Journal of Military Ethics (2004) 3(1): 53
/60

CASE STUDY

An Analysis of Moral Dissent:

An Army Officer’s Public Protest
of the Vietnam War
William A. Gouveia, Jr.
Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 7809 Mistic View Court, Rockville, MD
20855, USA
Tel: /1 301 330 2722, Fax: /1 202 687 5175, E-mail: williamgouveia@hotmail.com

What course of action do officers have when their conscience is in conflict

with their duty? William A. Gouveia, Jr., describes the case of Col. David
Hackworth, whose moral indignation at the conduct of the Vietnam War
led him to public condemnation of the conflict, and the premature end of
his brilliant military career. Gouveia argues that Hackworth’s story has
continuing relevancy and highlights important issues of the military /
civilian relationship in a democracy.

The military code precluding political involvement leaves few avenues for dissent,
raising the difficult question of how a military officer should act in a war that he or
she does not support. In examining the many complications of this question, it may
be useful to explore a case study from the Vietnam War that considers the various
options a military officer has when bearing a moral objection to the policy he or she
is asked to execute. Unlike previous wars in the recent history of the United States,
the Vietnam War did not have a wide base of domestic popular support after the
1968 Tet Offensive as opposition to the war emerged across American society from
students to senators, from draft dodgers to diplomats. In addition, many among
those fighting the war criticized it as members of rifle squads and members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff alike struggled within their consciences to reconcile personal
moral convictions with the oath that every officer and soldier takes to obey the
orders of those appointed over him. It is impossible to determine how many
members of the military quietly left out of disgust with the war. However, it is quite
clear that a majority of the military abided by the soldier’s code of executing orders
without public dissention.
A shocking exception to this silence was an address made directly to the
American public by an unlikely renegade, Army Colonel David Hackworth. After
five years in Vietnam and a combat record unequaled by any of his peers,

ª 2004 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/15027570310004825

54 William A. Gouveia, Jr.

Hackworth earned 110 medals and the accolade of the nation’s most decorated
living soldier despite his premature retirement. Nevertheless, Hackworth found
himself denounced by the Army as ‘insubordinate and treacherous’ for his
appearance on ABC television’s Issues and Answers in 1971. On this television
show, as journalist Ward Just summarizes, he ‘disclosed the bankruptcy of
American training and tactics and the incapacity of the [South] Vietnamese
Army, identified the lies and some of the liars who kept it afloat, and all but declared
the war a lost cause, unwinnable’ (Hackworth 1989: 16
/17). Colonel Hackworth,
speaking in uniform from the midst of his firebase in Vietnam, concluded the
interview; ‘I just have seen the American nation spend so much of its wonderful,
great young men in this country. I have seen our national wealth being drained
away. I see the nation being split apart and almost being split asunder because of
this war, and I am wondering to what end it is all going to lead to’ (ibid.: 783).
Hackworth’s forthright condemnation of the American conduct of the war led the
commander of US forces in Vietnam, General Creighton Abrams, who had
previously called Hackworth ‘the best battalion commander I ever saw in the
United States Army’, to immediately put him under a rule of silence (ibid.: 811).
Hackworth was forced to abandon his career, apply for retirement, and attempt to
reform the Army he loved from outside the institution.
Two aspects of his decision to circumvent the military’s internal channels of
dissent are notable. First, Hackworth’s brilliance as a soldier and as a leader
throughout his five combat tours in Vietnam earned him the accolades of the
Army’s highest leadership. He undoubtedly was on the fastest track to general
officer and knowingly sacrificed his career by speaking out. Second, unlike others
who were disgruntled by the conduct of the Vietnam War, Hackworth’s attempts to
reform the Army did not end after the initial media attention dissipated. He
committed himself to improving the armed forces and claims to have made greater
contributions to the debates surrounding military readiness than he could have had
he stayed within the Army as a general officer. However, thirty years after this
episode, the question lingers: Was Colonel Hackworth’s decision to speak directly to
the public a proper avenue of dissent or was it a disloyal violation of moral strictures
prohibiting military officers from interfering in political matters? After considering
the effects of his decision to speak out against the war, his options in reconciling this
moral dilemma, and the notion of military loyalty, it is clear that Colonel
Hackworth’s determination to condemn the war on national television was a
model of military character and moral courage.

The Moral Struggle of Speaking Out

David Hackworth quickly rose from a fifteen-year old private to become the Army’s
youngest colonel. A brilliant leader on the battlefields of Korea and Vietnam, his
dedication to the Army and to his soldiers was unquestionable. After his first several
years in Vietnam, he began to chronicle the problems he perceived and to speak to
his superiors about them. As the war drew on, his insights into the nature of the
war and America’s prospects for victory led him to become increasingly critical of
American involvement in Vietnam. For example, when Chief of Staff of the Army
 An Analysis of Moral Dissent 55

William Westmoreland solicited Hackworth’s insights, Hackworth was forthright in

communicating his perceptions of the problems in Vietnam, ‘The U.S. Army has
badly botched the war. I have concluded, after exhaustive study, that we have lost’
(ibid.: 619). In addition, he discussed the Army’s failures in Vietnam with every
senior officer with whom he had contact including a routine correspondence with
Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor. He worked with historian S.L.A. Marshall to
study the successful battlefield techniques in Vietnam; an effort which produced a
widely distributed tactical handbook entitled The Vietnam Primer (1966). None-
theless, realizing that his efforts had little effect, and recognizing that the course of
the war was unlikely to change despite the rising toll of American casualties,
Hackworth considered resigning in disgust. However, as he says, ‘After months and
months of ruminating on the issue, at the eleventh hour I knew it was true */I was
fed up with the system and the war but I still loved the Army’ (ibid.: 619).
The decision to speak out was one that Hackworth wrestled with for many
months. Hackworth initially resisted ABC’s requests for interviews and instead
chose to leak stories to trusted friends in the press. However, Hackworth began to
feel a moral responsibility to take his version of the truth directly to the American
public despite the realization that, ‘There were few things as taboo in the military as
criticizing it outside the fold . . . I’d been in the Army so long I was like one of
Pavlov’s dogs: to speak out was against everything I’d been trained for. It was also
against everything I’d believed in, against something I’d loved for so long and still
did . . . But what other avenue was left?’ (ibid.: 772).
In deciding whether to seek internal change or to bring external pressure on
the Army, Hackworth reflected on how his earlier efforts had produced no change
and questioned whether any individual could change the institution of the Army.
On the other hand, he writes, ‘by going outside channels directly to the American
people, I could make these guys think, and bring about change’ (ibid.: 774).
Hackworth later explained the factors behind his decision:

During Vietnam I finally got a look inside the inner circle of the Army’s top
brass
/ and witnessed corruption and evil so great it broke my heart . . . Few
[generals] cared about their men or the mission, most cared only about
clawing their way up the promotion ladder. All but the brain-dead among
them knew that it was a bad, unwinnable war that had no military objective;
yet not one serving general stood tall and told the American people this truth
. . . After observing this obscenity first-hand in the trenches of Vietnam for
almost five years, I told the American people
/ while in uniform and from
Vietnam
/ that the war was not winnable, they were being lied to and we
should get out now (Hackworth 2002).

In the Issues and Answers interview, nationally broadcast in 1971, Hackworth

spoke candidly about the poor training of soldiers and the failures of Army
management to develop a realistic strategic plan. He also mentioned that although
many officers shared his opinions, careerist concerns perpetuated a silence that, he
goes on to say, constituted ‘criminal neglect’ and resulted in the needless deaths of
soldiers. Furthermore, Hackworth did not shy away from implicating individuals
and discussing the rampant and delusional self-congratulation amongst Secretary of
Defense McNamara and General Westmoreland (Hackworth 1989: 777).
56 William A. Gouveia, Jr.

Impact of Public Dissention

Hackworth’s three-hour long diatribe incited more wrath than any similar efforts
throughout the war and produced a swift and strong reaction from his colleagues
and superiors. General Abram’s deputy, Lieutenant General William McCaffrey,
wrote that, ‘I don’t think we have had his like since George A. Custer’ (ibid.: 790).
Summarizing the overwhelming sentiment regarding Hackworth’s future in the
Army, Brigadier General John Howard commented, ‘It has been said that David
Hackworth ‘‘died’’ in the service of his country in 1971’ (ibid.: 806). Hackworth
wrote of the effort within the Pentagon, ‘The top Army generals from Westmoreland
on down launched a mammoth damage-control mission from the day the first
article appeared’ (ibid.). Even in later years, General Westmoreland sought to decry
the behavior of those who spoke out and to discredit any attempt to tarnish his
record. Writing in his 1976 memoir, Westmoreland dismisses the dissention of
Hackworth and others:

So long did some American soldiers serve in Vietnam and so exemplarily that
their records became almost legendary . . . No one better understood the
Vietnamese than John Vann, but he had an affinity for sounding off to the
press . . . Or Lieutenant Colonel David Hackworth, who had four Purple Hearts
from Korea and four more during five years in Vietnam. He also had two
Distinguished Crosses, nine Silver Stars, and nine Bronze Stars. As reflected by
those awards, Dave Hackworth’s combat record was unusual, but near the end
he developed an affinity for personal publicity, sometimes spoke irresponsibly,
and conducted himself with questionable ethics. He eventually retired
prematurely from the Army (Westmoreland 1976: 305).

Having examined the response to Hackworth’s public denunciation of the war,

the question arises: Was what Westmoreland decried as speaking irresponsibly the
most effective means of dissent for Hackworth? To properly answer this question,
three different but inseparable factors must be explored. First, how effective was his
public protest? Second, what other options do officers in Hackworth’s situation
have? Third, what moral obligations do officers have to the Army, to the
Constitution, and to the American people?
In evaluating the effectiveness of Hackworth’s dissent, an intriguing perspec-
tive is offered by Tom Cooney, who served with Hackworth in Vietnam and whose
counsel Hackworth sought when deciding whether or not to tape the Issues and
Answers interview: ‘It seems to me that Hackworth’s impact on military matters
would have been more significant in the military than standing outside and
criticizing. I think his suggestions for improving the country’s military preparedness
would have been heeded much more if he had gone on to be a general officer’
(Hackworth 1989: 785). Hackworth, writing eighteen years after he made
headlines in 1971, agreed with this assessment despite the opposition faced by
general officers whom Hackworth deeply admired
/ such as Hank Emerson and Hal
Moore
/ in their attempts to reform the Army. However, in a recent interview,
Hackworth rethought this comment and pointed to the effectiveness of his efforts to
reform the Army since his retirement (Hackworth 2002).
 An Analysis of Moral Dissent 57

Considering that his objective in appearing on Issues and Answers was, as he

expressed to a friend, to save one soldier’s life, Hackworth claims that there is
mounting anecdotal evidence to support his success. His prominence as a
determined critic of the military, which allows him to influence debates surrounding
Army readiness and leadership, results from his decision to
/ in a moment he calls
‘his finest hour’
/ speak out thirty years ago (ibid.). Had he not spoken out during
Vietnam, he would not have had the occasion to write the bestselling memoir About
Face in 1989. That book, he said, gave him an audience to begin a second career
acting to bring about military reform. He went on to discuss the popularity of his
Soldiers for the Truth organization and website, his Newsweek columns, his
Defending America articles, and his subsequent books and lectures. Hackworth
recently commented, ‘I’m not sure I had an impact by standing tall [in 1971] but
About Face became an important document for soldiers during the Persian Gulf
War’ (ibid.). This allowed him to articulate in newspaper columns the readiness
problems pointed out by his growing following before the ground campaign. The
overall effect of his actions in 1971, Hackworth claims, is that they ‘have made my
soapbox higher and given me a bigger platform from which I can influence the
military’ (ibid.). In addition, it has given him the stature to counsel others who
struggle with moral dilemmas arising from conflicting obligations to conscience and
to duty.
Furthermore, Hackworth’s dissention may have helped create a precedent for
similar denunciations, resignations, and, in some cases, mutinies during the last
years of the Vietnam War. In October 1971, a whole company of the First Cavalry
Division refused to conduct night patrols along the Cambodian border, an incident
that led Congress to call for an investigation. That same year, decorated Korean
War veteran LTC Anthony Herbert was pressured by the Army to resign after
charging two of his superiors in Vietnam with covering up war crimes. Major Joseph
Westbrook, a West Point graduate who had earned three Silver Stars in Vietnam,
‘was so revolted by the conduct of the war that he claimed conscientious objector
status as an exit from his second tour there’ (Nicosia 2001: 218).
There is also evidence that Hackworth’s bold words found an audience despite
the Army leadership’s efforts to muzzle them. The producer of Issues and Answers
wrote that she had, ‘received a greater volume of mail concerning your appearance
than for any other guest whom we have presented this year. All of the letters were
highly complimentary’ (Hackworth 1989: 793). Moreover, Hackworth himself
claimed, ‘The White House, Congress, and the media wanted answers to what I had
to say’, although he did not specify the results of these inquiries (ibid.: 806). Lastly,
Hackworth’s departure and that of those he may have influenced resulted in the loss
of leadership and experience in an Army deficient in both qualities. As General
Abrams remarked to Newsweek correspondent Nick Proffit in 1971, ‘We cannot
afford to lose men of his caliber. If it continues, the damage to the Army will be
irreparable’ (ibid.: 811).
The effectiveness of his decision to speak out can only be evaluated by
considering Hackworth’s other option, resignation, which is the standard avenue
for an officer in disagreement with the policies of his superiors. Although
Hackworth did indeed consider resigning, he was not alone in recognizing that
doing so would not bring about the changes that he thought necessary. Even the
Chief of Staff of the Army, General Harold Johnson, pointed out the futility of
58 William A. Gouveia, Jr.

resigning in protest, ‘What should my role have been? I’m a dumb soldier under
civilian control . . . I could resign, and what am I? I’m a disgruntled general for 48
hours and then I’m out of sight. Right?’ (McMaster 1997: 318). For Colonel
Hackworth, even with his tactical brilliance and chest full of medals, those 48 hours
would have been much shorter.
Another effect of resignation is that it removes the officer from the debate,
meaning that his or her views, abilities, and experience can no longer contribute to
the policy-making process. This may have been the reasoning that led Secretary
McNamara to avoid resigning in an environment where stepping out in protest is of
questionable utility because someone else will simply step right in. In McNamara’s
case, one can only speculate about what would have happened had he resigned and
publicly shared his convictions that the Vietnam War was unwinnable and that the
United States should withdraw, convictions he left office holding only to watch the
war continue for seven more years (Christopher 1995).
Others argue against the legitimacy of resignation on the grounds that it is the
duty of military officers to execute their duties as faithfully and ably as they can,
despite whatever disagreements they may have with policymakers and politicians.
Perhaps because of this military code precluding political involvement, the military
does not have an established venue for public disagreement and, as a result, public
pronouncements such as those by General MacArthur led to his dismissal by
President Truman during the Korean War. More recently, for example, General
Norman Schwarzkopf was politically pressured to retract public statements
lamenting the decision not to invade Baghdad during the Persian Gulf War.
The fury of the Truman
/MacArthur incident also served as a warning to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Vietnam War of the dangers of interfering in politics.
Thus, although the Chiefs objected to President Johnson’s conduct of the war, the
prohibition from political involvement forced them to either resign
/ sacrificing
their influence altogether
/ or serve quietly. A gripping, tragic figure who faced the
decision between these two equally undesirable poles was Army Chief of Staff
General Harold Johnson. Johnson was known throughout the Army as a deeply
religious and ethical man, and he disagreed profoundly with President Johnson’s
refusal to activate the Reserves during Vietnam. However, when faced with
executing policies he thought ‘unconscionable’, McMaster writes, ‘He did not resign,
resist, or object to the president’s decision . . . Johnson was willing to stay on and
‘‘try and fight and get the best posture that we can.’’ . . . Harold Johnson’s inaction
haunted him for the rest of his life’ (McMaster 1997: 318). In Lewis Sorley’s
examination of his moral struggles, Johnson recalls:

I remember the day I was ready to go over to the Oval Office and give my four
stars to the president and tell him [that]. . . ‘I resign and will hold a press
conference after I walk out your door.’ I made the typical mistake of believing I
could do more for my country and the Army if I stayed in than if I got out. I am
now going to my grave with that lapse in moral courage (Sorley 1998: 243).

Although his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff were not as forthright, they
still acknowledged their moral weakness. For example, Admiral David McDonald
recounted in 1976 that: ‘Maybe we military men were all weak. Maybe we should
have stood up and pounded the table . . . I was part of it and I’m sort of ashamed of
 An Analysis of Moral Dissent 59

myself, too’ (McMaster 1997: 319). Other public officials, such as three highly
decorated and well-respected retired generals, Ridgeway, Gavin, and Shoup, chose a
course similar to Hackworth’s in following a moral obligation to speak directly to
the American people about the war’s conduct (Buzzanco 1996: 344).

Loyalty and Military Morality

In conclusion, the exploration of Hackworth’s ethical dilemma has focused on
evaluating his three primary options as ones that can be judged by efficacy alone.
There are two notable flaws in this approach. To begin with, such assessments deal
almost entirely with hypothetical judgments. One can only speculate on the true
impact that individual cases of dissent have in a complex policymaking environ-
ment. More importantly, however, is that by appraising Hackworth’s decision in
light of its effects, one ignores the issue of his moral obligations. Choosing among
these three different resolutions
/ to serve as ably as possible, to resign quietly, or to
speak out publicly
/ is a decision predicated upon determining to whom military
officers owe their loyalty.
Loyalty is an essential component of the military ethos albeit a confusing one.
For example, the loyalty of the Joint Chiefs to President Johnson obscured their
loyalty to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines dying on the battlefields of
Vietnam. A soldier’s loyalty must encompass not only loyalty to superiors, but also
loyalty to subordinates, to the profession, and fundamentally to the Constitution.
This robust conception of loyalty led Hackworth to take his objections to the public
rather than leave the Army silently (Hirschmann 1970: 78). In an important
respect, Hackworth felt that he morally owed the American people his loyalty and
professional judgement. James Toner writes of the dishonor of denying one’s ethical
obligations, ‘Morally, such a failure would be indistinguishable from abandoning
one’s post under fire. The soldier should be prepared not only to die for his country,
but to be fired for it’ (Toner 1995: 72). Hackworth, whose physical courage is
displayed by his eight purple hearts, demonstrated his moral courage by being
prepared to give not only his life but also his career and his future for an ideal he
found worthy. Recently, Hackworth mentioned that he could not have morally
continued to serve in Vietnam and today it is only because he followed his
conscience that he can, as he said, ‘look in the mirror and know I didn’t flinch’
(Hackworth 2002).
In the final analysis, perhaps all public officials who circumnavigate the official
channels of dissent and take their arguments to the public should not be examined
by the effects of their decision or the factors that defined the decision for them, but
rather by considering the purity of their motives. Frances Harbour argues that,
‘when we judge an effect morally we are really judging the nature of the action that
produced it . . . [We] admire acts motivated by a desire for justice’ (Harbour 1995:
168). In this regard, there can be little doubt that David Hackworth went before
America on national television with the purest of motives: to end an unwinnable
and, in his view, tragic war. Some will continue to argue that his outspokenness
violated restrictions on political involvement by the military and that his actions
60 William A. Gouveia, Jr.

disrupted a noble war effort with a chance of success. A black wall in Washington,
one with over 58,000 names on it, stands in Hackworth’s defense.

References
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/8.
Hackworth, David H. & Julie Sherman, 1989. About Face . New York: Simon and Schuster.
Hackworth, David H., 2002. Interview with the author. April 25.
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December 2003; available at http://www.pbs.org/pov/stories/vietnam/stories1/hack-
worthfull.html.
Harbour, Frances V., 1995. ‘Basic Moral Values: A Shared Core’, Journal of Ethics and
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Hirschmann, Albert O., 1970. Exit, Voice and Loyalty . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Marshal, S.L.A. & David H. Hackworth, 1966. The Vietnam Primer. San Francisco: Ramparts
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Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.
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Biography
William A. Gouveia, Jr. is a national security consultant and a former Army
officer who served in armor, light infantry and special forces units. He earned a
BA degree from Columbia University and is currently pursuing a MA in security
studies at Georgetown University.