G.R. No.

122917 July 12, 1999

MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P.
PASCUAL, RAQUEL ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ,
JOSELITO O. AGDON GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR., CELSO M. YAZAR, ALEX G.
CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C. DELOS
REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F.
TATLONGHARI, IKE CABANDUCOS, COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA
CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q. MARMOLEJO, JOSE E.
SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY V.
GRUELA, BERNADETH D. AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ, MA.
ISABEL B. CONCEPCION, DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL DEL PILAR,
MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA, THELMA SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE
CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY BALOLOA,
ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO and TIMOSA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.

RELEVANT CASE:

43 deaf employee complaints were hired from 1988 to 1993 at Far East Bank and Trust

Co. A common contract identified as the "Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers" as

Money Sorters and Counters. The petitioners, 43 deaf-mute individuals, were hired by the

respondent bank as money sorters and counters under an "Employment Contract for

Handicapped Workers" which was valid for six months and subject to renewal. The employment

agreement was entered into pursuant to Article 80 of the Labor Code, recognizing the need to

provide disabled and handicapped persons gainful employment.

The Court will primarily decide whether the petitioners have been hired on a regular
basis. The petition is well-deserved. However, only those workers whose contracts were renewed
and who worked for more than six months are considered regular. Hence, their dismissal from
employment was illegal.
ISSUE :

Whether the petitioners, who worked as money sorters and counters for the respondent
bank, should be considered regular employees.

CONTENTIONS AND REASONING:

The petitioners argued that their tasks were necessary and desirable to the business of the
bank, and they were qualified disabled persons entitled to the same terms and conditions of
employment as qualified able-bodied individuals under the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons.
They contended that the contracts were meant to prevent them from becoming regular
employees.

The respondent bank argued that the employment contracts were valid and consistent
with Article 80 of the Labor Code. They asserted that the petitioners were "special workers" and
not part of the bank's regular complement.

HOLDINGS

The court held that the petitioners, except for sixteen of them, should be considered
regular employees. Their tasks as money sorters and counters were necessary and desirable to the
business of the bank, and they were qualified disabled individuals entitled to the same terms and
conditions of employment as qualified able-bodied employees under the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons. The employment contracts, which were initially governed by Article 80 of the
Labor Code, were rendered inapplicable due to the petitioners' qualification as disabled but
capable individuals. As such, they fell under Article 280 of the Labor Code, making them regular
employees after rendering more than six months of service.
 The court cited the Brent School v. Zamora case to emphasize that an employment
contract cannot evade the application of labor laws and regulations, and the character of
employment is determined by the nature of work performed, not the stipulations in the contract.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 20,
1995 Decision and the August 4, 1995 Resolution of the NLRC are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent Far East Bank and Trust Company is therefore ORDERED to pay back
wages and separation pay to each of the twenty-seven (27) petitioners named in this decision,
namely, Marites Bernardo, Elvira Go Diamante, Rebecca E. David, David P. Pascual, Raquel,
Albert Hallare, Edmund M. Cortez, Joselito O. Agdon, George P. Ligutan Jr., Liliberh Q.
Marmolejo, Jose E. Sales, Isabel Mamauag, Violeta G. Montes, Albino Tecson, Melody V.
Gruela, Bernadeth D. Agero, Cynthia de Vera, Lani R. Cortez, Ma. Isabel B. Concepcion,
Margaret Cecilia Canoza, Thelma Sebastian, Jeanette Cervantes, Jeanette Cervantes, Jeannie
Ramil, Rozaida Pascual, Pinky Baloloa, Elizabeth Ventura, and Grace S. Pardo are among the
cast members. The NLRC is hereby directed to compute the exact sum due each of these
employees in accordance with current rules and regulations within fifteen days of the Decision's
finality. SO ORDERED.Judges Romero, Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes concur.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

The primary issue, in this case,in this case is whether the petitioners, who are deaf-mute
employees hired under a special employment arrangement with a bank, should be treated as
regular employees entitled to the same benefits and protections as qualified able-bodied
employees. The bank claimed that the petitioners were simply accommodated workers involved
under extraordinary circumstances and so not entitled to normal employee status. The bank relied
on employment contracts that included a six-month fixed-term contract and stated that the
contracts were in compliance with Article 80 of the Labor Code, which covers the hiring of
disabled people. The petitioners argued that because their jobs as money counters and sorters
were critical to the bank's operations and hence desirable, they should be protected.

They said that their impairment did not disqualify them for the job and that they should
be treated the same as ordinary employees under the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, a law
that demands equal treatment for qualified disabled employees. The court assessed whether the
petitioners' tasks were essential and helpful to the bank's operations, as well as whether they
were qualified for their positions. The money sorting and counting jobs were determined to be
crucial to the bank's operations, and the petitioners, with the exception of sixteen of them, had
been performing these tasks for more than six months. The court applied the Magna Carta for
Disabled Persons, which grants eligible disabled employees the same rights and benefits as
qualified able-bodied employees.

Finally, the court found in favor of the petitioners, declaring that they should be treated as
regular employees, with the same benefits and protections as qualified able-bodied employees.
The court stressed that the principles of the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, which guaranteed
equitable treatment for eligible disabled employees, could not be superseded by contract
conditions requiring fixed-term employment. The petitioners were protected from illegal
dismissal since they were regular workers, and the court ordered the bank to pay back wages and
separation pay to the qualified petitioners and reinstate them, or pay separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement. The ruling of the court was based on protecting fairness and equitable treatment
for all employees, regardless of physical ability.