Constitutional Law 1

Problem-Based Bar Examination

Questions and Answers Classified
According to Module 1-3 Topics

Group 9 EH408
Atty. Edmar Lerios
 Table of Contents
Module 1 Topics
Nature of Constitution
(1) Parts
(2) Manner of Interpretation
(3) Process of Change

The Philippines as a State

(1) Elements
(2) Distinction Between Internal and
External Self-Determination

Fundamental Powers of the State

(1) Police Power
(2) Eminent Domain
(3) Taxation

Relevance of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies Dynamics

Among the Branches of the Government

(1) Separation of Powers

(2) System of Checks and Balances
(3) Delegation of Powers

State Immunity
(1) Basis
(2) Exceptions
The National Territory
(1) Scope
(2) Archipelagic Doctrine
 Table of Contents
Module 2 Topics
Legislative Department
(1) Congress
(2) Powers and Functions
(3) The Party-List System
(4) Appropriation

Case Questions

Module 3 Topics
Legislative Department
(1) Power of Impeachment
(2) Qualifications, Elections, and Terms of the President and Vice President
(3) Privileges, Inhibitions, Disqualifications
(4) Presidential Privilege
(5) Powers of the President
General Executive and Administrative Powers
(6) Power of Appointment
In General
Confirmation and By-passed Appointments

Midnight and Ad Interim, Appointments

(7) Power of Removal
(8) Power of Control and Supervision
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
(9) Executive Departments and Offices
(10) Local Government Units
(11) Emergency Powers
(12) Calling Out Powers
(13) Declaration of Martial Law, and Suspension of
the Priviege of Writ of Habeas Corpus; Extension
(14) Executive Clemency
(15) Forms and Limitations
(16) Diplomatic Power
(17) Powers Relative to Appropriation Measures
 MODULE 1

Preliminary
Concepts

The Nature of
the Consitution
Lambino v. COMELEC, GR 174153,
October 25, 2006
Question: The Yepes Group commenced gathering
signatures to amend the 1987 Constitution. Upon
gathering, voters were asked whether they agree to
change the Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. Upon expressing
their agreement, the voters were made to fix their
signatures on a signature sheet.
After six months, the Yepes Group was able to gather
6,300,000 signatures of registered voters, constituting
12% of the total registered voters, where each
legislative district is represented by at least 3% of its
voters. The Yepes Group, then, filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
proposed amendments.
Will the proposed amendments prosper?
Suggested Answer: The proposed amendments will
not prosper. Section 2, Article 17 of the Constitution
provides that amendments to the Constitution through
people’s initiative must be “directly proposed by the
people.” In Lambino v. COMELEC, the Court
discussed that this is only satisfied if the people sign
on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. However, in this case, the people were
only asked whether or not they agree to shift from a
Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system. Not having read the full text of
the proposed changes, the people were surely
unaware as to the nature and effect of these changes.
Thus, this renders the petition deceptive and
misleading.
Moreover, changing from a Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system no
longer constitutes an amendment but a revision. As
was discussed in Lambino v. COMELEC, if the
changes are so far-reaching that they alter the nature
of the basic governmental plan, then it is a revision. In
this case, the proposed change alters the structure of
the governmental system. Thus, such changes cannot
be proposed through people’s initiative, as Section 2,
Article 17 of the Constitution only allows for
amendments, not revisions, through people’s initiative.
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC
GR 127325 | March 19, 1997
Question: Hanabishi Saldivar, chairman of a political
group called ABC Movement, proposed to increase the
term limit of the president from 6 years to 12 years
through People’s Initiative. Upon filing the petition, the
COMELEC issued an order directing Saldivar to cause
the publication notice of hearing. Senator Buencamino
filed a special civil action for prohibition against
COMELEC and Saldivar’s petition on the grounds that
(a) the proposal to increase the term limit of the
president constitutes a revision which is beyond the
power of people’s initiative and (b) Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory, therefore,
amendments through people’s initiative can only be
implemented if there is a law passed by the Congress.
Should the Court grant the special civil action for
prohibition filed by Senator Buencamino? Explain.
Suggested Answer: The Court should grant the
special civil action for prohibition filed by Senator
Buencamino and order COMELEC to dismiss the
petition of Saldivar. In the case of Defensor-Santiago
v. COMELEC, the proposal to alter the term limit of the
officials of the state constitutes a revision of the
Constitution because it will also affect other provisions
such as the synchronization of elections and the State
policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service and prohibiting political dynasties. In
the case at bar, the proposed change to the
Constitution by Saldivar and his group is no longer a
mere amendment but a revision of the Constitution,
and revision is beyond the power of people’s initiative.
The Supreme Court also emphasized in the case of
Defensor-Santiago v. COMELEC that the system of
initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory and
Congress shall enact a law for the implementation of
the exercise of this right. Although RA 6735 provides
the three modes of initiative, this law also failed to
cover a system of initiative on amendment to the
Constitution. Therefore, since there is no law on
people’s initiative to amend the Constitution, the
petition of Saldivar will not prosper. The COMELEC
also cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations
on the implementation of the exercise of the right to
people’s initiative.
Gonzales v. COMELEC, GR L-28496, RELATED BAR QUESTIONS
November 9, 1967 2014 BAR Q & A
Question: With the passage of time, the members of
Question: In the Republic of Eldia, the Eldian
the House of Representatives increased with the
Parliament has recently passed the "Eldian
creation of new legislative districts and the
Constitution Amendment Act of 2099," which proposes
corresponding adjustments in the number of party list
significant changes to the Eldian Constitution,
representatives. At a time when the House
including alterations to the fundamental rights of Eldian
membership was already 290, a great number of the
citizens, the structure of the judiciary, and the mode of
members decided that it was time to propose
electing the President. The Eldian Parliament has
amendments to the Constitution. The Senators,
scheduled a general election to be held in six months,
however, were cool to the idea. But the members of
during which Eldian citizens will not only vote for their
the House insisted. They accordingly convened
representatives but also be asked to approve or reject
Congress into a constituent assembly in spite of the
these constitutional amendments. However, the Act
opposition of the majority of the members of the
provides limited information about the proposed
Senate. When the votes were counted, 275 members
changes, and there is no clear provision for the
of the House of Representatives approved the
publication of the amendments or their distribution at
proposed amendments. Only 10 Senators supported
polling places. Analyze the constitutional validity of the
such proposals. The proponents now claim that the
Eldian Constitution Amendment Act of 2099
proposals were validly made, since more than the
required three-fourths vote of Congress has been
Suggested Answer: The legal basis established in
obtained. The 14 Senators who voted against the
this analysis is in the case of Gonzalez v. Commission
proposals claim that the proposals needed not three-
on Elections, particularly on the Doctrine of Proper
fourths vote of the entire Congress but each house.
Submission. This doctrine emphasizes that
Since the required number of votes in the Senate was
constitutional amendments must be properly submitted
not obtained, then there could be no valid proposals,
to the electorate to ensure informed and meaningful
so argued the Senators. Were the proposals validly
participation in the amendment process.
adopted by Congress?
a.) Do you agree with Juan dela Cruz's defense, why
The Eldian Constitutional Amendment provides limited
and why not? Explain.
information about the proposed amendments, and
b.) In what way could Juan dela Cruz be prosecuted in
there are no clear provisions for their publication or
order not to damage foreign relations with Taiwan?
distribution at polling places.
Explain.
Considering that the Eldian Constitutional Amendment
Suggested Answer: The proposal was not validly
Act fails to meet the constitutional requirement for
adopted, because the ten (10) Senators who voted in
proper submission of constitutional amendments; the
favor of the proposed amendments constituted less
lack of transparency, accessibility, and adequate
than three-fourths of all the Members of the Senate.
information dissemination regarding proposed
Although Sec. 1, Art. XVII of the Constitution did not
amendments in Eldia, the amendment would be
expressly provide that the Senate and the House of
unconstitutional.
Representatives must vote separately, when the
Legislature consists of two (2) houses, the
determination of one house is to be submitted to the
separate determination of the other house. (Miller v.
Mardo, G.R. No. L-15138, 31 July 1961)

Question: The Municipality of Binangonan, Rizal, passed

a resolution authorizing the operation of an open garbage
dumpsite in a 9- hectare land in the Reyes Estate within
the Municipality's territorial limits. Some concerned
residents of Binangonan filed a complaint with the
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) to stop the
operation of the dumpsite due to its harmful effects on the
health of the residents.
The LLDA conducted an on-site investigation,
monitoring, testing and water sampling and found
that the dumpsite would contaminate Laguna de
Bay and the surrounding areas of the Municipality.
The LLDA also discovered that no environmental
clearance was secured by the Municipality from
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the LLDA as required by
law. The LLDA therefore issued to the
Binangonan municipal government a cease and
desist order to stop the operation of the dumpsite.
The Municipality of Binangonan filed a case to
annul the order issued by the LLDA. (1995 BAR)
Can the Municipality of Binangonan invoke police
power to prevent its residents and the LLDA from
interfering with the operation of the dumpsite by
the Municipality? Explain. Can the LLDA justify its
order by asserting that the health of the residents
will be adversely affected. Explain.
The Supreme Court cannot decide cases merely on the
basis of the letter of the Constitution. It has to interpret
the Constitution to give effect to the intent of its framers
and of the people adopting it. In Interpreting the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has to adopt it to the
ever-changing circumstances of society. When the
Supreme Court strikes down an act of the Legislative or
the Executive Department, it is merely discharging its
duty under the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority.
Alternative Answer: To a certain extent, the Supreme
Court is a continuing Constitutional Convention. When a
case is brought in court involving a constitutional issue. It
becomes necessary to interpret the Constitution, Since
the Supreme Court is supreme within its own sphere, its
interpretation of the Constitution will form part of the law
of the land.

Suggested Answer: 2011 BAR Q & A

No, the Municipality of Binangonan cannot invoke
its police power. According to Laguna Lake
Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231
SCRA 292, under Republic Act No, 4850, the
Laguna Lake Development Authority is mandated
to promote the development of the Laguna Lake
area, including the surrounding Province of Rizal,
with due regard to the prevention of pollution. The
Laguna Lake Development Authority is mandated
to pass upon and approve or disapprove all
projects proposed by local government offices
within the region. Yes, the Laguna Lake
Development Authority can justify its order. Since
it has been authorized by Executive Order No.
927 to make orders requiring the discontinuance
of pollution, its power to issue the order can be
inferred from this. Otherwise, it will be a toothless
agency. Moreover, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority is specifically authorized under its
Charter to issue cease and desist orders.
Question: Jose Cruz and 20 others filed a petition with
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite on their petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution shifting to a
unicameral parliamentary form of government. Assuming
that the petition has been signed by the required number
of registered voters, will it prosper?
Suggested Answer: No, this case will not prosper. In re,
Article XVII, Sec. 2 people’s initiative can only be applied
in an amendment, not a revision. In this case, the shift to
a unicameral parliamentary form of government calls for
a revision of the whole 1987 Constitution. Thus, people’s
initiative is not applicable.

2000 BAR Q & A

Question: One Senator remarked that the
Supreme Court is a continuing Constitutional
Convention. Do you agree? Explain.

Suggested Answer: I do not agree that the

Supreme Court is a continuing Constitutional
Convention. The criticism is based on the
assumption that in exercising its power of judicial
review the Supreme Court Is not merely
interpreting the Constitution but is trying to
remake the Government on the basis of the
personal predilections of the Members of the
Supreme Court, this is a power that properly
belongs to the people and their elected
representatives.
Philippines
as a State
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Campos
Rueda, 42 SCRA 23
Question: Juan dela Cruz is a Filipino programmer
residing in the Philippines. Due to the emergence of
internet technology, he was able to develop malware
that was able to infiltrate various systems in Southeast
Asia. The malware had caused severe damage in one
of the biggest microchip companies in Taiwan – the
Republic of China (RoC). Due to the severe damage,
the Taiwanese microchip company filed criminal and
civil cases against Juan dela Cruz breaching their law
on the Taiwanese Law of Cybercrime. The Taiwanese
government demanded that Juan dela Cruz be
prosecuted criminally. However, at that time, there was
no law yet in the Philippines punishing cybercrime.
Because of the lack of law to prosecute Juan dela
Cruz in the Philippines, the Taiwanese government
demanded the extradition of Juan dela Cruz for him to
be prosecuted in Taiwan. In the defense of Juan dela
Cruz about his extradition, he argues that the
Philippines does not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign
state but only maintains unofficial relations, thus
Taiwan could not demand the Philippines which is a
sovereign state his extradition by the principle of
adherence to international law.
a.) Do you agree with Juan dela Cruz's defense, why
and why not? Explain.
b.) In what way could Juan dela Cruz be prosecuted in
order not to damage foreign relations with Taiwan?
Explain.
Suggested Answer: Yes I agree with Juan dela Cruz
statement that Taiwan is not a recognized sovereign
state by the Philippines despite the good relationship
between the two nations. On the other hand, the
reason why Juan dela Cruz could not be extradited to
be prosecuted in Taiwan is not because of the non-
recognizance of Taiwan as a sovereign state by the
Philippines but by the absence of a reciprocal law of
Cybercrime in the Philippines. As per the doctrine of
reciprocity, extradition could only be granted if the
same offense is punishable or the same law is present
in the host country. However, Juan dela Cruz could be
arrested and prosecuted if he enters the territory of
Taiwan.
RELATED BAR QUESTIONS
2018 BAR Q & A
Question: Congress enacted a law to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to a full range of modern family
planning methods, including contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectibles, non- abortifacient
hormonal contraceptives, and family planning products
and supplies, but expressly prohibited abortion. To
ensure its objectives, the law made it mandatory for
health providers to provide information on the full
range of modern family planning methods, supplies
and services, for schools to provide reproductive
health education, for non-governmental medical
practitioners to render mandatory 48 hours pro bono
reproductive health services as a condition to
Philhealth accreditation, and for couples desiring to
marry to attend a family planning seminar prior to the
issuance of a marriage license. It also punishes certain
acts of refusals to carry out its mandates. The spouses
Aguiluz, both Roman Catholics, filed a petition to
declare the law as unconstitutional based on, among
others, the following grounds: (a) It violates the right to
life, since it practically sanctions abortion. Despite
express terms prohibiting abortion, petitioners claim
that the family planning products and supplies oppose
the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human
right, and the sanction of contraceptive use
contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity
of man. (b) It violates the constitutional prohibition
against involuntary servitude because it requires
medical practitioners to render 48 hours of pro bono
reproductive health services which may be against
their will. (c) It violates the Freedom of Religion, since
petitioners' religious beliefs prevent them from using
contraceptives, and that any State- sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, funded by taxes,
violates the guarantee of religious freedom. Rule on
each of the above objections.
Suggested Answer:
A. The law in question does not sanction abortion even
in practical terms. In the case of Imbong v. Ochoa (GR
No. 204819, April 8, 2014), the law on its face
expressly mentioned that abortion is not permissible,
and this was the determinative factor in making the
ruling. In the same case, the Court also found that the
RH law was replete with provisions that embody the
policy of protecting the unborn from the moment of
fertilization. In addition, the majority of the court
believes that the question of when life starts is a
scientific and medical issue; hence, the Court refused
to make a ruling on this issue.
B. Involuntary servitude denotes compulsion or
coercion to do something either through force, threats,
intimidation or other means. The accreditation with
PhilHealth, as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case
of Imbong v. Ochoa, should be viewed as an incentive
and not a punishment. These health service providers
also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide. Clearly, there is no
compulsion, force, or threat upon them to render the
pro bono services against their will.
C. What is prohibited in the Constitution is the
establishment of a state religion. While the
Establishment Clause in the Constitution restricts what
the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government.
They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrine as policy for everyone nor can they
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do
so would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus establish a state religion (Imbong v.
Ochoa, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014).
2017 BAR Q & A
Question: State A and State B, two sovereign states,
enter into a 10-year mutual defense treaty. After five
years, State A finds that the more progressive State B
did not go to the aid of State A when it was threatened
by its strong neighbor State C. State B reasoned that it
had to be prudent and deliberate in reacting to State C
because of their existing trade treaties. (a) May State
A now unilaterally withdraw from its mutual defense
treaty with State B? Explain your answer. (b) What is
the difference between the principles of pacta sunt
servanda and rebus sic stantibus in international law?
(c) Are the principles of pacta sunt servanda and rebus
sic stantibus relevant in the treaty relations between
State A and State B? What about in the treaty relations
between State B and State C? Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer:
State A may unilaterally withdraw from the mutual
defense treaty, State B committed a material breach of
the treaty by failing to come to the aid of State A (Art.
60-0) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;
Kolb, The Law of Treaties, p. 220; Aust, Modern Treaty
Lawand Practice, pp. 236-237). “Pacta sunt servanda
means that every treaty in force is binding upon the
States who are parties to it and States must perform
their obligation in good faith (Deutsche Bank AG
Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 188550, August 19, 2013, 704 SCRA 216).
Rebus sic stantibus means that a fundamental change
of circumstances, which occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty and
which was not foreseen by the parties may not be
invoked for withdrawing from a treaty unless their
existence constituted an essential
basis of the consent of the parties and their effect is
to radically transform the extent of the obligations still
to be performed (Article 62 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties).Yes. Pacta sunt servanda
was what bound State A and State B to comply with
their obligations under their mutual defense treaty,
despite the existing trade agreements between State
B and State C. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which enunciates the doctrine
of rebus sic stantibus, on the other hand, can be
invoked by State B as the reason why it did not
comply with its mutual defense treaty. Treaty is
concluded with the implied condition that it is
intended to be binding only as long as there is no
vital change in the circumstances. To State B,
compliance with the treaty would jeopardize its vital
trade development, Because of this unforeseen
change of circumstances combined with State B’s
non-compliance with its obligations under the treaty
in good faith, State A may now opt to unilaterally
withdraw from the treaty.
2000 BAR Q & A
Question: Declaring a rebellion, hostile groups have
opened and maintained armed conflicts on the
Islands of Sulu and Basilan. a) To quell this, can the
President place under martial law the islands of Sulu
and Basilan? Give your reasons. b) What are the
constitutional safeguards on the exercise of the
President's power to proclaim martial law?
Suggested Answer: a)If public safety requires it, the
President can place Sulu and Basilan under martial
law since there is an actual rebellion. Under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President can
place any part of the Philippines under martial law in
case of rebellion, when public safety requires it. b)
The following are the constitutional safeguards on the
exercise of the power of the President to proclaim
martial law: There must be actual invasion or
rebellion; The duration of the proclamation shall not
exceed sixty days: Within forty-eight hours, the
President shall report his action to Congress. If
Congress is not in session, it must convene within
twenty-four hours; Congress may by majority vote of
all its members voting Jointly revoke the
proclamation, and the President cannot set aside the
revocation; By the same vote and in the same
manner, upon Initiative of the President, Congress
may extend the proclamation If the invasion or
rebellion continues and public safety requires the
extension; The Supreme Court may review the
factual sufficiency of the proclamation, and the
Supreme Court must decide the case within thirty
days from the time it was filed;
Martial law does not automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the operation
of the Constitution. It does not supplant the functioning
of the civil courts and of Congress. Military courts have
no Jurisdiction over civilians where civil courts are able
to function. (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed.,
pp. 213214.)
Fundamental
Powers of
the State
Carlos Superdrug Corporation vs. DSWD,
et al., GR No. 166494, June 29, 2007
Question: President Juan signed a law providing a
20% discount for all services including, but not limited
to the availment of medicines, foods, and recreational
facilities and establishments for the senior citizens.
Maria, an 89-year old citizen, bought her maintenance
medicine in Pharma Z and asked for the entitlement of
20% discount, but Pharma Z denied the request. In
turn, Magda, the owner of Pharma Z filed a petition in
her assertion that the law is unconstitutional as the
granting of the said discount will result in a loss of
profit and capital, supplying her argument that their
pharmacy only imposes a 10% markup on branded
medicine. Is the law proclaimed by President Juan
unconstitutional as alleged by Magda?
Suggested Answer: NO. In the case of Carlos
Superdrug v. DSWD, et al. ruled that RA No. 9257
declared by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is
constitutional, asserting that the granting of the 20%
discount to senior citizens constitutes the provision of
the general welfare of this certain group of people.
Applying the same principle to the case of Magda as to
her question of the constitutionality of the law signed
by President Juan, the case is a perfect example of the
State’s demonstration of its police power, wherein, the
state, in promoting the welfare of a group of people
can impose the burden to private entities in subsidizing
the said discount.
In conclusion, the petition of Magda claiming that the
law is unconstitutional will not prosper as when the
conditions so demanded as determined by the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of
police power because property rights, though sheltered
by due process, must yield to the general welfare.
City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G.R. No.
118127, April 12, 2005
Question: City of Cebu passed an ordinance
prohibiting the establishment or operation of business
providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment
services and facilities where women are used as tools
in
entertainment for the social and moral welfare of the
community. Is the city ordinance valid?
Suggested Answer: No. The city ordinance is not
valid.
According to the ruling in City of Manila v. Judge
Laguio, a valid ordinance shall only be valid when they
are not contrary to the constitution and to the laws. It
must pass under two requirements: The test of
constitutionality and the test of consistency with the
prevailing laws. In the case at bar, the ordinance
mandates closure of legitimate business which violates
the constitutional right of due process. It also is not
consistent with prevailing laws because the local
government code of the Philippines merely gives the
right to regulate establishments to promote general
welfare, not to suppress and prohibit them altogether.
Thus, the city ordinance should be declared null and
void as it is unconstitutional and is ultra vires.
Pasong Bayabas Farmers Ass. Vs Ca, GR
Nos. 142359 and 142980, May 25, 2004
Question: In 1964, Lakeview Development
Corporation (LDC) acquired a parcel of land, which
was later transferred to Credito Asiatic Incorporated
(CAI). CAI planned to develop the property for
residential and industrial use and obtained various
approvals for this purpose. The aforesaid property was
converted from agricultural to residential granted by
the Ministry of Agrarian Reform from the July 3, 1979
Order of Agrarian Reform Minister Estrella.
Over the years, conflicts arose with the 37 members
as petitioners who are farmer-tenants who claimed
rights to the land. They filed a complaint for damages
and sought an injunction against CAI's development
activities. The case went through various legal
proceedings, including decisions from the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(PARAD).
The dispute centered on whether the land was subject
to agrarian reform laws, with the farmers arguing that it
should be distributed to them as agricultural land. The
PARAD initially ruled in favor of CAI, citing waivers and
quitclaims from the farmers and exemptions under
certain laws.
Is the property in question included under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, also known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)?
Suggested Answer: No. Before the enactment of
Republic Act No. 6657, which is the Agrarian Reform
Law, agricultural lands were defined as those used for
farming and not classified as industrial. These lands
did not include commercial, industrial, or residential
properties. However, this law, which became effective
on June 15, 1988, applied to all private lands suitable
for agriculture, regardless of the crops grown on them.
In this specific case, the property in question had
already been reclassified and converted from
agricultural to non-agricultural or residential land by
various administrative agencies before the enactment
of Republic Act. 6657. They granted approvals,
permits, and licenses for the development and sale of
the property for residential purposes. Hence, the land
in question is not included in the provisions of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) (Pasong
Bayabas Farmers Ass. Vs Ca, GR Nos. 142359 and
142980, May 25, 2004)
Mirasol v. DPWH, G.R. No. 158793,
June 8, 2006
Question: On July 6 2006, DPWH decided to pass
Administrative Order 6 that would limit the allowed
vehicles such as motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles,
pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles that could
use certain highways that are considered as “limited
access facilities” in Manila. Juan and Jose, avid
motorcyclists, filed a petition to the trial court of
declaratory judgment with application for TRO and
injunction to nullify the AO that DPWH has passed,
because according to them, their rights to travel are
being violated by said unconstitutional ordinance and
that there is not “scientific” basis for barring
motorcycles and the aforementioned vehicles from
accessing the limited access facilities.
Will the petition filed by Juan and Jose bring merit?
Suggested Answer: No, the petition will not be
merituos because Juan and Jose are not being
deprived of their right to use the limited access facility.
They are merely being required, just like the rest of the
public, to adhere to the rules on how to use the facility.
The SC stated in the case of Mirasol v. DPWH, that an
ordinance that a classification based on practical
convenience and common knowledge is not
unconstitutional simply because it may lack purely
theoretical or scientific uniformity. Hence, AO 6 does
not infringe upon petitioners’ right to travel and is not
unconstitutional.
PPA v. Cipres Stevedoring, G.R. No.
145742, July 14, 2005
Question: Cargo handling operations in Cebu City
were granted to respondent XYZ since 1979. In 1990,
petitioner Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) issued
Administrative Order 03-90, which outlined the
guidelines and procedures for the selection and award
of cargo
handling contracts in all government ports, including
cargo handling services. Respondent XYZ was able to
continue its business through hold-over permits
granted by the PPA. While the second hold-over
permit was in effect, the PPA issued AO 03-2000,
which stated that all contracts for cargo handling
services lasting more than three years should be
awarded through public bidding. XYZ filed for a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and argued that a
substantial number of workers in the port of Cebu City
faced the risk of displacement. Moreover, there was a
possibility that the contract for cargo handling in Cebu
City would be awarded to an incompetent and
inexperienced participant in the bidding process, unlike
XYZ, which had already invested a significant amount
of capital in its operations in the said port. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of XYZ. Is AO
03-2000 constitutional?
Suggested Answer: Yes. AO 03-2000 is
constitutional
Article XII, Section 6 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which provides for the exercise of the
state's police power to promote public interest and
general welfare.
The court held that the issuance of AO 03-2000, which
outlined guidelines and procedures for the selection
and award of cargo handling contracts, was justified
under the state's police power doctrine. The measure
aimed to promote fair competition, efficiency, and
transparency in the provision of cargo handling
services in government ports. While it affected the
stevedoring business, it was viewed as a reasonable
regulation that served the public interest and general
welfare.
The court, applying the police power doctrine as
provided by Article XII, Section 6 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, found that the issuance of AO 03-2000
was justified. Despite its impact on the stevedoring
business, the regulation was deemed necessary to
promote public interest and general welfare in the
provision of cargo handling services.
Chavez vs. Ramulo, G.R. No. 157036
Question: The PNP Chief, Pretty Elaine, granted by
the President an authority to issue guidelines to
suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms
Outside of Residence (PTCFOR) stressing the need
for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert
the rising crime incidents. The President directed the
PNP Chief to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry
Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR).
France, a licensed gun owner and holder of PTCFOR,
requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation
of the assailed Guidelines. However, his request was
denied. Thus, he filed a petition on the ground that the
PNP Chief has no power or authority to issue
guidelines.
Is France correct in his contention?
Suggested Answer: No, France is not correct in his
contention. As stated in Chavez vs. Ramulo, all
property in the state is held subject to its general
regulations, necessary to the common good and
general welfare.The test merely reiterates the essence
of the constitutional guarantees of substantive due
process, equal protection, and non-impairment of
property rights. In addition, the assailed Guidelines is a
valid exercise of police power for it has both the lawful
subject means, which are the requisites for the
exercise of police power to become valid.
Lawful subject means that the activity or property
sought to be regulated affects the public welfare. In the
instant case, the motivating factor of the PNP chief’s
directive on imposing a nationwide gun ban and the
further issuance of the assailed Guidelines is the
interest of the public's peace and safety in general.
Masikip vs. City of Pasig, GR No. 136349,
January 23, 2006
Question: Pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, S.1993
enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig, the
City of Pasig notified Jennie, the landowner, of their
intention to expropriate her land to provide sports and
recreational facilities to its poor residents. The
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit
organization. Moreover, there exists a Rainforest Park,
a community recreational area available to the
residents of Pasig. Jennie opposed the expropriation
on the grounds that there is no genuine necessity for
the taking of the property. Is the contention of Jennie
meritorious? Why?
Suggested Answer: The contention that there is no
genuine necessity is meritorious. In City of Manila v.
Chinese Community of Manila, the court held that the
very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain
is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character. Applying the same standard, City of
Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine
necessity to expropriate petitioner's property since the
intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit
organization, not the residents of Caniogan. The
necessity has not been shown, especially considering
that there exists an alternative facility for sports
development and community recreation in the area,
which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents
of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
Jesus is Lord Christian Foundation vs.
Mun. of Pasig, GR No. 155230, August 9,
2005
Question: The Municipality of Pasig needed an
access road from E.R. Santos Street to Brgy. Sto.
Tomas Bukid, Pasig. The municipality decided to take
51 square meters of the property of Jesus is Lord
Christian School Foundation, Inc. A letter was sent to
the owner expressing the Municipality’s intent to
acquire the property, but the owners rejected the offer.
The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an
ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings to acquire the property. One
of the whereas clauses of the ordinance, declared that
"the property owners were already notified by the
municipality of the intent to purchase the same for
public use as a municipal road."
May the Municipality of Pasig exercise its power of
eminent domain over the property?
Suggested Answer: The Municipality of Pasig may
not exercise its power of eminent domain over the
property. Under Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, wherein
the grant of the power of eminent domain to local
government units is grounded on, a valid and definite
offer must be made to the owner in order to exercise
the power of eminent domain. In this case, however,
the Municipality, through the letter sent to the owner,
and evident in the declaration of the whereas clause,
only proved its desire or intent to acquire the property
but not a definite and valid offer to acquire the
property. Thus, absent the definite offer required to
exercise its eminent domain, the Municipality of Pasig
cannot proceed with its expropriation of the property.
San Roque vs Republic, GR No. 163130,
Sept. 7, 2007
Question: Subject parcels of land together with
seventeen (17) others were subjected to expropriation
proceedings, and condemned in 1938, but the title was
not transferred to the government. It was later
subdivided and two (2) parcels of which were acquired
by YoursTruly Realty and Development Corporation in
1995. The government now claims that it is the owner
of the subject land by virtue of the 1938 expropriation
case decision. Yours Truly Realty and Development
Corporation on the other hand opposes that it is a
buyer in good faith and claims that there was no valid
expropriation proceeding because it was initiated by
the Executive Branch without approval from Congress
and that there was no payment of any compensation. If
you were the judge, how would you rule on the case?
Explain.
Suggested Answer: I would rule in favor of
YoursTruly Realty and Development Corporation.
According to jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
declared that Eminent Domain cases are to be strictly
construed against the government. The payment of
just compensation for the taking of private property for
public purpose is a requisite that is indispensable for
the valid exercise of the State's sovereign power of
eminent domain. The failure to observe this
requirement is fatal to the effectiveness of the taking
despite the claim of public purpose.
In this case, it is clear that the government failed to
give full payment of just compensation and receipt
thereof by the property owners. Therefore, I would rule
in favor of YoursTruly Realty and Development
Corporation. (San Roque Realty and Development
Corporation, v. Republic of the Philippines (through the
Armed Forces of the Philippines) G.R. No. 163130,
September 7, 2007; Power of Eminent Domain)
Secretary of DPWH vs. Heracleo, GR
179334 Apr 21, 2015
Question: In 1940, the DPWH took Heracleo and
Ramona Tecson’s property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings for the construction of the
MacArthur Highway. In 1994, the Tecsons demanded
the payment of the fair market value of the subject
property. The Secretary of DPWH offered to pay for
the property at a rate based on the time it was taken.
However, the Tecsons demanded the return of their
property or the payment of compensation at the
current fair market value.
1. Does the non-filing of the case for expropriation
will necessarily lead to the return of the property to
the landowner? Explain.
2. Is it correct for the landowner to demand payment
of compensation at the current fair market value?
Explain.
Suggested Answer:
1. No, the non-filing of the case for expropriation or
the lack of due process prior to the government’s
acquisition of private property and conversion to
public use will not lead to the return of the property
to the landowner. The primary objective of the
state’s power of eminent domain is to serve the
greater good. The nullification of the expropriation
because of the failure of the DPWH to initiate
expropriation proceedings before the taking of the
subject property will invalidate and weaken the power
of eminent domain. Therefore, subject property will not
be returned to the Tecsons.
2. No, just compensation should be fixed as of the time
of taking and not at the time of payment. In the case of
Forfom Development Corporation v. Philippine
National Railways, the Supreme Court held that just
compensation must be reckoned from the time of
taking. Although there is a significant disproportion
between the rate fixed as of the time of taking and the
current fair market value, the Court emphasized that
the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the
owner for the property taken but to compensate them
for the loss thereof. This was also reiterated in the
case of Evergreen v. Republic-DPWH, highlighting that
the word 'just' is used to modify the meaning of the
word 'compensation' to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall
be real, substantial, full and ample. Therefore, it is not
correct for the Tecsons to demand payment of
compensation at the current fair market value and
should only be compensated based on the actual
value of the subject property at the time it was taken.
City of Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R.
No. 137152, January 29, 2001
Question: On August 4, 1997, the City of
Mandaluyong filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig
City a complaint against respondents, Aguilars, for
expropriation of two (2) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of 1,636 square meters. In accordance
with Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996, the Mayor of
the City of Mandaluyong was given the authority to
initiate action for the expropriation of the subject lots
and construction of a medium-rise condominium for
qualified occupants of the land. Respondents contend
that the expropriation of their land is arbitrary and
capricious, and is not for a public purpose invoking that
the subject lots are their only real property and are too
small for expropriation.
Upon partition, four (4) co-owners, namely, Francisco,
Thelma, Rodolfo, and Antonio Aguilar each had a
share of 300 square meters while Eusebio, who died,
had five heirs who became co-owners of his 347
square-meter portion, each entitled with 69.4 square
meters of the land subject of litigation. Further,
respondents claim that the subject lots are their only
real property and that they, particularly two of the five
heirs of Eusebio Aguilar, are merely renting their
houses and therefore do not own any other real
property in Metro Manila. Petitioner argues that the
exercise of the power of eminent domain is not
anymore conditioned on the size of the land sought to
be expropriated, and the fact that only a few could
actually benefit from the expropriation of the property
does not diminish its public use character. Will the
petitioner’s complaint prosper?
Suggested Answer: No, the complaint will not
prosper. While we adhere to the expanded notion of
public use, the passage of R.A. No. 7279, the "Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992" introduced a
limitation on the size of the land sought to be
expropriated for socialized housing. The law expressly
exempted "small property owners" from expropriation
of their land for urban land reform. Further, Section 3
of R.A. 7279 defined that “Small-property owners” are
defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real
property whose property consists of residential lands
with an area of not more than 300 square meters in
highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other
urban areas; and (2) that they do not own real property
other than the same. As stated, the share of each co-
owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in
R.A. 7279 and the said subject lots are their only real
property, which qualifies respondents as "small
property owners" and are exempt from expropriation.
Therefore, the petitioner’s complaint for the
expropriation of two (2) parcels of land in Mandaluyong
City must be dismissed.
Question: Mr. Boy Laki Owns a parcel of land located
in a remote area within the City. Later on he found out
that the location was inhabited by informal settlers. In
his wish to occupy the land, ejection proceedings were
pursued and granted by the MTC. the location of the
land mr. Boy Laki owned was enlisted as one of the
proposed locations for relocation for homeless people
to occupy. For some reason the local government has
caused delays for the actions. And during the duration
of the ejectment proceedings a local resolution was
passed in the city granting the local government to
expropriate the land enlisted. In this case, are the local
government’s actions constitutional? Discuss your
answer.
Suggested Answer: The actions taken by the local
government are unconstitutional. According to section I
article III of the 1987 constitution “ no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws” The due process clause cannot
be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders the
expropriation of a private individual’s property. The
courts cannot even adopt a hands-off policy simply
because public use or public purpose. Section 9 article
III “Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation” in this case there were no
attempts of compensating the land owner. In the case
of Lagcao V. Judge Labra. The court ruled to nullify the
local ordinance expropriating the land of the
petitioners, due to ordinance is repugnant to the
pertinent provisions of the Constitution, RA 7279 and
RA 7160. Therefore the ordinance should not be valid
due to its unconstitutionality.
Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770,
February 9, 2011
Question: In 2010, the government of Pacifica
enacted a grand plan to build a state-of-the-art
underwater research facility off the coast of its capital
city, Marinetown. To make way for this ambitious
project, the government initiated the expropriation of
several coastal properties owned by local residents.
During the expropriation proceedings, government
officials assured the landowners that if, for any reason,
the underwater research facility project was
abandoned or significantly altered, the landowners
would have the option to repurchase their properties at
their original prices. The expropriation proceeded, but
after a series of budget cuts and changing priorities,
the government eventually abandoned the underwater
research facility project. Instead, the land was sold to a
multinational corporation for a luxury resort
development. Discuss and cite relevant jurisprudence
WON affected landowner have a legal basis to
demand the reconveyance of their properties from the
government of Pacifica.
Suggested Answer: The affected landowners in this
scenario do indeed have a legal basis to demand the
reconveyance of their properties from the government
of Pacifica.
In the case of Vda de Ouano vs Republic, the
Philippine Supreme Court established that when the
government initiates an expropriation of private
properties for a specific public purpose and assures
the landowners of constructive trust obligates the
government to reconvey the properties to the
landowners if the original public purpose of the
expropriation is not fulfilled.
By abandoning the project and selling the land to a
multinational corporation for a luxury resort
development, the government did not fulfill the original
public purpose for which the properties were
expropriated. Therefore, based on the precedent case,
the affected landowners in Pacifica have a valid legal
basis to demand the reconveyance of their properties
from the government.
Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA, G.R. No.
137285, January 16, 2001
Question: Dr. Simbako owns a portion of land which
he has established his clinic for the residents of Lapu-
Lapu City. the City Mayor, Junard Chan, wanted to
expand the roads aligned with his “17 Road
Development Projects” in his public goal of addressing
traffic congestion, promote economic growth, and
transforming Lapu-Lapu City into a ‘world-class city’.
The Mayor wanted to take ownership of the portion of
land the of clinic of Dr. Simbako offering Dr. Simbako a
Land Swap or Property Exchange. Dr. Simbako
agrees. Is this just compensation for eminent domain?
Suggested Answer: Yes. A Land Swap or Property
Exchange is a just form of compensation. In the case
of Estate of Jimenez v. PEZA, PEZA, in their authority
of eminent domain, entered into an agreement with
EOJ to transfer the former’s title of land 434 in
exchange for the latter’s lot 1406-B.
Just compensation is not strictly in the form of
monetary compensation. Just compensation in
eminent domain ensure that property owners are fairly
compensated for the loss of their property. So, a Land
swap is a just form of compensation of eminent
domain
Reyes vs. NHA, GR No. 147511,
January 20, 2003
Question: Company A’s lots were ordered
expropriated in favor of the NHA for the public purpose
of expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project
to accommodate the squatters relocated from the
Metropolitan Manila area. The NHA, however, had
failed to relocate the squatters. The expropriated lands
instead became a site for a low-cost housing project of
the NHA in which the lots will be sold to qualified low-
income beneficiaries. The NHA had not fully paid
Company A the just compensation fixed by the court
due to the alleged failure of petitioners to pay capital
gains tax and surrender the owners' duplicate
certificates of title. Can Company A oppose the
expropriation on the grounds that a low-cost housing
project deviates from “public use”?
Suggested Answer: No. Company A cannot oppose
the expropriation on the grounds that a low-cost
housing project deviates from “public use”. In the case
of Heirs of Juancho Ardona, et al. vs. Reyes, et al., the
idea that "public use" means exclusively use by the
public has been discarded. The expropriation of private
property for the purpose of low-cost housing for the
marginalized sector is further justified by the provision
under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution. It
follows that the low-cost housing project of respondent
NHA on the expropriated lots is compliant with the
"public use" requirement.
MCWD v. J. King and Sons Co., Inc.
175983, April 16, 2009
Question: Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD),
for its production well, wants to acquire a parcel of land
which is part of Pedro’s property. Despite negotiations
Pedro did not agree to a voluntary sale. This prompted
MCWD pursuant its charter to initiate expropriation
proceedings thru Board Resolution No. 001-234 and
approved by the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA). Pedro was granted a temporary restraining
order (TRO) by the Court of Appeals and restricted
MCWD of access. Is the CA correct?
Suggested Answer: No, the CA is incorrect in issuing
a TRO. MCWD is one of the numerous government
offices so empowered.
Under its charter, P.D. No. 198, as amended, MCWD
is granted the power of eminent domain. As a general
rule, the power to expropriate belongs to the
legislature. However, it may delegate the exercise of
the power to government agencies, public officials and
quasi-public entities. In the case at bar, MCWD is
delegated by the Congress, exercising its power of
eminent domain. (Metropolitan Cebu Water District
(MCWD), vs. J. King and Sons Company, Inc., G.R
No. 175983, April 16, 2009)
In the case at bar, MCWD is delegated by the
Congress, exercising its power of eminent domain. In
this case, MCWD was authorized thru Board
Resolution No. 001-234 and there was approval from
the LWUA. Therefore, the CA is incorrect. MCWD is
one of the numerous government offices so
empowered.
NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, G.R.
No. 154411. June 19, 2003
Question: PAGIBIG sent a demand letter to Helena
Agcaoilli stating that there are still unpaid debts
amounting to PHP 100,000.00 on her Home
Development Mutual Fund Loan as an OFW. Upon
summarizing the garnishments, it has been confirmed
that her total unpaid debt was PHP 110,000.00 and
should pay her debts before the end of the month.
Pursuant to the demand letter, Mrs. Agcaoilli filed with
the RTC a motion for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution and filed a
motion for payment of interest because of the
unsystematic payments of the PHP 110,000.00
causing delay. Can the funds and personal properties
of PAGIBIG be garnished?
Suggested Answer: Yes. The universal rule that
when the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant’s action “only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution” and
that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment
is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State
cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the
diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law. However, if
the funds belong to a public corporation or a
government-owned or controlled corporation which is
clothed with a personality of its own, separate and
distinct from that of the government, then its funds are
not exempt from garnishment. This is so because
when the government enters into commercial
business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to
be treated like any other corporation. Having a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the government,
the funds of such government-owned and controlled
corporations and non-corporate agency, although
considered public in character, are not exempt from
garnishment. Hence, it is clear that the funds of
PAGIBIG are not exempted from garnishment or
execution.
NPC v. CA & Pobre, G.R. No. 106804.
August 12, 2004
Question: Mr. Caldino owns a large parcel of land that
he planned to convert into a residential area; however,
the city government wants to take a portion of the
property to construct a road that would connect their
city to another neighboring city. The city government
filed an expropriation case in order to be able to start
construction on the site. The expropriation case was
approved and Mr. Caldino was compensated for the
portion of his property that will be converted into a
public road. During the construction of the road, the
workers dump the waste from the construction outside
of the limits of the agreed upon area of the
expropriation, so much so, that it changes the whole
topography of the whole property. Mr. Caldino raises
this complaint and is ignored by the city government
doing the construction. So, he files a case and
demands compensation for the damages of the
property.
Is Mr. Caldino within his right to demand for just
compensation for the damages on his property?
Suggested Answer: Yes, Mr. Caldino is within his
right to demand just compensation for the damages on
his entire property even when he was already initially
compensated. Although the city government followed
due process during the expropriation of Mr. Caldino’s
property (Article 3, Section 9), the construction of the
road also destroyed the rest of Mr. Caldino’s property,
making it inhabitable or unusable for Mr. Caldino. In
United States v. Causby, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that when private property is rendered
uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise
eminent domain, the taking is deemed complete. Such
taking is thus compensable (NPC vs. CA & Pobre).
Therefore, Mr. Caldino is entitled to further
compensation due to the further destruction of the rest
of his property.
De la Paz Masikip v. Judge Legaspi, G.R.
No. 136349, January 23, 2006
Question: Respondent city of Pasig passed an
ordinance proclaiming the expropriation of a partition
of property owned by Lourdes Masikip, The City’s
proposal intends to operate the parcel of land as it be
used for the “sports development and recreational
activities” of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. The
city of Pasig filed with the trial court a complaint for
expropriation and prayed that the trial court, after due
notice and hearing, issue an order for the
condemnation of the property. Masikip filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint. The trial court dismissed the
motion on the ground that there is a genuine necessity
to expropriate the property.Petitioner filed with the
Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari who
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was also denied. As
counsel for Masikip, what are the constitutional
objections to the validity of the ordinance?
Suggested Answer: As counsel for Masikip, I will
argue that the City of Pasig failed to establish the
genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property.
The court held that “the very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and
that necessity must be of a public character” The
purpose is, therefore, not clearly and not clearly and
categorically
public. The necessity has not been shown, especially
considering that there exists an alternative facility for
sports development and community recreation in the
area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all
residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
Thus, the complaint for expropriation filed before the
trial court by respondent City of Pasig must be
dismissed.
LBP v. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No.
169903, February 29, 2012
Question: Honey Bunch Sugar Plum Farms
Corporation, a registered owner of two parcels of
agricultural lands with an aggregate area of 500
hectares, agreed to voluntarily surrender the two
parcels of land to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) to be covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL).
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency
tasked to determine land valuation and compensation
of land acquired pursuant to the CARL, valued the
properties in the amount of P2,000,000.00. Honey
Bunch Sugar Plum Farms Corporation rejected such
valuation for being too low and filed a case against the
Secretary of DAR and the LBP praying for just
compensation in the amount of P12,000,000.00 with
damages and attorneys fee. Will the case prosper?
Suggested Answer: No, the case will not prosper.
Eminent domain is the inherent power of the
government to acquire private property for public use
with payment of just compensation. The
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law provides that it
is the Land Bank of the Philippines that would
determine just compensation.
In the case given, the determination by LBP of the just
compensation must be upheld as they are using the
mandatory formula for determining just compensation
as provided for by law. Hence, the case will not
prosper.
Sps. Lee vs. LBP, GR No. 170422,
March 7, 2008
Question: Petitioners SPS. Edmond Lee and Helen
Huang owned a 3.195 property covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (R.A. No.
6657). After rejecting the original offer of P315,307.87
compensation by the Department of Agrarian Reform,
they filed a petition to determine the just compensation
before the RTR of Balanga City, Bataan. The trial
court, acting as the Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
ruled in favor of petitioners and pegged the value of
the property at P250.00 per square meter based only
on the same exhibits, transcript of oral testimonies,
and the land valuation of an appraisal company
presented in a prior just compensation case involving a
parcel of land adjacent to the property subject.
Later on, it was found that the appraisal report relied
merely on the alleged selling price of the adjoining
lands in fixing the just compensation, and not on
CARP valuation. Was the SAC’s reliance on the
valuation made by the appraisal company misplaced?
Suggested Answer: Yes. As provided in Section 17 of
RA No. 6657 it enumerates the factors to be
considered in just compensation, as translated into a
basic formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 5,
series of 1998 (AO No. 5) provides that in determining
just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land,
the current value of like properties, its nature, actual
use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, tax
declarations, and the assessment made by the
government assessors shall be considered.
Applying the same context as provided by a competent
statute, although the SAC may, as a matter of
convenience and expediency, take judicial notice of a
decision or facts involved in another case tried by the
same court if the parties introduce the same in
evidence, the report must still be in accord with the
factors enumerated in RA No. 6657 and formula in AO
No. 5, therefore it is misplaced since the valuation was
not arrived at using the factors required by the law.
NAPOCOR v. Tiangco, G.R. No. 170846,
February 6, 2007
Question: Sometime around 1988, the NTC, a
government-owned corporation created for the
establishment of information and communication
sought to expropriate a land owned by a private
respondent named “Juan Gonzales”. The NTC
requires 14,857 square meters of the respondent’s
property for the establishment of a new cell tower
project that would cut through the respondent’s land
with fruit-bearing trees. The NTC tried to negotiate with
the respondent, but it was unsuccessful, so the NTC
filed a complaint for expropriation. In the trial court’s
decision, it granted the NTC a condemnation order
granting to take possession of the area sought to be
expropriated and valued the property at Php 4.25 per
square meter and issued an order to pay and deposit
with the provincial treasurer an amount of Php 63, 142.
Having complied with all the requisites, the NTC
started to expropriate the land, but the private
respondent disagreed with the valuation and filed a
motion for reconsideration with the document “Bureau
of Internal Revenue Circular Appraisal” which states
hat the cost of land in the area during 1985 is valued
Php 23 per square meter, in 1986 is Php 37 per
square meter and in 1987 was Php 44 per square
meter.
A. In this case, did the expropriator properly and validly
exercise the power of eminent domain?
B. And can we consider the payment rendered as
“just” compensation?
Suggested Answers:
A. Yes, the expropriation was properly exercised since
all the requirements have been accomplished.
As it was defined in the case of DPWH v. Gamir-
Consuelo Diaz heirs association INC. “Expropriation is
an involuntary sale where the landowner is practically
an unwilling seller. Provided all the requisites for its
exercise is present, a private individual cannot resist
the state’s exercise of its inherent power of eminent
domain”.
In this case, since the expropriator tried to negotiate
and follow the correct procedures for the expropriation
of the land; and provided that the owners of the land
were paid with just compensation. Then, it is a valid
practice and consistent with the due process clause,
and are not deprived of their property rights.
Therefore, the NTC exercises the power of eminent
domain validly and properly, thus further commencing
with the expropriation of the land.
B. No, since the value rendered by the court is unjust
and unsubstantial considering the area value of the
land.
In the case of NPC v. Court of Appeals, et al, it was
stated that “The court has equated just compensation
with the value of the property as of the time of filing of
the complaint consistent with the above provision of
rules. So too, where the institution of the action
precedes entry into the property, the just
compensation is to be ascertained as of the time.”
So, with that in mind, the valuation of the property was
substantially low and unjust; since the document
provided shows that what the court rendered as “just
compensation” does not conform to the value of the
property at the present time. The document only
proves and shows the disparity of how the court erred
on its valuation and this clearly violates the equal
protection of the laws clause in the constitution.
Therefore, the payment rendered must be declared
unjust and the just payment must be appropriate or
somehow close to the value of the property at the
present time.
City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, G.R. No.
142971, May 07, 2002
Question: Mr. and Mrs. Ramos own parcels of land in
a particular area in Cebu City, which the local
government unit found as most suitable for the
construction of an access/relief road in the area. The
LGU then filed a complaint for eminent domain around
July of 2005, and their writ of possession was granted
approximately two years after the complaint was
made. Upon agreement between the two parties which
they submitted to the trial court, just compensation was
determined by the court based on the time the property
was taken in 2007. The City of Cebu again filed a
complaint, arguing that compensation should be based
on the prevailing market price of the property at the
beginning of the expropriation proceedings. Will the
complaint prosper? Explain briefly.
Suggested Answer: NO, the complaint will not
prosper and should be dismissed. Eminent domain is a
fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is the Government’s right to appropriate,
in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. However, the
Government must pay the owner thereof just
compensation as consideration therefor.
In Section 19 of RA No. 7160, there is an express
provision that just compensation shall be determined
as of the time of actual taking. While Section 4, Rule
67 of the Rules of Court provides that just
compensation shall be determined at the time of the
filing of the complaint for expropriation, such law
cannot prevail over RA No. 7160, which is a
substantive law. (City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo,
G.R. No. 142971, 07 May 2002).
Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No.
146733, January 13, 2004
Question: Feliciano is the registered owner of a
94.1690 hectare unirrigated and untenanted rice land
which he voluntarily offered to sell to the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million. A notice of
intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property
for P1,342,667.466 was sent to Feliciano. The amount
offered was later raised to P2,594,045.39 and, upon
review, was modified to P2,280,159.82. Feliciano
rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to endorse the
case to the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing
the just compensation in a summary administrative
proceeding. Did the RTC arrive at a just compensation
supported by evidence?
Suggested Answer: No, the trial court should have
allowed the parties to present evidence thereon
instead of practically assuming a valuation without
basis. While market value may be one of the bases of
determining just compensation, the same cannot be
arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to
be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of
the property e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current
value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as
well as the tax declarations thereon. Since these
factors were not considered, a remand of the case for
determination of just compensation is necessary.
(Wycoco v. Judge Caspillo, G.R. No. 146733, January
13, 2004)
City of Manila v. Oscar Serrano, G.R. No.
142304, June 20, 2001
Question: The City of Cebu passed an ordinance
proclaiming the expropriation of a ten (10) hectare
property of ABC company, which is already a
developed commercial center in order to finance a
housing project for city employees in the vacant
portion of the said property. The ordinance fixed the
price of the land and the value of the improvements to
be paid to ABC Company on the basis of the prevailing
land value and cost of construction. (1) As a counsel
for ABC company, give two constitutional objections to
the validity of the ordinance.
Suggested Answer: As a counsel for ABC Company,
I will argue that the taking of the property is not for
PUBLIC USE and that the ordinance cannot fix the
compensation to be paid to ABC Company because
this is a judicial question that is for the courts to
decide. The law is clear in providing in article 3,
section 1 of the constitution, that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Furthermore, section 19 of the 1991 local Government
Code states that a local government unit may, through
its chief executive and acting pursuant to and
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for
public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just
compensation, pursuant to the provisions. The amount
to be paid shall be determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value at the time of the taking
of the property. That being so, these are the two
constitutional violations the said ordinance commits.
Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429,
December 19, 2005
Question: The Government, through expropriation
filed a petition to be entitled to a writ of possession
contending that a mere deposit of the assessed value
of
the property with an authorized government depository
is enough for the entitlement to said writ (Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court). However, respondents avers that
before an entitlement of the writ of possession is
issued, direct payment of just compensation must be
made to the builders of the facilities, citing RA No.
8974 and a related jurisprudence (2004 Resolution).
Rule 67 Government is only required to make an initial
deposit with an authorized gov’t depositary such initial
deposit must be equivalent to the assessed value of
the property for purposes of taxation.
RA 8974 Gov’t is required to make immediate payment
to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint,
to be entitled to a writ of possession. The market value
of the property (as stated in the tax declaration or
current zonal valuation) and the value of improvements
and structures are to be used as the standard for initial
compensation. Which rule should be followed in this
case?
Suggested Answer: The 2004 Resolution does not
particularize the extent such payment must be effected
before the takeover, but it unquestionably requires at
least some degree of payment to the private property
owner before a writ of possession may issue. The
utilization of Republic Act No. 8974 guarantees
compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it
assures the private property owner the payment of, at
the very least, the proffered value of the property to be
seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the
owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of
possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the
schematic under Republic Act No. 8974, one which
facially complies with the prescription laid down in the
2004 Resolution. (Republic v. Gingoyon)
CIR vs. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1988)
Question: Latte Inc., a small family business that sells
coffee, has submitted its annual tax report. One day
the business was stunned to receive a delinquency
letter coming from the BIR that it had unpaid taxes
amounting to 5,000 pesos in the year 2014-2015. The
business then showed to the BIR that it did pay the
missing taxes, however the BIR filed a case against
them. The business then filed an answer questioning
the BIR’s claim while presenting evidence that it did
pay the said amount. The court ruled in favor of Latte
Inc. Was the court correct in erring the decision of the
BIR?
Suggested Answer: Yes, this is because the
company had already shown evidence that it did pay
the missing amount of 5,000 pesos. Moreover, even if
it is inherent in the power of the state to tax, the use of
this power should be fair enough. Furthermore in
Section 28 of Article 6 of the 1987 constitution it states
that the power of taxation should be uniform and
equitable. In this case, the BIR did not see to it before
filing the case that the company did pay the lacking
amount.
Commissioner of Customs vs Makasiar,
177 SCRA 27
Question: In a coastal town, a composite team
composed of officers from the Bureau of Customs, the
Bureau of Immigration, and the Philippine Coast Guard
conducts a search operation on a warehouse
suspected of containing smuggled goods. During the
operation, the team seizes several containers of
imported luxury cars, claiming that they were brought
into the country without proper documentation and
payment of customs duties. The owner of the
warehouse, Mr. X, disputes the seizure and initiates
legal action, including a petition to enjoin the Bureau of
Customs from proceeding with the seizure and
forfeiture proceedings.
Discuss the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) over Mr. X's petition and whether the RTC can
enjoin the Bureau of Customs from continuing with the
seizure and forfeiture proceedings.
Suggested Answer: The jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) over Mr. X's petition and its authority
to enjoin the Bureau of Customs from continuing with
the seizure and forfeiture proceedings should be
assessed in light of established legal principles as
outlined in the case of Commissioner of Customs vs.
Makasiar, 177 SCRA 27 (1989)
In the provided case, it was clarified that the RTC does
not have jurisdiction to enjoin the Bureau of Customs
from conducting seizure and forfeiture proceedings
over goods. The case established that the Collector of
Customs has exclusive jurisdiction to initiate and
conduct such proceedings, and regional trial courts
lack the authority to interfere with these proceedings
even through writs of certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus.
Therefore, Mr. X's petition to enjoin the Bureau of
Customs from proceeding with the seizure and
forfeiture proceedings would not be within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
RELATED BAR QUESTIONS:
2022 BAR Q & A
Question: A city ordinance was passed providing for
the removal, at the owner's expense, of: (i) all outdoor
advertising materials displayed or exposed to the public
in designated regulated areas such as residential
zones, bridges, and along main city streets; and (ii)
billboards of substandard materials, or which obstruct
road signs and traffic signals. Failure to comply with
said ordinance authorizes the mayor, assisted by the
police, to implement the removal of the non-compliant
materials. ABC Ad Agency, owner of the billboards
removed by the city, filed a complaint because,
considering the nature of its business, the removal of
its billboards amounted to taking of private property
without just compensation. (2022 Bar) Will the
complaint prosper? Explain briefly.
Suggested Answer: NO, the complaint will and should
not prosper. It should be dismissed. The removal under
the ordinance of the subject billboards does not amount
to taking of private property under eminent domain
which cannot be done or allowed without just
compensation. The ordinance partakes of the nature of
a properly delegated and valid exercise of the police
power, clearly intended to promote the general welfare
based on lawful means which can be considered as
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
(Evasco v. Montanez, G.R. No. 199172, 21 Feb. 2018)
Accordingly, the removal of said billboards provided for
under the ordinance constitutes a valid taking under the
city's police power. It is established that a taking of
private property under the police power does not
require the payment of just compensation. (Cruz, 2015;
Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department
of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669,
25 Apr. 2017, citing Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v.
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, G.R. No. 175356, 03 Dec. 2013)
(Central Bar Q&As by Cruz, 2023)
2016 BAR Q&A
Question: Congress issued a law allowing a 20%
discount on the purchases of senior citizens from,
among others, recreation centers. This 20% discount
can then be used by the sellers as a “tax credit”. At the
initiative of BIR, however, R.A. No. 9257 was enacted
amending the treatment of the 20% discount as a “tax
deduction.” Equity Cinema filed a petition with the RTC
claiming that the R.A. No. 9257 is unconstitutional as it
forcibly deprives sellers a part of the price without just
compensation. If you were the judge, how will you
decide the case? Briefly explain your answer. (2016
BAR)
Suggested Answer: I will decide in favor of the
Constitutionality of the law. The 20% discount as well
as the tax deduction scheme is a valid exercise of the
police power of the State. (Manila Memorial Park Inc.
v. DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, 03 Dec. 2013; UPLC
Suggested Answers)
2009 BAR Q&A
Question: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality
of Sampaloc, Quezon, passed an ordinance imposing a
storage fee of ten centavos (P0.10) for every 100 kilos
of copra deposited in any bodega within the
Municipality’s jurisdiction. The Metropolitan
Manufacturing Corporation (MMC), with principal office
in Makati, is engaged in the manufacture of soap,
edible oil, margarine, and other coconut oil-based
products. It has a warehouse in Sampaloc, Quezon,
used as storage space for copra purchased in
Sampaloc and nearby towns before the same is
shipped to Makati. MMC goes to court to challenge the
validity of the ordinance, demanding the refund of the
storage fees it paid under protest. Is the ordinance
valid? Explain your answer. (2009 BAR)
Suggested Answer: YES. The municipality is
authorized to impose reasonable fees and charges as a
regulatory measure in an amount commensurate with
the cost of regulation, inspection, and licensing. (Sec.
147, LGC) In the case at bar, the storage of copra in
any warehouse within the municipality can be the
proper subject of regulation pursuant to the police
power granted to municipalities under the Revised
Administrative Code or the “general welfare clause”. A
warehouse used for keeping or storing copra is an
establishment likely to endanger the public safety or
likely to give rise to conflagration because the oil
content of the copra, when ignited, is difficult to put
under control by water and the use of chemicals is
necessary to put out the fire. It is, thus, reasonable that
the Municipality impose storage fees for its own
surveillance and lookout. (Procter & Gamble Philippine
Manufacturing Corporation v. Municipality of Jagna,
Province of Bohol, G.R. No. L-24265, 28 Dec. 1979;
UPLC Suggested Answers)
1989 BAR Q&A
Question: The City of Manila passed an ordinance
imposing an annual tax of P5,000.00 to be paid by an
operator of a massage clinic and an annual fee of
P50.00 to be paid by every attendant or helper in the
said clinic. Is the imposition a tax or a license fee?
(1989 BAR)
Suggested Answer: The imposition on the operator of
the massage clinic is BOTH a tax and a license fee.
The amount of P5,000.00 exceeds the cost of
regulation, administration and control but it is likewise
imposed to regulate a non-useful business in order to
protect the health, safety and morals of the citizenry in
general. The P50.00 impositions on the helpers or
attendants are license fees sufficient only for
regulation, administration, and control.
2013 BAR Q&A
Question: A group of philanthropists organized a non-
stock, non-profit hospital for charitable purposes to
provide medical services to the poor. The hospital also
accepted paying patients although none of its income
accrued to any private individual; all income was
plowed back for the hospital’s use and not more than
30% of its funds were used for administrative
purposes. Is the hospital subject to tax on its income?
If it is, at what rate? (2013 BAR)
Suggested Answer: YES. Although a non-stock, non-
profit hospital organized for charitable purposes is
generally exempt from income tax, it becomes taxable
on income derived from activities conducted for profit.
Services rendered to paying patients are considered
activities conducted for profit which are subject to
income tax, regardless of the disposition of said
income. The hospital is subject to an income tax rate
of 10% of its net income derived from the paying
patients, considering that the income earned appears
to be derived solely from hospital-related activities.
(CIR v. St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc., G.R. No.
195909 and 195960, 26 Sept. 2012; UPLC Suggested
Answers)
NOTE: Beginning July 1, 2020, up to June 30, 2023,
the rate of one percent (1%) shall apply to, among
others, hospitals which are non-profit. After June 30,
2023, the rate shall revert to the preferential corporate
income tax rate of 10%. (RR 3-2022)
2018 BAR Q&A
Question: Kilusang Krus, Inc. (KKI) is a non-stock,
non-profit religious organization which owns a vast
tract of land in Kalinga.
KKI has devoted 1/2 of the land for various uses: a
church with a cemetery exclusive for deceased priests
and nuns, a school providing K to 12 education, and a
hospital which admits both paying and charity patients.
The remaining 1/2 portion has remained idle.
The KKI Board of Trustees decided to lease the
remaining 1/2 portion to a real estate developer which
constructed a community mall over the property.
Since the rental income from the lease of the property
was substantial, the KKI decided to use the amount to
finance: (1) the medical expenses of the charity
patients in the KKI Hospital; and (2) the purchase of
books and other educational materials for the students
of KKI School. (2018 BAR)
(a) Is KKI liable for real property taxes on the land?
Suggested Answer: YES, but only on the leased
portion. Article VI, Section 28(3) of the 1987
Constitution provides that “charitable institutions,
churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation”.
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the
property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.
The leased portion of the land may be subject to real
property tax since such lease is for commercial
purposes, thereby removing the asset from the
property tax exemption granted under the Constitution.
(CIR vs. De La Salle University, Inc., GR. Nos,
196596, 198841, 198941, 09 Nov. 2016; UPLC
Suggested Answers)
(b) Is KKl's income from the rental fees subject to
income tax?
Suggested Answer: YES. Despite falling under the
organizations enumerated under Section 30 of the
NIRC, the last paragraph of the same provision makes
KKI’s income of whatever kind and character from any
of its properties, real or personal, or from any of its
activities conducted for profit regardless of the
disposition made of such income, subject to income
tax. (Sec. 30, NIRC last paragraph)
2017 BAR Q&A
Question: San Juan University is a non-stock, non-
profit educational institution. It owns a piece of land in
Caloocan City on which its three 3-storey school
building stood. Two of the buildings are devoted to
classrooms, laboratories, a canteen, a bookstore, and
administrative offices. The third building is reserved as
dormitory for student athletes who are granted
scholarships for a given academic year.
In 2017, San Juan University earned income from
tuition fees and from leasing a portion of its premises to
various concessionaires of food, books, and school
supplies. (2017 BAR)
(a) Can the City Treasurer of Caloocan City collect real
property taxes on the land and building of San Juan
University? Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer: YES. The City Treasurer can
collect real property taxes but on the leased portion.
Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution provides
that a non-stock, non-profit educational institution shall
be exempt from taxes and duties only if the property is
used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes. The test of exemption from taxation is the
use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution. The leased portion of the building may be
subject to real property tax since such lease is for
commercial purposes, thereby, it removes the asset
from the property tax exemption granted under the
Constitution. (CIR v. De La Salle University, Inc., G.R.
No. 196596, 09 Nov. 2016)
(b) Is the income earned by San Juan University for the
year 2017 subject to income tax? Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer: NO. The income earned is not
subject to income tax provided that the revenues are
used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational
purposes as provided under Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV of the
1987 Constitution. The requisites for availing the tax
exemption under Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV are as follows: (1)
the taxpayer falls under the classification nonstock,
non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it
seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually,
directly and exclusively for educational purposes; thus,
so long as the requisites are met, the revenues are
exempt from tax. (CIR v. De La Salle University, Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 196596, 198841 and 198941, 09 Nov. 2016;
UPLC Suggested Answers)
2022 BAR Q&A
Question: A city ordincane was passed providing for
the removal, at the owner’s expense, of: (i) all outdoor
How would you decide the appeal? Explain your
advertising materials displayed or exposed to the
answer.
public in designated regulated areas such as
residential zones, bridges, and along main city streets;
Suggested Answer: The decision of the lower court
and (ii) billboards of substandard materials, or which
should be reversed. In EPZA v, Dulay, 149 SCRA
obstruct road signs and traffic signals. Failure to
305 (1987) the Supreme Court declared PD No. 1533
comply with said ordinance authorizes the mayor,
to be an unconstitutional encroachment on the
assisted by the police, to implement the removal of the
prerogatives of the judiciary. It was explained that
non-compliant materials. ABC Ad Agency, owner of
although a court would technically have the power to
the billboards removed by the city, filed a complaint
determine the just compensation for property under
because, considering the nature of its business, the
the Decree, the court's task would be relegated to
removal of its billboards amounted to taking of private
simply stating the lower value of the property as
property without just compensation. Will the complaint
declared either by the owner or by the assessor. Just
prosper? Explain briefly.
compensation means the value of the property at the
time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent
Suggested Answer: No, the complaint will not
for the loss sustained. To determine it requires
prosper. Police power of the state may interfere with
consideration of the condition of the property and its
the ordinary enjoyment of property for the promotion of
surrounding, its improvements and capabilities.
the general welfare. As a rule, any properties
confiscated in the exercise thereof are not subject to
payment of just compensation but rather destroyed for 1989 BAR Q&A
being obnoxious. Here, the removal of the Billboards of Question: Pedro bought a parcel of land from Smart
ABC Ad Agency is made through a valid exercise of Corporation, a realty firm engaged in developing and
police power and not eminent domain. Moreover, there selling lots to the public. One of the restrictions in the
is not even taking or confiscation in the first place deed of sale which was annotated in the title is that
since the ordinance merely orders the removal but not the lot shall be used by the buyer exclusively for
confiscation of the same. Hence, the removed residential purposes. A main highway having been
billboards will remain properties of the complainant. constructed across the subdivision, the area became
1988 BAR Q&A commercial in nature. The municipality later passed
Question: Mr. Roland Rivera is the owner of four lots a zoning ordinance declaring the area as a
sought to be expropriated by the Export Processing commercial bank building on his lot. Smart
Zone Authority for the expansion of the export Corporation went to court to stop the construction as
processing zone at Baguio City. The same parcels of violative of the building restrictions imposed by it.
land had been valued by the Assessor at P120.00 per The corporation contends that the zoning ordinance
square meter, while Mr. Rivera had previously fixed cannot nullify the contractual obligation assumed by
the market value of the same at P100 per square the buyer. Decide the case.
meter. The Regional Trial Court decided for
expropriation and ordered the payment to Mr. Rivera at Suggested Answer: The case must be dismissed.
the rate of P100 a square meter pursuant to As held in Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership
Presidential Decree No. 1533, providing that in vs. FEATIi Bank and Trust Company, 94 SCRA 533,
determining just compensation for private property such a restriction in the contract cannot prevail over
acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the the zoning ordinance, because the enactment of the
compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. It is
declared by the owner or determined by the Assessor, hazardous to health and comfort to use the lot for
pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever residential purposes, since a highway crosses the
value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision subdivision and the area has become commercial.
of the appropriate government office to acquire the
property. Mr. Rivera appealed, insisting that just
compensation for his property should be determined
by Commissioners who could evaluate all evidence on
the real value of the property, at the time of its taking
by the government. He maintains that the lower court
erred in relying on Presidential Decree No, 1533,
which he claims is unconstitutional.

1996BAR Q&A
Question: The City of Pasig initiated expropriation
proceedings on a one-hectare lot which is part of a
ten-hectare parcel of land devoted to the growing of
vegetables. The purpose of the expropriation is to use
the land as a relocation site for 200 families squatting
along the Pasig river.
(a) Can the owner of the property oppose the
expropriation on the ground that only 200 out of the
more than 10,000 squatter families in Pasig City will
benefit from the expropriation? Explain.
(b) Can the Department of Agrarian Reform require the
City of Pasig to first secure authority from said
Department before converting the use of the land from
agricultural to housing? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
a) No, the owner of the property cannot oppose the
expropriation on the ground that only 200 out of more
than 10,000 squatter families in Pasig City will benefit
from the expropriation. As held in Philippine Columbian
Association vs. Pants, 228 SCRA 668, the acquisition
of private property for socialized housing is for public
use and the fact that only a few and not everyone will
benefit from the expropriation does not detract from
the nature of the public use.
b) No, the Department of Agrarian Reform cannot
require Pasig City to first secure authority from it
before converting the use of the land from agricultural
to residential. According to Province of Camarines Sur
vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 173, there is no
provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
which subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands
by local government units to the control of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and to require
approval from the Department of Agrarian Reform will
mean that it is not the local government unit but the
Department of Agrarian Reform who will determine
whether or not the expropriation is for a public use.
1998 BAR Q&
Question: The City of Cebu expropriated the
property of Carlos Topico for use as a municipal
parking lot. The Sangguniang Panlungsod
appropriated P10 million for this purpose but the
Regional Trial Court fixed the compensation for the
taking of the land at P15 million. 1. What legal
remedy, if any, does Carlos Topico have to recover
the balance of P5 million for the taking of his land?
Suggested Answer: The remedy of Carlos Toplco is
to levy on the patrimonial properties of the City of
Cebu. In Municipality of Paoay vs Manaois, 86 Phil
629. 632, the Supreme Court held: "Property,
however, which is patrimonial and which is held by a
municipality in its proprietary capacity as treated by
the great weight of authority as the private asset of
the town and may be levied upon and sold under an
ordinary execution." If the City of Cebu does not have
patrimonial properties, the remedy of Carlos Topico is
to file a petition for mandamus to compel it to
appropriate money to satisfy the Judgment. In
Municipality Makati vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA
206, 213. the Supreme Court said: "Where a
municipality falls or refuses, without justifiable reason,
to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered
against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of
mandamus in order to compel the enactment and
approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance,
and the corresponding disbursement of municipal
funds therefor."
2000 BAR Q&A
Question: Madlangbayan is the owner of a 500
square meter lot which was the birthplace of the
founder of a religious sect who admittedly played an
important role in Philippine history and culture. The
National Historical Commission (NHC) passed a
resolution declaring it a national landmark and on its
recommendation the lot was subjected to
expropriation proceedings. This was opposed by
Madlangbayan on the following grounds: a) that the
lot is not a vast tract; b) that those to be benefited by
the expropriation would only be the members of the
religious sect of its founder, and c) that the NHC has
not initiated the expropriation of birthplaces of other
more deserving historical personalities. Resolve the
opposition raised by Madlangbayan.
Suggested Answer: The arguments of
Madlangbayan are not meritorious. According to
Manosca v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 412 (1996),
the power of eminent domain is not confined to
expropriation of vast tracts of the land. The
expropriation of the lot to preserve it as the birthplace
of the founder of the religious sect because of his role
in Philippine history and culture is for a public
purpose, because public use is no longer restricted to
the traditional concept. The fact that the expropriation
will benefit the members of the religious sect is
merely incidental. The fact that other birthplaces have
not been expropriated is likewise not a valid basis for
opposing the expropriation. As held in J.M. Tuason
and Company, Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31
SCRA 413 (1970), the expropriating authority is not
required to adhere to the policy of "all or none".
2000 BAR Q&A
Question: Undaunted by his three failures in the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT), Cruz
applied to take it again but he was refused because of
an order of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS) disallowing flunkers from taking the test
a fourth time. Cruz filed suit assailing this rule raising
the constitutional grounds of accessible quality
education, academic freedom and equal protection.
The government opposes this, upholding the
constitutionality of the rule on the grounds of exercise
of police power. Decide the case discussing the
grounds raised.

Suggested Answer: As held in the Department of

Education, Culture and Sports v. San Diego,180 SCRA
533 (1989), the rule is a valid exercise of police power
to ensure that those admitted to the medical profession
are qualified. The arguments of Cruz are not
meritorious. The right to quality education and
academic freedom are not absolute. Under Section
5(3), Article XIV of the Constitution, the right to choose
a profession is subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. The
rule does not violate equal protection. There is a
substantial distinction between medical students and
other students. Unlike other professions, the medical
profession directly affects the lives of the people.
2011 BAR Q&A
Question: The city government filed a complaint of
expropriation of 10 lots to build a recreational complex
for the members of the homeowners association of
Sitio Sto. Tomas, the most populated residential
compound in the city. The lot owners challenged the
purpose of the expropriation. Does the expropriation
have a valid purpose?

Suggested Answer: No, it does not have a valid

purpose. In re Article 2, Sec. 23, the state shall
encourage non-governmental community-based or
sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the
nation. Hence, the expropriation is not valid because it
intends to benefit a private organization.
 Relevance of the
Declaration of
Principles and
State Policies
Pablo Ocampo v. HRET, G.R. No. 158466.
June 15, 2004:
Question: In a Congressional election, can the
candidate with the second highest number of votes be
eligible to be declared winner of the elective office if
the candidate who obtained the highest number of
votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office?
Suggested Answer: No. The candidate with the
second highest number of votes cannot be declared as
the winner.
According to Article VI Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution, “In case of vacancy in the Senate or in
the House of Representatives, a special election may
be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed
by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term.”
When a voter chooses his congressional candidate, he
chooses only one. If his choice is concurred in by the
majority of voters, that candidate is declared the
winner. Voters are not afforded the opportunity of
electing a 'substitute congressman' in the eventuality
that their first choice dies, resigns, is disqualified, or in
any other way leaves the post vacant.
There can only be one representative for that particular
legislative district. There are no runners-up or second
placers. Thus, when the person vested with the
mandate of the majority is disqualified from holding the
post he was elected to, the only recourse to ascertain
the new choice of the electorate is to hold another
election. (Ocampo v. HRET, G.R. No. 158466)
Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778
(1919)
Question:1. In the capacity of a judge, considering a
legal case involving a high-ranking government official
known for their severe disposition, who issued orders
to assemble roughly 200 individuals with a
documented history of sexual offenses and child
molestation within a prison. Subsequently, this official
directed these individuals to discreetly board a ferry
late at night, devoid of consent and the opportunity to
bid farewell to their families or address personal
matters. This directive is presented as an act of
'eliminating individuals considered detrimental and
malevolent to society,' relocating them to a desolate
area in the Philippines. Beyond the protections
articulated in the Bill of Rights, and acknowledging that
certain principles within the state policies outlined in
Article Two of the Philippine Constitution are not self-
executing, please elucidate the relevant constitutional
principles and their application when justifying punitive
measures against the government official in this case.
Suggested Answer: As a judge, the primary
constitutional norm that comes to mind when
considering this complex issue is enshrined in Article
2, Section 11 of the Philippine Constitution. This
provision reaffirms the State's unshakable commitment
to honoring every human being's inherent dignity and
ensuring the complete protection of their human rights.
This notion holds true even when dealing with people
who have a history of horrible crimes like sexual
assault and child abuse. Furthermore, it is critical to
recognize that certain of the concepts enshrined in
Article Two of the Philippine Constitution are not self-
executing. Individuals' dignity and human rights are
self-executing in this case, according to the principle of
individual dignity and human rights. As such, no further
legislation is required for its execution. Consequently,
it stands as a robust basis for justifying punitive actions
against the government official, emphasizing that the
government must respect the fundamental rights of all
individuals, regardless of their past transgressions.
Moreover, it is essential to consider that even in
instances where a constitutional principle is not self-
executing, it imposes a duty on the legislative and
executive branches to enact enabling laws and policies
that give life to these principles. Therefore, it becomes
incumbent upon the government to develop and
implement appropriate laws and regulations that
safeguard the rights and dignity of individuals,
including those with a history of serious offenses.
In conclusion, the constitutional principles outlined in
Article Two of the Philippine Constitution, particularly
regarding human dignity and rights, serve as a
compelling basis for justifying punitive measures
against the government officials. The fact that these
principles are not self-executing does not diminish their
significance, but rather underscores the responsibility
of the government to enact and enforce laws that
uphold these fundamental values.
Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18;
Question: 1. President BongMar wanted to join the
EXPANDED ASEAN trade agreement. Though the
Philippines is already a member of ASEAN, the
EXPANDED trade agreement treaty is of similar scope
as of the European Union wherein among others
ASEAN Member countries will be having a ONE
CURRENCY SYSTEM in order to strengthen
economic cooperation. Because of the strong desire of
the President in strengthening the nation’s economic
cooperation especially with its neighboring countries,
the President signed the trade agreement treaty along
with the ratification and was sent to the Senate for its
concurrence. Senator Zig Midori filed a proposed
“Resolution” for the senate to concur with the
Philippines’ ratification. The proposed “Resolution” was
read three times on three separate days. Three days
before the third reading, printed copies of the proposed
“Resolution” in its final form were distributed to all the
Senators. The Senators then unanimously approved
the “Resolution”, and the Senate expressed its
concurrence with the treaty’s ratification. A civil society
group filed a petition before the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the Senate’s concurrence on
the ground that this treaty is unconstitutional as it
violates Sec. 19, Art II of the Constitution which states
that The State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos. Rule on the petition, Explain briefly.
Suggested Answer: The petition should be
dismissed. The 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit
our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from
integrating into a global economy that is liberalized,
deregulated and privatized. The constitutional policy of
a “self-reliant and independent national economy”
does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign
investments, goods and services. (Tanada v. Angara,
G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997) It contemplates neither
“economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the
international community.”
As explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a
developing country that is keenly aware of
overdependence on external assistance for even its
most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or
economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding
mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue
foreign control of the national economy, especially in
such strategic industries as in the development of
natural resources and public utilities.
Mejof vs. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70
(1952)
Question: Jcj Kuznetzov, a Russian citizen who is a
spy was brought to the Philippines was due for
deportation but no ship, airship or vessel would take
him back to Russia due to lack of authority from the
government. Several years passed but the government
has not found a way to let Jcj be removed from the
Philippines, stating that it was not their fault that no
ship or airship would take Jcj. She then filed a petition
for habeas corpus questioning his detention. Should
Jcj Kuznetzov be released from prison?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Jcj Kuznetzov should be
released from prison. Under Article 2, Section 2 of the
Philippine constitution, the Philippines renounces war
as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.
In this scenario, Jcj Kuznetzov is being detained in the
Philippines without due process. Thus she filed for a
petition. In the case of Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, the
Philippines is a member of the United Nations which
promulgated the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The Philippine Constitution likewise provides
that it adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of its laws. Thus, as a state
policy, the Philippines adheres to an individual’s right
to liberty. Although deportation proceedings are
administrative and not criminal in nature, it cannot be
denied that Jcj has been denied her freedom. Under
sec. 1 of Article III of the Constitution: No one shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law. In this case, Jcj Kuznetzov is being detained in
the Philippines without due process. Therefore, Jcj
Kuznetzov should be released from prison.
Agustin vs. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979)
Question:In the BNN State, a new administration took
power in 1980, and the government tried to update and
reform many current regulations and legislation
concerning road safety and vehicle equipment. A new
executive order was issued as part of these reforms,
mandating all motor vehicles to install a specific type of
electronic safety device known as a "Electronic
Collision Warning System" (ECWS) by a government-
designated provider. The ECWS was designed to
 improve road safety by giving drivers with advanced criteria set out in Agustin v. Edu and whether it
collision warnings. Concerned residents, including complies with the principles of constitutional law and
Juana, the owner of a vintage car, have voiced their the delegation of police power as clarified in that
opposition to the new regulation. They contended that precedent case.
the ECWS mandate was unlawful, harsh, and arbitrary,
and that it represented an unconstitutional devolution Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115 (1957)
of police power. Juana, in particular, claimed that the
Question: 1. Oppa, a Korean businessman who came
government's stipulation that the ECWS be purchased
to observe the economy of the Philippines, he was
only from a government-designated provider was
also engaged in retail business in korea. He observed
confiscatory and infringed her rights. In response to
that his business would prosper in the Philippines.
these concerns, Juana and other concerned people
Soon after, he went back to the Philippines to start his
petitioned the Supreme Court, questioning the
business and it prospered for many years. Until the
legitimacy of the ECWS mandate and demanding a
Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade
temporary restraining order to its implementation.
Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve
Discuss if Juana and the other concerned citizens
the right to Filipinos to engage in a retailing business.
have a legal basis to protest to the ECWS mandate.
Having been affected by the said law, He argued that it
violates some treaty and it also violates the equal
Suggested Answer: No, Juana and the other
protection clause. Furthermore, he argued that his
concerned people do not have a legal basis to protest
business has a significant effect on the economy of the
the ECWS mandate. The precedent case of Leovilo
country and he should be given equal opportunity to
Agustin v. The Philippines (Agustin v. Edu) serves as
the Filipinos. Will his argument prosper?
the legal basis for this response. The Supreme Court
ruled in Agustin v. Edu that regulatory actions taken by
Suggested Answer: No. his argument will not
the government within the scope of its police power
prosper. As stated in the case of “Inchong v.
and for the purpose of promoting public safety and
Hernandez” which states that there is no conflict at all
welfare could be declared constitutional.
between the raised generally accepted principle and
with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause
Applying the Agustin v. Edu precedent, the
”does not demand absolute equality amongst
government's goal to improve road safety by
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
implementing the ECWS mandate is consistent with
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
the promotion of public safety and welfare, which is
both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
within the scope of the State's police power, as
enforced””; and, that the equal protection clause ”is not
articulated in Agustin v. Edu. As a result, the
infringed by legislation which applies only to those
government has a legitimate interest in implementing
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
such measures to prevent accidents and improve road
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
safety standards, which is consistent with the goals
grounds exist for making a distinction between those
established in the Vienna Convention on Road Signs
who fall within such class and those who do not.”
and Signals. However, as stated in Agustin v. Edu, the
Furthermore, in application of the police power in
crucial question here is whether the mandate to
enforcement of the RA 1180, Oppa will no longer be
acquire the ECWS exclusively from a government-
allowed to engage in retail business because such
designated provider amounts to an unreasonable
right is reserved to Filipinos. Therefore, his argument
delegation of power or is confiscatory. The Court
will prosper or be given a merit.
concluded in Agustin v. Edu that regulatory activities
must not be harsh, capricious, or confiscatory. To
In Re Garcia; 2 SCRA 984 (1961)
evaluate the legality of this obligation, the Court must
consider whether it serves a compelling public Question:Ramon, a citizen of the Philippines and a
purpose, provides acceptable alternatives or registered lawyer in Spain, moved back home to settle
exceptions, and is subject to competent control. In with his family. In hopes to practice his profession in
conclusion, as indicated in the legal case basis, the Spain he submitted a petition, invoking the treaty on
ECWS mandate does not contravene the principles academic degrees and the exercise of professions
articulated in Agustin v. Edu. The specific requirement praying that he be allowed to be admitted to the
to purchase the ECWS exclusively from a government- Integrated Bar of the Philippines without the
designated supplier, on the other hand, should be prerogative of taking the Bar examination. Will
evaluated further to determine whether it meets the Ramon’s petition be accepted or denied? Explain.
Suggested Answer: NO. Ramon’s petition will not be
accepted. The Treaty on Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions cannot be validly invoked by
Ramon since in the Article 11 of the said treaty
supplies that “the Nationals of each of the two
countries who shall have obtained recognition of the
validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the
stipulations of this Treaty, can practice their
professions within the territory of the Other”. In
Ramon’s case, he is a citizen of the Philippines,
wishing to practice law and filing a petition to allow him
to be admitted in the integrated bar of the Philippines
by invoking the treaty of academic degrees is void
since the petitioner is a Filipino citizen and therefore,
the laws of the country by which he belongs applies to
him and is not entitled to the privileges extended to
Spanish nationals desiring to practice their profession
in the Philippines. Therefore, Ramon’s petition will be
denied as the invocation of the Treaty on Academic
Degrees and the Exercise of Professions is invalid
since the petitioner is not a citizen of Spain and that
the existing laws of the country to which he belongs,
the Philippines, applies to him.
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, O.G. 4282
Yukio’s grandfather Shotoro held a high commanding
position in the Japanese Imperial Army in the
Philippines around 1943 to 1944. Shotoro has been
recently charged before a Military Commission with
having unlawfully disregarded and failed “to discharge
his duties as such commander to control the
operations of members of his command, permitting
them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes
against non-combatant civilians and prisoners of the
Imperial Japanese Forces, in violation of the laws and
customs of war”. Yukio argues on her grandfather’s
behalf that the EO No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it
violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law
but also our local laws, to say nothing of the fact (that)
the Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to
the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations
covering Land Warfare and, therefore, petitioner is
charged of `crimes’ not based on law, national and
international. Can Shotoro be charged in Philippine
courts?
Suggested Answer: Yes, EO No. 68 is constitutional
hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the
case at bar. EO 68 is in pursuant to the constitutional
provision that stated in Article 2 of the Philippine
Constitution. The Hague Convention and other similar
conventions whose principles are generally accepted
are considered as part of the law of the land. Similar to
Kuroda v. Jalandoni, the President as Commander in
Chief is fully empowered to consummate this
unfinished aspect of war, namely, the trial and
punishment of war criminals, through the issuance and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68. To conclude,
Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War
Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war criminals, was
issued by the President of the Philippines on the 29th
day of July, 1947. This Court holds that this order is
valid and constitutional, which is also provided in
Article 2, section 3 of the constitution.
Gonzales v. Hechnova, 9 SCRA 230
Question: An executive secretary of the President of
the Philippines authorized the importation of tons of
foreign rice to be purchased from private sources. A
petitioner filed his petition, averring that, in making or
attempting to make said importation of foreign rice, the
aforementioned respondents “are, acting without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because RA
No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends RA No.
2207 – explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and
corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency. The Executive Secretary
contends that the Government of the Philippines had
entered into valid executive agreements with countries
Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice.
Whether or not the executive secretary, in attempting
to import foreign rice, are acting without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction.
Suggested Answer: Yes. The executive secretary
entered into valid agreements with Vietnam and Burma
are considered acts without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction. According to the constitution, if a treaty
and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the
conflict must be resolved; the latter should prevail. In
the case at bar, within the conflicts between Republic
Act Nos. 2207 and 3452 and the aforementioned
contracts entered by the Philippine government
through the executive secretary they are both deemed
consistent, therefore the statute must prevail and the
treaty must be terminated
Sec. of Justice v. Lantion, Jan. 18, 2000
Question:The Department of Justice received from the
Department of Foreign Affairs a request from the
United States for the extradition of Juan Dela Cruz to
the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing
the procedure for extradition of persons who have
committed a crime in a foreign country. Juan Dela
Cruz requested for copies of the request and that he
be given ample time to comment on said request but
the Secretary of Justice denied the request pursuant to
the RP-US Extradition Treaty.Juan Dela Cruz filed a
petition assailing the act of the Secretary of Justice as
unconstitutional for violation of his right to due process
and right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and causes of the accusation against him while the
Secretary of Justice maintained that his act is a valid
exercise of the Philippines legal duties pursuant to the
RP-US Extradition Treaty. Is the act of the Secretary of
Justice valid?
Suggested Answer: Yes, the act of the Secretary of
Justice is valid. Jurisprudence provides that the
extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution,
and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a
criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused
from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty. In the case
given, Juan Dela Cruz’s fundamental rights are not
being violated as he is not yet subjected to criminal
prosecution but only a mere extradition. Hence, the act
of the Secretary of Justice is valid as there was no
violation of the fundamental rights of the accused.
Tanada v. Angara, May 2, 1997
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate
concurred in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO was said to
improve the country’s access to foreign markets, open
new opportunities for the services sector, and attract
more investments into the country. However, the parity
provisions and national treatment clauses of the WTO
Agreement were said to contravene the provisions of
Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Refute
this argument.
Suggested Answer: The parity provisions and
national treatment clauses do not violate Section 19,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
the state shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos
and local products. The very title "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies" highly demonstrates that
the principles under this article are not intended to be
self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts, rather used as judiciary aids or
guides in the Court’s exercise of judicial power and by
the Legislature to enact laws. In the case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, it was held that
the principles and state policies enumerated in Article
II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-
executing provisions, the disregard of which can give
rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation." Furthermore, while the
Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, it did not intend to
pursue an isolationist policy nor did it intend to shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy.
Lim v. Executive Secretary, April 11, 2002
Question: Sometime during 2001, The U.S and the
Republic of the Philippines conducted a joint military
exercise as part of the Visiting Forces Agreement
covered by the mutual defense treaty. They
commenced with the exercise in portions of Mindanao
specifically in Basilan but was later on found out that
the U.S troops engaged in the combat against the
MNLF since they were cornered by the Moro group
and was left no choice but to fight back during the
span of the joint military exercise. Although there were
no casualties for the U.S troops, their reason for
engaging in that combat was only for self-defense. Is
the defense of the U.S troops tenable?
Suggested Answer: Yes since there’s a provision on
the Visiting Forces Agreement that pertains to the right
of self-defense. Based on the case of Lim v. Executive
Secretary, it was stated that “In paragraph 8 section 1
stipulates that U.S exercise participants may not
engage in combat “except in self-defense”. In this
case, the act of engaging in battle is aligned with the
agreement since the U.S troops were left with no other
choice but to fight back since it’s a matter of life and
death. Hence, the act of defending themselves is not
against the MDT and VFA since the circumstance calls
for the doing of the act and is not an act of engaging
an offensive war in the Philippine territory which
conforms to the Charter of the United Nations and with
the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Therefore, their
defense is tenable and there should be no liability
against the U.S Troops.
Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
221697, March 8, 2016
Question:ASD, born in 1978 as a foundling, was
adopted by a known wealthy couple in Lucban,
Quezon when he was four (4) years old. In 1997, at 19
years of age, ASD took up permanent residence in
Canada, and he was eventually naturalized as a
Canadian citizen. He got married to a Filipina five (5)
years later and started a family with her. ASD came
home to the Philippines in 2016 and later on
reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225. In
accordance with the said law, ASD took his oath of
allegiance and executed a sworn renunciation of his
Canadian citizenship. Suppose in the May 2028
elections, he files his certificate of candidacy for
Congress, and a case is filed against him, questioning
his eligibility to run as member of Congress and
seeking to cancel said COC on the ground that he is a
foundling. This therefore, as claimed, renders ASD not
qualified to apply for reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 for he is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen to begin with. How should the case
against ASD be decided?
Suggested Answer: The case should be decided in
favor of ASD. According to Section 2, Article II of the
1987 Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law, one of which is
that foundlings are recognized citizens under
international law. The Philippines has the obligation to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless, including those who are foundlings. The
nationality of foundlings follows the place where they
were found. Furthermore, RA 9225 is a repatriation
statute that results in the recovery of a person’s
original nationality. ASD’s admission that he is a
foundling follows the fact that he is a natural-born
Filipino citizen by virtue of where he was found, which
was in Lucban, Quezon. Since ASD was a natural-
born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
was restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen through RA 9225.
Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279
Question: 1. A contingent of more than two hundred
Philippine marines and elements of the home defense
forces raided the compound occupied by the
petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street Zamboanga City, in
search of loose firearms, ammunition and other
explosives. The soldiers returned fire and a bloody
shoot-out ensued, resulting in a number of casualties.
The petitioners then filed for prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining
order. Their purpose was to recover the articles seized
from them. Is raid with no search warrant constitutional
under the court of law?
Suggested Answer: No, it is unconstitutional to
conduct raids without a search warrant. This is
recognized in Sec. 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, “the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”
In re PP v. Yanson, is it quoted that “while there are
exceptions to this rule, warrantless searches can only
be carried out when founded on probable cause, or ‘a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.’” Hence, is it unconstitutional to conduct raids
without a search warrant.
IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81
Question: After the term of Pres. GongDi has ended
who was known for his war on drugs and tokhang. The
citizenry feared that drug syndicates would soon again
come back. Recent news has shown that there are a
lot of Police Officers from top level general down to the
station police officers are involved in selling, betting &
protection of drug proliferation. Due to wide clamor of
the citizenry and losing of confidence by the people
towards the PNP organization, Pres. BongMar (newly
elected president) has executed an executive order
allowing the Armed Forces to exercise police powers
mainly in order to have a check and balance to PNP
and also to mitigate the proliferation of illegal drugs in
the country. This step has challenged some groups
and has called for its nullification due to its
unconstitutionality, citing Section 3 Article II of the
1987 Constitution. The executive department argues
that such an executive order was executed due to the
imminent danger on going and that the President as
the commander in chief has a duty to keep the peace
of the country. Is the executive order granting the AFP
police powers with the intent of preserving peace,
check and balance of the existing PNP organization,
and the power of the President as Commander in
Chief in accordance with the principles of our
Constitution? State your arguments why or why not.
Suggested Answer: The subject of the Executive Order
is unconstitutional. This clearly violates Section 3
Article II of the 1987 Constitution: Civilian authority is,
at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people
and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of
the State and the integrity of the national territory.
Though it is stated that in Sec. 18, Art. II of the
Constitution, being the commander-in-chief, that the
President whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion”.
However, THERE WAS NO DECLARED
EMERGENCY SITUATION and such executive order
is an INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN
A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (Law
Enforcement) Sec. 5(4) Art. XVI of the Constitution.
Also in Sec. 18, Art. II it indicates that this power of the
president as commander in chief is only applicable to
NECESSARY which in this case on the premise of
losing confidence with the PNP is not sufficient and
that all exhaustible means to address such issue has
been executed by the executive branch without
compromising the principles of the Constitution.
Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006
Question: On September 22, 2005, Sen. Rodolfo
Biazon invited several senior AFP officers to appear at
a Senate hearing on the Hello Garci scandal
scheduled for September 28, 2005. Thus, on
September 26, 2005, the Office of the Chief of Staff of
the AFP issued a Memorandum to PMA Supt. Gen.
Crisolito Baloing directing petitioners B/Gen (Ret.)
Francisco Gudani and Lt. Col. Alexander Balutan to
attend the hearing. However, on September 27 at
around 10:10 pm, a message was transmitted to the
PMA Superintendent stating that under a directive from
Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, no AFP personnel
shall appear before a congressional or Senate hearing
without her approval. Despite this, petitioners were
present at the hearing. Meanwhile, on the day of the
hearing, September 28, 2005, Pres. Arroyo issued
E.O. 464, which enjoined officials of the executive
department, including the military, from appearing in
any legislative inquiry without her consent. On
September 30, 2005, petitioners were directed by AFP
Chief of Staff Lt./Gen. Generoso Senga to appear
before the Office of the Provost Marshal General
(OPMG) on October 3, 2005 for investigation. On
October 4, Gen. Gudani reached the age of 56 and
was compulsorily retired from military service. On the
other hand, on October 24, 2005, petitioners were
served with Orders directing them to appear at the
Pre-Trial Investigation for violating Articles 65 and 97
of C.A. No. 408. Did Pres. Arroyo’s directive violated
the Constitution?
Suggested Answer: Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, the President is the Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces of the Philippines. Outside the
limitations of provisions such as Sec. 5, Art. XVI, the
President has absolute authority over members of the
armed forces, and can restrict their mobility and
speech. Both restrictions are necessary to insulate the
military from partisan politics and to ensure that they
are ready to be called in times of emergency. The
military must follow the President’s authority pursuant
to the principles of discipline and obedience to the
chain of command, with violation of the latter
punishable under Art. 65 of the Articles of War.
Gonzales, Et al. vs. Gen. Abaya, G.R. No.
164007, August 10, 2006
Question: Ms. Neck brace was elected to be the
president of the Philippines. However, one of the
Generals in the Armed forces, General Wheelchair,
was dissatisfied with the government and did not like
the president. In order to “change the president” he
staged a coup d’ etat in Rizal park, which caused panic
among the people in the place. He and his men were
arrested and charged for rebellion. Did the General
and his men violate any provisions of the constitution?
Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer: Yes, the General had violated
the principle that the Armed Forces is the protector of
the people and the state, as stated in Section 3, Article
2 of the 1987 constitution. The general should have
noted that the president is the representative of the
people, which is one of the essence of the Philippines
being a “republican” government under section 2 of
Article 2. Not just because he did not like the
president, that means he should replace it. The
general also failed to consider that the Armed Forces
SHOULD protect the people, and the state and his
actions of coup d’ etat in a populated area caused
panic in the people which is the exact opposite of what
he as a member is supposed to be doing.
People vs. Lagman and Zosa, 66 Phil. 13
(1938)
Question: In 1936, Lagman and Sosa, then twenty
year olds, did not go to the Acceptance Board to
register for their compulsory military service after being
duly notified of their obligation. They violated Section
60 of the Commonwealth Act No. 1, also known as the
National Defense Act, which stated it was necessary
for all Filipinos to comply with and if convicted of
noncompliance, they would either be fined P2,000,
serve prison time for up to one year, or both. Both men
admitted to not going and stated their reasons were
their family responsibilities. For Lagman, it was
because he had to support his father, had no military
leaning, and wished to not kill or be killed. For Sosa,
he was fatherless and had to support his mother and
eight year old brother. They claimed that it was
unconstitutional for them to comply with the
compulsory military service as they had family duties.
Is it unconstitutional for Lagman and Sosa to comply
with the National Defense Act?
Suggested Answer: No, it is not unconstitutional. In
Section 2, Article 2 of the 1935 Constitution, the
defense of the state is the prime duty of the
government and in fulfilling this duty, all citizens may
be required by law to render personal military or civil
service. The National Defense Law does not go
against this provision as it is the government’s duty to
defend the state. In a number of United State Court
decisions, it was ruled that compulsory military service
adopted by reason of civil war or world war does not
violate the constitution because the power to establish
said army is given by Congress. Applied here, the
National Defense Law does not go against the
Philippine Constitution.
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651,
August 4, 2003
Question: Atty. Juanita, a government employee, was
accused of living with a man who is not her husband.
Atty. Juanita testified that she entered the judiciary as
a widow and that she’s been living with the said man
for over ten years now with a child. Moreover, they are
both members of Jehovah's Witnesses and their
conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their
religious beliefs.
The complainant of the case argued that their religious
belief and practice cannot override the norms of
conduct required by law for government employees.
How would you rule the case?
Suggested Answer: The case will be in favor of Atty.
Juanita. Article III Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution
states that, “No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.”
In this case, the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality will
apply.
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality or accommodation
recognizes that the government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time
strives to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Moreover,
the wall of separation is meant to protect the church
from the state. (Estrada v. Escritor; A.M. No. P-02-
1651)
In this case, there is no compelling state interest to
punish Atty. Juanita. Hence, her conjugal arrangement
right to freedom of religion. Thus, the case will rule in
her favor.
Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines
vs. Of ice of The Executive Secretary, July
9, 2003.
Question: Several senior officers of the Armed
Forces received invitations from the Chairpersons of
the Senate Committees on National Defense and
Security for them to appear as resource persons in
scheduled public hearings regarding a wide range of
subjects. The invitations state that these public
hearings were triggered by the increasing number of
US military bases in the country. Gen. Cardo Dalisay
who is the incumbent AFP Chief of Staff was invited
but refused to attend because of an Executive Order
issued by Pres. BongMar banning all public officials
enumerated in Paragraph 6 thereof from appearing
before either house of Congress without prior approval
of the President to ensure adherence to the rule of
executive privilege. Among those included in the
enumeration are “senior officials of executive
departments who, in the judgment of the department
heads, are covered by executive privilege”. Several
individuals and groups challenge the constitutionality
of the subject executive order because it frustrates the
power of the Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation under Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution.
Decide the case.
Suggested Answer: The subject Executive Order is
unconstitutional. Paragraph 3 of said Executive Order
virtually provides that, once the head of office
determines that a certain information is privilege, such
determination is presumed to bear the President’s
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official
from appearing before Congress, subject only to the
express pronouncement of the President that it is
allowing the appearance of such official. These
provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims
of privilege by mere silence. Such presumptive
authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional
nature of the privilege, which is recognize with respect
to information the confidential nature of which is crucial
to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities
of the executive branch, or in those instances where
exemption from disclosure is necessary to the
discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is
thus premised on the fact that certain must, as a
matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information,
in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case. (Senate
v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006, 488
SCRA1)
Bayan v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 138570,
October 10, 2000
The Philippines and the United States of America had
an agreement for a possible extension of the military
bases, but with the Philippines rejecting proposals
from the US, it resulted in the abeyance of joint military
exercises. Even with the situation, the defense and
security relationship between the Philippines and the
United States of America still continued pursuant to the
Mutual Defense Treaty. There were negotiations by
both panels on the VFA which led to a consolidated
draft text, and in turn resulted in conferences and
negotiations which thereafter the President of the
Philippines approved the VFA which was signed by the
President’s secretary and the United States
Ambassador. Does the VFA meet the requirements of
Sec. 25, Article VIII of the Constitution?
Suggested Answer: Yes, the VFA meets the
requirement of Sec. 25, Art. XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Section 25, Article XVIII disallows
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the
country, unless the following conditions are sufficiently
met, (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must
be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so
required by congress, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
Here, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally
accepted rules for the conduct of its international
relations. While the international obligation devolves
upon the state and not upon any particular branch,
institution, or individual member of its government, the
Philippines is nonetheless responsible for violations
committed by any branch or subdivision of its
government or any official thereof. As an integral part
of the community of nations, we are responsible to
assure that our government, Constitution and laws will
carry out our international obligation. Therefore, VFA
meets the requirements of Sec. 25. Art. XVIII of the
1987 Constitution.
Lim v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No. 151445, April
11, 2002
You work as a lawyer representing a group of citizens,
in a country called "Republica." Recently Republica
has formed a defense agreement with its neighboring
superpower, "Neighboria." This agreement, known as
the "Republica Neighboria Mutual Defense Treaty
(RNMDDT) " aims to strengthen Republicas defense
capabilities by conducting exercises and collaborating
with Neighboria’s armed forces. However some
citizens led by Juan and Pedro have filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of these military
exercises conducted under the RNMDDT. They argue
that such exercises may go against Republica’s
constitution and its principles of sovereignty. While the
RNMDDT does outline provisions regarding the scope
of military activities it does not provide an exact
definition of what activities are considered permissible
under the treaty. The only explicit restriction mentioned
in the treaty is that Neighborias military personnel
should refrain from engaging in any form of activity, on
Republicas territory. As Juan and Pedros legal counsel
your task is to address the following question; Do the
joint military exercises carried out under the Republica
Neighboria Mutual Defense Treaty (RNMDDT) comply
with Republica’s constitution?
Suggested Answer: Yes, the Republica-Neighboria
Mutual Defense Treaty (RNMDDT)-mandated joint
military drills are legal under Republica's constitution.
This is legally supported by a comparable court case,
Lim VS. Exec. Sec. In that case, the court stated that
while attempting to interpret international treaties such
as the RNMDDT, one should begin by looking at the
agreement's exact language. If an agreement does not
explicitly state that something is not permitted and the
government allows it, it is normally regarded as
acceptable. We examine the RNMDDT using the ruling
from this case. It does not specify what actions are
permitted, but it explicitly states that Neighboria's army
is not permitted to participate in politics while in
Republica. Because there is no specific prohibition on
these military exercises and the government gives its
permission, they are permissible under Republica's
constitution. Therefore, the Republica's constitution
allows for collaborative military operations under the
RNMDDT. They are not prohibited under the treaty,
and as long as the government approves, they are
deemed lawful in Republica.
Pamatong v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161872.
April 13, 2004
Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its
due course. Juan requested a case for
reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again
denied his request. The COMELEC declared Juan,
along with 35 other people, as nuisance candidates, as
stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC
noted that such candidates “could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are either not nominated
by a political party or not supported by a registered
political party with national constituency.” Juan argued
that this was against his right to “equal access to
opportunities for public service,” citing Article 2,
Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC
was indirectly amending the Constitution in this
manner. Juan also stated that he is the “most qualified
among all the presidential candidates” and supported
the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged
capacity to wage national and international campaigns,
and his government platform. Does the COMELEC’s
refusal of Juan’s request for presidential candidacy,
along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the
right to equal access to opportunities for public
service?
Suggested Answer: No. The "equal access" provision
is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,
entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies."
The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no
plausible reason for a different treatment to the "equal
access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain
any judicially enforceable constitutional right but
merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of the provision does not give
rise to any cause of action before the courts.
Therefore, the COMELEC’s refusal of Juan’s
presidential candidacy did not violate his rights of
equal access.
Article VII, Section 13 par. 2
President Ferdinand Marcos, a year after his
appointment as President of the Republic of the
Philippines, appointed Bingbong Marcos, his nephew,
as the chief of the Cebu Port Authority, a Government-
Owned or Controlled Corporation. Is this appointment
valid?
Suggested Answer: No, this appointment is not valid.
Section 13 paragraph 2 of Article 7 states that the
spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within
the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during
his tenure be appointed as members of the
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
Chairmen or Heads of Bureaus or Offices, including
Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations and
their subsidiaries. Additionally, Section 26 of Article 2
states that the State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law. The facts present
that President Marcos, during his tenure, appointed
Bingbong Marcos, his nephew, a relative by
consanguinity within the third degree. Based on
Section 13 paragraph 2 of Article 7 and Section 26 of
Article 2 of the Constitution, The appointment by
President Marcos of Bingbong as the chief of the Cebu
Port Authority is not valid.
Chavez v. PEA & Amari, G.R. No. 133250,
July 9, 2002
The Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)
with Chromosome Group, a private corporation, to
construct a major expressway connecting PCY Island
and SVT Island. They entered into the Joint Venture
Agreement through negotiations without public bidding.
The following month, the Department of Public Works
and Highways issued a Resolution confirming the JVA
with Chromosome Group. President Marcos, through
his Executive Secretary, approved of the JVA. Mr.
Baek, CEO of Baek Corporation, a taxpayer and a
competitor of Chromosome Group, upon learning of
the negotiations between DPWH and its competitor,
filed a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. He contends that the
government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale
by PEA of the reclaimed lands to Chromosome Group.
He also prayed that the DPWH publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section
28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987
Constitution on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Is Mr. Baek correct? Defend
your answer.
Suggested Answer: Yes, Mr. Baek is correct. Section
28 of Article 2 on the policy of public disclosure states
that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest. Furthermore, Section 7 of Article 3 states that
the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law. Based on
Section 28 of Article 2 and Section 7 of Article 3, there
needs to be full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest. Therefore, there is a need for
DPWH to open the bidding to the public instead of
entering into a JVA with Chromosome Group. It can
then be said that Mr. Baek is correct.
Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726 (1940)
On the Summer of 1990, the Local Traffic Commission
of Catbalogan City recommended to the City
Engineering Office the temporary prohibition of animal-
drawn vehicles from passing through the streets of Del
Rosario and Mabini avenue after a series of accidents
involving a horse collapsing due to the extreme heat of
the sun, also, another accident involving a horse
getting hit by a bus that caused congestion and delays
of traffic. Notifying the Regional Director Anastacio,
and the latter informed Rolando, the Secretary of the
Department of Public Works (DPWH) and Highways. A
week later, the recommendation was approved by the
secretary of the DPWH through an endorsement and
so ordered the prohibition. Raven, a citizen of
Catbalogan filed a petition for a writ of prohibition
against the Local Traffic Commission of Catbalogan
City, alleging that the act of prohibition made by the
concerned agency constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. Will his case prosper? Why? Why
not?
Suggested Answer: NO. According to the
Commonwealth Act 548, section 1 of the said act
states that "to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on, roads and streets designated as
national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines"
and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of
traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic
makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest.” In the case of Raven,
there is no undue delegation of legislative power
because it does not confer legislative powers to the
secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highway as mentioned in the case of Calalang v.
Williams that the virtue of which the rules and
regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads, in the interest and convenience of the
public. Therefore, the case of Raven will not prosper
because “the delegated power, if at all, therefore, is
not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and
circumstances upon which the application of said law
is to be predicated.” (Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No.
47800).
APCD v. PCA, G.R. No. 110526, February
10, 1998
The Agriculture Authority, under the mandate to
regulate the agricultural sector as per APCD v. PCA,
introduces a policy allowing genetically modified (GM)
crops to be freely cultivated across the country.
Farmers United (FU), a coalition of small-scale
farmers, challenges this policy, claiming that it
contradicts the State principles and policies on
agricultural development outlined in the same case.
Does FU have a legal basis in their claim?
Suggested Answer: Yes, FU has a legal basis in
their claim In APCD v. PCA, the Supreme Court
affirmed the importance of State principles and policies
in regulating and protecting industries, particularly the
coconut industry. This case established that State
policies are crucial in ensuring the orderly growth and
development of vital sectors like agriculture. In this
case, FU asserts that the Agriculture Authority's policy
allowing unrestricted cultivation of GM crops directly
conflicts with the State's principles and policies on
agricultural development. The policy may undermine
traditional farming practices, compromise food
security, and have potential adverse environmental
effects. FU argues that such a policy does not align
with the State's duty to promote balanced agricultural
development. Given the legal precedent set by APCD
v. PCA and the significance of State principles and
policies in regulating industries, FU's challenge to the
Agriculture Authority's GM crop policy may have a
valid basis. The case merits further examination to
determine whether the policy conforms to the State's
principles and policies on agricultural development.
PLDT v. NTC, 190 SCRA 717 (1990)
A new telecommunications company, Moonverge, filed
an application with NTC for the issuance of a
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity
(CPCN) to construct, install, establish, operate, and
maintain an telecommunications system in National
Capital Region and Region 3 with a prayer for
provisional authority to operate Phase A of its proposal
within NCR. An Order by the NTC dated 10 October
2020 granting private respondent Moonverge
provisional authority to install, operate, and maintain a
telecommunications system in the National Capital
Region (Phase A). After due hearing, reception of
evidence and evaluation, with the hearings attended
by various oppositors, including DLPT. It was granted
only after a prima facie showing that Moonverge has
the necessary legal, financial, and technical
capabilities and that public interest, convenience, and
necessity so demanded. Oppositor, DLPT argued that
there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of NTC
and petitions to the Court to annul the NTC Order
dated 10 October 2020 and to order Moonverge to
desist from, suspend, and/or discontinue any and all
acts intended for its implementation. Is there grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC?
Suggested Answer: No, there grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NTC. In PLDT v. NTC, the
Court held that the NTC is the regulatory agency of the
national government with jurisdiction over all
telecommunications entities. It is legally clothed with
authority and given ample discretion to grant a
provisional permit or authority. In fact, NTC may, on its
own initiative, grant such relief even in the absence of
a motion from an applicant. The Court also held that
the decisive considerations of the NTC are public
need, public interest, and the common good.
Moreover, Section 24, Article II of the Constitution
recognizes the vital role of communication and
information in nation building. In this case, the NTC
granted a provisional authority to the applicant,
Moonverge, after due hearing, reception of evidence
and evaluation, with the hearings attended by various
oppositors, including DLPT. The final outcome of the
application rests within the exclusive prerogative of the
NTC being the regulatory agency of the national
government with jurisdiction over all
telecommunications entities. In adherence to Section
24, Article II of the Constitution, granting Moonverge
provisional authority may also provide the answer to a
much-desired improvement in the quality and delivery
of telecommunication as a public utility, to improved
technology, fast and handy mobile service, and
reduced user dissatisfaction. Hence, there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NTC in
granting a provisional authority to Moonverge.
Maquera v. Borja, G.R. No. L-24761,
September 7, 1965
Juan Dela Cruz was disqualified by COMELEC as a
candidate for vice-presidency on the basis that he
does not qualify for the property qualification and that
he did not file a surety bond worth 40,000 with a
company of good reputation which is stated in the RA.
1234 that COMELEC has passed. Juan assailed that
this decision is violative of his right to equal access to
run for public office and that this RA is unconstitutional.
Is Juan’s assertion correct?
Suggested Answer: Yes, RA 1234 is unconstitutional.
The Supreme court stated in the case of Maquera v.
Borja, that the effect of said Republic Act No. 1234
imposing property qualifications in order that a person
could run for a public office, are inconsistent with the
nature and essence of the Republican system
ordained in the Constitution and the principle of social
justice underlying the same. Consequently, Republic
Act No. 1234 is unconstitutional and hence null and
void.
Simon v. CHR, G.R. No. 100150, January 5,
1994
A “demolition notice” was issued and signed by Mr. J
under the office of the City Mayor, and sent to Mr. M
to vacate occupied premises in North EDSA. The latter
filed a letter complaint with the Commission on Human
Rights (CHR) to stop the demolition and later on
issued a Cease and Desist Order to Mr. J. However
the demolition was carried out. CHR consequently
denied the Motion to dismiss filed by Mr. J. Mr. J now
argues that CHR’s authority should be understood as
being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly
violated in this case were not civil and political rights,
but their privilege to engage in business. As the
presiding judge of the case. How would you decide the
case?
Suggested Answer: I would rule in favor of Mr. J. The
CHR’s authority is only limited to investigate human
rights violations involving Civil and Political Rights as
provided in Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987
Constitution. In the case at bar, similar to the ruling of
the Supreme Court in the case Simon v. CHR, G.R.
No. 100150, January 5, 1994 the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia
of Mr. M can fall within the category of "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" as
intended by the Constitution.
PASEI vs. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386 (1988)
Dole issued a Department order that temporarily
suspends the deployment of domestic and household
workers. Agency A, a recruitment agency that deploys
domestic workers aboard, contends that the said
Department order is unconstitutional because it does
not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers. Is the contention of Agency A correct?
Suggested Answer: No. It is wrong. According to the
Constitution, classification is allowed provided that (1)
such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2)
they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they
are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they
apply equally to all members of the same class. In the
case at bar, since the said ordinance rests on
substantial distinctions, then the ordinance should be
valid. Therefore the contention of Agency A is wrong.
Garcia v. Drilon
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed a petition seeking a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her
husband, Jesus C. Garcia, under the provisions of
R.A. 9262, which deals with domestic violence. She
claimed to be a victim of various forms of abuse due to
her husband's actions, including physical abuse and
economic violence. The court granted the initial TPO
for 30 days due to reasonable belief that violence
could occur. Does Republic Act 9262 violate or
infringes upon the provisions outlined in Article 2,
Section 12 of the Constitution?
Suggested Answer: No. RA 9262 does not infringe or
violate Section 12 of Article II in the 1987 Constitution
or the declaration of principles and state policies in
family as basic social institutions and natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth. It simply supports and provides remedies for
women (wife) and children who experience abuse from
the men (husband) in the context of being a family.
The differing treatment of women and men under RA
9262 is justified to ensure their equal treatment,
aligning with the state's commitment to uphold gender
equality, considering the biological, historical, social,
and cultural distinctions between them. Moreso, the
purpose of R.A. 9262 as outlined in its Declaration of
Policy, which reads as follows: “Section 2. Declaration
of Policy. It is hereby affirmed that the State upholds
the dignity of women and children and ensures
complete respect for human rights. Additionally, the
State acknowledges the necessity to shield the family
and its members, especially women and children, from
violence and potential harm to their personal well-
being and safety.” RA 9262, by providing distinct and
exclusive safeguards for women and children, who are
vulnerable victims of domestic violence,
unquestionably aligns with crucial government
objectives, such as safeguarding human rights,
promoting gender equality, and empowering women.
The gender-based categorization and the unique
remedies outlined in this law in favor of women and
children are significantly linked and, in fact,
fundamentally essential to achieving these objectives.
(Garcia v. Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013)
Phil. Telegraph & telephone Co. v. NLRC,
May 23, 1997
Lisa was hired by XYZ Company and worked for
several years. During her employment, Lisa got
married. Shortly after her marriage, the company
dismissed her on the ground that the company policy
does not allow the employment of married individuals.
Lisa challenges the dismissal, claiming that it is invalid.
Is the dismissal invalid?
Suggested Answer: Yes, the dismissal is invalid.
Section 14, Article II on the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies, expressly recognizes the role of
women in nation-building and commands the State to
ensure, at all times, the fundamental equality before
the law of women and men. In the case at bar, XYZ
company’s policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who
contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the
right against, discrimination, afforded all women
workers by our labor laws and by no less than the
Constitution. Hence, the dismissal of Lisa is invalid.
Tablarin vs. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 370
(1987)
Terry sought admission into a school of medicine for
the school year 1987-1988. However, she failed to
take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education, and
administered by the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). Terry’s mother, in behalf of
Terry, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court,
assailing the constitutionality of the NMAT requirement
on the grounds of it being violative of the vital role of
the youth in nation-building, as well as the State’s
giving priority to education to promote human
development. Is Terry’s mother correct in her
contention?
Suggested Answer: Terry’s mother is not correct in
her contention. The policies invoked are provided in
Article II of the 1987 Constitution which the
government is enjoined to pursue and promote.
However, as was stated in Tablarin v. Gutierrez, the
petitioners have failed to demonstrate in what manner
the statute they assail collide with the State policies of
Section 11, 13 and 17, Article II of the Constitution.
They have not discharged the burden of proof that lies
upon them. Similarly, here, the Court is not compelled
to speculate how the Medical Act regulation of
requiring the NMAT could possibly offend the
constitutional provisions herein pointed out by Terry's
mother, that is, Sections 13 and 17, Article 2 of the
Constitution. Thus, the NMAT cannot be
unconstitutional.
PRC v. de Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June
21, 2004
Lisa and others, a graduate of Fatima College of
Medicine, took the medical licensure examination and
successfully passed. Shortly thereafter, the Board
(PRC) observed the grades of the 79 successful
examinees from Fatima College in the two most
difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam. The
PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Fr. Nebres to investigate whether any anomaly or
irregularity occurred. Both Fr. Nebres and the NBI
concluded that the questionable passing rate must
have
an unusual reason for the clustering of scores and that
the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test
questions. Due to the findings, PRC issued Resolution
No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging Lisa and others
with "immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit"
and bar them from taking their oath. Lisa and others
argued that when an examinee satisfies the
requirements for the grant of his physician's license,
the Board is obliged to administer to him his oath and
register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and
par. (1) of Section 22 of the Medical Act of 1959.” If
you were the judge, would you allow the respondents
to take their oaths as physicians and register them,
steps which would enable respondents to practice the
medical profession?
Suggested Answer: No. As stated in the case of PRC
v. de Guzman, to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses
all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied
with all the conditions and requirements imposed by
the law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint
or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory,
then the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is
distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be
demanded if denied. Presently, the cast of doubt on
their medical licensure examination renders the
requirement as less than satisfactory. Thus, Lisa and
others are prevented from taking their oath as medical
practitioners not until they were able to resolve the
issue at hand.
U.P. BOR v. C.A., G.R. No. 134629, August
31, 1999
Thea Therese Boo is a Korean national and a holder of
a Philippine Visitor’s Visa. She is an aspiring K-pop
idol who decided to get additional training here in the
Philippines by obtaining a Doctorate degree in Music
majoring in Composition and Research at the
University of Philippines Diliman. After completing her
units of coursework required in her doctoral program,
she left the Philippines and went back to South Korea
because it was time for her to debut in a trio group
called Tres. After two years her group decided to take
a break from the Kpop scene so she returned to the
Philippines to work on her dissertation. Since she was
exhausted mentally and physically due to the demands
of being a celebrity, she decided to just present
whatever she could come up with based on her
sources. The final copy of Thea’s dissertation was then
presented for approval to the panel and upon a careful
perusal of the same, Dr. Jcj Barrera-Choi, a dean’s
representative to the panel, noticed that some portions
of her work were lifted from other works without the
proper acknowledgment. Nonetheless, Thea was
allowed to defend and eventually passed it on the
condition that she should incorporate certain
amendments to the final copy of her dissertation.
However, it was found that the final output was
unchanged and more content was added that would
make plagiarism even more evident. This prompted Dr.
Barrera-Choi to formally charge Thea with plagiarism
and recommend that the latter’s doctorate grant be
withdrawn. It resonated with the recommendation of
the UP Diliman Music Department and was approved
by the U.P. Board of Regents. This prompted Thea to
file a petition for mandamus with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and damages against petitioners
herein, alleging that they had unlawfully withdrawn her
degree without justification, thus violating her right to
enjoyment of intellectual property and to justice and
equity. If you were the judge deciding on the case,
what would be your ruling?
Suggested Answer: If I were the judge deciding on
the case, I would rule in favor of UP and against Thea
Therese Boo because there was no showing that the
former committed an error in their decision and
transgressed the latter’s right to enjoyment of
intellectual property and to justice and equity. As cited
in UP BOR vs. CA (G.R. No. 134625. August 31,
1999), Art. XIV, Section 5(2) of the Constitution
provides that "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in
all institutions of higher learning." This is nothing new.
The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitution
likewise provided for academic freedom or, more
precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities
and institutions of higher learning. It follows that if the
conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud,
the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to
the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has
granted without violating a student's rights. The pursuit
of academic excellence is the university's concern. It
should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to
take measures to protect itself from serious threats to
its integrity. Applying this to the case at bar, since UP
Diliman enjoys academic freedom, they have the right
to withdraw enrolled students of their respective
degrees and put them into disciplinary action if they
commit acts that are erroneous and/or fraudulent.
Thea erred in claiming that her degree was withdrawn
without justification and that her right to enjoyment of
intellectual property and to justice and equity was
violated because in the first place, she was informed
and made to participate in the investigation of the
controversy against her. It was also her own undoing
when she refused to incorporate the suggested
amendments to her dissertation despite advice from
the panel and wasted the chance of being allowed to
proceed to the final stage of her research. Hence, if I
were a judge deciding on the case, I would rule in
favor of UP and against Thea Therese Boo.
Camacho v. Coresis, G.R. No. 134372,
August 22, 2002
Dean Camacho filed an administrative complaint to the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against Dr.
Daleon for incompetence, insubordination, and unjust
discrimination on the grounds that there were ghost
students in the latter’s class who received passing
grades without attending regular classes but with
special arrangements to meet the subject
requirements. The university Board of Regents
investigated the complaint and issued a resolution
validating Dr. Daleon’s teaching method on the
grounds that it is supported by the constitutional
guarantee of academic freedom. The Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao also issued a Resolution
dismissing the complaint and affirming the Resolution
issued by the BOR. Is the application of the principle of
“Academic Freedom” in the Resolution issued by the
university BOR affirmed by the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao correct? Explain.
Suggested Answer: Yes, the application of the
principle of Academic Freedom in the resolutions
issued by the BOR and the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao is correct. In the case of Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, the Supreme Court held that academic
freedom under Section 5(2) of Article XIV of the 1987
Constitution is distinguished into two. On the one
hand, “academic freedom includes the right of the
academic institution to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives and the methods on how best to attain
them, free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint.” On the other hand, “academic
freedom is also granted to the university professor or
faculty member with the right to pursue his studies in
his particular specialty.” In the case at bar, the Board
of Regent, tasked to formulate rules and policies of the
university as an exercise of the university right granted
by the principle of academic freedom as an academic
institution, upheld and validated the teaching methods
of Dr. Daleon. Therefore, the teaching methods
applied by Dr. Daleon are an exercise of his right
granted by the principle of academic freedom as a
faculty member in accordance with the rules and
policies implemented by the university BOR.
Phil. Merchant Marine School v. CA
The Bureau of Higher Education-DECS Technical
Panel for Maritime Education (TPME) Secretariat
conducted a reinspection on the premises of Philippine
Merchant Marine School, Inc. (PMMSI) and submitted
a report recommending the gradual phasing out of the
BSMT Nautical Studies and Associate in Marine
Engineering programs based on the grounds that
BMMS, Manila, has inadequate training facilities and
equipment for BSMT Nautical Studies and AME
programs. On 2 May 1989, the TPME Secretariat
submitted another memorandum on its reinspection of
petitioner's premises made on 28 April 1989. Based on
its findings, no substantial improvement in terms of
minimum requirements, equipment, and training
facilities since the January 1989 inspection was made.
For this reason, in the letter dated 25 May 1989
Director Rosas notified the petitioner about the
aforementioned report and the DECS' decision that
The BSMT Nautical Studies and Associate in Marine
Engineering courses be gradually phased out. Such
being the case, the school shall no longer be allowed
to accept 1st year students and new enrollees starting
1st semester of school year 1989-90. In a letter dated
11 July 1989, the DECS through Secretary
Quisumbing informed the petitioner that it had received
reports that the petitioner enrolled freshmen for its
maritime programs which were ordered phased out
effective SY 1989-1990. In its letter to the DECS dated
26 July 1989, the petitioner moved for reconsideration
and requested another inspection of its premises.
Pursuant to the petitioner's request, another inspection
of the Manila premises was conducted by the TPME-
Secretariat on 8 August 1989. However, the petitioner
only obtained a general rating of 31.17% for Nautical
Studies and 28.53% for Marine Engineering. Should
the motion for reconsideration be granted or not?
Discuss briefly.
Suggested Answer: The motion for reconsideration
should be denied. Section 28 of the Education Act of
1982 provides that the operation of schools and
educational programs without authorization, and/or the
operation thereof in violation of the terms of
recognition, are hereby declared punishable violations
subject to the penalties provided in this Act. The
requirement on prior government authorization is
pursuant to the State policy that educational programs
and/or operations shall be of good quality and
therefore shall at least satisfy minimum standards with
respect to curricula, teaching staff, physical plant and
facilities, and of administrative or management
viability. Further, the petitioner is found to be deficient
in terms of the minimum requirements as provided in
DECS Order No. III, series of 1987, which refers to the
policies and standards for the Maritime Education
Plan, hence, a motion for reconsideration should not
be granted.
Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221
The first Budget meeting in the congress is in session
since the previous administration. Upon launching on
the k-12 curriculum to its transition from the previous
curriculum it has spent a surplus more than its budget,
which resulted in debt in order to continue its operation
for the transition period. In the session it was
appropriated that almost 60% of the Budget of the
Department of Education and Sports went to the
automatic appropriation for Debt. according to section
5, article XIV “the state shall take into account regional
and sectoral needs and conditions and shall
encourage local planning in the development of
educational policies and programs.” Is the Budget on
Education and sports consistent with the constitution?
Suggested Answer: Yes, the budget on education
and sports are consistent with the constitution. In the
case of Guingona V. Carague. The question of
whether the automatic appropriation intended for
payment of debt for education and sports are
constitutional. And it was held.It is not only a matter of
honor and to protect the credit standing of the country.
More especially, the very survival of our economy is at
stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated
an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education that said appropriation cannot
be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
Mandaluyong v. Francisco, G.R. 137152,
January 29, 2001
On August 4, 1997, the City of Mandaluyong filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City a complaint
against respondents, Aguilars, for expropriation of two
(2) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 1,636
square meters. In accordance with Resolution No. 516,
Series of 1996, the Mayor of the City of Mandaluyong
was given the authority to initiate action for the
expropriation of the subject lots and construction of a
medium-rise condominium for qualified occupants of
the land. Respondents contend that the expropriation
of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a
public purpose invoking that the subject lots are their
only real property and are too small for expropriation.
Upon partition, four (4) co-owners, namely, Francisco,
Thelma, Rodolfo, and Antonio Aguilar each had a
share of 300 square meters while Eusebio, who died,
had five heirs who became co-owners of his 347
square-meter portion, each entitled with 69.4 square
meters of the land subject of litigation. Further,
respondents claim that the subject lots are their only
real property and that they, particularly two of the five
heirs of Eusebio Aguilar, are merely renting their
houses and therefore do not own any other real
property in Metro Manila. Petitioner argues that the
exercise of the power of eminent domain is not
anymore conditioned on the size of the land sought to
be expropriated, and the fact that only a few could
actually benefit from the expropriation of the property
does not diminish its public use character. Will the
petitioner’s complaint prosper?
Suggested Answer: No, the complaint will not
prosper. While we adhere to the expanded notion of
public use, the passage of R.A. No. 7279, the "Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992" introduced a
limitation on the size of the land sought to be
expropriated for socialized housing. The law expressly
exempted "small property owners" from expropriation
of their land for urban land reform. Further, Section 3
of R.A. 7279 defined that “Small-property owners” are
defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real
property whose property consists of residential lands
with an area of not more than 300 square meters in
highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other
urban areas; and (2) that they do not own real property
other than the same. As stated, the share of each co-
owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set in
R.A. 7279 and the said subject lots are their only real
property, which qualifies respondents as "small
property owners" and are exempt from expropriation.
Therefore, the petitioner’s complaint for the
expropriation of two (2) parcels of land in Mandaluyong
City must be dismissed.
SSS Employ. Assn. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686
(1989)
Juan and employees of a government owned and
controlled corporation gathered to conduct a strike.
They blocked the roads and were adamant in
remaining unmoved. There was a writ of preliminary
injunction against them but Juan and friends claimed
on Article 2 section 18 that they have rights of workers
and part of that right is their right to strike. Are Juan
and friends wrong?
Suggested Answer: Yes, and no. While the
Constitution recognizes the rights of workers (Art 2. S
18) and their right to strike (Art XIII, sec 3) the method
by which they are to conduct such a
strike is outlined in specific laws & regulations enacted
by the government. In the case SSSEA v. CA,
government employees are expressly prohibited in
conducting strikes as mandated by Memorandum
Circular No. 6 and Executive Order No. 180 In
conclusion, Juan and friends are in the wrong and
should not continue their strike.
JMM promotion & Management v. CA, 260
SCRA 319
The Secretary of Labor issued Department Order No.
3 establishing various procedures and requirements
for screening performing artists under a new system of
training, testing, certification and deployment of the
former. Under the Department Order, performing
artists successfully hurdling the test, training and
certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's
Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to
processing of any contract of employment by the
POEA. United Performers and Entertainers Group
(UPEG) opposed the issuance because it interferes
with their personal liberty. Discuss the validity of the
issuance of Department Order No. 3 as an exercise of
police powers of the state.
Suggested Answer: The Department Order No. 3 is a
valid exercise of police powers of the state.The latin
maxim “salus populi est suprema lex” embodies the
character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed
at promoting the general welfare of the people under
the State's police power. Police power concerns
government enactments which precisely interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare or the common good. Even if it
interferes with the personal liberty of United
Performers and Entertainers Group (UPEG), because
the issuance is for the common good, there is no
question of its validity.
Bernardo v. NLRC, July 12, 1999
Forty-three(43) deaf-mutes are employed as
probationary employees in the Near West Bank. It is
stipulated in their contract that they shall be trained for
a period of 1 month to determine if they can continue
to finish the six month term of contract. It is further
stipulated that Near West Bank may terminate the
contract anytime. forty-three (43) of them worked for
more than six months by virtue of renewal of contract.
However they were still eventually dismissed. Is the
dismissal proper?
Suggested Answer: No. The employees, who worked
for more than six (6) months and whose contracts
were renewed are deemed regular. The Court, in the
case of Bernardo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 122917, July
12,1999 stressed not only the concern of the State for
the welfare of the disabled. According to the Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons, they are based on justice
and the equitable treatment of eligible individuals,
whether or not they are disabled. The petitioners in this
case are deafmutes, yet this does not prevent them
from working.
Prov. Of Rizal v. Exec. Sec., G.R. No.
129546, Dec. 13, 2005
Municipality A and Municipality B are two neighboring
municipalities. Municipality B wants to use a portion of
land in Municipality A as a dumping ground or landfill
to accommodate the former’s garbage disposal
problem. Despite the possibility of polluting
Municipality A’s water resources, Municipality B’s
proposal was granted. Municipality A petitioned for the
closure of the said landfill however, Municipality B said
that Municipality A has no power to control or regulate
its use since properties of this nature belong to the
national, and not to the local governments. In
accordance with the Philippine Constitution, is
Municipality B’s reasoning valid?
Suggested Answer: No. Municipality B’s reasoning is
not valid. Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987
Constitution states that “All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception
of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital
is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided
by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be
the measure and limit of the grant.” The state is, and
always has been, zealous in preserving as much of our
natural and national heritage as it can, enshrining as it
did the obligation to preserve and protect the same
within the text of our fundamental law.
 Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792;
The people of a mountain province in the Philippines
filed a taxpayer’s lawsuit against the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). In the
case, they demanded that the continued logging and
cutting down of trees have caused a distortion and
disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Defendant, DENR, on the other hand, filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause
of action against him and that it raises a political
question. The Judge sustained the motion to dismiss,
further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by the Constitution. The plaintiffs then filed the instant
special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to
rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
ground that the respondent judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Do the plaintiffs
have a cause for action?
Suggested Answer: Yes, respondents state that the
petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not
agree with this. The complaint focuses on one
fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16
Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with
it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country’s forests.
Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR
to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration,
utilization, development and conservation of the
country’s natural resources. The policy declaration of
E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV
Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O.
192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formation, and have defined the powers and functions
of the DENR. Thus, the right of the petitioners to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR’s
duty to protect and advance the said right.
C & M Timber Corp. v. Alcala, June 13,
1997
S.A.M. Timber Logging Corp. is a logging company
under the Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 95.
On March 01, 2004, the office of the President issued
an order declaring TLA No. 95 to S.A.M Timber
Logging Corp as of no force and effect due to its
“mediocre performance” of logging in the said area.
The TLA covers a large area of forest land in the
province of Surigao Del Norte where the logging
company is operating. Pursuant to the cancellation of
S.A.M. Timber Logging Corp, the office of the
President awarded the same area to Ice Spice
Lumberjack Services.
Was the directive of the President valid? Decide.
Suggested Answer:Yes.In C&M Timber Corp. v.
Alcala, June 13, 1997, the Supreme Court held that
“..timber licenses, permits, and agreements are
instruments by which the state regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources. They do not vest in
the licensee a permanent or irrevocable right to the
concession area and the forest products therein. They
may be amended, modified, replaced, or rescinded by
the chief executive when national interests require it.”
Interests of a private logging company are pitted
against that of the public at large on the pressing
public policy issue of forest conservation.
In the case at bar, the President being the Chief
Executive constitutes a valid exercise of its power.
Wherefore, the TLA is only a license or privilege, which
can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause.
Province of Rizal vs. Exec. Sec.,
December 13, 2005
The Office of the President, through Proclamation No.
635 set aside parts of the Marikina Watershed
Reservation for use as a sanitary landfill. The
Municipality of San Mateo and the residents of Pintong
Bocaue filed a petition before the Court of Appeals to
stop the said proclamation. The President taking
cognizance of the gravity of the problems issued a
Memorandum ordering the closure of the dumpsite but
later directed Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) and MMDA to reopen the
dumpsite "in view of the emergency situation of
uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a
critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic."
Claiming the above events constituted a "clear and
present danger of violence erupting in the affected
areas," the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for
Restraining Order which the Supreme Court granted.
Should the closure of the Sanitary landfill must be
made permanent?
Suggested Answer: Yes, the closure of the Sanitary
landfill should be made permanent.
The Constitution provides that The State shall protect
and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accordance with the rhythm and
harmony of nature. In the given case, the sanitary
landfill which is placed in the Marikina Watershed
Reservation must be stopped for violation of the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology as it
is harmful to the environment and the people as the
watershed is the source of water of the people and a
home for different species of animals. Therefore, the
closure of the Sanitary landfill should be made
permanent.
International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-Biotech Applications. Inc. v.
Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines),
et al., December 8, 2015
From 2007 to 2009, International Service for the
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. (ISAAA)
and the University of the Philippines Los Banos
conducted a contained experiment for the Bt Talong
experiment under the supervision of the National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP),
with certification that all biosafety measures were
compiled and issued in 2010. “Bt Talong '' are
eggplants containing bacillus thingiensis, a soil
bacterium which produces the Cry1Ac protein that is
toxic to the lepidopteran larvae, the most destructive
pest to eggplants. Upon the completion of the
contained experiment, the NCBP certified that all
biosafety measures were complied with, and no
untoward incident had occurred. By 2012, upon
expiration of the Biosafety Permits and the termination
of the field testing, Greenpeace Southeast Asia –
Philippines, Magsasaka at Siyentipiko sa
Pagpapaunlad ng Agrikultura (MASIPAG), and others
(respondents) filed a Petition for Writ of Continuing
Mandamus and Writ of Kalikasan, and a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order against ISAAA
alleging that the BT talong field trials violated their
rights to health and a balanced ecology because the
environmental compliance certificate was not secured
prior to the experiment and there were no scientific
studies that show the organism is safe for human
consumption and for the environment. Should the
Supreme Court grant the petition? On what grounds?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Supreme Court should
grant the petition to enjoin the conduct of the trials.
Applying the Precautionary Principle, Section 1, Rule
20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
which provides:
Section 1. Applicability. - When there is a Jack of full
scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between
human activity and environmental effect, the court
shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it. The constitutional right of the people to
a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the
benefit of the doubt. In this case, the risk of harm from
the field trials of BT Talong remains uncertain and
there exists a possibility of serious and irreversible
harm. Eggplants are a staple vegetable in the country.
Given the country’s rich biodiversity, the
consequences of contamination and genetic pollution
would be disastrous and irreversible. The constitutional
right of the people to a healthful ecology, as provided
in Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution should
be given the benefit of the doubt. Further, since the
scientific evidence as to the safety of Bt talong
remained uncertain, the precautionary principle should
be applied. Hence, the field trials shall be enjoined.
Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et
al., GR No. 189185, August 16, 2016
Sometime during 2009, Private Petitioner Marimar et.al
filed a petition for a writ of preliminary injunction and
prohibition in the RTC against the respondent Mango
Farmers Association Inc. The petitioners complain
regarding the alleged effects of the pesticides the
respondent’s been using for its mango trees since it
destroys root crops and causes some irritation of the
skin and was later found out that somehow it
contributes to the proximate cause. In the respondent’s
answer, they denied the allegation by saying that they
are only following the standards set by the competent
authority for the use of pesticides. Then, the RTC ruled
in favor of the respondents denying the petition for the
writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order and filed a motion for reconsideration but was
then denied again. Do the petitioners need to file an
appeal on the CA?
Suggested Answer: Yes, since clearly it was proven
on the inferior court that somehow the pesticide
contributes to the proximate cause of irritation and
destruction of root crops was the pesticides used by
the respondents. Based on section 15 of article 2 it
was stated that “The state shall protect and promote
the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them” In this case, there’s no
doubt that the RTC erred in making its decision of the
case since the pesticide somehow contributes to the
effects the petitioners have been experiencing. Also, it
is the duty of the state to advance the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology.
Although it is not the primary cause of the effects, the
fact that it contributes to the effect somehow needs to
be regulated or prohibited. Therefore, the petitioners
need to file an appeal to avoid the continuing effects of
the pesticide used.
Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Tanon straits, et al. v.
Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., GR No.
180771, April 21, 2016
An environmental nongovernmental organization,
being the representative of marine mammals adversely
affected, filed a case against QWE corporation for
conducting oil exploration activities in Tañon Strait,
which is declared a protected seascape in 1988. One
of the counter-arguments of the defendant corporation
is that the petitioners in the case have no legal
standing to file the petition, as they argue that parties
to an action, according to Section 1, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, should be either natural or juridical
persons. They further challenge the claim of legal
standing of the NGO on the ground that they are
representing animals, which cannot be parties to an
action. Moreover, the NGO is not the real party-in-
interest since they failed to show how they stand to be
benefited or injured by the decision in the case. Is
there a failure to state a cause of action rendering the
case be dismissed? Explain.
Suggested Answer: NO, there is no failure to state a
cause of action, and thus the case should not be
dismissed. The Supreme Court passed in 2010 the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which
allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen
to file an action before our courts for violations of our
environmental laws. This provision liberalizes standing
for all cases filed enforcing environmental laws and
collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct
interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of
nature. Even though this is primarily a procedural
issue, one of the objectives of the aforementioned
Rules is provided in Section 3, Rule 1 thereof, which
states: “To protect and advance the constitutional right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology.”
Such right is explicitly stated in Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution. Thus, the need to give marine
mammals legal standing has been eliminated by the
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of
nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental
laws. (see Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected
Seascape Tañon Strait v. Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, 21
April 2015)
Imbong v. Ochoa G.R. No. 204819
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health
Act of 2012 (RH Law), despite calls to withhold support
thereto, was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012. Challengers from various sectors of society
came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it
to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting
impact that its decision may produce, the Court now
faces the iris controversy, as presented in fourteen
petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.A perusal of
the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law. Is the RH
Law unconstitutional?
Suggested Answer: The Court declines to rule on its
constitutionality or validity. At any rate, Section 12,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution
and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution
affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of
parents in preparing the youth to become productive
members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development
of their children by recognizing that said role shall be
"primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing
the youth is superior to that of the State. It is also the
inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to
aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important
role in nation building.
Tanada vs. Angara, G.R. 118295, May 2,
1997
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate
concurred in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO was said to
improve the country’s access to foreign markets, open
new opportunities for the services sector, and attract
more investments into the country. However, the parity
provisions and national treatment clauses of the WTO
Agreement were said to contravene the provisions of
Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution. Refute
this argument.
Suggested Answer: The parity provisions and
national treatment clauses do not violate Section 19,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution which provides that
the state shall develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos
and local products. The very title "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies" highly demonstrates that
the principles under this article are not intended to be
self-executing principles ready for enforcement
through the courts, rather used as judiciary aids or
guides in the Court’s exercise of judicial power and by
the Legislature to enact laws. In the case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, it was held that
the principles and state policies enumerated in Article
II and some sections of Article XII are not "self-
executing provisions, the disregard of which can give
rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not
embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but
guidelines for legislation." Furthermore, while the
Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, it did not intend to
pursue an isolationist policy nor did it intend to shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy.
Ass. of Phil. Coconut Desiccators v.PCA,
Feb. 10, 1998
On November 5, 1992, seven desiccated coconut
processing companies belonging to the APCD brought
suit in the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region in Makati, Metro Manila, to enjoin the
PCA from issuing permits to certain applicants for the
establishment of new desiccated coconut processing
plants. Petitioner alleged that the issuance of licenses
to the applicants would violate PCA's Administrative
Order No. 02, series of 1991, as the applicants were
seeking permits to operate in areas considered
"congested" under the administrative order. While,
PCA then proceeded to issue "certificates of
registration" to those wishing to operate desiccated
coconut processing plants, this prompted the petitioner
to appeal to the Office of the President of the
Philippines on April 26, 1993 not to approve the
resolution in question. This petition is GRANTED.
What constitutional law would justify this decision?
Suggested Answer: Our Constitutions, beginning with
the 1935 document, have repudiated laissez-faire as
an economic principle. Although the present
Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it
nonetheless reserves to the government the power to
intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare provisions of Art. XII of the Constitution Sec. 6.
Individuals and private groups, including corporations,
cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall
have the right to own, establish, and operate economic
enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to promote
distributive justice and to intervene when the common
good so demands. Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or
prohibit monopolies when the public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair
competition shall be allowed.
PLDT v. NTC, G.R. No. 88404, October 18,
1990
Brewed coffee telecommunications is one of the
biggest mobile networks in the Philippines. One day, a
new company named Aquaflask mobile Inc, applied to
the NTC in order to establish telecommunication for
domestic use which requires that it share a network
with Brewed coffee telecommunications. However,
Brewed coffee telecommunications protested to the
NTC that it should not share the network with
Aquaflask mobile Inc, claiming that NTC would be
depriving the company. The NTC did not grant the
complaint. Can Brewed coffee telecommunications
really share the network with Aquaflask mobile?
Suggested Answer: Yes, this is because the NTC
regulates the use of communications. Furthermore, as
stated in section 24 of Article 2 of the 1987
constitution, it states that communications and
information are vital to nation building. In this case the
NTC was merely exercising its power to make sure
that telecommunications would be reaching more
people. Hence, Brewed Coffee telecommunications
cannot refuse the policies of the NTC.
Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52
On july 11, 1983, the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created under
P.D. 1869 pursuant to the government’s policy to
regulate and centralize through an appropriate
institution all games of chance authorized by existing
franchise or permitted by law. As a result, all games of
chance and other such forms of gambling under PD
1869 became allowed in the country, and have even
been advertised as “responsible gambling.” It was
proved that regulating and centralizing gambling
operations in one corporate entity was beneficial not
just to the government but to society in general. The
funds generated by PAGCOR have been used in the
building of infrastructure and socio-civic structures as
well as creating recreational and integral spaces that
improve the country’s existing tourist attractions.
Basco, a taxpayer and lawyer, sought to null P.D.1869
for violating the constitution. He claimed that P.D. 1869
is unconstitutional in that (a) it waived the Manila City
government’s right to impose taxes and license fees,
which is recognized by law; (b) the law has intruded
into the local government’s right to impose local taxes
and license fees, which enshrines the principle of local
autonomy,(c) violates the equal protection clause of
the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR while most
other forms of gambling are outlawed; and (d) it
violates the avowed trend of the COry government
away from monopolistic and crony economy, and
toward the free enterprise and privatization. He
claimed it was violating sections 11, 12, and 13 of
Article 2, Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of
Article XIV of the 1987 COnstitution. Is Basco right in
that PD 1869 is unconstitutional for regulating
gambling? Explain
Suggested Answer: The court cannot pass judgment
on questions of “morality, monopoly, trend to free
enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles
on social justice, role of youth and educational values”
being raised, as that is up to the Congress to
determine. Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by
law, is generally prohibited. However, this prohibition
does not mean that the government cannot regulate it
in the exercise of its police power. The concept of
police power is defined in Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA
481, 487 as the “state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order
to promote the general welfare.”
Limbonas v. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786
Atty. Pedro was the elected Speaker of the Regional
Legislative Assembly of Central Mindanao. In his
capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII, he
informed the Assembly members through the
Assembly Secretary that there shall be no upcoming
session as his presence was needed in Manila for a
congress hearing. However, the Assembly still held a
session while he was absent, thus, he was unseated
from his position.
The SC received a resolution from the Assembly
expressly expelling Atty. Pedro’s membership
therefrom. Atty. Pedro then petitioned that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and
have him reinstated as Member and speaker. The
Assembly argued that Atty. Pedro had "filed a case
before the Supreme Court against some members of
the Assembly on a question which should have been
resolved within the confines of the Assembly.”
Should the SC assume jurisdiction over autonomous
government in Mindanao and grant Atty. Pedro’s
petition to be reinstated as Member and speaker?
Suggested Answer: Yes, the SC assumes jurisdiction
and have the court grant Atty. Pedro’s petition to be
reinstated as Member and speaker.
Article X Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution states that,
“The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.”
Section 2 states that, “The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.”
In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with
minimum intervention from central authorities.
However, as a legislative arm, the autonomous
governments of Mindanao are subject to the
jurisdiction of the national courts.
Furthermore, The Presidential Decree No. 1618,
mandates that “the President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions.” Thus, the Regional Legislative Assembly of
Central Mindanao, their legislative arm, is made to
dischage chiefly administrative services. Further
emphasizing that the SC should assume jurisdiction.
Legaspi vs CSC, 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
Ralph Alvarez wanted to know if a certain Rufino
Requina and Joane Tapnio had civil service eligibility
as sanitation employees. He then sought from the Civil
Service Commission for their information. CSC then
refused stating that Alvarez was not entitled to the
information. He then instituted an action asking the
Court to compel the Civil Service Commission to
provide the information. Alvarez also claimed that his
right to be informed of the eligibility of the sanitation
employees is guaranteed by the Constitution and that
he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
acquire the information. Can Alvarez access the
government records to validate the civil service
eligibility of the employees?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Alvarez can access the
government records to validate the civil service
eligibility of the employees. Under Article 2, Section 28
of the Philippine constitution, subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest. Since Alvarez is
asking for the government records to validate the
eligibility of the employees, he is entitled to said
records because the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest. In the case of Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, the Supreme Court held that the
 the government agencies have no discretion to refuse
disclosure of, or access to, information of public
concern because the Constitution guarantees access
to such information. Both the 1973 (Art. IV, Sec. 6) and
1987 (Art. III, Sec. 7) constitutions recognize the right
of the people to information on matters of public
concern. They supply the rules by means of which the
right to information may be enjoyed by guaranteeing
the right and mandating the duty to afford access to
sources of information. It has been further enhanced in
the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of
full public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law," in Article II, Section 28.
Therefore, Alvarez can access the government records
to validate the civil service eligibility of the employees.
Valmonte vs Belmonte, 170 SCRA 256
(1989)
A group of concerned individuals, organized by Juana,
seeks to know about specific financial transactions
concerning the "National Finance Authority" (NFA), an
agency of the government. They believe it is crucial for
citizens to know that some high-ranking government
employees may have acquired substantial sums of
money provided by the NFA. Juana and her group
want to see the NFA's financial records and papers
pertaining to these transactions. They assert that the
general public has the right to this information in order
to guarantee transparency and avoid government
misconduct. The NFA, on the other hand, refuses to
give the requested data, claiming that financial records
contain confidential data about government employees
and should be kept private. They claim that these
individuals' right to privacy ought to be honored. Based
on the situation at hand, please answer this question:
Are Juana and her group entitled to examine the
National Finance Authority's (NFA) financial records,
irrespective of concerns about government employees'
privacy?
Suggested Answer: Yes, despite the concerns about
the government officials' privacy, Juana and her group
have the right to look into the National Finance
Authority's (NFA) financial records. The legal basis is
based on the principles stated in the case of Valmonte
VS. Belmonte. It underlines the importance of citizens'
access to information in participating in government
decisions and preventing abuses by the government.
The case further emphasizes that having the right to
privacy is a right enjoyed by individuals that is not
enforceable by organizations such as the NFA. The
right to privacy can only be asserted by the individual
whose privacy has been allegedly breached. Applying
the principles of the case of Valmonte VS. Belmonte,
Juana and her group are requesting access to the
NFA's financial records, which they believe are of
public concern and significance. As in the case of
Valmonte VS. Belmonte, the right of the public to know
about governmental financial transactions serves as
essential for transparency as well as the prevention of
corruption. As stated, the right to privacy is an
individual privilege that the NFA cannot use to withhold
details concerning public financial problems. Because
the NFA handles public funds, it must be transparent,
and the general public has a genuine interest in
knowing where or how that government money is
used. In conclusion, Juana and her group are allowed
to access the NFA's financial records under the
standards established in the cited case.
De Jesus vs. COA, G.R. 109023, August
12, 1998
Juan, et al. were employees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA). Prior to July 1, 1989, they
were receiving honoraria as designated members of
the LWUA Board Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification,
Bids and Awards Committee. On July 1, 1989, Rep.
Act 6758, entitled An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in
the Government and For Other Purposes, took effect.
Section 12* the said law provides for the consolidation
of allowances and additional compensation into
standardized salary rates. Certain additional
compensations, however, were exempted from
consolidation. To implement Rep. Act 6758, the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC
No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective
November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits
granted on top of basic salary. Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-
CCC No. 10 provides: "Payment of other
allowances/fringe benefits and all other forms of
compensation granted on top of basic salary, whether
in cash or in kind, shall be discontinued effective
November 1, 1989. Payment made for such
allowances/fringe benefits after said date shall be
considered as illegal disbursement of public funds."
Pursuant to the aforesaid Law and Circular, Pedro, as
corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the
payment of honoraria to Juan, et al. The latter filed an
appeal before the COA on the validity of the subject
Circular, arguing that the latter was void for being
inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the
law it is supposed to implement) and for having not
been published in the Official Gazette. COA dismissed
the appeal. Hence, the instant petition. Should the
petition of Juan and company be granted?
 members of the Senate. A former senator had said, "it
Suggested Answer: Yes. DBM-CCC No. 10 is void
is completely wrong, if not erroneous," and "is an
for failing to adhere to the publication requirement as
amendment of the Constitution by misinterpretation."
enunciated in Tanada v. Tuvera. COA should return
Some members of the Lower House agree with
the petitioners' withheld honoraria. Therefore, the
Secretary Ordonez, while others lament the latter's
petition of Juan and company is granted.
opinion as "questionable, unfortunate, and without any
basis at all." (1989 Bar)
Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace
Panel, GR 183591, Oct. 14, 2008 Do you or do you not agree with the
aforementioned ruling of the Department of
In August 2008, the signing of the Memorandum of
Justice? Why?
Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
A: NO. The Constitution provides that if foreign military
(GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
bases, troops or facilities are to be allowed after the
raised profound legal and constitutional concerns. In
expiration of the present Philippine-American Military
light of the Philippines' Declaration of Principles and
Bases Agreement in 1991, it must be "under a treaty
State Policies as enshrined in its Constitution, Can the
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the
BJE be considered as a state?
Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the
votes cast by the people in a national referendum."
Suggested Answer: Yes, the BJE can be considered
(Art. XVIII, sec. 25) A mere agreement, therefore, not a
as a state. According to Section 2, state ownership of
treaty, without the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the
all lands of the public domain of all natural resources in
members of the Senate will not be valid (Art. VII, sec.
the Philippines. Section 9, the National Economic and
21, Art. XVIII, sec. 4). With respect to the provision
Development Authority (NEDA) may head an
allowing nuclear weapons within the bases, the
independent economic and planning agency for the
Constitution appears to ban such weapons from the
country and, Section 20, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Philippine territory. It declares as a state policy that
(BSP) as an independent monetary authority the MOA-
"the Philippines, consistent with the national interest,
AD violates Article XII of the Constitution.
adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in its territory." (Art, II, sec. 8) However, the
Here, the BJE can be considered as a state because it
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would
is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the
seem to indicate that this provision of the Constitution
autonomous region recognized in the Constitution, the
is "not something absolute nor 100 percent without
status of its relationship with the national government
exception." It may therefore be that circumstances
being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM.
may justify a provision on nuclear weapons.
BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria
laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely a
permanent population, a defined territory, a Q: Does the 1987 Constitution provide for a policy of
government and a capacity to enter into relations with transparency in matters of public interest? Explain.
other states. The MOA-AD would not necessarily sever (1989 Bar)
any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it
runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial A: YES, the 1987 Constitution provides for a policy of
integrity of the Republic. transparency in matters of public interest. Section 28,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Thus, BJE can be considered as a state.
1. "Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law,
BAR Q&A the State adopts and implements a policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public
Q: The Secretary of Justice had recently ruled that the
interest,"
President may negotiate for a modification or
extension of military bases agreement with the United
2. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states:
States regardless of the "no nukes" provisions in the
"The right of the people to information on matters of
1987 Constitution. The President forthwith announced
public concern shall be recognized, Access to official
that she finds the same opinion "acceptable" and will
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
adopt it. The Senators on the other hand, led by the
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
Senate President, are skeptical, and had even warned
government research data used as basis for policy
that no treaty or international agreement may go into
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
effect without the concurrence of two-thirds of all
such limitations as may be provided by law."
 3. Section 20, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:
"The records and books of account of the Congress
shall be preserved and be open to the public in
accordance with law, and such books shall be audited
by the Commission on Audit which shall publish
annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and
expenses incurred for each member."
4. Under Section 17, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the sworn statement of assets, liabilities
and net worth of the President, the Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme
Court, the Constitutional Commission and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces
with general or flag rank filed upon their assumption of
office shall be disclosed to the public in the manner
provided by law.
5. Section 21, Article XII of the Constitution declares:
"Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed
by the government shall be made available to the
public."
6. As held in Valmonte vs. Belmonte, G.R. No. 74930,
Feb. 13, 1989, these provisions on public disclosures
are intended to enhance the role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking
abuse in government.
Q: What is the state policy on: (1994 Bar)
a) working women?
b) ecology?
c) the symbols of statehood?
d) cultural minorities?
e) science and technology?
a) Section 14, Article XIII of the Constitution provides:
"The State shall protect WORKING WOMEN by
providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking
into account their maternal functions, and such
facilities and opportunities that will enhance their
welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in
the service of the nation."
b) Section 16, Article II of the Constitution provides:
The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people and their posterity to a balanced and healthful
ECOLOGY in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature."
c) Section 1, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
"The FLAG OF THE PHILIPPINES shall be red, white,
and blue, with a sun and three stars, as consecrated
and honored by the people and recognized by law."
Section 2, Article XVI of the Constitution states: The
Congress may by law, adopt a new name for the
country, a national anthem, or a national seal, which
shall all be truly reflective and symbolic of the ideals,
history, and traditions of the people. Such law shall
take effect only upon its ratification by the people in a
national referendum."
d) Section 22, Article II of the Constitution provides:
The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES within the
framework of national unity and development."
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution reads: The
State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national development policies and programs, shall
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social
and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights or relations
in determining the ownership and extent of the
ancestral domains."
Section 6, Art. XIII of the Constitution provides: The
State shall apply the principles of AGRARIAN
REFORM or stewardship, whenever applicable in
accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of
other natural resources, including lands of the public
domain under lease or concession suitable to
agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of
small settlers, and the rights of indigenous
communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farm
workers in its own agricultural estates which shall be
distributed to them in the manner provided by law."
Section 17. Article XIV of the Constitution states: "The
State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to preserve and
develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It
shall consider these rights in the formulation of
national plans and policies."
e) Section 17, Article II of the Constitution provides:
"The State shall give priority to EDUCATION,
SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE,
and SPORTS to foster patriotism and nationalism,
accelerate social progress, and promote total human
liberation and development."
Section 14, Article XII of the Constitution reads in part:
"The sustained development of a reservoir of
NATIONAL TALENTS consisting of Filipino scientists,
entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level A: The DOCTRINE OF INCORPORATION means that
technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen the rules of International law form part of the law of the
shall be promoted by the State, The State shall land and no legislative action is required to make them
encourage appropriate technology and regulate Its applicable to a country. The Philippines follows this
transfer for the national benefit. doctrine, because Section 2. Article II of the
Constitution states that the Philippines adopts the
Sub-section 2, Section 3. Article XIV of the generally accepted principles of international law as
Constitution states: "They (EDUCATIONAL part of the law of the land.
INSTITUTIONS) shall inculcate patriotism and
nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human Q: En route to the tuna fishing grounds in
rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the
the Pacific Ocean, a vessel registered in
historical development of the country, teach the rights
and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and Country TW entered the Balintang
spiritual values, develop moral character and personal Channel north of Babuyan Island and with
discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, special hooks and nets dragged up red
broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and corals found near Batanes. By
promote vocational efficiency."
international convention certain corals are
Section 10. Article XIV of the Constitution declares: protected species, just before the vessel
"SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY are essential for reached the high seas, the Coast Guard
national development and progress. The State shall patrol intercepted the vessel and seized
give priority to research and development, invention, its cargo including tuna. The master of the
innovation, and their utilization; and to science and
vessel and the owner of the cargo
technology education, training, services. It shall
support indigenous, appropriate, and self-reliant protested, claiming the rights of transit
scientific and cultural capabilities, and their application passage and innocent passage, and
to the country's productive systems and national life." sought recovery of the cargo and the
release of the ship. Is the claim
Section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution provides:
meritorious or not? Reason briefly. (2004
"The Congress may provide for incentives, including
TAX DEDUCTIONS, to encourage private participation Bar)
in programs of basic and applied scientific research.
Scholarships, grants-in-aid or other forms of incentives A: The claim of innocent passage is not
shall be provided to deserving science students, meritorious. While the vessel has the right of
researchers, scientists, investors, technologists, and innocent passage, it should not commit a violation
specially gifted citizens." of any international convention. The vessel did
not merely navigate through the territorial sea, it
Section 12, Article XIV of the Constitution reads: The also dragged red corals in violation of the
State shall regulate the transfer and promote the
international convention which protected the red
adaptation of technology from all sources for the
corals. This is prejudicial to the good order of the
national benefit. It shall encourage widest participation
of private groups, local governments, and community Philippines. (Article 19(2) of the Convention on
based organizations in the generation and utilization of the Law of the Sea)
science and technology."
Q: The City Mayor issues an Executive
Order declaring that the city promotes
Q: What do you understand by the
responsible parenthood and upholds
"Doctrine of Incorporation" in
natural family planning. He prohibits all
Constitutional Law? (1997 Bar) hospitals operated by the city from
prescribing the use of artificial methods of
contraception, including condoms, pills,
intrauterine devices and surgical
sterilization. As a result, poor women
in his city lost their access to affordable family Q: The Philippine Government is negotiating a new
planning programs. Private clinics, however, continue security treaty with the United States which could
to render family planning counsel and devices to involve engagement in joint military operations of the
paying clients. (2007 Bar) two countries’ armed forces. A loose organization of
(a) Is the Executive Order in any way constitutionally Filipinos, the Kabataan at Matatandang Makabansa
infirm? Explain. (KMM) wrote the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
(b) Is the Philippines in breach of any obligation under and the Department of National Defense (DND)
international law? Explain. demanding disclosure of the details of the
(c) May the Commission on Human Rights order the negotiations, as well as copies of the minutes of the
Mayor to stop the implementation of the Executive meetings. The DFA and the DND refused, contending
Order? Explain. that premature disclosure of the offers and counter-
offers between the parties could jeopardize on-going
A: The Executive Order is constitutionally infirm. Under
negotiations with another country. KMM filed suit to
the 1987 Constitution, the State shall defend the right
compel disclosure of the negotiation details, and be
of spouses to establish a family in accordance with
granted access to the records of the meetings,
their religious convictions and the demands of
invoking the constitutional right of the people to
responsible parenthood. (Art. XV, Sec. 3[1]). By
information on matters of public concern. Decide with
upholding natural family planning and prohibiting city
reason. (2009 Bar)
hospitals from prescribing artificial methods of
contraception, the Mayor is imposing his religious A: The petition of KMM must be denied. Diplomatic
beliefs on spouses who rely on the services of city negotiations are privileged in order to encourage a
hospitals. This clearly violates the above section of the frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the
Constitution. parties by shielding the negotiations from public view
{Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquinb, 558 SCRA
Moreover, the 1987 Constitution states that no person 468 [2008])
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Art.
(#30) Congressman Sugar Oll authored a bill called
III, Sec. 1). The Constitution also provides that the
HB No. 0056 which legalizes jueteng. When the Bill
state shall promote a just and dynamic social order
became law (RA10156), Fr. Nosu Gal, a priest, filed a
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the
petition seeking for the nullification of RA 10156 on the
nation and free the people from poverty through
ground that it is unconstitutional as it violates Section
policies that provide adequate social services, promote
13 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution which states
full employment, a rising standard of living and an
that “The state recognizes the vital role of the youth in
improved quality of life for all. (Art. II, Section 9). The
nation-building and shall promote and protect their
loss of access of poor city women to family planning
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-
programs is discriminatory and creates suspect
being”. Fr. Gal filed the petition as a concerned citizen
classification. It also goes against the demands of
and as a taxpayer. Does Fr. Gal have a locus standi?
social justice as enshrined in the immediately
preceding provision. ANSWER: a. No, because Fr. Gal has no personal and
substantial interest that will be prejudiced by the
Q: The Mayor of San Jose City appointed his wife,
implementation of the law.
Amelia, as City Treasurer from among three (3)
(#74) In international law, it is a norm which States
employees of the city considered for the said
cannot derogate or deviate from their agreements:
position. Prior to said promotion, Amelia had been
ANSWER: d. jus cogens
an Assistant City Treasurer for ten (10) years, that
(#77) The doctrine considers the general customary
is, even before she married the City Mayor. Should
norms of international law as part of the municipal law
the Civil Service Commission approve the
and are to be enforced as such, without regards as to
promotional appointment of Amelia? Why or why
whether they are enacted as statutory or legislative
not? (2008 Bar)
rules or not.
A: The Civil Service Commission should disapprove ANSWER: c. Incorporation
the promotional appointment of Amelia. Section 59 (1),
Chapter 7, Title I, Subsection A, Book V of the
Administrative Code prohibits all appointments of a
relative of the appointing authority within the third
degree if a consanguinity or affinity. The prohibition
applies to all appointments, whether original or
promotional (Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission,
237 SCRA 184 [1994])
Q: Congress passed a bill appropriating PlOO-billion.
Part of the money is to be used for the purchase of a
200-hectare property in Antipolo. The rest shall be
spent for the development of the area and the
construction of the Universal Temple for All the World's
Faiths (UTAW-F). When completed, the site will be
open, free of charge, to all religions, beliefs, and faiths,
where each devotee or believer shall be
accommodated and treated in a fair and equal manner,
without distinction, favor, or prejudice. There will also
be individual segments or zones in the area which can
be used for the conduct of whatever rituals, services,
sacraments, or ceremonials that may be required by
the customs or practices of each particular religion.
The President approved the bill, happy in the thought
that this could start the healing process of our
wounded country and encourage people of varied and
often conflicting faiths to live together in harmony and
in peace. If the law is questioned on the ground that it
violates Sec. 5, Article III of the Constitution that "no
law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," how
will you resolve the challenge? Explain. (5%)
A: The contention must be rejected. The use of the site
temple will not be limited a particular religious sect. it
will be made available to all religious sects. The
temporary use of public property for religious purposes
without discrimination does not violate the Constitution.
(Ignacio v. De la Cruz, 99 Phil. 346 [1956]; People v.
Fernandez, 40 O.G. 1089 [1956]).
State A and State B, two sovereign states, enter into a
10-year mutual defense treaty. After five years, State A
finds that the more progressive State B did not go to
the aid of State A when it was threatened by its strong
neighbor State C. State B reasoned that it had to be
prudent and deliberate in reacting to State C because
of their existing trade treaties. (2017 Bar)
(a) May State A now unilaterally withdraw from its
mutual defense treaty with State B? Explain your
answer.
(b) What is the difference between the principles of
pacta sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus in
international law?
(c) Are the principles of pacta sunt servanda and rebus
sic stantibus relevant in the treaty relations between
State A and State B? What about in the treaty relations
between State B and State C? Explain your answer.
A:(a) State A may unilaterally withdraw from the
mutual defense treaty, State B committed a material
breach of the treaty by failing to come to the aid of
State A (Art. 60-0) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties; Kolb, The Law of Treaties, p. 220;
Aust, Modern Treaty Lawand Practice, pp. 236-237).
(b) “Pacta sunt servanda means that every treaty in
force is binding upon the States who are parties to it
and States must perform their obligation in good faith
(Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 188550, August 19, 2013,
704 SCRA 216).
Rebus sic stantibus means that a fundamental change
of circumstances, which occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty and
which was not foreseen by the parties may not be
invoked for withdrawing from a treaty unless their
existence constituted an essential basis of the consent
of the parties and their effect is to radically transform
the extent of the obligations still to be performed
(Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties).
(c) Yes. Pacta sunt servanda was what bound State A
and State B to comply with their obligations under their
mutual defense treaty, despite the existing trade
agreements between State B and State C. Article 62 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which
enunciates the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, on the
other hand, can be invoked by State B as the reason
why it did not comply with its mutual defense treaty.
Treaty is concluded with the implied condition that it is
intended to be binding only as long as there is no vital
change in the circumstances. To State B, compliance
with the treaty would jeopardize its vital trade
development, Because of this unforeseen change of
circumstances combined with State B’s non-
compliance with its obligations under the treaty in good
faith, State A may now opt to unilaterally withdraw from
the treaty.
Q: Congress enacted a law to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to a full range of modern family planning
methods, including contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectibles, non- abortifacient hormonal
contraceptives, and family planning products and
supplies, but expressly prohibited abortion. To ensure
its objectives, the law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of
modern family planning methods, supplies and
services, for schools to provide reproductive health
education, for non-governmental medical practitioners
to render mandatory 48 hours pro bono reproductive
health services as a condition to Philhealth
accreditation, and for couples desiring to marry to
attend a family planning seminar prior to the issuance
of a marriage license. It also punishes certain acts of
refusals to carry out its mandates. The spouses
Aguiluz, both Roman Catholics, filed a petition to
declare the law as unconstitutional based on, among
others, the following grounds:
(a) It violates the right to life, since it practically
sanctions abortion. Despite express terms prohibiting
abortion, petitioners claim that the family planning
products and supplies oppose the initiation of life,
which is a fundamental human right, and the sanction
of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an
affront to the dignity of man.
(b) It violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to render 48 hours of pro bono
reproductive health services which may be against
their will.
(c) It violates the Freedom of Religion, since
petitioners' religious beliefs prevent them from using
contraceptives, and that any State- sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, funded by taxes,
violates the guarantee of religious freedom.
Rule on each of the above objections. (2.5% each)
(2018 Bar)
(a) The law in question does not sanction abortion
even in practical terms. In the case of Imbong v.
Ochoa (GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014), the law on its
face expressly mentioned that abortion is not
permissible, and this was the determinative factor in
making the ruling. In the same case, the Court also
found that the RH law was replete with provisions that
embody the policy of protecting the unborn from the
moment of fertilization.
In addition, the majority of the court believes that the
question of when life starts is a scientific and medical
issue; hence, the Court refused to make a ruling on
this issue.
(b) Involuntary servitude denotes compulsion or
coercion to do something either through force, threats,
intimidation or other means. The accreditation with the
PhilHealth, as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case
of Imbong v. Ochoa, should be viewed as an incentive
and not a punishment. These health service providers
also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide. Clearly, there is no
compulsion, force or threat upon them to render the
pro bono services against their will.
(c) What is prohibited in the Constitution is the
establishment of a state religion. While the
establishment clause in the Constitution restricts what
the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government.
They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrine as policy for everyone, nor can they
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do
so would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus establish a state religion (Imbong v.
Ochoa, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014).
the treaty.
Q: The unabated rise of criminality and the reported
identification of delinquent children loitering in the wee
hours of the night prompted City Z to implement a
curfew ordinance. Minors unaccompanied or
unsupervised on the streets by their parents or
guardians between 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M. may be
apprehended by law enforcers subject to certain
exclusive exceptions. These exceptions are: 1. minors
running lawful errands, such as buying of medicines,
using telecommunications facilities for emergency
purposes and the like; 2. night school students; and 3.
minors working at night. Minors apprehended for
violation of the curfew ordinance shall be required to
undergo counseling, accompanied by their
parents/guardians. (2019 Bar)
(a) Does the curfew ordinance violate the primary right
and duty of parents to rear their children? Explain.
(2.5%)
(b) Does the curfew ordinance infringe any of the
minors' fundamental rights? Explain. (2.5%)
A:(a) No, the Curfew Ordinances are but examples of
legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. They may be
validly imposed by the state as parens patriae, and be
considered as its inherent right and duty to aid parents
in the moral development of their children, and, thus,
assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations. Under the Constitution, the State
can properly conclude that parents and others,
teachers for example, who have the primary
responsibility for children's well-being, are entitled to
the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of
that responsibility. (SPARK v. Quezon City, (GR. No.
225442, August 8, 2017)
(b) The subject ordinances can be considered as
unduly impairing minors' reasonable exercise of their
rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among
others. Their freedom of association and right to
peaceful assembly can be considered as effectively
curtailed because they are hindered from participating
in legitimate activities during certain hours of the day,
like political rallies or school meetings, as they may be
apprehended if they are caught out on the streets at
the specified hours, even if they would be just on their
way to or returning from said legitimate activities. This
hindrance necessarily includes a suppression of their
religious freedom as they would be, by reason of said
curfew ordinance, effectively be prevented from
attending religious activities during the specified hours.
Needles to state, all of these prohibitions constitute
curtailments on their freedom of expression (SPARKS
v Quezon City, G R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017)
Q: The United Nations General Assembly unanimously
passed a Resolution expressing the commitment of its
members to pass law and related policies that would
provide incentives for all citizens of the planet to
change their lifestyles so that the impending disasters
brought about by climate change can be avoided or
mitigated.
As the principal legal adviser of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, you are asked this query; Is this
General Assembly Resolution a valid source of State
obligation under international law? Explain briefly.
(2020/2021 Bar)
A: Yes, it can be considered as a valid source of State
obligation under international law.
It is to be noted that the subject resolution
unanimously approved by the United Nations General
Assembly covers only a basic commitment to pass
laws and related policies, which may differ or vary in
each state, to avoid impending disasters that may be
brought about by climate change. This general
commitment would be consistent with the universally
acknowledged right of all persons and all states to
have a balanced and healthful ecology.
This unanimously approved resolution expressing this
general commitment can be said to partake of the
nature of an international convention establishing a
rule, i.e., on the general avoidance of impending
disasters that may be brought about by climate
change, and also by virtue of its unanimous approval,
as a generally accepted principle of international law. It
is established that such are among the recognized
sources of State obligation under international law.
(Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38)
No, it cannot be considered as a source of State
obligation under International Law because it is a mere
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly and
cannot be said to be among any of acknowledged
sources of international law, which are international
conventions, international custom, general principles of
international law and judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.
(Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38)

Dynamics Among
the Branches of the
Government
De la Llana vs Alba (1982)
Question: Judge of the 7th RTC branch of Cebu city,
Judge Lil Pump filed a case questioning the
constitutionality of a newly enacted law named Batas
Pambansa blg. 98765 also named as "An act
reorganizing the judiciary, appropriating funds,
therefore other purposes." He claims that the law is not
a proper delegation of power to President Kanye West
because according to Judge Pump, it gives the
president the power to "fix the allowances of the
Judges and it impairs the independence of the
judiciary. The Supreme Court held that the law was not
violative of the Constitution. Do you agree with the
decision of the Supreme Court in this case?
Suggested Answer: Yes, The Batas Pambansa blg
129 is essential for the major reorganization of the
judiciary. As held by the supreme court in the case of
Delana vs. Alba, the court had decided that It is a
fundamental proposition that the legislative power to
create courts ordinarily includes the power to organize
and to reorganize them, and that the power to abolish
courts is generally co-extensive with the power to
create them. The power to abolish was not intended to
be qualified by the permanence of tenure. The law
does not violate the principle of the separation of
powers as contended by Judge Lil Pump, the
legislative was merely exercising its power, in
accordance to the constitution to to create laws and it
was not interfering with the due process or procedures
that the judiciary is vested. Hence, the petition that
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is unconstitutional is false.
Laureta and Maravilla, GR No. 68635
Question: Atty. Doraemon and his client Nobita lose in
a case decided by the Supreme Court and filed a
complaint before the office of the Ombudsman
charging the three justices, Justice Damulag, Justice
Soneo, and Justice Shizuka with explicitly and
purposefully rendering an unjust decision in violation of
the existing penal laws of the country. Does the office
of the Ombudsman have the power to review the
decisions of the Supreme Court? Why? Why not?
Suggested Answer: No, the office of the Ombudsman
has the power to review the decisions of the Supreme
Court. As postulated in section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution that the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law. The Supreme Court is
considered as the highest court in the land, to allow
Atty. Doraemon and his client Nobita to go beyond the
Supreme Court’s resolution and claim that the Justices
Damulag, Soneo, and Shizuka acted with full and
deliberate intent in rendering unjust decision is a clear
violation of their high office’s duty to act independently
and undermine its role as the final arbiter of all
justiciable disputes.
Hence, as mentioned in RE: Laureta and Maravilla
with G.R. No. 68635, it was stated that “The Supreme
Court is entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to
adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public
and private. No other department or agency may pass
upon its judgments or declare them unjust”. Therefore,
the office of the Ombudsman has no power to
intervene with the affairs of the highest court in the
Philippines.
Mantruste System vs CA,
179 SCRA 136 (1989)
Question: On 1 January 1987, the President of the
Philippines issued Proclamation No. 6969 creating the
Privatization Commission and one of the government
properties that is subject to privatization is the Manila
Heart Center (MHC). This proclamation, not being
inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been
repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained
operative. The Privatization Commission commenced
the bidding process absent any grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
on its part and ABC Corporation won the bidding. A
group of doctors from MHC filed a petition for
injunction to the lower court to enjoin the Privatization
Commission from transferring the MHC to the winning
bidder. Can the lower court issue an injunction to the
Privatization Commission from transferring the MHC to
the winning bidder? Explain.
Suggested Answer: No, the lower court cannot issue
an injunction to the Privatization Commission. In the
case of Mantruste System vs. CA, it held that Courts
may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT,
nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its
functions and the implementation of its decisions in
connection with the acquisition, sale, or disposition of
assets transferred to it. There can be no justification
for judicial interference in the business of an
 administrative agency, except when it violates a
citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave
abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without
jurisdiction. Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution also
provides that the power of the courts over the other
branches and instrumentalities of the Government is
limited only to the determination of "whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their
authority and in the performance of their assigned
tasks.
In this case, the lower court cannot issue an injunction
against the Privatization Commission for the transfer of
MHC to the winning bidders. The Proclamation is
consistent with the Constitution and there’s no violation
of citizen's constitutional rights or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
the exercise of Privatization Commission’s authority
and in the performance of its assigned tasks. There’s
no justification for judicial interference in the business
of the Privatization Commission. Hence, the lower
court cannot issue an injunction to the Privatization
Commission.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
Question: Majimbu, an international student in the
United States of America, was being deported on the
grounds that he had overstayed his student visa. He
was asked to show cause for him not to be deported.
After a hearing, the immigration judge ordered that
Majimbu’s deportation be suspended on the grounds
that he would suffer “extreme hardship” should he be
deported. Under Act 1234, the attorney general can
recommend for suspension of deportation and if it is
conveyed to Congress, the house has the power to
veto the AG’s determination. The house decided to
veto the order of the Judge and Majimbu was
deported. Is the part of the act authorizing a “one-
house veto” constitutional?
Suggested Answer: No, the act is not constitutional.
The act violated explicit constitutional standards of
lawmaking and congressional authority According to
the case of INS v. Chadha, an act that would give the
legislative branch the power to alter the legal rights,
duties, and regulation of persons, and executive
branch officials, is outside of its domain and power.
This is inconsistent with the fundamental constitutional
concept of checks and balances hence the act is
unconstitutional.
Senate Blue Ribbon vs Majaducon,
GR 136760, July 29, 2003
Question: General Lacson, was called by the Senate
Blue Ribbon committee, held by Senator Darth Vader
because they wanted to investigate certain allegations
about funds being misused by the AFP. The general
had contested this by claiming that is not within the
scope of the legislative department to interfere with the
dealings of the executive department. The General
filed a petition in the court and it held in favor of
General Lacson, at the protest of the senators. Can
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee in the investigation
of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the
AFP-RSBS funds, compel private citizens to appear
and testify before it?
Suggested Answer: Yes. The Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee has the authority to compel private citizens
to testify. By virtue of the Congress’s power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. This power is derived
from Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, which
is not limited to matters that are already pending
before Congress but also even matters that are purely
executive in nature. Furthermore, as it was held in the
case of Senate Blue Ribbon vs. Majaducon, the
Supreme Court had ruled that if there is a clear
legislative purpose, the Senate may conduct
investigations. In conclusion, the Senate may conduct
hearings because it is within its scope as mandated by
the law itself.
CHECKS AND BALANCES
Francisco, et al. vs. HR, et al.,
Question: In 2002, the House of Representatives
initiated an investigation into the disbursements and
expenditures from the Judiciary Development Fund
(JDF) by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In
2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed the first
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices, citing
constitutional violations, betrayal of public trust, and
other high crimes. The House Committee on Justice
found the first complaint sufficient in form but
dismissed it for insufficient substance. Later in 2003, a
second impeachment complaint was filed against Chief
Justice Davide, based on the results of the legislative
inquiry prompted by the House Resolution. Numerous
legal petitions were subsequently filed, with many
arguing that the second impeachment complaint was
unconstitutional, as it appeared to violate the one-year
restriction on initiating impeachment proceedings
against the same official, as stipulated in Section 5 of
Article XI of the Constitution. Is it within the scope of
judicial review to assess whether the Constitution has
excluded impeachment proceedings?
Suggested Answer: No, the act is not constitutional.
The act violated explicit constitutional standards of
lawmaking and congressional authority According to
the case of INS v. Chadha, an act that would give the
legislative branch the power to alter the legal rights,
duties, and regulation of persons, and executive
branch officials, is outside of its domain and power.
This is inconsistent with the fundamental constitutional
concept of checks and balances hence the act is
unconstitutional.
Suggested Answer: Yes. The judiciary has the
capacity to determine whether the proceedings of
impeachment have violated the Constitution. This is
because as held in the case of Fransico vs. HR, the
Supreme Court held that the courts are mindful of the
essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation
of powers among the legislative, executive, or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that
part of the governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people. Furthermore, the case stated that
the doctrine of checks and balances is very important
because it is the Constitution itself that designates this
power among the three branches of the government.
In this case, it is within the scope of the judiciary to
examine impeachment proceedings since it merely
upholds what the constitution has given to the
department.
Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005;
David, et al., April 20, 2006.
Question: The Senate Pink ribbon committee had
invited members of the military and the Secretary of
Defense in order to inquire about an alleged corruption
scandal involving a budget that was supposed to be for
purchasing military equipment which did not come.
Even after the Pink ribbon committee had sent
invitations to the officials, they made several excuses
in which they could not attend hearings that were
made by the senate. One day, President ABCDE,
issued an Executive order that bars officials coming
from the executive branch to attend hearings without
the president’s consent. Upon hearing this, members
of the senate were not pleased as it did not help them
with the investigation. Does the EO issued by the
president violate the principle of checks and balances?
Suggested Answer: YES, the EO that the president
had issued had violated the principle of checks and
balances, which is one of the essences of us being a
democratic and republican state according to Section 1
of Article II of the 1987 constitution. The Checks and
Balances principle enables other departments to
correct the mistakes of other departments, in this case
the Legislative inquiring about the Executive
department. The mere fact that the president issued an
ordinance barring members coming from the executive
department to appear before the senate constitutes an
evasion of inquiry in the part of the executive branch,
hence the EO is violative of the principles of checks
and balances.
La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos,
G.R. No. 127882. Dec. 1, 2004
Question: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act)
became effective on April 9, 1995. A Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) was signed
on March 30, 1995, between the Philippine
government and ABC Company, a Philippine
corporation, covering nearly 100,000 hectares of land
in specific provinces. On August 15, 1995, the
Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued DENR
Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed
by DEN Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on
December 20, 1996. Moreover, the petitioners also
stated that ABC is owned by QRST Ltd, a wholly
owned subsidiary of an Australian mining and
exploration company. However, ABC averred that
WMC sold all its shares in ABC to Scorpie Mines, Inc,
which is a 60% Filipino-owned company. ABC and
others petitioned for prohibition and mandamus, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order. They assailed
that there was abuse of discretion of the President in
entering foreign investment agreements. Is the
argument presented by ABC meritorious? Explain.
Suggested Answer: No, there is no grave abuse of
discretion by the President. In the case of La Bugal-
B’Laan v. Ramos, it is not unconstitutional to allow a
wide degree of discretion to the Chief Executive, given
the nature and complexity of such agreements, the
humongous amounts of capital and financing required
for large-scale mining operations, the complicated
technology needed, and the intricacies of international
trade, coupled with the State’s need to maintain
flexibility in its dealings, in order to preserve and
enhance our country’s competitiveness in world
markets.
Similarly, to this case, the President is in valid exercise
of his executive power in conducting an agreement
with the contractor. In conclusion, there was no grave
abuse of its executive power.
Arnault v. Balagtas. G.R. No. L-6749. July before the Committee certain documents and/or object
30, 1955. 97 PHIL 358-372 evidence required by the Committee.
Applying to the case at bar, Edgar was wrong in
Question: Edgar Soirrel was appointed as the questioning the capacity of the Senate to impose a
attorney-in-fact by Tom Riddle and was tasked to contempt charge against him considering that he was
engage in the negotiations for the Government of the not cooperative during the investigation by refusing to
Philippines’ purchase of Gryffindor and Slytherin reveal the identity of the person to whom a part of the
Estates. This was effected in 2022 and the price paid purchase price was delivered. Furthermore, it was
was Php 5,000,000.00. A year later, the Senate of the ruled by the Court in the case of Arnault vs. Balagtas
Philippines took notice of the said transaction and (G.R. No. L-6749. 1955) that as long as the contempt
decided to create a Special Committee to determine was committed in the course of the legislative process,
the validity of the purchase and whether the price paid then the legislature’s power and authority to punish
was fair and just. Within the course of the Senate defiance against it reigns supreme. Hence, Edgar is
investigation, Edgar was asked to reveal the identity of not correct in his contention when he questioned the
the person who was delivered a part of the purchase Senate’s capacity to punish him under the
price of Php 440,000.00 but his response was circumstances of the case.
disrespectful by covering his ears with his hands and
was completely rude towards the officials who were
present in the session. Hence, the Senate Special
Committee (SSC) rendered an order charging Edgar in
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979)-
contempt for contumacious acts which meant that he (Bangalisan, Jonalyn)
be placed in the custody of Sergeant-at-arms of the
Question: President Jimmy Carter of the United
Philippine Senate and imprisoned in the New Bilibid
States terminated the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Prison. Thereafter, Edgar made known to the SSC that
Taiwan without consulting or securing the prior
he decided to come clean and this time properly
approval of the Senate. Senator Barry Goldwater and
answer the inquiries of the latter in relation to the
other members of the Congress challenged the
controversy. The SSC considered his presentation of
President’s termination. Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2,
documents to support his claim/s but decided that he
of the Constitution states that the President has the
should still remain confined in Bilibid. Edgar then
power to make treaties, provided that two-thirds of the
decided to file a writ of habeas corpus in the Court of
Senate concurs. However, the Constitution does not
First Instance, which was approved by the same,
provide for how a treaty may be abrogated. May the
contending that his continued confinement was illegal
Court decide on whether or not the President can
and questioned the Senate’s capacity to punish the
abrogate by himself an international treaty?
contempt committed against it under the
circumstances of the case. Is Edgar correct in his
Suggested Answer: The Court may not decide on the
contention?
issue. The matter is not yet ripe for judicial review
since it is one having the nature of a political question
Suggested Answer:
"Pursuant to Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987
No, Edgar is not correct in his contention when he
Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested in one
questioned the Senate’s capacity to punish him under
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
the circumstances of the case. Article 6, Section 21 of
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that “The
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
involving rights which are legally demandable and
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
enforceable, and to determine whether there has been
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.”
instrumentality of the Government."" Under this
Moreover, as enunciated in the 2020 Rules of
definition, the Court cannot agree that the issue
Procedure by the Senate of the Philippines, the same
involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction
has the power to punish or cite in contempt any
of this Court to review"
witness before the Committee who disobeys any order
of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or
The Court was asked to settle a dispute between
to answer a proper question by the Committee or any
coequal branches of government. The doctrine of
of its members, or testifying, testifies falsely or
separation of powers restricts the Judicial Branch from
evasively, or who unduly refuses to appear or bring
deciding issues affecting the allocation of power
between the President and Congress as this is an
exercise beyond its constitutional power. Thus,
deciding whether or not the President can abrogate an
international treaty by himself is not within the authority
of the Judiciary.
DELEGATION OF POWERS
Garcia vs. Executive Secretary
Question: On 15 August 1991, Executive Order No.
475 was issued by the President reducing the rate of
additional duty on all imported articles from nine
percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem, except
in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which
continued to be subject to the additional duty of nine
percent (9%) ad valorem. Seven (7) days later, the
President issued Executive Order No. 478, dated 23
August 1991, which levied a special duty of P0.95 per
liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and
P1.00 per liter of imported oil products.
Petitioner Congressman Garcia assails the validity of
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478. He argues that
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of
Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
contend that since the Constitution vests the authority
to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may
not assume such power of issuing Executive Orders
Nos. 475 and 478 which are revenue-generating
measures. Comment on the constitutionality of
Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478.
Suggested Answer: TExecutive Orders Nos. 475 and
478 are constitutional. Under Section 24, Article VI of
the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,
revenue, and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course,
within the province of the Legislative rather than the
Executive Department. It does not follow, however,
that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue
measures, are prohibited to the President, that they
must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution provides that “The Congress may, by law,
authorize the President to fix within specified limits,
and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government." There is
thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to
authorize the President "subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose" to fix "within
specific limits" "tariff rates xxx and other duties or
imposts xxx”
Jaworski v. Pagcor, G.R. No. 144463,
January 14, 2004
Question: In 2005, Mr. Humbo Guerro owned an
online betting site called MGMHYBet. One day,
PAGCOR had contacted Mr. Humbo that they wanted
to share their franchise of operating internet gambling
with MGMHYBet. Mr. Humbo made a deal with the
PAGCOR. However, Senator Kylie Jenner, who was
the chairman of the senate committee on games,
amusement and sports, filed a complaint against
PAGCOR citing that (1) it acted beyond the limits that
was vested by the legislature (2) Senator Jenner’s
petition wanted to nullify the authority that PAGCOR
had given to MGMHYBet. Can PAGCOR transfer its
authority to another entity such as MGMHYBet?
Suggested Answer: No, the PAGCOR can not
transfer its authority that was delegated by the
legislature under them. As stated in the case of
Jaworski vs PAGCOR, this department is not allowed
under the same charter to relinquish or share its
franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
another entity. Furthermore, the supreme court had
held that it violated the principle of non-delegation of
powers, under the latin maxim, Potestas delegata non
delegari potest, which states that ”what has been
delegated can not be delegated”. The legislature, by its
powers of delegation had defined that franchise is a
special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty to
be performed by the grantee. PAGCOOR went beyond
its limits under the provisions set by the legislature.
US. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922)
Question: In a special session, an act was passed
and approved to penalize the monopoly and hoarding
of rice, palay, and corn. The said act contains the sole
authorization of the Governor General in issuing the
necessary Rules and Regulations in relation to the
distribution of the products. Was there undue
delegation of power to the Governor General? Explain.
Suggested Answer: No, the PAGCOR can not
transfer its authority that was delegated by the
legislature under them. As stated in the case of
Jaworski vs PAGCOR, this department is not allowed
under the same charter to relinquish or share its
franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to
another entity. Furthermore, the supreme court had
held that it violated the principle of non-delegation of
powers, under the latin maxim, Potestas delegata non
delegari potest, which states that ”what has been
delegated can not be delegated”. The legislature, by its
powers of delegation had defined that franchise is a
special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty to
be performed by the grantee. PAGCOOR went beyond
its limits under the provisions set by the legislature.
Suggested Answer: Yes, there was undue delegation
of power. In US v Ang Tang Ho, the court ruled that
there was a violation of the proclamation of the
Governor-General, wherein the legislature left it at the
sole discretion of the Governor-General to dictate the
related rules and regulations to carry it into effect. In
the question at bar, there is sole authorization given to
the Governor General, on the rules and regulations,
where the legislature has not given a definitive content
as to the standardization of the policy. Hence, giving
sole authority to the Governor-General is an undue
delegation of power.
Conference v. POEA, 243 SCRA 666 (1995)
Question: On January 14, 1994, the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), an
executive body, issued Resolution No. 01, Series of
1994, which increased compensation and benefits for
Filipino seamen on ocean-going vessels. Several
licensed manning agencies contested the resolution,
arguing that the POEA lacked the authority to fix and
promulgate rates affecting seamen's compensation
and that it violated constitutional standards. They also
claimed that the resolution was unconstitutional due to
alleged violations of equal protection and non-
impairment of contract clauses. Discuss the validity of
Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994, and the rule-making
power of an executive body.
Suggested Answer: Resolution No. 01, Series of
1994, issued by the POEA, is valid. The POEA had the
authority to promulgate this resolution under its rule-
making power, consistent with its mandate to protect
the rights of overseas Filipino workers. The resolution
adhered to a reasonable classification, did not violate
constitutional standards, and was within the scope of
the police power of the state to protect the public
interest. POEA’s power to promulgate rules
notwithstanding its executive nature, is conferred by
the legislative branch through enactment of EO No.
797 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos, who created
the POEA and defined its functions and powers. In
conclusion, POEA’s Resolution No. 01 series of 1994
is valid.
Pelaez vs Auditor General,
15 SCRA 569 (1965)
Question: President Kanye West made Executive
Order 12345 that indicates that a new municipality
would be created within Cebu City, named, the
Municipality of Saint Pablo. The members of the
legislature objected to President West's contention,
moreover, Mr. Pete Davidson, a resident of Cebu City,
had filed a case in the supreme court claiming that he
the President could not create a municipality. The
Supreme Court declared the president's act as an
invalid delegation. Was the Supreme Court correct in
erring the president’s action to be unconstitutional?
Suggested Answer: Yes, the President cannot issue
an executive order creating a municipality. In Sec 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code, insofar as it grants to
the President the power to create municipalities does
not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid
delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy
to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Without a statutory declaration of policy, there would
be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority. It is essential, to forestall a
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
the law: (a) be complete and (b) fix a standard to which
the delegate must conform. In this case, Sec. 68
lacked any such standard denying the President to
issue this kind of executive order.
People vs. Judge Dacuycuy,
173 SCRA 90 (1989)
Question: R.A. No. 4670 otherwise known as the
“Magna Carta for Public School Teachers” is being
assailed by alleged violators as unconstitutional
because among others (b) it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power, the duration of the
penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the
discretion of the court as if the latter were the
legislative department of the Government. Is the
contention by the alleged violators, correct?
delegation of power to the Governor General?
Explain.
Suggested Answer: Yes, Republic Act No. 4760 is
unconstitutional. Section 32 violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
power by vesting in the court the responsibility of
imposing a duration on the punishment of
imprisonment, as if the courts were the legislative
department of the government.
As provided in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the
legislative power is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines, except only to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
Granting the constitutionality of RA 4670 would
amount to judicial legislation. (People vs Dacuycuy,
173 SCRA 90 (1989).
Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007
Question: Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan
(KB), and Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc.
filed an original action before the Supreme Court
assailing the constitutionality of the imposition of
Universal Charge under Section 34 of Republic Act
9136, otherwise known as the “Electric Power Industry
Reform Act of 2001” and Rule 18 of the Rules and
Regulations which seeks to implement the said
imposition. The Universal Charge is a non-bypassable
charge which shall be passed on and collected from all
end-users on a monthly basis by the distribution
utilities and will be remitted to the PSALM Corp. on or
before the fifteenth (15th) of every month. All amount
collected shall be distributed to the respective
beneficiaries within a reasonable period to be provided
by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC).
Petitioners contend that the said universal charge is “a
tax to be collected from electric end-users and self-
generating entities”, hence, the power to tax should be
a legislative function and delegation of this power to
any executive or administrative agency like the ERC is
unconstitutional. Are the petitioners correct with their
contention? Explain.
Suggested Answer: No. The imposition of a universal
charge is not a tax, but an exercise of the State’s
police power as it is a well-established doctrine that
the taxing power is an implementation of police power.
(Section II, R.A. 9316)
Furthermore, a logical corollary to the doctrine of
separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation
of powers or potestas delegata non delegari potest
(what has been delegated cannot be delegated), that a
delegated power may not be further delegated by the
person to whom such power is delegated (Dalamal v.
Deportation Board, G.R. No. L-16812, October 31,
1963). However, this principle allows delegation of
legislative power to various specialized administrative
agencies as an exception to the general rule. It is
doubtful that the legislature can promulgate laws that
will deal adequately with and respond promptly to the
minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate
to administrative bodies the power to execute laws in
their specialized fields, further granting them authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate its
policies.
This exception to the non-delegation principle grants
the ERC, as an administrative body, authority to
impose rules and regulations and implement them.
Therefore, Section 34 of Republic Act 9136 and Rule
18 of the Rules and Regulations are constitutional.
Disini, Jr. et al. vs. Sec. of Justice,
GR No. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014
Question: Ordinance No. 7857 or “An Ordinance
Penalizing Catcalling and Other Forms of Public
Sexual Harassment”, penalizes all forms of sexual
harassment in public spaces such as catcalling, wolf-
whistling, leering, groping, and many others. In 2019,
the Safe Spaces Act or Republic Act No. 11313. A
group of men petitioned a claim that section 5 (a)(b)(d)
violates certain aspects of their constitutional rights,
most specifically Article 3 Section 4, and 5 of the
constitution. Are certain provisions of RA No. 11313
not constitutional insofar as they regard acts as crimes
or unlawful and impose penalties for their commission
as well as enable the government to penalize
violators?
Suggested Answer: No, they are constitutional. In
order to determine whether there is undue delegation
of legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests:
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing
he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test
mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to determine the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.
Furthermore, the law upholds the constitutional right to
protection and enhancement of the right of all people
to human dignity. The law also upholds Article 13
section 1 of the constitution wherein it states that “The
Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and
political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good.”
Chiongbian v. Orbos, SCRA 253, 1995
Question: President Fiona issued on October 12,
2013, Executive Order No. 1234, "Providing for the
Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in
Visayas." Under this Order (1) Negros Oriental, at
present part of Region VII, will become part of Region
VI. (2) Bohol, at present part of Region VII, will
become part of Region VIII. Petitioners protested and
contended that E.O. 1234 is unconstitutional. They
argued that there is no law that authorizes the
president to make alterations to the existing structure
of governmental units and it unduly delegates
legislative power to the President by authorizing her to
reorganize the existing regions. Are the petitioners
correct in their contention that E.O. 1234 is
unconstitutional?
Suggested Answer: No, Executive Order 1234
“Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative
Regions in Visayas" is not unconstitutional. In
Chiongbian v. Obos, the Court held that the regions
themselves are not territorial and political divisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays but are
"mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes." The power conferred on the
President is similar to the power to adjust municipal
boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v.
Auditor General as "administrative in nature." As the
Supreme Court observed in Abbas v. COMELEC,
"while the power to merge administrative regions is not
expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power
which has traditionally been lodged with the President
to facilitate the exercise of the power of general
supervision over local governments [see Art. X, Sec. 4
of the Constitution]. In this case, there is no need for
legislation from Congress to reorganize the existing
regions as the President’s reorganization of the
administrative regions in Visayas is an exercise of her
power of general supervision over local governments.
Hence, the petitioners’ contention that E.O. 1234 is
unconstitutional is incorrect.
Santiago vs. COMELEC 3/19/97
Question: Atty. George "Joji" Miller filed a petition to
"amend" the current constitution in order for the
Philippines to be turned into a communist state. Atty.
Miller went to the COMELEC for the petition to begin,
and the COMELEC, at the discretion of the petitioner,
assisted him in order to obtain the required number of
signatures, that was required under section 2 of article
17 of the 1987 constitution. This prompted Senator
Filthy frank to file a case against Atty. Miller and
Specifically the COMELEC, because according to him,
the agency had committed a "grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess in jurisdiction." The
Supreme Court had sided with the contention of the
senator, deeming the acts of the COMELEC as
unconstitutional. Was the Supreme Court correct in
deeming the acts of the COMELEC as
unconstitutional?
Suggested Answer: Yes, this is because section 2 of
Article 17, is a non-self-executing provision, hence it
needs an enabling law to invoke this certain provision.
The COMELEC can not exercise its power to gather
signatures, since there is no enabling law that grants
the petition. Hence the COMELEC has acted beyond
its scope, hence the Supreme Court was correct in
deeming the acts of the COMELEC as
unconstitutional.
Demetria vs Alba, 148 SCRA 208 (1987)
Question: The Philippines is led by Mr. President who
enjoys a supermajority in both houses of the
legislature, effectively consolidating power in the
executive branch. Facing a significant economic
downturn, the President proposes a series of executive
actions aimed at reviving the economy. Among these
actions is the unilateral transfer of substantial funds
from one government agency to another without
seeking congressional approval. While the President's
party supports these actions, opposition lawmakers
argue that they bypass the constitutional requirement
for legislative consent in fund transfers. The opposition
members initiated a legal challenge, contending that
the President's unilateral fund transfers violate the
principles outlined in Demetria V. Alba which
emphasized the need for adherence to constitutional
safeguards and limitations on the transfer of public
funds. Do the executive actions taken by the President
in this scenario, which involve unilateral fund transfers
without congressional approval, align with the legal
principles established in Demetria V. Alba and the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution?
Suggested Answer: No it does not align with the legal
principles established in Demetria V. Alba. In the case
of Demetria V. Alba, the principles regarding the
allocation and transfer of public funds within the
context of the 1987 Constitution have been
established.
The case highlighted the importance of adhering to
constitutional safeguards and limitations on fund
transfers. In this scenario, the executive actions taken
by the President involves unilateral fund transfers
without congressional approval. This approach
contradicts the legal principles established in Demetria
V. Alba which emphasized the need for adherence to
constitutional safeguards and limitations on the
transfer of public funds. The unilateral nature of these
actions raises concerns about the overreach of
executive authority in fund allocation. Therefore, the
executive actions taken by the President, involving
unilateral fund transfers without congressional
approval, do not align with the legal principles
established in "G.R. No. 71977" and are not consistent
with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
Adherence to constitutional safeguards and the
separation of powers between branches of
government is essential, and in this scenario, the
executive actions violate these principles.
Neri vs. Senate Committee,
GR. No. 80643, March 25, 2008)
Question: Person A, a close aide of the president,
was the Director General of the National Economic
and Development Authority (NEDA). Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security invited
person A for investigation regarding the Bribery of
corporation B to the President of the Philippines.
Person A refused to answer on the grounds that the
Presidential Communications Privilege. Is his
contention correct?
Suggested Answer:
Yes. His contention is Correct. As the Supreme Court
held in the case of, United States vs. Nixon, three
elements needed to be complied with in order for the
claim to executive privilege to be valid: 1.) The
protected communication must relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable presidential power;
2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself.
The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
“operational proximity” with the President; and, 3.) it
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need,
such that the information sought “likely contains
important evidence,” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the case of bar, person A has all the essential
elements, therefore, the claim to the presidential
communications privilege is Valid.
ABAKADA Guro Party List, et al. vs.
Ermita, November 10, 2003
Question: Country B is facing a public health
emergency due to the outbreak of a deadly virus. To
control the spread of the virus and mitigate its impact,
Congress passes the Public Health Crisis Act (PHCA)
and grants the Secretary of Health the power to
implement various measures to address the crisis. The
PHCA specifically authorizes the Secretary of Health
to impose mandatory lockdowns, suspend certain civil
liberties, and enforce penalties for non-compliance. Is
the delegation of power to the Secretary of Health
under the PHCA constitutional?
Suggested Answer: YES, the delegation of power to
the Secretary of Health under the Public Health Crisis
Act (PHCA) is constitutional. The legal basis for
delegation of powers in the Philippines is found in
Article VI, Section 1 of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which states that legislative power shall
be vested in the Congress of the Philippines. In the
case of Abakada Partylist v. Ermita, the Supreme
Court held that the delegation of legislative power to
the President, under the value-added tax (VAT) law,
was valid because the law provided a clear policy and
defined the limits within which the delegated authority
is to be exercised. Applying the principles laid down in
Abakada Party list v. Ermita to the case at hand, the
delegation of power to the Secretary of Health under
the PHCA is constitutional if the law provides sufficient
standards, determinate limits, and adequate
safeguards for the exercise of delegated authority.
Given the public health emergency and the need for
swift and effective action to control the spread of the
virus, it can be argued that the PHCA provides a clear
policy objective and grants the Secretary of Health the
necessary discretion to implement measures to
address the crisis, such as mandatory lockdowns and
the suspension of certain civil liberties. In conclusion,
the delegation of power to the Secretary of Health
under the PHCA is considered constitutional.
 The Republic invoked a state of immunity and moved

State Immunity
for the dismissal of the case on the ground that it had
not consented to be sued. Should the Republic’s
motion be granted?

Suggested Answer:
The motion should be denied. The doctrine of
Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83 governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.
Question: The case was filed by the Republic of the
Here, the alleged failure to abide by the conditions
Philippines requesting to nullify the ruling of The Court
under which the donation was given should not prove
of First Instance in Cebu in garnishing the public funds
an insuperable obstacle to a civil action, the consent
allocated for the Arm Forces of the
likewise being presumed when the State entered into a
Philippines. A decision was rendered in Special
contract. Under the circumstances, the fundamental
Proceedings confirming the arbitration award in the
postulate of non-suability of the state cannot stand in
amount of PHP 1,712,396.40 subject of Special
the way. (Santiago vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-48214,
Proceedings. This was declared final and executory by
December 19, 1978)
the respondent, Hon. Villasor, directing the sheriffs of
Rizal Province, Quezon City and Manila to execute
said decision. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil 819
Philippines were on deposit with the Philippine
Question: Prior to the Court of Industrial Relations a
Veterans Bank and PNB on the strength of the Alias
petition was filed in case No. 36-V entitled "National
Writ of Execution. These are public funds which were
Labor Union, versus Metropolitan Transportation
duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of
Service (Metran)," wherein the petitioner alleged that it
pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military
was a legitimate labor organization, thirty of whose
and civilian personnel and for the maintenance and
affiliated members were working and under the employ
operations of the AFP. Can the state be sued without
of the respondent; that the respondent "is a semi-
its consent?
governmental transportation entity, popularly known as
`Metran, having nine demands at length set forth in
Suggested Answer: No, the state may not be sued
said petition be granted. Therefore, Metran filed a
without its consent. This is stated in the provision of
petition for the dismissal of the case "on the ground
Sec. 3 Article XVI of the Constitution that reflects
that it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines and as
nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
such, it cannot be sued". It is an office "under the
character of the state and is based on the very
supervision and control of the Secretary of Public
essence of sovereignty. In re Republic v. Sandoval,
Works and Communications," under Executive Order
the principle of state immunity from suit also rests on
No. 59. Can Metran be able to invoke the Doctrine of
reasons of public policy in this case, public funds were
State Immunity?
appropriated, that public service would be hindered,
and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority
Suggested Answer: No, The doctrine of state
could be subjected to lawsuits at instance of every
immunity An unincorporated government agency is an
citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and
agency without any separate juridical personality of its
dispositions of the means required for the proper
own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested
administration of the government. What was done by
with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a
the respondent is not in conformity with the dictates of
claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper;
the Constitution.From the basic concept of the non-
otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
suability of the State, public funds cannot be the object
violated. However, the need to distinguish between an
of a garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be
unincorporated government agency performing
sued had been previously granted and the state
governmental function and one performing proprietary
liability determined.
Kawananakoa vs. Polybank, 205 US 349 functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in
favor of the former because its function is
Question: Don Gervacio sued the Republic of the governmental or incidental to such function, it has not
Philippines, represented by the Secretary of the been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was
DPWH, and asked for the revocation of a deed of not in pursuit of a necessary function of government
donation executed by him in favor of the said but was essentially a business. The court held that
government agency. Don Gervacio alleged that Metran was a mere office or agency of the
contrary to the terms of the donation, the failed to government, unincorporated and possessing no
develop it for public use but instead sold it to a private juridical personality under the law, incapable of suing
shopping mall. or being sued and that a claim against it would in effect
be a suit against the Government, which suit may not
prosper without the Government's consent.
Lung Chea Kung Kee & Co. v. Wright, 46
Phil. 44, 47 (1924)
Question: Company x, which is based in Los Angeles,
had filed a lawsuit against the Republic of the
Philippines demanding for it to be paid, because it did
not complete the payment when the company had
invested in one of the country’s projects. The company
won against the decision and demanded that the
Philippines should pay the company for damages.
However, when the company submitted the ruling of
the court in favor of them, the internal auditor, Mr. Left,
did not sign the document that was necessary for the
funds to be released. The company claims that the
Auditor should be held liable for not following the
court's ruling. Will the company ever get the money?
Should the Internal Auditor be held liable for not
signing the document?
Suggested Answer: No, this is because even if the
Philippines had entered into a commercial contract
with Company X, and it had waived its immunity from
suit, it does not necessarily mean that the court’s ruling
that the Philippines should pay Company X will be
applied. This is because of the principle of “suitability
does not mean liability”(Republic vs. NLRC). The
internal auditor is not held liable because the state is
not liable for the acts that were committed by regular
employees when they are performing their ordinary
functions, as stated in the case of Lung Chea Kung
Kee vs Wright. Furthermore, public funds cannot be
released when there is no special appropriations bill as
stated in section 25, paragraph 4, Article 6 of the 1987
constitution. In this case, no law was passed and the
company could not get the funds even if it had won in
the suit.
NIA vs CIA GR No 129169, November 17,
1999
Question: In 1975, Construction Company C won a
bid for the construction of O City’s new road. In their
contract, it was agreed that C will receive payment in
the form of Philippine peso (PHP) and American dollar
(USD), with the differential of the increase of USD to
be accounted for. It took C 4 years to complete the
project, with the project completion happening in 1979.
C was paid by O City but it lacked the difference from
the increase of the USD’s value. For several years, C
reached out to O City for the balance but it failed. In
1984, C then filed a case with the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), over the
dispute of the unpaid balance.
Does CIAC have jurisdiction to handle the dispute
between C and O city?
Suggested Answer: Yes, the CIAC has jurisdiction
over this case. E.O. 1008, also known as the
Construction Industry Arbitration LAw, gives the CIAC
jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connecting
with construction contracts whether the disputes arise
before or after the completion of said contracts. As the
case is not based on the contract but a dispute over
the balance.
Nessia vs. Fermin, 220 SCRA 615 (1993)
Question: The Municipality of Tapsi is sued for
damages arising from injuries sustained by a
pedestrian who was hit by falling debris from the
dilapidated ceiling of the municipal hall. The
municipality filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
invoking state immunity from suit.
Resolve with reasons.
Suggested Answer: The motion should be denied.
The injuries sustained by the victim were caused by
the apparent negligence of the municipality in the
maintenance of its facilities, or public building under its
supervision and control.
As a General rule, sec. 3, Art. XVI of the Constitution
provides that: The State cannot be sued without its
consent. Under the Civil Code, cities and municipalities
shall be liable for the damages for the death of, or
injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the
defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision. This provision of the Civil Code, a general
law, constitutes consent of the state, or, in this case of
the Municipality of Tapsi, to be sued for the subject
injuries. Accordingly, the Municipality can be
considered as having waived its immunity from suit.
Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88
Question: Person A, was employed as a game room
attendant in the special services department of the
U.S. Naval Station (NAVSTA). Person B, a special
services director of the NAVSTA, served a notice to
person A stating that his position is being converted
from a full-time position to a part-time position. Person
A filed a case for damages against Person B. Will the
case prosper?
Suggested Answer: No. The case will not prosper.
According to the constitution, the State cannot be sued
without its consent. A government officer is also
immune from suit when performing governmental
functions because the ultimate liability will belong not
to the
officer but to the government.
In the case at bar, since the actions of person B were
performed in the discharge of his official duties, then
he cannot be sued.
Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486
Question: A pickup truck owned and maintained by
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), a
government organization, collided with a bicycle being
ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, killing him. Hugo
Garcia, the NIA driver, was a regular NIA employee
who was operating the vehicle within city limits at the
time of the accident. Following that, Francisco
Fontanilla's parents initiated a civil suit against the
NIA. During the trial, it was established that the NIA, a
government agency, was performing proprietary
functions and that the accident was caused by the
driver, Hugo Garcia's, negligence. The trial court found
in favor of Francisco Fontanilla's parents, awarding
them moral and exemplary damages., explain the
concept of state immunity to the case.
Suggested Answer: State Immunity and Liability:
Under Philippine law, the liability of government
agencies, such as the NIA, depends on whether they
are performing governmental or proprietary functions.
Government agencies are generally immune from suit
when they perform governmental functions. However,
when they engage in proprietary functions, they are
subject to liability for their actions or negligence. In this
case, it was established that the NIA was performing
proprietary functions, as it was collecting fees and
engaging in activities that could be provided by a
private corporation. Therefore, the NIA assumes the
role of an ordinary employer and can be held liable for
damages caused by its employees within the scope of
their employment.
In this case, since there was negligence on the part of
the NIA and the accident resulted in the death of
Francisco Fontanilla, the award of moral damages is
legally proper. Additionally, since the negligence was
characterized as gross, the award of exemplary
damages is also legally proper. Attorney's fees may be
awarded when the winning party is entitled to
damages. Therefore, the award of attorney's fees is
also legally proper in this case. In conclusion, the NIA,
as a government agency performing proprietary
functions, can be held liable for damages caused by
the negligence of its employees. The award of moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees by
the trial court is legally proper based on the
circumstances of this case.
PNB vs. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595 (1978)
Question: The XYZ Municipal Housing Authority is an
agency of the Government in charge of giving low-
income citizens in a specific city affordable housing.
They hold a considerable sum of money at the Cityville
Local Bank. A construction-related dispute emerges
between the contractor, ABC Construction, and XYZ
MHA. ABC Construction argues that it is entitled to a
substantial sum of money for finished work. They
intend to pursue legal methods to recover the money
owed to them. ABC Construction chooses to issue a
notice of garnishment to the Local Bank of Cityville,
where XYZ MHA's funds are held. The XYZ MHA
protests this case, claiming that its money is public
funds and hence safeguarded by the constitutional law
doctrine of non-suability of a state. Is XYZ MHA's claim
correct?
Suggested Answer: No, XYZ MHA's claim is
incorrect. It was clarified in the case of PNB VS.
Pabalan that when a government agency participates
in commercial activity, its funds are susceptible to
being garnished. This is aligned with the doctrine of a
state's non-suability, allowing for legal actions against
government organizations under certain conditions. In
this situation, XYZ MHA is a governmental
organization that provides housing services, which
makes it a commercial operation. As a result, as
established in the PNB VS. Pabalan case, the funds
maintained by XYZ MHA in the Local Bank of Cityville
may be susceptible to garnishment. Therefore, XYZ
MHA's objection is invalid, so ABC Construction may
pursue garnishment in order to collect the money owed
to them.
Municipality of Makati vs. CA. 190 SCRA
206 (1990)
Question: City A initiated expropriation proceedings
against Property Owner B for a valuable piece of land.
After the court's final decision on the compensation
amount, City A took possession of the land but failed
to make the payment promptly. Property Owner B now
seeks to garnish City A's funds held in a specific bank
account dedicated to this expropriation case, arguing
that these funds should be subject to garnishment. City
A asserts that the funds are public and therefore
exempt from garnishment. Can Property Owner B
validly claim to garnish City A's funds dedicated to the
expropriation case? Cite relevant jurisprudence.
Suggested Answer: Yes, Property Owner B may
have a valid claim to garnish City A's funds dedicated
to the expropriation case. In the case of, Municipality
of Makati vs. The Court ruled that while public funds
are generally exempt from garnishment,
this exemption does not apply when there is a delay in
paying just compensation. The Court emphasized that
just compensation should involve not only the correct
determination of the amount but also prompt payment
within a reasonable time from the taking of the
property. Therefore, Property Owner B may have a
valid claim to garnish City A's funds because City A's
delay in paying just compensation undermines the
principle of prompt payment and just compensation.
Considering the legal precedent set in the Municipality
of Makati case, Property Owner B's claim to garnish
City A's funds dedicated to the expropriation case may
be upheld, especially if City A unreasonably delayed
payment. This ensures that the principle of just
compensation is upheld even when public funds are
involved.
UP vs. Dizon, GR No. 171782, August 23,
2012
Question: Cebu Technological University entered into
a contract with Makati Development Corporation for
the construction and renovation of the College of
Engineering building located in Cebu Technological
University, Main Campus. The university then failed to
pay Makati Development Corporation so the Regional
Trial Court ruled in favor of Makati Development
Corporation. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court
authorized the release of the garnish funds of CTU,
directing BPI to release the funds. While CTU brought
a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals to
challenge the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in
issuing the order averring that the university funds,
being government funds and properties, could not be
seized by virtue of writs of execution or garnishment.
Can the funds of CTU be a proper subject of
garnishment?
Suggested Answer: No. The funds of CTU were not
the proper subject for garnishment.
Under Presidential Decree No. 1445 defines a “trust
fund” as a fund that officially comes in the possession
of an agency of the government or of a public officer
as trustee, agent or administrator, or that is received
for the fulfillment of some obligation. A trust fund may
be utilized only for the “specific purpose for which the
trust was created or the funds received.”
In here, the funds of CTU are government funds that
are public in character. They include the income
accruing from the use of real property ceded to CTU
that may be spent only for the attainment of its
institutional objectives. Hence, the funds subject of this
action could not be validly made the subject of the
RTC’s writ of execution or garnishment. In the case of
UP vs. Dizon, the adverse judgment rendered against
the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly consented
was not immediately enforceable by execution against
the UP, because
suability of the State did not necessarily mean its
liability. A marked distinction exists between suability
of the State and its liability.
Therefore, the funds of CTU were not the proper
subject for garnishment.
Bergoso v. Chairman, Phil. Veterans Adm.,
32 Scra 206
Question: John Smith, an American, filed a civil suit
against the Philippines, a sovereign state, in the courts
of the Philippines seeking damages for a contractual
dispute arising from a construction project. John Smith
alleges that the Philippines breached the contract,
resulting in financial losses for his company. Can the
case of John Smith proceed?
Suggested Answer: No. John Smith cannot proceed
with his case. Bergoso v. Chairman, Phil. Veterans
Adm, establishes the principle of state immunity from
suit. In this landmark case, the Supreme Court of the
Philippines ruled that foreign nationals cannot file civil
suits against sovereign states in the domestic courts of
the Philippines without the state's consent. In line with
the precedent set by Bergoso v. Chairman, Phil.
Veterans Adm, John Smith's civil suit against the
Philippines is not allowed without the state's consent.
State immunity protects sovereign nations from being
sued in the courts of another country without their
agreement to waive this immunity. This principle is
based on the recognition that states should not be
subject to the jurisdiction of foreign courts in matters of
litigation. Therefore, John Smith's civil suit against the
Philippines cannot proceed without the state's consent
due to the principle of state immunity, as established
by the legal precedent in Bergoso v. Chairman, Phil.
Veterans Adm.
Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302
Question: John owns a piece of land adjacent to a
government forest reserve. The Director of Forestry,
exercising the powers of the government, issued an
order to seize John's land, alleging that it encroaches
upon the forest reserve. In response, John files a
lawsuit against the Director of Forestry, claiming that
the seizure of his land constitutes a violation of his
constitutional rights to property and due process.
The Director of Forestry asserts the doctrine of state
immunity as a defense, arguing that the government
cannot be sued without its consent.
Will the doctrine of state immunity apply to this case?
Suggested Answer: The doctrine of state immunity
may apply to this case.
The doctrine of state immunity holds that the
government cannot be sued without its consent. It is
based on the principle that the state, as a sovereign
entity, should not be subjected to the jurisdiction of its
own courts unless it has expressly waived its
immunity. In this case, John is suing the Director of
Forestry, who is exercising the powers of the
government. The Director of Forestry invokes the
doctrine of state immunity, claiming that the
government cannot be sued without its consent. The
applicability of the doctrine of state immunity, in this
case, depends on whether the government has waived
its immunity or if an exception to immunity applies.
Without further information regarding the consent or
waiver of governmental immunity, it cannot be
definitively determined whether the doctrine of state
immunity will apply to this case. However, if the
government has not waived its immunity and no
exception to immunity applies, it is likely that the
doctrine of state immunity will bar John's lawsuit
against the Director of Forestry.
Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424
(1987)
Question: In 2003, President Bonifacio issued
Executive Order No. 69 which mandated the
development of a Regional Government Center in the
Barangay Gumamela of the City of San Miguel.
Stretching across a total of 250 hectares, the newly
established center included 75 hectares of land owned
by Charlie, appropriated accordingly by the
government. Fast forward twenty years, the
government center is completed and operational and
Charlie has decided to reclaim the land. Charlie has
recently filed a suit against the Republic of the
Philippines in an attempt to recover ownership and
possession of the 75 hectares within the Regional
Government Center. The State invoked the doctrine of
state immunity. Will the suit against the State prosper?
Suggested Answer: No, the suit will not prosper. In
Republic v. Feliciano, the Court held that a suit against
the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted,
except upon a showing that the State has consented to
be sued. In this case, Charlie has no proof to present
to the Court that the Republic of the Philippines has
consented, either expressly or by implication, to be
sued. Hence, the suit against the Republic of the
Philippines filed by Charlie to recover ownership and
possession of the 75 hectares will not prosper.
Veterans Manpower & Protective Services,
Inc. v. CA
Question: A memorandum of agreement (MOA) was
executed between Philippine Association of Detective
and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) and
the PC Chief, which fixed the monthly contract rate per
guard for 8 hours of security service per day at
P2,250.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside
of Metro Manila. Thereafter, Odin Security Agency
(Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing
petitioner Veterans Manpower and Protective
Services, Inc. (VMPSI) of cut-throat competition by
undercutting its contract rate for security services
rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS), to which the latter was
found to be guilty by the former and was
recommended for expulsion from PADPAO and the
cancellation of its license. As a result, VMPSI request
for a clearance/certificate of membership from
PADPAO was denied. VMPSI wrote to the PC Chief
requesting to set aside the findings of PADPAO but to
no avail. VMPSI filed a complaint against the PC Chief
and PC-SUSIA but the latter filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds that the case is against the State which
had not given consent thereto.
If the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA did not perform their
official duties and acted in bad faith. Will a suit against
a public official be deemed a suit against the State?
Suggested Answer: No, The doctrine of state
immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against
public officials for acts done in the performance of their
duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as
one against the State where the satisfaction of the
judgment against the public official concerned will
require the State itself to perform a positive act, such
as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the
damages awarded to the plaintiff.
As stated in Aberca v. Ver, G.R. No. 69866, 15
Apr.1988, Public officials may be sued if they acted
oppressively or illegally in the performance of their
duties. A suit against a public officer who acted illegally
is not a suit against the state.
The rule does not apply where the public official is
charged in his official capacity for acts that are
unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public
officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity,
from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.
Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly
being sued not in his official capacity but in his
personal capacity, although the acts complained of
may have been committed while he occupied a public
position.
A public official may sometimes be held liable in his
personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction,
however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and
PCSUSIA are being called to account in this case,
were performed by them as part of their official duties,
without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no
recovery may be had against them in their private
capacities.
Farolan v. CTA, 217 SCRA 298
Question: Rosee bought 80 bales of screen net
consigned to New Life Trading. Said importation was
declared through a customs broker. However, the
customs examiner found the subject shipment
reflective of the declaration and reexamined the
shipment. Since the shipment was also misdeclared as
to quantity and value, the Collector of Customs
forfeited the subject shipment in favor of the
government. Later on, the goods were released in view
of the fact that they were being exposed to the natural
elements,
Upon receipt, however, Rosee alleges that the goods
were not released in good condition with some of it
missing. Rosee holds the Collector of Customs liable
for the damages. Can the collector of Customs be held
liable for the goods lost by Rosee?
Suggested Answer: No. The state may not be sued
without its consent, under Art XVI Sec. 3 of the 1987
Constitution. As an unincorporated government
agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own, the Bureau of Customs enjoys immunity from
suit. As an agency, the Bureau of Customs performs
the governmental function of collecting revenues which
is definitely not a proprietary function. Thus, private
respondent's claim for damages against the
Commissioner of Customs must fail.
Arigo v. Swift, GR 206501,
September 16, 2014
Question: A US Navy ship, while traveling along the
seas within the Philippine territory, caused damages to
the Philippines’ natural resources; specifically
damaging a significant portion of its protected coral
reefs. An organization whose duties are to promote
and protect the coral reefs of the Philippines wants to
file a case against these US officials.
In this sense, can the Doctrine of State Immunity
extend to state officials?
Suggested Answer: Yes. The Doctrine of State
Immunity can extend to state officials.
Article XVI Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution states
that, “The State may not be sued without its consent”.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its
consent is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law. Suing a representative of a state is
believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself.
If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not
necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his
official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the
immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its
consent. Therefore, the cloak of protection afforded the
officers and agents of the government is
removed the moment they are sued in their individual
capacity.
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also
applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them in the
discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,
such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay
the damages awarded against them, the suit must be
regarded as against the state itself although it has not
been formally impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16
SCRA 120]
Caloocan City v. Allarde, GR No. 107271
Maria, the executive assistant, together with Anna and
Martha got unjustly terminated from their work at the
Local Government Unit (LGU) of the City of
Catbalogan through a local ordinance passed by
Mayor Juan, removing their positions from the plantilla
of the said LGU. Maria, together with Anna and Martha
assailed the legality of the LGU’s declaration and sued
the agency before the court of Catbalogan, Branch 32.
The court ruled in favor of the three ladies and ordered
their reinstatement and backpay and other benefits.
The LGU obeyed, and passed a local ordinance,
through Ordinance No. 143 appropriating funds
intended for the back payment and other entitlements
of the petitioners, Anna and Martha got compensated
in full, except Blossom, as Mayor Barney refused to
sign the check intended for her. With this, Blossom
appealed to the Regional Trial Court to urge the
payment due to her but the City government of
Townsville refused to do so, insisting that Blossom is
not entitled to the back
payment of P420,000.00 that she demanded, because
of this RTC Judge Dela Cruz ordered the garnishment
of funds by the LGU deposited in a local branch of
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the
Sheriff showed the copy of the order and the manager
of DBP notified the LGU of the said garnishment, the
manager opted to obey the order and issued a check
of P420,000.00 finally getting the back payment due to
Maria.
Question: Why is the state’s immunity against suits
not applicable here? Explain.
Suggested Answer: YES. The state’s immunity
against suits does not apply here because the general
rule is that the state is immune from suits and its funds
are exempt from execution or garnishment. However,
the exception is that the state's immunity does not
apply when there is a corresponding appropriation as
required by law. In such cases, the funds allocated by
law specifically for the satisfaction of a money
judgment against the government may be legally
enforced through judicial processes.
In this case, the LGU cannot invoke its immunity from
suits because there is a clear appropriation signed
intended to pay Anna and Martha, including Maria’s
back payment. Therefore, as an exempting factor, in
the presence of a local appropriation, the LGU waived
its right to immunity against suits.
Therefore, the state's immunity against suits does not
apply in this case as there was a corresponding
appropriation required by law.
Question: Is the garnishment order issued by Judge
Dela Cruz valid?
Suggested Answer: YES. In the case of the Caloocan
City v Allarde, an ordinance had already been enacted
expressly appropriating the amount needed to pay the
respondent's back salaries plus interest. This
appropriation provided the legal basis for the
satisfaction of the money judgment against the
government and that the state's immunity from
execution or garnishment do not apply in this particular
situation.
Applying it to Judge Dela Cruz’s pronouncement, there
is a corresponding appropriation for the satisfaction of
a money judgment through the Ordinance No. 143, in
the given situation and the public policy considerations
are outweighed by the need to enforce the judgment
and provide justice to the aggrieved party.
Hence, the City of Catbalogan had enacted an
ordinance specifically allocating funds for the payment
of the respondent's back salaries and other
entitlements. Therefore, the money judgment could be
legally enforced through judicial processes, and the
state's funds were not exempt from execution or
garnishment in this particular situation.
Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424
(1987)
Question: In 1970, Pablo Feliciano filed a complaint
against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land in Camarines Sur.
Feliciano claimed he acquired the land through deed of
sale of the property traced from informacion posesoria.
However, the property was subject of Proclamation
No. 90, a proclamation reserving the land for
settlement under the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) issued by
President Ramon Magsaysay.
A. Does the doctrine of the State's non-suability apply
to a case involving the recovery and possession of a
parcel of land?
B. Can Proclamation No. 90 be cited as reference as a
waiver of State Immunity?
Suggested Answer:
A. Yes. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has
proper application in this case. The plaintiff has
included the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant
in a case seeking the recovery of land ownership and
possession, effectively treating the State as if it were
any private individual accused of encroaching on a
property. A lawsuit for property recovery is not an
action in rem, but rather an action in personam. It
specifically targets particular parties, and any resulting
judgment is binding solely on those parties. In this
instance, the plaintiff, who is the private respondent in
this matter, has initiated the action against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority.
B. No. A lawsuit against the State is generally not
allowed unless there is clear consent from the State,
either through express authorization or implied consent
through explicit statutory language. This consent can
be invoked by the courts at any stage of legal
proceedings, but it is not to be inferred lightly and must
be strictly construed.
It's essential to note that a presidential proclamation,
like the one in question, does not constitute legislative
action. For the State to waive its immunity from
lawsuits, it must do so through a legislative act.
(Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424 1987)
Agila Satellite v. Lichauco, G.R. No.
134887, July 27, 2006
Question: Sailor Moon and Sailor Venus, owns a
satellite company. Their company entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding with DOTC
concerning their planned launch of their Filipino-owned
satellite into outer space. Under the MOU, the launch
of the satellite was to be an endeavor of the private
sector, and the satellite itself would be owned by Sailor
Moon and Sailor Venus. However, to their surprise,
DOTC has awarded the orbital slot to an unknown
awardee. Sailor Moon and Sailor Venus filed actions
against the DOTC Secretary Chibiusa. The first cause
of action, for injunction, sought to establish the award
of orbital slot 123 should be enjoined since the DOTC
had previously assigned the same orbital slot to Sailor
Moon and Sailor Venus. The second cause of action,
for declaration of nullity of award, averred that the
award to the unknown bidder is null and void, as it was
rendered by Chibiusa beyond her authority. Would the
doctrine of non-suability of the State find application in
this case?
Suggested Answer: No, the doctrine of immunity of
state from suits does not apply here. The defense of
state immunity from suit does not apply since said
causes of action cannot be properly considered as
suits against the State in constitutional contemplation
as it is stated in the case of Agila Satellite v. Lichuaco.
These causes of action do not seek to impose a
charge or financial liability against the State, but
merely the nullification of state action. Had it been so
that Sailor Moon and Sailor Venus additionally sought
damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit
would have been considered as one against the State.
Had they impleaded the DOTC itself, an
unincorporated government agency, and not Chibiusa
herself, the suit would have been considered as one
against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in
this case.
Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Adm.,
56 SCRA 340
Question: As a sign of strong partnership between
China and Philippines, China has financed through
several pledges of government partnership projects
between the two countries. Among which is the
construction of the Bus Rapid Transit System in the
City of Cebu. China Machine Systems was appointed
by the Republic of China as its primary implementing
agency to undertake the construction of the BRT.
However, under some circumstances, China Machine
Systems failed to deliver the said BRT project on time.
Due to the severe delay of the project, the City of Cebu
through its Sangguniang Lungsod, filed a resolution to
sue China Machine Systems for the delay of delivering
the project. However, China Machine System argues
that it is sovereign immunity and that the suit filed
should be immediately dismissed. The said company
further argues that the project they are doing is in
performance of governmental function as appointed
and certified by the Republic of China. Decide on the
case and explain.
Suggested Answer: China Machine Systems cannot
automatically claim immunity, because just as the term
‘implementing agency’ has no precise definition for
purposes of asserting immunity from suit. (Deutsche
Gesellschaft Fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152318, April 16, 2009,
585 SCRA 150). Furthermore, despite the claim of
China Machine System that it is a Chinese
Government Controlled Corporation (State
Corporation), it failed to show evidence that it has not
consented to be sued under Chinese law. As a result,
it has the capacity to sue and be sued under Sec. 36
of the Corporation Code.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, Jan. 24, 1991
Question: A controversy arose within the Republic of
Bikini Bottom involving Mr. Cheolito Choi and Mr.
Squiddy Wad. This prompted the same, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), with the assistance of Solicitor General
Dwarly Tacon, to file a petition against the former
individuals charging them for violation of
reconveyance, reversion, and accounting, as well as
restitution and damages. Mr. Choi moved for a motion
to dismiss but was denied hence he responded with an
Answer accompanied by a compulsory counterclaim
and cross-claim with damages. He also requested for
a leave from the Sandiganbayan to implead the
petitioner and PCGG officials as party defendants by
reason of lodging the case against him to which he
referred as an “harassment suit.” In response, all the
PCGG officials invoked their immunity from suits
based on Executive Order No. 1 Section 4. Which of
the parties has the correct claim? Resolve.
Suggested Answer: The party who has the correct
claim is Mr. Cheolito Choi and not the PCGG officials
nor Solicitor General Dwarly Tacon. Executive Order
No. 1, which was cited above, pertains to the immunity
from suit of members which states that mere
invocation thereof does not ipso facto result in
automatic dropping of charges. Furthermore, as a
general rule in administrative law, public officials can
be held personally accountable for acts claimed to
have been
performed in connection with official duties where they
have acted ultra vires or where there is a showing of
bad faith. In the case at bar, being a lawyer does not
mean that a person enjoys special immunity from
damage suits because solely occupying public office
does not entail the same. This would mean the PCGG
officials’ act of invoking their immunity from suit based
on Executive Order No. 1 should not be well taken. Mr.
Choi was correct in filing a leave from the
Sandiganbayan so as to implead Solicitor General
Dwarly and the rest of the PCGG officials. It is
because when a lawyer acts in the name of a client, he
should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very same
case he has filed only as counsel and not as a party.
Any claim for alleged damages or other causes of
action should be filed in an entirely separate and
distinct civil action. Hence, the party who has the
correct claim is Mr. Cheolito Choi and not the PCGG
officials nor Solicitor General Dwarly Tacon.
RELATED BAR QUESTIONS
2018
Topic: Relevance of the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies:
1. Congress enacted a law to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to a full range of modern family planning
methods, including contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectibles, non- abortifacient hormonal
contraceptives, and family planning products and
supplies, but expressly prohibited abortion. To ensure
its objectives, the law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of
modern family planning methods, supplies and
services, for schools to provide reproductive health
education, for non-governmental medical practitioners
to render mandatory 48 hours pro bono reproductive
health services as a condition to Philhealth
accreditation, and for couples desiring to marry to
attend a family planning seminar prior to the issuance
of a marriage license. It also punishes certain acts of
refusals to carry out its mandates. The spouses
Aguiluz, both Roman Catholics, filed a petition to
declare the law as unconstitutional based on, among
others, the following grounds:
(a) It violates the right to life, since it practically
sanctions abortion. Despite express terms prohibiting
abortion, petitioners claim that the family planning
products and supplies oppose the initiation of life,
which is a fundamental human right, and the sanction
of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an
affront to the dignity of man.
(b) It violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to render 48 hours of pro bono
reproductive health services which may be against
their will.
(c) It violates the Freedom of Religion, since
petitioners' religious beliefs prevent them from using
contraceptives, and that any State- sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, funded by taxes,
violates the guarantee of religious freedom.
Rule on each of the above objections. (2.5% each)
Suggested answer:
A. The law in question does not sanction abortion even
in practical terms. In the case of Imbong v. Ochoa (GR
No. 204819, April 8, 2014), the law on its face
expressly mentioned that abortion is not permissible,
and this was the determinative factor in making the
ruling. In the same case, the Court also found that the
RH law was replete with provisions that embody the
policy of protecting the unborn from the moment of
fertilization.
In addition, the majority of the court believes that the
question of when life starts is a scientific and medical
issue; hence, the Court refused to make a ruling on
this issue.
B. Involuntary servitude denotes compulsion or
coercion to do something either through force, threats,
intimidation or other means. The accreditation with the
PhilHealth, as ruled by the Supreme Court in the case
of Imbong v. Ochoa, should be viewed as an incentive
and not a punishment. These health service providers
also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide. Clearly, there is no
compulsion, force or threat upon them to render the
pro bono services against their will.
C. What is prohibited in the Constitution is the
establishment of a state religion. While the
establishment clause in the Constitution restricts what
the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government.
They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrine as policy for everyone, nor can they
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do
so would cause the State to adhere to a particular
religion, and thus establish a state religion (Imbong v.
Ochoa, GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014).
2017
Public International Law: Treaty: Pacta sunt servanda,
Rebus sic stantibus
III. State A and State B, two sovereign states, enter
into a 10-year mutual defense treaty. After five years,
State A finds that the more progressive State B did not
go to the aid of State A when it was threatened by its
strong neighbor State C. State B reasoned that it had
to be prudent and deliberate in reacting to State C
because of their existing trade treaties.
(a) May State A now unilaterally withdraw from its
mutual defense treaty with State B? Explain your
answer. (2.5%)
Suggested Answer:
“Pacta sunt servanda means that every treaty in force
is binding upon the States who are parties to it and
States must perform their obligation in good faith
(Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 188550, August 19, 2013,
704 SCRA 216).
Rebus sic stantibus means that a fundamental change
of circumstances, which occurred with regard to those
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty and
which was not foreseen by the parties may not be
invoked for withdrawing from a treaty unless their
existence constituted an essential basis of the consent
of the parties and their effect is to radically transform
the extent of the obligations still to be performed
(Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties).
(c) Are the principles of pacta sunt servanda and rebus
sic stantibus relevant in the treaty relations between
State A and State B? What about in the treaty relations
between State B and State C? Explain your answer.
(2.5%)
2017
b) The following are the constitutional safeguards on
the exercise of the power of the President to proclaim
martial law:
There must be actual invasion or rebellion;
The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed sixty
days:
Within forty-eight hours, the President shall report his
action to Congress. If Congress is not in session, it
must convene within twenty-four hours;
Congress may by majority vote of all its members
voting Jointly revoke the proclamation, and the
President cannot set aside the revocation; By the
same vote and in the same manner, upon Initiative of
the President, Congress may extend the proclamation
If the invasion or rebellion continues and public safety
requires the extension;
The Supreme Court may review the factual sufficiency
of the proclamation, and the Supreme Court must
decide the case within thirty days from the time it was
filed;
Martial law does not automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the operation
of the Constitution.
It does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts
and of Congress. Military courts have no Jurisdiction
over civilians where civil courts are able to function.
(Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., pp. 213214.)

Declaring a rebellion, hostile groups have opened and

maintained armed conflicts on the Islands of Sulu and
Basilan.

a) To quell this, can the President place under martial

law the islands of Sulu and Basilan? Give your
reasons.

b) What are the constitutional safeguards on the

exercise of the President's power to proclaim martial
law?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a)If public safety requires it, the President can place

Sulu and Basilan under martial law since there is an
actual rebellion. Under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, the President can place any part of the
Philippines under martial law in case of rebellion, when
public safety requires it.
National
Territory
Arigo vs. Swift GR No. 206510, September
16, 2014
Question: The “Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act of
2009” ensures the protection and conservation of the
Tubbataha Reefs. Under its “no-take” policy, entry into
the waters of the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park is
strictly regulated and many human activities are
prohibited and penalized or fined. Sometime in 2013,
the USS Guardian, an Avenger-class mine
countermeasures ship of the US Navy, during the
discharge of their duties, ran aground on the northwest
side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs.
Subsequent grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations were conducted. A petition was filed
against the Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet for
allegedly causing environmental damage to the Reefs
thus violating constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology. Will the petition prosper?
Suggested Answer: The petition will not prosper.
Under Article 16, Section 3, of the Constitution, “The
State may not be sued without its consent.” In this
case, it is not the State that is sued but an official of
the State. Nonetheless, in United States of America v.
Judge Guinto, the Court discussed that the doctrine of
state immunity from suit is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the State for acts
allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their
duties. In this case, the US respondents were sued in
their official capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS
Guardian. Thus, the principle of State immunity bars
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court over the
persons of respondents.
Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438
Question:Bill, an American citizen, businessman, and
frequent visitor to the Philippines, was inside the U.S.
embassy when he got into a heated argument with a
Filipino citizen. Bill killed the Filipino Citizen inside the
U.S. Embassy. Right after the incident, the local police
of the PNP arrived and brought Bill to the nearest
police station. Upon reaching the station, the police
investigator uttered Bill’s Miranda rights and assigned
him an independent lawyer. Bill refused the services of
the lawyer and insisted that he be assisted by a
Filipino lawyer currently based in the U.S. The request
was denied, and the lawyer assigned by the police
stayed for the duration of the custodial interrogation.
Bill protested his arrest.
a. Bill argued that since the incident took place inside
the U.S. Embassy, Philippine courts have no
jurisdiction on the premise that U.S. Embassy grounds
are not part of Philippine territory; thus, technically, no
crime under Philippine law was committed. Is the
defense argument of Bill correct? Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer: It is established that the
Philippine courts have jurisdiction over acts done even
within the said U.S. Embassy grounds because the
“ground occupied by an embassy is not in fact the
territory of the foreign State to which the premises
belong through possession or ownership. The criminal
act committed however is determined by the territorial
sovereign.” (2 Hyde, International Law Chiefly as
Interpreted and Applied by the United States) cited in
Reagan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. L-26379, December 27, 1969
b. Bill also contended that he is entitled to the right of
bail based on the international standard of justice and
as a U.S. Citizen capital punishment is not applicable
to him because he is a resident of a U.S. state where
capital punishment is not applicable. Should Bill be
granted the right to bail despite that his crime
committed is punishable by reclusion perpetua in
Philippine laws and that being a U.S. citizen Bill should
be punished under the U.S. laws. Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer: No, Bill is not entitled to bail as a
matter of right. Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Const. Provides
that all persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable.
Therefore, assuming that Bill’s offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of Bill’s guilt is
strong, his petition for bail may be denied. Bill’s
reliance on the “international standard of justice” in
support of his petition for bail cannot take precedence
over our local laws on the matter, for it is settled that,
in case of a conflict between principle of international
law and our local laws, the latter should prevail.
(Inchong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 155)
Reagan vs CIR, 30 SCRA 968 (1969)
Question: Mr. Joe Mana, a U.S. citizen employed by a
U.S. government contractor providing technical
support to the U.S. Navy in the Philippines, purchased
a property within the Subic Bay Naval Base. He later
sold this property to another U.S. citizen who also
worked within the same naval base. Mana contests the
assessment of capital gains tax by the Philippine
Bureau of Internal Revenue, arguing that the property
sale within the naval base constitutes a transaction on
foreign soil and,
therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the Philippine
government. Is Smith liable for the capital gains tax?
Explain.
Suggested Answer: No, Joe Mana is liable for the
capital gains tax on the property sale within the Subic
Bay Naval Base. The key issue revolves around
whether the naval base constitutes foreign soil for tax
purposes. In the Philippines, the determination of
whether a specific area within its territory is considered
foreign soil is essential for tax liability. The case of
Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R.
No. L-26379) provides clear legal guidance on this
matter. In Reagan's case, it was established that the
Clark Air Force Base, even though leased to the
American armed forces, was not considered foreign
soil, and the Philippine government had the authority
to impose taxes on transactions within the base. This
decision was grounded on the principle that the
Philippines is an independent and sovereign state, and
its jurisdiction extends to its entire territory. Applying
the legal precedent set in Reagan's case to the
scenario presented, the Subic Bay Naval Base, like the
Clark Air Force Base, is situated within Philippine
territory. Hence, transactions within the naval base are
subject to Philippine tax laws, and Joe Mana is not
exempt from the capital gains tax, as the sale of the
property occurred within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
People vs. Gozo, 53 SCRA 476 (1973)
Question: Maria bought a house and lot located inside
the United States Naval Reservation within the
territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished
the house and built another one in its place, without a
building permit from the City Mayor of Olongapo City,
because she believed that a building permit was not
necessary for the construction of the house. Pedring, a
building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office
together with a patrolman of the Olongapo City police
force, apprehended four carpenters working on the
house of the accused and they brought the carpenters
to the Olongapo City police headquarters for
interrogation.
After due investigation, Maria was charged with
violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 144. The City
Court of Olongapo City found her guilty and sentenced
her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay
the costs. The RTC of Zambales, on appeal, found her
guilty on the above facts of violating such municipal
ordinance sentencing her to pay a fine and to demolish
the house thus erected. She elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals but in her brief, she would include a
question of the validity of such an ordinance
considering its applicability to her with regards to the
location of the
house, which was within the US naval base. Can the
State exercise administrative jurisdiction within the
naval base leased by the Philippines to the US armed
forces.
Suggested Answer: Yes, the Philippines can exercise
its administrative jurisdiction. Based on the case of
People v. Gozo, the Philippine Government has not
abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the
terms VFA, the United States Government has prior or
preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such
offenses. In relation to the case of X, even though her
house is within the US naval base, she can still be
prosecuted for violating the ordinances of Olongapo
City because she is still within its jurisdiction. Hence, in
the exercise of its sovereignty, the State does have
administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within
the US naval base.
RELATED BAR QUESTIONS
1989 Bar Q & A:
ARTICLE I: National Territory; Archipelagic Doctrine
(1989) No. 20: What do you understand about the
archipelagic doctrine? Is this reflected in the 1987
Constitution?
Suggested Answer: The ARCHIPELAGIC
DOCTRINE emphasizes the unity of land and waters
by defining an archipelago either as a group of islands
surrounded by waters or a body of waters studded with
islands. For this purpose, it requires that baselines be
drawn by connecting the appropriate points of the
outermost islands to encircle the islands within the
archipelago. The waters on the landward side of the
baselines regardless of breadth or dimensions are
merely internal waters. Yes, the archipelagic doctrine
is reflected in the 1987 Constitution. Article I, Section 1
provides that the national territory of the Philippines
includes the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands
and waters embraced therein; and the waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
1989 Bar Q & A:
Sovereignty of States; Natural Use of Territory (1989)
No. 19: The Republic of China (Taiwan), in its bid to
develop a hydrogen bomb and defend itself against
threats of invasion coming from the People's Republic
of China, conducted a series of secret nuclear
weapons tests in its own atmosphere.
The tests resulted in radioactive fallouts which
contaminated the rivers in and around Aparri and other
bodies of water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Can the Philippines complain against the
Republic of China for violation of its sovereignty?
Suggested Answer: In the Trial Smelter Arbitration
between the United States and Canada, the Arbitral
Tribunal held that air pollution from Canada should be
enjoined, because sovereignty includes the right
against any encroachment which might prejudice the
natural use of the territory and the free movement of its
inhabitants. Since the nuclear tests conducted by the
Republic of China resulted in radioactive fallouts which
contaminated the rivers and other bodies of water
within the Philippines, the Republic of China violated
the sovereignty of the Philippines. YES, the Philippines
can complain against the Republic of China for
violation of its sovereignty. Article 194 of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea requires States to
take all measures necessary to ensure that activities
under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as
not to cause damage by pollution to other States and
their environment.
1994 BAR Q & A:
ARTICLE I: National Territory; Exclusive Economic
Zone; Rights of the Coastal State (1994) No. 11: In the
desire to improve the fishing methods of the fishermen,
the Bureau of Fisheries, with the approval of the
President, entered into a memorandum of agreement
to allow Thai fishermen to fish within 200 miles from
the Philippine sea coasts on the condition that Filipino
fishermen be allowed to use Thai fishing equipment
and vessels, and to learn modern technology in fishing
and canning. Is the agreement valid?
Suggested Answer: No. the President cannot
authorize the Bureau of Fisheries to enter into a
memorandum of agreement allowing Thai fishermen to
fish within the exclusive economic zone of the
Philippines, because the Constitution reserves to
Filipino citizens the use and enjoyment of the exclusive
economic zone of the Philippines. Section 2. Article XII
of the Constitution provides: “The State shall protect
the nation's marine part in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and
reserve its use and enjoyment to Filipino citizens."
Section 7, Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The
State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen,
especially of local communities, to the preferential use
of the communal marine and fishing resources, both
inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such
fishermen through appropriate technology and
research,
adequate financial, production, and marketing
assistance, and other services. The State shall also
protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The
protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of
subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fish
workers shall receive a just share from their labor in
the utilization of marine and fishing resources.
1996 BAR Q & A:
Territory & Government No. 8: A law was passed
dividing the Philippines into three regions (Luzon,
Visayas, and Mindanao), each constituting an
independent state except on matters of foreign
relations, national defense and national taxation, which
are vested in the Central government. Is the law valid?
Explain.
Suggested Answer: The law dividing the Philippines
into three regions, each constituting an independent
state and vesting in a central government matters of
foreign relations, national defense, and national
taxation, is unconstitutional. First, it violates Article I,
which guarantees the integrity of the national territory
of the Philippines because it divided the Philippines
into three states. Second, it violates Section 1, Article
II of the Constitution, which provides for the
establishment of democratic and republic States by
replacing it with three States organized as a
confederation. Third, it violates Section 22, Article II of
the Constitution, which, while recognizing and
promoting the rights of indigenous cultural
communities, provides for national unity and
development. Fourth, it violates Section 15, Article X of
the Constitution, which provides for autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
within the framework of national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Fifth, it violates the sovereignty of the Republic of the
Philippines.
2004 BAR Q & A:
National Territory Distinguish briefly but clearly
between:
(1) The territorial sea and the internal waters of the
Philippines.
(2) The contiguous zone and the exclusive economic
zone.
(3) The flag state and the flag of convenience.
(4) The constitutive theory and the declaratory theory
concerning recognition of states.
(5) The Wilson doctrine and the Estrada doctrine
regarding recognition of governments.
Suggested Answer: (1) TERRITORIAL SEA is an
adjacent belt of sea with a breadth of 12 nautical miles
measured from the baselines of a state and over which
the state has sovereignty (Articles 2 and 3 of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea). Ships of all states
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea (Article 14 of the Convention on the Law
of the Sea). Under Section 1, Article I of the 1987
Constitution, the INTERNAL WATERS of the
Philippines consist of the waters around, between and
connecting the islands of the Philippine Archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, including
the waters in bays, rivers and lakes. No right of
innocent passage for foreign vessels exists in the case
of internal waters (Harris, Cases and Materials on
International Law, 5th ed., 1998, p. 407). Internal
waters are the waters on the landward side of
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is calculated (Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, 4th ed., 1990, p. 120). (2)
CONTIGUOUS ZONE is a zone contiguous to the
territorial sea and extends up to 12 nautical miles from
the territorial sea and over which the coastal state may
exercise control necessary to prevent infringement of
its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and
regulations within its territory or territorial sea (Article
33 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea). The
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE is a zone extending
up to 200 nautical miles from the baselines of a state
over which the coastal state has sovereign rights for
the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or
nonliving, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and
of the seabed and subsoil, and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration
of the zone (Articles 56 and 57 of the Convention on
the Law of the Sea). (3) FLAG STATE means a ship
has the nationality of the flag of the state it flies, but
there must be a genuine link between the state and the
ship (Article 91 of the Convention on the Law of the
Sea). FLAG OF CONVENIENCE refers to a state with
which a vessel is registered for various reasons such
as low or non-existent taxation or low operating costs
although the ship has no genuine link with that state
(Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th
ed., 1998, p. 425). (4) According to the
CONSTITUTIVE THEORY, recognition is the last
indispensable element that converts the state being
recognized into an international person. According to
the DECLARATORY THEORY, recognition is merely
an acknowledgment of the preexisting fact that the
state being recognized is an international person
(Cruz, International Law, 2003 ed.). (5) Under the
WILSON DOCTRINE, recognition shall not be
extended to any government established by revolution
or internal violence until the freely elected
representatives of the people have organized a
constitutional government. Under the ESTRADA
DOCTRINE, the Mexican government declared that it
would, as it saw fit, continue or terminate its diplomatic
relations with any country in which a political upheaval
had taken place and in so doing it would not
pronounce judgment on the right of the foreign state to
accept, maintain or replace its government (Cruz,
International Law, 2003 ed.). (In view of recent
developments, the Wilson doctrine and the Estrada
doctrine are no longer in the mainstream of public
international law.).
2005 BAR Q & A:
Exclusive Economic Zone; Rights of the Coastal State
Enumerate the rights of the coastal state in the
exclusive economic zone.
Suggested Answer: SOVEREIGN RIGHTS — for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and
managing the natural resources, whether living or
nonliving, of the seabed and subsoil and the
superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities
such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds in an area not extending more than
200 nautical miles beyond the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured. (See Art. 56, UNCLOS)
Jurisdiction, inter alia, with regard to: (1) the
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations
and structures; (2) marine scientific research; and (3)
the protection and preservation of the marine
environment. ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: In the
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE, the coastal State has
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether living or nonliving, of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its
subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds in an area not extending more than
200 nautical miles beyond the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured. Other rights include the
production of energy from the water, currents and
winds, the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures, marine scientific research
and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment. (Art. 56, U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea).
2009 BAR Q & A
National Territory Under the archipelago doctrine, the
waters around, between, and connecting the islands of
the archipelago form part of the territorial sea of the
archipelagic state.
Suggested Answer: False. Under Article I of the
Constitution, the wafers around, between and
connecting the islands of the Philippines form part of
its internal waters. Under Article 49 (1) of the U.N.
Convention on the Law of the Sea, these waters do not
.
form part of the territorial sea but are described as
archipelagic waters.
2013 BAR Q&A
National Territory Archipelagic Doctrine No.VI.
Congress passed Republic Act No. 7711 to comply
with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea. In a petition filed with the Supreme Court, Anak Ti
Ilocos, an association of Ilocano professionals, argued
that Republic Act No.7711 discarded the definition of
the Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and in
related treaties; excluded the Kalayaan Islands and the
Scarborough Shoals from the Philippine Archipelagic
baselines; and converted internal waters into
archipelagic waters. Is the petition meritorious? (6%)
Suggested Answer: No, the petition is not
meritorious. UNCLOS has nothing to do with the
acquisition (or loss) of territory. It merely regulates
sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous zones,
exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves
which it delimits. The Kalayaan Islands and the
Scarborough Shoals are located at an appreciable
distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago. A straight baseline loped around them
from the nearest baseline will violate Article 47(3) and
Article 47(2) of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea III. Whether the bodies of water lying
landward of the baselines of the Philippines are
internal waters or archipelagic waters, the Philippines
retains jurisdiction over them (Magallona vs. Ermita,
655 SCRA 476).
Topic: The National Territory 2022
A foreign commercial ship was spotted by the
Philippine Coast Guard dumping garbage and toxic
waste 20 nautical miles from Nasugbu, Batangas, the
nearest coastline of the Philippines. The officers of the
ship were arrested and charged in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Batangas for violation of environmental
laws of the Philippines. The officers of the ship files a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground that
Philippine courts do not have territorial jurisdiction over
the case since the vessel was sailing outside the
territorial sea of the Philippines when the arrest was
made.
Is the ground to dismiss correct? Explain briefly.
Suggested answer: No, the ground to dismiss is
incorrect. Under the UNCLOS, within the contiguous
zone, a State has the right to both prevent and punish
infringemeny of sanitary laws. Here, since the act of
dumping garbage and toxic waste of the foreign
commercial ship was committed 20 nautical miles from
the nearest coastline of the Philippines or within the
contiguous zone, such constitutes violation of the
sanitary law which aims to protect the environment.
2019 BAR Q&A
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), what are the rights of the
Philippines within the following areas: Contiguous zone
(2%)
The Contiguous Zone is an intermediary zone between
the territorial sea and the high seas extending
enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal state to a
maximum of 24 nautical miles from baselines for the
purposes of preventing or punishing violations of
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary (and thus
residual national security) legislation. Exclusive
economic zone (2%)
Suggested Answer: Under the EEZ, the coastal state
retains exclusive sovereignty over exploring, exploiting
and conserving all natural resources. Under Article 60
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS). It also has the right to construct and
authorize and regulate the construction, operation and
use of artificial islands, installations and structures for
the purposes provided for in Article 56 and other
economic purposes, installations and structures which
may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the
coastal State in the zone; it shall also have the
exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands,
installations, and structures, including jurisdiction with
regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety and
immigration laws and regulations.
2009 BAR Q&A
Scope (Terrestrial, Aerial, and Fluvial Domains)
William, a private American citizen, a university
graduate, and frequent visitor to the Philippines, was
inside the U.S. embassy when he got into a heated
argument with a private Filipino citizen. Then, in front
of many shocked witnesses, he killed the person he
was arguing with. The police came and brought him to
the nearest police station. Upon reaching the station,
the police investigator, in halting English, informed
William of his Miranda rights, and assigned him an
independent local counsel. William refused the
services of the lawyer, and insisted that he be assisted
by a Filipino lawyer currently based in the U.S. The
request was denied, and the counsel assigned by the
police stayed for the duration of the investigation.
William protested his arrest.
He argued that since the incident took place inside the
U.S. embassy, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction
because the U.S. embassy grounds are not part of
Philippine territory; thus, technically, no crime under
Philippine law was committed. Is William correct?
Explain your answer. (2009 BAR)
Suggested Answer: NO. William is not correct. The
premises occupied by the United States Embassy do
not
2 constitute territory of the United States but of the
Philippines. Crimes committed within them are subject
to the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Since
William has no diplomatic immunity, the Philippines
can prosecute him if it acquires custody over him.
(Reagan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. L26379, 27 Dec. 1969)
2015 BAR Q&A
A bill was introduced in the House of Representatives
in order to faithfully implement the provisions of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Congressman Pat Rio Tek questioned the
constitutionality of the bill on the ground that the
provisions of UN CLOS are violative of the provisions
of the Constitution defining the Philippine internal
waters and territorial sea. Do you agree or not with the
said objection? Explain. Describe the following
maritime regimes under UNCLOS
Territorial sea
Contiguous zone
Exclusive economic zone
Continental shelf
Suggested Answer: No, the petition is not
meritorious. UNCLOS has nothing to do with the
acquisition (or loss) of territory. It merely regulates
sea-use rights over maritime zones, contiguous zones,
exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves
which it delimits. The Kalayaan Islands and the
Scarborough Shoals are located at an appreciable
distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago. A straight baseline loped around them
from the nearest baseline will violate Article 47(3) and
Article 47(2) of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea III. Whether the bodies of water lying
landward of the baselines of the Philippines are
internal waters or archipelagic waters, the Philippines
retains jurisdiction over them (Magallona vs. Ermita,
655 SCRA 476).

Suggested Answer : No, the bill is not

unconstitutional because UNCLOS is an international
treaty that aims to regulate maritime zones and rights
and it has nothing to do with the aquisition or territory
loss, as stated in the case of Magalona vs. Ermita.

The Territorial sea is defined as a stretch of body of

water 12 nautical miles from the country’s baseline.
The state has full sovereinghty over this waters. The
contiguous zone is the zone 12 nautical miles from the
territorial sea or 24 nauticla miles from the baseline in
which a state excerces some jurisdiction over these
waters in terms of fiscal, sanitary and customs. The
Exclusive economic zone of a state is 200 nautical
miles from the baseline, in which a state may exploit its
natural resources. Lastly the Continental shelf is where
a state can explore the resources in this area as long
as the law allows it.

2013 BAR Q&A

Archipelagic Doctrine (2013) No.VI. Congress passed
Republic Act No. 7711 to comply with the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In a
petition filed with the Supreme Court, Anak Ti Ilocos,
an association of Ilocano professionals, argued that
Republic Act No.7711 discarded the definition of the
Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and in
related treaties; excluded the Kalayaan Islands and the
Scarborough Shoals from the Philippine Archipelagic
baselines; and converted internal waters into
archipelagic waters. Is the petition meritorious? (6%)
 MODULE 2

LEGISLATIVE
DEPARTMENT

Nature of
Legislative Power
NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
2010 BAR Q&A
Congresswoman A is a co-owner of an industrial
estate in Sta. Rosa, Laguna which she had declared in
her Statement of Assets and Liabilities. A member of
her political party authored a bill that would provide a
5- year development plan for all industrial estates in
the Southern Tagalog Region to attract investors. The
plan included an appropriation of 2 billion pesos for the
construction of roads around the estates. When the bill
finally became law, a civil society watchdog questioned
the constitutionality of the law as it obviously benefitted
Congresswoman A's industrial estate. Decide' with
reasons.
Suggested Answer:
The law is constitutional. Sec. 12, Art. VI of the
Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of a law
which will benefit the business interests of a member
of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It only
requires that if the member of Congress whose
business interests will be benefited by the law is the
one who will file the bill, he should notify the House
concerned of the potential conflict of interest.
2009 BAR Q&A
Congressman Nonoy delivered a privilege speech
charging the Intercontinental Universal Bank (IUB) with
the sale of unregistered foreign securities, in violation
of R.A. 8799. He then filed, and the House of
Representative unanimously approved, a Resolution
directing the House Committee on Good Government
(HCGG) to conduct an inquiry on the matter, in aid of
legislation, in order to prevent the recurrence of any
similar fraudulent activity.
SThe HCGG immediately scheduled a hearing and
invited the responsible officials of IUB, the Chairman
and Commissionersof the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the Governor of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). On the date set for the
hearing, only the SEC Commissioners appeared,
prompting Congressman Nonoy to move for the
issuance of the appropriate subpoena ad testificandum
to compel the attendance of the invited resource
persons.
The IUB officials filed a suit to prohibit HCGG from
proceeding with the inquiry and to quash the
subpoena, raising the following arguments:
The subject of the legislative investigation is also the
subject of criminal and civil actions pending before the
courts and the prosecutor's office; thus, the legislative
inquiry would preempt judicial action.
Suggested Answer:
The argument is not tenable; since this is an essential
component of legislative power, it cannot be made
subordinate to criminal and civil actions. Otherwise, it
would be very easy to subvert any investigation in aid
of legislation through the convenient ploy of instituting
criminal and civil action. (Standard Chartered Bank
[Philippine Branch] v. Senate Committee on Banks,
Financial Institutions and Currencies,
C.R.No.167173,27 Dec.2007)
2019 BAR Q&A
Under the 1987 Constitution, to whom does each duty/
power/ privilege / prohibition/ disqualification apply:
(2019 BAR)
(a) The power to allow small-scale utilization of natural
resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and
fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
(b) The sole power to declare the existence of state of
war.
Suggested Answer:
The Congress, by virtue of a special law. The State
shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its
archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens. (Sec.2(3), Art. XII, 1987
Constitution)
The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses
in joint session assembled, voting separately.
(Sec.23(1), Art. VI,1987 Constitution)
2017 BAR Q&A
The Congress establishes by law Philippine Funds,
Inc., a private corporation, to receive foreign donations
coming from abroad during national and local
calamities and disasters, and to enable the
unhampered and speedy disbursements of the
donations through the mere action of its Board of
Directors. Thereby, delays in the release of the
donated funds occasioned by the stringent rules of
procurement would be avoided. Also, the releases
would not come under the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit (COA).
(a) Is the law establishing Philippine Funds, Inc.
constitutional? Explain your answer.
(b) Can the Congress pass the law that would exempt
the foreign grants from the jurisdiction of the COA?
Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer:
The establishment of Philippine Funds, Inc. is valid. It
was created to enable the speedy disbursements of
donations for calamities and disasters, public purpose
is no longer restricted to traditional government
functions. (Petitioner- Organization v. Executive
Secretary, C.R. Nos, 147036-37 & 147811, 10 Apr.
2012) Congress cannot exempt the foreign grants from
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. Its
jurisdiction extends to all government-owned or
controlled corporations, including those funded by
donations through the Government. (Sec. 3, Art /X-D,
Sec. 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution; and
Petitioner Corporation v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
Nos. 147036-37 & 147811,10 Apr. 2012)
1996 BAR Q&A
Are the following hills filed in Congress constitutional?
(1996 BAR)
(a) A hill originating from the Senate, which provides
for the creation of the Public Utility Commission to
regulate public service companies and appropriating
the initial funds needed to establish the same. Explain.
(b) A hill creating a joint legislative- executive
commission to give, on behalf of the Senate, its
advice, consent, and concurrence to treaties entered
into by the President. The hill contains the guidelines
to he followed by the commission in the discharge of
its functions. Explain.
Suggested Answer:
(a) YES. It is not an appropriation bill, because the
appropriation of public funds is not the principal
purpose of the bill. A law is not an appropriate
measure if the appropriation of public funds is not its
principal purpose, and the appropriation is only
incidental to some other objective. (Association of
Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, 14July 1989)
(b) NO.The Senate cannot delegate this function to
such a commission, because under Sec. 21, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the concurrence of at least two-thirds
of the Senate itself is required for the ratification of
treaties. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
2014 BAR Q&A
Congress enacted a law exempting certain
government institutions providing social services from
the payment of court fees. Atty Kristopher Timoteo
challenged the constitutionality of the said law on the
ground that only the Supreme Court has the power to
fix and exempt said entities from the payment of court
fees.
Congress, on the other hand, argues that the law is
constitutional as it has the power to enact said law for
it was through legislative fiat that the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF)and the Special Allowance
for Judges and Justices (SAJJ), the funding of which
are sourced from the fees collected by the courts, was
created. Thus, Congress further argues that if it can
enact a law utilizing court fees to fund the JDF and
SAJJ, a fortiori it can enact a law exempting the
payment of court fees.
Discuss the constitutionality of the said law, taking into
account the arguments of both parties.
Suggested Answer:
The law is unconstitutional. The Constitution has taken
away the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement the Rules of Court. The fiscal autonomy of
the Judiciary guaranteed by Section 3, Article VIII of
the Constitution recognized the authority of the
Supreme Court to levy, assess, and collect fees.
Congress cannot amend the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court for the payment of legal fees by
granting exemptions. (In re Petition for Recognition of
Exemption of the Government Service Insurance
System from Payment of Lega; Fees,A.M. No. 08-2-
01-0, 11 Feb.2010, 612 SCRA 193; In re Exemption of
National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/
Docket Fees, A.M. No. 05-10-20-SC, 10 March, 2010,
615 SCRA 1; In re Exemption from Payment of Court
and Sheriffs Fees of Duly Registered Cooperatives.
A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, 13 Mar. 2012)
2008 BAR Q&A
In 1963, congress passed a law creating a
government-owned corporation named Manila War
Memorial Commission (MWMC), with the primary
function of overseeing the construction of a massive
memorial in the heart of Manila to commemorate victim
of the 1945 Battle of Manila. The MWMCcharter
provided an initial appropriation of Pl,000,000,
empowered the corporation to raise funds in its own
name, and set aside a parcel of land in Malate for the
memorial site. The charter set the corporate life of
MWMC at 50 years with a proviso that Congress may
not abolish MWMC until after the completion of the
memorial. Forty-five (45) years later, the memorial was
only 1/3 complete and the memorial site itself had long
been overrun hy squatters. Congress enacted a law
abolishing the MWMCand requiring that the funds
raised hy it he remitted to the National Treasury. The
MWMCchallenged the validity of the law, arguing that
under its charter its mandate is to complete the
memorial no matter how long it takes. Decide with
reason.

Suggested Answer:
The contention of MWMC is untenable. An implied
limitation on legislative power is the prohibition against
the passage of irrepealable laws. Such laws deprive
succeeding legislatures of the authority to craft laws
appropriate to the milieu. (City of Davao v. Regional
Trial Court G.R.No. 127383, 18 Aug 2005)

Bicameral
Congress
BICAMERAL CONGRESS
2019 BAR Q&A
Candidate X, a naturalized Filipino citizen, ran for
Congressman for the Lone District of Batanes. After a
close electoral contest, he won by a slim margin of 500
votes. His sole opponent, Y, filed an election protest
before the Commission on Election (COMELEC),
claiming that X should be disqualified from running for
said position because he is not a natural-born citizen.
While the case was pending, X was proclaimed by the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Batanes as the duly
elected Congressman of the province.
Is X qualified to run for Congress? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
NO, X is not qualified to run for Congress. The
Constitution prescribes that no person shall be a
Member of the House of Representatives unless he is
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. (Sec. 6, Art.
VI, 198 7 Constitution) In this case, X is a naturalized
citizen and is thus not qualified to run for Congress.
2014 BAR Q&A
With time, the number of members of the House of
Representatives increased with the creation of new
legislative districts and the corresponding adjustments
in the number of party-list representatives. At a time
when the House membership was already 290, a great
number of the members decided that it was time to
propose amendments to the Constitution. The
Senators, however, were cool to the idea. But the
members of the House insisted. They accordingly
convened Congress into a constituent assembly
despite the opposition of the majority of the members
of the Senate. When the votes were counted, 275
members of the House of Representatives approved
the proposed amendments. Only 10 Senators
supported such proposals. The proponents now claim
that the proposals were validly made since more than
the required three-fourths vote of Congress has been
obtained. The 14 Senators who voted against the
proposals claim that the proposals needed not three-
fourths vote of the entire Congress but each house.
Since the required number of votes in the Senate was
not obtained, there could be no valid proposals, so
argued the Senators. Were the proposals validly
adopted by Congress?
Suggested Answer:
The proposal was not validly adopted because the ten
(10) Senators who voted in favor of the proposed
amendments constituted less than three-fourths of all
the Members of the Senate. Although Sec. 1, Art. XVII
of the Constitution did not expressly provide that the
Senate and the House of Representatives must vote
separately, when the Legislature consists of two (2)
houses, the determination of one house is to be
submitted to the separate determination of the other
house. (Miller v. Mardo, C.R.No. L-15138, 31 July
1961)
1999 BAR Q&A
Victor Ahmad was born on December 16, 1972, to a
Filipino mother and an alien father. Under the law of
his father's country, his mother did not acquire his
father's citizenship. Victor consults you on December
21, 1993, and informs you of his intention to run for
Congress in the 1995 elections. Is he qualified to run?
What advice would you give him? Would your answer
be the same if he had seen and consulted you on
December 16, 1991, and informed you of his desire to
run for Congress in the 1992 elections? Discuss your
answer.
Suggested Answer:
NO, Victor Ahmad is not qualified to run for Congress
in the 1995 elections. Under Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution, a member of the House of
Representatives must be at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election. Since he will
be less than twenty-five (25) years of age in 199 5,
Victor Ahmad is not qualified to run.
Under Sec. 2, Art. IV of the Constitution, to be deemed
a natural-born citizen, Victor Ahmad must elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. I shall advise him to elect Philippine
citizenship if he has not yet done so, and to wait until
the 1998 elections. My answer would be the same if he
consulted me in 1991 and informed me of his desire to
run in the 1992 elections.
Alternative Answer:
Under Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution, Victor
Ahmad must have elected Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority to be considered a
natural-born citizen and qualified to run for Congress.
Republic Act No. 6809 reduced the majority age to
eighteen (18) years. Cuenca v. Secretary of]ustice
(C.R.No. L-18069, 26 May 1962) recognized three (3)
years from reaching the age of majority as the
reasonable period for electing Philippine citizenship.
Since Republic Act No. 6809 took effect in 1989 and
there is no showing that Victor Ahmad elected
Philippine citizenship within three (3) years from the
time he reached the age of majority on December 16,
199C, he is not qualified to run for Congress.
If he consulted me on December 16, 1991, I would
have informed him that he should elect Philippine
citizenship so that he could be considered a natural-
born citizen.
2015 BAR Q&A
On August 15, 2015, Congresswoman Dina Tatalo
filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5432, entitled "An
Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone
District of the City of Pangarap." The hill eventually
became a law, R.A.No. 1234. It mandated that the lone
legislative district of the City of Pangarap would now
consist of two (2) districts. For the 2016 elections, the
voters of the City of Pangarap would be classified as
belonging to either the first or second district,
depending on their place of residence. The
constituents of each district would elect their
representative to Congress as well as eight (8)
members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod. R.A. No.
1234 apportioned the City's harangays. The
COMELEC thereafter promulgated Resolution No.
2170 implementing R.A. No. 1234. Piolo Cruz assails
the COMELEC resolution as unconstitutional.
According to him, R.A. No. 1234 cannot be
implemented without conducting a plebiscite because
the apportionment under the law falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Is the
claim correct? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
The claim is erroneous. The constitution does not
require a plebiscite for the creation of a new legislative
district by a legislative reapportionment. It is required
only for the creation of new local government units
[Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R.No. 176970, 08 Dec.
2008)
2015 BAR Q&A
The Partido ng Mapagkakatiwalaang Pilipino (PMP) is
a major political party that has participated in every
election since the enactment of the 1987 Constitution.
It has fielded candidates mostly for legislative district
elections. A number of its members were elected, and
are serving, in the House of Representatives. In the
coming 2016 elections, the PMP leadership intends to
join the party-list system. Can PMP join the party-list
system without violating the Constitution and Republic
Act (R.A.) No.7941?
Suggested Answer:
YES. As for political parties, they may participate in the
party-list race by registering under the party-list system
and no longer field congressional candidates. These
parties, if they field congressional candidates,
however, are not barred from participating in the party-
list elections; what they need to do is register their
sectoral wing or party under the party-list system.
2014 BAR Q&A
Greenpeas is an ideology-based political party fighting
for environmental causes. It decided to participate
under the party-list system. When the election results
came in, it only obtained 1.99 percent of the votes cast
under the party-list system. Bluehean, a political
observer, claimed that Greenpeas is not entitled to any
seat since it failed to obtain at least 2% of the votes.
Moreover, since it does not represent any of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society,
Greenpeas is not entitled to participate under the
party-list system. How valid are the observations of
Bluehean?
Suggested Answer:
The claim of Bluebean that Greenpeas is not entitled
to a seal under the party-list system because it
obtained only 1.99 percent of the votes cast under the
party-list system is not correct. The provision in Sec.
5(2) Art. VI of the Constitution provides that the party-
list representatives shall constitute twenty percent
(20%) of the total number of the members of the
House of Representatives is mandatory after the
parties receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes case for the party-list system have been
allocated one seat, the remaining seats should be
allocated among the parties by the proportional
percentage of the votes received by each party as
against the total party-list votes [Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, 21 Apr. 2009)
The claim of Bluebean that Greenpeas is not entitled
to participate in the party-list elections because it does
not represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sectors of society is not correct. It is enough that its
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest of its
sector (Atong Panglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R.No.
203766, 02 Apr. 2013)
This sectoral wing shall be considered an independent
sectoral party linked to a political party through a
coalition. (Atong Panglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC,
G.R.No. 203766, 02 Apr.2013)
2009 BAR Q&A
Rudy Domingo, 38 years old, natural-horn Filipino,
and a resident of the Philippines since birth, is a
Manila-based entrepreneur who runs KABAKA, a
coalition of peoples' organizations from fisherfolk
communities. KABAKA's operations consist of
empowering fisherfolk leaders through livelihood
projects and pieces of training on good governance.
The Dutch Foundation for Global Initiatives, a private
organization registered in The Netherlands, receives a
huge subsidy from the Dutch Foreign Ministry, which,
in turn is allocated worldwide to the Foundation's
partners like KABAKA.Rudy seeks to register KABAKA
as a party list with himself as a nominee of the
coalition'. Will KABAKA and Rudy be qualified as a
party-list and a nominee, respectively? Decide with
reasons.
Suggested Answer:
KABAKA and Ruby are not qualified as a party list and
as nominees, respectively, since KABAKA is receiving
a subsidy from the Dutch Foreign Ministry. Under Sec.
2(5), Art. IX-C of the Constitution, a political party that
is supported by any foreign government cannot be
registered with the Commission on Elections. (UPLC
Suggested Answers)
2007 BAR Q&A
The Supreme Court has provided a formula for
allocating seats for party-list representatives.
The twenty percent allocation - the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty
percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the
party list;
The two percent threshold - only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to
have a seat in the House of Representatives;
The three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless
of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled
to a maximum of three seats; that is, one 'qualifying'
and two additional seats;
The first-party rule - additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be determined in relation to the
total number of votes garnered by the par with the
highest
A: Under Sec. 11 (b) of Republic Act 7941, only the
parties which received at least two percent of the total
votes cast for the party- list are entitled to have a seat
in the House of Representatives. To have meaningful
representation, the elected party-list representative
must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. (Veterans Federation Party v.
COMELEC,G.R.136781, 06 Oct.2000)
(c) The three-seat limit - each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained,
is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one
'qualifying' and two additional seats.
A: Sec. 11(b) of Republic Act 7941 allows qualified
parties to have a maximum of three (3) seats in the
House of Representatives so that no single group will
dominate the number of votes. For each of these rules,
state the constitutional basis, if any, and the purpose.
(2007 BAR)
(a) The twenty percent allocation - the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the
party list.
A: The party-list congressmen should not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, because this is the maximum number
of party-list congressmen. (Sec. 5(3), Art. VI, 1987
Constitution; Veterans Foundation Party v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 136781, 06 Oct.2000)
(b)The two percent threshold - only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to
have a seat in the House of Representative or legally
qualified party is entitled to shall be determined
concerning the total number of votes garnered by the
party with the highest number of votes.
A: Additional seats to which a qualified party is entitled
are determined by the proportion of the total number of
votes it obtained with the total number of votes
obtained by the party with the highest number of votes,
to maintain proportional representation. This is
because while representation in the party-list system is
proportional, a party is entitled to a maximum of three
seats regardless of the number of votes it obtained.
(Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC,C.R. No.
136781, 06 Oct. 2000)
2013 BAR Q&A
In the May 2013 elections, the Allied Workers' Group
of the Philippines (AWGP), representing land-based
and sea-based workers in the Philippines and
overseas, won in the party list congressional elections.
Atty.Abling, a labor lawyer, is its nominee. As part of
the party's advocacy and services, Congressman
Abling engages in labor counseling, particularly for
local workers with claims against their employers and
for those who need representation in collective
bargaining negotiations with employers. When labor
cases arise, AWGP enters its appearance in
representation of the workers and the Congressman
makes it a point to be there to accompany the workers,
although a retained counsel also formally enters his
appearance and is invariably there. Congressman
Abling largely takes a passive role in the proceedings
although he occasionally speaks to supplement the
retained counsel's statements. It is otherwise in CBA
negotiations where he actively participates/
Management lawyers, feeling aggrieved that a
congressman should not actively participate before
labor tribunals and before employers because of the
influence a congressman can wield, filed a disbarment
case against the Congressman before the Supreme
Court for his violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and breach of trust, in relation,
particularly with the prohibitions on legislators under
the Constitution. Is the cited ground for disbarment
meritorious?
Suggested Answers:
Being a congressman, Atty. Abling is disqualified
under Sec. 14, Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution from
personally appearing as counsel before quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies handling labor cases
constitutes personal appearance before them. [Puyat
v. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-5122, 25 Mar. 1982) His
involvement in collective bargaining, and negotiations
also involves the practice of law, because he is making
use of his legal knowledge for the benefit of others.
(Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 03 Sept. 199)
The Bureau of Labor Relations is involved in collective
bargaining negotiations (Article 250 of the Labor
Code).
Atty. Abling should not be disbarred but should be
merely suspended from the practice of law.
Suspension is the appropriate penalty for involvement
in the unlawful practice of law. [Tapay v. Banco/a, A.C.
No. 9604, 20 Mar. 2013)
Alternative Answer
NO, Congressman Abling cannot be disbarred. A
retained counsel formally appears for AWGP. His role
is largely passive and cannot be considered a personal
appearance. His participation in the collective
bargaining negotiations does not entail a personal
appearance before an administrative body. (Sec. 13,
Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
2004 BAR Q&A
JAR faces a dilemma: should he accept a Cabinet
appointment now or run later for Senator? Having
succeeded in law practice as well as prospered in
private business where he and his wife have
substantial investments, he now contemplates public
service hut without losing the flexibility to engage in
corporate affairs or participate in professional activities
within ethical hounds. Taking into account the
prohibitions and inhibitions of public office whether as
Senator or Secretary, he turns to you for advice to
resolve his dilemma. What is your advice? Explain
briefly.
Suggested Answer:
I shall advise JAR to run for Senator. As Senator, he
can retain his investments in his business, although he
must make a full disclosure of his business and
financial interests and notify the Senate of a potential
conflict of interest if he authors a bill. (Section 12,
Article VI, 1987 Const.) He can continue practicing
law, but he cannot personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice, the Electoral Tribunals, or
quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies (Sec. 14,
Article VI, 1987 Const.).
As a member of the Cabinet, JAR cannot directly or
indirectly practice law or participate in any business.
He will have to divest himself of his investments in his
business (Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution). The Constitutional prohibition imposed
on members of the Cabinet covers both public and
private office or employment (Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, G.R.No. 83896, 22 Feb. 1991)
2018 BAR Q&A
Q: What and whose vote is required for the following
acts:
(a) The repeal of a tax exemption law.
A: The Constitution is silent on the voting requirement
for repealing a tax exemption. However, it could be
considered that the voting requirement to grant is also
the voting requirement to repeal; hence, the required
vote is the majority of all the members of Congress.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The granting of tax exemptions requires the majority of
all members of the Congress because granting such
will impair the lifeblood of the government. Repealing
such tax exemption, however, is not inimical to such
lifeblood, and a simple majority is needed instead of a
qualified majority.
(h) A declaration of the existence of a state of war.
A: Two-thirds of all members of Congress, voting
separately. (Sec. 23 (1), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
(c) The amendment of a constitutional provision
through a constituent assembly.
A: The proposal for the amendment shall be valid,
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members. (Sec.
1, Art. XVII, 1987 Constitution) For the effectivity of the
amendment; however, the vote needed is the majority
of all those who voted. (Sec 4, Art. XVI/, 1987
Constitution)
NOTE: Any of these two answers should be
acceptable as the question is not clear on whether it is
asking for the voting requirement for the validity of the
proposal or the effectivity of the amendment.
(d) The resolution of a tie in a presidential election.
A: A majority of all the members of both Houses of
Congress, voting separately. (Sec. 4, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
(e) The extension of the period for the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
A: The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special
session. (Sec. 18, Art VII, 1987 Constitution
2002 BAR Q&A
In an election case, the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal rendered a decision upholding the
election protest of protester A, a member of the
Freedom Party, against protester B, a member of the
Federal Party. The deciding vote in favor of A was cast
by Representative X, a member of the Federal Party.
For having voted against his party mate,
Representative X was removed by Resolution of the
House of Representatives, at the instance of his party
(the Federal Party), from membership in the HRET.
Representative X protested his removal on the ground
that he voted based on the evidence presented and
contended that he had the security of tenure as an
HRET Member and that he could not be removed
except for a valid cause. With whose contention do
you agree, that of the Federal Party or that of
Representative X? Why?
Suggested Answer:
I agree with the contention of Representative X. As
held in Bondoc v. Pineda, (C.R. No. 97710, 26 Sept.
1991) the members of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal are entitled to security of tenure like
members of the judiciary. Membership in it may not be
terminated except for a just cause. Disloyalty to a party
is not a valid ground for the expulsion of a member of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. Its
members must discharge their functions with
impartiality and independence from the political party
to which they belong.
2002 BAR Q&A
Suppose there are 202 members in the House of
Representatives. Of this number, 185 belong to the
Progressive Party of the Philippines or PPP, while 17
belong to the Citizens Party or CP. How would you
answer the following questions regarding the
representation of the House in the Commission on
Appointments? (2002 BAR)
(a) How many seats would the PPP be entitled to have
in the Commission on Appointments? Explain your
answer fully.
(b) Suppose 15 of the CP representatives, while
maintaining their party affiliation, entered into a political
alliance with the PPP to form the "Rainbow Coalition"
in the House. What effect, if any, would this have on
the right of the CP to have a seat or seats in the
Commission on Appointments? Explain your answer
fully.
Suggested Answer:
a) The 185 members of the Progressive Party of the
Philippines represent 91.58 percent of the 202
members of the House of Representatives. Under
Article Vl Section 18 of the Constitution, it is entitled to
have ten of the twelve seats in the Commission on
Appointments. Although the 185 members of the
Progressive Party of the Philippines Represent 10.98
seats in the Commission on Appointments, under the
ruling in Guingona v. Gonzales, (G.R. No. 106971, 20
Oct 1992), a fractional membership cannot be rounded
off to full membership because it will result in
overrepresentation of that political party and under-
representation of the other political parties.
b) The political alliance formed by the 15 members of
the Citizens Party with the Progressive Party of the
Philippines will not result in the diminution of the
number of seats in the Commission on Appointments
to which the Citizens Party is entitled.As held in
Cunanan v. Tan (C.R. No. l-19721, 10 May 1962), a
temporary alliance between the members of one
political party and another political party does not
authorize a change in the membership of the
Commission on Appointments. Otherwise, the
Commission on Appointments will have to be
reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to
another in the House of Representatives.
2017 BAR Q&A
Sec. 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that no
bill passed by either House of Congress shall become
a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days and printed copies of it in its final form have been
distributed to the Members of the House three days
before its passage. Is there an exception to the
provision? Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer
The exception to this provision is when the President
certifies the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or necessity (Sec. 26, Article VI,
1987 Const; and Tolentino v.Secretary of Finance,
C.R.No. 115455, 25 Aug. 1994)
2017 BAR Q&A
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by
both the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress that the bill
was passed on a certain date are conclusive on the
bill's due enactment. Assuming there is a conflict
between the enrolled bill and the legislative journal, to
the effect that the enrolled bill signed by the Senate
President and eventually approved by the President
turned out to be different from what the Senate passed
as reflected in the legislative journal.
a) May the Senate President disregard the enrolled bill
doctrine and consider his signature as invalid and of
no effect?
b) May the President thereafter withdraw his
signature? Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer:
a) YES. As held by the Court in Astorga v. Villegas
(G.R. No. L-23475, 30 Apr. 1974), conclusive proof of
a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the
respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that
the Senate President declared his signature on the bill
to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that
the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he
had signed had never been approved by the Senate.
This declaration should be accorded even greater
respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did
for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable
in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding
officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The
lawmaking process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does
not add to the validity of the bill or cure any defect
already present upon its passage
b) YES. The President can withdraw his signature. The
journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress
is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. The
Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments
into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly
enacted and therefore did not become law. In the face
of the manifest error committed and subsequently
rectified by the President of the Senate and by the
Chief Executive, for the Court to perpetuate that error
by disregarding such rectification and holding that the
erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice
truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body
(Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-23475, 30 Apr. 1974)
2017 BAR Q&A
Sec. 26(2), Art.VI of the Constitution provides that no
bill passed by either House of Congress shall become
a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days and printed copies of it in its final form have been
distributed to the Members of the House three days
before its passage. Is there an exception to the
provision? Explain your answer.
Suggested Answer:
If a bill is certified as urgent by the President as to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency, the 3 readings can be held on
the same day. (Sec. 26(2), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
1993 BAR Q&A
Ernest Cheng, a businessman, does not know the
legislative procedure. Cheng retains you as his legal
adviser and asks for enlightenment on the following
matters: (1993 BAR)
(a) When does a bill become a law even without the
signature of the President?
A: Under Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution, a
bill becomes a law even without the signature of the
President if he vetoes it but his veto is overridden by a
two-thirds vote of all the members of both the Senate
and the House of Representatives and If the President
failed to communicate his veto to the House from
which the bill originated, within thirty days after the
date of receipt of the bill by the President.
(b) When does the law take effect?
A: As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, (G.R. No. L-63915, 24
Apr. 1985), a law must be published as a condition for
its effectivity and in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code, it shall take effect fifteen days following the
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation unless it is
otherwise provided. (Executive Order No. 292,
Revised Administrative Code of 1989)

Rules on
Appropriation and
Re-Alignment
RULES ON APPROPRIATION AND RE-ALIGNMENT
2001 BAR Q&A
Suppose that the forthcoming General Appropriations
Law for the Year 2002, in the portion about the
Department of Education, Culture, and Sports, will
contain a provision to the effect that the Reserve
Officers Training Course (ROTC) in all colleges and
universities is hereby abolished, and in lieu thereof, all
male college students shall be required to plant ten
(10) trees every year for two (2) years in areas to be
designated by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources in coordination with the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and the local
government unit concerned. It further provides that the
same provision shall be incorporated in future General
Appropriations Acts. There is no specific item of
appropriation of funds for the purpose. Comment on
the constitutionality of said provision.
Suggested Answer:
A: The provision is unconstitutional because it is a
rider. Section 25(2), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, "No provision or enactment shall be
embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation
therein." The abolition of the Reserve Officers Training
Course involves a policy matter. As held in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez (C.R. No. 113105,
19 Aug. 1994), this cannot be incorporated in the
General Appropriations Act but must be embodied in a
separate law.
1998 BAR Q&A
Suppose the President submits a budget that does not
contain provisions for CDF (Countrywide Development
Funds), popularly known as the pork barrel, and
because of this Congress does not pass the budget.
(1998 BAR)
(a) Will that mean paralization of government
operations in the next fiscal year for lack of an
appropriation law?
b) Suppose in the same budget, there is a special
provision in the appropriations for the Armed Forces
authorizing the Chief of Staff, AFP, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of National Defense, to use
savings in the appropriations provided thereto to cover
up whatever financial losses suffered by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (RSBS) in
the last five (5) years due to alleged bad business
judgment.
(c) Would you question the constitutionality and validity
of the special provision?
Suggested Answer:
a) NO, the failure of Congress to pass the budget will
not paralyze the operations of the Government.
Section 25(7), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
"If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall
have failed to pass the general appropriations bill for
the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law
for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed
reenacted and shall remain in force and effect until the
general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
b) YES, the provision authorizing the Chief of Staff,
with the approval of the Secretary of National Defense,
to use savings to cover the losses suffered by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System is
unconstitutional. Section 25(5], Article Vl of the
Constitution provides: "No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriation law for their respective offices from
savings in other Items of their respective
appropriations."
c) In Philippine Constitution v. Enriquez (G.R No.
113105, 19 Aug. 1994), the Supreme Court held that a
provision in the General Appropriation Act authorizing
the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the funds
of the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
Systems was unconstitutional. "While Section 25(5)
allows as an exception the realignment of savings to
augment items in the general appropriations law for
the executive branch, such right must and can be
exercised only by the President under a specific law.
2019 BAR Q&A
A committee of the Senate invited Mr. X and Mr. Y, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Secretary of Energy,
respectively, as resource speakers for an inquiry in aid
legislation. Mr. X refused to attend, arguing that the
Senate, not its committee, has the power to compel
attendance. Meanwhile, Mr. Y attended the committee
hearing but upon being asked about discussions made
during a closed-door cabinet meeting, he refused to
answer invoking executive privilege. The committee
members insisted that Mr. Y answer the question
under the right of Congress to information from the
executive branch. (2019 BAR). Based on his
argument, is Mr. X's non-appearance permissible?
Explain.
Suggested Answer:
NO. Sec, 21, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution specifically
provides that the Senate or the House of
Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation following its
duly published rules of procedure.
2015 BAR Q&A
Several senior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines received invitations from the Chairperson
of the Senate Committees on National Defense and
Security for them to appear as resource persons in
scheduled public bearings regarding a wide range of
subjects. The invitations state that these public
bearings were triggered by the privileged speeches of
the Senators that there was massive electoral fraud
during the last national elections. The invitees
Brigadier General Matapang and Lieutenant Coronel
Makatuwiran, who were among those tasked to
maintain peace and order during the last election,
refused to attend because of an Executive Order
banning all public officials enumerated in paragraph 3
thereof from appearing before either house of
Congress without prior approval of the President to
ensure adherence to the rule of executive privilege.
Among those included in the enumeration are "senior
officials of executive departments who, in the judgment
of the department beads, are covered by executive
privilege." Several individuals and groups challenge
the constitutionality of the subject executive order
because it frustrates the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation under Sec. 21, Art. VI of
the 1987 Constitution. Decide the case.
Suggested Answer:
Under Section 5, Article XVI of the Constitution, the
President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. By this power, the President
can prevent the Brigadier General Matapang and
Lieutenant Colonel Makatwiran from appearing before
the Senate to testify before a legislative investigation.
(Guidani v. Senga, G.R. No.170165, 15 Aug.2006) The
provision in the Executive Order which authorized
Department Secretaries to invoke executive privilege
in case senior officials in their departments are asked
to appear in a legislative investigation is
unconstitutional. It is upon the President that executive
power is vested. Only the President can make use of
Executive Privilege. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777, 20 Apr. 2006)
The provision in the Executive Order which authorized
Department Secretaries to invoke executive privilege
in case senior officials in their departments are asked
to appear in a legislative investigation is
unconstitutional. It is upon the President that executive
power is vested. Only the President can make use of
Executive Privilege. (Senate v. Ermita, G.R.No.
169777, 20 Apr. 2006)
2014 BAR Q&A
A few months before the end of the present Congress,
Strongwill was invited by the Senate to shed light on
an inquiry relative to the alleged siphoning and
diverting of the pork barrel of members of Congress to
non-existent or fictitious projects. Strongwill has been
identified in the news as the principal actor responsible
for the scandal, the leader of a non-governmental
organization that ostensibly funneled the funds to
certain local government projects that existed only on
paper. At the start of the bearings before the Senate,
Strongwill refused at once to cooperate. The Senate
cited him in contempt and sent him to jail until he
would have seen the light. The Congress, thereafter,
adjourned sine die preparatory to the assumption to
office of the newly-elected members. In the meantime,
Strongwill languished behind bars and the remaining
senators refused to have him released, claiming that
the Senate is a continuing body and, therefore, he can
be detained indefinitely. Are the senators right?
Suggested Answer: The Senators are right. The
Senate is to be considered as a continuing body for
purposes of the exercise of its power to punish for
contempt. Accordingly, the continuing validity of its
orders punishing for contempt should not be affected
by its sine die adjournment. (Arnault v. Nazareno,
G.R.No. L- 3820, 18 July 1950)
Alternative Answer:
The Senators are wrong. Under the 1987 Constitution,
the Senate is no longer a continuing body because
less than the majority of the Senators continue into the
next Congress. While the Senate as an institution is
continuing in the conduct of its day-to-day business,
the Senate of each Congress acts separately from the
Senate of the Congress before it. All pending matters
terminate upon expiration of each Congress. (Neri v.
Senate, G.R. No. 180643, 25 Mar. 2008)
2010 BAR Q&A
The House Committee on Appropriations conducted
an inquiry in aid of legislation into alleged irregular and
anomalous disbursements of the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) and Congressional Initiative
Allocation (CIA) of Congressmen as exposed by X, a
Division Chief of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM). Implicated in the questionable
disbursements are high officials of the Palace. The
House Committee summoned X and the DBM
Secretary to appear and testify. X refused to appear,
while the Secretary appeared but refused to testify
invoking executive privilege.
(a) May X be compelled to appear and testify? If yes,
what sanction may be imposed on him?
(b) Is the Budget Secretary shielded by executive
privilege from responding to the inquiries of the House
Committee? Explain briefly. If the answer is no, is
there any sanction that may be imposed upon him?
Suggested Answer:
a) YES.X may be compelled to appear and testify.
Only the President or the Executive Secretary by the
order of the President can invoke executive privilege.
(Senate v. Ermita, G.R.No. 169777, 20 Apr. 2006) He
can be cited for contempt and ordered to be arrested.
(De la Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
G.R.No. 184849, 13 Feb. 2009)
b) NO. The Secretary of Budget and Management is
not shielded by executive privilege from responding to
the inquiries of the House Committee on
Appropriations, because the inquiry is in aid of
legislation and neither the President nor the Executive
Secretary by the order of the President invoked
executive privilege. (Senate v. Ermita, supra.) For
refusing to testify, he may be cited for contempt and
ordered to be arrested [De la Paz v. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, supra.)
2009 BAR Q&A
Congressman Nonoy delivered a privilege speech
charging the Intercontinental Universal Bank (IUB) with
the sale of unregistered foreign securities, in violation
of R.A. 8799. He then filed, and the House of
Representatives unanimously approved, a Resolution
directing the House Committee on Good Government
(HCGG) to conduct an inquiry on the matter, in aid of
legislation, to prevent the recurrence of any similar
fraudulent activity. The HCGG immediately scheduled
a hearing and invited the responsible officials of IUB,
the Chairman and Commissioners of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Governor
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). On the date
set for the hearing, only the SEC Commissioners
appeared, prompting Congressman Nonoy to move for
the issuance of the appropriate subpoena ad
testificandum to compel the attendance of the invited
resource persons. The IUB officials filed suit to prohibit
HCGG from proceeding with the inquiry and to quash
the subpoena, raising the following arguments. Are the
foregoing arguments tenable? Reasons. (2009 BAR)
(a) The subject of the legislative investigation is also
the subject of criminal and civil actions pending before
the courts and the prosecutor's office; thus, the
legislative inquiry would preempt judicial action.
(b) Compelling the IUB officials, who are also
respondents in the criminal and civil cases in court, to
testify at the inquiry would violate their constitutional
right against self-incrimination.
(c) May the Governor of the BSP validly invoke
executive privilege and, thus, refuse to attend the
legislative inquiry? Why or why not?
Suggested Answer:
a) The argument is not tenable; since this is an
essential component of legislative power, it cannot be
made subordinate to criminal and civil actions.
Otherwise, it would be very easy to subvert any
investigation in aid of legislation through a convenient
ploy of instituting criminal and civil actions. (Standard
Chartered Bank [Philippine Branch] v. Senate
Committee in Banks, Financial Institutions and
Currencies, C.R.No. 167173, 27 Dec. 2007)
b) The argument is untenable. Since the IUB officials
were not being subjected to a criminal penalty, they
cannot invoke their right against self-incrimination
unless a question calling for an incriminating answer is
propounded. (Standard Chartered Bank [Philippine
Branch] v. Senate Committee in Banks, Financial
Institutions and Currencies, C.R. No.167173,27 Dec.
2007)
c) NO, because the power to invoke executive
privilege is limited to the President. (Senate v. Ermita
C.R.No. 169777, 20 Apr. 2006)
1991 BAR Q&A
The President signs into law the Appropriations Act
passed by Congress but she vetoes separate items
therein, among which is a provision stating that the
President may not increase an item of appropriation by
transfer of savings from other items.
The House of Representatives chooses not to override
this veto. The Senate, however, proceeds to consider
two options: (1) to override the veto and (2) to
challenge the constitutionality of the veto before the
Supreme Court. (1991 BAR)
(a) Is option (1) viable? If so, what is the vote required
to override the veto?
(b) Is option (2) viable? If not. why not? If viable, how
should the Court decide the case?
Suggested Answer:
a) Option 1 is not viable in as much as the House of
Representatives, from which the Appropriations Act
originated and to which the President must have
returned the law, is unwilling to override the
presidential veto. There is, therefore, no basis for the
Senate to even consider the possibility of overriding
the President's veto. Under the Constitution the vote of
two-thirds of all the members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, will
be needed to override the presidential veto.
b) It is not feasible to question the constitutionality of
the veto before the Supreme Court. In Gonzales v.
Macaraig, (C.R. No. 87636, 19 Nov. 1990), the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a similar
veto. Under Article VI, Sec. 27(2) of the Constitution, a
distinct and severable part of the General
Appropriations Act may be the subject of a separate
veto. Moreover, the vetoed provision does not relate to
any appropriation and is more an expression of a
congressional policy in respect of augmentation from
savings than a budgetary provision. It is therefore an
inappropriate provision, and it should be treated as an
item for purposes of the veto power of the President.
The Supreme Court should uphold the validity of the
veto in the event the question is brought before it.
2017 BAR Q&A
Sec. 3, Art. XI of the Constitution states that "no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within one year.” What
constitutes initiation of impeachment proceedings
under the provision? (2017 BAR)
Suggested Answer:
It is initiated by the filing of a verified complaint by any
member of the House of Representatives or any
citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any
member thereof. If the verified complaint is filed by at
least 1/3 of all its members of the House of
Representatives, the same shall constitute the Articles
of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall forthwith
proceed. (Sec. 3(4), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)
In Francisco v. House of Representatives (G.R. No.
160261, 10 Nov. 2003), the Supreme Court clarified
that the "term 'to initiate' refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking
initial action of said complaint."
2013 BAR Q&A
As a leading member of the Lapiang Mandirigma in the
House of Representatives, you were tasked by the
party to initiate the moves to impeach the President
because be entered into an executive agreement with
the US Ambassador for the use of the former Subic
Naval Base by the US Navy, for free, i.e., without need
to pay rent nor any kind of fees as a show of goodwill
to the U.S. because of the harmonious RPUS
relations.
Cite at least two (2) grounds for impeachment and
explain why you chose them.
Suggested Answer:
The President can be impeached for culpable violation
of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust. The
Supreme Court has already ruled that the provision in
Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution requires a
treaty even for the mere temporary presence of foreign
troops in the Philippines. (Bayan v. Zamora, G.R.No.
138570, 10 Oct. 2000) The President cannot claim,
therefore, that he acted in good faith. [Report of the
Special Committee in the Impeachment of President
Quirino, Congressional Record of the House of
President Quirino, Congressional Record of the House
of Representatives, Vol. IV, p. 1553). Betrayal of public
trust includes violation of the oath of the office of the
President [Record of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. II, p. 272). In his oath of office, the President
swore to preserve and defend the Constitution. (Sec.
5, Art. VI/, 1987 Constitution)
2012 BAR Q&A
A verified impeachment complaint was filed by two
hundred (200) Members of the House of
Representatives against Madam Chief Justice Blue.
The complaint was immediately transmitted to the
Senate for trial.
(a) Madam Chief Justice Blue challenges such
immediate transmittal to the Senate because the
verified complaint was 1.) not included in the order of
the business of the House, 2.) was not referred to the
House Committee on Justice for bearing and
consideration for sufficiency in form and substance,
and 3.) was not submitted to the House Plenary for
consideration as enumerated in Paragraph (2), Section
3, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Decide with
reason.
A: Since the verified complaint was filed by 200
Members of the House of Representatives and they
constituted at least one-third of its Members, it need
not undergo the procedure in Paragraph 2, Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution. The verified complaint
constitutes the Articles of Impeachment and trial by the
Senate should proceed forthwith. (Sec. 3(4), Art. XI,
1987 Constitution)
2000 BAR Q&A
Is cronyism a legal ground for the impeachment of the
President? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
A: YES, cronyism is a legal ground for the
impeachment of the President. Under Section 2, Article
XI of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust is one of
the grounds for Impeachment. This refers to violation
of the oath of office and includes cronyism which
involves unduly favoring a crony to the prejudice of
public interest. (Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol.II,p.272)
1999 BAR Q&A
What are the grounds for impeachment? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
Under Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution, the
grounds for impeachment are culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, and betrayal of public trust.

(b) What is the purpose of Impeachment? Does

conviction prevent further prosecution and
punishment? Explain
A: The purpose of impeachment is not to punish but
only to remove a public officer to secure the people
against gross political misdemeanors. [Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary,
2009 ed., p.1150). Conviction does not prevent further
prosecution and punishment according to law. (Sec.
3(7), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)

(c) Enumerate the ground for impeachment. Is graft

and corruption a ground for impeachment?
A: The following are the grounds for impeachment;
defend the Constitution.
Culpable violation of the Constitution;
Treason;
Bribery;
Graft and corruption;
Other high crimes; and
Betrayal of public trust
 Lambino v COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, 25 Oct

Electoral Tribunal 2006), mean that Santiago's pronouncement has

effectively been abandoned. If you were consulted by

and Commission those behind the new attempt at a people's initiative,

how would you advise them?

on Appointments Suggested Answer:

ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS AND COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
2006 BAR Q&A
What is the function of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal?
What is the composition of each?
Suggested Answer:
The function of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is to be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Senators and
Congressmen, respectively. (Section 17, Article of the
Constitution)
The Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal are composed of
nine members, three of whom are Justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six members are Senators and
Congressmen, respectively, chosen based on
proportional representation from the political parties as
well as the parties registered under the party-list
system represented in the House of Representatives,
in the case of the latter. (Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution)
I shall advise those starting a people's initiative that
initiative to pass a law defining political dynasties may
proceed as their proposal is to enact a law only and
not to amend the constitution. The decision in Santiago
v. COMELEC(C.R.No. 127325 19 Mar. 1997) which
has not been reversed, upheld the adequacy of the
provisions in Republic Act 6735 on initiative to enact a
law.
Alternative Answer:
I shall advise those starting a people's initiative that
the ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Election that
there is as yet no enabling law for an initiative has not
been reversed. According to Section 4(3), Article VllI of
the Constitution, a doctrine of law laid down in a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court en bane may
not be reversed except if it is acting en bane. The
majority opinion in Lambino v. COMELEC,C.R No.
174153, 25 Oct. 2006) refused to re- examine the
ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC,C.R.No. 127325, 19
Mar. 1997) because it was not necessary for deciding
the case. The Justices who voted to reverse the ruling
constituted the minority.

2014 BAR Q&A

Several citizens, unhappy with the proliferation of
families dominating the political landscape, decided to
take matters into their own hands. They proposed to
come up with a people's initiative defining political
dynasties. They started a signature campaign for the
purpose of coming up with a petition for that purpose.
Some others expressed misgivings about a people's
initiative for the purpose of proposing amendments to
the Constitution, however. They cited the Court's
decision in Santiago v. Commission on Elections (G.R.
No. 127325 19 Mar. 1997), as authority for their
position that there is yet no enabling law for such
purpose. On the other hand, there are also those who
claim that the individual votes of the justices in
2019 BAR Q&A
Candidate X, a naturalized Filipino citizen, ran for
Congressman for the Lone District of Batanes. After a
close electoral contest, he won by a slim margin of 500
votes. His sole opponent, Y, filed an election protest
before the Commission on Election (COMELEC),
claiming that X should be disqualified from running for
said position because he is not a natural-born citizen.
While the case was pending, X was proclaimed by the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Batanes as the duly
elected Congressman of the province.
Did X's proclamation divest the COMELEC of its
jurisdiction to decide the case and vest the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction
to hear the case? Explain.
A: NO, COMELEC maintains its jurisdiction over the
matter. To divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction over
election cases of Members of the House of
Representatives, the following requisites must concur:
(P-A-O)
Valid Proclamation;
Valid Oath; and
Assumption of office on June 30.
Thus, the mere proclamation of X does not yet transfer
jurisdiction from the COMELEC to the HRET. (Reyes
v. COMELEC,G.R No. 207264, 22 Oct. 2013)
2018 BAR Q&A
Ang Araw, a multi-sectoral party-list organization duly
registered as such with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), was proclaimed as one of the winning
party-list groups in the last national elections. Its first
nominee, Alejandro, assumed office as the party-list
representative.
About one year after Alejandro assumed office, the
Interim Central Committee of Ang Araw expelled
Alejandro from the party for disloyalty and replaced
him with Andoy, its second nominee. Alejandro
questioned before the Comelec his expulsion and
replacement by Andoy.
The Comelec considered Alejandro's petition as an
intra-party dispute that it could resolve as an incident
of its power to register political parties; it proceeded to
uphold the expulsion. Is the Comelec's ruling correct?
Suggested Answer:
Alejandro's petition should be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. It is the HRET that has jurisdiction over the
case because Alejandro is already a Member of the
House of Representatives. (Lico v, Commission on
Elections, C.R.No. 205505, 29 Sept 2015)
2000 BAR Q&A
Is cronyism a legal ground for the impeachment of the
President? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
A: YES, cronyism is a legal ground for the
impeachment of the President. Under Section 2, Article
XI of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust is one of
the grounds for Impeachment. This refers to violation
of the oath of office and includes cronyism which
involves unduly favoring a crony to the prejudice of
public interest. (Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol.II,p.272)
1999 BAR Q&A
What are the grounds for impeachment? Explain.
Suggested Answer:
Under Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution, the
grounds for impeachment are culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, and betrayal of public trust.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS AND COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS
2006 BAR Q&A
What is the function of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal?
What is the composition of each?
Suggested Answer:
The function of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is to be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of Senators and
Congressmen, respectively. (Section 17, Article of the
Constitution)
The Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal are composed of
nine members, three of whom are Justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six members are Senators and
Congressmen, respectively, chosen based on
proportional representation from the political parties as
well as the parties registered under the party-list
system represented in the House of Representatives,
in the case of the latter. (Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution)
2017 BAR Q&A
Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution establishes an
Electoral Tribunal for each of the Houses of Congress
and makes each Electoral Tribunal "the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members." On the
other hand, Sec. 2(1), C(Commission on Elections),
Art. IX of the Constitution grants the COMELEC the
power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations "relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall."
Considering there is no concurrence of jurisdiction
between the Electoral Tribunals and the COMELEC,
state when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals
begins, and the COMELEC's jurisdiction your answer.
Suggested Answer:
It is well-entrenched in a long line of cases decided by
the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal begins once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office. It is
only after the occurrence of these events that a
candidate can be considered as either a Member of
the House of Representatives or a Senator.
The practical application of these rulings, at least
insofar as the HRET is concerned, has been that it
commences exercising such jurisdiction, to the
exclusion of the COMELEC, which has initial
jurisdiction over said matters, upon the proclamation of
the winning candidate (Cruz, 2014).
2014 BAR Q&A
Beauty was proclaimed as the winning candidate for
the position of Representative in the House of
Representatives three (3) days after the elections in
May. She then immediately took her oath of office.
However, there was a pending disqualification case
against her, which case was eventually decided by the
COMELEC against her 10 days after the election.
Since she had already been proclaimed, she ignored
that decision and did not bother appealing it. The
COMELEC then declared in the first week of June that
its decision holding that Beauty was not validly elected
had become final. Beauty then went to the Supreme
Court questioning the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
claiming that since she had already been proclaimed
and had taken her oath of office, such an election body
had no more right to come up with a decision - that the
jurisdiction had already been transferred to the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. How defensible
is the argument of Beauty?
Suggested Answer:
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case of Beauty
since she has already been proclaimed. The
proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative
fact that triggers the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal over election
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the winning candidate. The
proclamation divests the Commission on Elections of
jurisdiction over the question of disqualifications
pending before it at the time of the proclamation. Any
case of questions over the qualifications of a winning
candidate should be raised before the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal. (Limkaichong v.
COMELEC,G.R.Nos. 178831-32, 01 Apr. 2009;
Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC,G.R.No.205033,
18June2013)
Alternative Answer:
The argument of Beauty is untenable. For the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal to acquire
jurisdiction over the disqualification case, she must be
a Member of the House of Representatives. Although
she had been proclaimed and had taken her oath of
office, she had not yet assumed office. The term of
office of the Members of the House of Representatives
begins at noon on the thirtieth day of June following
their election. [Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264,
25 June 2013)
2012 BAR Q&A
Mr. Yellow and Mr. Orange were leading candidates in
the vice-presidential elections. After the elections,
Yellow emerged as the winner by a slim margin of
100,000 votes. Undaunted, Orange filed a protest with
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). After due
consideration of the facts and the issues, PET ruled
that Orange was the real winner of the elections and
ordered his immediate proclamation. (2012 BAR)
(a) Aggrieved, Yellow filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Certiorari challenging the decision of the
PET alleging grave abuse of discretion. Does the
Supreme Court have jurisdiction?
A: The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the
petition. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not
simply an agency to which the Members of the Senate
Court were assigned. It is not separate from the
Supreme Court. [Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, 23 Nov. 2010)
(h) Would the answer in (a) be the same if Yellow and
Orange were contending for a senatorial slot and it
was the Senate Electoral Tribunal who issued the
challenged ruling?
A: The Supreme Court would have jurisdiction if it were
the Senate Electoral Tribunal that issued the
challenged ruling. The Supreme Court can review its
decision if it acted with grave abuse of discretion. [Leri
as v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
G.R.No. 97105, 15 Oct. 1991
(c) What is the composition of the PET?
A: The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is composed of
the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court sitting en bane. (Sec.4, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
1990 BAR Q&A
Y was elected Senator in the May 1987 national
elections. He was born out of wedlock in 1949 to an
American father and a naturalized Filipina mother. Y
never elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. Before what hody should T, the losing
candidate, question the election of Y? State the
reasons for your answer.
Suggested Answer:
T, the losing candidate, should question the election of
Y before the Senate Electoral Tribunal because the
issue involved is the qualification of Y to be a Senator.
Sec. 17, Art. VIof the 1987 Constitution provides that
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Suggested Answer:
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case of Beauty
since she has already been proclaimed. The
proclamation of the winning candidate is the operative
fact that triggers the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal over election
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the winning candidate. The
proclamation divests the Commission on Elections of
jurisdiction over the question of disqualifications
pending before it at the time of the proclamation. Any
case of questions over the qualifications of a winning
candidate should be raised before the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal. (Limkaichong v.
COMELEC,G.R.Nos. 178831-32, 01 Apr. 2009;
Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC,G.R.No.205033,
18June2013)
Alternative Answer:
The argument of Beauty is untenable. For the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal to acquire
jurisdiction over the disqualification case, she must be
a Member of the House of Representatives. Although
she had been proclaimed and had taken her oath of
office, she had not yet assumed office. The term of
office of the Members of the House of Representatives
begins at noon on the thirtieth day of June following
their election. [Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264,
25 June 2013)
2012 BAR Q&A
Mr. Yellow and Mr. Orange were leading candidates in
the vice-presidential elections. After the elections,
Yellow emerged as the winner by a slim margin of
100,000 votes. Undaunted, Orange filed a protest with
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). After due
consideration of the facts and the issues, PET ruled
that Orange was the real winner of the elections and
ordered his immediate proclamation. (2012 BAR)
(a) Aggrieved, Yellow filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Certiorari challenging the decision of the
PET alleging grave abuse of discretion. Does the
Supreme Court have jurisdiction?
A: The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over the
petition. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not
simply an agency to which the Members of the Senate
Court were assigned. It is not separate from the
Supreme Court. [Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, 23 Nov. 2010)
(h) Would the answer in (a) be the same if Yellow and
Orange were contending for a senatorial slot and it
was the Senate Electoral Tribunal who issued the
challenged ruling?
2009-2010 BAR Q&A
Q: What are the essential elements of a valid petition
for a people's initiative to amend the 1987
Constitution? Discuss.
A: The elements of a valid petition for a people's
initiative are the following:
1. At least twelve percent (12%) of the registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three percent (3%) of the
registered voters in it, should directly sign the entire
proposal; and
2. The draft of the proposed amendment must be
embodied in the petition. [Lambino v. COMELEC, C.R
No. 174153, 25 Oct. 2006)
2005 BAR Q&A
Q: The present Constitution introduced the concepts
and processes of Initiative and Referendum. Compare
and differentiate one from the other.
Suggested Answer:
A: Initiative is the power of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose (Sec. 3(a), R.A. No. 6735). Referendum is the
power of the electorate to approve or reject a
legislation through an election called for the purpose.
(Section 3(c), R.A No. 6735)
Suggested Answer:
I shall advise those starting a people's initiative that
initiative to pass a law defining political dynasties may
proceed as their proposal is to enact a law only and
not to amend the constitution. The decision in Santiago
v. COMELEC(C.R.No. 127325 19 Mar. 1997) which
has not been reversed, upheld the adequacy of the
provisions in Republic Act 6735 on initiative to enact a
law.
Alternative Answer:
I shall advise those starting a people's initiative that
the ruling in Santiago vs. Commission on Election that
there is as yet no enabling law for an initiative has not
been reversed. According to Section 4(3), Article VllI of
the Constitution, a doctrine of law laid down in a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court en bane may
not be reversed except if it is acting en bane. The
majority opinion in Lambino v. COMELEC,C.R No.
174153, 25 Oct. 2006) refused to re- examine the
ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC,C.R.No. 127325, 19
Mar. 1997) because it was not necessary for deciding
the case. The Justices who voted to reverse the ruling
constituted the minority.

2014 BAR Q&A

Several citizens, unhappy with the proliferation of
families dominating the political landscape, decided to
take matters into their own hands. They proposed to
come up with a people's initiative defining political
dynasties. They started a signature campaign for the
purpose of coming up with a petition for that purpose.
Some others expressed misgivings about a people's
initiative for the purpose of proposing amendments to
the Constitution, however. They cited the Court's
decision in Santiago v. Commission on Elections (G.R.
No. 127325 19 Mar. 1997), as authority for their
position that there is yet no enabling law for such
purpose. On the other hand, there are also those who
claim that the individual votes of the justices in
Lambino v COMELEC (G.R. No. 174153, 25 Oct
2006), mean that Santiago's pronouncement has
effectively been abandoned. If you were consulted by
those behind the new attempt at a people's initiative,
how would you advise them?
MODULE 2
Case Questions
Aldaba, et. al. v. COMELEC
Question: Can congress pass a bill creating a
legislative district in a city using a certificate from the
Philippine Statistics Authority (formerly NSO) certifying
that the city’s population will exceed the population
requirement of 250,000 people before a specific date?
Proposed Answer:
No. Congress cannot use a certification from the PSA
as a basis to create a new law. According to the law, a
city must first obtain the actual population of 250,000
before any proposal to pass a bill. In the case at bar,
mere certification of the projected population from the
growth rate of the city’s population is not sufficient to
fulfill the constitutional requirement. Therefore, such
certification is not allowed.
Sema v. Comelec, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008
Question:
The Congress passed RA 9054, which included
Section 19, Article VI, granting the ARMM Regional
Assembly the authority to establish provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. In line with this
authority, the ARMM Regional Assembly issued
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act
201), through which they established the Province of
Shariff Maribago, comprising the eight municipalities in
the first district of Lapu-Lapu.
Is section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
constitutional?
Answer:
No. Under Section 5 (3) Article VI of the Constitution
states that the power to create a province or a city with
a population of 250,000 or more requires the power to
create a legislative district. Section 19 Article VI of RA
9054 is barred under Section 5 (1) Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which grants Congress the authority
to expand the permissible number of members in the
House of Representatives by passing a law. Also,
Section 5 (4) confers on Congress the ability to
redistribute legislative districts. This redistribution
authority inherently encompasses the capacity to
establish new legislative districts from pre-existing
ones. In the case at bar, the issuance of MMA Act 201
to established Province of Shariff Maribago that was
crafted by regional or local legislative body is
unconstitutional as it overstepped its bounds and
encroached the authority of Congress. Therefore,
under the Constitution, the authority to raise the
permissible number of House of Representatives
members and to reconfigure legislative districts is
vested exclusively to Congress.
Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
136781, 6 October 2000
Question: Does the Constitution require all such
allocated seats to be filled up all the time and under all
circumstances?
Answer:
No. It is not required that the twenty percent
constitutional allocation be filled up all the time and
under all circumstances because it is merely a ceiling
and therefore not mandatory. As provided in the case
of Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC, a simple
reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
easily conveys the equally simple message that
Congress was vested with the broad power to define
and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down
only the percentage of the total membership in the
House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives. Considering the foregoing statutory
requirements, it will be shown that Section 5(2), Article
VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely
provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
Navarro, et. al. v. Executive Secretary Ermita, et.
al., G.R. No. 180050, 10 February 2010
Juan wants to create a new province in the Philippines
composed of two or more islands with a population of
180,000 and a total land area of 1,500 square
kilometers. He believes that the exemption from the
land area requirement for provinces composed of two
or more islands applies in this case. Can Juan's
proposed province be created?
Answer: No, Juan's proposed province cannot be
created.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 461 of the Local Government Code of 1991,
which provide the criteria for creating a province,
including the minimum population and land area
requirements. The Local Government Code of 1991
requires a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants and a contiguous
territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers or a territory comprising two (2) or more
islands. In this case, Juan's proposed province failed
to meet both requirements. The proposed population
of 180,000 is below the minimum requirement, while
the total land area of 1,500 square kilometers is below
the minimum requirement for a province, whether
composed of one or more islands.
Juan's proposed province fails to meet both the
minimum population and land area requirements, and
therefore, it cannot be created based on the provisions
of the Constitution and the Local Government Code of
1991.
Juan's proposed province cannot be created because
it does not meet the requirements set forth by the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
BANAT v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
179271 & 179295, [April 21, 2009]
Question:
MONDE Partylist ranked 30th among the Partylist
groups with a vote of 177,028 (1.11%). They filed a
petition to the court assailing the constitutionality of the
2% threshold to qualify one seat. Moreso, they
questioned the seat allocation of the Partylist groups in
the congress. As the judge, is the petition meritorious?
Should any seat be allocated to BANAT?
Answer:
Yes, the petition is meritorious with regards to the
unconstitutionality of the 2% threshold. As ruled in the
case of BANAT v. COMELEC, two percent threshold
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats. Thus, in this case
we strike off the 2% threshold due to its
unconstitutionality.
With regards to the seat allocation, yes the MONDE
Partylist should have a seat allocated. As ruled in the
BANAT v. COMELEC, the allocation has been fixed
wherein 1) ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections 2) Party-lists with at least 2% votes will have
one guaranteed seats 3) those with sufficient votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to
their total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.4) each party is only entitled to a
maximum of three (3) seats. The MONDE Partylist
ranked 30th among the partylist groups with a
percentage of 1.11%. Thus, the MONDE Partylist is
entitled to one seat in the congress.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
203766, 2 April 2013
Question:
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC), through a
public announcement, reminded political parties and
party-lists of the Dec. 29, 2023 deadline for
applications of registrations for the 2025 national and
local elections. It was also further emphasized by the
same that “all groups intending to register as a Political
Party, a Coalition of Political Parties, or a National,
Regional, or Sectoral Group or Organization to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation
must ensure strict compliance with the guidelines
outlined in Comelec Resolution No. 10673.” The
Integrated Union of Law Students and Lawyers of the
Philippines (IULSLP), amongst others, registered and
manifested their desire to participate and hopefully be
a part of the House of Representatives of the
Philippine Congress. However, COMELEC rendered a
decision that disqualified IULSLP and 17 other party-
list groups and organizations from participating in the
2025 national and local elections. Aggrieved, the
disqualified groups filed separate petitions, which
would eventually be consolidated and rendered one
Decision. They all commonly posited that (1) the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the said
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for
registration under the party-list system or by the
cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations; and (2) the
criteria for participating in the party-list system laid
down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay
Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT)
should be applied by the COMELEC.Is the Integrated
Union of Law Students and Lawyers of the Philippines
(IULSLP), and 17 other party-list groups and
organizations, correct? Analyze and render your ruling.
Suggested Answer:
No, petitioners in the case at bar are not correct in
their two claims against COMELEC.
As to the first claim, the COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion, and the fault is not found in
them since they were only following prevailing
jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. However, as
in the case of Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC (G.R.
No. 203766. 2013), there were new rules set forth
which eventually would lead to the abandonment of the
BANAT doctrine as authorized under the 1987
Philippine Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
The abovementioned leads to an answer for the
second claim wherein in the same case of Atong
Paglaum, since new parameters have been adopted in
the determination of the qualification of national,
regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list
system, the BANAT doctrine is no longer applicable.
Abang Lingkod Party-List v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 206952. October 22, 2013
Question:
The COMELEC required previously registered party-
list groups to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for
purposes of determining their continuing compliance
with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941 or the
Party-List System Act. The Tanim party-list, an
organization representing the farmers and fisherfolk,
submitted, among other pertinent documents, digitally
altered photographs of their activities to prove it had a
track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. The COMELEC En Banc canceled
Tanim’s registration as a party-list solely on the ground
of failing to establish its track record.
Is the COMELEC’s decision correct?
Answer:
No, the COMELEC’s decision is not correct. Under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to
register under the party-list system are not required to
submit evidence of their track record. Moreover, the
new parameters in screening parties, organizations or
associations under the party-list system are laid down
in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, wherein national
or regional parties need not represent any
marginalized and underrepresented sector. As for
sectoral organizations, no such parameter requires
them to adduce evidence showing their track record. In
the present problem, Tanim party-list, a sectoral
organization, needed not prove its track record to
qualify as a registered party-list. It is enough that its
principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
concerns of its sector, that is, the farmers and
fisherfolk. Thus, the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it canceled Tanim’s registration as a
party-list on the ground of lack of track record
notwithstanding that a group’s track record is not
required.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
190582, 8 April 2010
Question:
The Bahaghari LGBT Party is an organization founded
to advocate for the rights of members of the LGBT
community. In 2021, the organization filed a petition for
registration with the COMELEC. However, the latter
dismissed the petition on the ground that Bahaghari is
not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution
and RA 7941. Is the COMELEC correct in dismissing
the petition filed by Bahaghari on the said ground?
Suggested Answer:
No. Section 5 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
states that one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth,
and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector. In the case of Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,
which was cited in the case of Ang Ladlad LGBT Party
v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court held that the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive and that the crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. In the
case at bar, Bahaghari’s application for registration
with the COMELEC is in accordance and/or in
compliance with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941. Therefore, the COMELEC erred in
dismissing Bahaghari’s petition for registration.
Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,
Inc. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192803, 10 December
2013
Question:
The Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed 28
party-list organizations as winners involving a total of
35 seats guaranteed and additional seats. Petitioner,
Alliance for Farmers and Plantation Reconstruction,
Inc.,(AFAPO) was a duly accredited party-list under
Republic Act No. 7941 garnered a total of 147,204
votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked fiftieth
(50th). Petitioner then filed an election protest before
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
questioning the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-list groups. The
petitioner argues that the votes of all the registered
voters who actually voted in the May 2010 elections
should be included in the computation of the divisor
whether valid or invalid. The petitioner claims that
there should be no distinction in law between valid and
invalid votes. All of the votes should be included in the
divisor to determine the 2% threshold. Is the petitioner
correct?
Suggested Answer:
No, the petitioners are not correct. Not all votes cast in
the elections should be included in the divisor. Section
11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 provides that only
those votes cast for the party-list system shall be
considered in the computation of the percentage of
representation. The total votes cast for the party-list
system include those votes made for party-list groups
indicated in the ballot regardless of the pendency of
their motions for reconsideration or petitions before
any tribunal in relation to their cancellation or
disqualification cases. However, votes made for those
party-list groups whose disqualification attained finality
prior to the elections should be excluded if the
electorate is notified of the finality of their
disqualification by the Commission on Elections.
Therefore, the divisor also shall not include invalid
votes.
ANGKLA: Ang Partido ng mga Pilipinong Marino,
Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 246816,
September 15, 2020
Question:
Taga Isla Ako (TALAKO) party-list filed a complaint
against the comelec claiming that they should be
awarded with an additional seat (3 out of 3 seats) after
garnering a total percentage of 2.81% of the total
number of votes received on the 2019 elections. Citing
the case of Angkla v. Comelec that the The remaining
party-list seats (or the "additional seats") shall then be
distributed in proportion to the recomputed number of
votes until all the additional seats are allocated. Should
the petition prosper?
Suggested answer
No, the claim on availing a third seat will not prosper.
Following the Republic Act No. 7941 proportional
representation - the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to
their total number of votes." and in the ruling of Angkla
v. Comelec it states that There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage
is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38,
which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats
reserved under the Party-List System and the 17
guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole
integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds to a party's
share in the remaining available seats. Second, we
assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed.
We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the
second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the
three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each
qualified party-list candidate is entitled. And following
the Banat formula the basis for the additional seats is
proportionality to the total number votes obtained by
each of the participating party, organization, or
coalition,' however, it was inevitable that the number of
votes included in computing the 2% threshold would
have to be still factored in in allocating the party-list
seats among all the participating parties,
organizations, or coalitions. In this case although the
TALAKO party-list obtained 2% threshold it cannot
avail the 3rd seat allocation since it fails the
requirement on the 2nd round part 1 which is in
proportion to their total number of votes. Therefore the
petition has no merit.
Trillanes v. Marigomen, GR No. 223451, 2018
Question
VP Aquino filed a case against Senator Pedro
Penduko for his acts of defamation and slander during
the hearing while the congress was in session.
Senator Penduko called the VP, a narcissistic,
uncultured, and dumb person during the hearing
because of the negligence of legal matters of the VP.
Subsequently, the senator after the session, attended
a media interview in relation to the session conducted
by the congress strictly on other matters not pertaining
to the VP. The respondent senator said that the case
should be dismissed since he was covered by the
privilege of speech and debate. Is the contention of
Senator Pedro Penduko correct and tenable?
Suggested Answer
Yes, the contention of Senator Pedro Penduko is
correct and tenable since the media interview does not
pertain to the acts he said in relation to the VP and the
subject of the interview is in regard to other matters. In
section 11 of article 6 in the 1987 constitution, it was
stated that “A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not
more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.” In this case, the acts of the
senator were in due fulfillment of his duty to criticize
the acts of the VP in negligence of his duty. Hence, the
utterances made by the senator during the session are
covered by the privileged speech and debate, though it
may be slanderous to the end of the VP, these acts of
the senator are to deliver the blow to the
irresponsibleness of the VP. Also, the media interview
did not violate anything since the discussion was
centered on other matters, rather than the utterances
he made to the VP. For these reasons, the acts of the
senator did not violate anything and the case should
be dismissed since the utterances were covered by the
privilege of speech and debate emanated by the
constitution itself.
Belgica, et al. vs. Exec. Sec., et al. GR No. 208566,
Nov. 19, 2013
Question
Maria is a concerned citizen who discovered alleged
irregularities in the disbursement of government funds.
She filed a petition challenging the constitutionality of
certain budget practices in the country. The issues
raised included the alleged violation of the principles of
separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative
power. In response to the petition, the Supreme Court
issued a ruling declaring certain budget practices
unconstitutional. However, the Court also mentioned
the prospective effect of the ruling.
Discuss the legal basis for the prospective effect of the
Supreme Court's ruling in the context of constitutional
challenges to government budget practices,
Suggested Answer
In the case of Belgica v. Ochoa, the Supreme Court
declared various aspects of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) system unconstitutional due
to violations of the principles of separation of powers
and the non-delegability of legislative power. One of
the important legal principles applied in this case is the
"prospective effect" doctrine.
The prospective effect doctrine is a legal principle
derived from the operative fact doctrine, which
recognizes that, until a law or executive act is declared
unconstitutional, it is presumed valid and its
consequences must be respected. The doctrine of
prospective effect is particularly relevant in cases
involving constitutional challenges to government
budget practices. In Belgica, the Court applied this
doctrine, which means that its ruling only applied to
future actions and events, not retroactively affecting
past actions.
This doctrine allows the legal system to respect the
principle of legal stability and safeguard the legitimate
expectations of individuals who may have acted in
accordance with the law as it existed at the time. In
constitutional challenges to government budget
practices, prospective effect provides a balance
between ensuring compliance with constitutional
principles while avoiding undue disruption in
government operations and financial transactions.
Therefore, in the case of Maria's petition challenging
the constitutionality of budget practices, the
prospective effect doctrine, as established in Belgica v.
Ochoa, serves as the legal basis for the Supreme
Court's decision to declare the ruling applicable only to
future actions and not to retroactively affect past
transactions or practices. This ensures fairness, legal
stability, and the protection of legitimate expectations,
as the rule of law is upheld.
Pichay vs. ODESLA, GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012
Question: The newly elected President of the
Republic of XYZ releases an executive order for the
reorganization of offices within the Office of the
President Proper in January 2023, not long after taking
office. The executive branch is being reorganized with
the intention of improving efficiency and streamlining
processes. As a result, some offices that were already
open are combined, and some tasks are divided up
among several departments. A number of those
affected by the reorganization challenge the
reorganization, arguing that the actions go against
fundamental constitutional rights.
What are the legal arguments that you can make to
support the constitutionality in light of the constitutional
provisions governing the reorganization power of the
President and its implications on due process and
equal protection rights?
Suggested Answer:
The recently elected President's reorganizing of offices
within the Office of the President Proper is compliant
with the constitutional framework that governs the
President's reorganization power. The goal of pursuing
it is to achieve economy, efficiency, and simplicity in
government operations. Due process rights and the
equal protection provision are not violated by the
rearrangement because it was done in good faith and
with reasonable classification.
(Pichay vs. ODESLA, GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012)
Araullo vs. Aquino, et al., GR No. 209287 July 11,
2014
Question: The Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP) was introduced by the Philippine President in
2013 with the aim of accelerating the funding of
government projects. The initiative gave the Executive
the ability to transfer money from low-priority projects
to high-priority ones. The DAP's constitutionality was
contested by a number of groups, who claimed that it
went against the precept that "no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."
Is the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP)
constitutional and in accordance with the provision on
treasury disbursements when it was implemented?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, the implementation of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP) was in line with the
constitutional provision. The DAP functioned as a
program to prioritize spending, not as a new fund or
appropriation. It did not necessitate additional funds
from the Treasury
(Araullo vs. Aquino, et al., GR No. 209287 July 11,
2014)
Neri v. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Question:
Maria Posadas is the head of the National Economic
and Development Authority and is being asked to
appear in front of the senate for further questioning
and probing regarding a bribery issue that she is
involved in which she also mentioned she asked for
the president’s advice on the matter. However, by
order of the president, she did not attend her
scheduled appearance. She was sent a Show Cause
letter which she responded by stating that her refusal
is due to the fact that the issues dealt with delicate and
sensitive national security and diplomatic matters. She
then invoked her right of executive privilege. Does
executive privilege apply to Maria’s current situation?
Answer
Yes, Posadas was well within her rights to claim right
of executive privilege and not appear in front of the
senate for further questioning. Similar to the case of
Neri v. Senate, the information that Posadas would
have to disclose might affect the diplomatic as well as
economic relations of the countries that are involved in
the issue as well as fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public
officials. So, Posadas in the end, like Neri, is within her
rights to claim executive privilege.
Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006
QUESTION:
On November 2, 2023 President Ferdinand Marcos
issued an Executive order, effective immediately,
which, among others, reads that “all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the
government not be mandated and shall be exempted
from appearing before either House of Congress.” This
exemption is justified by the need to prevent the
disclosure of classified or confidential information.
Whether the said Executive order contravenes the
power of inquiry vested in Congress.
ANSWER:
Yes, The objective of conducting question hour is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. When Congress exercises its power of
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this
power — the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment.
Executive privilege may only be invoked by the
President. The President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such power. While it is
discretionary for executive officials to show up during
question hour, it is mandatory for them to show up
during inquiries in aid of legislation.
PHILCOMSAT vs. Senate, June 19, 2012
Q: The Philippine Telecommunications Company, a
government-owned and controlled corporation
consistently received monetary dividends via PCGG.
However, it suffered financial loss due to
mismanagement. A Proposed Senate Resolution
(PSR) was introduced and aimed to conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by PTC, as well as the mismanagement
committed by their respective board of directors. A
Committee Report proposed several actions, including
the privatization and transfer of the government's
shares in PTC and the Privatization Management
Office (PMO) within the Department of Finance (DOF),
and suggested the replacement of government
nominees as directors of PTC. Is the committee report
valid, there being no enabling legislation?
Suggested Answer: Yes, the committee report is
valid. In the case of PHILCOMSAT HOLDING CORP
v. Senate, Supreme Court ruled that the Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its committees
have the authority to undertake inquiries in aid of
legislation, following the established rules of
procedure. The rights of anyone involved in or
impacted by such investigations shall be upheld. It was
stated when the legislative power of inquiry is given to
a congressional committee, such as the Senate
Committees in this instance, it must also include all the
necessary and appropriate authorities to effectively
carry out its duties.
In the case given, the Senate Committees do not
need to have an enabling legislation to recommend
such changes as they are constitutionally obligated to
carry out legislative inquiries whereto it also includes
all the necessary and appropriate authorities to
effectively carry out its duties. The extensive discretion
granted to Congress regarding these legislative
investigations has been firmly established; otherwise,
Article VI, Section 21 would become meaningless.
Hence, the committee report is valid.
Balag vs. Senate, July 3, 2018
Question:
A first year law student from University of San Carlos
allegedly died due to hazing-related activities
conducted by CJ Fraternity. Following this incident, the
Senate released a resolution directing the appropriate
committees to conduct a legislative inquiry into the
recent death. When the alleged president of the
fraternity attended the hearing, he refused to answer
and invoked his right to self-incrimination. He was then
cited in contempt and was ordered to be placed in
detention after the senate hearing. Sen. Lerios gave
him a chance to purge out of contempt, however, the
petitioner still refused to answer. Should the Senate
release a contempt order?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, provided that he would be arrested and detained
until such time he gives his true testimony, or until the
legislative inquiry, which was the basis for the
detention, ends.
However, it is important to note that the interests of
the Senate and the witnesses in the legislative inquiry
should be kept in balance. As held in Balag vs.
Senate, the Senate can effectively exercise its power
of contempt during the inquiry when a witness
performs a contemptuous act, while ensuring that the
constitutional rights of the persons appearing before
the said inquiry of the Senate are respected.
Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, 10
December 2003
Back in 2001, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which provides for a limitation on elective
officials who run for an office other than the one they
are holding in a permanent capacity by considering
them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of
the certificate of candidacy, was expressly repealed by
Section 14, Republic Act No. 9006, otherwise known
as the Fair Elections Act. The title of the said law is
“An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,
Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices.” Some Members of the House of
Representatives filed a case, contending that Rep. Act
No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on
the use of media for election propaganda and the
elimination of unfair election practices, and so the
repeal of Section 67 is neither embraced in the title nor
germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
Are the petitioners correct?
Suggested Answer:
NO, the petitioners are not correct.
In the case of Fariñas v. Executive Secretary, the
Court ruled that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
validly repeals Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The proscription in Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution is aimed against omnibus bills and log-
rolling legislation. This provision merely calls for all
parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression
in its title. That an act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
general subject.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives
of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code within its contemplation. (Fariñas v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, 10 December
2003)
Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR No. 169777,
20 April 2006
Question: In a recent investigation, the legislative
body has summoned several officials from the
Executive Department to appear before it. However,
before the scheduled appearance, the Executive
secretary Waldo issues an order requiring officials to
secure the President's consent before attending such
hearings. The legislative body questions the validity of
this order and its impact on their power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Does the executive order
requiring officials to secure the President's consent
before appearing before the legislative body
contravene the power of inquiry vested in Congress?
Suggested Answer:
Yes, an executive order requiring officials to secure the
President's consent before appearing before the
legislative body contravenes the power of inquiry
vested in Congress
In the case of Senate v. Ermita, the constitutional issue
revolved around Executive Order 464 (E.O. 464),
which added a requirement that all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch must secure the
consent of the President before appearing before
either house of Congress. The contention was that
E.O. 464 imposed an additional condition beyond what
is stated in Section 22, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution. The Supreme Court, in its ruling, declared
certain provisions of E.O. 464 as void for being in
violation of the Constitution.
 can be raised. The exercise of emergency powers,
The Executive secretary Waldo’s order requiring such as the taking over of privately owned public utility
officials to secure the President’s consent before or business affected with public interest, is a different
attending such hearing introduced an additional matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
requirement which was challenged as unconstitutional The President cannot decide whether exceptional
for allegedly infringing on the power of Congress to circumstances exist warranting the take over of
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as provided by privately-owned public utility or business affected with
the Constitution. public interest. Nor can he determine when such
exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise,
Given the precedent set by the Senate vs. Ermita without legislation, the President has no power to point
Case, it can be concluded that an executive order out the types of businesses affected with public
mandating officials to secure the President's consent interest that should be taken over.
before appearing before the legislative body
contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, et. al.;
Barreras-Sulit vs. Ochoa, Jr., et. al., GR no. 196231
Question
& 196232; January 28, 2014
Can the President during the emergency authorized to
temporarily take over or direct the operation of
Question:
any privately owned public utility or business affected
Maria, the deputy ombudsman for military officials, was
with public interest without authority from
removed from office by the president on the grounds
Congress?
that because her office took so long to give a final
verdict, the accused police officer in a case she was
Answer
handling entered a hospital and killed many civilians
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency
and then himself. The president asked for an inquiry
powers. However, knowing that during grave
into this incident, and it was found that the police
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for
officer had been waiting for over a year for the final
Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the
verdict.
framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow
On the grounds of negligence in the carriage of her
Congress to grant emergency powers to the President,
duties, she was dismissed. Aggrieved, she filed a suit
subject to certain conditions, thus: (a)there must be a
questioning the constitutionality of section 8 (2) of RA
war or other emergency; (b)the delegation must be
6770, which allows the president to remove the deputy
for a limited period only; (c)the delegation must be
or special prosecutor on any of the grounds provided
subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
for the removal of the Ombudsman and after due
prescribe; and (d)the emergency powers must be
process. She argued that she fulfilled all her duties in a
exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
timely manner and that she even finished drafting her
Congress. The taking over of private business affected
proposal within 10 calendar days of receiving the case
with public interest is just another facet of the
files. She argued that she cannot help that the case
emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
files go through many hands before reaching hers and
Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution states
that it will go through many others after hers. Is the
that the “the State may, during the emergency and
power of the president to remove the deputy
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily
ombudsman constitutional?
take over or direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with public
ANSWER:
interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President.
Yes, the President’s power to remove the deputy
Whether or not the President may exercise such power
ombudsman is constitutional as it is stated in Section
is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to
2, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution, “non-
her pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms
impeachable officers, such as the Special prosecutor
thereof. There is a distinction between the President’s
and the Deputy Ombudsman, may be removed from
authority to declare a state of national emergency and
office as may be provided by law.” In RA 6770 Section
her authority to exercise emergency powers. The
8 (1) states also that in accordance with the above
authority to declare a state of national emergency is
mentioned article, the ombudsman may be removed
granted by Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, hence,
from office for impeachment for, and conviction of,
no legitimate constitutional objection
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust.
Abakada Guro v. Ermita, GR No. 168056, 1
September 2005
Question
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of a newly
passed law pertaining to the increase of value added
tax (VAT) on various products. Petitioners contend that
the law passed is unconstitutional since, allegedly, the
conference committee has stricken off some
provision’s, made several amendments and did not
strictly comply with the rules of both houses. Moreover,
the president certifies the immediate enactment of the
bill to remedy the financial crisis. Reconciliation was
made by the conference committee before the law was
passed, but petitioners also raise the argument that
the provisions of the said law can only be made by the
house of representatives since the law pertains to a
tariff bill.
Question 1
Is the contention of the petitioner, correct?
Answer:
No, Since the contention of the petitioner regarding the
compliance of internal rules of procedure of congress
is only procedural and it is the duty of congress to
instill discipline in their members for the rules of its
proceedings.
According to the case of Farinas v. Executive
secretary, the supreme court held that “Under the
"enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and
the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment. The Court finds no reason to deviate from
the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities
alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal
rules of Congress. This Court is not the proper forum
for the enforcement of these internal rules of
Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural and with their observance
the courts have no concern.”
In this case, the contention of the petitioners is on the
hands of the congress, and they cannot let the
judiciary decide for whatever irregularities on the
procedure of the congress for it conducts based on its
own procedure and it is out of their jurisdiction to rule
on the procedures.
For these reasons, their contention of declaring the
newly passed law unconstitutional holds no water and
their case should be dismissed.
Question 2
Is the 2nd argument of the petitioner, correct?
Yes, the 2nd argument of the petitioner is indeed
correct.
In accordance with section 24, article 6 of the 1987
constitution “All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills,
bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments”.
In this case, the reconciliation of the bills was
necessary for the passage of the law, for the president
certifies its immediate enactment since it was to cure
the possible quagmire that the state may face. In this
context, the law states that the senate may propose
amendments to the bills pertaining to section 24,
article 6. We cannot dawdle on the fact that these bills
are absolutely limited to the house of representative
itself. The power may be vested on to the house of
representative, but it does not indeed necessarily
mean that the senate cannot propose for its
amendments.
For these reasons, the argument is correct but it does
not imply or prove the unconstitutionality of the said
law.
Gudani vs Senga GR No 170165. August 15 2006
Question:
Several senior officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines received invitations from the Chairperson
of the Senate Committees on National Defense and
Security for them to appear as resource persons in
scheduled public hearings regarding a wide range of
subjects. The invitations state that these public
hearings were triggered by the privileged speeches of
the Senators that there was massive electoral fraud
during the last national elections. The invitees Brig.
General Maisog and Lt. Col. Sakto, who were among
those tasked to maintain peace and order during the
last election, refused to attend because of an
Executive Order banning all public officials
enumerated in paragraph 3 thereof from appearing
before either the House of Congress without prior
approval of the President to ensure adherence to the
rule of executive privilege. Among those included in
the enumeration are “senior officials of the executive
departments who, in the judgment of the department
heads, are covered by executive privilege.” Several
individuals and groups challenge the constitutionality
of the subject executive order because it frustrates the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Decide the case.
Answer:
The subject Executive Order is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Paragraph 3 of said Executive Order virtually provides
that, once the head of the office determines that a
certain information is privileged, such determination is
presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the
effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before
Congress,
 Answer:
subject only to the express pronouncement of the
The JPEPA is a matter of public concern... It is evident
President that it is allowing the appearance of such an
that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
official. These provisions thus allow the President to
during the negotiations towards its execution are
authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
matters of public concern The ground relied upon by
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary
respondents is thus not simply that the information
to the exceptional nature of the privilege, which is
sought involves a diplomatic matter, but that it pertains
recognized with respect to the information the
to diplomatic negotiations then in progress. "secrecy of
confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of
of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive
the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of
branch or in those instances where an exemption from
the press nor of the freedom of access to information."
disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly
, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may
important executive responsibilities. The doctrine of
not be kept perpetually confidential - since there
executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that
should be "ample opportunity for discussion before [a
certain information must, as a matter of necessity, by
treaty] is approved" - the offers exchanged... by the
kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
parties during the negotiations continue to be
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the
privileged even after the JPEPA is published
obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Congress, the necessity
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other
foreign governments in future negotiations. A ruling
that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now
Bayan Muna V. Alberto Romulo
be open to public scrutiny would discourage future
Question:
Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their
In the case of Bayan Muna V. Alberto Romulo, was the
views during negotiations.
agreement valid, binding and effective without the
concurrence by at least 2/3 of all the members of the
LAMP vs. Sec. of DBM, GR No. 164987, April 24,
Senate? Comparing the agreements to the rome
2012
statute how does it differ from ours?
Question:
Answer:
Petitioners Lawyers Against Corruption (LAC) is a
group of lawyers who have banded together with a
The right of the Executive to enter into binding
mission of dismantling all forms of corruption in the
agreements without the necessity of subsequent
country. According to LAC, the implementation of
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long
Project Priority Fund (PPF) allocates lump sums to
usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have
individual legislators for the funding of projects.
entered executive agreements covering such subjects
Petitioners claim that kickbacks on illegal misuse of the
as commercial and consular relations, most favored-
PPF have become a common exercise of corrupt
nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright
members of Congress.
protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
The respondent’s defense states that the petitioners’
the settlement of claims. The validity of these has
allegations are mere speculations because they failed
never been seriously questioned by our courts. The
to provide proof of its unconstitutionality and evidence
Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor
of exploitative misuse of members of Congress in the
does it differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going
form of kickbacks. Is the implementation of PPF
against each other, one complements the other.
unconstitutional?

Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16,

Suggested Answer:
2008
No, the implementation of PPF is not unconstitutional.
Question:
In the case of LAMP v Sec. of DBM, there is a
As a Filipino Citizen, thus JPEPA on the right to
presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of
information that must meet the threshold
Congress. The burden of proof is on the party alleging
requirement that it be a matter of public concern?
that there is a clear breach of the Constitution. In the
case at hand, LAC has failed to provide evidence for
the unconstitutionality of the implementation of PPF.
Thus, the implementation of PPF is valid and
constitutional.
 MODULE 3

EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
Power of
Impeachment
Q: Sec. 3, Art. XI of the Constitution states that "no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the
same official more than once within a period of one
year." What constitutes initiation of impeachment
proceedings under the provision? (2017 BAR)
A: It is initiated by the filing of a verified complaint by
any member of the House of Representatives or any
citizen upon resolution of endorsement by any member
thereof. If the verified complaint is filed by at least 1/3
of all its members of the House of Representatives, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed. (Sec. 3(4),
Art. XI, 1987 Constitution).
In Francisco v. The House of Representatives (G.R.
No. 160261, 10 Nov. 2003), the Supreme Court
clarified that the "term 'to inititate' refers to the
filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with
Congress' taking initial action of said complaint."
Q: As a leading member of the Lapiang Mandirigma in
the House of Representatives, you were tasked by the
party to initiate the moves to impeach the President
because be entered into an executive agreement with
the US Ambassador for the use of the former Subic
Naval Base by the US Navy, for free, i.e., without need
to pay rent nor any kind of fees as a show of goodwill
to the U.S. because of the harmonious RPUS
relations.
Cite at least two (2) grounds for impeachment and
explain why you chose them. (2013 BAR)
A: The President can be impeached for culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
The Supreme Court has already ruled that the
provision in Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution
requires a treaty even for the mere temporary
presence of foreign troops in the Philippines. (Bayan v.
Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, 10 Oct. 2000)
The President cannot claim, therefore, that he acted in
good faith. [Report of the Special Committee in the
Impeachment of President Quirino, Congressional
Record of the House of
President Quirino, Congressional Record of the House
of Representatives, Vol. IV, p. 1553). Betrayal of public
trust includes violation of the oath of the office of the
President [Record of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. II, p. 272). In his oath of office, the President
swore to preserve and defend the Constitution. (Sec.
5, Art. VI/, 1987 Constitution)
Q: At least one-third of all the members of the House
of Representatives may file articles of impeachment
by? (2012 BAR)
A: verified complaint and resolution. (Sec. 3(1), Art. XI,
1987 Constitution)
Q: A verified impeachment complaint was filed by two
hundred (200) Members of the House of
Representatives against Madam Chief Justice Blue.
The complaint was immediately transmitted to the
Senate for trial. (2012 BAR)
(a) Madam Chief Justice Blue challenges such
immediate transmittal to the Senate because the
verified complaint was 1.) not included in the order of
the business of the House, 2.) was not referred to the
House Committee on Justice for bearing and
consideration for sufficiency in form and substance,
and 3.) was not submitted to the House Plenary for
consideration as enumerated in Paragraph (2), Section
3, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Decide with
reason.
A: Since the verified complaint was filed by 200
Members of the House of Representatives and they
constituted at least one third of its Members, it need
not undergo the procedure in Paragraph 2, Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution. The verified complaint
constitutes the Articles of Impeachment and trial by the
Senate should proceed forthwith. (Sec. 3(4),
Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)
(b) What is the purpose of Impeachment? Does
conviction prevent further prosecution and
punishment? Explain
A: The purpose of impeachment is not to punish but
only to remove a public officer to secure the people
against gross political misdemeanors. [Bernas, The
1987 Constitution of the Philippines, A Commentary,
2009 ed., p.1150). Conviction does not prevent further
prosecution and punishment according to law. (Sec.
3(7), Art. XI, 1987 Constitution)
(c) Enumerate the ground for impeachment. Is graft
and corruption a ground for
impeachment?
A: The following are the grounds for impeachment;
1. Culpable violation of the Constitution;
2. Treason;
3. Bribery;
4. Graft and corruption;
5. Other high crimes; and
6. Betrayal of public trust
Q: Is cronyism a legal ground for the impeachment of
the President? Explain. (2000 BAR)

A: YES, cronyism is a legal ground for the

impeachment of the President. Under Section 2, Article
XI of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust is one of
the grounds for Impeachment. This refers to violation
of the oath of office and includes cronyism which
involves unduly favoring a
crony to the prejudice of public interest. (Record of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 272)

Q: What are the grounds for impeachment? Explain.

(1999BAR)

A: Under Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution, the

grounds for impeachment are culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, and betrayal of public trust.
Qualifications, Elections,
Term of the President and
Vice President

Q: Can a charismatic and effective 30-year-old former

mayor of a chartered city in Metro Manila legally run
for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
2022 elections? Explain briefly. (2020-2021 BAR)

A: No, He is not qualified because he is only thirty

years old. Under the Constitution, no person may be
elected President unless he is at least forty years of
age on the day of the election. (Sec 2, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
Privileges,
Inhibitions,
Disqualifications
Q: Will the president's immunity from suit continue
even after his term has ended, considering that the
events covered by the petition took place during his
terms? (2018 BAR)

A: NO. The presidential immunity from suit exists only

in concurrence with the President's incumbency. A
non-sitting President cannot claim immunity even if the
acts complaints were committed while he was still a
sitting President. The reason for this is that if the
immunity is not granted while he is in office, he might
be spending all his time in attending to litigations. After
his term, he can already attend to them. [Estrada v.
Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, 03 Apr. 2001;
Rodriguez v. MacapagalArroyo,
G.R. Nos. 191805 & 193160, 15 Nov. 2011)

Q: Upon complaint of the incumbent President of the

Republic, "A" was charged with libel before the
Regional Trial Court. "A" moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that the Court had no
jurisdiction over the offense charged because the
President, being immune from suit, should also he
disqualified from filing a case against "A" in court.
Resolve the motion. (2010 BAR)

A: The motion should be denied. The immunity of the

President from suit is personal to the President. It may
be invoked by the President only and not by any other
person. (Soliven vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 14
Nov. 1988)
Presidential
ALTERNATIVEA NSWER:
NO. Only the President or the Executive Secretary by

Privileges
order of the President can invoke executive privilege.
(Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777,
20 Apr. 2006).
Though executive privilege may be extended through
Q: Distinguish "presidential communications privilege" the Executive Secretary via an order, absent such
from "deliberative process privilege." (2010 BAR) formal extension of privilege in favor of Mr. Y, the
cabinet secretary could not on his own authority invoke
A: Presidential communications privilege applies to the the privilege. (In all instances, there exists a
decision-making of the President. The deliberative presumption that inclines heavily against executive
process privilege applies to the decision-making of secrecy and in favor of disclosure.) (Neri v. Senate
executive officials. Unlike the "deliberative process Committee on Accountability, G.R. No. 180643, 04
privilege, "the presidential communications privilege" Sept. 2008)
applies to documents in their entirety and covers final
and postdecisional matters, as well as pre- deliberative
ones. The deliberative process privilege includes
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations
comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated. (Neri v. Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, 04 Sept. 2008)

Q: A committee of the Senate invited Mr. X and Mr. Y,

the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Secretary of
Energy, respectively, as resource speakers for an
inquiry in aid legislation. Mr. X refused to attend,
arguing that the Senate, not its committee, has the
power to compel attendance. Meanwhile, Mr. Y
attended the committee hearing but upon being asked
about discussions made during a closed-door cabinet
meeting, he refused to answer invoking executive
privilege. The committee members insisted that Mr. Y
answer the question pursuant to the right of Congress
to information from the executive branch. (2019 BAR)
Is Mr. Y's refusal to answer based on executive
privilege valid? Explain.

A: YES, Mr. Y's refusal is valid. The privilege includes

presidential conversations, correspondences, or
discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings. The
intention of the President to prevent leakage of
information to the public is crystal clear because the
discussions were made in a "closed-door meeting."
(Sereno v. Committee on Trade and Related Matters,
G.R. No. 175210, 01 Feb. 2016)

Powers of the
President
Q: A Senator filed a petition for mandamus to compel
a newly elected President to sign, approve, and
transmit to the Senate for its ratification the treaty
creating the International Criminal Court. Should this
petition prosper? Explain briefly. (2020-2021 BAR)
A: NO. The President may not be compelled to submit
the treaty to the Senate for its concurrence.
It is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its
consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. The refusal
of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its
behalf is a decision which is within the competence of
the President alone, which cannot be encroached
upon by the courts via a writ of mandamus. Courts
have no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties. The
writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners cannot
prosper or be granted as it is beyond the jurisdiction of
courts to compel the executive branch of the
government to transmit the signed text of the treaty to
the Senate. (Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, C.R. No.
158088, 16 July 2008, cited in Pangilinan v. Cayetano,
C.R Nos. 238875,
239483 & 240954, 16 Mar. 2021)
Q: The President, concerned about persistent reports
of widespread irregularities and shenanigans related to
the alleged ghost projects with which the pork barrel
funds of members of Congress had been associated,
decided not to release the funds authorized under a
Special Appropriations Act for the construction of a
new bridge. The Chief Executive explained that, to
properly conserve and preserve the limited funds of
the
government, as well as to avoid further mistrust by the
people, such a project - which he considered
unnecessary since there was an old bridge near the
proposed bridge which was still functional - should be
scrapped. Does the President have such authority?
(2014 BAR)
A: The President has the authority to withhold the
release of the funds under a Special Appropriation Act
for a project he considered unnecessary. The faithful
execution of the laws requires the President to desist
from implementing a law if doing so will prejudice the
public interest. It is folly to require the President to
spend the entire amounts appropriated in the law in
such a case. (Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez, C.R. No. 113105, 19 July1994)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The President does not possess the authority to scrap
the Special Appropriations Act to construct the new
bridge. His refusal to spend the funds appropriated for
the purpose is unlawful. The President is expected to
faithfully implement the purpose for which Congress
appropriated funds. Generally, he cannot replace
legislative discretion with his own personal judgment
as to the wisdom of a law, (Araullo v. Aquino, C.R No.
209287, 01 July 2014)
Q: The President abolished the Office of the
Presidential Spokesman in Malacanang Palace and a
long-standing Bureau under the Department of Interior
and Local Governments. The employees of both
offices assailed the action of the President for being an
encroachment of legislative powers and thereby void.
Was the contention of the employees, correct?
Explain. (2003 BAR)
A: The contention of the employees is not correct.
Sec, 31, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987
has delegated the President's continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of
the President to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency. (Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora, C.R Nos. 142801-802, 10
July 2001) Since this includes the power to abolish
offices, the President can abolish the Office of the
Presidential Spokesman, provided it is done in good
faith. The President can also abolish the Bureau in the
Department of Interior
and Local Governments, provided it is done in good
faith because the President has been granted
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the National Government to effect
economy and promote efficiency. The powers include
the abolition of government offices. (Presidential
Decree No. 1416, as amended by Presidential Decree
No. 1772; Larin v. The Executive Secretary, C.R.
No.112745, 16 Oct. 1997)
Q: What is the nature of an "acting appointment" to a
government office? Does such an appointment give
the appointee the right to claim that the appointment
will, in time, ripen into a permanent one? Explain.
(2003 BAR)
A: According to Sevilla v. Court of Appeals (C.R. No.
L-41182- 3, 16 Apr.1988) an acting appointment is
merely temporary. A temporary appointment cannot
become a permanent appointment unless a new
appointment which is permanent is made.
(Marohombsar v. A/onto, C.R. No. 93711,25
Feb.1991). This holds true unless the acting
appointment was made because of a temporary
vacancy. In such a case, the temporary appointee
holds office until the assumption of office by the
permanent appointee.
Q: When is an appointment in the civil service
permanent? Distinguish between an "appointment in
an acting capacity" extended by a Department
Secretary from an ad interim appointment extended hy
the President. Distinguish between a provisional and a
temporary appointment. (1994 BAR)
A:
1. Under Sec. 25(a) of the Civil Service Decree, an
appointment in the civil service is PERMANENT when
issued to a person who meets all the requirements for
the position to which he is being appointed, including
the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance
with the provisions of law, rules and standards
promulgated in pursuance thereof. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
2. An appointment in an ACTING CAPACITY extended
by a Department Secretary is not permanent but
temporary. Hence, the Department Secretary may
terminate the services of the appointee at any time.
On the other hand, an AD INTERIM APPOINTMENT
extended by the President is an appointment which is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments and was made during the recess of
Congress. An ad interim appointment is permanent.
(Summers v. Ozaeta, G.R. No. L-1534 25 Oct. 1948)
3. In Sec. 24 (d) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, a
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT is one issued to a
person to a position needed only for a limited period
not exceeding six months. Under Sec. 25(b) of the
Civil Service Decree, a temporary appointment is one
issued to a person who meets all the requirements for
the position to which he is being appointed except the
appropriate civil service eligibility because of the
absence of appropriate eligibles and it is necessary in
the public Interest to fill the vacancy. On the other
hand. Sec. 24(e) of the Civil Service Act of 1959
defined a PROVISIONAL APPOINTMENT as one
issued upon the prior authorization of the Civil Service
Commission in accordance with its provisions and the
rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereto
to a person who has not qualified in an appropriate
examination but who otherwise meets the
requirements for appointment to a regular position in
the competitive service, whenever a vacancy occurs
and the filling thereof is necessary in the interest of the
service and there is no appropriate register of eligibles
at the time of appointment. Provisional appointments in
general have already been abolished by Republic Act
6040. However, it still applies with regard to teachers
under the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
(UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: The President appoints the Vice President as his
Administration's Housing Czar, a position that requires
the appointee to sit in the Cabinet. Although the
appointment of the members of the Cabinet requires
confirmation hy the Commission on Appointment (CA),
the Office of the President does not submit the
appointment to the CA. May the Vice President validly
sit in the Cabinet? (2017 BAR)
A: YES. Under Sec. 3 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of
the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no
confirmation.
: While Congress was not in session, the President
appointed Antero as Secretary of the Department of
Tourism (DOT), Benito as Commissioner of the Bureau
of lmmigration (BI), Clodualdo as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), Dexter as Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), and
Emmanuel as Philippine Ambassador to Cameroon.
The following day, all the appointees took their oath
before the President, and commenced to perform the
functions of their respective offices. (2016 BAR)
(a) Characterize the appointments, whether permanent
or temporary; and whether regular
or interim, with reasons.
A: The appointment of Antero as Secretary of Tourism
is ad interim because it is subject to confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments and was made while
Congress was not in session. He can start performing
his duties upon his acceptance, because it is
permanent and
cannot be withdrawn after its acceptance. [Matibag v.
Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, 02 Apr. 2002)
The appointment of Benito as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Immigration is regular and permanent. It is
not required to be confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. He can start performing his duties upon
acceptance of the appointment. (Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
The appointment of Clodualdo as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission is ad interim because it is subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
and was made while Congress was not in session. He
can start performing his duties upon his acceptance of
the appointment, because it is permanent and cannot
be withdrawn.
The appointment of Dexter as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights is regular and
permanent upon his acceptance. It is not required to
be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. He
can start performing his duties upon his acceptance.
[Bautista v. Salonga G.R. No.86439, 13 Apr. 1989)
The appointment of Emmanuel as ambassador to
Cameroon is ad interim because it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment.
(Sec. 16, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
(b) A civil society group, the Volunteers Against
Misguided Politics (VAMP), files suit, contesting the
legality of the acts of the appointees and claiming that
the appointees should not have entered into the
performance of the functions of their respective offices,
because their appointments had not yet been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Is this
claim of VAMP correct? Why or why not?
A: NO. The claim of VAMP is not correct. The
Commission of Investigation and the Commission on
Human Rights can immediately start performing their
functions upon acceptance since they are not required
to be confirmed. The Secretary of the Department of
Tourism and the Chairman
of the Civil Service Commission, disbursements of
their salaries and emoluments are valid.
Q: Margie has been in the judiciary for a long time,
starting from the lowest court. Twenty (20) years from
her first year in the judiciary, she was nominated as a
Justice in the Court of Appeals. Margie also happens
to be a first-degree cousin of the President. The
Judicial and Bar Council included her in the short-list
submitted to the President whose term of office was
about to end-a month before the next presidential
elections. Can the resident still make appointments to
the judiciary during the so-called midnight appointment
ban period? Assuming that he can still make
appointments, could he appoint Margie, his cousin?
(2014 BAR)
A: NO, the President cannot make appointments to the
Court of Appeals. The President can make
appointments only to the Supreme Court two months
before a presidential election until the end of his term,
but not to the rest of the Judiciary like the Court of
Appeals. Under Sec. 4(1), Art. Vlll of the Constitution,
vacancies in the Supreme Court shall be filed within
ninety (90) days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Under Sec. 9, Art; Vlll of the Constitution, vacancies
in the lower courts shall be filled within ninety (90)
days from submission of the list of nominees. These
appointments are screened by the Judicial and Bar
Council, and the process necessarily precludes or
prevents the President from making purely political
appointments to the courts, which is what is sought to
be prevented by the prohibition. (De Castro v. Judicial
and Bar Council C.R. No. 191002, 20 Apr. 2010)
Assuming he can still make appointments, the
President may appoint his first cousin as Justice of the
Court of Appeals. The prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. Vll of
the Constitution against appointment by the President
of relatives within the fourth degree by consanguinity
or affinity does not extend to appointments to the
Judiciary.

Q: While Congress was in session, the President
appointed eight acting Secretaries. A group of
Senators from the minority bloc questioned the validity
of the appointments in a petition before the Supreme
Court on the ground that while Congress is in session,
no appointment that requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments can be made without
the latter's consent, and that an undersecretary should
instead be designated as Acting Secretary. Should the
petition be granted? (2013 BAR)
A: NO, the petition should not be granted. The
Department Head is an alter ego of the President and
must enjoy his confidence even if the appointment will
be merely temporary. The Senators cannot require the
President to designate an Undersecretary to be the
temporary alter ego
of the President. (Pimentel v. Ennita, C.R. No. 164978,
13 Oct. 2005)
Q: The President appointed Dexter I. Ty as
Chairperson of the COMELEC on June 14, 2011, for a
term of seven (7) years pursuant to the 1987
Constitution. His term of office started on June 2, 2011
to end on June 2, 2018. Subsequently, the President
appointed Ms. Marikit as the third member of the
COMELECfo r a term of seven (7) years starting June
2, 2014 until June 2, 2021. On June 2, 2015,
Chairperson Ty retired optionally after serving the
government for thirty (30) years. The President then
appointed Commissioner Marikit as COMELEC
Chairperson. The Commission on Appointments
confirmed her appointment. The appointment papers
expressly indicate that Marikit will serve as COMELEC
Chairperson "until the expiration of the original term of
her office as COMELEC Commissioner or on June 2,
2021." Matalino, a taxpayer, files a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court asserting that the
appointment of Marikit as COMELEC Chairperson is
unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) The
appointment of Marikit as COMELEC Chairperson
constituted a reappointment which is proscribed by
Section 1 (2), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution; and
(2) the term of office expressly stated in the
appointment papers of Marikit likewise contravenes
tl1e aforementioned constitutional provision. Will the
constitutional challenge succeed? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A: The first argument is untenable since
Commissioner Marikit was not reappointed but actually
was a promotional appointment as she had not yet
fully served her term. What the Constitution prohibits is
a reappointment of a COMELEC Commissioner after
serving the seven-year term. On the second argument,
the limitation of the term of Commissioner Marikit as
chairman until expiration of her original term on June
2, 2021 is valid only until June 8, 2018, that is, the
unexpired portion of the last chairman's term but
invalid if until 2021 as it exceeds the limitation. A
promotional apportionment is allowed provided that the
aggregate period of the term of the appointee will not
exceed seven years and that the rotational scheme of
staggering terms of the commission membership is
maintained. (Funa v, Ermita, C.R No. 192791, 24 Apr.
2012)
Q: A was a career Ambassador when be accepted an
ad interim appointment as a cabinet Member. The
Commission on Appointment bypassed bis ad interim
appointment, however, and be was not re-appointed.
Can be re-assume bis position as career
Ambassador? (2010 BAR)
A: The career Ambassador cannot re-assume his
position as career Ambassador. His ad interim
appointment as Cabinet Member was permanent.
(Summers v. Ozaeta, G.R. No. L- 1534 25 Oct. 1948)
He abandoned his position as Ambassador when he
accepted his appointment as Cabinet Member
because as Cabinet Member, he could not hold any
other office during his tenure. (Sec. 13, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution)
Q: In March 2001, while Congress was adjourned, the
President appointed Santos as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections. Santos immediately took his
oath and assumed office. While bis appointment was
promptly submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation, it was not acted upon
and Congress again adjourned. In June 2001, the
President extended a second ad interim appointment
to Santos for the same position with the same term,
and this appointment was again submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Santos
took his oath anew and performed the functions of his
office.
Reyes, a political rival, filed a suit assailing certain
orders issued by Santos. He also questioned the
validity of Santos' appointment. Resolve the following
issues: (2005 BAR)
(a) Does Santos' assumption of office on the basis of
the ad interim appointments issued by the President
amount to a temporary appointment which is prohibited
by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution?
A: The assumption of office by Santos based on one
ad interim appointment issued by the President does
not amount to a temporary appointment. An ad interim
appointment is a permanent appointment, because it
takes effect immediately and can no longer be
withdrawn by the president once the appointee has
qualified for office. (Sec. 16 (2), Art. VII, 1987
Constitution; Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036,
02 Apr. 2002)
(b) Assuming the legality of the first ad interim
appointment and assumption of office by
Santos, were bis second ad interim appointment and
subsequent assumption of office to the same position
violations of the prohibition on reappointment under
Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution?
A: The second ad interim appointment of Santos does
not violate the prohibition against reappointment under
Sec. 1(2) Art. lX-C, 1987 Constitution. The prohibition
does not apply to a by-passed ad interim appointment
because it has not been finally disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments. [Matibag v. Benipayo,
G.R. No. 149036, 02 Apr. 2002) The prohibition
against reappointment in the Constitution presupposes
the end of the term. After the end of the term, he
cannot be reappointed.
Q: TRUE or FALSE: The president exercises the
power of control over all executive departments and
agencies, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. (2009 BAR)
A: TRUE. Under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution the President has control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices. His power of control
extends to agencies with respect to their administrative
functions, even if they are performing quasi-judicial
functions (Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128, 2000) and to
government-owned or controlled corporations.
(National Marketing Corporation v. Acra, G.R. No. L-
25743, 30 Sept. 1969)
Q: A law provides that the Secretaries of the
Departments of Finance and Trade and Industry, the
Governor of the Central Bank, the Director General of
the National Economic Development Authority, and the
Chairperson of the Philippine Overseas Construction
Board shall sit as ex- officio members of the Board of
Directors (BOD) of a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC). The other four (4)
members shall
come from the private sector. The BOD issues a
resolution to implement a new organizational structure,
staffing pattern, a position classification system, and a
new set of qualification standards. After the
implementation of the Resolution, Atty. Dipasupil
questioned the legality of the Resolution alleging that
the BOD bas no authority to do so. The BOD claims
otherwise arguing that the doctrine of qualified political
agency applies to the case. It contends that since its
agency is attached to the Department of Finance,
whose bead, the Secretary of Finance, is an alter ego
of the President, the BOD's acts were also the acts of
the President. Is the invocation of the doctrine by the
BOD proper? Explain. (2015 BAR)
A: The invocation by the Board of directors of the
doctrine of qualified political agency is improper. The
doctrine of qualified political agency essentially
postulates that the heads of the various executive
departments are the alter egos of the President, and,
thus, the actions taken by such heads in the
performance of their official duties have deemed the
acts of the President unless the President himself
should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in
recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of
government, all executive organizations are adjuncts
of a single Chief executive; that the heads of the
executive Departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive
functions of the president as the Chief Executive are
performed through the Executive Departments. The
doctrine has been adopted here out of practical
necessity, considering that the President cannot be
expected to personally perform the multifarious
functions of the executive office.
The Cabinet Members sat on the Board of Directors ex
officio, or because of their office or function, "not
because of their direct appointment to the Board by the
president. It was the law, not the President, that sat
them in the Board." Under the circumstances, when
the members of the Board of Directors affected the
assailed ... reorganization, they were acting as the
responsible members of the Board of Directors
constituted pursuant to the law, not as the alter egos of
the President. (Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigillo,
C.R. No. 185571, 05 Mar. 2013; Manalang-Demigillo v.
Trade and
Investment Development Corporation of the
Philippines, C.R. No. 168613, 05 Mar. 2013)

Emergency
Powers
Q: True or False: A proclamation of a state of
emergency is sufficient to allow the President to
take over any public utility (2010 BAR)
A: The statement that a proclamation of emergency is
sufficient to allow the President to take over any public
utility is false. Since it is an aspect of emergency
powers, in accordance with Section 23 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, there must be a law delegating such
power to the President. (David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
C.R. No. 171396 03 May2006)
Q: To give the much-needed help to the Province
of Aurora devastated by typhoons and torrential
rains, the President declared it in a "state of
calamity." Give at least four ( 4) legal effects of
such a declaration. (2005 BAR)
A: Declaration of a state of calamity produces, inter
alia, these legal effects within the Province of Aurora:
1. Automatic Price Control - under R.A. No. 7581, The
Price Act;
2. Authorization for the importation of rice under R.A.
No. 8178, The Agricultural Tariffication Act;
3. Automatic appropriation under R.A. No. 7160 is
available for unforeseen expenditures arising from the
occurrence of calamities in areas declared to be in a
state of calamity;
4. Local government units may enact a supplemental
budget for supplies and materials or payment of
services to prevent danger to or loss of life or property,
under R.A. No. 7160;
5. Entitlement to hazard allowance for Public Health
Workers ( under R.A. No. 7305, Magna Carta for
Public Health Worker.5), who shall be compensated
hazard allowances equivalent to at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of the monthly basic salary of health
workers receiving salary grade 19 and below, and five
percent (5%) for health workers with salary grade 20
and above; and
6. Entitlement to hazard allowance for science and
technological personnel of the government under R.A.
No. 8439; and 7. A crime committed during a state of
calamity will be considered aggravated under Art. 14,
par. 7 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Q: The continuing threat to the security of the State in
various parts of the country prompted the National
Security Adviser of the President to adopt a
"Comprehensive National Security Strategy (CNSS)"
with the following components:
Component 1: During a state of emergency, the
President, in the exercise of his power of general
supervision, may delegate to the heads of local
government units (LGUs), through an administrative
issuance, the power to call-out the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) for a more effective and
immediate response to the ground situation; and
Component 2: In declaring Martial Law, the President,
in a preemptive action and without waiting for the
recommendation of the Secretary of National Defense
and the AFP, may rely upon any intelligence
information he may have gathered through other
sources.
Disturbed by the strategy's supposed infirmities, a
concerned citizens' organization raised the
constitutionality of the two (2) components of the
CNSS before the Supreme Court. (2019 BAR)
(a) Is component 1 of the CNSS constitutional?
Explain.
A: NO, component 1 of the CNSS is not constitutional.
Inside the 1987 Constitution is a well-entrenched
constitutional precept that One President means that
there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may
only be performed by the president as the Head of
State. One of the acts is one inherent in the
Commander-in-Chief powers of the president which is
the calling out powers. This power is vested upon the
President alone as an act of lesser gravity with the act
of declaring martial law. As cited in Villena, there are
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which cannot be used by any
other person either through ratification or approval
because it must be exercised by him in person.
(Kulayan v.Gov. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, 03 July. 2012)
(b) Is component 2 of the CNSS constitutional?
Explain.
A: YES, component 2 of the CNSS is constitutional. A
plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution shows that the President's power to
declare martial law is not subject to any condition
except for the requirements of actual invasion or
rebellion and that public safety requires it. In Lagman
v. Medialdea, the Court ruled that even the
recommendation of, or consultation with, the Secretary
of National Defense, or other high-ranking military
officials, is not a condition for the President to declare
martial law. Therefore, it is only on the President and
no other that the exercise of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of
the Constitution is bestowed. (Lagman v. Medialdea,
G.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017)
Q: On February 24, 2006, President Gloria
MacapagalArroyo issued Proclamation No. 1017
declaring a state of national emergency. Is this
Proclamation constitutional? Explain. (2006 BAR)
A: The proclamation is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. This is just
pursuant to the President's calling-out power under
Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution.
However, pp 1017's provisions giving the President
express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to
direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even
those not related to lawless violence as well as
decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to
impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. Likewise, under Sec. 17, Art. XII of
the Constitution, the President, in the absence of
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public
utilities and businesses affected with the public
interest. [David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, 03 May
2006)
Q: Distinguish the President's authority to declare a
state of rebellion from the authority to proclaim a state
of national emergency. (2015 BAR)
A: The power of the President to declare a state of
rebellion is based on the power of the President as
chief executive and commander-in-chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to suppress it. It is not
necessary for the President to declare a state of
rebellion before calling out the Armed forces of the
Philippines to suppress it. The proclamation only gives
notice to the nation that such a state exists and that
the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called
upon to suppress it (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 159085, 03 Feb. 2004). On the other hand, a
proclamation of a state of national emergency, the
President is already calling out the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to suppress not only rebellion but also
lawless violence. [David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396,
03 May 2006)
Q: The President issued a Proclamation No. 1018
placing the Philippines under Martial Law on the
ground that a rebellion staged by lawless elements is
endangering the public safety. Pursuant to the
Proclamation, suspected rebels were arrested and
detained, and military tribunals were set up to try them.
Robert dela Cruz, a citizen, filed with the Supreme
Court a petition questioning the validity of
Proclamation No.1018. (2006 BAR)
(a) Does Robert have a standing to challenge
Proclamation No. 1018? Explain.
A: YES, Robert has standing. Under Article VIII,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme
Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law. As citizen therefore,
Robert may file the petition questioning Proclamation
No. 1018.
(b) In the same suit, the Solicitor General contends
that under the Constitution, the President as
Commander-in-Chief, determines whether the
exigency has arisen requiring the exercise of his power
to declare Martial Law and that his determination is
conclusive upon the courts. How should the Supreme
Court rule?
A: The Supreme Court should rule that his
determination is not conclusive upon the courts. The
1987 Constitution allows a citizen, in an appropriate
proceeding, to file a petition questioning the sufficiency
of the factual basis of said proclamation. Moreover, the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law involve the
curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights
and individual freedoms, and thus necessitate
safeguards by Congress and review by the Supreme
Court (IBP v. Zamora, C.R. No. 141284, 15 Aug.
2000).
c) The Solicitor General argues that, in any event, the
determination of whether the rebellion poses danger to
public safety involves a question of fact and the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. What should be
the ruling of the Court?
A: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. (Sec. 1 (2), Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution) When the grant of power is qualified,
conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of
whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions
have been met or the limitations respected, is
justiciable - the problem being one of legality or
validity, not its wisdom. The Supreme Court has the
power to review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law. (Sec.18, Art. VII, 1987
Constitution) Thus, in the matter of such
declaration, two conditions must concur: (1) there must
be an actual invasion or rebellion; and (2) public safety
must require it. The Supreme Court cannot renege on
its constitutional duty to determine whether or not the
said factual conditions exist. (IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No.
141284, 15
Aug. 2000)
(d) Finally, the Solicitor General maintains that the
President reported to Congress such
proclamation of Martial Law, but Congress did not
revoke the proclamation. What is the effect of the
inaction of Congress on the suit brought by Robert to
the Supreme Court?
A: The inaction of Congress has no effect on the suit
brought by Robert to the Supreme Court as Sec. 18,
Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution provides for checks on
the President's power to declare martial law to be
exercised separately by Congress and the Supreme
Court. Under said provision, the duration of martial law
shall not exceed sixty days but Congress has the
power to revoke the proclamation or extend the period.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has the power
to review the said proclamation and promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. (Sec.
18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)
Q: Declaring a rebellion, hostile groups have opened
and maintained armed conflicts on the Islands of Sulu
and Basilan. (2000 BAR)
(a) To quell this, can the President place under martial
law the islands of Sulu and Basilan? Give your
reasons?
A: If public safety requires it, the President can place
Sulu and Basilan under martial law since there is an
actual rebellion. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution, the President can place any part of the
Philippines under martial law in case of rebellion, when
public safety requires it. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
(b) What are the constitutional safeguards on the
exercise of the President's power to proclaim martial
law?
A: The following are the constitutional safeguards on
the exercise of the power of the President to proclaim
martial law:
1. There must be actual invasion or rebellion;
2. The duration of the proclamation shall not exceed
sixty days;
3. Within forty-eight hours, the President shall report
his action to Congress. If Congress is not in session, it
must convene within twenty-four hours;
4. Congress may by majority vote of all its members
voting Jointly revoke the proclamation, and the
President cannot set aside the revocation;
5. By the same vote and in the same manner, upon
Initiative of the President, Congress may extend the
proclamation If the invasion or rebellion continues and
public safety requires the extension;
6. The Supreme Court may review the factual
sufficiency of the proclamation, and the Supreme
Court must decide the case within thirty days from the
time it was filed;
7. Martial law does not automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
operation of the Constitution; and
8. It does not supplant the functioning of the civil courts
and of Congress. Military courts have no
Jurisdiction over civilians where civil courts are able to
function. (Cruz, 1995)

Executive
Clemency
Q: What is the pardoning power of the President
under Art. VIII, Sec. 19 of the Constitution?
Is the exercise of the power absolute? (2017 BAR)
A: The pardoning power, as embodied in Sec. 19 of
Art VII, is as follows: "Except in cases of impeachment,
or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress."
The exercise of the pardoning power is not absolute.
The following are the limitations on the pardoning
power of the President:
1. it can be granted only after conviction by Final
judgment, except in cases of amnesty;
2. it cannot be granted in cases of civil or legislative
contempt;
3. it cannot absolve convict of civil liability;
4. it cannot be granted in cases of impeachment;
5. it cannot be granted for violations of election laws
without favorable recommendations of the
COMELEC; and
6. it cannot restore public offices forfeited.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. He
shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress. (Sec. 19, Art Vll, of the 1987 Constitution)
No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of
sentence for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations shall be granted by the President without
the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
(Sec.5, Art IX-C, 1987 Constitution)
The only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in:
1. impeachment cases;
2. cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction;
and
3. cases involving violations of election laws, rules and
regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC.
4. Any act of Congress by way of statute can not
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President. ( Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, C.R. No.
206666, 21jan. 2015)
Q: Distinguish between pardon and amnesty.
(2017,1999 BAR)
A: The following are the distinctions between pardon
and amnesty:
1. Pardon is a private act and must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned; while amnesty is a
public act of which courts take judicial notice;
2. Pardon does not require the concurrence of
Congress, while amnesty requires the concurrence of
Congress;
3. Pardon is granted to individuals, while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities;
4. Pardon may be granted for any offense, while
amnesty is granted for political offenses;
5. Pardon is granted after final conviction, while
amnesty may be granted at any time; and
6. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from
the consequences of his offense, while
amnesty looks backward and the person granted it
stands before the law as though he had committed no
offense. (Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, C.R. No. L- 1278,
21 Jan.1949)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Pardon can be given only after final convictions;
amnesty can be given at any time and even before the
filing of a criminal case. Pardon looks forward;
amnesty looks backward, as if the accused never
committed & crime. Pardon is given to individuals.
Amnesty is given to a class of persons. Pardon is
given for all criminal offenses. Amnesty is given for
political offenses. Pardon does not require the
concurrence of Congress. Amnesty requires the
concurrence of Congress. Pardon must be proven,
because it is a private act; amnesty need not be
proven, because it is a public act. [Barriequinto v.
Ferrandez, C.ll No. L-1278, 21 Jan.1949)
Q: What are the constitutional limitations on the
pardoning power of the President? (2015, 1999
BAR)
A: The following are the limitations on the pardoning
power
of the President:
 Q: Bruno still had several years to serve on his
1. It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment;
sentence when he was conditionally pardoned by the
2. Reprieves, commutations, pardon, and remission of
President. Among the conditions imposed was that he
fines and forfeitures can be granted only after
would "not
conviction by final judgment;
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
3. Amnesty requires the concurrence of the majority of
Bruno accepted all of the conditions and was released.
all members of Congress;
Shortly thereafter, Bruno was charged with 2 counts of
4. The favorable recommendation of the COMELEC is
estafa. He was then incarcerated to serve the expired
required for violation of election laws, rules and
portion of his sentence following the revocation by the
regulations; and
President of the pardon. Bruno's family filed a petition
5. The President cannot pardon members and
for habeas corpus, alleging that it was error to have
employees of the Judiciary found guilty by the
him recommitted as the charges were false, in fact,
Supreme Court in administrative cases.
half of them were already dismissed. Resolve the
petition with reasons. (2005 BAR)
Q: The president cannot grant pardon in cases of
impeachment. He may, however, exercise such power
A: The petition should not be given due course. The
when? (2012 BAR)
grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and
conditions of a conditional pardon are PURELY
A: A person convicted in an impeachment proceeding
EXECUTIVE ACTS which are not subject to judicial
is subject to prosecution, trial and punishment in an
scrutiny. The acceptance thereof by the convict or
ordinary criminal action. (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987
prisoner carried with it the authority or power of the
Constitution)
Executive to determine whether a condition or
conditions of the pardon has or have been violated.
Q: ST, a Regional Trial Court judge who falsified his
Where the President opts to revoke the conditional
Certificate of Service, was found liable by the Supreme
pardon given, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency and
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction
meted the penalty of suspension form office for 6
therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a
months. Subsequently, ST filed a petition for executive
convict may be recommended for the violation of his
clemency with the Office of the President. The
conditional pardon. The determination of the
Executive Secretary, acting on said petition issued a
occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and
resolution granting ST executive clemency. Is the grant
the proper consequences of such breach, is a purely
of executive clemency valid? Why or why not? (2008
executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny. [Torres v.
BAR)
Gonzales, G.R. No. 76872, 21 July 1987)

A: NO. The grant of executive clemency is not valid.

First, in this case, the power of executive clemency
Q: A while serving imprisonment for estafa upon
cannot be delegated for it was not signed by the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole,
President himself but by the Executive Secretary and
was granted pardon by the President on condition that
second, the power of executive clemency cannot
he should not again violate any penal law of the land.
extend to administrative cases in the Judiciary,
Later, the Board of Pardons and Parole recommended
because it will violate the principle of separation of
to the President the cancellation of the pardon granted
powers and impair the power of the Supreme Court
him because A had been charged with estafa on 20
under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution of
counts and was convicted of the offense charged
administrative supervision over all courts [Petition for
although he took an appeal therefrom which was still
Judicial Clemency of Romillo, G.R. No. 97091, 09 Dec.
pending. As recommended, the President canceled the
1997)
pardon he had granted to A. A was thus arrested and
imprisoned to serve the balance of his sentence in the
first case. A claimed in his petition for habeas corpus
filed in court that his detention was illegal because he
had not yet been convicted by final judgment and was
not given a chance to he heard before he was
recommitted to prison. Is A's argument valid? (1997
BAR)
A: The argument of A is not valid. As held in Torres v.
Gonzales (G.R. No. 76872, 23 July 1987) a judicial
pronouncement that a convict who was granted a
pardon subject to the condition that he should not
again violate any penal law is not necessary before he
can be declared to have violated the condition of his
pardon. Moreover, a hearing is not necessary before A
can be recommitted to prison. By accepting the
conditional pardon, A, agreed that the determination by
the President that he violated the condition of his
pardon shall be conclusive upon him and an order for
his arrest should at once issue. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Governor A was charged administratively with
oppression and was placed under preventive
suspension from office during the pendency of his
case. Found guilty of the charge, the President
suspended him from office for ninety days. Later, the
President
granted him clemency hy reducing the period of his
suspension to the period he has already served. The
Vice Governor questioned the validity of the exercise
of executive clemency on the ground that it could he
granted only in criminal, not administrative, cases.
How should the question he resolved? (1997 BAR)
A: The argument of the Vice Governor should be
rejected. As held in Llamas v. Orbos, (G.R. No. 99031,
15 Oct. 1991) the power of executive clemency
extends to administrative cases. In granting the power
of executive clemency upon the President, Sec. 19,
Art. VII of the Constitution does not distinguish
between criminal and administrative cases. Sec. 19,
Art. VII of the Constitution excludes impeachment
cases, which are not criminal cases, from the scope of
the power of executive clemency. If this power may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would have been
unnecessary to exclude impeachment cases from this
scope. If the President can grant pardons in criminal
cases, with more reason he can grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are less
serious. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
Q: The first paragraph of Section 19 of Article VII of
the Constitution providing for the pardoning power of
the President, mentions reprieve, commutation, and
pardon. Please define the three of them and
differentiate one from the others. (1988 BAR)
A: The terms were defined and distinguished from one
another as follows:
REPRIEVE is a postponement of the execution of a
sentence to a day certain.
COMMUTATION is a remission of a part of the
punishment, a substitution of less penalty for the one
originally imposed.
PARDON, on the other hand, is an act of grace,
proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws which exempts the individual on
whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law
inflicts for a crime he has committed. (People v. Vera,
C.R. No. L-45685, 16 Nov. 1937)
Q: Under the 1987 Constitution, to whom does each
duty/ power/ privilege/ prohibition/ disqualification
apply: (2019 BAR)
The power to ratify treaties and international
agreements.
A: The President. (Bayan v. Zamora, C.R No. 138570,
10 Oct. 2000)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The Senate. (Sec. 21. Art. Vil, 1987 Constitution,
based on jurisprudence, Saguisag v. Ochoa, C.R. No.
212426, 12 Jan. 2016; Pimentel,Jr. v Executive
Secretary, C.R No. 158088, 06 July2005)
Q: The president may contract or guarantee foreign
loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines only
upon prior concurrence of the? (2012 BAR)
A: Monetary Board. (Sec. 20, Art Vil, 1987
Constitution)
Q: What are the restrictions prescribed by the
Constitution on the power of the President to contract
or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of
the Philippines? Explain. (1999 BAR)
A: Under Sec. 20, Art Vil of the Constitution, the power
of the President to contract or guarantee loans on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines is subject to
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board and
subject to such limitations as may be prescribed by
law. (UPLC Suggested
Answers)
Q: Can the House of Representatives take active part Q: Distinguish between "pocket veto" and "item
in the conduct of foreign relations, particularly in veto." (2009 BAR)
entering into treaties and international agreements?
Explain. (1996 BAR) A: A pocket veto is when the President is considered
A: NO, the House of Representatives cannot take to have rejected a bill submitted to him for his approval
active part in the conduct of foreign relations, when Congress adjourns during the period given to the
particularly in entering into treaties and international President
agreements. The President alone is the representative to approve or reject a bill. On the other hand, an item
of the nation in the conduct of foreign affairs. [United veto or partial veto, is the power of a President to
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. nullify or cancel specific provisions of a bill, usually a
304, 21 Dec. 1936) Although the Senate has the budget appropriations bill, without vetoing the entire
power to concur in treaties, the President alone legislative package. (UPLC Suggested Answers)
negotiates treaties and Congress is powerless to
intrude into this. However, if the matter involves a Q: What are the limitations/restrictions provided by
treaty or an executive agreement, the House of the Constitution on the power of Congress to
Representatives may pass a resolution expressing its authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import
views on the matter. and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues.
Explain. (1999 BAR)
Q: The Philippine Government is negotiating a new
security treaty with the United States which could A: Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
involve engagement in joint military operations of the within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
two countries' armed forces. A loose organization of and restrictions it may impose, tariff rates, import and
Filipinos, the Kabataan at Matatandang Makabansa export
(KMM) wrote the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues and other duties
and the Department of National Defense (DND) or imposts within the framework of the national
demanding disclosure of the details of the development program of the Government. (Sec. 28(2),
negotiations, as well as copies of the minutes of the Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
meetings. The DFA and the DND refused, contending
that premature disclosure of the offers and counter-
offers between the parties could jeopardize on-going
negotiations with another country. KMM filed suit to
compel disclosure of the negotiation details, and be
granted access to the records of the meetings,
invoking the constitutional right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. (2009 BAR)
(a) Decide with reasons.
A: The petition of KMM must be denied. Diplomatic
negotiations are privileged in order to encourage a
frank exchange of exploratory ideas between the
parties by shielding the negotiations from the public
view. (Akbayan Citizens Action Party v. Aquino, C.R.
No. 170516 26 July 2008)
(b) Will your answer be the same if the information
sought by KMM pertains to contracts entered into by
the Government in its proprietary or commercial
capacity? Why or why not?
A: KMM is entitled to have access to information
pertaining to government contracts entered into by the
Government in the exercise of its proprietary or
commercial capacity, the right to information under the
Constitution does not exclude contracts of public
interest and are not privileged. (Sec. 7, Art Ill, 1987
Constitution; Valmonte v. Belmonte, C.R. No. 74930,
13 Feb. 1989)
A: YES. The President may be held accountable under
the principle of command responsibility. Being the
commander-in-chief of all armed forces, he necessarily
possesses control over the military which qualifies him
as a superior within the purview of the command
responsibility doctrine.
On the knowledge issue, it must be pointed out that
although international tribunals apply a strict standard
of knowledge, i.e. actual knowledge, the same may be
established through circumstantial evidence. In the
Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted, and
superiors may be charged with constructive
knowledge. As to the failure to prevent or punish, it is
important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, the President has the power to
effectively command, control and discipline the
military. (Rodriguez v. CMA, C.R. Nos. 191805 &
193160, 15 Nov. 2011)
Q: What do you mean by the "Calling-out Power" of
the President under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution? (2006 BAR)
A: The calling-out power of the President refers to the
power of the President to order the armed forces,
whenever it becomes necessary, to suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.
Q: To contain the spread of a virus, and in line with the
World Health Organization's declaration of a
pandemic, the President declared Martial law
throughout the entire Philippine archipelago. As an
additional justification, the Proclamation declaring
martial law cited the possibility that health protocols
might not be followed.
A law student filed a petition before the Supreme Court
questioning the sufficiency of the constitutional and
factual bases for the martial law declaration.
Does the law student have standing to file this action?
Explain briefly. (2020-21 BAR)
A: YES. Under the Constitution, any citizen may file an
appropriate proceeding questioning the sufficiency of
the factual basis for any proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. (Sec. 18(3), Art VII, 1987 Constitution; Lagman
v. Medialdea, C.R. No. 231658, 04 July 2017)
Q: Typhoon Bangis devastated the Province of
Sinagtala. Roads and bridges were destroyed which
impeded the entry of vehicles into the area. This
caused food shortage resulting in massive looting of
grocery stores and malls. There is power outage also
in the area. For these reasons, the governor of the
province declares a state of emergency in their
province through Proclamation No. 1. He also invoked
Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991
(R.A. No. 7160) which vests on the provincial governor
the power to carryout emergency measures during
man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to
call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to
suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the same
proclamation, the governor called upon the members
of the Philippine National Police, with the assistance of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to set up
checkpoints and breakpoints, conduct general
searches and seizures including arrests, and other
actions necessary to ensure public safety. Was the
action of the provincial governor proper? Explain.
(2015 BAR)
A: NO, the provincial governor is not endowed with the
power to call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor
Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state
of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces and
the police. The calling-out powers contemplated under
the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the
invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government
Code since said provision only refers to calamities and
disasters only and not of looting as in the instant case.
(Kulayan vs Tan, G.R. No. 187298, 03 July 2012)
Q: Command responsibility pertains to the
responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other
persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflicts. The doctrine has now found
application in civil actions for human rights abuses and
proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of
Amparo.
May the doctrine of command responsibility apply to
the President for the abuses of the armed forces (AFP
and PNP) given his unique role as the commander-in
chief of all the armed forces? Explain your answer.
(2017 BAR)

Module 3
Case Questions
De Lima v. Duterte, G.R. No. 227635, October 15,
2019
Question
Senator Juan, during his privilege speech, questioned
why the Philippines is one of the biggest importers of
rice. Sen. Juan commented, “Day 200 bago maging
20php ang kilo ng bigas.” In response, the President of
the Philippines issued a number of public statements
against Sen. Juan, including denunciations of his
corruption and immorality. The statements prompted
him to initiate the petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data against the President.
Is the President immune from suit, considering the
President hasn't invoked the immunity himself yet?
Should the petition be dismissed?
Answer
The petition must be dismissed even without the
President invoking the privilege of immunity from suit.
The President of the Philippines is immune from suit
during his incumbency. However, pronouncements
made in his or her official capacity may still be the
subject of suit, as long as the respondent in the case is
the executive secretary, not the president. After his or
her incumbency, however, the president should no
longer be able to plead immunity for any case that may
be filed against him or her.
Presidential immunity from suit only extends to civil,
criminal, and administrative liability. A proceeding for
the issuance of a writ of habeas data, as in this case,
does not determine any such liability. The Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data only requires courts to ascertain
the accountability and responsibility of the public
official or employee. Thus, the President cannot invoke
immunity from suit in a petition for such writ.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ ofHabeas Data
provides: The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged
in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to
protect by means of judicial complaint the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information
of an individual.
Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR Nos. 146710-15, March 2,
2001;
Question
In the Philippines, President Severus Snape is facing a
corruption scandal, and Vice President Hermione
Granger takes the oath of office as the new President
amid public protests and calls for President Snape's
resignation. President Snape makes a public
statement acknowledging President Granger's oath-
taking but with reservations about its legality, stating
he is leaving the presidency for the sake of peace and
national healing. Simultaneously, President Snape
sends a letter to legislative leaders declaring his
inability to exercise the powers and duties of his office.
In this scenario, is President Snape's departure from
office a valid resignation, or does it constitute a
temporary inability to act as President, and what legal
implications may arise from this situation?
Answer
President Snape's departure from office constitutes a
valid resignation.
The legal basis for this conclusion is the principle of
voluntary resignation, which is a fundamental concept
in constitutional law. Resignation is the voluntary act of
an incumbent executive official relinquishing their
position. In this context, we can refer to the relevant
provisions of the hypothetical country's constitution or
legal framework, which likely outline the process for
resignation and succession.
President Snape's public statement acknowledging
President Granger's oath-taking, along with his
expression of leaving the presidency for the sake of
peace and national healing, reflects a clear and
voluntary intention to resign. This is akin to the actions
and statements of former President Joseph Estrada in
the case of Joseph Estrada vs. Aniano Desierto. In
that case, the Supreme Court affirmed his resignation,
taking into account his public acknowledgment of his
successor and his emphasis on leaving for the sake of
peace and national healing.
President Severus Snape's departure from office
should be regarded as a valid resignation, as it aligns
with the legal principle of voluntary resignation.
President Hermione Granger's assumption of the
presidency following this resignation is legitimate, and
there is no temporary inability to act as President in
this context.
David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 Rufino v. Endriga, GR No. 139554, July 21, 2006
Question: QUESTION:
The senate committee issued invitations to various In a case involving the governance of the National
officials of the executive department and Military Heritage Trust (NHT), a legal dispute emerges about
officials for them to appear as resource speakers in the President Juan's appointment of new board
public hearings on a wide rang of subjects. This members. The dispute centers on a clause in the
invitation states that there is an electoral fraud as governing law that is comparable to one analyzed in a
shown in the respective privilege speeches of the case regarding the Cultural Center of the Philippines
Senators. The Senate Committee on National Defense (CCP). This provision empowers the President to
and Security also invited AFP officials to appear on its designate new board members even if the board is not
own hearing on various issues. Before the scheduled totally vacant.
hearing, the president then issued E.O. 464, which
prohibits officials of the executive department from Is the provision allowing President Juan to nominate
appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation new National Heritage Trust board members
without the consent of the president. The executive unconstitutional, establishing an improper delegation
secretary informed the Senate that the officials invited of the President's appointing power under the
to the hearing cannot attend without the consent of the Constitution?
President pursuant to E.O. 464. Despite this, two AFP
officials attended the Committee on National Defense ANSWER:
and Security hearing. And as a result, these two
officials were relieved from service. Is E.O. 464 Yes. The legal basis is built from case law precedent
unconstitutional? Why or why not? set in a comparable instance regarding the CCP in the
case of Rufino VS. Endriga. In that case, the Supreme
ANSWER: Court ruled that a clause permitting the appointment of
The petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of new board members when the board is not totally
EO 464 are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2 (a) are vacant was unconstitutional, highlighting the exclusive
VALID. Under Article 6, Section 21 of the Constitution, nature of the President's appointing power as specified
the congress may inquiries in aid of legislation. Since in Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
congress has authority to inquire into the operations of Applying the legal principles outlined in the referenced
the executive branch, it would be inconsistent to hold case to the hypothetical scenario of the National
that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive Heritage Trust, a provision allowing the President to
officials who are the most familiar with and informed on appoint new board members when the board is not
the executive operations, although there are entirely vacant would be considered an invalid
exemptions to the power of inquiry which exemptions delegation of the President's appointing power under
fall under the rubric of “executive privilege” (the power the Constitution.
of the government to withhold info from the public, the
courts, the congress) it is only recognized in relation to
certain types of information of a sensitive character,
and it is inclined heavily against secrecy and in favor of
disclosure. Also, under section 21 of the Constitution
where the power of congress to compel the
appearance of executive officials under section 21 and
the lack of it under section 22 find their basis in the
principle of Separation of Powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of congress to legislate by refusing
to comply with its demands for information. In here,
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from
the executive branch, whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such
information on the ground that it is privileged, it must
so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it
must be respected. Therefore, in this case, the
Congress has a right to information from the executive
branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation.
Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 158088, July 6, 2005
Question:
Senator Jimin, Senator Boo, and a number of other
advocates and defenders of human rights filed a
petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.The
Philippines signed the Statute through Charge d'
Affairs Vernon H. Chwe of the Philippine Mission to the
United Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it
be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the
signatory states.
As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President
acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested
with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm
of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority
to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the
President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter
into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to
his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that "no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two- thirds of all the Members
of the Senate."
Will the petition for mandamus on whether the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate
the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of
the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even
without the signature of the President prosper?
Suggested Answer:
No, the petition will not prosper.
According to Sec. 21 Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution,
no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all the Members of the Senate.
However, in our system of government, the President,
being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ
and authority in external relations and is the country's
sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
country's mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs.
Hence, the President is vested with the authority to
deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations,
enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business
of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other
states.
Petitioners' submission that the Philippines is bound
under treaty law and international law to ratify the
treaty which it has signed is without basis. The
signature does not signify the final consent of the state
to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to
the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself
requires that the signature of the representatives of the
states be subject to ratification, acceptance or
approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act
by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a
treaty signed on its behalf, a state expresses its
willingness to be bound by the provisions of such
treaty. After the treaty is signed by the state's
representative, the President, being accountable to the
people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty
to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure
that they are not inimical to the interest of the state and
its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even
after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative whether or not to ratify the same.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution,
the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to
the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its
consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is
within the authority of the President to refuse to submit
a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent
for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the
refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been
signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be
taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of
the President alone, which cannot be encroached by
this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no
jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President
in the performance of his official duties. The Court,
therefore, cannot issue the writ o f mandamus prayed
for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to
compel the executive branch of the government to
transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.
Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 2 March
2001
Question:
President Nando M. Arcos got betrayed by his
longtime friend Congressman Alfie Romaldez after he
went on-air exposing President Arcos to have received
P2.5 billion illegal transfer of money from the drug
lords from October 2100 to November 2105, because
of this, the public went ballistic and called for his
immediate resignation as he had lost the moral
authority to govern. As a result teachers, students, and
government employees went out of their workplaces to
gather at SAED Boulevard that compelled Arcos to
resign and vacate the presidential palace that paved
the way for Vice-President Rob R. Edo to take oath as
the president administered by chief justice Macalimba
In a letter submitted to the Senate president and the
Speaker of the House of Representative recognizing
the oath taking of VP Edo despite his doubt and a year
later Arcos challenged the legitimacy of the presidency
of Edo by claiming that he did not resign from office,
but rather a president on leave as he had also
transmitted a written letter saying that he is unable to
discharge the duties and responsibilities as a president
appointing the Vice-President to become the Acting
President. Will the case of Arcos in challenging the
legitimacy of the presidency of Rob E. Edo prosper?
Why/Why not?
Answer:
No, the case of Arcos will not prosper. As provided in
the case of Estrada v. Arroyo the Supreme Court held
that the resignation of the former President Joseph E.
Estrada cannot be doubted because the act of leaving
the Malacanang already constituted his resignation,
moreover, in his press release and written letter
submitted to the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives he acknowledged the
oath-taking of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as president of
the Republic of the Philippines despite his doubts on
the legitimacy of her presidency.
In the case at bar, challenging the legitimacy of the
presidency of Rob R. Edo by Nando M. Arcos will not
prosper because Arcos despite his doubts recognized
the oath taken by his VP in a written letter submitted to
the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives as the sworn President of the
Republic which simply is the reason why his case will
not prosper before the court.
Arturo de Castro v. JBC, GR No. 191002,17 March
2010
Question:
Problems arise as Chief Justice Vice Ganda will retire
by 17 May 2025, 7 days after 2025 Presidential
Elections. President Nadine, considering Section 15,
Article VII, Executive Department, of the 1987
Constitution, has appointed a new Chief Justice that
would replace Chief Justice Ganda.
Does the incumbent President have the power to
appoint the next Chief Justice?
Answer:
Yes, the Incumbent President can appoint the next
Chief Justice. According to the case of De Castro v.
JBC, it has been emphasized that the prohibition under
section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments
to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the judiciary. As can be seen, Article
VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and,
among others, it lists the powers vested by the
Constitution in the President. Hence, President Nadine
can appoint the next Chief Justice.
Matibag v. Benipayo, GR No. 149036, April 2, 2002
Question
Mr. Hello Garci became the Chairman of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on the basis of
the ad interim appointment issued by President Glory.
However, the Commission on Appointment has not
acted on the merits of the appointment, hence by-
passing the ad interim appointment. The President
renewed the ad interim appointment of Mr. Hello Garci
as the Chairman of the COMELEC. Can the President
make such a renewal?
Answer
Yes, the President can renew the ad interim
appointment of Mr. Hello Garci as Chairman of the
Commission on Election. It was held by the Court in
Matibag v. Benipayo, a by-passed ad interim
appointment can be revived by a new ad interim
appointment because there is no final disapproval
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. In the
case at bar, Mr. Hello Garci’s ad interim appointment
was by-passed by the Commission on Appointments.
Having no final decision by the Commission on
Appointments to give or withhold its consent to the
appointment as required by the Constitution, President
Glory can renew Mr. Hello Garci’s appointment.
Gonzales III v. OP, G.R. No. 196231, 4 September
2012
Question:
John is a Deputy Ombudsman in the constitutionally-
created Office of the Ombudsman. He has been
involved in a disciplinary issue and there is a question
about whether the Office of the President has the
jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary
power over him.
Answer:
No, the Office of the President is not allowed to
exercise administrative disciplinary power over John, a
Deputy Ombudsman.
The decision in Gonzales III v. OP, G.R. No. 196231,
held that Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770,
which gives the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman, violates the independence of the
Office of the Ombudsman and is unconstitutional. It
was ruled that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to
discipline and removal by the President would place
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman at
risk.
In the case at bar, there is a question of jurisdiction to
exercise administrative disciplinary power of the
President over John. Section 8(2) Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6770 infringes on the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman as John is a Deputy Ombudsman
and is unconstitutional.
Hence, the Office of the President is not allowed to
exercise administrative disciplinary power over John, a
Deputy Ombudsman.
Nacino v. The Office of the Ombudsman, GR Nos.
234789-91, September 3, 2019
Question:
Last year, the President of the Philippines appointed
Mr. X to become the Chief of Philippine National
Police. Months later, Mr. X was on top of the
Mamasapano operation that killed 44 Special Action
Force (SAF) troopers. The tragedy resulted to
resignation of Mr. X in his position.
Question: If Mr. X did not resigned from his position
as the Chief of PNP, can the President of the
Philippines being the Chief Executive remove Mr. X
from his position? Explain.
Answer:
Yes, the President of the Philippines can remove Mr. X
from his position as Chief of the Philippine National
police. As provided in the Nacino v. The Office of the
Ombudsman, that the President is not the
Commander-in-Chief of the PNP. He is not the PNP
Commander-in-Chief because under the 1987
Constitution, the PNP is no longer part of the armed
forces. The President is only Commander-in-Chief in
relation to the armed forces.
The PNP, being a civilian agency, is not part of the
armed forces. In relation to the PNP, the President is
the Chief Executive, in the same way that he acts as
the Chief Executive to all the civilian agencies of the
Executive bureaucracy. Provided further, Section 17,
Article VII of the Philippines Constitution, “The
President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.”Being the Chief
Executive, the President has the power of control,
therefore, is not the source of the Executive's
disciplinary power over the person of his subordinates.
Rather, his disciplinary power flows from his power to
appoint: "the power to remove is inherent in the power
to appoint. In this case, the President of the Philippines
may exercised his power to remove Mr. X from his
position as the Chief of PNP
Sulit v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 196232, January 14, 2014
Question:
Ombudsman Dora was accountable for "gross
negligence and grave misconduct in handling the case
against Swiper” under Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770
wherein they failed to promptly resolve the said case
despite the number of pleas. Ombudsman Dora filed a
petition and questioned the constitutionality of Section
8 (2) of RA No. 6770 subject to her disciplinary
proceeding and which allowed the President to remove
the deputies. As a judge, how would you rule in this
case?
Answer:
As the judge, the petition is meritorious and to grant
Gonzales' petition to declare Section 8 (2) of RA No.
6770 unconstitutional. As ruled in the case of Sulit v.
Ochoa, Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional
with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman as it
directly intrudes upon the constitutionally-granted
independence. In the case of Dora, the petition should
be granted given that the law directly interferes with
the Constitution. Thus, The kind of independence
enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly
cannot be inferior — but is similar in degree and kind
— to the independence similarly guaranteed by the
Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since
all these offices fill the political interstices of a
republican democracy that are crucial to its existence
and proper functioning.
Kapunan, Jr. v. CA
G.R. Nos. 148213-17. March 13, 2009.
Question:
Ramos was charged with the murder of Kilusang Abril
Uno (KAU) Chairman Vic Orais. Ramos invoked
immunity from prosecution by reason of a general
grant of amnesty issued to him by President Fidel V.
Ramos. The Panel of the Department of Justice
refused to consider Ramos’ defense of amnesty as
such amnesty granted to him extends only to acts
constituting the crime of rebellion.
Is the Panel correct?
Answer:
Yes, the Panel is correct. A grant of amnesty issued by
the executive is not absolute. As was discussed in
Kapunan, Jr. v. CA, a grant of amnesty is only as far-
reaching as what it is certified for. In this problem,
Ramos’ grant of amnesty extends only to acts
constituting the crime of rebellion. As was further
explained in Kapunan, Jr. v. CA, it is incumbent upon
the petitioners to prove before the courts that the
murders were elemental to their commission or
attempted commission of the crime of rebellion. A
general averment is not sufficient. Since there was no
proving as to the instrumentality of the murder of Orais
to the commission of rebellion on Ramos’ end, Ramos
cannot invoke immunity from prosecution
notwithstanding his general grant of amnesty.
Sanlakas v. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656,
February 3, 2004
Question:
On November 10, 2023, 250 AFP members took arms
against the Philippine government, protesting the
corruption in the AFP. These men sought the
resignation of the existing president, defense
secretary, and the head of the PNP. Due to the
incident, the president issued Proclamation 123
declaring a state of rebellion and directing the PNP
and AFP to suppress the rebellion through General
Order No. 1. Members of Congress filed a petition
challenging the president's issuing of Proclamation
123 and General Order No. 1. The declaration of a
state of rebellion, according to the petitioners, is an
exercise of Congress' emergency powers,
undermining the latter's legislative power. Decide on
the case.
Suggested Answer:
The incumbent president has the authority to declare a
state of rebellion as Chief Executive vested with
executive power under Section 1 of Article VII of the
Constitution and commander-in-chief power under
Section 18 of the same article. In relation to the
President's commander-in-chief power, the Supreme
Court held in the case of Sanlakas v. Executive
Committee that the sole criterion for the President to
invoke its power to call out is that "whenever it
becomes necessary," the President may call the
armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion." In the case at bar, the act of
taking arms of the 250 members of the AFP against
the Phlippine government constitutes an actual
rebellion that endangers the public and its safety.
SSection 18 of Article VII does not prohibit the
president from declaring a state of rebellion, and such
an act is supported by the President's executive
power. Therefore, the president is merely exercising
the powers vested to her or him by the Constitution,
and on this grounds the petition must be dismissed.
Gudani v. Senga, August 15, 2006
Question:
Gon and Killua were directed by AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Hisoka, per instruction of Pres. Chrollo, not testify
before said Committee. On the very day of the hearing,
President Chrollo issued Executive Order No. 464
enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in
any legislative inquiry without her approval. However,
the two testified before the Senate, prompting Gen.
Hisoka to issue an order directing Gon and Killua to
appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal
General (OPMG) on 3 October 2005 for investigation.
The following day, Gen. Gon was compulsorily retired
from military service. After investigation, the OPMG
recommended that the two be charged with violation of
Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior
officer. Thus, Gon and Killua filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition seeking that the order of
President Chrollo be declared unconstitutional. Will the
petitioner’s complaint prosper?
Suggested Answer:
No, the complaint will not prosper. Article VII, Section
18 of the Constitution provides that “The President
shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” In
view of this provision, the President may prevent a
member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry as she has constitutional authority to
do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-chief,
and that as a consequence a military officer who defies
such injunction is liable under military justice.
Therefore, the exigencies of military discipline and the
chain of command mandate that the President's ability
to control the individual members of the armed forces
be accorded the utmost respect
Kulayan v. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012
Question:
The governor of the province of Caub has formed a
special task force from the PNP for the sole purpose of
liberating people under threats of an alleged rebel
group. Due to the recent kidnappings perpetrated by
the said rebel group. Declaring a state of emergency,
In the city it proclaimed that for security purposes the
task force will conduct the following; 1. The setting-up
of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province, 2. The
imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to
such Guidelines as may be issued by proper
authorities, 3. The conduct of General Search and
Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the
kidnappers and their supporters, 4. To conduct such
other actions or police operations as may be
necessary to ensure public safety. The governor stated
that it is aligned with the Section 465 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows
on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder and lawless violence. Are the
actions taken by the governor valid and constitutional?
Why or why not?
Suggested answer:
No, the actions taken by the governor is invalid and
unconstitutional. The actions taken are in violation of
Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which
grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief
executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of
the armed forces. In the case of Kulayan v. Tan, it
stated that section 465 above, as the said provision
expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether
man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief
executive of the province, is certainly empowered to
enact and implement emergency measures during
these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the
case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a
disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring
the case.
under this provision to justify their actions. second , Given the legal precedent set by the Ampatuan case, it
there was no evidence or even an allegation on record can be concluded that the President’s deployment of
that the local police forces were inadequate to cope the military without congressional authorization is
with the situation or apprehend the violators. If they justifiable under the Constitutional Authority as
were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial Commander-in-Chief.
governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government, or such other Fortun, et al. v. Gloria Macapagal- Arroyo, GR No.
authorized officials, for the assistance of national law 190293, 20 March 2012
enforcement agencies. The Local Government Code
does not involve the diminution of central powers Heavily armed men believed led by the Yeagerists
inherently vested in the National Government, Overall Liberation Organization (YOLO) gunned down
especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the and buried under shoveled dirt 99 innocent civilians. In
Constitution to the President in matters of security and response to this carnage, President Mikasa issued
defense in this case similarly the grounds of Presidential Proclamation 1900 declaring a state of
kidnapping in forming the task force is invalid and emergency on Paradis Island, Philippines.
unconstitutional due to the fact that only the president
has the sole authority to do such a thing. The next day, President Mikasa issued Presidential
Proclamation 1910 declaring martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
Ampatuan v. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011
on Paradis Island. 2 days after, the President
Question
submitted her report to Congress where on the same
In a Southeast Asian country, a tragic incident
day, Congress convened in joint session to review the
unfolded on December 15, 2022, leading to a
validity of the President’s action. But a day after,
significant loss of life, including journalists. In response
before Congress could act, the President issued
to this event, the President issued a proclamation
Presidential Proclamation 1920, lifting martial law and
declaring a state of emergency in specific provinces
restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
and a city, directing the armed forces and police to
Petitioner Theo Magath brought the present actions to
take measures to prevent and suppress lawless
challenge the constitutionality of Presidential
violence. Local officials contested these actions,
Proclamation 1910. Can the petitioner still challenge
asserting violations of constitutional principles. Did the
the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1910 after it
President's deployment of the military without
has been promptly lifted by the President?
congressional authorization violated constitutional
principles regarding the use of emergency powers?
Suggested Answer:
No, the petitioner cannot challenge the constitutionality
Answer:
of Proclamation No. 1910. In a similar case of Fortun v
No, the President’s deployment without the
Arroyo, the court ruled that the lifting of martial law and
authorization of congress did not violate the
restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
constitutional principles regarding emergency powers.
in Maguindanao was a supervening event that
In the case of Ampatuan v. Puno, the SC clarified the
obliterated any justiciable controversy. Analogous to
President’s deployment of the military without
the case at hand, President Mikasa lifted the martial
congressional authorization as permissible provided
law proclamation that ceased the controversy for the
that there is factual evidence of lawless violence as
court to review. Thus, the challenge to the
established by the Commander-in-Chief powers under
constitutionality of a proclamation of martial law
section 18, of Article VII of the Constitution which
promptly lifted by the President is invalid.
states “The President shall be the Commander-in-
Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and
whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion…”
The President of the Southeast Asian country issued a
proclamation declaring a state of emergency and
directing armed forces and police to take measures to
prevent and suppress lawless constitutes as a valid
exercise of presidential powers.
Lagman v. Medialdea, July 4, 2017, G.R. No. 231658
Question:
A group of Congressmen contested Proclamation No.
216, which declared martial law in the Mindanao area,
as unconstitutional. They claimed that the
proclamation violated the 1987 Constitution by
suspending the right to writ of habeas corpus and that
it was made without a proper factual basis.
Is the Proclamation No. 216, declaring martial law in
Mindanao, constitutional considering the arguments
raised by the group of congressmen?
Answer:
Proclamation No. 216 is constitutional, the President
has sufficient factual basis to believe that the rebellion
in Mindanao posed a threat to public safety and order.
The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is
justified, it is necessary to prevent the escape of
suspects and to ensure the success of the military
operations. Limitations however are that it cannot be
used to suppress dissent or target political opponents
and to report to Congress on the progress of martial
law and to lift it once the threat to public safety had
been eliminated
Lagman v. Pimentel, GR Nos. 235935, 236061,
236145, 236155, February 6, 2018
Question:
Proclamation No. 216, signed by President Berto
Bulerte on May 23, 2017, suspended the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus and declared martial law
over Mindanao for a maximum of sixty days. After
then, the President asked Congress to extend
Proclamation No. 216's effective date until December
31, 2017, and the Congress granted his request by
passing Resolution of Both Houses No. 2. The
President asked for a one-year extension again on
December 8, 2017.
Is the extensions of Proclamation No. 216 and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus constitutionally valid?
Answer:
The extensions of Proclamation No. 216 and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is constitutionally valid. The Congress is
empowered under the Constitution to determine how
long these extensions will last. The idea that the 60-
day restriction can be inferred from the language of the
Constitution is rejected by the Court. The President's
belief that there was a real insurrection was supported
by enough factual evidence, which allowed
Proclamation No. 216 to be issued.
Saguisag v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January 12,
2016
QUESTION:
An executive agreement was executed between the
Philippines and USA. Desiring to enhance their military
capabilities and promote peace, the Philippines and
USA have reached the following agreement.
The executive agreement pertains to the cooperation
of the parties in the areas of:
1. Joint Training Exercises: The Parties shall conduct
joint military training exercises to enhance their
respective military operational capabilities
2. Access to Military Facilities: The Parties may grant
each other access to military facilities for purposes
of joint exercises, training, and logistical support,
subject to the laws and regulations of the host
country.
The Senate of the Philippines took upon itself to
procure a certified true copy of the Executive
Agreement and, after exhaustive deliberation, took a
unanimous vote, and declared that the said agreement
was against the best interests of the country. Is the
Executive Agreement binding in terms of Philippine
law?
ANSWER:
Yes. The Executive Agreement is binding. According
to the case of Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern
Sea Trading; Executive Agreements are defined as
international agreements embodying adjustments of
detail carrying out well-established national policies
and traditions and those involving arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature.
The role of the President as the executor of the law
includes the duty to defend the State, for which
purpose he may use that power in the conduct of
foreign relations. The President, however, may enter
into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that
allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to implement an
existing law or treaty
Therefore, the executive agreement does not need the
Senate's concurrence. As an executive agreement, it
remains consistent with existing laws and treaties that
it purports to implement. It remains consistent with
existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.
Esmero v. Duterte, GR No. 256288, June 29, 2021
Q: Atty. Chavez seeks the issuance of a writ of
mandamus to compel the President of the Philippines
to comply with his constitutional duty to defend the
national territory, that includes the West Philippine
Sea, against Chinese incursions. The petitioner
contends that it is the President's ministerial obligation,
as part of his mission to execute the laws and ensure
their faithful execution, to defend the national territory
by petitioning the United Nations (UN) to send UN
Patrol Boats to protect our fishermen. Will the petition
prosper? Explain.
A: No. the petition will not prosper.
In the case of Esmero v. Duterte, the President is
immune from suit during his incumbency, regardless of
the nature of the suit filed against him. Mandamus can
only be used to compel the performance of a pre-
existing duty, not to control discretion. The President
has the exclusive authority to conduct foreign relations,
but this power must be exercised within the context
and parameters set by the constitution and existing
domestic and international laws.
In the case given, the President as the sole
organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally
assigned chief architect of our foreign policy, he is
vested with the exclusive power to conduct and
manage the country’s interface with other states and
governments. Such power is discretionary and not
ministerial. As the Head of State, he has the authority
to make decisions based on his own judgment, and he
is responsible to his country in his political role and to
his own conscience. The President has executive
power under the Constitution, which includes the duty
to implement the law, safeguard the Philippines, and
manage foreign affairs. Also, the president is immuned
from suit while he is the acting President.
Hence, the petition will not prosper.
David, et al. v. Macapagal-Arroyo
GR 171396 | May 3, 2006
Question:
The government is currently grappling with
widespread lawless violence and rebellion perpetrated
by both extreme left and extreme right factions across
the Philippines, with the aim of destabilizing the
government. In response to this crisis, President Emz
has issued Presidential Proclamation 123, officially
declaring a state of national emergency. In exercising
her authority, she has invoked the power to call upon
the military to assist in quelling the lawless violence
and rebellion. However, a group of citizens is
contesting the constitutionality of Presidential
Proclamation 123, contending that the President
cannot declare a national emergency without the
explicit approval of Congress. Is the Presidential
Proclamation, without the explicit approval of Congress
and calling out the military to aid the President in
suppressing lawless violence and rebellion,
unconstitutional?
Answer:
No, Presidential Proclamation 123 is not
unconstitutional. As for the approval of Congress, in
line with the precedent set by the Court in the case of
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the court ruled that the
President, in this case, President Arroyo, possesses
the authority to declare a state of national emergency
even in the absence of a Congressional enactment. As
for the constitutionality of calling out powers of the
President, Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
empowers the President to call upon the armed forces
whenever necessary to prevent or suppress instances
of lawless violence, invasion, and rebellion. In the case
at bar, the widespread occurrences of lawless violence
and rebellion by extreme left and extreme right factions
throughout the Philippines provide a justifiable basis
for the President's invocation of her powers to call out
the military. Consequently, the proclamation is in
accordance with constitutional provisions, ensuring the
effective suppression of lawlessness and rebellion.
Hence, Presidential Proclamation 123 is not
unconstitutional.
Lim v. Commission On Elections and Joseph Delective office, the focal point of this controversy. It is
Ejercito Estrada, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015 to be understood that President Hipolito’s grant of
Question: pardon in question that declared the former’s
Ricardo Nazareno was the former President of the restoration of his civil and political rights substantially
Republic of Maharlika in 2022 and decided to run in complies with the requirement of express restoration.
the 2025 midterm elections by way of filing a certificate Hence, the wording of the pardon, as abovementioned,
of candidacy for the position of representative for the extended to former President Estrada is, beyond
3rd District of the City of Manila. But it was cut short as doubt, complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
the Sandiganbayan filed charges against him for the
crime of plunder with the penalty of reclusion perpetua It is well-entrenched that where the words of a statute
and accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be
period of sentence and perpetual absolute given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
disqualification. Yet, just a few weeks after that, interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From
President Jekyll Hipolito, granted an executive the words of a statute, there should be no departure.
clemency unto Nazareno by way of a pardon which
restored his civil and political rights. This is evidenced
Estrada vs. Desierto, GR Nos. 146710-15, April 3,
by the words “In view hereof and under the authority
2001
conferred upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant
Question:
executive clemency to Ricardo Nazareno... He is
Mr. Z was elected President of the Philippines on
hereby restored to his civil and political rights.” The
2016 Presidential Election, after more than two years
latter then proceeded to run as a district representative
in service, several anomalies and issues of corruption
to which he was duly elected. His victory did not go
surfaced that directly linked him to the controversies.
unchallenged, however, as Goryo Agila filed a petition
Widespread protest and call for Pres. Z’s resignation
for disqualification on the ground that the latter is
was blaring. Due to the extreme pressure happening
disqualified to run for public office because of his
around him, on November 9, 2018, he evacuated
conviction for plunder, relying on Section 40 of the
Malacanang Palace and claimed afterwards that he
Local Government Code (LGC), concerning Section 12
was just actually on leave. The incumbent Vice-
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). COMELEC
President Mr. X took oath as the new President on the
dismissed the petition and held that Nazareno’s right to
same day. Subsequently, Mr. Z faced a plunder case,
seek public office had been effectively restored by the
he uses absolute immunity from suit as his defense,
pardon vested upon him by President Hipolito. In
since his term still ends by June 30, 2022. Is Mr. Z
response, Agila claimed that COMELEC committed
correct in claiming absolute immunity from suit as his
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
defense on the plunder case, believing that his term
of jurisdiction in dismissing his petition.
will still be up to June 30, 2022?
If you were the judge deciding on the case at bar, what
Answer:
would be your ruling?
Mr. Z is not correct.
In the case of Estrada v. Desierto the Supreme Court
Suggested Answer:
held that a non-sitting President, cannot claim
If I were a judge deciding on the case at bar, I would
executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
rule in favor of COMELEC and against Agila.
committed as sitting President. His stance that his
immunity covers his entire term of office disregards the
The arguments posited by Agila are insufficient to
reality that he has relinquished the presidency and
prove that the assailed COMELEC decision was
there is now a new de jure President.
issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise
In the case at bar, Mr. Z also was ousted on the day
of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to
he left the Malacanang Palace the seat of presidency
perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so
and on the same day a new President took an Oath of
“patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of
Office replacing Mr. Z. In effect, Mr. Z was no longer a
discretion.
sitting President of the Philippines and loss all the
privileges that attaches to the Office of the President,
Former President Nazareno was granted an absolute
including absolute immunity from suit that he invoked
pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
as his defense to his plunder case in the Office of the
rights, which naturally included the right to seek public
Ombudsman.
Therefore, Mr. Z is not correct in claiming absolute
immunity from suit as his
Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March 17,
2010, April 20, 2010
The current chief justice is scheduled to retire 10 days
before the next presidential election. Can the president
still appoint the successor of the retiring chief justice,
provided that Section 15, Article VII of the constitution
prohibits a President or Acting President from making
appointments two months before the next presidential
election?
Suggested answer:
Yes, the president can still appoint a chief justice
despite the prohibition. The prohibition under Sec. 15,
Article 7 in the Constitution does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
Article 8 of the constitution is dedicated to the Judicial
Department and defines the duties and qualifications
of Members of the Supreme Court, among others.
Section 4, article 8 mandates the President to fill the
vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the
vacancy.
Therefore, the president may still appoint a successor
of the chief justice.
Constantino v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October
13, 2005
Question;
Thus the President Has the right to exercise his
borrowing powers to have a loan to other countries?
Answer:
Yes. There is no question that the president has
borrowing powers and that the President may contract
or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of this country
with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes
no distinction whatsoever, and the fact that a debt or a
loan may be onerous is irrelevant.
Suggested Answer:
The crux of the matter lies in whether Executive Order
No. 2023, which establishes the Anti-Corruption
Investigative Commission (ACIC), infringes upon the
legislative power of Congress.
Drawing inspiration from Biraogo, the Supreme Court
would likely consider the inherent authority of the
President to conduct investigations, including the
creation of fact-finding bodies. The Court would
reference Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution,
which imposes on the President the duty to ensure the
faithful execution of laws. This provision could be
invoked to justify the creation of the ACIC as a means
for the President to address concerns about corruption
within the government.
However, the Court may also scrutinize the specific
language and scope of Executive Order No. 2023. If
the order explicitly targets a particular administration or
group, similar to the issues in Biraogo, concerns about
the equal protection clause may arise. The Court
would likely emphasize the need for impartiality and
fairness in investigations, cautioning against any
appearance of singling out specific individuals or
entities without just cause.
In summary, while the President has the authority to
establish investigative bodies, the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 2023 would hinge on the order's
language, scope, and its adherence to principles of
fairness. The Court may uphold the President's
authority to address corruption but could strike down
specific provisions of the order if they raise
constitutional concerns, particularly those related to
equal protection.

Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R.

No. 192935, December 7, 2010
Situation:
In response to rising public concerns about corruption,
newly elected President Maria Rodriguez issued
Executive Order No. 2023 on August 15, 2023,
establishing the Anti-Corruption Investigative
Commission (ACIC). The ACIC is tasked with
investigating alleged cases of corruption within the
government. A concerned citizen, Carlos Mendoza,
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
2023, arguing that it violates the legislative power of
Congress to create public offices and appropriate
funds. Evaluate the constitutional issues raised by
Carlos Mendoza and discuss the potential implications
of the Supreme Court's ruling.
Gonzales v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 196231, January 28,
2014
QUESTION:
Manila Police District Senior Inspector Cardo Dalisay
and four others faced charges such as robbery, grave
threat, robbery, extortion, and physical injury. Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales directed NAPOLCOM to
provide records of Dalisay's case, approving a
decision that found them guilty of grave misconduct
and imposed dismissal. However, before the
Ombudsman's final decision, Dalisay hijacked a tourist
bus, leading to his death and casualties. The Office of
the President instructed the Department of Justice and
the Department of the Interior and Local Government
to investigate. An Incident Investigation and Review
Committee (IIRC) later found the Ombudsman and
Gonzales accountable for gross negligence and
misconduct, dismissing them from service.
However, Dalisay petitioned that the OP has no
jurisdiction to exercise administrative power under
Section 8 (2) RA 6670 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989
which states that a deputy may be removed from office
by the President for any of the grounds provided for
the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due
process.
Does the Office of the President have jurisdiction to
exercise administrative power over a Deputy
Ombudsman ?
ANSWER:
No. Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 is unconstitutional
because it violates the core constitutional principle of
the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman as
expressed in Section 5, Art XI of the Constitution which
states that:
“Section 5, Art XI
There is hereby created the independent Office of the
Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be
known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at
least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed.”
Therefore, subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to
discipline and removal by the President, whose
officials are under the Ombudsman's authority, poses
a significant risk to the independence of the
Ombudsman's office as it prejudices the power of the
Ombudsman to conduct an admin investigation.
Bayan v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000)
Question:
The President of the Philippines, through the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, ratified a treaty with the nation of
Wakanda. After its ratification, it was then officially
transmitted to the Senate for concurrence wherein the
Senate gave its concurrence with two-thirds of the
vote. The treaty was called out by respondents after
foreign troops from Wakanda were present in the
country of the Philippines. Respondents questioned
the validity of the treaty and also claimed that the
President acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
ratified the treaty. Is the power to ratify treaties lodged
with the Senate?
Answer:
No, ratification is generally held to be an executive act,
undertaken by the head of the state, through which the
formal acceptance of a treaty is proclaimed. Hence,
the power to ratify the treaty is vested in the President
and not in the legislature. The role of the Senate is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification, in accordance with the
principle of a healthy system of checks and balances.
However, per the principle of separation of powers,
into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude,
and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Similar to
the case of Bayan v. Zamora, wherein the president
also entered a treaty with the United States, the
president has the power to ratify treaties and it is the
job of the executive branch to do so.
 Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes GR No. Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
180771, April 21, 2015 to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
Question: demand that he act personally, the multifarious
Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Marine executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Guardians" in the petition, are the toothed whales, Executive are performed by and through the executive
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
which inhabit the waters in and around the Tupaba departments, performed and promulgated in the
Strait. They are joined by Juana and Petra as their regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
legal guardians and as friends (to be collectively reprobated by the Chief Executive presumably the acts
known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize of the Chief Executive.
with, and seek the protection of, the aforementioned
marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-
petitioner is former President Gabriela, for her express
declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to
protect the Tupaba Strait, among others. On June 13,
2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting
through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey
and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with APEX.
This contract involved geological and geophysical
studies of the Tupaba Strait. The studies included
surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of
seismic and magnetic data. APEX, assisted by DOE,
also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as
well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait.

On December 21, 2004, DOE and APEX formally

converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration,
development, and production of petroleum resources
in a block covering approximately 2,850 square
kilometers offshore the Tupaba Strait. APEX
committed to drill one exploration well during the
second sub-phase of the project. On March 6, 2007,
the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the
DOE and APEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration
project in Tupaba Strait. Months later, on November
16, 2007, APEX began to drill an exploratory well, with
a depth of 3,150 meters, near San Nicolas town in the
western Cebu Province. This drilling lasted until
February 8, 2008. The petitioners insist that SC-46 is
null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution.

As the alter ego of the President, was Service

Contract No. 46 validly entered to by the DOE
Secretary?

Suggested Answer:
NO, the DOE Secretary cannot validly enter into a
Service Contract involving the exploration of
petroleum. The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency-
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Contributors

JAN MOISES ALARCON FRANZ MOUR MAGHINAY

JEAN SYVEL AMISTAD KATHERINE MAPULA
MIKAELA GOLDEN BAEL JUSTINE ANNE MENDOZA
JONALYN BANGALISAN RAYMOND MORALES
JEMIMAH BANZA JEAN PAUL OGARIO
JCJ BARRERA PIA ANTONI PAQUIBOT
CARYL ANNE BELTRAN MICHELLE PASTOR
STEPHANY JEN BULANTE MARTHA CECILIA QUERO
CHRISTINE CABREJAS CHRISTINE QUISTADIO
DICK CYRIL CALAYAG JUPERT REMOLLO
ALTHEIA THEREZ CELIS RUFINO NINO REQUINA
MARTIN FELIP COLIFLORES THEA THERESE ROQUE
EDRALPH DABUET ANDREA BLAIR SABINAY
GUERRERO DAJAO VALERIE SABUERO
RADIN JOY DAJAO JOANE LARISSA TAPNIO
ALFE DARO KENT BRYAN TORRES
SERGE RAMIE ENRIQUEZ NOEL TUNACAO
RYAN JUANITO GARCIA JOSHUA YBAÑEZ
CHARISSE HAZEL GO CHARLES EARL YCOT
SAMANTHA MACARIOLA