How Quantum Computing Impacts

Cyber Security And Provides New

Perspectives On Disruptive Innovation
Theory
Module Code: IB3L60
Student Number: U1600116
Word Count: 3979

Table of Contents
Introduction 2

Quantum Computing Overview 3

Quantum Computing Fundamentals 3
The Current Quantum Computing Landscape 3
The Global Quantum Computing Market 4
Quantum Machines: Past to Present 5
Quantum Computing Investment 6
Quantum Computing’s History 9

Disruptive Innovation Literature Review 10

Revolutionary Innovation 11

Quantum Computing’s Development Future 13

Quantum Computing’s Effects On Cyber Security 14

Prime Number Factorisation 14
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) 15

Post-Quantum Business and Cyber Security 16

Quantum Annealing 16
Quantum as a Service 17
General Post-Quantum Information Systems 18

Challenges to Quantum Computing’s Progress 18

References 20
Introduction
Quantum computing (QC) represents the new technological frontier. Tools are being
created to control entangled quantum states of particles which are so complex that
they can’t be simulated with our best supercomputers. Yoo et al. (2012) defines QC
as a digital innovation because it relies on digital technology platforms to create a
novel computational method. Hitherto considerations don't extend past small,
individual use-cases, despite QC having sizable implications for every industry.
Academically, QC doesn’t conform to the theoretical frameworks surrounding
disruptive digital innovations. These research gaps created the impetus for this
paper, and they will be addressed by augmenting the existing disruptive innovation
frameworks. Using this tool, forecasting the future implications for global markets
becomes more feasible. For example, cyber security’s effects on the development of
QC and its implications in the post-quantum world are overarching and profound. If
delivered at global scale, quantum computing has the potential to provide provably
unbreakable security. Contrastingly, it could empower malicious actors with the
intractable power to hack nearly all existing information systems that use industry
standard cryptographic methods. This paper will outline the fundamentals of
quantum computing, alongside the existing QC landscape. Following this, future
developments of the technology are considered, alongside cyber security as an
example of a use-case that advances quantum computing’s development. Lastly,
this paper analyses the future of quantum computing for global business practices,
especially as they pertain to cyber security, and suggests some challenges to
progress.

2
Quantum Computing Overview

Quantum Computing Fundamentals

Computing systems rely on storing and manipulating information. Classical
computers manipulate individual bits, which store information as binary 0 and 1
states. Contrastingly, quantum computers rely on quantum bits (qubits) to interact
with information. These qubits leverage three quantum mechanical phenomena
(IBM, 2020):
1. Superpositioning: ​Qubits can be a combination of states that are normally
described independently, such as both 1 and 0. A human analogy is playing
two musical notes at once; you hear the notes in superposition.
2. Entanglement: ​The data held in qubits is always affected by data stored in
other qubits, even when the qubits are physically separated from one another
(Holst, 2019).
3. Interference: ​Individual particles can cross their own trajectories and interfere
with the direction of their path.

These phenomena create a computing environment that doesn’t store information as

binary states. It uses qubits, which can be both 1 and 0 at the same time, or a
combination of states, enabling concurrent computations (Holst, 2019). Precisely
because of this, QC is highly applicable to domains where computational costs are a
barrier to progress, such as finance, molecular biology, and cyber security. In fact,
these use-cases are currently the driving force behind its development as a
technology. However, Ladd et al. (2010) argues that QC will only ​replace c​ lassical
computing in specific situations, but will not supersede it in every domain.

The Current Quantum Computing Landscape

Today many companies and countries have recognized the potential of QC in
strategic industries. The main players include start-ups, like D-Wave or Rigetti, and
giant firms like Google or IBM, alongside governments like China and the USA. To
understand the current quantum computing landscape, the global commercial
market, the existing quantum computers, and the investment pipeline will be
analysed.

3
The Global Quantum Computing Market
In 2017 the enterprise cloud computing market was valued at $650m (Lanjudkar,
2019). Forecasts of the global QC market can be unreliable due to the technology’s
infancy, but according to Statista (2019a), who complied multiple market forecasts
(Figure 1), QC will become a billion-dollar industry between 2020 and 2030.

Figure 1: Quantum computing global market projections and forecast

comparison 2017 to 2030 (in million USD)

Statista, 2019a

Tractica (2019a) forecasts enterprise quantum computing revenues to surpass $9bn

by 2030 (Figure 2). This highlights not only the rapid growth of the industry, but its
potential size, representing a comprehensive alteration to the computational
hardware landscape.

4
Figure 2: Size of the enterprise quantum computing market worldwide 2017 to 2030 (in
million USD)

Tractica, 2019a

It is clear from the existing research, limited as it may be in forecasting accuracy,

that quantum computing is poised to become an expansive market. Importantly, this
will create an investment cycle that pushes quantum computing’s development.
Increasing adoption of QC breeds investment in research and development, which
brings the cost per unit of performance down. Consequently, commercialisation of
the technology will increase, completing the cycle.

Quantum Machines: Past to Present

The first working quantum computer was introduced by Chuang et al. (1998) and the
field has shown strong growth since. In 2018, Google’s “Sycamore” processor solved
a computation in 200 seconds which, they claimed, would have taken the best
classical supercomputer 10,000 years. This marks a point at which QC is able to
complete tasks that classical supercomputers feasibly cannot, referred to as
quantum supremacy (Holst, 2019). Alibaba, however, announced that they had
solved the same problem using classical methods. (CB Insights, 2019). Figure 3
plots important quantum machines from the last 20 years, highlighting the strong
growth in qubit capacity.

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Figure 3: Number of qubits achieved in quantum computers by organisations from
1998 to 2019

CB Insights, 2019

With this trend forecast to continue, demonstrable quantum supremacy is not far in
the distance (Holst, 2019). Figure 3 also suggests American tech companies have
been responsible for the biggest breakthroughs in achieving high qubit machines
until now.

Another important consideration for the state of existing quantum computers is their
relative cost and complexity to configure. Remote access removes the barriers to
adoption for businesses, giving rise to the Quantum as a Service (QaaS) industry.
The business model has some of the largest players contributing to it, despite being
in the inception phase. For example, in 2019 Rigetti announced that their 32-qubit
hybrid quantum computer chip will be available on AWS Braket (AWS, 2020).
Alibaba released an 11-qubit quantum computer to their cloud service in 2018 (Gao
& Mak, 2018) and IBM released a 28-qubit machine called “Raleigh” in 2020 (Chow
& Gametta, 2020).

Quantum Computing Investment

The investment pipeline for quantum computing shows that governments are
realising the importance of developing quantum capabilities. Whilst it is difficult to
compare commitments with different time periods, figure 4 indicates that China,
USA, and EU will pioneer QC investment over the next 5 years.

6
Figure 4: Government investment into quantum computing technology

Holst, 2019

Given the potential importance of QC for national security, it is unsurprising that

China and the USA have committed the most to development spending. China’s
$10bn investment over 3 years relates to their developments in long-distance
communications via entanglements, which are virtually tamper-proof, and quantum
radar, which threatens US stealth technology (Smith-Goodson, 2019). Western
societies have a private-sector culture which is already investing in QC, with the
majority of the highest equity-funded QC companies being from the Americas
alongside a handful of Europeans (Figure 5).

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Figure 5: Quantum computing companies ranked by total equity funding as of
October 2019 (in million USD)

Statista, 2018

QC is a legislatively sparse area and therefore the superiority of government planned

investment or private sector investment is difficult to predict. However, it is clear
from Figures 5 & 6 that private sector funding appears to be significantly behind
government investment, possibly due to a lack of commercialised QC applications.

8
Figure 6: Quantum Computing Startup Deals and Funding Worldwide From
2012 to 2019

Statista, 2019b

Figure 6 shows that startup funding deals over the past 8 years has only shown
slight growth, but the financial implications have steadily risen. Most notably, since
2017 YoY investment has broken the $100m barrier. Funding has increased as
technology steadily proves its applicability and comes closer to commercial viability.
Notwithstanding, Figure 6 excludes hidden internal investments made by firms, such
as IBM and Alibaba, potentially worth millions of dollars.

Quantum Computing’s History

Radical transformation comes from social movements, incumbent reconfigurations,
and technological landscape developments. Figure 7 outlines the timeline of
important developments pertaining to QC as a radical transformation.

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Figure 7: Timeline of Quantum Computing Developments

From the time horizon and interdisciplinary approach of academics and businesses
(Figure 7), it is clear that there was no unilateral coordination of research and
development efforts. Interestingly, unilateral approaches to quantum computing
developments may be possible in future. Tushman et al. (1991) argued that products
should be seen as subsystems, each of which is individually innovated. Today’s
technology firms and governments control enough resources to innovate these
subsystems.

Disruptive Innovation Literature Review

Successful digital innovations are often described as generally disruptive, and
frequently as ​disruptive innovations​. According to Christensen and Bower (1995),
disruptive innovation occurs when an incumbent introduces higher-quality products
or services to satisfy the higher-end market, overshooting the needs of mainstream
and low-end customers. This opens the market for entrants to find footholds in less
profitable segments, with which they can quickly improve the performance of their
offerings and move upmarket. Srivastava et al. (2001) argue that this theory enables
broad market-place contexts to be analysed in parallel to emerging or substitute
products. Interestingly, quantum computing does not fit into this theoretical
framework as it overlooks anything other than incremental technology changes
(Adner, 2002). The lack of an interdisciplinary and unilateral approach to its
development thus far undermines this fundamental assumption of disruptive
innovation. QC represents a fundamental departure from the status quo in
computational physics, and as such is a radical innovation.

Schmidt and Druehl (2008) likewise critique disruptive innovation theory, arguing that
inaction of incumbents allows new technology to develop into a sufficient alternative
to the existing conditions. Therefore the new technology is only disruptive in the long

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run. This theory appears more closely aligned with QC’s trajectory, possibly because
disruptive innovation theory is too focused on market niches and supply-side
interactions (McDowall, 2018; Adner, 2002). An alternative trajectory for digital
innovations was suggested by Phaal et al. (2004), who argued that substantial
improvements in performance become impossible over time due to economic or
technical constraints. The slowdown creates a turbulent environment until a new
dominant design emerges. Given that Moore’s law has begun to fail, thanks to the
dimensional limits of atoms themselves, the new dominant design might be quantum
computing (Spender, 2018). Contrastingly, technological competition analysis has
revealed that transitions between technologies are not due to incumbent
technology’s limits (Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Henderson, 1995). In summary,
disruptive innovation theory does not appear to represent quantum computing’s
trajectory into the mass market. Alternative theories look more promising, but a new
conceptualization is required.

Revolutionary Innovation
To advance understanding of QC’s development trajectory, Figure 8 outlines an
augmented version of the disruptive innovation concept by Christensen et al. (2015).

Figure 8: Revolutionary Innovation Lifecycle

Adapted from Christensen et al., 2015

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As a revolutionary innovation, rather than simply disruptive, quantum computing
begins from the highest price point per unit of performance and slowly becomes
more attractive for mainstream markets. During phase 1, efficient algorithms do not
exist for each use-case and infrastructure experiences decoherence or lacks qubits.
This makes QC applicable to very few practical situations, and progress is mainly
academic or extremely high risk investments. In phase 2, price per performance unit
begins to fall with increasing speed as the innovation develops with iterative help
from the niche use-cases that it now serves. For example, the UK government
announced £1bn in funding for quantum technologies from a mix of private and
public sector. From this, they expect to realise commercial opportunities that
otherwise would not have been met, proving that financial assistance is necessary to
develop at the requisite speed (Department for Business, Energy & Industrial
Strategy, 2019). Such developments in quantum computing may allow it to tip into
phase 3: a mass market forms, sparking continuous funding for product development
on a larger scale, in tandem with new applications of the technology being found.

From QC’s development history, and its current investment and adoption levels, it is
likely that the technology is coming to the end of phase 2 of the revolutionary
innovation lifecycle. It has entered the realm of niche-use cases, as will be later
discussed, but has not quite hit the high end of the market at the end of phase 2.
This is foreseeable in the future, however as it took nearly 50 years to get to this
point in the life cycle, further developments are not expected soon. In conclusion,
augmenting existing disruptive innovation theory appears to be a more accurate
description of where the technology came from and therefore more likely to forecast
its future.

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Quantum Computing’s Development Future
Funding for QC is relatively small compared to AI and blockchain, as QC is not
advanced enough to present a viable return on investment for short-term equity
funding (Holst, 2019). However, one alternative measure of the development future
is applications for related patents.

Figure 9: Number of patent applications worldwide from 1999 to 2017

Relecura, 2018a

Increases in patent applications (Figure 9) indicate that research and development is

translating into valuable steps towards commercialisation (Holst, 2019). As an entity
advances knowledge in its subsection of quantum computing, it applies for patents to
protect its investment. Continuing on this trajectory provides protection for
commercial quantum activities, pushing technology developments further. Currently,
America is responsible for over ⅓ of quantum computing patent applications from
1999-2017 (Figure 10).

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Figure 10: Share of quantum computing patent applications worldwide from
1999-2017, by country

Relecura, 2018b

China and Taiwan make up 22% with few other large individual players, further
highlighting the China vs America competition in this field (Figure 10). Impacts of this
are likely to be moulded by the idiosyncratic political landscape and extent to which
key industries adopt the technology in each country, making them hard to predict.
Overall the development future of quantum computing is bright, with research
translating into patentable technological developments.

Quantum Computing’s Effects On Cyber Security

QC’s impact on the cyber security market exemplifies the revolutionary impact that
this technology may have on other industries. Explaining this requires some
understanding of the types of problems that quantum computers help to solve.

Prime Number Factorisation

Prime factoring is the process of determining the set of prime numbers that multiply
together to equal the original integer N. The classical computer approach is to check,
step-by-step, all possible numbers sequentially from 2 to √N , which increases the
number of operations exponentially with the increase of N (Chiang et al., 2016) .
Even slightly more intelligent factoring algorithms, such as Fermat’s, take an
inordinate number of operations on a supercomputer (Lehman, 1974). Factoring
prime numbers is prevalent in information security because it has superpolynomial
time complexity for conventional computers. Therefore knowing the prime number

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used to encrypt a file (public key) does not pose a security risk because only the
prime factors of that integer can decrypt it (private keys). The public key can be
published, allowing encrypted communications to be sent between parties. However
only authorised parties (those with the private keys) can decrypt the messages.
These difficulties in factoring primes constitute a fundamental cornerstone of modern
cryptography, especially industry standard encryptions like Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) or Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) (Rivest et al., 1983; Miller, 1986).

Quantum computing’s advantages derive from super-positioned qubits doing

calculations in parallel, rather than a classic sequential process. As a result, factoring
primes is trivial for a quantum computer, as proved by Shor’s algorithm (1999).
Quantum computers can, theoretically, make encryptions based on prime number
factorisation redundant by factoring prime integers in polynomial-time (Bermudo
Mera et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2018; Grosshands et al., 2017; Kerner, 2017).
However, Preskill (2018) claims that any meaningful factoring via any variation of
Shor’s algorithm is beyond today’s quantum capabilities because of their noisy and
intermediate-scale (50-200 qubits). Thus, it remains the case that quantum
computing could in the future undermine the fundamental algorithmic principles that
our cyberspace security is based on.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

QKD is a technique which ensures secure distribution of private keys for encryptions.
It uses single photons to transfer information, and generates truly random numbers
to be used as keys to authenticate messages (Yang et al., 2019). Using QKD means
any attempt at eavesdropping on communications will introduce abnormally high
qubit error rates in transmission, and thus warn users of interception (Ekert, 1991).
Using this application of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle means that QKD provides
provable s​ ecurity, without excessive delay in transmission (Mayers, 2001; Yang et
al., 2019). Demonstration of security is paramount for governments, particularly
military personnel, and therefore explains the interest in patenting quantum
cryptography technologies from specific countries (Figure 11). The patents protect
their investments thus far, and encourage future investments to further the
technology. There is clear cryptographic leadership from China and America, who
combined have more patents than the rest of the world.

15
Figure 11: Number of quantum cryptography patent applications worldwide, as
of 2015, by country

The Economist, 2017

However, QKD is only feasible with fault-tolerant quantum computers which are still
decades away from being available. The quantum cryptography patents (Figure 11)
show that progress is being made, but QKDs are not in the foreseeable future.

Post-Quantum Business and Cyber Security

Quantum computing has made increasing progress towards mass market adoption
and phase 3 of the revolutionary innovation lifecycle. Therefore, it is worth
considering what the potential impacts of QC could be on business environments,
and specifically cyber security, in a future where it is ubiquitous: the post-quantum
world.

Quantum Annealing
Quantum annealing is metaheuristic for finding the minimum of a given function over
a set of finite possible solutions (Stollenwerk et al., 2020). It is best used in
optimisation problems for researchers to find absolute minimum sizes, lengths,
costs, and distances (CB Insights, 2019). For example, Stollenwerk et al. (2020)

16
found optimal trajectories for air traffic management. Alternatively, Google and
D-Wave partnered with Volkswagen to optimise Beijing’s traffic flows (Neukart et al.,
2017). Quantum annealing found ideal paths for each individual vehicle, resulting in
the average congested routes falling from 140 to 58. This is a clear example of
quantum supremacy, but hypothetical applications are even more impressive. For
example, state and topology attacks are two cyber attacks in which a malicious actor
seeks to change the meter or network data, enabling them to interfere with state or
topology estimates, and thus operations (Liu et al., 2009; Kim & Tong, 2013a). To
find the optimal countermeasure to these attacks is equivalent to finding the
minimum vertex cover of the sub-network’s topology (Kim & Tong, 2013b).
Therefore, Javad-Kalbasi et al. (2019) argued that quantum annealing is the
strongest defence mechanism against such attacks, suggesting that in a
post-quantum world we may have even stronger cyber security measures. Equally,
CB Insights (2019) suggest using quantum annealing to optimize aircraft routing
according to weather, airport schedules, passenger information and fuel costs.
Classical computers would take thousands of years to solve this problem.
Summarily, widespread quantum annealing may optimise many practical scenarios
alongside offering improvements to cyber security.

Quantum as a Service
Due to QC’s installation and maintenance costs, QaaS is the only pragmatic delivery
model for global scale quantum computing. Many firms will see no benefit to
developing in-house quantum capabilities, especially if QaaS offers a cost-effective
alternative. Therefore, it is foreseeable that QaaS will be responsible for the majority
of enterprise quantum computing’s $5.8bn market in 2025 (Lanjudkar, 2019). In this
event, global monopoly powers are likely to have condensed into the handful of
companies that offer QaaS. This questions whether a global monopoly on the best
computational technology, especially one with QC’s cyber security implications,
should be controlled by private companies. However, in a future where quantum
computing is available to the mass market, there are benefits to be realised. One
example is Grover’s algorithm (1998) which searches unstructured datasets with
time complexity O(√n) instead of O(n) like classical computers (Wichert, 2016). This
is hyper-efficient for applications like web searches or processing high-scale IoT data
streams, both of which will become more important in future. Alternatively, QaaS
could improve training of AI models because quantum-enabled AI can ingest large
volumes of unstructured data at high velocity (Zhaokai et al., 2014). Simultaneously,
QaaS may empower malicious actors with the tools to undermine the cryptographic
principles upon which our cyber security is based. This is however counterbalanced
by the few entities who own quantum computers, and therefore have usage
oversight. Summarily, the advent of QaaS has huge ethical implications for global

17
monopoly powers, with both the potential to improve our information systems and to
destroy their security.

General Post-Quantum Information Systems

Almost all information systems in the post-quantum world will need to make
alterations to their cyber security measures. Most systems adopt the datagram
transport layer security (DTLS) as the security protocol. Here, industry standard
security is based on RSA or elliptic-curves, and therefore vulnerable to quantum
computing attacks, as discussed earlier. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is an
emerging field which attempts to create quantum-resistant systems through
conventional cryptography (Anderson, 2019). One example of PQC’s application is
e-voting security systems that use steganography with cryptography to add sufficient
complexity (Arome et al., 2019). It would be expedient to make integrating
post-quantum security, such as lattice-based cryptosystems, hash functions, or
commutative encryption, mandatory in future (Bermudo Mera et al., 2019; Moldovyan
et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2019). This is because nearly all systems are vulnerable to
quantum information sciences, representing an emerging threat (U.S Government
Accountability Office, 2018). Progress has already been made towards this, such as
evaluating algorithms that withstand quantum-enabled attacks (National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 2017). Consequently, enterprises that want to lead
industries with strong cyber security requirements - which is increasingly becoming
all industries - need a PQC strategy.

Challenges to Quantum Computing’s Progress

A critical consideration for existing quantum computers is that while in use, the
internal operations must be isolated from the outside universe. This is because tiny
leaks of information can disturb fragile quantum waves, which causes the process
called decoherence (Ladd et al., 2010). Resultantly, QCs are difficult to build and
maintain, requiring a laboratory-style environment alongside expertise in computing
and physics (Preskill, 2018). Thanks to these requirements, developments are slow
and fault-tolerant quantum computers remain distant. The criteria for such machines,
set out by DiVincenzo (2000), also creates friction. Subsystems to control the
computer, to measure qubits, and to preserve isolation require different states, thus
fundamentally conflicting with each other (Ladd et al., 2010). Overall, quantum
computers are still, and will remain for the foreseeable future, highly complex to
configure. To overcome this challenge, it is recommendable to invest in the physical
infrastructure and education of individuals who can advance the technology.

18
Furthermore, existing legislative infrastructure needs to be addressed. Under Article
32 of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (2018), there is a clause requiring
“state of the art” technical measures to ensure cyber security is appropriate to risks.
Similarly, the FTC requires “reasonable safeguards” under the Federal Trade
Commission Act Section 5 (The US Federal Reserve, 2017). The question of how to
decide what constitutes “state of the art” or “reasonable safeguards” becomes more
salient over time, considering QC’s forecasted growth in the most important
consumer markets in the world (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Size of the enterprise quantum computing market by industry from
2017 to 2030 (in million USD)

Tractica, 2019b

Aerospace, Agriculture, Life Sciences, and Automotive industries have the highest
forecasted quantum computing growth according to Figure 12. These industries
require some of the most stringent regulatory standards, necessitating progressive
legislation in the face of quantum supremacy and its impacts on cyber security.
Currently, law-making ignores the advent of quantum computing, creating a
potentially uncertain environment in which future businesses can operate. The risk of
retrospective legislation undermining existing commercial practices also reduces risk
taking and therefore investment in QC. As such, the legislative environment is
currently a barrier to progress for quantum computing and clarification is required as
to whether citizens have a right to quantum-resistant products and services in the
future.

19
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