MODULE 2-B.

EQUAL PROTECTION

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL EQUALITY

A) ART. II, SEC. 11 (FREE ACCESS TO THE COURTS)

B) ART. II, SEC. 14 (EQUALITY OF WOMEN AND MEN)

C) ART. II, SEC. 26 (PUBLIC SERVICE)

D) ART. VIII, SEC. 5(5) (LEGAL AID TO POOR)

E) ART. IX-C, SEC. 10 (PROTECTION OF CANDIDATES)

F) ART. XII, SEC. 2, PAR. 2 (RESERVATION OF MARINE RESOURCES)

G) ART. XII, SEC. 10 (NATIONALIZATION OF BUSINESS)

H) ART. XIII, SEC. 1 AND 2 (SOCIAL JUSTICE)

I) ART. XIII, SEC. 3 (PROTECTION TO LABOR)

101) BIRAOGO VS. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 (G.R. NOS. 192935 AND 193036, DECEMBER 2,
2010)

FACTS:

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."

In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a
public office and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as
incumbent members of the House of Representatives.

The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
"independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his
control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book
I of the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to
cite people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot
impose criminal, civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
ISSUES:

Is EO No. 1 unconstitutional?

HELD:

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive
Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and
present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.

As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers
a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial
injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a
resort to the courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which,
to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates
"reorganization" as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of
the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from
one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or
vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa.

Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of
economy or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a
modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive
Order No. 1.

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the
power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different
from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either
a valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public
office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory
basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.
The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office.
Said decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos
of the authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create
offices and transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas"
clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization
of the national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided
in Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body
as it cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it.

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out
by the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the
commission to conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less
adjudication on the merits of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The
phrase, "when in the course of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a
contrary interpretation from that of the petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies. The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3
(2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be
shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover
all the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
"concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the
questioned executive order.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class
of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. The Philippine Supreme
Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power that "includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These
provisions, however, have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-
equal bodies of government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the
other departments.

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by
the Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as
void and unconstitutional. GRANTED.

POLITICAL LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

Fourth issue:

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause.

In order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who
naturally belong to the class. "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to
embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must be borne in mind that the
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.

The OSG ventures to opine that "to include other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden
the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness." The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the
legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and the evil it breeds."

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited.The Court, however, is of the
considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws
should not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to
which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered.

The petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

102) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JUMAUAN (722 SCRA 108)

103) REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. VS. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE
(G.R. NO. 197676, FEBRUARY 4, 2014)
104) VILLANUEVA VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (G.R. NO. 211833, APRIL 7, 2015)

105) TOLENTINO VS. BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY [90 PHIL 83, 90(1951)]

106) PEOPLE VS. CAYAT [68 PHIL 12, 18 (1939)]

DOCTRINE: Protection of laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification to
be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

FACTS:

Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe was found guilty of violating
sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.

Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the non-Christian tribe to buy,
receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their so-called native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof
provides for its punishment.

Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal
protection of the laws, violative of the due process and it is an improper exercise of police power.

ISSUES:

Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?

RULING:

No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.

Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classifications. The classification to
be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not
be limited to existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification rests on real and substantial
distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious belief, but in a way to the geographical and more
directly to the natives of the Philippines of a low grade of civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure
peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The experience of the past and the lower court observed that the
use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper
the efforts of the Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is intended to apply for
all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature understood that civilization of a people is a slow process and that
hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of
same class.

107) PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION VS. PRADO (227 SCRA 703)

FACTS:

This is a petition raised by the members of the lower courts who assails the constitutionality of Section 35 of Republic
Act No. 7354 implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 92-28. Philippine Judges
Association vs. Prado
It is alleged that the said law is discriminatory per se to withdraw the franking privilege of the Judiciary but not on
other offices of the government, such as: the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines;
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives; the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the
Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public
offices and officers.

However, the respondents contend that there is no discrimination since the law is based on the valid classification in
accordance of the equal protection clause. In addition, not only the Judiciary department will be affected with it but
also other offices like Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office;
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; etc. Philippine Judges Association
vs. Prado.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD:

The Court held Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 unconstitutional, thus violates the equal protection clause. Philippine
Judges Association vs. Prado

In Ichong vs. Hernandez, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
all others in these same particulars.

The Court finds its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of
the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not
based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking
privilege. Philippine Judges Association vs. Prado

108) ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ (G.R. NO. L-7995, MAY 31, 1957)

109) SMITH BELL & CO. VS. NATIVIDAD (40 PHIL. 136)

110) BACHE AND COMPANY VS. RUIZ (L-32409, FEB. 27, 1971)

APPLICABILITY, SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS, DISCRIMINATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF

PERSONS PROTECTED

111) BACHE AND COMPANY VS. RUIZ (L-32409, FEB. 27, 1971)

112) PHIL. ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386 (1988)]

The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) is a firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of
Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement."

It challenged the Constitutional validity of DOLE’s Department Order 1 (series of 1988), in the character of
"Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers," in a
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
The measure is assailed (1) for "discrimination against males or females;" that it does not apply to all Filipino workers
but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" (2) for being violative of the right to travel, and (3) for
being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

PASEI also invoked Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution providing for worker participation "in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law as Department Order No. 1,
as contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations.

It also claimed that it violated the Charter's non-impairment clause; in addition to the "great and irreparable injury"
that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the POEA, filed a
Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of
Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland.

In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power of the
Philippine State.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not D.O. 1 violates the equal protection clause;

RULING:

No. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to “female contract workers,” but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that “equality before the law” under the
Constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications,
provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. The
Court is satisfied that the classification made—the preference for female workers—rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force
abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical
and personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various
forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent government action.
As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling
that duty, the Court sustains the government’s efforts. The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the
first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with
an identical predicament.

113) CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES VS. POEA

114) LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. NO. 128096, JANUARY 20, 1999)
115) COMELEC VS. CRUZ (G.R. NO. 186616, NOVEMBER 20, 2009)

FACTS:

When RA 9164 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections” was
passed, questions of the constitutionality were raised against Section 2 which states that

“No barangay elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position: Provided
however, that the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Voluntary renunciation
of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected. Before the 2007 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections, some
of the then incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the RTC a petition for
declaratory relief to challenge the constitutionality of the said provision as it is violative of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution in as much as the barangay officials were singled out that there consecutive limit
shall be counted retroactively.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provision in Section 2 of RA 9164 is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

RULING:

The equal protection clause is under Sec 2 Art III of the Constitution which provides: “Nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.” This is however considering equality under the same conditions and
among persons similarly situated. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective
officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with
respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is
that while the Constitution provides for a 3-year term and 3-term limit for local elective officials, it left the
length of term and the application of the 3-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by
Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes
as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under
these conditions.

116) YRASEGUI VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES (G.R. NO. 168081, OCTOBER 17, 2008)

117) GOBENCIONG VS. CA (G.R. NO. 159883, MARCH 31, 2008)

118) QUINTO VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 189698, DECEMBER 1, 2009 AND FEBRUARY 22, 2010)

119) INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS VS. QUISUMBING [G.R. NO. 128845, 333 SCRA
13 (2000)]

FACTS:

Respondent International School. Ind. (School), pursuant to PD 732, is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. The decree authorizes the
School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine
or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their
employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. School hires both foreign
and local teachers as members of its faculty. classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate
25% more than local-hires.
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner - International
School Alliance of Educators,

"a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" of the School, contested
the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-
hires should be induded in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.

On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an
Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary I Leonardo A.
Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner
now seeks relief in this Court.

Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the
grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes race discrimination

ISSUE:

Whether equal work for equal pay applies in the case.

RATIO:

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the
policy against these evils. The Constitution 81 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to
"give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person.
"in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith

International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles
of law include principles of equity, ie.. the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is
reasonable.The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention
against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice.
The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.

The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly. the Labor
Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an
affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and
ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment

"The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in
salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (Sth ed.) as " reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly,
the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "consideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering
of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission, [24] we said that:
"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business.
Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from

"sal" the pay of the Roman soldier. it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered.

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to
the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the
same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the

"dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary
rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits
accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires. such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home
leave travel allowances.”

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FACTS:

Private respondent, International School (IS), hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine
whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire.

one’s domicile?

one’s home economy?

one owe economic allegiance?

Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that
individual to the Philippines?

Should the answer to any of four tests queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire;
otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.

The School grants foreign-hires salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the
difference on two “significant economic disadvantages” foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the “dislocation
factor” and (b) limited tenure.

When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School
Alliance of Educators, “a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members” of
the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue eventually caused a
deadlock between the parties. Petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the DOLE to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. DOLE Acting
Secretary, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School.

Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in an
Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires is an invalid and
unreasonable classification and violates the Equal Protection Clause.
HELD:

Yes, Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. The foregoing provisions
impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of “equal pay for equal work.”

Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort, and responsibility, under similar conditions,
should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its “international character” notwithstanding. The
School contends that the petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-
hires.

The employer, IS, in this case has failed to show evidence that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or
effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions. In this case, the court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by the respondent
School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification.

There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the
School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the
sympathy of the Court.

The Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,” “to afford labor full
protection.” The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective
bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are
contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the
salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between
the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to
foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.

120) ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ (G.R. NO. 95367, MAY 23, 1995)

121) TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 132922, APRIL 21,
1998)

122) DUMLAO VS. COMELEC (95 SCRA 392)

FACTS:

Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Viscaya. He has already retired from his office and has been receiving
retirement benefits. In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, BP Blg. 52 was enacted. This law
provides that retirees from public office are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law avvering that it is
class legislation hence unconstitutional. In general, he invoked equal protection of law. His petition was joined by
Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two, however, have different issues. The suits of Igot and
Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP Blg. 52 regarding the term of office of
the elected officials, the length of the campaign, and the provision which bars person charged for crimes from running
for public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints against them after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a cause of action.

RULING:

NO. The Supreme Court pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for the latter should have never been merged.
Dumlao’s issue is different from Igot and Salapantan. They have different issues. Further, this case does not meet all
requisites to be eligible for judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal
and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the
filing of complaints against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and
void.

The assertion that BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of the equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiation, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger
employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not
so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65
years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our local governments. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65
years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. But, in
the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumlao), who has retired from a provincial, city, or municipal office,
there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the
challenged provision.

123) DE GUZMAN VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 129118, JULY 19, 2000)

124) CENIZA VS. COMELEC (96 SCRA 763)

125) LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 176951, APRIL 12, 2011)

Action:

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry
P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

FACTS:

During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30
June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of
fiscal independence.

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,
which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood
bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No.
1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors,
individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills
lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature.

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent
municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment
because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the
Local Government Code.

ISSUE:

Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

RULING:

By constitutional design and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political subdivisions or
LGUs is essentially legislative in character. But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by... law, create,
divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality.

In any event, petitioners' constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to assume purely ex
hypothesis the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in
accordance with, among other things, the... income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise,
the conversion is invalid. We shall explain.

Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court finds that the LGC-
amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million
income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws,. which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the
final analysis, to the "criteria established in the Local Government Code," pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987
Constitution. We shall now proceed to discuss this exemption angle.

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus,
applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvenience,... an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the
intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its... letter.

It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable therefrom assume
relevancy in discovering legislative intent.

Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In construing a statute,
the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best
harmonizes with the context and promotes... in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature

And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners have not
overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question.

Principles:

Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent,
[1] for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that... which is within the letter
but not within the spirit is not within the statute.[2] Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is
as much within the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the... statute is not within the
statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.

126) ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ (101 PHIL 1155)

FACTS:

A law, RA No. 1180 entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business" was enacted with an effect of nationalizing the
retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are:

(1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade;

(2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15,
1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law,
until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or
until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons;

(3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for
the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation

of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce
and industry;

(5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business;

(6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the
proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the
business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and

(7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such
business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Petitioner Inchong, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that
said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly
city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Inchong attacks the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and
property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
(3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act
against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of
Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid
exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national
economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are
infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired,
and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

ISSUE:

WON RA 1180 is unconstitutional since its exercise violates one’s right to due process and equal protection as
guaranteed by the Constitution

RULING:

NO. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within the scope of police power of the State. It is clear
that the law in question was enacted to remedy a real and actual threat and danger to the national economy posed by
alien dominance and control of retail business and free citizens and country from the said dominance and control.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep.
As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its
scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of
all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and
public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. However, the Constitution
has set forth limitations thereof and the most important of these are: the due process clause and the equal protection
clause.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is
the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can
neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty
and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.

The best evidence to determine the alien dominance in retail business are the statistics on the retail trade, which put
down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien
domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the
year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to
the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade. Statistical figures reveal that in percentage
distribution of assets and gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course,
that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through
their assets and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino retailers.

The Court finds that law does not also violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient
grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already
engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege. The wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere.

127) ORMOC SUGAR CO., INC. VS. TREASURER OF ORMOC CITY (22 SCRA 603)

FACTS:

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passedOrdinance No. 4, Series of 1964, imposing “on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to 1% per
export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries.”

Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50
and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.

Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complain tagainst the City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and
Mayor, alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

On the other hand, the defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within defendant city’s power to enact under
the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the afore-cited constitutional limitations.

ISSUE:

WON the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause.

HELD:

Yes, the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of equal protection clause.

The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a reasonable
classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification
applies not only to present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the
present; (4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

The questioned ordinance does not meet the requisites for a reasonable classification.

The ordinace taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none
other. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar
central in the city of Ormoc.
To be reasonable, it should be applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular
and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, for the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the
ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon .

 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

128) PEOPLE VS. HERNANDEZ [99 PHIL. 515 (1956)]

129) PEOPLE VS. ISINAIN [85 PHIL. 648 (1950)]

DECISION

In the morning of March 7, 1947, Urbano Cruz, the encargado of the coconut grove of Arturo Eustaquio in Latuan and
Balagtasan, City of Zamboanga, was informed by Lazaro Viernes, one of the guards, that there were three persons
stealing coconuts in the said plantation. Cruz called Ernesto Fargas, the truck driver of Eustaquio, and accompanied
by some laborers, both proceeded to the plantation. There the group saw three persons, chopping coconuts. When
they approached, the trespassers started to run away, but Cruz fired a shot into the air, and one stopped and was
apprehended. He turned out to be the herein appellant, Moro Isnain, who, upon investigation by the precinct
commander of the corresponding police station (Lt. Bucoy) acknowledged his culpability, asked for pardon and
identified his confederates as Moros Addi and Akik (who are still at large). Before the justice of the peace he pleaded
guilty to the charge.

However, in the court of first instance he changed his mind. He admitted he had been arrested during the raid, but
submitted the flimsy excuse that he had merely gone to the place because he was thirsty. Anyway, he confessed that
he joined the other two thieves in order to drink — and did drink — coconut water. This naturally constitutes theft of
the coconuts. He also owned to having asked pardon from Lieutenant Bucoy "even to the extent of kissing his hand."
Therefore there is no question in our minds that the appellant, with the other two runaways unlawfully picked
coconuts from the plantation of Arturo Eustaquio, fruits which, according to the evidence, were valued at more than
thirty-three pesos (P33.76).

The only question raised with much earnestness by his attorney de officio is that article 310 of the Revised Penal
Code classifying as qualified theft, the stealing of coconuts is unconstitutional, because it punishes the larceny of
such products more heavily than the taking away of similar produce, such as rice and sugar, and thereby denies him
the equal protection of the laws. It is unquestionable that the constitutional guaranty requires the treatment alike, in
the same place and under like circumstances and conditions, of all persons subjected to state legislation. But a state,
"as a part of its police power, may exercise a large measure of discretion, without violating the equal protection
guaranty, in creating and defining criminal offenses, and may make classifications as to persons amenable to
punishment, so long as the classifications are reasonable and the legislation bears equally on all in the same class,
and, where a reasonable classification is made as between persons or corporations, the persons or corporations in
each class may be dealt with in a manner different from that employed with regard to the persons or corporations in
other classes."

Thus it means no violation of the constitutional provision to make it a felony fraudulently to sell a part of a stock of
trade whereas the fraudulent sale of other property is made a misdemeanor only, and to make it grand theft to steal
bovine animals, and petty theft to steal other kinds of animals.

In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of
the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy. Unlike rice and sugar cane farms where the
range of vision is unobstructed, coconut groves can not be efficiently watched because of the nature of the growth of
coconut trees; and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be, as it has been in the past the
favorite resort of thieves. There is therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded the industry; and as it
can not be said that the classification is entirely without basis, the plea of unconstitutionality must be denied.
The crime is punished by article 309, paragraph 5, in connection with article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 417. (Republic Act No. 120, enacted after the offense, is not applicable.) The
penalty is prision correccional to its full extent. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should be
sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 4 months of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional. Thus modified, the appealed decision will be affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

FACTS:

In the morning of March 7, 1947, Urbano Cruz the encargado of the coconut grove of Arturo Eustaquio in Zamboanga
was informed by the guard that there were 3 persons stealing coconuts in the plantation.

Upon arriving on the plantation, the group of Cruz saw the 3 persons chopping coconuts and upon seeing them, the
trespassers started to run away.

Cruz fired shots in the air and defendant Isnain stopped and was apprehended.

Before the justice of peace he pleaded guilty of the charge however in the CFI, he changed his mind.

He admitted to his arrest during the raid but submitted a flimsy excuse that he had merely gone to the place because
he was thirsty and confessed that he had joined the other 2 thieves in order to drink coconut water.

Isnain’s attorney de oficio raised the constitutionality of Art. 310 of the RPC classifying as qualified theft, the stealing
of coconut, as it allegedly punishes the larceny of such product more heavily than the taking away of similar produce
(rice and sugar), and thereby denies Isnain the equal protection of the laws.

ISSUE:

Whether the harsher penalties in the theft of coconuts (over other objects of theft) renders the penal law contrary to
the constitutional guaranty on equal protection of the law.

DECISION:

No. Although the constitutional guaranty requires the treatment alike of all persons subject to state legislation in the
same place and under the same circumstances and conditions; the state, as a part of its police power, may exercise
a large measure of discretion, without violating the equal protection guaranty, in creating and defining criminal
offenses, and may make classifications as to persons amenable to punishment, so long as the classifications are
reasonable and the legislation bears equally on all in the same class, and, where a reasonable classification is made
between persons or corporations, the persons or corporation in each class may be dealt with in a manner different
from that employed with regard to the persons or corporations in other classes.

In the matter of theft of coconuts, the purpose of the heavier penalty is to encourage and protect the development of
the coconut industry as one of the sources of our national economy.

Unlike rice and sugarcane farms, coconut groves cannot be efficiently watched because of the nature of its growth;
and without a special measure to protect this kind of property, it will be, the favourite resort of thieves.

There is therefore, some reason for the special treatment accorded in the industry; and as it cannot be said that the
classification is entirely without basis.
130) CHAVEZ VS. PCGG (G.R. 130716, DECEMBER 9, 1998)

131) NUNEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [111 SCRA 433 (1982)]

132) GALLARDO VS. PEOPLE (G.R. 142030, APRIL 21, 2005)

FACTS:

The records show that the above-numbered case originated from a sworn letter-complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao by Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health Workers (PHWs) of
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, charging herein petitioners Mayor Arturo A. Gallardo, Vice-Mayor Peter Melchor J. Arches,
Sangguniang Bayan members Allan B. Ampoloquio, Cirilo N. Bacquiano, Josue M. Rodaje, Benjamin R. Macasaet,
Jr., Victorina delos Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin, Quirina T. Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P. Espina, Noel
Guinita and Budget Officer Ofelia Nacional, all public officers of the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate in the municipal budget the
amount representing payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan accruing to the
complaining PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits.

Public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the Resolution dated 26 November 1998 of Graft
Investigation Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding probable cause to
indict petitioners of the crime alleged.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused were not accorded the equal protection of laws when the Ombudsman dismissed the cases
similar to case of the accused.

HELD:

The contention that petitioners’ right to equal protection of the law has been transgressed is equally untenable. The
equal protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all
persons are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. It allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial
differences, one class may be treated differently from another. Simply because the respondent Ombudsman
dismissed some cases allegedly similar to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on his
part, absent a clear showing that he gravely abused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. The Ombudsman
dismissed those cases because he believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial.
On the other hand, he recommended the filing of appropriate information against petitioners because there are ample
grounds to hold them for trial. He was only exercising his power and discharging his duty based upon the
constitutional mandate of his office. Stated otherwise, the circumstances obtaining in the numerous cases previously
dismissed by the Ombudsman are entirely divergent from those here existing.

 PUBLIC POLICY

133) QUINTO VS.COMELEC (G.R. NO. 189698, FEBRUARY 22, 2010)

FACTS:

The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 that they violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
BACKGROUND:

Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as unconstitutional.

Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.

The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of
the COMELEC Resolution 8679: “Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon filling of his certificate of candidacy“

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal protection clause of the constitution.

HELD:

The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA
9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.

RULING:

These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits civil service officers
and employees from engaging in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.

The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and employees in partisan
political campaign is unmistakable.

The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification if
the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated different from the other.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privelege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to
priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not enfringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class and reasonable
ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials. Elective officials occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by
an appointing authority.

FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed
Resolution. They aver that the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of
early printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does not automatically
make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing. Petitioners further posit that the provision
considering them as ipso facto resigned from office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the
equal protection clause in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are appointed officials considered resigned upon filing of their certificates of candidacy? Is Section 13 of RA 9369
violative of the equal protection clause?

RULING:

No to the first question and yes to the second. “ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY
WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN
PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC.” The said proviso seems to mitigate the situation of disadvantage
afflicting appointive officials by considering persons who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the
campaign period, thereby, conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only be considered
as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by law as candidates.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their
CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly
discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. There is thus
no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to
meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso
of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection
clause.

134) GUTIERREZ VS. DBM (G.R. NO. 153266, MARCH 18, 2010)

135) CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOC. VS. BSP (G.R. NO. 148208, DEC. 15, 2004)

136) PNB VS. PALMA (G.R. 157279, AUGUST 9, 2005)

137) UNIDO VS. COMELEC [104 SCRA 17 (1981)]

138) PJA VS. PRADO [227 SCRA 703 (1993)]

139) OLIVAREZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [248 SCRA 700 (1995)]

FACTS:
Baclaran Credit Cooperative, Inc. (BCCI), through its board member charged petitioner Parañaque Mayor Olivarez
with Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for unreasonably refusing to issue a mayor’s permit despite
request and follow-ups to implement Parañaque Sangguniang Bayan Resolution which petitioner himself approved.
the resolution authorized BCCI to set up a night manufacturer’s fair during the Christmas fiesta celebration of and at
Baclaran for 60 days for which they will use a portion of the service road of Roxas Boulevard from the corner of
Opena to Rivera Streets. BCCI requesting assistance for the issuance of a mayor’s permit, BCCI counsel Atty.
Renato Dilag to petitioner formally demanding implementation of Resolution. petitioner replied letter to Atty. Dilag
stating among others that the non-implementation of Resolution was due to BCCI’s failure to apply for appropriate
permit and license to operate the Night Manufacturer’s Fair which was one of the conditions in the authorization.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner disregarded right to the Equal Protection of BCCI?

RULING:

Yes, petitioner failed to show, in apparent disregard of BCCI’s right to equal protection, that BCCI and the unidentified
Baclaran-based vendors’ associations were not similarly situated as to give at least a semblance of legality to the
apparent haste with which said executive order was issued. It would seem that if there was any interest served by
such executive order, it was that of herein petitioner. As the mayor of the municipality, the officials referred to were
definitely under his authority and he was not without recourse to take appropriate action on the letter-application of
BCCI although the same was not strictly in accordance with normal procedure. There was nothing to prevent him
from referring said letter-application to the licensing department, but which paradoxically he refused to do. Whether
petitioner was impelled by any material interest or ulterior motive may be beyond us for the moment since this is a
matter of evidence, but the environmental facts and circumstances are sufficient to create a belief in the mind of a
reasonable man that this would not be completely improbable, absent countervailing clarification. Lastly, it may not be
amiss to add that petitioner, as a municipal mayor, is expressly authorized and has the power to issue permits and
licenses for the holding of activities for any charitable or welfare purpose, pursuant to the Local Government Code of.
Hence, he cannot really feign total lack of authority to act on the letter-application of BCCI.

140) TIU V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 127410, JANUARY 20, 1999)

FACTS:

RA 7227 seeks to accelerate the conversion of military reservations into other productive uses. Section 12 thereof
created the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), which includes the City of Olongapo, Municipality of Subic and the
lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and granted special privileges.

Thereafter, EO 97 was issued to clarify the application of the incentives provided by RA 7227. Sec. 1 of EO 97
provides for the tax and duty-free importations shall only be applied raw materials, capital goods and equipment
brought in by business enterprises into the SSEZ. Except for these items, importations of other goods into the SSEZ,
whether by business enterprises, resident individuals are subject to the taxes and duties under Philippine laws. The
exportation or removal of tax and duty free goods from the territory of the SSEZ to other parts of the Philippines shall
be subject to duties and taxes under Philippine laws.

Section 1.1 thereof grants the enjoyment of the tax and duty incentives to the business and enterprises and residents
within the presently fenced-in former Subic Naval Base only. It excludes the the first two component cities as
provided for by Sec. 12 of RA 7227.

ISSUE:
Whether the EO 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution in confining the application of R.A. 7227
within the secured area.

HELD:

No, said Order is not violative of the equal protection clause; neither is it discriminatory. Rather, than we find real and
substantive distinctions between the circumstances obtaining inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base, thereby
justifying a valid and reasonable classification. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute,
but is subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real
differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. The equal protection of
the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the
oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either by the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to
those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable.
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Classification, to be valid, must:

-rest on substantial distinctions,

-be germane to the purpose of the law,

-not be limited to existing conditions only, and

-apply equally to all members of the same class.

It is well-settled that the equal-protection guarantee does not require territorial uniformity of laws. As long as there are
actual and material differences between territories, there is no violation of the constitutional clause. And of course,
anyone, including the petitioners, possessing the requisite investment capital can always avail of the same benefits
by channeling his or her resources or business operations into the fenced-off free port zone. That the classification
set forth by the executive issuance does not apply merely to existing conditions. As laid down in RA 7227, the
objective is to establish a “self-sustaining, industrial, commercial, financial and investment center” in the area. There
will, therefore, be a long-term difference between such investment center and the areas outside it.

Lastly, the classification applies equally to all the resident individuals and businesses within the “secured area.” The
residents, being in like circumstances or contributing directly to the achievement of the end purpose of the law, are
not categorized further. Instead, they are all similarly treated, both in privileges granted and in obligations required.
The Court holds that no undue favor or privilege was extended. The classification occasioned by EO 97-A was not
unreasonable, capricious or unfounded. To repeat, it was based, rather, on fair and substantive considerations that
were germane to the legislative purpose.

141) COCONUT OIL REFINERS V. TORRES (G.R. 132527, JULY 29, 2005)

142) ISAE VS. QUISUMBING (G.R. NO. 128845, JUNE 1, 2000)

143) PHILRECA VS. DILG (G.R. NO. 143076, JUNE 10, 2003)

144) BELTRAN VS. SECRETARY OF HEALTH (G.R. NO. 133640, NOVEMBER 25, 2005)

FACTS:
The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern. The National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in
order to promote and preserve public health and safety.

What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No
rule that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act
seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood
banks in the country. It was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently
published in the Official Gazette on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.

On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719
provides, Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of
two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary. ”
Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. — The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks
over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The
decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and
public safety.”

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating
commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled “An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and
Sale of Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories.”

The law, which was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of
blood banks and blood processing laboratories.

On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 7 of RA 7719 and its implementing rules is valid on the ground that it violates the equal
protection clause.

Decision:

Petition granted. The assailed law and its implementing rules are constitutional and valid. What may be regarded as
a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule that will cover every
case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited but
classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted.

The classification, however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; (b) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and,
(d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health
and welfare. Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which
unjustifiable discrimination and inequality shall be allowed.

To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood banks/centers and commercial blood
banks. We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons: First, it was based on
substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical service while the latter
is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a
sale of commodity. Second, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane
to the purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary
blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This
necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business
enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to
voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system. Third, the
Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar
circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions. Lastly, the law applies
equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of
the State. The health of the people is a primordial governmental concern.

Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power in order to promote
and preserve public health and safety. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality
of the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that
petitioners have failed to over overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act
constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by petitioners, is for Congress to determine.

145) PEOPLE VS. VERA (65 PHIL 56)

FACTS:

Private respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng applied for the probation under provisions of Act No. 4221. Cu Unijieng
states in his petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted, that he has no criminal
record and that he would observe good conduct in the future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro
Tuason presiding, referred the application for probation of the Insular Probation Office which recommended denial of
the same. The Court of First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set the petition for
hearing on April 5, 1937.

The Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu
Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among other things, that Act No.
4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its
applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial
boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces.

Judge Vera denied the application for probation of Cu Unijieng. The respondent judge thereupon set the hearing of
the motion for execution on August 21, 1937, but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae as in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae
was signed and submitted to court was to have been heard on August 19, 1937. Petitioners came to SC on
extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of Manila which fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the execution of
the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the
apparent inability of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng."
Petitioners contended that even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for
probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in
continuing to entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu Unjieng to prison after he
had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937, denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 11 of Act. 4221 is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws.

HELD:

Yes

RATIO:

Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others in prohibited. But classification on a reasonable
basis, and nor made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be reasonable must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.

It is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a situation in which discrimination and inequality are
permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the
law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and
circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal
protection of the law and is on that account bad.

If the law has the effect of denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. Under section 11 of the
Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several provinces and not be in force in other provinces, but
one province may appropriate for the salary of the probation officer of a given year — and have probation during that
year — and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no probation is subsequent years. While this
situation goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the
Probation Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under
the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand".

MODULE 2-B-1. JUDICIAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW (TESTS)

 STRICT SCRUTINY TEST

 INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY

 RATIONAL BASIS TEST

146) SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. (G.R. NO. 167614, MARCH 24, 2009)

FACTS:
Antonio Serrano, claims that the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 violates the OFWs'
constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them
due process.

Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 provides:Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less. x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Antonio Serrano (serrano for brevity) was a Filipino sea fairer employed as Chief Officer by Gallant Maritime Services
Inc and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc (respondents for brevity) under a 12- month contract with Basic Monthly Salary of
US$1400. However, when he departed on March 19. 1998, Serrno was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment of Second Officer with monthly salary of US$1,000 with the assurance that he would be made Chief
Officer by the end of April 1998. However, respondents failed to keep their promise so Serrano refused to stay as
Second Oficer and was repatriated to the Philippines, having served only 2 months and 7 days fot eh 12 month
contract.

Serrano filed a complaint before the Labor arbiter for constructive dismissal and payment of money claims (total
US$26442.73), moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

LABOR ARBITER: Serrano was declared illegally dismissed and was awarded monetary benefits, representing
Serrano’s salary for three (3) months of the unexpired portion of his employment contract (total USD8,770) at the
exchange rate of USD45 and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of total amount awarded. LA’s basis was Serrano’s
basic pay (USD1,400), fixed overtime pay (USD700), vacation leave pay (USD490).

Serrano appealed to the NLRC, arguing that he is entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract
pursuant to Tripe Intefrated Services Inc vs. NLRC.

NLRC: NLRC modified the monetary awards and ordered respondents to pay only USD4669 which is equivalent to 3
months salary (USD1400 x 3); Salary differential of USD45 and 10% attorney’s fees of USD424.5, reasoning that
R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually
performed, and for vacation leave pay. Other findings were affirmed.

Serrano questioned the constitutionality of said provision.

Court of Appeals: The CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling on the reduction but skirted the constitutional issue.

Respondents argue that respondent cannot belatedly question the constitutionality of the said law on appeal.

The Sol Gen (OSG) argues that since the law preceded Serrano’s contract, it (especially the monetary claims) is
deemed incorporated therat sans stipulation. The OSG further contends that there is a reasonable and valid basis to
differentiate OFW from local workers; and therefore the provision does not violate the equal protection clause nor
sec. 18 Art. II of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the issue of Constitutionality was timely raised by Serrano and before the proper tribunal
2. Whether or not Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 8402 is constitutional.

3. Whether or not Serrano is entitled to salaries equivalent of three months of the unexpired portion or salaries
equivalent of the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract including overtime pay and holiday
pay.

RULING:

1. The Court may exercise its power of judicial review of acts of a co-equal branch, i.e Congress, when the
following conditions are satisfied:

a. There is an actual controversy

b. The constitutional question is raised by proper party and at the earliest opportunity

c. The constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case.

In ruling that the conditions were met, the Court ruled that:

There is an actual controversy re the Labor and CA’s computation of Serrano’s monetary claims.

The issue on Constitutionality was timely raised when Serrano raised the same before the Court of Appeals, such
court having been vested with the power of judicial review to declare a law unconstitutional.

The constitutional issue is critical to the resolution of the monetary claim of Serrano.

2. On Violation of Non-Impairment Clause (Sec 10, Art II of the Constitution)

The provision does not violate the principle of non-impairment of contract (as the law preceded the contract and laws
operate prospectively.

On Violation of Sec 1, Art III; Sec 18, Art II; and Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution

The subject clause VIOLATES the Equal Protection Clause and Right of an individual to due Process(Sec 1, Art III),
recognizing their rights as a protected Sector (Sec 18, Art II; and Section 3 of Article XIII)

Prior to R.A. 8042, all OFWs who were illegally terminated were subjected to a uniform rule of monetary benefits
computation: basic salary times the entire unexpired portion of their employment. However, upon the enactment of
R.A. 8042, illegally dismissed employees with unexpired portion of 1 year or more are singled out and subjected to
the disadvantageous monetary award of 3 months of their unexpired portion; as opposed to those illegally terminated
OFWs with unexpired contracts of less than one year who are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired period; and
illegally dismissed local workers with fixed-term employment who are not subjected to the 3-cap limitation.

Filipino workers are protected and afforded certain rights under the Constitution subject to the inherent power of
Congress to incorporate a system of classification into its legislation.

There is a valid classification if the classification is

1.) based on substantial distinction,

2.) germane to the purpose of law,

3) it is not limited to existing conditions; and

4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law:

1.) the deferential or rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally
related to serving a legitimate state interest

2.) the middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification
serves an important state interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest;
and

3.)) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional, and the
burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest

In American jurisprudence, strict scrutiny is triggered by suspect classifications based on race or gender but not when
the classification is drawn along income categories. However, foreign decisions, although persuasive, are not per se
controlling in the Philippines. Philippine laws are to be construed in light of our lawmakers intent and construed to
serve our own public interest.

Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the Court in the present case also employs
the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to
OFWs.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause
may possibly serve.

The Court ruled that the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a compelling state
interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.

The Court declared the provision unconstitutional clause VIOLATES the Equal Protection Clause and Right of an
individual to due Process(Sec 1, Art III), recognizing their rights as a protected Sector (Sec 18, Art II; and Section 3 of
Article XIII).

Note how the Court approaches the issue applying Section 1, Art III and not solely on the provisions re the
Constitution’s state policy on labor.

This is so because Setion 3 of Article XII is not a self-executing provision and it cannot on its own, be a source of
enforceable right. What it does is recognize labor as a protected sector; otherwise, it will lead to a broad interpretation
would suggest a blanket shield in favor of labor.

In declaring the subject clause unconstitutional, the Court reasoned that since the same deprived Serrano of property
and money benefits without an existing valid and definitive governmental purpose, it violated not only Serrano’s right
to equal protection but as well as his right to substantive due process under (Section1, Art. III of the Constitution);
thus, entitling Serrano to his salaries for the entire unexpired period.

3. Serrano is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period, not including his overtime and leave pay
because there is no evidence that he performed work during those periods.

Salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay
is compensation for all work "performed" in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for
any work "performed" on designated rest days and holidays.
MODULE 3. PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION AND CORRESPONDENCE

 ART. III, SEC. 3(1)

 CONCEPT, BASIS AND ASPECTS

147) WHALEN VS. ROE [429 US 589 (1977)]

FACTS.

In 1970, in response to a concern that legitimate drugs were being diverted into unlawful channels, the New York
state legislature created a special commission to evaluate the state’s drug-control laws. The commission was tasked
with producing new legislation to help the state monitor and control drug use. The commission produced a new
statute that classified potentially harmful drugs into five schedules. Schedule I included highly abused drugs that had
no medical use and could not be prescribed. Schedules II through V included drugs with a progressively lower
potential for abuse but with recognized medical purposes. Except in emergencies, the act requires all prescriptions
for Schedule II drugs to be prepared in triplicate on an official form. The form includes personal information about the
recipient of the drug, including his or her name and address. A copy of the form is forwarded to and kept by the New
York State Department of Health. Once received by the Department, information is logged into a private computer.
Forms are locked in a vault for five years and destroyed. Roe (plaintiff) represented a group of patients regularly
receiving Schedule II drugs in New York. Roe brought suit in federal district court against Whalen (defendant),
Commissioner of the New York Department of Health, alleging that the New York statute was unconstitutional as a
violation of a patient’s right to privacy. The district court held the statute unconstitutional, and Whalen appealed to the
United States Supreme Court.

ISSUE.

May the government maintain lists of personal health information without violating a zone of privacy?

HELD.

Yes. Appeals Court ruling reverse.

Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) argued that there are two different interests implicated by zones of privacy.
The first is the right to avoid disclosing personal matters and the second is the right to independence in making
certain decisions.

The statute protects against public disclosure and some degree of disclosure is already inherent in the current
prescription drug system. The Respondent has failed to establish how the statute invades any right or liberty.

Discussion.

The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) does not argue there is no invasion of privacy here, only
that there is no constitutionally impermissible invasion of privacy. J. Stevens acknowledges the fear of accidental
disclosure, but he also acknowledges that there is a statutory penalty for unauthorized disclosure.

ADDITIONAL:

Appellees contend that the statute invades a constitutionally protected "zone of privacy." The cases sometimes [429
U.S. 589, 599] characterized as protecting "privacy" have in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests.
One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence
in making certain [429 U.S. 589, 600] kinds of important decisions. Appellees argue that both of these interests are
impaired by this statute. The mere existence in readily available form of the information about patients' use of
Schedule II drugs creates a genuine concern that the information will become publicly known and that it will adversely
affect their reputations. This concern makes some patients reluctant to use, and some doctors reluctant to prescribe,
such drugs even when their use is medically indicated. It follows, they argue, that the making of decisions about
matters vital to the care of their health is inevitably affected by the statute. Thus, the statute threatens to impair both
their interest in the nondisclosure of private information and also their interest in making important decisions
independently.

We are persuaded, however, that the New York program does not, on its face, pose a sufficiently grievous threat to
either interest to establish a constitutional violation.

Public disclosure of patient information can come about in three ways. Health Department employees may violate the
statute by failing, either deliberately or negligently, to maintain proper security. A patient or a doctor may be accused
of a violation and the stored data may be offered in evidence in a judicial proceeding. Or, thirdly, a doctor, a
pharmacist, or the patient may voluntarily reveal information on a prescription form.

The third possibility existed under the prior law and is entirely unrelated to the existence of the computerized [429
U.S. 589, 601] data bank. Neither of the other two possibilities provides a proper ground for attacking the statute as
invalid on its face. There is no support in the record, or in the experience of the two States that New York has
emulated, for an assumption that the security provisions of the statute will be administered improperly. And the
remote possibility that judicial supervision of the evidentiary use of particular items of stored information will provide
inadequate protection [429 U.S. 589, 602] against unwarranted disclosures is surely not a sufficient reason for
invalidating the entire patient-identification program.

Even without public disclosure, it is, of course, true that private information must be disclosed to the authorized
employees of the New York Department of Health. Such disclosures, however, are not significantly different from
those that were required under the prior law. Nor are they meaningfully distinguishable from a host of other
unpleasant invasions of privacy that are associated with many facets of health care. Unquestionably, some
individuals' concern for their own privacy may lead them to avoid or to postpone needed medical attention.
Nevertheless, disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies,
and to public health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may
reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having
responsibility for the health of the community, does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy.

Appellees also argue, however, that even if unwarranted disclosures do not actually occur, the knowledge that the
information is readily available in a computerized file creates a genuine concern that causes some persons to decline
needed [429 U.S. 589, 603] medication. The record supports the conclusion that some use of Schedule II drugs has
been discouraged by that concern; it also is clear, however, that about 100,000 prescriptions for such drugs were
being filled each month prior to the entry of the District Court's injunction. Clearly, therefore, the statute did not
deprive the public of access to the drugs.

Nor can it be said that any individual has been deprived of the right to decide independently, with the advice of his
physician, to acquire and to use needed medication. Although the State no doubt could prohibit entirely the use of
particular Schedule II drugs, it has not done so. This case is therefore unlike those in which the Court held that a
total prohibition of certain conduct was an impermissible deprivation of liberty. Nor does the State require access to
these drugs to be conditioned on the consent of any state official or other third party. Within dosage limits which
appellees do not challenge, the decision to prescribe, or to use, is left entirely to the physician and the patient.

We hold that neither the immediate nor the threatened impact of the patient-identification requirements in the New
York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972 on either the reputation or the independence of patients for whom
Schedule II drugs are medically indicated is sufficient to constitute an [429 U.S. 589, 604] invasion of any right or
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

148) MORFE VS. MUTUC (G.R. NO. L-20387, JANUARY 31, 1968)
FACTS:

One of the specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public officer, either
within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office “and within the month of January of every
other year thereafter”, as well as upon the termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office
to which he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the
amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar: . . .”

In relation to Morfe’s alleged accumulation of assets grossly disproportionate to his reported incomes after his
assumption to office, plaintiff Morfe alleged that the periodical submission of such sworn statement of assets is
violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional
right to privacy, implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition
against self-incrimination..

On the otherhand, the defendants Secretary of Justice and Executive Secretary contended that it was a legitimate
exercise of police power, and that Morfe, having accepted a public position, voluntarily assumed the obligation to give
information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption of office but during the time he continues
to discharge public trust.

Lower court: Law is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the required periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities is unconstitutional on
the grounds of it being an unlawful invasion of right to privacy, and an insult to the personal integrity and official
dignity of public officials.

HELD:

No. SC said that such provision of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is constitutional. It is within the State’s police
power, and is not violative of due process and liberty. It is also not a violation of guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure, and is not against the non-incrimination clause. Furthermore, it is not an insult to the personal
integrity and official dignity of public officials.

The Anti-Graft Act of 1960 was precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption
and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust.

The State’s inherent police power enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
However, if the police power extends to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life, then anyone with
an alleged grievance can invoke the protection of due process which permits deprivation of property or liberty as long
as such requirement is observed.

If due process mandate is not disregarded, even a public official, to protect the security of tenure which is analogous
to property, can protect himself from an infringement of his liberty. However, liberty, in the interest of public health,
public order, or safety, of general welfare, in other words through the proper exercise of the police power, may be
regulated.

In here, the reasonableness of the law makes the prohibition valid and within the ambit of police power.
It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with
its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a
requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
every two years after having done so upon assuming office. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of
police power.

A periodical submission of sworn statement of assets and liabilities after assumption of office is within the power of
the government to impose, even if it will affect the public officer’s liberty, for as long as due process is observed. In
subjecting the public officer to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the
statement of the amounts and sources of income, the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise
would be a private sphere.

Other Notes:

Presumption of validity

Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement for employment so a public officer can
make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present evidence to rebut the
presumption of validity.

“If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is
much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects the most rights of property, the permissible
scope of regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)

Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause

“Inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and
welfare of society” (Justice Malcolm)

The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain (Justice Taney, going
beyond curtailment of rights)

Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action affecting persons in
public or private life can invoke the protection of due process.

It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which in a
limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he considers as
an infringement of his liberty.

Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed.

The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of reason and
result in sheer oppression.

“It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with
its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a
requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
every two years after having done so upon assuming office. There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of
police power.”

Right to privacy or Right to be left alone

“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right
of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the
objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that
a public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in
subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the
amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year,
there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.”

Unreasonable Search and Seizure

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom from testimonial
compulsion.

Right against self-incrimination

We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a man’s conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him
in fleeing from justice.

Insult to personal integrity and official dignity

Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a
statute invalid.

149) DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (G.R. NO. 203335, FEBRUARY 11, 2014)

 ZONES OF PRIVACY

150) IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF SABIO VS.
SENATOR GORDON (G.R. NO. 174340, OCTOBER 17, 2006)

FACTS:

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an inquiry in aid
of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation
(PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on
May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.
At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to
testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered performance of its task. Gordon’s
Subpoena Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited in contempt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

HELD:

No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research
data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their
constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.

 EXCLUSIONARY RULE

 ART. III, SEC. 3(2)

151) SILVERTHORNE LUMBER VS. US [251 US 385 (1920)

FACTS:

Silverthorne (the individual who owned the company) was cited for contempt for refusing to produce books and
documents before the Grand Jury.

Silverthorne had been indicted and arrested. While Silverthorne (and his father) were detained, a U.S. Marshal
“without a shadow of authority,” went to their company and seized all books and papers held there. The papers were
seized pursuant to an invalid warrant, and a new warrant was drafted based on information in the documents seized.
The Court ordered the original documents returned, and then issued a subpoena for the documents. The
Silverthornes refused to produce the documents, arguing that the Court was benefiting from the original unlawful
seizure, as without that seizure, they would not have been able to draft a new warrant for the materials.

ISSUE:

Is it permissible for the government to benefit from an unlawful act?

HOLDING:

No

DISCUSSION:

The Court agreed that it “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words” by allowing the government to use the
knowledge obtained unlawfully. The Court agreed that “[I]f knowledge of them (the evidence) is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government’s own wrong
cannot be used by it in the way proposed.” In other words, if the government can show it could have obtained the
needed information from another source, it may be permitted to keep the evidence, but absent that proof, the
evidence will be inadmissible.

152) PEOPLE VS. ARUTA (G.R. NO. 120915, APRIL 3, 1998)

FACTS:
P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant named Benjie, that a certain “Aling Rosa” would be arriving from Baguio
City the following day, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, Abello assembled a team. Said team
proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon 1988 and deployed themselves near
the Philippine National Bank building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station.

While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the
same day from where two females and a male got off.

It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team “Aling Rosa” who was then carrying a travelling bag.
Having ascertained that accused-appellant was “Aling Rosa,” the team approached her and introduced themselves
as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked “Aling Rosa” about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the
former. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “Cash
Katutak.”

The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature.
Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of Property Seized was
prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves. Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a “Demurrer to
Evidence” alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellant’s
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence. RTC
convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio
City to Olongapo City in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

ISSUE/S:

WON the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant violated the latter’s constitutional rights.

HELD/RATIO:

Yes. In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize the
warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant’s bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under
Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides that:

Sec. 5: Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she
just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was committing a
crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of
the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-
appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record,
there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the
pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violation of the
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither was there any semblance of any
compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-
appellant’s bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated
otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal, it
being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant for these are “fruits of a poisoned tree” and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III,
Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

153) PEOPLE VS. RONDERO (G.R. NO.125687, DECEMBER 9, 1999)

PER CURIAM:

The facts of the case are as follows:

On the evening of March 25, 1994, Mardy Doria came home late from a barrio fiesta. When he noticed that his nine
year old sister, Mylene, was not around, he woke up his parents to inquire about his sister's whereabouts. Realizing
that Mylene was missing, their father, Maximo Doria, sought the help of a neighbor, Barangay Kagawad Andong
Rondero to search for Mylene. Maximo and Andong went to the house of a Barangay Captain to ask for assistance
and also requested their other neighbors in Pugaro, Dagupan to look for Mylene.

The group began searching for Mylene at around 1:00 o'clock in the morning of March 26, 1994. They scoured the
campus of Pugaro Elementary School and the seashore in vain. They even returned to the school and inspected
every classroom but to no avail. Tired and distraught, Maximo started on his way home. When he was about five (5)
meters away from his house, Maximo, who was then carrying a flashlight, saw herein accused-appellant Delfin
Rondero pumping the artesian well about one (1) meter away. Accused-appellant had an ice pick clenched in his
mouth and was washing his bloodied hands.

Maximo hastily returned to the school and told Kagawad Andong what he saw without, however, revealing that the
person he saw was the latter's own son. Maximo and Andong continued their search for Mylene but after failing to
find her, the two men decided to go home. After some time, a restless Maximo began to search anew for her
daughter. He again sought the help of Andong and the barangay secretary. The group returned to Pugaro Elementary
School where they found Mylene's lifeless body lying on a cemented pavement near the canteen. Her right hand was
raised above her head, which was severely bashed, and her fractured left hand was behind her back. She was naked
from the waist down and had several contusions and abrasions on different parts of her body. Tightly gripped in her
right hand were some hair strands. A blue rubber slipper with a tiny leaf painted in red was found beside her body
while the other slipper was found behind her back.

Half an hour later, five (5) policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. They found a pair of
shorts under Mylene's buttocks, which Maximo identified as hers. Thereafter, Maximo led the policemen to the
artesian well where he had seen accused-appellant earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the artesian
well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their
headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene's body, he saw accused-
appellant washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro
and arrested accused-appellant.

For Mylene's burial, her parents spent P5,043.00 during her wake, P9,000.00 for funeral expenses and P850.00 for
church services and entombment.

On March 28, 1994, the hair strands which were found on the victim's right hand and at the scene of the crime,
together with hair specimens taken from the victim and accused-appellant, were sent to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for laboratory examination.

Meanwhile, on March 30, 1994, accused-appellant was formally charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide in an information which reads:

The undersigned 4th Assistant City Prosecutor accuses DELFIN RONDERO y Sigua, of Pugaro District, Dagupan
City, of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of March, 1994, in the city of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused DELFIN RONDERO y Sigua, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
criminally and forcibly have carnal knowledge with one MYLENE J. DORIA, a 9-year old girl, against her will and
consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, criminally and unlawfully employed violence against her person, thereby
causing the death of said MYLENE J. DORIA, as evidenced by the Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel,
Asst. City Health Officer, this city, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased, MYLENE J.
DORIA in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other
consequential damages.

Contrary to Article 335 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. In the meantime, the NBI sent a fax message to the
Dagupan City Police Station saying that it could not conduct an examination on the hair strands because the proper
comparative specimens were not given. The NBI suggested that hair strands be pulled, not cut, from the suspect and
from the victim on the four regions of their heads so that all parts of the hair strands, from root to tip, may be
presented. Thereupon, accused-appellant, who executed a "waiver of detention" including a waiver of the provisions
of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution on the rights of the accused during custodial investigation, was allegedly
convinced by a certain Major Wendy Ocampo to give sample hair strands. Another police officer went to the Doria's
residence to get hair samples from Mylene, who had not yet been interred. The hair strands taken from accused-
appellant and the victim were later indorsed to the NBI for laboratory testing. Comparative micro-physical
examination on the specimens showed that the hair strands found on the right hand of the victim had similar
characteristics to those of accused-appellant's, while the hair specimen taken from the crime scene showed similar
characteristics to those of the victim's. Alicia P. Liberato, the NBI Senior Forensic Chemist who conducted the
microscopic examination on the hair samples, later reiterated the aforesaid findings in court.

At the trial, Dr. Cornel, the physician who conducted the autopsy on Mylene at around 9:30 o'clock in the morning of
March 26, 1994, testified that the victim's death probably occurred before 11:00 o'clock in the evening of March 25,
1994 judging from the rigidity of her lower and upper extremities. He explained that the contusions and hematoma
found on Mylene's body were possibly caused by a blunt instrument, a clenched fist or a piece of wood. The
lacerated wounds on her face may have been caused by a bladed instrument, not necessarily sharp, or by hitting her
head on a concrete wall with jagged edges. The abrasions on her elbow, right buttock and upper hip may have been
caused by a rough object that came in contact with her skin. Dr. Cornel also explained that the victim's upper and
lateral incisors may have been avulsed by a sudden blow in the mouth using a blunt instrument, stone or wood. He
added that the fresh hymenal lacerations at 1:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions and the fresh
laceration of the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions could have been caused either by sexual
intercourse or by an object forcibly inserted in Mylene's vagina.

Accused-appellant resolved not to testify at the trial, opting instead to present his wife and his father as witnesses to
account for his whereabouts on the night of the gruesome incident.

Christine Gonzales, wife of accused-appellant, testified that on March 25, 1994, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
she had a quarrel with her husband. Accused-appellant was then slightly drunk and apparently irked when supper
was not yet ready. He slapped his wife and shouted invectives at her, causing a disturbance in the neighborhood and
prompting his father, who lived just a house away, to intervene. When accused-appellant refused to be pacified, his
father hit him in the nose, mouth and different parts of the body. His father left accused-appellant profusely bleeding.
Accused-appellant then changed his blood-stained clothes and went to bed with his wife. It was a little after 8:00
o'clock in the evening.

Christine woke up the next day at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning. She washed some clothes including the blood-
stained ones her husband wore the night before. After doing the laundry, she went out to pay her father a visit. On
her way back home, Christine was informed by a child that her husband was arrested by the police. Christine rushed
home and found some policemen taking the newly washed undershirt and short pants of accused-appellant from the
clothesline. The policemen brought Christine with them to the police headquarters for questioning. When asked about
the blood on her husband's clothes, Christine told them about their quarrel the night before.

Accused-appellant's father, Leonardo Rondero, corroborated Christine's story. He testified that on the night in
question, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he was resting at home, located only a house away from his son's,
when he heard the latter having a heated discussion with Christine. Embarrassed at the scene that his son was
creating at such an hour, Leonardo went to the couple's house to pacify the slightly inebriated accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant ignored his father and continued shouting at his wife. Leonardo then hit him several times causing
his nose and mouth to bleed profusely that it stained his sando and short pants. Startled at the injuries that his son
sustained, Leonardo went home. Early the next morning, March 26, 1994, at around 1:30 o'clock, Leonardo was
awakened by his neighbor, Maximo Doria, who sought his assistance to search for his missing nine-year old daughter
Mylene. Leonardo willingly obliged. Thus, Maximo, Leonardo and the barangay secretary searched the nearby
houses for hours but failed to find Mylene.

On October 13, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE:

For the crime you had wilfully and deliberately committed, this court finds you guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder defined and punished by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659, in relation to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, together with all its attendant aggravating circumstances without any mitigating circumstance of
whatever nature.

You, Delfin Rondero, are hereby therefore sentenced to die by electrocution pursuant to Article 81 of Republic Act
No. 7659, for your heinous crime as charged in the information as a punishment and as an example to future
offenders.

You are hereby further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim by paying to them an amount of P60,000.00 for the
loss of life of Mylene J. Doria; P15,000.00 for consequential damages and P100,000.00 as moral damages.

May God have mercy on your soul.

SO ORDERED.

Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration. On November 10, 1995, the trial court issued an order modifying its
earlier decision, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act. No. 7610, otherwise known as the
"Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," the penalty for homicide is
reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age.

In this appeal, accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
AMENDED TO HOMICIDE AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER LIFE IMPRISONMENT (sic) AND TO INDEMNIFY
THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IN THE AMOUNT OF P175,000.00 BASED ONLY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF HOMICIDE.
III. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN FINDING ACCUSED GUILTY TO (sic) THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE DESPITE ILLEGAL ARREST AND ILLEGAL DETENTION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 27

The appeal has no merit.

Accused-appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is not strong enough to
sustain his conviction, asserting that Maximo Doria's testimony that he saw him about a meter away washing his
bloodied hands at an artesian well was highly improbable inasmuch as it was dark at that time. Accused-appellant
also considered it strange that when Maximo saw him, he did not bother to ask if he had seen Mylene. Finally,
accused-appellant alleges that the slippers presented in court as evidence are not the same ones which were
recovered at the scene of the crime since the pictures presented in court did not show the leaf painted in red on the
left slipper.

Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference. Such evidence is founded on experience and observed facts and coincidences establishing
a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be proved. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction in criminal cases when there is more than one circumstance, derived from facts duly given
and the combination of all is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The test for accepting
circumstantial evidence as proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is: the series of circumstances duly proved must
be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and
inconsistent with his innocence.

In the case at bar, the prosecution avers that there are several circumstances availing which, when pieced together,
point to accused-appellant as the author of the gruesome crime committed on the night of March 25, 1994, to wit:

1. A few hours after the victim's probable time of death, Maximo saw accused-appellant, with an ice pick clenched in
his mouth, washing his bloodied hands at an artesian well.
2 A pair of slippers which Maximo identified as belonging to accused-appellant was found at the scene of the crime.
One was found beside the victim's body while the other was under her buttocks. Maximo positively pointed to
accused-appellant as the owner of the pair of slippers because of a distinguishing mark of the painting of a red leaf
on the left slipper. Maximo said accused-appellant used to frequent their house wearing the same pair of slippers for
over a year.

3. The hair strands which were found on Mylene's right hand and the hair strands taken from accused-appellant were
shown to have similar characteristics when subjected to microscopic

examination.

4. Accused-appellant's undershirt and short pants which he wore on the night of March 25, 1994 had bloodstains. His
wife admitted having washed the undershirt and short pants in the early morning of March 26, 1994.

Contrary to the allegations of accused-appellant, the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain his
conviction. Maximo stated on the witness stand that he was able to identify accused-appellant because he focused
his flashlight on him while he was washing his bloodstained hands at an artesian well located only a meter away from
where Maximo was standing. Maximo considered it wise not to talk to accused-appellant because at that time he had
an ice pick clenched in his mouth and looked slightly drunk. As to the allegation that the slippers presented in court
were not the same ones recovered at the scene of the crime, suffice it to say that the photographs taken of the crime
scene were not focused only on the pair of slippers; hence, the red leaf may be too minuscule to be noticed. In any
case, the pair of slippers shown in the photographs corroborate the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses that a
pair of rubber slippers were indeed recovered at the scene.

It might not be amiss to note that Maximo was not shown to have had any motive to impute so grave a wrong on
accused-appellant. Prior to the incident, accused-appellant used to frequent Maximo's house for a visit. On the night
of the incident, Maximo even sought the help of accused-appellant's father to search for Mylene.

On the other hand, the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense are incredulous, to say the least. Leonardo
Rondero, accused-appellant's father, testified that he mauled his son in an effort to pacify him during a heated
altercation with his wife, Christine. Leonardo said that he felt embarrassed because his son was shouting invectives
at Christine and was causing a scene in the neighborhood so he hit the accused-appellant several times. Leonardo's
curious way of pacifying his son resulted in bodily injuries on the latter. Strangely, despite his sustained injuries and
profuse bleeding, accused-appellant and his wife just went to sleep after Leonardo left. We find it unnatural that a
father, a barangay kagawad, would repeatedly hit his son in an effort to pacify him in the middle of a marital spat. We
find it even more unnatural that one who was bleeding profusely would act so insouciant as to just go to sleep without
attending to his injuries.

Accused-appellant alleges that while in the custody of police officers, some hair strands were taken from him without
his consent and submitted to the NBI for investigation, in violation of his right against self incrimination. Aside from
executing a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellant executed a waiver
of the provisions of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution regarding the rights of an accused during custodial
investigation. It appears, however, that the waivers were executed by the accused without the assistance of a
counsel of his own choice.

The use of evidence against the accused obtained by virtue of his testimony or admission without the assistance of
counsel while under custodial investigation is proscribed under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution, to
wit:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 17. No person shall he compelled to be a witness against himself.

The aforesaid rules are set forth in the Constitution as a recognition of the fact that the psychological if not physical
atmosphere of custodial investigations in the absence of procedural safeguards is inherently coercive in nature.
However, to paraphrase Justice Sanchez in the case of Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, "Compulsion does not
necessarily connote the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates
to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice or impair his capacity for making rational
judgment would be sufficient. So is moral coercion tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant."
Needless to say, the above-mentioned provisions are an affirmation that "coercion can be mental as well as physical
and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."

It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communication from the accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance emitted from the body of the accused may be received as
evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness and morphine forced out of the mouth of the accused may also be
used as evidence against him. Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair samples were forcibly
taken from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence
against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature
acquired from the accused under duress.

On the other hand, the blood-stained undershirt and short pants taken from the accused are inadmissible in evidence.
They were taken without the proper search warrant from the police officers. Accused-appellant's wife testified that the
police officers, after arresting her husband in their house, took the garments from the clothesline without proper
authority. This was never rebutted by the prosecution. Under the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of
the poisonous tree," evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used to gain other evidence because the
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. Simply put, accused-appellant's garments,
having been seized in violation of his constitutional right against illegal searches and seizure, are inadmissible in
court as evidence.
Nevertheless, even without the admission of the bloodied garments of the accused as corroborative evidence, the
circumstances obtaining against accused-appellant are sufficient to establish his guilt.

Having disposed of the foregoing, we now come to the issue of whether accused-appellant should be convicted of the
special complex crime of rape with homicide.

It is a jurisprudential rule that an appeal throws a whole case to review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court
to correct such error as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assigned
errors or not.

The trial court dismissed the charge of rape holding that it has not been adequately proven due to the absence of
spermatozoa in the victim's private part. It is well settled that the absence of spermatozoa in the victim's private part
does not negate the commission of rape for the simple reason that the mere touching of the pudenda by the male
organ is already considered as consummated rape. Mylene Doria was naked from waist down when she was found.
Her private organ had hymenal lacerations at 1:00 o'clock, 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions. There were fresh
lacerations in the labia minora at 6:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock positions as well. The trial judge even noted that "it
can be conclusively deduced that her sex organ was subjected to a humiliating punishment." While the examining
physician speculated that the lacerations could have been caused by a piece of wood or rounded object, he did not
rule out the possibility of forcible sexual intercourse.

The presence of physical injuries on the victim strongly indicates the employment of force on her person. Contusion
was found on Mylene's face, arms and thighs. In rape cases, when a woman is forcibly made to lie down, she will
utilize her elbow as the fulcrum so that abrasions will be observed. In an attempt to stand, the victim will flex her neck
forward. The offender will then push her head backwards, causing hematoma at the region of the occiput. To prevent
penetration of the male organ, she will try to flex her thighs and the offender will give a strong blow to the inner
aspects of both thighs so that the victim will be compelled to straighten them.

As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, aside from the hymenal lacerations, the examining physician testified that
Mylene sustained abrasions on her left elbow, right buttock and right upper hip and contusion hematoma at the
occipital area, i.e., back part of the head, right side. Indeed, the physical evidence indubitably tells a harrowing crime
committed against nine-year old Mylene Doria in a manner that no words can sufficiently describe.

Anent accused-appellant's third assignment of error, it might be true that accused-appellant's warrantless arrest was
not lawful. The police officers who arrested him had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that he was the
perpetrator of the crime just committed. His warrantless arrest was not based on a personal knowledge of the police
officers indicating facts that he has committed the gruesome crime but solely on Maximo's suspicion that he was
involved in the slaying of Mylene since he was seen washing his bloodied hands in the early morning of March 26,
1994. Nevertheless, it is hornbook knowledge that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused is deemed
waived when, instead of quashing the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily
submits himself to the court by entering a plea of guilty or not guilty during the arraignment and participating in the
proceedings.

Finally, we reiterate that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then
called to render judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable, and whether they are
made the subject of assigned errors or not. This precept should be borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused who
unwittingly takes the risk involved when he decides to appeal his sentence.

Accused-appellant's guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt for the rape and brutal slaying of Mylene
Doria, this Court has no other recourse but to impose the penalty of death upon accused-appellant Delfin Rondero y
Sigua. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, "when by reason or on
occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death." At this juncture, it should be stated that
four justices of the court have continued to maintain the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659 insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that this law is constitutional and
that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
The award of P50,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the victim is increased to P75,000.00 in line with our ruling in
People vs. Mahinay. 48 The award of moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00 is reduced to P50,000.00. Further,
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the sum of P15,000.00 as consequential damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City finding accused-appellant Delfin
Rondero y Sigua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Delfin
Rondero y Sigua is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of special complex crime of rape with
homicide committed against Mylene J. Doria and is accordingly sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.
He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P15,000.00 as consequential damages.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon
finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of
pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

 ART. III, SEC. 2

154) SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD (G.R. NO. 157870, NOVEMBER 3, 2008)

FACTS:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of... secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or
by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. x x x The drug... testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to... undergo drug testing:... x x x x

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the
related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a
random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules
and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing... the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for
use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of... the Civil Service Law;... x x x x

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo
a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be
subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate
for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate.

He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a... senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to
schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the... provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a
third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous

Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the... right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-
incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury... as a result of the
allegedly illegal cond... ct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5]... is not only acceptable but may even be necessary... is...
accompanied by proper safeguards,... we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context
of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily
submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities.

reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

"randomness" and

"suspicionless."

Worse still, the accused persons are... veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
ISSUES:

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates
for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs
violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or
do they constitute undue delegation of... legislative power?

RULING:

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching... significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections,
possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the... subject matter of the petition, among
other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi
owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of

Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

Pimentel's contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect.

The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but
to yield obedience to the... commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9]

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations
which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation

If Congress... cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure,
is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise... specified in the Constitution.[13]

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly
state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of
candidacy. This argument may be... accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular
section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the
obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering... to the statutory command. And
since the provision deals with cand... ith cand

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public
and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out
illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the... well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful
effects of dangerous drugs."
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools
and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually
fewer rights than an adult, and are... subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools;
(3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty;... and (4) schools have the right to
impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

is not only acceptable but may even be necessary... he Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited
drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people,[21] particularly the youth and school children who
usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective... method is conceptualized and put in motion, a
random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary
if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to... be
promoted and protected.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec.
36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same
reason. The Court notes in this regard that... petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to
drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"[23]
has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless... drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
violates the right to priva... vacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of
the Constitution.[24] Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and... gratuitous and does not merit
serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a... person's ordinary sensibilities.[27] And while there has been general agreement as to the basic
function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against `unreasonable
searches and seizures' into workable... broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,"

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is
the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.

the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, w

In this case, the office or workplace serves as the... backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a
large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any,... entered into
by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in
the workplace.

While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may
be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage
drug use by not... telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of
RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be
subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's... work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of
reducing the risk in the work place."

Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the... prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of
the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is... accompanied by
proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

gal drug in the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious
effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of... promoting and
resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illega

To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individual's... privacy interest under the premises.

Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and
deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than
other modes. The

Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the... random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under
the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug... testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of
officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random...
procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in
an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test
results are established.

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug
testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing for... students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the... constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with
criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and

"suspicionless."

In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal... complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When
persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the... prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right
to privacy.[40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt... to harness a medical test as
a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are...
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

155) NACAGUE VS. SULPICIO LINES (G.R. NO. 172589, AUGUST 8, 2010)

FACTS:
Respondent Sulpicio Lines, Inc. hired Nacague as "hepe de viaje" or the representative of Sulpicio Lines on board its
vessel M/V Princess of the World.

Sulpicio Lines received an anonymous letter reporting the use of illegal drugs on board the ship.

Ceasar T. Chico, a housekeeper on the ship, submitted a report regarding the drug paraphernalia found inside the
Mopalla Suite Room and the threat on his life made by Nacague and Chief Mate Reynaldo Doroon after he found the
drug paraphernalia.

Sulpicio Lines sent a notice of investigation to Nacague informing him of the charges against him for use of illegal
drugs and threatening a co-employee.

When the ship docked in the port of Manila on, some crew members of the ship, together with Nacague, were
subjected to a random drug test. They were taken to S.M. Lazo Medical Clinic and were required to submit urine
samples. Nacague was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Sulpicio Lines subjected Nacague to a formal investigation. Nacague denied using illegal drugs.

5 days after the random drug testing, Nacague went to Chong Hua Hospital in Cebu City to undergo a voluntary drug
test. The drug test with Chong Hua Hospital yielded a negative result. Nacague submitted this test result to Sulpicio
Lines. However, Sulpicio Lines still terminated him from the service for the reason of finding him culpable of grave
misconduct and loss of trust and confidence due to his positive drug result.

Feeling aggrieved, Nacague filed a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and for reinstatement with
backwages.

LA rendered a decision in favor of Nacague and declared that Sulpicio Lines illegally dismissed Nacague.

REASON OF LA: The drug test result from S.M. Lazo Clinic was questionable because the clinic is not accredited by
the Dangerous Drug Board and not under its supervision.

NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

REASON OF NLRC: Nacague, who was performing a task involving trust and confidence, was found positive for
using illegal drugs, he was guilty of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.

MR denied.

CA affirmed NLRC’s decision.

REASON OF CA: Sulpicio Lines complied with both the procedural and substantive requirements of the law when it
terminated the employment of Nacague.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the termination was valid.

RULING:

NO. Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. The lack of accreditation of
S.M. Lazo Clinic made its drug test results doubtful.
Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165 provides that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing centers.
Moreover, Section 36 also prescribes that drug testing shall consist of both the screening test and the confirmatory
test.

The law is clear that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing centers.In this case, Sulpicio Lines
failed to prove that S.M. Lazo Clinic is an accredited drug testing center. Sulpicio Lines did not even deny Nacague’s
allegation that S.M. Lazo Clinic was not accredited. Also, only a screening test was conducted to determine if
Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not confirm the positive result of the screening test with a
confirmatory test. Sulpicio Lines failed to indubitably prove that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs amounting
to serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that it had a valid and
legal cause for terminating Nacague’s employment. When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment
is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.

PETITION is GRANTED.

 ART. III, SEC. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 17 (PENUMBRA)

156) GRISWOLD VS. CONNECTICUT [381 US 479 (1965)]

RULE:

Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help
give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers in
any house in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
explicitly affirms the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fifth Amendment in its self-incrimination clause enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides that the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people.

FACTS:

A Connecticut statute made it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. Appellant
Griswold, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and appellant Buxton, its medical
director, a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical
advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for
the wife's use. Appellants claimed that the accessory statute as applied violated the Fourteenth Amendment. An
intermediate appellate court and the State's highest court affirmed the convictions.

ISSUE:

Was the Connecticut statute that made it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception
unconstitutional?

ANSWER:
Yes

CONCLUSION:

The United States Supreme Court first held that as accessories, Griswold and Buxton had standing to challenge the
substantive law and to raise the constitutional rights of the married people with whom they had a professional
relationship. In examining the United States Constitution, the Court found a right of privacy implicit in the Third
Amendment's prohibition against the quartering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment's right of people to be secure in
their persons, the Fifth Amendment's right against self-incrimination, and the Ninth Amendment's right to retain rights
not enumerated in the Constitution. The right of privacy to use birth control measures was found to be a legitimate
one. Thus, the Court concluded that Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-32 (rev. 1958) was unconstitutional.

157) OPLE VS. TORRES (G.R. NO. 127685 JULY 23, 1998)

FACTS:

Petitioner Ople prays that the Court invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System” on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of
the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AO No. 308 is violative of the right to privacy

HELD:

Yes.

The court prescinds from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough
to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth
of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do.
Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government
agency to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded– whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual’s file may include his
transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for
medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and
useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.

The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from
various sources– governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc. In the case at bar, the threat comes from
the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by
giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-
keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens.

 REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY

158) OPLE VS. TORRES (G.R. NO. 127685 JULY 23, 1998)

159) POLLO VS. CONSTANTINO-DAVID (G.R. NO. 181881, OCTOBER 18, 2011)

FACTS:

Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-
Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na"
program of the CSC.

An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David. The letter
contained information about an employee of CSC which also acted as a lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having
a pending case in the CSC.

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT), and
issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically "to back up all the files in the computers
found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions."

The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of preserving all the files
stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers
were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal
Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer
assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in
connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson David
issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or
counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which had
no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he "lawyering" for people with cases in the CSC. He
accused CSC officials of conducting a "fishing expedition" when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in
his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search conducted in the Petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files without
his knowledge and consent transgressed his constitutional right to privacy.

HELD:

No.

Ratio:

The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. But to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it is
essential that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction.
The "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the…probable-cause requirement
impracticable," x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related
misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure
the efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public
employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of
government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this
reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:

"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the…
action was justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted
‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,’"

The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct
prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in the CSC-ROIV
where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly "lawyering" for individuals with
pending cases in the CSC. Chairperson David stated in her sworn affidavit.

A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

160) AYER PRODUCTIONS VS. JUDGE CAPULONG [160 SCRA 861 (1988)]

161) KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. DIRECTOR-GENERAL NEDA (G.R. NO. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006)

FACTS

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order (EO) No. 420 on April 13, 2005, directing all government
agencies and government-owned and - controlled corporations to adopt uniform data collection and format for their
existing identification (ID) systems.

ISSUE:

Whether EO 420 infringed on the citizen’s right to privacy

RULING

The Right to Privacy

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the
performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that these ID cards violate
their right to privacy. Neither have there been complaints of abuse by government entities in the collection and
recording of personal identification data. In fact, petitioners in the present cases did not claim that the ID systems of
government entities prior to EO 420 violated their right to privacy. Thus, they had even less basis for complaining
against a unified ID system under the executive order in question. The data collected and stored under EO 420 were
to be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself would show only 8 of these.

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. With the exception
of the eight specific data to be shown on an ID card, the personal data to be collected and recorded under EO 420
shall be treated as “strictly confidential” under Section 6(d) of the executive order. These data are to be considered
not only strictly confidential, but also personal matters.

As such, they shall be exempt or outside the coverage of the people’s right to information, under Section 7 of Article
III of the Constitution on matters of public concern. Being matters that are private and not of public concern, the data
treated as “strictly confidential” under EO 420 cannot be released to the public or the press.

Compared with the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen (cited in the
Dissent), the 14 specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive
and far less personal. They are, in fact, routine for ID systems, unlike the sensitive and potentially embarrassing
medical records of patients taking prescription drugs. Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the
constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right to privacy.

Indeed, compared with the disclosures of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court upheld in Whalen, those
required under EO 420 are far more benign. Hence, they cannot constitute any violation of the right to privacy or be
used to embarrass or humiliate anyone.

Ople v. Torres was not the proper authority on which to base the argument that EO 420 would violate the right to
privacy. In that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely
on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. EO 420 applies only to government entities that, pursuant
to their regular functions under existing laws, already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards. It does not grant these
entities any power that they do not already possess under existing Laws.

 R.A. 1405 SECRECY OF BANK DEPOSITS

162) REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EUGENIO (G.R. NO. 174629, FEBRUARY 14, 2008)

FACTS:

Following the promulgation of Agan, a series of investigations concerning the award of the NAIA 3 contracts to
PIATCO were undertaken by the Ombudsman and the Compliance and Investigation Staff (CIS) of petitioner AMLC.
The OSG wrote the AMLC requesting the latter’s assistance "in obtaining more evidence to completely reveal the
financial trail of corruption surrounding the [NAIA 3] Project," and also noting that petitioner Republic of the
Philippines was presently defending itself in two international arbitration cases filed in relation to the NAIA 3 Project.
Alvarez had been the Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee of NAIA-IPT3 Project. By this time, Alvarez had
already been charged by the Ombudsman with violation of Section 3(j) of R.A. No. 3019.

AMLC filed an application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson, and
Cheng Yong before the RTC Makati which was granted.

The Republic, through the AMLC, filed an application before the Manila RTC to inquire into and/or examine thirteen
13 accounts and 2 related web of accounts alleged as having been used to facilitate corruption in the NAIA 3 Project.
Among said accounts were the DBS Bank account of Alvarez and the Metrobank accounts of Cheng Yong.

Authority was granted to the AMLC to inquire into the bank accounts listed therein.

ISSUE:
Whether or not AMLA is an exception to Sec 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act

HELD:

It is evident that Section 11 does not specifically authorize, as a general rule, the issuance ex parte of the bank
inquiry order.

SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. ― Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as
amended, Republic Act No. 6426, as amended, Republic Act No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or
examine any particular deposit or investment with any banking institution or non bank financial institution upon order
of any competent court in cases of violation of this Act, when it has been established that there is probable cause that
the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering
offense under Section 4 hereof, except that no court order shall be required in cases involving unlawful activities
defined in Sections 3(i)1, (2) and (12).

To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) may inquire into or examine any deposit of
investment with any banking institution or non bank financial institution when the examination is made in the course of
a periodic or special examination, in accordance with the rules of examination of the BSP.70 (Emphasis supplied)

Of course, Section 11 also allows the AMLC to inquire into bank accounts without having to obtain a judicial order in
cases where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom, certain
violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235,
destructive arson and murder. Such special circumstances do not apply in this case.

In the instances where a court order is required for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, nothing in Section 11
specifically authorizes that such court order may be issued ex parte. It might be argued that this silence does not
preclude the ex parte issuance of the bank inquiry order since the same is not prohibited under Section 11. Yet this
argument falls when the immediately preceding provision, Section 10, is examined.

SEC. 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. ― The Court of Appeals, upon application ex parte by the
AMLC and after determination that probable cause exists that any monetary instrument or property is in any way
related to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue a freeze order which shall be effective
immediately. The freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless extended by the court.

Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze order under Section 10 and the bank inquiry order under
Section 11 are similar in that they are extraordinary provisional reliefs which the AMLC may avail of to effectively
combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially, Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex
parte application for the provisional relief therein, a circumstance absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had
intended to authorize ex parte proceedings for the issuance of the bank inquiry order, then it could have easily
expressed such intent in the law, as it did with the freeze order under Section 10.

Even more tellingly, the current language of Sections 10 and 11 of the AMLA was crafted at the same time, through
the passage of R.A. No. 9194. Prior to the amendatory law, it was the AMLC, not the Court of Appeals, which had
authority to issue a freeze order, whereas a bank inquiry order always then required, without exception, an order from
a competent court.74 It was through the same enactment that ex parte proceedings were introduced for the first time
into the AMLA, in the case of the freeze order which now can only be issued by the Court of Appeals. It certainly
would have been convenient, through the same amendatory law, to allow a similar ex parte procedure in the case of
a bank inquiry order had Congress been so minded. Yet nothing in the provision itself, or even the available
legislative record, explicitly points to an ex parte judicial procedure in the application for a bank inquiry order, unlike in
the case of the freeze order.

There is a right to privacy governing bank accounts in the Philippines, and that such right finds application to the case
at bar. The source of such right is statutory, expressed as it is in R.A. No. 1405 otherwise known as the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1955. The right to privacy is enshrined in Section 2 of that law.
Because of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic state policy in the Philippines.
Subsequent laws, including the AMLA, may have added exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act, yet the secrecy of bank
deposits still lies as the general rule. It falls within the zones of privacy recognized by our laws. The framers of the
1987 Constitution likewise recognized that bank accounts are not covered by either the right to information under
Section 7, Article III or under the requirement of full public disclosure under Section 28, Article II. Unless the Bank
Secrecy Act is repealed or amended, the legal order is obliged to conserve the absolutely confidential nature of
Philippine bank deposits.

Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act
itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be examined by "any person, government official,
bureau or office"; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the
examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by the Court as constituting an additional
exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.

The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank
account upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is
probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law,
or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the
deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom,94 certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002,95 hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and murder, then there is
no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts.

It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a
"litigation" encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when "the money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation." The orientation of the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a
provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-blown trial.

Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean
that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older law that "[a]ll deposits of whatever
nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature." Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and that nature is
unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above. There is disfavor towards construing these exceptions
in such a manner that would authorize unlimited discretion on the part of the government or of any party seeking to
enforce those exceptions and inquire into bank deposits. If there are doubts in upholding the absolutely confidential
nature of bank deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such accounts, then such doubts must be
resolved in favor of the former. Such a stance would persist unless Congress passes a law reversing the general
state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts.

The presence of this statutory right to privacy addresses at least one of the arguments raised by petitioner, that Lilia
Cheng had no personality to assail the inquiry orders before the Court of Appeals because she was not the subject of
said orders. AMLC Resolution No. 75, which served as the basis in the successful application for the Makati inquiry
order, expressly adverts to Citibank Account No. 88576248 "owned by Cheng Yong and/or Lilia G. Cheng with
Citibank N.A.,"97 whereas Lilia Cheng’s petition before the Court of Appeals is accompanied by a certification from
Metrobank that Account Nos. 300852436-0 and 700149801-7, both of which are among the subjects of the Manila
inquiry order, are accounts in the name of "Yong Cheng or Lilia Cheng."98 Petitioner does not specifically deny that
Lilia Cheng holds rights of ownership over the three said accounts, laying focus instead on the fact that she was not
named as a subject of either the Makati or Manila RTC inquiry orders. We are reasonably convinced that Lilia Cheng
has sufficiently demonstrated her joint ownership of the three accounts, and such conclusion leads us to
acknowledge that she has the standing to assail via certiorari the inquiry orders authorizing the examination of her
bank accounts as the orders interfere with her statutory right to maintain the secrecy of said accounts.
 R.A. NO. 4200 [ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW (1965)]

 ARTS. 290, 291, 292 AND 299. REVISED PENAL CODE

163) KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. DIRECTOR-GENERAL NEDA (G.R. NO. 167798, APRIL 19, 2006)

164) SPS. HING VS. CHOACHUY (G.R. NO. 179736, JUNE 26, 2013)

FACTS:

On August 23, 2005, petitioner-spouses Bill and Victoria Hing filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue
City a Complaintfor Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), docketed as Civil Case MAN-5223 and raffled to Branch 28, against
respondents Alexander Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy.

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 1900-B) covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 42817 situated in Barangay Basak, City of Mandaue, Cebu;that respondents are the owners of
Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) located at Lots 1901 and 1900-C, adjacent to the property of
petitioners;that respondents constructed an auto-repair shop building (Aldo Goodyear Servitec) on Lot 1900-C; that in
April 2005, Aldo filed a case against petitioners for Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction/TRO,
docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-5125;that in that case, Aldo claimed that petitioners were constructing a fence
without a valid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building, which is adjacent to
petitioners property;that the court, in that case, denied Aldos application for preliminary injunction for failure to
substantiate its allegations;that, in order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents on June 13, 2005
illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear Servitec two video surveillance cameras facing
petitioners property;that respondents, through their employees and without the consent of petitioners, also took
pictures of petitioners on-going construction;and that the acts of respondents violate petitioners right to privacy.Thus,
petitioners prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the video surveillance cameras and enjoined from
conducting illegal surveillance.

In their Answer with Counterclaim,respondents claimed that they did not install the video surveillance cameras, nor
did they order their employees to take pictures of petitioner's construction. They also clarified that they are not the
owners of Aldo but are mere stockholders.

On October 18, 2005, the RTC issued an Ordergranting the application for a TRO.

Respondents moved for a reconsiderationbut the RTC denied the same in its Orderdated February 6, 2006.

Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with application
for a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

On July 10, 2007, the CA issued its Decisiongranting the Petition for Certiorari. The CA ruled that the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was issued with grave abuse of discretion because petitioners failed to show a clear and
unmistakable right to an injunctive writ.The CA explained that the right to privacy of residence under Article 26(1) of
the Civil Code was not violated since the property subject of the controversy is not used as a residence. The CA
alsosaid that since respondents are not the owners of the building, they could not have installed video surveillance
cameras.They are mere stockholders of Aldo, which has a separate juridical personality.Thus, they are not the proper
parties.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not there is a violation of petitioners right to privacy?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

POLITICAL LAW: right to privacy

The right to privacy is enshrined in our Constitutionand in our laws. It is defined as "the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities."It is the right of an individual "to be free from unwarranted publicity, or
to live without unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.
"Simply put, the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone."

The Bill of Rights guarantees the peoples right to privacy and protects them against the States abuse of power. In this
regard, the State recognizes the right of the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not even the State, except
"in case of overriding social need and then only under the stringent procedural safeguards," can disturb them in the
privacy of their homes.

POLITICAL LAW: the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to determine whether there is a violation of the
right to privacy.

In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy"
test. This test determines whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and whether the expectation has
been violated.In Ople v. Torres,we enunciated that "the reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy depends
on a two-part test: (1) whether, by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) this
expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may, therefore,
limit or extend an individuals "reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a persons
expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances
surrounding the case.

In this day and age, video surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of
everyone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable expectation
of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was obtained. Nor should
these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of anothers residence or business office as it would be no different
from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-Wiretapping Law.

In this case, the RTC, in granting the application for Preliminary Injunction, ruled that:

After careful consideration, there is basis to grant the application for a temporary restraining order. The operation by
respondents of a revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of
petitioners, who are the owners of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on respondents property or the
roof of the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of
the land of petitioners.

Based on the ocular inspection, the Court understands why petitioner Hing was so unyielding in asserting that the
revolving camera was set up deliberately to monitor the on[-]going construction in his property. The monitor showed
only a portion of the roof of the factory of Aldo. If the purpose of respondents in setting up a camera at the back is to
secure the building and factory premises, then the camera should revolve only towards their properties at the back.
Respondents camera cannot be made to extend the view to petitioners lot. To allow the respondents to do that over
the objection of the petitioners would violate the right of petitioners as property owners. "The owner of a thing cannot
make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a third person."

The RTC, thus, considered that petitioners have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property, whether they
use it as a business office or as a residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing
petitioners property or covering a significant portion thereof, without their consent, is a clear violation of their right to
privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a preliminary injunction was justified. We need not belabor that the issuance
of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the court taking cognizance of the case and should not be
interfered with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the court.Here, there is no indication of any
grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an injunctive writ.

This brings us to the next question: whether respondents are the proper parties to this suit.

165) GAANAN VS. IAC [145 SCRA 113 (1986)]

166) KATZ VS. U.S. [389 U.S. 347 (1967)]

CASE BRIEF

In this case, the Supreme Court of the United States (“Court”) dealt with the scope and nature of search and seizure
as provided by the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment protects persons and their property from unreasonable searches by the US government and
lays down requirements for issuing warrants for the same. This case involved the use of an electronic listening and
recording device (“electronic device”) placed outside a public phone booth to eavesdrop on the conversation of Katz,
the petitioner, inside the phone booth. The petitioner challenged the use of the electronic device for surveillance of his
personal conversation as being violative of his Fourth Amendment rights.

The Court held that overhearing private conversations in a public phone booth, on whose privacy the petitioner
justifiably relied, constituted an unlawful ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. It was
held that the Fourth Amendment protected people and not places per se. It protected what people sought to protect
as private, in both public and private spaces. The Court further held that the Fourth Amendment protected not just
tangible property, but also oral statements recorded via electronic devices, without any actual trespass or physical
intrusion. The seizure of the petitioner’s private conversation was therefore held to be presumptively unreasonable,
and hence unlawful, without a warrant.

CASE SUMMARY

FACTS:

The Federal Bureau of Intelligence (“FBI”) agents placed an electronic device outside a public phone booth to listen
to the petitioner’s telephone conversations inside the booth. The District Court allowed the telephonic conversations
to be presented as evidence against the petitioner. He was subsequently convicted for transmitting wagering
information across US states via telephone. Pursuant to this, he moved to challenge the evidence obtained using the
electronic device in the Court of Appeals, contending that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights.

The Court of Appeals upheld the use of the electronic device on the ground that there was no physical intrusion into
the area occupied by the petitioner. He then moved the Court via a writ of certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether recording of conversations inside a public phone booth using an electronic device placed outside the phone
booth constituted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

DECISION
The Court, in a 7-1 decision (with Justice Marshall abstaining), held that the use of an electronic device placed
outside a public phone booth for overhearing conversations inside the booth constituted ‘search and seizure’ under
the Fourth Amendment. The ‘search and seizure’ was unlawful as it was conducted without obtaining a prior warrant.
The Court provided five opinions - one majority opinion by Justice Stewart, three concurring opinions by Justice
Douglas, Justice Harlan and Justice White, and one dissenting by Justice Black.

Discussing the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that it protected individual privacy against certain
types of governmental intrusions and not the right to privacy in general. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment
did not concern itself with the question of what constituted ‘constitutionally protected areas’. The Fourth Amendment
protected people and what they sought to protect as private even in public places. It did not protect places per se.

In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan explained the nature of the protection provided to people by the Fourth
Amendment by articulating a two-fold test on the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’. Fourth Amendment protections
were available, he held, when a) a person exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and b) the society considered
it reasonable. Therefore, he held that the petitioner, after paying the toll for making calls and shutting the door behind
him, was reasonably entitled to assume that his conversation was not being intercepted. This expectation was
reasonable despite the fact that the phone booth was a public place.

The Court considered the reading of the Fourth Amendment as limited to search and seizure of tangible property in
Olmstead vs. United States (277 U.S. 438) and Goldman vs. United States (316 U.S. 129) to be too narrow. It relied
on Silverman vs. United States (365 U.S. 505) and Warden vs. Hayden (387 U.S. 294) to expand it to include
recording of oral statements that were overheard without actual physical intrusion/trespass. The dissenting opinion,
however, held the tangibility of the objects being searched and seized as sine qua non for the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment.

Discussing the reasonability prong of the Fourth Amendment, the Court held that searches and seizures conducted
without a prior warrant by a Magistrate were per se unreasonable. This was held to be especially true in the case of
electronic surveillance, where the consent of the suspect was crucial. The Court agreed that the seizure of the
petitioner’s private conversations was conducted in a restrained manner, under precise and discriminate
circumstances, and to fulfill legitimate needs of law enforcement. However, the lack of prior judicial approval in the
form of a warrant rendered it unlawful.

167) RAMIREZ VS. CA (G.R. NO. 93833, SEPTEMBER 28, 1995)

168) SALCEDO-ORTANEZ VS. CA [235 SCRA 111 (1994)]

169) ALEJANO VS. CABUAY (G.R. NO. 160792, AUGUST 25, 2005)

FACTS:

Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took
control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The soldiers disarmed the security officers of
Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their
support for the administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several
cabinet members. Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after
several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier
planted. The soldiers then returned to their barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive
to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The
transfer took place while military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood
incident. Government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against the soldiers involved in
the Oakwood incident. the CA rendered its decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the
regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing
Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in
court regarding visiting hours and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate court declared
that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication,
this does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which
is the proper subject of habeas corpus proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainees is an infringement of a citizen’s privacy
rights.

HELD:

No, the SC do not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the detainees’ letters violated the detainees’
right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a
valid measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The
letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and
their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting
as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present
case, since the letters were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of
the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the
detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for
inspection in the presence of the detainees. The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438,
as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial
detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. The detainees in the present case
are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion
perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an
armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military
armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other
high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider range of
deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military custodian is in a better
position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf
and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks involved, we should defer
to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

 R.A. NO. 1017 [DATA PRIVACY ACT (2012)]

 RULES OF COURT, RULE 130, SEC. 24

 PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS

170) IN RE: LAURETA [148 SCRA 382 (1987)]

171) PEOPLE VS. ALBOFERA, [152 SCRA 123 (1987)]

FACTS:

Sometime in 1980, Rodrigo Esma was tending his onion farm when the accused called him and informed him they
would ran after somebody. There Lawi-an told Albofera that the forester was around making a list of people engaged
in “caingin” Whereupon, Albofera asked Esma to join him in going after the forester. The two were able to overtake
the forester. Albofera at once put his arm on the shoulder of Carancio and asked him to go with them to the upper
portion because they will do something there. Thereafter, the persons gathered decided to kill Carancio. Esma did not
join the group but remained in the house of Lawi-an.
The following day, at about 9:00 o’clock in the morning, Sisneros was at his farm when accused Lawi-an and Jun
Menez passed by and called him. When Sisneros got near the two, accused Lawi-an told him that the forester was
already killed and warned him not to reveal this matter to anybody otherwise he would be killed. In June 1981,
Sisneros reported the killing of that forester to his brother. The police authorities arrested accused Albofera on July 2,
1981. Accused Romeo Lawi-an was subsequently arrested on July 4, 1981. In the course of the trial, the prosecution
presented a letter written in the Visayan dialect by accused Alexander Albofera, while under detention, to witness
Rodrigo Esma several days before the latter testified on October 20, 1982.

Rodrigo Esma’s Affidavit referred to in the letter taken on July 21, 1981, mentioned accused “Albofera and “alias Jun”
“as having killid the victim. After trial, the lower Court found the circumstantial evidence sufficient to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt of both accused for the crime charged, and sentenced them to death in its
Decision of October 5, 1984.

ISSUE:

Whether the letter of the Accused to prosecution witness is inadmissible in evidence against him which violates his
rights of privacy of communication and correspondence.

HELD:

No, the submission is untenable. The foregoing provision implements another Constitutional provision on the security
of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the
result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy.
Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and Identified
the same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter.
Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor.
Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his
culpability.

172) ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [253 SCRA 699 (1996)]

DOCTRINE IN NACHURA: The right to privacy of communication may be invoked against the wife who went to the
clinic of her husband and there took documents consisting of private communications between her husband and his
alleged paramour.

FACTS:

Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. One day, she went to the clinic of her husband, together with her
mom, her driver and Dr. Martin’s secretary and forcibly opened the drawer of her husband’s clinic and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards,
cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs without Dr. Martin’s knowledge and consent. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought an action for the recovery of documents and papers, as well as damages against her wife before
the RTC. The RTC ruled in his favor, declaring him to be the exclusive owner of such documents. The writ of
preliminary injunction was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were
enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

Cecilia’s side: She contends that the case of Alfredo Martin vs Alfonso Felix, Jr. (NOTE: the case is between her
husband, Dr. Martin and a lawyer, atty. alfonso) where the court ruled that the documents and papers were
admissible in evidence and that the use of those documents by Atty. Alfonso did not constitute gross malpractice and
gross misconduct.

ISSUE:

WON the documents in question are inadmissible in evidence.

HELD:

Yes. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it
is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a]
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or
to her.

173) DEANO VS. GODINEZ [12 SCRA 483 (1964)]

174) WATERHOUSE DRUG CORPORATION VS. NLRC (G.R. NO. 113271. OCTOBER 16, 1997)

 WRIT OF HABEAS DATA [A.M. NO. 08-1-16-SC (JANUARY 22, 2008)]

175) LEE VS. ILAGAN (G.R. NO. 203254, OCTOBER 8, 2014)

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent were former common law partners wherein sometime in 2011, Ilagan found out that his
digital camera is missing and that on the next day, Lee is confronted him about a sex video purportedly in the digital
camera with another woman. The alleged video was saved and reproduced by the petitioner allegedly to be used as
evidence against Ilagan on several cases filed by her to wit a.) Violation of the Anti-Violence Against Woman and
their Children; and b.) and administrative case before the NAPOLCOM. However, respondent Ilagan prayed for the
issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data claiming that the his right to privacy, life, liberty and security is violated or has
been threatened with violation by the act of the petitioner of using the contents of the digital camera against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issuance of a writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD:

No. As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as "a remedy available to
any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The Court finds that
Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated
through the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. The petition for habeas
data must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other. The allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing
an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. Lee even made it clear in
her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as
evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan. Here, while Ilagan purports a privacy
interest in the suppression of his video, he failed to explain the connection between such interest and any violation of
his right to life, liberty or security that would warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas data.

 ART. 26, CIVIL CODE

 ART. 32, CIVIL CODE, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES

176) ABERCA VS. VER [160 SCRA 590 (1989)]

FACTS:

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs
by various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered
by General Fabian Ver «to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses
in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila,»

Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing
in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding
party confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper
warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers;
that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated
them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain incriminatory information or
confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted
and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass
and punish them, said plans being previously to and sanctioned by defendants.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging
among others that (1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise
of a damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the
courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their
official duties.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the respondents can be held liable for damages

2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in the constitution?

3. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal
searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution?

RULING:

1.Yes. The purpose of article 32 of the Civil Code is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. No man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity.

Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to
nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community.

The decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or
person ‘directly’ or “indirectly” responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it
is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person
indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from claiming damages for the
illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional rights by seeking judicial authority. What the writ
suspends is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It
cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of their rights.

3. NO. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of
action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights. The suspension
does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual
to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

 R.A. 8293 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE

 ART. 723, CIVIL