INTRODUCTION TO AIR POWER
Reference: PAF Air Power Manual, Series 2000
ASSUMPTIONS
Definition of Air Power
AIR POWER
➢ The ability to project military force in the third
dimension-which includes the environment of the
space – by or from a platform above the surface
of the earth. (PAF Air Power Manual)
➢ The ability to do something in the air. It consisted
of transporting all sorts of things by aircraft from
one place to another. Billy Mitchell
➢ May also be characterized as the ability to fly
wherever one wishes at any time, and to prevent
the enemy from doing the same.
Air Power Theorists and Theories
ASSUMPTIONS
GIULIO DOUHET
1869-1930
“The Father of Air Power”
▪ Born into a military family in Italy in 1869.
▪ Served as a professional artillery officer
▪ A prolific writer and had successfully marketed
several plays and poems before the war
▪ Published his book “Command of the Air” in
1921, emphasizing the significance of the
strategic bombing
“…the sky is to become another battlefield no less
than the battlefields on land and at sea. For if there are
nations that exist that are untouched by the sea, there are
NONE that exist without the breathe of air…The Army and
Navy must recognize the Air Force, the birth of a third
brother-younger but nonetheless important, in the great
military family.”
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1. Airpower is inherently offensive; the bomber will
always get through.
2. All wars will be total wars.
3. Civilian morale is unstable.
4. The hegemony of the defensive form of ground
warfare is permanent.
AIR MARSHAL HUGH
MONTAGUE TRENCHARD
(1873-1956)
“Father of the
Royal Air Force”
• Commanded the Royal Flying Corps in World
War I
• Organized the independent Air Force and a
bomber force for bombing German rail and
industrial targets
• Chief of the Air Staff from 1919 to 1929,
formulated the doctrine and strategy of the
RAF in World War II.
1. The bomber will always get through; it does not
need an escort.
2. Civilian morale is fragile, but the British
[morale] is tougher than the Germans, and the
moral effect of bombing is much more
devastating than the physical effect.
3. The offensive is the stronger form of the air
war.
4. Night navigation, target acquisition, and bombing
accuracy are manageable problems.
5. Air superiority is a prerequisite for all other
military operations
GENERAL
WILLIAM “BILLY”
MITCHELL
(1879-1936)
• Earliest American Air Power Theorist
• Planned and lead the Greatest Air Battle of
WW1, the Battle of Saint Mihiel
• Advocated for a large and independent
American Air Force
ASSUMPTIONS
1. The coming of aviation was revolutionary.
2. Command of the air is a prime requirement.
3. Airpower is inherently offensive; the bomber
will always get through.
4. Antiaircraft artillery is ineffective.
5. Airpower could defend the continental United
States more economically than the Navy, and
the latter’s form of warfare is obsolescent.
6. Airmen are a special and elite breed of people,
and they alone can understand the proper
employment of airpower.
7. Future wars will be total; the ascendancy of the
ground defensive will persist; everybody is a
combatant.
8. Civilian morale is fragile.
COLONEL
JOHN A WARDEN III USAF
(Retired)
• Warden has more combat flying experience
and extensive formal education than Douhet,
Trenchard and Mitchell
• Flew OV-10 Broncos and F-4D phantoms
during the Vietnam War
• Warden was also an F-15 wing commander at
Bitburg, Germany
• He was the Head, CHECKMATE, an office
serving under the Air Force deputy chief of
staff for plans and operations and concerned
with long-range planning.

Because of the unpredictability of human behavior and

the predictability of material damage, the capability of the
enemy should be targeted as the first priority.

Warden believed that targeting the enemy’s physical

capability should be done with the full realization that
military objectives must serve the political ones.

WARDEN’S RINGS
COLONEL JOHN R BOYD
(USAF, Retired)
1927-1997

• Served as an Enlisted Man in the Army Air

Force from 1945-47 & later a USAF Officer in
1951
• Boyd flew fighter missions in the F-86 Sabre
during the Korean War in 1953, he was later
assigned to Nellis AFB, Nevada
• As a fighter pilot in Korea & tactics instructor at
Nellis AFB, Boyd observed, analyzed &
assimilated the relative energy states of
fighter aircraft

➢ In 1988, Warden developed a COG Model in the

form of 5 rings.
➢ Argued that Airpower’s inherent speed, range,
and flexibility allow it to strike the full
spectrum of enemy capabilities in a swift and
decisive manner.
➢ Advocated air strikes against the enemy’s
Center of Gravity (COG). The point where the
enemy is most vulnerable and the point where
an attack will have the best chance of being
decisive.

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ASSUMPTIONS
1. Human behavior is complex and
unpredictable.
2. Material effects of military action are more
predictable.
3. Air superiority is a prerequisite for victory or
even survival.
4. The offensive is by far the stronger form of the
air war.
5. Victory is and always has been achieved in
the mind of the enemy commander—
everything must be directed toward that end.
6. Americans are even more sensitive to friendly
and even enemy casualties than ever before.
THESIS
• The art of air campaign planning is vital and once
air superiority is assured, Ai Power can be used
either in support of the arms or can be supported
by the other arms, and sometimes can function
independently to achieve decisive effects.
• Technology made a parallel attack (as opposed
to sequential ones).
• The Centers of Gravity vary from case to case.
They may be arranged in five rings. At the center
are leadership targets, then means of production,
infrastructure, population, and fielded forces in
the outer perimeter.
• Almost all states and other political entities have
the five rings, and they always appear with
leadership at the center.
TARGETING
• The enemy should be targeted as the first priority.
• Targeting the enemy’s physical capability (as
opposed to his psychological objectives) should
be done with the full realization that military
objectives must clearly serve the political
objectives.
• Targeting the COG in any ring simultaneously is
more effective than sequential targeting;
targeting the objectives in all the rings in parallel,
rather than sequentially, tends to be even more
decisive than attacking only one ring or starting
with the outer ring and proceeding inward through
each ring in turn.
AIR SUPERIORITY
• Command of the air remains Warden’s first
priority for all operations in the air or on the
surface, though it sometimes may be achieved in
parallel attacks rather than sequential.
• Warden believed that the least efficient place for
achieving air dominance was in the air.
• Air attack can serve more than one role.
AIR EXPLOITATION
• Air interdiction by any other name is still
preferable to close air support because it allows
more targets to be killed at less cost.
• The preservation of air reserves and argues the
idea as a radical one.
ORGANIZATION FOR WAR
• Role of the Armed Forces: can function in either
a supporting or a supported role, depending on
the circumstances.
• Force Structure: the nature of the units sent will
vary in accordance with what is available and the
constraints and opportunities peculiar to that
theater; The greatest variety and number of
forces must be sent as early as possible for air
superiority; offensive is based largely on the idea
of denying the enemy the ability to react.
• Technology: precision-guided munitions (PGM)
and stealth.
IMPACT
• The naval aviation community building its PGM
capability and making its command, control, and
communications capability more compatible with
joint operations.
• Warden’s book “The Air Campaign” was to have
an effect as pervasive and long-lasting on the
armed forces.
Air Power Characteristics
STRENGTHS
1. Perspective
- elevation provides a broader field of view than
can be had by observers on the surface.
2. Speed
- being elevated above the surface gives
aerospace platforms the potential to move very
rapidly because they are not constrained by
surface friction or impeded by terrain obstacles.
3. Reach
- aircraft can project military power over great
distances in any direction unimpeded by surface
features such as mountain barriers or expanses
of water.
4. Maneuverability
- While surface forces can move only on the
earth’s surface and are dependent on its features
for any vertical movement, elevation gives
aerospace platforms three-dimensional
maneuverability.
5. Ubiquity
- refers to the ability to operate almost anywhere
within the air and over the surface. This attribute
is also described as mobility and persuasiveness
and implies the same sense of movement
unconstrained by physical barriers.
6. Flexibility
- air power is flexible in that assets can be
diverted quickly and effectively from one task to
another and from one target to another.
7. Responsiveness
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 - the characteristics of air power make it very
responsive to, and capable of, demonstrating a
nation’s political intent.
8. Concentration
- It has physical and psychological effects.
Speed, reach and flexibility allow air power to
concentrate military force.
LIMITATIONS
Air power has inherent limitations namely impermanence,
limited payloads, and fragility.
1. Impermanence
- Aircraft cannot stay airborne indefinitely.
2. Limited Payload
- the payloads that can be carried by aircraft are
far more limited than those that can be carried by ships or
by land vehicles.
3. Fragility
- air vehicles are, by their nature, highly stressed
and have to be as light as practicable, they carry little or
no armor protection.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
1. Cost
- high technology equipment inevitably costs
more than simple equipment, and as military
aircraft tend to be at the cutting edge of
technology, they can be costly.
2. Dependency on Bases
- Air Power is often seen to be more obviously
dependent on its bases than either land power or
sea power.
3. Sensitivity to Light and Weather
- Air Power is sometimes perceived as being far
more sensitive to weather and light conditions
than other forms of military force.
4. Sensitivity to Technology
- Air Power is a product of technology, and
technological advances inevitably affect air
power development.
Tenets of Air Power
1. Centralized control and decentralized execution
of air force.
2. Air power produces synergistic effects.
3. Air power systems are suited to persistent
operations.
4. Air operations must be prioritized.
5. Air operations must be balanced.
THEORIES & CONCEPTS OF AIR POWER: CLASSICAL TO
THE PRESENT
*FRAMING CONCEPTS:
Airpower - The ability to project military force in the third
dimension – which includes the environment
of space – by or from a platform above the
surface of the earth (PAF Air Power Manual)
- defined by other countries in accordance
with their own peculiar circumstances &
purposes
Military Theory - can be described as “a comprehensive
analysis of all the aspects of warfare, its
patterns, and inner structure, and the mutual
relationships of its various
components/elements.” (Milan Vego)
-Theories of land, naval, and air warfare
intended to explain the nature, character &
characteristics of war in each physical
medium
Levels of War: SOT
Strategic Level - Grand Strategic where most basic but
important decisions such as entering a war,
war aims, alliances, end state & made by the
political leadership
- Military Strategic concerned w/ overall
conduct of the war, force allocations & priority
fronts made by the highest military leadership
w/ approval of their political masters
Operational Level- Concerned with how to achieve the
strategic objectives thru conduct of military
operations (campaigns) under an operational
commander
Tactical Level - Where opposing forces physically meet
(battles, engagements, raids)
Air Strategy - The art & science of organizing, developing,
deploying & employing air forces to achieve
military objectives
Campaigns - Series of tactical operations designed to
achieve objectives set by strategy
Air Strategy:
1. Strategic Air Power - Air Power employed as the primary
means of winning a war (usually by bombing
an enemy’s homeland, war-making capacity
& population)
2. Tactical Air Power - Air Power employed in conjunction with
or to support other forces (land, naval) in
battles & campaigns
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*In practice, the distinction between Strategic & Tactical Air
Power are often blurred
**Strategic capabilities can be employed for tactical missions
& vice versa
ROOTS OF AIR POWER (1903-1918)
1. Birth of Military Aviation (1903-1914)
1903 - the invention of the airplane & its
developmental potential made the air a viable
medium of war
- Idea of flying machines & war in the air
followed shortly
H.G. Wells - wrote on war in the air and bombing of cities
in 1907
1911 - First use of aircraft in combat by Italy in Libya
1914 - major military powers each possessed
established military aviation organizations
2. World War I and War in the Air (1914-18)
World War I - first conflict between air forces
• Initially, the level of technology limited air units & aircraft to
reconnaissance & observation
• Air forces started as components of armies & navies
• The four years of war transformed air power into a viable &
valuable instrument of war
Technical Transformation
– Engines
– Airframes
– Armament
– Aircraft Design
– Aircraft Carriers
Organizational Transformation from support arms of armies
(air corps) & navies (naval air service) to air forces
Operational/Technological Transformation
– Intelligence-Surveillance-Reconnaissance
– (Reconnaissance Aircraft)
– Counter-Air (fighters)
– Tactical Strike (attack aircraft)
– Strategic Strike (long-range bombers)
– Naval Aviation (carrier aircraft)
3. Air Power in the Last Year of WW1 (1918)
– Ground operations = joint air-land operations
– Air superiority first role of air forces
– Strategic bombing = physical effect limited, psychological
effect strong
– Naval warfare transformed by long-range ISR & aircraft carrier
operations
Classical Air Power Theory (1919-1939)
Air Power Lessons & Issues from World War One
• Aircraft as an important weapon
• Its tactical role is well recognized but strategic role uncertain.
• Air power has a brief history compared to land and sea power
so problem of digesting lessons
• Promise of better technology as aircraft design became a
science that will transform warfare
Questions for Air Power Theorists
• Key Strategic/Operational Questions:
– Strategic Bombardment (vs enemy homeland) or Tactical
Air (vs enemy military/naval forces)?
– Offensive Air Power or Defensive Air Power
• Key Technical/Technological Questions:
– Bomber vs Fighter
– Aircraft Carrier vs Battleship
• Key Organizational Questions:
– What organization will control air forces: Army? Navy?
Establish Independent Service?
Classical Air Power Theories & Concepts
• Strategic Air Power
• Air Defense
• Tactical Aviation
• Naval Aviation
Strategic Air Power Theories & Theorists:
Guilio Douhet - Italian military officer who wrote Command
of the Air – most articulate air power theorist
- Success lay through Command of the Air
(the ability to prevent the enemy while
retaining the ability to fly oneself)
- The entire population is in the front line in an
air war and they could be terrorized with
urban bombing
- There is no defense against aircraft
- Victory will go to the side that can launch the
swiftest & strongest air attack
Hugh Trenchard - 1st Commander of the RAF
- Promoted strategic bombing as the way to
victory
- Target of the bombing campaign would be
the civilian population to break its morale so it
would sue for peace
- Advocated substitution of ground forces by
air forces in keeping peace & order
throughout British Empire
William “Billy” Mitchell - Earliest American Air Power Theorist
- Conducted 1921 bombing tests that sank the
ex-German battleship Ostfriesland
- Argued vehemently for strategic bombing by
a large, independent air force
- Advocated use of air power to destroy
fielded forces of the enemy, on land and at
sea
- Feuded with the US Navy on who should
take over Coast Defense Role
US Air Corps Tactical School
- Forerunner of Air University and breeding
ground for US Army Air Corps doctrines,
strategies & theories from the 1920s up to
WW2
- Came up with the idea of strategic bombing
using precision attacks on the economic
infrastructure
*Industrial Web targeting – a modern
industrial society is an interconnected system
or “web”.
- All air forces need to do is to identify the
nodes & subject these to attacks and the
whole system will collapse
- Pinned much faith on technical solutions like
the B-17 heavy bomber & Norden bombsight
Four Major Points of Strategic Air Power:
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1. Air Power can win a war on its own because of its ability to
directly strike at an enemy’s territory, population & sources of
power
2. The most effective employment of air power can only be done
by an Air Service fully independent from and co-equal of the
Army & Navy
3. The bomber is the primary weapon
4. There is no defense against a strategic bombing offensive
AIR DEFENSE
1920s - promoted the belief that offensive air power
will overcome any defense
• Bombers often have better performance than fighters
• Methods of detecting aircraft slow & cumbersome since
limited only to ground observers
• Popular belief that “the bomber will always get through” (UK
PM Stanley Baldwin)
Three key breakthroughs in the 1930s:
1. Radio wave experiments successfully detected aircraft over
long distances (Radio Direction-Finding or Radar)
2. Monoplane fighter (fast & heavily armed)
3. Radio communications enabled C2
Radar detects aircraft & passes info to Sector Station (C2)
↓ 1. German Air Campaign vs UK (1940-41)
Sector Station analyzes radar reports, track direction of enemy
a/c & gives order to intercept
↓
After receiving order from Sector Station, fighter squadrons
intercept
Hugh Dowding - Head of UK Fighter Command who
developed the first integrated air
defense system linking radar, fighter
units & headquarters
TACTICAL AVIATION
• Germans & Russians saw the value of air power more along
the lines of its contribution to surface forces
• Luftwaffe doctrine emphasized fighter air superiority,
balanced multi-role air force
• Equipment priority on specialized attack aircraft, fighters &
medium bombers
• German widespread adoption of radio-facilitated air-ground
coordination during CAS & BAI
• Experiments with air mobility & airborne/parachute operations
by Germany & Russia
NAVAL AVIATION
• Interwar period saw debate on impact of air power on navies
• Question on which would be the primary weapon: aircraft or
battleship?
• US, UK & Japan developed carrier aviation & took advantage
of naval limitation agreements to convert battleship hulls to
aircraft carriers
• Officers who believed that air power & carriers would be the
wave of the future included Isoroku Yamamoto, Minoru
Genda, William Moffett, William S. Sims & John Towers
Major Conflicts (1919-1939)
Interwar Conflicts - as Initial Proving Ground of Air
Power Theories/ Concepts/
Doctrines
– Sino-Japanese War 1937 (strategic & tactical bombing, carrier
operations)
– Spanish Civil War 1936-1939 (strategic & tactical bombing, air
mobility)
– “Warm Up” to World War Two & lessons used by the future
Axis Powers to develop doctrines and improve capabilities
AIR POWER THEORY TO PRACTICE IN A GLOBAL TOTAL
WAR (1939-1945)
World War II Air War - Largest air war in history with air
forces numbering in millions of
personnel and tens of thousands of
aircraft
Tested the following air power
theories:
– Air power through strategic
bombardment can win the war alone
– Air defense can defeat a strategic
air campaign
– Tactical air power in joint
operations
– Aviation in naval war
Strategic Bombing Campaigns in World War II
2. UK Night Bombing Campaign vs Germany (1940-45)
3. US Daylight Bombing of Germany (1942-45)
4. US Bombing of Japan (1944-45)
Integrated Air Defense System vs Strategic Bombing
– The Royal Air Force & later the German Luftwaffe
employed IADS vs the respective strategic bombing
campaigns launched against their countries
– IADS vs strategic bombing hinged on the ability of
defenses to inflict unacceptable losses (5% as norm) vs the
attackers
– Key success factor = absence or presence of fighter escorts
protecting strategic bombing force
Strategic Bombing as “Failure”
– Belief “The bomber will always get through”
against IADS led to unsustainable losses
– Required fighter escorts to allow the bombers to
get to the target w/ acceptable losses
– Failed to Destroy or Cripple Enemy Production
-German war production actually rose to highest
levels in Summer 1944 during the peak of Allied
bombing
– Failed to Destroy the Morale of Enemy Population
– Failed on the promise of being less costly than
ground campaigns
- US and British fatalities from the air war (145,000 KIA
& Missing) almost at par with their ground combat
fatalities (160,000 KIA)
Strategic Bombing as “Success”
– Prevented Enemy Production from Attaining Its Full Potential
– Represented a True Second Front That Tied in Massive
Enemy Resources
• 1 million plus German personnel for air defense
• 10,000 plus heavy Anti-Aircraft Artillery
• The majority of the German Fighter Force
• Production priority from offensive capabilities
(bombers) to defensive capabilities (fighters)
– The Oil Campaign Crippled German Ground Forces
Tactical Aviation in Joint Campaigns: The Axis
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– Germany & Japan primarily used their air forces for tactical
support of ground operations
– Germany’s Blitzkrieg from 1939-42 in Europe spearheaded by
the Luftwaffe which after winning control of the air, provided air
support to surface forces plus airborne assault
– Japan’s army & naval (land\carrier-based) air forces played a
similar role from Pearl Harbor to the conquest of Southeast Asia
Tactical Aviation in Joint Campaigns: The Allies
– Western Allied & Soviet ground campaigns in Mediterranean
& Europe from 1942-45 made under air superiority
– US/UK Strategic air forces also employed for tactical bombing
vs German Army
– Allies conducted large-scale airborne operations in Western
Europe in 1944-45
– Land-based air forces & aircraft carriers critical in the defeat
of the German U-Boats in the Battle of the Atlantic
– After Pearl Harbor, the US Navy adopted the aircraft carrier as
the primary naval weapon & American industrial might
constructed more than 100 carriers from 1941-45
– Major naval campaigns and battles in the Pacific decided by
the superior air force (land & carrier-based) such as Coral Sea,
Midway, Guadalcanal, Philippine Sea & Leyte Gulf
– Mid-1945, Japan’s remaining naval ships remained in harbor
under the mercy of Allied air attacks
– The US Navy-led amphibious offensive in the Central Pacific
from 1943-44 spearheaded by carrier-based air power (Tarawa,
Marianas, Iwo Jima, Okinawa)
– MacArthur’s 1942-45 joint campaign from Australia via New
Guinea to the Philippines based on achieving air superiority
before projecting ground & naval forces under its umbrella
• WW2 tested the theory whether or not air power can win a war
on its own (strategic air power)
• Contrary to the expectations of strategic bombing theorists of
the Interwar Era, air power was not able to deliver on what they
promised
• What it was able to deliver was that success in ground and
naval operations need control of the air as a precondition
• Air Power was also a tremendous force multiplier in
joint campaigns & tactical operations
AIR POWER IN THE COLD WAR ERA (1945-1989)
Cold War Strategy & Military Systems
- the defeat of the Axis in WW2 inaugurated a new politico-
military rivalry between the US-led Western Powers & the
communist USSR with its satellites that lasted until 1989
Cold War - This conflict known was marked not by direct
armed confrontation between the two
superpowers but wars by proxies
Cold War Air Power Theory - was shaped in large part by
technological developments
• Technologies Driving Cold War Air Power
– Nuclear Weapons
– Ballistic Missiles
– Supersonic Jet Aircraft
– Rotary-Wing Aircraft
– Tactical Guided Missiles (AAM, SAM, ASM)
– Electronic Warfare
– Airborne Early Warning & Control (AWAC)
– Space Reconnaissance Satellites
– Precision Guidance (later stage)
– Stealth (later stage)
Nuclear Weapons & Air Power
Nuclear Weapons - seen as ultimate expression of
strategic air power
Albert Einstein – stated “I know not with what weapons World
War III will be fought, but World War IV will be
fought with sticks and stones.”
• Air Force Strategic Bombers & Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles form two of the three legs of the
Nuclear Triad
Nuclear Weapons & Deterrence
– Massive Retaliation = a massive
conventional attack will be met by the use of
nuclear weapons
– Counterforce = Survivability of nuclear
delivery systems from first strike to enable
counterstrike & Mutually Assured Destruction
(MAD)
– Focus on targeting & how many weapons
allocated to targets
Nuclear Weapons & Limited War
– General War involving nuclear weapons
seen as too destructive but some believe its
use in a limited conflict possible
– Limited meaning introduction of nuclear
weapons in a conventional war
– Development of small nuclear weapons
carried by tactical aircraft for use in the
battlefield
Conventional Air Power Theory
• Strategic Bombardment/Strike as core of air power theory
continuity from WW2 (bombers & surface to surface missiles)
• New element that impacted on conventional strategic strike
was the moral question of massive civilian casualties leading to
later investment in precision guided weapons
• Strategic bombers on occasion used in the tactical battlefield
• Offensive Counter Air vs Defensive Counter-Air = IADS vs
SEAD (1960s-80s)
– Radars, Electronic Warfare, Firepower integration
– IADS = Interceptors + GBADS (Radar, SAM, Anti-
Aircraft Artillery) + Integrated C2
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 – SEAD = Electronic Warfare Aircraft + Attack Aircraft
armed w/ Anti-Radiation Missiles or bombs
– The Soviets invested in SAM-based IADS while the
US invested in SEAD

• Airmobility (1960s)
– Improvements in helicopter performance & technology
– Requirement of dispersion in a nuclear battlefield
– US Army developed Airmobile Divisions using helicopters to
transport soldiers like modern (air) cavalry
– Became an effective weapon for counterguerrilla warfare

• AirLand Battle (1970s-80s)

– Post Vietnam US Army refocused to meet a massive
conventional threat in Europe
– US Army and Air Force conceived of an expanded battlefield
that extends hundreds of kilometers into an enemy’s rear area
– While ground forces deal with forward enemy forces, the air Effects-Based Targeting
force will deal with succeeding echelons (Follow-On Forces • Originated from Classical Theories & Theorists (i.e. nodal
Attack or FOFA) points of Industrial Web Targeting)
– Western investment in intelligence collection systems • Further amplified by John Boyd’s Centers of Gravity
integrated with deep strike capabilities called a Military • David Deptula argued that stealth aircraft armed with PGM
Technical Revolution by the Soviets can change paradigms by focusing on effects rather than
traditional general target destruction
AIR POWER IN COLD WAR CONFLICTS
• Korean War (1950-53) - introduced OCA vs DCA jet vs jet
combat
• Vietnam War (1945-75) – Strategic Bombing, Air mobility &
SEAD vs IADS
• Arab-Israeli Wars (1967, 73, 81) – OCA, SEAD vs IADS
• Falklands War (1982) Winner of OCA = control of Falklands
Island
• Soviet-Afghan War (1979-87) – Air mobility, airspace denial
(Mujahideen Stinger MANPADs vs
Soviet Air Force)

AIR POWER AFTER THE COLD WAR (1989-PRESENT)

Post Cold War Air Developments
• The End of the Cold War in 1989 made US sole remaining John Boyd & OODA
superpower • Fighter Pilot
• Offensive air warfare by Western air forces within Joint • Father of the F-15, F-16 & A-10
Operations in the ascendant • 1964 Aerial Attack Study codified USAF fighter tactics
• Air superiority first goal of joint operations • OODA Loop Concept generated from study of fighter combat
• Western sensitivity over collateral casualties & damage wherein the advantage lie with the aircraft that transitioned
• Precision guided munitions usage & standoff attacks faster in its maneuvers
increasing trend
• The line between specialized types (bombers, attack, fighter)
became blurred & disappeared with the maturation of Multi-Role
Fighter

Post-Cold War Air Power Theorists/Theories

• John Warden
• Effects-Based Targeting
• John Boyd

Air Power in Post-Cold War Conflicts

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• Operation Desert Storm (Jan-Feb 1991) air campaign AIR POWER DEVELOPMENT
patterned after Warden’s Rings
• Operation Deliberate Force (1995) & Allied Force (1999) vs What is air power?
Serbia saw restrictive ROE and increasing use of PGM (70% in ⮚ Project force in the 3rd dimension.
Deliberate Force & 70% in Allied Force) ⮚ Ability to do something in the air.
• Pattern emerging of leading role of airpower in Western armed ⮚ Ability to fly wherever one wishes
forces
⮚ Ability to prevent the enemy from doing the same
Observations & Insights for the Future
Evolution of Air Power
1. PRE FLIGHT / MANNED FLIGHT
21st-Century Warfare Trends
- Greek legends show gods and goddesses having the gifts of
• Airpower, Military Operations & Capabilities
flight.(Daedalus and Icarus)
– linear attrition to non-linear maneuver-effects based &
- Some religions relate stories of angels with wings flying to the
sequential to simultaneous operations
heavens
– Jointness further exploit single service capabilities
- Ancient Chinese records tell of human attempts to sail through
– Network-centricity will generate greater domain awareness at
the air
various levels of war & more rapid sensor-to-shooter interface
- BALLOONS AND AIRSHIPS - First thoughts directed toward
(basis of new RMA?)
lighter-than-air flight.
– Growing recognition of cyber as a distinct warfare environment
- LEONARDO DA VINCI
(akin to air power in the 1920s & 30s)
o First experiment in aviation
– Artificial Intelligence will enhance capabilities & performance
o Planned for several flying machines, including a
of Unmanned Aerial Systems that would enable them to operate
helicopter powered by four men and a light hang glider.
& survive in high threat environments
– Computer-Driven Augmented Reality will enable aircrew to
- SIR GEORGE CAYLEY ( the man who discovered the flight)
generate & rapidly process massive amounts of data and
- W.S. HENSON & JOHN STRINGFELLOW (received a patent
intelligence
for a man-carrying, powered aircraft named the Ariel in 1843.)
– Computer generated modelling & 3-D Printing promise to
- JOSEPH & ETIENNE MONTGOFIER
speed up development and production of air power systems
Made lighter-than-air flight possible
– Nanotechnologies, hypersonic missiles, directed energy &
− Montgofier gas
electromagnetic weapons=more lethal, longer ranged & quick
− First passengers: sheep, rooster, duck
acting firepower
First human passengers
− Pilatre de Rozier (+)
Air Power in Post-9/11 Conflicts
first killed in an aircraft
• Global War on Terror (2001-Present)
− Marquis d’Arlandes
– Precision Decapitation Strikes vs Terrorist Leaders
artillery officer
using manned & unmanned capabilities
- PIERRE BLANCHARD & DR. JOHN JEFFRIES
• Arab-Israeli Conflicts in Lebanon & Gaza – Massed rocket
⮚ Pierre Blanchard pioneered the flight of a hot-air
attacks from Hezbollah & Hamas countered by Iron Dome Anti-
balloon in America (Philadelphia, 1793)
Rocket System
• Syrian Civil War = 21st Century SEAD vs IADS ⮚ Pierre Blanchard and Dr. John Jeffries flew across
• Current War in Ukraine reinforces effectiveness of airspace the English Channel
denial (Stinger SAMs vs Russian Air Force), problems of
deconfliction (Both Air Forces & IADS same equipment) & - 1793 – French Army used balloons for reconnaissance
ballistic missile for conventional strikes by Russia - 1862 – Used by both Union and Confederate troops
- Barnstormers
Questions for Air Power Theorists - Otto Lilienthal (Father of Modern Aviation) Single and Bi-
• Would airpower theory follow and evolutionary building block wing Gliders
approach or follow a revolutionary part? - Octave Chanute published a compendium of early aviation
• What lessons on recent conflicts provide a waypoint to future experiments (multi wing glider)
air power theories? - SAMUEL PIERPONT LANGLEY
• What key technologies will shape air power theoretical ⮚ Steam powered glider
development ⮚ Catapult launch over water
⮚ Nearly beat Wright Brothers
Final Thoughts
• Airpower has become a favored choice as a military option - THE WRIGHT BROTHERS First manned powered flight
especially among Western Countries (US, NATO, Israel) in history

• Air Power cannot win a war on its own but it has a decisive 2. WORLD WAR 1 (1914-1918)
impact as part of a joint team (No details included in this slide of World War 1)

• Air power theory development is directly proportional to the 3. WORLD WAR 2

industrial, R&D, human resource investment to aviation
(Western Example)
The Major Air Forces

SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 9 of 37

- Air Power Roles: EVOLUTION OF WARFARE
⮚ Close Air Support, Interdiction, Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Air Transport Ancient & Medieval Warfare
(3000 BC – 16th Century)
⮚ Improvements in engine power
⮚ Development in propeller-driven, all-metal monoplanes Ancient Warfare
increased speed from 120 mph to 350 mph from 1918 - development of larger socio-political organizations
to 1939. based on agriculture = war as a large-scale organized
⮚ Speed of fighter aircraft reached 450 mph activity
⮚ Atomic bomb - first military powers (3000BC – 400 BC)
o Egypt
⮚ Ballistic Atomic bomb
o Hyksos
⮚ Ballistic missiles o Assyria
⮚ Jet o Babylon
⮚ Rocket aircraft o Persia
⮚ Electronic warfare o China
- Military innovations include metal weapons (bronze,
⮚ Navigation aids
iron) horse-drawn chariots, cavalry & siege craft
⮚ Airborne radar - Hellenic (Greek Warfare) & Hellenistic (Greek-
⮚ Helicopters Influenced) emerged in Southern Europe &
Mediterranean
- Cold War - Military Innovation – Armored Infantry Combat,
⮚ nuclear weapons become more powerful and their combined Arms (Infantry-Cavalry-Missile Troops),
delivery systems improved Naval Warfare
- Major Powers:
✔ Intercontinental ballistic missiles
o Athens
✔ Submarines o Sparta
✔ Bombers o Macedon
➢ Jet widely accepted for supersonic speeds o Carthage
➢ Anti aircraft missiles o Rome/Byzantium
➢ Helicopters matured to become a useful tactical - Naval Warfare
support & attack aircraft o The Mediterranean Sea as arena of naval
➢ Space systems were developed for recon warfare
➢ Spawned stealth technology o Early naval powers – Egyptians,
Phoenicians, Persians, Athens, China, Rome
o Wooden ships powered by sail & muscle
4. CONTEMPORARY WAR
power armed with spikes at bows for
⮚ accuracy of weapon systems due to IT ramming
✔ satellite/ laser guidance increase o Roman innovation of corvus or bridge that
accuracy in meters connected its warship to that of an enemy
✔ responsiveness of air operations where enabling Roman marines to attack (land
warfare at sea)
✔ missions can be retargeted in minutes
o Roman invasion of Britain (55BC, 54BC &
✔ sophistication and increased capabilities 43AD) examples of early amphibious
of weapons operations
✔ systems - Notable Military Leaders:
✔ aerial refueling o Alexander the Great
✔ multi-role fighter o Themistocles
o Julius Caesar
✔ smart munitions
o Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus
✔ UAVs o Hannibal of Carthage
✔ C4ISR o Cyrus the Great
⮚ Air Power capability shift to irregular war o Sargon of Assyria
(counter-terrorism) o Ramses
o Thutmose III
o Sun Tsu
- Major Wars of the Ancient Era
o Warring States China (475-221 BC)
o Greco-Persian Wars (440-449 BC)
o Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC)
o Macedonian Conquests (336-323 BC)
o Punic Wars (264-146 BC)
o Roman Expansion in Europe (58 BC – 9 AD)
o Barbarian Invasions of Roman Empire (375-
410 AD)
- Fall of Rome in 476 AD marked the end of the Ancient
Era

Medieval Warfare
- Period between the Fall of Rome to the 15th Century
known as Middle Ages or Medieval Period
- Major Military Developments
o Heavy Armored Cavalry (Europe)
o Light Cavalry (Islamic Countries, Mongols)
o Military Architecture & Engineering (Castles
& Siege Warfare)
o Gunpowder Artillery (Late Middle Ages)
- Major Military Powers
o Mongol Empire (13th-14th Centuries)
o Byzantine Empire (6th-11th Centuries)

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 o Holy Roman Empire (9th-12th Centuries)
o Ottoman Empire (13th-16th Centuries)
o Islamic Arab Empire (7th-13th Centuries)
o Normans (11th-13th Centuries)
o China
- Notable Military Leaders
o Belisarius
o Genghis Khan
o Subotei
o Saladin
o Richard III Lion Hearted
o Charlemagne
o Suleiman the Magnificent
o Yi Sun Sin
- Major Wars
o The Crusades (1095-1191)
o Mongol Conquests of China and Eastern
Europe (1206-1300s)
o 100 Years War (1337-1453)
o Islamic Expansion in Mediterranean &
Southern Europe (636-718)
o Ottoman Expansion (1200-1500)
- Naval Warfare
o The Mediterranean, North Sea, East China
Sea as theaters of naval war
o Naval technology little advancement except
fire & gunpowder weapons beginning to arm
ships
o Prominent naval powers the Vikings, Venice,
Byzantine, Ottoman Turks, China
o Mongol 1281 invasions of Japan destroyed
typhoon (kamikaze)
Early Modern Warfare
(16th Century-1900)
- Early Modern Period was the era from the 16th
Century to the 19th Century
- Rise of the Nation State, Continental Empires
- National Mobilization & Mass Armies
- Industrial Age Warfare
o Mass Production
o Telegraph
o Railroads
o Ocean-Going Vessels
o Iron-Clad Warships
- Command & Control Revolution – General Staff
- Firepower Revolution transforms land & naval warfare
– gunpowder weapons
- Evolution of interstate conflict from wars of limited
objectives (17th-18th Century Europe) to total war (19th
Century Napoleonic, American Civil Wars)
- Western Dominance (Europe & US) over rest of the
world except Japan
- Major Wars of the Early Modern Period
o 30-Years War (17th Century Central Europe)
o Seven Years War (18th Century Europe,
Americans, Asia)
o Napoleonic Wars (1802-1815 Europe)
o American Civil War (1861-65 US)
o Franco-Prussian War (1870-71 France)
o European Expansion to Africa (1830-1880)
o Russo-Japanese War (1903-1905 Asia)
- Notable Military Leaders
o Gustavus Adolphus (17th Century)
o Duke of Malborough (18th Century)
o Frederick the Great (18th Century)
o Napoleon Bonaparte (19th Century)
o Horatio Nelson (19th Century)
o Duke of Wellington (19th Century)
o Ulysses Grant (19th Century)
o Robert Lee (19th Century)
o William Sherman (19th Century)
o Helmut Von Moltke (19th Century)
o Heihachiro Togo (Early 20th Century)
- Naval Warfare (1500-1860)
o Development of ocean-going sail powered
ships armed with cannons as primary naval
weapon
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 11 of 37
o Spain & Portugal first Western imperial
maritime powers followed by Holland, France
& Great Britain
o Naval power projection enabled the West to
conquer the rest of the world (America, Asia,
Africa)
o Great Britain’s geography enabled it to
become the greatest maritime power and
leading nation by the early 19th Century (Pax
Britannica)
- Naval Warfare (1860-1905)
o Industrial Revolution ushered ironclad
warships powered by steam
o UK HMS Warrior launched in 1860 made
wooden ships obsolete
o USS Monitor vs CSS Virginia 1st naval battle
between ironclads in 1862
o American Civil War ushered the submarine
(CSS Hunley) & spar torpedo
o Cannons were mounted in turrets
o By late 19th Century new naval powers
emerged such as Germany, the US, Italy
and Japan
The World Wars
(1914-1945)
- Period between 1914-1945 saw the largest & worst
wars in history
- 2 World Wars (1914-18; 1939-45) & several major
conflicts in between (Sino-Japanese War, Spanish
Civil War)
- Total Mobilization of Society = War vs Society
- Rise of Air Power
- Military developments driven by internal combustion
engine
o Mechanized Combines Arms War on Land
o Amphibious Warfare (Land-Sea-Air)
o Anti-Submarine Warfare (Sea-Air)
o Air Warfare (Strategic Bombing, Integrated
Air Defense, Tactical Aviation)
- World War One (1914-1918)
o Pitted Entente (UK, France, Russia, US,
Japan, Italy) vs Central Powers (Germany,
Austro-Hungary, Ottoman Turkey)
o Great Power/National Rivalries
o Fought in Europe, Asia, ME & Africa
▪ Europe & Middle East Land War
▪ Air War in Europe
▪ Naval Surface War & Submarine
Warfare in the North Sea, Atlantic,
Pacific and Indian Oceans
- World War I developed weapons
o Poison gas
o Submarine
o Aircraft carrier
o Tank
o Aircraft
o Machine guns
o Artillery
- World War I key military problems:
o How to break the trench warfare deadlock
(land)
o Decisive Fleet Battle or Destruction of
maritime trade (sea)?
o What is the role of air power? (support
armies and navies or strategic attack on
enemy countries)?
- World War I Land War
o 1914 – Maneuver War in Western and
Eastern Europe (Schlieffen Plan, 1st Marne,
Ypres, Tannenberg)
o 1915-17 – Trench Warfare in Western
Europe; Defeat of Russia (Verdun, Somme,
Brusilov Offensive, Passchendaele,
Caporetto, Cambrai, Megiddo)
o 1918 – Allied Victory after US Entry (German
Peace Offensive, 2nd Marne, Amiens, Allied
100-Days Offensive, Vittorio Veneto, Allied
Salonika Offensive
- World War I Naval War
 o 1914-16 – Surface Fleet Engagements o Nuclear Weapons
(Coronel, Falkland Island, Jutland) - Victories by Axis Powers in Europe 1939-1942
o 1915-18 – German Submarine Campaign conquered Western Europe & large parts of USSR
(U-Boat Campaign) o Poland
o Amphibious Warfare (Gallipoli) o Netherland, Belgium, France
- World War I Air War o Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete & North Africa
o 1914-18 – organization of air forces to o Operation Barbarossa (USSR Invasion)
support land & naval campaigns - Japan’s conquest of Southeast Asia & Western
o 1915 – Strategic bombing (vs UK) pioneered Pacific (Dec 1941-May 1942)
by Germany o Hong Kong, Guam & Wake Island
o 1918 – UK Royal Air Force as first o Southeast Asia
independent air force - Allied Counter-Offensive (late 1942-45)
- Interwar Period the era between WW1 & WW2 (1919- o Guadalcanal & Papua-New Guinea
1939) o El Alamein
- Developments laid the groundwork for new world war o Stalingrad & Krusk
as the following challenged the Post-WW1 o Sicily & Italy
international order o D-Day & Normandy
o 1922 Rise of Fascism (Italy) o Operation Bagration
o 1933 Nazism (Germany) o Philippines, Iwo Jima, Okinawa & Burma
o 1918 Bolshevism (USSR) - 1945 conquest of Germany (May) & Japan’s
o 1930s Militarism (Japan) surrender after atomic bombings (Aug)
- Interwar Period where new military concepts were - Naval War (1939-45)
developed o Battle of the Atlantic in Europe primarily
o Mechanized Combined Arms Warfare between US-UK Navy vs German U-Boars
o Carrier Warfare o Pacific Naval War carrier warfare between
o Amphibious Operations US & Japanese Navies; US submarine
o Strategic Bombing campaign vs Japan
o Integrated Air Defense - Air War (1939-45)
o Airborne/Parachute Warfare o UK Royal Air Force defeated German
- Major Conflicts of the Interwar Period Luftwaffe in Battle of Britain (1940-41)
o 1935 Italian invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) o Western Allied Bombing of Germany (1940-
o 1936 Spanish Civil War 45) saw defeat of Luftwaffe by the RAF & US
o Sino-Japanese Conflict Army Air Force
- Nazi Germany early employment of Gray Zone o Strategic bombing campaign vs Japan
Warfare in Austria & Czechoslovakia culminated in atomic bombings of Hiroshima
o Nazi separatists among ethnic Germans & Nagasaki
o Encouragement of Nazi Parties - Notable Military Leaders (Land)
o Propaganda & Psychological Warfare o Douglas MacArthur
promoting German Rearmament & military o Dwight Eisenhower
modernization o George Patton
o Proxy Wars through “volunteer” military units o William Slim
(Luftwaffe Condor Legion in Spain) o Bernard Montgomery
- World War II (1939-45) largest conflict is history o Georgi Zhukov
- Triggered by combination of: o Ivan Konev
o Ideological conflict (Germany vs USSR) o Erich Von Manstein
o Power Rivalries (Germany-Japan vs Wester o Erwin Rommel
Powers) o Tomuyuki Yamashita
o Grand Alliance (US, USSR, UK, China) vs - Notable Military Leaders (Naval)
Axis Powers (Germany, Japan, Italy) o Chester Nimitz
- World War II Scale o William Halsey
o Fought in Europe Asia-Pacific, ME o Andrew Cunningham
o Land, sea & air warfare o Isoroku Yamamoto
o Conventional Warfare but allies supported by o Karl Doenitz
resistance forces in Axis-occupied territories - Notable Military Leaders (Air)
o Total mobilization (millions of military o George Kenney
personnel per major power; society involved o James Doolittle
in war production) o Hugh Dowding
o Mass slaughter of civilians (genocide, o Arthur Tedder
blockade, bombing) o Adolf Galland
o Larger military forces than WW1 (i.e. US &
USSR 15m ea; Germany 13m; UK & Japan Cold War Era
6m ea) - Post-WW2 emergence of US-USSR rivalry known as
- Key Military Strategic Problems/Issues Cold War
o Coalition Warfare (Allies vs Axis) - Cold War more of proxy wars rather than direct
o Prosecuting multi-fron wars (US, UK, combat between superpowers
Germany) - US policy containing communism vs USSR policy of
o Unified Direction of War (US/UK, Germany) expansion & support to “national liberation
o Balancing military & economic mobilization movements”
(US, UK) - Either superpower fought in limited way bu their
o Manpower Allocation among Services surrogates fought in a more total manner
o Joint Amphibious Warfare (US, UK, Japan) - Wars – conventional, guerilla, terrorism but political
o Combined arms maneuver warfare dimension paramount
- World War II developed weapons - Nuclear Weapons provided a limit to escalation of
o Jet Aircraft conflicts (Mutually Assured Destruction; Balance of
o Helicopters Terror)
o Amphibious Assault Craft - New military technologies include space-based
o Radar systems, missile defense, stealth & precision
o Sonar guidance
o Cruise Missiles - Major Wars & Conflicts
o Ballistic Missiles o Chinese Civil War (1946-48)

SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 12 of 37

 o Berlin Blockade (1947-48) o Russia-Ukraine War largely conventional
o Arab-Israeli Wars (1947-48, 1956, 1967, with wide use of tanks, artillery, missiles,
1973) airpower over clearly defines frontlines
o Korean War (1950-53) o Cyber attacks did not work as advertised in
o Indo-Pakistan Wars (1949, 1965, 1971) terms of effects
o Cuban Missile Crisis o China’s Taiwan invasion scenario will feature
o Vietnam War (1945-54, 1965-75) conventional war elements like amphibious
o Falklands War (1983) assaults, missile warfare, cyberwar
o Third World Insurgencies (SEA, Latin (multidomain operations)
America, Africa)
- Notable Leaders Importance of Military History
o Mao Tse-Tung
o Vo Nguyen Giap Military History
o Fidel Castro - The study of the past pertaining to military affairs such
o Ramon Magsaysay as:
o Robert Thompson o Wars
o Edward Lansdale o Military organizations (Units & Staff)
o Moshe Dayan o Campaigns and Battles
o Matthew Ridgeway o Functional Military Activities (i.e. Intelligence,
o Creighton Abrams CMO)
o Curtis Lemay o Weapons & Technology
o Hyman Rickover o Command & Leadership (both systems &
individuals)
Current Warfare o Individual Accounts of Service Men
- The period from the end of the Cold War to the
Present focus of current warfare Why is Military History Important
- Types of Conflict range from conventional regional - From Whispers of Warriors (US Rep Ike Skelton)
war to insurgencies o [History is] the most effective means of
- Wester (US-led) superiority in conventional warfare, teaching war during peace. – Helmuth Von
especially air and naval power led enemies to adopt Moltke
asymmetric approaches (terrorism, insurgency, “Gray o The study of military history lies at the
Area Warfare”) foundation of all sound military conclusions
- Global Information Technology Revolution exposed and practice. – Alfred Thayer Mahan
larger audiences to its destructive, this influencing o In order for a man to become a great
public opinion (CNN Effect) soldier… To attain this end… it is
- Debate between the predominance of conventional necessary… to read military history…
war or unconventional war (insurgencies, terrorism) or (George Patton)
hybrid conflicts o Only the study of history is capable of giving
- Gray Zone Phenomena “toolkit for coercion below the those who have no experience of their own a
level of direct warfare includes information operations, clear picture of what have just called the
political coercion, economic coercion, cyber friction of the whole machine. Kale Von
operations, proxy support, and provocation by state- Clausewitz
controlled Forces.” (CSIS) - From Whispers of Warriors (US Rep Ike Skelton)
- Involvement of Non-State Actors o Lessons in Fighting – students of military
o Insurgent Groups history can gain an experiential foundation of
o Terrorists (Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiya, Abu war
Sayyaf) o Lessons in Generalship – military history
o Private Security/Mercenaries provides a wealth of case studies in
o Organized Crime Groups (in several cases generalship/leadership
working in concert with insurgents & o Lessons in Innovation – “The value of
terrorists) history… is not only to elucidate the
o NGOs (may affect perceptions on military resemblance of past and present, but also
operations (Human Rights Groups, Pro & their essential differences.” (Julian Corbett,
Anti-War movements) British Naval Theorist)
o Media – more resources, worldwide reach o Lessons in Lessons Learned – history
- Key military developments teaches that every war is unique
o UAVs - History should be studied: (Michael Howard)
o Network Centric Warfare o In Breadth – have a wide perspective; even
o Ballistic Missiles non-military factors influence military history
o Anti-Missile Defense (i.e. weather)
o Multi-Role Combat Aircraft o In Depth – military history is not just wars,
o Stealth battles and great leaders; even not so
o Cyberwar glamorous elements play an important part
- Wars & Conflicts (i.e. logistics, maintenance, service support)
o Desert Storm (1990) o In Context – the lessons of military history
o Balkan Air Campaign (1994, 1999) are not of general application (what worked
o Enduring Freedom (2001-Present) in one previous operation may not work on a
o Iraqi Freedom (2003-2012) current one)
o Lebanon (2006)
o Gaza (2009, 2012, 2013, 2021) Evolution of War
o Crimea (2014)
o Kashmir Conflict Lessons
o Global War on Terror Asia, Africa & Middle - Difficulty of predicting what the future will hold (Nature
East (2001-Present) of WW1 accurately predicted not by military but by a
o Syrian Civil War (2011-Present) late 19th Polish Banker – Ivan Bloch)
o Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (2022) - Militaries would have to prepare for various forms of
- Wars & Conflicts in the 2020s war (even conventional)
o The “Revenge of Conventional War” in - Every war, whether they are fighting it or not will
Ukraine & Taiwan present militaries with new challenges & are thus
worth studying

SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 13 of 37

 - Innovation is good but since one could not predict the
future, the ability to adapt to surprise & changes
equally if not more important
“Only the dead have seen the end of war” – Socrates
“The human heart is the starting point of all matters pertaining
to war” – Marshall Maurice de Saxe
WAR AND WARFARE
WHAT IS WAR?
- Popular notion of war as combat:
- between military forces (“We cannot win a war
vs _____”)
- Military forces involved as the only protagonists
either on one side or both
- Except for Karl Von Clausewitz, no one
defined what war is
Clausewitz defines war as
- "an act of violence intended to compel our
opponent to fulfill our will“
- War is a clash between major interests that is
resolved by bloodshed
Sun Tzu while not defining what war is
acknowledges its importance
- “War is vital to the state, the road to life or ruin.”
Why are Wars fought? (Thucydides)
-Fear (security, safety, survival))
-Honor (prestige, national honor)
-Interest (territorial, economic, resource
gain)
The nature of war is constant or objective
regardless of time, political systems,
technology state
As opposed to its constant nature, the
evolving/transforming
WAR’S ENDURING ELEMENT
1. War as an Instrument of Policy
-“War has its own grammar (combat) but not its own
logic (policy)”
-Aim of strategy is to convert military effort into
political reward (Colin Gray)
-The purpose of fighting is not to win a military
victory (for its own sake)…the purpose of fighting
is to secure a better peace
-Military strategy is subordinate to policy/grand
strategy
-The whys of going to war are determined by
policy-makers
-Sun Tzu Perspective also considers the
non-military means in the conduct of war
(psychological, diplomatic, economic –
Michael Handel)
-Role of force is more down-stated – “the
acme of victory is not to win a hundred
victories in a hundred battles but to win
without fighting”
2. War’s Trinity
-primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which
are to be regarded as a blind natural force
(people)
-the play of chance and probability within which
the creative spirit is free to roam (the commander
and his army)
-as an instrument of policy, which makes it
subject to reason alone (government)
-The passions that are to be kindled in war must already
be inherent in the people
-the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 14 of 37
in the realm of probability and chance depends on the
particular character of the commander and the army
-but the political aims are the business of government
alone.
-Govt sets the policy, the army fights to achieve the policy &
popular support sustains the policy and the army in its fight
-Civilian Control of the Military – Political Leadership sets
the policy, military leadership formulates the strategy
-There is no clear-cut subdivision between policy making and
conduct of military operations
-Public opinion affects military operations
3. The Intangible Elements
a. Political Factor
-The political element is the one that distinguishes war
from other forms of organized violence
-Clausewitz’ views
-‘war was nothing but the continuation of policy with
other means’
-war should never be thought of as something
autonomous, but always as an instrument of policy
-war has its own grammar but not its own logic
b. Human/Moral Factor
-People fight today for the same reason they
fight in Thucidydes’ time – fear, honor &
interest
-Moral forces = human factor
o Commander (quality, character, skill)
o Army (cohesion, fighting spirit, pride)
o Popular Support
c. Uncertainty
-From LTGEN Harold McMasters (US Army)
on the three age-old truths about war:
-First, war is political. Second, war is
human. THIRD, war is uncertain, precisely
because it is political and human.
d. Fog & Friction – Uncertainty, Danger, Confusion,
the Weather, the enemy, Murphy’s Law (“anything
that can go wrong will go wrong)
Action in war is like movement in a resistant
element. Just as the simplest and most natural of
movements, walking, cannot easily be performed in
water, so in war, it is difficult for normal efforts to
achieve even moderate results.
‘Distinguishes real war from war on paper’
EVOLVING CHARACTER OF WAR
-Clausewitz – “Every age would have its own kind of
war …and each period would have its own theory of
war.”
-Transformation in War products of ff transformations
o Political
o Social
o Cultural
o Economic
o Science & Technology
-These transformations could be singular or in
Combination
Politics & War
-Political Power & War - War is about politics, and
politics is about the distribution of power—who has
how much of it, what they do with it, and what the
consequences are (Colin Gray)
-Mao – “War is politics with bloodshed and politics is
war without bloodshed”
-Resort to War to challenge and overthrow an existing
political order
-Ideology was, is & can also be a driver of war
-18th-19th Century Colonial Wars justified not only
on idea of power & prestige but also on “civilizing
mission” against indigenous population of
conquered territories
-Ideological Conflicts like WW2 Russo-German War
(Nazism vs Bolshevik Communism) & 1945-1991
Cold War (Democracy vs Communism)
-Post WW2 Decolonization Movement spurred wars
of national liberation in Asia, Africa and ME against
colonial powers
Social Forces & War
-Nationalism based on a group’s common affinity
(language, culture, etc.) became a driver of total war
o Liberty, Equality, Fraternity infused national spirit that
led to mobilization of French Society during the
Napoleonic Wars of early 19th Century
o Mobilization of society with the men doing the fighting
and the women & children doing the production of
weapons and other essentials
-Ethnic Conflicts within states between
ethno-cultural groups
-Social Classes & Class Conflict basis of Marxist
Leninist Military Theory
o Class struggle between the capitalist & the worker
o The Capitalist has control of the apparatus of state to
oppress the worker (including the military)
o To end the oppression, the worker must wage
revolution to destroy the capitalist system, establish a
dictatorship of the proletariat & control apparatus of
state (for the short term)
o The object of war is to advance the class struggle &
the army should serve the proletariat (control by the
Party)
Culture & War
-Culture shaped by national character, world view &
historical experience
-Influence of Culture on military theory seen best on
“Ways of War”
o “Eastern Way of War” characterized by mobility,
indirectness, geographical breadth, light forces
o “Western Way of War” characterized by direct action,
technocratic solutions, heavy forces
Economics & War
-War as a large-scale organized activity became
possible due to economic development
-Development of Agriculture
o made possible the development of larger societies &
economic diversification due to food sufficiency
o led to the organization of armies that could be
supported by society
-Economic development also translated to superior
politico-military organizations
-Development of Warfare shaped by dominant
activity of a particular age (Alvin & Heidi Toffler)
o 1st Wave War –Agricultural Age war fought
w/weapons adapted from farming tools
o 2nd Wave War Industrial Age War w/ mass
armies, mass production of weapons, total
mobilization
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 15 of 37
o 3rd Wave War – Information Age War fought
w/
information technology weapons
-Economics as determinant of Military Power
o Adam Smith (Wealth of Nations, 1776) –
ability of a nation to wage war dependent on
productive capacity
o Alexander Hamilton – economic policy must
be protected by military means = maritime
trade & navy
o Friedrich List – the greater the productive
power, the greater the strength of the nation
in foreign relations & its independence in
times of war; economic tools could become
military tools (railways)
Science, Technology & War
-One of the dynamic shapers of war is science &
technology
-19th Century Industrial Revolution onward, science &
technology became a key factor of military science as
well as the material element of war
o Naval Power
o Air Power
o Nuclear Power
-Importance of Science & Technology to maintain
technical military superiority through Research &
Development and Industrialization
Science, Technology & Military Theory
-In many cases, technological innovations in the civilian
sector effected transformation in war (railroads, telegraph,
internal combustion engine)
-Ways of waging war (strategy) also influenced by scientific
methods such as system analysis
-Emphasis is on quantifiable measures, cost-benefit analysis
& resource efficiencies (war by statistics)
o Examples are Robert MacNamara’s Vietnam
Measures of Success
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
1. Enduring and authoritative principles that
guide armed forces in the conduct of war
2. Meant to be guidelines and not a catch-all to
predetermine activities
o Strict observance does not guarantee success
while violation does not guarantee failure
o Critical for success is recognition of the right
context and condition for application (strategic,
operational & tactical art of leaders)
3. Objective: To direct every military operation
toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable
objective
4. Offensive: To seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative
5. Surprise: To strike the enemy at a time or place or
Ina manner for which it is unprepared-
Mass: To concentrate the effects of combat power
at the place and time to achieve decisive results
6. Maneuver: To place the enemy in a position of
disadvantage through the flexible application of
combat power
7. Unity of Command: To ensure unity of effort
under one responsible commander for every
objective
8. Economy of Force: To allocate minimum essential
combat power to secondary efforts
9. Security: To never permit the enemy to acquire
unexpected advantage

10. Simplicity: To prepare clear, uncomplicated plans
and concise orders to ensure thorough
understanding
11. Successful application of the Principles of War would
have to overcome Clausewitz’s challenge that in war
everything is simple, but even the simplest action is
extremely difficult
12. The Principles of War is not a formula or a science but
demands the highest skill, strongest will and character
from the applier (art of command & leadership)
13. These principles should not be seen as stand-alone parts
but interrelated elements
o The key is knowing when to apply, in what
combination, what to emphasize, what to de-
emphasize & if needed, what to violate
o If men make war in slavish obedience to its rules, they
are bound to fail – Ulysses S Grant
14. Successful application of the Principles of War would
have to overcome Clausewitz’s challenge that in war
everything is simple, but even the simplest action is
extremely difficult
15 The Principles of War is not a formula or a science but
demands the highest skill, strongest will and character
from the applier (art of command & leadership)
16. These principles should not be seen as stand-alone parts
but interrelated elements
o The key is knowing when to apply, in what
combination, what to emphasize, what to de-
emphasize & if needed, what to violate
o If men make war in slavish obedience to its rules, they
are bound to fail – Ulysses S Grant
WARFARE
WHAT IS WARFARE
-War & Warfare are often used
interchangeably
o War is a political act
o Warfare deals with the ways and methods of
conducting war
Warfare as a Science
-Development of Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTP)
-Science and Technology in War (weapons & related
technology development)
Warfare as an Art
-The successful conduct of depends on the skill,
experience, intelligence & will of the practitioner (The
Human Factor)
-Successful conduct of war must contend with the fog &
friction of war (everything that can go wrong will go
wrong or Murphy’s Law)
LEVELS OF WAR & WARFARE
-The Levels of War influence the means &
resources available to the conduct of war
o At the Grand Strategic Level, warfare can be
practiced using the instruments of national power
(i.e. Political Warfare, Economic Warfare,
Propaganda Warfare)
o The military is just although the primary
instrument of war
o The (Military) Strategic, Operational & Tactical
Levels of War are the realms where the military
has primacy although political factors impact on
their conduct
FACTORS THAT IMPACT ON WARFARE
1. Geography & Topography
-Influences the type of strategy, forces to be
developed & how warfare will be conducted
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 16 of 37
o a country with a large landmass will likely adopt a
land warfare oriented strategy and develop a large
army and air force
o a country dependent on the sea will likely develop a
maritime oriented strategy and develop a strong navy
& air force
-Strategically important geography as military
Objective
2. Politics
-Political objectives & policies regulate the conduct
of war
-Relations between the political and military
leaderships determine the extent of each other’s role
in formulating & executing military strategy
3. Economics
-Economic resources as military objectives
-National economic strength largely determines the
size, shape, material capabilities & technological
sophistication of military forces
4. History & Strategic Culture
-Way & Style of Warfare (i.e. Western & Eastern Ways
of War)
-Operational Styles
5. Science and Technology
-Technical Quality of Armed Forces
-Influences ways in that they can generate new concepts
of fighting a war (i.e. airpower, space, cyberwarfare)
6. Socio-Cultural
-Relationship of armed forces to the larger society (degree
of public support, national morale, strategic mobilization)
TYPES OF WARFARE
1. Geography Based
a. Continental Warfare
o Land-based
o Objective is a landmass
o Primary means is landpower
o Airpower may play a co-equal or subordinate role
o Seapower usually plays a subordinate role
b. Maritime Warfare
o Sea-based
o Objective is to control or deny the area of the sea (i.e.
China A2D2)
o Seapower & airpower play major roles
o Landpower employed usually to seize or defend
critical islands
2. Among or Within States
a. Inter-State Warfare
o Warfare between states or coalition of states
o Usually conventional warfare
b. Intra-State Warfare
o Occurs within the borders of a Nation States
o Usual forms are rebellion\insurgency or civil war
o May employ both conventional and unconventional
Forces
3. Military Capability/Service-Oriented Based
a.Land Invasion
-Preferred by land forces advocates
-Direct attack on an enemy’s homeland
-Direct control of enemy population and territory
b. Aerial Bombardment
-Preferred by airpower advocates
-Attacks on enemy homeland through air bypassing surface
forces
-Targets are enemy forces, warmaking capacity (industries,
communications, energy, resources) & populations
-Goal is to induce collapse of will leading to surrender or at the
very least weaken the enemy significantly to make it vulnerable
to other types of strategy

c. Blockade
-Preferred by seapower advocates
-Goal is to cut off an enemy homeland from sources of
supply coming from the sea
-Particularly effective vs maritime nations
-“Death not by direct means but by slow strangulation”
d.Joint Warfare
-Circumstances may require using a combination of
invasion, bombardment and blockade or all three to
achieve military objectives (Pacific War 1941-45)
4. Based on Enemy Strength or Weakness
a. Attrition
-Based on favorable ratio in losses inflicted and
suffered
-Direct approach
b. Maneuver Warfare
-Based on attacking an enemy weakness
-Indirect approach
c. Symmetrical Warfare
-Similar types of forces (i.e. army vs army)
d. Asymmetric Warfare
-Dissimilar types of forces (air force vs army)
-Employing a way or means that the enemy has no
direct counter (Positional or Functional Dislocation)
Types of Forces
1. Regular Warfare
-Conventional forces regularly organized & equipped
-Large-scale and fought at land, sea, air, cyber and even
space domains
-Usually employed in more or less open terrain where
there is little danger of collateral damage
2. Irregular Warfare
-Warfare between armed forces and guerillas
-Armed forces may adapt their methods (counter-guerilla) and
organizations (special forces, light infantry) to deal with
guerillas
-Usually employed in areas where the normal advantages of
conventional forces are minimized or even negated (restricted
terrain, hostile population)
3. Hybrid Warfare
-Coordinated employment of regular & irregular forces
(sometimes including paramilitaries, private military
contractors)
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 17 of 37
PHILIPPINE MILITARY HISTORY AND MILITARY AVIATION
(65 SLIDES)
1. PHILIPPINE MILITARY HISTORY: SHAPERS
1.a Geography & Topography
o The course &character of war is shaped by
geography
▪ Philippines – Archipelagic; Mountains & Forests
▪ Threats emanate from the sea or use mountains &
forests as base areas or areas of operations
o The development of armed forces & their
capabilities shaped by the challenge of defending
the geographic area of their country
▪ Philippines require air, naval and land forces
o Geographic make-up makes it susceptible to
conflicts w/in the country among ethnic groups
1.b Politics
o Creation of AFP linked to the change in political
status of the Philippines from colony to independent
Republic
o Political Ideology root of threat to the Republic
(Communist Insurgency)
o Inter-service Relations among the branches of the
AFP (Militics) affect military priorities
o Civil-Military Relations between the Armed Forces &
the National Leadership affect strategy, resource
allocation & capability priorities
1.c Socio-Cultural
o Philippines has a long history of conflict between its
ethno-linguistic groups
o One thread of conflict is the struggle of national
assimilation vs self determination (Moro Struggle)
o Strong Foreign (US) influence in the creation of the
AFP – organization, equipment, doctrine
1.d Technology
o Technology advancement led to creation of new
military organizations (aircraft = PAS, PAAC, PAF)
o Technology employment also shape roles of air
power (air defense, air strike, ISR, mobility)
o New fields of military capabilities (radars, sonars,
UAV, armored vehicles)
2. PHILIPPINE MILITARY HISTORY
PRE-COLONIAL & COLONIAL ROOTS
o Pre-Colonial Warfare characterized by small-scale
warfare
▪ Limited nos of combatants
▪ Barangay as basic unit provide limited manpower
potential
▪ Larger political socio-political organizations translated to
stronger military (i.e. Muslim Sultanates)
▪ Military Technology primarily non-gunpowder weapons
w/few exceptions
▪ Pirate raids
o Coming of Spaniards in the 16th Century exposed
weakness of native Military system
▪ Spain became dominant maritime power by 16th Century
▪ Beginning w/Magellan, Spain sent 6 expeditions to
Philippines fr 1521-65
▪ Legazpi Expedition (1565-74) successfully captured
Manila
▪ Natives have no national unity that can mobilize the
population & resources to resist
▪ Superior technology (gunpowder weapons, ocean-going
ships)
▪ Superior organization & resources of an Empire
o Native Resistance vs Spain fr16th-19th Century
o Muslim Resistance most effective due to superior political
organization & motivation
o Native Revolts – caused by colonial abuses, opposition to
colonial policies, defense of old way of life & personal
reasons
o Spain used divide and rule policy pitting one ethnic group
vs another or assassination of leaders
o Employment of Natives as Colonial Troops in Spain’s
Wars either in defense of Philippines or in overseas
expeditions
3. BIRTH OF A NATIONAL MILITARY HISTORY
(REVOLUTION & FILIPINO-AMERICAN WAR)
BIRTH OF A NATIONAL MILITARY HISTORY 1896-1912
o Mid-Late 19th Century Created a Filipino National Identity
▪ Discrimination & Exploitation Hallmark of Spanish
Colonial Rule
▪ Opportunities for Travel and Study to Europe for Young
Filipino Elites exposed them to the ideas of nationalism
& human rights
▪ Filipino national struggle began with Reform Movement
in 1880s at Europe where they asked for assimilation and
equal representation as Spanish Citizens
▪ Failure of Reform Movement symbolized by arrest o Jose
Rizal on 7 July 1892 led to establishment of movement
to overthrow Spanish Government & gain freedom: The
Kataas-Taasang, Kagalang-Galangang Katipunan ng
mga Anak ng Bayan or KATIPUNAN
o The Philippine Revolution 1st Phase (1896-97)
▪ 23 August 1896 Cry of Pugad Lawin ushered in War of
Independence
▪ Revolution started in Manila, Batangas, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, Nueva Ecija & Tarlac followed later
in Cebu and Northern Luzon
▪ Defeat of Forces of Bonifacio contrasts with successes
of Aguinaldo’s forces in Cavite
▪ March 22 1897 Tejeros Convention saw creation of the
Philippine Army under Artemio Ricarte and break-up of
revolutionary forces between Aguinaldo & Bonifacio
▪ 1897 saw large scale Spanish counteroffensive that re-
conquered Cavite & forced the revolutionary forces to
withdraw northward to Bulacan
▪ Revolutionary forces besieged at Biak na Bato, Bulacan
agreed to Pact of Biak na Bato with leadership agreeing
to exile to Hong Kong in exchange for amnesty to those
who joined the revolution & payment of compensation
o The Philippine Revolution 2nd Phase (1898-99)
▪ May 1 US Navy victory over Spanish Navy at the battle
of Manila Bay ushered a resumption of the Revolution
▪ Aguinaldo & other exiled leaders returned triggering the
return to the ranks of the revolutionary army of its
members & defections from the Spanish Colonial Army
▪ August 1898 Battle of Manila – Filipino & American
troops battled to take Manila but Americans were able to
take Intramuros through prior agreement with Spaniards
▪ Rising tensions between Filipino & American troops after
Fall of Manila from Aug 1898 to Feb 1899
▪ December 1898 Treaty of Paris between US & Spain led
to annexation of the Philippines by Washington & laid the
groundwork for a new war between the Philippines and
the Americans
▪ Philippine Republic proclaimed at Malolos 21 January
1899
o Filipino-American War (1899-1913)
▪ 4 Feb 1899 shooting of Filipino soldier at San Juan
Bridge opened the war
▪ War involved conventional phase (Feb-Nov 1899) &
guerilla warfare phase (Nov 1899-onward)
▪ While Luzon main theater, American later invaded
and occupied the Visayas and Mindanao
▪ Both Philippine & US Armies are made up of
“amateurs at war
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 18 of 37
▪ Difference is superior American leadership
(professional & veteran), firepower and organization
▪ US also utilized Filipinos vs the Philippine Army
(Macabebe Scouts, Philippine Scouts, Philippine
Constabulary)
▪ Resistance in Luzon ended 1904; Mindanao 1913
4. CREATION OF A NATIONAL ARMED FORCE
(COMMONWEALTH ARMY-WORLD WAR II)
US Colonial Rule (1904-1935) Military System
• No national Philippine Army
• Philippine National Guard incl Aviation Section
mobilized for possible participation in WW1 as part
of US Army
• Filipinos can join the US Army as member of
Philippine Scouts
• When the Philippines gained commonwealth status
as preparatory to independence was the creation of
a Philippine Armed Force became possible
US Colonial Rule (1904-1935) Military Aviation
• Danger of air attack on Philippines recognized by
US authorities as early as 1909
• First American air unit established in 1912 & first
bases for seaplanes at Fort Mckinley & Kindley Field
(Corregidor)
• First military air base for land-based aircraft at Clark
Field in 1919
• Camp Nichols established in 1913 was converted to
an air base in 1924 to serve the capital
• End of WW1 in 1918 as Philippine National Guard
Aviation Section in ground training
• Proposal to train Filipino military pilots approved by
Gov Gen Harrison & started training program in Nov
1919 at Camp Claudio, Parañaque
• Philippine Air Service (PAS) formally established in
July 1920 & graduated 1st and only class December
1920
• Gov Gen Leonard Wood dissolved PAS 19
December 1921
Philippine Commonwealth Army (1935-1941)
• Product of Defense Plan made by US Military
Mission led by Douglas MacArthur
• 10-division Army numbering 100,000 men (40k to be
trained every yr)
• Army Air Corps of 150 bombers & 100 fighters
• Off-Shore Patrol of 50 patrol torpedo (PT) boats
• Problems – lack of resources, funds, obsolete
weapons in limited numbers & lack of cooperation
with US Army in the Philippines
• Before WW2 actual strength fewer than planned
(100k Army including reserves; 42 aircraft w/combat
types obsolete; 3 PT boats)
World War II (1941-45)
• Deteriorating Intl Situation caused by Japan’s
expansion led to activation of the United States
Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) 27 July
1941
• Philippine Army called to service as part of USAFFE
• 8 December 1941 start of war with air strikes at
Clark Field
• Successful Japanese invasions of Lingayen (22
December) & Atimonan (23 December) forced the
USAFFE to withdraw to Bataan & Corregidor
• January to April 1942 Bataan Campaign
• Battle of Abucay (Jan 1942)
• Battle of the Points and Pockets (Jan-Feb 1942)
• Final Japanese Offensive & Fil-Am Surrender ( April
1942)
• 6 May 1942 – Fall of Corregidor followed by
surrender of the whole Philippines to the Japanese
May 12
• Guerilla resistance vs Japanese throughout the
country 1942-44
 • Oct 1944 return of American liberation forces to the
Philippines
• Key battles & campaigns include Leyte; Mindoro;
Luzon; Visayas-Mindanao
• Philippine guerillas fought as conventional forces
• Philippines secured Jul 1945
• Japan surrenders 15 Aug 1945
• Philippine Campaign of 1944-45 largest joint air-
land-sea campaign in the Pacific War
Philippine Army Air Corps in WW2
• PAAC inducted to US Armed Forces in the Far East
July 1941 as US-Japan relations worsen
• 1 day after start of Pacific War PAAC largely escaped
destruction of Allied air power during Dec 9 Japanese
attacks
• In aerial combat missions (Dec 10,12 & 23), PAAC
shot down 3 Japanese a/c for loss of 1
• After orders fr HQ to destroy a/c personnel fought at
Bataan & Corregidor as Provisional Air Corps
Regiment
• After Fall of the Philippines, PAAC members joined
guerilla forces (1942-44)
• Return of US forces in 1944 reconstituted PAAC &
recovered personnel ordered to US for refresher
training
• Oct 1945 re-established 1st PAAC aerial unit, 1st
Troop Carrier Squadron (C-47)
• WW2 hammered home lesson of command of the air
as key to Phil defense
5. CREATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, KOREA & THE HUK INSURGENCY
Reconstitution of the Philippine Army 1946
• 1947 saw establishment of the 3 Branches of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (PAAC reorganized
into the Philippine Air Force 1 Jul 1947)
• Korean War 1950-53 first international commitment of
the AFP; 1st experience of winter fighting
• Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (PEFTOK)
fought under the US Army & distinguished itself in the
Battles of Yultong, Erie and the relief of Gloster Hill
Main challenge for the AFP was the Huk Insurgency
• Huk Insurgency was an agrarian-based rebellion
organized by the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas in
Central & Southern Luzon
• Huks started as a WW2 guerilla movement but
initiated rebellion after the war
• Initially successful bec of poor performance by the
AFP & natl govt who adopted purely militarist solution
instead of looking at the social component of the
problem
• Turning point came in 1950 with appointment of
Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense
• Magsaysay’s fired incompetent & corrupt senior
officers & instituted reforms in the AFP
• His combined & integrated military operations (Right
Hand) with civic action (Left Hand)won the hearts &
minds of the people leading to loss of support to the
Huks
• Successful Govt Operations in 1st six months of 1951
broke the back of the rebellion
PAF in the Anti-Huk Insurgency
• PAF primary missions were close air support,
interdiction, aerial resupply, psychological operations
& civic action
• Aerial resupply from PAF enabled AFP ground troops
to operate for months in Huk territories
• Use of aircraft mounting loudspeakers to convince
Huk members to surrender while formenting conflict
between leaders
• PAF & agriculture experts cooperate to interdict Huk
agricutural areas
• Civic action to provide air transport to civilians
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 19 of 37
6. EXTERNAL DEFENSE ARMED FORCES
Cold War Alliance with the US, AFP orientation became
external defense
• 1947 Military Bases and Military Assistance
Agreements (MBA) & (MAA) & 1951 RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty (MDT) fostered close defense
relations bet the 2 countries
• 1958 establishment of RP-US MDB paved the way
for what would become the Balikatan Exercise
• Defeat of Huks in mid-50s shifted focus to external
defense
• Establishment of Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization (SEATO) in the 1954 Manila Pact
created alliance between RP & Western countries
Philippine Air Force
• Sent an Air-Ground Liaison Team to provide air
support requirements for the PEFTOK
• Entered Jet age in 1955 & Supersonic Age in 1965
• Established Philippine Air Defense Zone in 1953
• Wings in 1952 & Air Division in 1960s
• Nation-wide Air Defense System by 1970
• Large-scale Air-ground exercises with PA (Exercise
Sumilang)
• Combined Joint Anti-Submarine Exercises w/ US
Navy & Philippine Navy in 1950s
• Participation in combined training with US & other
SEATO Allies in Flying Brothers Aerial Gunnery
Competition (early 1960s)
• Participation as aerial peacekeepers flying F-86
fighters in the 1963 UN PKO Mission to Congo
• Provided aerial contingent to the Philippine Civic
Action Group to Vietnam
Philippine Army
• Conventional Force Organization
• Divisional Organization mid-1950s
• Combined arms capability like armor and artillery
• Provided bulk of Philippine Civic Action Group
(PHILCAG) to help South Vietnam in the Vietnam
War
Philippine Navy
• Surface ships and amphibious warfare
• Combined exercises with PAF & US Navy in anti-
surface warfare, anti-submarine & amphibious opns
7. THE AFP IN THE MARTIAL LAW PERIOD
THE AFP IN THE MARTIAL LAW PERIOD(1972-86)
• The early 1970s saw the emergence threats from the
CPP-NPA and the Mindanao separatist movement
• Student protests and the bombing of the opposition
Liberal Party Rally at Plaza Miranda in 1971 led to the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
• Political dilemma for Pres Marcos as under the 1935
Constitution, his term will end in 1973
• FM declared Martial Law on 21 Sep 1972 &
established a dictatorship (“Constitutional
Authoritarianism”)
Martial Law a controversial chapter in the AFP’s history
became the main instrument of the Marcos Dictatorship
• Closure of Congress & arrest of opposition figures
• Charges of human rights violations & corruption
• Control over Industries & other aspects of national life
• Inclusion of the Civilian Police in the AFP as part of
the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police
• “Bastardized” hybrid of a compulsory ROTC to male
college students later called Citizen Military Training
• Appointment or assignment of active duty military
officers to civilian offices outside the DND
• The AFP professional outlook became more focused
on management than on study of war and military
developments
 • AFP Internal Security Operations versus the CPP-
NPA (nationwide) & MNLF (Mindanao)
• Campaign vs CPP-NPA followed pattern of classic
counterinsurgency with the AFP playing the central
role in Strategy Formulation
• Establishment of Regional Unified Commands
patterned after PC regional organizations
• Campaign vs MNLF more along the lines of semi-
conventional war (battalion sized as norm)
• Initially the AFP was outgunned in battles vs the
MNLF that led to purchases of non-US weapons such
as additional artillery & armored vehicles
The Campaign vs the CPP-NPA
o Started in Northern Luzon in 1971 with the MV
Karagatan Incident & the raid on the PMA Armory by
renegade officer Victor Corpuz
o By the Mid-1970s CPP-NPA insurgency spread to
other parts of Luzon and the Visayas & by 1980
spread to Mindanao
o Insurgency Hotbeds 1972-1986
▪ Cagayan Valley & the Mountain Provinces
▪ Southern Tagalog & the Bicol Region
▪ Samar-Leyte
▪ Davao
The Campaign vs the MNLF
• MNLF separatist rebellion started 1972
• First large scale operations in Jolo with largest PAF
operation in support of Marines at Sibalu Hill Nov
1972
• 1973-76 saw Central Mindanao as main theater of
operation as AFP fought large scale operations vs the
MNLF
• Jolo another main AOR with heavy battle for Jolo City
in 1974 (Sulu Air Task Group HQ besieged)
• 1974 fighting in Zamboanga Peninsula
• Tripoli Agreement between RP and MNLF brokered
by Libya for Muslim autonomy but occasions of
violence continued
• 1978 saw the treacherous massacre of an AFP peace
party led by 1st ID Commander BGEN Teodulfo
Bautista by the MNLF
• Early 1980s, the secessionists severely weakened
with Misuari in Exile
Other developments
o Self Reliant Defense Posture Program (SRDP)
triggered by partial embargo of weapons to the AFP
by its major ally so the Govt turned to local
manufacturers
▪ Small arms & ammunition were produced by
more sophisticated weapon systems beyond
local capability
▪ Lack of R & D & industrial capacity
o Renegotiation of Lease Period of the US bases in RP
in 1974 that will see them removed in 1991 barring a
new treaty
The PAF in the Martial Law Period
Beginning 1971 primary mission became ISO
o Campaign vs CPP-NPA
o Campaign vs MNLF in Mindanao
PAF became a tactical ground support force with only TD buy
being the F-8 Crusader fighter in 1978
Self Reliance Defense Posture (SRDP) Program began in the
1970s
o R & D on munitions, weapons & aircraft parts
o License produced aircraft (Cali Project)
cancelled by MND
8. EDSA 1986 TO THE END OF THE 20TH CENTURY
Political Crisis in the early 1980s
o Stagnation of the Economy due to control by Marcos
Cronies
o Worsening Communist Insurgency
o Lack of democratic space
o Favoritism in the top posts of the AFP (“Overstaying
Generals”)
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 20 of 37
o Benigno Aquino Assassination on 21 Aug 1983
triggered mass protests from various political groups
o Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) formed as
a reflection of dissatisfaction w/in the AFP on Marcos
The 1986 EDSA Revolution
o 07 Feb 1986 bet Marcos & Cory Aquino Election
attended by fraud & violence leading to mass protests
by the opposition
o 21 Feb discovery of military uprising by govt forces led
to the call of Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile & PC
Chief Fidel V Ramos for the people to join them at
Camps Crame & Aguinaldo
o Feb 22 onward saw hundreds of thousands of civilians
join the uprising
o 24 February defection of the 15th Strike Wing to the
rebels turned the tide & triggered defections from other
AFP units
o 25 February Marcos fled the country & Mrs Aquino
became President
The Post EDSA Challenges for the AFP (1986-2000)
o AFP reorganization towards a smaller force
o PNP reverted to civilian control & became part of DILG
in 1992
o Return of Nur Misuari led to resumption of secessionist
struggle this time by his rivals in the MILF
o The AFP had to fight off a series of coup attempts (1987
& 1989) from the RAM led by Col Gregorio Honasan
o Resumption of Communist Insurgency but by 1991 the
movement imploded & nearly disintegrated due to
effective military operations & purging by the CPP
o End of US basing presence in 1991 after RP Senate
rejected a new bases treaty
o The election of Fidel V Ramos in 1992 paved the way
for peace with the RAM & the MNLF
o 1995 discovery of Chinese structures at Mischief Reef
in the WPS
o 1995 AFP Modernization Law but implementation
encountered problems due to 1997 Financial Crisis and
growing preoccupation with internal security
o Emergence of the Abu Sayyaf & MILF as threat groups
while the CPP-NPA was gradually regaining strength
o 1999 RP-US Visiting Forces Agreement led to
resumption of large scale military exercises bet the AFP
& US forces
o Internal orientation vs insurgencies & rigt-wing coup
attempts
o Heavy equipment losses in 1989 Coup
o F-8 fighters inoperational and largely destroyed in 1991
Pinatubo Eruption
o 1995 PAF flight discovered Chinese structures at
Mischief Reef
o 1997 Asian Financial Crisis put Modernization Program
on hold
9. THE AFP IN THE 21ST CENTURY
AFP Operations and Other Activities
o 2000 opened with the largest offensive of the AFP
since the 1970s in the Central Mindanao Abu Bakr
Campaign
o Subsequent operations at Buliok (2003), Liguasan
(2005) & Operation Lightning Sword (2008) vs MILF
hardliners
o Simultaneous campaigns vs the Abu Sayyaf –Jemaah
Islamiya in Zamboanga, Basilan & Jolo
o Campaigns vs CPP-NPA especially in
CALABARZON, Bicol, Bohol, Bukidnon & Campostela
Valley
o Participation of RP in the Global War on Terror after
the 9/11 attacks in the US
o AFP sent a contingent to Iraq after its occupation by
the Coalition of the Willing in 2003 but the contingent
was withdrawn after OFW Angelo dela Cruz was
kidnapped & held hostage
o Participation of the AFP in HADR (Milenyo 2006,
Ondoy 2009, Yolanda 2013)
 o Support to National Development role of the AFP in MILITARY OPERATIONS
Kalayaan Barangay Program (2000-2010), Visit of
Pope Francis & APEC Summit (2015) OTHER THAN WAR
o AFP PKO deployments in Liberia, Golan Heights, (MOOTW)
Indo-Pakistan Border, Haiti
o Rising tensions with China in the WPS from 2011-
present triggered by Beijing’s aggressive moves • US Air Force Doctrine 2-3 dtd 05 October 1996
o Modest but continuing Modernization (PAF FA-50PH; • New Roles of the Military: Perspectives from the
PAF AW-109 Attack Helicopters; Rizal Class Frigates; Philippines by Clarita R Carlos, PHD
Hermes UAV; Atmos Self Propelled Artillery; Spyder
SAM)
o Future Modernization Targets – MRF, Tanks, C4ISR
connectivity (network-centric warfare)

AFP Continuing Challenges

o Territorial Defense of WPS
o Threat of Spillover Conflict (Taiwan, Korean
Peninsula)
o Terrorism & Radicalism
o Communist Insurgency
o HADR
o Support to National Development
o AFP Modernization & Transformation to a Capable
Conventional Military

PAF Operations & Developments

o AFP Modernization Prioritized ISO during 1st Decaade
of 21st Century
o Expansion of Ground Forces for ISO (SPOW Combat
Groups) in early 2000s covering primarily
CALABARZON
o Retirement of F-5 in 2004 marked loss of fighter
capability
o 2003 Joint Defense Assessment assessed AFP TD
capability as non-mission capable
o Global War on Terror generated military assistance
from US but more for ISO
o Major combat commitments in Mindanao vs MILF,
ASG, Maute-ISIS (Marawi 2017)
o PAF played important roles in HADR operations as
first responders
o Air Force units & personnel participated in PKO
missions to Liberia, Golan Heights, Haiti
o As part of the GRP effort to revive its TD capabilities, Definition of War and MOOTW
acquisition of FA-50 from South Korea with first
delivery in 2015
o Modernization Plans call for acquisition of systems War
that will complete an integrated air defense system
(fighters, radars, SAM, AAA, C3I systems), LRPA, • Large-scale, sustained combat operations to
UAV achieve national objectives, or protect national
interests placing a state in wartime
- US definition

• Technically, wars refer to those with at least

1,000 battle-related deaths a year.
- Uppsala Conflict Database Program

“War is …an act of force to compel our enemy to do our

will.”
“War is a true political instrument, a continuation of
political activity by other means.”
- Carl von Clausewitz

MOOTW

“Encompass the use of military capabilities across the

range of military operations short of war”.
- Joint Pub 03-07

“A wide range of activities where the military instrument

of national power is used for purposes other than large
scale combat operations usually associated with war”
- Joint Pub 03-07

SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 21 of 37

Comparison of War and MOOTW
Characteristics of MOOTW
Purpose of MOOTW
Principles of MOOTW
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 22 of 37
Why MOOTW
• Achieve strategic objectives
• Deter war
• Promote peace
• Support Civil authorities
• Less costly than war
• Natural part of escalating to and de-escalating to
war.
• Involve elements of both combat and noncombat
operations
• More sensitive to political considerations
• More restrictive rules of engagement (ROE)
• Aimed to achieve national objectives as quickly
as possible and conclude military operations
• Deterrence
• Prevent potential aggressors
• Peace enforcement, strikes, and raids
• HA and peacekeeping support
• Forward presence
• Forces stationed overseas and afloat,
periodic and rotational deployments,
access and storage agreements, port
visits, and foreign community support
• Crisis response options
• Respond rapidly either unilaterally or as
a part of a multinational effort
1. Objective - To direct every military operation
toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable
objective
2. Unity of Effort – To seek unity of effort in every
operation
3. Security – To never permit hostile factions to
acquire a military, political, or informational
advantage
4. Restraint – To apply appropriate military
capability prudently. Judicious use of force is
necessary, carefully balancing the need for
security, the conduct of operations, and the
political objective
5. Perseverance – To prepare for the measured,
protracted application of military capability in
support of strategic aims
6. Legitimacy – To have committed forces sustain
the legitimacy of the operation
Types of MOOTW
1. Arms Control
▪ Seize WMD
▪ Escort authorized deliveries of weapons
▪ Dismantle
▪ Destroy
▪ Dispose of weapons and hazardous material
2. Combatting Terrorism - Actions taken to
oppose terrorism from wherever the threat.
• Anti-terrorism programs - defensive measures
• Counter terrorism - offensive measures
3. Support to Counterdrug Operations- federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies in their
effort to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into
the United States.
4. Enforcement of Sanctions and/or Maritime
Intercept Operations - Employ coercive
measures to interdict the movement of certain
types of designated items into or out of a nation
or specified area
In May 1994, the military selected Supreme Court Justice
Emile Jonassaint to be provisional president of its third de
facto regime. The UN and the U.S. reacted to this
extraconstitutional move by tightening economic
sanctions (UN Resolution 917). On July 31, 1994, the UN
adopted Resolution 940 authorizing member states to use
all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's
military leadership and restore constitutional rule and
Aristide's presidency.
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 23 of 37
5. Enforcing Exclusion Zones
• Prohibit specified activities in a distinct
geographic area
• These zones can be established in the air,
sea, or on land.
• Purpose: Persuade nations or groups to
modify their behavior to meet the desires of
the sanctioning body or face continued
imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of
force
In November 1990, the UN Security Council
adopted Resolution 678, permitting member states to use
all necessary means, authorizing military action against
the Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait, and demanded a
complete withdrawal by 15th of January 1991. When
Saddam Hussein failed to comply with this demand, the
Gulf War (Operation "Desert Storm") ensued on the 17th
of January 1991 (, with allied troops of 28 countries, led
by the US launching an aerial bombardment on Baghdad.
The United States, in an attempt to prevent the genocide
of the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq and the Kurds to the
north, declared air exclusion zones north of the 36th
parallel and south of the 32nd parallel.
6. Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and
Overflight
• To demonstrate international rights to
navigate sea or air routes
7. Humanitarian Assistance
• To relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-
made disasters or other endemic conditions such
as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation
• Generally limited in scope and duration
• Intended to supplement or complement efforts of
host-nation civil authorities or agencies

8. Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA):
• Provide temporary support to domestic civil
authorities when permitted by law, and are
normally taken when an emergency overtaxes the
capabilities of the civil authorities.
9. Nation Assistance and/or Support to
Counterinsurgency
• Rendered to a nation by US forces within that
nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or
emergencies, or war, based on agreements
mutually concluded between the United States
and that nation
• Nation assistance operations support a host
nation (HN) by promoting sustainable
development and growth of responsive
institutions.
• Goal: To promote long-term regional stability
• Security assistance, foreign internal defense
(FID), and humanitarian and civic assistance
(HCA).
10. Peace Operations (PO)
• Military operations to support diplomatic efforts to
reach a long-term political settlement
• Tailored to each situation and may be conducted
in support of diplomatic activities before, during,
or after conflict
Two (2) Types
1. PKO - Military operations undertaken with the
consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed
to monitor and facilitate implementation of an
agreement and support diplomatic efforts to
reach a long-term political settlement
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 24 of 37
2. PEO - Application of military force, or threat of its
use, normally pursuant to international
authorization, to compel compliance with
resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or
restore peace and order.
11. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
• Relocate threatened noncombatants from a
foreign country
• Methods and timing are significantly influenced by
diplomatic considerations
• Similar to a raid; Involves swift insertion of a force,
temporary occupation of objectives, and ends
with a planned withdrawal
12. Protection of Shipping
• When necessary, military forces provide
protection of flag vessels, citizens, and their
property against unlawful violence in and over
international waters.
13. Recovery Operations
• To search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return
personnel or human remains, sensitive
equipment, or items critical to national security
14. Show of Force Operations
• Designed to demonstrate a state’s resolve,
involvement through increased visibility of
deployed forces
• Attempt to defuse a specific situation that if
allowed to continue may be detrimental to
interests or national objectives
• Military in nature but often serve both political and
military purposes
 15. Strikes and Raids
• Offensive operations conducted to inflict
damage on, seize, or destroy an objective for
political purposes
• Punish offending nations or groups, upholding
international law, or preventing those nations or
groups from launching their own offensive
actions
• Usually, a small-scale operation involving swift
penetration of hostile territory to secure
information, confuse the enemy, or destroy
installations

MOOTW in the Philippines

• Pre-War AFP
- Philippine Constabulary (PC) – 08 August
1901
- Law enforcement outside towns and cities
- Rid the countryside of lawless bands
- Sakdalistas - a peasant-based political party
• Environmental Protection and Rehabilitation
• Post-War AFP
- Internal security role
- Hukbalahap or Huks in 1955
- New People’s Army (NPA)
- Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
- Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)

• Strategy of Holistic Approach Against Threat

Groups
- Twin Secessionism: CNN & MILF • International PKO
- ASG

• Support to Law Enforcement and Addressing

• Efforts in Internal Security and Crisis Transnational Crime
Operations
- Kalayaan Barangay Program (KBP)
- Army Literacy Patrol System (ALPS)
- Special Advocacy on Literacy/Livelihood and
Advancement for Muslims (SAL’AAM or peace)
program
- Civil-Military Operations

• Disaster Response

• Support to Peaceful Elections

SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 25 of 37

 • Support during Pandemic
• Conduct of CMO activities
Other MOOTW in PAF
Purposive Stakeholder Engagements
The need to promote and gain support for the different
initiatives, programs, and projects related to the PAF
Flight Plan led the PAF to have a different approach to
Civil-Military Operations through Purposive Stakeholders
Engagements.
PAF CMO Intervention Teams (PAFCIT)
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 26 of 37
Dedicated groups tasked to help PAF Units in carrying out
their CMO functions in specific areas of concern.
Members of the PAFCIT are armed with specialized CMO
skills in the identification of vulnerable sectors in the
community and their specific social concerns and link
them with pertinent local government units, agencies, and
non-government or private organizations that can help
address their problems.
Project Tinta
Project Tinta is a print-based public affairs project aimed
at maximizing the exposure of PAF messaging through
various tabloids and newspapers wherein the Command
can write about opinion columns as well as share press
releases. These opinion columns in tabloids and
community newspapers aim to distribute AFP information
specifically its positions, arguments, and clarifications on
issues that affect its ISO mission, security concerns, and
localized events or incidents that contain security issues
that the government must address.
Usapang Pangkapayapaan, Usapang Pangkaunlaran
The Usapang Pangkapayaan, Usapang Pangkaunlaran
(UP UP) Pilipinas was developed to create a flagship
program of the PAF Virtual TV. The program aims to
provide an avenue for collaborative talk between
government and private organizations to discuss matters
relating to security and national development. Hosting
guest from the military, government agencies, and private
individuals, the UP UP Forum serves a medium to tell the
Filipino people the various government initiatives
supporting peace and national development as well as
how private individuals may help in supporting the said
initiatives and promoting the “whole-of-nation” approach
of DSSP Kapayapaan.
Campus Peace and Development Forum (CPDF) DSSP OPLAN KAPAYAPAAN

The Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff for CMO (A-7), and

Reservist and Retirees (A-9), in pursuit of their function to
support the goals of DSSP “Kapayapaan, formulated the
Campus Peace and Development Forum. Using a
coordinated effort by PAF units’ CMO operators and the
AFRC’s Air Reserve Center personnel to engage with the
schools and educate the students with pertinent security
matters that center with the still on-going counter- The AFP strengthens the stakeholder’s partnership taking
insurgency activities, and the AFP efforts to eliminate seriously the inputs/contributions of civilians into crafting
Violent Extremism, CNTs and CTG elements disrupting this comprehensive plan that entails the performance of
the peace and order situation throughout the country the AFP on non-traditional functions such as peace
which has been undermining regional growth and building, law enforcement and support to national
development for decades. development.

Supreme Student Council Society of the Philippines

(SSCSP) SOUTH CHINA SEA SITUATION
(INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER)

Godofredo L Senires III, Ph.D.

Why do we need to study FOREIGN RELATIONS?

This is Political Science on the way international systems
operate.

Globalization is that concept on international strategies

The PAFCMOG initiated activities for the student-leaders expanding the business operations worldwide. It has affected
to be empowered to become transformational and the political. Socio-economic, including sultural forces across
global community. Defying borders by bringing population closer
efficient leaders at their respective schools through
together.
different leadership exercises, to drive all the members of
this organization to become peace-loving ambassadors
But it also comes with geopolitical issues and challenges.
and good governance advocates by spreading knowledge
of responsible citizenship.
Ex: Trade and investments, tourism, labor (OFWs), migration,
IPSP OPLAN BAYANIHAN defense

South China Sea

1. South China Sea (SCS) was named by the Portuguese

sailors in the 16th century.
2. 1982 UNCLOS allowed country’s to claim its Exclusive
Economic Zones of up to 200 NMs (370.7 KMs) beyond
territorial waters.
3. Filipino Admiral Tomas Cloma conquered the
Kalayaan Group of Islands and declared it Free Territory of
Freedomland in 1956. PH stance that those islands was no
man’s land.
4. China and Taiwan harassed residents of Freedomland
and Ramon Island was claimed by Taiwan.
5. 1974: Cloma redefined the micronation as a
Principality and changed the name to Kingdom of Colonia St.
John; stepped down and gave the reigns of succession to
Colonia’s first king – John I.
6. 1978: Ferdinand Marcos released a decree that
incorporated Colonia as part of Palawan.

What can we do about South China Sea issue?

The AFP conducts support operations to ‘win the peace’
in order to help the Filipino nation create an environment National Power – the ability of a nation to secure the goals and
conducive for sustainable development and a just and objectives for the purpose of its national interest in relation with
lasting peace. other nations. It can be applied by: (Methods of National
Power)
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 27 of 37

Persuasion This consist of acts in defining and logically
explaining a particular issue or dispute to other nations;
persuade other nations to adopt a particular view of perception.
Rewards This is merely an act to offer an award, material,
economic of psychological. (e.g. economic aid, loans or grants)
to win support or change the behavior of other states.
Punishment A powerful nation can exercise power through
punishments against an offending or unhelpful state. These can
be in a form of economic sanctions or placing trade restrictions
or ensuring a denial of a possible reward.
Force The last method is the actual use of force or physical
violence to compel the desired change in the behavior of other
nations.
Instruments of National Power – are the sum of all resources
available to a nation in the pursuit of its national objectives
(national survival)
Diplomatic
• 68 embassies and 126 consulates
• The Philippines has some 3,367 subsisting
agreements since 1946
• Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
• Defense and Armed Forces Attache (DAFA) to send
Daily Special Reports
• ASEAN
• United Nations (UN)
• Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
Military
• AFP: Internal Security Operations (ISO)
• AFP: Territorial Defense Operations (TDO)
• AFP: Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster
Response (HADR)
• International Defense and Security Engagements
(IDSE)
• Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT)
• Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
• Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
• Balikatan Exercise
• Bilateral Air Contingent Exchange –Philippines
(BACE-P 10-22)
• War on Terror
Economic
• Economic Cooperation (APEC)
• World Trade Organization (WTO)
• 2010 ASEAN Trade in Good Agreement (ATIGA)
• Philippines – Japan Economic Partnership
• Philippines – European Free Trade Association Free
Trade Agreement
• Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (PH
and 14 Asia Pacific countries)
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 28 of 37
Geopolitical Issues in Asia
UNCLOS:
Territorial Waters – 22kms/ 14miles/ 12NM from the baseline
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) – 370km/ 230miles/ 200NM
from the baseline
2016 Hague Ruling: 479-page resolution invalidated Beijing’s
sweeping claim to the entire South China Sea; recognized
Manila’s sovereign rights in areas within its 200-nautical mile
exclusive economic zone. The ICJ has no enforcement powers.
As of June 2021: ASEAN and China vowed to avoid activities
that could escalate tensions in the SCS.
Philippine Limitations
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (1935)
Article I National Defense Policy, Sec. 2 (a) The security of the
Philippines and the freedom, independence, and perpetual
neutrality of the Philippine Republic shall be guaranteed by the
employment of all citizens, without distinction of age or sex, and
all resources.
1987 Philippine Constitution
Article II Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
Philippine Foreign Policy:
The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its
relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and
the right to self-determination. (Sec. 7, Article II)
Making a Strategy: PESTEM
Political
Economic
Socio-Cultural
Technological
Environment
Military – last option
Methods of National Power
Persuasion
Rewards
Punishment
Force
DO WE HAVE THE WAYS AND MEANS TO PUSH OUR
NATIONAL INTERESTS?
AIPB/JIPOE

FORCE PROVIDER, FORCE EMPLOYER CONCEPT

MISSION OF THE PAF – ORGANIZE, TRAIN, EQUIP,

MAINTAIN AND PROVIDE FORCES IN SUPPORT OF THE
AFP MISSION.

LOWER UNITS OF THE PAF SUCH AS TACTICAL

OPERATIONS WINGS, TACTICAL OPERATIONS GROUP IS
IN SUPPORT TO THE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND ITS
CAMPAIGN PLAN

The AFP’s method for collecting, organizing, and processing

intelligence.
• An analytic framework for organizing information to help
provide timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence to the military
decision making process.
• INTENT: to give the Commander and his staff information on
the conditions within his operational area (AO, AOI, OE) that
could affect the outcome of his mission.
TASKS
• APPLY AIPB/JIPOE IN THE CURRENT SITUATION AS THE
AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER.
• Consists of four (4) basic steps. ✔ Continuous
✔ Cyclical
• Conducted prior to and during joint
force operation
• NOTE:
✔ Steps 1-2-3 compile information about
specific features of the OE.
✔ Step 4 consolidates these information to help predict enemy
COA
STEP ONE: DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
• AS THE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER, WHAT WILL BE
YOUR FIRST STEP?
• WHAT IS THE MISSION?
• WHAT IS THE COMMANDER’S INTENT
• GET A MAP!
• DEFINE AREA OF OPERATION, AREA OF INTEREST
• GET THE FEATURES OF BASILAN? IS ZAMBASULTA
IMPORTANT?
• GET AS MUCH INFORMATION ABOUT TERRAIN,
WEATHER, POLITICS, ECONOMY, CULTURE AND THE
THREAT ITSELF - ABU SAYAFF GROUP
DEFINE THE AREA OF OPERATION AND AOI
AREA OF OPERATION:
a geographical area, including the airspace above, assigned to
a Commander in which he has responsibility and the authority
to conduct military operations.
ACCORDING TO THE MANUAL. YOU HAVE TO DEFINE:
Features of the environment Features of activities within the OA.
1. Define the Area of Interest (AOI)
2. Define the Operational Environment (OE)
3. Gather available intelligence and identify intelligence gaps

SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 29 of 37

 • REFUELLING AREAS
• LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF AIR ASSETS
• CLOSE AIR SUPPORT
• AIR TO GROUP OPERATIONS (TROOP INSERTION)
• TYPE OF VEGETATION IN THE AREA – TREES, JUNGLE,
GRASS, WATER SOURCE • HIGHEST PEAK/ ELEVATION
• IDENTIFY SUPPLY SOURCE
• LOCATION OF FRIENDLY FORCES
• LOCATION OF THIRD PARTY (MNLF)

- FROM THE DATA IN STEP 1 (DEFINE THE OE), LET US

INTELLIGENCE PART
GATHER AVAILABLE INTEL AND IDENTIFY INTEL GAPS
• Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
• Academia, Media Broadcasts, Interagency, Internet,
Newspapers/Periodicals
• Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
• Debriefings, Source Operations, Interrogation Operations,
Document and Media Exploitation
• Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)
• Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic
Intelligence (ELINT), Foreign Instrumentation Signals
Intelligence (FISINT)
• Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)
• Imagery, Geospatial Information, Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
• Counter Intelligence (CI)
DESCRIBE THE IMPACT OF EACH CHARACTERISTIC TO
THE MISSION. AS THE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER,
FOCUS ON AIR OPERATIONS.
1. WEATHER – DESCRIBE HOW WILL THE INCOMING
WEATHER AFFECT AIR OPS
2. ECONOMY – DESCRIBE PROBABLE COLLATERAL
DAMAGE, INDUSTRIES THAT MAY BE AFFECTED, LOSS OF
INCOME OF THE PROVINCE OF SULU
3. CULTURE – DESCRIBE
4. EXISTING LAWS – RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ETC.
5. MOST IMPORTANT, REVIEW YOUR PMESII AND
ASCOPE. BANGGA NYO DTO SA STEP 2
DESCRIBE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT SUMMARY
STEP TWO
1. What terrain and weather features exist within the AO and
AOI?
2. Are there elements (e.g. demography, culture, laws) that can
influence the unit’s operation?
3. How will all of these affect the friendly COA and enemy COA?
JIPOE Step THREE: EVALUATE THE ADVERSARY AND
OTHER RELEVANT ACTORS

DEFINE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT SUMMARY JIPOE STEP THREE develops a profile of the enemy.
STEP ONE
1. What is the mission? INTENT: To develop threat models which accurately portray
2. What is the Commander’s intent? how the adversary doctrinally operates under normal conditions.
3. What features comprise the AO?
4. What areas can affect the current mission? How? EVALUATE THE ADVERSARY AND OTHER RELEVANT
5. What information is available about the terrain, weather, and ACTORS
threat? • SPECIFIC ADVERSARY/ENEMY CAPABILITIES AND COAs
6. What information needs to be obtained about the AO, AOI, ARE EVALUATED. (THIS IS A JOINT EFFORT FROM THE 2s
weather, and threat? IN THE GROUND)
o CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
JIPOE Step Two: DESCRIBE THE IMPACT OF THE o CURRENT PERIODIC STATUS REPORT OR
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ORDER OF BATTLE • IT SHOULD ANSWER “HOW
DO THE ENEMY OPERATES?”
JIPOE STEP TWO requires the analyst to demonstrate how the • ASG WITHOUT KV? ASG WITH
weather, terrain, and other characteristics of the OE can affect KV?
both friendly and enemy operations within a given AO, AOI, and • DO THEY CONSTANTLY MOVE
OE.. WHENEVER THEY HAVE KVs?
• WHERE ARE THE ENEMY
INTENT: To allow the Commander to quickly choose and exploit STRONGHOLDS? (CIVILIAN SUPPORTERS) (TERRAIN
the terrain (and associated weather, politics, economics, or FEATURES THAT THEY ALREADY MASTERED)
other relevant factors) that best supports the friendly mission. • RISKS – PURSUE AND
OPERATE? NEGOTIATE?
- FROM THE DATA IN STEP 1 (DEFINE THE OE), LET US o DEVELOP MODELS – ORDER OF BATTLE OR
DESCRIBE THE IMPACT OF EACH CHARACTERISTIC TO PERIODIC STATUS REPORT
THE MISSION. AS THE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER, o COMPOSITION, STRENGTH, DISPOSITION,
FOCUS ON AIR OPERATIONS. TACTICS, COGs, CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS, RISKS
1. TERRAIN – DESCRIBE THE AREA OF OPERATION AND o MOST IMPORTANT IS TO DETERMINE CENTER OF
AREA OF INTEREST GRAVITY
• DISTANCE OF AIRFIELDS – ZAMBO – BASILAN – TAWI- • WHAT IS CENTER OF GRAVITY?
TAWI, LUZON?
• WHAT TYPE OF AIRCRAFT IS APPLICABLE TO THE
ABOVEMENTIONED TERRAIN
• WHAT ARE THE CAPABILITIES OF PAF AIR ASSETS
CURRENTLY IN THE AREA (LETS SAY ALL AIR ASSESTS
ARE CURRENTLY AVAILABLE)
• HOW FAST THEY CAN ARRIVE?
• WHERE WILL THEY TAKE OFF?
• WHERE WILL THEY LAND?
• PROBABLE LANDING ZONES

- FROM THE DATA IN STEP 1 (DEFINE THE OE), LET US

DESCRIBE THE IMPACT OF EACH CHARACTERISTIC TO
THE MISSION. AS THE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER,
FOCUS ON AIR OPERATIONS.

SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 30 of 37

FROM THE DATA GATHERED IN STEP 1 AND 2 DEFINE MOST DANGEROUS COA
AND DESCRIBE; ENHANCE YOUR TEMPLATES • THE ASG WILL EXECUTE THE KV AFTER 24 HOURS. THE
EXECUTION WILL BE BROADCASTED WORLDWIDE TO
BASIC REQUIREMENTS ATTRACT ATTENTION
PLOT AND CONTINOUSLY UPDATE YOUR SITUATION MAP • SUICIDE MISSION TO ATTRACT INTERNATIONAL
• ENEMY TEMPLATE ATTENTION
• FRIENDLY FORCES TEMPLATE • ENEMY MOVEMENTS • IMMEDIATE SUPPORT FROM FOREIGN TERRORIST
• TERRAIN KEY FEATURES FIGHTERS,
SUBSEQUENTLY IT WILL ATTRACT MORE ATTENTION
IDENTIFY ENEMY CENTER OF GRAVITY (INTERNATIONALLY)
“The hub of all power and movement, on which everything
depends...the point at which all our energies should be directed” • VERY IMPORTANT. AFTER IDENTIFICATION OF ENEMY
– Clausewitz COA, PLOT IT IN YOUR SITUATION MAP.
- YOUR MAP SHOULD CONSIST THE BASIC
WHAT IS COG? INFORMATION
• IT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT TASK! -CURRENT SITUATION
• IT IS SIMPLY CRIPLING THE ENEMY AND FINDING THEIR -PROBABLE ENEMY MOVEMENT
WEAKEST SPOT WILL PROBABLY STOP THEIR -PROBABLE AREAS OF ENGAGEMENTS BOTH
OPERATION AIR AND GROUND OPS
• SOURCE OF STRENGTH AND POWER
o FUNDING DETERMINE GOVERNMENT COA
o FAMILY TIES
o BELIEFS • AS AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER, COME UP WITH A
o RELIGION PLAN ON HOW YOU WILL SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS
o TERRAIN USING ALL AIR ASSETS OF THE PAF. ALL OF THESE
“Generally, there is no COG at the tactical level; it has decisive ACTIONS MUST HAVE TIMELINES.
points” 1. CONDUCT OF ISR OPERATIONS • WHERE? HOW?
2. CONDUCT OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT • WHEN? WHERE?
DETERMINE ADVERSARY/ENEMY COA WHAT TYPE?
3. CONDUCT OF AIR TO GROUND OPERATIONS • HOW?
ENEMY OBJECTIVE AND END STATE? WHEN?
• TO RECEIVE THE RANSOM MONEY
• ARE THEY FIGHTING FOR SOMETHING? ISLAMIC STATE? • AS AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER, WHAT IS THE ENEMY
OR JUST PLAIN BANDITRY? CAPABILITY THAT CAN HAMPER AIR OPERATIONS?
• SOURCE OF INCOME, FOR THEM TO LIVE AND SUPPORT
THEIR FAMILIES? STEP FOUR: DETERMINE ENEMY COA KEY QUESTIONS
• FROM HERE, WE CAN DEDUCE THAT FROM PREVIOUS 1. What are the most likely COAs the enemy will consider? 2.
AND CURRENT STATE OF THE BASILAN BASED ASG, THEY Does he have the capability to conduct these operations? 3.
ARE LINKED TO DAESH/ISIS BECAUSE OF ISNILON How can deception be used?
HAPILON, WITH INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT LIKE THE ISIS 4. How will he employ his assets to achieve his goals?
5. What are his other possible COAs.
EVALUATE THE ENEMY SUMMARY 6. What is the enemy’s most dangerous COA?
STEP THREE:
1. Who is the threat? (continuous, cyclic) KEY POINTS TO REMEMBER
2. What is his desired end state?
3. Where are his forces deployed? • IDENTIFICATION OF WHAT TYPE OF MISSION IS
4. What type of weapons, equipment, and tactics will he use? 5. IMPORTANT, HERE YOU WILL KNOW WHAT LEVEL OF
How does he doctrinally conduct operations? OPERATION WILL BE CONDUCTED – WILL IT BE TACTICAL,
6. Who is the key leader? OPERATIONAL, STRATEGIC OR COMBINATION OF THE
THREE
STEP FOUR: DEVELOP COA
• COMBINATION OF STEP 1-3 • IN RELATION TO THE ABOVE, JIPOE MAY NOT ALWAYS
• HOW WILL THE ENEMY USE THE TERRAIN? BE EMPLOYED, IN A TACTICAL LEVEL, AN INTELLIGENCE
• HOW WILL THE ENEMY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB) OR
WEATHER? GEOGRAPHIC ESTIMATE ON COUNTER INSURGENCY
OPERATIONS MAY SUFFICE TO FULLFILL THE MISSION.
AGAIN, UPDATE YOUR SITUATION MAP
• WHERE COULD THE ENEMY GO FROM POINT A TO POINT • STAGES/STEPS IN JIPOE IS SEEN TO BE OVERLAPPING
B? (MOST OF THE TIME) BECAUSE OF ITS CYCLIC
- NAMED AREA OF INTEREST (NAI) CHARACTERISTIC.
• WHERE COULD BE THE AREA THAT ENEMY AND
GOVERNMENT FORCES MEET? • JIPOE VS AIPB/IP
• JIPOE – MACRO, IPB/GESCON – MICRO
STEP FOUR: • JOINT OPNS POSSIBLE IN BOTH IPB AND JIPOE –
DETERMINE ADVERSARY/ENEMY COA YES!

ENEMY COA BASE ON THEIR CAPABILITIES • AIPB VS IPB – SAME PROCESS BUT WITH EMPHASIS TO
• THE ASG MAY LURE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND AIR OPERATIONS
CONDUCT SNIPER OPERATIONS • THE ASG CAN
CONDUCT IED OPERATIONS • IDENTIFY YOUR ROLE IN A MISSION. IT MAY REQUIRE
• SUICIDE BOMBER TACTIC YOU PLAY A ROLE. OTHER SITUATIONS MAY REQUIRE
YOU TO BECOME THE COMMANDER
MOST PROBABLE ENEMY COA (MOST LIKELY TO ADOPT)
• THE ASG WILL USE THE KV AS HUMAN SHIELD
• THEY WILL NOT ENGAGE INTO FRONTAL ASSAULT WITH
THE ARMED FORCES
• THEY WILL EVADE GOVERNMENT TROOPS AS MUCH AS
POSSIBLE UNTIL THEIR DEMAND HAS BEEN MET

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NATURE AND PRINCIPLES OF WAR
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
▪ Define war in a broad sense based on the writings of
Clausewitz and Sun Tzu
▪ Relate the character of war to the different dimensions
of power
▪ Examine the different western and eastern principles of
war in relation to historical and modern examples
▪ Human/Moral Factor
o People fight today for the same reason they fight
in Thucydides’ time – fear, honor & interest
o Moral forces = human factor
o Commander (quality, character, skill)
o Army (cohesion, fighting spirit, pride)
o Popular Support
▪ Fog & Friction – Uncertainty, Danger, Confusion, the
Weather, the enemy, etc. (Murphy’s Law)
▪ ‘Distinguishes real war from war on paper’

SCOPE EVOLVING CHARACTER OF WAR

▪ Defining War
▪ War’s Enduring Element POLITICS AND WAR
▪ Evolving Character of War ▪ Colin Gray - “War is about politics, and politics is about
▪ Levels of Warfare the distribution of power—who has how muchof it, what
▪ Principles of War (Western) they do with it, and what the consequences are”
▪ Principles of War (Chinese) ▪ “Just War Theory” [jus ad bellum vs jus in bello]
based on religious and moral grounds (Crusades)
DEFINING WAR ▪ Ideology-based wars (Cold War)
▪ Decolonization movement in Asia, Africa
ETYMOLOGY
▪ Latin bellum – “war” SOCIAL FORCES AND WAR
▪ Old English werre – “large-scale military conflict” ▪ Nationalism based on a group’s common affinity
▪ French guerre – “hostility, combat” became a driver of total war
▪ Ethnic Conflicts within states between ethno-cultural
DEFINITION groups
▪ War as “organized violence” ▪ Social Classes & Class Conflict basis of Marxist-
▪ Clausewitz defines war as Leninist Military Theory
o An act of violence intended to compel our
opponent to fulfill our will “, a clash between major CULTURE AND WAR
interests that is resolved by bloodshed ▪ Culture shaped by national character, worldview &
▪ Sun Tzu while not defining what war is acknowledges historical experience (strategic culture)
its importance ▪ Influence of culture on military theory seen best on
o “War is vital to the state, the road to life or ruin.” “Ways of War”
o Western Way of War characterized by direct
action, technocratic solutions, heavy forces
WAR’S ENDURING ELEMENT o Eastern Way of War characterized by mobility,
indirectness, geographical breadth, light forces
WHY ARE WARS FOUGHT?
(THUCYDIDES) ECONOMICS AND WAR
▪ Fear (security, safety, survival) ▪ War as a large-scale organized activity became
▪ Honor (prestige, national honor) possible due to economic development
▪ Interest (territorial, economic, resource gain) ▪ Development of agriculture made possible the
development of larger societies & economic
diversification due to food sufficiency
▪ Economic development also translated to superior
politico-military organizations
▪ Development-security nexus: economics as
determinant of military power
▪ Adam Smith – ability of a nation to wage war
dependent on productive capacity
▪ Alexander Hamilton – economic policy must be
protected by military means = maritime trade & navy
▪ Friedrich List – the greater the productive power, the
greater the strength of the nation in foreign relations &
its independence in times of war; economic tools could
become military tools (railways)

TECHNOLOGY AND WAR

▪ One of the influential sources of military theory is
science & technology
WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY ▪ 19th Century onward, science & technology became a
(SUN TZU) primary driver of military theory
▪ Considers the non-military means in the conduct of war o Naval Power
(psychological, diplomatic, economic) o Air Power
▪ Role of force is more downplayed – “the acme of victory o Nuclear Power
is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred battles ▪ Military “modernization” through R & D and
but to win without fighting” industrialization

THE INTANGIBLE ELEMENTS

▪ Political Factor
o The political element is the one that distinguishes
war from other forms of organized violence
o Clausewitz: ‘war was nothing but the continuation
of policy with other means’
o War should never be thought of as something
autonomous, but always as an instrument of
policy

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LEVELS OF WARFARE
PRINCIPLES OF WAR (WESTERN) – MOOE SUMS
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
▪ Enduring and authoritative principles that guide armed
forces in the conduct of war
▪ Meant to be guidelines and not a catch-all to
predetermine activities
▪ Strict observance does not guarantee success while
violation does not guarantee failure
▪ Critical for success is recognition of the right context
and condition for application (strategic, operational &
tactical art of leaders)
▪ British military officer J. F. C. Fuller developed a list of
principles based on the works of Clausewitz and Jomini
for use by the British Army in World War I
▪ The US Army modified them and published its first list
in 1921
OBJECTIVE
▪ When undertaking any mission, commanders should
have a clear understanding of the expected outcome
and its impact. Commanders need to appreciate
political ends and understand how the military
conditions they achieve contribute to them.
o Ensure that all actions contribute to the goals of
the higher headquarters.
o Example: Ho Chi Minh’s objective in the Vietnam
War was the unification of North and South
Vietnam under communist rule.
OFFENSIVE
▪ Offensive operations are essential to maintain the
freedom of action necessary for success, exploit
vulnerabilities, and react to rapidly changing situations
and unexpected developments.
o Offensive actions are those taken to dictate the
nature, scope, and tempo of an operation.
o Example: Rather than continue to defend at
Busan, MacArthur went on the offensive with
Operation Chromite (the Incheon landing) in
Korea.
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 33 of 37
MASS
▪ Commanders mass the effects of combat power in time
and space to overwhelm enemies or gain control of the
situation.
o Time: applies the elements of combat power
against multiple targets simultaneously
o Space: concentrates the effects of different
elements of combat power against a single target
o Example: Schwarzkopf’s decision to increase the
Operation Desert Storm force from one to two
corps reflected his concern for mass.
ECONOMY OF FORCE
▪ Commanders never leave any element without a
purpose. When the time comes to execute, all
elements should have tasks to perform.
o Economy of force requires accepting prudent risk
in selected areas to achieve superiority in the
decisive operation.
o Economy of force involves the discriminating
employment and distribution of forces.
o Example: In World War I, the Schlieffen Plan
depended on an economy of force effort in the
east in order to gain mass in the west.
MANEUVER
▪ As both an element of combat power and a principle of
war, maneuver concentrates and disperses combat
power to place and keep the enemy at a disadvantage.
It includes the dynamic, flexible application of
leadership, firepower, information, and protection etc.
o Achieves results that would otherwise be more
costly
o Keeps enemies off balance by making them
confront new problems and new dangers faster
than they can deal with them.
o Example: The Battle of Red Cliffs was an example
of maneuver warfare by Zhou Yu and Zhuge
Liang.
UNITY OF COMMAND
▪ Unity of command means that a single commander
directs and coordinates the actions of all forces toward
a common objective.
o Develops the full combat power of a force
o Usually requires giving a single commander
authority
o Example: Eisenhower did an excellent job of
maintaining unity of effort among coalition forces
in World War II.
SECURITY
▪ Calculated risk is inherent in conflict. Security protects
and preserves combat power.
o Does not involve excessive caution
o Measures taken by a command to protect itself
from surprise, interference, sabotage,
annoyance, and threat
o Example: The French did not have adequate
security in the Ardennes Forest when the
Germans attacked in World War II.
SURPRISE
▪ Surprise results from taking actions for which an
enemy or adversary is unprepared.
o It is only necessary that the enemy become aware
too late to react effectively.
o Contributions to surprise include speed,
information superiority, and asymmetry.
o Example: The terrorist attack on September 11
depended on surprise.
PRINCIPLE OF WAR (CHINESE) – SOUL MAMA
ASYMMETRY
THE PRINCIPLES OF UNRESTRICTED WARFARE
▪ Case study on the First Gulf War written by PLAAF
MULTIDIMENSIONAL COORDINATION
Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in 1999
▪ “Warfare which transcends all boundaries and limits”
▪ Key elements: new weapons, enlarged battlespace,
new warriors, and non-military operations
ADAPTABILITY (ADJUSTMENT)
REFERENCES
OMNIDIRECTIONALITY
▪ Combined use of all related factors
o Intent: use of all war resources to obtain a 360°
field of vision
o Policy level – use of nation’s entire combat power
o Strategic – use in warfare of national resources
o Operational – use on a designated battlefield of
various measures to attain campaign objectives
o Tactical – use of various kinds of
weapons/methods
SYNCHRONY
▪ Actions in different domains at the same time
▪ Bringing key factors of warfare which are dispersed in
different spaces and different domains to bear in the
same, designated space or time
LIMITED OBJECTIVES
▪ “Goals must be smaller than the means”
▪ When setting objectives, give full consideration to the
feasibility of accomplishing them
▪ Do not pursue objectives which are unrestricted in time
and space
UNLIMITED MEASURES
▪ Unlimited means to attain goals
▪ Unlimited measures to accomplish limited objectives is
the ultimate boundary
▪ Employ measures beyond restrictions, beyond
boundaries, to accomplish limited objectives
SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 34 of 37
MINIMAL CONSUMPTION
▪ Similar to “economy of force”
▪ Use the least amount of combat resources sufficient to
accomplish the objective
▪ Involves the rational designation of objectives and the
rational use of resources
▪ Finding and exploiting the enemy’s soft spot
▪ Seek nodes of action in the opposite direction from the
contours of the balance of symmetry
▪ Mostly the weaker side selects as its main axis of battle
those areas or battle lines where its adversary does not
expect to be hit
▪ This is the only rule that encourages “breaking rules so
as to use the rules”
▪ Similar to unity of action
▪ Coordination & cooperation among different forces in
different dimensions, military/non-military, in order to
accomplish an objective
▪ Adjustment and control of the entire process
▪ During the entire course of a war, from its start, through
its progress, to its conclusion, continually acquire
information, adjust action, and control the situation
▪ The Principles of War is not a formula or a science but
demands the highest skill, strongest will and character
from the commander (art of command & leadership).
▪ These principles should not be seen as stand-alone parts
but interrelated elements.
▪ The key is knowing when to apply, in what combination,
what to emphasize, what to de-emphasize & if needed,
what to violate.
▪ Clausewitz, C.. (1976). On war. (M. Howard & P. Paret,
Trans.). Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University.
▪ Cordova, R. (2019). “Understanding China’s Gray
Zone Strategy in the South China Sea: Defining
Strategic Approaches for the Philippines”, Manila:
National Defense College of the Philippines.
▪ Qiao, L., and X. Wang. (1999). Unrestricted warfare:
Two Air Force senior colonels on scenarios for war and
the Operational Art in an era of globalization. Beijing:
PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.
▪ Sun Tzu. (1994). The art of war. (R. D. Sawyer & M.
chiin L. Sawyer, Trans.). Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
INTRO TO MILITARY STRATEGY
Common misconceptions
MILITARY STRATEGY ◇ Anything “strategic” is a legitimizer; a powerful word to claim
an upgrade in significance
Etymology: Gk. stratos – “army”+ agein – “to lead”; therefore ◇ Strategy is a checklist
strategos – “generalship ◇ Strategy can be done in isolation
◇ Strategy = planning
Definition: ◇ “the employment of battles to gain the end of
war” (Clausewitz, 1830/1976) The Job of a Strategist

◇ “the art of distributing and applying military Carl von Clausewitz- The talent of the strategist is to identify
means to fulfill the ends of policy” (Liddell Hart, the decisive point and to concentrate everything on it, removing
1967) forces from secondary fronts and ignoring lesser objectives.

◇ “the calculation of objectives, concepts and What strategists do:

resources within acceptable bounds of risk to ◇ “Currency conversion” – determining what kind of military
create more favorable outcomes that may response and on what scale will generate
otherwise exist by chance or at the hands of the necessary strategic effect to achieve
others” (Yarger, 2006) political objectives
◇ Bridging the soldier and the policymaker
Strategy = Ends + Ways + Means ◇ Consider all dimensions in war preparation and watermarking
◇ Assumes that while the future cannot be predicted, the
Strategy -is about how (way or concept) leadership will strategic environment can be studied,
use the power (means or resources) available to assessed, and, to varying degrees,
the state to exercise control over sets of anticipated, and manipulated
circumstances and geographic locations to
achieve objectives (ends) that support 9 state The Giants of Strategy
interests
Thucydides and his Famous ‘Trap’
Types of Strategy (GCAF) ◇ Treatise: The Peloponnesian War
◇ requires his readers to find the general truths of
◇ Geography-based strategy, war, and peace, amidst the concrete details of
￭ Continental his rich historical narrative
￭ Maritime ◇ Takeaway: What kinds of forces tend to inspire people,
◇ Capability-based drive politics, create crises, and bring (or prevent)
￭ Land invasion resolution, with what consequences for human
communities?
￭ Naval blockade
￭ Aerial bombardment Sun Tzu and the Path of Least Resistance
￭ Joint strategy ▪ Treatise: The Art of War
◇ Adversary-based ▪ Influenced Eastern strategists and generals on
￭ Attrition revolutionary warfare
￭ Maneuver warfare ▪ Stressed the unpredictability of battle, the importance
￭ Symmetrical warfare of deception and surprise, the close relationship
￭ Asymmetric warfare between politics and military policy, and the high costs
◇ Force-based of war
￭ Regular ▪ Takeaway: “All warfare is deception.”
▪ Sun Tzu’s basic strategy entails manipulating the
￭ Irregular
enemy in order to create the opportunity for an easy
victory and then applying maximum power at the
What strategy is, and what it is not appropriate moment
(The short and simple; Good vs bad strategy; ▪ Emphasized the role of situational awareness
Common misconceptions) ▪ Championed the bloodless victory
Helmuth von Moltke- “Strategy is more than a science; it is the Jomini and Geometry
application of knowledge to practical life, the development of ▪ Treatise: Summary of the Art of War
thought capable of modifying the original guiding idea in the light ▪ Developed a very scientific approach to war
of ever-changing situations; it is the art of acting under the ▪ Stressed the principle of concentration, the strategic
pressure of the most difficult conditions.” value of interior lines, and the close relationship
between logistics and combat
The short and simple: ▪ Takeaway: Strategy decides where to act, logistics
▪ Yarger, 2006- Strategy provides a delicate balance brings the troops to the point, and grand tactics decide
among the objectives, the methods used to pursue the the manner of execution and employment of troops.
objectives, and the available resources
▪ Gray, 2007- Strategy is where policy meets the Clausewitz and the Center of Gravity
battlespace ▪ Treatise: On War
▪ Freedman, 2013- Strategy is the art of creating power ▪ Used a trinitarian analysis
o primordial violence, hatred, and enmity
Good vs bad strategy: o the play of chance and probability
o war’s element of subordination to rational policy
Good strategy is founded on a proper understanding and ▪ Takeaway: Military efforts should be focused against
analysis of the strategic environment and national interests and the enemy’s “center of gravity”
policy, and an understanding of the theory and role of strategy
(Yarger, 2006)

Bad strategy includes misunderstanding the character of the

war entered and waging it in the manner preferred and
understood, rather than in the ways appropriate to the strategic
challenge (Gray, 2007)

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 Drivers of Strategy (PEGSSH)
◇ Geography
◇ Politics
◇ Economics
◇ History and Strategic Culture
◇ Science and Technology
◇ Socio-cultural Factors

Strategy Formulation
- the Strategy Formulation process
- Policy-Strategy connection

Levels of Strategy (SOT)

Strategic Level
◇ Level where the decision to go to war, set its (political)
objectives, victory conditions and conflict termination are
made
◇ At the grand strategic level, the military instrument is
employed in other conjunction with other instruments of
national power (politico-diplomatic, economic, informational)
◇ Military strategy is formulated & executed to directly achieve
the political objective of the war
◇ Responsibility resides in the political leadership & the
Armed Forces High Command

Operational Level
◇ Where various military operations (air, land, sea, cyber) are
conducted whose goal is to achieve the military objectives set
by the strategic level
◇ Military strategy is focused at the operational level through
the planning & execution of campaigns (joint or single service)
◇ The campaign provides the operational design that enables
tactical operations to achieve military objectives at the
strategic level

Tactical Level
◇ Battles or engagements fought by individual units serve as
building blocks for campaigns

SOC Class 2022-B Area 4 Exam Reviewer Page 36 of 37

Policy-Strategy Connection

Policy is a set of principles to guide the management of affairs,

strategy translates these principles into achievable
objectives and directions

*Policies without strategies are useless, just as strategies

unfounded on policies are without bearing

Case in Point: 21st Century China and Sun Tzu

Mao Zedong- “To get someone to do something for himself that

he thinks is in his own interests, but which is
actually in your interests, is the essence of
strategy.”

◇ Instead of directly attacking another country’s policy actions,

China’s strategy is to decrease the strategic options of its
adversary until the other country is either: 1) pushed to make
mistakes due to lack of strategic flexibility, or
2) cornered into making a particular decision serving China’s 45
interests

Military Strategy: Go
◇ Conquest through encirclement
◇ Maneuver vs attrition
◇ Indirect attacks and psychological combat
◇ Features multiple battles over a wide front, rather than a
single decisive encounter
◇ Emphasizes long-term planning over quick tactical advantage

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