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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I along with my team members would want to convey our sincere gratitude to
Asst. Professor Vishalakshi Sathianathan for providing us an opportunity to work on
this project and to allow us to learn and grow during the preparation of this project.
We would also like to thank our professors, for sharing their knowledge and
expertise in the subject matter, which helped us to shape our ideas and concepts, our
batchmates, for their constructive feedback and suggestions that helped us to improve
our work, the library staff, for providing us with access to research materials and
resources that were critical to the completion of the project, our family and friends,
for their unwavering support and encouragement.
Without their support and contribution, this project would not have been possible.
Wearem deeply grateful to each and every one of them for their invaluable assistance.
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D.Y. Chandrachud
Chief Justice of India
PREVIOUSLY
Sitting Judge of the Supreme Court of India May 13th 2016 - November 7th, 2022
Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court October 31st 2013 - May 12th 2016
Permanent Judge of Bombay High Court March 29th 2000 - 30th October 2013
Senior Advocate, Bombay High Court June 1998 - March 29th 2000
Additional Solicitor General for Union of India 1998 - March 28th 2000
EDUCATION
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Table of Content
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TITLE OF THE PROJECT: CJI Dhananjajay Yashwant Chnadrachud A Case Study
I. Introduction
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II. Early life and Education
Chief Justice Dhananjay Yeshwant Chandrachud was born on November 11th, 1959 in
Mumbai. His father, Y.V. Chandrachud, was the 16th Chief Justice of India. His mother, Prabha
Chandrachud, was a singer for All India Radio. He completed schooling from The Cathedral &
John Connon School Fort Mumbai and St. Columba's School, Delhi. CJI Chandrachud graduated
from St. Stephens College in Delhi with a degree in economics and mathematics in 1979, before
obtaining a Bachelor’s degree in Law from the Faculty of Law at Delhi University in 1982. He
compounded his legal education with an LL.M from Harvard University in 1983 after obtaining the
‘Inlaks’ scholarship, and received the Joseph H. Beale prize for securing the highest marks in the
Conflict of Laws course. He stayed at Harvard until 1986 to complete his Doctorate in Juridical
Sciences. His doctoral dissertation was on affirmative action where he considered the law in a
comparative framework. On completing his studies, he enrolled as an advocate with the Bar Council
of Maharashtra.
Career as an Advocate
CJI Chandrachud’s focus on social causes stems from his days as an advocate. In 1997,
then-advocate Dr. Chandrachud, represented a labourer who was denied further employment by the
public corporation he worked for after he contracted HIV-AIDS. The Bombay HC held that merely
contracting HIV-AIDS was not a ground for violating the laborer’s Right to Livelihood as he was
still medically fit to perform his job. Dr. Chandrachud also appeared in cases involving the rights of
bonded women laborers, and religious and linguistic minorities.
While practicing as an Advocate, CJI Chandrachud remained involved in legal academics by
taking a position as a Visiting Professor of Comparative Constitutional Law at the University of
Bombay , Oklahoma, Harvard, Yale between 1988 and 1997. He has practiced as a lawyer
for Sullivan & Cromwell and in the Bombay High Court.
1998 was a big year for CJI Chandrachud. He was designated as a Senior Advocate in June
despite being only 38 years old—this designation is rarely given to advocates below the age of 40.
Further, he was appointed as an Additional Solicitor General of India, a position he held until his
elevation as a Judge of the Bombay HC on March 29th, 2000.
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Career as a Judge
CJI Chandrachud spoke about his time as a Judge at the Bombay HC in glowing terms. He
credits Justice Ranjana Desai, who he served with on a criminal Bench, for the shift in his approach
towards crimes against women. He admits that he adopted a ‘straight-jacketed approach’ during his
initial days as a Judge, but serving alongside Justice Desai gave him the ‘necessary feminist
perspective’ to apply the law to social realities. This perspective is apparent in his SC Judgments
like Lt. Colonel Nitisha (2021) where he recognized the concept of ‘indirect discrimination’ and
held that women should also be considered for receiving Permanent Commissions in the Army.
After over a decade at the Bombay HC, then-Justice Chandrachud was appointed as the Chief
Justice of the Allahabad High Court on October 31st, 2013. He was elevated as a Supreme Court
Judge on May 13th 2016, and became the 50th Chief Justice of India on November 9th, 2022,
following CJI U.U. Lalit’s retirement.
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IV. Landmark Cases
A) Fundamental Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court held that a fundamental right to privacy is guaranteed under the Constitution of
India.
PARTIES
Petitioner/Intervenors: Justice K.S. Puttaswamy; Centre for Civil Society (CCS); S.G.
Vombatkere; Mathew Thomas; Raghav Tankha; Kalyani Menon Sen; Ram Prasad Misal;
Lawyers: Shyam Divan; Kapil Sibal; Gopal Subramanium; K.V. Vishwanathan; P. Chidambaram;
Arvind Datar; Meenakshi Arora; Sajan Poovayya
Respondents: Union of India; Planning Commission; Unique Identification Authority of India;
CASE DETAILS
Case Number: Writ Petition (Civil) No 494 of 2012; (2017) 10 SCC 1; AIR 2017 SC 4161
CASE DESCRIPTION
In 2012, Justice K S Puttaswamy, a retired judge of the High Court, filed a writ petition in
the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of the Aadhaar scheme introduced by the
UPA Government.
On August 11th 2015, a Bench of three judges comprising
Justices Chelameswar, Bobde, and C. Nagappan passed an order that a Bench of appropriate
strength must examine the correctness of the decisions in M P Sharma v Satish Chandra, District
Magistrate, Delhi, 1954 (Eight Judge Bench) and Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1964 (Six
Judge Bench). In particular it ordered that the Court must decide whether we have a fundamental
right to privacy.
This matter was first placed before a Five Judge Bench headed by the then Chief Justice
Khehar. Subsequently, the matter was referred to a Nine Judge Bench on July 18th 2017. The
Bench comprised Chief Justice Khehar and Justices Jasti Chelameshwar, S.A. Bobde, DY
Chandrachud, Abdul Nazeer, Nariman, R.K. Agarwal, Abhay Manohar Sapre, and Sanjay Kishan
Kaul. Arguments began on July 19th 2017 and concluded on August 2nd 2017.
In a historic decision delivered on August 24th 2017, the Bench unanimously recognized a
fundamental right to privacy of every individual guaranteed by the Constitution, within Article 21
in particular and Part III on the whole. The decisions in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh were
overruled.
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Since the 2017 judgment, the fundamental right to privacy has been cited as precedent in
various landmark judgments, such as the Navtej Johar and Joseph Shine judgments
The Court overturned the 2010 Allahabad High Court judgment that divided the title to the Babri
Masjid / Ram Janmabhoomi site. It awarded the title to the deity, Shri Ram Virajman.
PARTIES
Petitioners: M. Siddiq (Deceased); Maulana Asshad Rashidi; Sunni Central Board of Waqfs.
CASE DETAILS
Case Number:CA 10866-10867/2010
CASE DESCRIPTION
Babri Masjid is a 16th century mosque located in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. The site of the
mosque is also believed to be the birthplace of Lord Ram (Shri Ram Janmabhoomi) by a large
number of Hindus. This has repeatedly led to disputes about who possesses the land.
The current legal dispute arose out of a 1949 Faizabad court order. On the night of
December 22nd, a set of Hindu idols were placed (appeared) under the Babri Masjid dome. A law
and order situation developed. On December 29th 1949, a Faizabad court placed the site under the
custodial responsibility of the state to control rising communal tensions. In particular, the
Additional Magistrate issued a preliminary order under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 and directed the site to be placed under the receivership of the Chairman of the
Municipal Board.
Following the 1949 order, three key title suits challenging it were filed:
In 1959, the Nirmohi Akhara filed a title suit .The Nirmohi Akhara claims it is the rightful
manager of the Ram Janmabhoomi.
In 1961, the Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Board of Waqfs (hereafter Sunni Waqf Board) also
filed a suit. The Board claims possession of the mosque.
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In 1989, senior advocate Deoki N Agarwal filed a suit on behalf of Lord Ram in the
Allahabad High Court. All prior suits were moved to the High Court.
In a significant development, in 1992 Babri Masjid was demolished by kar sevaks affiliated
with the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and other organizations.
In September 2010, the Allahabad High Court delivered a judgment dividing the Ayodhya
title into three equal parts. It awarded the title to the Nirmohi Akhara, Lord Ram represented
by Triloki Nath Pandey (a RSS volunteer and Vishva Hindu Parishad functionary, who
replaced Agarwal after his death), and the Sunni Waqf Board.
All the parties filed appeals, claiming various rights over the disputed land. In 2011, the
Supreme Court stayed the Allahabad High Court judgment.
On November 9th 2019, the court delivered its judgment. It awarded the title to the
deity, Shri Ram Virajman and directed the State to grant the Sunni Waqf Board an alternate site
at Ayodhya for the construction of a mosque.
PARTIES
Petitioner: Indian Young Lawyers Association; Dr Laxmi Shastiri; Prerna Kumari; Alka Sharma;
Sudha Pal
Respondent: State of Kerala; Travancore Devaswom Board; Chief Tanthri of Sabarimala Temple;
CASE DETAILS
Case Number:WP (C) 373/2006
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CASE DESCRIPTION
The Sabarimala Temple, considered the abode of Lord Ayyappa, is located in the Periyar
Tiger Reserve in the Western Ghat mountain ranges of Pathanamthitta District, Kerala. The temple
is known for its unique religious practices—devotees undertake a 41 day penance,
renouncing worldly pleasures, before they visit the temple. Devotees consider Lord Ayyappa to be a
celibate deity. Women in their ‘menstruating years’ (between the ages of 10 to 50) were customarily
prohibited from entering the temple to protect celibacy.
The exclusion of women was first challenged at the Kerala High Court. In 1991, the Kerala
High Court in S. Mahendran v The Secretary, Travancore held that the exclusion was constitutional
and justified, as it was a long-standing custom. The practice did not violate women devotees’ Rights
to Equality and Freedom of worship.
In 2006, Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a public interest litigation petition before
the Supreme Court challenging the Sabarimala Temple’s prohibition of women from the temple
premises. The Association argued that the custom violates the Right to Equality under Article 14, as
the practice is ‘derogatory to the dignity of women’. Freedom of religion under Article 25 states
that ‘all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess,
practise and propagate religion’. The exclusion of women devotees violates that right.
One year later, on November 14th 2019, by a narrow 3:2 majority, the Bench delivered
a Judgment keeping the review petitions pending. Speculating that other freedom of religion cases
may object to the reasoning in the 2018 Sabarimala Judgment, they referred certain overarching
constitutional questions to a larger 9-Judge Bench. These overarching issues pertain to women’s
access to public religious institutions. Justices Nariman and Chandrachud dissented, holding that
this speculation went beyond the narrow scope of a review petition. More on the Sabarimala
Review Petition here. Most notably, the Bench stated that the 2018 Judgment would be enforced
until the review petitions were decided.
On September 6th 2018 a five-judge Bench unanimously struck down Section 377 of the Indian
Penal Code, to the extent that it criminalised same-sex relations between consenting adults.
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PARTIES
Petitioner: Navtej Johar; Sunil Mehra; Ritu Dalmia; Aman Nath; Ayesha Kapur; Akkai
Padmashali; Keshav Suri; Arif Jafar; Ashok Row Kavi; Anwesh Pokkuluri
Lawyers: Mukul Rohatgi; Saurabh Kirpal; Arvind Datar; Menaka Guruswamy; Anand Grover;
Jayna Kothari; E.C. Agrawala; Suraj Sanap; Shally Bhasin; Pritha Srikumar; Sunil Fernandes;
Respondent: Ministry of Health
CASE DETAILS
Case Number:WP (Crl.) 76/2016; WP (C) 572/2016
CASE DESCRIPTION
Section 377 of the IPC categorized consensual sexual intercourse between same-sex
people as an “unnatural offence” which is “against the order of nature”. It prescribed a punishment
of 10 years imprisonment. The provision is a Victorian-era law, which survived into the 21st
century. Interestingly, about 123 countries around the World have never penalized or
decriminalized homosexuality. Currently, 57 countries actively criminalize same-sex relations.
Naz Foundation (India) Trust challenged the constitutionality of Section 377 of the Indian
Penal Code under Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 before the Delhi High Court. The Foundation
contended that Section 377 reflects an antiquated understanding of the purpose of sex, namely as a
means of procreation, and has no place in modern society. Further, the police had weaponised the
provision, which impeded efforts aimed at preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS. The Foundation
cited an instance in 2001 in Lucknow where HIV prevention workers, who were distributing
condoms to homosexual men, were arrested on the allegation that they were conspiring to commit
an offence. The Naz Foundation also argued that the provision was being misused to punish
consensual sex acts that are not peno-vaginal.
The Delhi High Court ruled in 2009 that Section 377 cannot be used to punish sex between
two consenting adults – this violates the right to privacy and personal liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution. The Court held that classifying and targeting homosexuals violates the equal
protection guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution. Section 377 thus violated human dignity
which forms the core of the Indian Constitution.
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The four judgments unanimously cited fundamental rights violations in reading down
Section 377. They found that Section 377 discriminates against individuals on the basis of their
sexual orientation and/or gender identity, violating Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. Further,
they ruled that Section 377 violates the rights to life, dignity and autonomy of personal choice
under Article 21. Finally, they found that it inhibits an LGBT individual’s ability to fully realize
their identity, by violating the right to freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a).
The Court evaluated the arrests of five human rights activists under the Unlawful Activities
Prevention Act (UAPA) by the Maharashtra Police and allowed the investigation to continue. The
Police accused the activists of involvement in the Bhima Koregaon violence and sedition.
PARTIES
Petitioner: Romila Thapar, Devaki Jain, Prabhat Patnaik, Satish Deshpande, Maja Dharuwala
Lawyers: Mr. AM Singhvi; Mr. Prashant Bhushan; Ms. Indira Jaising; Mr. Rajeev Dhavan
Respondent: Union of India, State of Maharashtra
CASE DETAILS
Case Number:WP (Crl.) 260-261/2018
CASE DESCRIPTION
On August 28th 2018, the Maharashtra Police had carried out simultaneous raids across
different parts of India, resulting in the arrest of five activists: Varavara Rao, Sudha Bhardwaj,
Gautam Navalakha, Vernon Gonzalves and Arun Ferreira. The Maharashtra Police alleged that the
activists were responsible for the Elgar Parishad, an event which was held to celebrate 200 hundred
years of the battle of Koregaon Bhima, in January 2018. According to the police, the Parishad
triggered the Bhima Koregaon violence. The Police further claimed that the activists are members
of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), a banned organization.
On August 29th 2018, five eminent citizens—Romila Thapar, Devaki Jain, Prabhat Patnaik,
Satish Deshpande and Maja Dharuwala—submitted a joint petition to the Supreme Court
challenging the arbitrary arrests of the August arrestees.
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The petitioners contended that the Police violated the activists’ rights to equality (Article
14), free expression (Article 19) and personal liberty (Article 21). They argued that the arrests were
arbitrarily made to curb dissent. They emphasized that the activists had been booked under the
draconian Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA). Further, they claimed that the
Maharashtra Police had made serious procedural lapses during the raids.
On September 28th 2018, the Court delivered its Judgment. A 2:1 majority allowed the
Maharashtra Police’s investigation to continue. The Court held that the accused are not entitled to
demand a specific mode of investigation. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar on behalf of Chief Justice Dipak
Misra and himself wrote the majority opinion. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud authored the dissenting
opinion and suggested the appointment of an SIT.
Books & Awards
He was awarded the prestigious Inlaks Scholarship, offered to Indian citizens pursuing
graduate education abroad.
To be sure, law has done much for him, right from the time he studied it at Delhi University.
He did his LLM at Harvard, where he received the Joseph H. Beale prize, which is awarded to the
student who tops the Conflict of Laws course.
Chief Justice Of India (CJI) DY Chandrachud was felicitated with the "Award for Global
Leadership" by the Harvard Law School. The felicitation comes at a time when the Harvard Law
School is celebrating the 100th anniversary of its Graduate Law Program.
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Conclusion
If one were to define the essence of his charm in one word, it would be humility. Sometimes it is
difficult to believe that we are speaking to the highest judicial officer in the country. He has been
part of benches that delivered landmark judgments.such as the Ram Janmabhoomi verdict, Right
to Privacy verdict, etc. He is one of the judges who had decriminalised homosexuality in a
landmark judgment in 2018, thus changing the lives and relationships of thousands of Indians. He
is one of the judge who, in the same year, had allowed women of all ages to visit and worship at
Sabarimala, where age-old tradition had restricted their entry to the temple. This was one of the
judges who had ruled in 2017 that the right to privacy was a fundamental right under the
Constitution, thus impacting the authority of the government and global platforms like Facebook
and Instagram to collect personal data.
Chief Justice Chandrachud has responded to lawyers by calling for “balance and harmony”
during his tenure. He has urged the government and judiciary to work together rather than find
fault with each other.
Chandrachud’s far-reaching judgments as a Supreme Court judge have made him a legal
legend. He has twice upturned his father’s judgments, which, by any standards, is a pretty gutsy
thing to do given the old boy’s formidable reputation. His penchant for revisiting stagnant issues
and pushing for reform has made him a public hero.
He has played a key role during watershed moments. Like in the Sabarimala case, where a
majority of the five-judge Constitution bench declared that preventing the entry of women of
menstrual age was unconstitutional.
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Equally transformative was the judgment that affirmed the right of women, irrespective of
their marital status, to seek safe and legal abortion till 24 weeks of pregnancy.
The CJI, who was present at the Harvard Law School with David Wilkins, Professor at
Harvard Law School and Faculty Director, spoke about the initiatives taken by the Supreme Court
during his first year of tenure, which included the use of technology in court processes, the launch
of handbook on combating gender stereotypes and others.
Referring to the legal aid clinics, he stated that law students should be involved in clinical
legal models, where they are actively involved in real-time cases in local areas.
Asked whether the legal profession can be democratized, he referred to the new law clerks'
scheme implemented in his tenure, which provides equal access to all to apply for a clerkship at the
Supreme Court. He also shared his concern about the mental health of lawyers.
He suggested that apart from senior lawyers and judges, the law schools should also develop
a mechanism to train the students in handling stress and mental health.
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Reference
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