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 339

SPECIAL LECTURE

THE ROLE OF THE ICJ IN THE PROMOTION OF THE RULE OF LAW*

Judge Ronny Abraham**

Introduction
I. Meaning of the Rule of Law
II. Contribution of the ICJ to the Promotion of the Rule of Law
III. Limits to the Works of the ICJ
IV. Enforcement of the Judgments of the ICJ

Introduction

Excellencies, Judges, Professors,

Mr. Director-General,
Distinguished colleagues and dear friends,

It is an honour for me to give this lecture on the International Court of Justice

and the promotion of the rule of law, co-hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Japan branch of the International
Law Association.

I. Meaning of the Rule of Law

Asking the question of the role of the ICJ in the promotion of the rule of law
raises the question of what we mean exactly when we refer in the international
context to the concept of the rule of law, which was originally developed by
common law constitutionalists in a domestic context. In a report on "[t]he rule of

* Lecture delivered at the JIIA International Forum, Tokyo, 2 August 2017, co-hosted by
the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
and the International Law Association (ILA), Japan Branch.
** President of the International Court of Justice at the date of this lecture (since 15 February
2015); former Director of Legal Affairs at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, former
Commissaire du gouvernement, former Professor of international law at Institut d'6tudes
politiques of Paris, University of Paris X-Nanterre, and University of Paris II Panthton-
Assas, member of the Board of the Societefrangaisepour le droit international, member
of the European Group of Public Law, member of the Board of Editors of the Annuaire
frangais de droit international.
I wish to thank Ms. Anne Coulon, my special assistant, for her invaluable contribution to
the preparation of this lecture.

Japanese Yearbook of International Law

Vol. 60 (2017), pp. 339-349
340 judge Ronny Abraham

law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies," issued in 2004,2
former Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon rightly observed that "[concepts such as
[...] the rule of law [...] are essential to understanding the international community's
efforts to enhance human rights, protect persons from fear and want, address
property disputes, encourage economic development, promote accountable gover-
nance and peacefully resolve conflict. They serve both to define our goals and to
determine our methods. Yet [- he went on], there is a multiplicity of definitions
and understandings of such concepts." The Secretary General proposed a defi-
nition of the rule of law, a concept which he pointed out is "at the very heart of
the Organization's mission." In his words, the rule of law "refers to a principle of
governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, in-
cluding the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with
international human rights norms and standards." In fact, the rule of law, despite
its name, is a concept, an ideal the pursuance of which requires to establish safe-
guards in the form of proper rules aimed at ensuring - and I am again quoting
the Secretary General - [the] supremacy of law, equality before the law, account-
ability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, par-
ticipation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and proce-
dural and legal transparency."
On 24 September 2012, the high-level meeting of the General Assembly ad-
opted a Declaration on the rule of law at the national and international levels, in
which it recognized that "the rule of law applies to all States equally, and to inter-
national organizations, including the United Nations and its principal organs, and
that respect for and promotion of the rule of law and justice should guide all of
their activities and accord predictability and legitimacy to their actions." In that
same Declaration, the high-level meeting "recognize[d] the positive contribution of
the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations,
including in adjudicating disputes among States, and the value of its work for the
promotion of the rule of law"; it "reaffirm[ed] the obligation of all States to comply
with the decisions of the International Court of Justice in cases to which they are
parties" and "call[ed] upon States that have not yet done so to consider accepting
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in accordance with its Statute."
It "also recall[ed] the ability of the relevant organs of the United Nations to request
advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice."3
Over the last decade, the General Assembly has adopted each year a reso-
lution on the rule of law at the national and international levels, each of which
"invites the International Court of Justice [...] to continue to comment, in [its] re-

2 UN Doc. S/2004/616.
UN Doc. A/RES/67/1 (24 September 2012).
 ICJAND THE RULE OF LAW 341

ports to the General Assembly, on [its] current rolfe] in promoting the rule of law."'
The Secretary General has for its part presented annual reports to the General
Assembly on the question of [s]trengthening and coordinating United Nations rule
of law activities," in which he has emphasized "the key role [played by the
International Court of Justice] in the rule of law architecture of the United Nations."

II. Contribution of the ICJ to the Promotion of the Rule of Law

Contributing to the rule of law is at the heart of the work of the International
Court of Justice. Indeed, because of the universality of the adherence to the Charter
of the United Nations and to its Statute which is annexed thereto, because of the
general scope of its subject-matter jurisdiction, and also because of its composition
- 15 independent judges representing the main forms of civilization and the prin-
cipal legal systems of the world, elected by all the States Members of the
Organization through the General Assembly and the Security Council -, the inter-
national Court of Justice is in a unique position to promote the rule of law among
the different actors of the international community. But what does promoting the
rule of law mean, exactly? What does it concretely translate into?
In its Judgment in the case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta), the Court, which was then discussing the legal concept of
equity, stated that "the justice of which equity is an emanation, is not abstract justice
but justice according to the rule of law ; which is to say that its application should
display consistency and a degree of predictability []...]"6 By doing so, it emphasized
two of the core requirements of a legal system based on the rule of law: consis-
tency and predictability, both of the law itself, whether substantive or procedural,
and of the judicial decisions. Today, I would like to refer to a few concrete ways in
which the Court's works have furthered such consistency and predictability.
First, consistency. Despite the clear statement in Article 59 of the Court's Statute
that "t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties
and in respect of that particular case," the Court has made a point of developing
and applying a consistent jurisprudence in all the areas of the law that its decisions
have related to. As I stated in my declarations appended to the recent judgments

4 The Rule of Law at the National and InternationalLevels, UN Doc. A/Res/62/70 (6

December 2007); A/Res/63/128 (11 December 2008); A/Res/64/116 (16 December2009);
A/Res/65/32 (6 December 2010); A/Res/66/102 (9 December 2011); A/Res/67/97 (14
December 2012); A/Res/68/116 (16 December 2013); A/Res/69/123 (10 December 2014);
A/Res/70/118 (14 December 2015); A/Res/71/148 (13 December 2016).
5 See in particular: UN Doc. A/71/169 (2016).
6 ContinentalShelf (Libyan Arab Jamabiriya/Malta),judgment, LCJ Reports 1985, p. 39,
para. 45.
342 judge Ronny Abraham

issued by the Court in the cases brought by the Marshall Islands against India,
Pakistan and the United Kingdom respectively,, in which the Court decided that it
could not proceed to the merits of the cases, "ilt is [...] a judicial imperative which
the Court has always recognized, and which in my view is incumbent upon all its
Members, that it must be highly consistent in its jurisprudence, both in the interest
of legal security and to avoid any suspicion of arbitrariness."' This is why, in my
opinion, "even if a judge has expressed reservations, or indeed his disagreement,
at the time the Court established [a given] jurisprudence, once the Court has done
so, he must consider himself to be bound by it thereafter (not legally, of course,
but morally), just as much as if he had agreed with it."' That imperative applies
both when it comes to applying substantive law and to answering the question of
the Court's jurisdiction in a case, and the Court's obedience to that principle has
been decisive in guaranteeing the consistency of its judicial decisions. Consistency
of international law itself has been guaranteed by the fact that the Court's
Judgments have frequently been relied upon as precedents by other international
judicial institutions as authoritative in all areas of public international law. It has
also been guaranteed by the persistent awareness of the Court about the decisions
of other judicial bodies, and the reference it has made to such decisions, when ap-
propriate, in its own Judgments.
Secondly, predictability. The main way in which the Court has contributed to
the predictability of international law is by clarifying the state of the law in diverse
areas through its judgments and advisory opinions. In particular, it clarified the
existence, content and scope of non-written rules of international law, especially
rules of customary international law. In addition, it clarified conventional law by

Obligations concerningNegotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and

to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India), Jurisdiction of the Court and
Admissibility of the Application, Judgment of 5 October 2016; Obligations concerning
Negotiations relating to Cessation of the NuclearArms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament
(MarshallIslands v. Pakistan),Jurisdictionof the CourtandAdmissibility of the Application,
Judgment of 5 October 2016, Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of
the NuclearArms Race and to NuclearDisarmament(MarshallIslands v. United Kingdom),
PreliminaryObjections,Judgment of 5 October2016.
8 Declarations of President Abraham, Obligations concerning Negotiations relating to

Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v.
UnitedKingdom), PreliminaryObjections, Judgmentof5 October2016, para. 10; Obligations
concerning Negotiations relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear
Disarmament(MarshallIslands v. India), Jurisdictionof the Court andAdmissibility of the
Application, Judgment of 5 October 2016, para. 10; Obligations concerning Negotiations
relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall
Islands v. Pakistan),Jurisdictionof the CourtandAdmissibility of the Application,judgment
of 5 October 2016, para. 10.
9 Ibid., para. 9.
 ICJAND THE RULE OF LAW 343

interpreting a number of treaty provisions in different fields. I will in turn give one
example of each of these ways in which the Court has contributed to the predict-
ability of international law.
A good example of a field of customary international law that the jurispru-
dence of the Court has helped clarifying is the law on jurisdictional immunities of
States and State immunity from enforcement. Its Judgment in the case concerning
JurisdictionalImmunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening),
issued on 3 February 2012,10 is particularly enlightening in this respect.
In this decision, the Court first clarified the scope of State immunity from civil
proceedings before the judicial organs of another State. Because of the specifics of
the case before it, the Court's findings were limited in scope to the question of juris-
dictional immunities for acts jure imperii, thereby leaving open the question of
whether different rules may apply in the case of acts jure gestionis. Yet, the contri-
bution of this decision to the rule of law at the international level should not be
underestimated. In particular, the Court's decision clarified the essentially procedural
nature of the law of immunity and identified some of the consequences of such
nature; furthermore acts jure imperii still constitute a significant part of State action
and the rules of customary international law identified by the Court in this respect
are therefore of interest, especially in the absence so far of a multilateral treaty in
force on the subject - indeed, the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, adopted on 2 December 2004, which, by
the way, neither Germany nor Italy had even signed at the date of the Court's
Judgment, was not in force at the time of that Judgment, and still isn't today.
The Court's clarifications were multiple.
First, it concluded, on the basis of an analysis of the relevant practice of do-
mestic courts and tribunals, as well as of opiniojuris as demonstrated by the posi-
tions taken by States and the jurisprudence of a number of national courts, that
"customary international law continues to require that a State be accorded im-
munity in proceedings for torts allegedly committed by its armed forces and other
organs [...] in the course of [...] an armed conflict" even when such torts allegedly
took place on the territory of the State whose jurisdictions are seized of a claim
against the allegedly wrongful State." The Court indicated that its conclusion on
this point was "confirmed by the judgments of the European Court of Human
Rights to which [it had] referred."12
Secondly, it made clear that, contrary to what was alleged by the Respondent
in the case, the availability of jurisdictional immunity was not dependent upon the

jurisdictionalImmunities of the State (Germany v. Italy; Greece intervening),judgment,

J0
I.CJ Reports 2012, p. 99.
Ibid., pp. 134-135, paras. 77-78.
12 Ibid., p. 135, para. 78.
344 judge Ronny Abraham

gravity of the act a State might have committed or even upon the peremptory
nature of the rule which it is alleged to have violated. The Court recalled that the
question of entitlement to jurisdictional immunity is "preliminary in nature" and
must be answered by a national court faced with such question even "before [the
latter] can hear the merits of the case brought before it and before the facts have
been established." By doing so, it not only clarified the content of the rules appli-
cable in the field of State jurisdictional immunities, but also the articulation be-
tween these rules and other bodies of international law; in particular, the Court
specified that "under customary international law as it presently stands, a State is
not deprived of immunity [from the jurisdiction of the courts of other States] by
reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human
rights law or the international law of armed conflict," whether the rules allegedly
violated have the status of jus cogens or not.13
Thirdly, the Court stated that under customary international law as it currently
stands, "the entitlement of a State to immunity [is not] dependent upon the exis-
tence of effective alternative means of securing redress"; hence, the fact that re-
course to a particular court might be the claimants' "last resort" has no bearing on
the issue of State jurisdictional immunity." On that point, I shall mention that the
Court's decision has been subject to criticism precisely on the ground that access to
justice must be considered one of the essential requirements of a legal order based
on the rule of law, and that the Court's findings in the case effectively denied such
access. Yet, and I will come back to this issue later in my presentation, the right to
access to a judge is not an absolute right and abiding by the rule of law also im-
plies identifying and respecting the limits of that right under international law.
Turning to the - different - issue of immunities from enforcement, the Court
recalled that, in the event that "a judgment has been lawfully rendered against a
foreign State" in a situation where the latter could not claim jurisdictional im-
munity, "it does not follow ipso facto that the State against which judgment has
been given can be the subject of measures of constraint on the territory of the
forum State or on that of a third State, with a view to enforcing the judgment in
question." Faced with the issue whether entering a legal charge against a property
of a State constituted a measure of constraint in violation of that State's immunity
from enforcement, the Court recognized the existence of a "well-established
practice" that "there is at least one condition that has to be satisfied before any
measure of constraint may be taken against property belonging to a foreign State:
that the property in question must be in use for an activity not pursuing gov-
ernment non-commercial purposes, or that the State which owns the property has
expressly consented to the taking of a measure of constraint, or that that State has

1 Ibid., p. 139, para. 91 and p. 142, para. 97.

1 Ibid., p. 143, para. 101.
 ICJAND THE RULE OF LAW 345

allocated the property in question for the satisfaction of a judicial claim. "15
Of course, the Court's jurisdiction in the case was limited to the issues raised
by the Parties, and a number of questions relating to the customary international
law on State immunities remain open. Yet, I believe that the Judgment issued in
the case opposing Germany to Italy greatly contributed to the clarification of that
body of law, and therefore to the predictability of its application.

I will now move on to the contribution of the Court to the clarification of ex-
isting international treaty rules in various areas; in my opinion, the development of
the Court's jurisprudence in the field of international law of the sea subsequent to
the entry into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
1982 (to which I will refer to as "UNCLOS") is a striking example of such contri-
bution. I note in passing that the interpretation and clarification of UNCLOS provi-
sions by the Court has benefited both UNCLOS States Parties and States that are
not parties to that instrument, since many UNCLOS provisions have been recog-
nized as reflecting customary international law.
As you may know, Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS, which are almost
identical, except for the fact that Article 74 refers to the exclusive economic zone
and Article 83 to the continental shelf, provide that "[t]he delimitation of the [ex-
clusive economic zone and the continental shelf] between States with opposite or
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as
referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order
to achieve an equitable solution." These provisions do not describe a particular
method of delimitation, and in this regard, a significant contribution was made by
the Court in its jurisprudence developed over the years, and in particular in its
Judgment issued in the case relating to the MaritimeDelimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine)." Building on the evolution of previous jurisprudence, the
Court set out a three stage methodology for the purposes of delimiting the conti-
nental shelf or exclusive economic zones, or drawing a single delimitation line:
first, I quote, "the Court establish[es] a provisional delimitation line, using methods
that are geometrically objective and also appropriate for the geography of the area
in which the delimitation is to take place." Having established this provisional line,
the Court considers, at the second stage, whether there are relevant circumstances
calling for an adjustment of that provisional line in order to achieve an equitable
result. At the third stage, finally, the Court will verify that the line does not "lead to
an inequitable result by reason of any marked disproportion between the ratio of
the respective coastal lengths and the ratio between the relevant maritime area of

Ibid., p. 148, para. 118.

16 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), judgment, J.CJ Reports
2009, p. 61.
346 judge Ronny Abraham

each State by reference to the delimitation line.""

Since its iteration in the case Romania v. Ukraine, this methodology has not
only guided the Court's own decisions in matters of maritime delimitations

-
namely in the subsequent cases relating to the Territorialand Maritime Dispute
between Nicaragua and Colombia,, and to the Maritime dispute between Peru and
Chile" - but has also been subsequently followed by other international courts
and tribunals dealing with these issues. Indeed, in their respective decisions in the
cases relating to the delimitations of the maritime boundaries in the Bay of Bengal,
opposing Bangladesh and India2 0 and Bangladesh and Myanmar2 1 , the arbitral tri-
bunal and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea both referred to and
applied the three-stage approach developed by the Court for the purposes of
drawing the delimitation line between the Parties. More recently, the arbitral tri-
bunal constituted under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration to
decide the case relating to the maritime delimitation between Croatia and Slovenia
followed this three-step methodology in its award rendered last June, after noting
that the ICJ has developed a "settled jurisprudence" relating to the interpretation of
the UNCLOS provisions on the delimitation of the territorial sea and beyond.22 These
few examples show that the Court has not only contributed to the development of
the law of the sea, but also to the predictability of its rules and of the way in which
to apply them - one of the key requirements of the rule of law on the interna-
tional plane.

1 Ibid., pp. 101-103, paras. 115-122.

is TerritorialandMaritimeDispute (Nicaraguav. Colombia),Judgment, I. Cf. Reports 2012,
p. 624.
'9 Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, I.CJ. Reports 2014, p. 3.
20 Award of 7July 2014 in the matter of the Bay of Bengal MaritimeBoundary Arbitration
between the People'sRepublic ofBangladesh and the Republic ofIndia, PCA Case No. 2010-
16. See in particular paras. 341 and 345, citing Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.CJ Reports 2009, p. 101, para. 116 and stating that the
"equidistance/relevant circumstances method is preferable unless, as the International
Court of Justice stated in Nicaragua v. Honduras, there are 'factors which make the
application of the equidistance method inappropriate' (Judgment, J.C.j Reports 2007, p.
659 at p. 741, paragraph 272)."
21 Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar),Judgment of 14 March 2012,
ITIOS Reports 2012. See in particular para. 233, citing Maritime Delimitation in the Black
Sea (Romaniav. Ukraine), Judgment, I.CjReports 2009, pp. 101-103, paras. 116, 120, 122.
22 Final Award of 29 June 2017 in the matter of an arbitration under the arbitration
agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the
Republic of Slovenia, signed on 4 November 2009, between the Republic of Croatiaand the
Republic of Slovenia, PCA Case No. 2012-04, paras. 999, 1002.
 ICJAND THE RULE OF LAW 347

III. Limits to the Works of the JCJ

Before I turn to the question of the enforcement of the Court's decisions, I

would like to reflect on the limits to the works of the International Court of Justice,
which themselves derive from the necessity to respect the rule of law and what it
means in the international legal order. This requires to go back to the basics of the
powers and functions of the Court and to the fundamental principle that its juris-
diction in contentious matters is subject to the consent of the Parties appearing
before it. In other words, a State can only be made a party to a dispute before the
Court insofar as it has accepted the Court's jurisdiction over such dispute. The nec-
essary consent, as you know, may be expressed in several ways, including but not
limited to, making a declaration recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Court's Statute, or inserting in a bilateral
or multilateral treaty a compromissory clause, that is to say a provision conferring
jurisdiction to the Court over disputes concerning the interpretation or application
of the concerned treaty.
The Court's Statute provides that in the event of a dispute as to whether it has
jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court. 3 What may
2

seem paradoxical is that in the context of the Court's exercise of its contentious
jurisdiction, one of the ways in which it applies the rule of law is by declining its
jurisdiction in cases where it considers that the necessary consent is lacking.
Indeed, promotion of the rule of law at the international level does not equate
guaranteeing unrestricted access to justice for international legal subjects; access to
justice itself is conditioned upon respect for the applicable rules, and in the case of
the ICJ it means scrupulously checking that the required consent of both States is
established. In order to guarantee inter alia the supremacy of law, fairness in the
application of the law, and legal certainty, the Court cannot adopt an extensive ap-
proach, nor a restrictive one, for that matter, when examining whether States
parties to a case have indeed given their consent to its jurisdiction; it must bind
itself to interpreting the means by which States are alleged to have expressed their
consent to jurisdiction, and in doing so, it must also identify the limits to such
consent. When faced with an Application going beyond the limits expressed by
the Respondent, abiding by the rule of law requires the Court to decline its juris-
diction; while it does mean that an Applicant is left with no judicial venue to assert
its claim, it also guarantees respect of State consent, which is at the core of the
formation of international law itself as much as it is at the core of the basis for any
international court's jurisdiction.

23 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 36, paragraph 6.

348 judge Ronny Abraham

IV. Enforcement of the Judgments of the ICJ

Finally, I would like to briefly address the question of the enforcement of the
judgments of the Court. This issue is of significant importance since enforcement
of judicial decisions is one of the requirements of the rule of law; yet it is of a
lesser interest in practice as it may seem in theory, since in fact the record of State
compliance with the decisions of the Court is highly satisfactory.
As you know, the Security Council is vested with a role in the enforcement of
the Court's decisions. Under paragraph 2 of Article 94 of the UN Charter, [ilf any
party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment
rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council,
which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon mea-
sures to be taken to give effect to the judgment."
One question that may be of interest is the role that the Court itself may be
called upon to play with respect to the enforcement of its own decisions. We know
that the Court, which has unequivocally affirmed the binding character of its orders
on provisional measures,24 has been called upon to decide on the responsibility of
a State for a breach of such order.25 However, it has so far never been asked to
make a pronouncement on the compliance of a State with one of its former
Judgments. The question was raised by the Parties to the case concerning Alleged
Violations ofSovereign Rights andMaritime Spaces in the CaribbeanSea (Nicaragua
v. Colombia),26 in which the Respondent contained that the Application was "an at-
tempt to enforce [a Court's] Judgment even though the Court has no post-adjudi-
cation enforcement jurisdiction." The Respondent, which objected to both the juris-
diction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application, argued inter alia that
"the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the Court are based upon a
division of functions according to which the Court is entrusted with the task of ad-
judication, while post-adjudication enforcement is reserved for the Security Council
in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 94 of the Charter." Yet, in its Judgment,
the Court observed that, while the dispute in the case concerned alleged violations
by the Respondent of the Applicant's rights over maritime zones that the Court de-
clared in a Judgment appertain to it, those rights themselves "[were] derived from

24 LaGrand(Germany v. United States of America), judgment, 1.C. Reports 2001, p. 506,

para. 109.
25 CertainActivities CarriedOut by Nicaraguain the BorderArea (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua)
and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River (Nicaraguav. Costa
Rica), judgment, I.CJ. Reports 2015, pp. 712-713, paras. 121-129 and p. 740, para. 229 (3)
(operative part).
26 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea
(Nicaraguav. Colombia), PreliminaryObjections, judgment, I. Cf Reports 2016, p. 3.
 ICJAND THE RULE OF LAW 349

customary international law," not from the Judgment. Therefore, concluded the
Court, the Applicant "did] not seek to enforce [one of its] Judgment[s] as such" and
the Court was "not called upon to consider the respective roles accorded to [...] the
Security Council (by Article 94, paragraph 2, of the Charter) and the Court." 27 This
prudent statement leaves open the question of the Court's potential own role in
the follow up of States' compliance with its judgments.

This brings to an end this general presentation of the role of the International
Court of Justice in the promotion of the rule of law. I thank you once again for
giving me the opportunity to give this lecture today.

27 Ibid., para. 109.