ARTICLE 23-25

DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY

Strict liability, also known as absolute liability, strict tort, or liability without fault is the legal doctrine that assigns responsibility
for damages or injuries even if the person or company that was responsible for the damage or injury was not at fault or negligence.

Strict liability is different from intent crimes, as well as from intentional or negligent torts. Tort law is the largest area of civil
law, and it enables those who have been hurt to pursue a claim for compensation from individuals or entities who harmed them. In
many tort or personal injury claims, plaintiffs must prove that a defendant was negligent or acted intentionally.

Some examples of the application of strict liability in Civil Code are:

 Article 1314; strict tort against inducers. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party.
 Article 1711; strict tort against employers. Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay
compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the
event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of
and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts illness or
disease caused by such employment.
 Article 2184; strict tort against drivers with solidary liability against motor vehicles owners. In Motor vehicle mishaps,
the owner is solitarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due
diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty
of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations or least twice within the next preceding two months. If the owner was
not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article2180 are applicable.

and other provisions such as article 2187, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2183, 1723, 1712. The rationally is that under strict
liability the law expects every person to comply with certain absolute duties to make society safe.

Doctrine of Court Vigilance

The courts must render justice and, therefore, they must be very vigilant in protecting the rights of the disadvantaged with the end
view that any decision will be in consonance with what is right and legal.
A. Manuel Lagunzad vs Maria Soto- Yamashita
G.R. No. L-32066 August 6, 1979
MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner,
vs.
MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" under the
name of his own business outfit, the "MML Productions." It was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty.
Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story," the rights to which
petitioner had purchased from Atty. Rodriguez in the amount of P2,000.00.
The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla. Padilla was then a mayoralty candidate of
the Nacionalista Party (then the minority party) for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November, 1951
elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men were tried and convicted for that
murder in People vs. Lacson, et al. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history."
Although the emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private
and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of
one "Auring" as his girlfriend.
Petitioner received a telephone call from one Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, objecting to the filming of the
movie and the "exploitation" of his life. Shown the early "rushes" of the picture, Mrs. Amante and her sister, Mrs. Gavieres, objected
to many portions thereof notwithstanding petitioner's explanation that the movie had been supervised by Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr.,
based on his book "The Long Dark Night in Negros."
Mrs. Amante, for and in behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes, corrections and
deletions in the movie. Petitioner contends that he acceded to the demands because he had already invested heavily in the picture
to the extent of mortgaging his properties, in addition to the fact that he had to meet the scheduled target date of the premiere
showing.
After some bargaining as to the amount to be paid, which was P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to P20,000.00, petitioner and
private respondent, represented by her daughters and Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, at the law office of Jalandoni and Jamir, executed a
"Licensing Agreement".
(Relevant part of the Condition)
1. For and in consideration of the authority and permission hereby granted by LICENSOR to LICENSEE, LICENSEE
shall pay LICENSOR, through Atty. Lope E. Adriano at the Pelaez and Jalandoni Law Office, 6th Floor, Magsaysay Bldg., San Luis,
Ermita, Manila, the following:
a) The sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, payable without need of further demand, as
follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10, 1961; P10,000.00 on or before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before November 30,
1961. In default of the payment of any of these amounts as they fall due, the others become immediately due and demandable.
b) A royalty in such amount corresponding to TWO AND A HALF PER CENTUM (2-½ %) of all gross income or receipts derived by,
and/or for and in behalf of, LICENSEE as rentals and or percentage of box office receipts from exhibitors and others for the right to
exploit, use, distribute and/or exhibit the picture anywhere here in the Philippines or abroad.
Petitioner takes the position that he was pressured into signing the Agreement because of private respondent's demand,
through Mrs. Amante, for payment for the "exploitation" of the life story of Moises Padilla, otherwise, she would "call a press
conference declaring the whole picture as a fake, fraud and a hoax and would denounce the whole thing in the press, radio,
television and that they were going to Court to stop the picture."
Petitioner paid private respondent the amount of P5,000.00 but contends that he did so not pursuant to their Agreement but
just to placate private respondent.
Because petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, private respondent instituted the
present suit against him praying for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with legal
interest from the filing of the Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-
1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.
ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN UPHOLDING THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF RESPONDENT AS DEFINED IN ART. 26 OF THE
NEW CIVIL CODE OVER THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FILM THE PUBLIC LIFE OF A PUBLIC FIGURE, INFRINGED UPON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS.
RULING:
No. Neither do we agree with petitioner's submission that the Licensing Agreement is null and void for lack of, or for having an
illegal cause or consideration. While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The Moises Padilla Story,"
that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said
deceased's life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v. Curtis, "a privilege may be given the
surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their
feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and memory of the deceased."
Petitioner's averment that private respondent did not have any property right over the life of Moises Padilla since the latter
was a public figure, is neither well taken. Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in toto a person's right to
privacy. The right to invade a person's privacy to disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted
efforts to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little romance in the film because without it,
it would be a drab story of torture and brutality.
The interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by
petitioner. Taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular circumstances presented, and
considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have
to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern.
B. AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD and McELROY & McELROY FILM PRODUCTIONS vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial court of Makati, Branch 134 and JUAN PONCE ENRILE. - SOWAKEN
G.R. No. 82380 (APRIL 29, 1988)

FACTS:
An Australian film maker (Petitioner Hal McElroy), and his movie production company (Ayer Productions) proposed motion
picture entitled “The Four Day Revolution”. This motion picture would re-enact the events that made possible the EDSA revolution
which is designed to be viewed in a six hour mini-series television play. This motion picture was also endorsed by the other
government agencies consulted here in the Philippines, and the General Fidel Ramos.

However, petitioner (Hal McElroy) informed private respondent Juan Ponce Enrile about the projected motion picture in which
he replied otherwise that “he would not and will not approve of the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his name, or
picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television …or other medium for advertising or commercial exploitation”.

Petitioner agreed to this demand and the name of private respondent Enrile was deleted from the movie script. But sometime
in February 1988, private respondent filed a complaint with application for Temporary restraining order and wilt of pretion with the
regional Trial Court of Makati.

ISSUE:
Whether the right of privacy of the private respondent was violated by the petitioners.

RULING:
NO, The right of privacy of the private respondent was not violated by the petitioners.

In the case at issue, applying the clear and present danger test the subject matter of the “Four Day Revolution” relates to the non-
bloody change of government that took place in February 1986, indeed, not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private
life of private respondent Ponce Enrile. In other words, no “clear and present danger” of any violation of any right to privacy that
private respondent could lawfully assert.

Furthermore, Private respondent is a public figure precisely because, inter alia, of his participation as a principal actor in the
culminating events of the change of government in February 1986. Because his participation therein was major in character, a film
reenactment of the peaceful revolution that fails to make reference to the role played by private respondent would be grossly
unhistorical. As what Profs. Prosser and Keeton have referred to as a public figure.

Such public figures were held to have lost, to some extent at least, their tight to privacy. Three reasons were given, more or less
indiscriminately, in the decisions that they had sought publicity, and consented to it, and so could not complaint when they
 received it; that their personalities and their affairs has already public, and could no longer be regarded as their own private
business; and that the press had a privilege, under the Constitution, to inform the public about those who have become legitimate
matters of public interest. On one or another of these grounds, and sometimes all, it was held that there was no liability when they
were given additional publicity, as to matters legitimately within the scope of the public interest they had aroused.

In the line of equilibrium (balance) in the specific context of the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of
expression and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the proposed motion picture must be fairly
truthful and historical in its presentation of events. It must further, be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private
respondent and certainly no revelation of intimate or embarrassing personal facts “matters of essentially private concern”. To the
extent that “four day revolution” limits itself in portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution, the intrusion
into private respondent’s privacy cannot be regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out even
without a license from private respondent.

C. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Alfonso Verchez, Grace Verchez-Infante, Mardonio Infante,
Zenaida Verchez-Catibog and Fortunato Catibog - Tulio
G.R. No. 164349 January 31, 2006

Facts:
On January 21, 1991, Editha Verchez was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital due to an ailment. Her daughter Grace
Verchez-Infantes immediately went to the Sorsogon Branch of RCPI to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog, who
was residing in Quezon City, for her to send a check money for the hospital expenses. Three days after sending the telegram,
Zenaida received no response. Consequently, the same sent another letter to Zenaida reprimanding her for not sending any financial
aid. Zenaida disclaimed having received any telegram.

Zenaida finally received the telegram after 25 days. On inquiry from RCPI why it took that long to deliver it, a messenger of RCPI
replied that he had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was another messenger who previously was assigned to deliver the
same but the address could not be located, hence, the telegram was resent. As a consequence, Editha’s husband Alfonso, by letter,
demanded an explanation from the RCPI, who replied, by letter, that the delay in the delivery of the telegram was due to force
majeure.

On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida, filed a complaint against RCPI before the RTC of
Sorsogon for damages alleging that the delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of Editha to their damage
and prejudice, for which they prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages. RCPI filed its answer, alleging that the delay in
the sending of the telegram was due to force majeure.
Finding that the nature of RCPI’s business obligated it to dispatch the telegram to the addressee at the earliest possible time, the
RTC awarded the prayed moral damages relying on Art. 2176 and Article 1173 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Article 2176 – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being at fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Article 1173 defines the fault of (sic) negligence of the obligor as the "omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time, or the place."

As the RTC explained that the obligation of RCPI to deliver the telegram to the addressee is of an urgent nature and that the
negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision stating that the delay in the delivery of the telegram to the addressee caused “filial
tranquility” to the respondents. Aggrieved, RCPI filed a petition for review raising the question “Is the award of moral damages proper
even if the trial court found that there was no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent acts?”.

Issue:
Whether the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, erred in awarding the respondents moral damages.

Ruling:
No. Art. 2219 of the Civil Code provides: “Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (10) Acts and
actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35”. Further, Article 26 of the Civil Code, in turn, provides: “Every
person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief. ---
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.”

Applying the above-quoted provisions, RCPI’s negligence in not promptly performing its obligation undoubtedly disturbed the peace
of mind not only of Grace but also her co-respondents. As observed by the appellate court, it disrupted the "filial tranquility" among
them as they blamed each other "for failing to respond swiftly to an emergency." The tortious acts and/or omissions complained of in
this case are, therefore, analogous to acts mentioned under Article 26 of the Civil Code, which are among the instances of quasi-
delict when courts may award moral damages under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
D. Hing vs Choachuy - ADDATU

Hing vs Alexander Choachuy

FACTS:
Petitioner-spouses are the registered owners of a land, which is adjacent to the Aldo owned by respondents.

Petitioner-spouses are the registered owners of a land, which is adjacent to the property of the respondents. Respondents own Aldo
Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) and later on, they constructed an auto-repair shop building on a property adjacent to the
property of the petitioners.

Aldo filed a case against the petitioners claiming that petitioners were constructing a fence without a valid permit and that the
construction would destroy the wall of its building. However, the court denied Aldo’s application for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations. To get evidence to support the said case, Aldo illegally set-up and installed on the their building two
surveillance cameras facing the property of the petitioners and the employees of Aldo even took pictures of petitioner’s on-going
construction.

The petitioners filed a case against respondents praying that respondent be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and
enjoined from conducting illegal surveillance.

RTC: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners and it directed respondents to immediately remove the revolving camera that they
installed. Respondents filed with the CA under Rule 65.

CA: The court ruled in favor of the respondents. It held the right of privacy under Art 26(1) of is limited only to residences. Hence, the
right of privacy of the petitioners was not violated because the property of the petitioners involved in this case is used for business,
not residence.

ISSUE: Whether the right of privacy of the petitioners was violated.

RULING:
Yes, the right of privacy of the petitioners was violated.

The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. It is defined as "the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or
from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities." It is the right of
an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the
public is not necessarily concerned."
Art 26 (1) of the Civil Code protects an individual’s right to privacy and provides legal remedy against abuses that may be committed
against him by other individuals. This provision recognizes that a man’s house is his castle, where his right to privacy cannot be
denied or even restricted by others. It includes "any act of intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into the residence of another
without the consent of the latter."

The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s residence," however, does not mean that only the residence is entitled to privacy
because the law covers also “similar acts”. A business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom
and only such individuals as are allowed to enter may come in.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. This test
determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has been violated.51 In Ople v.
Torres,52 we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether, by
his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this expectation is one that society recognizes as
reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore, limit or extend an individual’s "reasonable expectation of
privacy."53 Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it
depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.54

In this case, the acts by respondents of installing a revolving camera violated the right of privacy of the petitioners. The monitor
showed only a portion of the rook of the factory of Aldo, hence, the camera was set up to monitor the on-going construction in
petitioners’ property.

NOTE:
An individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or residence as it may extend
to places where he has the right to exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s
residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore, erred in limiting the application of
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code only to residences.
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION Vs. JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION - ADLOC

Facts:
Respondent Jesichris Manufacturing Company is a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic
and metal products, specifically plastic-made automotive parts. On the other hand, Petitioner is engaged in the manufacture and
distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal.

Respondent Jesichris filed a complaint for damages for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin Petitioner
Willaware Products Corporation from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of respondent.

The complaint originated sometime in November 2000, the respondent discovered that the petitioner had been manufacturing and
distributing identical automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these products at a lower
price targeting the same customers. Respondent further alleged that because of the petitioner's office's proximity to its office and the
fact that some of its employees had transferred over to it, petitioner had developed familiarity with the respondent's products,
particularly its plastic automotive parts.

Petitioner Willaware denies all the allegations of the respondent except the following:
Petitioner is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal.
There’s physical proximity of the petitioner's office to the respondent's office.
Respondent’s employees had transferred to him.
Over the years, petitioner had developed familiarity with respondent’s products, especially its plastic made automotive parts.

Petitioner claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere reproductions of original
parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to the specifications of the original parts of motor vehicles they intend
to replace. Thus, respondent cannot claim that it "originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts. Even assuming for the
sake of argument that [respondent] indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use,
manufacture and sell these as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only exclusive manufacturer
of these plastic-made automotive parts as there are other establishments which were already openly selling them to the public.

RTC: Ruled in favor of respondent.

Petitioner clearly invaded the rights or interest of respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair
competition. Petitioner’s acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of respondent’s and the selling of
the same products to respondent’s customers will have to be enjoined.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. Petitioner asserts that if there is no intellectual property protecting its products, copying them for
production and selling it does not amount to unfair competition. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure away respondent’s
employees to get trade secrets. It points out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded in the market and the copying
of these can be done by simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.

Respondent averredp that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case to prosper under Article 28
of the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present as the parties are trade rivals and petitioner’s
acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately copying its products and employing its former employees.

CA: Affirmed the ruling of RTC. It was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of Willaware that prejudiced
Jesichris.

Issue: Whether the petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

Article 28 provides that “Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damage."

The concept of “unfair competition” under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property laws. Under the
present article, which follows the extended concept of “unfair competition” in American jurisdictions, the term covers even cases of
discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of
a competitor’s contracts, or any malicious interference with the latter’s business.

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade
rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or
otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive
or high-handed method. Here, both characteristics are present.

In this case, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts.
The acts of the petitioner were clearly “contrary to good conscience” as petitioner admitted having employed respondent’s former
employees, deliberately copied respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling these products to respondent’s
customers. It is also testified by witnesses which indicates that the petitioner was in bad faith in competing with the business of the
respondent.
Thus, the petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

Note:
Prefatorily, the SC stressed that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on human relations, and not unfair
competition under Republic Act No. 8293, as the present suit is a damage suit and the products are not covered by patent
registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration is immaterial in the case.