1

Russia and the International Criminal Court:

From Uncertain Engagement to Positive Disengagement1

Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov2

Russian delegation had been party to the drafting process of the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court. The delegation voted for the text, stating that 17 July
1998 “marks the end of an important effort to reconcile different legal systems. It was a
reason for satisfaction that a compromise package has been crafted that the Russian
Federation has been able to support”3. The treaty was signed by Russia on 13 September
20004, as ordered by the President. The Presidential Executive Order 5 was initiated by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in coordination with the principal stake-holders – the
Prosecutor General, the Supreme Court, Ministries of Internal Affairs, of Defense, of
Justice, the Federal Security Service, and the Foreign Intelligence Service. It referred to
the Rome Statute as “worked out with participation of the Russian Federation”. Sixteen
years and two months later the President promulgated another Executive Order of
immediate relevance to the Rome Statute, although this time it instructed the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to notify the depositary of Russia’s intention not to become a party to the
Statute6. For whatever reason, unlike the Executive Order to sign the Statute, this one was
initiated by the Ministry of Justice, in coordination with the Foreign Ministry and other
unspecified departments of the executive branch, as well as with the Supreme Court, the
Prosecutor General’s Office, and the Investigative Committee.
This brief paper will offer author’s perception of the evolution of the official
Russian attitude towards the Rome Statute and the Court it had established, based on
available government acts and statements, and relevant, though few, judicial sources, as
1
Based on remarks delivered at Panel VI: State Engagement and Disengagement of the Nuremberg Forum
2018 “20th Anniversary of the Rome Statute: Law, Justice and Politics” -
https://www.nurembergacademy.org/fileadmin/media/pdf/events/2018/Nuremberg-Forum-2018_Program.pdf
2
Professor of International Law, Judge ad hoc for the interstate case “Ukraine v. Russia” at the ECHR,
Judge (Ret.) of the former UN ICTR and ICTY. The author wishes to acknowledge support he received from the
non-profit International and Comparative Law Research Center - http://www.iclrc.ru/en
3
Press Release L/2889, 20 July 1998 - https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2889.html
4
United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, CHAPTER XVIII PENAL MATTERS, 10. Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court -
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en
5
Sobraniye Zakonodatel’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Collection of Legislation of the Russian Federation]
(SZ RF), 11 September 2000, No. 37, Item 3710.
6
SZ RF, 21 November 2016, No. 47, Item 6630.

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well as demonstrate that, official “disengagement” from the ICC notwithstanding, there is
a continued interest in the Russian academic community in the international criminal law
in general, and matters related to the ICC – in particular.
***
At the outset, credit should be given to the Nuremberg Forum organizers for
dedicating a separate panel to discuss approaches of those major states which chose either
not to engage the ICC, or to disengage from the Court and its founding document. One of
co-authors of this collection of papers originating in panel presentations at the
Nuremberg Forum 2018, Carsten Stahn, edited a multiple-author volume on the ICC law
and practice which appeared in 20157. As someone who had to deal with a group of co-
authors numbering nineteen8, this author can hardly imagine how one can lead a legion of
fifty eight experts each with his or her own view of the world. However, in a review9 of
that volume edited by Professor Stahn, this author pointed out, as a single most obvious
and substantive deficiency, absence of contributions from and about “disengaging” states,
except maybe South Africa, which at the time of publication was only on its way to a
temporary disengagement from the ICC10. Of course there were contributors whose
native or educational backgrounds could be traced to major non-parties, but they focused
on issues other than attitudes of those states towards the Rome Statute and the ICC.
As to Russia, following her delegate’s vote for the adoption of the Rome Statute
and then signing of the treaty, in early 2003 the President instructed the Ministry of
Justice to set up an inter-agency working group tasked with drafting a law on ratification
of the Rome Statute11. The group went further than drafting a law that would merely

7
THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT/Ed. Carsten Stahn, OUP 2015.
8
MEZHDUNARODNOYE PRAVO [International Law]/Ed. Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, 4th Edition, 2015,
reprinted in 2018. An earlier edition was translated into English by William E. Butler and appeared as
INTERNATIONAL LAW – A RUSSIAN INTRODUCTION, Eleven International Publishing, 2009.
9
B.R. Tuzmukhamedov (Book Review), Moscow J. Int’l L., Issue 3 (99) 2015, p. 267.
10
On 19 October 2016 South Africa notified the depositary of its withdrawal from the Rome Statute only to
“revoke the Instrument of Withdrawal” on 7 March 2017 (for citation see Fn. 4 above). The grounds for, and
circumstances of those actions, while offering rich material for constitutional, international, and comparative law
analysis, fall outside the scope of this paper.
11
A respective Instruction of the President (Porucheniye Presidenta), an act in the third tier below Decree
(Ukaz) and Executive Order (Rasporyazheniye), to the Ministry of Justice, was not available to this author, however
experts privy to activities of the inter-agency group cite its designation as Instruction No. Pr-48 of 10 January 2003,
and refer to the composition of the inter-agency group as comprising representatives of the Main Legal Directorate
of the Administration of the President, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Internal Affairs,
Federal Security Service, Prosecutor General’s Office, Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law (an adjunct of
the Government), Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, et al. – Elena Trikoz, RIMSKIY
STATUT MEZHDUNARODNOGO UGOLOVNOGO SUDA V ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII: RAMOCHNAYA MODEL
IMPLEMENTATSII [The Rome Statute of International Criminal Court: A Framework Model of Implementation] – in:

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 3

establish Russia’s consent to be bound by the Statute. It also drafted multiple

amendments to the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure that would bring
national legislation in harmony with the Statute. The group submitted legislative drafts to
the President’s Administration in late 2005, thus completing its mandate12. However, the
product was deemed as requiring revision and further work, and had been put aside
indefinitely13.
As to the Government declarations, to the best of this author’s knowledge, the last
official comment coming from the Foreign Ministry, that positively discussed the
feasibility of Russia becoming party to the Rome Statute, goes back to July 2009. At a
press-briefing the spokesperson of the Ministry read out prepared remarks and indicated
that “in the long term Russia is interested in becoming a full party to the Rome Statute.
What needs to be determined are the optimum terms and timing of our accession to that
international treaty. As per instructions from the President of Russia, proposals on
harmonizing Russian legislation with provisions of the Statute are being reviewed. It is
already apparent that we would need to introduce certain amendments to our national
legislation to prevent its coming into conflict with requirements of the Rome Statute”.
The Foreign Ministry spokesperson implicitly referred to the inter-agency working group
which were to draft “balanced and compound decisions that would ensure subsequent
efficient participation of our country in the system of international criminal justice”.
However, there was an apparent caveat: the Foreign Ministry official made it clear that a
final decision had yet to be taken based on ascertaining that the ICC had proven itself as a
“genuinely universal judicial mechanism, free from political bias and impartiality” 14.
Statements made by Russian delegates at the Review Conference in Kampala in
2010 were generally positive towards the Rome Statute and the ICC, but they did not

MEZHDUNARODNIY UGOLOVNIY SUD: PROBLEMY, DISCUSSII, POISK RESHENIY [International Criminal Court:
Problems, Discussions, Search for Solutions]/Eds. G. Bogush and E. Trikoz, Moscow 2008, p. 148.
12
The draft is reproduced as annex to MEZHDUNARODNIY UGOLOVNIY SUD: PROBLEMY,
DISCUSSII, POISK RESHENIY, p. 717-727. Subsequently a team of legal academics picked up from where the
working group left the draft, and developed it even further, though recognizing that “it has become another futile
attempt to modify the Russian criminal legislation” – G. Bogush, G. Esakov, V. Rusinova, MEZHDUNARODNIYE
PRESTUPLENIYA. MODEL’ IMPLEMENTATSII V ROSSIYSKOYE UGOLOVNOYE ZAKONODATEL’STVO [International
Crimes. A Model of Implementation into the Russian Criminal Legislation], Moscow, 2017. The book includes an
upgraded draft and detailed, well-documented commentary thereto. For further reading see: Gennady Esakov,
International Criminal Law in Russia: Missed Crimes Waiting for a Revival, Journal of International Criminal
Justice, Issue 15, 2017, Pp. 371–392.
13
Trikoz, op. cit., p. 149.
14
Press Briefing by the Official Representative of the MFA of Russia A.A. Nesterenko on 21 July 2009 -
http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/798036

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3339809

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specifically address prospects of ratification. Metaphorically comparing the ICC to “a

kind of a sword of Damocles for those who admit a possibility of achieving political
goals by committing mass murders, extermination and violating international law”, the
Head of the Russian Delegation went on to state that “already today at the initial stage of
the ICC existence we can affirm that the Court has fulfilled itself and found its own place
in the world. In the course of the Rome Conference Russia voted for the Statute and
further signed it. Our country has not ratified the Statute. Currently Russia, being a non-
Party to the Statute, fruitfully cooperates with the ICC”15.
Not being part of, or privy to diplomatic process that culminated in adoption of the
Rome Statute, or other events, whether at the Assembly of States Parties or the Review
Conference. However, this author, nonetheless, has sound reasons to believe that
diplomats who led Russian delegations at Rome and Kampala conferences, negotiated in
good faith. However, it seems in retrospect that chances of ratification by the time of the
Review Conference have slimmed down, as compared to the period immediately
following the Rome Conference. It would be fair to describe the Russian position as
evolving from positive to uncertain engagement, and then onwards from uncertain to
positive disengagement.
Initial signs of uncertainty may be related to the issuance, by the ICC Prosecutor,
of the first arrest warrant for President of Sudan Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir16. On 5
March 2009, the very next day after issuance of that arrest warrant, the Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson released a statement indicating that Russia shared concerns raised by
African and other states over immunity of the head of state in office, above all of a state
which was not party to the Rome Statute. The other issue was striking the right balance
between needs of justice and those of peaceful settlement17.

15
Statement by H.E. Kirill G. Gevorgyan, Director of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Review Conference of
the Rome Statute of the ICC Kampala, 1 June 2010 - https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/Statements/ICC-RC-gendeba-RussianFederation-ENG.pdf (English translation).
16
Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-1, 4 March 2009 -
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-02/05-01/09-1
17
Statement by Russian MFA Spokesman Andrei Nesterenko Regarding the Issuance by International
Criminal Court of an Arrest Warrant against Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, 5 March 2009 -
http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/maps/sd/-
/asset_publisher/Xen9fAlVS0x7/content/id/303238?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_Xen9fAlVS0x7&_101_INSTANCE
_Xen9fAlVS0x7_languageId=en_GB (English translation).

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Russia voted for the referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC Prosecutor 18, only
to subsequently observe that the OTP focused on the alleged abuses by the Gaddafi
regime, rather than violence against civilians attributable to other parties19.
Likewise, Russia cooperated with the OTP during the preliminary examination
into the situation in and around South Ossetia20. However, it expressed growing
apprehension of the course of that examination which, in Russia’s perception, was
focusing on crimes allegedly committed by South Ossetian militias and Russian military,
while being rather lenient towards the Georgian side21.
Finally, Russian official statements reflect repudiation of approaches of the Office
of the ICC Prosecutor with respect to the preliminary examination into the situation in
Ukraine, whether in matters of fact or, again, the balance between peaceful settlement
and justice, concluding that the ICC was unable or unwilling to be part of the
settlement22. It is remarkable that initial sharp reaction to the OTP approach to the
situation in Ukraine appeared the next day after promulgation of the Executive Order
regarding Russia’s intention not to become party to the Rome Statute and three days after
the release of the 2016 Report on Preliminary Examination Activities where the
Prosecutor discussed the situation in Ukraine23. However, it was not cited as a reason for
Russia’s ultimate decision regarding the Rome Statute, though it would be fair to say that
avenues chosen by the ICC in examination of situations in Georgia and Ukraine put
Russia into positive disengagement mode.
There has not been any practical legislative action, whether a submission of the
treaty for consideration by the State Duma (a legislative chamber of the Federal
Assembly) or, as is standard practice in ratification proceedings, appointment of the
18
UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/1970 (2011), 26 February 2011, adopted by unanimous vote.
19
Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations at the
Security Council Briefing by the ICC Prosecutor on the Report Pursuant to the UNSCR 1970 (2011) -
http://russiaun.ru/ru/news/sc_lb
20
Remarks to that effect were made during the Briefing of the MFA Spokesperson on 21 July 2009, see Fn.
14 above.
21
On the beginning of ICC’s investigation of events in South Ossetia in August 2008, Briefing by Foreign
Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova Moscow, January 29, 2016 -
http://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/briefings/-
/asset_publisher/D2wHaWMCU6Od/content/id/2039123?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_D2wHaWMCU6Od&_101_IN
STANCE_D2wHaWMCU6Od_languageId=en_GB#7 (English translation)
22
ICC report, Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, November 17, 2016
- http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2529854?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTAN
CE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB (English translation).
23
The Office of the Prosecutor. Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, p. 33-42 -
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf

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President’s representative at ratification hearings. The only subsequent public action by

the President was the above-referenced Executive Order promulgated on 16 November
2016 by which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was instructed to notify the UN Secretary
General of Russia’s intention not to become a party to the Rome Statute24. It was
followed by the Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which expounded the
Executive Order and gave reasons for Russia’s actions, including failure of the ICC “to
become a truly independent, authoritative international tribunal” and, more specifically,
the Court’s “attitude vis-à-vis the situation [in South Ossetia] of August 2008”25.
While citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as legal authority for
not becoming party to a treaty which Russia has already signed, the Statement opined that
Russia acted “to withdraw its signature from the Statute”. That part of the Statement, at
least in the opinion of this author, is not without a flaw. It should be recalled that, under
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention “a State is obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) It has signed the treaty or has
exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty”26.
While the “clarity” requirement has certainly been met, the concept of “unsigning”
a treaty seems to be deficient. A declaration of intention not to become a party to the
treaty envisaged by Art. 18 (a) terminates the interim period which begins at the moment
a State indicates its intention to become a party, that indication being expressed by
signing of an authentic copy of a treaty, and lasts till either the instrument of ratification,
acceptance or approval, or declaration of intention not to become a party, is placed in the
custody of a depositary. Moreover, it is doubtful, to say the least, that the lead-in phrase
of Art. 18 gives a state which has deposited a declaration of intention not to become a
party to the treaty a free hand to “defeat the object and purpose of a treaty”. As to the
signature, it belongs to the treaty and remains, or for that matter hibernates, in the domain
of the depositary. Whether and how that hibernation can ever be interrupted, is anyone’s
guess.

24
See Fn. 6 above.
25
Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry, 16 November 2016 (English version) -
http://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/-
/asset_publisher/t2GCdmD8RNIr/content/id/2523566?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_t2GCdmD8RNIr&_101_INSTAN
CE_t2GCdmD8RNIr_languageId=en_GB
26
UNTS, vol. 1155, No. 18232, p. 336.

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As to other domestic processes, this author is aware that in early 1999, even prior
to Russia’s signing of the Rome Statute, the State Duma had been contemplating
parliamentary hearings on the practicality and practicability of participation in the Rome
Statute. One of the issues that legislators pondered on was compatibility of the Statute
with the Russian Constitution. Whether those hearings ever took place is beyond this
author’s knowledge. However, the Russian Association of International Law initiated an
expert round table at the State Duma which was held in December 2001. The two lead-in
speakers were Amb. Kirill Gevorgyan, Deputy Head of the Russian Delegation at the
Rome Conference27, and this author. Amb. Gevorgyan discussed the Conference and
commented on the Rome Statute, while his co-reporter addressed possible issues of
constitutionality and ways to harmonize the Rome Statute and the Russian Constitution28.
As to constitutional issues29, hypothetically those could include surrender of own
citizens to the ICC, complementarity in so far as it makes the ICC part of domestic
judicial system, immunity of senior government officials, right to be tried by jury, right to
request pardon and respective presidential prerogative to grant pardon, exclusive
authority of the State Duma to declare amnesty, right to appeal judicial decisions, and
right to petition international human rights bodies.
Those issues could be resolved without either interference with the Rome Statute,
or tampering with constitutional rights, freedoms, and authority. In fact the most
straightforward way would have been for the Constitutional Court to declare lack of
jurisdiction. The reason is that the Constitution and the governing statute authorize the
Court to review international treaties that are not yet in force. It could be argued that the
Rome Statute should not be reviewed due to it being in force prior to it being challenged.
Conversely, the Constitutional Court could focus on the Rome Statute not being in
force with the respect of the Russian Federation, thus meeting the test of admissibility.
But again, currently this is a mere hypothetical discussion.

27
Formerly Director of Legal Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, judge at ICJ since
2015.
28
This author’s remarks were later published as Rimskiy Statut Mezhdunarodnogo Ugolovnogo Suda:
Vozmozniye Voprosy Konstitutsionnosti (The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Possible Issues of
Constitutionality) - Moscow J. Int’l L., Issue 2 (46) 2002, p. 165-173.
29
Constitutionality of the Rome Statute was further discussed in multiple publications by this author,
including, in English, in The ICC and Russian Constitutional Problems, Journal of International Criminal Justice,
Issue 3, 2005, Pp. 621–626.

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Incidentally, when Judge Philippe Kirsch, then the ICC President, visited Moscow
in February 2004 to meet Russian officials and address a conference on the Rome Statute,
this author’s name had been struck off the list of speakers at the eleventh hour. Such was
the mood at the time that some organizers were concerned that President Kirsch would be
upset by remarks about constitutionality that might put into doubt the prospects of
ratification of the Statute. That notwithstanding, a private meeting had been set up for
President Kirsch and this author, resulting in an enlightening and broad-ranging
discussion30.
No political or legislative action by Russia regarding the Rome Statute or ICC
should realistically be expected any time soon, if at all. However, occasional references
to events at and around the ICC are likely, such as were remarks by the Foreign Ministry
spokesperson critiquing attack at the ICC by the US National Security Adviser John
Bolton in his speech at the Federalist Society in Washington, D.C. on 10 September
201831. Russian representatives will not sit idle during ICC-related briefings and debates
at the United Nations. There will be continued official reaction to the ICC activities with
respect of Georgia and Ukraine situations.
Despite definitive and seemingly final executive decision of Russia with respect to
the Rome Statute, legal community in Russia, both academics and practitioners, are well
aware of the Statute and the ICC, and that includes judges at the senior level. Such
awareness was demonstrated by at least three judges of the Constitutional Court who
turned to the ICC and the Statute to seek arguments in support of their separate
opinions32.
Russian legal community is open to active interaction with international criminal
judges and prominent academics at various fora in Russia. Apart from a visit by Judge
Kirsch in the early days of the ICC, another former President of the ICC, Judge Sang-
hyeon Song participated in several events, including Martens Readings on Contemporary

30
Episode is recapped with kind permission of Judge Philippe Kirsch.
31
Statements by US President’s National Security Adviser John Bolton with regard to International
Criminal Court, Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow, September 13, 2018 -
http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3343212?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTAN
CE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB#12 (English translation).
32
Judgment No. 16-P, 2 July 2013, Separate opinion of Judge Sergey Kazantsev -
http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision135324.pdf; Ruling No. 1248-O, 28 June 2012, Separate opinion of Judge
Nikolay Bondar - http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision105554.pdf; Ruling No. 174-O-O, 17 January 2012,
Separate Opinion of Judge Sergey Knyazev - http://doc.ksrf.ru/decision/KSRFDecision89079.pdf

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Issues of International Humanitarian Law in 2017, as did over a dozen judges of the UN
ICTY and ICTR in 2015, and before then, in 2011, the late Hans-Peter Kaul who at the
time had been the Vice-President of ICC. At various times the Readings benefitted from
insights of Benjamin Ferencz, the Chief Prosecutor at the Einsatzgruppen Trial in
Nuremberg, and Professor William Schabas. The Martens Readings, a biennial
conference with a venue in St. Petersburgh, is a joint venture of the Russian Association
of International Law, the Reginal Delegation of the International Committee of Red
Cross, and St. Petersburgh University Department of International Law.
Judge Anita Ušacka, formerly of the ICC, and the STL President Ivana Hrdličkova
have become regular participants in professional events organized by various institutions
in Russia.
In November 2018 this author had the privilege of moderating a panel on evidence
in international criminal tribunals which included Judge Hrdličkova, ICC Judge Kimberly
Prost, Lord Iain Bonomy, a retired Judge of the UN ICTY and the Supreme Courts of
Scotland, and Peter Kremer, QC, a retired senior trial attorney at the ICTY. That panel
was part of a one-day seminar put together by the Moscow-based International and
Comparative Law Research Center33. On 5-16 August 2019 the Center is hosting the
Second Summer School on Public International Law with Judge Hrdličkova teaching a
course on Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law34.
International criminal law and justice are part of curricula at the Academic
University of Justice which is an educational adjunct of the Supreme Court of Russia. It
trains would-be judges and provides upgrade instruction to judges-in-office. Its Chair of
International Law offers courses in international criminal law and principles of operation
of international criminal tribunals35.
Similar courses are taught at law schools of internationally reputable Russian
universities. Chair of International Law at the Law Faculty of the Moscow State
University offers a course in International Judicial Proceedings and, optionally, in
International Courts and Tribunals36; several instructors at the Chair of International Law
at the Law Faculty of the St. Petersburgh State University teach courses in International

33
http://www.iclrc.ru/en/events/36
34
http://www.iclrc.ru/en/summer-school/programme
35
https://rgup.ru/?mod=pages&id=4973
36
http://www.law.msu.ru/structure/kaf/meghd-pr/teaching

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Criminal Law and in International Judicial Institutions37. Courses offered by the Chair of
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, and Criminology at the International Law Faculty of
the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations are more focused and
include: Theory of International Criminal Law; International Criminal Proceedings and
Human Rights; International Law Enforcement Institutions (with a module on ICC and
other international criminal courts and tribunals); International Standards of Criminal
Proceedings38.
And finally, the Russian-language ICC Moot competition, which started in 2012 as
a joint endeavor of several enthusiastic younger faculty members from the Higher School
of Economics and Moscow State University has developed into a regular and highly
professional event, bringing together law students from Russia and several other former
Soviet republics39. That annual competition culminates in finals held on the premises of
the ICC in The Hague. Students from Kazan Federal University in Central Russia
participated in two instalments of the Nuremberg Moot Court, and in 2017 reached semi-
finals.

37
http://law.spbu.ru/AboutFaculty/Departments/mezhprava/Member.aspx
38
https://mgimo.ru/study/faculty/mp/kugolov/courses/
39
http://aidp-russia.ru/iccmoot

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