Meaning of Psychoanalytic Concepts and Confirmation of Psychoanalytic Theories

Author(s): Else Frenkel-Brunswik

Source: The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 79, No. 5 (Nov., 1954), pp. 293-300
Published by: American Association for the Advancement of Science
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 Method
and Scientific
Psychoanalysis
These four articles-by Else Frenkel-Brunswik,B. F. Skinner, Jerome Richfield, and Michael
Scriven-are based by the authors on papers read by them in the symposiumon "Psychoanalysis
and scientificmethod" that comprised the third part of the five-partconference in the general
subject Validation of ScientificTheories held in Boston, Massachusetts, in December 1953. Prof.
H. Feigl of the Universityof Minnesota was chairman for the symposium.
The papers for the firsttwo parts, on "Reasons for the acceptance of scientifictheories" and
"The presentstate of operationalism,"appeared in the September and October issues. Those for
the remainingparts, on "Organism and machine" and "Science as a social and historical phe-
nomenon" will appear in subsequent issues.

Conceptsand
Meaningof Psychoanalytic
of Psychoanalytic
Confirmation Theories*
ELSE FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK

The author taught and has done research in psychology at the Universityof
Vienna, where she received her Ph.D., and more recentlyat the Universityof
California in Berkeley. Her training at Vienna included philosophy of science.
For the current academic year she is a fellow of the newly established Center
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Menlo Park, California.

FREUD'S ideas in the sphereof personalityinclude indirection; Einstein (2) speaks of "the
at firstarouseda clamorof protestthat has ever-widening logical gap" between observation
neverentirely subsided.Once theinitialshock and basic concepts or laws. According to Hempel
ensuingfromFreud's discoverieshad been over- (3), it is precisely the "fictitious concepts rather
come, however, the scrutinies of the system ap- than those fully definable by observables" that
pear to be concernedmore with its formal or enable science to proceed to explanation and pre-
methodologicalcharacteristicsthan with its con- diction.
tent.Thus we hear of the alleged subjectivismor A comparison between the situation in physics
animism of psychoanalysis,of its confusionof hypo- and in psychoanalysisis certainlynot in all respects
theses and facts, or of the nonverifiabilityof its justified. However, modern physics and psycho-
hypotheses. analysis have in common a turning away from
Many of the objections against psychoanalysis the "natural" to a "fictitious" language. And the
have their origin in an overly narrow interpreta- common result of this policy is that a wider and
tion of scientific empiricism or of operationism, simpler network of interrelationshipswithin ob-
and generally in a vaguely antitheoreticalattitude. servable data is, ultimately being achieved. The
Since it is the physical sciences that are usually fact that theoretical constructs, such as "uncon-
taken as the ideal model of scientifictheory con- sciousness," "id," "superego," or "repression," refer
struction and of operational procedure, certain only indirectly,and not completely at that, to ob-
fundamental changes in the conception of theoreti- servable data must thereforenot be made the basis
cal structurethat have taken place in the field of of an objection against psychoanalysis as such. It
physics itself must be taken into consideration. may De helpful in the early stages of discovery to
Philipp Frank (1) points out that the earlier ultra- designate certain patterns of behavior in terms of
positivistic requirement, according to which all the special and relativelyfixed classificationslisted.
principles of physicsshould be formulatedby using Today many of the earlier statements of psycho-
only observable qualities, has been broadened to analysis may be reformulatedin termsof behavioral

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patterns in such a manner that the facets of be- sion or dependenceunderspecifiedconditions,for
havior connected with the more genuinelybiologi- example,in therapy.In his definition of behavior
cal and instinctual processes-the id-are differ- Carnap (6) has expresslyincluded "dispositions
entiated from those that are the result of cultural to behaviorwhichmay not be manifestin a given
and parental commands and taboos the superego. mustagreewithFreud
special case." We therefore
Whereas in Europe the most importantfunction thatit is the veryassumptionof unconsciousproc-
of logical positivism was to stress the necessity of to take its place
esses that enables psychoanalysis
relating existing theories to empirical data, in this as "a natural science like any other" (7). He goes
country, and especially in the case of the social on to explain that these processesare "in them-
sciences, its major function seems to be the ad- selves just as unknowableas those dealt with by
vocacy of the formation of, and a tolerance for, othersciencessuch as physicsand chemistry." And
theoryper se. he remainsin the spiritof the natural sciences
With regard to the definitionof basic concepts, when he stressesthat "it is possible to establish
some critics of psychoanalysishave objected to an the laws whichthoseprocessesobey and to follow
alleged lack of sophistication in Freud concerning over long and unbrokenstretches theirmutualre-
the philosophy of science and to his tendency to lation and interdependences" (p. 36).
"reify" his concepts. Actually Freud, in contrastto Originallythe conceptsof consciousand uncon-
some of his followers,was keenly aware of logical scious signifyparticular "systems"possessed of
and epistemological problems. Definitions in sci- certaindynamiccharacteristics, callingfora speci-
ence, he maintains (4, p. 60 f), ficationof theirrelationshipswithinthe over-all
formalmodel.When dreamsor subsequentfreeas-
. . . are in the nature of conventions;although
everythingdepends on their being chosen in no
sociationsare used, thisis done for the establish-
arbitrarymanner,but determinedby the important ment of intermediate linksthat can be insertedin
relationstheyhave to the empiricalmaterial-re- the gap betweenthe two systemsand that help to
lationsthatwe seem to divinebeforewe can clearly recoverthe latentmaterialin a processof inter-
recognizeand demonstrate them.... Progressively pretation.Obviouslyto avoid confusionconcern-
we mustmodifytheseconceptsso thattheybecome ing mentalistic reification,
Freud suggests"employ-
widelyapplicable and at the same time consistent ing for the recognized mental systemscertain
logically.Then, indeed,it may be time to immure arbitrarilychosen names." But since he cannot
them in definitions.. . . The science of physics ignoreconsciousnessas the commonpoint of de-
furnishesan execellentillustrationof the way in parture,he proposesto use the abbreviationCs
which even those "basic concepts"that are firmly
establishedin the formof definitions
are constantly
(forconsciousness)and Ucs (fortheuncounscious)
being alteredin theircontent. when the two words are used in the systematic
sense.
Most clinical descriptions found in Freud em- Only in Freud's later writingsdoes the term
ploy the inferentialconstructof the "unconscious." "unconscious"take on a distinctreference to men-
Freud considers the assumption of unconsciousness tal qualities.One of the chiefreasonsforthisshift
as necessary because the data of consciousness are was the empiricalrealizationthat not onlythe id
"exceedingly defective" (5, p. 22). Conscious acts but also the superegois in part unconscious.In
alone do not enable us to account for certain as- effectthis merelyunderscoresthe increasingem-
pects of slips of tongue and of other parapraxes, of phasis on the system-character of Freud's basic
dreams, of mental symptomsor obsessions in the conceptsand the decreasingemphasison the more
sick, let alone the sudden inspirations of healthy introspectionistic betweenconsciousand
distinction
persons. In carryingus, as Freud says, "beyond the unconscious.
limitations of direct experience," the assumption Freud readilyacknowledgesthat a "rough cor-
of unconscious acts makes the disconnected and relationof . . . the mentalapparatusto anatomy
unintelligible conscious acts fall into a demonstra- . . . exists."If so far everyattemptto establisha
ble connection. localizationof his constructshas miscarried,the
From the standpoint of the logic of science, un- presentimperfectstate of the biological sciences
conscious tendencies are a special case of latent must be held responsible.SiegfriedBernfeld(8)
or "dispositional" characteristics. They are com- has amplypointedout the influenceof Helmholtz'
parable to such physical characteristicsas magne- physicalism and of the principleof conservationof
tism, provided that we do not insist on assigning energyon Freud.But it mustbe stressedthatwhile
them to "the mind" in a metaphysical sense. Such at the beginningFreud was intenselydominated
composite terms as "unconscious hostility"or "de- by neurophysiological thinking,the decisiveprog-
pendency" describe a disposition to display aggres- ressin psychoanalysis did not occur untilafterhe

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freedhimselffromthe search for such analogies "the same value as approximationsas belongsto
and turnedto more openlypsychologicalmodels. the correspondingintellectualscaffoldingfound
In defendingthe complexitiesof his approach, in othernaturalsciences."We mustexpectthemto
Freud stresses thatthereis no obligationto achieve "remainfora considerabletimeno less indetermi-
at our veryfirstattempta theorythat "commends nate than thoseof the older sciences(force,mass,
itselfbyitssimplicity, in whichall is plain sailing." attraction, etc.)" (7, p. 36).
Freud arguesthatwe mustdefendcomplexities of Freud ascribes some of the difficulties in his
the theoryitselfso long as we findthat theyfit speculationsabout the instincts-speculations that
in withthe resultsof observation;yetwe mustnot he likes to call his "mythology"-toour being
abandon our expectationof being guided in the obligated to operate with "metaphoricalexpres-
end by thoseverycomplexitiesto the recognition sionspeculiarto psychology." We mustadd in his
of "a state of that
affairs is at once simple in itself behalf that, for the type of problems with which
and at the same timeanswersto all the complica- psychoanalysisdeals, the mentalistic-introspec-
tionsof reality"(9, p. 122). If we notea similarity tionist or animistic-vocabularyconstitutesthe
of tonewithlogicalempiricism, we mustnot forget precise counterpartto what Frank (1) calls the
the fascination thatin -turn psychoanalysis has had "pictural"vocabulary,and thatin turnthislatter
formanyof the logical empiricists; theyhave seen vocabularyis recognizedin physicsas a legitimate
thegeniusof Freud at a timewhenmostpsycholo- or at least tolerableingredient of the earlierstages
gistsand psychiatrists werestilldeeplyresistant. of conceptformation. Whereasthe analogicalpro-
Next to the concept of the unconscious,it is ceduremaynotbe suitedforpurposesof ultimately
thatof "instinct"whichhas been objectedto most proving a scientifichypothesis,it may well be
vigorouslyin the face of claims of psychoanalysis argued that the functionof mentalisticanalogies
forconsideration as a science.The psychoanalytic is more importantin psychologythan it is in
conceptof instinctis complicatedby the assump- physics.
tion of far-reaching transformations and disguises, One of the mostbewilderingaspectsof psycho-
particularlyof the sex instinct.In reality,some analytictheoryis the turningaway frortthe ob-
partsof Freud'sinstincttheory,notablythe theory viousface-valuepictureof personality as it derives
of infantilesexualityand of the psychosexual stages from introspection or from the direct,"phenotypi-
of development, belongto themostlucid and most cal" observationof externalbehaviorsegments.An
powerfully executedportionsof the psychoanalytic example is the reinterpretation of overt friendli-
system.As in the case of the unconscious,Freud nessas a signof underlying or of extreme
hostility,
pursues an essentiallyoperational course in defin- tidinessas a sign of preoccupation with dirt.The
ing the instincts.He does so in pointingto the ca- discrepancydisappearswith the specification of a
pacityof the instinctsto "act vicariouslyfor one set of fixedor variableoperationalconditionsthat
another"and to readilychange theirobjects.The determinewhenovertbehavioris to be interpreted
mechanismsof repression, of reversalinto the op- as "genuine"and whenas manifesting someheter-
posite,or of sublimationare some of the more ogeneouslatentfactor.
strikingexamplesof this variability.It may well Since scientificinferenceconcerning"central"
be argued that the explanatoryvalue of the con- processes-thatis, the assumptionof internalstates
cept of instinctlies preciselyin this emphasison on the basis of externalevidence-cannot be de-
variability.Only in the case of an assumedone-to- fendedunlessit is based on a wide varietyof cir-
one correspondence betweeninstinctand manifest cumstantialevidence (10), centralinferencecan
behavior would the concept of instinctbecome be said not to have been legitimately attempted
circularor superfluous as an unnecessary duplica- beforepsychoanalysis. It can be shownthaton the
tion of behavior. Freud's concept of instinctis negativeside of the ledger psychoanalysis, espe-
a trulyexplanatory,inferentialconstructimbued cially in its beginnings,has comparativelydeem-
with some degree of independence.He avoided phasized both the surfacemanifestations in their
unnecessaryduplicationby fullyconsideringthe specificidentityand-what is more-the so-called
functionalambiguities inherentin the relationships "distal"achievements of behavior.These latterre-
betweendrivesand behaviorratherthanbydirectly sultsof behaviorin turnplay the dominantrole in
projectingbehavioraltrendsback intothesubjects. Darwin's thinkingand in such neo-behaviorist sys-
The mixtureof pioneeringgustowithan under- temsas that of Tolman (11). The regroupingof
standingforultimatelogicalrequirements, whichis manifestobservablefactsas undertakenby Freud
so characteristicof Freud, is revealed when he centersabout samenessof "need"-that is, same-
speaksof the"superbindefiniteness" of theconcept ness of assumed internalcause or dynamism-
of instinct.He goes on to claim for the instincts whilein the case of Tolman it centersabout same-

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ness of effectand, as we may add, in the case of
Egon Brunswik's theory of perceptual thing-con-
stancy (12) it centers about sameness of external
object.
By virtue of this inherent incompleteness, psy-
choanalysis did not altogether manage to avoid
the pitfalls of motivational relativism and of a
genetic dissolution of overt adjustmental values.
This one-sidedness has, to a certain extent, been
remedied in the more recent turning of psycho-
analysis from an almost exclusive emphasis on the
id and on motivation to an increased concern
with the ego that is, with reality-orientedbe-
havior and with adjustment in general. Even so,
psychoanalyticexpansion in this direction has been
more programmatic than real, and there are a
number of problems that can be solved only by an
explicit integration of psychoanalysis with psy-
chology proper and with sociology. The con-
ceptual tools of psychoanalysis just are not suffi-
cient to explain fully rational and social behavior
(10). In fact, if we were to deny this we would
obscure the essential theoretical contribution of
Freud, which is his discovery of motivational dy-
namics.
In the context of adjustment problems, Freud
tends to view character structure from a merely
"defensive" point of view-that is, in terms of
protectingoneself frominternal threatsrather than
in terms of external task orientation-and social
influences are seen as a series of traumata that
bring to a halt or discontinue instinctual gratifica-
tion and expression. While providing an under-
standing of an important aspect of the individual's
attitude toward society, this view does not do
justice to all the satisfactionsgained from moving
along constructivesocial avenues.
With all this said it must be granted that so far
as motivation, per se, is concerned, psychoanalysis
has achieved a legitimate reconstructionof objec-
tive causes rather than a mere pseudo-explanation
in terms of subjectively experienced motives as
such criticsas Toulmin (13) and Flew (14) would
have it. Far from identifyingthe introspectively
reported motive and the objective explanation, the
major merit of psychoanalysis is to have differ-
entiated the two and unmasked and "discredited"
as to their explanatory value the subjective ex-
periences of motivation. The phenotypical, "mani-
fest" characteristicsare taken to provide only the
indirectcues for inferencesconcerningthe "latent,"
genotypical forces of motivation. It is of compara-
tively lesser significance that in the majority of
cases it is verbal behavior such as dreams, free
associations, and the like, rather than overt motor
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behaviorproper,that psychoanalysis takes as the
manifestbasis for drive interpretations. This does
not mean, however,that psychoanalysis is "intro-
spectionistic."As everyoneknows,it is precisely
throughpsychoanalysis that we have learned to
doubt the face value of introspection.
It mustfurther be pointedout thatthe assump-
tionof thedynamisms of the "innerman" to which
suchbehaviorist criticsof psychoanalysis as Skinner
(15) have objected can be shownto increasethe
parsimonyof the scientific descriptionof behavior
patterns.A translationof the psychoanalytic con-
ceptsintotheterminology of theclassicalbehavior-
ist'sso-called"stimulus-response" approach,useful
as it may be in certaincontexts,has its difficulties
and limitations.As we have seen, the major em-
phasisof psychoanalysis is on the discoveryof in-
ternal causes; these include, in the language of
psychoanalysis, "subjectivephantasies" and gen-
erallythe differential meaningsan externalevent
may acquire forvariousindividuals.Freud began
to make progressin his understanding of hysteria
onlyafterhe had givenup the idea of a simpleex-
ternalcausation.Freud pointsout that only after
the hypotheticalfactor of the hystericalphan-
tasies had been introduceddid the structureof
the neurosisand itsrelationship to the patient"be-
come conspicuous."Since the relationshipof these
phantasiesto externalfactorsis mostcomplexand
ambiguous,it seemsheuristically fruitfulto assume
the internal mechanismspostulated by psycho-
analysis,leavingtheirfulloperationalspecification
for a lattertime. Contraryto Skinner,I believe
thatsuch assumptionsdo not carryus outsidethe
"bounds of naturalscience."But I do agree with
Skinneron the point that any "lookinginsidethe
organismfor an explanation of behavior" can
easily lead to a neglectof some of the environ-
mental factorsand readily acknowledgethat it
has done so in the case of psychoanalysis.
Even more crucialis the fact that hypothetical
extrapolationsfromovertbehaviorhelp to select
the most relevant,thoughoftenless conspicuous,
aspectsof behaviorwhichotherwisewould be lost
in thepracticallyinfinite rangeof possibleobserva-
tion. The relativelygreat explanatoryand pre-
dictive value of hypothesesdealing with under-
lyingmotivationcan be demonstrated statistically
by means of multiplecorrelation(16). It is with-
out doubtbased on thefactthattheselectivity just
referredto enterscruciallyinto the formationof
these hypotheses.We may add that, from the
standpointof logical analysis,thereis no alterna-
tive but to be behavioristicin any psychological
endeavor; neitherthe so-called "subjectivephan-
THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY
tasies" in which psychoanalysis is interested,nor tionshipsto the distinctionmade by Carnap and
"introspective" events of any kind in others, can Hempel betweenpostulatory theoreticalconstructs
be constitutedexcept by inference from the mani- and conceptsmore directlyreducibleto observa-
fest physical observation of organisms. tion could be pointedout. Guided by some rela-
In the process of theory-construction, Freud is tivelyfragmentary initial empiricalobservations,
generally quite careful in attemptingto distinguish Freud seemsto have proceededratherdirectlyto
what we now call the "postulatory" from what we thebuildingof a hypothetical theoreticalstructure,
now call the "operational" elements of the theory, with empirical interpretation lagging somewhat
at the same time allowing their interplay as he behind; in the definition of such theoreticalcon-
moves along. However, his system would benefit structs as superego,ego,and id, themajoremphasis
fromgreater formalizationand especially also from is on theirstructural relationships to one another
a more systematic differentiationbetween basic ratherthan on theirrelationships to observation.
assumptions and their derivations. For example, a Hiis frequent oscillationbetween hypothetical con-
combination of the assumptions of infantile sexu- structs and intervening variableshas affordedsome
ality and of repressionmay be able to cover many protectionagainstboth a too narrowoperational-
of the more specifictheoremsin psychoanalysis. ism and the dangersof meaninglessgeneralization.
Feigl (17) places psychoanalysis at the third of Consideringnow brieflythe attemptsat con-
the four "levels" of explanation he distinguishes, firmation of psychoanalytic hypotheses, it mustbe
thus grouping it together with the relatively de- pointed out that by involvingconceptsmore re-
scriptive behavior theories of Tolman and Hull. moved fromthe immediatedata, psychoanalysis
To me it seems that at least a certain group of has lengthenedthe chains of intellectualand ex-
psychoanalytic concepts, including that of the un- perimentalwork that connectthe principleswith
conscious, goes beyond this level by involving what the observationalprotocols.We may recall here
Reichenbach (18) calls "surplus meaning." In the statementof Frank (1) that modernphysics
terms of a distinction recently injected into psy- requiresspecial ingenuityin verifying its theories
chological theory by MacCorquodale and Meehl and that this fact is a resultof the greaterab-
(19), this latter group of concepts would seem to stractnessof concepts. Traditional Newtonian
be "hypothetical constructs," in contradistinction physicscould easily be verifiedby observation,
to the "intervening variables" which are thought since it was a directformulation of everydayex-
of as resting exclusively on the values of a speci- perience,obviousand plausibleto commonsense,
fied set of empiricallyobserved data. In their own whereasin Einstein'sgeneral theoryof relativity
rather sketchy analysis, the last-named authors "the descriptionof the operationsby which the
point out that such termsas "libido," "censorship," quantitiesinvolvedcould be measuredbecomesa
or "4superego"were in psychoanalysisoriginallyin- seriousand complextask. It becomesan essential
troduced as interveningvariables-that is, as con- partof the theory"(1, p. 19 f).
ventionalized designations of observable properties Psychoanalysis shareswith modernphysicsthe
-but that there frequentlywas an unnoticed shift fact that its statements do not lend themselvesto
toward hypothetical constructs. the mostdirectand obvioustypesof confirmation.
In their arguments the authors tend to overlook In each case, the highlyinterpretive statements in-
the fact that statements containing intervening volveddo not carrythe rulesof theirconfirmation
variables are by no means exhaustible by state- as obviouslywith themselvesas do more descrip-
ments concerning their observational basis. Both tive statements. In reviewingthe extensivelitera-
Carnap (6) and Hempel (3) have made it clear ture on objectivestudiesof psychoanalytic hypo-
that sentences containing disposition terms can- theses(20, 21), one is impressedby the fact that
not be fully translated into sentences about ob- the more descriptivetypesof hypothesesinvolved
servables. Since we cannot specify all conditions in thetheoryof "fixation"and "regression" proved
and manners in which latent tendencies become to be morereadilyaccessibleto experimental con-
manifest, dispositional statements involve "open" firmation than the more explanatoryones on "re-
termsand require an infiniteseries of conditions in pression,""projection,"and "reactionformation."
order to be tested. This mayindeedbe due to the factthatthe latter
The distinction between intervening variables derivefromthemoreinferential and abstractparts
and hypothetical constructs may, in my opinion, of psychoanalytic theory.Complexconditions, such
nonethelessbe retained as a gradual one involving as those involved in the analysis of transference,
differentdegrees of indirectness of evidence or are requiredbeforethat whichhas been repressed
differentkinds of surplus meaning. Possible rela- may become conscious.Misunderstandings of psy-

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 choanalytic theory have arisen when statements
concerningrepressionthat originallywere intended
to refer to unconscious-that is, inferred rather
than overt-processes, were erroneously taken as
purely descriptivestatementsof conscious contents.
As in physics,a simple identificationof statements
containing disposition termswith statementsabout
manifest events is not permissible. Still and all,
some of the experimentalstudies have verifiedeven
such seeminglyfar-fetchedpsychoan-alyticassump-
tions as symbolism.
A type of approach other than the experimental,
and one that I have tried to develop for a number
of years, concentrates on the principle of alterna-
tive manifestations of motivational tendencies.
This principle describes the basic pattern of inter-
relationships between the two strata involved in
all psychoanalytic theory, the manifest and the
latent, and can be shown to underlie most if not
all of the specificmechanisms just mentioned. The
possibilityof analyzing statisticallythe tangled re-
lationships between the two strata after imbuing
them with some degree of operational indepen-
dence may be illustrated by a study dealing.with
motivation in its relation to overt behavior seg-
ments (16) and one dealing with certain mecha-
nisms of self-deception (22). In the formerstudy
a comparison of over-all motivational ratings
with specific behavioral manifestations is used
for a "rational reconstruction"of the cues under-
lying the so-called "intuitive inferences" made
by the clinicians; the same general procedure
would apply in case of the more explicit and more
scrutinizinginferencesconcerning motivational dy-
namics made by the psychologist as a scientist
rather than as a synopticrater. Knowledge of the
type of drive variable involved seems to hold good
promise for behavior prediction of an "either-or"
type, furtherspecificationof which must hinge on
other than "dynamic" factors.Among these further
factors determining,whether, say, underlying ag-
gression is worked out in a socially constructive
formor in neurotic symptoms,such situational fac-
tors as social and economic or occupational con-
ditions must be assigned a major role.
In our study of self-deception, certain formal
criteria of distortion,which may take their place
alongside the more content-orientedtype of diag-
nostic criteria favored in psychoanalysis proper,
were established by means of a linguistic analysis
of the individuals' responses. For example, favor-
able self-descriptionsthat do not correspond to the
manifestbehavioral realities are frequentlyformu-
lated in exaggerated terms. The use of such lingu-
istic or semantic devices as superlatives,generaliza-
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tions, and repetitionswas found to be statistically
concomitant with a shortcoming rather than a
strengthin the area concerned.
In the verificationof psychoanalytichypotheses,
the systematicevidence furnishedby academic psy-
chology constitutes only one of several avenues.
Psychoanalysis itself has provided confirmatory,
though seldom rigorous, empirical evidence of
overwhelming scope, ranging from the wealth of
material accumulated from individual patients to
a synopsis of dream mechanisms, of lapses of
tongue and memory,of pathologic symptoms,and
of certain relevant features of folklore,myth, and
other cultural phenomena. Regardless of how im-
perfect psychoanalytictheorymay be in its formal
structure, it has no rival among psychological
theoriesas far as the range of both its evidence and
its explanatory power is concerned.
Some of the obstacles encountered in the efforts
to separate manifest behavior and latent motiva-
tion, or surface and depth in general, go beyond
the merely methodological difficultiesencountered
in the process of scientific verification. One of
these additional difficultiesis a semantic one. The
vocabulary of everyday language does not furnish
us consistentlywith two separate sets of terms,one
for overt behavior and the other for underlying
motivation. Unless we drastically depart from
familiarusage, the term "friendliness,"forexample,
stands either for the basically friendlyoutlook on
life or for the techniques of friendliness-genuine
or fake-by which this basic outlook may be imple-
mented or pretended, or for both. This dilemma is
in a formal sense similar to the one presented by
the two-faced meaning of our common perceptual
terms (12). These terms also tend to have double
reference,one to the personal and somewhat vari-
able perceptual response, and the other to the
interpersonal, measured physical stimulus. Most
perceptual qualities exhibit highlytangled relation-
ships to a variety of measured stimulus variables.
The conceptual separation of perceptual stimulus
and perceptual response can thus no longer appear
as a case of entities superfluously multiplied;
neither can, we may add, the separation of "be-
havior" and "motivation" with their similarly
tangled relationships, as outlined in some of the
foregoingparagraphs.
Certainly. both the motivations and the be-
haviors are constituted from overt behavior, as
both stimuli and perceptual responses are con-
stituted from differenttypes of observational ex-
periences. But motivations are arrived at through
a synopsis of the constant elements in many bits
of behavior. The problem of the genuineness of
THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY
behaviorthat I have pointedout as crucialin the voiced againstan overlynaive rationalinterpreta-
contextof provingpsychoanalytic hypotheses illus- tionof ethics,it has merelyturnedagainstthe as-
tratestheneed thatthe twosetsof eventsbe made sumedmajor executiveprincipleof the traditional
conceptuallyand operationallyindependentof formsof ethicsratherthanagainsttheirbasic con-
each otherso that-theirfar-reaching actual inde- structivecontent.This particularexecutiveprin-
pendenceunderthe principleof alternativemani- ciple is the mechanismof repression.Most pre-
festationscan be broughtout. An independent psychoanalytic stresssuchinhibitory
ethicalsystems
nomenclaturefor the different levels will thus in devicesas thelookingawayfromevil,or its denial,
the end have to be established.This would remove or its masterythroughstrength of will. From psy-
much of the temptationto fall back into an over- choanalysiswe have learnedabout the inefficiency
simplified,prepsychoanalytic, single-levelor sur- and the dangersof thesevariousformsof repres-
face treatmentof the motivationalaspectsof be- sion; fromthe same source we have learned of
havior. the importance of consciousness, integration, and
It has been observedthateach timeseparations maturity. All that is considered an essential in-
of the kind just describedhad to be substituted gredient of maturity in psychoanalysis, such as
forpreviousidentificationsin thehistory of science, rationality,the overcoming of aggression, coopera-
therewas irrational,emotionalresistanceagainst tiveness, the ability to love and to work, and the
the recognitionof the equivocationsor ambiguities courage to face inside and outside threats that op-
involved.Besidestheirapplicabilityto our outlook pose these characteristics,bespeak standards that
on psychoanalysis in particular, these resistances stand up well among the traditional systems of
have some bearing on the topic of one of the other ethics. In psychoanalysis every neurosis is in and
symposiumsof this conference, the acceptance or by itself considered as failure at moral control.
rejection of scientifictheoriesin general. They may The importanthistoricalcontributionof traditional
also be linked with what I have called "intolerance systemsof ethics is the attempt to strengthencon-
of ambiguity" (23). Acceptance of the ambiguous sciousness and conscience against the invasion of
relationshipbetween motivation and manifestation, the instincts; through psychoanalysiswe have be-
which is the chief discovery of psychoanalysis,re- come aware that such strengthening can be
quires cognitive tolerance of ambiguityon the part achieved only by facing and working through,
of the scientist.Its opposite, the concretistic,com- rather than by merely condemning, the forces
pulsive, and dogmatic patterns of perception and threatening our -conscious personal and social
thought that have been so vividly described by values. From this latter viewpoint the mortal sin is
both psychiatristsand psychoanalystsand are not self-deception and lack of insight rather than a
infrequent among scientists are not conducive to lack of repression.
the acceptance of psychoanalysis. It may be that the diversion of attention from
A final word must be added concerning the true the functionsof reason in psychoanalysishas con-
or alleged ethical implications of psychoanalysis. tributed to the semblance of ethical relativism. As
Together with the cognitive resistances just out- we have seen, psychoanalysiswas so overwhelmed
lined, ethical connotations may be the chief de- by its epoch-making discovery of the role of irra-
terminantsof the acceptance and furtherdestiny tional forces-that the explicit exploration of reason-
of any scientific theory. It has been objected ing processes was temporarily obscured, even
against psychoanalysis-perhaps more often in the though-it was, reason and not the irrational that
past than in the present-that its orientation is held the top spot so far as the evaluative attitude
fundamentally amoral. Arguments of this kind of psychoanalysisis concerned.
were raised, not only by philosophers in search of There is an illuminating reversal in the role
a systemof absolute values, but also by empirically played by reason when we compare the direct ver-
oriented social scientistsand psychologistsof major bal formulationsmade by Freud, on the one hand,
stature,among them Max Weber (24). Weber saw and Weber or Durkheim (26), on the other, with
in psychoanalysis an expression of a tendency to the actual function of reason in the theoretical
loosen our basic ethical principles. In a letter of edifices of these men. Both Durkheim and Weber
1907 Weber had accused Freud of proposing a have repeatedly been described as rationalists,
psychiatricor "nerves" ethics characterized by the albeit both see the foundations of societyin funda-
prevalence of the "hygienic" point of view (25, mentallynonrational moral qualities. Freud, on the
p. 417). other hand, has been criticized for having given
Against these strictures it may be said that, too much prominence to the irrational, while in
with all the reservations that psychoanalysis has fact his one hope is the overcoming of the irra-

November 1954 299

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
tionalin a societybuilton reason.Freud neglected
to explorereason directlyand challengedthe po-
tencyof reasonin guidinghuman conduct.But in
his evaluationsof the goals of humandevelopment
he has an exaltedesteemforreason,and his under-
standingforthevicissitudes of unreasonhas sharp-
ened his grasp for the fundamentalnature of
reason;in thismorecrucialrespecthe is a believer
in reasonin the best senseof the word.
References and Notes
* This is a condensation of the writer's monograph,
Psychoanalysisand the Unity of Science [Proc. Am.
Acad. Arts Sci. 80, No. 4 (1954)], which was spon-
sored by the Institute for the Unity of Science in
Boston. Some of the views expressed herein were
firstformulatedin 1940 (see ref. 10).
1. P. Frank, Modern Science and Its Philosophy (Har-
vard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1941).
2. A. Einstein, in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell,
Library of Living Philosophers,vol. 5, P. A. Schilpp,
Ed. (Northwestern Univ. Press, Evanston, Ill.,
1944), p. 289.
3. C. G. Hempel, Fundamentals of concept formation
in empirical science, in Intern. Encycl. Unified Sci.
vol. II, No. 7 (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago,
1952).
4. S. Freud, "Instincts and their vicissitudes" (1915),
Collected Papers (Hogarth, London, 1925), vol. 4,
pp. 60-83.
5. , "A note on the unconscious in psychoanaly-
sis" (1912), Collected Papers, vol. 4, pp. 22-29.
6. R. Carnap, Phil. Sci. 3, 420 (1936); 4, 2 (1937).
7. S. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940), J.
Strachey, Tr. (Norton, New York, 1949).
8. S. Bernfeld, Psychoanal. Quart. 13, 341 (1944).
9. S. Freud, "The unconscious" (1915), Collected
Papers, vol. 4, 98-136.
10. E. Frenkel-Brunswik,J. Abnormal & Social Psychol.
35, 176 (1940).
11. E. C. Tolman, Purposive Behavior in Animals and
Men (Century, New York, 1932).
12. E. Brunswik, Wahrnehmung und Gegenstandswelt
(Deuticke, Vienna, 1934).
13. S. Toulmin, Analysis 9, 23 (1948).
14. A. Flew, ibid. 10, 8 (1949).
15. B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (Mac-
millan, New York, 1953).
16. E. Frenkel-Brunswik,Motivation and Behavior (Ge-
netic Psychol. Monogr., 1942).
17. H. Feigl, in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, H.
Feigl and W. Sellars, Eds. (Appleton-Century-Crofts,
New York, 1949).
18. H. Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction (Univ.
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1938).
19. K. MacCorquodale and P. Meehl, Psychol. Rev. 55,
95 (1948).
20. E. R. Hilgard, in Psychoanalysis as Science, E.
Pumpian-Mindlin, Ed. (Stanford Univ. Press, Calif.,
1952).
21. R. R. Sears, Survey of Objective Studies of Psy-
choanalytic Concepts (Social Sci. Research Council
Monogr. No. 51, 1943).
22. E. Frenkel-Brunswik,J. Social Psychol. 10, 409
(1939).
23. , J. Personality 18, 108 (1949).
24. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism (Scribner's, New York, 1930).
25. Marianne Weber, Max Weber: Ein Lebensbild
(Lambert-Schneider, Heidelberg, 1950).
26. E. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method
(Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1950).

Critiqueof Psychoanalytic
Concepts
and Theories
B. F. SKINNER

Dr. Skinner, who is professor of psychology at Harvard University,has con-

tributedto the experimentalanalysis of behavior chieflythrough work with rats
and pigeons but recentlyhe has extended his techniques to the human organism
in the study of psychotic behavior and methods of instructionin elementary
schools. Dr. Skinner received his trainingat Hamilton College and Harvard and
has taught at the Universityof Minnesota and Indiana University.He is the
author of Behavior of Organisms, Science and Human Behavior, and Walden
Two (a novel).

FREUD'S great contribution

to Western wholly unsuspected unsuspected, in particular, by
thoughthas been described as the application the veryindividuals whose behavior theycontrolled.
of the principle of cause and effectto human Freud greatly reduced the sphere of accident and
behavior. Freud demonstrated that many features caprice in our considerations of human conduct.
of behavior hitherto unexplained-and often dis- His achievement in this respect appears all the
missed as hopelessly complex or obscure-could be more impressivewhen we recall that he was never
shown to be the product of circumstances in the able to appeal to the quantitative proofs charac-
historyof the individual. Many of the causal rela- teristicof other sciences. He carried the day with
tionshipshe so convincinglydemonstratedhad been sheer persuasion-with the massing of instances

300ETHE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY

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