Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011)

Iraqi insurgency
Part of the Iraq War

Insurgents in northern Iraq, 2006

Date 1 May 2003 – 18 December 2011

(8 years, 7 months, 2 weeks and 3 days)
Location Iraq
Result Inconclusive
US and Coalition forces fail to defeat Iraqi insurgents[7][8][9][10]
2003–2006 insurgency phase deteriorates into 2006–2008 civil war

20,000+ additional American soldiers deployed to Iraq to quell violence in troop surge
of 2007
End of American military presence in Iraq with 2007–2011 withdrawal
Iraqi government manages to reclaim all land occupied by US and Coalition forces in
Iraq

Post-withdrawal 2011–2013 insurgency phase deteriorates into 2013–2017 civil war

Continued Iraqi conflict

Belligerents

United States Ba'ath loyalists Sunni insurgents Shia insurgents

United Kingdom
Fedayeen Al-Qaeda in Iraq Mahdi Army
MNF–I Saddam (2003 Only) (2004–06) Special Groups
(2003–09) SCJL Islamic State of Kata'ib Hezbollah
United States Iraq[6] (from 2006)
JRTN Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq
(2003–09) Islamic Army of Iraq
Badr Brigades
United Kingdom Ansar al-Sunnah
(2003–09) Others
(2003–07)
 Australia (2003– Others
09) Iraqi Islamic
Romania (2003– Resistance Army (not
09) to be confused with
Azerbaijan iraqi hamas)
(2003–08)
Kuwait (2003–
08)
Estonia (2003–
09)
El Salvador
(2003–09)
Bulgaria (2003–
08)
Moldova (2003–
08)
Albania (2003–
08)
Ukraine (2003–
08)
Denmark (2003–
08)
Czech Republic
(2003–08)
South Korea
(2003–08)
Singapore
(2003–08)
Croatia (2003–
08)
Bosnia and
Herzegovina (2003–
08)
Republic of
Macedonia (2003–
08)
Latvia (2003–08)
Poland (2003–
08)
Kazakhstan
(2003–08)
Mongolia (2003–
08)
 Georgia (2003–
08)
Tonga (2004–08)
Japan (2004–08)
Armenia (2005–
08)
Slovakia (2003–
07)
Lithuania (2003–
07)
Italy (2003–06)
Norway (2003–
06)
Hungary (2003–
05)
Netherlands
(2003–05)
Portugal (2003–
05)
New Zealand
(2003–04)
Thailand (2003–
04)
Philippines
(2003–04)
Honduras
(2003–04)
Dominican
Republic (2003–04)
Spain (2003–04)
Nicaragua
(2003–04)
Iceland (2003–
unknown)

New Iraqi
government

Iraqi Armed Forces

Iraqi Police
Iraqi Kurdistan

Peshmerga
Sons of Iraq
Supported by:
Iran[1][2]

Artesh
Quds Force

NATO

NATO Training
Mission – Iraq

Israel[3][4][5]
United Nations

United Nations
Security Council
United Nations
Secretariat

United Nations
Assistance
Mission for Iraq

Commanders and leaders

George W. Bush Abu Musab al- Muqtada al-Sadr
Barack Obama Saddam Zarqawi † Abu Deraa
Tommy Franks Hussein (POW) Abu Ayyub al-Masri † Akram al-Kaabi
Izzat Ibrahim al-
Donald Rumsfeld Abu Omar al- Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis
Douri
Robert Gates Baghdadi † Qais al-Khazali
Tony Blair Abu Bakr al-
Gordon Brown Abid Hamid Baghdadi
David Cameron Mahmud (POW) Ishmael Jubouri
John Howard Ali Hassan al- Abu Abdullah al-
Kevin Rudd Majid (POW) Shafi'i (POW)
Silvio Berlusconi Barzan Ibrahim al-
Walter Natynczyk Tikriti (POW)
José María Aznar Taha Yasin
Anders Fogh Ramadan (POW)
Rasmussen Tariq Aziz (POW)
Aleksander Mohammed Younis
Kwaśniewski al-Ahmed
Ayad Allawi
Ibrahim al-Jaafari
Nouri al-Maliki
Ali Khamenei
Mohammad Salimi
 Ataollah Salehi
Qasem Soleimani

An Iraqi insurgency began shortly after the 2003 American invasion deposed longtime leader Saddam
Hussein. It is considered to have lasted until the end of the Iraq War and U.S. withdrawal in 2011. It was
followed by a renewed insurgency.

The initial outbreak of violence (the 2003–2006 phase) was triggered by the fall and preceded the
establishment of the new Iraqi government by the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF–I), which was led by
the United States. From around 2004 to May 2007, Iraqi insurgents largely focused their attacks on MNF-I
troops,[11] but later shifted to targeting the post-invasion Iraqi security forces as well.

The insurgents were composed of a diverse mix of private militias, pro-Saddam Ba'athists, local Iraqis
opposed to the MNF–I and/or the post-Saddam Iraqi government, and a number of foreign jihadists. The
various insurgent groups fought an asymmetric war of attrition against the MNF–I and the Iraqi
government, while also fighting among themselves.

The insurgency was shaped by sectarian tensions in Iraq, particularly between Shia Muslims (~60% of the
population) and Sunni Muslims (~35% of the population). By February 2006, the violence escalated into a
Shia–Sunni civil war, and for the next two years, the MNF–I and the Iraqi government were locked in
intense fighting with various militants, who were also targeting each other based on their sectarian
affiliations. Many of the militant attacks in American-controlled territories were directed at the Shia-
dominated government of Nouri al-Maliki. Militancy continued amid post-invasion Iraqi reconstruction
efforts, as the federal government tried to establish itself in the country. The civil war and sectarian violence
ended in mid-2008, having been quelled by the American troop surge of 2007.

However, after the American withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, a renewed sectarian and anti-
government insurgency swept through the country, causing thousands of casualties. Two years later, the
violence of the new insurgency escalated into the Second Iraq War, largely triggered by the rise of the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Background
The 2003 invasion of Iraq (19 March – 1 May 2003) began the Iraq War, or Operation Iraqi Freedom, in
which a combined force of troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland
invaded Iraq and toppled the government of Saddam Hussein within 26 days of major combat operations.
The invasion phase consisted of a conventionally fought war which concluded with the capture of the Iraq
capital Baghdad by U.S. forces.

Four countries participated with troops during the initial invasion phase, which lasted from 19 March to 15
April 2003. These were the United States (148,000), United Kingdom (45,000), Australia (2,000), and
Poland (194). Thirty-six other countries were involved in its aftermath. In preparation for the invasion,
100,000 U.S. troops were assembled in Kuwait by 18 February.[12] The United States supplied the
majority of the invading forces, but also received support from Kurdish irregulars in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The invasion was preceded by an air strike on the Presidential Palace in Baghdad on 19 March 2003. The
following day coalition forces launched an incursion into Basra Province from their massing point close to
the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. While the special forces launched an amphibious assault from the Persian Gulf to
secure Basra and the surrounding petroleum fields, the main invasion army moved into southern Iraq,
occupying the region and engaging in the Battle of Nasiriyah on 23 March. Massive air strikes across the
country and against Iraqi command and control threw the defending army into chaos and prevented an
effective resistance. On 26 March the 173rd Airborne Brigade was airdropped near the northern city of
Kirkuk where they joined forces with Kurdish rebels and fought several actions against the Iraqi army to
secure the northern part of the country.

The main body of coalition forces continued their drive into the heart of Iraq and met with little resistance.
Most of the Iraqi military was quickly defeated and Baghdad was occupied on 9 April. Other operations
occurred against pockets of the Iraqi army including the capture and occupation of Kirkuk on 10 April, and
the attack and capture of Tikrit on 15 April. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and the central leadership went
into hiding as the coalition forces completed the occupation of the country.

On 1 May, an end of major combat operations was declared, ending the invasion stage of the Iraq War and
beginning the military occupation period and the Iraqi insurgency against coalition forces.

History

2003–2006: initial insurgency

The Iraqi insurgency of 2003–06 erupted following the invasion of

Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein's rule in May 2003. The
armed insurgent opposition to the United States-led multinational
force in Iraq and the post-2003 Iraqi government lasted until early
2006, when it deteriorated into a sectarian civil war, the most
violent phase of the Iraq War.

2006–2008: insurgency to civil war U.S. Army M1A2 Abrams tanks

patrol the streets of Tal Afar, Iraq in
Following the U.S.-launched 2003 invasion of Iraq, the situation February 2005.
deteriorated, and by 2007, the intercommunal violence between
Iraqi Sunni and Shi'a factions was described by the National
Intelligence Estimate as having elements of a civil war.[13] In a 10
January 2007 address to the American people, President George W.
Bush stated that "80% of Iraq's sectarian violence occurs within 30
miles (48 km) of the capital. This violence is splitting Baghdad into
sectarian enclaves, and shaking the confidence of all Iraqis." [14]
Two polls of Americans conducted in 2006 found that between
65% and 85% believed Iraq was in a civil war;[15][16] however, a
similar poll of Iraqis conducted in 2007 found that 61% did not
believe that they were in a civil war.[17]

In October 2006, the Office of the United Nations High Map of the Islamic State of Iraq and
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Iraqi government its provinces on 7th of April, 2007
estimated that more than 370,000 Iraqis had been displaced since
the 2006 bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, bringing the total
number of Iraqi refugees to more than 1.6 million.[18] By 2008, the UNHCR raised the estimate of refugees
to a total of about 4.7 million (~16% of the population). The number of refugees estimated abroad was 2
million (a number close to CIA projections[19]) and the number of internally displaced people was
2.7 million.[20] The estimated number of orphans across Iraq has ranged from 400,000 (according to the
Baghdad Provincial Council), to five million (according to Iraq's anti-corruption board). A UN report from
2008 placed the number of orphans at about 870,000.[21][22] The Red Cross has also stated that Iraq's
humanitarian situation remains among the most critical in the world, with millions of Iraqis forced to rely on
insufficient and poor-quality water sources.[23]

According to the Failed States Index, produced by Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace, Iraq
was one of the world's top 5 unstable states from 2005 to 2008.[24] A poll of top U.S. foreign policy experts
conducted in 2007 showed that over the next 10 years, just 3% of experts believed the U.S. would be able
to rebuild Iraq into a "beacon of democracy" and 58% of experts believed that Sunni-Shiite tensions would
dramatically increase in the Middle East.[25][26]

In June 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense reported that "the security, political and economic trends in
Iraq continue to be positive; however, they remain fragile, reversible and uneven." [27] In July 2008, the
audit arm of the U.S. Congress recommended that the U.S. Government should "develop an updated
strategy for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008 and addresses the long-term goal of
achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself".[28] Steven Simon, a Senior Fellow for Middle
Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote in May 2008 that "the recent short-term gains"
had "come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq."[29]

After Iraqi security forces took the lead in security operations on 30 June 2009, Iraq experienced a
"dramatic reduction in war-related violence of all types ..., with civilian and military deaths down by 80 to
90 percent compared with the same period in 2008."[30]

2008–2011: low-level insurgency

In 2010, the low point for the al-Qaeda effort in Iraq, car bombings declined to an average of ten a month
and multiple-location attacks occurred only two or three times a year.

Aftermath

2011–2013: American withdrawal and renewed insurgency

The Iraqi attacks since U.S. withdrawal[31] relates to the last stage of violent terror activities engaged by
Iraqi, primarily radical Sunni and Shia insurgent groups against the central government and the sectarian
warfare between various factions within Iraq in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal. The events of post-
U.S. withdrawal violence succeeded the previous insurgency in Iraq (prior to 18 December 2011), but have
showed increasingly violent patterns,[32] raising concerns that the surging violence might slide into another
civil war.[31]

Militant organizations
The Iraqi insurgency is composed of at least a dozen major organizations and perhaps as many as 40
distinct groups. These groups are subdivided into countless smaller cells. The Washington-based Centre for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) estimates that less than 10% of insurgents are non-Iraqi foreign
fighters.[33] According to the Chief of the British General Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, speaking in
September 2007,
 The militants (and I use the word deliberately because not all are insurgents, or terrorists, or
criminals; they are a mixture of them all) are well armed – probably with outside help, and
probably from Iran. By motivation, essentially, and with the exception of the Al Qaeda in Iraq
element who have endeavoured to exploit the situation for their own ends, our opponents are
Iraqi Nationalists, and are most concerned with their own needs – jobs, money, security – and
the majority are not bad people.[34]

Because of its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi

insurgency is difficult to determine, but the main groupings are:

Ba'athists, the supporters of Saddam Hussein's former

administration including army or intelligence officers,
whose ideology is a variant of Pan-Arabism.
Iraqi nationalists, Iraqis who believe in a strong version
of Iraqi self-determination. These policies may not
necessarily espouse a Pan-Arab ideology, but rather
advocate the country's territorial integrity including
A roadside bombing in Iraq on 3
Kuwait and Khuzestan. Historical figures of this
movement include the pre-Ba'athist leader of Iraq Abd al- August 2005
Karim Qasim and his government.
Iraqi Salafi Islamists, the indigenous armed followers of
the Salafi movement, as well as any remnants of the Kurdish Ansar al-Islam: individuals with
a Salafi-only policy opposed to non-Salafis though not aligned to one specific ethnic group.
Though opposed to the U.S.-led invasion, these groups are not wholly sympathetic towards
the former Ba'ath Party as its members included non-Salafis.
Shi'a militias, including the southern, Iran-linked Badr Organization, the Mahdi Army, and the
central-Iraq followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. These groups neither advocate the dominance of
a single ethnic group, nor the traditional ideologies behind the Iraqi state (e.g. these
particular Shi'as do not support the capture of Khuzestan or other border areas with Iran, but
rather promote warm relations with Iran's Shi'a government).
Foreign Islamist volunteers, including those often linked to al Qaeda and largely driven by
the Salafi/Wahhabi doctrine (the two preceding categories are often lumped as "jihadists");
Possibly some socialist revolutionaries (such as the Iraqi Armed Revolutionary Resistance,
which claimed one attack in 2007).
Non-violent resistance groups and political parties (not part of the armed insurgency).

Arab nationalists

Ba'athists and pro-Saddamists

The Ba'athists include former Ba'ath Party officials, the Fedayeen

Saddam, and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence elements
and security services, such as the Mukhabarat and the Special
Security Organization. Their goal, at least before the capture of
Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist
government to power. The pre-war organization of the Ba'ath Party
and its militias as a cellular structure aided the continued pro-
Saddam resistance after the fall of Baghdad, and Iraqi intelligence
Ba'ath Party flag
operatives may have developed a plan for guerrilla war following
the toppling of Saddam Hussein from power.
Following Saddam's capture, the Ba'athist movement largely faded; its surviving factions were increasingly
shifting to either nationalist factions (Iraqi, though not Pan-Arab, such as the ideology of the pre-Ba'athist
regime), or Islamist (Sunni or Shia, depending on the actual faith of the individual, though Ba'ath Party
policy had been secular, and many of its members were atheist).

As the goal of restoring the Ba'ath Party to power was seemingly out of reach, the alternative solution
appeared to be to join forces with organisations who opposed the U.S.-led invasion. Many former
Ba'athists had adopted an Islamist façade to attract more credibility within the country, and perhaps gain
support from outside Iraq. Others, especially following the January 2005 elections, became more interested
in politics.

The fall of Baghdad effectively ended the existence of the Fedayeen Saddam as an organized paramilitary.
Several of its members died during the war. A large number survived, however, and were willing to carry
on the fight even after the fall of Saddam Hussein from power. Many former members joined guerrilla
organizations that began to form to resist the U.S-led coalition in Iraq. By June, an insurgency was
underway in central and northern Iraq, especially in an area known as the Sunni Triangle. Some units of the
Fedayeen also continued to operate independently of other insurgent organizations in the Sunni areas of
Iraq. On 30 November 2003, a U.S. convoy traveling through the town of Samarra in the Sunni Triangle
was ambushed by over 100 Iraqi guerillas, reportedly wearing trademark Fedayeen Saddam uniforms.

Following the execution of Saddam Hussein, Deputy Leader of the Iraqi-cell of the Iraqi-led Ba'ath Party
and former Vice President of Iraq Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri became a leading candidate to succeed him as
Leader of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party. Ad-Douri had taken over the running of the Iraqi Ba'ath Party following
Saddam Hussein's capture in 2003 and had been endorsed by a previously unknown group calling itself
Baghdad Citizens Gathering.[35][36] On 3 January 2007 the website of the banned Iraqi Ba'ath Party
confirmed that he was new leader of the party.[37][38]

Increasing Syrian influence in the Iraqi Ba'ath Party may well have a major effect on result in a
fragmentation of Ba'athist parts of the insurgency.[39]

Iraqi nationalists (non-Ba'athist)

Iraqi nationalists are mostly drawn from the Arab regions. Their reasons for opposing the Coalition vary
from a rejection of the Coalition presence as a matter of principle to the failure of the multinational forces to
fully restore public services and to quickly restore complete sovereignty.

One notable leader of the insurgency among nationalist Sunni is former aide to Saddam Hussein and a
former regional Ba'ath Party Organiser Mohammed Younis al-Ahmed al-Muwali who has been crossing the
border between Iraq and Syria disbursing funds, smuggling weaponry and organising much of the fighting
in the central area of Iraq.[38][39]
One former minister in the interim government, Ayham al-Samarai, announced the launch in 2005 of "a
new political movement, saying he aimed to give a voice to figures from the legitimate Iraqi resistance. 'The
birth of this political bloc is to silence the skeptics who say there is no legitimate Iraqi resistance and that
they cannot reveal their political face,' he told a news conference." [40] It is unclear what became of this
movement.

Shia militias

Government inefficacy and Iranian support

The Shia militias have presented Nouri al-Maliki with perhaps the greatest conundrum of his administration
given the capture of Amarah. American officials have pressed him hard to disarm the militias and rid the
state security forces of their influence.[41]

A 2008 report by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point based on reports from the interrogations of
dozens of captured Shia fighters described an Iranian-run network smuggling Shia fighters into Iran where
they received training and weapons before returning to Iraq.[42][43]

Badr Organization

One major Shia militia in Iraq is the Badr Organization, the military wing of the Supreme Islamic Council
of Iraq. The group is currently based in Karbala, Iraq, and is also active in areas throughout southern Iraq.
The group was formed by the Iranian Government to fight the Saddam Hussein-controlled Iraq during the
Iran–Iraq War. Originally, the group consisted of Iraqi exiles who were banished from Iraq during the reign
of Saddam Hussein. After the war ended in 1988, the organization remained in Iran until Saddam Hussein
was overthrown during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Following the invasion, the brigade then moved into
Iraq, became members of the new Iraq Army, and aided coalition forces in insurgents.

Colonel Derek Harvey told Reuters "that the U.S. military detained Badr assassination teams possessing
target lists of Sunni officers and pilots in 2003 and 2004 but did not hold them. Harvey said his superiors
told him that 'this stuff had to play itself out' – implying that revenge attacks by returning Shi'ite groups
were to be expected. He also said Badr and ISCI offered intelligence and advice to U.S. officials on how to
navigate Iraqi politics."[44]

In a letter published by the Coalition in February 2004, an insurgent believed to be Zarqawi wrote that
jihadis should start an open sectarian war so that Sunnis would mobilize against what would otherwise be a
secret war being waged by Shia. The author only specifically pointed to assassinations carried out by the
Badr Brigade as an example of this secret war.[45]

In December 2005, the group and their leaders in the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq participated in
parliament elections, under the pro-Shiite coalition known as the United Iraqi Alliance, and managed to get
36 members into the Iraqi Parliament.

The Badr organization supports the government of Nouri Al-Maliki.

Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army

Supporters of the young Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr are largely impoverished men from the Shi'a urban
areas and slums in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a cities.[46] The Mahdi Army area of operation stretches
from Basra in the south to the Sadr City section of Baghdad in central Iraq (some scattered Shi'a militia
activity has also been reported in Baquba and Kirkuk, where Shi'a minorities exist).

During his group's active militant phase, Al-Sadr enjoyed wide support from the Iraqi people according to
some polls. A poll by the Iraq Center for Research and Studies found that 32% of Iraqis "strongly
supported" him and another 36% "somewhat supported" him, making him the second most popular man in
Iraq, behind only Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani. The Mahdi Army is believed to have around 60,000
members.[47][48]

After the December 2005 elections in Iraq, Al-Sadr's party got 32 new seats giving him substantial political
power in the divided Iraqi Parliament. In January 2006, he used these seats to swing the vote for prime
minister to Ibrahim Al-Jaafari, giving Al-Sadr a legitimate stake in the new Iraqi government and allying Al-
Jaafari with the cleric.

On 27 November 2006, a senior American intelligence official told reporters that the Iranian-backed group
Hezbollah had been training members of the Mahdi Army. The official said that 1,000 to 2,000 fighters
from the Mahdi Army and other Shia militias had been trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon, and a small
number of Hezbollah operatives have also visited Iraq to help with training. Iran has facilitated the link
between Hezbollah and the Shia militias in Iraq, the official said. "There seems to have been a strategic
decision taken sometime over late winter or early spring by Damascus, Tehran, along with their partners in
ait Lebanese Hezbollah, to provide more support to Sadr to increase pressure on the U.S.," the American
intelligence official said.[49]

Foreign participants

When Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003, several documents were found in his possession.
One particular document, which was apparently written after he lost power, appeared to be a directive to his
Ba'athist loyalists warning them to be wary of Islamist mujahideen and other foreign Arabs entering the
country to join the insurgency. The directive supposedly shows Saddam having concerns that foreign
fighters would not share the same objectives as Ba'ath loyalists (i.e. the eventual return of Saddam to power
and the restoration of his regime). A U.S. official commenting on the document stressed that while Saddam
urged his followers to be cautious in their dealings with other Arab fighters, he did not order them to avoid
contact or rule out co-operation. Bruce Hoffman, a Washington counter-terrorism expert stated that the
existence of the document underscores the fact that "this is an insurgency cut of many different cloths...
[and] everybody's jockeying for their position of power in the future Iraq." Many experts believe that
fighters from other countries who have flocked to Iraq to join the insurgents are motivated by animosity
toward the United States and the desire to install an Islamic state in place of the Ba'ath Party's secular
regime.[50]

Foreign fighters are mostly Arabs from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq, primarily through the
porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, to assist the Iraqi insurgency. Many of these fighters are
Wahhabi fundamentalists who see Iraq as the new "field of jihad" in the battle against U.S. forces. It is
generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of Al-Qaeda and the related group
Ansar al-Islam are suspected of infiltrating into the Sunni areas of Iraq through the mountainous
northeastern border with Iran. The United States and its allies point to Jordanian-born Al-Qaeda in Iraq
leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the key player in this group. Zarqawi was considered the head of an
insurgent group called Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad ("Monotheism and Holy War") until his death on 7 June 2006,
which according to U.S. estimates numbers in the low hundreds.

Usage of the term "foreign fighters" has received criticism as being Western-centric because, taken literally,
the term would encompass all non-Iraqi forces, including Coalition forces.[51] Zarqawi has taken to
taunting the American forces about the irony of the term: "Who is the foreigner, O cross worshippers? You
are the ones who came to the land of the Muslims from your distant corrupt land." (Communiqué of 10
May 2005).[52] Zarqawi's group has since announced the formation of the Ansar platoon, a squad of Iraqi
suicide bombers, which an AP writer called "an apparent bid to deflect criticism that most suicide bombers
in Iraq are foreigners."[53]

While it is not known how many of those fighting the U.S. forces in Iraq are from outside the country, it is
generally agreed that foreign fighters make up a very small percentage of the insurgency. Major General
Joseph Taluto, head of the 42nd Infantry Division, said that "99.9 per cent" of captured Insurgents are
Iraqi.[54] The estimate has been confirmed by the Pentagon's own figures; in one analysis of over 1000
insurgents captured in Fallujah, only 15 were non-Iraqi.[55] According to the Daily Telegraph, information
from military commanders engaging in battles around Ramadi exposed the fact that out of 1300 suspected
insurgents arrested in five months of 2005, none were foreign, although Colonel John Gronski stated that
foreigners provided money and logistical support: "The foreign fighters are staying north of the [Euphrates]
river, training and advising, like the Soviets were doing in Vietnam"[56]

In September 2006, the Christian Science Monitor reported, "It's true that foreign fighters are in Iraq, such
as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. But they are a small minority of the insurgents, say administration critics. Most
Iraqi mujahideen are Sunnis who fear their interests will be ignored under Iraq's Shia-dominated
government. They are fighting for concrete, local political goals – not the destruction of America." The
paper quoted University of Michigan history professor Juan Cole: "If the Iraqi Sunni nationalists could take
over their own territory, they would not put up with the few hundred foreign volunteers blowing things up,
and would send them away or slit their throats."[57] In 2005, the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) concluded that foreign fighters accounted for less than 10% of the estimated
30,000 insurgents and argued that the U.S. and Iraqi Governments were "feeding the myth" that they
comprised the backbone of the insurgency.[33]

Despite the low numbers of foreign fighters their presence has been confirmed in several ways and
Coalition forces believe the majority of suicide bombings are believed to be carried out by non-Iraqi
foreigners. Kenneth Katzman, a Middle East expert with the Congressional Research Service,[58] stated in
June 2005: "I still think 80 percent of the Insurgents, the day-to-day activity, is Iraqi – the roadside
bombings, mortars, direct weapons fire, rifle fire, automatic weapons fire...[but] the foreign fighters attract
the headlines with the suicide bombings, no question."[59]

In September 2005, Iraqi and U.S. forces conducted a counter-insurgency operation in the predominantly
Turkmen town of Tal Afar. According to an AP, report, an Iraqi Army Captain claimed that Iraqi forces
arrested 150 non-Iraqi Arabs (Syria, Sudan, Yemen and Jordan) in the operation;[60] the American army
claimed 20% of arrests were foreign combatants,[61] while Donald Rumsfeld on PBS confirmed that
foreign combatants were present.[62] However, not all accounts of the battle mention these arrests,[63] and
U.S. Army commander Colonel H. R. McMaster said the "vast majority" of Insurgents captured there were
"Iraqis and not foreigners."[64] Iraqi journalist Nasir Ali claimed that there were "very few foreign
combatants" in Tal Afar and charged "Every time the US army and the Iraqi government want to destroy a
specific city, they claim it hosts Arab fighters and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."[64]

There are allegations that the U.S. government has attempted to inflate the number of foreign fighters in
order to advance the theory that the insurgency is not a local movement. U.S. Army Specialist Tony
Lagouranis spoke about his job identifying many of the bodies after the assault on Fallujah:

We had women and children, old men, young boys. So, you know, it's hard to say. I think
initially, the reason that we were doing this was they were trying to find foreign fighters. [U.S.
commanders] were trying to prove that there were a lot of foreign fighters in Fallujah. So,
mainly, that's what we were going for, but most of them really didn't have I.D.'s but maybe
 half of them had I.D.'s. Very few of them had foreign I.D.'s. There were people working with
me who would—in an effort to sort of cook the books, you know they would find a Koran on
the guy and the Koran was printed in Algeria, and they would mark him down as an Algerian,
or you know guys would come in with a black shirt and khaki pants and they would say, well,
this is the Hezbollah uniform and they would mark him down as a Lebanese, which was
ridiculous, but—you know... [AMY GOODMAN: So, what did you say?] Well, I was only a
specialist, so actually, you know, I did say something to the staff sergeant, who was really in
charge, and you know, I just got yelled down you know, shot down.[65]

Foreign fighters' nationality distribution

In July 2007, the Los Angeles Times reported that 45% of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops and
Iraqi civilians and security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15% are from Syria and Lebanon; and 10% are
from North Africa. 50% of all Saudi fighters in Iraq come as suicide bombers. In the six months preceding
that article, such bombings have killed or injured 4,000 Iraqis.[66]

According to a U.S. military press briefing on 20 October 2005, 312 foreign nationals from 27 countries
had been captured in Iraq from April to October 2005.[67] This represents a component of the Iraqi
insurgent movement, which also includes a nationalist movement encompassing over 30 Shia and Sunni
militias.

Foreign insurgents captured in Iraq in the 7-month period April–October 2005:

 Nationality Number

Egypt 78

Syria 66

Sudan 41

Saudi Arabia 32

Jordan 17
United States 15

Iran 13

Palestine 12
Tunisia 10

Algeria 8

Libya 7

Turkey 6

Lebanon 3

India 2

Qatar 2

United Arab Emirates 2

United Kingdom 2

Denmark 1

France 1

Indonesia 1

Ireland 1

Israel 1

Kuwait 1

Macedonia 1

Morocco 1

Somalia 1

Yemen 1

Total 619

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and Sunni jihadists

The extent of Zarqawi's influence is a source of much controversy. Zarqawi was reported killed in action in
March 2004 in "a statement signed by a dozen alleged insurgent groups".[68] His Jordanian family then
held a funeral service on his behalf, although no body was recovered and positively identified. Iraqi leaders
denied the presence of Zarqawi in Fallujah prior to the U.S. attack on that city in November 2004.
Zarqawi's existence was even questioned.[69]
Involvement of Zarqawi in significant terrorist incidents was not usually proven, although his group often
claimed it perpetrated bombings. As al-Qaeda is an "opt-in" group (meaning everyone who agrees to some
basic Wahhabi moral tenets and the fundamental goals may consider himself a member), it is most likely
that "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" is a loose association of largely independent cells united by a common strategy and
vision, rather than a unified organization with a firm internal structure.

On 8 June 2006, Iraqi officials confirmed Zarqawi was killed by two 500 lb laser-guided bombs dropped
from an F-16 the previous evening. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian who was trained in Al-Qaeda camps
in Afghanistan took his place.

A document[70] found in Zarqawi's safe house indicates that the guerrilla group was trying to provoke the
U.S. to attack Iran in order to reinvigorate the resistance in Iraq and to weaken American forces in Iraq.[71]
"The question remains, how to draw the Americans into fighting a war against Iran? It is not known
whether American is serious in its animosity towards Iraq, because of the big support Iran is offering to
America in its war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Hence, it is necessary first to exaggerate the Iranian danger
and to convince America and the west in general, of the real danger coming from Iran...". The document
then outlines 6 ways to incite war between the two nations. Iraqi national security adviser Mowaffak al-
Rubaie said the document, shows al-Qaeda in Iraq is in "pretty bad shape." He added that "we believe that
this is the beginning of the end of al-Qaeda in Iraq."

Journalist Jill Carroll, detailing her captivity in Iraq, described one of her captors who identified himself as
Abdullah Rashid and leader of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq. He told her that; "The Americans
were constantly saying that the mujahideen in Iraq were led by foreigners... So, the Iraqi insurgents went to
Zarqawi and insisted that an Iraqi be put in charge." She continued by stating; "But as I saw in coming
weeks, Zarqawi remained the insurgents' hero, and the most influential member of their council, whatever
Nour/Rashid's position... At various times, I heard my captors discussing changes in their plans because of
directives from the council and Zarqawi."[72]

Schism between foreign fighters and native Iraqi insurgency

Large-scale terrorist attacks against civilians carried out by foreign fighters, as well as the interpretation of
Islam that they attempt to impose on the local population in areas under their control, have increasingly
turned Iraqis against them, in some cases breaking out into open fighting between different groups in the
insurgency.[73][74][75] There are signs that local Islamist insurgent groups have also increasingly caused the
population to turn against them.[76][77][78][79]

Opinions differ on how broad this schism is. Terrorism expert Jessica Stern warned that; "In the run-up to
the war, most Iraqis viewed the foreign volunteers who were rushing in to fight against America as
troublemakers, and Saddam Hussein's forces reportedly killed many of them."[80] This opinion contradicts
Iraqi scholar Mustapha Alani, who says that these foreigners are increasingly welcomed by the public,
especially in the former Ba'athist strongholds north of Baghdad.

While some have noted an alliance of convenience that existed between the foreign fighters and the native
Sunni insurgents, there are signs that the foreign militants, especially those who follow Zarqawi, are
increasingly unpopular among the native fighters. In the run-up to the December 2005 elections, Sunni
fighters were warning al-Qaeda members and foreign fighters not to attack polling stations. One former
Ba'athist told Reuters; "Sunnis should vote to make political gains. We have sent leaflets telling al-Qaeda
that they will face us if they attack voters." An unnamed Sunni leader was quoted commenting on Zarqawi;
"Zarqawi is an American, Israeli and Iranian agent who is trying to keep our country unstable so that the
Sunnis will keep facing occupation."[81]
By early 2006, the split between the Sunni groups and the Zarqawi-led foreign fighters had grown
dramatically, and Sunni forces began targeting al-Qaeda forces for assassination. One senior intelligence
official told the Telegraph that Zarqawi had fled to Iran as a result of the attacks.[82] In response to al-
Qaeda killings in Iraq, Sunni insurgents in al-Anbar province led by former Ba'athist intelligence officer
Ahmed Ftaikhan formed an anti-al-Qaeda militia called the Anbar Revolutionaries. All of the militia's core
members have relatives who have been killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq, and they have sought to prevent foreign
jihadis from entering the country. The group "claims to have killed 20 foreign fighters and 33 Iraqi
sympathizers."[83] The schism became all the more apparent in when a tape alleged to be from the
Mujahedeen Shura Council urged Osama Bin Laden to replace al-Qaeda in Iraq's current head with an
Iraqi national. The Mujahedeen Shura Council, however, issued a statement shortly afterwards denying the
authenticity of this tape.

On 19 July 2007 seven domestic insurgent groups informed journalists in Damascus that they were forming
a united front independent of al-Qaeda.[84]

Covert Iranian military involvement

An estimated 150 Iranian intelligence officers, plus members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps,
are believed to be active inside Iraq at any given time.[85] For more than a year, U.S. troops have detained
and recorded fingerprints, photographs, and DNA samples from dozens of suspected Iranian agents in a
catch and release program designed to intimidate the Iranian leadership.[85] Iranian influence is felt most
heavily within the Iraqi Government, the ISF, and Shiite militias.

Although the CPA enforced a 1987 law banning unions in public enterprises, trade unions such as the Iraqi
Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and Iraq's Union of the Unemployed have also mounted effective
opposition to the Coalition.[86] However, no trades unions support the armed insurgents, and unions have
themselves been subject to attacks from the insurgents. Hadi Saleh of the IFTU was assassinated under
circumstances that pointed to a Ba'athist insurgent group on 3 January 2005.[87] Another union federation,
the General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE) opposes the Coalition forces in Iraq and calls for immediate
withdrawal but was neutral on participation in the election. Whereas the GUOE wants all Coalition troops
out immediately, both the IFTU and the Workers Councils' call for replacement of U.S. and British forces
with neutral forces from the UN, the Arab League and other nations as a transition.[88]

Tactics
The tactics of the Iraqi insurgency vary widely. The majority of
militant elements use improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car
bombs, kidnappings, hostage-taking, shootings, ambushes, sniper
attacks, mortar and rocket strikes and other types of attacks to target
U.S. Army Sgt. McCool shot by an
Iraqis and U.S. forces with little regard for civilian casualties.
Iraqi insurgent sniper in Ramadi,
2006.
Awareness of American public opinion
A single study has compared the number of insurgent attacks in Iraq to supposedly negative statements in
the U.S. media, release of public opinion polls, and geographic variations in access to international media
by Iraqis. The purpose was to determine if there was a link between insurgent activity and media reports.
The researchers' study suggested it may be possible that insurgent attacks spiked by 5 to 10% after
increases in the number of negative reports of the war in the media.
The authors believe this may possibly be an "emboldenment effect"
and speculated that "insurgent groups respond rationally to
expected probability of US withdrawal."[89]

Iraqi public opinion

A series of several polls have been conducted to ascertain the
position of the Iraqi public further on Al Qaeda in Iraq and the U.S.
presence. Some polls have found the following: An armed Iraqi interpreter on patrol
with U.S. troops on the streets of
Polls suggest the majority of Iraqis disapprove of the Baghdad. They became frequent
presence of Coalition forces.[90] targets of insurgents during the war.
A majority of both Sunnis and Shi'as want an end to the
U.S. presence as soon as possible, although Sunnis are
opposed to the Coalition soldiers being there by greater margins.[91]
Polls suggest the vast majority of Iraqis support attacks on insurgent groups with 80%
supporting US attacks on Al-Qaeda.[92][93]

Directly after the invasion, polling suggested that a slight majority supported the US invasion.[94] However
polls conducted in June 2005 suggest that there is some sentiment towards Coalition armies being in Iraq. A
2005 poll by British intelligence said that 45% of Iraqis support attacks against Coalition forces, rising to
65% in some areas, and that 82% are "strongly opposed" to the presence of Coalition troops.[95] Demands
for U.S. withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq's Parliament.[96] These results are
consistent with a January 2006 poll that found an overall 47% approval for attacks on U.S.-led forces. That
figure climbed to 88% among Sunnis. Attacks on Iraqi security forces and civilians, however, were
approved of by only 7% and 12% of respondents respectively. Polls conducted between 2005 and 2007
showed 31–37% of Iraqi's wanted US and other Coalition forces to withdraw once security was restored
and that 26–35% wanted immediate withdrawal instead.[97][98][99]

A September 2006 poll of both Sunnis and Shias found that 71% of Iraqis wanted the U.S. to leave within
a year, with 65% favoring an immediate pullout and 77% voicing suspicion that the U.S. wanted to keep
permanent bases in Iraq.[100] 61% approved of attacks on U.S. forces.[90] A later poll in March 2007[101]
suggests the percentage of Iraqis who approve of attacks on Coalition forces has dropped to 51%. In 2006 a
poll conducted on the Iraqi public revealed that 52% of the ones polled said Iraq was going in the wrong
direction and 61% claimed it was worth ousting Saddam Hussein.[97]

Despite a majority having previously been opposed to the US presence, 60% of Iraqis opposed American
troops leaving directly prior to withdrawal, with 51% saying withdrawal would have a negative
effect.[102][103]

Scope and size of the insurgency

The most intense Sunni insurgent activity takes place in the cities and countryside along the Euphrates
River from the Syrian border town of al-Qaim through Ramadi and Fallujah to Baghdad, as well as along
the Tigris river from Baghdad north to Tikrit. Heavy guerrilla activity also takes place around the cities of
Mosul and Tal Afar in the north, as well as the "Triangle of Death" south of Baghdad, which includes the
"-iya" cities of Iskandariya, Mahmudiya, Latifiya, and Yusufiya. Lesser activity takes place in several other
areas of the country. The insurgents are believed to maintain a key supply line stretching from Syria
through al-Qaim and along the Euphrates to Baghdad and central Iraq, the Iraqi equivalent of the Ho Chi
Minh trail. A second "ratline" runs from the Syrian border through Tal Afar to Mosul.

Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas varies by

group and fluctuates under changing political climate, the latest
assessments put the present number at between 3,000 and 7,000
fighters along with numerous supporters and facilitators throughout
the Sunni Arab community. At various points U.S. forces provided
estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions. A few are
provided here (although these numbers almost certainly have
fluctuated):

Fallujah (mid-2004): 2,000–5,000 In a November 2004

operation, the Fallujah insurgency has been destroyed
or dispersed, but had staged a comeback in 2005, albeit
not to former strength, in the course of 2005–2008 the
Provincial control of Iraq in
remainder of the insurgency was defeated in Fallujah
September 2011
and the rest of Al-Anbar province.
Coalition control
Samarra (August 2011): 1,000+
Baquba (August 2011 ): 1,000+
Baghdad (August 2011): 2,000+

Guerilla forces operate in many of the cities and towns of al-Anbar province, due to mostly ineffective Iraqi
security forces in this area. There was extensive guerrilla activity in Ramadi, the capital of the province, as
well as al-Qa'im, the first stop on an insurgent movement route between Iraq and Syria. In 2006, reports
suggested that the Anbar capital Ramadi had largely fallen under insurgent control along with most of the
Anbar region, and that as a result the United States had sent an extra 3,500 marines to reestablish control of
the region. In the early part of 2007 the insurgency suffered serious setbacks in Ramadi after they were
defeated in the Second Battle of Ramadi in the fall of 2006. With the help of the Anbar Salvation Council,
incidents fell from an average of 30 attacks per day in December 2006 to an average of fewer than four in
April 2007.[104]

Baghdad is still one of the most violent regions of the country, even after the 2007 troop surge more than
two-thirds of the violence that takes place in Iraq happens in Baghdad even though the Iraqi Government is
in firm control of the entire city. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The
road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country, if not the world. Iraqi security
and police forces had also been significantly built up in the capital and, despite being constantly targeted,
had enjoyed some successes such as the pacification of Haifa Street, which however subsequently saw a
massive surge of insurgent activity.[105] and after the failed Coalition Operation Together Forward fell
under Sunni insurgent control. The U.S. and Iraqi Forces scored many decisive victories in 2007 during the
U.S. troops surge when they launched Operation Law and Order and Operation Phantam Thunder which
broke the back of the insurgency and has since the saw a mass reduction in violence by 80 percent since
then.

Recent intelligence suggests that the base of foreign paramilitary operations has moved from Anbar to the
religiously and ethnically mixed Diyala province. By July 2007 Diyala had fallen under almost total
Insurgent control, and had become the headquarters for the Sunni-dominated Islamic State of Iraq, which
has issued a proclamation declaring the regional capital Baqubah its capital.
In response to a law allowing for the partitioning of Iraq into autonomous regions, members of the
Mutayibeen Coalition (Khalf al-Mutayibeen[106]), a coalition of Sunni insurgent groups including Al Qaeda
in Iraq, announced the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq encompassing parts of 6 of Iraq's 18 provinces
on 15 October 2006.[106][107] Yet another show of defiance came on 18 October when Sunni fighters
brazenly paraded in Ramadi. Similar parades were held two days later in several towns across western Iraq,
two of which occurred within two miles of U.S. military bases.

By October 2006, small radicalized militias had seemed to overshadow the larger and more organized
Sunni groups which had composed the insurgency previously.[108] As disagreements emerged in pre-
existing groups for reasons ranging from the rift in the Sunni forces between foreign and Iraqi fighters,
competition between Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade, and anger over various decisions such as Muqtada al
Sadr's agreement to join the political process, dozens of insurgency groups sprung up across the country,
though particularly in Baghdad where the U.S. army has listed 23 active militias. Residents have described
the capital as being a patchwork of militia run fiefs. As a result of the insurgency's splintering nature, many
established leaders seemed to lose influence. This was particularly illustrated on 19 October, when
members of the Mahdi army briefly seized control of Amarah. The attack, while demonstrating the
influence of the Madhi army, is believed to have originated as a result of contention between local units of
the Madhi army and the allegedly Badr brigade run security forces, and the timing suggested that neither Al
Sadr nor his top commanders had known or orchestrated the offensive.[109]

At the height of the war, insurgents launched hundreds of attacks each month against Coalition forces.
Overtime, insurgency groups moved to more sophisticated methods of attack such as Explosively formed
penetrators, and infrared lasers, which cannot be easily jammed. These attacks contributed to the rate of
civilian casualties which in turn reduced Iraq's public safety as well as the reliability of infrastructure.[110]

As of 29 January 2009 4,235 U.S. soldiers, 178 British soldiers and 139 soldiers from other nations (allied
with the coalition) have died in Iraq. 31,834 U.S. soldiers had been wounded.[111] Coalition forces do not
usually release death counts. As such, the exact number of insurgents killed by the Coalition or Iraqi forces
is unknown. Through September 2007 more than 19,000 insurgents were reported to have been killed in
fighting with Coalition forces and tens of thousands of Iraqi "suspected civilians" were captured (including
25,000 detainees in U.S. military custody at the time), according to military statistics released for the first
time.[112]

American-led counter-insurgency operations

Over 500 counter-insurgency operations have been undertaken by
the U.S.-led Coalition or the Iraqi government. These include
Operation Option North and Operation Bayonet Lightning in
Kirkuk, Operation Desert Thrust, Operation Abilene and
Operation All American Tiger throughout Iraq, Operation Iron
Hammer in Baghdad and Operation Ivy Blizzard in Samarra – all
in 2003; Operation Market Sweep, Operation Vigilant Resolve Video footage taken from the gun
and Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah in 2004; Operation camera of an Apache helicopter
Matador in Anbar, Operation Squeeze Play and Operation showing the killing of people whom the
Lightning in Baghdad, Operation New Market near Haditha, U.S. military regarded as suspected
Operation Spear in Karabillah and the Battle of Tal Afar – all in Iraqi insurgents. Date and location:
2005; Operation Swarmer in Samarra and Operation Together December 1, 2003, near Al-
Taji.[113][114]
Forward in Baghdad in 2006; and Operation Law and Order in Baghdad, Operation Arrowhead Ripper in
Baqouba and Operation Phantom Strike throughout Iraq – all in 2007.

See also
Iraq portal

Asia portal

Challenge Project
Sectarian violence in Iraq (2006–2008)
Iraqi insurgency (2011–2013)
Consolation payment
Fallujah during the Iraq War
Juba (sniper)
List of revolutions and rebellions
Iraq War order of battle 2009
USA kill or capture strategy in Iraq
USA list of most-wanted Iraqis
Joint Special Operations Command Task Force in the Iraq War
Task Force ODIN
Executive Order 13303

Chronology:

History of Iraq (2003–11)

2003 in Iraq
2004 in Iraq
2005 in Iraq
2006 in Iraq
2007 in Iraq
2008 in Iraq
2008 Mosul offensive
2009 in Iraq
2010 in Iraq
2011 in Iraq

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Sources
Bishku, Michael B. (2018), Israel and the Kurds: A Pragmatic Relationship in Middle Eastern
Politics, vol. 41, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies

Further reading
Chehab, Zaki. Iraq Ablaze: Inside the Insurgency, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd. ISBN 1-84511-110-9.
Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report,
April 2005 (https://web.archive.org/web/20230328141142/https://www.usip.org/sites/default/f
iles/sr134.pdf)
Rogers, Paul. Iraq and the War on Terror: Twelve Months of Insurgency. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1-
84511-205-9.
Hashim, Ahmed S (https://web.archive.org/web/20061102215837/http://ksgfaculty.harvard.e
du/Ahmed_Hashim). Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq. (http://www.cornellpress.co
rnell.edu/cup_detail.taf?ti_id=4447) I.B. Tauris. ISBN 0-8014-4452-7. JSTOR (https://www.jst
or.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctvrf8c5d)
Enders, David. Baghdad Bulletin: Dispatches on the American Occupation University of
Michigan Press (4 April 2005) ISBN 0-472-11469-7 JSTOR (https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3
 998/mpub.100388)
O'Connell, Edward. Bruce R. Pirnie. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: 2003–2006 (https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20221219091728/https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/200
8/RAND_MG595.3.pdf)/ RAND ISBN 978-0-8330-4297-2.
Jürgen Todenhöfer Why do you kill? The untold story of the Iraqi resistance. (https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20090826024513/http://www.whydoyoukillzaid.com/)

External links

Analysis
Christopher Alexander, Charles Kyle and William McCallister The Iraqi Insurgent Movement
(https://web.archive.org/web/20221219091714/http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/03alex
ander.pdf), Commonwealth Institute 14 November 2003
Carl Conetta "400 Days and Out: A Strategy for Solving the Iraq Impasse (https://web.archiv
e.org/web/20090320002300/http://www.comw.org/pda/0507bm34.html)". Project on Defense
Alternatives (http://www.comw.org/pda/), 19 July 2005.
Frontline: The Insurgency (https://web.archive.org/web/20230410155130/https://www.pbs.or
g/wgbh/pages/frontline/insurgency/) PBS Frontline 21 February 2006
Insurgent Iraq: Links to full-text online articles and reports about the Iraqi Insurgency (https://
web.archive.org/web/20100224074914/http://www.comw.org/pda/0603insurgency.html).
Compiled by Project on Defense Alternatives (http://www.comw.org/pda/), March 2006.
Updated 22 August 2006.
"Electronic Propaganda in Iraq (https://web.archive.org/web/20230308150814/http://www.wa
dinet.de/news/dokus/Electronic_Propaganda_Study.pdf)". wadinet.de (PDF)

News articles
Biedermann, Ferry. "Portrait of an Iraqi Rebel (https://web.archive.org/web/2017101207084
4/https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/168/36870.html)." Salon. 16 August
2003, via globalpolicy.
"Crushing Iraq's insurgency may take up to 10 years (https://web.archive.org/web/20040831
082234/http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=11043)." Middle East Online (UK).
23 August 2004.
multimedia article by Australian Journalist Paul McGeogh of the Sydney Morning Herald (htt
ps://web.archive.org/web/20060223092033/http://www.smh.com.au/flash/mcgeough/main.ht
ml)

Supportive of the insurgents

Iraqi Resistance Reports (https://web.archive.org/web/20221205222220/https://www.albasra
h.net/moqawama/english/iraqi_resistance.htm) from albasrah.net (http://www.albasrah.net/).

Profiles of insurgent groups

"Iraq's Insurgents: Who's Who (https://web.archive.org/web/20230406030909/https://www.al
basrah.net/index.php)". Washington Post, 19 March 2006.
 BBC: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (https://web.archive.org/web/20230604232745/http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3483089.stm)

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