Agriculture and Food

Policy

Block 4, 2023
Agriculture and
development

Dagim Belay
Department of Food and
Resource Economics

Email: dgb@ifro.ku.dk
• Learning outcomes
• Describe the significance of agriculture’s contribution to
developing economies

• Describe the state of agricultural productivity in developing

world

• Identify major constraints of agricultural development in

developing nations

• Understand the role of incentives in promoting agricultural

technology adoption and productivity

• Analyze the role of incentives and institutions in improving

agricultural marketing and commercialization
Outline

• Agriculture’s contribution to development

• Low Productivity of agriculture in developing
world
• Constraints to agricultural development
• Agricultural productivity and technology adoption
• Agricultural marketing and commercialization
 What Can Agriculture Do for Development?

(1) Agriculture is a very large and key sector in most poor countries.

• Large shares of GDP & crucial to economic growth

• In 2018, it accounted for 4% of global GDP and in some least developing
countries, it can account for more than 25% of GDP.
• Systematically larger shares of employment
• About 25% of the world population is directly engaged in farming (World
Bank 2023)
• Poverty is Rural:
• Low productivity sector
• Three out of four poor people in developing countries live in
rural areas
• A sector that produces key outputs:
• Food (both raw materials and inputs to processed food)
• Cash crops (e.g., coffee, cocoa, sugar, cotton, tea, oil palm,
rubber, etc.)
Share of agriculture in the economy
The share of labor in agriculture

Compiled from WDI

Agriculture and Rural Poverty
Price trends
(2) Agriculture is important during structural transformation

• At low levels of development, shares of agriculture in GDP and in

employment are large but decline as countries develop.

• Christiaensen et al. (2011): agricultural growth is up to 3.2 times

better at reducing poverty.

• World Bank: Agricultural development is one of the most powerful

tools to end extreme poverty, boost shared prosperity, and feed a
projected 9.7 billion people by 2050.

• Growth in the agriculture sector is two to four times more

effective in raising incomes among the poorest compared to other
sectors.

• Analyses in 2016 found that 65% of poor working adults made a

living through agriculture.
(2) Agriculture is important during structural transformation

• The structural transformation gives rise to different roles for

agriculture at different stages of the transformation.
• The World Bank (2008) defines 3 developing country types
• Agricultural Based Countries
• Transforming Countries
• Urbanized Countries
 The role of Agriculture in the three groups
• Agriculture-based economies (Sub-Saharan Africa):
agriculture contributes significantly to growth, and the poor are
concentrated in rural areas.
• Policy challenge: to help agriculture play its role as an engine of growth and
poverty reduction

• Transforming economies (Asia, North-Africa, Middle East):agriculture

contributes less to growth, but poverty remains overwhelmingly rural.
• Policy challenge:
• To limit political tensions accompanying the rising urban-rural income gap.
• Growth in agriculture and the rural nonfarm economy is needed to reduce
rural poverty and narrow the urban-rural divide

• Urbanized economies (Eastern Europe, Latin America):agriculture

contributes only little to growth. Agriculture acts like any other competitive
tradable sector, and predominates in some locations.
• Policy challenge: to reduce the remaining rural poverty by including the rural poor
in agricultural production as direct producers and by creating jobs
Agrarian Patterns in Latin America

Progress and Remaining Poverty Challenges

• Apart from latifundios (large holdings) and minifundios
(small farms) much production occurs on family farms and
medium sized farms.

• Latifundios (traditional ones, especially) are relatively

inefficient; landlords/owners are sometimes less focused on
the business of farming; and large farms typically entail
higher transaction costs

• Overall the agricultural sector seems to be doing well in

many Latin American countries. Two prominent examples:
Chile (diversification), and Brazil (biofuels)

• Extreme rural inequalities still persist.

Agrarian Patterns in Asia

Problems of Fragmentation and Subdivision of Peasant

Land
• A problem with the impact of colonial rule in strengthening
land tenure systems of private property rights and the
consequent rise of moneylenders

• Contemporary landlordism in India and Pakistan involves

absentee landlordism and persistence of sharecroppers and
tenant farmers

• Rapid population growth resulted in more fragmentation and

peasant impoverishment
 Agrarian Patterns in Africa

Subsistence Agriculture and Extensive Cultivation

• Low productivity due to lack of technology

• Shifting Cultivation

• Seasonal demand for labor depending on rainy season

• High dependence on unimproved seeds sown on unfertilized, rain-fed

fields

• Relatively high fraction of underutilized land

• High concern about climate change impact

• Need for an African new green revolution

 Low Productivity of agriculture in developing world

• Clear evidence from micro data as well as macro data.

• True whether we look at output per unit of land (yield) or output per unit
of labor ( "productivity" )

• Not just a function of poor measurement...

Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t
 FAO Estimates of Output per Land

Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t
 M i c r o Estimates of Output per Land

• Similar findings using micro data

• Richest countries produce at least twice as much grain per hectare
as poorest
• What about land per worker?
Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t
 FAO Estimates of Land per Worker

Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t
 M i c r o Estimates of Land Per Worker

• We compiled independent estimates from household surveys

• Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS)

• Measure: hectares per worker; rural households

• Surveys are for developing countries

Land per Worker: Some Micro Estimates from LSMS

Malawi, 2010: 0.4 hectares / worker

Ethiopia, 2011: 0.3 hectares / worker

Tanzania, 2010: 0.3 hectares / worker

Guatemala, 2003: 1.9 hectares / worker

Nigeria, 2010: 0.5 hectares / worker

 Direct Micro Measures of Output per Worker

• Some micro studies compute not only yield but also labor.

• Allows for direct comparisons of output per unit of labor.

• Data show very large differences across agricultural production

systems.
Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t
Global production of agricultural outputs (1)
Global production of agricultural outputs (2)
Agricultural Potential and Market Access
Group work

▪ Why is agriculture relatively/absolutely so

unproductive in poor countries? Discuss and list the
main deriving factors.

▪ Hint:

▪ Supply side factors

▪ Demand side factors

 Constraints to agricultural development
• Why is agriculture relatively/absolutely so unproductive in poor
countries?
• There are two main challenges related to agriculture in
developing world:
• Supply side: Low productivity
• Low level of technology adoption
• Demand Side: Inefficient marketing and commercialization
• Inefficient and fragmented output market
 Agricultural Productivity and Technology adoption

• Agriculture in poor countries has low productivity.

• In particular, productivity appears to be low relative to potential.
• Agricultural productivity growth is one of the main components of the
structural transformation process.
• Modern agricultural practices such as improved crop varieties, inorganic
and organic fertilizers, commercialization, and other complementary
agronomic management practices are key drivers of agricultural
productivity.

• However, adoption rates of such technologies in developing countries

have remained persistently low.
• Farmers seem systematically to under use new and effective
technologies.
 Evidence: Low Level Use of Improved Technology

• Evidence in various forms:

• Low levels of modern variety use in many parts of the
developing world.
• Low levels of fertilizer use in African agriculture.
• Low levels of mechanization in African agriculture.
Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t

• Evidence of large yield gaps in many countries.

• Difference between actual farm yield and the potential
yield.
Global use of agricultural inputs
 Modern Variety Adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa

Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t
 Evidence: Yield Gaps in Sub-Saharan Africa
Example: Multiple Crops in Ethiopia

Area Production Actual Yield On-farm Trials

Crop (ha ×106) (mt ×106) (mt/ha) (mt/ha)
Maize 2.01 6.16 3.01 6.0-8.0
Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t

Wheat 1.63 3.43 2.11 2.5-5.0

Sorghum 1.71 3.60 2.11 3.3
Finger millet 0.43 0.74 1.72 2.8-2.9
 Yield Gaps in Maize

Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t
 Evidence: Fertilizer Use

.34 / 70
Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t
Input Use
 What Do These Data Really Show?

• They show that certain technologies are not widely used

in developing countries.

• Adoption rates of such technologies in developing

countries have remained persistently low.
Possible Explanations

• Technologies do not work

• Technologies are not profitable
• Technologies are profitable but constraints to adoption prevent
uptake.
• Credit
• Risk/Insurance
• Lack of information
• Lack of skills/training
• Failures of social learning
• Missing input and output markets
• Etc.
• Technologies are profitable but behavioral factors limit uptake.
Technologies Do Not Work

• Technologies may not exist at all for some crops or production

environments.
• Reasons for limits to the development of technologies.

• Technologies may exist but fail to work.

• Technologies may work under experimental conditions but not in

Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t

farmers’ fields.
• How are technologies evaluated?
• How would one measure on-farm effectiveness of a technology?
 Technologies Are Not P r o f i table
• Prices of inputs and outputs may make technologies
unattractive to farmers.
• Shadow prices; not market prices!
• In particular, shadow price of labor, as the key input.
• Also shadow prices of home consumed goods...
• Huge measurement problems.

• Shadow price is an estimated price for an item,

commodity, or service that is not ordinarily bought and
Agr icu lt u r e a n d D ev e l o p m e n t
sold in any marketplace.
Issues in Calculating Shadow Prices

• Shadow prices are proxied by farmgate prices.

• But if farmers do not sell at farmgate prices, then their
shadow value is presumably higher.
• Transport costs matter; farmgate prices of inputs will be
higher than market prices, while prices of output will be
lower.
• Unobserved quality dif f erences.
• Own production may be viewed as higher quality than what is
purchased from the market.
• Missing markets.
• Markets for labor and capital services may be entirely
missing.
• Own labor and hired labor are imperfect substitutes; wage
rates may be a poor proxy for shadow value of labor.
Seasonality and Shadow Values

• Prices of many goods vary over the course of the year in

agricultural areas.
• Crop prices drop at harvest time, then rise.
• Non-agricultural goods prices may vary depending on the
availability of transport.

• Shadow price of labor may also vary over the course of the year.
• Shadow price of labor may vary across tasks, time of day.
• Not the same price for all members of the household...

• Makes it difficult to calculate farm profits or the profitability of a

new technology!
 Summary

• Many possible reasons why new technologies may not in fact be as

profitable as they appear.

• Scientists who develop these technologies are often quite bad at

assessing profitability.

• Extension agents and research establishments who promote new

technologies may not know whether or not they are profitable.

• Claims of success for new technologies should be viewed with some

skepticism.

• Calculating profitability is much harder than calculating technical

feasibility.
 Constraints to Agricultural Technology adoption

• Many possible constraints to adoption.

• Literature has focused on identifying key constraints.
(1) liquidity, credit and saving
(2) risk
(3) information, knowledge and skills
(4) input and output markets,
(5) labor market inefficiencies
(6) land market inefficiencies, as well as
(7) externalities
• Difficult to identify which ones are binding:
• Many markets are missing in rural areas.
• Many households are affected by multiple constraints.
• How important are different constraints?
• How well can informal institutions provide workaround
 LIQUIDITY, CREDIT AND SAVINGS

• Agricultural income streams are characterized by large cash inflows

once or twice a year that do not align well with specific times when
farmers need access to capital to either make agricultural
investments or, for example, pay school fees.
• Saving can be difficult for farmers given their limited resources,
• a variety of demands on their money
• the seasonal cycle of production
• prices of their agricultural production.
• Credit and saving products could help farmers make investments in
inputs and other technologies by making cash available when
needed.
• Supply side
• formal financial service providers are often unwilling or
unable to serve smallholders
• Demand side
• demand from farmers for formal credit products is low.
• Even where formal financial products are available, farmers
may opt to borrow money from within their social networks,
or informal lenders.
 EVIDENCE SUMMARY:
• Increasing access to formal credit has typically had limited
impacts on smallholder farmers’ profitability
• Low take up of credit is one reason behind these limited impacts
• farmers who used newly available credit products invested in more
productive technologies and practices such as crops grown, land
cultivated, and inputs used, in most cases this access to credit did
not increase their profits
• Targeted savings products can increase agricultural investment,
but encouraging active use of these products can be a challenge
• E.g., communal savings group
• Offer flexible collateral arrangements
• E.g., flexible collateral arrangement allows smallholders to use
stored crops as collateral to secure a loan, using warehouse receipts
to guarantee claims.
• Improve credit market information
• Where physical collateral is lacking, helping borrowers build
reputational collateral can unlock access to credit. Without credit
histories, banks cannot identify risky borrowers, and often lack viable
recourse to recover their losses.
• Adjust financial service schedules to accommodate the
seasonality of smallholders’ livelihoods

• Design financial products to overcome behavioral biases

and help protect savings from spending pressures

• E.g., Financial product design adaptations that target

behavioral biases have also shown promise. Helping farmers
save for inputs from harvest until planting time, including
nudges to behavior to overcome time inconsistency (Duflo,
Kremer and Robinson 2011) can increase purchase of
agricultural inputs.

• Financial service provision should be carefully considered

alongside risk mitigation
 Risk
• Production and demand side risks
• On production side: smallholder farmers have limited buffer stocks to cope with volatile
food prices and climate uncertainty, and typically have few formal financial services to
protect them from risk.
• On demand side: Issues adopting novel production technologies, e.g., GMOs.
• EVIDENCE SUMMARY
• Individually marketed rain-index insurance products suffer from very low demand from
smallholders; substantial subsidies are required to generate strong insurance demand
• Financial education, group protection, and links to credit have
not proven viable options to improve insurance demand:
• “Linking credit with insurance has mixed results, suffering from
the same demand problems that have beset standalone index
insurance. The offering of indemnified loans that interlink an
insurance product with credit appears promising, but demand for
such loans has been shown to be surprisingly low in the few trials
that have tested this mechanism (McIntosh et al. 2017, Giné and
Yang 2009, Karlan et al. 2014 and Karlan et al. 2011)” (J-PAL,
CEGA, and ATAI 2016).

• Linking credit with insurance has even been shown to drive down
credit demand (Banerjee et al. 201417 and Giné and Yang 2009).
• Adopting insurance can increase risk-taking in
production decisions
• Where insurance projects have been successful in achieving
widespread uptake (largely via free distribution) they tend
to increase the appetite for activities vulnerable to risk
(Cole et al. 2013, Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012,
Gunnsteinson 2014, Cai et al. 2009 and Cai 2016).

• Magruder (2018) emphasizes, however, that these studies

are “a handful of promising results that suggest the
potential for risk reduction to spur technology adoption,”
necessarily drawn from exceptional contexts where
insurance take-up rates were sufficient to detect the
impacts of insurance on productive technology adoption.

• New risk-mitigating crop varieties provide a promising

alternative or complement to insurance that can reduce
farmers’ risk and produce higher yields
 Information, Knowledge and Skills

• Information services are important when introducing truly

novel and unfamiliar technologies that can improve farmer
welfare.
• Use simple and accessible channels, provide timely guidance
and focus on important aspects that are difficult to observe.
• Social networks play an important role in driving adoption
• Farmers learn from observing the decisions and experiences of
people in their social networks.
• Advice from multiple people is important for adoption
• Beaman et al (2015b) worked with the Malawi Department of
Agriculture Extension Services (DAES) to promote pit planting,
experimentally evaluating the selection of trained farmers using
social network mapping, finding that this achieved much more
technology diffusion compared to business-as-usual extension
agent selection of trainees. Researchers estimate that 70% of
people needed to see at least two connections to be persuaded to
adopt the technology.
• Farmers are more likely to follow advice from demonstrations
that reflect their own characteristics

• Communicators that more closely resembled target farmers’ own

demographic and socio-economic circumstances were more
effective at promoting a new technology in Malawi (BenYishay
and Mobarak 2014).

• Incentivizing extension agents can induce higher engagement

with harder-to-reach clientele, and performance-based
incentives tied to learning outcomes can increase technology
adoption

• Site-specific agronomic information increases productivity

and adoption of high yield varieties (Ayalew et al. 2022)

• Training by extensions agents and farmer field schools are

documented to improve adoption of high yield seed varieties,
fertilizer and irrigation, etc.
INPUT AND OUTPUT MARKETS

• Farmers who would benefit from technology adoption may be

unable to access agricultural technologies due to inadequate
infrastructure, missing supply chains or unprofitably high prices.
Where technologies simply are not available at the local level,
clearly the presence and efficiency of input supply chains plays a
critical role in technology adoption (Emerick et al, 2015).

Evidence Summary
• Price information can lead to a reduction in price dispersion;
however, farmers often need more than price information to
access more profitable points of sale

• Quality certification is an important contracting problem

• Intermediaries provide interlinked services; interventions aiming

to shift market relationships can produce important, unanticipated
effects
Behavioral explanations

• Perhaps low take-up of improved technologies is driven not

by profitability but by behavioral constraints.

• Farmers cannot commit to trying new technology; e.g.,

purchasing fertilizer.

• If this is true, what differs between farmers in Africa (for

example) and those in Europe or N. America?
• Why are African farmers unable to commit to buying
fertilizer, but Asian farmers have no problem?
Cultural, Social, Institutional and Historical
Explanations

• Perhaps some farmers do things in what appear to be non-

maximizing ways because:
• They have always done it that way and do not want to
change...
• Their community expects everyone to farm in a
particular way.
• Non-monetary benefits related to social status or well-
being.
• Institutional and political factors could hinder adoption of
new ag. technologies
• We ignore these explanations at our peril!
Empirical evidence

• Esther Du o, Michael Kremer, and Jonathan

Robinson. (2008). "How high are rates of return to
fertilizer? Evidence from eld experiments in Kenya."
American Economi c Review 98(2): 482-488.

• Objective: Test the hypothesis that while fertilizer

and hybrid seed increase yield on model farms,
they are actually not profitable on many small
farms, where the condition is less than optimal.
 Return to fertilizer: Research design

• RCT

• Treatment 1: Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) fertilizer to be

applied as top dressing (when maize plants were knee high).

• Treatment 2: Full package recommended by the Ministry of

Agriculture was implemented
• Hybrid seeds were in place of traditional varieties, and Di-
Ammonium Phosphate (DAP) fertilizer was supplied to plants
along with CAN for use at top dressing.
• Control: farmers farmed as usual with traditional seed without
fertilizer

• They varied the quantity of fertilizer applied:

• 1 teaspoon, 1/2 teaspoon, and 1/4 teaspoon of top dressing
fertilizer per-planting hole.
 Returns to Fertilizer: Main Findings

• Reports very high rates of return to fertilizer on maize in

western Kenya.

• But returns appear to have a knife-edge property:

• if fertilizer dose is slightly too high or slightly too low, the
return is either insignificantly different from zero, or possibly
negative.

• Using ½ teaspoon of top dressing fertilizer per hole would

increase agricultural income (net of fertilizer cost) by about
Ksh 1,100 ($33 PPP).

• Is this a sufficient return to motivate farmers?

 Returns to Fertilizer

Using 1/4, 1/2, and 1 teaspoon of fertilizer increases yield by 28, 48,
and 63 percent, respectively. The full package increases yield by 91
percent.
 Agricultural marketing and commercialization
“Consumption is the sole end purpose of all production: and the
interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it
may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.”
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776)

• Agricultural marketing comprising of all activities involved in supply

of farm inputs to the farmers and movement of agricultural products
from the farms to the consumers.

• The agricultural marketing system includes two major sub-system

viz. product marketing and input (factor) marketing.

• The product marketing sub-system includes farmers, village/primary

traders, wholesalers, processors, importers, exporters, marketing
cooperatives, regulated marketing committees and retailers.

• The input sub-system includes input manufacturers, distributors,

related associations, importers, exporters and others who make
available various farm production inputs to farmers.
 Agricultural commodity markets

Agricultural commodity markets are characterized by

• high transportation costs,
• absence of reliable market information,
• a lack of trust among actors concerning products and
transactions,
• asymmetric bargaining power among market actors,
• incomplete contract enforcement,
• inadequate storage facilities and
• absence of product quality assurance
 Evidence on improving efficiency of agricultural
commodity markets (via prices)
• Enormous focus on providing access to market price information
• Lack of access to market price being the most pervasive aspect of incomplete
commodity markets
• Studies on the effects of price information (PI) almost exclusively focus on
market performance;
• sales price and revenue (eg., Svensson and Yanagizawa 2009; Goyal 2010;
Fafchamps and Minten 2012);
• price dispersion (eg., Jensen 2007; Aker 2010; Goyal 2010);
• price discovery (e.g., Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo 2010)

Access to technology (mainly mobile devices)

• Jensen (2007): mobile in Kerla -> lower price dispersion
• Aker (2010): rollout of mobile service coverage in Niger - > lower price
dispersion in Millet
• Aker & Fafchamps (2013): rollout of mobile service coverage in Niger -> no
effect on cowpea prices
• Muto & Yamano (2009) : mobile coverage expansion in Uganda -> increased
banana sales and not maize
Direct access to price information
• Svensson & Yanagizawa (2009): MIS (via radio) - >+prices
for maize.
• Goyal (2010): opening of market (internet kiosk) in Madhya
Pradesh (India) -> +soyabean prices
• Fafchamps & Minten (2012): Free SMS Subscription (agri
info) in Maharashtra (India) -> no effect on agri. prices
 Empirical study

Belay, D., Ayalew H. 2020. “Nudging farmers using price information in crop choice:
Evidence from Ethiopian Commodity Exchange”. Agricultural Economics 51(5): 793– 807
 Motivation
• Most rural households in developing countries make a large part of their livelihood
from rain-fed crop production, susceptible to incidences of crop failure due to
various agricultural shocks (drought, flooding, pest attack, etc.) and price volatility.

• Due to absence of well-functioning insurance markets in rural areas of most

developing countries, small-scale farmers often rely on crop choice decisions to
internalize risks.

• Diversifying crop portfolio through production of cash crops insures small-holder

farmers against shocks and improves welfare.

• Decision to produce cash crops entails market-related risks, often inhibiting the
potential of households to benefit from growing cash crops in developing countries.

• Reducing uncertainty, the most pervasive aspect of market risk, by ensuring access
to market price information is theoretically considered to be among the least costly
methods of inducing farmers to plant risky but high-return cash crops.

64
• Access to reference market price information can also influence the decision of crop
choice, the most important decision in the farming activity.

• Very scant literature on crop choice response to PI. Only Goyal (2010) attempted to
estimate output response to price information

• Existing studies mostly rely on prices from private source of information, single crop or
mobile coverage,

• Variation in timing and spatial distance of price display screens as an indicator for
variation in intensity of access to price information.
 The Ethiopian Commodity exchange (ECX)

• ECX was set up in 2008

• Aim to transform the agricultural markets into modern, transparent and
efficient marketing system
• Membership-based system
• Tradables: Coffee, sesame, wheat, haricot beans and maize
The intervention
• In 2012, Government built 94 price display screens in 7 national regional
states.
• Still being rolled out across the country.
• price display screens provide real time reference market price across the
country
Geographic location of price display screens (2012) 67
ECX Price display screen in Bonga, Keffa Zone

68
 Theoretical Framework

Bargaining power Higher Change

of farmers
Access to Increase price in Crop
reference market Reduce expected choice
price information market risk

Increased
allocation of inputs

69
Research Questions

What is the effect of access to reference prices on farmer’s choice for

ECX commodities?

What are the possible channels?

• Changes in average price

• Changes in variance of prices

 Data
Sources:
• Ethiopian Statistical Authority (CSA): Ethiopian Agricultural Sample
Survey 2009-2016
• Ethiopian Commodity exchange
Constructed a pseudo panel of EAs from repeated cross-section (Deaton 1985)
Enumeration areas as cohorts
Calculated minimum distance to nearest price display screens
Identification Strategy
73
74
Main Results

75
76
77
Internal Validity tests

78
Mechanisms

79
 Findings

• Access to price information through price display screens has nudged farmers
to plant more of ECX traded commodities.
• If we reduce the distance from households to the nearest plasma display
screen by half, then the output share of ECX-traded commodities increases
by 9.6 percentage points.
• reducing the distance from the EA to the nearest plasma display screen by
half increases the share of land allocated to ECX-traded commodities by
4.25 percentage points.
• More fertilizer and other inputs allocated to traded commodities in ECX
Mechanisms
• Increased average farm gate prices for traded commodities
• Reduced price variance of ECX traded commodities
WDR 2008: Four Policy Objectives
Suggestions for agricultural
based countries
• Improve access to markets and
develop modern market chains

• Achieve a large-scale and

sustainable smallholder-based
productivity revolution for
African agriculture, with
emphasis on helping
subsistence farmers enter the
market and fostering
sustainable resource
management

• Achieve food security and

improve livelihoods for those
who remain as subsistence
farmers

• Capitalize on agricultural
growth to develop the rural
nonfarm sector
Thank You!
Top three take-home message of today’s lecture

1. Message 1

2. Message 2

3. Message 3