to summon assistance.
Response Action to Unauthorized attempt to board or actual unauthorized access to aircraft
• If possible detain the person concerned.

• Do not allow the person to have access to the aircraft or leave the area
• Do not allow further persons to board the aircraft until it is searched;
• Notify the security supervisor or control; and
• Ensure airline representative is notified.
Aircraft Intrusion
If there is evidence of intrusion at an aircraft a detailed search must be carried out. Such a search is a
specialized task conducted in accordance with the concerned airline’s specific security procedures, usually
using a security search check list.
Aircraft Security Search
A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of the aircraft for the purpose of discovering suspicious
objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles and substances.
Aircraft Security Check
An inspection of the interior of an aircraft to which passengers may have had access and an inspection of the
hold for the purposes of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices,
articles or substances
- 64 -
Handout 6.1
Page 1 of 3
Module 06
Aircraft Security Checks
Threat Identification
Threat Items can be infiltrated into an Aircraft either by employees working at the airport or by passengers. A
wide variety of airport employees or organizations can have access into an aircraft they can be authorized or
unauthorized.
An airport / airline employee may be authorized to have access into an aircraft if he is a bonafide employee of
the organization and is required to access the aircraft to perform his job functions.
An airline employee needing access into an aircraft maybe from the following depts.:
• Security,
• Engineering,
• In-flight,
• Customer service,
• Cabin Appearance,
• Cargo,
• Catering - External & Internal,
• Flight operations.
Aircraft Search
Why must an aircraft search be carried out?
There are legal and business reasons for carrying out aircraft searches.
Legal reason
International and national laws will apply. Sections of ICAO Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices
relating to the security of aircraft, give a direct bearing on the requirements of the aircraft operators
regarding the aviation security programme.
Sections of ICAO Annex 17, Standards and Recommended Practices relating to the security of aircraft, define
what contracting states must do.
Business Reasons
Establishing and implementing sound security measures also makes perfect business sense:
• Liability – demonstration of due diligence/duty of care;
• Market access – especially into the United States of America;
• Consumer confidence– especially in the wake of recent terrorist attacks;
• Cost avoidance – laws suits, loss of assets, etc.
- 65 -
Handout 6.2
Page 1 of 3
Extract from ICAO Security Manual (Doc 8973)
Appendix 19
Aircraft Security Search Checklist
The regular search of aircraft for suspect explosive devices and weapons should be conducted prior to
commencing each flight. A similar search will be required when an aircraft is suspected of being the target of
an act of unlawful interference. The difference between the two types is only in the degree and thoroughness
of search undertaken, and these will be dictated by the total circumstances applicable to each situation.
Aircraft operators should develop an aircraft search procedure checklist for each type of aircraft in service and
include this checklist as part of the flight crew security kit. Use of such a checklist by ground crews will be
particularly helpful at locations where the only persons familiar with the particular type of aircraft or
configuration of aircraft are flight deck and cabin crew members.
Regular searches normally conducted prior to each flight are to be carried out while the aircraft is in the
normal gate or apron parking position. (Pre-flight Anti Sabotage Checks)
Aircraft searches should be carried out in good lighting conditions; this may require the use auxiliary power
units or the attachment of ground power lines to the aircraft. It will be necessary to impose and maintain
control of access to the aircraft before starting the search, which should be carried out with the minimum
number of persons on board.
To avoid duplication of effort the search of an aircraft should be conducted systematically by staff familiar
with the particular aircraft, provided with a checklist and assigned to specific areas of the aircraft. Attention
should be given to those areas to which passengers have had access, such as main cabins, galley areas and
toilets, but the search should also include the flight deck exterior of the aircraft and cargo holds.
Before starting the search, strict control of access must be implemented to the aircraft being searched. This is
necessary to ensure devices are not introduced into the aircraft once it has been cleared. Control of access
must then be maintained until the aircraft doors are closed prior to push back.
Searchers should be briefed not to touch suspicious objects but to notify the search coordinator, mark the
location with a prominent object (but not touching the device) and withdraw from the immediate area to
await further instructions. When a suspect device is discovered the possibility of secondary devices should not
be discounted.
Hand-held communications are useful for coordination of the search and are often the only way of ensuring
appropriate and speedy lifesaving procedures for search and evacuation. However, once a suspect device has
been located those using hand-held communications should immediately move away and ensure that they
and anyone else in the area move outside the cordon as quickly as possible. Radios should not be used to
transmit within 25 m of a suspect device.
All entrance doors, hatches, inlet and exhaust ducts, service and access doors, etc., must be opened to allow
the necessary access to all areas to be inspected. However, a check must be made to ensure that all doors and
covers which were opened for inspection purposes are closed on conclusion of the search.
- 66 -
Handout 6.2
Page 2 of 3
It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect explosive devices as they can
be disguised in many ways. Trained & competent personnel who are familiar with the physical layout and the
normal contents of the aircraft should conduct the search of the aircraft.
When to search?
There are 4 instances when searches are usually conducted:
• Pre-flight;
• During en route transit stops;
• Post flight; and
• When the flight / aircraft is under increased threat.
Pre-flight Searches should be conducted under normal circumstances and also for emergency situations. As
no baggage can be loaded inside the aircraft without the respective passenger on board (NO PASSENGER – NO
BAGGAGE), similarly the aircraft cannot be declared sterile / secured without the search.
Pre-flight Aircraft Searches should be carried for all flights at:

• Originating Station
• Turn Around Station
• Transit Station
The search will involve a systematic inspection of the interior of the aircraft, including the passenger cabin
area, seats, overhead bins/ racks, toilets, galleys etc. The search will also involve an inspection of the exterior
of the aircraft, particularly the nose wheel area, wheel bay & aircraft Holds.
The pre-flight aircraft search will be carried out as under:
For Originating flights:

• Prior to the boarding of passengers and the loading of cargo, baggage and catering.
• Search can be carried out from the rear to the front of the aircraft or vice versa.
• The search should be carried out with a aircraft search checklist. This will avoid duplication of effort.
• The search can be carried out by more than one person / teams allocated with a specific areas for search.
Each team will carry the checklist.
• Each person / team member will sign on the checklist after completion of the search.
• After the search is completed, the aircraft should not be left unattended and strict access control should be
maintained.
For Turn Around Flights:

• After all the passengers have disembarked / deplaned.
• After Cleaners have carried out their duties and disembarked.
• After all Baggage, Cargo & Catering (if any) has been offloaded from the aircraft.
• Search can be carried out from the rear to the front of the aircraft or vice versa.
• The search should be carried out with a aircraft search checklist. This will avoid duplication of effort.
• The search can be carried out by more than one person / teams allocated with a specific areas for search.
Each team will carry the checklist.
- 67 -
Handout 6.2
Page 3 of 3
• Each person / team member will sign on the checklist after completion of the search.
maintained.
For Transit Flights:

• After all the passengers have disembarked / deplaned.
• After Cleaners have carried out their duties and disembarked.
• Ensure that passengers deplaning at transit station do not leave any item / baggage in the aircraft.
• The level of search to be carried out will depend upon the threat to the aircraft at the transit station and
the categorization of the airport.
• The search should be carried out with an aircraft search checklist.
maintained.
Who should carry out searches?
Cabin crew/or trained Security staff is usually responsible for searching the interior of the aircraft, including:
• Passenger cabins
• Seats
• Baggage storage lockers
• Lavatories/WC
• Galleys
• Other areas such as the baggage hold
Search teams should be briefed to look for unidentified objects or anything:

• that should not be there
• that cannot be accounted for
• that is out of place.
For an effective search:

• Searchers must be familiar with the aircraft type being searched.
• The searcher must be able to recognize an explosive or incendiary device.
• Search must be conducted using a checklist.
What equipment do you need?
Some tools are indispensable in conducting a search, these include:

• Checklists
• Search plan
• Flashlights (torches)
• Screwdriver
• Mirror and mirror extension.
Handout 6.3
Page 1 of 5
- 68 -
An Aircraft Security Search Checklist is a comprehensive document. Airlines have type-specific checklists
relevant to the aircraft they fly in their fleet. The Type-specific checklists in some cases provide aircraft floor
plans to aid in search.
Checklists ensure a thorough and efficient search and save time. It helps to avoid duplication or omission of
search tasks. Checklists should always be available on the aircraft, for searches when away from base or in the
air.
Extract from ICAO Security Manual (Doc 8973)

Appendix 19
Aircraft Interior
• Seats, including pouches, cushions and underside of seats
• Log book and flight manual stowage
• Crew oxygen mask stowage
• Entire floor, including area forward of rudder pedals and beneath all flight deck seats
• Ceiling, side and rear walls
• Life-jacket stowage
• Crew coatroom and luggage stowage area
• Table and drawer of third crew member’s position
• Area around rudder/brake pedals
• Inside first-aid kit
Forward entrance
• Stairway including underside
• Connection of stair to fuselage, as well as shelf at this point
• Escape chute stowage
• Cabin attendant seat, life-raft stowage and seat back
• Forward windscreen and storage unit, including compartments
• Oxygen mask compartment
• Ceiling and wall
• Fire extinguisher stowage
Companionway — flight deck

• Walls, ceiling and floor
• Coatroom
• Overhead baggage storage — entire area with baggage removed
• Compartments above baggage rack and coatroom
• Drinking fountain, cup dispenser, cup disposal compartment and drain valve access
• Area above and along sidewall of stowage compartment, forward side of forward toilet
- 69 -
Handout 6.3
Page 2 of 5
Forward compartment
• Coatrooms and enclosed mask and vest stowages
• Flight attendants’ and passengers’ seats (including underside of seats)
• Passenger berth
• Ceiling, floor and walls
• Crew and passenger life vest stowages
• Portable oxygen stowage cupboard
• Seats (pouches and oxygen mask compartment)
• Table between rear lounge chairs and its compart ment
• Literature containers
Forward galley
• Remove all containers, food boxes and ovens, if not already done
• Open and inspect all galley compartments, bar and refrigerator
• Inspect containers removed from galley and bar
• Oxygen mask stowage (bar)
• Galley service door (tape stowage; hinge recess)
• Compartments above service doors
Forward toilets
• Remove soiled and waste material not already removed
• Remove containers under sinks, inspect contents and areas around sink
• Inspect towel compartment
• Tissue dispenser
• Toilet
• Mirror and compartments
• Door
• Oxygen mask stowage
• Access to drinking fountain
• Waste water receptacle
Main cabin
• Seats (pouches, oxygen mask stowage, cushions and underside of seats)
• Pillow racks, blankets and hand rail
• Floor — do not remove carpet unless presence of foreign object is suspected
• Side walls, including windows and curtains
• Bulkheads and foot recesses and oxygen mask stowage
• Ceiling
• Light recesses
• Compartments at aft end of each handrail
• Compartments behind rear cabin seats
• Stretcher equipment stowage above hat rack
• Demonstration life vest stowage
- 70 -
Handout 6.3
Page 3 of 5
• Emergency escape rope compartments

• Escape chute stowages
• Main door and recess with door closed
• Magazine racks
• Life raft stowages
• Life vest pouches
• Passenger berths
• Oxygen cabinet
• Cargo tie-down stowage
• Literature containers
• First-aid kit, only if unsealed
• Passenger oxygen service units — drop them down and inspect
• Oxygen and CO2 cylinder stowage drawers, forward sides of 1 and 3 galleys and aft toilets
• Over wing emergency exit release covers
• Aft entry door cabin attendant’s seat
• Drinking fountain, cup dispenser, cup disposal compartment and drain valve access at floor
• Portable emergency exit lights — remove light and inspect
Centre galley and bar

• Remove all containers, food boxes and ovens, if not already done
• Open and inspect all galley compartments, bar and refrigerator
• Inspect all containers removed from the aircraft
• Glass stowage in bulkhead forward of bar
• First-aid kit in compartment aft side of aft unit — only if unsealed
• Compartment above service door
• Service door and recess
• Escape chute stowage’s
• Cabin attendants’ seats in aisle No. 2 galley
• Oxygen mask compartment in ceiling
• Portable emergency exit light, remove light and inspect
Rear galley area and bar

• Flight attendants’ seat
• Galley — remove all containers
• Open and inspect all compartments
• Compartments in front bulkhead
• Inspect containers removed from aircraft
• Diplomatic mail locker
• Galley service door hinge recess
• Escape slide stowages (each door)
• Aft entrance door hinge recess
• Life raft stowages
• Oxygen bottle ceiling stowage
- 71 -
Handout 6.3
Page 4 of 5
Aft toilets
• Remove soiled and waste material
• Remove and inspect container under sink
• Inspect sink and area around sink
• Towel container
• Tissue dispenser
• Toilet seat and lid
• Mirror and compartments
• Flight attendants’ seat
• Door
• Access to drinking fountain
• Waste water receptacle
Aft wardrobes and coatrooms

• Remove coats and hand baggage
• Inspect entire area
• Sky cots and flight cradles
• First-aid kit, only if unsealed
• Life vest stowage
Aircraft Exterior
Fuselage (the areas behind/in the following doors and openings should be checked)
• Radom
• Ground pneumatic connector panel
• Cabin compressor air-inlets
• Cabin compressor access panels
• Doppler navigation antenna door
• Cabin compressor air-outlets
• Heat exchanger control access panels
• Heat exchanger outlet guide vanes
• Radio rack air-outlet
• Beacon-holder (beacon removed)
• Security locker and contents
• Flashlights (check batteries)
• Seals of first-aid kits for proper condition
• Seals of life raft panels for proper condition
• Accessory compartment door
• Auxiliary tank fuel sump doors
• Cabin pressure safety valves
• Aft waste water service panel
- 72 -
Handout 6.3
Page 5 of 5
• Cabin pressure regulator valve
• Aft waste system service panels
• Access door to stabilizer-mechanism
• Tail cone access door
• Aft potable water service panel
• Aft cargo doors
• Forward cargo doors
• Forward potable water service panel
• Ground air conditioning connector door
• External power fuser door
• External power receptacle
Cabin compressor compartment

• Entire compartment, especially area of hollow spaces and cavities
Accessory compartment
• Entire compartment as well as all installations
Cargo compartments
• Forward cargo compartment, especially area underneath hinge snap-panel of cargo door floor covering
• Waste water tank compartment
• Flight-kit boxes
• Aft cargo compartment (especially area of cargo door hinge joints)
• Zone immediately behind aft cargo compartment
Landing gear wheel wells and gears

• Nose wheel well — area behind access and zip-fastener panels
• Entire main wheel wells and zone of wing roots LH + RH
• Gears, wheels — tires, rims, brakes and parts such as struts, drag-braces, beams, arms, actuators, frames
and trucks
Wings
• Trailing edge flap sections
• Snap-covers to fuel X-feed tube
• Snap-covers to fire-extinguisher bottles
• Pressure refuelling adapters
• Inspection snap-covers
• Fuel vent openings
Engines and pylons

• Engine air-intake, exhaust and fan-duct
• Engine oil and pneumatic heat exhanger air-inlet scoop
• Engine oil refill cover
• Engine heat exchanger air-outlet door
• Constant speed drive oil refill cover
• Open engine cowl doors and fan cascade vanes. Entire engine installation and all openings on the cowl
doors and pylons to be checked.
- 73 -
Handout 6.4
Page 1 of 2
Post Search Reports

In all cases, a report should be prepared when a search is completed and provided to the pilot in command
and/or other company authority. Search reports should normally contain:
• Date of the search ;
• Flight number/ aircraft registration/ tail number;
• Time search started;
• Time search completed;
• A completed checklist. noting the areas searched
• Name and signature of team leader/ supervisor;
The supervisor should consolidate all checklists to ensure no part of the aircraft is missed from the search.
Only that part of the checklist that has actually been searched by the individual/team should be completed.
Searchers must never sign off on an area that they have not searched and they must always ensure the
recorded times are accurate. If you are called away to complete another task before the search is completed,
a note to this effect must be made on the checklist.
Suspect Items
Action to take on finding a suspect item If any object located during a search and cannot be positively
identified, it must be dealt with as a “suspect item”.
Discovery - Response Actions:-

• DO NOT TOUCH
• NOTIFY SUPERVISOR
• MARK AREA WHERE OBJECT IS LOCATED
• REMEMBER A DESCRIPTION OF THE OBJECT
• EVACUATE AIRCRAFT
Airport security should be notified immediately so that bomb disposal personnel can deal with it without
delay. Subject to bomb disposal personnel authority and commensurate with local emergency procedures, the
aircraft may be towed to a “safe area”. The aircraft should be evacuated and all persons should be kept at a
distance of at a minimum of 100 meters. Fire fighting personnel should be placed on standby Once declared
safe, the search should be resumed for secondary suspect items or explosive devices/ weapons
Action on Locating a 'Suspect' Item

If any object is located during an aircraft search and it cannot be positively identified, it must be dealt with as
a 'Suspect Item'. Action to be taken by the searcher:
• Do Not Touch
• Notify Supervisor
• Evacuate Aircraft
• Remember description of the Object / Item
• Mark area where object / item is located
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Handout 6.4
Page 2 of 2
Action to be taken by the Supervisor:

• Supervisor will inform Airport Manager (AAI) so that BDDS personnel are informed to deal with the
situation.
• Ensure the finder of the Suspect Item waits for the arrival of the bomb disposal team in order to provide
them with any useful information.
• BDDS will advice on movement of aircraft
• Fire Fighting Services will be on standby to deal with an explosion or fire until such time as the BDDS
declare the suspect item to be safe.
• If suspect item is declared safe search procedures should be completed to ensure that no secondary
sabotage device or substance is on the aircraft.
• In case of transit flight if a handbag remains unidentified. It will be removed from the aircraft and
necessary action for suspected article will be carried out.
Prior to offloading the handbag from the aircraft, it should be visually inspected for necessary security
cleared stamps
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Handout 7.1
Page 1 of 3
Module 07
Organization of Response to acts of unlawful Interference
Types of Emergencies and Crisis
The ICAO definition of emergency contained in the ICAO Airport Services Manual, Part 7 Airport Emergency
Planning, identifies sabotage, unlawful seizure and bomb threats as types of airport emergencies. The Acts of
Unlawful Interference will include the following:
ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a
civil aviation facility.
Crisis
In normal, everyday life, personal crises almost appear from nowhere and challenge our sense of what is
normal and well managed. A crisis is defined as “Decisive moment, time of danger or acute difficulty”.
Panic and confusion are normally associated with crises.
Characteristics of a Crisis
• Surprise
• Insufficient information when you need it most
• Events outpace response (real or perceived)
• Escalating flow of events
• Loss of control (real or perceived)
• Important interests at stake
• Intense scrutiny from the outside (media)
• Panic
• Development of siege mentality
• Disruption of regular decision-making process
• Affected decision-makers focus on short- term planning/decisions/actions.
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Handout 7.1
Page 2 of 3
Phases of Crisis Situation

In any given crisis situation, there are certain constantly changing levels of behaviour due to anxiety or
excitement on the part of the offender that can range from exhaustion to highly emotional, beyond which the
behaviour of the terrorist becomes uncontrollable.
Sequence of Events during an Hijack
Phase 1 Intimidation Phase

Phase 2 Custodial Phase
Phase 3 Resolution phase
Phases / Stages of A CRISIS
Crisis Situation Phase 1 - Intimidation Phase:
Hijackers will try to gain control and show who is in charge as quickly as possible. At the beginning of the
incident, the offender’s anxiety level is high. They are nervous, pumped-up and irritated.
Their excitation level rises to the hysterical stage quickly and they become very aggressive and border on the
uncontrollable.
As soon as the hijackers/terrorists feel that they have gained the initiative, and that the incident appears to be
progressing towards their objective, then this anxiety/excitation level decreases and their emotional graph
drops.
Handout 7.1
Page 3 of 3
- 77 -
Crisis Situation Phase 2 Custodial Phase:
The custodial phase is the period when passengers and crew are held captive. This phase is the longest phase
of any crisis situation and it is during this time that both the offenders and the authorities are trying to gain
and hold the initiative in order to direct the course or the outcome of the incident.
It is important from the point of view of the authorities to keep the emotional state of the offenders within
the stress stage because it has been shown from a study of past incidents that this makes the possibility of
successful psychological attrition relatively high.
If the stress becomes too emphatic, the emotional curve rises closer to the hysterical stage, at which time the
offenders behaviour verges on the uncontrollable.
If stress on the offender is reduced, the emotional curve drops below the agitated stage is reached in an
incident and attempts are made by the authorities to re-establish control by the introduction of new factors
and stipulations.
This is likely to raise the suspicion of the offenders who will become agitated and whose emotional state will
quickly rise to uncontrollable levels and possibly precipitate extreme action on the part of the offenders, that
is, the possible execution of hostages.
It therefore follows that the best course of action is to keep the offenders in a constant emotional state,
within the stress zone, eventually tiring them out mentally.
Crisis Situation Phase 3 - Resolution phase:
This is where psychological attrition or physical overpowering is achieved and the authorities realize their
objective and neutralize the offenders.
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Handout 7.2
Page 1 of 4
Crisis Management
Emergencies will arise regardless of the security measures incorporated into the airport or airline security
procedures. Since emergencies are bound to arise, they must be planned for although it is not known when,
where, how, or what will occur; and Since any portion of the airline or airport facilities may be subject to an
emergency situation, it is essential that the airline, crewmembers and authorities be prepared for an effective
response.
Lack of Emergency Response will lead to:

• Prolongation of the period of time when the airline or airport cannot resume normal operations
• No control over the situation by management (the control may then be under that of the perpetrators of
the act of unlawful interference);
• The situation escalates from an emergency situation to a crisis, and outside intervention required.
Principles of Effective Crisis Management
When considering the management of aviation security crises, the following basic principles are adopted:
• Containment;
• Isolation;
• Preparation; and
• Strategy.
Containment: The incident area must be contained in order to control access to the incident and prevent
unplanned movement from the incident site. It is necessary to create two controlled access barriers or
cordons.
These should be designated the inner cordon, which immediately surrounds the incident, and the outer
cordon, located at a greater distance from the incident.
The area between the inner cordon and the incident should be kept sterile and free of movement unless
sanctioned by the incident commanders.
The area between the inner and outer cordons should be reserved for essential personnel who are part of the
planned response.
Located on the Inner Cordon is the Forward Control Point (FCP), which is a command and control centre for
controlling movement through the Inner Cordon. Ideally, the Incident Control Centre (ICC) should be located
in the area between Inner and Outer cordons.
The outer cordon is designed to keep all non-essential personnel away from the incident.
Isolation: Once the incident site has been surrounded and secured then the process of isolating the hijackers/
terrorists should commence. The objective is to make the offenders totally dependent upon the authorities
thus creating a situation on in which negotiations can be carried out.
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Handout 7.2
Page 2 of 4
This can be done by restricting the communication equipment available, such as closing down telephone lines,
establishing interference to radio or television broadcast signals (if necessary), shutting off electrical, heating
or ventilation systems (if necessary).
Preparation: Advance preparation of all of the facilities that could possibly be required should be undertaken
previously and details included in the contingency/ emergency plans.
• Identification of remote areas for parking of hijacked aircraft;
• Closed circuit television (CCTV) coverage of such isolated areas;
• Preparation of potential sites for a Forward Control Point (FCP)
• Provision of communication systems (mobile/ portable/ hard-wiring)
• Establishment of an Emergency Operations Centre (EOC)
• Identification of holding areas for specialist support units
Strategy: Each crisis is different and it is impossible to lay down clear strategies or hard and fast rules on how
to respond to each crisis, especially where hostages are involved.
When contemplating what strategy needs to be deployed to with the emergency or crisis the obvious main
need is to preserve human life additionally the responding authorities will need to consider international
reaction to their handling of the incident, cooperation and communication (or lack of) among involved States
and the options available to terminate the incident.
Predetermined strategy and planning for dealing with aviation security emergencies that are included in
airline contingency plans and airport emergency plans.
There are two basic alternatives:

• To secure the release of the hostages unharmed whilst conceding as little as possible to the hostage-takers
C known as hostage negotiation; or
• To attempt to rescue the hostages and neutralize the hostage-takers by offensive action namely an armed
intervention.
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Handout 7.3
Page 1 of 4
Command and Control
Command
Executive command
Executive command of the response to an act of unlawful interference occurring in India is responsibility of
the Central Committee with Director General, Civil Aviation as Chairman and COSCA / Addl. Commissioner,
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security as Convener.
Operational command
Operational command of the response to an act of unlawful interference is the responsibility of the
Chairman Aerodrome Committee. With relation to an act of unlawful interference concerning an aircraft
operational command of the response will be discharges by:-
(a) Air Traffic Control (AA), whilst the aircraft is airborne or taxing immediately after landing until the
aircraft comes to a halt, or from the time aircraft commences taxing prior to take off until the aircraft
leave airspace of India;
(b) Airport Security Unit, from the time the aircraft comes to a halt immediately after landing until the
incident is terminated or until the aircraft commences taxing immediately prior to take off.
Extract from Volume 5 Chapter 5 – Contingency Plans Doc 8973
Incident access and control
5.5.1 A controlled area should be established

covering the main incident area. Within the
controlled area, an inner cordon should be
established surrounding the actual incident with a
forward control point to control all access to the
inner cordon. The cordon is normally armed. The
purpose of the inner cordon is to isolate the
incident and prevent access to the incident by the
public or press and contain any breakout by the
perpetrators. Access to the inner cordon is
permitted only with the agreement of the
forward control point commander. In the case of
an act of unlawful seizure it is important that the
forward control point be mobile. An example
incident site is illustrated in Figure I below.
5.5.2 Plans must include traffic control around the airport and within the landside areas of the airport to allow
rapid access and egress of emergency vehicles and any other persons or agencies needed at the airport in
connection with the incident. A rendezvous point and staging area should be nominated outside the inner
cordon for all agencies that will be arriving at the incident. Emergency services such as fire and ambulance
crews should stand by at the rendezvous point outside the inner cordon to deal with the results an explosion
or fire.
Handout 7.3
Page 2 of 4
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Incident access and control in India
(a) On receipt of information of an act of unlawful interference, it is the responsibility of ATC Officers on duty
at the airport to take further action as specified in the National Contingency Plan.
(b) On receipt of information of an act of unlawful interference occurring at an airport or affecting an aircraft
in flight, it is the responsibility of ATC officer on duty at that airport to activate the Aerodrome Committee
Control Room and take further action in accordance with the Contingency Plan of the Airport.
(c) All agencies with the responsibilities for the activation of Aerodrome Committee control room and Central
Committee Control Room are to ensure that these centers are regularly maintained and tested and that
all communication equipments installed therein are in good working order.
Functions of Crisis Management Centers
To deal with acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation the following Group/Committees shall be
established:-
a. Cabinet Committee on Security
b. Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH)
c. Central Committee (CC)
d. Aerodrome Committee (AC)
Cabinet Committee on Security

Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) is the apex body to decide the policy and take decisions on strategic
issues like response to hijacker’s demands involving national security, foreign policy, political implications,
strategy/approach to negotiations, forcible termination of the hijack etc. It will be advised by COSAH for this
purpose. Minister of Civil Aviation would also be included in the CCS for management of aircraft hijack
situations.
Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH)

COSAH would comprise senior officials of Govt. to deliberate on the problems arising out of the contingency,
obtain necessary inputs from all Govt. agencies and Central Committee, brief and advise CCS about
developments and decisions to be taken, and communicate Govt. decisions/directions/guidance to the
Central Committee.
The composition of the COSAH is as under:

1) Cabinet Secretary Chairman
2) Addl. Secretary Cabinet Secretariat Conveyor
Functions
COSAH will meet immediately on receipt of intimation of aircraft hijack. However, in case of prolonged crisis
COSAH need not necessarily be in continuous session till the termination of the hijack, and may constitute a
Sub Group, which will be in session continuously. The composition of the Sub Group would be decided by
COSAH depending on the specific situation. For example, the Sub Group could be chaired by Foreign Secretary
in case an Indian registered hijacked aircraft lands at a foreign airport and by the Home Secretary in case
armed intervention for termination of the hijack looks likely (in case an Indian registered hijacked aircraft
lands at an Indian civil airport).
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Handout 7.3
Page 3 of 4
Central Committee (CC)

The Central Committee (CC) is the executive authority responsible for dealing with the contingency of
hijacking under the guidance of COSAH / CCS. It will meet in the Central Committee Control Room situated in
the new ATC building, near IGI Airport , New Delhi.
It shall guide the Aerodrome Committee for handling the situation on the ground including for negotiations
and/or forcible termination of hijack. The CC is empowered to deal with the situation in all respects and take
appropriate decisions on its own initiative except on major policy / strategic issues.
Constitution of the Central Committee

1) Director General Civil Aviation (DGCA) Chairman
2) Joint Secretary (In-Charge of Security) Member / Alternate Chairman
Ministry of Civil aviation
3) Commissioner of Security Civil Aviation (COSCA) Convener
The CC will maintain a panel of negotiators, psychiatrists and linguists so that they may be summoned to the
Control Room in case required.
The functions of the Central Committee would include the following:

(i) Keeping track of the situation and all developments, being in constant touch with all concerned agencies /
officials and taking timely decisions and action for handling the situation.
(ii) Providing inputs to COSAH on all developments.
(iii) Analysis and anticipation of developing situation, building possible scenarios and submission of strategic
options for consideration of COSAH / CCS.
(iv) Implementation of decisions of COSAH / CCS.
(v) Providing guidance and issuing necessary instructions to the Aerodrome Committee.
Aerodrome Committee (AC)

The Aerodrome Committee is established at every airport. In the event of an emergency, the concerned
Aerodrome Committee shall assemble at the airport without loss of time, not later than half an hour, in the
earmarked Control Room and will address the hijack situation in accordance with the Contingency Plan of the
concerned airport and directions of the Central Committee.
Constitution of the AC shall be as under:

1) Home Secretary of the State Chairman
2) Airport Director/ Dy. GM / Sr. Manager/ Convener
Incharge Airport, AAI / Airport Management
3) Representative from R&AW (on arrival) Convener
4) IG (Int)/ DIG (Int) Special Branch Member
5) Joint Director IB / Dy. Director IB (MHA)
6) A senior representative from Army
7) A senior representative from Air Force
8) A senior representative from Navy
(in case affected airport is Navy controlled)
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Handout 7.3
Page 4 of 4
9) Senior most officer of Airport Security Unit

(Commandant / Dy. Commandant / Asst. Commandant of CISF (ASG)
10) A senior most executive of the affected airline
11) Any other member as considered necessary Negotiators / Psychologist
12) Superintendent of Police of the area
Functions of Aerodrome Committee
The AC will provide for:

• Adequate Mobile Emergency Lights
• Fuel, Water, Food for crew and pax
• Positioning of Fire/Crash tenders Strategic points.
• Communication setup
– Forward post and control room.
• Forewarning Hospitals and arrangement of Ambulances.
• Barracks for commandos
• Security around the affected aircraft
• Negotiation team.(at initial stage)
Communication system
The Central Committee will be in constant touch with the Aerodrome Committee through the ATC. The
Aerodrome Committee would also remain in continuous communication with the CC through STD telephone,
direct speech circuit system, HF/ VHF etc.
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Handout 7.4
Page 1 of 2
Role of Police, Airport and Airline Operators
All organizations, receiving information that indicates an act of unlawful interference about to be committed
or in progress or has been committed, will take such appropriate action as specified in the Contingency Plan.
The course of action to be taken will include dissemination of the message to all concerned in accordance
with the Contingency Plan, the assessment of the message and a plan of action amongst those concerned.
The organization receiving such information shall be responsible for gathering and recording of as much
information as on the message to allow an accurate assessment to be made of the incident.
Duties of ATC
• ATC Officers on duty at the airport will take action as specified in the National Contingency Plan.
• ATC officer on duty at that airport will activate the Aerodrome Committee Control Room and take further
action in accordance with the Contingency Plan of the Airport.
• Air Traffic Control centre will provide assistance to safeguard to the affected flight, if it enters or is in India
air space and wishes to land at any airfield in India. It will also take appropriate action to expedite the
conduct of all phases of the flight, including permission to land.
• On landing, the aircraft is to be directed to the designated isolated aircraft parking position and all further
action taken in accordance with the Contingency Plan of the airport.
Role of Police
• Control movement of traffic around the affected airport
• Maintain the outer cordon
Role of Airport Operators

• Prepare Contingency Plans for Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
• Earmark Isolated Area for the hijacked aircraft
• Operations Room for NSG
• Barrack / tent accommodation for Command Task Force
• Communication set-up between forward control post and aerodrome committee control room (EOC/ICC)
• Provision of Vehicles
• Maintain panel of doctors, negotiators, linguists, etc.
• Provide medical assistance to relatives of passengers & crew
• Briefing room for media
• Hostage Reception / Enquiry Center.
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Handout 7.4
Page 1 of 2
c) Role of Airline Operators
Role of the senior airline management representative, which could be initially the airline station manager, will
be to provide assistance to the national and incident CMTs, as and when required.
• Communicate about the hijack threat immediately to the concerned RDCOS BCAS and Commissioner of
Security (Civil Aviation) by telephone followed by detailed report by fax
• Install appropriate communication systems in aircraft
• On aircraft hijack the commander will communicate with Air Traffic Services(ATS) on
o Deviation of Flight
o Squawk appropriate transpoder code
o Description of hijackers
o Number of offenders and arms carried by them
o Demands made by the hijackers
• Open Information Centers at the airport to provide latest information about affected aircraft.
• Provide appropriate prescribed phrases in different languages on cards.
• Arrangements for providing temporary shelter / drinking water etc. to facilitate relatives of passengers &
crew at Origin & destination station
• Provide written report of Pilot-in-command to appropriate authority
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Handout 8.1
Page 1 of 4
Module 08
Response to Bomb Threat to Aircraft on Ground
Bomb Threat
A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, which suggests, or infers, whether true or false that the
safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, or any airport or civil aviation facility or any person may be in
danger from an explosive or other item or device.
Characteristics of Bomb Threats
Experience has shown that bomb threats may be directed against:

• Aircraft on the ground or in the air;
• Airport installations, facilities and buildings; or navigation aids on or in the immediate vicinity the airports;
• Air cargo designated for shipment by air; or cargo installations, facilities and buildings.
Action by the Recipient of a Bomb Threat Telephone Call
Receipt of Bomb Threats

Telephoned bomb threats may be received by airports, airlines and cargo agents either directly from the
people issuing the threats or from intermediaries, for example, the media or press agencies. In either case,
recipients should try to obtain as much information as possible about the threat in order to facilitate
assessment of it and identification of the person issuing it.
To facilitate the collection of information, aircraft operators and airports should install tape recording facilities
on appropriate exchanges and/or telephones. Continuous loop equipment, which should be kept running
continuously, is preferable to conventional recording equipment which must be switched on when a recording
is to be made. When a bomb threat has been recorded, the tape should be retained as evidence.
Staff Instructions and Training

Staff such as telephone switchboard operators and airline ticket sales people who are likely to receive bomb
threat calls should be briefed on the action they should take before taking up their duties, and the responses
required from them should be incorporated into appropriate staff instructions.
They should be provided with checklists to facilitate their reactions. Supervisors should be similarly aware of
the response required and of the need to relay information about bomb threats to trained bomb threat
assessors.
Action by Recipient of a Bomb Threat

Any person receiving a bomb threat directly by telephone should:
• Listen carefully and make a note of the actual words used by the caller;
• Either take action to trace the call or alert a colleague in order that they may do so;
• Take such action as may be necessary to tape record the call, where this is not done automatically;
• Prolong the call to obtain as much information as possible;
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Handout 8.1
Page 2 of 4
• Ask the caller the following questions:
Asked first so that that an evacuation can be

WHERE is the bomb?
planned
So that a time factor is known for the
WHEN will it go off?
evacuation
To help in recognition of the device during a
WHAT does it look like?
search
WHO are you? To see if the caller is from a credible group
To build up a better picture of the incident and
WHY are you doing this? keep the caller on the line to assist in tracing
the call
Note 1. — The questions should be posed as open questions rather than as leading ones. For
example, ask, “Where exactly is the bomb?” rather than, “Is the bomb in the hold of the
aircraft?”
Note 2. — The order in which the questions are asked is important as the caller may hang up
before all the questions can be asked.
• If possible, test the credibility of the caller by making up a non-existent flight number, flight time or
location and asking the caller whether that is the one to which he or she is referring;
• Inform a supervisor who should inform the nominated bomb threat assessor, the police or security
services.
People receiving calls from intermediaries should:

• Ask for, and make written note of, the precise time at which the threat was issued and the exact words
used by the caller;
• Ask whether the intermediary obtained answers to any of the questions detailed above and about the
origin of the call and the caller’s identity.
The recipient of a written bomb threat should preserve the message and deliver it to the supervisor with
precise information about its discovery. Messages discovered in flight should be referred to the pilot-in-
command immediately.
Supervisors should interview the recipient of any call or message in order to complete the Bomb Threat
Report Form shown below and relay it without delay to the nominated bomb threat assessor.
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Handout 8.1
Page 3 of 4
SAMPLE BOMB THREAT REPORT FORM
Time: Date:
Name of person receiving threat message:
Message: (Caller’s exact words)
WHERE IS THE BOMB?
Terminal Fuel storage Cargo area Airline offices or Other

facility maintenance
area
Aircraft Flight number Departing Going to
Did the caller appear to be familiar with the aircraft or building when describing the location?
YES / NO
WHEN WILL IT EXPLODE?
Time : Day : Date :

In flight?: YES/NO If moved?: YES/NO Other :
WHAT DOES IT LOOK LIKE?
Briefcase Shopping/carrier bag Suitcase

Box/parcel Other (describe)
WHO ARE YOU?
Name : Organization :
Where are you now?
WHY ARE YOU DOING THIS?
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Handout 8.1
Page 4 of 4
BACKGROUND DETAILS (Circle appropriate answer)
Origin of call
Internal (from within Public
Local Long distance
building) telephone/cellular/mobile
Attempt made to trace call? Yes/No

Caller’s identity
Sex: Approximate age: Language spoken:
Voice characteristics
Loud Soft High-pitched Deep
Raspy Pleasant Other
Speech
Fast Distinct Stuttering Slurred
Slow Distorted Nasal Other
Background noise
Noisy Quiet Trains Aircraft
Street traffic Voices Office machines Factory machines
Kitchen Party atmosphere Animals Music
Mixed (describe)
Accent
Local Not local Colloquial Regional Foreign
Manner
Angry Calm Irrational Rational
Coherent Incoherent Deliberate Emotional
Intoxicated Laughing Righteous Obscene
Other (describe)
Command of language
Excellent Good Fair Poor
COMPLETE FORM AND PASS TO NOMINATED BOMB THREAT ASSESSOR

DISCUSS THREAT CALL ONLY WITH BOMB THREAT ASSESSOROR POLICING AUTHORITIES.
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Handout 8.2
Page 1 of 3
Bomb Threat Assessment
A systematic procedure to assess bomb threats is necessary to ensure, as far as humanly possible, that
whenever there exists an actual bomb or other device the assessment leads to positive action and where the
threat is a hoax the assessment results in the minimum disruption to operations.
Such a procedure was devised by several States using a technique called “Positive Target Identification” (PTI).
The methodology was designed to lead a bomb assessor to a logical conclusion. PTI will assist in classifying the
threat as:
• Specific; or
• Non-specific;
The process of PTI is to use the specificity of the information contained in the threat to determine the
credence to be applied to the threat. The more information given by the caller (most threats are made
anonymously over the telephone; written threats are rare), the more likely the threat should be taken
seriously. Each threat must be assessed to determine its significance and the risk it represents so that
appropriate measures may be implemented.
Bomb Threat Contingency Plan
The salient features of a Bomb Threat Contingency Plan are:

• Designation of airport director as coordinator.
• Establishment of bomb threat control room.
• Evaluation of call by bomb threat assessment committee guided by BWAF.
• Questioning technique.
• Duties and responsibilities of various agencies at airport such as AAI, ASG / APSU, airlines, BDDS, DGCA,
customs and immigration.
• Search procedure.
• Evacuation of building under threat.
• Procedure to deal with unidentified / suspected baggage.
Bomb Threat Assessment on the Ground
Bomb threat assessment carries substantial responsibility. Bomb threat assessors should be appropriately
trained and available 24 hours a day. Each aircraft operator and airport should have at least one assessor on
duty or on call within the company at all times. Where a threat is received against an aircraft on the ground,
the targeted aircraft operator and the appropriate airport security services agency should agree on
assessment.
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Handout 8.2
Page 2 of 3
Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC)
In India Bomb threat call is assessed by the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC). BTAC is a
recognized apex body at the airport empowered to evaluate every threat call and take appropriate action as
laid down as deemed necessary without reference to any higher outside agency.
The Bomb Threat Committee comprises of:
No Officials Agency Status

Airport Director or Director operations Airport Operator Coordinator.
1
or his representative
2 CASO or his representative ASG (CISF or State Police) Member
3 Security Manager / Station Manager Aircraft Operator Member
4 Watch Supervisory Officer (WSO) ATC Member
5 Airworthiness Officer DGCA Member
6 Representative of local police State Police Member
Officer I/C BDDS ASG/State Police/ NSG (where ever Member
7
located)
8 FRRO/Asst FRRO * Immigration Member
9 Deputy Commandant * Customs Member
COE or his representative BCAS Observer
10
(wherever located)
RDCOS or his representative BCAS Observer
11
(wherever located)
(Should be present in case threat relates to international terminal, international airlines or
*
import/export cargo terminal)
Aircraft operators may require pilots-in-command to refer bomb threats received on board aircraft in flight to
operations staff on the ground for assessment, or they may authorize the pilots-in-command to assess threats
themselves. Where pilots-in-command are authorized to assess bomb threats, they should be provided with
guidance from the police or State security services.
It is important that the bomb threat assessor obtain full details of the threat message — ideally in the form of
a completed Bomb Threat Report Form from the person who received it and by the fastest possible means.
The bomb threat assessor should assess the threat by working methodically through the Bomb Warning
Assessment Form (BWAF). Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF) is a guideline to the committee for
systematic and scientific evaluation of the Bomb Threat Call. It is designed to lead the assessor to a logical
assessment of the threat as GREEN (Hoax), AMBER (Non Specific) or RED (specific) Threat described below
with the actions required.
GREEN (Hoax) A warning, which may not identify a target Present countermeasures negate threat.
or a specific group of targets, or which No extra precautions necessary.
otherwise lacks credibility.
AMBER (Non A warning that can be related to one or This may involve danger and may require
Specific Threat) more targets but where there is doubt augmentation of countermeasures.
about its credibility or about the
effectiveness of existing countermeasures.
- 92 -
RED (Specific A specific warning where the threat is of a Likely to involve a danger to people,
Threat) nature which permits identification of a property or commercial activities and
specific target, or where the caller has therefore merits countermeasures.
positively identified himself or the
organization involved and is judged
credible.
Note.— Category RED warnings against Take all necessary countermeasures.
aircraft in flight should be notified
immediately to the pilot-in-command of the
aircraft and the destination or nominated
diversion airport
Although the procedure is largely dependent upon the provision of “Yes” or “No” answers to a series of
questions, the assessor must also take account of other factors that may bear upon the credibility of the
threat including, but not limited to, the following:
• The recent history of warnings and incidents for the airport and the main aircraft operators;
• The possible influence of current events such as:
o Industrial disputes concerning the aircraft operator of the flight concerned or airport;
o Disputes with neighbouring communities or environmental protest groups concerned with, for example,
airport expansion or development;
o Similar incidents having been recently reported in the media which may have prompted a hoax call;
o High-profile persons who may attract a threat at the airport or are passengers on the flight;
• Any reported incidents such as overbooked passengers, a passenger refused boarding, or disputes at
check-in or the gate involving friends or relatives;
• Anything particular or unique about the cargo being carried on the flight;
• Additional security measures that have been taken and the local police or security authority’s opinion of
the warning.
Deterring and Detecting Persons Responsible For Bomb Threats

Details of bomb threat incidents should be recorded by aircraft operators and airports and detailed in a report
which should be sent to the State’s civil aviation and security policy and regulatory section so that trends may
be considered, and to the appropriate police authority in order that the circumstances may be investigated.
When a person initiating a bomb threat is identified, that person should be prosecuted under the relevant
laws of the State; evidence of the cost and concern caused by the incident should be submitted for
consideration by the court, and convictions should be publicized to deter potential offenders.
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Handout 8.3
Page 1 of 2
Bomb Threat Response by Ground Authorities
Action after Positive Threat Assessment

In consultation with the police and other appropriate agencies, each aircraft operator and airport should
develop contingency plans to be implemented when bomb threats issued against it are assessed as RED or
AMBER to reduce the risks arising from such bomb threats.
Duties of Air-Carrier:
• Attend BTAC meeting.
• Stop Boarding of passengers if already boarded. Disembark all passengers and crew with all cabin
baggage. Escape slides should only be used in extreme emergencies;
• Be prepared to move the aircraft and GS equipment to a remote location such as the isolated parking
position in case BTAC decides to treat the call specific without loosing time;
• isolate and re-screen all passengers and their cabin baggage and hold them in a separate area until the
crew members, hold baggage, cargo and catering supplies have been inspected/screened, searched and
declared safe;
Duties of Air-Crew
• Stop boarding in-case boarding has already commenced
• Disembark passengers already boarded with their cabin baggage
• Send them to terminal building
• Make a final inspection of the cabin to ensure all pax have disembark & carry necessary shut down before
deplaning self.
• Do not touch, open or attempt to remove any unclaimed article / device, but report to the coordinator.
• Pre-embarkation check, comprising of 100% screening of hand baggage by ASG shall be implemented on
departing crew & pax.
• Post security checks Crew & Pax would wait in the boarding hall for announcements of boarding.
• Before boarding the aircraft, crew and pax are required to identify their registered baggage at the isolated
bay / BMA before proceeding for Secondary Security Checks & Boarding.
Action taken if the BTAC assess the call as Specific Threat Call
• Aircraft will be towed to the isolated bay.
• Senior Airline official from Security / Flight Crew / Engg / Catering / Cargo, Traffic, GSD etc. with sufficient
staff to be available to assist Anti-Sabotage check / search team.
• Aircraft will be searched by BDDS, dog squad, airline engineer & security, ASG, AWO and if required
assistance will be taken from crew.
• On receipt of clearance from the coordinator screened crew will be escorted to the departing aircraft.
• Escorted crew would alight from bus at a safe distance of 100 mtrs from the aircraft.
• Crew should identify their hold baggage at the Isolated bay and proceed for Secondary Security Check
/100% hand baggage check by airline security before boarding the aircraft.
• Crew to give clearance for passenger boarding after necessary checks..
• On receipt of clearance from the crew, screened pax will be escorted to the departing aircraft.
• Escorted pax will alight from bus at a safe distance of 100 mtrs from the aircraft.
• Pax are required to identify their hold baggage at the Isolated bay before proceeding for Secondary
Security Check & Boarding.
• Head Count to be taken
Handout 8.3
Page 2 of 2
- 94 -
Action to be taken if the BTAC assess the call as Non – Specific Call
• Aircraft to remain at parking bay
• Aircraft search would be carried out by AME & Airline security. Crew will assist if required
• Aircraft Security Search Check-list to be used for the Search
• On receipt of clearance from the coordinator screened crew to be escorted to the departing aircraft.
• Crew to identify their hold baggage before proceeding for Secondary Security Check & Boarding.
• Crew to give clearance for passenger boarding after necessary checks.
• On receipt of clearance from the crew, screened pax will be escorted to the departing aircraft.
• Pax to identify their hold baggage before proceeding for Secondary Security Check & Boarding.
• Head Count to be taken
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Handout 8.3
Page 1 of 1
Do’s & Don’ts for suspect item

Do’s
• Do evacuate men immediately to a safe distance.
• Open all windows & doors.
• Place sand bags around the suspected object.
• Inform bomb disposal squad.
• Inform fire brigade, hospital and ambulance.
• Do handle the package alone if you are duty bound to handle
Don’ts
• Do not touch or remove the object unless you are duty bound
• Do not open the package.
• Do not puncture package.
• Do not submerge packet into water.
• Do not accept identification marks on its face value. It could be a disguised bomb.
• Do not pass metallic object over the package.
• Do not direct flash light directly over the suspected object.
• Do not cut the strings or wire.
• Do not bring suspected device in security control room or police station.
• Always remove the men first and not the bomb from scene.
• Do not attempt to open the baggage by hand, always use remote entry technique.
• Don’t stereotype, the bomb being high explosive, it may be incendiaries.
• Don’t transport the suspected object through congested area.
• Do not permit re-entry of people until object is removed.
• Don’t be a dead hero
Countermeasures adopted for handling Bomb Threat Calls

• Installation of caller ID
• Wide publicity in local newspaper
• Prompt evaluation of call with help of BWAF
• Deployment of dog / BDDS in airports.
• Periodical mock up exercise
• Up gradation of EDS / EDDS.
• Installation of EVDS / ETDS
• CTX – machines (computer tomography x-ray)
• Training of employees
• A dedicated ASG (CISF) is inducted
• Centralized monitoring of CCTV by APSU/ASG, customs, immigration
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Handout 9.1
Page 1 of 4
Module 09
Response to Bomb Threat to Aircraft in Air
Bomb Threat for Aircraft-in-flight
An aircraft is deemed to be in-flight when:

• It is taxing to takeoff point
• Aircraft lands back at departing station
• Scheduled arrival or diverted aircraft
Actions Before Take off / After Landing
On receiving notification of the bomb threat to an aircraft at the airport, the ATC - controller will immediately
notify the appropriate authority, the aircraft operator and the airport operator :-
(a) If the aircraft is on the ground

• Clearance will be denied for take-off until appropriate measures have been taken to establish that the
threat is false and continuance of the flight may be authorized, or until the aircraft and contents have
been searched and declared by a competent authority to be no longer under threat.
• After denying clearance, the control tower will clear affected taxiways and runways and direct the
aircraft to taxi or be towed to the isolated parking position.
• Rescue, fire fighting and security services shall be alerted in accordance with the airport emergency plan.
(b) For aircraft on bay

• Commander to immediately disembark passengers / crew with their hand baggage.
(c) For pushed back aircraft where Tow Tractor is still attached
• Commander to bring the aircraft to the same parking stand and disembark Passengers/crew with their
hand baggage.
(d) For pushed back aircraft when engine has started but taxiing has yet not commenced
• Commander to bring back the aircraft to the same parking stand on its own power and disembark
passengers/crew with their hand baggage.
(e) For aircraft, which has commenced taxiing

• Commander to continue taxing to the Isolation Bay.
(f) If the aircraft is airborne

• Aircraft will be cleared to land in accordance with established emergency procedures at the request of
the pilot-in-command.
- Decision on the action to be taken rest with the pilot-in-command.
• If the decision made is to continue the flight, then, for the duration of that flight, the aircraft should be
treated as suspect and appropriate separation arranged with contiguous ATS units to ensure that other
aircraft are not endangered.
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Handout 9.1
Page 2 of 4
(g) When the aircraft under bomb threat has departed before receipt of bomb threat call message
• Commander of aircraft will be informed regarding the bomb threat to the aircraft.
• BTAC decision would be passed on as soon as it is arrived at.
• Commander to either wait for BTAC decision, or return for landing or divert to nearest airport.
- He may continue to his scheduled destination without waiting for BTAC decision.
(h) Commander’s decision to be conveyed to the coordinator and also to the Area control/ATC units of
scheduled / diverted destination.
(i) Communicate decision of BTAC to Commander of affected aircraft as soon as it is received from the
coordinator.
(j) If the Commander, on hearing BTAC decision decides to land back or divert to nearest airport or continue
to his scheduled destination, inform commander’s decision to coordinator and affected ATC units
accordingly.
- In such a case, the affected aircraft will be treated as “suspect” and appropriate separation arranged
with air traffic service to ensure that other aircrafts are not endangered.
(k) If the commander of the aircraft decides to land back,

- Coordinator to be informed
- Aircraft is cleared for landing on priority under established emergency procedures.
- Upon landing of the aircraft, the aircraft will be directed to isolation bay directly irrespective of fact
that BTAC has declared call as “Non Specific” or “Specific” or not able to take a decision due to
paucity of time.
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Handout 9.2
Page 1 of 1
Bomb Threat Assessment in the Air
Written bomb threats discovered on board aircraft in flight are likely to be spurious, but each one should be
considered on its merits in order to assess the risks involved. Where pilots-in-command are authorized to
assess threats, airlines should provide them with guidance to enable them to assess the risks and decide upon
a course of action. They should consider the following:
• The circumstances surrounding the threat to determine if it originated before the aircraft’s departure or
during the flight. The pilot -in-command should consider whether the threat could have been discovered
during the pre-flight search of the aircraft, or at an earlier stage in the flight. If the pilot-in-command
concludes that the author of the threat is on board and would be affected by an explosion, the threat is
likely to be a hoax;
• The precise wording of the threat, to determine whether it suggests there is a credible reason for the
threat having been given. A threat is most likely to be genuine if there is a reason for it, such as a desire to
avoid the casualties that would result from an explosion. It is likely that a person issuing such a threat will
seek to ensure that it gets through and that there is time to react to it. Where no clear reason for the
threat can be deduced, the threat is less likely to be genuine;
• Whether there is any person on board (e.g. a political figure or other well known person) who might
attract a threat;
• Whether there are passengers on board who might be responsible for a threat (e.g. a potentially disruptive
passenger, deportee or inadmissible, young people or rowdy passengers);
• Whether the airline’s operations centre can be contacted by radio to establish whether this is an isolated
incident or one of a series of similar events affecting the airline;
• If the pilot-in-command is not satisfied that the incident is a hoax, he or she should seek information
through the airline’s operations centre about the current threat to the airline’s interests at the airport of
departure, with a view to establishing whether there are credible motives for attacking the aircraft or
disrupting the flight and the quality of security measures at the airport of departure. Aircraft operators
should therefore develop procedures for making such information available to the pilot-in-command with
the least possible delay.
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Handout 9.3
Page 1 of 3
Aircraft in Flight
1. When a bomb threat is associated with an aircraft in flight, and once the threat has been assessed as
positive, the aircraft operator should contact the pilot-in-command, directly or through the air traffic
services unit, to provide information about the threat and device and about how to respond.
2. On receipt of the information, the pilot-in-command should require a discreet search of the aircraft by
crew members insofar as this is possible in flight and conducted in such a manner as to not cause
passengers to panic.
3. In those cases where the bomb threat assessment indicates that it is unlikely that there is a bomb on
board the aircraft, but where an aircraft operator or a pilot-in-command wishes to be prudent before
committing, for example, to an extended flight across water — the aircraft should be diverted to an
airfield at which it can land safely. Once it has landed, consideration should be given to taking the actions
described above for threats against an aircraft on the ground.
4. When the pilot-in-command has reasonable grounds for believing that there is a bomb on board the
aircraft, consideration should be given to the potential effects of an explosion on board the aircraft to
people on the ground, particularly within densely populated areas. Action as described in the following
guidelines should be taken:
• An aircraft emergency should be declared to the ATS unit stating the nature of the emergency, and the
aircraft should be diverted to the nearest civil or military airfield at which it can land safely. The route
to the nominated nearest suitable airfield should avoid densely populated areas.
• If the aircraft is required to make an approach to land over a densely populated area, it should be
permitted to land at that airfield in accordance with current emergency procedures. Its time in the air
should not be prolonged in order to divert to another airfield.
• If an immediate landing cannot be made, consideration should be given to seeking expert advice by
communicating on radio with the ATS unit or other ground station which should, in turn, provide a
landline link with the State’s explosive disposal experts. The possibility of radio communications
between aircraft and ATS units being monitored, with the attendant risk of compromise, should be
taken into account during transmissions. Consideration should be given to the use of on-board aircraft
telephone communications or digital cellular telephones.
• The pilot-in-command may also consider making discreet inquiries to establish whether any passenger
has bomb disposal (BD) or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expertise.
Only the initials for these skills should be used in order to reduce the likelihood of alarming other
passengers. Caution should be exercised about the skills any passengers may say they have and where
possible a check on their background should be initiated through the ATS unit or ground station with
which the aircraft is in communication.
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Handout 9.3
Page 2 of 3
5. In addition to the above guidelines, if a suspect explosive device is discovered on board an aircraft, the
pilot-in-command should direct that:
• The suspect object not be moved, touched or opened;
• Passengers should be moved as far away as possible, instructed to fasten their seat belts and keep
their heads below the tops of the seat backs;
• Portable oxygen, bottles of alcohol and first aid kits should be removed from the vicinity. Fire
extinguishers should be readily available.
6. If an immediate landing can be made, the item should be left in place, covered with polythene and then
packed around with pillows, blankets, coats and other blast absorbent materials. The item itself must be
kept dry (hence the polythene) but surrounding materials should be wet in order to reduce the risk of fire.
7. If an immediate landing cannot be made, the pilot-in-command should take expert advice from explosives
disposal experts as described above and consider moving the item, especially if its position poses a real
threat to the aircraft. Reference to the aircraft flying manuals should identify the type-specific least risk
bomb location. If this is a door, a stable platform of hard, blast-attenuating materials, such as cabin
baggage, upon which the suspect item can be placed, should be built to the centre of the door.
8. It is unlikely that an explosive device placed on an aircraft will be fitted with an anti-handling triggering
mechanism. Nevertheless, if the device is to be moved, the following actions should be taken:
• the suspect object should not be opened;
• a check should be made to ensure that it is free to move — i.e. that there is, for example, no thread
joining it to the aircraft structure which may indicate an anti-handling triggering mechanism;
• it should be moved gently and kept in the same attitude in which it was found;
• it should be placed, in the same attitude, in the prepared least risk bomb location and packed around
as described above and suitably restrained against movement during flight or during deceleration or
landing.
Note 1. — No procedures which involve disconnecting or cutting electrical circuits in the suspect items should
be attempted.
Note 2. — As a general rule, a suspect package or article should not be jettisoned from an aircraft in flight,
particularly through a dorso-lateral door, emergency exit or hatch. Tests have shown that such a course of
action will subject the object to severe buffeting by the airflow. This could cause an explosion in close proximity
to the fuselage, or engine(s) of the aircraft, resulting in a loss of control and possible consequential destruction
of the aircraft.
9. If no suspicious item is found and an immediate landing cannot be made, the pilot-in-command should
consider the following:
• Although a bomb threat may have been received and assessed as RED, aircraft should be flown as
normally as possible, striking a balance between the need for a rapid landing and the risk arising from
undue haste.
• An emergency should be declared and the aircraft should divert to the nearest suitable airfield. The
choice of airfield should take into account landing performance requirements, approach aids,
emergency facilities and the proximity of approach paths to densely populated areas.
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Handout 9.3
Page 3 of 3
• The ATS unit should be fully briefed on flight intentions so that the appropriate ground measures can
be initiated at the airfield of intended landing.
• The cabin crew should be briefed to be prepared for a possible emergency landing and prepare for
the possible use of crew oxygen/smoke masks.
• If operationally possible, the cabin differential pressure should be reduced to zero by descending the
aircraft to the cabin altitude. Do not raise the cabin altitude. Maintain this cabin altitude until the top
of descent. When the minimum safe altitude and range considerations permit, descend aircraft to
below 10 000 ft.
• All efforts should be taken to minimize aircraft manoeuvres and to try to avoid turbulence.
• Careful consideration should be given to the choice between flying fast to minimize airborne time and
flying slowly to minimize air loads and damage in the event of fuselage rupture. In most cases, the
turbulent air penetration speed will be a reasonable compromise.
• Consideration should be given to establishing the aircraft -landing configuration as soon as possible.
• Details of remote parking requirements and the immediate availability of passenger steps should be
requested from the airfield of landing. The airfield should be advised of the need to remove
passengers from the vicinity of the aircraft to at least 200 m in an upwind direction as quickly as
possible after landing.
10. When an aircraft lands following receipt of a bomb threat that has been assessed RED or AMBER,
provision should be made to disembark passengers and crew with a minimum of delay (with their cabin
baggage when circumstances permit). The necessary emergency services should be provided to preserve
life and prevent injury, and the aircraft should be parked where it will not hazard people or premises in
the event of an explosion. The actions for a bomb threat against an aircraft on the ground should then be
implemented.
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Handout 9.2
Page 1 of 3
Recommended In-Flight Emergency Safety Procedures for a Suspect Device On Board

Least Risk Bomb Location (LRBL) Procedures
1. Action: IF POSSIBLE, DESCEND, LAND, TAXI TO A REMOTE SITE AND EVACUATE THE AIRCRAFT
IMMEDIATELY.
Purpose: To get passengers and crew away from the hazard. If landing the aircraft and evacuating
passengers within 30 minutes is not possible, implement the following:
2. Action: CONTACT an air traffic control facility and your company operations office to request assistance
from an explosives specialist.
Purpose: To get expert advice directly from an Aviation Explosives Security Specialist (Bomb Technician).
Other countries may wish to implement local procedures.
3. Action: If possible, DESCEND to attain no more than a 1 pound-per-square-inch (PSI) pressure differential
while maintaining the existing cabin pressure as long as possible. It is extremely important that the cabin
pressure differential (? P) be reduced, even if the crew is unable to land immediately due to the distance
to a safe landing area (e.g., over the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans).
Purpose: To avoid strongly amplifying the effects of an explosion, preclude the activation of an altitude
sensitive device and to assist in evacuation of smoke.
4. Action: After considering the aircraft’s capabilities and the distance to the nearest suitable airport, SLOW
to approach speed if possible, and configure the aircraft for landing, restricting maneuvering to a
minimum. This may not be possible in all instances due to the distance to the nearest safe landing area.
Purpose: In the event of a detonation, the systems for lowering landing gear and other landing aids could
be damaged. Reducing approach speed and level flight may enhance aircraft survivability.
5. Action: Covertly CHECK for passengers for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) expertise using only the
initials by announcing: Are there any EOD personnel on board?
Purpose: By using the initials, only persons familiar with EOD will be made aware of the problem.
WARNING: DO NOT OPEN or attempt to gain entry to the internal components of a closed or concealed
device. Any attempt may result in an explosion. Booby-trapped closed devices have been reported as having
been on board aircraft in the past.
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Handout 9.2
Page 2 of 3
DO NOT CUT OR DISCONNECT ANY WIRES
6. Action: KEEP all passengers seated with their seat belts fastened and seat backs and tray tables in their
full, upright positions, at least 4 rows from the suspect device.
Purpose: Distance from an explosion is one of the best protective measures for passenger safety. Placing
seat backs and tray tables in their full, upright positions will provide additional protection.
7. Action: SELECT the designated least risk bomb location (LRBL) for your aircraft from the Flight Operations
Manual.
Purpose: To prepare for moving the suspect item to the correct location on the aircraft.
8. Action: DISABLE all nonessential power to the areas in the vicinity of the LRBL.
Purpose: To reduce potential secondary fire ignition hazards.
9. Action: If the LRBL is a door, DISARM the escape slide and pin the inflation bottle if possible. DETACH the
slide from the door, and LAY it flat on the floor.
Purpose: To provide protection for the floor structure and aircraft systems beneath the floor.
10. Action: PREPARE the LRBL before moving the device. Construct a platform of baggage from the floor up to
the center of the LRBL site. Place at least 10 inches of wetted materials on top of this platform. Place a
single, thin sheet of plastic (e.g., trash bag) on top of the wetted materials.
Purpose: The escape slide and baggage will dissipate blast forces that could otherwise damage the floor
structure or critical systems beneath the floor and reduce or prevent fragments and fire in the cabin. The
wetted materials will also significantly reduce the chance of a cabin fire. Do not omit the plastic sheets, as
we do not want the suspect device to get wet and possibly short circuit an electronic timer.
11. Action: SLIDE a stiff, thin card, such as the emergency information card, underneath the device. If there is
no resistance under the device, leave the card in place.
Purpose: To check for an anti-lift switch.
NOTE: No anti-lift activated device has ever been reported on board an aircraft in flight.
CAUTION: In the unlikely event that the card cannot be slipped under the device, it may indicate that an
anti-lift switch is present and that the device cannot be moved.
NOTE: If the device cannot be moved to the LRBL, the best possible course of action may require you to
execute a modified LRBL packing procedure, keeping the device at its current location.
CONSULT with an Explosives Security Specialist to develop improvised procedures.
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Handout 9.2
Page 3 of 3
12. Action: If the device can be relocated, MOVE the device in the position found with the card in place to
the prepared LRBL. Stabilize it on top of the plastic sheet above the 10 inches of wetted materials and
centered against the inside surface of the structure at the identified LRBL site.
Purpose: To prevent detonation if an anti-lift switch is used in the suspect device.
NOTE: Though very sensitive vibratory-activated devices are not expected on board aircraft in flight, less
sensitive types requiring a 90-degree change in attitude have been encountered. Keeping the device in
the position found will reduce the chance of an accidental detonation.
13. Action: With the device against the inside surface of the cabin interior at the LRBL site (avoiding the
observation port when the LRBL is a door), PLACE an additional single thin sheet of plastic over the device.
Saturate soft blast-attenuating materials with water or any other nonflammable liquid.
Carefully pack at least 10 inches of material around and on top of the suspect device.
FILL the entire remaining area used as the LRBL with soft blast-attenuating materials up to the overhead
and out to the aisle. If the LRBL is on a tail cone, fill the tail cone with blast-attenuating materials forward
of the suspect device.
Purpose: To lessen the thermal effects, absorb energy, and assist in directing the blast, smoke, and
fragmentation outward.
14. Action: SECURE the LRBL stack in place using belts, ties, or other appropriate materials.
Purpose: To ensure the LRBL stack stays in place during the remainder of the flight.
15. Action: MOVE all passengers at least 4 rows of seats from the LRBL. In aircraft where the LRBL is under a
passenger cabin floor, ensure that seats above the LRBL are vacated as well. Seat backs and tray tables
throughout the cabin should be placed in their full, upright positions.
Purpose: Distance from an explosion is one of the best protective measures for passenger safety. Placing
seat backs and tray tables in their full, upright positions will provide additional protection.
16. Action: LAND and TAXI to a remote site, and EVACUATE the aircraft as soon as possible, avoiding exits on
the LRBL side of the aircraft and exits near the LRBL to the maximum degree possible. Be prepared to
provide the responding bomb squad with a description of the suspect device and a briefing on all actions
taken by the crew.
Purpose: To reduce passenger and crew exposure to the suspect device.
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Handout 9.3
Page 1 of 1
LEAST RISK BOMB LOCATIONS (LRBL)

AIRBUS INDUSTRIE:
All Models (Except A380) Right aft cabin door
BOEING AIRCRAFT:
B-707, B-720 (All Models) Left rear entry door
B-717 (All Models) Aft bottom of tail cone fairing
B-727-100 Right galley door
B-727-200 Right forward galley service door
B-737, B-747, B-757, B-767 (All Models) Right rear service door
B-777 (All Models) Right rear cabin door
DC-8 Right aft service/entry door
DC-9, MD-80, MD-90, MD-95 Aft bottom of tail cone fairing
DC-10 Right aft entry door
MD-11 Right aft entry door
BOMBARDIER AEROSPACE:
DHC-7 Right rear baggage door
DHC-8 Series 100/200 Left rear baggage door
DHC-8 Series 300 Left rear baggage door
DHC-8 Series 400 Right rear service door
CRJ-200 (CL-600-2B19) Right galley service door
CRJ–700 (CL-600-2C10) Right galley service door
CONVAIR:
CV-880, CV-990 Right rear service door
FOKKER:
F28, F70, F100 Right forward service door
LOCKHEED:
L-1011 (with lower galley) Lower galley service door
L-1011 (without lower galley) Right aft cargo door
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Handout 9.4
Page 1 of 3
Flight Crew Checklist for In-Flight Chemical / Biological Weapons
Situation
In Cabin But Inactivated In Cabin And Activated In Cargo Hold
• Don mask and goggles. • Don mask and goggles. • Don mask and goggles.
• Inform ATC and declare • Inform ATC and declare • Inform ATC and declare
emergency. emergency. emergency.
• Squawk 7700. • Squawk 7700. • Squawk 7700.
• Do not change altitude until • Turn off recirculation fans. • Turn off recirculation fans.
procedure directs.
• Turn off recirculation fans. • Raise cabin elevation to 10000 • Accomplish cargo smoke/fire
ft at fastest rate possible. checklist.
• Decrease cabin temperature. • Decrease cabin temperature. • Advise systems operational

control.
• Attempt to contain/wrap • Execute emergency descent • Maintain positive cabin

device. procedure. pressure until landing.
• Advise systems operational • Advise systems operational • Stop aircraft with surface wind
control. control. at 10/2 o’clock position.
• Initiate slow descent to • Upon landing, evacuate aircraft • Upon landing, evacuate aircraft
appropriate alternate via upwind side of airplane. via upwind side of airplane.
aerodrome.
• Quarantine passengers upwind • Quarantine passengers upwind • Quarantine passengers upwind

of aircraft until assistance of aircraft until assistance arrives of aircraft until assistance arrives.
arrives.
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Handout 9.4
Page 2 of 3
Cabin Crew Checklist for In-Flight Chemical/Biological Weapons
Identification
Any suspicious substance or package discovered on-board an aircraft must be considered hazardous until
proven otherwise. A substance or package not normally found on the aircraft and that meets certain criteria
should alert a crew member that precautions must be taken. A suspicious package may:
• have oily stains, discoloration or odour;
• Be unclaimed by anyone on board.
A suspicious substance may:

• be a white, tan or beige colored powder;
• Have the consistency and texture of talcum powder.
Crew Action
Discovery of a suspicious spilled substance — on the aircraft in flight

• DO NOT TRY TO CLEAN UP THE SUBSTANCE.
• Pilot-in-command must be advised. Ventilation should be turned down to minimum.
• Flight crew to consider going on oxygen.
• Consider directing passengers and cabin crew to go on oxygen.
• If contact has been made with the substance, immediately wash hands and forearms repeatedly.
• Don protective equipment — gloves and mask. (Special procedures for the donning of mask and removal of
mask and gloves.)
• Cover the substance immediately with anything suitable at hand, then create as many barrier layers as
possible between the agent and the cabin atmosphere by covering the item with multiple layers of plastic
trash bags, dry blankets, more plastic, wet blankets, then more dry blankets to minimize leakage and
spreading.
• Isolate the area. Do not allow anyone to approach the substance in a radius of 3 meters. (Move
passengers.)
• Have any individuals exposed to the substance wash their hands and forearms repeatedly.
• Stop all activities as much as possible around the substance to avoid disturbing the substance.
• Change clothing that may have been contaminated and place it in a sealed bag.
• Try to assess the extent of the contamination.
• Keep a list of all persons who may have had contact with the substance.
• Detailed description of the substance must be given to the pilot-in-command and the authorities.
Discovery of a suspicious package/envelope — on the aircraft in flight
• DO NOT SHAKE OR EMPTY CONTENTS OF ENVELOPE OR PACKAGE.

• Advise the pilot-in-command.
• Flight crew to consider going on oxygen.
• Don protective equipment — gloves and mask. (Special procedures for the donning and removal of mask
and gloves.) Cover all exposed skin.
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Handout 9.4
Page 3 of 3
• Isolate the area — move passengers and extra crew members away from the suspicious item.
• Do not move the item.
• Create as many barrier layers as possible between the agent and the cabin atmosphere by covering
the item with multiple layers of plastic trash bags, dry blankets, more plastic, wet blankets, then more
dry blankets to minimize leakage and spreading.
• Moistened paper towels provided to passengers as breathing filters MAY help in some circumstances.
• Consider directing passengers and cabin crew to go on oxygen.
• If contact has been made with the substance, immediately wash hands and forearms repeatedly.
• Ensure no one touches, moves or otherwise disturbs the item.
• List all people in the area when the suspicious item was recognized.
• Detailed description of item must be given to the pilot-in-command and the authorities.
The pilot-in-command in conjunction with the responsible cabin crew will assess the situation in order to take
further appropriate action.
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Handout 10a.1
Page 1 of 1
Module 10
Response to Disruptive Passengers
Introduction
Disruptive behaviour shall be considered under a term of criminal offence, and the offender shall be dealt in
accordance with the procedures given in this document. All the Company employees shall comply with the
policies and procedures outlined in this document.
Definition
Disruptive passenger in general terms refers to an individual passenger or group of passengers who exhibits
disruptive and/or violent behaviour during flight. It can also be defined as any behaviour on-board an aircraft
which interferes with the crew in the conduct of their duties and disrupts the safe operation of an aircraft.
Causes of Disruptive Behaviour

There are several factors associated with disruptive behaviour, the following examples are listed in the phase
of order:
Pre-flight Phase:
• Long waiting lines,
• Security checks and miss-handled carry-on baggage,
• Crowded airports,
• Incorrect information received or false and misleading information,
• Bad behaviour of ground crew,
• Last minute changes and delays,
• Under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
• Personality disorders.
In-flight Phase:
• Fear of flying,
• Under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
• Problems with airline flight handling,
• Personality disorders,
• Passengers expectations too great,
• Cabin crew attitude and misbehaviour,
• Inconvenient cabin seating and or rejected upgrade request and cramped conditions in the aircraft cabin,
• Diversions and missing connecting flight due to delays.
Signs of Disruptive Passenger

Signs of disruptive passengers include the following examples, but not limited to :
• Behaving in a way that gives suspicion of a threat to flight safety such as tampering with a smoke detector
or any other safety related device on-board the aircraft,
• Failure to follow safety regulations such as refusing to fasten seat belt,
• Acting in a disorderly or irrational manner,
• Intentionally interfere with the performance or duties of a crew member,
• Use of threatening, abusive or insulting language,
• Operating a portable electronic device when such an act is prohibited.
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Handout 10a.2
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Classification of Threats
A very useful industry developed tool for determining the seriousness of an unruly or assaultive-passenger
incident, and the responses thereby warranted, is a four-tiered scheme of threat levels. This has permitted
the development of a broadly understood reference that can be used to describe an ongoing incident in a way
that facilitates the understanding of crew and ground personnel as to what level of seriousness the on-board
situation has reached. Thereby ground can anticipate somewhat the crew response and what the consequent
ground supportive response should be. The levels are:
Level 1 : Disruptive behaviour including non-compliance, irrational and disorderly.

Level 2 : Physically disruptive behaviour including damage to property or aircraft, physical assault of
crew or other passengers.
Level 3 : Life threatening behaviour, including threat or actual involvement of any weapon and
attempts to open aircraft exits.
Level 4 : Attempted or actual breach of the flight deck door, including violence directed at the door.
Note: To decide whether or not a person is to be considered disruptive is always a matter of judgement.
Wherever possible, it is advisable to discuss the behaviour demonstrated by the passenger with colleagues and
consider their opinions when making the assessment.
Regulatory Provisions for Dealing with Disruptive Passengers
The Tokyo Convention Act, 1975

The Tokyo Convention Act 1963 on offences and certain acts committed on-board an aircraft stipulates that
crew members may exercise extreme measures in order to protect the safety of the aircraft and its
passengers, crew and cargo. The Government of India has enacted the Tokyo Convention Act in 1975 by
incorporating certain provisions of the Tokyo Convention 1963 in the Aircraft Manual (India), Volume 3 –
International Conventions. Chapter III - Powers of the Aircraft Commander (Articles 5 through 10) of the
Tokyo Convention Act 1975 contains the substantive provisions and details the offences that are to be
considered.
The Tokyo Convention Act 1975 also confers powers upon the aircraft Commander in respect of offences and
certain other acts committed on-board the aircraft. These powers should be exercised whenever warranted.
When the Commander has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed or is about to commit
an offence on-board the aircraft that may jeopardize the safety of aircraft or its occupants, then the
Commander may take all reasonable measures including restraint which are necessary :
• To protect the safety of the aircraft; or
• To protect persons of property on-board; or
• maintain good order and discipline on-board; or
• To enable him to handover such person to the relevant authorities or to disembark in accordance with
provisions of the Tokyo Convention.
Additionally, any crew member or passenger may take necessary action without the Commander’s authority
when he has reasonable grounds to believe that such action is immediately necessary to protect the safety of
aircraft, or persons of property on-board.
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Handout 10a.2
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The Tokyo Convention also specifically addresses illegal interference with international civil aviation, provides
immunity for actions taken against perpetrator. In particular, the article 10 states that, “For actions taken in
accordance with this convention, neither the aircraft Commander, any other member of the crew, any
passenger, the owner / operator of the aircraft nor the person on whose behalf the flight was performed shall
be held responsible in any proceeding on account of the treatment undergone by the person against whom the
actions were taken.”
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Handout 10a.3
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Handling Disruptive Passengers
After Take-off
After take-off, the management of the situation by the cabin crew will depend on the threat level. There are
basic four steps management strategies to handle the disruptive passenger:
Soft Approach The first approach is the soft approach, asking the passengers’ to obey the rule and behave
appropriately.
Strong Verbal Is a verbal advisory approach to disruptive passengers’ which states, “You must immediately
cease if you wish to avoid prosecution and your removal from this aircraft at the next point of arrival”.
Authoritative Approach The matter is escalated to the Pilot-in-command who issues the Notification Card as
a final warning.
Restrain The PIC may order the passenger to be restrained if he fails to comply with the final warning.
During flight, if a passenger displays disruptive or abusive behaviour or refuses to obey lawful and reasonable
instructions, the cabin crew should first employ the soft approach to talk to the passenger.
The passenger must also be advised of the legal aspects and its consequences at this early stage. A friendly
but firm verbal request to behave is the most appropriate first step in most cases.
If this fails, the cabin crew shall adopt the strong verbal approach with an advisory “You must immediately
cease if you wish to avoid prosecution and your removal from this aircraft at the next point of arrival”.
When it appears that the soft and strong verbal approach has failed and the situation is deteriorating it will be
appropriate to issue ‘Notice to Disruptive Passenger’ with the permission of the Pilot-in-command.
However, if despite the verbal and written warnings the passenger conduct remains threatening and unsafe,
the CCIC shall adopt authoritative approach and refer the matter to the Pilot-in-command and seek approval
for restraining the passenger.
Suspicious or Threatening
• Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew members
• Be attentive to other activity within the passenger population in the event of Level 1 threat is a diversion to
cover a hijacking
• Initiate “Lockdown” of flight crew compartment
• Suspend traffic in “Clear Zone”
• Alert able-bodied passengers
• Attempt to defuse the situation verbally.
• Pilot-in-command to consider an announcement from the flight crew compartment.
• Issue Unruly Passenger Notification Card, if appropriate
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Handout 10a.3
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Physically Abusive Behaviour
• Use Separation Techniques
• Communicate with the flight crew and other cabin crew
• Initiate lockdown of flight crew compartment
• Be attentive to other activity within the passenger population in the event the Level 2 threat is a diversion
to cover a hijacking
• Suspend traffic in “Clear Zone” and block with ABPs.
• Pilot-in-command shall advise ATC and Airline and request that the appropriate Law Enforcement Agency
meet the aircraft.
• Pilot-in-command should consider diversion and landing plan
• Solicit help from Cabin Crew and Passengers
• Be aware of potential interception by military aircraft
Life Threatening Behaviour

• Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew
• Suspend traffic in “Clear Zone” and block with ABPs and Service Carts.
• Solicit all help from Cabin Crew and Passengers
• Cabin Crew provide information regarding perpetrators to pilot-in-command
• Use force to subdue assailant(s)
• Use restrains and other on-board resources
• If necessary, implement least-risk bomb or CBW procedures
• Pilot-in-command will declare an emergency and activate landing plan.
• Squawk appropriate transponder code
• Prepare for possible rapid descent.
• Monitor radio on 121.5MHz and prepare for interception by military aircraft
• After landing, if possible, pull fire switches and disconnect generators
• If appropriate escape from the aircraft
Attempted or Actual Breach of Flight Crew Compartment

• Maintain Aircraft Command and Control at all costs.
• Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew
• Solicit help via the public address system from Cabin Crew and Passengers
• Defend flight crew compartment using whatever force is necessary to eliminate the threat.
• Use commands and all available resources and necessary force to subdue assailant(s) and eliminate the
threat.
• Use restrains and other on-board resources
• Pilot-in-command will declare an emergency and activate landing plan for nearest suitable airport.
• Squawk appropriate transponder code
• Monitor radio on 121.5MHz and prepare for interception by military aircraft
• As soon as operationally feasible initiate possible rapid descent.
• After landing, if possible, pull fire switches and disconnect generators
• If appropriate escape from the aircraft
Handout 10a.3
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Cockpit Crew Responsibility
• The Pilot-in-command nor the First Officer shall personally get involved in dealing with the disruptive
passenger.
• The flight crew must not leave the Flight Deck in-flight to assist with any disruptive incident;
• If the same passenger(s) continues the disruptive behaviour, the Pilot-in-command should inform Jet
Airways Flight Dispatch / GHA through any available means of communication regarding the disruptive
passenger(s);
• For Level 2 to 4 incidents, the Pilot-in-command must inform ATC and the Flight Deck door must remain
locked for the remainder of the flight;
• If necessary, the Pilot-in-command shall switch ON seat belt signs in order to assist the Cabin Crew
members in managing all passengers;
• As a last resort and if it is considered unsafe to continue to the planned destination, divert the aircraft.
The Pilot-in-command decision shall be final;
• After landing, the Pilot-in-command shall hand over the disruptive passenger’s details to APM / Duty
Manager and instruct further co-ordination with CCIC;
Hand-over to Police
Upon arrival, the Pilot-in-command shall make a PA requesting all passengers to remain seated. The CCIC will
co-ordinate with the Pilot-in-command to identify the unruly passenger to the authorities. After handing over
the unruly passenger to the authorities, the affected crew should provide the authorities with any relevant
information pertaining to the incident. It must be noted that whenever law enforcement officers are called to
meet the flight, written statements will be taken on arrival, and crew may be interviewed.
Note:
• If the incident had occurred in Indian Territory, then as per the Indian Law the crew who witness the
incident shall physically lodge the police complaint. In such cases, the witness crew member shall lodge the
police complaint at the Airport Police Station with assistance from the Security and Airport Services
representatives under consultation of Jet Airways Legal department.
• At overseas stations, the APM / Duty Manager will assist the crew members in dealings with the police
and/or local authorities.
Restraining Of Passenger
Passenger will be restrained only on those occasions where passenger behaviour is likely to endanger the
safety of the aircraft and its occupants. The authority to command restraining of passenger rests with the
Pilot-in-command, who shall base his decision on the reports and recommendations made by the CCIC. The
Tokyo Convention Act 1975 confers powers upon the aircraft Pilot-in-command in respect of offences and
certain other acts committed on-board the aircraft. These powers should be exercised whenever warranted.
The Company will support the Pilot-in-command any time these powers are legally used. The flight deck crew
must not get physically involved nor be present in the cabin while the restraint process is in progress. Cabin
crew are trained in the handling of such cases. Whenever the crew experiences difficulty in controlling
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Handout 10a.3
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intoxicated, violent or armed passengers, a FSR must be raised by the Pilot-in-command (DGCA Air Safety
Circular 5/1982 refers). The CCIC shall detail the incident in the ‘Disruptive Passenger Flight Disturbance
Report. The CCIC must also request witness reports from passengers who witnessed the incident.
Passengers who have been restrained shall be handed over to the airport security / police officials.
Guidelines on Restraining a Passenger
When restraining a passenger, the following should be considered :

a) When restraining a passenger, it is important to handle the situation professionally.
b) The restraining ties should be kept ready prior to its application.
c) To minimise disruption, if possible, isolate the restrained passenger by relocating surrounding passengers.
d) The crew will act as a team to restrain the passenger. Crew may accept but must not solicit (except in
exceptional circumstances) or depend upon assistance from other passengers.
e) Only reasonable and necessary force may be used to effect the control and restrain.
f) Crew must remain alert following restraint, as a violent passenger may try to convince the crew member
into a false sense of security.
g) Once restraint has been achieved, the passenger shall be checked at regular intervals (maximum 15
minutes) to ensure that no injury is being caused to the passenger and blood circulation and free breathing
is maintained.
h) Prior to landing the CCIC should designate one crew member or an able bodied passenger to be seated in
an area close enough to the passenger to enable him to be released in the event of an emergency
situation.
Note: Do not tie a person to the aircraft structure.
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Handout 10a.4
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Powers Of The Aircraft Commander
ARTICLE 5
1. The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to offences and acts committed or about to be committed
by a person on board an aircraft in flight in the airspace of the State of registration or over the high seas
or any other area outside the territory of any State unless the last point of take-off or the next point of
intended landing is situated in a State other than that of registration, or the aircraft subsequently flies in
the airspace of a State other than that of registration with such persons still on board.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3, an aircraft shall for the purposes of this Chapter,
be considered to be in flight at any time from the moment when all its external doors are closed following
embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation. In the case of a forced
landing, the provisions of this Chapter shall continue to apply with respect to offences and acts
committed on board until competent authorities of a State take over the responsibility for the aircraft and
for the persons and property on board.
ARTICLE 6
1. The aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed, or
is about to commit, on board the aircraft, an offence or act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1,
impose upon such person reasonable measures including restraint which are necessary:
a) to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein; or
b) to maintain good order and discipline on board; or
c) to enable him to deliver such person to competent authorities or to disembark him in accordance with
the provisions of this Chapter.
2. The aircraft commander may require or authorize the assistance of other crew members and may request
or authorize, but not require, the assistance of passengers to restrain any person whom he is entitled to
restrain. Any crew member or passenger may also take reasonable preventive measures without such
authorization when he has reasonable grounds to believe that such action is immediately necessary to protect
the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein.
ARTICLE 7
1. Measures of restraint imposed upon a person in accordance with Article 6 shall not be continued beyond
any point at which the aircraft lands unless:
a) such point is in the territory of a non-Contracting State and its authorities refuse to permit
disembarkation of that person or those measures have been imposed in accordance with Article 6,
paragraph 1 c) in order to enable his delivery to competent authorities; or
b) The aircraft makes a forced landing and the aircraft commander is unable to deliver that person to
competent authorities; or
c) That person agrees to onward carriage under restraint.
2. The aircraft commander shall as soon as practicable, and if possible before landing in the territory of a State with a
person on board who has been placed under restraint in accordance with the provisions of Article 6, notify the
authorities of such State of the fact that a person on board is under restraint and of the reasons for such restraint.
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Handout 10a.4
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ARTICLE 8
1. The aircraft commander may, insofar as it is necessary for the purpose of sub paragraph a) or b) of
paragraph 1 of Article 6, disembark in the territory of any State in which the aircraft lands any person who he
has reasonable grounds to believe has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft an act
contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1 b).
2. The aircraft commander shall report to the authorities of the State in which he disembarks any person
pursuant to this Article, the fact of, and the reasons for, such disembarkation.
ARTICLE 9
1. The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities of any Contracting State in the territory
of which the aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed on board the
aircraft an act which, in his opinion, is a serious offence according to the penal law of the State of registration
of the aircraft.
2. The aircraft commander shall as soon as practicable and if possible before landing in the territory of a
Contracting State with a person on board whom the aircraft commander intends to deliver in accordance with
the preceding paragraph, notify the authorities of such State of his intention to deliver such person and the
reasons therefor.
3. The aircraft commander shall furnish the authorities to whom any suspected offender is delivered in
accordance with the provision of this Article with evidence and information which, under the law of the State
of registration of the aircraft, are lawfully in his possession.
ARTICLE 10
For actions taken in accordance with this Convention, neither the aircraft commander, any other member of
the crew, any passenger, the owner or operator of the aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf the flight was
performed shall be held responsible in any proceeding on account of the treatment undergone by the person
against whom the actions were taken.
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Handout 10a.5
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Information to be relayed by Captain before landing to the Police:
• Identity of the offender and complainant

• Time, date, location of the incident
• Description of the incident
• Injuries requiring medical attention
• Complainant prepared to take an action
• Witnesses to the incident
Incident Report Details
• Aircraft registration
• Flight number
• Commander’s name
• The time and aircraft position
• Name, passport number, nationality, journey and details of the disruptive passenger
• Incident Report details
• Names and contact addresses of witnesses
• Brief details of the incident
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Handout 10a.5
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Handout 10a.5
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Handout 10a.5
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Handout 10.1
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Module 10
In-flight Response to Acts of Unlawful Seizure (Hijack)
Definition
1. Unlawful act of Seizure (Hijacking). Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (i) Unlawfully, by force
or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of that aircraft, or
attempts to perform any such act, or (ii) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform
any such act, commits the offence of hijacking that aircraft.
2. Clear Zone. The area of the passenger cabin immediately in front of the flight crew compartment door,
including galleys and lavatories.
3. Lock down. The condition of the flight crew compartment door being closed and locked securely, with no
traffic permitted either in or out of the flight crew compartment.
4. Able-bodied Passenger (ABP). Passenger who is clearly physically able and willing to help cabin crew
maintain good order and discipline on board the aircraft.
5. Sleeper. The “sleeper” is a terrorist operative who will be present but not indicate his or her presence
during the early stages of a takeover and perhaps not at all throughout the operation.
6. Deep Sleeper. The “deep sleeper” is on board specifically to develop intelligence and operational
information for future activities. Very rarely will the “deep sleeper” break his or her cover, and will
generally be so well documented that he or she will be totally unsuspected and will be cleared following
the operation with the other passengers.
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Handout 10.2
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Understanding the Behaviour of Terrorists
13.4.1 …as a minimum, this programme shall include the following elements:
….
e) Understanding of behaviour of terrorists so as to facilitate the ability of crew members to cope
with hijacker behaviour and passenger responses;
Terrorism and Terrorists
Terrorism can be defined as a premeditated, politically motivated use of unlawful, shocking, and unexpected
violence perpetrated against both combatant and non-combatant targets (human and symbolic) by sub
national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. Terrorism has been with us
for a long time. Early recorded terrorist campaigns occurred in 48 A.D. against the Romans.
Terrorism has been referred to as theatre of the obscene. Terrorism is theatre. The more shocking, the more
brutal, the greater is the media interest. Terrorists know this, and play to the media, who unwittingly spread
the message of the terrorist element. Worldwide media coverage, which puts the terrorist and his or her
cause upon the world stage, is perhaps the single strongest immediate objective of most terrorist actions.
Motivation to join a terrorist group ranges from boredom and craving of excitement to strong religious or
political convictions. There are multiple causal factors that bring individuals into the world of terrorism.
Amongst these are generation after generation of hatred, ethnic conflicts, deep divisions within States,
traditions of violence, and lack of recognized communication channels. Economic, political, religious, and
psychological aspects often are factors. It has been said that “the fanatic often seems to view the world from
a particular perspective lying at the extreme of a continuum”.1 In some cases mental illness is a factor.
Some terrorists are addicted to fanaticism and intoxicated with hatred — and they are driven by emotions
more than by reason. Addiction is permanent; intoxication is temporary. Various motivations can drive these
psychological phenomena. These characteristics are common to all extremist groups regardless of their target.
An extensive international research project on the psychology of political terrorism found that the basic
premise of most terrorists who were evaluated was that “their violent acts stem from feelings of rage and
hopelessness engendered by the belief that society permits no other access to information-dissemination and
policy formation processes”.2
The goals, methods, demands, messages and statements of terrorists are clearly communicated to potential
terrorists, who are often inspired by the associated notoriety and publicity to emulate the behaviour. Crew
members need to be aware that terrorists will manipulate their victims, the public, the authorities and the
press. Trained terrorists are very knowledgeable in these areas. They will use, if possible, unwitting crew
members as “mouthpieces” of their cause or situation. Terrorists’ actions are normally aimed far more at the
outside audience than at their victims.
For many terrorists, terrorism has become the only reason for being. The organization gives them credibility
and identity. It gives them a belief system that creates within them feelings of self-value. The result is that
they perceive the goals of the organization to be of ultimate importance and, in their view, morally correct.
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Handout 10.2
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The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?, Report prepared under an
Interagency Agreement by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, United States, September 1999.
This report provides an in-depth view on the subject and is recommended to anyone who seeks additional
information on terrorist behaviour.
The Changing Nature of Hijacking

In the latter half of the 20th Century, most hijackings were of a nature that reflected a basic psycho
physiological weakness in the individual. Many hijackers were driven by their underlying disorders — they
professed a cause, often of a political or religious nature but their disorders and not the professed cause was
at the origin of their behaviour. As a result, they were often quite responsive to the hijacker management
techniques then employed by the crews and hijack response teams of many States. Less frequent was the
attack by a terrorist or by an organized terrorist group. In these attacks the stakes were very high and
generated a very large media interest.
Several terrorist attacks over the past years have heralded a much different and more sinister terrorist
strategy — to kill as many people as possible. This change is critically relevant to the way civil aviation
responds to terrorist acts aboard aircraft: flight and cabin crews confronted with attempted hijackings can no
longer anticipate that their aircraft will be seized and held until political or other demands are met; they must
assume from the outset that the goal of the hijackers is to use the aircraft as a weapon to kill as many people
on the ground as possible. In essence, any attempt to seize an aircraft today must be viewed as an imminent
deadly threat to the aircraft, its crew and passengers and to people on the ground, and crews must be
prepared to use any means available, up to and including deadly force, to prevent the hijackers from gaining
control of the aircraft.
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Handout 10.3
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Procedures to Be Used By Aircrew In The Event Of a Hijacking
These are intended to give common definition and a broadly understood reference that can be used to describe an
ongoing incident in a way that facilitates the understanding of crew and ground personnel as to what level of
seriousness the on-board situation has reached.
Ground personnel can then anticipate the crew response and what the consequent ground support response
should be.
Passenger Disturbance Threat Levels

Level 1 — Disruptive behaviour;
Level 2 — Physically abusive behaviour;
Level 3 — Life-threatening behaviour;
Level 4 — Attempted breach or actual breach of the flight crew compartment.
Clearly a hijacking incident could be classed as Level 3 or Level 4.
Crew’s Strategies to Deal with Terrorists
While terrorism has recently taken over the hijacking role, it must be remembered that not all hijackers are
terrorists. However, in order to successfully combat the terrorist, defeat him and thereby survive, it is
critically important to identify and understand the perpetrator, to not underestimate but to know and respect
the capabilities of the perpetrator, without being overwhelmed by the magnitude of the enemy.
The intelligence of terrorists can span a broad spectrum. Generally, the more intelligent, the higher the
position of the individual has in the team. Crews should remember that they might well be confronted by a
rather intelligent individual amongst the perpetrators and, while they may be totally at odds philosophically, it
is wise to maintain a respectful attitude toward the perpetrators and their espoused beliefs. It is generally
counterproductive for a crew member to be goaded into a philosophical or political discussion with his or her
captors.
Terrorists have several ways to disengage themselves from moral accountability for the human consequences
of their actions. They:
• Consider themselves as protectors from great evil;
• Place responsibility for their actions on their leader, who “told them to do it”;
• Minimize, ignore, or deny the suffering of their victims; and
• Dehumanize their victims.
The last is perhaps the greatest direct threat to crew and passengers in a hostage situation. Crews should, in a
nonassertive, non-aggressive way, while mindful of the potential impact on them of the Stockholm
Syndrome, ensure that they are seen as individuals, as human beings, by the terrorists to the extent possible.
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Handout 10.3
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In an ongoing hostage situation, crew members must recognize that they, too, are a team, much as the
perpetrators are a team and, as long as the crew maintains their discipline, their trust in one another, and
their faith in the efforts and capabilities of the outside resources to ultimately come to their rescue, they will,
to some degree, maximize their ability to remain in control of the situation.
A crew should be aware in an incident that all perpetrators may not make their presence known, either early
in the incident, or ever during or even following the incident. A frequently used method of terrorists is to have
“sleepers” and “deep sleepers” involved in their operations.
The “sleeper” is a terrorist operative who will be present but not indicate his or her presence during the early
stages of a takeover and perhaps not at all throughout the operation. He or she is generally present to
develop information or, in the event it is deemed necessary, to enter in to back up and support the overt
members of the terrorist team.
The “deep sleeper” is on board specifically to develop intelligence and operational information for future
activities. Very rarely will the “deep sleeper” break his or her cover, and will generally be so well documented
that he or she will be totally unsuspected and will be cleared following the operation with the other
passengers.
Cabin crew should be aware that the primary objective of the “deep sleeper” is the development of
intelligence information for use in future attacks. Cabin crew should therefore observe particularly closely any
passengers who appear to be “casing” the aircraft. Seat numbers should be noted, and delivered to the
appropriate authority following the flight.
Crew members need to be aware of the ties between past and present incidents, and possible future
incidents. These ties may range from aspects as simple as the above, to those very multi-dimensional and
complicated ties that cross the entire transportation industry, such as our security principles. An incident, and
its impacts, can continue on in many ways. It is important that the crew member maintain this awareness, be
it while speaking to outsiders of an experience, or perhaps accidentally sharing sensitive security information
and procedures with those without a specific need to know.
We must have common procedures with the inherent flexibility to respond to the specific threat at hand, be
the perpetrator mentally unbalanced, a dedicated and highly trained terrorist, or a threat of a new and
unexpected nature.
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Handout 10.3
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Crew Actions Level 3 - Life threatening behaviour
• Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew.

• Suspend traffic in “clear zone” and block with ABPs and service carts.
• Suspend service of alcoholic beverages
• Solicit all available help from cabin crew and passengers.
• Cabin crew to provide information regarding perpetrators to pilot-in-command.
• Use force to subdue assailant(s).
• Use restraints and other on-board resources.
• If necessary, implement least-risk bomb or CBW procedures.
• Pilot-in-command will declare an emergency and activate landing plan.
• Squawk appropriate transponder code.
• Prepare for possible rapid descent.
• Monitor radio on 121.5 MHz and prepare for interception by military aircraft.
• After landing, if possible, pull fire switches and disconnect generators.
• If appropriate, escape from the aircraft.
Crew Actions Level 4 - Attempted breach or actual breach of flight crew compartment
• Maintain aircraft command and control at all costs.

• Communicate with flight crew and other cabin crew.
• Solicit help via the public address system from cabin crew and passengers.
• Defend flight crew compartment using whatever force is necessary to eliminate the threat.
• Use commands and all available resources and necessary force to subdue assailant(s) and eliminate the
threat.
• Use restraints and other on-board resources.
• Pilot-in-command will declare an emergency and activate landing plan for nearest suitable airport.
• Squawk appropriate transponder code.
• Monitor radio on 121.5 MHz and prepare for interception by military aircraft.
• As soon as operationally feasible initiate possible rapid descent.
• After landing, if possible, pull fire switches and disconnect generators.
• If appropriate, escape from the aircraft.
Cabin Crew Response
The ultimate goal for all except the perpetrators during any incident of unlawful interference is the survival of
all on board. Very strong emphasis needs to be made in cabin crew training that the lockdown of the flight
crew compartment is:
a) To ensure the continued integrity of the flight;
b) To maintain continuity of control; and
c) For the protection of those on board and on the ground.
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Handout 10.3
Page 4 of 5
The role of the cabin crew is to protect the integrity of the flight crew compartment, and use any measures
and available resources to thwart any attempted hijack and save lives in the passenger cabin.
At the first indication that an incident is starting, immediate lockdown of the flight crew compartment should
occur. Should the incident appear to advance to a Level 3 or Level 4 incident?
a) The clear zone should be immediately activated,

b) Passengers should be told to remain in their seats,
c) A galley cart should be placed in front of the flight crew compartment door,
d) ABPs should be requested to block the flight crew compartment door area.
It is far better to be overly cautious than to wait and see what develops.
Control of Able Bodied Person (ABP)
When a passenger or passengers are called upon for assistance as ABPs, the cabin crew must always
remember that they are in charge of the cabin, and should maintain control over those ABPs who are called
upon to assist.
Cabin crew may have to verbally assertively re-establish control of the cabin following successful closure of an
incident
Immunity for Crew Actions
Article 10
The Tokyo Convention of 1963 (Convention of Offences and certain other Acts Committed on Board) Provides
immunity for action taken against perpetrator.
“ For actions taken in accordance with this convention, neither the aircraft commander, any other member of
the crew, any passenger, the owner or the operator of the aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf the flight
was performed shall be held responsible in any proceeding on account of the treatment undergone by the
person against whom the action were taken ”
Pre-flight Procedure
• Establish a Code for action (pre-flight briefing)
Crew Member Role in a Hijack

• Keep the Hijackers Off The Plane
• Don’t Take Off With Them on Board
• Keep Them Out Of The Cockpit
• Land At The Earliest Opportunity
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Handout 10.3
Page 5 of 5
Cockpit Action
• Granted Advance Notification
– Transponder 7500 . . . Not 7700
– Pass as much information to ATC as possible
• Hijacker(s) Present
– Transponder 7500 once assessment has been made of the hijacker
– Notify hijacker of all actions in advance
– If passengers are aware, ask to use PA system to re-assure them and to request they co-operate
Cockpit Excuses
• Weather
• Fuel Load
• Airplane Capability
• Flight Plan Required
• Mechanical Problems
• Maps and Charts Required
• Need for Crew Rest
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Handout 10.4
Page 1 of 3
Signals and Covert Communication Systems for Hijack Situation
CODED SIGNALS
The following information is an example of a code word, TRIP, transponder codes, procedures and flap signals
for the hijack situation. These are in use by at least two contracting States,
Canada and the United States of America and are shown in 10.4 page 2 of this handout.
10.4 Page 4 of this handout is an extract from the ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation (PANS) as presented in
the Emergency Chapter of the Jeppesen Manual. This extract depicts the transponder procedures to be used
globally in the event of a hijack.
Coded Signals: Canada and the United States (Extract from Transport Canada, Security Guidelines for
Aircrew)
The following standard transponder and oral coded signals have been agreed on in the event of an aircraft
hijacking. On receipt of one or more of the signals, Air Traffic Controllers will take appropriate action.
Designated representatives of Canada and/or U.S. Justice and Transportation Departments and airlines are
familiar with the signals and their meaning. The signals requesting intervention from outside do not mean the
intervention will be immediate.
The signals and associated messages shown are applicable to scheduled commercial operators operating in
Canada and under part 121 while within U.S. airspace. However, the signals may be used by other than
commercial operators, if they are required.
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Handout 10.4
Page 2 of 3
PILOT TRANSPONDER PILOT ORAL MEANING OF CONTROLLERS ACTION

SIGNAL MESSAGE* MESSAGE
After use Code 7500, Transmit a radio Situation appears Controllers shall
change transponder to message which desperate. Want acknowledge receipt of 7700
Code 7700. See notes 1, 2, includes (Aircraft call armed intervention. by transmitting (Aircraft call
3 and 4. sign) TRANSPONDER sign) (name of facility) NOW
SEVEN ZERO. READING YOU ON
TRANSPONDER SEVEN ZERO.
NOTE: Within U.S. airspace,

controller will include
sentence AWHAT IS YOUR
ALTITUDE (OR HEADING).
This indicates that he will
notify authorities.
Following confirmation Situation desperate.
that a hijacking is in Want armed
progress, have full flaps intervention now.
down after landing: or
lower full flaps while on
the ground. See Note 4
Retracting flaps after Leave alone - do not
landing. See Note 4 intervene
If unable to change transponder signal or when not under radar control.
Note 1: Pilots who decide to change from Code 7500 to Code 7700 should remain on Code 7500 until three
minutes have elapsed or until an acknowledgement of Code 7500 has been received from the controller,
whichever is sooner, before changing to Code 7700.
Note 2: Pilots who retract flaps after having squawked Code 7700 should return to Code 7500 and remain on
Code 7500 for the next leg of the hijacked flight unless the situation changes again. The Pilot may transmit
A(Aircraft call sign) BACK ON SEVEN FIVE ZERO@ to emphasize the fact that intervention is no longer desired.
Note 3: Aircraft squawking Code 7700 and not in radio contact with the ground will be considered by ATC to
have an in-flight emergency (in addition to hijacking) and the emergency procedures designated shall be
followed. In these cases, notification of other concerned authorities shall include information that the aircraft
was observed to have displayed the hijack code as well as emergency code.
Note 4: This action is a request for armed intervention. Confirmation that a hijack is in progress must be
received before any action is taken. Because of the drastic consequences possibly arising from armed
intervention pilots must ensure the flaps are retracted after landing if a hijack situation has been
communicated to ground authorities but immediate intervention is not desired. Prior to an actual assault on
an aircraft every effort shall be made to preserve the airworthiness of the aircraft.
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Handout 10.4
Page 3 of 3
Note 5: SELCAL PROCEDURES: No Selcal shall be originated by a ground station to an aircraft in known hijack
condition unless the pilot instructs the ground station or his appropriate company ground personnel that Selcal
may be used to contact the flight. This applies to all Communications Centres. With the deranged hijacker on
the flight deck, the light and bell alarms which accompany ground-originated Selcal tones could trigger the
individual (and nearly did so in one case) into violent action, with potentially disastrous results.
References: --Criminal Code of Canada -- ICAO Annex 17 -- FAA
Extract from the ICAO Procedures for Air Navigation (PANS) as presented in the Emergency Chapter of the
Jeppesen Manual. This extract depicts the transponder procedures to be used globally in the event of a hijack.
Unlawful Interference
General
An aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference shall endeavour to notify the appropriate ATS
unit of this fact, any significant circumstances associated therewith and any deviation from the current flight
plan necessitated by the circumstances, in order to enable the ATS unit to give priority to the aircraft and to
minimize conflict with other aircraft. (Annex 2, 3.7)
When an air traffic services unit knows or believes that an aircraft is being subjected to unlawful interference,
no reference shall be made in ATS air-ground communications to the nature of the emergency unless it has
first been referred to in communications from the aircraft involved and it is certain that such reference will
not aggravate the situation (Annex 11, 5.6.2).
Transponder Operations - Unlawful Interference with Aircraft In-flight
Should an aircraft in flight be subjected to unlawful interference, the pilot-in command shall endeavour to set
the transponder to Mode A Code 7500 to give indication of the situation unless circumstances warrant the use
of Code 7700. (Doc 8168, Vol I, Part VIII, 1.5.1).
When a pilot has selected Mode A Code 7500 and is subsequently requested to confirm the code by ATC
he/she shall, according to circumstances, either confirm this or not reply at all (Doc 8168, Vol I, Part VIII,
1.5.2).
Note: The absence of a reply from the pilot will be taken by ATC as an indication that the use of Code 7500 is
not due to an inadvertent false code selection.
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Handout 10.5
Page 1 of 2
Air Crew Do’s and Don’ts
Air Crew Do’s - Crew Behaviour
Self Control
• Do Carryout Regular Duties
• Do Eat when given the opportunity
• Do Exercise
• Do Work slowly
• Do Rest
• Do Protect yourself
• Do Communicate with external forces
• Do Consider effects of escape
Passenger Control
• Consider deterring intervention
• Consider encouraging intervention
• Keep passengers occupied
• Deal with passengers needs
• One class service
• Provide food and soft drink
• Ration food and water
• Issue personal cups, plates & cutlery
• Consider facilitating escape
• Provide encouragement
• You are still there for passengers safety
Hijacker Control
• Allow hijacker to establish rapport with chosen crew member
• Reduce hijackers anxiety
• Trained to cooperate
• Blame authorities for delays
• Encourage food and drink
• Request food and water, toilet servicing and air conditioning units
• Communicate personal details
• Secure release of elderly & children
Air Crew Don’ts

• Don’t Attempt to overpower the hijackers
• Don’t Antagonize
• Don’t Argue
• Don’t Belittle
• Don’t Threaten
• Don’t Make any move
• Do not suggest any course of action
• Don’t Provide liquor.
• Don’t Block Exits
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Handout 10.5
Page 2 of 2
Advantages of a Release
• Reduces bargaining power
• Provides up-to-date information to the authorities
• Humanitarian
• Fewer people to guard and serve
• Limits depletion of food and water
Information: Useful information needed about the hijackers

• Number of Hijackers
• Male / Female
• Nationality
• Language Spoken
• Weapon
• Safe Doors
• Dress Code
Information Required by Air Traffic Control

The flight crew will intimate the ATC as soon as possible the under mentioned details
• Routing & ETA
• Fuel Endurance
• Number of Passengers & Crew
• Condition of Passengers & Crew
• Number of Hijackers
• Weapons, Explosives & Incendiary Devices
Assault Phase
During the assault phase advise all the crew
• Get Down
• Protect Yourself
• Obey Commands
• Evacuate Aircraft When Told To
• Be Prepared To Be Treated As a Potential Hijacker
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Handout 10.6
Page 1 of 3
Hostage Reaction to a Hijack
Human reaction to a hijack is thought to be a subconscious emotional response to the trauma of being a
hostage or innocent victim. The three common phases of reaction, shock, realization and self-preservation.
SHOCK PHASE
In this phase, the hostage is in a state of shock and refuses to accept that such a thing could happen to him. It
can only be a dream so the best thing to do is to go to sleep because he hopes that, like a dream, it will be all
over when he wakes up. This is said to include some aspects of reaction formation (denial that there is a
conflict) and disengagement (not wishing to know about it). This mental confusion may explain why so few
hostages in hijack incidents can remember what actually happened during the hijack: they make poor
witnesses during later debriefing.
REALIZATION PHASE
This phase is characterized by wishful thinking that the incident will be over soon and freedom regained. To
help pass the time, the hostage resorts to alternative activity that is preferable to taking note of what is going
on. Such activity has included counting the windows in the aircraft, or counting the other hostages, and is a
form of suppression of taking ones mind off a problem by concentrating on in-valid tasks.
SELF-PRESERVATION PHASE
The earlier defense mechanisms having failed, the hostage is driven to sit back and consider his predicament.
Starting by completely ignoring the hijackers, the hostage considers his own past-life and provided he regards
it as /not so bad, decides to hang on to it. This is a symptom of the individual acting purely in self interest, and
is followed by the go calling on other defense mechanisms.
However, these defense mechanisms are not invoked quite so automatically: it appears that the pros and
cons are examined more methodically, with considerable regard for previous experience. Two explanations of
what happens have been suggested, viz:
• Identification. The hostage first identifies with his parents – what would they have done in such
circumstances? The parents are unlikely to have been hijacked so no parallel exists. Lacking guidance from
the past, the hostage then identifies with the captor i.e. the hijacker, and tends to follow the captor’s
example. This type of identification is called introjections and involves acceptance of other people's norms,
even though they may be contrary to ones own standards of behaviour.
• Regression. Alternatively, the hostage can be considered as regressing to a very much earlier stage of ego
development - as far back as childhood when he was dependent on his mother to supply his every need.
The hostage is now dependent on the captor for everything, even his life: the captor is therefore the new
mother figure protecting the hostage from evil (in this case the police!)
Whichever explanation is preferred, the effect is the same, as both unite the captors and the hostages against
outsiders. However, to achieve sympathy for the captors, the hostages must have one important ingredient -
positive contact with the captors/hijackers. In the early stages of a hijack, only negative contact occurs
because the hijackers tend to be brutal and irrational in their dealings with the hostages.
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Handout 10.6
Page 2 of 2
As time passes, the hijackers become friendlier, even considerate, and tend to talk to and explain their actions
to the hostages: this is the essential positive contact which will do much to produce the sympathy in these
circumstances.
This sympathy can go to extremes, and is known as the Stockholm syndrome from a bank hold -up incident in
Stockholm where one of the hostages ended up marrying the criminal captor! Aircrews should be aware of
this characteristic of hijack behaviour: used intelligently, it can do much to alleviate the situation and preserve
the lives of both crew and passengers.
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Handout 10.7
Page 1 of 2
The Stockholm Syndrome
Many people were astonished to see, on a television news interview in September 1976, an airline Captain
befriending and defending the motives of a group of terrorists who had just killed a policeman and hijacked
his aircraft from America to France.
Irresponsible?
No, not really, he was just a victim of a human reaction known as the STOCKHOLM SYNDROME.
It was named after an infamous bank robbery in Stockholm on 23 August 1973.
At 10h15, the quiet early routine of the SVERIGES KREDITBANK was destroyed by the chatter of a submachine
gun. As clouds of plaster and glass settled around the 60 stunned occupants, a heavily armed, lone gunman
called out in English, The party has just begun. The party, was to continue for 131 hours, until 09h00 on 28
August, for four young bank employees who were held hostage by the bank robber/prison escapee named
OLSSON. Their jail was a carpeted bank vault which they came to share with another criminal named
OLOFSSON, who joined the group after OLSSON demanded his release from a local penitentiary.
This particular hostage situation gained notoriety because the electronic media exploited the fears of the
victims, as well as the sequence of events. Contrary to what had been expected, it was found that the victims
feared the police more than they feared the robbers. During a telephone call to the Prime Minister, one of the
hostages expressed a typical feeling of the group when she said; the robbers are protecting us from the
police.
After this incident, the hostages felt no hatred for their captors. In fact, they felt that the subjects had given
them their lives back and were emotionally indebted to them for their generosity. Even now they still visit
them in jail, and one of them is engaged to OLOFSSON.
The Phenomenon
The STOCKHOLM SYNDROME seems to be an automatic, unconscious, emotional response to the trauma of
becoming a victim. Though some victims may think it through, this is not a rational choice by a victim who
decides consciously that the most advantageous behaviour in this predicament is to befriend his captor.
Without delving deeply into the FREUDIAN theories of personality, it seems that the reaction develops from
three separate subconscious assessments that we might call regression to infancy, life threat from outside,
and life saving by the captor.
Regression to Infancy
As a baby or young infant, one has little or no freedom of movement, very limited means of communication
and is totally dependent on some adult, generally one’s mother, for food. Similarly, the hostage has little or
no freedom of movement, very limited means of communication and must rely on the captor for sustenance
during a long seige. It seems then that the hostage suffers a personality regression to his infancy and relates
his captor to his mother, depending on his captor for comfort when in his presence. This bond is actually
mutual experience which usually works to the hostage=s benefit. As the hostage becomes closer or better
known to the captor, the more difficult it is for the captor to execute his victim.
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Handout 10.7
Page 2 of 2
Life Threat from Outside

In a calm hostage situation, there seems little immediate threat to the hostage’s lives. However, as police
approach or otherwise intervene, so the danger to the hostage rises. Typically, the captor’s gun is held at the
hostage head if the police are near, but the gun is lowered as the police withdraw, so it is subconsciously
assessed that the threat is from the outside forces and not from the captor. This outside force causes the
hostages and captors to unite into one threatened group.
Life-saving by the Captor

When a captor frequently threatens the life of a hostage and then does not kill him, it is seen in the hostage’s
subconscious mind that the captor is actually giving life to the hostage. Gratitude develops by the hostage
towards his captor which, in extreme cases, can approach idol worship, equating this life-giver with a supreme
power. This is the part of the Stockholm Syndrome which can remain after the hostage=s release C sometimes
for many years. A classic example of this build-up of gratitude comes from one of the hijack victims of the
TWA flight 355.
After it was over and we were safe, I recognized that they had put me through hell and had caused my
parents and fiancé a great deal of trauma. Yet, I was alive. I was alive because they had let me live. You know
only a few people, if any, who hold your life in their hands and then give it back to you. After it was over and
we were safe, and they were in handcuffs, I walked over to them and kissed each one and said thank you for
giving me my life back. I know how foolish it sounds, but that is how I felt.
This was the hijacking, after which, as mentioned at the beginning, the Captain appeared on television
expressing sympathy for his hijackers as well as an understanding of their political cause. In addition, some of
the passengers began a defense fund for the captor’s legal costs.
Is it avoidable?
Yes. A strong-minded, self-disciplined adult in a hostage situation can remain apart from the emotional ties to
his captor without being outwardly aggressive or nonco-operative.
For example, a British Ambassador, Sir Geoffrey Jackson, was held captive for 244 days and so impressed his
captors with his dignity that they were forced to regularly change his guards for fear that he might convince
them that his cause was just and theirs wrong. Also, in America, Dr. Claude Fly was held for 208 days and
maintained his mental isolation from his captors by concentrating on writing and, in fact, wrote his 600-page
autobiography during his capture.
It is not suggested that we should all immediately write our memoirs should we be held in a hijack or other
hostage situation. One should, however, try to insulate oneself from the motives and personalities of the
captors without antagonism. At the same time, it is best to humanize oneself to the captor by letting him get
to know his hostage, thereby increasing one=s chance of survival.
After a hostage situation has ended, it is important that the victims rest and analyze their feelings before any
contact with the press. This is not only to avoid the embarrassment of being seen to side with the captor, but
also to increase the chance of successful criminal prosecution of the captor.
Trying to avoid the Stockholm syndrome is important for all hostage victims but especially important for crew
members of hijacked aircraft.
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Handout 10.8
Page 1 of 2
Post - Landing Procedures

Once the aircraft is on the ground, it is absolutely imperative that it remains on the ground. The flight crew
shall keep the door in lockdown. Since the flight crew cannot know with great certainty what is happening in
the cabin, lockdown should continue until absolutely certain from external personnel who have been visually
identified that the incident is really over.
• Once the aircraft is on ground, it must remain there.
• Lock - down must be maintained until clear confirmation that the incident is over.
• Make aircraft non-flyable.
• Decide if flight crew will evacuate.
• Once the aircraft is on ground, it must remain there.
Lock - down must be maintained until clear confirmation that the incident is over.
• Make aircraft non-flyable.
• Decide if flight crew will evacuate.
• Attempt to taxi aircraft to isolated parking bay.
• Attempt to have communications landline connected to aircraft.
• Advice status of emergency chutes to ground authorities.
• Ration food and water in case of protracted incident
• Establish good housekeeping practices throughout aircraft cabin area
• Off-load all alcoholic bar contents at first opportunity
Tactics of Ground Authorities

In all hijack incidents, the government of the country of landing will undoubtedly be the prime negotiator.
Other governments may be involved and play critical roles.
• Attempts to decide in delays means better survival chances.
• Delay tactics should not compromise aircraft worthiness.
• Portray the old, young and ill passengers as a burden and strive for early release.
• Delays may be considerable but are part of the negotiation process.
• Deadlines passed are positive steps to successful conclusion.
• Crew must be patient and realize that authorities have a big picture.
Ground Intervention
• When requested from crew or if situation is deemed desperate.
Crew must anticipate if situation deteriorates to extreme.

• Assault will be by doors, emergency exits and floor trap doors.
Actions on Ground Intervention

• Crew and passengers must follow instructions given by assaulting team.
• Lie on floor to remove themselves from line of fire.
• Wait for further instructions from AIT when rescue action subsides
• Expect to be treated as suspect until fully identified as non-hijacker
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Handout 10.8
Page 2 of 2
Post Incident Actions

Crews must, and passengers should, bear in mind that any information given to the media can be of great
value to perpetrators in future incidents.
• Interviewed by:
– Airport Authorities, Police, Explosive / CB specialists, State Officials, Company Officials.
• Follow company policy
• Do not talk about incident or threat with public or media.
• Incident Reports mandatory.

– Airlines to Appropriate Authorities of the State
– State Authorities to the ICAO
• Preliminary report
• Final report
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Handout 11.1
Page 1 of 1
Module 11
Hostage Negotiation
Terrorists take hostages with the intent of getting as much publicity as possible for their cause. These
incidents have usually been planned for months, and the hostage-takers have the physical and psychological
support of their fellow members. Usually the demands of the terrorists will go beyond the authority of local
police departments, requiring involvement of Federal officials. The likelihood of hostages being killed is very
high, since the terrorists will have discussed this possibility and may be prepared to die as “martyrs.” The key
to negotiating with terrorists is to convince the hostage-takers that their point has been well-made, their
demands have been heard, and killing the hostages would simply serve to discredit them in the eyes of the
public.
Why are Hostages Taken?

Hostages are taken for many reasons, not all of which are initially apparent - in political terrorism, the reasons
include showing the public that the government is not able to protect its own citizens. Also, taking hostages
virtually guarantees immediate media coverage, and after repeated hostage incidents, it is the hope of the
terrorists that the government may overreact and become excessively restrictive with its own citizens, thus
causing civil discontent and a grassroots movement to overthrow the government.
Law enforcement personnel are most likely to encounter hostage incidents that involve either criminal acts or
the mentally disturbed. If a hostage is taken in a criminal situation, it is usually because the criminal was
unable to complete the crime and escape before the police responded, making the taking of hostages a
spontaneous event. The criminal’s primary reason for taking hostages is to insure his own safety. Therefore,
the demands are invariably for safe passage and a means of escape in return for the hostages’ lives. It is also
very common for them to demand additional money.
A husband or wife may take a child hostage in a custody or domestic dispute. One person believes the other is
an unfit parent and should not have the child, and this is the only way he believes he can regain custody of the
child.
Finally, a mentally disturbed person may take hostages in order to right what he perceives to be a wrong. He
may believe that he has to take hostages in order to carry out some sacred mission or to prove that he can do
something important.
Whatever the initial reason for taking hostages, it is clear that the motive for holding the hostages may
change. For example, a criminal interrupted in the act of robbing a bank may initially demand a great deal of
money, but later reduce this demand to a guarantee of physical safety or clemency in court. Other hostage-
takers may initially demand an immediate change in a government policy or in a prison situation. These
demands may eventually change to an agreement for talks with appropriate officials about the conditions. No
matter what the initial reason for taking hostages, it is not uncommon for the hostage-taker, after some
period of time, to be willing to accept a lesser goal. Whenever a barricaded subject or a hostage situation
exists, there are two basic alternatives available to responding agencies:
• to secure the release of the hostages unharmed whilst conceding as little as possible (known as hostage
negotiation); or
• to attempt to rescue the hostages and neutralize the hostage-takers by offensive action - an assault by an
armed intervention team.
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Handout 11.2
Page 1 of 4
Hostage Negotiation
It is a process of verbal dialogue between the incident responding authorities and the hostage-takers as a
means of bargaining for the release of hostages
Objective of Hostage Negotiation

The basic objectives of hostage negotiation are:
• Resolution of the incident
• Wearing down of the hostage-takers; and
• Tactical negotiations
Command and Control

The most important of these elements, without which any response is doomed to failure, is the establishment
of a clear command structure that will allow decisions to be made at both the strategic (national policy) and
tactical (incident site) level, and a system of communication that will feed information to the decision-makers
and transmit these decisions to staff in the field charged with implementing them.
Executive command at the national policy level where overall strategy is decided upon to ensure that the
national interests and concerns of the State are being met.
Operational command at the scene of the crisis incident where tactical decisions are made within the
parameters of the overall strategy decided upon at the national level.
Operational command should be exercised at an incident control centre located between the inner and outer
cordons. The forward control point, which controls the inner cordon.
The term “incident commander” has been used several times and, however, it is necessary to touch upon the
subject of incident command from the conceptual point of view Most contemporary views of management in
a non-crisis situation are moving away from individual decision- makers to the point where managers are
facilitators who work as part of a team and facilitate that team’s ability to self-solve problems and manage
themselves. Whilst this is true to a certain extent in crisis situations, it has to be remembered that crises by
their very nature disrupt the regular decision-making process requiring a more dynamic and swifter
decision-making process Thus, in the management of crises, there is a need to designate an individual as the
principal decision-maker who will be advised and counselled by the crisis management team.
The Process of Negotiation
Priorities in a hostage incident include preservation of life, apprehension of the hostage-taker, and recovering
or protecting property.
If these alternatives are considered, always progress from the earlier response to the latter response because
it is virtually impossible to return to negotiating, for example, after an assault has taken place. Therefore, the
initial response may preclude the use of other responses later on.
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Handout 11.2
Page 2 of 4
Various aspects of hostage negotiation include:

• What kind of person takes hostages;
• What are common reasons for taking hostages;
• What behaviour can be expected from a hostage;
• The process of negotiation;
• Considerations in selecting a negotiator;
• The interactions between the negotiation team, the on scene commander, and the armed intervention
team; and
• How to use a clinical psychologist as a consultant for negotiation.
Hostage Negotiation Techniques
Establish a problem-solving climate by:

• Acknowledging existence of problem to perpetrator;
• Expressing desire to understand;
• Willingness to help solve problem; and
• Establishing climate of working together for solution.
Develop atmosphere where the goal is compromise, by:

• Having the negotiator communicate (give-and- take attitude);
• Showing willingness to bargain; and
• yielding on some issues, holding on others, bargaining for everything, avoid forcefulness or not make
threats;
Do not force confrontations by giving ultimatums, avoid soft bargaining the negotiator should not be too
concerned for perpetrator’s feelings; and
The negotiator does not need to feel he is liked or accepted by perpetrator.
Composition of Hostage Negotiation Team
Two five-man teams will work 12-hour shifts with a 30-minute handover period before and after each shift.
Each team will consist of:
a) Team Leader;
b) Negotiator;
c) Strategist;
d) Liaison Officer; and
e) Requirements Officer.
Team Leader
The team leader reports directly to the Incident Commander and supervises the hostage negotiation team.
The leader will elicit policy decisions from the Incident Commander, seek agreement on what is negotiable
and what is non-negotiable and other operational matters, monitor deadlines closely, anticipate demands and
needs, and explore alternative concessions.
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Handout 11.2
Page 3 of 4
Negotiator
The negotiator should normally be the only person with whom the hostage-takers speak. The negotiator is
represented as a middle person who cannot make decisions on major demands and who is reliant on “senior
officers” to consider such demands. They can, however, agree to minor demands, such as food, drink and
cigarettes, but will not deliver these without clearance from the Incident Commander.
Strategist
A strategist stays with the negotiator throughout the incident and discusses negotiation tactics with the
negotiator. If the negotiations are taking place some distance from the Incident Control Centre, a radio or
telephone link to the team leader is maintained constantly.
Liaison Officer
The hostage negotiation team liaison officer will remain with the negotiator at all times and assist in
maintaining the negotiator’s incident board. In the absence of the team leader, the liaison officer will be
available to advise the Incident Commander on matters pertaining to negotiations, and will also liaise with the
armed intervention team and the intelligence unit.
Requirement Officer
The requirement officer will liaise with other responding agencies and advise on the hostage negotiation
team’s needs. The requirement officer will liaise with the inner cordon concerning escorts, forewarning of
cordon movements, and will be responsible for stage managing the delivery of items to the stronghold.
Selecting A Negotiator
The negotiator should be a volunteer, usually an experienced law enforcement person in excellent mental and
physical health. He must be able to think clearly under stress.
Desirable personality traits for a negotiator include:

• He must possess emotional maturity. He should accept abuse, ridicule, and insulting statements without
responding emotionally. When those around him are anxious, frightened, or confused, he should be able to
maintain a clear head.
• He should be a good listener and have excellent interviewing skills.
• He should be a person who can easily establish credibility with others.
• He should have the ability to use logical arguments to convince others that his viewpoint is rational and
reasonable.
• He should be able to communicate with persons from the lowest to the highest socio-economic class.
• He should have “practical intelligence,” common sense, and be “street wise.”
• He should have the ability to cope with uncertainty and be willing to accept responsibility with no
authority.
• He should have total commitment to the negotiation approach.
• He should understand that if negotiations are not progressing and lives are in imminent danger, he will
have to assist in planning an assault to rescue the hostages.
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Handout 11.2
Page 4 of 4
Guidelines for Negotiation
Take your time when negotiating. The passage of time increases the likelihood hostages will be released
unharmed for the following reasons:
• Basic human needs for food, water, sleep, and the need to extricate from a stressful situation increase;
• Anxiety tends to be reduced;
• Most persons begin to think more rationally and less emotionally;
• The Stockholm Syndrome begins to form;
• Hostages have increased opportunity for escape;
• Intelligence gathered will permit better decision-making;

• Increased rapport and trust can develop between the negotiator and hostage-taker;
• The hostage-taker’s expectations and demands may be reduced; and
• The incident may simply fade. Some hostage-takers have simply allowed hostages to walk out with no
expectation of something in return.
Although there is no question that the passage of time can enhance the negotiation process, there are also
some negative effects.
Negotiators, armed intervention team members, and command post personnel may get tired and bored,
making mistakes possible. There may also be a loss of objectivity. Law enforcement personnel, in an effort to
end the incident, may be more willing to take a precipitous action that may be unnecessary, for example,
inadvertently creeping toward the subject or lessening caution in maintaining cover in perimeter control.
Pick the right time to establish contact. Give the hostage-taker time to calm down. Premature contact may
result in him feeling extreme stress, causing him to make unreasonable and threatening demands. If he is
given time to calm down and realistically assess the situation, the demands he makes may be more
reasonable.
Charter of Psychiatrist/Clinical Psychologist at a Counter Terrorist Incident
The psychiatrist/clinical psychologist will work with the hostage negotiation team leader. This specialist’s role
will be as follows:
a) To advise on the suspects’ personality types and mental states; and
b) To comment on proposed tactics, with particular emphasis on avoiding upsetting the suspects
unnecessarily.
c) To comment on the suspects’ likely priorities in their demands and on any evident psychological needs;
d) To chart the psychological progression of events;
e) To advise on:
i) Defusing any crisis; and
ii) Phase III strategy and tactics;
e) To provide emotional support to the negotiator and strategist; and
f) To advise the hostage negotiation team leader on the suitability of:
i) The current or proposed negotiator;
ii) Any potential intermediary.
Handout 11.3
Page 1 of 1
- 148 -
Armed Intervention Team
The armed intervention team (AIT) is necessary; to provide a tactical option to the Incident Commander for
the resolution of the incident or to respond should the situation deteriorate beyond acceptable levels.
The armed intervention team is required to provide the Incident Commander with an immediate action (IA)
plan that can be used when the situation deteriorates to unacceptable levels prior to the primary option being
ready.
The team leader will advise and assist the Incident Commander on the tactical options available to him and
formulate a plan, known as the primary option, to release the hostages by offensive action; and execute the
primary option or the immediate action on the direction of the Incident Commander in order to release the
hostages and resolve the incident.
Depending upon the circumstances, the tactical options available to the armed intervention team may include
the following:
• sniper action against the hostage-takers in their stronghold position (not normally a viable option if the
stronghold is an aircraft);
• assault action with sniper support on the stronghold;
• sniper action against the hostage-takers whilst they are moving from the stronghold; and
• Ambush of the hostage-takers en route between stronghold/vehicle/aircraft or upon arrival at a new

location.
- 149 -
Handout 11.4
Page 1 of 1
Post Hijack Procedures
Hostage Reception
During the course of negotiation, arrangements may be concluded for the release of a number of hostages in
return for concessions from the authorities on demands made by the hostage-takers. Also, hostages will be
released following a successful armed intervention. This release and reception of hostages must be carefully
controlled to ensure that only genuine hostages are released.
Release & Reception
1. The following basic rules should always apply:

a) the hostage takers must always supply names and physical descriptions of all the hostages being
released;
b) the hostage takers must ensure that the hostages exit the stronghold via an agreed route, one by one
with their hands in the air;
c) on first contact, the receiving officer will ask the hostages to identify themselves;
d) With the exception of sick or injured hostages, all hostages will be subjected to a thorough body
search conducted in the prone position. As far as possible, searches should take place out of sight of
the stronghold;
e) sick or injured hostages will be quickly searched prior to being escorted for medical treatment;
f) after search clearance, the hostage will be escorted to the hostage reception centre via the agreed
route (usually through the forward control point); and
g) should a searching officer suspect that a hostage is not genuine, the individual will immediately be
handcuffed (in the prone position) and guarded pending the arrival of assistance.
Responsibilities
2. The commander of the field support group will be responsible for locating a suitable location for the
hostage reception centre and transport thereto if necessary. This will be large enough to
accommodate the hostages and the debriefing teams and will be within the outer cordon and
preferably near the incident control centre.
3. Security of the hostage reception centre will be the responsibility of the commander of the field
support group.
4. Actual hostage reception will be the responsibility of the inner cordon.
- 150 -
Handout 12.1
Page 1 of 2
Module 12
Persons Traveling Under Special / Legal Status
Person authorized to carry weapons, fire arms on board.
Carriage of arms and ammunition, explosives or explosive device or any other dangerous goods on board a
aircraft is regulated as per the provision of Aircraft (Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003 subject to exemption of this
ordered by the Appropriate Authority.
Airline operators are permitted to transport weapons in areas which are not accessible to passengers and
crew during flight subject to prior approval in writing from Appropriate Authority. For the licensed weapons
within India, no additional permission is needed.
The Commissioner may -

(i) authorize a person to carry dummy weapon, explosive, explosive device or any other dummy prohibited
item in the hold/ cabin baggage of an aircraft for the purpose of testing the efficacy of the aviation
security measures; and
(ii) Permit a person to carry weapon in his cabin baggage or on person in the flight if it is so required for the
purpose of performing duty by such person as Personal Security Officer of a dignitary, sky marshal or in-
flight security guard.
The following Personnel are authorized to carry Arms & Ammunition on board the aircraft in the passenger
cabin:
1. Personal Security Officers of VVIPs & SPG Protectees
(a) Permission has been granted by the Central Government to Personal Security Officers of VVIPs like
President, Vice President, Prime Minister and SPG protectees, for carriage of authorized weapons and
ammunitions on board an aircraft while traveling with these VVIPs / protectees by air.
(b) The above Personal Security Officers can carry their weapons and ammunition on their person or in
their hand baggage in fully unloaded condition ie. weapon and ammunition shall be kept separately.
2. Sky Marshals
(a) In order to provide adequate security coverage to aircrafts registered in India and engaged in civil
aviation operations to and from all civil airports in India, permission has been granted by the Central
Government to Sky Marshals, while on duty in such aircraft, for carriage of weapons and ammunition on
board such an aircraft.
(b) The Sky Marshals shall be in possession of their Identity Cards and authorization, issued by
Commissioner of Security (CA) from time to time, for carriage of weapons and ammunition on board an
aircraft.
(c) Station Manager / Airport Manager of the concerned airlines shall ensure that the pilot-in-command is
notified as to the number of armed persons and their seat allocation on board the aircraft.
- 151 -
Handout 12.1
Page 2 of 2
3. PSO (s) of other VIP / dignitary of high risk category
a. PSO (s) of other VIP / dignitary of high risk category whenever allowed by the government of India to
accompany such a VIP / dignitary during his /her journey by air or any person on bonafide duty with
weapon and ammunition while travelling by air shall carry the authorized weapons and ammunition in
his/ her registered baggage only.
b. The Personal Security Officers or the persons on duty mentioned above shall carry with them their
valid Identity Cards and Duty Slips / Movement Orders authorizing them to carry specific weapons and
ammunition while on bonafide duty travelling by air and shall produce the same to the Airport /
Airlines Security Officers/ Manager
4. Regular Passengers
a. In the case of regular passengers the Station Manager / Airport Managers of all airlines are authorized
to allow carriage of only one licenced revolver or pistol or shotgun and fifty cartridges belonging to a
bonafide passenger.
At foreign airports, where Indian carriers operate, the discretion to permit the carriage of personal weapon
and ammunition in the Registered Baggage will vest with the Airport Manager of the concerned airlines in
consultation with the Airlines Security Officer if available.
In all such cases, the passenger shall carry valid documents and also subject to the provision that such carriage
do not violate the local / national laws, rules and regulations.
The above instructions shall be subject to any further restrictions applicable in countries of transit and
destination.
The person responsible for security function at that station is responsible to ensure the weapon/s are in
unloaded condition.
He will also ensure that the weapon/s is loaded in proper secure container and stored into such area of
aircraft which is not accessible to any passenger from passenger cabin. Aircraft operator will not carry any
weapon till such facility is not provided on board of the aircraft.
Any passenger is authorized to carry only one weapon and fifty cartridges on board of aircraft.
Carriage of Kirpan
As Kirpan hold religious sentiments in India, BCAS had allowed carriage of Kirpan in passenger cabin on person
under certain restriction. The restrictions are as follow:
• The Sikh passenger is allowed to carry Kirpan in Indian in passenger cabin.
• The total size of Kirpan should not be greater than 9 inch. And the blade
size should not be more than 6 inch.
• The Kirpan will be allowed on domestic routes only. Even on the domestic
leg of any International flight the Kirpan will not be allowed.
- 152 -
Handout 12.2
Page 1 of 4
Carriage Passengers of Special Category
Due to local laws and regulation aircraft operators are obliged to carry certain passengers of Special
Categories who can be potential disruptive passenger on board of aircraft. The passengers of Special
Categories can be:
• Inadmissible passengers
• Deportees
• Persons being extradited
• Refugees and asylum seekers
Inadmissible passengers
A passenger who is refused admission to a State by the authorities of that State, or who is refused onward
carriage by a State authority at a point of transfer (e.g. due to lack of visa, expired passport etc)
Deportees
A deportee is a person who has legally been admitted to a country by its authorities or who had entered a
country legally, and who at some later time is formally ordered by the authorities to be removed from that
country.
Persons being extradited
This is the category of persons traveling under special status who are subject to an extradition order.
Refugees and Asylum seekers
When Refugees and Asylum seekers do not meet the necessary criteria to remain in a country, the
immigration authority of the State will order them to leave.
As when such passengers are carried by any aircraft operator the risk perception of the said flight goes higher
than normal passenger flight as these passengers can be disruptive passenger on board of aircraft. Before any
aircraft operator carrying such passenger on board of any aircraft the aircraft operator has to assess the risk in
such movement.
To assess the risk, the aircraft operator will collect all the relevant information regarding such passenger from
immigration authority of the state. The aircraft operator will collect information regarding:
• A major objection on the part of the individual to be returned to another country
• The mental or physical state
• Nature of any criminal act already committed by the individual
• Individual is wanted by the police of any other State
• Individual personally objects to carriage by air
After assessing risk in such movement the aircraft operator will carry such passenger either with escort or
without escort.
- 153 -
Handout 12.2
Page 2 of 4
Procedure to carry passenger of special category without escort
When the aircraft operator is carrying such passenger without escort, then safety of the passenger and
aircraft is responsibility of the aircraft operator. To ensure safety of passenger and crew the aircraft operator
will ensure:
• Thorough check of individual baggage
• No public disclosure of movement
• Travel formalities properly completed
• Any special requirements should be made available
• Any special requirements should be made available
Procedure to carry passenger of special category with escort
When the aircraft operator is carrying such passenger without escort, then safety of the passenger is
responsibility of the escort. To ensure safety of passenger the escort will ensure:
• Be in plain clothes
• Not be in possession of firearms or weapons
• Be trained in appropriate restraint devices (to be concealed to the public)
• Ensure that the individual and baggage is thoroughly checked
• Keep the captain informed of any incident during the flight
• Ensure no alcohol is served
• Be in possession of the escorted person’s personal property including passport, travel documents and
ticket
• Be in possession of the deportation/removal order
• Supervise the taking of medication
• No permit the deportee to disembark at transit stops
Persons in custody and under Administrative Control
Prior permission from Appropriate Authority will be obtained for transporting prisoners or persons under
administrative control or deportees with escort in the commercial flights and the conditions laid down in such
permission will be followed strictly by air operators, who will be informed of such approval in time.
Notification Requirement
Commissioner shall notify in due time the appropriate aircraft operator and pilot-in-command when
passengers are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings.
Such passengers include persons in the custody of law enforcement personnel, mentally disturbed persons
under escort, deportees and inadmissible persons.
When a person is obliged to travel because he or she is deemed to be inadmissible or the subject of a
deportation order, Commissioner shall inform authorities in transit and destination States of the identity of
the person, the reason for transporting that person, and an evaluation of any threat posed by that person.
- 154 -
Handout 12.2
Page 3 of 4
Carriage of Prisoners in aircraft Ref Circular No. 42/ 2005 dated 24.10.2005
(i) No aircraft operator shall allow a prisoner and escorting officers as passengers unless prior permission
is obtained from the BCAS by the concerned policing authority who is responsible for transportation
of such prisoner with escorts by air.
(ii) The policing authority requiring transportation of a prisoner by air shall send their request in writing
to the Commissioner / Regional Dy. Commissioner of Security (CA), BCAS at least 7 (seven) days in
advance.
(iii) The policing authority responsible for carriage of a prisoner by air shall indicate classification of such
prisoner as dangerous or otherwise in their application addressed to the commissioner or Regional
Dy Commissioner of Security (CA), BCAS.
(iv) No more than one prisoner, classified as dangerous, shall be allowed on any one flight.
(v) Minimum 02 (two) escorts of the Policing authority shall be required for one prisoner who is classified
as dangerous by the policing authority.
(vi) Policing authority officers or other authorized persons should notify a responsible representative of
the operator well before the date it is proposed to transport a prisoner, or as soon as practicable in an
emergency, the identity of the person being escorted, the flight on which transportation has been
arranged, and whether or not the escorted person is considered dangerous.
(vii) Escorting officers should be apprised, by a responsible representative of the aircraft operator, of the
potential danger to the safe operation of the aircraft should they take any action during an act of
unlawful interference without direction from the pilot-in-command.
(viii) Escorting officers shall ensure that a prisoner does not carry contraband, weapons, matches or other
potentially dangerous items.
(ix) Escorts shall be equipped with adequate restraining devices to be used in the event they determine
that restraint is necessary. Under normal circumstances a prisoner should not be shackled to any part
of the aircraft, including seats, tables etc.
(x) Escorts shall not carry arms, mace, teargas or similar incapacitating gas generating devices or any
dangerous goods / prohibited items specified by the BCAS on board the aircraft. Weapon and
ammunition if any may be allowed in registered baggage as per instructions in force.
(xi) Escorts shall adequately identify themselves to security personnel policing authority officers on duty
at the security check points and flight attendants. Their presence on board and seat assignment shall
be transmitted by the flight attendants to the pilot-in-command who should acknowledge receipt of
this information.
(xii) Any other security personnel and passengers authorized to carry firearms on board the aircraft should
be made aware of the transportation of a prisoner and escorts and their location.
- 155 -
Handout 12.2
Page 4 of 4
(xiii) A prisoner along with escorts should be boarded before all other passengers and disembarked after
all other passengers have left the Aircraft.
(xiv) They should be seated as far as to the rear of the passenger cabin as is possible but not in a lounge
area or next to / directly across from an exit.
(xv) They should only be seated in a row for two or more seats and at least one escort should sit between
the escorted person and any aisle.
(xvi) They should be accompanied at all times and kept under surveillance, including visits to the lavatory.
(xvii) No intoxicating beverage shall be served to escorts or prisoner while on board the aircraft.
(xviii) Prisoner may be served food at the discretion of escorts but should not be provided with metal
utensils or a knife.
(xix) Aircraft operator should not accept a prisoner and escort(s) as passengers unless concurrence has
been obtained in advance from the BCAS (GOI) and other operators that may be involved en route
and at the intended final destination. In such cases sufficient advance notification must be given to
operator so that prior agreements can be obtained.
(xx) The airline operator shall inform the pilot-in-command of the aircraft in which such person shall be
escorted about the presence of such person in the flight.
- 156 -
Handout 12.3
Page 1 of 1
Exemption from pre-embarkation security checks:
VVIPs / VIPs and their accompanying spouse are exempted from pre-embarkation security checks at all civil
airports in the country as per BCAS AVSEC Circular No. 06/2008 dated 04th September 2008
1. President
2. Vice President
3. Prime Minister
4. Governors of States
5. Former Presidents
6. Former Vice-President
7. Chief Justice of India,
8. Speaker of Lok Sabha
9. Union Ministers of Cabinet rank
10. Chief Ministers of States
11. Deputy Chief Ministers of States
12. Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission
13. Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha & Rajya Sabha
14. Holders of Bharat Ratna Decoration
15. Ambassadors of foreign countries, Charge D’ Affairs and High commissioners and their spouses
16. Judges of Supreme Court
17. Chief Election Commissioner
18. Comptroller & Auditor General of India
19. Deputy Chairman Rajya Sabha & Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha
20. Minister of State of the Union Council of Ministers
21. Attorney General of India
22. Cabinet Secretary
23. Lt. Governors of Union Territories
24. Chiefs of staffs holding the rank of full General or equivalent rank
25. Chief Justices of the High Courts
26. Chief Ministers of Union Territories
27. Deputy Chief Ministers of Union Territories
28. Visiting Foreign dignitaries of the same status as at Sl. Nos. 1 to 4,7,8,9 above
29. His Holiness the Dalai Lama
30. SPG Protectees
31. Shri Robert Vadra, while traveling with SPG Protectees.
Spouse of the president of India is exempted from pre-embarkation security checks at all civil airports even
when he/she is not accompanying the president.
Former Prime Ministers of India are also exempted from pre-embarkation checks at all civil airport in
country.
Except the categories specified above, all other categories of passengers, traveling by air through the civilian
airports in the country, are to be subjected to pre-embarkation security checks without making any exception
in any particular case.
- 157 -
- 158 -

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Trainee Reference Book

Aviation Security Course for Air Crew

This Restricted material is

Issue Date: 2015

Module No. Topic Page No.

2 Development of Counter Measures

3 Legislation and Aviation Security Programme

4 Recognition of Explosives / IEDs and prohibited Items

5 Protection of Parked aircraft

6 Aircraft Security Checks

7 Organization of Response to acts of unlawful Interference

8 Response to Bomb Threat to Aircraft on Ground

9 Response to Bomb Threat to Aircraft in Air

10 In-flight Response to Acts of Unlawful Seizure (Hijack)

12 Persons Traveling Under Special / Legal Status

• To understand the course objective, structure and methodology

After completion of this course, the trainees will be able to:

Threats on CA Ops Industry counter – measures to Weapons, dangerous articles,

Lunch Break (1 hour)

Characteristics of a Crisis Main principles of CAS relating

Role of Police, airport and Recommended procedures to

Terminologies Relating to Civil Aviation Security

1. AAI - Airports Authority of India

Threats to Civil Aviation

RISK = THREAT x VULNERABILITY

Factors contributing to terrorism:

The supports needed by the terrorist organizations:

Threats to civil aviation operations:

New and Emerging threats:

Where can the threats come from?

Who are the offenders?

Objectives of these hijackers

What are the techniques used for hijacking?

Counter Measures to prevent act of unlawful interference

• A dedicated ASG has been inducted at airports.

21 Feb 1931: 01st Hijacking in the world

31 Jan 1971: 01st Hijacking in India

Jun 1985: Kanishka Tragedy (Air india)

23 Jun 1985: Narita Incident

2 Apr 1986: TWA Rome : Athens Bombing

3rd May 1986: Air Lanka Bombing

24th Dec 1999: Hijacking of IC – 814

24th July 2001: Colombo airport attack

11th September 2001: US Attacks

22nd December 2001: Shoe Bomber

28 Nov 2002: Arkia Airlines Mombasa – Tel Aviv

Aug 2006 : Terror Plot against US bound Flights from UK

THIS PLOT IF EXECUTED COULD HAVE TAKEN OVER 1500 LIVES.

December 25, 2009: Northwest Airlines Flight 253 (Schiphol Incident)

25 Jan, 2011: Moscow Incident

COSCA is the appropriate authority for implementation of Annexure-17 to Chicago convention of

COSCA is responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of NCASP.

Roles / Functions / Duties /Responsibilities of BCAS

Coordination among different organizations on AVSEC matters.

Advising the Govt. of India on Security matters

Technical Evaluation of equipments used in aviation security.

Role of Aviation Security Group (ASG) / Airport Security Unit (APSU)

The primary role / responsibilities of the ASG is as under:

• Surveillance and patrol of all airport terminal areas;

What Is Unlawful Interference

Development of Security Measures

The Security Measures include the following:

• Baseline security measures