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Attracted to Crime: Exploration of Criminal Motivation Among

Respondents in Three European Cities

Article in Criminal Justice and Behavior · November 2011

DOI: 10.1177/0093854811423347

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ATTRACTED TO CRIME
Exploration of Criminal Motivation Among
Respondents in Three European Cities

OLENA ANTONACCIO
University of Miami
EKATERINA V. BOTCHKOVAR
Northeastern University
CHARLES R. TITTLE
North Carolina State University

Using data from samples of randomly selected adults in three major cities in Greece, Russia, and Ukraine, several issues
concerning criminal motivation are addressed. First, contrary to assumptions of many control theories, there is evidence of
substantial variation in criminal attraction across individuals, with such attraction often being minimal. Second, direct
measurement of criminal attraction is strongly associated with property and violent crime projections. Third, although
variables from strain and social learning theories help explain criminal motivation, they do not appear sufficient to account
for it. Nevertheless, attraction to crime appears to mediate the relationship between strain/prior reinforcement and criminal
outcomes. Yet, the results show variations among research sites, thus indicating that the part played by criminal motivation
may be somewhat context dependent. Overall, the research suggests the wisdom of further attention to motivation, particularly
in improving efforts to explain it, measure it directly, and bring it more prominently into explanatory models.

Keywords: criminal motivation; crime; strain; differential reinforcement; Russia; Ukraine; Greece

T he notion of criminal motivation, or attraction to misconduct, has been one of the most
elusive concepts in criminology, perhaps because its existence or production is often
assumed rather than discussed or measured directly (Jacobs & Wright, 1999; Wikström,
2006). As Jacobs and Wright (1999) aptly note, “motivation is criminology’s dirty little
secret—manifest yet murky, presupposed but elusive, everywhere and nowhere” (p. 149).
The idea that people may be attracted to or impelled toward crime, at least under some
conditions, is inherent to virtually all explanations of criminal behavior. Theories differ,
however, in the extent to which they acknowledge variations in the degree of attraction to
crime and in the extent to which they emphasize motivational factors in their explanations
of criminal behavior. Whereas some explanatory accounts, especially control theories,
simply take criminal attraction for granted (e.g., Cohen & Felson, 1979; Gibbs, 1975;
Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi, 1969), other theories attempt to identify factors
implicated in the production of criminal motivation (e.g., Agnew, 1992; Colvin, 2000;
Colvin, Cullen, & Vander Ven, 2002; Gove, 1980; Kaplan, 1980; Tittle, 1995).

AUTHORS’ NOTE: We thank the anonymous reviewers and the editor for their insightful comments and sug-
gestions. All correspondence should be addressed to Olena Antonaccio, University of Miami, 5202 University
Dr., Merrick Bldg., Room 120, Coral Gables, FL 33146; email: oantonaccio@miami.edu.

CRIMINAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
JUSTICE AND
AND BEHAVIOR,
BEHAVIOR, Vol.Vol. 38
XX,No. 12,X,December
No. 2011
Month 2007 1200-1221
1200-XXX
DOI:
DOI: 10.1177/0093854811423347
©
© 2011
2007 International Association
American Association forfor Correctional
Correctional andand Forensic
Forensic Psychology
Psychology

1200
 Antonaccio et al. / CRIMINAL MOTIVATION   1201

Because control theorists de-emphasize motivation, researchers usually ignore it alto-

gether, focusing instead on things that might inhibit the person from expressing those
assumed motivations in actual criminal conduct (see Kempf, 1993). Scholars addressing
motivational issues (see e.g., tests of general strain theory), on the other hand, typically try
to measure the presumed precursors of motivation in order to ascertain if they actually
result in the projected criminal outcomes, without attempting to estimate the effects of
criminal motivation directly. As a result, little is currently known about the part played by
motivation in generating crime. However, indirect evidence from quantitative studies using
longitudinal data, as well as qualitative analyses of offenders’ decision making, suggests
that cross-individual variability in attraction to crime is common, as is variation within
individuals over time (Brezina & Piquero, 2003; Jacobs & Wright, 1999; Katz, 1988;
Shover, 1996). A few studies have tried to measure motivation directly (Brezina & Piquero,
2003; Tittle & Botchkovar, 2005), and they have found it to be a potent predictor of crimi-
nal conduct in its own right and/or a strong mediator between theorized causal factors and
criminal outcomes. However, most evidence concerning criminal attraction is indirect.
Moreover, the extant evidence concerning criminal attraction is incomplete because it is
derived mainly from U.S.-based, nonrandom, or age-limited samples.
Our contribution to understanding criminal attraction uses a direct measure to investi-
gate the interlinkages of theorized motivational causes, actually measured motivation, and
criminal probability as specified in two of the most prominent criminological theories—
general strain and social learning. We hope to learn, first, the extent to which criminal
attraction varies from individual to individual and across substantially different cultural
contexts. Furthermore, we evaluate the accuracy of strain and social learning in their
accounts of the origins of criminal motivation and assess the extent to which criminal
motivation/attraction actually mediates relationships between the causes and criminal out-
comes specified by these two theories.

CRIMINAL MOTIVATION AND GENERAL STRAIN THEORY

One of the leading contemporary theories that implicates its principal explanatory vari-
able in the production of criminal motivation, which in turn is theorized to generate crime,
is general strain theory (GST; Agnew, 1992, 2006). Notably, its author explicitly acknowl-
edges that the theory is built on the assumption that attraction to crime varies across the
population and that some individuals may feel more motivated than others to commit acts
of crime (Agnew, 1993). GST contends that criminal motivation is a product of exposure
to strains (negative treatments and conditions) that “make people feel bad and create pres-
sure for corrective action” (Agnew, 1993; 2006, p. 17). Furthermore, most negative emo-
tions generated by strains, alone or in conjunction with each other, are said to increase
perceived attractiveness of crime. Therefore, strains and subsequent negative emotions
motivate individuals to commit crime, and that attraction in turn may produce actual
unlawful behavior. Although much of the attraction to crime produced by strain is tempo-
rary and fleeting, the formation of more enduring, stable attraction to misconduct is pos-
sible when exposure to strain is chronic or repeated. Under those conditions, strains “may
directly foster the belief that crime is desirable” (Agnew, 2006, p. 47).
Despite GST’s high frequency of citation and enjoyment of wide support for its hypoth-
esized link between strain and crime (e.g., Moon, Morash, McCluskey, & Hwang, 2009;
S. W. Baron, 2007; see also Froggio, 2007, for a review), the theorized causal sequence involving
1202   Criminal Justice and Behavior

criminal motivation as a mediator of the relationships between strain and misconduct has not
been investigated directly. It would seem critical to do so because such a sequence is enunci-
ated by the author of the theory. In addition, of potentially greater import, the idea that strain
affects crime through the intervening mechanism of criminal motivation clearly differentiates
strain theory from control explanations of criminal behavior (Agnew, 1993).

CRIMINAL MOTIVATION AND SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY

Social learning, which some consider the leading criminological theory (Agnew, 1999;
Sampson, 1999), also attempts to identify factors indirectly affecting criminal involvement
through enhanced motivation to do so (Akers, 1985, 1998; Bandura, 1977). This explana-
tory framework, as formulated by Akers, who built on Sutherland’s (1939) original differ-
ential association theory, features differential reinforcement—variations in the balance of
rewards and punishments attached to behaviors—as a principal variable explaining miscon-
duct (see Akers, 1998). Criminal behavior is theoretically a consequence of learning from
experiences of positive rewards and negative costs associated with prior acts. Differential
reinforcement may prompt criminal behavior directly or indirectly, through definitions—
the individual’s cognitive perceptions—favorable or unfavorable to such behavior. Most
relevant for our purposes, differential reinforcement is also postulated to be “a separate
source of motivation for behavior” (Akers, 1998, p. 98), making criminal motivation an
intervening link between past differential reinforcement and involvement in misbehavior.
Past research has produced much empirical evidence favorable to social learning theory
(for reviews, see Akers, 1998, pp. 110-117; Akers & Sellers, 2004, pp. 101-105). Yet, the
causal sequences of the theory involving differential reinforcement, criminal motivation,
and misconduct have not been fully explored. One exception to the general pattern is the
supportive study by Brezina and Piquero (2003) investigating the relationships among
social learning variables and measures tapping attractiveness of alcohol and marijuana use
among high school students. But, the researchers do not estimate possible mediating effects
of attraction on those deviant behaviors. Given that this study and others point to the impor-
tance of social learning factors in the etiology of attraction to misconduct, further inquiry
into the hypothesized mediated relationship between differential reinforcement and crimi-
nal behavior through enhanced criminal motivation is clearly warranted.

CRIMINAL MOTIVATION AND DIFFERENT CULTURAL CONTEXTS

The countries from which our samples are drawn—Russia, Greece, and Ukraine—
represent sufficiently different cultural contexts to pose challenges to assumptions of theo-
retical generality. As figures presented in Appendix A demonstrate, the three countries
differ substantially economically and culturally, with the differences between the two for-
mer members of the Soviet Union and Greece being especially dramatic (Central Intelli-
gence Agency, 2008; Council of Europe, 2008; Freedom House, 2007; Transparency Inter-
national, 2008; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008). Greece, a highly mod-
ernized country similar in many ways to other Western and Southern European nations, has
enjoyed relative political stability and democracy in the most recent decades and has
experienced more economic well-being than Ukraine or Russia.
Because of numerous political, economic, and social transformations endured by
Ukraine and Russia in the past two decades, both may still be regarded as countries in
 Antonaccio et al. / CRIMINAL MOTIVATION   1203

transition (Antonaccio & Tittle, 2008; Gilinskiy, 2006). In the political sphere, Russia con-
tinues to deal with many issues concerning democratic development, whereas Ukraine has
to settle numerous political disputes. Furthermore, the traumatizing rapid change from
socialism to capitalism in the early 1990s has led to the failure of the system of government-
insured benefits and caused widespread financial troubles among many residents of both
countries. Without a doubt, that shift has contributed to increased levels of economic
inequality and to the worsening of many indicators of quality of life (Foglesong & Solomon,
2001; Gilinskiy, 2006; Kalman, 2002; Passas, 2000; Pridemore, 2002). These dramatic
experiences seem to have taken a toll on the morale of the residents of Russia and Ukraine,
as they have reported negative behaviors and beliefs (Abbott & Sapsford, 2006; FOM,
2002; Kalman, 2002) that are also verified by the data we collected.
Specifically, we find that the Russian and Ukrainian respondents are more likely to be
involved in illegal behaviors, show less endorsement of conventional moral beliefs, and
exhibit lower levels of religiosity and social integration than do the Greek respondents
(Appendix A). Moreover, Ukraine and Russia suffer from a number of other social prob-
lems, including high rates of violence and corruption (Council of Europe, 2008; Transpar-
ency International, 2008; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008). In sum, the
evidence shows that Greece, Ukraine, and Russia appear to represent markedly different
socioeconomic environments that may moderate effects of criminal motivation. For
instance, we may logically expect that in seemingly more anomic and crime-laden environ-
ments of Russia and Ukraine, individuals will experience more chronic or repeated strains
and crime-favorable reinforcement and, consequently, will have stronger motivation to
commit crime. Moreover, as numerous scholars (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990; Paternoster
& Simpson, 1996; Tittle, 1995; Wikström, 2006) argue, effects of criminal motivation may
be counteracted to different degrees by constraints such as moral beliefs and social bonds.
As was noted earlier, Russians and Ukrainians in our samples display weaker morality and
less social integration and therefore appear to have fewer and weaker constraints than
Greeks. Therefore, we may find evidence of contextual conditioning effects and actually
uncover higher levels of criminal motivation and more potent effects of motivation on
criminal behavior in Russia and Ukraine.

METHOD

PARTICIPANTS

The data for this study come from household surveys conducted in the fall of 2006 in
Greece, Russia, and Ukraine. The three cities in our sample (Athens, Greece; Nizhni
Novgorod, Russia; and Lviv, Ukraine) were selected, at least partly, because each is reputed
to embody the cultural patterns of its respective country. Each is quite populous and all
have exhibited widely publicized actions to preserve their unique national cultural patterns.
Athens, Greece’s capital and center of the largest metropolitan area in the country, where
approximately half of all the country’s population resides, continues to reflect authentic
national Greek culture (Britannica, 2009; Christodoulou, Papadopoulos, Douzenis, &
Kanakaris, 2009). Nizhni Novgorod is still thought by many to be one of the most traditionally
1204   Criminal Justice and Behavior

Russian cities (Kommersant Moscow, 2004; Tittle & Botchkovar, 2005). Finally, Lviv, the
largest city in Western Ukraine, is usually identified as the “capital” of that region. Despite
various instances of attempted political, economic, and cultural domination by foreign
invaders, Lviv has remained the stronghold for true Ukrainian culture (Hrytsak, 2000;
Kenney, 2000).
Under our supervision, local professional survey organizations completed face-to-face
interviews with 400 randomly selected eligible adults in Athens, 500 in Nizhni Novgorod,
and 500 in Lviv. A two-stage sampling design with an initial random selection of street
routes followed by the random selection of residences was used. In each selected house-
hold, the individual 18 or more years old with a birthday closest to the date of the interview
was targeted. Those who could not be interviewed because of unavailability, inability to
arrange appointments within allocated call-back limits, or refusal were randomly replaced
from an initial oversampled pool. Approximately 70% of the respondents were random
replacements, a figure that is only slightly higher than is typical in comparable city surveys
in the United States (e.g., Grasmick & Bursik, 1990) and is generally comparable to sur-
veys in other countries (Couper & Leeuw, 2003; Kordos, 2005; Vågerö et al., 2008). To
increase rates of disclosure and assure anonymity, sensitive survey questions concerning
past and projected misconduct and moral beliefs were answered by respondents in private
in a short self-administered questionnaire.
The comparison of several sociodemographic characteristics between the samples and the
most recent censuses from the three countries suggests that our samples are generally repre-
sentative of the areas where the surveys were conducted with minor discrepancies only in
two instances, the slightly overrepresented aged in the Greek sample and females in the
Ukrainian sample. Yet, age- and gender-specific analyses indicate no substantial departures
from the overall patterns of results, and thus no apparent biases in both samples are expected.

MEASURES

Criminal behavior. We focused on respondents’ self-projections of their likelihood of com-

mitting six acts of illegal behavior, three violent and three property crimes (see Appendix B).
Because self-reported projections provide for more reasonable assumptions about causal
ordering, they have become a frequently used alternative to self-reports of past criminal
behavior. In addition, they have proven to be as valid, or sometimes more valid, than self-
reports of past misconduct (e.g., Albarracin, Johnson, Fishbein, & Muellerleile, 2001; Green,
1989; Murray & Erickson, 1987; Pogarsky, 2004). Respondents were asked to imagine them-
selves in a crime-favorable situation in the future and then to estimate in five categories
from 1 (absolutely unlikely) to 5 (very likely) the chance they would commit each of the six
crimes in question (see Appendix B for exact wording).
Two indices of misconduct, one merging answers about three types of violence (alpha = .74,
Greece; .69, Russia; and .84, Ukraine) and one combining responses concerning three lev-
els of property offending (alpha = .91, Greece; .83, Russia; and .91, Ukraine), were con-
structed by adding raw scores for each item.1 Natural logarithm transformations were
applied to reduce skewness (from a range of 2.0 to 3.9 to a range of 0.7 to 2.8).

Criminal motivation. Though many theorists posit that motivation is important in produc-
ing criminal behavior, there is little agreement about its meaning or about how to measure
 Antonaccio et al. / CRIMINAL MOTIVATION   1205

it (Osgood, 1997; Tittle & Botchkovar, 2005). Operationalizations range from indirect mea-
sures such as anger/frustration (Agnew, 1993) to immediate situationally motivating factors
(Jacobs & Wright, 1999). However, the more common approach and the one that we fol-
lowed is defining criminal motivation as respondent’s sense that a criminal/deviant act
would be “attractive” because it is pleasurable and desirable (Nagin & Paternoster, 1993;
Piquero & Tibbetts, 1996; Tittle & Botchkovar, 2005). Moreover, following previous
authors (see Tittle, 1995; Tittle & Paternoster, 2000), we distinguished between criminal
motivation/attraction and constraint and conceptualize criminal motivation/attraction as a
perceived desire to engage in criminal behavior that is independent of any possible con-
straints on behavior. Thus, we assumed that people who admitted to viewing a given crimi-
nal act as attractive would be motivated to commit such an act even though they might not
actually do so because of external or internal constraints such as social bonds, risks of
punishment, self-control, or morality.2
Our measure of criminal motivation combined two survey items concerning desirability and
attractiveness of specific illegal behavior. In order to establish a proper causal order of the
variables and ensure that criminal motivation follows rather than precedes reports of past rein-
forcement or strain, these questions tapped current cognitive perceptions of attractiveness and
desirability of the six acts of misconduct under examination by referring to current time frames
such as present point in the life of a respondent and most recent crime-favorable situation (see
Appendix B for exact wording). While all items had five original response categories from
never to very often, the last three categories were collapsed to reduce skewness of distributions.
Because the two indicators were related reasonably well with each other (.5 to .7), we summed
them to create indexes of motivation for each of six offenses. The z scores for those indexes in
turn were used to construct two additive offense-specific measures of motivation for violence
and property offending, with higher scores indicating more criminal motivation.

Strain. To create a measure of general strain we employed several survey items asking
respondents about their exposure to the four types of potentially straining experiences and
conditions at present, in the past 2 years, and in total prior life (shown in Appendix B,
responses were in five categories from 1 = never to 5 = very often). Since GST appears to
claim that attractions to crime are especially likely in the context of repeated strains
(Agnew, 2006), our measure tried to capture repeated strain by summing z scores for the
items reporting potentially straining experiences in all three periods of time. We also con-
ducted alternative analyses with measures of present and past strains. Consistent with the
theory’s predictions, the results of these analyses show somewhat stronger effects with the
measure of repeated strain. Therefore, we report the results only for this measure.

Crime-favorable reinforcement. We created composite measures of favorable reinforce-

ment for violence and property offending using the items that reflect both direct reinforce-
ment and indirect (or vicarious) reinforcement for misconduct (see Appendix B; all ques-
tions use five response options from 1 = never to 5 = very often). Since Akers (1998) argues
that the process of reinforcement involves experiences of rewards and costs associated with
prior acts, direct reinforcement was tapped by respondents’ experiences with misconduct
and its consequences, such as first, punishments following their childhood misconduct and
second, benefits of adult involvement in illegal behaviors. To measure the degree of received
reinforcement for misbehavior, we multiplied the frequency of the respondent/others’
misbehavior by the magnitude of the consequences for each question.
1206   Criminal Justice and Behavior

Past vicarious reinforcement favorable to violent and property offending was tapped by
respondents’ reports of their friends’ past involvement in the six acts of misconduct. These
questions were also multiplied by the degree to which others were observed by respondents
to have been rewarded for involvement in those transgressions. Finally, we incorporated
respondents’ perceptions of having received messages from family, friends, or associates
endorsing those six illegal acts as additional indicators of vicarious reinforcement.
The resulting two multi-item measures of positive violence and property offending rein-
forcement consist of 7 multiplicative terms and 3 single-item indicators. They were constructed
by adding the z scores for these 10 items. Higher numbers indicate stronger past reinforcement.

Control variables. The following four control variables were incorporated into all analy-
ses to account for any antecedent influences on the variables of interest: gender (0 for male
and 1 for female), age (the year of birth), family intactness during childhood (0 for living
with two biological parents and 1 for all other arrangements), and respondent’s perception
of family economic status during childhood (“How would you evaluate the economic status
of the family in which you grew up relative to other families in that time?” with five response
categories ranging from 1 = very poor to 5 = very good). We also conducted analyses (not
shown here) with a measure of current socioeconomic status (SES) as another control vari-
able and obtained similar results. Merged-sample analyses also include dummy variables for
Russia and Ukraine with Greece as a base category. Finally, past crime, a variable that is
often utilized as a control in analyses of prospective criminal behavior, was incorporated into
the measures of crime-favorable reinforcement. Descriptive statistics for these and other
variables used in the analyses are shown in Table 1. For any variables in all three samples
the rates of missing data are very low (less than 1.5%), and the few missing values for inde-
pendent and control variable were replaced using the expectation maximization algorithm.

ANALYSIS

We employed two alternative methods of analyses. First, we used ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression with logged dependent variables to estimate all causal sequences. Sec-
ond, we estimated these models using negative binomial regression that preserves the
original, skewed, distributions of dependent variables. Since both methods produced the
same substantive findings and we wished to maximize comparability with past research on
criminal motivation, we present only the findings from the OLS estimates.
The Preacher-Hayes (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) test was used in testing mediating effects
of criminal motivation. It purportedly provides less biased estimates of indirect effects
based on bootstrapped confidence intervals. We also conducted formal regression diagnos-
tic tests for all models. Variance inflation factors are all less than 2.7 (well under the 4.00
usually taken as the threshold for serious problems; see Fisher & Mason, 1981), indicating
that our results are probably not biased by multicollinearity.

RESULTS

CRIMINAL MOTIVATION

Descriptive statistics for the two measures of criminal motivation shown in Table 1 sug-
gest that the assumptions of motivational theories about criminal attraction may be closer
 TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in the Analysis

Greece Russia Ukraine Full Sample

Valid Valid Valid Valid

Variables Range M SD Cases Range M SD Cases Range M SD Cases Range M SD Cases

Projected 0.00 to 2.40 0.26 0.49 397 0.00 to 2.56 0.61 0.69 496 0.00 to 2.56 0.77 0.75 500 0.00 to 2.56 0.57 0.69 1,393
violence (ln)
Projected theft 0.00 to 2.20 0.17 0.47 397 0.00 to 2.56 0.52 0.74 497 0.00 to 2.56 0.89 0.86 500 0.00 to 2.56 0.55 0.78 1,394
(ln)
Violence –1.39 to 10.79 0.00 0.271 400 –1.82 to 9.60 0.00 2.50 500 –2.21 to 7.44 0.00 2.65 500 –2.21 to 10.79 0.00 2.62 1,400
motivation
Theft motivation –1.21 to 10.42 0.00 0.288 400 –1.77 to 7.66 0.00 2.75 500 –2.58 to 5.31 0.00 2.81 500 –2.58 to 10.42 0.00 2.80 1,400
Strain –13.04 to 22.44 0.13 8.24 400 –13.04 to 32.18 –0.72 8.36 500 –13.04 to 32.22 0.61 8.14 500 –13.04 to 32.22 0.00 8.26 1,400
Violence –6.04 to 38.90 0.00 6.04 400 –9.46 to 27.62 0.00 5.86 500 –11.10 to 22.65 0.00 6.54 500 –11.10 to 38.90 0.00 6.16 1,400
reinforcement
Theft –6.24 to 35.04 0.00 7.02 400 –9.86 to 30.35 0.00 6.22 500 –11.92 to 21.59 0.00 7.38 500 –11.92 to 35.04 0.00 6.87 1,400
reinforcement
Age 18 to 85 43.30 15.97 400 18 to 84 46.29 17.22 500 18 to 86 43.41 17.32 500 18 to 86 44.40 16.95 1,400
Gender 0 to 1 0.50 0.50 400 0 to 1 0.55 0.50 500 0 to 1 0.62 0.49 500 0 to 1 0.56 0.50 1,400
Family intactness 0 to 1 0.09 0.28 400 0 to 1 0.20 0.40 500 0 to 1 0.16 0.37 500 0 to 1 0.15 0.36 1,400
Childhood 1 to 5 2.95 0.90 400 1 to 5 3.03 0.76 500 1 to 5 3.11 0.78 500 1 to 5 3.04 0.81 1,400
socioeconomic
status

1207  
1208   Criminal Justice and Behavior

to the truth than the assumptions made by control theories. First, according to these data,
criminal attraction is clearly not uniform among individuals and is not generally high. The
range of index scores for violence attraction is from a low of –2.21 to a high of 10.79 while
the minimum attraction for property crime is –2.58, with a maximum of 10.42. Moreover,
77% of the Greek respondents, 58% of the Russian participants, and 38% of the Ukrainian
respondents reported never having an attraction to property crime, while the corresponding
figures for violence are 62, 42, and 40 (see the last two rows of Appendix A). Not only does
criminal attraction appear to vary substantially among individuals, frequently being absent
altogether, but there seem to be clear differences among the samples in the three countries.
Overall, Russian and Ukrainian respondents seem to exhibit considerably more attraction
than the Greeks to the two types of crime being investigated here. Furthermore, t tests
conducted with the raw score measures of criminal motivation confirm that the means of
the motivation indices in the Russian and Ukrainian samples are significantly different
from those in the Greek sample.

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS → CRIMINAL MOTIVATION

The data strongly support the idea that criminal attraction is highly variable. If the data
are correct, a major issue for criminological theory, then, is to explain that variation. Here
we consider two theories that feature variables/processes designed to do that. The results
in Table 2 (based on the full sample) permit some insight into how well these two theories
perform in that respect.
The coefficients from Models 2 and 3 show that both strain and reinforcement, respec-
tively, are significantly related to the indices of attraction to violent and property offending,
even with gender, age, childhood family intactness, and childhood family SES in the equa-
tions. These associations range from moderate for strain (standardized coefficients of .17)
to relatively strong for past reinforcement (standardized coefficients .65 and .70). Further-
more, predictions of criminal attraction from both strain and past reinforcement are robust,
persisting even when both measures are included in the equations (Model 4). Yet, the pre-
dictive coefficients for strain are smaller and somewhat less stable than those of reinforce-
ment. The strain coefficients predicting criminal attraction, though remaining significant,
are nevertheless reduced substantially (by approximately 70%) when the measures of
reinforcement are included, whereas the coefficients for reinforcement decrease by only
about 1% when the strain measure is considered.
Strain and past reinforcement in combination appear to add substantially (increases from
39% to 45%) to the R2 for criminal motivation, above what is provided by the control vari-
ables (compare Models 1 with Models 4, differences confirmed by F tests), although most
of this additional explanatory power comes from the contribution of prior reinforcement.
Furthermore, the dummy variables designating countries in our full sample (not reported)
are not significant, suggesting that whatever effects strain and reinforcement have on
criminal motivation are not conditioned by the cultural context.
It is noteworthy that two demographic characteristics, age and gender, both significantly
predict criminal attraction and continue to do so when other variables, including strain and
reinforcement, are included in the equations. Thus, although our results support the two
theories’ implications concerning criminal motivation, it seems likely that those two theo-
ries do not fully account for attraction to criminal behavior. Since neither sex nor age, in
 TABLE 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regressions Predicting Criminal Motivation (Merged Sample)

a. Violence Motivation (N = 1,393) b. Property Offending Motivation (N = 1,394)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B

Strain .054* .008 .169 .015* .006 .047 .059* .009 .173 .016* .006 .048
Reinforcement .274* .009 .646 .270* .009 .636 .287* .008 .702 .283* .008 .693
Gender –.708* .138 –.134 –.771* .136 –.146 –.278* .106 –.053 –.302* .107 –.057 –.530* .149 –.094 –.598* .147 –.106 –.198 .106 .035 –.220* .106 –.039
Age –.031* .004 –.200 –.031* .004 –.198 –.008* .003 –.054 –.009* .003 –.055 –.037* .005 –.223 –.037* .005 –.221 –.012* .003 –.072 –.012* .003 –.073
Family intactness .303 .194 .042 .238 .191 .033 .134 .148 .019 .119 .148 .016 .407* .209 .052 .335* .206 .043 .066 .149 .008 .050 .148 .007
Childhood .100 .090 .031 .155 .089 .048 .151* .069 .047 .166* .069 .051 –.062 .097 –.018 –.002 .095 .000 .008 .069 .002 .043 .132 .007
socioeconomic
status
Adjusted R2 .06 .09 .45 .45 .06 .08 .52 .53

*p < .05.

1209  
1210   Criminal Justice and Behavior

and of itself, can explain anything (see Wikström, 2006), their indicators must conceal
other causal processes that might be uncovered using variables from other criminological
theories claiming to explain criminal attraction.

CRIMINAL MOTIVATION → CRIMINAL PROBABILITY

Furthermore, to investigate the potential effects of criminal motivation on criminal prob-

ability, we first examine bivariate correlations (the results not shown and available from the
authors upon request). Those figures indicate that attraction to crime is significantly and
strongly related to prospective involvement in both violent and property offending (coef-
ficients from .52 for violence in Greece to .77 for property offending in Ukraine). These
associations are significant in all three countries, with higher correlations being present
in Russia and Ukraine than in Greece. The statistical significance of differences between
bivariate correlations is confirmed by Fisher’s test.
Tables 3 through 5 present regression coefficients concerning the associations between
attraction to crime and criminal probability by country (because our findings appear to vary
by research sites, as country dummy coefficients are significant in all models). The figures
from Model 1 in these tables indicate that, in all instances, criminal motivation is strongly
and significantly related to the dependent variables (standardized coefficients ranging from
.49 to .75), even with all the control variables included. Thus, it would appear that motiva-
tion is an exceptionally important variable in explaining criminal probability in all three
settings.
However, our findings do point toward possible cross-cultural differences in the degree
of influence that criminal motivation exercises on the probability of misbehavior. The fig-
ures presented in Model 1 in Tables 3 through 5 show that these coefficients are stronger
in Russia and Ukraine than in Greece, with all such differences being shown statistically
significant using the Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998) test.

MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS → CRIMINAL MOTIVATION → CRIMINAL PROBABILITY

It remains to be seen, however, whether the measures of criminal motivation mediate

associations between various theoretical explanations for criminal behavior and indicators
of such criminal probability, as is so often assumed but rarely tested. Relevant coefficients
are presented in Tables 3 through 5, Models 2 through 7.
The hypothesis of mediation presupposes (R. M. Baron & Kenny, 1986) the existence of
significant relationships between theoretical causes of crime and criminal probability when
criminal motivation is not taken into consideration, as well as between motivation and
criminal probability, which has already been shown. The presupposition of an association
between theorized causal variables and criminal probability is partially supported in the
case of strain (Models 2 and 6) and fully supported for reinforcement (Models 4 and 6). In
Model 2, which includes all control variables, the strain coefficients significantly predict
criminal projections only in Russia and Ukraine, and even then they are very modest rela-
tive to other predictors in the model (standardized coefficients range from .10 for violence
in Russia to .21 for property offending in Ukraine). With one exception (violence in the
Ukrainian sample), these associations are somewhat unreliable, being reduced to nonsig-
nificance by the inclusion of prior reinforcement in the predictive equations (Model 6).
 TABLE 3: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results Predicting Projected Crime (Greece)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7

b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B

a. Violent Offending Index (N = 397)

Motivation .089 .008* .493 .092* .008 .507 .023* .011 .125 .025* .011 .138
Strain .004 .003 .059 –.004 .003 –.059 –.003 .002 –.044 –.003 .002 –.058
Reinforcement .047* .003 0.584 .040* .005 .490 .048* .003 .590 .040* .005 .490
Gender –.076 .042 –.078 –.118* .048 –.120 –.073 .042 –.074 –.085* .039 –0.086 –.080* .039 –.081 –.082* .039 –.084 –.076* .039 –.078
Age –.005* .001 –.172 –.007* .002 –.238 –.005* .001 –.164 –.004* .001 –0.143 –.004* .001 –.143 –.004* .001 –.137 –.004* .001 –.134
Family intactness –.032 .075 –.018 .001 .087 .001 –.027 .075 –.015 –.018 .070 –0.010 –.024 .069 –.014 –.014 .070 –.008 –.019 .069 –.011
Childhood socioeconomic status –.014 .024 .025 .001 .028 .001 –.018 .024 –.033 .011 .023 .020 .006 .023 .011 .008 .023 .015 .002 .023 .004
Adjusted R2 .30 .06 .30 .39 .40 .39 .40
b. Property Offending Index (N = 397)
Motivation .090* .006 .555 .093* .007 .573 .018* .009 .113 .021* .009 .130
Strain .002 .003 .044 –.005* .002 –.082 –.002 .002 –.043 –.003 .002 –.059
Reinforcement .045* .002 .673 0.039* .004 .585 .045* .002 .519 .039* .004 .580
Gender –.015 .036 –.017 –.003 .045 –.003 –.013 .036 –.014 .002 .032 .002 –0.001 .032 –.001 .004 .032 .004 .001 .032 .001
Age –.007* .001 –.230 –.010* .001 –.351 –.006* .001 –.218 –.005* .001 –.158 –0.005* .001 –.159 –.004* .001 –.151 –.004* .001 –.150
Family intactness .000 .066 .00 .081 .080 .049 .006 .066 .003 .002 .058 .001 –0.005 .058 –.003 .006 .058 .003 .000 .058 .000
Childhood socioeconomic status –.062* .021 –.119 –.086* .026 –.165 –.066* .021 –.127 –.059* .019 –.113 –.057* .019 –.110 –.061* .019 –.117 –.060* .019 –.115
Adjusted R2 .40 .11 .41 .53 .53 .53 .54

*p < .05.

1211
1212
TABLE 4: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results Predicting Projected Crime (Russia)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7

b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B

a. Violent Offending Index (N = 496)

Motivation .154* .010 .557 .153* .010 .553 .092* .012 .332 .092* .012 .332
Strain .009* .004 .103 .003 .003 .031 –.000 .003 –.025 .000 .003 –.008
Reinforcement .068* .004 .581 .045* .005 .380 .068* .004 .581 .045* .005 .381
Gender –.118* .050 –.085 –.220* .060 –.159 –.122* .050 –.088 –.072 .049 –.052 –.065 .047 –.047 –.072 .050 –.052 –.064 .047 –.046
Age –.005* .002 –.121 –.009* .002 –.227 –.005* .002 –.119 –.004* .002 –.108 –.003* .001 –.083 –.004* .002 –.108 –.003* .001 –.084
Family intactness –.017 .062 –.010 –.026 .075 –.015 –.020 .063 –.011 –.016 .062 –.009 –.016 .058 –.010 –.016 .062 –.009 –.016 .058 –.009
Childhood socioeconomic status .027 .035 .029 .048 .042 .053 .031 .035 .034 .035 .034 .039 .030 .032 .033 .035 .034 .039 .029 .033 .032
Adjusted R2 0.38 0.10 0.38 0.40 0.46 0.40 0.46
b. Property Offending Index (N = 497)
Motivation .178* .009 .659 .177* .009 .654 .128* .011 .472 .127* .011 .471
Strain .010* .004 .110 .005 .003 .054 .004 .003 .047 .003 .003 .036
Reinforcement .070* .004 .588 .038* .005 .314 .070* .004 .583 .037* .005 .311
Gender –.122* .050 –.082 –.319* .065 –.214 –.129* .050 –.086 –.171* .053 –.114 –.101* .047 –.068 –.176* .053 –.118 –.106* .048 –.071
Age –.001 .002 –.026 –.008* .002 –.173 .000 .002 –.021 –.002 .002 –.050 .000 .001 .001 –.002 .002 –.046 .000 .001 .004
Family intactness –.037 .062 –.020 –.058 .082 –.032 –.043 .062 –.023 –.065 .067 –.036 –.050 .059 –.027 –.070 .067 –.038 –.053 .059 –.029
Childhood socioeconomic status –.007 .035 –.008 –.038 .046 –.039 .000 .035 .000 –.001 0.037 –.001 .007 .033 .008 .005 .037 .005 .012 .033 .012
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.08 0.47 0.39 0.53 0.40 0.53

*p <.05
 TABLE 5: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results Predicting Projected Crime (Ukraine)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7

b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B b SE B

a. Violent Offending Index (N = 500)

Motivation .150* .010 .533 .144* .011 .512 .066* .011 .234 .065* .011 .232
Strain .018* .004 .199 .011* .003 .120 .006* .003 .064 .005 .003 .058
Reinforcement .072* .004 .634 .057* .005 .496 .071* .004 .619 .055* .005 .483
Gender –.117* .056 –.076 –.307* .064 –.200 –.143* .056 –.093 –.143* .050 –.093 –.103* .049 –.067 –.157* .050 –.102 –.115* .049 –.075
Age –.008* .002 –.175 –.013* .002 –.301 –.008* .002 –.178 –.006* .002 –.134 –.005* .001 –.115 –.006* .001 –.137 –.005* .001 –.118
Family intactness .087 .074 .042 .158 .085 .077 .079 .073 .038 .080 .066 .039 .062 .064 .030 .077 .066 .037 .059 .064 .029
Childhood socioeconomic status .003 .036 .003 .031 .042 .033 .009 .036 .010 .041 .033 .043 .029 .032 .030 .044 .032 .045 .031 .032 .032
Adjusted R2 .40 .18 .40 .50 .53 .51 .54
b. Property Offending Index (N = 497)
Motivation .229* .009 .747 .226* .009 .736 .121* .012 .393 .121* .012 .393
Strain .022* .004 .207 .005 .003 .048 –.002 .003 –.014 –.002 .003 –.015
Reinforcement .088* .003 .754 .054* .004 .464 .089* .003 .759 .055* .005 .469
Gender –.047 .051 –.026 –.227* .076 –.128 –.058 .052 –.033 –.057 .049 –.032 –.033 .045 –.018 –.053 .050 –.030 –.029 .045 –.016
Age –.003* .002 –.062 –.010* .002 –.206 –.003* .002 –.063 –.005* .001 –.101 –.003* .001 –.065 –.005* .001 –.100 –.003* .001 –.064
Family intactness .080 .069 .034 .220* .102 .093 .077 .069 .033 .061 .066 .026 .045 .060 .019 .061 .066 .026 .046 .061 .019
Childhood socioeconomic status .057 .034 .051 .146* .050 .132 .060 .034 .054 .080* .032 .073 .060* .030 .054 .079* .033 .072 .059* .030 .053
Adjusted R2 .60 .13 .61 .63 .69 .63 .69

*p < .05.

1213
1214   Criminal Justice and Behavior

TABLE 6: 
Results of Three Tests of Mediation Effects of Definitions on the Relationship Between
Reinforcement and Crime

Strain Prior Reinforcement

Violent Offending Property Offending Violent Offending Property Offending

Reduction Bootstrap Reduction Bootstrap Reduction Bootstrap Reduction Bootstrap

in Effect Confidence in Effect Confidence in Effect Confidence in Effect Confidence
Country (%) Intervals (%) Intervals (%) Intervals I (%) Intervals I

Greece n/a n/a n/a n/a 15 –.0027, .0183 13 –.0055, .0159

Russia 67 .0026, .0109* 50 .0066, .0173* 34 .0156, .0325* 46 .0254, .0404*
Ukraine 39 .0032, .0117* 77 .0099, .0230* 21 .0092, .0237* 39 .0263, .0416*

*p < .05.

Measures of reinforcement, on the other hand, are significantly and strongly associated
with projected future violence and property offending in all three countries (standardized
coefficients ranging from .58 for violence in Greece to .76 for property offending in
Ukraine) and remain so with all control variables as well as the measures of strain included
in the equations (Models 4 and 6).
Furthermore, confirming mediation requires that the association observed between a
theoretical causal variable like strain or reinforcement and criminal probability be signifi-
cantly reduced or eliminated when motivation is included in the equation (R. M. Baron &
Kenny, 1986). In assessing mediation in strain models, we focus only on the Russian and
Ukrainian samples (Models 2 and 3 in Tables 4 and 5) because no stable association
between strain and crime was shown in the Greek sample. The figures indicate that in three
out of four instances the coefficients for strain predicting violence and property offending
are fully mediated by criminal motivation. In the fourth instance, strain predicting pro-
jected future violence in the Ukrainian sample, only partial mediation occurs. Overall, the
effects of strain on different types of misconduct, though only modest in any case, are
nevertheless reduced by 39% to 77% by the inclusion of criminal motivation in the predic-
tive equations, and the results from the Preacher-Hayes (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) statisti-
cal procedures confirm the significance of these findings (Table 6).
While the original associations between reinforcement and criminal projection are sub-
stantially larger and more consistent than those for strain, the overall evidence of mediation
is somewhat weaker for reinforcement. The figures in Models 4 and 5 in Tables 3 through
5 suggest partial rather than full mediation because all the reinforcement coefficients
remain significant and strong even with criminal motivation in the equations. Furthermore,
significant meditation effects are present only among the Russian and Ukrainian samples
(Table 6).

DISCUSSION

In line with previous, though sparse, research (Brezina & Piquero, 2003; Tittle &
Botchkovar, 2005) and challenging some control theories, our results confirm that attrac-
tion to crime varies substantially among individuals and across research sites and is often
minimal. In addition, they show that criminal motivation strongly predicts violence and
 Antonaccio et al. / CRIMINAL MOTIVATION   1215

property offending in all three of our samples. Thus, there are strong reasons to pay more
attention to criminal attraction as a variable and bring its direct measure into studies of
criminal behavior.
Criminal attraction is particularly important in the light of the findings suggesting cross-
cultural differences in its levels and influences. For instance, the Greek respondents report
much lower levels of criminal motivation than do the Russian or Ukrainian interviewees.
These discrepancies may be due, at least to some extent, to environmental differences in
anomie, the state of normlessness (Durkheim, 1893/1984). The drastic social, economic,
and political transformations experienced by Russia and Ukraine may have caused many
individuals to experience straining and traumatic events repeatedly as well as to observe
and participate in crime-reinforcing incidents. However, the effects of criminal attraction
also appear to be greater in Russia and Ukraine, suggesting that theories like strain and
social learning that point toward criminal attraction as a key mediator may need some
refinement to more effectively specify their scopes.
In addition to widespread anomie, as suggested earlier, the ability of criminal motivation
to predict crime in different locales could be linked to the degree of balance between levels
of motivation and levels of constraint (Becker, 1968; McCarthy, 2002; Paternoster &
Pogarsky, 2009; Tittle, 1995). Greater social integration and stronger moral beliefs in
Greece may reduce the overall impact of criminal motivation. And, there are other forces
potentially at work. For example, the failure to find stronger effects for individual strain in
face of general levels of misery in Russia and Ukraine could be because potentially strain-
ing influences that are excessively experienced cease to produce strong straining effects as
people become accustomed to it; instead, they generate a more or less constant state of
criminal motivation. Similarly, when potentially reinforcing conditions are faced too often,
they may lose their immediate criminogenic potency. More theoretical work may be needed
before accurate contingencies bearing on sociocultural variations can be articulated and
incorporated into major criminological theories.
Furthermore, the failure of our measures of strain and reinforcement to explain all of the
variation in individual attraction to crime suggests that criminal motivation may have mul-
tiple sources besides those specified in those two theories. Numerous other accounts, such
as reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981) and coercion, and social support theories (Colvin,
2000; Colvin et al., 2002) may contain potential explanations for criminal motivation.
Moreover, some prior studies suggest that biological influences may contribute to increased
attraction to crime (Gove & Wilmoth, 1990; Raine, 2002). Finally, regardless of the sources
of criminal attraction, our data suggest that it exercises some degree of mediation between
strain and reinforcement, at least for the Russian and Ukrainian samples, thus providing
some support for causal sequences set forth in strain and reinforcement in general strain
and social learning theories. But, since our data do not support a conclusion of mediation
by criminal motivation in the sample of Greek respondents, those causal chains may be
context dependent.
In sum, our data suggest that scholars would do well to focus more directly on criminal
attraction as a potential influence on behavior. Yet, although our research offers unique
insights into the role of criminal attraction in explaining criminal behavior, several poten-
tial limitations exist. First, our data are subject to the same well-known weaknesses as
1216   Criminal Justice and Behavior

survey data collected anywhere else, such as potential withholding or exaggeration of

information. Second, the measurement of some key variables may be less than ideal. In
particular, criminal motivation may be difficult to tap using ordinary survey items, mainly
because survey measures cannot take into account situational stimuli. In addition, our
measures of strain and reinforcement may not capture all of the elements relevant to each
variable, and therefore, their failure to account for all variation in individual attraction to
crime may also be attributed limitations in their measurement. Third, there are reasons to
be critical of our ability to establish firmly the theorized causal ordering of the variables.
With specifically focused question wording, we were able to differentiate retrospective,
contemporaneous, and prospective measures of the concepts of interest. Yet, the actual
causal ordering of our variables may be different. For example, although some extant lon-
gitudinal research suggests otherwise, criminal motivation may be a completely stable
construct rooted in early childhood experiences and antecedent to much prior reinforce-
ment and strain exposure. Long-term longitudinal studies with repeated measures may be
necessary for strong answers to the questions we are addressing.

CONCLUSION

This research has been designed to help overcome weaknesses in the research literature
concerning criminal motivation. While virtually every theory assumes that criminal attrac-
tion, or motivation, is implicated in actual criminal conduct, very few studies attempt direct
measurement and assessment of the part it plays. Moreover, theories differ in their assump-
tions about the distribution and origin of criminal motivation, with some portraying it as
ubiquitously strong and inherent and others contending that it is highly variable, depending
on various theoretical influences. Finally, ideas about criminal attraction imply that its pres-
ence, sources, and effects are universal, although the relevant research is sparse and limited
mainly to Western contexts and age-bounded and nonrandom samples.
Our data, drawn from surveys conducted in three different social contexts—major cities
in Greece, Russia, and Ukraine—show that criminal attraction, at least as we measure it, is
quite variable, both among individuals and across contexts, and contrary to many control
theories, it is sometimes extremely low. Furthermore, direct measures of criminal attraction
prove to be strong predictors of criminal probability and usually serve as mediators between
theoretical variables put forth by prominent theories and criminal probabilities. In addition,
the sources of criminal motivation, as implied by the large repertoire of variables from
numerous criminological theories designed to account for criminal behavior through their
supposed effects on criminal motivation, appear to be broad and varied. Finally, aspects of
criminal attraction appear to be somewhat dependent on the social/cultural context.
Overall, then, our data suggest that theorists, especially those in the “control” tradition,
need to pay more attention to potential variations in the strength of criminal attraction. In
addition, theorists generally need to specify more accurately the sources of criminal moti-
vation, particularly as they might vary among social contexts, and to draw out the likely
causal sequences in which it is implicated. Correspondingly, researchers may need to begin
measuring criminal attraction directly and bringing it into empirical schemes to more accu-
rately account for misconduct.
 Antonaccio et al. / CRIMINAL MOTIVATION   1217

Appendix A
Comparison of Countries’ and Samples’ Characteristics

Greece Russia Ukraine

Countries’ characteristics
Freedom House rating of democracy 1.5 5.5 3.5
Gross domestic product per capita $29,361 $16,139 $7,271
Population in poverty (%) n/a 18 29
Life expectancy 79 66 68
Homicide rate 1.5 19 8.5
Corruption ranking 56 143 118
Samples’ characteristics (%)
Physically harming another person on purpose in the last 5 years 6 14 27
Admitting a minor property offense in the last 5 years 9 15 34
Acceptability of committing a minor property crime 17 27 41
Acceptability of physically harming another person on purpose 8 18 26
At least one organizational membership 32 11 15
None or only a few friendships 24 77 51
Many or moderate number of relationships with neighbors 51 23 36
Religious or very religious 47 19 31
Never wanting or needing to commit any property offense and considering 77 58 38
them not at all gratifying or pleasing
Never wanting or needing to commit any violent offense and considering 62 42 40
them not at all gratifying or pleasing

Appendix B
Survey Items Used for Constructing Crime-Specific Measures of Reinforcement

Projected Future Violence Projected Future Property Offending

In the future if you are in a situation where you have a strong desire or need and the opportunity to commit
each act, what is the chance that you will do so?
1. Hit another person on purpose in an emotional outburst 1. Take money or property from others worth less
than $5
2. Physically harm another person on purpose 2. Take money or property from others worth
more than $5 but less than $50
3. Use violence or threat of violence to accomplish some 3. Take money or property from others worth $50
personal goal or more.
Criminal Motivation
How often at this point in your life, you find yourself needing or wanting to . . . ?
1. Hit another person on purpose in an emotional outburst 1. Take money or property from others worth less
than $5
2. Physically harm another person on purpose 2. Take money or property from others worth
more than $5 but less than $50
3. Use violence or threat of violence to accomplish some 3. Take money or property from others worth $50
personal goal or more.
Think back to the last time you were in a situation in which you could have gotten away with doing it. In that
situation, how gratifying or pleasing to you would it have been to . . .
1. Hit another person on purpose in an emotional outburst 1. Take money or property from others worth less
than $5
2. Physically harm another person on purpose 2. Take money or property from others worth
more than $5 but less than $50
3. Use violence or threat of violence to accomplish some 3. Take money or property from others worth $50
personal goal or more.
(continued)
1218   Criminal Justice and Behavior

Appendix B (continued)
Strain
How frequently have you experienced it?
1. You failed to achieve some goal that is important to you (e.g., career achievement or level of income)
2. You failed to achieve some goal that, because of hard work, an agreement, or principles of justice, you
deserve to achieve (e.g., getting a promotion at work or graduating from college)
3. Bad things happened to you (e.g., being a victim of a crime, becoming seriously ill, or getting in conflict with
a friend, partner, or family member)
4. You did not do as well at things as some other people (e.g., not having gotten what others got or not having
performed as well as others)
Past Direct Reinforcement for Violence Past Direct Reinforcement for Property Offending
1. When you were growing up, before age 8, how often did 1. When you were growing up, before age 8, how
your caregivers catch you when you did what you now know often did your caregivers catch you when you
most people would regard as misbehavior? x When you did what you now know most people would
were growing up, before age 8, how often did your regard as misbehavior? x When you were
caregivers punish or show disapproval when they caught growing up, before age 8, how often did your
you engaging in what you now know most people regard caregivers punish or show disapproval when
as misbehavior? they caught you engaging in what you now
know most people regard as misbehavior?
2. How often did you [do each of the three acts of violence]? 2. How often did you [do each of the three acts of
x How often did you benefit from [do each of the three property offending] during the past 5 years? x
acts of violence]? How often did you benefit from [each of them]?
Past Vicarious Reinforcement for Property
Past Vicarious Reinforcement for Violence Offending
1. How often have most of your friends [done each of the 1. How often have most of your friends [done
three acts of violence]? x How often during your lifetime each of the three acts of property offending]? x
have you observed or heard about people benefitting from How often during your lifetime have you
having [done each of the three acts of violence]? observed or heard about people benefitting
from having [done each of the three acts of
property offending]?
2. How often during your lifetime that family, friends, or 2. How often during your lifetime that family,
associates have indicated that [doing each of the three friends, or associates have indicated that
acts of violence] is morally acceptable? [doing each of the three acts of property
offending] is acceptable?

NOTES
1. For all dependent and independent variables, we also experimented with creating different types of alternative measures
(e.g., factor-based scales, raw score or weighted indices, etc.), and in all cases the alternative measure produced similar
substantive results.
2. In addition, alternative multivariate analyses that incorporated four constraint variables (social bonds, self-control,
moral beliefs, perceptions of certainty of punishment) as controls revealed the overall patterns of substantive results similar
to those reported here (with somewhat attenuated effects of strain). Overall, the findings from those analyses (not shown but
available upon request) confirm that criminal motivation and those four constraining factors, even though negatively corre-
lated in most cases, still exert some independent influences on criminal behavior and that taking into consideration constraint
variables does not change substantially our conclusions regarding criminal motivation.

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 Antonaccio et al. / CRIMINAL MOTIVATION   1221

Olena Antonaccio is an assistant professor of sociology at the University of Miami. Her interests include theory testing and
development and comparative criminology.

Ekaterina Botchkovar is assistant professor of criminology and criminal justice at Northeastern University. Her interests
include comparative criminology and theory development.

Charles R. Tittle is a professor of sociology and Goodnight/Glaxo-Wellcome Distinguished Chair of Social Science at North
Carolina State University. His interests include theory development and testing.

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