EXECUTIVE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Study for AFCO committee

Inquiries by Parliaments
The political use of a democratic right1

ABSTRACT
Conducting in-depth investigations is an ancient and essential right of parliaments in Europe. Yet,
despite a provision of the Lisbon treaty, the European Parliament still has a limited institutional
capacity to conduct inquiries. This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy
Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the AFCO Committee,
discusses the theoretical basis of parliamentary investigation, compares recent committees of
inquiries and develops recommendations for up-grading the European Parliament’s capacity.

Background
 The Maastricht Treaty was the first text to offer a substantial empowerment of the Parliament’s
investigative authority. Article 226 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union granted
Parliament the right to set up temporary committees of inquiry and provided a legal basis for
investing these committees with significant powers regarding their possibilities for action and the
political impact of their work.
 The negotiations between the three institutions on a regulation based on Article 226 TFEU has not
been successful after ten years.
 Since 1995, the Parliament has set up five committees of inquiry, gradually increasing their duration
as well as their number of members, but it has faced procedural and political limitations.

Aim
 The aim of this report is to assess the investigations led by Parliament in the past, especially through
comparing them with practices within national parliaments of the EU.
 The report also proposes recommendations on how to strengthen the Parliament’s capacities.

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Full study in English: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/648709/IPOL_STU(2020)648709_EN.pdf

Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs

Directorate-General for Internal Policies
PE 648.709 - March 2020
PE 648.709 EN
 Executive summary - EU Agencies and Conflicts of Interests

Result 1: the standard justifications for granting legislatures inquiry prerogatives generally apply in
the case of Parliament.

 For a long time, parliaments have been granted investigative powers as a consequence of the political
responsibility of the government. Indeed, parliaments’ basic purpose is to collect information in order
to judge the government’s effectiveness. Consequently, parliamentary inquiries look backward (‘what
has been done and by whom?’) but also forward (‘what should be done and by whom?’).
 Supplementary justifications for these powers are suggested and assessed in the case of Parliament as
proposed by the following table:

Justifications Relevant for Parliament Irrelevant for Parliament

Lack of accountability of the Council

Overseeing government Accountability of the Commission
towards Parliament

Especially since EU law is implemented

Fighting against information loss
at the national level

Compensating for the lack of legislative Parliament has been an active legislator
‘Power without influence’ syndrome
influence since Maastricht and Lisbon

The identification of the opposition is

Granting rights to the opposition ‘Policing the bargains’
unclear in Parliament

Especially since it is difficult for

Feeding public debates Parliament to achieve this through law-
making

Restoring civil peace Possibly

Note: Parliament refers here to the European Parliament

Result 2: a Parliament ‘far way so close’ from national parliaments of the EU regarding inquiries:

 The issues addressed by the committees of inquiry in Parliament are close, even very similar, to
those found in national parliaments despite the Treaty provision that Parliament should focus on
‘alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law’.
 As illustrated by the following figure, there are far fewer committees appointed in Parliament than
in lower assemblies of large Member States and the dynamic of the last decade in national parliaments
has not reflected in Parliament. This deficit may result from: a. the institutional weakness of inquiries
carried out by Parliament; b. competition with powerful standing committees; or c. an institutional style
favouring consensual law making.

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

Change in the number of committees of inquiry in different parliaments including the European
Parliament, yearly averages by decades (1979-2019)

3,5

2,5

1,5

0,5

0
1979-89 1990-99 2000-09 2010-19

France (National Assembly) Italy Poland (Sejm)

Germany (Bundestag) Spain (Congreso) European Parliament

Result 3: Parliament already has a genuine capacity to investigate but also faces real limits:

 Since 1995, the Parliament has set up five committees of inquiry, gradually increasing their duration as
well as their number of members. It has made strategic use of its prerogatives to scrutinise and
control EU policies. The committees of inquiry have offered an opportunity for Parliament to influence
the agenda of the European Commission and shape democratic debate by raising citizens’ awareness.
 All committees have been faced yet with a lack of sincere cooperation from a number of other EU
institutions, both relating to access to documents and the organisation of hearings. Although the
committees fail to hear all the witnesses they wished, they heard most of them through a pro-active
strategy based on the mobilisation of the Parliament’s presidency, a use of the medias, a mobilisation
of the interested parts and a ‘blame and shame’ strategy.

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 Executive summary - EU Agencies and Conflicts of Interests

Three sets of ten recommendations

 The first set aims to maintain the Parliament’s power of inquiry without waiting for Parliament, the
Council and the Commission to agree on the adoption of a regulation, because the latter remains
uncertain, and because investigating is one of Parliament’s democratic duties.

1: The Parliament should quickly appoint new committees of inquiry without waiting for a final
agreement.

2: The size, duration and cost of the Parliament committees of inquiry should generally be limited.

3: The Parliament should strengthen its inquiry powers through a professional and cross-party approach
and by signing with the Commission a transitional agreement on cooperation during inquiries as long as
the negotiations on Article 226 TFEU continue.

4: The networking role of the Parliament should be strengthened regarding parliamentary and
non-parliamentary non-judicial inquiries conducted at both the EU and domestic levels. The
traditional physical and virtual tools for interinstitutional cooperation should be employed to this
end.

 The second set of recommendations advises the Parliament to strengthen its current bargaining
position in view of implementing Article 226 TFEU. This would entail traditional strategies from past
interinstitutional bargains, especially:

5: The Parliament should construct a democratic narrative to support its inquiry role. Each
committee of inquiry organised should be an opportunity to advance it. When necessary, a ‘name
and blame’ strategy should be implemented in relation to this democratic narrative.

6: All or nearly all groups should support the Parliament’s negotiator. This could be achieved without
modifying the Parliament’s rules of procedure through a political cross-party agreement giving each of
them the right to propose the topic of a committee of inquiry and granting them the role of rapporteur
or chair within it.

7: The president on the Parliament’s side of any formal and public meetings with the Commission and
Council representatives could publicly and systematically mention the ongoing negotiations and the
Parliament’s concerns.

8: The EP could obtain frank public support from a large number of national parliaments on this issue in
exchange for more balanced interparliamentary cooperation with them (generally or on a given issue).

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IPOL | Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs

 For theoretical as well as strategic reasons, the report finally consider that Parliament lowers the level
of ambition concerning the Council.

9: The Parliament could change its negotiating position and accept that the right to compel
witnesses would depend on the level of their organisation, whether EU or domestic. For any EU
agent, this right would be maximal and directly enforced and sanctioned at the EU level. For
Member States’ leaders and agents, this right would not be mandatory, but refusals should be duly
communicated. For third parties, a summons would in principle be mandatory and enforced by
Member States according to existing regulations for their national parliaments.

10: The Parliament could change its negotiating position and accept that the right to access documents
would depend on the EU or domestic level of the organisation in which the documents are situated. For
any EU document, access would be total and directly enforced and sanctioned at the EU level. For Member
States’ authorities, access would not be mandatory, but refusals should be duly communicated. For third
parties, access would in principle be mandatory and enforced by Member States according to existing
regulations for their national parliaments.

Disclaimer and copyright. The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent
the official position of the European Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the
source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. © European Union, 2020.

External Authors: Olivier ROZENBERG, Sciences Po

Research Administrator responsible: Eeva PAVY Editorial assistant: Fabienne VAN DER ELST
Contact: poldep-citizens@europarl.europa.eu

This document is available on the internet at: www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses