CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

I. Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs Zamora, August 15, 2000

Facts:

In order to stop the tide of escalating violence and crime, President Joseph Estrada ordered the
deployment of the Philippine Marines to assist the Philippine National Police (PNP) in visibility patrols
throughout Metro Manila. In response to this directive, Task Force Tulungan, a joint visibility patrol team
led by Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, was described in a Letter of Intent (LOI) dated
February 2000. An official memorandum from Pres. issued by Estrada on January 24, 2000. The IBP filed
a petition to invalidate LOI 02/2000 on January 17, 2000, claiming that the deployment of the Marines
violated the constitution and constituted a military intrusion into the civilian functions of government as
outlined in Article II, Sec. 3 and Art. 5(4) of Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

1. Does the IBP have legal standing in the case at bar?

2. Is the president’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces subject to judicial
review?
3. Is the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate constitutional
provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP?

Ruling:

In the first issue, the IBP has failed to provide the requisites for legal standing in the case at bar in that it
has failed to conclusively prove that such deployment would harm the IBP in any way. It’s contention
that it is fighting to uphold the rule of law and the constitution is insufficient, too general and too vague.
As to the second issue, the Court disagrees with the contention of the Solicitor-General that the
president’s act is a political question beyond the authority of the Court to review when the grant of
power is qualified or subject to limitations, the issue becomes whether the prescribed qualifications have
been met, then it becomes a question of legality and not wisdom, so is not a political question. It is then
subject to the Court’s review power. As to the third issue, the Marines only assist the PNP, the LOI itself
provides for this. In fact, the PNP Chief is the leader of such patrols and in no way places the over-all
authority in the Marines.

THEREFORE, petition is DISMISSED

CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

II. Olaguer vs Military Commission, May 22, 1987

Facts:

On 24 December 1979, herein Petitioners – all, of which, are civilians – were arrested by the
military and were subsequently detained at Camp Crame and were then transferred to Camp Bagong
Diwa. Sometime in 1980, the then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces created the Respondent
Military Commission No. 34 for the purposes of trying the said Petitioners of their alleged crimes.
Hastily, the said Respondent Commission sentenced the Petitioners to death. Petitioners now come to
the Supreme Court to challenge the said Military Commission.

Issue:
W/N the actions of the military are Constitutional?

Ruling:

It must be noted that in 1981, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2045, thereby
officially lifting Martial Law. Furthermore, between 1981 and 1986, the Petitioners were given
provisional liberty thereby rendering their Petitions for Habeas Corpus moot and academic. It has
been held in a long line of cases that Military Commissions/Tribunals have no jurisdiction to
try civilians for alleged offenses when Civil Courts are open and functioning. Such being the case here,
the respondent Military Commission’s actions of trying the Petitioners and rendering sentence is
null and void. And assuming that the same does have jurisdiction, the fact that the trial(s) were
conducted hastily – i.e., the Petitioners were never actually given a chance to defend themselves
or even
present their own evidences – due process was actually denied to the Petitioners; hence, their
sentence should be treated as unconstitutional.
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

III. Sanlakas vs Executive Secretary, February 3, 2004

Facts:

Some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) stormed and seized the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City.
Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the
resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National
Police (PNP).
Because of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of rebellion" and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion. However, the president only lifted the declaration of a state of rebellion
on August 1, 2003, despite the end of the Oakwood occupation on July 27, 2003.
The petitioners, Sanlakas, contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does
not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. On the other
hand, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have been rendered moot by the lifting of
the declaration. In addition, the Solicitor General questions the standing of the petitioners to
bring suit.

Issues:

1. W/N the petitioners have the standing to bring suit.

2. W/N proclamation no. 427 and General Order no. 4 are Constitutional

Ruling:

1. No, according to the court, petitioner Sanlakas has no legal standing to bring suit. Every
action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or
infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement. In this case,
petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the resort to the Court

2. Yes, it is constitutional. Although, it is true that under Sec 18, Art VII, the Constitution
does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion in order to exercise
the calling out power, it is equally true that it also does not prohibit the President from
declaring such.
Thus, the president, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces,
was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These
are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

IV. Gudani et. al. v. Lt. Gen. Senga et. al. August 15, 2006

Facts:

Senator Biazon invited several officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), including General
Gudani and Colonel Balutan, to testify before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
regarding the "Hello Garci" controversy. General Senga, the AFP Chief of Staff, initially requested the
postponement of the hearing, citing his inability to attend and the officers' prior commitments to urgent
operational matters. However, Gudani and Balutan had already traveled to Manila to attend the hearing.

The following day, General Senga sent a letter to Senator Biazon, informing him that no approval had
been granted by the President for any AFP officer to testify before the hearing. Nevertheless, Gudani and
Balutan testified about the conduct of the 2004 elections. General Senga subsequently issued a statement
noting that the two officers had disobeyed a legal order, in violation of Article of War 65, and would be
subject to General Court Martial Proceedings. On the same day as the hearing, the President issued
Executive Order 464, which required that government officials seek her approval before testifying in
legislative inquiries.

Gudani and Balutan were then directed to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General for
investigation. They invoked their right to remain silent, and the next day, Gudani was compulsorily
retired from military service due to reaching the age of 56. Following the investigation, the Office of the
Provost Marshal General recommended that the petitioners be charged with violation of Article of War
65.

Petitioners filed a certiorari and prohibition seeking that: (1) the President's order, coursed through
General Senga, preventing them from testifying before Congress without prior presidential approval, be
declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against them be quashed; and (3) General Senga and others be
permanently enjoined from proceeding against them for testifying before the Senate.

Issues:
W/N the President had the authority to prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the President had the constitutional authority to prevent a member of the
armed forces from testifying before a legislative inquiry, based on her power as Commander-in-Chief.

The Court's determination that, as a general rule, military officers may be required to seek presidential
approval before appearing before Congress stemmed from the idea that deviating from this rule would
diminish the President's prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief.

Petitioners argued that they were justified in testifying before the Senate since they had been invited.
However, the Court emphasized that the order preventing their testimony originated from the President,
who is the head of the executive branch and the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Any military
officer summoned by Congress may be compelled to testify, and if the President refuses, a judicial order
can be issued to enforce compliance.

The concept of executive privilege was not applicable in this case because the prevention of their
testimony was based on the Chief Executive's power as Commander-in-Chief, which includes authority
over the actions and speech of military personnel. The Court recognized that the President's ability to
control individual members of the armed forces was crucial to military discipline and the chain of
command. In cases where a military officer must choose between obeying the President and obeying the
Senate, the Court affirmed that the officer must prioritize the President's orders. The Constitution
designates the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, not the Senate.
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

V. David et. al. Vs Arroyo et. al. May 3, 2006

Facts:

On February 24, 2006, during the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power 1 Celebration, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national
emergency. She cited her constitutional powers as Commander-in-Chief and the authority vested in her
by Section 18, Article VII of the Philippine Constitution to "call out the armed forces to prevent or
suppress rebellion."

PP 1017 was followed by General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), which was issued to implement PP 1017. G.O.
No. 5 instructed the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Chief of the PNP, and their respective personnel to take
actions to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.

After the issuance of these proclamations, the Office of the President canceled programs and activities
related to the Edsa People Power I anniversary and revoked permits for rallies previously issued by local
governments. Government officials announced that political rallies deemed to be organized for
destabilization purposes were canceled, and the possibility of warrant-less arrests and takeovers of
facilities, including media, was mentioned.

Rallies and public assemblies were dispersed by anti-riot police, who used force and non-lethal crowd
control measures.

Additionally, the CIDG and PNP operatives conducted raids on media offices, including the Daily Tribune,
and confiscated materials.

Issue:
W/N PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 were constitutional.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that PP 1017 was constitutional in its function as a call by the President for the
AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, as it was in line with Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. However, certain extraneous provisions in PP 1017 granting the President powers, such as
issuing decrees, enforcing obedience to all laws, and imposing standards on media, were declared
unconstitutional.

The Court also ruled that the President, in the absence of legislation, could not take over privately-owned
public utilities and private businesses affected by public interest, based on Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution.

Regarding G.O. No. 5, it was deemed valid as it was an order issued by the President as Commander-in-
Chief to AFP subalterns. It provided a valid standard, instructing the military and police to take necessary
and appropriate actions to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. However, the words "acts of
terrorism" were deemed unconstitutional because they were not legally defined or made punishable by
Congress, leaving the limits of the AFP's authority undefined.
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

VI. Salviar M. Kulay an et. al v. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan, et. al., G. R. No. 187298

Facts:

The dispute revolves around a state of emergency declared by Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan of Sulu in
response to the kidnapping of three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
The kidnapped individuals, Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were abducted by
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) while they were inspecting a water and sanitation project for
the Sulu Provincial Jail.

Subsequently, a Local Crisis Committee, later renamed the Sulu Crisis Management Committee, was
formed under the leadership of Governor Tan to investigate the kidnapping incident. In response to this
crisis, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, which declared a state of emergency in
the province of Sulu. The proclamation justified this declaration by citing the kidnapping incident as a
terrorist act under the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). Additionally, it invoked Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which empowers the Provincial Governor to take emergency
measures during man-made and natural disasters and to call upon national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder and lawless violence.

In Proclamation No. 1, Governor Tan called upon the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Civilian
Emergency Force (CEF) to establish checkpoints, and to conduct general searches, seizures, and arrests,
as well as other actions deemed necessary to ensure public safety in Sulu. The petitioners, led by Jamar
Kulayan, contested the validity of Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines. They argued that
these measures were issued ultra vires, meaning they exceeded the legal authority granted to Governor
Tan. The petitioners contended that the proclamation violated Sections 1 and 18 of Article VII of the
Constitution, which bestow upon the President the sole authority to exercise emergency powers and
calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Issue:
W/N the governor can exercise the calling-out powers of the President as outlined in the Constitution.

Ruling:

It emphasized that the Constitution designates one repository of executive powers—the President of the
Republic. Executive powers, as defined in Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution, are vested solely in the
President. This means that the authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers is
exclusive to the President.

The Court further elaborated that, despite being a civilian, the President is designated as the nation's
supreme military leader by Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, which stipulates that civilian
authority is supreme over the military at all times. This designation makes the President the ceremonial,
legal, and administrative head of the armed forces.

Additionally, the Court noted that the Constitution does not require the President to possess military
training or talents. However, as the Commander-in-Chief, the President has the authority to direct
military operations and determine military strategy. While the President may delegate the actual
command of the armed forces to military experts, the ultimate power to make these decisions remains
with the President.

In the context of this case, the Court concluded that Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he issued
Proclamation No. 1 and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.
The Constitution's calling-out powers, as specified in Section 7, Article VII, are exclusive to the President.
Therefore, an exercise of these powers by another official, even if they hold the position of a local chief
executive, is ultra vires and cannot be justified by invoking Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

VII. Torres vs Gonzales 152 SCRA 272

Facts:

1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was was granted conditional pardon by the president
on condition that he "would not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines". He accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1982, he was charged with 20
counts of estafa (pending trial) while in 1985, he was convicted of sedition (pending appeal). In 1986,
Justice Secretary Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president
cancelled the pardon. Torres was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the
unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres thus filed a petition for habeas corpus before the SC
questioning the validity of the arrest order. He claimed that he did not violate his conditional pardon
since he has not been convicted by final judgment of 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition.

Issue:

W/O conviction by final judgment necessary before a person may be validly rearrested and recommitted
for violation of the terms of his condition pardon?

Ruling:

The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences
of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i)
of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of
violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.

Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged
to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed
against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum
period, upon a convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate
any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's
executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

VIII. Monsanto vs Factoran 170 SCRA 190

Facts:

Petitioner Monsanto (then Asst. Treasurer of Calbayog City) was among others who were
convicted of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. While her appeal was pending, the
President extended her an absolute pardon which she accepted. She then requested she be restored to
her
former post which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. Her request was eventually referred to
the Office of the President which held that she is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement. She now
comes to this Court averring that as her case was pending on appeal at the time of her pardon and thus
there was no final judgment of conviction, the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her. Her
employment could not have been deemed forfeited.

Issue:
W/N a convicted public officer who has been granted an absolute pardon by the President entitled to
reinstatement without the need of a new appointment?

Ruling:

No. Having accepted the pardon, Monsanto is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed
conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.183 Pardon184 implies guilt. It does
not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the
moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness. Pardon granted after conviction frees the
individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights, but it cannot
bring back lost
reputation for integrity. Thus, we hold that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public
office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such pardon
undoubtedly restores her eligibility for appointment to that office. She may apply for reappointment, but
a pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to
anyone deemed to be of bad character
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

IX. People vs Salle Jr. 250 SCRA 581

Facts:

Appellant Mengote was convicted of murder and destructive arson. While his appeal was pending, he was
granted a conditional pardon. He was released on the same day and thereafter immediately left for his
province without consulting his counselor who could not therefore file a Motion to Withdraw his appeal.
His counselor now seeks that he be deemed to have abandoned his appeal by his acceptance of the
conditional pardon so that the same
may be considered valid and enforceable.

Issue:
May a pardon be enforced while appeal is pending?

Ruling:

No. The clause in Art VII, Sec 19 of the Constitution “conviction by final judgment” mandates that no
pardon may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final. 185 This clause which was
absent in the amended 1973 Constitution was revived in the present Constitution to prevent the
President from exercising executive power in derogation of the judicial power. We now declare that the
“conviction by final judgment” limitation
prohibits the grant of pardon to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the
trial court. Hence, before an appellant may be validly granted pardon, he must first ask for the
withdrawal
of his appeal, i.e. the appealed conviction must first be brought to finality. Wherefore, xxx the conditional
pardon granted Mengote shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of withdrawal of his appeal.
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

X.Garcia vs COA 226 SCRA 356

Facts:

Garcia was a Supervising Lineman of the Bureau of Telecommunications (the Bureau) when he was
summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision
rendered in the administrative case against him for the loss of several telegraph poles. Based on the same
facts, a criminal case for theft was filed against him for which he was acquitted. His acquittal was founded
on the fact that he did not commit the offense imputed to him. He thereafter sought reinstatement but
was denied by the Bureau, so he
sought executive clemency. The executive clemency was granted to him. He then filed with Commission
on Audit a claim for payment of back wages but was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Is Garcia entitled to back wages?

Ruling:

Yes. [The Court reiterated Monsanto v. Factoran, that pardon does not wash out the moral stain however]
if the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new
man and as innocent as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged thereby restoring to him
his clean name xxx prior to the finding of guilt. Such is the case at bar. The executive clemency ipso facto
reinstated him and that
automatic reinstatement also entitles him to back wages. The right to back wages are meant to afford
relief to those who have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or those otherwise
acquitted of the charges against them. Further, the dismissal of Garcia was not a result of any criminal
conviction that carried with it forfeiture of the right to hold public office, but it is the direct consequence
of an administrative decision of a branch of the Executive Department over which the President has
power of control. The executive clemency thereby nullified his dismissal. His separation from the service
being null and void, he his thus entitled to
back wages.
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

XI. Llamas vs Orbos 202 SCRA 844

Facts:

Vice Gov. Llamas of Tarlac filed with the DILG an administrative complaint against his Governor, charging
him of violation of the Local Govt Code and other laws including the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
DILG found the Governor guilty and suspended him for 90 days. Llamas then assumed office as Acting
Governor. The Governor applied for executive clemency which was granted by the President. He then
reassumed governorship. Llamas
now comes to this Court claiming that the President acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in extending the executive clemency as the same, he avers among others, only applies
to criminal and not administrative cases.

Issue:
Does the President have the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases?

Ruling:

Yes, but only those in the Executive Department. The Constitution does not distinguish between which
cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, so the Court must not also distinguish. In
the same token, it would be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the
coverage of Art VII, sec 19 if executive clemency may only be exercised in criminal cases. Further, if the
President may grant executive clemency in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant the
same in administrative cases, which
are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. It is also evident from the intent of the Constitutional
Commission that the President’s executive clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage,
except as already provided in the Constitution. Moreover, under the doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive depts., it is clear the
President may grant executive clemency as she may also reverse or modify a ruling issued by a
subordinate to serve the greater public interest. It must be stressed, however, that when we say the
President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to this in the Executive
branch, not in the Judicial nor Legislative.
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

XII. Eduardo Kapunan vs Court of Appeals, March 13,2009

Facts:

The petitioners, Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi have been charged with the killing of KMU
Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver Leonor Alay-ay. On June 1986 Olalia and Alay-ay’s dead body was
found. The murder of Olalia is a controversial case during that time, for Olalia’s profile to be the
Chairman of the KMU. On Nov. 1998, private respondents Feliciano Olalia and Perlina Alay-ay, filed a
complaint letter to Department of Justice for the alleged complex kidnapping and killing of Olalia and
Alay-ay,against Edgardo Kapunan and Oscar Legaspi and other men and officers of Philippine
NationalPolice (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).Sec. Serafin Cuevas, Secretary of
Department of Justice, created a panel which are tasked to conduct a preliminary investigation on Olalia’s
case. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss with the Department of Justice on the ground that the
amnesty granted to them by the National Amnesty Commission extinguishes their criminal liability under
Proclamation 347 issued by Pres. Fidel V. Ramos entitled, “Granting of
Amnesty to the rebels, insurgents and all other persons, who may or may have committed crimes against
public order and crimes committed in furtherance of political ends. However, the motion has been
denied, hence this motion for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi, extinguishes their criminal liability in the
Olalia case.

Ruling:
NO. The panel created by the Department of Justice refused to consider the defense of Amnesty of the
petitioners on theground that the document presented pertaining to the Amnesty failed to show that the
Olalia murder case is one of the crimes for which the amnesty was applied for. The Court of Appeals also
dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the panel created by the DOJ, the Appellate
Court refused to rule on the applicability of Amnesty issued to Kapunan and Legaspi. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition on the ground that the Amnesty granted to Kapunan and Legaspi pertains only to
the crime against rebellion and does not cover the murder case of Olalia and Alay-ay.
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

XIII. Commissioner of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading

Facts:

Respondent Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was the consignee of several imported shipments which were
declared forfeited to the Govt having been found to lack the required certificates by the Central Bank. EST
appealed, but the decision was affirmed by petitioner Commissioner of Customs and so the matter was
taken to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which reversed the decision in favor of EST. Petitioner
Commissioner now seeks the review of the decision rendered by the CTA which was grounded, among
others, on the basis that the seizure and forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan cannot be justified
under EO 328 (an executive agreement between Phils. and Japan) for it believes the same to be of
dubious validity. CTA entertained doubt because of the fact that the Senate had not concurred in said
EO’s making.

Issue:
Is the concurrence of the Senate required before entering international “executive agreements”?

Ruling:

No. The concurrence of the Senate is required by our Constitution in the making of “treaties,” which are,
however, distinct and different from “executive agreements”193 which may be validly entered into and
become binding through executive action without such concurrence. Decision appealed from reversed.
CONSTITUTION 1 CASE DIGESTS Article VII- John Dominic Masacote, JD 1-D

XIV. Lourdes Rubrico et.al. Vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo et.al.

Facts:

Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the 301 st Air
Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base
in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico
Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were
also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the
individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the
petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for
kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed
for damages and for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during
her incumbency.Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, et al.By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case.

Issue:
W/N the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

Ruling:

The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not
expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986
Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.
observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his
or her tenure.Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency,
may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or
law. It will degrade the dignity of the
high office of the President, the Head of State.