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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-136
vs.
JUDGE McFARLAND
JEFFREY PASTOR,
GOVERNMENT’S SENTENCING
Defendant. MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 21, 2023, Defendant Jeffrey Pastor will stand before the Court for

sentencing having defrauded the public by participating in a bribery scheme. As a Cincinnati

City Councilmember, Pastor traveled to Miami, Florida with a cooperating witness and undercover

agents posing as “investors” in a development project in the City of Cincinnati. In Miami, Pastor

explained how he would advance their project in the city and solicited bribe payments in return for

his official action. Upon his return, Pastor received a $15,000 cash bribe.

But Pastor did not stop there. Driven by a desire to profit off his duties as an elected public

servant, Pastor continued to solicit bribes from undercover agents and businesspeople working on

behalf of the government—on multiple occasions, over an eight-month period. His corruption

was flagrant, aggressive, and relentless; and it was captured in recorded meetings and phone calls.

Pastor’s sentencing marks a grim reality of local corruption—the criminal convictions of

one-third of Cincinnati City Council. Based on his own conduct, the need to deter public

corruption, and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities, the United States requests a sentence of

24 months of imprisonment, the top of the parties’ agreed Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentencing range.

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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jeff Pastor began his corrupt scheme just months after taking his oath as a City of

Cincinnati Councilmember in January 2018. Pastor’s goal was clear—to use his position as an

elected public official and control over city business to enrich himself.

The grand jury charged Pastor in a ten-count indictment for his conduct spanning June

2018 to April 2019. Count 1 charged conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud; Counts 2

and 8 charged honest services wire fraud; Counts 3, 5, and 9 charged federal funds bribery; Counts

4, 6, and 10 charged attempted extortion under color of official right; Count 7 charged money

laundering. (Doc. 4 (Indictment).) The charges involved Pastor’s solicitation and receipt of

bribe payments from Cooperating Witness 1, who was pursuing a development project in the city

(“Project 1”); Cooperating Witness 2, who was attempting to purchase property from the City of

Cincinnati for potential development (“Project 2”); and undercover agents (“UCEs”) posing as

investors working with Cooperating Witnesses 1 and 2 on their projects. (PSR ¶¶ 37–38.)

Pastor has plead guilty to Count 2. 1

The statement of facts in his plea agreement outlines the conduct for which Pastor has plead

guilty. In September 2018, Pastor and his co-conspirator—his “middleman” in the scheme,

Tyran Marshall—travelled via private airplane to Miami, Florida intending to meet with investors

related to Project 1. (Doc. 52, PageID 173; PSR ¶¶ 39–41.) Pastor did not know that the

“investors” were undercover FBI agents, or that Cooperating Witness 1 was working at the

direction of the government. During a recorded meeting attended by undercover agents and

1
Per the plea agreement, the government will dismiss the remaining counts at the entry of final
judgment.

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Cooperating Witness 1, Pastor promised to provide favorable official action in the City of

Cincinnati for Project 1 and explained that he could receive money through a non-profit entity,

“Ummah Strength.” He would later explain that the purpose of the non-profit entity was to

“sanitize” the money. (Doc. 52, PageID 173.)

Immediately following the meeting, Pastor began reaching out to UCE-1 for money.

While in Miami, Pastor agreed to accept $15,000 in return for official action relating to Project 1

and Project 2. Then, after flying back to Cincinnati from Miami, Pastor called UCE-1 to

“negotiate a monthly retainer”—he wanted more than the $15,000 for which he had already

agreed. After discussing additional compensation, Pastor again agreed with UCE-1 that $15,000

would be the retainer fee for providing official action by Pastor to advance Projects 1 and 2 in the

city. He received $15,000 in cash from UCE-1 the following week. (Id.)

In addition to the $15,000 cash that Pastor received in October 2018, Pastor received

$40,000 in bribe payments during the relevant period, totaling $55,000. (PSR ¶ 61.) He

received $10,000 in cash in August 2018 during a private meeting with UCEs in a condo in

downtown Cincinnati. (Id. ¶ 40.) Then, following the $15,000 payment in October 2018,

Pastor continued to solicit additional payment from UCE-1 and others while offering to provide

official action relating to projects before the City of Cincinnati. (Doc. 52, PageID 173–74; PSR

¶¶ 41–61.) Specifically, Pastor began reaching out directly to Cooperating Witnesses 1 and

Cooperating Witness 2 for money to help advance their projects.

For example, on October 4, 2018, the same day Pastor received $15,000 from UCE-1 for

help advancing Project 1 and Project 2, Pastor instructed Cooperating Witness 1 to coordinate all

future discussions about Project 1 with Marshall. (PSR ¶ 43.) The next day, Marshall told

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Cooperating Witness 1 that Pastor wanted additional compensation and followed up with a text

message stating, “20k for the latter part of our discussion (10 apiece)”—that is, $20,000 for

Pastor’s help with Project 1, $10,000 for Pastor and $10,000 for Marshall. (PSR ¶¶ 43–44.)

Marshall clarified the corrupt solicitation on Pastor’s behalf during a recorded call 10 days later:

“Most definitely twenty. You know, take care, take care of what we need to take care of . . . a lot

of what you all doing is going through council and that is where Jeff comes in, and Jeff, Jeff,

definitely gonna hold you down.” (Id. ¶ 44.)

On October 9, 2018, Pastor and Marshall met with Cooperating Witness 2 about

progressing Project 2 in the City of Cincinnati. (Id. ¶ 45.) A week later, Marshall corruptly

solicited Cooperating Witness 2. During a recorded call, Marshall stated Pastor wanted to see

Project 2 succeed and asked for a $22,500 donation to fund Ummah Strength. Marshall noted

$2,250 would be used to file the 501(c)(3) paperwork and $20,000 would be used to “spearhead”

the entity. (Id.)

A week later, UCE-1 confronted Pastor about his demands for more money relating to

Project 1 and Project 2. Pastor acknowledged that Marshall contacted Cooperating Witness 2 and

requested payment for Pastor’s support of Project 2. (Id. ¶ 46.) UCE-1 told Pastor that any

payments would come from him, not Cooperating Witness 1 or Cooperating Witness 2. Pastor

then instructed UCE-1 to make additional payments directly to Marshall. Later that day, Pastor

reached out again to UCE-1 and asked, “why do they keep putting this all on you?”; a reference to

UCE-1 again paying Pastor for Projects 1 and 2. Pastor stated, “in my opinion and in Tyran’s

opinion, I thought it was incredibly unfair . . . you know, they live here in the City of Cincinnati

and you’re outside of the City of Cincinnati.” (Id.)

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Pursuant to the new corrupt agreement, Pastor accepted another $10,000 cash from UCE-

1 on October 24, 2018; and he accepted a $10,000 check from UCE-1 to Ummah Strength, LLC

on November 15, 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 46–49.)

But these additional payments also did not stop Pastor from continuing to solicit bribes.

In January 2019, Marshall reached out to UCE-1 on Pastor’s behalf—so as not to raise any “red

flags”—seeking “base salaries” for Pastor’s and Marshall’s work “in and out of the city” and “seed

money” for Ummah Development once Project 1 broke ground. (Id. ¶¶ 50–54.) During a

meeting on January 30, 2019, Pastor told UCE-1 he wanted a $115,000 salary to help on city

projects. Pastor also mentioned all the work he was doing for Cooperating Witness 2 and UCE-

1 in the city. This solicitation was rejected. (Id. ¶ 58.)

At the same time, Pastor and Marshall were soliciting additional money from Cooperating

Witness 2, to include $200,000 in salaries ($115,000 for Pastor, $85,000 for Marshall) and “points

on the deal,” stating there is “a lot of money to be made” on Project 2. Pastor explained that he

“thanks God for the little twenty”—the $20,000 UCE-1 paid to Pastor in October and November

2018—but $200,000 is “the median income to do the things he’s doing”—i.e., helping Cooperating

Witness 2 with Project 2 in the city. (Id. ¶¶ 55–57.) These solicitations were also rejected.

Frustrated but undeterred, Pastor continued to solicit Cooperating Witness 2 directly for

additional payment to advance Project 2. (Id. ¶ 59.) During a meeting on February 6, 2018,

Pastor stated, “I would like to be compensated for my time” for his work in the city advancing

Project 2. Pastor noted he was pressuring City officials to support the project. He then

demanded an additional $25,000 from Cooperating Witness 2 to “keep him engaged” because the

money he previously received from UCE-1 “doesn’t dignify the work that I am doing.” Pastor

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clarified that he wanted additional payment for the work he had already done to advance Project 2

in the city, and to be compensated for work on the “back end”—to include $10,000 cash now and

the remaining $15,000 later, along with percentage on the deal after favorable city action relating

to Project 2. (Id.) As a result of this corrupt solicitation, Pastor received another $10,000 cash

to advance Project 2. (Id. ¶ 60.)

But his corrupt solicitations continued. Over the next month, Pastor requested additional

payments from Cooperating Witness 2 on four separate occasions for his continued help advancing

Project 2 in the city. (Id.) Ultimately, Pastor characterized the remaining money he wanted as

follows: “I thought, what was extremely reasonable was like okay, what I thought I heard you

say, hey, here’s $7,500 you get this done, boom and then at the end we’ll give you another $7,500,

like, I like shit like that.” (Id.) Pastor also wanted a percentage of the “overall deal.”

III. THE SENTENCING GUIDELINE RANGE AND PRESENTENCE REPORT

In the plea agreement, the parties calculated the guidelines for Count 2 as follows:

• Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(a)(1), the base offense level is 14 because the Defendant was

a public official at the time of the offense.

• Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2), 2 levels are added.

• Pursuant to Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(3), 4 levels are added because the Defendant

was an elected official at the time of the offense.

• The USAO does not oppose a 2 level reduction in offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 3E1.1 based upon the Defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, provided that the

Defendant’s conduct continues to demonstrate compliance with the terms of § 3E1.1. The

Defendant may be entitled to an additional 1 level decrease pursuant to § 3E1.1(b) in

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recognition of the Defendant’s timely notification of his intention to plead guilty.

(Doc. 52 ¶ 8.) Further, the government agrees that a 2-level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G.

amendment § 4C1.1 is applicable, resulting in total offense level 15. 2 Pastor is Criminal History

Category I. Pursuant to this calculation, his guideline range is 18 to 24 months imprisonment.

In the parties’ Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the applicable sentencing range is capped at 24

months of imprisonment. (Id.)

As set forth in the PSR, Probation’s calculation yields a total offense level 21 (PSR ¶ 80)

and a guideline range of 37 to 46 months (id. ¶ 118). Probation assessed the full scope of Pastor’s

criminal activities in calculating its guideline range. The parties’ Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement,

however, calculates the guidelines based on the $15,000 bribe payment Pastor received on October

4, 2018. The government asserts that the Court should accept the plea agreement and sentence

Pastor pursuant to the offense levels set forth in the plea agreement.

But the Court still must consider all relevant facts to determine the appropriate sentence

within the parties’ agreed range. Here, the PSR details “information relevant to the factors under

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),” including facts relevant to “the appropriate sentence within the applicable

sentencing range,” “the defendant’s history and characteristics,” and “the defendant’s behavior

that may be helpful in imposing sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d)(1)–(2). There are no

objections to the PSR. (PSR at PageID 246.) The Court, therefore, must consider the facts

documented in the PSR at sentencing, including the conduct detailed in paragraphs 34 through 61. 3

2
The parties did not anticipate this offense level adjustment at the time of the Rule 11(c)(1)(C)
plea. However, the parties intend to amend the plea agreement at sentencing by agreement of the
parties to include this offense level adjustment for the benefit of the defendant.
3
To the extent the Court believes reviewing the transcripts or listening to the recordings of the

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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 385 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“So long

as the defendant receives a sentence at or below the statutory ceiling . . . the district court does

not abridge the defendant’s right[s] . . . by looking to other facts, including acquitted conduct,

when selecting a sentence within that statutory range”); United States v. Williams, 214 F. App’x

552, 555 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting it is “well-settled that relevant unconvicted conduct, even

acquitted conduct, may be considered in determining a defendant’s sentence”).

IV. APPLICATION OF THE 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) FACTORS

Application of the § 3553(a) factors support a 24-month sentence of imprisonment.

A. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense; Seriousness of the Offense; History and
Characteristics of the Defendant

Elected officials owe a duty to provide honest services to constituents, and officials violate

that duty by soliciting and accepting bribe payments. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 368

(2010). “This country[’s] . . . proper functioning requires elected officials to serve the common

good, not illicit personal gain. Our citizens place faith in the honesty and integrity of elected

officials.” United States v. Morgan, 635 F. App’x 423, 450 (10th Cir. 2015). As one court

explained, corruption by a public official:

demean[s] the integrity and work ethic of the many public servants
in his community who strive each day to improve life and
governance . . . . And [the corrupt official] has damaged the political
morale of his constituency . . . and of all Americans. The deviant
acts of the corrupt public official are of course horrific, “but a
hundred times worse is the demoralization of our people which
results.”

interactions documented in the PSR would assist the Court, the government can provide those to
the Court prior to sentencing in a supplemental submission.

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United States v. Sorenson, 233 F. Supp. 3d 690, 700 (S.D. Iowa), aff'd, 705 F. App’x 481 (8th Cir.

2017) (quoting Justice Louis Brandeis, Speech to the Good Government Association (1903))

(emphasis added).

More pointedly, President Theodore Roosevelt explained to Congress in 1903 the effect of

corruption on society: “There can be no crime more serious than bribery. Other offenses violate

one law while corruption strikes at the foundation of all law.” Theodore Roosevelt, Third Annual

Message to the Senate and House of Representatives (Dec. 7, 1903) (emphasis added).

Roosevelt’s words remain all too relevant today. See, e.g., Sorenson, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 703

(“There’s so much money sloshing around government right now that it’s very difficult to have

confidence that any decision is being made on the merits. That doubt about whether our public

servants are operating in our interests or whether their vote is available for purchase to the highest

bidder is magnified every time we see another politician exposed as corrupt.”) (quoting United

States v. Silver, No. 1:15–cr–00093, Dkt. No. 300 at 58 (S.D.N.Y.)).

Here, the brazenness of Pastor’s corruption is jarring. He used his control over city

business to extract thousands of dollars in illicit payments. Pastor took a secret, all-expense-paid

trip to Miami knowing the purpose of the trip was to corruptly discuss official action relating to

projects before the city. Then, despite receiving $25,000 from UCE-1 to advance projects in the

city, he wanted more. Days after receiving $15,000 from UCE-1 in October 2018, Pastor

attempted to separately solicit Cooperating Witness 1 and Cooperating Witness 2 to advance the

same projects for which he had already received bribe payments from UCE-1. Pastor even

remarked to UCE-1 that it “was incredibly unfair” that UCE-1 had to make additional payments

because Cooperating Witness 1 and Cooperating Witness 2 “live here in the City of Cincinnati and

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you’re outside of the City of Cincinnati.” (Id.) In other words, in Pastor’s mind, fairness dictated

that he be allowed to shake down the local businessmen because of their close ties to the city.

Pastor and his middleman characterized the corrupt payments solicited and received in

various ways—a “retainer,” “base salaries,” “seed money,” “points on the deal,” “the little twenty,”

the “median income” for his work, “compensate[ion] for my time,” money to “keep him engaged,”

and a percentage of “the overall deal.” Each was an attempt by Pastor to corrupt his duty as a

public official. He was driven by his desire to use his office for selfish purposes, to enrich himself

under the guise of service. The more he received, the more he wanted. And when rebuffed, the

more emboldened he became. In the beginning of the scheme, Pastor attempted to use a non-

profit to “sanitize” the money and a middleman to not raise any “red flags.” But, by the end,

Pastor’s conduct was straightforward and flagrant: as Pastor explained, he wanted to be

“compensated for my time” advancing city business, both for the “work that I am doing” and on

the “back end.”

Pastor corrupted the city’s business and violated the oath he swore to the people of

Cincinnati. This type of corruption damages democratic governance, as courts have recognized.

Government corruption breeds cynicism and mistrust of elected officials.

It causes the public to disengage from the democratic process because . . .
the public begins to think of politics as ‘only for the insiders.’ Thus
corruption has the potential to shred the delicate fabricate of democracy
by making the average citizen lose respect and trust in elected officials and
give up any hope of participating in government through legitimate
channels.

United States v. Ganim, 3:01cr263 (JBA), 2006 WL 1210984, at *5 (D. Conn. May 5, 2006) (order

denying resentencing of former mayor of Bridgeport) (internal citation omitted). This is

precisely what Pastor did here—he has reinforced the all-too-pervasive idea that elected public

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officials are bought and paid for, serving the needs of their private benefactors rather than the

citizens they have sworn to serve. In this way, his conduct “strikes a blow against every principle

on which a democracy is founded.” United States v. Kruger, No. 1:11-CR-300, Doc. 264-2, p.

46-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (court remarks in sentencing transcript related to state senator).

Sentencing courts properly consider these effects on democratic governance in determining

an appropriate sentence in corruption cases. See United States v. Fattah, 813 F. App’x 808, 813–

14 (3d Cir. 2020) (district court properly supported sentence in finding defendant’s “flagrant

conduct undermines the confidence of the citizenry in the integrity of all public institutions and

public officials. This cynicism saps the strength of [ ] our democracy.”); Sorenson, 705 F. App’x

at 483 (affirming district court consideration of “los[t] confidence in the integrity of its system of

government” when an official “abuses his position by using it to facilitate the offense”); Morgan,

635 F. App’x at 448–52 (noting the proper consideration at sentencing for bribery offenses of the

“harm to the reputation of honest public servants and the public faith in legitimate state

government”); United States v. White, 663 F.3d 1207, 1217–18 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming district

court’s application of § 3553(a) factors where district court explained, “when someone’s elected

to a position of trust as an elected official, . . . they just don't have a right to have a bag that they

can carry around stuff they get from people that are involved with them in this process.”); United

States v. Ganim, 256 F. App’x 399, 402–03 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding sentence reasonable because

the “elected municipal official . . . criminally and shamelessly flouts his lawful authority and the

public trust”).

These factors support a 24-month sentence.

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B. Need to Deter Criminal Conduct

As the above makes clear, corruption crimes are serious offenses that threaten democratic

governance. For this reason, courts have found general deterrence to be a particularly important

factor in sentencing corruption cases. See United States v. Watkins, 691 F.3d 841, 853 (6th Cir.

2012); Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 966–67; Sorenson, 705 F. App’x at 483. “[T]he need for a

general deterrence is a priority, and a significant sentence would likely deter those in high places

. . . from abusing the public trust.” Fattah, 813 F. App’x at 813–14 (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted); Morgan, 635 F. App’x at 450 (“Deterrence is a crucial factor in sentencing

decisions for economic and public corruption crimes”) (citing Senate Report); see also United

States v. Peppel, 707 F.3d 627, 637 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Because economic and fraud-based crimes

are more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, these crimes

are prime candidates for general deterrence.”) (quoting United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227,

1240 (11th Cir. 2006)). “‘[O]ne of the primary objectives’ of sentencing elected officials

convicted of bribery is ‘to send a message to other public officials that bribery is a serious crime

that carries with it a correspondingly serious punishment.’” Morgan, 635 F. App’x at 450–51

(quoting United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2013)); Sorenson, 233 F. Supp.

3d at 699 (“It must be made plain to the public at large that behavior such as that exhibited by

Defendant is categorically unacceptable and will not be tolerated by a self-respecting and

functional democratic government.”).

This is particularly true in Cincinnati. Two other city councilmembers have been found

guilty of bribery offenses in the last three years, representing, with the defendant, a full third of

Cincinnati City Council. In addition, the recent state-level corruption in Ohio is well documented.

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The Court should consider the need to deter similar behavior by local public officials in

determining its sentence in this case. See Watkins, 691 F.3d at 853 (“Regarding general

deterrence, the court additionally explained that the widespread corruption problem facing the

county and surrounding areas called for a harsher sentence.”); Anderson, 517 F.3d 953, 966

(affirming district court’s reference “to a number of recent public corruption scandals” as an

appropriate sentencing consideration given the need for general deterrence); United States v.

Krause, No. 1:10CR235, 2011 WL 2637184, at *4 (N.D. Ohio July 6, 2011), aff’d, 513 F. App’x

482 (6th Cir. 2013) (sentence appropriate “given the rampant corruption scandal that still plagues

Cuyahoga County”).

C. Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities

The last factor the Court must consider when fashioning a sentence is “the need to avoid

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found

guilty of similar conduct[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). This need is particularly acute for public

officials convicted of violating the public trust. In such cases, the “entire public suffers as a

result” of the official’s misconduct, and they “ought not be requested to tolerate a sentence amount

grossly at odds with the sentencing guidelines and amounting to little more than a slap on the

wrist.” Morgan, 635 F. App’x at 448–52 (rejecting five-year probationary sentence for a state

senator as “grossly inappropriate” and substantively unreasonable).

The district court in United States v. Sorenson eloquently explicated these principles while

rejecting the prosecution and defense’s joint request to sentence a public official to a term of

probation. 233 F. Supp. 3d 690 (S.D. Iowa 2017). In the court’s view, the parties’ proposed

probationary sentence “would in no way reflect the seriousness of the Defendant’s offenses” and

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“[i]t would simultaneously erode, if only by an increment, America’s foundational, utter rejection

of tolerance for corrupt governance.” Id. at 699 (internal quotation marks omitted). “When it

comes to political corruption, the community—historically and presently—requires that real,

tangible, and severe consequences meet those who gain a position of public trust and then abuse

that trust for personal gain.” Id. The district court ultimately sentenced the state senator to 15

months’ incarceration, which was the bottom end of the Guidelines after granting the

Government’s request for a departure based on substantial assistance. Id. at 704-05.

As the Sorenson court recognized, sentencing a defendant within the range recommended

by the Guidelines addresses the concern of unwarranted disparities. See Gall v, 552 U.S. at 54

(noting that “avoidance of unwarranted disparities was clearly considered by the Sentencing

Commission when setting the Guidelines ranges”); United States v. Sanchez, 989 F.3d 523, 541

(7th Cir. 2021) (“A sentence within a Guideline range necessarily complies with § 3553(a)(6).”

(alteration and quotation marks omitted)). Multiple circuits, including our own, have affirmed

Guidelines sentences for public officials convicted of bribery. In United States v. Jones, the Sixth

Circuit affirmed a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment for a state driver’s licensing clerk who

received approximately $20,000 in bribes, which was a within-Guidelines sentence. 260 F.

App’x 873, 876, 879 (6th Cir. 2008). In United States v. Arroyo, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a

sentence of 57 months’ imprisonment for a state representative who received approximately

$32,500 in bribes, which was the top of the Guidelines range after a plea. 75 F.4th 705, 708–09

(7th Cir. 2023). In United States v. Salesman, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a sentence of 51

months’ imprisonment for a city commissioner who received approximately $3,340 in bribes,

which was a within-Guidelines sentence. 467 F. App’x 835, 849–50 (11th Cir. 2012). In United

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States v. Abate, the Third Circuit affirmed a sentence of 51 months’ imprisonment for a utilities

director who received kickbacks, which was a within-Guidelines sentence. 302 F. App’x 99, 104

(3rd Cir. 2008). Sentencing the defendant at the top of the parties’ agreed Guidelines range as

set forth in the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement will avoid unwarranted disparities between

similarly situated defendants.

Notably, this § 3553(a) factor “concerns national disparities between defendants with

similar criminal histories convicted of similar criminal conduct.” United States v. Conatser, 514

F.3d 508, 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). “So the question is not necessarily whether

a particular defendant received a sentence that was different from the sentences of his co-

defendants.’” United States v. Wright, 991 F.3d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Nevertheless, to the extent the Court considers the sentences in bribery cases of other

Cincinnati councilmembers, those cases are distinguishable. Former Cincinnati Councilmember

Tamaya Dennard received 18 months’ imprisonment for receiving a bribe after a plea entered three

months after indictment, which was a significant benefit to the public, the court, and the judicial

system. See United States v. Dennard, 1:20-cr-00042, Doc. 43 (S.D. Ohio). Her conduct

involved a single $15,000 payment and did not include the type of relevant conduct at issue here.

Another Councilmember, P.G. Sittenfeld, received a 16-month sentence after a jury trial. See

United States v. Sittenfeld, 1:20-cr-00142, Doc. 300 (S.D. Ohio). He was convicted of receiving

a $20,000 contribution to a PAC he controlled. The government sought a guideline sentence,

which was 33–41 months, and asserts the below-guideline sentence was inconsistent with the facts.

With that said, although Pastor is receiving a significant benefit for his acceptance of responsibility

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through the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, Pastor’s overall offense conduct and characteristics

were more egregious than both Dennard’s conduct and Sittenfeld’s conduct.

V. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, a sentence of 24 months of imprisonment is appropriate.

KENNETH L. PARKER
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

/s/ Matthew C. Singer

Emily N. Glatfelter (0075576)
Matthew C. Singer (IL 6297632)
Assistant United States Attorneys
221 East Fourth Street, Suite 400
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202
Office: (513) 684-3711
Fax: (513) 684-6385
E-mail: Emily.Glatfelter@usdoj.gov
E-mail: Matthew.Singer@usdoj.gov

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 Case: 1:20-cr-00136-MWM Doc #: 68 Filed: 12/14/23 Page: 17 of 17 PAGEID #: 280

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that the foregoing was filed with the Court’s CM/ECF System this 14th

day of December 2023, which provides electronic notice to all parties.

/s/ Matthew C. Singer

MATTHEW C. SINGER (IL 6297632)
Assistant United States Attorney

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