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HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT †

Wealth, Health, and Health Services in Rural Rajasthan

By ABHIJIT BANERJEE, ANGUS DEATON, AND ESTHER DUFLO*

What are the determinants of health and of districts of India, with a large tribal population
well-being? Income and wealth are clearly part and an unusually high level of female illiteracy
of the story, but does access to health care have (at the time of the 1991 census, only 5 percent
a large independent effect, as the advocates of of women were literate in rural Udaipur). The
more investment in health care, such as the survey was conducted in collaboration with two
World Health Organization’s Commission on local institutions: Seva Mandir, an NGO that
Macroeconomics and Health (Commission on works, among other things, on health in rural
Macroeconomics and Health, 2001), have ar- Udaipur, and Vidhya Bhawan, a consortium of
gued? This paper reports on a recent survey in a schools, teaching colleges, and agricultural col-
poor rural area of the state of Rajasthan in India leges, who supervised the administration of the
intended to shed some light on this issue, where survey. The sample frame consisted of all the
there was an attempt to use a set of interlocking hamlets in the 362 villages where Seva Mandir
surveys to collect data on health and economic operates in at least one hamlet.1 The sample was
status, as well as the public and private provi- stratified according to access to a road (out of
sion of health care. the 100 hamlets, 50 hamlets are at least 500
meters away from a road). Hamlets within each
stratum were selected randomly, with a proba-
I. The Udaipur Rural Health Survey bility of being selected proportional to the ham-
let population. We then selected 10 households
We collected data between January 2002 and in each of 100 hamlets using simple random
August 2003 in 100 hamlets in Udaipur district, sampling, and all individuals were surveyed
Rajasthan, India. Udaipur is one of the poorest within each household.
The data collected include four components:
† (i) a village survey, where we obtained a village
Discussants: Lant Pritchett, Harvard University; Norbert
Schady, World Bank. census, a description of the village’s physical
infrastructure, and a list of health facilities com-
* Banerjee and Duflo: Department of Economics, Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139;
monly used by villagers (100 villages); (ii) a
Deaton: Department of Economics and Woodrow Wilson facility survey, where we collected detailed in-
School, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 (e-mail: formation on activities, types and cost of treat-
deaton@princeton.edu). We thank Seva Mandir for invalu- ment, referrals, availability of medication and
able help in accessing their villages and Vidhya Bhawan for
quality of physical infrastructure in all public
hosting the research team. Special thanks go to Neelima
Khetan of Seva Mandir, Hardy K. Dewan of Vidhya facilities (143 facilities) serving the sample vil-
Bhawan, and Drs. Renu and Baxi from the health units of lages, all “modern” private facilities mentioned
Seva Mandir. We thank Annie Duflo, Neeraj Negi, and in the village surveys or in the household inter-
Callie Scott for their superb work in supervising the survey, views (we have surveyed 85 facilities so far, but
and the entire health project team for their tireless effort.
Callie Scott also supervised data entry and cleaning, and she this survey is ongoing), and a sample of the
performed much of the data analysis underlying this paper.
We are grateful to Lant Pritchett and Norbert Schady for
1
excellent comments. The authors gratefully acknowledge A hamlet is a set of houses that are close together, share
financial support from the Center for Health and Wellbeing, a community center, and constitute a separate entity. A
Princeton University, the John D. and Catherine T. village is an administrative boundary. A village comprises
MacArthur Foundation, the National Institute of Aging 1–15 hamlets (the mean number of hamlets in a village is
through the National Bureau of Economic Research, the 5.6). Seva Mandir in general operates in the poorest hamlets
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the World Bank. within a given village.
326
VOL. 94 NO. 2 HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 327

traditional healers mentioned in the village sur- widespread, and adults self-report a wide range
veys (225 facilities were surveyed); (iii) a of symptoms: one-third reported cold symptoms
weekly visit to all public facilities serving the in the last 30 days, and 12 percent say the
villages (143 facilities in total, with 49 visits per condition was serious; 33 percent reported fever
facility on average) where we checked whether (14 percent, serious), 42 percent reported “body
the facility was open, and if so, who was ache” (20 percent, serious), 23 percent reported
present; and (iv) a household and individual fatigue (7 percent, serious), 14 percent problems
survey, covering 5,759 individuals in 1,024 with vision (3 percent, serious), 42 percent
households. The data cover information on eco- headaches (15 percent, serious), 33 percent back
nomic well-being, integration in society, educa- aches (10 percent, serious), 23 percent upper
tion, fertility history, perception of health and abdominal pain (9 percent, serious), and 11
subjective well-being, and experience with the percent chest pains (4 percent, serious); 11 per-
health system (public and private), as well as a cent had experienced weight loss (2 percent,
small array of direct measures of health (hemo- serious). Few people reported difficulties with
globin, blood pressure, weight and height, peak personal care, such as bathing, dressing, or eat-
flow meter measurement). ing, but many reported difficulty with the phys-
ical activities that are required to earn a living in
agriculture. Thirty percent or more would have
II. Health and Wealth in Rural Udaipur difficulty walking five kilometers, drawing wa-
ter from a well, or working unaided in the fields;
The households in the Udaipur survey are 18 –20 percent have difficulty squatting or
poor, even by the standards of rural Rajasthan. standing up from a sitting position.
Their average per capita household expenditure Yet when asked to report their own health
is 470 rupees, and more than 40 percent of the status, shown a ladder with 10 rungs, 62 percent
people live in households below the official place themselves on rungs 5– 8 (more is better),
poverty line, compared with only 13 percent in and less than 7 percent place themselves on one
rural Rajasthan in the latest official counts for of the bottom two rungs. Unsurprisingly, older
1999 –2000. Only 46 percent of adult males people report worse health. Also, women at all
(age 14 and older) and 11 percent of adult ages consistently report worse health than men,
females report themselves as literate. Of the 27 which appears to be a worldwide phenomenon.
percent of adults with any education, three- Nor do our life-satisfaction measures show any
quarters completed standard eight or less. The great dissatisfaction with life: on a five-point
survey households have little in the way of scale, 46 percent take the middle value, and
household durable goods, and only 21 percent only 9 percent say their life makes them gener-
have electricity. ally unhappy. Such results are similar to those
In terms of measures of health, 80 percent of for rich countries; for example, in the United
adult women and 27 percent of the adult men States, more than a half of respondents report
have hemoglobin levels below 12 grams per themselves as a three (quite happy) on a four-
deciliter; 5 percent of adult women and 1 per- point scale, and 8.5 percent report themselves as
cent of adult men have hemoglobin levels below unhappy or very unhappy. These people are
8 grams per deciliter. Using a standard cutoff presumably adapted to the sickness that they
for anemia (11 g/dl for women, and 13 g/dl for experience, in that they do not see themselves as
men), men are almost as likely (51 percent) to particularly unhealthy or, perhaps in conse-
be anemic as women (56 percent) and older quence, unhappy. Yet they are not adapted in
women are not less anemic than younger ones, the same way to their financial status, which
suggesting that diet is a key factor. The average was also self-reported on a ten-rung ladder.
body mass index (BMI) is 17.8 among adult Here the modal response was the bottom rung,
men, and 18.1 among adult women; 93 percent and more than 70 percent of people live in
of adult men and 88 percent of adult women households that are self-reported as living on
have a BMI less than 21, considered to be the the bottom three rungs.
cutoff for low nutrition in the United States What about the relation between health and
(Robert Fogel, 1997). Symptoms of disease are wealth? The standard measure of economic
328 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2004

TABLE 1—SELECTED HEALTH INDICATORS, BY POSITION


IN THE PER CAPITA MONTHLY EXPENDITURE DISTRIBUTION

Group
Bottom Middle Top
Indicator third third third
Reported health status 5.87 5.98 6.03
No. symptoms self-reported 3.89 3.73 3.96
in last 30 days
BMI 17.85 17.83 18.31
Hemoglobin below 12 g/dl 0.57 0.59 0.51
Peak flow meter reading 314.76 317.67 316.39
High blood pressure 0.17 0.15 0.20
Low blood pressure 0.06 0.08 0.09
FIGURE 1. LOWESS PLOTS OF SELF-REPORTED HEALTH
Notes: Means reported are based on data collected by the
STATUS, BY SEX, AGE, AND PCE
authors from 1,024 households. See text for survey and
variable description.
TABLE 2—HEALTH, HAPPINESS, AND ECONOMIC STATUS

status in India is household total per capita Hemoglobin


Independent Self-reported level below Self-reported
expenditure (PCE), which we collected using an variable health status 12 g/dl happiness
abbreviated consumption questionnaire previ-
A. Regressions Using Subjective Economic Status (SES):
ously used by the National Sample Survey in
SES 0.12 0.01 0.14
the 1999 –2000 survey. In Table 1, we show (4.1) (0.8) (11.6)
self-reported health, number of symptoms SES ⫻ worker 0.14 ⫺0.03 0.01
reported in the last 30 days, BMI, the fraction of (4.7) (4.3) (0.9)

individuals with a hemoglobin count below 12, B. Regressions Using Total Household Expenditure (THE):
peak flow meter, and the fractions of individuals ln(THE) 0.27 ⫺0.06 0.23
with high blood pressure and low blood pres- (3.6) (3.2) (7.4)
ln(THE) ⫻ worker 0.05 ⫺0.01 ⫺0.003
sure, broken down by third of the per capita (4.0) (4.5) (0.5)
income distribution. Although the pattern is not
always consistent across the groups, individuals Notes: Regressions also include age and age-squared. Ab-
in the lower third of the per capita income solute t statistics are reported in parentheses below the
coefficients.
distribution have, on average, a lower level of
self-reported health, lower BMI, and lower lung
capacity, and they are more likely to have a
hemoglobin count below 12 than those in the driven by the effect of health on income, since
upper third. Individuals in the upper third report we would observe such a relation if men earn
the most symptoms over the last 30 days, per- more because they are stronger.
haps because they are more aware of their own We investigate this further in Table 2, in
health status; there is a long tradition in the which the self-reported health status is re-
Indian and developing country literature of gressed on age, age-squared, and measures of
better-off people reporting more sickness (see economic status. Our regressions show that,
e.g., Christopher Murray and Lincoln C. Chen, conditional on total household expenditure, nei-
1992; Amartya K. Sen, 2002). ther health nor happiness was reduced by house-
Figure 1 shows self-reported health as a func- hold size, so we report regressions using total
tion of age and gender, comparing the bottom household expenditure rather than per capita
three deciles with the top three deciles. Self- household expenditure. We also show the re-
reported health is better in the higher deciles, sults of using the household’s own report of its
though the effect is much stronger for men than financial status on a 10-point scale; this measure
for women, for whom there is little or no PCE is typically a better predictor of health and hap-
gradient. The steeper gradient for men may be piness than are expenditure measures. We also
an indication that some of this relationship is constructed a dummy for each adult indicating
VOL. 94 NO. 2 HEALTH, HEALTH CARE, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 329

whether that person had earnings from work and tending patients; whenever the nurse was absent
then regressed self-reported health status on from a subcenter, we made sure to look for her
each measure of economic status and its inter- in the community. Since subcenters are often
action with the worker dummy. As anticipated, staffed by only one nurse, this high absenteeism
the slope of the regression of health on eco- means that these facilities are often closed: we
nomic status is higher for earners, by about found the subcenters closed 56 percent of the
one-fifth for total household expenditure, and time during regular opening hours. Only in 12
by a factor of 2 for the self-reported economic percent of the cases was the nurse to be found
status measure. Column 2 shows the same re- in one of the villages served by her subcenter.
gression with an indicator for having a hemo- The situation does not seem to be specific
globin level below 12 g/dl as the dependent to Udaipur: these results are similar to the
variable. In both cases, we also find the inter- absenteeism rate found in nationally repre-
action between the income-earner dummy and sentative surveys in India and Bangladesh
household welfare status to be negative. These (Nazmul Chaudhury and Jeffrey Hammer,
findings are consistent with the idea that at least 2003; Chaudhury et al., 2003).
some of the gradient comes from the effects of The weekly survey allows us to assess
health on earnings, although they could also whether there is any pattern in center opening.
indicate that the nutrition and health inputs re- For each center, we ran a regression of the
ceived by workers are more income-elastic than fraction of personnel missing on dummies for
those of nonworkers. The last column of the each day of the week, time of the day, and
table shows parallel regressions with happiness seasonal dummies. We find that the day-of-the-
rather than health as the dependent variable. A week dummies are significant at the 5-percent
concern with these subjective variables is that level in only 7 percent of the regressions, and
there is a personality-based (and reality-free) the time-of-the-day dummies are significant
component that is common to both the happi- only in 10 percent of the regressions. The public
ness and the health measure, and which could facilities are thus open infrequently and unpre-
be different for workers and nonworkers. But dictably, leaving people to guess whether it is
these regressions, unlike those for self-reported worth their while walking for over half an hour
health status or anemia, show no effects of the to cover the 1.4 miles that separate the average
interaction term; there appears to be some sug- village in our sample from the closest public
gestive evidence of a feedback from health to health facility.
earnings, but not from happiness to earnings. Faced with this situation, do households
forgo the consumption of health care? Far from
III. Health Care and Health in Rural Udaipur it: Households spend a considerable fraction of
their monthly budget on health care. In the
The combination of the public facility survey, expenditure survey, households report spending
a private facility survey, and the household sur- 7.3 percent of their budget on health care.
vey casts light on the state of public and private Households in the top third of the per capita
health care provision in Udaipur district and its income distribution spend 11 percent of the
place in people’s lives. The picture is bleak. budget on health care. Visits to public facilities
Starting with the public health facility surveys, are generally not free (the households spend on
the weekly absenteeism survey reveals that, on average 110 rupees when they visit a health
average, 45 percent of medical personnel are facility) even though medicines and services are
absent in subcenters and aid posts, and 36 per- supposed to be free, when they are “available.”
cent are absent in the (larger) primary health Even those who are officially designated as
centers and community health centers.2 These “below the poverty line,” who are entitled to
high rates of absences are not due to staff at- completely free care, end up paying only 40
percent less in public facilities than others. Vis-
2
its to traditional healers (“bhopas”) account for
A subcenter serves 3,600 individuals and is usually
staffed by one nurse. A primary health center serves 48,000 19 percent of the visits and 12 percent of the
individuals and has on average 5.8 medical personnel ap- health expenditure of the average household.
pointed, including 1.5 doctors. Poorer households are more likely to visit the
330 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2004

bhopas than richer households (27 percent of do not perceive their health as particularly bad,
the visits and 19 percent of the average monthly but they seem fairly content with what they are
health expenditure), especially in villages where getting: 81 percent report that their last visit to
the public health facilities are closed most often: a private facility made them feel better, and 75
in the villages served by the third of facilities percent report that their last visit to a public
that are closed the most often, 29 percent of the facility made them feel better. Self-reported
health visits of the poor are to bhopas (as health and well-being measures, as well as the
against 18 percent in villages served by facili- number of symptoms reported in the last month,
ties that are the most open). Irrespective of appear to be uncorrelated with the quality of the
whether the public facility serving the village is public facilities. The quality of the health ser-
mostly closed or not, visits to other private vices may impact health but does not seem to
providers account for 57 percent of the visits impact people’s perception of their own health
and 65 percent of the costs. or of the health-care system.
Health personnel in the private sector are
often untrained and largely unregulated, even if REFERENCES
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