THE MUNDKA BUILDING FIRE

GLASS FAÇADE IMPACT ON THE INCIDENT

Abhay Purandare
1.0 The Incident

On 13th May, 2022, and for a few days thereafter, a devastating fire in a building located in
an industrial area on the outskirts of Delhi, drew media attention, the people’s ire and
leader’s sympathies. The official death toll was 27, and while many were reported missing or
unaccounted for, on the day of the incident, the figure surprisingly remained constant
thereafter and therefore, can be considered official (in most likelihood, there was a media
freeze on the coverage of the incident). By the next week, the incident was forgotten, and it
was back to normal! I tried visiting the site 5 days later to get a better understanding of the
incident (especially considering the high number of fatalities) but expectedly access to the
building was denied, as it was sealed off; a magisterial level enquiry was going on (hopefully,
the report will not be ‘classified’ and will be in the public domain so we can all learn from
the incident).

2.0 The Building

However, certain aspects of the incident were quite evident and clear. I will focus on the
building layout, and the impact of the façade on the incident progression and its fallout in
this discussion. The affected building according to my estimate is approximately 16 mtrs by
28 mtrs, the shorter (north facing) side facing the main Rohtak road (from where most of
the images seen in media have been taken – Image 1 & image 3).

The main road

is the only fire
brigade access
to the building
as the longer
side and the
rear are not
accessible for
heavy vehicles
(the longer side
abuts a small
alley - see
Image 2).

Image 1
 The fourth side is a
common wall between
this building and the next
(note that what appears as
an integral building is
actually two buildings
separated by a common
concrete wall - see image
3). Both parts of the
building were built by a
common owner (in 2011),
but one part (the
unaffected part) was later
sold off [1]. The
unaffected part of the
building, however, gives
accurate information
about the kind of external
façade on the building.

The Building is a G+3

structure, with multiple
tenants on the ground
floor each having separate
access. The 1 to 3rd floors
Image 2
have a single stair access
from the ground floor on the West side of the building (these floors were rented out to a
single tenant). Building is a concrete structure with non-load bearing masonry wall at the
rear and near the stairs (at the stairs, the masonry wall is ¾ height - see image 3). There was
construction on the terrace as well, where the owner resided with his family.

As per one news report, the stairs were physically separated from the floors with steel
sheets [2]. However, the stair space was open to the floors, which meant that there was no
barrier to prevent travel of smoke and convected heat to the floors from the stairs.
Image 3

Image 4
3.0 The Façade & Its Impact on the Incident.

A combination ACP + Glass façade was fitted on the exterior of the building on the North
and West sides. From pics of the incident it is evident that the ACP was combustible (images
show it burning during the incident). The glass sheets were stated to be toughened glass in
aluminium frame (remnants of the aluminium frame are visible in pics). On the North (Main
Road facing) side, the glass sheets were fitted between the floor slabs; these are long panes
extending from floor to ceiling. On the West side, the glass sheets are smaller in size and in
the form a curtain wall, fitted to the edge of the floor slab, with ACP only at the top of the
building (these can be seen in Image 5 below). Importantly, both the arrangements do not
have any openable panels, which essentially means that the building is fully enclosed with
no natural ventilation. There were small openings created to allow AC piping to run to the
compressor units located outside the façade.

While the building was constructed and occupied without any formal approvals (BU or Fire
NOC), even the local building regulations require openable panels of size 1.5 Mtr x 1.5 Mtr
for glass facades, alongwith opening mechanism from inside as well as outside, and proper
marking to easily identify the openable panels. It also includes requirement for sealing of
the openings between the floor slab and the façade. Of course, it would also be required to
protect the single staircase, for these requirements to be effective.

Image 5. Glass façade in front (L) and Side (R) of the building (Note that the image on the
left is of the unaffected block of the building)

Fire Ignition & growth: Two different versions appear in media reports regarding the initial
ignition source. Earlier reports stated that there was a generator on the first floor, where
the fire started. Another media report also states that the power failed, and when someone
opened the door to go and start the generator, smoke poured into the room; an indication
that the fire had already initiated before the power failed. Later reports [1] state that there
was a changeover switchboard on the first floor for electricity connection, and this is where
ignition occurred; as cardboard and other materials were dumped in the same place, it may
have caused the fire to spread quickly.

As is known, fire consumes oxygen and in an enclosed building, oxygen is not freely available
to the fire. Considering the activity carried out inside the premises, most materials in the
would be natural or synthetic polymers in different forms (essentially carbonaceous fuels).
While the normal product of combustion involving these materials is Carbon Dioxide (CO2),
a lack of sufficient oxygen results in generation of carbon monoxide (CO). In a normal
building fire, both CO2 and CO are generated, however, the proportion of CO increases with
reduction in oxygen levels. And therein lies the problem. CO has more affinity for
hemoglobin as compared to oxygen, and once a person inhales CO laden air, it quickly
combines with it (in the lungs) to forms carboxyhemoglobin. Effectively, it blocks out oxygen
from entering your blood, and thus preventing it from reaching your organs, including your
brain. Note that organs with a high oxygen requirement, such as the heart and the brain, are
especially sensitive for this effect

Around 150 people were in a conference room on the second floor, and reports state that
when they became aware of the fire, and opened the conference room door, smoke gushed
in; a clear indication that fire was already well
developed by the time they became aware of it.
There was no question of using the stairs as it
was entirely smoke logged. As the fire was
growing (and there was not enough oxygen
available), the smoke would also have increasing
levels of CO. The effect of CO on the human
body is in terms of its dose i.e. exposure level x
time. This means that a low concentration
exposure for a longer duration has the same
effect as a short exposure to a high
concentration. Interestingly, at concentrations of
approx. 1.5% (15000 ppm), loss of consciousness
can occur after 2-3 breaths, and death can occur
in less than 3 minutes. Poorly ventilated fires in
enclosed spaces have been shown to have
concentrations above this level.

As the smoke was intense, and people were
getting suffocated, occupants broke open panes
using chairs, etc, to get fresh air [3]. In these
conditions, those unable to get fresh air, and
getting exposed to smoke may already have high
Image 6. Occupants being rescued from
the North side by a crane. Note that the
glass façade on first floor is intact and
large quantity of smoke is not visible at
this stage.
enough dose of CO in their body to loose consciousness; as one employee who escaped
alive, stated to the media “People were screaming and they were unable to breathe. Some
people just fell unconscious when the smoke started to fill the second floor” [4]. In an
unconscious state as well, the body continues to respire, and the dose keeps on increasing
till the critical organs fail, leading to death. I would believe that those who lost their lives
would have collapsed in the first few minutes of exposure to the CO laden smoke; at this
stage the fire would not have been well developed (see Image 6)

Later stage of the incident: For a fire in a building, the heat release rate (HRR) of a fire is
influenced to a large extent on the amount of oxygen available to the combusting fuel,
which is again dependent on the openings on the buildings. As glass panes were broken by
occupants on the first and second floor by people trying to get fresh air and escape, the fire
too would have got oxygen resulting in higher HRR, allowing the fire to grow and spread
(also at least two crane operators used their cranes to create openings and rescue people
from the building). As the fire grew and began affecting the glass façade, causing glass to fall
out, it allowed more and more oxygen to reach the fire increasing its HRR further. This is
again corroborated by media reports [3]; a crane operator who was using his crane on the
west side to help people climb down stated ”as the fire intensified, flames started coming
toward us and glass panes started shattering and falling on us from above”. See Image 7
below.

Image 7. The fire at two different stages (as seen from the west side), and corresponding
façade failure.

Later images of the fire show flames coming out from the floors; a clear indication of
flashover (a stage where everything on the floor is pyrolyzing and burning). Temperatures
would be in the range of 800-900 C at this stage on the floors. Not surprising that the bodies
of those who had collapsed earlier were charred beyond recognition.
4.0 Observations/ Learnings

Means of Egress should be the primary focus in buildings, not fire protection (locally, the
term ‘fire protection’ refers specifically to firefighting equipment/systems); conditions
become untenable (dangerous) for occupants in the first few minutes, and occupants should
be able to evacuate safely in this time. Currently, there’s too much importance on fire
protection; after a serious fire incident in Surat, 2017, there was such a rush to buy fire
extinguishers that there was a shortage in that state for a couple of months! As if installing
extinguishers would solve the problem - when the fundamental issue was the means of
egress.

A building which is totally enclosed (as in this case) and has a single unprotected stair that
connects all spaces is a recipe for disaster in case of a fire. Even naturally ventilated single
stairs have gotten smoke-logged in the past resulting in fatalities (Takshashila, 2017). In this
case, the presence of the façade had a major bearing on the incident, aiding the generation
of CO laden smoke and allowing it to spread to all floors of the building. Later as the façade
framework failed and created further opening, it allowed the HRR to increase considerably.

Are we seeing this for the first time. If a careful analysis of past incidents is done, similar
observations can be made. Whether we are willing to take the effort to do that analysis and
learn from it, is another story. Does any past data exist? Past tests on this specific issue
(behaviour of facades in fires) have been conducted in the past at IIT Gandhinagar, with
some pretty relevant and clear observations [5] related to glass façade, stating that (also see
Image 8) –

- It was observed that the glass panels did not break due to fire but fell to ground in intact
form due to failure of pressure tapes and binder gel (silicone structural sealant) used for
fixing panel to the aluminium framework. Therefore, façade sealant plays an important role
in enhancing performance of façade assembly.
- Expansion of cladding framework also contributed to failure of glass panels in intact form.
Major failure at the connections of the framework members was observed. Horizontal and
vertical aluminium member connections of cladding framework require special attention.
- Aluminium cladding framework was observed to melt at many locations as temperatures
within the compartment reached above melting point of aluminium. Therefore, use of
aluminium for framework requires reconsideration.

The question is, are these findings converting into building regulations and codes, to ensure
safety of occupants from a building fire?
 Image 8. The façade failure as observed in the IIT Gn test (L) and at the Mundka fire (R).
Note that the HRR and fire duration was much higher in case of the latter.

While clearly, the building in question was not constructed within the regulatory framework
(and many questions abound as to how this is possible, however that’s a separate issue and
not part of this discussion), but importantly, it is similar to thousands of others in almost all
cities in the country. Are we obtaining required information from incidents like these to
prevent the next one? Is relevant information from so-called enquiries being disseminated
to relevant stakeholders? More importantly, when tests are being conducted at great cost
and effort (like the one mentioned here), to gain a better understanding of these specific
issues, shouldn’t there be interest and willingness amongst stakeholders to obtain the
information gained? Or, as in the past, we can continue to go from one incident to another,
allowing the adage ‘every time history repeats itself, the cost goes up’ to be proven right
each time! And douse the problem with our sympathies and ex-gratia payments!

References:
[1] https://theprint.in/india/trail-of-negligence-runs-long-but-for-mundka-neighbours-death-trap-owner-lakra-
no-villain/961388/
[2] https://www.republicworld.com/india-news/general-news/mundka-building-was-congested-steel-sheets-
separated-floors-staircase-enquiry-reveals-articleshow.html
[3] https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/delhi-news/there-were-no-windows-we-were-choking-mundka-
fire-survivors-recount-horror-101652554228767.html
[4] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/called-my-husband-to-see-me-one-last-time-is-lucky-to-be-
alive-says-survivor/articleshow/91568829.cms
[5] Report on Experimental investigation of fire behavior of different types of façade used in Buildings (IITGN-
UL/Façade/01), 2017