Yopp 2015

Journal of Mathematical Behavior 39 (2015) 79–99
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
The Journal of Mathematical Behavior

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jmathb
Prospective elementary teachers’ claiming in responses

to false generalizations
David A. Yopp ∗
University of Idaho, Departments of Mathematics and Curriculum and Instruction, 313 Brink Hall, Moscow, ID 83844, United States
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: When faced with a false generalization and a counterexample, what types of claims do
Received 19 November 2014 prospective K-8 teachers make, and what factors influence the type and prudence of their
Received in revised form 12 June 2015 claims relative to the data, observations, and arguments reported? This article addresses
Accepted 15 June 2015
that question. Responses to refutation tasks and cognitive interviews were used to explore
Available online 1 July 2015
claiming. It was found that prospective K-8 teachers’ claiming can be influenced by knowl-
edge of argumentation; knowledge and use of the mathematical practice of exception
Keywords:
barring; perceptions of the task; use of natural language; knowledge of, use of, and skill with
Counterexample
the mathematics register; and abilities to technically handle data or conceptual insights.
Refutation
Claiming A distinction between technical handlings for developing claims and technical handlings
Generalizing for supporting claims was made. It was found that prudent claims can arise from arguer-
Argument developed representations that afford conceptual insights, even when searching for support
Argumentation for a different claim.
Proof © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Technical handles
1. Introduction
Teachers need to be able to refute students’ invalid claims to help students develop an understanding of the mathematical
situation (Giannakoulias, Mastorides, Potari, & Zachariades, 2010). Studies demonstrate that students and teachers have dif-
ficulty generating appropriate refutation arguments (Balacheff, 1991; Potari, Zachariades, & Zaslavsky, 2009; Giannakoulias
et al., 2010). While previous research has noted that students and teachers give problematic responses to false generaliza-
tions, the literature lacks careful attention to the claims presented and the influences on those claims.
Logically, one counterexample establishes that a generalization is false. Some literature suggests that further exploration
of false statements can present opportunities for rich mathematical investigations. The basic idea is that once a counterex-
ample is found, a student might attempt to classify all counterexamples, find counterexamples that provide insight into why
the generalization is false, or develop a true generalization by altering the original claim (Peled & Zaslavsky, 1997; Komatsu,
2010; Yopp, 2013). On the other hand, as will be shown in this article, attempts to go beyond the existence of a counterex-
ample, including making claims about classes of counterexamples and claims about cases that conform to the original claim,
can lead to problematic responses when a counterexample would have sufficed. Barring two notable exceptions, Balacheff
(1991) and Galbraith (1981), the literature has not addressed problematic responses developed after a counterexample has
been identified.
Abbreviations: CI, conceptual insight; PST, prospective elementary (K-8) teacher; TH, technical handle.
∗ Tel.: +1 208 885 6220; fax: +1 208 885 5843.
E-mail address: dyopp@uidaho.edu
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmathb.2015.06.003
0732-3123/© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
80 D.A. Yopp / Journal of Mathematical Behavior 39 (2015) 79–99
Fig. 1. Wuan’s response to the prompt, “Develop a viable argument for or against a claim that the sum of five consecutive numbers is divisible by 6.”.
In the United States, teachers’ difficulties with communicating appropriate responses to false generalizations could prove
particularly problematic for mathematics students. Common Core State Standards for Mathematics (CCSSM) call for students
to construct counterexamples (NGACBP and CCSSO, 2010), and assessment designers are proposing middle-grade assessment
items that ask students to test propositions or conjectures with examples (SBACS, 2013). Similar items for earlier grades
may soon follow. Stylianides and Ball (2008) provide evidence that conjecture exploration and counterexample production
are within the conceptual reach of children as early as third grade.
This paper explores the following research question: When faced with a false generalization and a counterexample, what
types of claims do prospective K-8 teachers (PSTs) make, and what factors influence the type and prudence of their claims
relative to the data, observations, and arguments reported? A “claim” is a mathematical statement that an arguer believes
to be true. “Prudent claims” are claims that can be supported by the data, warrants, or conceptual insights that accompany
a PST’s claim. Claims are different than conjectures, in my lexicon, because conjectures have no connotation of truth. In this
study I find that after PSTS acknowledge a counterexample, they often make imprudent and problematic claims. Furthermore,
PSTs’ ability to articulate prudent claims, with a goal of creating a viable argument, is influenced by their perception of the
task; their natural language usage; their knowledge of, use of, and skill with the mathematics register; their knowledge of
argumentation; their knowledge and use of the mathematical practice of exception barring; and their ability to handle data
and conceptual insights appropriately and prudently.
2. The issue
In order to communicate a viable argument once they are aware of a counterexample, PSTs must report the counterex-
ample and demonstrate that the example is indeed a counterexample, and/or they must present an alternative claim and
support for that claim. This is the critical issue. How PSTs report this information can influence the correctness or appro-
priateness of their responses, even when the counterexample presented is otherwise correct. Student responses shown
in Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate problematic reporting. These responses appeared on final exams in my mathematics courses for
prospective elementary school teachers, which served as the context for this study.
Fig. 2. Bobbi’s response to the prompt, “Develop a viable argument for or against a claim that the sum of five consecutive numbers is divisible by 6.”.
D.A. Yopp / Journal of Mathematical Behavior 39 (2015) 79–99 81
Wuan (Fig. 1) reports an appropriate counterexample in the foundation and demonstrates that the candidate is indeed a
counterexample in the warrant. Yet the claim “the sum of five consecutive numbers is not divisible by 6” is literally equivalent
to a generalization. This false claim also occurs in the warrant (narrative link) of Bobbi’s response (Fig. 2), although the
statement that Bobbi labels as the claim is equivalent to an existence statement. In the second line of her warrant (narrative
link), appearing faintly, Bobbi inserts the word “always” between “not” and “divisible.” It is unclear what Bobbi believes this
insertion changes about the domain of the claim.
The variable expression in Bobbi’s foundation complicates an interpretation of her argument. Bobbi’s discussion of this
expression appears to support a generalization. In contrast, the example in Wuan’s data and warrant appears to sup-
port an existence statement. While a reader might make inferences about what each of these PSTs intended to write,
the point is that it is not completely clear what either is claiming. We are left to infer the intended meaning of these
claims, and we do not have clear evidence that the PSTs have mastery of the mathematics register or accepted mathe-
matical argumentation practices. Such responses can be problematic for instructors to assess—and even more problematic
when presented to other PSTs during collective argumentation, as will be shown in Section 7 that follows. This article
explores the quality and prudence of PSTs’ claiming, the processes through which their claims arise, and influences on their
claiming.
3. Background literature
Much of the literature addressing students’ and teachers’ responses to false generalizations describes the difficulties
these arguers have in generating counterexamples and the challenges they face in noting the status of counterexamples
as refutations. Some teachers undervalue counterexamples as refutation arguments, and some teachers express views that
counterexamples are exceptions as opposed to complete refutations of a claim (Potari et al., 2009; Giannakoulias et al., 2010).
Some teachers view refutations based on theory as providing stronger and more general conclusions than counterexample
arguments, even when the theory referenced does not actually disprove the claim (Potari et al., 2009; Giannakoulias et al.,
2010). The “theory” that Potari et al.’s teachers use in refutations includes: maintaining that none of the “known” theorems
apply, referring to a nonexistent theorem, noting an inappropriate use of a theorem, and stating a general rule in opposition
to the claim.
Studies have also found that both students and teachers may believe that counterexamples and a proof of a
claim can co-exist (Balacheff, 1991; Galbraith, 1981; Potari et al., 2009; Stylianides & Al-Murani, 2010), although
Stylianides and Al-Murani report finding no evidence of this misconception when they interviewed participants
who at first appeared to express this view. This research is important to my study because a PST’s understand-
ing and beliefs about what constitutes refutation in mathematics are likely to influence the type of claims a PST
develops.
Of particular interest to this study are the actions that PSTs take once they note a counterexample. In the mathematical
philosophy literature, Lakatos (1976) uses the history of mathematics literature and a fictional account to provide a descrip-
tion of actions that mathematicians might take when facing a refutation. This description has proven useful in studying
student and teacher refutations (see Balacheff, 1991; Giannakoulias et al., 2010; Larsen & Zandieh, 2008). Lakatos’s descrip-
tion includes monster-barring, in which a definition for the mathematical object at hand is revised to bar objects that make
the claim untrue; exception-barring, in which the class of mathematical objects considered is reduced to bar the objects that
make the claim untrue; and proofs and refutation, in which the “proof” is analyzed to find a class of mathematical objects
for which the argument is valid.
Along these lines, Balacheff (1991) found that once they “witnessed” a counterexample, the 13- and 14-year-olds in his
study either modified their original conjecture’s conditions or conclusion, modified the definition of the objects concerned,
or “brushed aside” the counterexample as not sufficient to call the conjecture into question. Influences on these actions
(which Balacheff describes as determinations of choices) included students’ background in logic, students’ background in
argumentation, and students’ perception of the didactical contract. Galbraith (1981) reports similar findings and notes
cases when students made conjectures based on insufficient evidence and failed to acknowledge or define the domain of a
conjecture.
Balacheff (1991) is important to my study because his students’ responses can be associated with claiming, even though
it is not clear in his work whether the students stated an explicit claim when they modified the conditions and conclu-
sion or brushed aside counterexamples. If the students did state explicit claims, one wonders how they worded those
claims.
4. Theoretical framework for this study
In this study I asked PSTs to present arguments that included an explicit claim and support for that claim. I also requested
that they present only claims they believed they could support with a viable argument. Therefore, it is assumed that PSTs’
claiming in this study was influenced by the arguments they developed and the actions they took in developing these
arguments.
4.1. Arguments and activities associated with argument production
4.1.1. Arguments and viable arguments

Toulmin (1958/2003) defines an argument as having a claim and support for that claim. Toulmin develops an argument
analysis scheme that has been used extensively in mathematics education literature to construct plausible argument lay-
outs (e.g., Conner, Singletary, Smith, Wagner, & Francisco, 2014; Krummheuer, 1995; Krummheuer, 2007). In particular,
Giannakoulias et al. (2010) employ the scheme to describe teachers’ responses to false generalizations. Toulmin’s scheme
consists of constructing a layout for an argument by identifying and labeling argument features as follows: a statement being
established as true, labeled as claim; facts and other information supporting the claim, labeled as data; a link between the
data and claim, labeled as warrant; reasons the warrant should be taken as valid in the particular field, labeled as backing;
descriptions about the certainty of the claim, labeled as qualifiers; and circumstances under which a warrant is not valid,
labeled as rebuttals. Krummheuer (2007) chooses to focus on the core of the argument – claim, data, and warrant – but other
researchers adopt the full model or some modification of it (e.g., Conner et al., 2014).
To understand PSTs’ support for their claims, I adopt Toulmin’s scheme to construct a layout of the PSTs’ arguments. I
adopt the full model but focus primarily on the core. I use this core to define what I mean by viable argument. Viable arguments
have a claim, data, and a warrant and meet the following criteria: (1) express a clear, explicit, unambiguous, prudent, and
appropriately worded claim; (2) express support for that claim that involves acceptable data (or foundations); (3) express
acceptable warrants (or narrative links) that link the data to the claim; and (4) identify the mathematics (definitions and prior
results) on which the argument relies. Acceptable data/foundations include examples, diagrams, prior results, definitions,
narrative descriptions, stories, etc., provided that the representation of the data/foundations can be appealed to appropriately
in the warrant. For instance, examples are acceptable when crafting arguments for generalizations when they are generic
examples (Balacheff, 1988; Sandefur, Mason, Stylianides, & Watson, 2013; Yopp & Ely, 2015) and are used as a referent to
illustrate objects or relationships that support the claim. Viable example-based arguments become possible when students
are able to express features common to all possible examples and appeal only to those features generically in support of the
claim (Yopp & Ely, 2015).
Acceptable warrants express how the data/foundations are used to support the claim. If the claim is a generalization, then
the warrant must express how the data are used to represent all cases. In other words, acceptable warrants express how
the conditions of the claim are used to support the conclusion. In generic-example arguments, warrants must communicate
how the examples are appealed to in representing all cases. They also must communicate how the properties demonstrated
in the examples are common to all examples in the domain of the claim.
Criterion 4, identify the mathematics on which the argument relies, also needs elaboration. Mathematical claims are based
on the meaning of the objects and operations involved in the claim and, in more colloquial terms, on previously established
or accepted results. These “meanings” are determined by definitions, axioms, and theorems. Viable arguments must express
these meanings, at least semantically.
Example-based arguments for existence claims, including counterexample arguments, fit into my viable argument frame-
work as follows: One or more candidate examples are presented as the data/foundations, and a demonstration that a
candidate has the desired properties is presented as the warrant. For counterexample arguments, demonstrating that the
candidate has the desired properties means showing that the candidate is in the domain of the generalization but does not
satisfy the conclusion. At times, “that the candidate is in the domain of the generalization” is presented without support and
taken as self-evident.
4.1.2. Manipulate, get-a-sense-of articulate

Because I am studying both the types and quality of PSTs’ claiming relative to the types of supports provided or available,
I needed a framework for analyzing how the PSTs report coming to those claims, as well as how they report developing
support for a claim. In other words, what types of activities occurred and are associated with the claim?
Mathematics education researchers such as Sandefur et al. (2013) and Mason (1981) have found Bruner’s (1966) descrip-
tion of activity during mathematical thinking useful in analyzing participants’ actions. I found the description useful as well.
Sandefur et al. (2013) restate Bruner’s description as follows: Manipulation (manipulate) means using familiar mathemat-
ical objects for a specific purpose. This purpose is “to get-a-sense-of some underlying structure, pattern, or relationship by
experiencing the effects of various actions and forming conjectures” (Sandefur et al., 2013, p. 327). As the first two phases
become more coherent, students may be encouraged to articulate. In my study, PSTs are asked to articulate an argument,
which includes a claim, so their overarching purpose is the construction of at least one viable argument in response to a
false generalization.
For my study, “forming conjectures” can be described as get-a-sense-of what can be claimed and supported. Often this
stage is implied by the connections between the manipulate stage and the articulate stage. Online posts make up much of
the data in my study; thus, PSTs are inherently in the articulate stage. I found that the PSTs typically report their activities in
coming to a claim. In this way their manipulate and get-a-sense-of stages are identified through the activities they report.
4.1.3. Technical handles and conceptual insights

When analyzing PSTs’ responses, I use a framework for understanding how they assembled their activities into an argu-
ment. This analysis needs to consider both the claim and the support for the claim, which are assumed to be related. This is
important because PSTs might report using one type of activity to develop a claim and report using another type of activity
to develop support for that claim.
In terms of developing support for a claim, Raman, Sandefur, Birky, Campbell, and Somers (2009) suggest movements,
not always found in order, in creating a proof. The first is getting a key idea (a reinterpretation of that proposed in Raman,
2003) that gives a sense of belief and understanding that may or may not provide clues about how to write a proof. The
second is a technical handle that gives a sense of “now I can prove it” and a way to communicate the ideas behind the proof.
The third is a culmination of the argument into a standard form (relative to the audience).
Sandefur et al. (2013) recast the Raman et al. framework and report “two important components” (p. 328) to creating a
proof: “(1) finding a conceptual insight (CI), i.e., a sense of a structural relationship pertinent to the phenomenon of interest
that indicates why the statement is likely to be true, and (2) finding some technical handles (TH), i.e., ways of manipulating
or making use of the structural relations that support the conversion of the CI into acceptable proofs” (p. 328).
I found a need to reinterpret the Sandefur et al. (2013) and Raman et al. (2009) frameworks for the context of my study.
These two frameworks seem to use the term “handles” as a metaphor for getting a grasp on how to develop a proof. In my
study, the claim is not necessarily in place, so the term handles needs to be broader. I use the term handles to describe how an
arguer makes use of any insights, data, or observations in developing a viable argument, which includes developing a claim.
In this sense, I analyze how the student assembles (culminates) a variety of data, insights, knowledge, and perspectives
to develop an argument to present to others. A similar modification is needed for the term conceptual insight in order for
claiming to be an explicit component of developing insight (e.g., a sense of what can be claimed).
An additional modification to Sandefur et al.’s (2013) term conceptual insight is to use the phrase “relational structure
between a generalization’s conditions and conclusions” instead of “structural relationship pertinent to . . ..” I found it difficult
to use the term pertinent structure in my analysis because “pertinent” is in the eyes of the beholder and seems to presuppose
a claim. I prefer the phrase relational structure between a generalization’s conditions and conclusions in part because the PSTs
encountered false generalizations. Counterexamples express a relational structure between conditions, which they meet,
and conclusions, which they do not meet. I distinguish between relational structure that is limited to a few cases and
relational structure that encompasses a class of objects, which offers opportunities for making prudent generalizations. This
broader term allows me to examine relational structure as it is expressed in each PST’s data and insights. I then use the PST’s
expressed relational structure to assess the prudence of the associated claim.
For my study, the term conceptual insights (CI) can refer to either of the following: developing a sense or belief based in
relational structure between a generalization’s conditions and conclusions about what might be claimed (including whether
a conjecture is true or false); or developing a sense or belief based in relational structure between a generalization’s conditions
and conclusions about why a claim is true or false or what causes the claim to be true or false.
Because the PSTs had an explicit goal of articulating a viable argument, which includes making claims, I needed two
distinct but related types of handlings of data and CIs that describe PSTs’ efforts to achieve that goal. Technical handles
of type 1 (TH1) describe ways of making use of data and CIs in developing and articulating claims. Technical handles of
type 2 (TH2) describe ways of manipulating and making use of data and CIs in developing and articulating support for
claims. TH2s align well with the way technical handles are described in Sandefur et al. (2013). I describe technical handles
first without any connotation of whether they are constructive. I apply adjectives (e.g., prudent, imprudent, problematic,
adequate, inadequate) to note a technical handle’s subtype and potential for viable argumentation. The adjectives prudent
and imprudent need some attention. Galbraith (1981) asserts that “avoidance of conjecture on insufficient evidence” (p. 26)
is an essential component of successful proving. An example of imprudent claiming is when a PST puts forth a generalization
with infinite domain when only a finite number of examples are presented and no relational structure shared by all cases is
presented. I will exemplify this framework further in Section 7.
I should also point out that in my earlier work (Yopp, 2014) I noted three technical handles in articulating an argument.
In that work, expressing the data or CIs adequately relative to the claim and CI is a technical handle of type 2. Developing
an adequate link between the data and claim is a technical handle of type 3. I still see these as related but distinct skills,
particularly in the articulate stage when crafting an argument to share with others. However, for the purposes of this study,
which has an emphasis on developing and articulating claims, collapsing these two handles into one type of technical handle
made the framework easier to employ. The CI often becomes the warrant or link in elementary arguments such as those
discussed in this paper. Thus, the technical handles associated with appropriately expressing data and appropriately wording
a link between data and claims are assumed to be interwoven.
4.1.4. Reasoning
To further describe the arguments that PSTs present, I look for reasoning types associated with making and supporting.
Reasoning is a very broad term, and there is no consensus on its definition (Conner et al., 2014). For the purposes of this
study, I define reasoning as ways in which PSTs come to a claim or support a claim.
Inductive reasoning occurs when a PST makes a for-all claim from examining a proper subset of cases. Deductive reasoning
occurs when a PST links data to claims using one or more inference rules in a chain of logical necessity. For this study, the
key element here is the logical necessity, not whether the rule applied is explicitly stated. Deductive reasoning can be used
either to support or to arrive at a claim, but inductive reasoning can only be used to arrive at a claim. When a PST uses the
empirical data from an inductive activity to support a generalization, the reasoning is empirical. Empirical reasoning refers
to supporting a claim by exhausting only a proper subset of cases to which the claim applies.
It is a robust finding that there are students at all levels who are convinced of mathematical validity by empirical evidence.
Stylianides and Stylianides (2009), however, found that many of the pre-service elementary teachers who developed empir-
ical arguments were also aware that their arguments were not proof. Thus, my framework includes a distinction between
PSTs who present empirical reasoning and those who express naïve empiricism by asserting that the empirical evidence is
sufficient for viable argumentation.
Another way PSTs may come to a claim or support a claim is by using an analogy. Analogical reasoning is observed
when a PST develops or explores a claim, or support for a claim, by noting similarities between corresponding mathematical
situations or by noting correspondences between structures among mathematical situations. (See Conner et al., 2014, for a
discussion of how analogical reasoning has been used in other mathematics education literature.)
Finally, when a PST searches for a deductive argument for a claim, the reasoning can be described as abductive. Pedemonte
(2007) describes abductive reasoning as “an inference which allows the construction of a claim [about inference rules and
cases] starting from an observed fact [sic]” (p. 29). Conner et al. (2014) elaborate on this idea, writing that “abduction can be
seen in the mathematics classroom when students first come across a result and then have to guess or hypothesize which
particular rule or case afforded (or might afford) such a result” (p. 187). Placing these perspectives into the language of
my study, PSTs demonstrate abductive reasoning when they present a claim and then search for data and inference rules
(warrants) to construct a deductive argument.
4.2. Influences on argument production
4.2.1. Knowledge of viable argument and argument practices

My framework already has a notion of viable argument (defined above) that I communicated to the PSTs. However,
PSTs come to any study with prior experiences in mathematics that may include arguing, justifying, and proving. PSTs may
have learned argument standards and argument practices in previous courses that would influence their responses to my
refutation tasks. Thus, I looked to the literature for argument knowledge frameworks useful in developing my theoretical
framework for this study.
Stylianides and Ball (2008) develop a framework for knowledge about proof for teaching that draws distinctions between
the knowledge about the logico-linguistic structure of proof and the knowledge of situations for proving. The former refers
to knowledge for communicating in accordance with a community’s norms for stating and supporting claims, particularly
the norms canonical to the mathematical community. The latter refers to knowledge for mobilizing proving opportunities
for students and is related to understanding of a task’s purposes. I will address this last construct in a different section.
For this study, knowledge of argumentation will refer to PSTs’ understanding of what constitutes a viable argument. I
applied a code of sufficient or insufficient understanding of a particular argument knowledge type (e.g., that testing a subset
of cases does not prove a generalization) based on a PST’s claim and support of the claim—or a PST’s activity associated with
developing the claim or its support.
As mentioned in Section 3, Lakatos (1976) provides a theoretical framework, based on historical events, for actions that
mathematicians might take when facing a refutation. This framework has proven useful in studying student and teacher
refutations (e.g., Balacheff, 1991; Giannakoulias et al., 2010; Larsen & Zandieh, 2008).
In this study, I adopted Lakatos’s framework to look for occasions when PSTs use the practices of mathematicians or
practices akin to those of mathematicians. In such cases, I applied an influence code of sufficient or insufficient understanding
or use of [the practice].
4.2.2. Academic, natural, and semantic language and the mathematics register
The way in which words are used in natural language can influence how those same words are used in mathematics.
Semantic meanings of words influence how students engage with and assess proofs (Mejia-Ramos & Inglis, 2011). The
mathematics register uses the precise technical meanings of conjunctives such as if, when, and therefore in ways that are
different from their everyday uses (Schleppegrell, 2007). For instance, Galbraith (1981) notes that many students do not
give proper attention to words like “every.” The appropriate use of the mathematics register is important for learning
(Schleppegrell, 2007), and such use is viewed by some as intertwined with the practice of mathematics itself:
Language is crucial for mathematical reasoning and communication with others about mathematical ideas, claims, and
explanations, and proofs. Mathematical language is not simply an inert canon, inherited and learned from a distant
past. It is also the medium in which mathematics is enacted, used, and created. (Ball and Bass, 2000, p. 205)
Robotti (2012) argues that students’ natural language usage can be seen as a research tool for studying the evolution of
students’ mathematical processes, especially during proving episodes. In my study, I assumed that PSTs’ claims are influenced
by their use of language, including the mathematics register. I applied a code of sufficient or insufficient knowledge of, use of,
or skill with the mathematics register to determine plausible influences on the claims that PSTs developed.
4.2.3. Perceptions of the task

Participants in Balacheff’s (1991) study were asked to “give a way of calculating the number of diagonals of a polygon once
the number of its vertices is known” (p. 93). Their assigned goal was to develop a generalization for all polygons and defend
that generalization (Balacheff’s analysis was performed with this goal in mind), so it is unlikely that his participants would
view a counterexample argument as a complete response to the task. Perceived didactic contracts can influence responses,
and theoretically there is always a didactic contract in place, either explicitly or implicitly given. This perceived contract
could come from the researcher, the teacher, or some previous experiences in an argument context. For my study, I adopted
a broader term, perceptions of the task, to account for these influences.
The Stylianides and Ball (2008) conception of knowledge of situations for proving has some relationship to my conception
of perceptions of the task. Within the Stylianides and Ball construct are two types of knowledge related to tasks: knowledge of
different kinds of proving tasks and knowledge of the relationship between proving tasks and proving activities. Knowledge
of proving tasks refers to an understanding of proving tasks and the classification of tasks. For example, does the task involve
refuting or verification? Or does the task involve finitely many or infinitely many? The latter refers to knowledge of the
critical aspects of the proving activity that can be provoked by a task and its purposes. (For instance, refuting a claim might
provoke a counterexample search, while a claim about finitely many objects might provoke systematic enumeration.) These
constructs are not an exact match for my study because PSTs enrolled in a content course are often given a task and asked to
produce an argument in response, as opposed to being asked to develop the task itself. Also, the word knowledge might not
tell the entire story because PSTs likely combine existing knowledge with perceptions of teacher/researcher expectations
(i.e., the didactic contract). Finally, I do not view viable argument and proof as synonymous. I preserve the word proof for
formal, logical arguments that explicitly appeal to prior results and make all the logical progressions explicit.
Aspects of the Stylianides and Ball knowledge-of-proving-tasks conception, however, do resonate with the knowledge
and perceptions likely to be found among PSTs when they encounter an argument task. PSTs must make judgments about
the purposes of the task and what mathematical practices are expected from them. When PSTs encounter a false claim,
they must ask themselves whether they are expected to produce a counterexample and declare the original claim false, or
whether they are expected to alter the claim based on their counterexample(s) and develop a new generalization—or both.
Thus, I found it necessary to recast Stylianides and Ball’s framework for this context. Perceptions of the task refers to the
types of responses PSTs view as appropriate, required, or desired (e.g., present a counterexample argument or develop an
alternative generalization). This construct differs from the earlier construct knowledge of argumentation in the following
way. A student who asserts that a counterexample is all that is needed for a complete response to a task with a false
generalization expresses a perception of the task. A student who asserts that a refutation task is not complete until an
alternative generalization that classifies all counterexamples or conforming cases is developed also expresses a perception of
the task. A student who asserts that a counterexample is sufficient for showing a generalization is false expresses knowledge
of argumentation. A student who asserts that general support, not specific cases, is required to create a viable argument for
a generalization also expresses knowledge of argumentation.
5. Methods
I conducted the study reported in this article within a larger research project investigating the effects of the teaching
sequence for improving PSTs’ ability to construct and critique arguments. This larger project involved a course on mathemat-
ics for elementary (K-8) teachers with an emphasis on number and operation. I was the teacher/researcher doing research
akin to that described by Cobb and Steffe (1983). The larger study was comprised of several tasks that involved making claims
and developing arguments for those claims. This section briefly describes the participants, the teaching they experienced,
and the research strategy I chose to address the research question.
5.1. Participants and data collection
Data were collected during a 10-week teaching experiment (Cobb & Steffe, 1983) designed to improve PSTs’ ability to
construct viable arguments. Twenty-one PSTs who were enrolled in an undergraduate mathematics content course for
elementary school teachers in the Western United States participated in the study. Data were collected from five sources:
(1) PSTs’ weekly posts in an online environment (147 posts in total); (2) my observations during in-class work (30 lessons
that had at least some type of argumentation practice); (3) PSTs’ written responses to in-class tasks; (4) PSTs’ responses on
paper-and-pencil assessments (two assessment items on the final exam); and (5) four task-based clinical interviews with
PSTs (as described in Goldin, 2000), which were audio-recorded and transcribed. I performed clinical interviews in groups
of four, based on PSTs’ online discussion groups.
5.2. Teaching and tasks
In the course I gave PSTs the framework for viable argument (described in Section 4.1.1) as a standard for constructing
arguments.
PSTs received instruction on creating viable arguments and critiquing the arguments of others (see NGACBP and CCSSO,
2010, for a description of this phrase). This instruction reflected the constructivist practices described in Cobb and Steffe
(1983). I demonstrated the argument practices canonical to mathematicians and the viable argument framework through
both explicit instruction and interactions with the PSTs during collective argumentation activities. PSTs frequently worked
on argument tasks alone and in groups in a manner resembling what Cobb and Steffe might call “working at a distance”
from the teacher. I reflected on PSTs’ responses/arguments and built models of their thinking and practices. I reflected on
the distance between (1) their responses and current practices and (2) the knowledge and practices I hoped they would
learn and adopt. In this way, I viewed the PSTs as constructing their own thinking and practices, perhaps choosing what to
learn based on prior experiences; and I attempted to bridge the gap between the intended learning and what was actually
learned or adopted by the PSTs.
Argument tasks included developing and exploring conjectures, mostly in number theory, and responding with argu-
ments. I gave explicit instruction about the differences between generalizations and existence statements, as well as the
standards for viable argument for each type. PSTs received instruction on arguing with counterexamples; with the method
of exhaustion; with prior results to show that a conclusion follows necessarily from conditions; and with referents such as
diagrams, variable expressions, and generic examples to demonstrate that the conclusion of a claim follows necessarily for
all cases in the domain of a claim.
PSTs also received instruction on some of the refutation practices described in Lakatos (1976). After a counterexample
argument was constructed, I emphasized the practice of developing and arguing for generalizations about conforming cases
(finite and infinite domains) and generalizations about classes of counterexamples (finite and infinite domains). I made
explicit that one counterexample is sufficient to refute a generalization, but that often mathematicians look for alternative
generalizations after a counterexample argument is complete. Accordingly, PSTs practiced writing a new argument separate
from the counterexample argument. During such episodes, I emphasized exception barring, in which I modeled the practice
of restricting a claim to only the cases we had actually considered.
The PSTs completed a variety of argumentation tasks throughout the semester. Here, for brevity and clarity, I present only
two of the tasks. I presented these tasks to the PSTs toward the end of the semester, after PSTs had received the instruction
described above. The PSTs’ responses to the tasks and to the follow-up interview questions are assumed to reflect the
knowledge and practices the PSTs constructed from the experiences in the course (and perhaps prior experiences).
Task 1: You are teaching a sixth-grade class. You ask the class to investigate the sums of consecutive [counting]
numbers and develop some rules about the types of numbers that are sums of 2, 3, 4, and 5 numbers. After some
set time, three students offer rules. Sally says that the sum of two consecutive numbers is odd. Sophia says that the
sum of three consecutive numbers is divisible by 3. Isabella says, “I think that the sum of four consecutive numbers is
divisible by 4.” Write exemplary responses that include viable arguments.
Task 2: Examine the conjecture and respond with a viable argument. Conjecture: For all natural numbers n, n2 + n + 41
is a prime number.
5.3. Data analysis
I addressed the research question about PSTs’ claiming, stated in Section 1, using a generative study (Clement, 2000)
and interpretive analysis to modify and revise existing frameworks. This process can include developing new categories
as well as modifying existing ones, in order to analyze and interpret the study’s data (e.g., build a model for the data).
Teaching experiments are well-suited for generative studies that build models for students’ thinking and practices because
participants are studied as they engage over time in a particular learning experience. This article reports on the thinking
and practices that emerged within the teaching experiment—not on the impact of the experiment as a model for developing
argumentation skills.
Analysis methods resembled those described by Miles and Huberman (1994), in which the analyst begins with a theoret-
ical coding framework that is constantly compared to the data until a model that fits the data emerges. I employed the entire
scheme described in Section 4. In practice, the literature discussed in Section 4 was an a priori lens for the data analysis. The
final theoretical framework emerged from constantly comparing the existing literature to my data and adapting themes until
a fit emerged. As new or modified conceptual themes emerged, I verified the themes through triangulation. For example,
as I coded PSTs’ posts, I confirmed emerging themes with task-based interview data, in-class written work, and assessment
data.
In Section 7, I illustrate the findings with cases to give empirical support for the existence of practices and influences.
Other than noting whether or not the occurrence was isolated to one or two participants, I make no assertions about the
frequency of occurrences based on this sample. (Therefore, I do not include statistics such as “7 out of 21.”)
5.4. Summary of framework as an analysis scheme
Tables in Appendices A and B summarize the final theoretical framework as it was used as an analysis scheme. For clarity
and brevity, I have included only aspects of the framework that I actually observed in my data. For example, I found no
instances of monster barring, perhaps due to the context, so this practice is not included in the table.
6. Illustrating the analysis framework
The example below, though developed from my data, does not represent any one PST’s work. Instead it is an illustration of
the framework based on an accumulation of responses found in my data. (No single PST in my study expressed the framework
so coherently.) The purpose of this example is to provide the reader with a clear understanding of how the framework is
applied. Using a fictionalized version of data and events to develop a coherent illustrative model for argumentation has
precedents in the mathematics philosophy literature (e.g., Lakatos, 1976) and mathematics education literature (e.g., Leron
& Zaslavsky, 2013).
6.1. Discovering that the claim Is false
Kate encounters the prompt in Task 1 and is asked to develop a response. She begins by generating some examples in a
manipulate stage. She writes:
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10; 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 = 14; 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 = 18
In a get-a-sense-of stage, Kate notices that none of her examples has a sum that is divisible by 4. Her conceptual insight
is that there are examples of four consecutive numbers that satisfy the conditions of the claim but not the conclusion. She
suspects that no sum of four consecutive numbers is divisible by 4, but she does not have an insight about why this is so.
She is aware that the relational structure between the conditions and not the conclusion does not address all cases, but only
the three examples considered.
In the articulate stage, Kate writes the following argument:
Claim
Isabella’s claim is false.
Data: 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10.
Warrant: 1, 2, 3, and 4 are four consecutive counting numbers. These numbers sum to 10. 10/4 = 2.5 is not an integer.
Therefore, the sum is not divisible by 4.
6.1.1. Analysis
Kate expresses a prudent TH1 by articulating a claim that does not go beyond what she can support with her data and
CI. Kate does not claim that no sum of four consecutive numbers is divisible by 4. Such a claim would not be prudent relative
to the data and CI expressed. This is because the CI, up to this point, does not attend to any relational structure shared by all
possible examples. The relational structure observed depends on the specific examples tested.
Kate’s foundation expresses an adequate TH2 because she has assembled her data and CI into a viable argument by
meeting the standards for arguing for an existence claim (there exists a counterexample). Her data exhibit a candidate
in the domain of the original claim, and her warrant demonstrates that the candidate has the desired properties (not the
conclusion).
6.2. Kate’s movements toward a generalization
Based on her data, Kate wonders whether there exists a sum of four consecutive numbers that is divisible by 4. She
suspects there is not one. She wishes to get-a-sense-of the relational structure between the conditions of the claim (the sum
of four consecutives) and not the conclusion (not divisible by 4) to understand why there are counterexamples. She reenters
the manipulate stage to look for this structure. She recalls seeing consecutive numbers written as n, n+ 1, . . . and writes the
conditions of the claim as n + (n + 1) + (n + 2) + (n + 3). She manipulates this sum to form the expression 4n + 6. Reentering the
get-a-sense-of stage, Kate notices that dividing 4n + 6 by 4 results in a remainder of 2. This observation becomes a CI about
the relational structure between the conditions of the claim and not the conclusion that applies to all possible examples
(cases) in the domain of the claim. She returns to the manipulate stage to express her CI in a manner that can be appealed to
in a viable argument. She writes 4n + 6 as 4(n + 1) + 2.
In an articulate stage, Kate writes the following argument:
Claim
For all sums of four consecutive counting numbers, none are divisible by 4.
Data: Let n represent any counting number. n + (n + 1) + (n + 2) + (n + 3) = 4n + 6 =4(n + 1) + 2
Warrant: My foundation shows that any collection of four consecutive numbers has a sum equal to a multiple of 4
plus 2. A multiple of 4 plus 2 has a remainder of 2 when divided by 4 and is therefore not divisible by 4.
6.2.1. Analysis
Kate expresses a prudent TH1 of her data and CI by developing a generalization that is appropriate relative to her data
and CI. This is because her CI expresses the relational structure shared by all possible examples in the domain of her claim.
Kate expresses an adequate TH2 by assembling her data and CI as a viable argument. The handlings occur in various
stages of argumentation. One technical handling occurs when she represents the conditions of the claim generically as
n + (n + 1) + (n + 2) + (n + 3). Another handling occurs relative to her CI when she expresses 4n + 6 as 4(n + 1) + 2. This handling
occurs in a movement from a get-a-sense-of stage back to a manipulate stage with a goal of developing an adequate rep-
resentation of the CI for viable argumentation. This last “movement” is unique from the framework illustrated in Fig. 1 in
Sandefur et al. (2013, p. 339). Sandefur et al. place technical handles (TH2) in the get-a-sense-of stage. In my data they occur
in both pre-articulate stages.
7. Results
In the subsections that follow, I apply the analysis framework to report findings that emerged in my data to address the
research question about the types of claims PSTs produced and plausible influences.
7.1. Problematic and imprudent claims and influences
PSTs often presented problematic claims in response to false generalizations in which the literal meaning of their claims
was unclear or the literal meaning was different from what they intended to express. These problematic claims were
influenced by PSTs’ use of natural language and PSTs’ limited knowledge of, use of, and skill with the mathematics register.
PSTs often presented imprudent claims about conforming cases after noting an infinite class of counterexamples. These
imprudent claims were influenced by insufficient understandings of the mathematical practice of exception barring, per-
ceptions that responses to refutation tasks should be general, insufficient understanding of the limitations of empirical
evidence, insufficient knowledge that general claims require data about the relational structure for all cases, and insufficient
understanding of and skill with the mathematics register.
7.1.1. Problematic claims influenced by language use and knowledge of, use of, and skill with the mathematics register
In the exchange between Jerri and Gabbi in Appendix C, Jerri’s first post contains a problematic claim. Jerri claims that
“for all Natural numbers N, N2 + N + 41 is SOMETIMES a prime number.” To understand the types of claims Jerri believed he
was presenting as well as his thoughts about the domain of his “sometimes” claim, I asked Jerri about the post. Below are
excerpts from the interview:
Yopp: So the original conjecture . . . what kind of statement is that?
Jerri: That’s a for-all.
Yopp: . . . What does that say to you mathematically as a for-all or a there-exists? [Yopp points to Jerri’s first post.]
Jerri: There exists a counterexample.
Yopp: Mathematically, have you done what you are to do?
Jerri: As far as writing a viable argument or proving it false?
Yopp: What would your claim be?
In the transcript Jerri then restates his “sometimes” claim found in his first post and mentions that all multiples of 41 are
counterexamples. Jerri continues, “So I guess that would be more of a there-exists statement because it’s sometimes. It’s not
for all numbers. But I wasn’t thinking that way.”
Jerri is using “sometimes” as neither an existence qualifier nor a for-all qualifier; yet he wishes to express his observation
about an infinite and unbounded set of counterexamples, as well as express observations about the existence of conforming
cases. Jerri wishes to do all of this without making a claim about all the real numbers.
Jerri’s reported activities (in the sense of Bruner, 1966) and conceptual insights are important for understanding his
claiming practices. In his first post, Jerri reports a manipulate stage during which he discovers a variety of conforming cases
and counterexamples. Jerri also reports a get-a-sense-of stage in which he found two CIs that can be associated with claiming.
One CI expresses a relational structure between the conditions and the conclusion for the inputs N = 3, 4, and 41 (i.e., particular
conforming cases and a particular counterexample). The other CI expresses a relational structure between the conditions
and not the conclusion for an infinite class of counterexamples (i.e., multiples of 41).
The combination of Jerri’s posts and interview responses offers insights into the handling of his data and CIs in developing
claims. Jerri’s “sometimes” claim expresses a problematic TH1 because the literal meaning of his claim is unclear relative to
other information he gives. In the first post, Jerri appears to make claims about both the existence of counterexamples and
conforming cases, but the interview data suggest otherwise (“I guess that would be more of a there-exists statement . . .. But
I wasn’t thinking that way.”). Yet his response to Gabbi in his second post (“We are trying to show that this formula works
almost every time or SOMETIMES”) suggests that Jerri is using “sometimes” to express existence notions. Next, toward the
end of his exchange with Gabbi, Jerri is attempting to state that the claim is false and then classify all conforming cases and
all counterexamples (see the claim at the end of the second post – “if not for 41 and its multiples, it will work ALL the time”
– and similar claims in his third post). What is clear in his posts is that Jerri has either limited knowledge of or limited skill
with the mathematics register for expressing his observations. In particular, he wants to express a claim about an infinite
class of counterexamples and, at least in the first post, a finite number of known conforming cases. However, at the end
of his first post, Jerri reports that he is not sure how to make this claim. In sum, Jerri makes rich observations about the
mathematical situation in Task 2 and wishes to express them, but he lacks sufficient mastery of the mathematics register to
express his observations correctly or in a manner that communicates them clearly to his peer and instructor.
Other problematic handles of data and CIs occur when the literal meaning of the PST’s articulated claim is different from
what the PST intended to claim. An example of this occurs in the posts from another student who worked in a different
online group from Jerri and Gabbi:
Jean: [Reports on the first five conforming examples.] But what happens if we use 41 as n? n = 41[;] 412 = 1681[;]
1681 + 41 + 41 = 1763[;] 41 goes into 1681 41 times, as 1683 is 41 squared. However, 41 goes into 41 + 41 twice as well,
so I am noticing something really big: 1763 is NOT PRIME . . . Check it out: 1763/41 = 43. Boom. So this claim is FALSE,
as n = 41 is a counterexample.
Jean: So, new claim: n2 + n + 41 does not produce a prime number for all natural numbers, n . . ..
Jean’s reported manipulate stage expresses a purposeful testing of the claim in Task 2 against examples. In the get-a-sense-
of stage, Jean notes conforming cases and a counterexample. He expresses the structural relation between the conditions
(a natural number) and not the conclusion (41 is a factor of 1683), and thus, he identifies a CI. Here the relational structure
is limited to a finite set of particular cases. In the articulate stage, Jean reports his earlier stages and writes a claim that the
original claim is false. Jean then returns to the conversation, responding to his own post, and presents a “new claim” that
incorporates the phrase “for all.” This new claim is literally a generalization.
Unfortunately, Jean’s new claim states that no outputs are prime, and this interpretation is inconsistent with what Jean
likely intended to express. Jean reports both conforming cases and counterexamples, so it is unlikely that he intended to
write an impossibility claim for all inputs. Jean’s issues are with natural language usage, not a misconception about what can
be claimed from the data and insights. Jean may not see a difference between stating, “n2 + n + 41 is not prime for all natural
numbers” and stating, “n2 + n + 41 is not prime for at least some natural numbers.” Moreover, Jean may not be aware that
among mathematicians, the use of the phrase “for all” invokes perceptions that the claim’s conclusion applies to all cases in
the claim’s domain. The position expressed in this article is that Jean’s technical handlings of his data and insights in forming a
claim are problematic because the claim is not worded appropriately with respect to the data and insights expressed. I view
this type of formal claiming as a technical skill, a skill in which Jean may not have received formal training in his schooling
outside of this course.
7.1.2. Imprudent claims influenced by insufficient understanding or use of exception barring

In Jerri’s exchange with Gabbi, shown in Appendix C, and in his follow-up interview, an imprudent claim is present. Jerri
claims that all natural numbers other than multiples of 41 are conforming cases. Jerri has offered no conceptual insight about
the conforming cases other than demonstrating the existence of a handful of conforming cases. Jerri expresses skepticism
about empirical evidence when he writes in his third post, “As far as I know there are no other [counterexamples].” Jerri is
also skeptical in his first post when he explores the original claim in Task 2 by examining cases past the first few conforming
cases until he finds a counterexample. Moreover, Jerri expresses an understanding that generalizations require general
support when he presents the foundation N(N + 1) + 41 in support of his claim about an infinite class of counterexamples.
Consequently, Jerri is not a naive empiricist. Yet, in his third post, Jerri claims that 41 is the least counterexample, a claim
that is false (40 is also a counterexample). In fact, when I review Jerri’s reported manipulate and get-a-sense-of stages, I find
no evidence that Jerri is looking for a structural insight that accommodates a claim about all non-multiples of 41. Thus, Jerri
expresses an imprudent TH1 when he assembles his data and CIs into alternative claims about the least counterexample and
all conforming cases. The structural relationships he acknowledges do not apply or attend to all cases in the domain of these
claims.
In my data, the type of overgeneralizations that Jerri makes seems to be associated with inadequate representations—
those that do not offer structural links between the conditions (e.g., not a multiple of 41) and the claim (e.g., prime
output). Such overgeneralizations are also associated with a limited understanding of or use of the practice of excep-
tion barring. Throughout Jerri’s exchange with Gabbi, Jerri continues to put forth claims about conforming cases (e.g.,
all natural numbers except 41 and its multiples work), but Jerri never focuses on developing restricted claims about
what he knows for certain to be true. This is despite having a compelling CI about multiples of 41 and having ade-
quately handled this CI by writing N(N + 1) + 41, which would serve as an adequate TH2 for a claim restricted to multiples
of 41.
Jerri seems to feel that claims restricted to proper subsets of the original claims domain are inadequate responses to the
task (I will address this in detail in the Perceptions section). This is evidenced in his first response to Gabbi: “We are trying to
show this formula works almost every time or sometimes.” In Jerri and Gabbi’s discourse, neither PST attempts to develop
a claim restricted to “known” conforming cases.
Absent throughout my data, except for one case described below, is any use of exception barring to restrict a generalization
to the finite number of cases tested. In the one exception, a PST offers a claim restricted to the first 40 cases; but a peer PST
dismisses the claim as insufficient for the task and asks, “I wonder what the point of proving 1–40 is . . . what patter[n] does
that build?” This suggests perceptions of the task, but it also relates to exception barring. PSTs seem quick to use exception
barring by writing a generalization that “throws out” known counterexamples, but the practice of restricting claims to known
conforming cases appears in my data only once.
Fig. 3. Drew continues to express a “density” notion—here on her final exam.
PSTs made overgeneralizations not only in the form of imprudent exception barring, but also in the form of over-
generalizations about the density of conforming cases. The online post and follow-up work from Drew illustrate this
finding:
Drew: You made a good point, Jean, that the claim has a counterexample and is therefore false. I also wonder why,
though, that adding 41 most of the time works in this case. My thoughts are that it might have to do with the fact that
41 is a prime number itself. If you add a prime number to a prime number, then the end result will no [sic] be prime
unless you add another prime number to it, at least most of the time.
Drew’s peers had already posted the counterexample 41 and several conforming cases before Drew entered the conver-
sation. Prior to Drew’s post, Jean posted a claim that n2 + n + k is composite when k = n. Jean supported this claim with the
general representation k(k + 2).
In the post above, Drew reports being in a state of abduction in which she is trying to get-a-sense-of why the expression
n2 + n + k outputs a prime “most of the time,” which is apparently her claim. Drew offers no information about a manipulate
stage and may only be referencing data from previous posts. We know little about the details of Drew’s get-a-sense-of stage,
although her claim that “most of the time the output is prime” appears to be based in a false insight about adding primes
and not in a representation of the conditions or conclusion of the original claim in Task 2.
Drew’s “most of the time” claim is imprudent based on the data and CI expressed in previous posts and the false insight
about adding primes. Drew presents no relational structure about adding primes to support the subclaim about primes. She
exhibits an inappropriate TH1 when she develops a “most of the time” claim based on the limited amount of data and the
limited scope of the CI. Comparing her practice to the practice of exception barring, Drew does not limit her claiming to
those cases that have been sufficiently explored.
Some readers might find Drew’s use of terms like “most of the time” to be sensible based on empirical observations.
I don’t disagree. Some readers might even note that for countable subsets of countable sets, terms like “usually” and
“most of time” are not necessarily meaningful (e.g., it does not make sense to say there are more rational numbers than
integers). I acknowledge that reasoning is a messy business and that pursuing the “why” based on an observation about
a set of finite data is a noteworthy mathematical practice. But finding ways to validate Drew’s claim based on an ana-
lyst’s knowledge of mathematics is not the purpose of this study. The purpose is to explore the claims developed in the
articulate stage relative to the data or conceptual insights presented and plausible influences. The data and insights Drew
presents are insufficient for supporting even a claim that the conforming cases are infinite. Even if we give Drew the ben-
efit of the doubt and assume that she means that up to some finite value, the number of conforming cases exceeds the
counterexample cases, we would still be overlooking the fact that the claim is not appropriate relative to the data or CI
presented. Let’s not forget that primes become less frequent over intervals of set length as the interval bounds grow larger.
So intuitions about primes and “frequency” are problematic at best. Drew is likely unaware of this and unaware of the
mathematical standard of not making claims for which you have insufficient support (Galbraith, 1981). The concern is that
Drew is expressing a type of empiricism about all counting numbers based on a relatively small, specialized sample of
values.
In fact, Drew seems to have a habit of overgeneralizing about density based on finite data. Fig. 3 shows one of her final
exam responses that also makes a density (“usually”) assertion without support.
The practice of exception barring can be viewed not only as “throwing out” known counterexamples, but also as a practice
of restricting one’s claims to cases of which we are certain. In this sense, Drew expresses a limited understanding or use of
this practice.
While the cases above illustrate situations in which the domain of the claim is infinite, examples of insufficient under-
standing of exception barring can also occur when claiming about a finite number of cases. In my data, only one case emerged
in which the arguer suggested restricting the domain to a finite number of conforming cases:
Fig. 4. Corey’s problematic claim and unsupported, imprudent assertion in the warrant.
Corey: . . . So, maybe 41 is the only number that doesn’t work and then we could change our claim to all natural
numbers under 41. I think this definitely needs some further looking into by our group members. I would say that any
multiple of 41 would make this conjecture false.
Jean: Yes, I would imagine that any multiple of 41 would make it false, as it would then be divisible by 41. But one
counterexample is all we need to prove it wrong. I wonder what the point of proving 1–40 is, though? What patter[n]
does that build?
Corey is responding to others’ posts about Task 2 that included a few conforming cases and the counterexample 41. Corey
does not report enough detail to understand her manipulate and get-a-sense-of stages; yet there is enough information in
her post to get a picture of her TH1. Corey’s proposed claim, that inputs 1–40 have prime outputs, is false because 40 is also
a counterexample. It appears that Corey has not explored any cases other than those presented by peers: “So, maybe 41 is
the only number that doesn’t work.” Recall that Galbraith (1981) asserts that avoiding making conjectures on insufficient
evidence is an essential component of successful proving.
Corey appears to have a habit of including information about cases not sufficiently supported, even when that information
is not necessary to support her claim. In Fig. 4, Corey offers a problematic claim that is equivalent to a generalization, and
she supports it in part with an imprudent assertion, “I’m sure there are some . . . that work.”
7.1.3. Imprudent claims influenced by insufficient understanding of the limitations of empirical evidence
Some PSTs made imprudent claims and expressed no understanding of the limitations of empirical evidence. One example
is Gabbi’s first response to Jerri (Appendix C). In her first post, Gabbi moves Jerri’s “sometimes” qualifier to a different position
in the claim. In her second post, Gabbi asserts that she is adding a non-multiple of 41 to the infinite list of counterexamples. I
was interested in Gabbi’s use of the word sometimes in her claim, her understanding of counterexample arguments, and her
goals for developing an argument (e.g., why is she searching for one more counterexample?). In the follow-up interview, I
read to Gabbi her first response to Jerri and asked her about her thinking. Below is an excerpt:
Gabbi: I guess I was just thinking that maybe since he had two [conforming examples] right here that maybe he just
could have had, maybe, more [counterexamples] over here, just to, kinda like, balance it out. I just thought maybe it
would just have made it stronger, in my opinion.
Yopp: So he had two cases where it was a prime number . . .
Gabbi: Yeah, and then he only had one [where n2 + n + 41 isn’t prime].
Yopp: So to prove to someone or to argue that something is false, how many counterexamples do you need?
Gabbi: I was just thinking more than one, but that’s just me.
Yopp: I do want to say, mathematically, you only need one counterexample to show it’s false . . ..
Gabbi: So that’s all you needed?
Gabbi’s use of the word sometimes is confusing and expresses a limited understanding of the mathematics register with
respect to how quantifiers are used in mathematics to make assertions clear. We know she wishes to create a generalization
(“I think it . . . needs to be generalized”), and she may be asserting that the number of counterexamples is the same as the
number of conforming cases. Most interesting are Gabbi’s assertions about “balancing it out” as a way to improve the support
for the “sometimes” claim and her critique in her first post: “Having one counterexample does not really prove your point.”
Gabbi expresses an insufficient understanding of counterexample argumentation, but this follows a limited understanding
of the role of empirical data and its potential for viable argumentation. Gabbi clearly wants to make a claim that is more
general than the one Jerri presents, and she bases her claiming on examining an insufficient number of cases.
Readers might view Gabbi’s claiming as presenting an imprudent claim that is false. I want to make clear, however, that
my findings are not based in truth of the claims that PSTs present. Below is an example of a true claim that is still imprudent
because the PST does not report a sufficient CI for making the claim.
Charli: Data for Claim #3. My example of the claim: 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10 or 4 + 5 + 6 + 7 = 2 [22] supports the claim that
says: “The sum of four consecutive counting numbers is not divisible by 4.” Because shown here proves that these
consecutive counting numbers are not divisible by 4.
The claim Charli presents in quotes is equivalent to a generalization, although it is not completely clear in the post whether
she intended to make a generalization. In the third sentence, Charli specifies “these consecutive counting numbers,” raising
the possibility that she has restricted the claim to just the examples presented. Yet during a follow-up interview, Charli
reports that she was making a generalization about all sums of four consecutives in her post. When asked to read her post
and discuss whether her claim applies to all sums or just those included in her post, Charli responds, “I was doing data, so I
just picked those right off the top of my head.”
Follow-up questions reveal that Charli thinks of data as being examples or a list of numbers as in science experiments.
Charli says that she intended to “get general about it in the warrant.” When asked whether her support was sufficient for a
generalization, Charli responds, “So then did I need to include more [examples] . . . like, a different [example], like, instead
of 4, 5, 6, 7, or? [sic].”
At this point, a peer from Charli’s discussion group who participated in the interview writes n + n + 1 + n + 2 + n + 3 =4n + 6
and says, “This is what you are basically saying in more general form.” Charli responds, “So mine was just an example. So,
like, what data could we have used to make it more [general]? Because all I did was 1, 2, 3, 4. I could have done, like, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25.”
Charli’s manipulate and get-a-sense-of stages involve only examples, and she expresses an imprudent TH1 and an inade-
quate TH2. Even though Charli expresses some understanding of mathematical argumentation by stating that she wishes to
“get general . . . in the warrant,” she does not express understanding that in order to get general about it in the warrant, the
data must express the relational structure shared by all cases. Charli does not show an understanding that data should be
handled in a manner so that the relational structure between the sum of four consecutives and not divisible by 4 is transparent.
Finally, Charli does not express an understanding about limiting her claim to what she can support or an understanding that
no amount of examples is sufficient support for a generalization with infinite domain.
In Charli’s case, I note the plausibility of two influences. One, Charli expresses an insufficient understanding that arguing
for generalizations requires attention to structural elements shared by all cases. Two, Charli does not express an under-
standing of the practice of exception barring that limits claims to the cases examined. Thus, her imprudent TH1 is influenced
by insufficient understandings of both how generalizations are supported by referents (e.g., the structure expressed in
examples) and what claims can be made based on data and CIs.
7.1.4. Imprudent claiming in there-exists contexts

Gabbi’s data offer an example of another type of imprudent handling in developing claims. This imprudent handling
relates to making existence claims. After her first post (Appendix C), Gabbi enters a manipulate stage in which she searches
for another counterexample. After an apparent get-a-sense-of stage, Gabbi reports that 632 + 63 + 41 = 4073 is not prime. This
stage is problematic because she does not express a structural relationship between the conditions and not the conclusion.
This would involve demonstrating the pertinent structure for a counterexample: that 4073 has a factor other than 1. In
fact, Jerri contests the counterexample, and Gabbi reports that she did not actually check. Incidentally, she responds with
another candidate counterexample, 40, which is indeed a counterexample; but again, Gabbi offers no relational structure
that connects 1681 to “not prime.”
I coded Gabbi’s TH1 of her data as imprudent because she lacks an appropriate CI to warrant the existence claim. This
example offers a chance to reiterate a key component in my theoretical framework: that to explore PSTs’ claiming appro-
priately, one needs to examine both the TH1 and TH2. This is because the term “argument” incorporates both the claim and
the support for the claim. Prudent claiming is inherently associated with knowledge about the support for that claim, or at
least a CI about how the claim can be viably supported. An appropriate CI for Gabbi’s counterexample claim can be based in a
relational structure that connects 402 + 40 + 41 to not the conclusion “not prime.” Viable existence arguments not only offer
a suitable candidate, but also demonstrate that the candidate has the desired properties. Thus, Gabbi imprudently makes her
claim without appropriate support for her claim. This claiming is associated with incomplete pre-articulate activity stages.
7.1.5. More on exception barring and perceptions of the task

Jean’s response to Corey in Section 7.1.2 offers insight into PSTs’ limited use of prudent exception barring and its influences
on claiming. Corey’s proposed restricted claim (cases 1–40 for Task 2) offers a legitimate form of exception barring, even
though Lakatos’s (1976) characters might call this playing it safe. Unfortunately, Corey’s approach to restricting the domain
of her claim to a finite “exhaustible” set is dismissed by her peer for not finding a pattern. The group never returns to this
claim or any other claim about the known conforming cases.
While a reader might value Jean’s desire for a more general claim (and I do as well), let’s return to the scope of this
article. My goal is to document types of claiming and influences on claiming that might be observed in PSTs in this
type of course. Regardless of the reasons for Jean’s dismissal of Corey’s claim, its effect is that a viable mathematical
practice – restricting claims to those cases the arguer feels certain of – is no longer part of the PSTs’ collective argumen-
tation. Such practice has the potential to limit overgeneralizing, but Jean dismisses the practice as not meeting the task’s
objectives.
7.2. Prudent claims and their influences
Jerri’s second claim (in his first post, Appendix C) that all multiples of 41 are counterexamples expresses a prudent
TH1 relative to the data and the CIs he presents. The expression N(N + 1) + 41 conveys a structural relationship for a class
of objects that meet the conditions (multiples of 41) and not the conclusion (output is composite). In the interview, Jerri
reports developing this representation because he felt that he needed to “figure out why that is” [that all numbers other than
41 seem to conform to the original claim]. He reports changing the constant term to other numbers, including composites,
to try to meet this goal. In my data, these types of prudent claims are associated with CIs and with data that were sufficiently
handled so that the structural relationships for all cases in the domain of the resulting claim were transparent. These claims
also are associated with perceptions that complete responses to refutation tasks explain why there are counterexamples,
conforming cases, or both.
In a group different from those previously discussed, a PST named Sam develops a prudent alternative generalization
from a CI developed while searching for an explanation for why there are counterexamples to Isabella’s claim (Task 1).
Sam’s peer, Andy, makes clear that only one counterexample is needed to complete that part of the task. Sam returns
to the conversation and offers a CI for why counterexamples exist. Sam ultimately develops an alternative generaliza-
tion for Isabella’s claim based on her search for why counterexamples exist. Along the way, Sam makes only claims about
counterexamples and does not overgeneralize relative to her data—except, perhaps, when she claims that Isabella’s claim
“isn’t always true” (although it is not completely clear how she uses the quantifier “always”). Yet the prudent claims
that Sam and Andy present appear to be influenced by their knowledge of argumentation and by Sam’s desire to explain
why.
The following excerpt from Sam and Andy’s online discussion about Task 1 demonstrates this point:
Sam: Sophia’s claim makes sense as well. N + (N + 1) + (N + 2) = a number divisible by 3. I like writing it out like this
because you can see the group of three that the N + 1 and N + 2 makes, therefore verifying that it will make a number
divisible by 3. Isabella claims that N + (N + 1) + (N + 2) + (N + 3) = a number divisible by 4. For the same reason, we can
see that this isn’t always true. Take the numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 for instance. Added together their sum is 10, which is
not divisible by 4.
Andy: Isabella’s claim is not accurate, and you proved it by showing (1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10). All it needs is one counterex-
ample, and then no further talk is necessary.
Sam: I found a problem with using our same reasoning. Of course, proving it false by counterexample works, but I
was trying to figure out a true claim to make and our basis seemed shaky. . . . Now I’ve done some thinking about
number 3 [Isabella’s claim] and I think I came up with a solution. I’ll just type this one. N + (N + 1) + (N + 2) + (N + 3) = ?
N + N + N + N + N + 1 + 2 + 3 = 4N + 6 [sic]. So the answer is always going to be some multiple of 4, plus 6 more. In [Sophia’s
claim] it just so happened that having a remainder sum of 3 worked so that it was divisible by 3 because it was [sic]
also 3N, or a multiple of 3, plus another 3. In this problem we see that a multiple of 4 plus 6 will not always be
divisible by 4 or 6. It will however always be divisible by 2. We could change the claim to make it true by saying that
N + (N + 1) + (N + 2) + (N + 3) = an even number[.]
I wanted to know more about Sam’s understanding of counterexample arguments and arguments for generalizations. I
also wanted to know more about her assertion that their “basis seemed shaky.”
Yopp: [After the counterexample,] are you done at this point?
Sam: For proving it false? Yes.
Yopp: But you were trying to find a true statement about four consecutive numbers. What was the true statement
you were after?
Sam: Um, what I . . . I didn’t even start with trying to think of a claim. I started with writing it out as general and found
that it’s always going to equal, and I made it [inaudible], but 4N and plus 6 is going to be this, going to be the sum of
four consecutive numbers.
Yopp: [Sam, you write,] “Proving it false by counterexample works, but I was trying to figure out a true claim . . . and
our basis seemed shaky.” What do you mean there?
Sam: Well, I think, um, actually I’m not even sure if our basis was shaky. The basis that I was trying to make for it was
shaky in my head. I was saying that [N,] N + 1 and N + 2 makes a group of three, so obviously that’ll work [referring to
her work on Sophia’s claim]. But what I wanted to say was that this makes 3n and then plus three. That’s why that
works because it’s a multiple of 3 plus another multiple of 3. And so I was thinking that I hadn’t explained that clearly
[for the sum of four consecutives]. I was just referring to the remainder [when divided by 4], which is why I went
further on my next post to talk about what made the remainder of the multiples in the remainder.
I then guided Sam and her group toward the generalization, for all sums of four consecutive numbers, none are divisible by
4, that appeared in a later post by one of their peers. This generalization had not been supported with a viable argument:
Andy: I also did a bunch of examples but I didn’t do them on the post. I just was like, hmmm. Because once I found
my counterexample I was, like, maybe there is . . . so I tried to pick some random numbers to see if that was going to
work and I couldn’t find anything, so I didn’t comment.
Yopp: On the floor, there’s a generalization that these two [Sam and Andy] have established. For all consecutive
numbers, never divisible by 4. They’ve each done a bunch of examples. Are you all satisfied with their argument?
Andy: I’m not even satisfied by that.
Sam: I’d like to look into it, but I’m not satisfied with that.
Yopp: Why are you not satisfied?
Andy: Because it’s not general enough. . . . Because you have all those but there are, like, infinite possibilities.
Sam: I’m satisfied in a different way . . . because the answer is always going to be a multiple of 4, plus 6. So it’ll be
divisible by 4 with a remainder of 2.
7.2.1. Further analysis of Sam’s claiming and reasoning

In Sam’s first post, she offers an argument for Sophia’s claim (Task 1) and an argument against Isabella’s claim (Task 1).
In an apparent manipulate stage, Sam has symbolically expressed the conditions of Sophia’s claim. In a get-a-sense-of stage,
Sam has found a structural reason for the truth of the claim (the 1 and the 2 make a group of three). There is a clear CI
about the relational structure between the conditions (sum of three consecutives) and the conclusions (divisible by 3). This
structure is expressed, in part, by N + N + 1 + N + 2.
Sam develops a similar representation for Isabella’s claim in a manipulate stage, but in a get-a-sense-of stage, Sam
produces a particular counterexample. The TH1 associated with her claim (“isn’t always true”) is difficult to label as pru-
dent because she presents only one counterexample. Later posts indicate that perhaps she is using “isn’t always” to express
general observations – possibly that there are multiple or even infinitely many counterexamples – yet this is unclear in this
post.
After Sam presents a counterexample argument and claim, she returns to the conversation and reports her search for a
true claim. She also critiques her previous reasoning associated with her counterexample argument. Part of her reasoning
in this second post can be described as analogical. This is because she refers to the approach she used to address Sophia’s
claim in order to explain why there are counterexamples to Isabella’s claim. It is evident that Sam’s earlier get-a-sense-of
stage is not complete because she returns to the conversation and reports another manipulate stage. In this stage, Sam adds
like terms and to form 4N + 6, an expression that has potential for a variety of prudent claims about divisors.
Here, Sam reports developing CIs about divisors. She enters the articulate stage when she claims that the sum of four
consecutive numbers is not always divisible by 4 or 6, but the sum is always divisible by 2. Ignoring the problematic use of
the word always and the fact that stronger claims can be made about 4 and 6, these claims are prudent relative to the data
expressed. Thus, I labeled them as prudent TH1s.
In the interview data, Sam affirms the stages described above: “I didn’t . . . start with trying to think of a claim. . . . I started
writing it out as general and found what it’s always going to equal.” Sam also says that she wanted to explain why there are
counterexamples and affirms her understanding that general arguments require general support.
In Sandefur et al. (2013) the focus is on learner-generated examples developing into CIs and, ultimately, a proof. When an
arguer searches for a proof of a claim, the arguer engages in abductive reasoning. When the arguer pieces together already
identified cases and rules, sequencing them using logical necessity, the arguer engages in deduction.
Sam develops a general representation of the relational structure prior to having her specific alternative claim in mind.
In that moment, the claim arises from the structure expressed. Such acts situate better with TH1 codes than TH2 codes. The
claiming arises from arguer-developed representations of data that afford general conceptual insights. This type of reasoning
is unique from inductive reasoning, in which claims are developed from empirical observations or patterns observed in a
subset of cases.
What is interesting in the post is that Sam is in an abductive state when she explores the structure of 4N + 6 to “explain
why” not all sums of four consecutives are divisible by 4. From this expression, Sam reports seeing a “true claim”: that the
sum is divisible by 2. Interestingly, Sam never asserts that all sums of four consecutive numbers are not divisible by 4. She
does not seem to realize that until the cognitive interview. When Sam learns of this claim during the interview, she says
Fig. 5. A model for coming to a prudent claim when a counterexample is noted.
she is not satisfied with the empirical evidence and develops a CI about why all sums are not divisible by 4 (4n + 6/4 has a
remainder of 2). Thus, Sam expresses a strong understanding of viable mathematics argumentation.
In summary, Sam’s reasoning in developing the “divisible by 2” claim can be described as deductive reasoning, but in a
different order than the way the term is often used. Sam uses an expression as a starting case for a sequence of rules used
to come to (or observe) a claim. One implicit rule found in Sam’s reasoning is if two terms are divisible by 2, then the sum is
divisible by 2. The chain of reasoning is as follows: sum of four consecutives implies the sum is of the form 4N + 6, which implies
divisible by 2.
Figs. 5 and 6 are diagrams developed from my data that capture Sam’s progression to prudent claims. Fig. 5 offers a model
for the process that Sam reports in coming to a counterexample claim (idealized to remove the issues with use of the word
“always”). Fig. 6 offers a model for the process that Sam reports in coming to a prudent alternative generation.
Fig. 6. A model for coming to a prudent claim when a CI about a relational structure emerges.
Table 1
TH1s when the relational structure expressed is limited to particular cases, or the expression of that structure is vague.
Example Conceptual Insight Claim Assessment Observed Influences
Task 2 response: Andy acknowledges another Limited to the relational Prudent relative to the Knowledge that one
PST’s counterexample 41 and claims that no structure expressed in a data referenced counterexample is all that is
other work is needed to show the particular case (meets required to refute a claim
generalization is false conditions and not the Perception that providing one
conclusion) counterexample is a sufficient
response to a false
generalization
Task 2 response: Corey notes that 41 is a Unclear, but the arguer does Imprudent relative to Insufficient understanding or
counterexample (demonstrated by a peer in claim that any multiple of 41 the data presented use of the mathematical
a previous post) and writes, “Maybe we would make this conjecture practice of exception barring
could change the claim to all natural false and restricting claims to only
numbers under 41 [produce prime those cases considered
numbers]”
Task 1 response: Charli presents two examples Limited to the relational Imprudent relative to Insufficient knowledge that
of four consecutive numbers that are not structure expressed in the data presented in general claims with infinite
divisible by 4 and claims that the sum of four particular cases (meets the argument domains require data about the
consecutive numbers is not divisible by 4 conditions and not the relational structure for all cases
conclusion)
Task 2 response: Jean gives both conforming Limited to the relational Problematic. The literal Insufficient understanding of
cases and counterexamples for Task 2 and structure expressed in interpretation is and skill with the mathematics
claims that n2 + n + 41 does not produce a particular cases (meets different from the register
prime number for all natural numbers conditions and not the arguer’s intent.
conclusion)
Task 2 response: Gabbi acknowledges or Relational structure expressed Imprudent and Insufficient understanding of
presents conforming cases and a for particular cases only, both problematic relative to and skill with the mathematics
counterexample and claims that sometimes conforming and the data presented in register
for all natural numbers n2 + n + 41 is prime. counterexample the argument Insufficient knowledge of the
Gabbi views this claim as a generalization Arguer does claim that any limitations of empirical
and claims there are infinitely many cases of multiple of 41 would make this evidence as support for
each type: conforming and counterexamples conjecture false generalizations
7.3. Summary of influences on claiming
Tables 1 and 2 reorganize the findings presented in the previous sections. These summaries are based on the domain
of the data and CIs presented or acknowledged by the PST relative to the claim the PST articulates. Table 1 summarizes
the influences on claiming when the relational structure presented or acknowledged is either limited to particular cases
or is too vague to viably support a generalization. Table 2 summarizes claiming when the relational structure presented
or acknowledged encompasses an infinite class of objects. This organization was motivated by my hypothesis that prudent
claiming is associated with the domain of the data and CIs presented and with awareness of that domain.
8. Discussion
PSTs’ arguments in response to false generalizations, after a counterexample(s) was acknowledged, were influenced by
their abilities to develop appropriate claims relative to their data or CIs (TH1 skills). At times PSTs’ claiming was also influ-
enced by their abilities to adequately represent, use, and appeal to their data or CIs (TH2 skills). PSTs might develop any
one of the THs without the other present, demonstrating that viable argument features are not necessarily constructed in
a particular order. I found that adequate representations of data or CIs for viably arguing about an infinite class of coun-
terexamples can exist prior to the explicit development of the generalization. Claiming that arose from arguer-developed
representations of data that afford CIs was unique from a type of abductive reasoning, in which representations and rules are
sought to support an existing claim. This claiming also was unique from inductive reasoning, in which claims are developed
from empirical observations or patterns observed in a subset of cases. In one instance, an arguer was in an abductive state
searching for an explanation for why counterexamples existed. The arguer reported developing an alternative generalization
from a representation created for the aforementioned purposes.
TH1s were profoundly influenced by a PST’s knowledge of argumentation. Overgeneralizing about the number of coun-
terexamples or conforming examples was common. Problematic claims that made assertions about the density or frequency
of the counterexamples were present in two PSTs’ responses. I also observed confusing quantifiers (e.g., sometimes). In their
discussion (Appendix C), Gabbi’s and Jerri’s “sometimes” claims illustrate why a lack of standardized language for this com-
munity is problematic. Gabbi perceives her sometimes qualifier as creating a generalization, but it is not clear that Jerri
always uses “sometimes” in this way. Gabbi appears to interpret the sometimes qualifier as asserting that there are an
infinite number of counterexamples and an infinite number of conforming cases—and perhaps the same number of each. At
minimum, their use of this term creates dissidence in their conversation. Their discussion might have been more productive
if they had a shared mathematical vocabulary for communicating their ideas and observations.
Table 2
TH1s when the relational structure between conditions and conclusions is explicit and encompasses an infinite class.
Example Conceptual insight Claim assessment Plausible or observed

influences
Task 1 response: Sam presents a An explicit CI was not Prudent relative to the Knowledge of the limitations of
counterexample and then returns to the expressed but is likely present structural elements empirical evidence as
conversation looking for a true (e.g., that only one of the terms expressed mathematical support for
generalization. Sam develops the expression in 4N + 6 is divisible by 4 or 6) generalizations
4N + 6 for the sum of four consecutives and Knowledge that general claims
claims that the sum is not always divisible by require general support
4 or 6 Desire to develop a true
generalization and explain why
there are counterexamples
Task 2 response: Jerri observes that 41 and its N2 + N + 41 can be written as Imprudent Insufficient understanding or
multiples are counterexamples and asserts N(N + 1) + 41, so multiples of 41 overgeneralization use of the mathematical
that if it were not for 41 and its multiples, are counterexamples relative to the CI and practice of exception barring
n2 + n + 41 is prime structure expressed
Task 2 response: Jerri observes that 41 and its N2 + N + 41 can be written as Prudent relative to the Perception that responses to
multiples are counterexamples and claims N(N + 1) + 41, so multiples of 41 CI and structure refutation tasks should explain
that “there are infinite that will not be prime are counterexamples expressed why
using this formula” [n2 + n + 41]
Task 2 response: Jean observes that n2 + n + p, n2 + n + k can be expressed as Prudent relative to the Perception that refutation
where p is a prime and n = p, produces a k(k + 2) when n = k CI and structure tasks involve finding a pattern
composite expressed
Task 2 response: Corey notes that any multiple Multiples of 41 are Imprudent relative to Insufficient understanding or
of 41 is a counterexample and suggests counterexamples because you the CI expressed use of the mathematical
claiming that n2 + n + 41 is prime for all n can create groups of 41 practice of exception barring
except 41 and its multiples
Task 2 response: Drew acknowledges another Adding a prime to a prime is Imprudent relative to Insufficient understanding or
PST’s counterexample 41 and asserts that the not prime, unless you add the CI expressed use of the mathematical
original claim works most of the time another prime, at least most of practice of exception barring
the time (this is false)
Many of the PSTs lacked an adequate understanding of what claims are appropriate relative to their data and CIs. Many also
lacked adequate knowledge of how to use the mathematics register, particularly with respect to the precision of quantifiers.
We should not overlook that PSTs who say “most of the time” or “usually” based on testing a proper subset of examples are
expressing empiricism.
In his conversation with Gabbi, Jerri illustrates how PSTs who are otherwise skeptical about empirical evidence may fail to
apply this skepticism appropriately to their alternative claims in response to false generalizations. After developing a variable
representation for demonstrating why all multiples of 41 are counterexamples, Jerri overgeneralizes about conforming
cases. While Jerri qualifies his claim about conforming cases in one of his online posts (“As far as I know there are no other
[counterexamples].”), in other posts and in the interview, Jerri abandons this skepticism. Of course, we want PSTs to be free
to share thoughts and intuitions. That does not change the analysis in this article, however. Jerri is not conjecturing; he is
offering a proposition that he believes is true, and he reiterates that during the interview. Recall that Jerri also asserts that
41 is the least counterexample, which is false. The point of this article is not to discourage PSTs from offering a variety of
conjectures for which the truth is uncertain. Rather, the point is to document claims that an arguer puts forth as true and
to note whether the claims are prudent, imprudent, or problematic relative to the data and CIs expressed. Jerri presents
no viable reason to believe his claim about conforming cases other than empirical evidence from examining relatively few
cases. Furthermore, he fails to acknowledge Gabbi’s correct counterexample of 40 (Gabbi’s last post).
Previous literature has established that PSTs who offer empirical arguments for generalization may express awareness
that the arguments are not proofs, if they are given the opportunity to critique their arguments (Stylianides & Stylianides,
2009). The results of this study suggest that training in exception barring might also give PSTs opportunities to express
awareness of the limitations of empirical evidence. The results demonstrate that the PSTs were not skilled in exception
barring or did not use the practice at all. One PST dismissed the practice of restricting an alternative generalization to a finite
domain because it did not build a pattern for a large class or all cases.
Natural language usage also influenced PSTs’ ability to express appropriate claims. While it was possible for some of
the PSTs to use natural language to communicate an appropriate claim, several PSTs’ claims, when restated with proper
quantifiers, were false or imprudent relative to their data or CIs.
The types of claims that PSTs pursued were also dependent on their perceptions of the task—in particular, whether
they felt that demonstrating that the original conjecture is false was sufficient as a response, or whether an alternative
generalization was desired. In one case, a PST perceived that the task was to show that the formula in the original claim
“works” sometimes or almost every time.
Not all of the PSTs expressed an understanding that arguments for generalization require data or CIs in a format that
could be appealed to generically, even when they acknowledged that the warrant should be general. This knowledge issue
can be associated with overgeneralizing with respect to the data or CIs present.
Consistent with previous studies, there was evidence in my study that some PSTs did not have a clear understanding
of the role of counterexamples in refutation. They also did not have a clear understanding of what constitutes a sufficient
argument against a generalization. On the positive side, several PSTs acknowledged that counterexample arguments are
sufficient. They pursued explanations beyond presenting a counterexample for what appeared to be intellectual curios-
ity. Sam provided evidence that it is plausible for PSTs to value “explaining why” there are counterexamples while still
communicating minimally sufficient counterexample arguments.
I am not asserting that PSTs should be discouraged from presenting causal information in counterexample arguments.
Instead I contend that PSTs should know that causal information and generalizable warrants and data are not necessary to
show that a generalization is false. This knowledge might prevent PSTs from including unnecessary and incorrect information
in arguments that would otherwise be viable. In particular, having a standard that a counterexample argument should attend
only to a counterexample and nothing more might prevent PSTs from making unsupported or false alternative claims within
the counterexample argument itself.
I also assert that PSTs might benefit from instructors’ giving them explicit “license” to restrict their claims to finite domains
when only that domain has been tested and no general CI is present. Emphasizing this type of exception barring in response
to false generalizations might help PSTs avoid presenting empirical arguments by stating only claims that their data and CIs
support.
These findings suggest that PSTs might also benefit from explicit instruction on the mathematics register and canonical
standards for argumentation—in particular, how to express claims that are appropriate relative to the data or CIs presented.
Secondary mathematics education majors likely take coursework where the language of mathematics and standards for
proof and proving are stressed. PSTs who do not take advanced mathematics coursework, however, may not receive sufficient
training and practice with these mathematical practices.
The use of the term viable argument in CCSSM instead of proof suggests plausible alternatives to formal, logical argu-
ments. Yet argumentation instruction that does not explicitly stress “the rules” and “the register” of mathematics may
not be adequate for argumentation in mathematics courses, even in early grades. The PSTs in this study had difficulty
making appropriate claims. At times these difficulties led to significant communication issues, which often resulted in
false claims (e.g., Jerri and Gabbi’s debate about claims and support for those claims). Even otherwise proficient PSTs such
as Jean and Sam, who in their discussions appear to have appropriate perceptions of the task and strong argumentation
skills, might benefit from explicit instruction on what types of claims can be stated prudently in response to data and
CIs, as well as instruction on what language is appropriate (e.g., being clearer about the domain of an “isn’t-always-true”
claim).
These findings also suggest that PSTs might benefit from explicit instruction on the distinction between arguing that
a conjecture is false and developing an alternative generalization. Constructing both types of arguments as separate and
distinct responses might be viewed as the standard for a fully developed response to a false generalization. Such a standard
might help teachers avoid some of the issues noted in previous literature (e.g., not valuing counterexample arguments as
complete refutations and viewing refutations based on theory as stronger than counterexample arguments). Developing
counterexample arguments and alternative generation arguments as distinct products offers teachers the opportunity to
express correct counterexample knowledge while also embracing the mathematical practice of going beyond refutations to
understand why counterexamples exist or to use exception barring to discuss known conforming cases without confounding
and confusing these practices.
Finally, direct instruction on THs might also prove beneficial for PSTs. It would be interesting to know whether practice
with each of the THs would improve PSTs’ skills in handling their data and CIs to construct viable arguments. A PST might
be successful in producing a prudent claim but might need scaffolding to develop appropriate representations of data or
CIs, as well as adequate warrants when supporting a claim (or visa versa). Careful distinctions between these types of
handles might help PSTs organize the products of their explorations for the articulate stage by attending to each handle
separately.
9. Limitations
While these findings address some of the affordances to communicating a viable argument, findings should not be viewed
as a model for how PSTs develop viable argumentation skills. Teaching experiments use tasks, lessons, and interviews to
induce learning so that researchers may study and build models for how PSTs develop practices. Teaching experiments also
create environments in which PSTs’ practices and thinking become transparent. Ultimately this work uses empirical findings
to build one plausible model for influences on PSTs’ ability to communicate a viable argument. In this study I introduced
PSTs to a definition of viable argument and types of viable arguments to give them objectives, concepts, and language for
argument production, and to improve argument communication. While my teaching actions likely influenced the types of
responses, this is true in all case studies and teaching experiments. I have been careful to give the readers an overview of
the argumentation practices that I emphasized in my instruction. My views about viable arguments in mathematics courses
may not represent the views of others. Because the definition of viable argument was unique to this setting, findings may
not be generalizable to all settings. The definition used here, however, is consistent with Toulmin’s (1958/2003) definition
of argument and CCSSM’s description (NGACBP and CCSSO, 2010).
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank the reviews and editors whose feedback greatly improved this article.
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Journal of Mathematical Behavior 39 (2015) 79–99

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

The Journal of Mathematical Behavior

Prospective elementary teachers’ claiming in responses

4. Theoretical framework for this study

4.1. Arguments and activities associated with argument production

4.1.1. Arguments and viable arguments

4.1.2. Manipulate, get-a-sense-of articulate

4.1.3. Technical handles and conceptual insights

4.2. Inﬂuences on argument production

4.2.1. Knowledge of viable argument and argument practices

4.2.3. Perceptions of the task

5.1. Participants and data collection

5.2. Teaching and tasks

5.3. Data analysis

5.4. Summary of framework as an analysis scheme

6. Illustrating the analysis framework

6.1. Discovering that the claim Is false

6.2. Kate’s movements toward a generalization

7.1. Problematic and imprudent claims and inﬂuences

7.1.2. Imprudent claims inﬂuenced by insufﬁcient understanding or use of exception barring

Fig. 3. Drew continues to express a “density” notion—here on her ﬁnal exam.

7.1.4. Imprudent claiming in there-exists contexts

7.1.5. More on exception barring and perceptions of the task

7.2. Prudent claims and their inﬂuences

7.2.1. Further analysis of Sam’s claiming and reasoning

Fig. 5. A model for coming to a prudent claim when a counterexample is noted.

Example Conceptual Insight Claim Assessment Observed Inﬂuences

7.3. Summary of inﬂuences on claiming

Example Conceptual insight Claim assessment Plausible or observed

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