FULL NAME: Clement Wendo

REGISTRATION NO: LLB/4522/22

COURSE Instructor. Orina

COURSE NAME: Public International Law

TASK: Continuous Assessment Test

DATE DUE:17th November 23

 (a) Why were the acts of the demonstrators not attributed to the Iranian government in
the first phase?

As a general rule, the conduct of private individuals or entities is not attributable to

the state under International Law. Therefore, the only conduct attributable to the state at the
international level is that of its organs of government, or of others who have acted under the
direction, or control of those organs, that is the agents of the states.1 In the Home Missionary
Society Claim, the tribunal dismissed the claim by the US that Britain was in breach of duty
to maintain order leading to the loss of life and property. It went ahead to state that a
government should not be held responsible for the acts of rebels that have been committed in
breach of its own authority.2

In the Tehran case, during the first phase, the militants had executed their attack as
private individuals who had no any form of official status as recognized agents of the Iranian
State. As such, their conduct of instigating the attack, overrunning the embassy and seizing
the embassy could not be attributed to the state.3 Prior to the November 4th attack, there had
been a prior attack on the embassy on 14th February 1979. After acting swiftly and retuning
control of the embassy to American Diplomatic Officials, the Iranian government, through
the prime minister had expressed regrets for the attacks, made arrangements to prevent future
attacks and also was prepared to make reparations to the US. From the prior conduct of the
government, the militants were acting in breach of the authority of the state and as such, the
government of Iran was not liable for their activities.

(b) How could Iran violate its responsibilities during the first phase if it was not liable
for the actions of the demonstrators?

Although the state of Iran was not imputable for the attacks on the US Embassy on 4th
November 1979 and of the subsequent consulates, the principle of “pacta sunt servanda”
imposed an obligation on Iran to the U.S as a party to the treaties.4 As the receiving state, Iran
was under the obligation to protect the US Embassy and Consulates, their staffs, archives,
their means of communication and the staff’s freedom of movement.5 It was Iran’s duty to
1
United Nations, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Chapter II, Attribution of Conduct to a State, Article 2.
2
Home Missionary Society Claim (USA V Great Britain) 1920 6 RIAA 42.
3
United States of America v Iran [1980] ICJ 1
4
Vienna convention on the law of treaties, article 26.
5
United States of America v Iran [1980] ICJ 1 para 61.
take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any form of intrusion
or damage as per the convention.6 As the receiving state, Iran was under the obligation to
protect diplomatic agents and to prevent any attacks on their person, freedom or dignity.7The
archives and the documents of a diplomatic mission were also to be protected by the
receiving state. Subsequently, the Vienna convention of 1963 also imposed a duty on Iran to
take all appropriate steps to protect the consular premises from any form of intrusion or
damage.8 Iran had further obligations in the Vienna Convention of 1963 under articles
40,33,28,34 and 35.
According to the ICJ, the obligations were not only contractual obligations but also
obligations under the general International Law. Therefore, in the Tehran case, the conduct of
the Iranian authorities on 4th November 1979 of failing to render help amidst frequent calls
for help was not as a result of lack of appropriate means. It is established in the case that on
14th February 1979, the Revolutionary guards and the prime minister had freed the
ambassador and his staff after an armed attack on the US embassy which had led to a hostage
situation. Subsequently, the prime Minister had expressed deep regret for the incident and had
given assurance that necessary arrangements had been made to prevent future incidents. He
also expressed the willingness of the government of Iran to make reparations to the United
States of America.
Prior to the 4th November incident, Iranian police had intervened quickly on 1st
November to quell the protests outside the US embassy. Other attempted invasions of other
foreign embassies in Tehran in November 1979 and January 1980 had been thwarted by the
Iranian authorities successfully. Subsequent attacks on the US consulates in February 1979
had been thwarted by the Iranian authorities successfully. It is also established that similar
attacks on consulates in Kemshah on 5th November 1979 had been successfully thwarted and
the premises returned to their rightful owners.
Despite the promises by the Iranian authorities and despite the countless, frequent
calls for help, the Iranian forces took no apparent steps to prevent the militants from invading
or to persuade and compel them to withdraw. Therefore, the inaction of the Iranian
government constituted a breach of its obligations under the Vienna conventions of 1961 and
1963.
Therefore, on the 4th of November 1979;
(i) The Iranian authorities were fully aware of their obligations, under the
conventions in force between the two states, to protect the premises of the US
embassy and its diplomatic and consular staff from any attacks, and from any
infringement of their inviolability and to ensure the security of such other
persons as may be present on the said premises
(ii) Iranian authorities were fully aware, as a result of the countless and frequent
calls for help made by the US Embassy, of the urgent need for action on their
part.

6
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 22(2).
7
‘Ibid’, Article 29.
8
‘Ibid’, Article 31(3).
 (iii) The Iranian government had the means to perform their obligations. This is
evidenced by the incidents of 14th February 1979 and 5th November 1979,
where Iranian authorities successfully recovered the US Embassy and the
foreign consulate from the militants respectively.
(iv) The Iranian authorities completely failed to comply with the obligations
imposed by the conventions to which the two countries were signatories. This
is evidenced by the aforementioned reasons of inaction despite calls for help,
inaction despite having the means and the fact that on 5th November 1979, the
authorities were able to successfully free a consulate from the militants and
return it to the rightful owners.
In conclusion, the Islamic Republic of Iran was responsible for its failure to take
sufficient action to prevent the seizure or to bring it to an immediate end.
(c) Why did the court conclude that Iran was internationally liable for the activities that
took place on the second phase? Which provision of the ILC’s articles on state
responsibility is of relevance?
As a general rule, the status of a person or body as a state organ, or its mandate to act on
behalf of the state are established at the time of the alleged wrongful act. However, as an
exception to this general rule, conduct which was subsequently acknowledged and adopted
by the state as its own is also attributable to the state.9 Also, it is a general rule that the
conduct of a person or a group of persons not acting on behalf of the state is not considered
an act of the state under international law. However, the conduct is to be considered an act of
the state if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question
as its own.10
In the present case, it was established that the acts of the militants were not imputable to
the state on the first instance because the militants were not acting as agents of the state and
that the acts could only be imputable to the state if the militants were acting as agents of the
state. It was expressly stated as follows;
Their conduct might be considered as itself directly imputable to the Iranian State only if
it were established that, in fact, on the occasion in question the militants acted on behalf of
the state, having been charged by some competent organ of the of the Iranian State to carry
out a specific operation. The information before the court does not, however, suffice to
establish with the requisite certainty the existence at that time of such a link between the
militants and any competent organ of the state.11

In the second instance, Iran was held to internationally liable in accordance with
article 11 of the ILC’s draft articles. The article stipulates that the conduct of persons or
groups of persons which is not attributable to the state shall be considered an act of the state

9
United Nations, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries' (2001) Attribution of Conduct to a State Article 11, commentary (1).

10
‘Ibid’, Article 11.
11
United States of America v Iran [1980] ICJ 1 para 58 p30.
under international law if and to the extent that the state acknowledges and adopts the
conduct in question as its own.12
Even after failing to take adequate steps as stipulated in the Vienna conventions of
1961 and 1963, there was an expression of approval of the take-over of the embassy and of
the Consulates at Tabriz and Shiraz by militants from numerous Iranian authorities including
religious, judicial, executive, police and broadcasting authorities. The most notable of them
all was the endorsement by the Ayatollah Khomeini. The decree by the Ayatollah amounted to
a decree by the state which expressly approved and maintained the situation. The court stated
as follows on the issue:
“The policy thus announced by the Ayatollah Khomeini, of maintaining occupation of
the embassy and the detention of its inmates as hostages for the purpose of exerting pressure
on the United States Government was complied with by other Iranian authorities and
endorsed by them repeatedly in statements made in various contexts. The result of that policy
was to transform the legal nature of the situation created by the occupation of the embassy
and the detention of its diplomatic and consular staff as hostages. The approval given to these
facts by the Ayatollah Khomeini and other organs of the Iranian State, and the decision to
perpetuate them, translated continuing occupation of the embassy and detention of the
hostages into acts of the state.”13
As the leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini’s declaration of endorsing acts of the
militants made them agents of the state. As such, the court established that the agents were
being used to compel the Government of the USA to comply with the orders of the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

12
‘Supra n9’

13
‘Supra n11’, p.36 para 74.