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Civilian Starvation: A Just Tactic of War?
Claire Thomas a
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Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Hull, Hull, UK

Online Publication Date: 01 June 2005

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Journal of Military Ethics, 4:2, 108 - 118
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 Journal of Military Ethics,
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Vol. 4, No. 2, 108
118, 2005

/

Civilian Starvation: A Just Tactic of

War?
CLAIRE THOMAS
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Hull, Hull, UK

ABSTRACT There is general agreement that the targeting of civilians in war is morally wrong.
But sometimes starvation tactics are accepted as being a better option than direct military
attacks. This article questions this view by arguing that starvation tactics affect civilians first and
inflict long-term suffering. It argues that they are not just unless they can be limited to a small
area where only military personnel will be affected. It looks at the provision for starvation tactics
in the Geneva Conventions, and at the argument of double effect. It then illustrates the argument
with three case studies: the siege of Leningrad; the application of sanctions prior to and during the
Gulf War in 1990
/1991; and restrictions of food during the war in Bosnia.

KEY WORDS: Starvation, just war, civilians, Geneva Conventions, double effect

Introduction

Suppose in World War II it had been proposed by an international organisation to send food
parcels to Germans in Berlin, by way of London. Would the British have agreed, and helped
the aid organisation do just that? (A warlord in the Bosnian war, quoted in O’balance
1995: 102)

This quote from the war in Bosnia illustrates that some people still condone
the tactic of restricting food supplies to an area occupied by the enemy.
In order to reduce the suffering of civilians in war, this tactic needs to be
addressed. Although the Geneva Conventions prohibit starvation as a
deliberate policy, they contain ambiguities which mean that civilians continue
to starve during war. The failure of the Geneva Conventions in this regard
highlights the difficulty of recognising the different forms of starvation
tactics. This is especially the case when they are portrayed as being kinder
alternatives to direct attacks.
Best (1980: 256) supports the tactic of starvation used in World War I by
arguing that ‘to have allowed the unfortunate existence of these . . . ultra-
non-combatants to inhibit action against the combatants would have been as
unreasonable as, for instance, to allow the unfortunate presence of civilians in
defended buildings to inhibit the direction of militarily necessary shellfire

Correspondence Address : Claire Thomas, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of
Hull, Cottingham Road, Hull, HU6 7RX, United Kingdom. E-mail: C.Thomas@pol-as.hull.ac.uk

1502-7570 Print/1502-7589 Online/05/01000108
/11 # 2005 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/15027570510030815
 Civilian Starvation: A Just Tactic of War? 109
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against them’. This article will refute his belief. It will argue that starvation
tactics inflict protracted suffering. They target civilians directly, whereas
civilian casualties from direct military attacks are usually secondary
consequences. The article will therefore argue that the only time starvation
should be used is when non-combatants can be isolated from the armed
forces. This situation will occur only rarely, and the tactic is less effective than
when civilians are present. To target only the military with starvation, it must
be carried out in a limited area, i.e. a siege. Blockades and sanctioning of food
cannot be justified, as the scope of the restricted area will always be too large
to enable civilian isolation.
The article will look first at how the Geneva Conventions and additional
protocols have some ambiguity in this area. It will continue by showing that
the principle of double effect cannot be applied in the same way for starvation
tactics as it is for direct attacks, and that a military necessity argument would
disregard any principle of discrimination and the duty a soldier has to
civilians on the battlefield. Finally, it will use the cases of Leningrad, Bosnia
and Iraq to illustrate the arguments made.

The Geneva Conventions

Non-combatant Immunity
The allocation of civilian status is not straightforward. The Geneva
Convention’s definition of a civilian is someone who is not a member of
the armed forces, including irregular forces (cf. Geneva Convention III
Article 4A1, 2,3, 6; Protocol I Article 50 & Article 43). In this context,
civilians are the same as non-combatants.
Some authors question this definition of civilians. They point out that in
many cases a large proportion of the population is involved in the war effort,
through working in ammunition factories, providing food for the soldiers,
and so forth, and that a sharp distinction between soldiers and civilians in the
context of a blockade is too simple. If it makes good strategic sense to prevent
food getting through in order to weaken soldiers, it also makes good sense to
weaken the arms producers in the same way (Fotion and Elfstrom 1986: 194,
202).
One can also argue in the case of democratic countries that if the
population has voted for a particular government that is now at war, it bears
some responsibility and therefore should suffer the consequences of its
actions (Buzan 2002: 89
90). But even here there will never be a case where
/

100% of the population can be categorised as losing their civilian protection:

some, for example children, are not allowed to vote, and some are not able to
take part in hostilities due to infirmity, age, and so on.
In siege or blockade situations, if civilians stay in the besieged or blockaded
area and refuse to surrender, they could be assumed to be giving up their
rights as civilians. But if they have been coerced to stay in the area by military
forces, and are not free to leave, one can hardly say that they have given up
their rights as civilians (Walzer 2000: 163, 168
9).
/
 110 C. Thomas
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The Geneva Conventions state that a civilian population retains its

character as civilian even if it is not entirely composed of civilians (Protocol
I Article 50). This appears to be the only way to deal with the problem of
isolating the opposing armed forces from civilians in order to apply a tactic of
starvation. Starvation is not a tactic that can be applied in a directly targeted
way, but will always affect the civilians in an area at least as much as the
military. And when civilians are trapped in an area where a tactic of starvation
is being applied, they have to cooperate with the armed forces in that area in
order to survive. It is impossible to make a clear judgement about who is
contributing to the war effort voluntarily and who is not. Therefore a
presumption of civilian status is required.

The Tactic of Starvation in the Geneva Conventions

The 1949 Geneva Conventions recognised the right to food for certain
civilians (such as children and expectant mothers), but still recognised the
legitimacy of sieges and blockades as a tactic (Marcus 2003: 266). Safe
passage of food was not required if there were reasons for fearing that it
would give an advantage to the enemy (Geneva Convention IV Article 23).
Therefore the Conventions upheld the notion that a compromise must be
reached between military requirements and humanitarian considerations
(Marcus 2003: 267).
The provisions for civilians were strengthened in 1977 in the additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Protocol I Article 54 states that
‘Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited’. But there is
some ambiguity. The official commentary to the Protocol does not rule out
blockades, but rather refers to Article 70 about the provision of relief to the
civilian population. Article 70 also contains the caveat that this relief should
be provided ‘subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned’ (Protocol I
Article 70:1). This means that the clear obligation in the Convention to ensure
humanitarian relief during a blockade is diluted by allowing it to be
abrogated in certain circumstances (Marcus 2003: 267
8). These circum-
/

stances are mostly concerned with guarantees that the relief consignments are
needed for humanitarian purposes, and will be used as such (Commentary on
Prot I Art 70). The general principle of not pursuing a tactic of starving
civilians stands, but the Geneva Conventions could relatively easily be
bypassed. Guarantees of impartial distribution and agreement of when
exactly deliveries of food become essential for survival are subjects that could
be contested. As a result, there is still room for some tactics of starvation,
even though this goes against the underlying aim of civilian protection within
the Conventions.

Double Effect and the Difference between Tactics of Starvation and Direct Military
Attacks
The doctrine of double effect claims that civilian casualties can be accepted if
the act is a legitimate act of war, the direct effect is morally acceptable, the
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intention is good, and the intended effect is good enough to compensate for
the secondary evil effect (Walzer 2000: 153).
There are problems with using the doctrine of double effect in this way. For
one thing, it can provide a blanket justification for any act in war that harms
civilians (Walzer 2000: 153). Also, when referring to starvation, the following
things need to be taken into account: distinction, intention, and proportion.

Distinction
Distinction demands that one sees combatants and non-combatants differ-
ently, and targets only the former. One can make the argument that because
starving armed forces is a justifiable tactic, then as long as starvation is aimed
at the armed forces primarily, some civilian casualties are acceptable. Some
duty to civilians can be taken into account by ensuring that the tactic is only
used when the objective is an essential one for the belligerent forces and
consideration is taken of the civilian population wherever possible.
In the case of starvation by siege and blockade, this argument is
complicated by the fact that the duty to civilians is shared by the besieged
forces as well as the belligerents. The besieged forces need to take care to
ensure that civilians are not caught up in the same area as the armed forces.
They also have responsibility for decisions about how the food is distributed.
For example, they could allocate higher rations to children and the sick,
rather than to soldiers, who are the normal priority in these circumstances
(Fotion and Elfstrom 1986: 201).
But the fact that any tactic of starvation is one that cannot be targeted
precisely at a military target and will affect civilians more than the armed
forces, means that an area where the military and civilians cannot be isolated
for this kind of blanket tactic should not be targeted. In cases such as this,
combatants and non-combatants are united at the target and therefore it is
impossible to make a meaningful distinction between the two (Zupan 2004:
113).

Intention
To a large extent the basis of the double effect argument is intention. If the
intention of the belligerent army is to harm civilians, its tactics are not valid.
However, if the intention is to target the military, but civilians get caught up
in it, they are more acceptable. A comparison can be made between starvation
tactics and shooting indiscriminately. In both cases the intention is to harm
combatants but without caring who gets hurt at the same time (Zupan 2004:
113). This is not acceptable. There is a duty to take account of civilians, not to
ignore them.
The situation is even more problematic when starvation tactics are targeted
at the civilian population. The aim here is usually not only to enfeeble the
armed forces, but to create such unrest among the civilian population that it
will lead to surrender. The mood of the civilian population is seen as a crucial
consideration in the strategy of war (Crane 2002: 219). But if the civilian
 112 C. Thomas
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population is targeted specifically through starvation, it contravenes even the

most basic assumption of non-combatant immunity.

Proportion
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was once asked whether the price
of half a million children dying from sanctions was worth it. She replied ‘I
think it is a very hard choice, but we think the price is worth it’ (quoted in
Wall 2000: 1092). The issue of proportion is an interesting one. It expects that
any act that is done is in proportion to the benefit gained. It would be hard to
accept, for example, the unintentional but foreseeable killing of 100 civilians
in order to save one soldier’s life. It would be easier to accept the
unintentional but foreseeable death of one civilian to save 100 soldiers. In
most cases the price paid by civilians is very high. It is necessary to show that
the expected benefit gained is in proportion to the price paid by the civilian
population. This will be very difficult with starvation tactics as their aims can
only be achieved slowly.
It is also difficult to maintain accountability when it comes to starvation
tactics. The casualties will tend to be hidden from view. Starvation is not as
dramatic as a bomb which kills a large number of people. However, the
statistics are equally bad, if not worse. For example, given that an estimated
one million people died in the Leningrad siege, it seems hard to say that the
tactic was proportional to any objective achieved.
So, the doctrine of double effect does not apply for starvation tactics. But
we still need to ask whether there is a case for using starvation when it is
militarily essential.

Military Necessity and Duty to Civilians

Military necessity is a powerful argument. But it can only be determined
accurately in hindsight. A high chance of success is important when using a
military necessity argument. Judgements about military necessity after the
event will tend to suffer from ‘victor’s judgement’.
Gordon (1999) argues that military necessity should not be allowed to
override the principle of discrimination. ‘If military necessity can legitimate
harm directly and intentionally done to civilians, then it is true that siege can
invoke this justification; but if so, then the principle of discrimination has
been lost altogether’ (Gordon 1999). She argues that if we lose the principle of
discrimination we also lose the argument that ethical constraints have a place
in war.
In the Geneva Conventions, some things are absolutely prohibited, and
others have military necessity get-out clauses. As pointed out earlier,
starvation of civilians is prohibited and there can be no military necessity
argument. But destroying the things necessary for human survival, including
food, can be allowed if militarily necessary (Sandvik-Nylund 1998: 25).
The problem is that if food is allowed into a besieged or blockaded area for
the civilians, it will usually get diverted to help the armed forces. In these
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situations helping civilians can result in a protracted war, and more civilians
being hurt in the long term. The tactic of starvation is never a quick one. It
involves waiting for a long time until the enemy gives up or dies of starvation.
The trouble with the humanitarian provision of aid in these circumstances is
that it makes a long-term tactic even longer. This problem points to the need
to carefully manage the aid that is provided, and the need for more research
into the uses and abuses of humanitarian provision during wartime (see for
example Väyrynen 1999; Barber 1997). But it does not negate the need to
distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and therefore does not
change the need to let food through to civilians on the other side.
The difficulty is to create the correct balance between military effectiveness
and the belligerent army’s duty to the civilian population. As previously
mentioned, with a starvation tactic the military necessity argument for not
allowing in food has some force, as the food is unlikely to be eaten by civilians
only. Historically, the normal approach in the case of siege is that the
commander of the besieging army is not responsible for the people who have
already lived in the city or who go there for protection, as he did not force them
there (Walzer 2000: 164
165). This means that the commander does not let
/

them leave either. A solution could be for the commander to have a duty to allow
citizens to leave the besieged area if they want to. Any who stay then yield their
right of protection as civilians. This solution depends on soldiers carrying out
their duty to help civilians to leave the scene of a battle. This will give the
commander of the besieging army a distinct handicap in his conduct of the siege,
but all restrictions placed on soldiers by the war convention bring certain
disadvantages (Walzer 2000: 168
170). The situation is obviously not the same
/

for starvation through blockades, where it is more difficult for civilians to leave.
As a food blockade cannot be aimed at the military target and away from
civilians, this argument would make blockade unacceptable (Walzer 2000: 174).
Any starvation tactic needs to prioritise its consideration for civilians. This
article has shown that starvation tactics almost always target civilians
directly, and civilians are always in the front line, and suffer consequences
as bad as from direct military attacks. This goes against the basic principles of
the Geneva Conventions. Therefore starvation tactics should be avoided in all
cases possible. Direct military attacks should be considered first. If as a last
resort starvation is seen as the only way to proceed, then it may be justifiable
if civilians are allowed to leave. But due consideration needs to be taken of
whether the other side will allow civilians to leave, and of the fact that the
tactic will be much diminished because the civilians will have left. The tactic
should only be used in a small area, because of the difficulty in isolating
civilians. Using starvation across a broad area is not a valid tactic as it is not
realistic or desirable to evacuate civilians in such circumstances.

Case Studies
Leningrad
During World War II, the Germans kept the city of Leningrad encircled for
27 months (Dupuy and Dupuy 1970: 1079, 1114). The Russians were slow in
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anticipating the German siege. As a result, the attempted evacuation of

women and children came too late - the way out of the city had already been
cut (Barber and Harrison 1991: 66). The whole city was employed during the
siege to build defences, produce armaments, and be ready to fight if necessary.
The authorities made an effort to ensure that no one was merely an onlooker
(Pavlov 1965: 6
8). It is unlikely that all these people had actually
/

volunteered (Barber and Harrison 1991: 74).

From September 1941 until December 1942, the Germans were mostly
successful in stopping food and other provisions from entering the city. Food
was strictly rationed in Leningrad, which had a population of 2,544,000,
including 400,000 children, at the beginning of the siege (Pavlov 1965: 48).
Soldiers received higher rations than civilians, with factory workers receiving
more than other workers or dependents. Estimated deaths from starvation or
starvation-related causes over the course of the whole siege range between
632,000 and one million people (Pavlov 1965: 125; Barber and Harrison 1991:
87). Civilians were forced to stay in the city as the German commander gave the
order to shoot anyone trying to leave (He was acquitted of having committed a
war crime at his Nuremberg trial after the war.) (Walzer 2000: 166).
One way to justify the German attempt to starve the city into submission
would be to show that everyone within the city at this time was directly
involved in the war effort by their own volition, and therefore any civilians
had given up their civilian status and their right of protection. Many of the
citizens had become involved in the war effort, but there were also many who
were not directly involved, for example children, the old and the frail.
According to the Geneva Conventions, this means that the population as a
whole needs to be treated as a civilian population. The German refusal to let
anybody leave Leningrad left civilians no choice but to join the campaign for
survival. Many civilians wanted to leave in September 1941, but were not able
to. When the ‘Ice Road’ was opened up in January 1942, many people did
leave willingly (Pavlov 1965: 48). The fact that civilians helped with the war
effort in Leningrad is not a good enough argument to show that it was a
legitimate target. Their situation was forced on them by the siege, and there
was no way out for them. The civilians had to cooperate with the Russian
authorities to survive.
It is clear that the German siege tactic did not discriminate between
military and civilian targets. In fact there is some evidence that the Germans
deliberately targeted the Russian authorities through the civilian population.
At the same time, the large number of deaths makes a military necessity
argument difficult. The Russians were not completely innocent either, as they
chose to use civilians to support their war effort. However, that did not negate
the duty of the Germans to discriminate between military and civilian targets.

UN Sanctions and the Blockading of Iraq during the Gulf War

Sanctions were the first measure applied after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990. They continued throughout the war and beyond. The
sanctions being referred to in this article are those imposed before and during
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the Allies’ military attacks. The aim is to look at the use of sanctions in the
context of war or the threat of war, not as a containment device after war.
Therefore, the article will not look at the debate about the use of sanctions
after the war. Although UN resolutions allowed food to enter Iraq for
humanitarian reasons, for the first year restrictions prevented Iraq from
raising funds, meaning that in effect the sanctions applied to food too
(Herring 2002: 40).
The use of sanctions is a long term tactic, but in this case the objectives
were short term - to influence the Iraqi people to oppose Saddam Hussein.
The international community’s intention was for the sanctions to work before
military force was necessary, and before actual starvation happened. However
some suffering of Iraqis was needed in order for the tactic to work at all. The
sanctions brought economic problems to Iraq, but not enough to force a
retreat from Kuwait (Freedman and Karsh 1993: 189
192). A Harvard
/

University team assessed that Iraq was headed for a ‘public health
catastrophe’ resulting in tens of thousands of deaths by the end of 1991
(quoted in Herring 2002: 40). The number of people, civilian and military,
that died in the direct military action was estimated at 40,000 (Gordon 1999).
It is difficult, therefore, to see the sanctions as more humane than direct
military attacks.1
The argument in defence of sanctions is that they are better than direct
military attacks. But although it can be argued that sanctions were intended
to bring only hardship, not death, to invoke the desired result, they were
coercive and could not distinguish fully between the civilian population and
the army. This is contrary to the principles of the Geneva Conventions, and
the result was not just hardship but starvation.
Not only did sanctions fail to distinguish between military and civilian
targets as regards food, but civilians were the intended target, being used to
influence Saddam Hussein. Although one could argue that the intention was
good, this good intention is not enough to override the fact that civilians were
being targeted directly in a tactic that would only work in the long term, and
once the civilians were suffering. Although direct attacks may be more visible
to the outside world, and bring overt suffering, at least they can be targeted
more directly at the military.
Sanctioning food is not a legitimate tactic as it cannot be targeted at the
military. It necessarily affects the whole population. It would also not be
acceptable to expect civilians to move out of the targeted area, as this would
create a massive refugee problem. This is not to say that all sanctions are
wrong. This article has only been concerned with those sanctions that affect
the ability of the civilian population to obtain food.

Bosnia
Food was a crucial factor in the civil war in Bosnia, further complicated by
the involvement of the international community, which became involved in
providing humanitarian relief. These aid convoys were often stopped and
delayed by both Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. It was a major tactic of the Serb
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army to prevent food from reaching Bosnian Muslims, partly because of their
war aim of ethnic cleansing. This immoral aim makes any tactic - starvation
or otherwise - immoral. It has been questioned whether the provision of food
actually extended the war and caused more suffering in the long run, rather
than helping the civilians (Michaels 1994: 23; O’balance 1995: 228). The
Bosnian Muslim forces and the UN did not want to facilitate the evacuation
of civilians from besieged areas - the Bosnians because their appeals for
foreign intervention relied on the beleaguered population, and the UN as it
would achieve the war aims of the Serbs, and create a severe refugee problem
(O’balance 1995: 69).
The intended targets of the starvation tactics in the Bosnian war were
civilians as well as combatants. The aim of ethnic cleansing meant that
distinction was not made between the civilian population and the armed
forces. Both populations suffered from lack of food together. The only
mitigating evidence is that both sides pursued the same policy. The argument
could be made that the civilians became legitimate military targets due to
their cooperation in the war effort, but the Geneva Conventions would not
allow this argument as they maintain that civilians only lose their civilian
status when they take direct part in hostilities. Many civilians were also not
allowed to leave the besieged area by their own government (O’balance 1995:
69). The other argument that could be used in this case is military necessity.
But, as argued above, this should not be an excuse for not discriminating
between civilian and military targets. It would appear that in the Bosnian war
discrimination was not made a priority.

Conclusion
This article set out at the beginning with the argument that the tactic of
starving civilians should not be allowed, and is not a more humane or more
justifiable method of war than direct military attacks. It has argued that
restrictions of food must be a very last resort, must not be targeted at
civilians, and should make provision for civilians in the area to move away.
The Geneva Conventions clearly disallow starvation of civilians as a tactic of
war, but contain some ambiguity because Parties must agree to let any relief
through.
Starvation tactics are different from direct military targeting. In direct
military operations, military targets are chosen. If civilians also get hurt it can
be acceptable if the intention was to damage the military target. In starvation
tactics, it is clear that civilians will be in the way, and in fact will be targeted
first, as the armed forces will always get access to food before the civilians. On
top of this, most starvation tactics are in fact aimed directly at the civilian
population. The intention is that a collapse of the ‘home front’ will result in
defeat for the army. The consequences of starvation tactics are hard to
control, but are always severe. They are more severe for the civilian
population than the armed forces. It is not at all clear that starvation causes
lesser effects than direct attacks. The numbers of dead in our examples were
all extremely high, and it is difficult in most cases to see that the military
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objectives achieved were worth such a high price. Starvation is a long, drawn
out tactic, that creates much suffering before its success, if any, can be seen.
There is a duty to civilians on both sides. This article has looked primarily
at the duty of the besieging or blockading forces to allow civilians to be
excluded from the effects of any starvation tactic. But there is also a duty on
the armed forces being besieged or blockaded to shelter the civilians from the
effects of starvation. This includes allowing them to leave if they wish, and
providing adequate rations for civilians, e.g., by giving priority to children
and the sick rather than to soldiers.
The argument that blockade is more humane than artillery, bullets or
bombs (Best 1980: 256) does not account for the fact that direct military
attacks should be able to keep civilian casualties lower through more efficient
targeting, and the deaths are more likely to be quick rather than the slow,
painful death of starvation. A report by the UK House of Commons Select
Committee on Development warned that unless economic sanctions can be
carefully targeted, they have the capacity to ‘kill more children than armed
warfare’ (quoted by Rai 2001: 24). This does not mean that all blockades or
sanctions are wrong, only those that restrict the passage of supplies essential
for human survival. However, the practicalities of pursuing a blockade while
allowing food through may make it difficult to pursue one justly and
effectively.
Some commentators argue for the use of starvation as a tactic by arguing
that the kindest way to fight a war is to finish it quickly. But this argument
does not work, as starvation tactics are long-term, slow tactics. They are not
going to achieve a quick victory, only help to win a long war. And they do
that only by causing much suffering for the civilian population. A food
embargo ‘will always bear more heavily on the innocent (women and children
in particular) than on government officials and the army’ (Hazelzet 1999: 90).
It is important that discrimination between civilians and combatants is
maintained. It is a clear basis on which the Geneva Conventions are built.
There has to be respect for the immunity of civilians from both sides. The
tactics of starvation cause greater harm to non-combatants than to
combatants. Starvation will always put civilians on the front line, whether
intentionally or not. Therefore the Geneva Convention needs to be more
generally accepted as prohibiting all forms of starvation tactic, and the
ambiguity in the Convention taken out in order to prohibit all practices that
disrupt or prevent the safe passage of humanitarian supplies. Unless civilians
can be excluded, starvation is not a just tactic of war.

Notes
1
The use of sanctions in Iraq after 1991 is a hotly debated question which is not within the scope of this
paper. For further information on that question, see Herring (2002) and Rai and Eden (2001).

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Biographies
Claire Thomas is a PhD candidate at the University of Hull. Her research
is centred on the use of violence in global politics.